Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge: Reconciling Economic Regionalism and Solidarity 3031315421, 9783031315428

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FEDERALISM AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS SERIES EDITORS: SOEREN KEIL · EVA MARIA BELSER

Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge Reconciling Economic Regionalism and Solidarity Erika Arban

Federalism and Internal Conflicts

Series Editors Soeren Keil, Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland Eva Maria Belser, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Switzerland

This series engages in the discussions on federalism as a tool of internal conflict resolution. Building on a growing body of literature on the use of federalism and territorial autonomy to solve ethnic, cultural, linguistic and identity conflicts, both in the West and in non-Western countries, this global series assesses to what extent different forms of federalism and territorial autonomy are being used as tools of conflict resolution and how successful these approaches are. We welcome proposals on theoretical debates, single case studies and short comparative pieces covering topics such as: • Federalism and peace-making in contemporary intra-state conflicts • The link between federalism and democratization in countries facing intra-state conflict • Secessionism, separatism, self-determination and power-sharing • Inter-group violence and the potential of federalism to transform conflicts • Successes and failures of federalism and other forms of territorial autonomy in post-conflict countries • Federalism, decentralisation and resource conflicts • Peace treaties, interim constitutions and permanent power sharing arrangements • The role of international actors in the promotion of federalism (and other forms of territorial autonomy) as tools of internal conflict resolution • Federalism and state-building • Federalism, democracy and minority protection For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for consideration, please get in touch with Ambra Finotello ambra.finotello@ palgrave.com, or series editors Soeren Keil [email protected] and Eva Maria Belser [email protected].

Erika Arban

Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge Reconciling Economic Regionalism and Solidarity

Erika Arban Melbourne Law School University of Melbourne Carlton, VIC, Australia

ISSN 2946-5370 ISSN 2946-5389 (electronic) Federalism and Internal Conflicts ISBN 978-3-031-31542-8 ISBN 978-3-031-31543-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31543-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Westend61/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my parents

About This Book

The book retraces the long trajectory of debates on federalism and regionalism as occurred in Italy starting from the years of unification in the nineteenth century, and the constitutional solutions adopted or discussed to accommodate the many asymmetries that characterise the country, particularly the North/South divide. The Italian regional model that emerged with the 1948 constitution, later strengthened with the 2001 reform, was a sort of compromise between centripetal and centrifugal forces, but it displays features that have the potential to stimulate interesting comparative discussions. Although the future of Italian regionalism remains unclear, the Italian regional model combines lessons coming from different theoretical experiences, including federalism, sub-state nationalism, and the European unification process: it is thus an innovative experiment crafted by those who were looking for a compromise between unitary and federal schemes. The book sits comfortably within the broader debate on multi-level governance and on the complex relations among the different layers of a composite polity. As classic federal systems continue to search for solutions to seemingly intractable problems, the book embraces the view that the search for such solutions could extend beyond the pure federation into quasi-federal polities like regional systems, in which similar issues arise. The originality of the work rests on the fact that it studies the Italian case—very little known outside domestic borders but unique in

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its own features—to sharpen focus on issues of (economic) regionalism, a theme that until now has found little space in constitutional law scholarship. A theorisation of economic regionalism from the point of view of constitutional law is relevant because it offers the opportunity to reflect on the reconciliation between diversity and social cohesion and thus create a more constructive environment for individuals and the collectivity. The book also addresses the interconnectedness between economic regionalism, solidarity, subsidiarity, and sub-state nationalism, which also represents an original point. By looking at the Italian case study, the book addresses two main questions: (i) how to define, from the point of view of constitutional law, (economic) regionalism; and (ii) how to reconcile federalism and economic regionalism with concepts like solidarity, subsidiarity, asymmetry, and sub-state national theory. Two points need to be clarified. First, the book insists a lot on the North/South socio-economic divide, but Italy is undoubtedly characterised by numerous de facto asymmetries that contribute to paint a much more complex canvass, and considering only the North/South divide would tell only part of the story. However, the attention given mainly to such divide can be explained by the focus of the book on economic regionalism. Second, in retracing the intellectual history of federal ideas in Italy, consideration is given particularly to thinkers like Cattaneo and Salvemini. This does not mean that they were the only thinkers in the federal scene (although federal thinkers have for a very long time being in the minority), but certainly their influence has been notable. The theoretical framework in which the book is situated combines three main strands of scholarship which are closely linked to one another: federalism theory, theories of (economic) regionalism, and sub-state nationalism. In terms of methodology, it combines theoretical, analytical, and normative approaches, coupled with some comparative overviews. The book is structured in six chapters. Chapter 1 sketches the theoretical framework as the foundation for the analysis that follows: it does so by distilling existing literature on federalism, regionalism, and sub-state national theory. The chapter presents federalism as an umbrella term that includes different experiences: in fact, while the federation emerged in the US has inspired most federal models that have come into existence until the 1950s (thus creating the quintessential classic or fully-fledged federation), more recently we have witnessed a certain creativity in adapting the federal elements to specific situations. Regional states are examples of how

ABOUT THIS BOOK

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federal features have been adjusted to forge specific models, construed as variants of the more traditional federal paradigm. The chapter also maps those elements that characterise a regional system, and how it differentiates from a pure federation. Finally, the discussion on federal theory is often linked to sub-state nationalism: in fact, federal-inspired schemes tend to accommodate the various needs of nations within multinational states and federations: an overview of the main traits of sub-state national theory is offered in the chapter. The Italian case is interesting because these three theoretical strands are all conflated. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the past, present, and future of Italian regionalism, as they concentrate on Italy by exposing the interconnectedness of the various theoretical perspectives illustrated in Chapter 1 in creating the current regional model, which thus borrows from all these theories. Specifically, Chapter 2 delves into the debate on federalism in Italy before and after unification and shows how federal ideas have played an indirect role in forging the unitary state emerged in 1861, although federalism was repudiated by the fathers of the Kingdom of Italy. While many theorists contributed to the debate on the virtues and vices of a federal solution for Italy, attention will be given especially to the intellectual contributions coming from Cattaneo and Salvemini. Chapter 3 discusses how federal ideas have powerfully re-emerged in the early 1990s in the political agenda of the Northern League, something that led to the constitutional reform of the regional model of 2001; the chapter also speculates on the present and future of Italian regionalism, emphasising some of the shortcomings of the current constitutional scheme and the debate on regionalism at political level. The remaining chapters detail some of the most interesting lessons coming from Italian regionalism that might have a broader comparative reach. More specifically, Chapter 4 looks at the unique experience with regionalism in Italy to theorise and describe economic regionalism, particularly by looking at the specific socio-economic and political fractures that create internal tensions. In doing so, the chapter also explores the principle of subsidiarity and asymmetry as potential constitutional law solutions to economic regionalism. Chapter 5 opens up a discussion on solidarity in the context of federalism and economic regionalism, and broadly explores the issue of how it is possible to reconcile economic regionalism with principles such as fairness, equality, and solidarity. By delving into the difference between horizontal and vertical solidarity, the

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chapter concludes in the sense that federalism and solidarity are compatible ideas because they serve different purposes: federalism reconciles unity and diversity, while solidarity fortifies the family-like relationship among various federal subjects. Finally, Chapter 6 brings together federalism, economic regionalism, sub-state national theory, and solidarity, focusing on the importance to acknowledge, for prudential and principled reasons, asymmetrical socio-economic interests. A range of solutions are also proposed to mediate between competing interests.

Contents

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Federalism, Regionalism, Sub-state Nationalism: Some Theoretical Insights 1.1 Federalism 1.1.1 Etymology and Historical Precedents 1.1.2 Federalism in Modern Times: Bullinger, Althusius, and the Enlightenment 1.1.3 The Emergence of Federalism in North America 1.1.4 Federalism in Europe 1.1.5 Federalism in Contemporary Times 1.1.6 Common Elements of Federations 1.1.7 Asymmetrical and Multinational Federations 1.1.8 Conclusion: Federalism as a Dynamic Concept 1.2 Regionalism and the Regional State 1.2.1 Theories of Regionalism 1.2.2 The Regional State and Its Identifying Elements 1.3 Sub-state Nationalism 1.3.1 Nations and Nationalism 1.3.2 Plurinational States and Federations 1.3.3 Challenges to the Nation State and Forms of Constitutional Accommodation 1.3.4 Other Forms of Accommodation References

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Italian Regionalism: From Risorgimento to the 2001 Constitutional Reform 2.1 The Pre-unitary Period 2.1.1 Federalism in the Nineteenth Century 2.1.2 Carlo Cattaneo and His Idea of Federalism 2.2 The 1861 Unification and the Formation of the Italian State 2.2.1 The Unification Process: Administrative Unification 2.2.2 The Statuto Albertino 2.2.3 The Debate Over the Creation of Regions 2.2.4 The Aftermath of Italian Unification 2.2.5 Gaetano Salvemini and the “Southern Question” 2.2.6 Catholic Church and Local Self-Government 2.2.7 The First Post-war Period 2.2.8 The Post-fascism Period 2.3 The 1948 Constitution and the Regional State 2.3.1 The Constituent Assembly 2.3.2 The 1948 Constitution: The Regional State 2.3.3 Special and Ordinary Regions 2.3.4 The Implementation of the Regional Model in the 1970s References Italian Regionalism: The 2001 Constitutional Reform and Beyond 3.1 The Path to the 2001 Constitutional Reform: The Resurgence of Federal Ideas 3.1.1 The Bicameral Committee 3.1.2 The Restructuring of Public Administration 3.1.3 Other Pre-2001 Reforms 3.1.4 Provisions on the Functioning of Regions 3.2 The 2001 Constitutional Reform (Articles 114–120 and 127) 3.2.1 The Component Units of Italian Regionalism (Article 114 Const.) 3.2.2 The Abrogation of Article 115 Const. 3.2.3 Differential Regionalism (Article 116 Const.)

35 36 37 38 44 44 45 45 46 47 51 51 52 53 53 55 57 59 60 65 66 68 69 70 70 74 75 76 77

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The Division of Legislative Powers (Article 117 Const.) 3.2.5 The Principle of Subsidiarity (Article 118 Const.) 3.2.6 Fiscal Federalism (Article 119 Const.) 3.2.7 Substitution Powers (Article 120 Const.) 3.2.8 The So-Called Federalist Principle (Article 127 Const.) 3.3 The Post-2001 Constitutional Reforms of Title V 3.3.1 The (Failed) Constitutional Reform of 2006 3.3.2 The 2012 Reform (Constitutional Law 1/2012) 3.3.3 The (Failed) Constitutional Reform of 2016 3.3.4 The Reform of the Number of MPs of 2020 3.3.5 The 2022 Reform 3.4 Italian Regions and the European Union 3.5 Future Trends of Italian Regionalism References

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Theorising Economic Regionalism, Asymmetry, and Subsidiarity 4.1 Economic Regionalism and the Italian Case Study 4.1.1 Defining Economic Regionalism 4.1.2 Lega Nord, Economic Regionalism, Sub-state Nationalism 4.2 Economic Regionalism and Asymmetry 4.2.1 Asymmetry in General 4.2.2 Features of Constitutional Asymmetry 4.2.3 Constitutional Asymmetries in Italy 4.2.4 Asymmetry and Economic Differences 4.3 Subsidiarity 4.3.1 A Brief Intellectual History of Subsidiarity 4.3.2 Subsidiarity in Italy 4.3.3 Vertical Subsidiarity 4.3.4 Horizontal Subsidiarity 4.3.5 Subsidiarity in the Interpretation of the Constitutional Court 4.3.6 Subsidiarity Beyond Federalism 4.4 Conclusion References

77 80 80 81 82 83 83 84 85 86 87 87 89 95 101 102 103 107 113 113 115 117 119 120 121 123 123 124 125 127 129 129

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Reconciling (Economic) Regionalism and Solidarity 5.1 Solidarity in General 5.1.1 Constitutional and Federal Solidarity: A Comparative Overview 5.1.2 The Three Meanings of (Federal) Solidarity 5.2 Solidarity in Italy 5.2.1 Federalism and Solidarity as Antithetical Concepts 5.2.2 Solidarity in the Italian Constitution and Constitutional Case Law 5.3 Reconciling Federalism and Solidarity 5.3.1 Horizontal and Vertical Solidarity 5.3.2 The Alleged Clash Between Federalism and Solidarity 5.4 Conclusion References Conclusion: Reconciling Federalism, (Economic) Regionalism, and Solidarity 6.1 Acknowledging Economic Regionalism and Economic Differences 6.1.1 Reasons of Principle 6.1.2 Reasons of Prudence and the Reconciliation of Diversity and Social Cohesion 6.1.3 Unlock the Willingness to Show Solidarity 6.2 The Morality of Autonomist Claims in Economic Regionalism 6.3 Suggesting Strategies to Explain Asymmetrical Interests 6.3.1 Asymmetrical Solutions 6.4 Conclusion References

Index

135 137 141 148 151 151 153 157 157 158 161 162 165 167 168 169 173 173 175 177 184 186 189

About the Author

Erika Arban is Senior Research Associate with the Laureate Program in Comparative Constitutional Law “Balancing diversity and social cohesion in democratic societies” at Melbourne Law School. She holds a PhD from the University of Ottawa, where her thesis was awarded the Governor General Gold Medal for the best doctoral thesis in the Humanities. She also held teaching positions at the University of Ottawa, the University of Antwerp, and the University of Milan Statale. Erika researches primarily in comparative constitutional law and theory, with a focus on federalism and legal methodology. She is particularly interested in cities as constitutional units, constitutional law and socio-economic divides, and languages in comparative constitutional law. Erika is one of the co-editors of Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism (Routledge 2021), and the sole editor of Cities in Federal Constitutional Theory (OUP 2022). She is the co-convenor of the IACL research group New Frontiers of Federalism and comments editor of Comparative Constitutional Studies. Her work has been published in journals such as The Modern Law Review, The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, and ICON.

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CHAPTER 1

Federalism, Regionalism, Sub-state Nationalism: Some Theoretical Insights

One key aim of this book is to sketch the trajectory of Italian regionalism from the unification of Italy in the early 1860s until the most recent constitutional developments in the 2000s, and situate it in comparative perspective. A crucial trait of this path of progressive decentralisation has been the accommodation of the profound socio-economic differences between the North and the South of the country. And while the present state of Italian regionalism remains ambiguous, the regional model in place distils lessons coming from different theoretical experiences, including federalism, regionalism, sub-state nationalism, and the European unification process, and can be seen as a compromise between unitary and federal aspirations (Arban 2021b). In this chapter, I briefly revisit theories of federalism, regionalism, and sub-state nationalism as they have all played an important role in shaping the Italian regional model.

1.1 1.1.1

Federalism

Etymology and Historical Precedents

The intellectual history of federalism has been retraced in detail many times. Here, I do not aspire to add anything new to the discussion, but simply to recollect the main milestones of this long-standing historical © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Arban, Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31543-5_1

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trajectory, as this will help situate the Italian experience in the broader context. The term federalism has a double etymological root, originating in the Latin words foedus and fides . Foedus means covenant, contract or agreement, while fides means trust or faith (Burgess 2000). Therefore, the etymological understanding of federalism can be summarised as being a pact premised on reciprocal recognition and respect (Burgess 2000). In practice, however, defining federalism is much more controversial, and little agreement exists among scholars on how to construe it in a universally accepted fashion, especially considering the evolution that federal systems have experienced over the past few decades (Palermo and Kössler 2017). Each scholar thus tends to use a different definition of federalism. In this book, I resort to a classic characterisation of federalism as suggested by Burgess, who represented it as a philosophical or ideological concept that advocates federal principles, whereby “authority should be divided and power dispersed among and between different groups and organizations in society” (Burgess 2000). Such definition is broad enough to encompass various experiences as they have recently emerged and that do not fall exactly within the matrix of classic federations, as I will better explain in the remainder of the chapter. One of the challenges when retracing the intellectual history of federalism is that there are very few historical milestones that can assist us in this endeavour. In fact, from a historical standpoint, federalism originated from the coming together at different times and in different places of various political and philosophical ideas interlaced with theological concepts as emerged mainly in the Middle East, Europe, and North America (Elazar 1987; Burgess 2006). And while it was with the US constitution of 1787 that our understanding of modern federalism has become more clearly delineated (at least based on contemporary standards), according to part of the scholarship the idea behind federalism “existed from time immemorial” (Burgess 2006), from the first communities of Israel (circa 3000 B.C.) to the leagues of Greek city-states, from the Roman Empire to the confederations of North American indigenous peoples (Watts 2008), and from the Holy Roman Empire (Elazar 1987) to the Hanseatic League binding some German northern towns (Loughlin 2013). Despite these precedents, however, no theory of federalism as we understand it today was formulated in the ancient world (Schütze 2009), since federalism in contemporary terms is rather the product of modern political theory. What existed in the pre-modern world

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was one type of federal-like form—the confederation—where sovereign states were linked together by a “perpetual treaty” and enjoyed “equal and independent” status (Schütze 2009). But this scheme fell into international law, and therefore, confederations were construed as international organisations (Schütze 2009). The confederation that emerged in the US among the thirteen former colonies can be traced back to this tradition. 1.1.2

Federalism in Modern Times: Bullinger, Althusius, and the Enlightenment

With the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, a transition occurred from a medieval world based on guilds and communes to the rise of the “European State system” (Schütze 2009) and the idea of indivisible sovereignty reposing on the state (Loughlin 2013). Such transition was momentous for federalism. But even before Westphalia, the seed of modern federal ideas had already developed within some religious circles in countries like Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, considering that at least two of the founding fathers of modern federal thought, Althusius and Bullinger, were theologians from those countries who contributed to shed light on the relationship between church, state, and religion and indirectly on federalism (McCoy and Baker 1991; see also Arban 2022). The Swiss theologian Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575), a leader of the Reformed Church of Zurich (McCoy and Baker 1991), is usually identified as the father of the “covenantal” theory of federalism, commonly associated with the Anglo-American federal tradition (Burgess 2000; see also Arban 2022). The essence of his thought is contained in the work The One and Eternal Testament or Covenant of God (or Testament ), authored in 1534 (original title in Latin: De testamento seu foedere Dei unico et aeterno). The Testament bears a distinct religious and theological signature, where the author seeks to unveil the meaning behind the covenant concluded by God with Abraham as described in the Old Testament which, for him, was “the divine framework for human life, both religious and civil…” (McCoy and Baker 1991). As a theologian, Bullinger did not forge a political theory of federalism, since his reflections on the covenant were mainly religious and philosophical. However, he may have contributed to plant a seed that would later sprout, considering that his ideas influenced the Reformed tradition in Europe but particularly in England and Scotland, a tradition that was later taken to the new world

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by the Puritans and used in the first colonies in New England (McCoy and Baker 1991). Inspired by Bullinger, the German Calvinist Johannes Althusius (1563–1638) is regarded as the main intellectual and theoretical founder of continental European federalism (Elazar 1994; see also Arban 2022). The essence of his philosophy is sketched in his Politica Methodice Digesta, first published in 1603, and considered the “first fully developed, systematic articulation of modern federal political philosophy” (Burgess 2000). In this work, Althusius described the various forms of associations in which human beings expressed themselves: families, collegia, cities, provinces, and the commonwealth (Althusius 1995). It was through these associations that citizens could operate, be represented, and maintain their liberties (Elazar 1994). Baker and McCoy also observe how Althusius articulated a political scheme with multiple levels, departing in this way from the popular view at the time of a dichotomous relationship between the individual and society (McCoy and Baker 1991; see also Arban 2022). Like Bullinger, neither Althusius elaborated a complete federal theory at that time. While still interspersed with theological and philosophical ideas, his work was nonetheless remarkable because of his new way of conceiving society as a compound organisation premised on the family as the primordial form of association: this was seen as an important federal element (McCoy and Baker 1991; see also Arban 2022). In any event, both Althusius and Bullinger remained at the margins of European political thought for a long time, their work and ideas being eclipsed by those intellectuals influenced by the Westphalia state system who defended an idea of statism, nation state, centralisation, and sovereignty, like Bodin in France or Hobbes in Britain (Burgess 2000). In particular, they both presented a view of the state in conflict with the strong centralised vision theorised by Jean Bodin (1530–1596), whose Les Six Livres de la Republique (1576) became the “classic rationalisation” of the unitary, monarchical, and strongly centralised state which would inspire European culture for a long time (Burgess 2000; see also Arban 2022). Bodin’s ideas deeply influenced some of his contemporaries: for example, Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, authored in 1651, is a direct descendant of Bodin’s project, while John Locke’s Treatise on Civil Government of 1689 exemplified the transition from absolutism and divine rights to an idea of limited government (Burgess 2000).

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During the Enlightenment, an idea of federalism as a tool to foster international peace was propounded by thinkers like l’Abbé de St. Pierre and Immanuel Kant. L’Abbé de St. Pierre authored in 1712 Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe, where he spoke of the “normative potential of federalism as a mechanism for perpetual peace” (Karmis and Norman 2005). Similarly, in Toward Perpetual Peace of 1795, Kant maintained that peace “cannot be instituted or assured without a pact of nations among themselves … so there must be a league of a special kind … called a pacific league … [which] seeks to end all war forever”: in order to achieve such perpetual peace, Kant continued, the idea of federalism should be extended to all states (Kant 2005). 1.1.3

The Emergence of Federalism in North America

Despite the general indifference across Europe towards the work of Bullinger and Althusius, their political ideas were somehow able to travel and reach the American continent, contributing to the emergence of modern federalism in North America. I already noted how the constitution of the United States of America of 1787 is considered the first, archetypal federal constitution of modern times and, as such, it represents the culminating point of the evolution of modern federal ideas. However, the milestones that helped shaping federalism in the New World are not so distinct, as American federalism is also the product of a concatenation of different experiences and traditions, from (federal) theology to (federal) political philosophy and (federal) practice in societal institutions brought by European newcomers (McCoy and Baker 1991). The encounter with the quasi-federal (or confederal) model of Native American polities also contributed to forge US federalism (McCoy and Baker 1991; Lutz 1998): in fact, according to Lutz, the Iroquois confederation, while not directly influencing the US Articles of Confederation, was nonetheless an example of a “successful, independent constitutional system that had significant consequences for North American history”; based on an “oral ‘text’”, the Iroquois constitution gave birth to the “first constitutional system” in North America (Lutz 1998). Also, the British imperial dimension played a role, since the first American colonies were linked to the mother country based on standard British colonial custom (Burgess 2006). A detailed history of the emergence of the US federal constitution is beyond the scope of this chapter, as an abundant literature already exists.

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Here, it suffices to say that, after declaring their independence from the British Empire in 1776, most of the thirteen former colonies drafted their own constitutions, which served as the basis for the Articles of Confederation of 1777 and later for the federal constitution of 1787 (Burgess 2006; Dinan 2012). In 1787, a conference was called in Philadelphia to discuss the opportunity to revise the confederal union as set up by the Articles of Confederation, as it was still rooted on the classic view of confederation as an agreement among sovereign states under international law (Burgess 2006). As it is well known, however, this conference led to the proposal of a new constitutional arrangement, whose essence was detailed in the Federalist Papers, a collection of essays authored by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison under the pseudonym of Publius. Their purpose was to persuade the delegates to the convention to ratify a new constitution that would replace the Articles of Confederation. Among the novelties introduced by the 1787 constitution, there was the proposal of a union of both states and citizens: in fact, the federal government would represent states in the Senate (the “federal” element), while citizens would be represented in the House of Representatives (the “national” element) (Karmis and Norman 2005; Schütze 2009). Also, the new constitution was ratified by the people of the several states, rather than by the American peoples (Schütze 2009). Sovereignty, in other words, was divided between two levels of government, states, and the union, thus placing the US in a position in between an international and a national structure (Schütze 2009): as Madison famously put it, it was “neither a national nor federal Constitution, but a composition of both” (Madison 2004). As Burgess noted, by drawing a system of government based on popular sovereignty, embedded in a written constitution, with a political authority divided and shared between different levels of government, the US constitution of 1787 became the archetypal model of federation (Burgess 2000), although the terms “federal” or “federation” do not appear in the constitutional text (Wheare 1963). 1.1.4

Federalism in Europe

Because of its innovative features, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the American federal experience fuelled the intellectual interest of students of political science and constitutionalism across Europe. But in addition to the US model, two other strands of federal

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philosophy helped shaping federal ideas in the old continent: PierreJoseph Proudhon and Roman Catholic social theory. Similarly to Althusius, also the French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865)—who, incidentally, is considered the “father of anarchism and libertarian socialism” (Burgess 2006)—contributed to the evolution of continental European federal thought, by recognising a “multi-layered” society “built up from below via families, groups, economic units and local communities” (Burgess 2000; see also Proudhon 1979), and in this composite structure of society, it is possible to detect a federal seed, one that favoured groups and organisations closest to citizens. The core of his thought is enshrined in the work Du principe fédératif of 1863, where Proudhon contended that “it is the idea of contract that we must take to be the principal idea in politics” (Proudhon 2005). The federal contract was defined as “a bilateral and commutative contract concerning one or more specific objects, having as its necessary condition that the contracting parties retain more sovereignty and a greater scope of action than they give up” (Proudhon 2005). The essence of the federal contract was to “reserve more powers for the citizens than for the state, and for municipal and provincial authorities than for the central power” (Proudhon 2005). Proudhon also asserted that a federation is “an agreement by which one or more heads of family, one or more towns, one or more groups of towns or states, assume reciprocal and equal commitments to perform one or more specific tasks, the responsibility for which rests exclusively with the offices of the federation” (Proudhon 2005). In other words, for Proudhon, federalism should not be limited to state structures, but should be “complemented by an industrial-agricultural federation composed of autonomous enterprises, as well as associations of producers and consumers” (Palermo and Kössler 2017). A federal system is one where society is governed by a hierarchy that is not “imposed from the top down” but where power “rests securely on its base” (Proudhon 2005). The “policy of federation” was for him the “policy of progress” (Proudhon 2005). The gist of Roman Catholic social theory, on the other hand, was spelled out in a string of papal encyclicals written between the 1880s and the 1960s (Rerum Novarum, Quadrigesimo Anno and Pacem in Terris ) (Burgess 2006; see also Arban 2022). Rerum Novarum was authored by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 to defend the interests of the working classes and protect the idea of private property. In defending families, Pope Leo XIII defined them as true societies “older than any State” with rights

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and duties “quite independent of the State” and “prior to those of the community”. The State should intervene only when a family found itself in “exceeding distress” so public aid should help meeting the needs since “each family is part of the commonwealth”. With this encyclical, Pope Leo XIII reaffirmed the relevance of the family as the primordial component of society, where individual members found the ideal environment to blossom, while state institutions played the role of promoting the common good. In 1931, Pope Pius XI wrote Quadrigesimo Anno which called upon the principle of subsidiarity to rein in the excessive centralism of the State (Burgess 2006; see also Arban 2022). The gist of subsidiarity has been identified in the following passage: Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and … a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do …. The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone can do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining …. Therefore, those in power should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various associations, in observance of the principle of ‘subsidiary function,’ the stronger social authority and effectiveness will be happier and more prosperous condition of the State.

Finally, Pacem in Terris of Pope John XXIII of 1963 “elevated” the principle of subsidiarity to a “universal principle” to be adopted also in the ambit of international relations and the world order (Burgess 2006; see also Arban 2022). 1.1.5

Federalism in Contemporary Times

The US federal model of 1787 greatly inspired other constitutional experiences across the globe: the federal systems implemented in some Latin American countries (notably Mexico in 1817, Argentina in 1860, Brazil in 1889) all followed, to a certain extent, the US constitution. But federal constitutions were also adopted in Switzerland (1848) and

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Canada (1867), and this trend continued throughout the twentieth century, when more states enacted federal constitutions: Australia (1901), Austria (1920), Germany (1949), India (1950), and Malaysia (1963). More recently, federal arrangements have been used in territories torn by internal racial, ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages (Ethiopia, Nigeria, or Nepal) (Hale 2004). Despite its undeniable success, federalism has also encountered moments of intellectual impasse, to the point of being questioned, with federal ideas at times deemed obsolete. For example, in the late 1930s, the English intellectual Harold Laski concluded that, at least in the US, “the epoch of federalism” was “over” and that only centralised state systems could effectively confront the problems of new times (Laski 2005). In fact, for him, federalism was suitable for thriving capitalist systems, but it was not appropriate in times of economic recession (Laski 2005, see also Burgess 2006). However, after the end of the Second World War, and again following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, interest in both the theory and practice of federalism has blossomed again (Karmis and Norman 2005). But federalism has also informed the European integration process started in the 1950s. As mentioned above, already in the eighteenth century, thinkers like Kant and l’Abbé de St. Pierre had propounded the creation of a federal union for Europe. In the nineteenth century, the Milanese Carlo Cattaneo emerged as a fervent advocate of federal solutions, pushing towards a European federation as the only alternative for peace (see Chapter 2). However, times were not ripe then to carry out such an ambitious scheme. In the twentieth century, the idea of a federal Europe was shared by some intellectuals, like Maritain in France and Spinelli in Italy (Palermo and Kössler 2017; Maritain 1993): the creation of the first European Communities in the 1950s can thus be seen as the evolution of such philosophical and political thoughts. 1.1.6

Common Elements of Federations

This book portrays federalism as an idea encompassing a large array of federal possibilities sharing common characteristics. Federalism is thus conceptually different from federation: the former can be read as a “philosophical statement” or “ideological position” that promotes a form of government where powers are dispersed among various levels of government, whereas federations are sovereign states with a precise type of

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institutional arrangement (Burgess 2000; King 1982). A federation can thus be seen as the most complete realisation of the federal principle, but other federal-like models exist that find in federalism their source of inspiration. As Elazar famously asserted, the essence of federalism is to express “self-rule” (the delegation of powers from the centre to the periphery) and “shared rule” (local governments participating and having a role in central politics) through a “constitutional distribution of powers” between the central government (usually for purposes of common interest to the state as a whole) and the constituent units (for purposes of local autonomy) (Elazar 1987). But self-rule and shared rule is a formula that can be expressed in many ways. Being the first, archetypal modern federation, the US constitution has for long been regarded as the main reference to identify the most typical federal traits. Following the classification elaborated by Watts (Watts 2008), a classic federation thus presented two levels of government each having a direct relationship with its citizens and each being independent and sovereign with respect to its own sphere of competences (Wheare 1963). Next, a federal constitution was characterised by a division of legislative powers between the centre and the constituent units, and by a division of revenues between the various echelons of government. Furthermore, a federal constitution was written, supreme and amendable only with the approval of both central and local representatives acting together. A pure federation also featured a second or upper chamber (federal senate) representing the interests of the constituent units at central/national level, thus giving them a forum to advance their claims and participate in federal legislation. It also contemplated a mechanism (usually, a constitutional or supreme court) to settle disputes between levels of government, as well as some form of process facilitating intergovernmental cooperation (Arban 2022). While all fully-fledged federations fall one way or the other within such description, there is no uniformity among them, as several factors impact the way a federation is shaped (Benz and Knüpling 2012). For instance, the way powers are divided between levels of government varies on a case-by-case basis, with some federations being more (de)centralised than others (Watts 2013). Likewise, in some federations, residuary powers (powers not explicitly assigned by the constitution to any level of government) are vested in the central government, whereas in others they are vested locally (Swenden 2006). Powers can also be assigned exclusively

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to each order of government, or they can be concurrent. Federations vary also depending on how representation is framed in the federal senate: sometimes senators are directly elected by citizens, whereas other times they are appointed by the executive. Senate representation can also be based on equal representation or on population (Wheare 1963). Economic and social disparities between federations also affect the way each federal template is engineered, as do the number and size of component units or the natural resources available in each territory (Watts 2013). Considering the above, contemporary scholarship tends to refrain from identifying a federation merely through a closed list of elements, as this can be both limiting and misleading (Palermo and Kössler 2017; Popelier 2021). 1.1.7

Asymmetrical and Multinational Federations

Within the same federation, the level of homogeneity among constituent sub-units might differ due to economic, social, linguistic, or religious disparities, thus leading to forms of asymmetrical federalism (Tarlton 1965; Swenden 2006; Sahadzic 2021). Asymmetry, on the other hand, expressed the extent to which component units did not share common features (Tarlton 1965; Sahadzic 2021). The most traditional forms of asymmetry relate to the sharing of authority in a federation, the so-called political and constitutional asymmetry (Gagnon 2001). Examples of asymmetrical federations in the Western world include Canada, Belgium, and Spain (Sahadzic 2021; Popelier and Sahadzic 2019). I will revert to (a)symmetrical federalism in Chapter 4 of the book. Within the constellation of federal possibilities, another classification commonly made is between “single-nation” federations and “multinational” federations. Gellner defined nations as people who “share the same culture, where culture … means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating” and who “recognize each other as belonging to the same nation”; nations see themselves as distinct societies and demand various forms of autonomy or selfgovernment to ensure their survival as distinct societies (Pinder 2007; see also Arban 2022). When defining multinational federations, it is also important to recall ethnofederalism, which is conceived as a “federal political system” where at least one component territorial governance unit is associated with a “specific ethnic category” (as it happens in Canada or India, for example) (Hale 2004). Ethnofederal solutions have become

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popular in countries torn by ethnic conflicts (Hale 2004). Multi-national federalism will be further elaborated upon in Sect. 1.3 below. 1.1.8

Conclusion: Federalism as a Dynamic Concept

In conclusion, we can say that—while sharing common features—federal arrangements are not static, but continuously evolve to allow political systems to adapt to the always changing social, economic, and political needs and to the “altered societal values and perspectives” of a given country (Rogoff 1997). Building on Friedrich, federalism is thus a dynamic, not a static, process (Friedrich 1968; Sahadzic 2021; Popelier 2021). Consequently, there is no clear standard federal model or principle, as federalism “means different things in different contexts” (Palermo and Kössler 2017) and experiments with federalism continue all the time, as illustrated in the next section.

1.2

Regionalism and the Regional State

As noted, at least until the 1950s, federal and unitary models represented the two most common forms of government, at least in the West. The federal model was antithetical to the unitary state which was predominant in Europe at the time: in fact, in a unitary state, “decision-making is firmly located at the centre of the state system” so that all “peripheral units have … little or no influence on its exercise, because the centre has had exclusive veto power over their demands” (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). This obviously stands in contrast to the federal state where, as noted, decision-making is shared between the centre and the constituent units, with self-rule and shared rule constitutionally embedded (Erk and Anderson 2009). However, while a fully-fledged federation is the constitutional scheme that perhaps most perfectly embodies federal principles, it does not represent the only way to express the spirit of federalism: in fact, beyond pure federations, federalism has become an umbrella-concept that encompasses various models of state organisation. Specifically, since “the federal/ unitary distinction is too crude to capture the complexity of contemporary governance” over the past few decades “new types of relationship among the constituent territorial units have been developing at the supranational, the sub-national and the international levels” (Loughlin 2008), thus enriching the possibilities offered by federalism.

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Consequently, for the history of federalism, the mid-1950s have been momentous since—in addition to fully-fledged federations—new federallike arrangements have emerged. According to Elazar and Watts (Elazar 1994; Watts 2008), such quasi-federal models include federacies (asymmetrical pacts that can be dissolved only by mutual agreement between a larger and a smaller polity, with the smaller polity having greater autonomy but a reduced role in the government of the larger polity, as is the case of US and Puerto Rico); associated states (asymmetrical pacts that can be dissolved unilaterally but otherwise similar to federacies, like India and Bhutan); common markets (systems based on shared economic functions, like Mercosur or the first European Communities); consociational polities (where non-territorial federations are divided along religious, cultural, ethnic, or ideological groups and characterised by government by coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and autonomy for each segment); unions (compounded polities where constituent units maintain their integrity through the common organs of the general government and possibly with some degree of devolution, like in the UK, the latter being a grant of powers from the centre to the periphery that is not constitutionally entrenched); leagues (associations of independent polities for specific purposes and a common secretariat, like Asean); and regional states (which participate from the same theoretical foundations of federalism). As part of this exercise of classification, the expression multilevel governance has also been coined as an overarching term to include all decentralised (federal and quasi-federal) forms of government: originally devised to describe the European Union, it was later extended to all types of multi-layered schemes (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2003). Burgess talks about a “penumbra of federalism” to indicate these federally-inspired models whose boundaries are “not always sharp and precise … so that one concept shades off into another” to create new hybrids (Burgess 2013). Sahadzic uses the expression multi-tiered systems to define systems “with multiple tiers of government in which the central level is mixed with subnational entities that have lawmaking power” (Sahadzic 2021). I will refer to these models as quasi-federal or hybrid, and in this section, I will specifically sharpen focus on regionalism and the regional state for their relevance in Italy.

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1.2.1

Theories of Regionalism

As is the case with federalism, also regionalism is a general concept that defines a variety of experiences, the regional state being just one of them. Since the 1970s, regional governments across the world have increased in number (Henderson 2010). At European level, the growth of regional experiments can be in part explained by the activity of the European Parliament, which adopted a “Charter of Regionalization” intended to encourage “member states to institutionalize regional identities within them” (Spektorowski 2003). Similarly, regionalism was promoted by concomitant crises regarding both the “unitary versus federal” dichotomy (no longer adequate to fully encapsulate all the existing models of governance) and the nation state paradigm. Broadly understood, regionalism implies the existence of a “local” or “regional” dimension. At the same time, the very concept of region is a “rubbery” one, as it stretches “above and below the national state” (Marks et al. 2008). Regionalism can thus be explored at two different levels: international and national. At international level, regionalism is “a policy whereby states and nonstate actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region” (Fawcett 2004). In this sense, regionalism aims at promoting “common goals in one or more issue areas” (Fawcett 2004) for instance “a sense of regional awareness or community” or “consolidating regional groups and networks” or “pan- or subregional groups formalized by interstate arrangements and organizations” (Fawcett 2004). Since the mid-1980s, various forms of regionalism have flourished globally, the EU being perhaps the most obvious—but not unique—project (De Lombaerde et al 2010). Regarding regionalism as a quasi-federal model (and, as such, at the national level), it often includes a territorial dimension, represented by a level of government situated between the central state and the municipalities (Keating and Wilson 2010), since in both pure federations and unitary states, local autonomies had traditionally difficulties thriving (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). The creation of the EU has welcomed the regionalisation of a few once centralised countries, thus contributing to foster consideration for the local or territorial sphere that regionalism tends to advance. Italy and Spain are considered quintessential regional states, and the trajectory of the Italian regional model is described in detail in Chapter 2.

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A preliminary problem when discussing regionalism at all levels is the definition of region. As noted, the concept of region is in fact “polysemous” and a “‘container-concept’ with multiple meanings” (De Lombaerde et al. 2010) and no firm definition (Palermo and Kössler 2017). As an example, the term region can be used to refer to different realities, like the EU, or the North-Rhine-Westphalia, or the Euregio (De Lombaerde et al. 2010). Theorists also distinguish between microregions and macro-regions: while the former refer to the “space between the national and the local within a particular state”, the latter are “larger territorial … units or sub-systems, between the state level and the global system level” (De Lombaerde et al. 2010). As better explained in the remainder of the book, in Italy the local subunits that compose the geo-political skeleton of the state are called regions and are clearly identifiable by their institutional and political borders and by each having a capital city: consequently, because regions are the territorial sub-units that compose the state, the expression regionalism in Italy identifies the system of local self-government. Other times, region can refer to historical borders no longer existing: for example, Italy abounds with examples of regions that are not politically recognised but only retain a historical importance, like Carnia in the North East or Langhe in Piemonte. But it is also possible to use the term region to indicate a geographical area that is not so clearly defined, neither on a geo-political nor on a historical basis: in this sense, region could refer to a “cluster” of regions or otherwise termed geo-political sub-units who simply share similar interests or other traits (e.g. economic), such as the “West of Canada” or the Ruhr region in Germany. Because of the inherent difficulty in agreeing upon a definition, many works on regionalism avoid to define a region. 1.2.2

The Regional State and Its Identifying Elements

As it will be further illustrated in Chapter 2, it was the Spanish republican constitution of 1931 that first introduced the regional state as a quasifederal model (Barbera 2012; Arban 2021b), but this constitution was never actually applied because of the civil war that broke up in the country (Bin and Falcon 2012a; Arban 2021b). A few years later, the Italian founding fathers drew inspiration from it and used it for the regional state emerged in 1948 as an alternative to the traditional unitary and federal options (Bin and Falcon 2012a; Arban 2021b).

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But how can we distinguish a fully-fledged federation from a regional system? The answer might not be so obvious. As I have argued elsewhere, a regional state can be intuitively thought of as something more than a unitary state and something less than a pure federation, which means that in a regional state only some—not all—typical federal markers are present (Arban 2021a). In other words, regional states can be thought of as incomplete or imperfect federal systems (Arban et al. 2021). Certainly, a signature element of regional states is the recognition of local autonomies (regions, municipalities, provinces). In fact, most classic federations constitutionally entrench only two levels of government, the federal and the state/provincial (or otherwise called, like cantons in Switzerland or Länder in Germany and Austria). Regional constitutions, on the other hand, tend to constitutionally embed more than two echelons of government, as they recognise also the tier that is closest to citizens (usually, municipalities, and/or provinces), sometimes in connection with the principle of subsidiarity. This is what happens with article 114(1) of the Italian constitution, which provides that the Republic is composed of municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, regions, and the state, all such entities being autonomous and having their own statutes, powers, and functions in accordance with the constitution. In very similar terms, article 137 of the Spanish constitution mandates that the State is organised territorially into municipalities, provinces, and the self-governing communities, all enjoying self-government for the management of their respective interests. Article 18 of the Brazilian constitution maintains that the Brazilian federation is organised politically and administratively by the Union, the states, the federal district, and the counties, all autonomous as provided for in the constitution. Some federal constitutions like the German and the Swiss do mention municipalities, but they are not expressly recognised as a third level of government. Like federations, also regional states are characterised by “forms of territorial partition of power” (Grasso 2009), with peripheral governments enjoying legislative and executive powers, although judicial authority usually rests with the centre (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). The way regional states emerge is sometimes used as a discriminant. According to Pinelli, for instance, a federal model usually presupposes the merger of former independent states into a federation (Pinelli 2006), whereas regional states commonly emerge from the decentralisation of a unitary state (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Others explain that the

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regional state is “part of a bottom-up process” which may have “socioeconomic, political or cultural driving force or may be a combination of all these factors” (Swenden 2006). Some other theorists take the opposite approach, contending that, differently than a federal model, a regional state develops “through a top-down dynamic, without a true federal motivation” (Baldini and Baldi 2014). This “state formation” argument, however, is weak: in fact, while both Italy and Spain have emerged from a process of decentralisation of a once unitary state, decentralisation can also lead to the formation of a fully-fledged federation, as was the case of Belgium. Likewise, not all federations have materialised from the merger of formerly independent states: for example, not all fifty states in the US were independent at the time they joined the Union, and similar conclusions can be reached for other federations (Arban 2021a). More generally, there has been a move from “coming together” federations— characterised by the merger of formerly independent units—to “holding together” federations, whereby the state is progressively decentralised to curb potential secessionist threats. Incidentally, Palermo and Kössler use the expressions aggregative (or integrative) and devolutionary federal systems to refer to very similar processes (Palermo and Kössler 2017). Another factor used to distinguish federal from regional models is how legislative powers are divided between the centre and the periphery. According to Caretti and Tarli Barbieri, in a federal state, the central government enjoys certain powers specifically enumerated in the constitution, while peripheral governments only have a general competence in areas not listed in the constitution; conversely, in regional states, the opposite happens, with general competences enjoyed by the central tier, and enumerated competences belonging to the regions (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). This argument is also weak, because it directly builds upon the US federal experience, where federal powers are enumerated and state powers are residual. But, as mentioned before, each federal system differs in the way powers are divided, with some federal states being more centralised (or decentralised) than others, or fluctuating between periods of more or less intense centripetal (or centrifugal) trends. Regional and federal systems do share similar ways of division of powers, as proved by Canada (a traditional fully-fledged federation) and Spain (a regional state). The presence, in a federal state, of a second chamber (usually the senate) representing the interests of local territories is also used to distinguish between federations and regional states (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri

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2012; Grasso 2009). But this argument can also be easily rebutted: in fact, not all fully-fledged federations have strong territorial chambers, as is the case of Canada, where senators (who are not democratically elected but are appointed by the Prime Minister) do not seat in the upper chamber in representation of the interests of the various provinces, although they are chosen on a provincial basis, thus making the Canadian Senate a comparatively “weak” federal chamber (Brun et al. 2008). To remedy the problem, a common practice has developed in states with “weak” regional representation to seek alternative solutions: in Italy, for example, a “Permanent Conference for the Relations among State, Regions and Autonomous Provinces” (“Permanent Conference”) acts as a substitute for the regional chamber (Ceccherini 2021; Arban 2021a). In Canada, there has also been the emergence of similar “federal-provincial” or “interprovincial” conferences (Brun et al. 2008). Also, the level of involvement of territorial units in the revision process of the constitution is sometimes used to distinguish between federal and regional schemes (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; see also Arban 2021a). In fact, the constitution of a fully-fledged federation cannot be amended unilaterally, e.g. by the central (or federal) tier only, since the participation of the federated entities is required, while the same would not be true in regional states. Yet, even in regional systems, regions can play a role (albeit limited) in constitutional amendment procedures: for example, article 138 of the Italian constitution provides that regions can participate in the process by requesting a referendum in the event the constitutional law amending the constitution is approved by both chambers by absolute majority but not by two-thirds of the members. Likewise, both federal and regional systems are often characterised by the presence of an umpire (a constitutional or supreme court) called to settle conflicts of attribution of powers between central and peripheral levels, as exemplified by article 134(2) of the Italian constitution (Arban 2021a). In an ideal federal system, each level of government is financially autonomous. In practice, however, even within regional states, the constituent units might enjoy a certain amount of fiscal autonomy (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Maybe this fiscal capacity is not as vast as in federations, but nonetheless it is constitutionally entrenched. In Italy, for instance, article 119(1) grants “financial autonomy of revenues and expenditures” to all local sub-entities (municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, and regions), whereas article 119(2) dictates that the

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aforementioned local sub-units enjoy “autonomous resources”. Similar considerations can be made for Spain. Furthermore, it is also contended that in fully-fledged federations constituent units usually enjoy judicial powers, whereas such power is not enjoyed by local sub-units in regional systems (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012), where there are no “regional” courts akin, for example, to the US State Courts, but there is only one, national judicial system. Yet, once again, things are not always so clearly defined, because also in traditional federations like Canada, while there is a provincial court system, its jurisdiction is very limited, and provincial judges of general jurisdiction are appointed by the federal government and part of a centralised court system having the Supreme Court at its apex (Arban 2021a). Likewise, scholars often note that, in a federation, the constituent units enjoy “full constitution-making power” whereas regions in a regional state can only draft “charters containing a mere frame of government” (Delledonne and Martinico 2010). This means that, in a regional state, the national constitution is the only existing constitution, one that has not emerged from a covenant, and that is not “competing” with other constitutions existing within each unit (Bin and Falcon 2012b). This argument, however, is once again biased by a US-centric federal vision, where each of the fifty states composing the Union has in fact its own constitution. But this is by no means an absolute rule: first, there are federations whose constituent units do not have formally codified constitutions (as is the case of Canada) and, second, also regions in regional states can have documents that, while not sub-national constitutions tout court, still present interesting features, as is the case of Italian statuti or of Spanish estatutos de autonomía (Popelier et al. 2021). Finally, to distinguish a regional from a federal state, scholars contend that in the former the territorial sub-units enjoy “original sovereign power” (Grasso 2009), thus implying that both the centre and the peripheral units share the “nature of state” and enjoy the whole bundle of functions and state powers (Bin and Falcon 2012a). Conversely, in regional states, sovereignty belongs to the centre, and territorial units do not enjoy original sovereignty but only a “constitutionally protected autonomy” (Grasso 2009). Consequently, in regional states, sovereignty remains “undivided” and “firmly anchored” with central institutions, although the constitution provides for a division of legislative powers, a direct consequence of the fact that the national constitution is the only constitution in the state, and local autonomies are “delimited” by it (Bin

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and Falcon 2012b). This explanation, however, is also rather weak especially from a theoretical perspective: in fact, as I explained elsewhere, the understanding of (split) sovereignty and autonomy differs in the continental European and Anglo-American legal traditions, and what is usually referred to as the sovereignty of the constituent units is nothing more than their autonomy (Arban 2021a). This section has unveiled the difficulties that exist in categorising the regional state model and how it differs from federal schemes. The problem is that most of the factors used for purposes of such classification are not decisive, as they are more helpful in assessing the differences between a unitary and a federal model. My argument is that a key element that could be used to distinguish regional and federal systems is the presence of a so-called federal culture or “thinking federal”: while its exact meaning remains blurred, federal culture in practice refers to the idea of “power sharing” which is “essential to the federal way” (Elazar 1987). When, for a variety of reasons, there is resistance towards such federal culture, it is very unlikely that a fully-fledged federation emerges. As a result, the eventual decentralisation put in place might resemble something less than federal, for example a regional state, and called in different ways to avoid the use of the “f” word: stato regionale (regional state) in Italy, estado auton´omico (autonomic state) in Spain, system of cooperative government in South Africa, or devolution in the UK, Sri Lanka, or Kenya (Arban 2021b). In any event, the distinction between federal and regional models is very subtle and is becoming more and more blurred, with a resulting “contamination” of one model with features and characteristics of the other (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Furthermore, regional states share similar tensions to those existing in classic federations, so mechanisms and strategies applied in one model can be easily exported to the other (Arban et al. 2021). For such reason, instead of seeing it as an “intermediate form” between the unitary and the federal state, some scholars contend that the regional model has become the “common model” that both unitary and federal states tend to create (Barbera 2012). Likewise, most recent literature tends to refrain from distinguishing between federations and regional models, preferring to embrace expressions like “multi-tiered” systems (Sahadzic 2021; Popelier 2021). In conclusion, it could be asked whether this exercise of classification has any practical utility, if we consider that the same adjective regional seems a fictitious one, since it appears nowhere in the constitutions of

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Spain and Italy (the two archetypal regional states) (Arban et al. 2021).1 Regardless of the answer, a key advantage of regional models as opposed to classic federations is, as I argued elsewhere, resiliency: rather than being rigidly anchored to the plainly vertical or horizontal dynamics typical of unitary and federal templates respectively, regional systems espouse a more cross-sectional relationship between the centre and the periphery, one that takes into account additional levels of government (i.e. municipalities and/or provinces), thus being more prone to experimentation and adaptability to the fast-pace changing reality, and closer to citizens (Arban et al. 2021).

1.3

Sub-state Nationalism

In this final section, I explore another instance where the classic “unitary vs. federal” dyad is often challenged: plurinational (or multinational) states. I briefly introduced this topic earlier in the chapter, when I distinguished between single-nation and multinational federations. While other definitions exist, in this book I build on Gellner and Pinder and define a nation as people who “share the same culture, where culture … means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating” and who “recognise each other as belonging to the same nation” (Pinder 2007). In such context, nations “see themselves as distinct societies and demand various forms of autonomy or selfgovernment to ensure their survival as distinct societies” (Pinder 2007). Also, in federal or quasi-federal systems, more than one nation identifies itself as “co-founder” of the federation (McGarry and O’Leary 2007). As a synonym of “culture” or “people”, a nation shares “identity-related features” like language, history, or culture, with members identifying and recognising themselves as belonging to it (De Schutter 2007); furthermore, differently than immigrant groups (who might claim changes to policies for enhanced equal respect or affirmative action), nations look for changes of authority and other forms of self-government (Kymlicka 1995; De Schutter 2007). As Tierney observes, sub-state nationalities have repeatedly challenged the “traditional models of constitutionalism and constitutional theory” and argued for the “institutional accommodation of their respective 1 Incidentally, but interestingly, article 1 of the proposed Chilean constitution—repealed by national plebiscite in 2022—defined Chile as a “regional” state.

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sub-state national society” without necessarily having “different political values from other territorial spaces within the state” (Tierney 2004). Because, as we saw, federalism aspires to reconcile unity and diversity through self-rule and shared rule, federal solutions are often sought after in plurinational contexts. But also in unitary or quasi-federal systems, sub-state national societies can acquire a certain degree of autonomy, even though the self-rule component may not be embedded in the constitution, as happens in the devolved system in the UK (Tierney 2004). 1.3.1

Nations and Nationalism

Nations and nationalism are two interlaced concepts. In political theory, the definition of nation is perhaps less disputed or controversial than that of nationalism (Norman 2006). We have already offered a definition of nation according to Gellner and Pinder, and in fact, Norman posits that most contemporary definitions of nation agree on certain common elements: nations can in fact be assimilated to “human communities”, distinct both from a state and from an ethnic group, and often sharing similar language, memories, myths, or homeland (or territorial boundaries) (Norman 2006). Nationalism, on the other hand, “can refer to several distinct sorts of things, properties, mental states, abstract entities, and processes” (Norman 2006). Béland and Lecours suggest that “nationalism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that takes different forms in different societies and whose specific nature is still the subject of debate” (Béland and Lecours 2005). Furthermore, nationalism “has been used to refer to a process, a kind of sentiment or identity, a form of political rhetoric, an ideology, a principle or set of principles, and a kind of socialpolitical movement ” (Norman 2006). A common feature of nationalism is its “identity dimension” in the sense that nationalism features an identity that comes “from the sharing of common markers such as language, religion, or ethnic origins” (Béland and Lecours 2005). People belonging to nations usually have a dual national identity, one of the national community and the other of the nation state (McEwen and Lecours 2008). The second feature of nationalism is “territorial mobilization” in the sense that “it seeks to gain or maintain for a group – the nation – a measure of self-government most often in the form of autonomy or independence” (Béland and Lecours 2005). In the words of O’Leary, nationalism could

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thus be summarised as “a political philosophy that holds that the nation ‘should be collectively and freely institutionally expressed, and ruled by its co-nationals’” (O’Leary 2001). Following the end of the Second World War, there has been a burgeoning of nationalist movements around the globe. Tierney identifies at least three movements: (i) nationalist movements evolving from the process of decolonisation of Asian and African countries in their attempt to “emancipate” from Europe; (ii) nationalist movements originating from the disintegration of communism and socialism in Eastern Europe; and (iii) sub-state nationalism (Tierney 2004). To distinguish the latter from other forms of nationalism, the term “neo-nationalism” has also been employed (Tierney 2004). The communal feature is that they all seek better accommodation for national societies (Tierney 2004). Tierney distinguishes between sub-state nationalism and ethnic nationalism, since the latter is more “reactionary” and “exclusivist” and focuses more on the “common ethnicity or bloodlines of a particular group” (Tierney 2004). Conversely, sub-state nationalism is more associated with “civic nationalism”, one that fosters “a progressive, liberal and inclusive vision of a shared national identity based upon common political values, and largely blind to biological differences such as race, colour and ethnicity” (Tierney 2004). Ethnic nationalism can be brought to extreme consequences leading to civil wars and cruel ethnic cleansing: in this sense, sub-state nationalism takes a milder (or more civic) approach. However, it is fair to say that this cannot be seen as a universal truth either: in fact, in some instances, sub-state nationalism conflates with ethnic nationalism and be associated with drastic, violent, or ethnicity-directed actions, such as ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), a nationalist and military organisation claiming the independence of Euskadi, the Basque Country, not always adopting pacific methods. Sub-state national societies differ from minority groups like immigrant communities. In fact, sub-state national societies resemble more the state hosting them, since they are in a position to play many of the “functional” and “identificatory” roles played by a nation state, and are “territorially concentrated” and characterised by a historically settled population and by “an elaborate set of social, cultural, and … governmental networks and institutions which make the possibility of self-government for the substate national society a feasible option” (Tierney 2004, see also Kymlicka 1995). Conversely, immigrant communities are usually not interested in

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self-government, but they aspire to “integrate within the receiving society” instead of creating “constitutionally autonomous units” (Tierney 2004; but see also Kymlicka 1995; De Schutter 2007). Nations within multinational states and federations also differ from regions within a regional state. In fact, to paraphrase Tierney, regions are not inclined to engage in a conflictual relationship with the state (Tierney 2004). However, sub-national societies and regions share traits such as “sub-state, territorially-demarcated, collective identities; political, economic or cultural cleavages between sub-state territories and the centre; and the social generation of discrete political identities and political organisations at sub-state level” (Tierney 2004). Considering the above, sub-state national societies are different than other groups in two main aspects: (a) “societal or cultural distinctiveness” (like territorial concentration, common history, language, religion, etc.) and (b) “potential for self-government” (Tierney 2004). 1.3.2

Plurinational States and Federations

As posited by Swenden, plurinational or multinational states are marked by the presence of at least two territorially distinct communities. Their territorial distinctiveness can be linked to the presence of a particular language, religion, tribe, a shared history, but above all a shared understanding of being part of a separate political community with a distinctive identity separate from or in addition to that of the state as a whole. (Swenden 2013)

The voluminous body of literature on sub-state nationalism usually identifies Canada, the UK, and Spain as multinational states in the Western world (Tierney 2004; Kymlicka 1995). In fact, in these three countries, we encounter societies (or nations, such as Quebec, Scotland, Ireland, Wales or Catalonia, and the Basque Country, respectively) which occupy a clearly defined territory and distinguish themselves for their culture, language, or other historical elements which have been able to thrive through the implementation of modern societal, governmental, and legal institutions (Tierney 2004). Belgium is also considered a multinational state due to the Flanders/Wallonia dichotomy, but other examples of plurinational states include India and Malaysia. Most multinational

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states are in fact federations, since the federal paradigm “provide[s] effective ways of giving these different identities opportunities for collective and free institutional expressions” (O’Leary 2001). 1.3.3

Challenges to the Nation State and Forms of Constitutional Accommodation

Because of the societal or cultural distinctiveness and their potential for self-government that characterise sub-state national societies, they often represent a challenge to the host nation state since they seek constitutional change, as they believe that “their national status is not properly recognised within the state as a consequence of the privileged position enjoyed by the dominant society of the state” (Tierney 2004). Furthermore, they question “traditional monistic conceptions of internal constitutional sovereignty” and, in exchange, offer solutions that go in the direction of a re-designing of the existing authority patterns (Tierney 2004). Yet, the challenge is not only towards internal sovereignty and the constitutional models that express it. They challenge also external sovereignty and the ways in which it is manifested (Tierney 2004). Secession is perhaps the most “threatening” challenge to external sovereignty and the least desired solution (Tierney 2004; Bossacoma Busquets 2020), particularly on the part of the host state. In fact, a territorial loss would greatly reduce the international prestige and power of the state, and exacerbate cultural or ethnic-based conflicts among the various communities, which at some point might also turn towards secession (McEwen and Lecours 2008). Such threats could be minimised by “nurturing citizens’ loyalty” and “attachment to the state” (McEwen and Lecours 2008). How is this normally pursued? Solutions tended to accommodate sub-national societies other than secession are generally preferred: first, because the constitutional dialogue between the host state and the sub-state national society can be revamped through the existing schemes of constitutional accommodation (Tierney 2004); second, because of the identity and loyalty ties that bind the host state and sub-state national societies (McEwen and Lecours 2008). Usually, sub-state national societies aspire to constitutional accommodation in three ways: autonomy, representation at the centre, and recognition of their national status (Tierney 2004).

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Autonomy means that sub-state national societies might seek additional or distinctive powers in comparison with the rest of the country (selfgoverning rights). Such powers should be constitutionally entrenched to allow sub-state national societies to autonomously manage issues of domestic policy of specific interest to them (like education, social policies, economic development, cultural aspects, immigration, etc.). In other words, these groups demand forms of political autonomy to “ensure the full and free development of their cultures and the best interest of their people” (Tierney 2004). In order to strengthen minorities’ voices, different tools could be used, including devolution of powers, forms of regionalism, or a federal system (if a federal structure is not yet in place) (McEwen and Lecours 2008). Tensions could emerge if the host state resists decentralisation (Tierney 2004). At the same time, such asymmetrical solutions are not always easy to implement and not always welcomed especially by the rest of the country: in fact, asymmetry might fuel sentiments of jealousy and resentment among those communities who do not belong to the sub-state nation. I will revert to this point in Chapters 5 and 6 of the book. Representation, on the other hand, refers to situations where the national pluralism inherent in the specific state is reflected within central institutions via the enhancement of representatives of the different nations at central institutions (McEwen and Lecours 2008; Kymlicka 1995). In this way, the state is no longer construed of as a single national community, but is perceived as a “union state” or “compact of peoples” (Tierney 2004). This can happen in different ways: from the creation of a “ministerial or bureaucratic position designed to speak on behalf of the national minority” to the establishment of an upper chamber (or senate) representing the interests of sub-state national groups at the centre, to forms of representation within the constitutional (or supreme) courts (McEwen and Lecours 2008). With the development of supra-national institutions such as the EU, recognition has progressively being affirmed and sought also beyond the state through a phenomenon also referred to as “protodiplomacy” (Tierney 2004). In this last case, however, experience has proved that it is not always easy for sub-state national societies to affirm themselves beyond state borders; consequently, unless the constitution of the host state allows it, such forms of proto-diplomacy (or paradiplomacy) can be significantly frustrated by the host state (Tierney 2004; Lecours 2008).

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Finally, recognition refers to the aspiration of constitutional acknowledgement of the language of the sub-state national society or of some other symbolic issues such as flags, anthems, or other totems (Tierney 2004; see also Swenden 2013). In multinational states or federations, where the linguistic cleavage is a major component, official bi- or multilingualism gives minorities an opportunity to express their voice at the centre (McEwen and Lecours 2008; Kymlicka 1995). Recognition is thus linked to the very essence of the alleged distinctiveness of the sub-state national group, its behaviours, traditions, and traits that allow the clear identification of one sub-state national group from the others. At the same time, it is never easy to decide which is the most appropriate form of recognition, as this can significantly vary from one context to the other (Norman 2006). Norman identifies several “principles of recognition” that could be encoded in a multinational federal constitution (Norman 2006). First, a “partnership” agreement, so that the national minority group can be seen as “a full partner in the federation” (Norman 2006). Second, and linked to the above, is the “collective assent” recognising the “legitimacy of a federal constitution for national minorities”: in fact, because it often happens that multinational states were established without a collective assent of all constituent communities, at some stage it would be important to formally give such assent (Norman 2006). Third, “commitment and loyalty”: in fact, because the collective assent seals the commitment and loyalty to the federal project, when the majority asks a sub-national society to “demonstrate its loyalty” absent any form of recognition, this would not constitute a form of recognition (Norman 2006). Fourth, “antiassimilationism” could secure recognition to sub-state national societies, by demanding acceptance at all levels of the fact that “the state contains more than one ‘people’ and more than one national culture, language, religion”, etc. (Norman 2006). One way to implement this principle is to reconsider the distribution of certain powers seen to have “assimilationist effects” by sub-state national societies from the centre to the periphery (as mentioned before, especially powers in areas such as culture, immigration, or language policies) (Norman 2006). Fifth, and again linked to the prior principle, is to grant territorial autonomy “in the form of a federal province exercising powers that will promote the continued existence and flourishing of their group” (Norman 2006).

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Sixth, “equal right of nation building”, is a possible way to grant constitutional recognition to minorities (Norman 2006). Finally, “multiple and nested national identities” should be “widely recognized in the political culture that national identities are not mutually exclusive” (Norman 2006). 1.3.4

Other Forms of Accommodation

Forms of judicial accommodation, meaning the involvement of actors such as courts, is one other method used by sub-state nations to seek accommodation within the host state (Tierney 2004). A celebrated example of court involvement in sub-state national accommodation is the opinion rendered in 1998 by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) known as the Secession Reference. As it is well known, in that instance the SCC was called upon by the federal government—in the aftermath of the 1995 secession referendum in Quebec—to express its opinion on the legality of unilateral attempts by a Canadian province to secede from the federation (Tierney 2004). More recently, also the constitutional court of Spain has ruled in matters pertaining to national societies, when it halted the referendum for the independence of Catalonia (Ferreres Comella 2014). Referenda are another mechanism used in settling tensions between the host state and the sub-state national society, and can be used for any of the main aspirations usually sought by sub-national states when looking for enhanced constitutional accommodation (autonomy, representation, and recognition) (Tierney 2004). Finally, participation in constitutional change similarly represents an opportunity for sub-national societies to have their voice heard. The significance of this individual contribution in the constitutional change process is improved if citizens are “able to participate, influence debate, make choices, change opinions, and develop his identity(ies) within the context of his own national society” (Tierney 2004). In the next chapters, I will illustrate how theories of federalism, regionalism, and sub-state nationalism played out in the Italian context and helped forging a unique asymmetrical regional state.

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CHAPTER 2

Italian Regionalism: From Risorgimento to the 2001 Constitutional Reform

In this chapter, I revisit the history of Italian regionalism from Risorgimento to the 2001 constitutional reform.1 This helps clarify how theories of federalism, regionalism, and sub-state nationalism have come together and contributed to forge the type of state emerged in Italy. In fact, the relationship between Italy and federalism is an old one, and to fully understand the seeds of the constitutional reform of 2001 (thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3), we need to consider also the events that took place in the years that led to the political unification of the peninsula in the 1860s. While at that time Italy was nothing more than a fragmented territory composed of small states (as posited, “Italy was hardly more than a geographical expression” (Amoretti 2002)), federal ideas had already started to sprout, especially in some intellectual circles in Milan, with Carlo Cattaneo being a prominent figure in this regard: in fact, although the Risorgimento was filled with other key intellectuals such as Mazzini 1 Risorgimento (in English, “Resurgence”) is a historiographic term that is used to describe the complex process of economic, cultural, political, and social transformations during the nineteenth century that led to the unification of Italy. The beginning of Risorgimento is tentatively set in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, while the end coincides with the designation of Rome as capital of the Kingdom of Italy in 1871: in between these two moments, there were the rebellions in the 1820s and 1830s, the revolutions in 1848, and the wars of independence.

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or Ferrari (nonetheless mentioned in the chapter), I chose to focus specifically on Cattaneo as he was a strenuous advocate of federalism and local autonomy, and always rejected the unification project as it was realised in 1861; furthermore, his ideas on federalism may be of great relevance also beyond Italian borders. I will also sharpen focus on the intellectual work of Gaetano Salvemini, who advocated a federal solution specially to foster the socio-economic development of the South of Italy. When Italy was eventually unified, however, the federal solution was abandoned, but certainly not ignored by the fathers of unification, the decision to opt for a centralised rather than a federal state being caused by reasons that are still debated. Some of the theoretical contributions emerged at the time of unification were also revived at the time of the Constituent Assembly, when a regional state was finally implemented with the 1948 constitution.

2.1

The Pre-unitary Period

Italy has a long-standing tradition of deep political, socio-economic, and linguistic fragmentation. In the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, Italy as a peninsula was divided in nine states: the Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia (ruled by the House of Savoy); LombardyVenetia (or Lombardo-Veneto, a province of the Austrian Empire); the Dukedom of Modena and Reggio Emilia (under the rule of Frances IV); the Dukedom of Parma and Piacenza (administered by Mary Louise—the daughter of the Austrian Emperor and Napoleon’s widow); the GrandDuchy of Tuscany (governed by Leopold II of Lorraine—nephew of the Austrian Emperor); the Dukedom of Lucca (governed by the Bourbons); the Dukedom of Massa Carrara; the Papal State (which included part of Emilia, the Romagna, Marche, Umbria, and Lazio); and finally, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (under the Bourbons’ rule, who were linked to Austria). Most of the Italian territory was thus under the (direct or indirect) control of the Austrian Empire, and Italy was a nonhomogeneous entity, a compound of diverse political structures (such as dukedoms, absolute monarchies, and theocracies), each of them with their own laws and institutional apparatuses. Because of such political and institutional fragmentation, there were substantial socio-economic differences among the various territories: in this scenario, Piedmont and LombardyVenetia were perhaps the most developed areas, at least from an economic and industrial standpoint.

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But at that time Italy was heterogeneous also linguistically, with the Italian language, derived from Latin, that was spoken only by intellectuals, while most of the population communicated almost exclusively in dialect (Lepschy et al. 1996). Interestingly, Eva noted how Latin could not function as a homogenising linguistic factor since it was spoken only by the educated or used during religious ceremonies, meaning that most of the population did not understand it (Eva 1999). Furthermore, at the time of unification, only less than three per cent of the people spoke the Tuscan dialect (which represented the basis of modern Italian), and most noble families preferred to speak French (Eva 1999). 2.1.1

Federalism in the Nineteenth Century

Across Europe, it took quite some time during the nineteenth century for federal ideas to take roots. In fact, the French Revolution and its ideals heavily contributed to strengthen the idea of nation states characterised by a strong central government and administration, something that contrasted the idea of distribution of powers promoted by federalism. The same work of Althusius—nowadays regarded as one of the founding fathers of federalism, as noted in Chapter 1—remained unnoticed throughout the French Revolution and for most of the nineteenth century, when it was eventually discovered by Otto von Gierke (Hueglin 1979). The impact of the centralised model, which reached its apex in the Napoleonic time, was so pervasive that more than half of the European population was administered according to it, and even after the fall of Napoleon, the administrative institutions survived the breaking up of the empire (Ciuffoletti 1994). The influence of Napoleonic ideas of a centralised nation state certainly played a role also in Italy in the years of unification, as better illustrated in the remainder of the chapter. Debates over whether to adopt a federal or unitary model for Italy began before the actual political unification of the peninsula. For example, in 1796 the Lombard administration in Milan issued a contest to suggest the ideal structure to adopt in Italy (Ciuffoletti 1994). The contest was won by Melchiorre Gioia, an economist, intellectual, and politician who advocated a centralised model, since it would give the possibility to overcome local disunity and help ensure uniformity (Ciuffoletti 1994). Conversely, in those same years, Sismonde de Sismondi, a Swiss economist, historian, and critic, suggested that the Italian Republics of the

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Middle Ages should be the basis for liberty, and federalism the alternative option to prevent war and contrast absolutism (Urbinati 2010). The end of the Napoleonic regime and the fall of the French democracy in Italy stimulated more discussions on the institutional asset to give to Italy (Ciuffoletti 1994). Federal solutions were propounded mainly by intellectuals living in Lombardy, some of them seeking to maintain a Kingdom in the North within an Italian confederation of states (Ciuffoletti 1994). According to Antonio Rosmini (1797–1855), for instance, a strongly centralised state would occupy the spaces of civil society and of the Church; consequently, federal states were the organisations that better respected human beings and their associative forms (like families, corporations, communes): a federal solution would thus better respond to the peculiar geographic, political, and economic configuration of Italy (Ciuffoletti 1994). The abbot Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852) was another interesting figure during the Italian Risorgimento. Gioberti was a representative of neo-guelphism; a cultural and political movement emerged at the time as an expression of liberal Catholicism. He supported the idea of an Italian confederacy of conservative inspiration under the leadership of the Pope. A unification so conducted would free the peninsula from foreign rulers, but it would also free the Italian people from foreign ideas that would overshadow what he considered the moral supremacy of Italians (Gioberti 1866). Federalism in Italy during the Risorgimento, however, is intimately intertwined with the work of Carlo Cattaneo, as the next section illustrates. 2.1.2

Carlo Cattaneo and His Idea of Federalism

Born in Milan in 1801, Cattaneo was a genuine intellectual who, at his death in 1869, left an extensive scholarly heritage ranging over a wide variety of topics, including languages, literature, philosophy, politics, law, or infrastructures (Sabetti 2000; see also Arban 2017). He was also the founder and main editor of Il Politecnico, a review that published contributions on several areas of knowledge. Cattaneo was a liberal thinker, and his liberalism rejected all forms of despotism: as such, he preferred a republican (as opposed to a monarchical) form of state, since he believed that monarchies could hardly be reconciled with individual liberties (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017), and that the true nature of Italy was republican (Cattaneo 2010b; see also Arban 2017).

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One of the subjects that most fascinated Cattaneo was federalism, and the constitutional model to ideally recommend for Italy undergoing unification. He was an advocate of federalism both for Italy and for each European state, in addition to proposing federalism for Europe in general. In this regard, he used to say that “we will have peace only with the United States of Europe” (Ciuffoletti 1994; Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017) and that the day that Europe could become all similar to Switzerland or to America, the day when Europe would print on its forehead: United States of Europe: not only Europe would be spared from the mourning need of war, fires and gallows, but it would also make hundred thousand millions. (Cattaneo 1850)

Cattaneo defined federalism as “the law of the peoples ” which should have its own place next to the “law of the nation” and the “law of humanity” (Cattaneo 2010c; see also Arban 2017). In his view, the federal state was the only political formula that allowed to reconcile unity and freedom, the latter construed as a double limitation (at national and supra-national level) of political power (Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Arban 2017). In 1851, Cattaneo explained in a letter that federalism is the “theory of freedom, the only possible theory of freedom” (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017).He cherished this idea of freedom, which he intended as independence from foreign power, but also as the possibility to enjoy institutions that allowed autonomy and capacity to decide within the state (Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Arban 2017). On the other hand, for him a unitary state could only be authoritarian and despotic, because unity would smother autonomies, the free initiative, and freedom, while a variety of political centres would protect such freedom (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017). Cattaneo used an effective metaphor to describe this: [w]hen huge power and huge wealth and honours are collected in the hands of a central authority, it is too easy to build or acquire the majority within a single parliament. Freedom becomes just a name: everything is done as between masters and servants. (Cattaneo 2010d; see also Arban 2017)

Although his federalism was rooted in his Lombard origin and partially shaped by the political and historical conflict between Lombardy and

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Piedmont (Lepre 1994; see also Arban 2017), at the same time it was free from any specific geographical connotation: in fact, Cattaneo was aware of the existence of different legal traditions across Italy and Europe, but for him federalism went beyond such differences to embrace a general political idea of freedom (Urbinati 2010). Cattaneo’s federal vision continuously evolved to adjust to the historical events taking place at the time. In fact, the philosopher and historian Norberto Bobbio (1909–2004), who extensively studied Cattaneo’s life and work, identified three phases of this intellectual evolution. The first federal moment coincided with Cattaneo’s younger age and ended with the insurrections of 1848 (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017) (incidentally, the Lombard insurrection went under the name of “Five Days of Milan” and erupted as a rebellion against the Austrian control of the city and the surrounding territory). At this stage, federalism mainly took a cultural nuance, since his political involvement was almost absent (Thom 2000). During this first phase, he opposed the despotic and centralised regime of the Habsburgs which, in his opinion, alienated citizens from institutions and prevented Lombardy from further development (Papa 2002; see also Arban 2017). In this regard, he used to refer to Vienna, the capital of the Empire, as “the ancient and whole nest of slavery” (Cattaneo 2010a; see also Arban 2017) and alleged that “any order that Austria can establish in Italy, is anarchy” (Cattaneo 1849; see also Arban 2017). While the region was already enjoying a relative well-being and prosperity, Cattaneo thought that Lombardy could continue to flourish only if the Austrian Empire would turn into a federation (Lovett 1972; Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017). The type of federation recommended by Cattaneo for Austria was devised as the first step towards the full independence of Lombardy (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017).Federalism was thus broadly construed as an ideology to apply to European politics at large, without talking about a federal solution specifically for Italy yet (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017). With the failure of the 1848 uprisings and the return of Lombardy under direct Austrian control, Cattaneo’s federalism entered a second phase, which would last until about 1860. At this stage, his federal project shifted towards the foundation of an Italian federation composed of all formerly independent entities. Cattaneo argued that “[e]ach Italian State shall remain free and sovereign … each population shall be at its own home, under the protection and supervision of all the others. This is what wise America teaches us” (Cattaneo 1849; see also Arban 2017).

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This federal scheme was viewed as the best way to achieve Italian unification. Because the two only models of classic federation existing at the time were the United States (with the 1787 constitution) and Switzerland (which had become a federation in 1848), Cattaneo looked at these two systems to elaborate a federal theory for Italy (Sabetti 2010; see also Arban 2017). The third moment began after the unification of Italy under the House of Savoy, with the extension to the whole territory of the laws and bureaucratic apparatus of the Kingdom of Piedmont, a process also referred to as the “Piedmontisation” of Italy that Cattaneo so much abhorred, saying that “among all our peoples there is an awareness that the present system, conceived for one state and not for a plurality of united states, is not sufficient to satisfy their needs (Cattaneo 1860; see also Arban 2017) and the dismissal of all federal solutions. With the failure of the federal project, from 1860 until his death Cattaneo completely concentrated his endeavours on the idea of devolution and decentralisation (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017). In other words, while still believing that federalism was the only possible way to unify Italy, he acknowledged the failure of this idea and worked towards some form of legislative and administrative autonomy of local self-governments (Urbinati 2010). Many scholars have tried to understand and explain the reasons for the defeat of Cattaneo’s federal project for Italy. For some, his project contrasted with the widespread idea that federalism was synonymous with disaggregation and weakening of the unity of the Italian territory: in fact, Mazzini and other patriots strongly believed that a federal structure for Italy would lead to civil wars or to the conquest through external wars (Ciuffoletti 1994). For this reason, Cattaneo and federalists in general were accused of “municipalism” since those who opposed federal ideas (the majority at the time) understood federalism as equal to breaking up the nation (Ciuffoletti 1994; Hine 1996; see also Arban 2017). This probably prevented a correct interpretation of federal theories (Colucci 2004). Similarly, because he criticised the creation of a unitary state, Cattaneo’s federal vision was seen as inappropriate and dangerous, especially considering the efforts that the Kingdom of Piedmont first, and the Kingdom of Italy later, were making to unify the territory (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017). Hence, Cattaneo was regarded as an opponent of the unitary state, and the same concept of federalism assumed this negative connotation of anti-unitary and anti-state principle, one that would spread a feudal system of state-nations that the Risorgimento was

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trying to eliminate (Colucci 2004; see also Arban 2017). Cattaneo often complained that in Italy there was a lack of true understanding of federalism and, since it was frequently opposed to unity, it was construed as a principle of isolation and separation and, as such, running counter the ideals of Risorgimento. Furthermore, at the time, there was some confusion in the language adopted: in fact, the terms “federation” and “confederation” were used as synonyms, when in fact they refer to two very distinct things, as illustrated in Chapter 1 (Colucci 2004; Arban 2017). Even Salvemini (see infra) lamented that the federal idea was “perfectly unknown” in Italy even by those who were supposed to have a good understanding of it (like constitutional law and administrative law scholars) (Salvemini 1955). Another reason that helps explain the failure of Cattaneo’s federal ideas was the way the Italian unification process was implemented: the urge to complete the national unification as soon as possible, and the need to benefit from the favourable international situation, pushed Camillo Benso, Conte di Cavour (one of the fathers of Italian unification and first prime minister of the Kingdom of Italy), to proceed without delay to the annexation of the various territories of the peninsula (the process dubbed the “Piedmontisation” of Italy, as recalled above) (Ciuffoletti 1994; Bobbio 2010). And even if Cavour was aware of the differences existing in Italy at the time, regions were feared for their anti-national forces and pressures they attempted to feed (Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Arban 2021). In other words, the creation of a federal state ex novo was perceived as requiring lots of time and energy, as well as economic and institutional efforts, and since there was no time to wait to implement that, all territories were quickly annexed by the Kingdom of Piedmont, which was then renamed Kingdom of Italy (Ziblatt 2004). Another explanation of the failure of Cattaneo’s federalism was its lack of active organisation and structure. Federalism was certainly supported by intellectuals, but it was not expounded into a theory that could be used by jurists or politicians (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017). Furthermore, Cattaneo had a very negative idea of politics, seeing it as “hatred” and “perpetual fight” (Bobbio 2010; see also Arban 2017) and deliberately chose to keep himself far from power and political activism, convinced that he could better serve his country through his intellectual and critical research (Urbinati 2010). Certainly, this did not help the federal cause for Italy, as there was nobody ready to support it politically.

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Finally, beyond a general exposition of his federal thought, Cattaneo did not leave behind any written work dealing with specific “federal” issues, like division of powers, which would clearly condense in one single document his federal vision for Italy (Papa 2002; see also Arban 2017). In other words, Cattaneo’s federal project was too indefinite and theoretical to be realised in practice. Thus, the fathers of unification could not rely on any written document clearly detailing how a federal Italy should look like. At this stage, another important figure of Italian Risorgimento is worth mentioning: Giuseppe Ferrari (1811–1876). Like Cattaneo, Ferrari was also born in Milan from an affluent family, and graduated in law from the University of Pavia, without however ever practicing the legal profession (Lovett 1979). A personal friend of Cattaneo, and good acquaintance with Proudhon, he spent part of his life in France where in 1838 he decided to settle by his own choice (Lovett 1979). Throughout his intellectual life, he took a radical position against Gioberti and the widespread Italian Catholic tradition (Lovett 1979). While he initially sympathised with Mazzini and his vision of a unified Italy under a republican and centralised form of government, Ferrari later came to criticise this theory of unity as well as Mazzini’s assumption that there was an underlying sense of unity among Italian people. In fact, Ferrari contended that since Italian history had been shaped by the Roman Empire and the papacy, which represented “universal and federal principles”, they could not be the basis for the unity of Italy; likewise, while there might be an underlying Italian culture, this was not enough to transform it into a political force (Lovett 1979). Similar to Cattaneo and Proudhon, Ferrari also advocated federalism for Italy under unification; however, differently than Proudhon—who contended that federalism had universal applicability— Ferrari claimed that federalist principles were not universally applicable, but they were certainly apt to the Italian case (Lovett 1979). In any event, beyond the rejection of federalism in Italy, federal ideas found obstacles across all Europe at the time, mainly because of the presence of national states of ancient tradition, of multinational empires, and of strong social tensions within each state. Therefore, except perhaps in Switzerland (which became a federation in 1848 following centuries of confederal arrangements among its cantons) and Germany (whose Länder first federated in 1871), advocates of federalism were seen as conspirators in a model that was against the idea of nation, and therefore defenders of “feudal particularism” and of “aristocratic privileges” (Ciuffoletti 1994).

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2.2 The 1861 Unification and the Formation of the Italian State 2.2.1

The Unification Process: Administrative Unification

As anticipated, the Italian state that emerged in the early 1860s mirrored the Piedmontese model which, of all the pre-existing states in the Italian peninsula, “was the most affected by the centralist policies of Napoleonic France” (Grottanelli de’ Santi 2006). Consequently, all federal or regional proposals were abandoned, so that “the united Italy of 1861 immediately took the form of a centralised system hostile to territorial specificities, impermeable to autonomistic claims, and intolerant of municipal and regional ‘particularism’” (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). Furthermore, as already pointed out, at least since 1858, “few inside Italy still held to federalism. Indeed, the democratic federalist argument was generally caricatured, with its adversaries depicting it as a narrow municipalism or … as neo-Guelph” (Thom 2000). The reasons that explain this choice of a unitary and centralised state are multifarious. In the first place, the newly created Kingdom of Italy was facing too many problems that called for a centralised structure: banditry, regional separatism (coming from certain regions both in the North and in the South), the fear of jeopardising a national unity that was still incomplete and precarious, and lack of trust for the self-governing capacities of local groups (Ciuffoletti 1994). Also, the Piedmontese model was extended to the whole peninsula because of the poverty of the economic, social, and civil infrastructures and texture of most of the country, because of the incompetence and unreliability of peripheral administrative personnel, and because of the hostility of the rural masses towards the new legal system, as if most of the population did not identify itself with the system implemented by the Piedmontese and felt rebellious towards it (Ciuffoletti 1994). The unification process was realised in two ways. First, with the “Laws for the administrative unification of the Kingdom” of 1865 (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012), through which the Piedmontese administrative model was extended to the whole peninsula. In particular, while the territory was divided into municipalities and provinces, these local autonomies were subject to a rigid state control, with mayors appointed by the King, the provincial administration governed by a “prefect” (who was a representative of the central government), and more in general the activities

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of local autonomies subject to state control (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Second, and quite importantly, with the Statuto Albertino, as sketched in the next section. 2.2.2

The Statuto Albertino

The Statuto Albertino inherited from Piedmont became the Basic Law that unified Italy and remained in force from 1861 to 1944. It owes its name to Carlo Alberto, King of Piedmont-Sardinia, who granted it in 1848 in the aftermath of European insurrections (Cassese 2012). It thus pre-dated Italian unification, being the “constitution” of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia (Cassese 2012). But the statuto was not a real constitution, since it was not enacted and approved by a parliament or popular assembly, but it was simply granted to the people by the King (Cassese 2012). This implies that Italians “did not participate at all in the choice of the structure that its new State was to assume” (Cassese 2012). Also, it was a “flexible” document, meaning that it did not contain any procedure detailing its amendment, so it could be modified by ordinary laws (Cassese 2012). Another weakness was that the statuto was not called constitution. In fact, the term constitution “evoked the French Revolution and traumatic events such as the constituent assemblies that were being convened in Paris in those very months” so the term statuto was seen as more “neutral” and “recalled Italian municipal tradition” (Cassese 2012). In other words, “[u]nited Italy did not give itself a constitution. Rather, it inherited the document” that had been in force in the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia (Cassese 2012). In any event, as noted by some scholars, the Piedmontese model offered at least two reasons for being imposed to the rest of the peninsula: first, the Kingdom of Piedmont was the only regime existing in Italy at the time having some institutional and administrative structure and, second, the Piedmontese legislation was among the most advanced of the time (Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Ziblatt 2004). 2.2.3

The Debate Over the Creation of Regions

I mentioned above how Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872), one of the heroes of Italian Risorgimento and unification, generally opposed a federal solution for Italy. However, while he was a strenuous and

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convinced advocate of the unitary principle, at the same time he acknowledged the importance of creating regions: in other words, for Mazzini, the unitary principle was not coterminous with centralisation (Ambrosini 1946–1947). In fact, he thought that the Italian state should recognise regions as an intermediate level of government between the central state and municipalities, each with their own economic and linguistic features (Ambrosini 1946–1947; see also Arban 2021). And while he thought that it would be impossible to implement in Italy a federal system akin to the US and Switzerland (as envisioned by Cattaneo), regionalisation could be a viable compromise, since the regional model would bring at least two advantages: on the one hand, it would remedy some of the problems created by centralisation, like for instance the slowing down of public life and, on the other hand, it would strengthen local sub-units (Ambrosini 1946–1947). But also Cavour, along with his minister of interior Marco Minghetti, were not opposed to the idea of creating a regional or decentralised scheme (Arban 2021). Minghetti favoured the creation of regions not only as administrative entities but also as “autarchic” entities vested with normative powers (Ambrosini 1946–1947; see also Arban 2021). For Minghetti, regions would “conciliate … the positions of those who wanted to preserve the great variety of trends, traditions, interests of those natural entities, and of those who dreamt of an administrative unification” without jeopardising the “unity and forces of the nation” (Santinello 2012). In other words, the idea was to forge a new model for unified Italy, something different than a pure centralised state or a classic federation, as embodied by the US and Swiss models (Ambrosini 1946–1947; see also Arban 2021). However, especially after the death of Cavour, these proposals were withdrawn, since there was a fear that a regionalisation would compromise the unity of the state which was still too fragile and needed to be solidified. Consequently, the parliament approved Law 2248/1865 on the municipal and provincial unification of the Kingdom of Italy, thus modelling the Italian state on the French scheme (Santinello 2012). 2.2.4

The Aftermath of Italian Unification

The years following the Italian unification presented complex issues. The new Kingdom of Italy remained weak mainly because, as noted, it had

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not emerged out of a popular revolution, but it was imposed by the Piedmontese from the top (Amoretti 2002), and this process did not help the emergence of a true Italian identity (Arban 2021). Therefore, even after unification, the various peoples that composed the mosaic of Italian society remained linked to local traditions (Lepre 1994). As Salvemini explained in 1900, forty years of unification only helped developing the aversion of the Northerners towards the Southerners and vice-versa; a situation that has remained largely unsolved to this date (Salvemini 1955). Also, the new political class that came to power after unification lacked administrative skills, and a massive number of inexperienced people entered administrative roles in the newly formed state (Lepre1994). And because there had been no popular revolution to swipe away the “old” political generation of bureaucrats, there was no replacement of the administrative class with new forces and ideas (Lepre 1994). When Cattaneo died in 1869, an economic and political crisis was plaguing Italy, so the whole centralised system was seriously challenged, since it appeared weak and incapable to validly face all these problems (Ciuffoletti 1994). Since unification and for several decades afterwards, requests for increased decentralisation were put on the table each time the liberal and centralised state created in 1861 was facing a crisis: from statesman and economist Stefano Jacini to politician Alberto Mario and many others, they all borrowed from Cattaneo’s ideas to propose some form of decentralisation and increase local autonomy, but this never resulted in a relaxation of the centralised form of state (Ciuffoletti 1994). 2.2.5

Gaetano Salvemini and the “Southern Question”

Until the 1890s, the thrust towards a broader decentralisation came mainly from Lombardy and the Northwest, which were the most industrialised areas of Italy, at least compared to the South which was still anchored to a quasi-medieval and rural economy. But towards the end of the nineteenth century, decentralisation became a driving force in the discussion of the Questione Meridionale (the Southern Question) (Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Davis 1996). Scholarship has defined such questione meridionale in the following terms: … an ensemble of problems created by the existence of a vast area within the Italian state, corresponding more or less to the regions of the former

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Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which since the dawn of the unified Italian State has presented … weaker economic development, less advanced social relations, and lower levels of key aspects of civil life than the Center and North of the country. Reciprocal prejudice between inhabitants of Italy’s North and South has accentuated the gap between the peninsula’s two main macro-areas … In consequence, no less today than in the past, the situation has undermined a sense of belonging to a single national community (Pescosolido 2017; see also Pescosolido 2019).

The backwardness of the South, especially when confronted with regions such as Lombardy, Piedmont or Liguria in the North, was the result of a concatenation of factors, including the latifundist estates that characterised agricultural production, widespread illiteracy, very poor infrastructures (especially roads and railways), and organised crime (Pescosolido 2019). Consequently, the idea that the economic and social backwardness of the South was caused by the strong centralism of the state, which implied the exploitation of the poorer South by the richer North, became increasingly popular, and many considered the forced unification of 1861 under the Piedmontese rule a grave error for Italy: an increased autonomy for Southern regions, if not some form of federal arrangement, was thus proposed as the solution to the problems, in particular by Salvemini (Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Arban 2017). Gaetano Salvemini (1873–1957) was born in Molfetta (Apulia) in 1873 and appointed professor of medieval and modern history at the University of Messina (Sicily) in 1901. He was later lecturer of Italian foreign policy at King’s College in London, before moving to the United States, where he taught at Harvard University (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006; Barbagallo 2007; see also Arban 2017). Inspired by the work of Cattaneo, Salvemini delved into the concept of “region” as an intermediate step between municipalities and the (federal) state: all the work he produced on the Southern question revolved around the idea that only a federal solution could solve the problems faced by the centralised state; for him, federalism was the only administrative system that could eliminate the economic and financial unbalances between the various territories in Italy (Salvemini 1955; Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Arban 2017). Salvemini acknowledged that federalism had the potential to favour the education of rural masses and the growth of political awareness among farmers in the South (Barbagallo 2007; see also Arban

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2017). Also, a federal scheme would allow the creation of solidaritybased relationships among the various regions, inspired by a sense of justice which was guaranteed by the detachment of federal institutions from local issues (Salvemini 1955). Even corruption, so pervasive in that part of the country, was for him a “necessary consequence of centralism” (Salvemini 1955). Furthermore, Salvemini believed that a federal solution would help resolve all issues of “distributive justice” between the North and the South (Salvemini 1955). Salvemini identified the centralised state as one of the three “illnesses” that afflicted Southern Italy, along with its “semifeudal structure” that prevented people from developing their skills at self-government and the economic oppression coming from the North (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006; see also Arban 2017): consequently, only a drastic reform of Italian politics would help solve the problem (Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). The priority was thus to implement the following: (a) a federal-like structure in the form of administrative autonomy; and (b) universal suffrage, to help rural and middle-class masses to take part in public life (Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). In fact, Salvemini believed that federalism and universal suffrage could play a role in educating the masses, since in federal systems citizens were involved in public life, and relied on their own initiative and not on a distant authority (Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). Pursuant to the proposed decentralisation, the central government would exclusively deal with issues like foreign policy, monetary policy, civil, criminal, and commercial legislation, while areas like education, army, police, and financial administration should fall within regional and municipal competences (Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). He also contended that it was important to leave to municipalities and regional governments the control over roads, waters, judicial system, education, public order, and finance and in general all subjects not related to foreign policy, customs policy, monetary policy, and items of very general interest (Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). Salvemini thus believed that a renaissance of the South of Italy would be possible only through the dismantling of a centralised public administration. Yet, his encounter with Giustino Fortunato (1848–1932), who was a prominent historian and politician who dedicated his work to study the socio-economic problems of Southern Italy after unification, started undermining his belief (Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). In fact, for Fortunato, the backwardness of the south as opposed to the rest of the country was linked to its natural (i.e. physical, geographical,

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climatic) traits that would be difficult to change without some form of state intervention (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006). Furthermore, he thought that federalism would not provide the remedy for the long-standing problems of the South, since any form of local autonomy acknowledged by the Italian state would open the possibility for local elites to increase their powers (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006; Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). Therefore, while still emphasising the democratic value of autonomy, Salvemini started to believe that federalism as a system of government and process would take a longer time to realise, so it could best be promoted and implemented incrementally, at different stages (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006; see also Arban 2017). Echoing Cattaneo, Salvemini also believed that there was a lack of “sound current of federalist thought” in Italy (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006), and federalism should be adopted not only as an objective, but also as a method “consistent with the ends being pursued” (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006; Salvemini 1955; see also Arban 2017). However, even Salvemini had to eventually admit that, at the time of unification, a federal system of public administration would not be viable, because various parts of the country needed bureaucratic protection in order to modernise (Lacaita and Sabetti 2006; see also Arban 2017). Unfortunately, the central administration was deaf to such claims and attempted to solve the problems plaguing the South with specifically targeted interventions (Salvemini 1955; Ciuffoletti 1994; see also Arban 2017). In conclusion, and as I argued elsewhere (Arban 2017), it is possible to emphasise some differences and similarities between Cattaneo and Salvemini in the way they conceived federalism. For one thing, Cattaneo’s federal vision was more overarching, in the sense that his focus was not limited to Lombardy or Italy, but it extended to the rest of European countries and to a project of creating the “United States of Europe”. Salvemini, on the other hand, focused more on the South of Italy and on the benefices that a federal pattern would bring to that specific area of the country. Furthermore, for Cattaneo, federalism was the vector to achieve freedom (as noted, federalism was for him a “theory of freedom”), both for the individual and for the public sphere, whereas for Salvemini federalism was the vector for the rural masses in the South to emancipate and become more active and involved in the events directly affecting them. To a certain extent, it could be said that, while Cattaneo had a rather idealised, romantic and as such abstract understanding of federalism, Salvemini at least attempted to put forth some more concrete

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proposal of how federalism would benefit the South, at least in regard to division of powers. At the same time, both Cattaneo and Salvemini saw federalism as a mean to enhance the human being both as individual and as part of a larger community. Finally, it is worth pointing out that some of the “evils” or “illnesses” that both Cattaneo and Salvemini wanted to solve through federalism (like the gap between the North and the South or excessive bureaucracy) represent problems still existing today, and this shows the value and modernity of their vision (Arban 2017). 2.2.6

Catholic Church and Local Self-Government

Also some Catholic thinkers favoured forms of regional decentralisation. For instance, pursuant to the teaching contained in the encyclical Rerum Novarum authored by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 (see Chapter 1), the Sicilian priest Don Luigi Sturzo (1871–1959) advocated a regional administrative decentralisation for Sicily and for the whole South, so that this part of the country could also find its way to overcome the economic and social crisis afflicting it (Ciuffoletti 1994). Founder of Partito Popolare Italiano (People’s Party), Sturzo encouraged regional institutions to be elected by universal and direct suffrage, instead of by the central government; he also believed that regional entities should not become state entities with delegated powers from the centre, but should be autonomous within the limits of the laws; likewise, regional institutions should enjoy a certain fiscal autonomy, allowing them to levy their own taxes, manage the funds, and be able to have regulatory and legislative powers to legislate locally and within their territory, so that regions would not be simply decentralised peripheral entities, but autonomous administrative units (Santinello 2012). 2.2.7

The First Post-war Period

More than federal proposals, petitions for regional autonomy constantly resurfaced each time there was a crisis in the relationship between the state and society, not only within Italy, but at European level as well (Ciuffoletti 1994). For example, after the outbreak of the First World War, between 1913 and 1914, the fear of an impending war revived the federal discourse as the ideal mean to defuse nationalist and imperialist discourses (Ciuffoletti 1994). And even if several thinkers of the past like Kant and Cattaneo had already advocated it, the idea of a European federation was becoming

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increasingly popular to settle the conflicting relationships among European nation states. Most thinkers of the time agreed on the fact that post-war Europe had to be rebuilt pursuant to economic integration and with the abolition of internal customs barriers (Ciuffoletti 1994). But the first post-war period saw a renewal of federal (or regional) ideas in Italy too. The impact of this disastrous war, and the consequent rise of fascism, led many intellectuals to question again the structure and origins of the Kingdom of Italy during Risorgimento (Lovett 1972). Moreover, the annexation to Italy after the war of new territories having diverse administrative traditions (like Trento, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Carinzia, and Carniola) was another reason why mild federal-oriented forces timidly appeared at the time (Ciuffoletti 1994). Another thorny issue for Italy in the first post-war period was bureaucracy. In fact, since unification, Italy had transformed into a highly complex bureaucratic system which was hindering the development of the territory, since each region or geographic area (particularly the newly annexed territories) was confronted with diverse problems that a strongly centralised and bureaucratic system could not efficiently face (Ciuffoletti 1994). In the early 1920s, a proposal in regional terms was in fact discussed in parliament, targeting in particular the so-called terre redente (the aforementioned territories annexed to Italy after the war, which already enjoyed some autonomy, in particular Trento and Trieste). Also in the South, especially in Sicily and Sardinia, claims for more autonomy were voiced by some autonomous movements (Ambrosini 1946–1947; Ciuffoletti 1994). Yet, while the time seemed ripe for a reform in regional/federal terms, the advent of fascism in the 1920s suffocated these programmes, suppressing all autonomy claims and reiterating the authority of a strongly centralised state (Ciuffoletti 1994; Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). In fact, the 1926 fascist reform deeply changed the functioning of municipalities and provinces, as all municipal administrative powers were concentrated in the hands of a podestà (an official appointed by the king) with a parallel extension of the powers of the prefetto, as “the interpreter within the province of the political program of the State” (Santinello 2012). 2.2.8

The Post-fascism Period

Until the second world war, Italy retained a very centralised constitutional system, with ministers based in Rome and “locally peripheral structures on

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a hierarchical basis” where each province had a prefect vested with considerable powers to execute the orders coming from the central government (Grottanelli de’ Santi 2006). With the end of fascism, most Italian federalists preferred to concentrate on the supra-national, rather than the national, dimension of federalism (Ciuffoletti 1994). As founders of the Italian and European federal movement, Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986) and Ernesto Rossi (1897–1967) most likely drew inspiration from Cattaneo for their political ideas. In their Manifesto di Ventotene, authored in 1941, they criticised the system of “nation-states” that was, in their opinion, the principal cause of wars. In fact, they alleged that “[t]he absolute sovereignty of national States has led to the desire of each of them to dominate, since each feels threatened by the strength of the others” (Spinelli and Rossi 2005). Therefore, the first thing to do was “the definitive abolition of the division of Europe into national, sovereign States” (Spinelli and Rossi 2005). They also fostered the “disappearance of some of the most important dynasties” which represented “a serious obstacle to the rational organization of the United States of Europe, which can only be based on the republican constitution of federated countries” (Spinelli and Rossi 2005). However, they continued, in order to have a solid federal State, it would be required to have a “European armed service instead of national armies”, and it would be necessary for the new organisation to have “sufficient means to see that its deliberation for the maintenance of common order are executed in the individual federal states, while each State will retain the autonomy it needs for a plastic articulation and development of political life according to the particular characteristics of the various peoples” (Spinelli and Rossi 2005).

2.3

The 1948 Constitution and the Regional State 2.3.1

The Constituent Assembly

The fascist regime in Italy fell in July 1943, Mussolini was arrested and a new government was established. This was a direct consequence of the devastating trajectory that the war had taken for the Kingdom of Italy, as a result of some disastrous military campaigns, heavy bombings over Italian cities, and a general sense of demoralisation among the Italian people. However, the events that took place following the fall of fascism are complex and still debated among historians. In September 1943, the

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Kingdom of Italy surrendered to the Allies by signing the Armistice of Cassibile. While the Allies were in the South, Germany freed Mussolini and occupied the North, where they established a puppet state called Italian Social Republic, led by the same Mussolini, which lasted until the surrender of the German troops in May 1945. In the confused aftermath that followed the end of the war, on 2 June 1946, the Italian people were called to vote on a referendum to choose between a republican and a monarchical form of State: the republican front won the vote by a slight majority, so monarchy was rejected and a republican form of state was implemented (Pinelli 2006). On that same day, they were also called to select the members of the Constituent Assembly, whose main objective was to draft a new constitution and create a new democratic and republican state premised on local self-government and individual values (Arban 2021). Once again, a discussion ensued on the value of creating regions, and which legislative powers and financial autonomy they should be granted (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Mangiameli 2014). However, positions within the Constituent Assembly diverged on this issue. On the one hand, there was the left, mainly represented by the Communist Party (“PCI”) and the Socialist Party (“PSI”), who sought “strong State intervention and planned nationalisations in the economic field” (Pinelli 2006). On the other hand, the centre-right represented mainly by the Christian Democrats (“DC”), advocated ideals of “freedom and dignity”, and favoured a development of the territorial dimension of the peoples (Pinelli 2006). It is important to point out, however, that before the election of the Constituent Assembly, special forms of autonomy had already been granted to certain territories. For example, in 1944 Sicily and Sardinia—the two largest islands and, as such, geographically disadvantaged territories—were provided with temporary institutions, like a high commissioner (nominated by the Prime Minister) and a regional chamber “representative of the local political, economic, union, and cultural organisations” (Santinello 2012). In 1946, a charter for Sicily was also drafted considering the potential independentist threats existing in the territory that would grant the island ample legislative powers (Delledonne and Monti 2019): later, such charter was adapted as a special statute of autonomy (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019; Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Mangiameli 2014; Ferrara and Scarpone 2014; Martines et al. 2019). Likewise, in order to tame separatist movements and better deal with the unique linguistic, geographical, and economic conditions of Valle

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d’Aosta, in 1945 such territory was transformed into an “autonomous district” enjoying particular forms of administrative autonomy in specific subject matters (Santinello 2012; Ferrara and Scarpone 2014; Delledonne and Monti 2019). Finally, in 1946, through to the so-called De GasperiGruber agreement between Italy and Austria which protected the German speaking minorities in South Tyrol (and later included in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty), special conditions of autonomy were granted by the Italian and Austrian governments to the region (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019; Martines et al. 2019; Delledonne and Monti 2019). Such autonomist or independentist movements had one common aspect, that is, a reaction towards the past fascist regime which, as often happens with dictatorships, had suppressed local languages and identities in an attempt to uniformise differences (Delledonne and Monti 2019). 2.3.2

The 1948 Constitution: The Regional State

A new constitution for Italy was implemented in 1948 creating a regional state—a compromise between centralism and federalism—with the aim to remedy the excessive centralisation existed until then (Ciuffoletti 1994). As one scholar argued, this constitution was “the product of hard times, the most genuine reaction to a moral disaster”; it was also written “in a vacuum” since, differently than Japan and West Germany, “Western Allies did not intervene in Italy’s decision-making process” (Pinelli 2006). The constitutional asset that the constituent fathers gave to Italy in 1948 is considered the first example of regional state. Yet, a similar form of regional government had already been created in Spain with the 1931 constitution, although it was never fully implemented because of the civil war that broke up in the country in 1936 (Arban 2021). Such Spanish experience, along with other defunct or still existing federal models in Europe, were sources of inspiration. In this regard, it is often argued that the regional state implemented in 1948—and the regions so created—was an invention of the Constituent Assembly and particularly of the genius of Gaspare Ambrosini (Arban 2021). However, as suggested by Martines et al., this claim should perhaps be nuanced. In fact, at least in theory, the Constituent Assembly was free to choose whatever form of state they deemed appropriate for Italy: after all, the June 1946 election gave its members full mandate by the Italian people and as such it enjoyed full constituent powers (Martines et al. 2019). Yet, a decision was made to build on previous

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discussions, especially those on the opportunity to create regions as occurred a few decades early at the time of unification and propounded by Mazzini, Cavour, and Minghetti (Martines et al. 2019). Furthermore, quite influential were also the ideas on regional autonomy made by Don Sturzo, since the regional state was at the basis of the political programme of his Partito Popolare (Martines et al. 2019). Like it was the case with Cattaneo whom, as noted, had a traditional idea of federalism in line with classic liberalism, Sturzo’s thought was also inspired by classic liberalism, coupled by his personal preoccupation for the South. This played a crucial role at the time of the discussions on regionalism during the constituent assembly. However, since the founding fathers had a rather old-fashioned understanding of regionalism, to a certain extent it undermined its implementation, as I will explain in a moment. With the post-war constitution, Italy was divided into twenty regions, five of them having special status, while the remainder regions being “ordinary”. As noted by D’Atena, the same term “region” used to identify the territorial units so created was a direct consequence of the influence of Spanish regionalism although this nomen was already used at the time of unification (D’Atena 2014). Pursuant to article 116, these five regions enjoyed “particular forms and conditions of autonomy, according to their statuti adopted with constitutional law”. The five special regions are: Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste. Their special status allowed them to have “immediate autonomy reflective of comparative geographic isolation, prior legislative and administrative self-sufficiency, and linguistic minorities” (Del Duca and Del Duca 2006). By 1948, the statuti of Sicily, Sardinia, Valle d’Aosta, and Trentino-South Tyrol were already in force. The statuto of Friuli Venezia Giulia, on the other hand, was approved only in 1963, at the end of the international monitoring phase of Trieste after the war (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019; Ferrara and Scarpone 2014; Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012).2 2 The capital city of Friuli Venezia Giulia is Trieste. Pursuant to the Peace Treaties ending the second world war, Trieste and its province became a free territory (the Free Territory of Trieste, in Italian Territorio Libero di Trieste) and divided in zones A and B; its purpose was to accommodate the ethnically and culturally mixed population living in the area, and at the same time tame the territorial tensions between Italy and Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of the “Memorandum of Understanding” between Italy, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia signed in London in 1954, Italy was granted the administration of zone A, while Yugoslavia was granted the administration of zone B. In 1975,

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A combination of linguistic divide, secessionist/autonomist movements, geographical position, and international obligations thus explains and justifies the creation of the five special regions. However, the level of autonomy enjoyed by each special region is different, since the system of powers enshrined in each regional statuto is bilaterally negotiated with the central authorities. Consequently, Trentino-South Tyrol and Valle d’Aosta have a much stronger “autonomist consciousness” which has translated into a greater degree of legislative and fiscal autonomy, to the point that they are in fact the two most autonomous regions (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). Sicily and Sardinia, on the other hand, have over time developed a stronger dependence—especially at fiscal/financial level— from the central state, fortified also by the creation of stronger political ties with national institutions; Friuli Venezia Giulia also has a weaker scope of autonomy (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). Conversely, ordinary regions were either “originally independent states before Italian unification” or “laid out according to different criteria” (like the “geographical definition of railway areas”) (Grottanelli de’ Santi 2006). In any event, all regions were basically “the creations of politicians and jurists of the Constituent Assembly and not a constitutional response to a pressing popular demand, nor were they the negotiated result of a compromise to reach a new constitutional settlement” (Grottanelli de’ Santi 2006). 2.3.3

Special and Ordinary Regions

Special and ordinary regions diverge in a few traits, the most striking among them being the different constitutional rank of regional charters or statuti: in fact, statuti of special regions are bilaterally negotiated and have the rank of a constitutional law, making them stronger in the hierarchy of norms and more difficult to change, whereas charters of ordinary regions are simple regional laws (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). Second, under the constitutional framework emerged in 1948, special regions were granted broader legislative powers, all listed in their statuti and often being exclusive in nature; ordinary regions, on the other hand, could legislate only in a limited number of areas, and within the framework set by national laws (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). the Treaty of Osimo between Italy and Yugoslavia finally settled the borders between the two countries around Trieste (ex multis, see Ottaviano 1971; Martines et al. 2019).

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As for administrative powers, special and ordinary regions enjoyed the same autonomy: in fact, the 1948 constitution introduced the so-called principle of parallelism whereby all regions (through municipalities and provinces) were vested with all administrative functions in subject matters falling within their legislative powers (Ferrara and Scarpone 2014; Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). In the ambit of fiscal autonomy, the 1948 constitution granted all regions full autonomy with regard to expenditures, and a much more limited autonomy with regard to revenues. Yet, statuti of special regions could provide for broader “financing channels” (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012) to the point that they “receive much more favourable financial treatment” (D’Atena 2014). In any event, while maintaining the classification between special and ordinary regions, the 2001 constitutional reform, detailed in Chapter 3, has reduced the gap between them. Some scholars were unconvinced about the regional structure as emerged in the aftermath of the 1948 constitution. For example, Piras outlined how the provisions on regions lacked a clear scope, and therefore, there was no organic project articulated in the provisions on regionalism (Piras 1971). Similarly, as mentioned, commentators noted how the 1948 regions did not correspond to homogeneous historical realities, being neither the “seven entities from which Italy was unified in the 1860s, nor do they correspond in any comprehensive way to prior entities”: therefore, these regions “have not joined to create a State. Rather, the State through its institutions continues to birth and shape its Regions as meaningful political and governmental units” (Del Duca and Del Duca 2006). Other scholars talked about regions as “artificial constructions” and “imposed from the top” (Desideri 2014). The one just outlined was the arrangement contained in the 1948 constitution, and it is commonly referred to as regional State, or a “compromise between the centralized State, which had existed in Italy since unification, and a looser federal State” (Rogoff 1997). In addition to the twenty regions, the territory was further divided into provinces (which are subdivisions of regions) and municipalities, composed of towns and urban and rural districts, which represent the “basic governmental unit[s]” (Rogoff 1997). At the time of writing, there are 110 provinces and a bit less than 8,000 municipalities.

2

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The Implementation of the Regional Model in the 1970s

The purpose of the regional design contained in the 1948 constitution was to depart from the strong centralised model existing since unification and strengthened during the Mussolini dictatorship. The 1948 constitution aimed at recognising the importance of local self-government, especially considering the cultural, economic, linguistic, and social fragmentation that had characterised Italy over the centuries (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). To do so, the 1948 constitution was (and still is) grounded on a “pluralist principle” (Mirabelli 2006). One very important provision contained in the 1948 constitution is enshrined in article 5, mandating that: The Republic is one and indivisible. It recognises and promotes local autonomies, and implements the fullest measure of administrative decentralisation in those services which depend on the State. The Republic adapts the principles and methods of its legislation to the requirements of autonomy and decentralisation.

Despite the provisions on regionalism contained in the constitution, the Italian territorial organisation continued to be characterised by a “strong centralist thrust” (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). In fact, although the constitution granted legislative powers on matters such as agriculture, public works, tourism, and urban planning also to ordinary regions, these were “little more than paper entities” while they had no powers to levy taxes and depended entirely on the central state (Del Duca and Del Duca 2006). More importantly, the provisions on regionalism contained in the new constitution needed the legislative action of the parliament, something that went missing for a long time (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). In fact, except for the five special regions, the regional State became a reality only in the early 1970s, when implementing legislation was enacted by parliament, and financial resources were transferred from the centre to the periphery for the functioning of such entities. In the years immediately after its first election, the Italian Parliament was reticent in actualising the regional state. In addition to a political clash existing in the post-war period between the two major party coalitions (the Christian Democrats and the Communists), which had opposite views on regionalisation (Del Duca and Del Duca 2006), other factors help explain this delay, from the need to rebuild the country, significantly devastated after the war, to the

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necessity to put in place economic and social measures that needed strong central action, to the failed reform of central state entities and organs (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Consequently, not only the implementation of ordinary regions was not seen as a priority, but also the already existing special regions found themselves “reshaped” and their privileges reduced by the central government (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Only in 1970, regional councils of the ordinary regions were elected, so that the regional model envisaged by the constitution became operative. This change of attitude was probably due to a transformed stance by political parties towards regions and local governments; a change that was dubbed “constitutional thaw” (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Yet, despite the creation of regional governments in the 1970s, the system remained quite centralist, also because article 127 of the constitution contained a “national interest” clause that was often used by the national government to justify legislation on subject matters supposedly assigned to the regions (Groppi and Scattone 2006). However, the advent of regions marked a “radical innovation in the local administration” of the state: in fact, until the early 1970s, local administration was nothing but the “expression of a public administration conceived in a unitary fashion” and State power “completely dominated the public administration scene” (Berti 1971). In conclusion, this chapter showed how theories of federalism, regionalism and to a certain extent sub-state nationalism all played a role and shaped the regional model implemented in 1948, even when some specific solutions (like a fully-fledged federal scheme) were rejected. The next chapter will delve more thoroughly on the constitutional reform of 2001 and the future of regionalism in Italy.

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Del Duca, Louis F., and Patrick Del Duca. 2006. An Italian Federalism?— The State, Its Institutions and National Culture as Rule of Law Guarantor. American Journal of Comparative Law 54: 799–841. Delledonne, Giacomo, and Matteo Monti. 2019. Secessionist Impulses in the Italian Legal System: The (Non)Influence of the Secession Reference. In The Canadian Contribution to a Comparative Law of Secession. Legacies of the Quebec Secession Reference, ed. Giacomo Delledonne and Giuseppe Martinico, 185–207. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Desideri, Carlo. 2014. A Short History of Regionalism in Italy Since the Republican Constitution. Italian Regionalism and Its Evolution. In Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary and Federal Processes, ed. Stelio Mangiameli, 35–65. Cham: Springer. Eva, Fabrizio. 1999. Deconstructing Italy: (Northern) Italians and Their New Perception of Territoriality. GeoJournal 48: 101–107. Fabbrini, Sergio, and Marco Brunazzo. 2003. Federalizing Italy: The Convergent Effects of Europeanization and Domestic Mobilization. Regional and Federal Studies 13: 100–120. Ferrara, Antonio, and Davide Scarpone. 2014. The Special Regions and the Autonomous Provinces. In Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes, ed. Stelio Mangiameli, 111–135. Cham: Springer. Gioberti, Vincenzo. 1866. Del primato morale e civile degli italiani. Napoli: Morano. Groppi, Tania, and Nicoletta Scattone. 2006. Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle. International Journal of Constitutional Law 4: 131–137. Grottanelli de’ Santi, Giovanni. 2006. The Italian Variant of Federalism. In Patterns of Regionalism and Federalism. Lessons for the UK, ed. Jörg Fedtke and Basil S. Markesinis, 3–16. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing. Hine, David. 1996. Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective. In Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy, 109–129. Oxford and Washington, DC: Berg. Hueglin, Thomas O. 1979. Johannes Althusius: Medieval Constitutionalist or Modern Federalist. Publius 9: 9–41. Lacaita, Carlo, and Filippo Sabetti, eds. 2006. Civilization and Democracy: The Salvemini Anthology of Cattaneo’s Writings. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Lepre, Aurelio. 1994. Italia, Addio? Unità e disunità dal 1860 a oggi. Milano: Mondadori. Lepschy Anna L., Lepschy Giulio, and Miriam Voghera. 1996. Linguistic Variety in Italy. In Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics, ed. Carl Levy, 69–80. Oxford and Washington, DC: Berg.

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CHAPTER 3

Italian Regionalism: The 2001 Constitutional Reform and Beyond

In this chapter, I illustrate how the Italian regional template distils lessons from several theoretical experiences such as federalism, regionalism, substate nationalism, the European unification process, as well as the unitary or centralised models. Emerged mainly from the socio-economic tensions between the North and the South, Italian regionalism can be seen as the quintessential model of regional state, an innovative experiment crafted by those who were looking for a compromise between the federal and the unitary templates, both rejected as not ideal to address the unique complexities of the Italian society (Arban 2021). The resurgence of federal ideas in the early 1990s is the result of a process started some years earlier and led by Lega Nord (“LN”); although other motives exist, the roots of this revival are mostly political and economic, and this makes the trajectory of Italian regionalism quite unique compared to other experiences, which were mainly pushed by linguistic and ethnic reasons (see Spain, Belgium, United Kingdom, and Canada, among others).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Arban, Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31543-5_3

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3.1 The Path to the 2001 Constitutional Reform: The Resurgence of Federal Ideas In the last part of Chapter 2 I noted how, in the aftermath of the creation of the regional state, many were critical about the actual viability of the regional model created with the 1948 constitution. However, throughout the decades from the 1950s to the 1980s, the Italian political scene had been dominated by three main parties, the Christian Democrats (“DC”), the Communist Party (“PCI”), and the Socialist Party (“PSI”), with the former being in power most of the time (Amoretti 2002). Such parties had different views on regionalism and decentralisation, often switching positions in favour and against it. Yet, none of these parties was actually a regionalist or federalist party, and federalism was absent from their political agendas. Yet, attempts to strengthen the position of regions at political level were often put forth independently from party lines, especially in the early 1970s after the actual creation of regional governments, since such implementation left many regions unsatisfied with the powers granted to them (Leonardi 1992). For this reason, some initiatives were launched by local political leaders, particularly by the three regional presidents Bassetti (Lombardia), Fanti (Emilia Romagna), and Lagorio (Tuscany), who belonged to each of the three major political parties of the time (DC, PCI, and PSI, respectively) (Leonardi 1992). A regionalist front catalysed around these leaders that advocated increased regional powers at the central level (Leonardi 1992). An Interparliamentary Commission for the Regions was also created at the time, with Fanti as President, to hear regional voices and propose new reforms (Leonardi 1992). Finally, a major reform on devolution of powers to the regions was passed thanks to a transversal agreement among the three major parties (Leonardi 1992). Incidentally, it was in fact Fanti who first used the term Padania to refer to the regions surrounding the Po Valley. Padania would then become one of the most cherished concepts of LN, as I will further illustrate in Chapter 4. In the revival of federal ideas in Italy, a key theoretical role was played by Gianfranco Miglio (1918–2001), a constitutional law scholar and political scientist who spent his academic career at Università Cattolica in Milan. In those years, Miglio was known as the LN’s main ideologist, although his collaboration with the party was short-lived. The interest that Miglio had for federalism as a solution for Italy dated back to the time antecedent the Constituent Assembly (Maestri 2011). When the

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regional model was put in place in 1948, Miglio became a harsh critic of regions, mainly because of the lack of their historical value: in the alternative, he proposed the creation of cantons, following the Swiss model (Maestri 2011). In the early 1980s, along with other four academics, Miglio worked again on proposing a constitutional reform for Italy, something that concretely contributed to the debate on institutional reforms (Maestri 2011). But it was in the 1990s that he became a well-known protagonist of the political scene, also because of his direct political involvement as senator, first with Lega Lombarda (Lombard League, before it became Lega Nord), and then with Partito Federalista (Federalist Party) which he founded after breaking up with Lega Nord following disagreements with Bossi (Maestri 2011; Spallino 2017). Among his production on federalism, I will recall here his Modello di Costituzione Federale per gli Italiani (Model for a federal constitution for Italians), which he presented in December 1994 (Spallino 2017). His purpose was to illustrate theoretical aspects linked to federalism, since he believed that it was the only model that would allow Italy to emancipate from the corrupted and inefficient system then in place (Spallino 2017). In fact, for him, Italy and its people were too heterogeneous, and therefore, the interests and priorities of the different regions were considerable different from one another; also, absent a history of unity, there was no real aspiration for a geographical and historical unity (Spallino 2017). Likewise, the malfunctioning and slow bureaucracy made the centralised state modelled on France unsuitable (Spallino 2017). He also believed that it was not possible to insert federal elements into a constitution—like that of 1948— which was intended to create a different state template, hence the need to re-write a federal constitution (Spallino 2017). Building on his ideas as developed at the time of the constituent assembly, his federal vision for Italy included the establishment of a federal covenant among the political and territorial units of the Italian federation—the cantons—composed of the fifteen ordinary regions grouped together in three macro-areas: the Po Valley (composed of Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna); Central Italy (composed of Toscana, Umbria, Lazio, Marche); and Southern Italy (composed of Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria) (Spallino 2017). The autonomy of the five special regions would be preserved within such federal model (Spallino 2017). In any event, starting from the late 1980s, the economic, political, and social context, in Italy and globally, started to change radically due to a concatenation of events, including the end of communism in Eastern

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Europe (which brought major changes also to the Italian party system) and the strengthening of the EU project with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht. It was in this context of deep national and supra-national transformations that LN, which had emerged from the fusion of some regional leagues, began to introduce federalism in its agenda, especially to empower regions in the north and allow them to be more competitive at global level. Such contextual changes and the trajectory of LN in those years will be sketched more in detail in Chapter 4. 3.1.1

The Bicameral Committee

When federalism became part of the LN’s political agenda, the first reaction of other political actors was rather negative, because federalism was associated with the anti-state and anti-national approach maintained by the LN, which was very critical of centralisation of power in Rome and of the South of Italy. However, after an initial ostracism, other parties decided to embrace federal ideas, to the point that federalism became some sort of “political obligation for all political forces” in this transition process (Roux 2008). Yet, the 2001 constitutional reform cannot be fully understood without analysing the initiatives taken before then, including the Bicameral Committee and the reorganisation of public powers of 1997, which paved the way to the constitutional reform (Cartei and Ferraro 2002). In January 1997, the Italian Parliament established a committee composed of both senators and deputies and charged with the implementation of constitutional reforms under the guidance of Massimo D’Alema (Rogoff 1997). The Commission was entrusted with the reframing of local self-government, but also with the revision of Part II of the constitution, especially the form of state, the form of government and bicameralism, and the system of constitutional guarantees (Rogoff 1997; Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). The establishment of the Bicameral Committee was fuelled by demands for more regional autonomy as voiced by the LN, but reforms in federal terms were supported also by Forza Italia (“FI”), the party founded by Silvio Berlusconi in 1993 also well rooted in Northern Italy (especially Lombardy). Among the reforms recommended by the Bicameral Committee, there was the development of local autonomy by granting regions residuary legislative powers, but it rejected the proposal of transforming the Senate into a Chamber representing regional governments (a sort of federal

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Senate): eventually, a decision was made not to pursue the reforms proposed by the Bicameral Committee (Pinelli 2006; Bull and Pasquino 2007). Other institutional reforms were debated both before and after the works of the Bicameral Committee. For example, in 1976, the then secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, Bettino Craxi, proposed a “Great Reform” of the constitution, which was followed in 1985 by the Bozzi Committee (tasked with proposing a reform of Part II of the constitution), in 1992 during the XI legislature by the De Mita/Iotti Committee, and in 1994 during the XII legislature by a study committee on institutional, electoral, and constitutional reforms chaired by the then Minister Speroni (Bull and Pasquino 2007). 3.1.2

The Restructuring of Public Administration

Law 59/1997, also known as the First Bassanini Law (from the name of the Minister for Regional Affairs and Public Administration who proposed the bill), transferred administrative powers to regions and local authorities (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). Specifically, the law conferred to regions, provinces, and municipalities “all functions and administrative duties relative to care of the interests and promotion of the respective communities’ development” (Del Duca and Del Duca 2006). Law 59/1997 was propelled by subsidiarity, which had become one of the fundamental principles of EU law when enshrined in the TEU (Cartei and Ferraro 2002). According to the Bassanini Law, the central government should grant all administrative tasks and functions to municipalities, provinces, and mountain communities, except for those tasks and functions incompatible with the local dimension. This principle applies to both the State and the regions, meaning that the latter might defer their own functions to local autonomies unless a unitary action is needed, in which case the region will act (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). The Bassanini reform was dubbed a “federal reform with unchanged Constitution” or “administrative federalism with unchanged Constitution” meaning that it introduced some federal elements into the Italian legal system without amending the constitution (Desideri 2014). In the same year, Law 127 (also referred to as Second Bassanini Law) was passed, with the goal of simplifying administrative practices, decision-making, and control procedures (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003).

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3.1.3

Other Pre-2001 Reforms

Other provisions were approved in those years to implement some of the basic principles contained in Law 59/1997. For example, administrative functions in the area of health care and cultural matters were transferred to regions with Law 112/1998, and a complex reorganisation of the ministerial system, including the reduction of the number of state structures, was brought by Laws 300/1999 and 303/1999 (Cartei and Ferraro 2002). Also very important was the introduction of the direct election of the presidents of the regions with constitutional law 1/1999, which was preceded by a 1993 reform introducing the direct election of mayors (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003; Desideri 2014). Constitutional law 1/1999 also amended articles 122 and 123 bringing significant changes to election powers and to statuti of ordinary regions, as more thoroughly detailed in the next section. Finally, Law 56/2000 granted new and broader financial competences to the regions (Cartei and Ferraro 2002). 3.1.4

Provisions on the Functioning of Regions

Articles 121–126 of the constitution include provisions regulating the institutional organisation of regions. These articles were significantly altered in 1999 by constitutional law n. 1, which granted more powers to these entities and anticipated the constitutional amendments of 2001. • Regional bodies (article 121 Const.) Article 121 identifies the official bodies of the region and their main functions and spheres of competence. They include: the regional council (consiglio regionale, the elected legislative assembly), the regional executive (giunta), and the regional president (who is the president of the giunta) (article 121(1)). The role of consiglio regionale is to perform the legislative functions of the region, as well as “the other functions attributed to it” by the constitution and by other laws. Although the consiglio regionale enjoys legislative functions, the Italian Constitutional Court (“ItCC”) banned the possibility that a regional charter can change the name of such body into “parliament”. In fact, according to the ItCC, the Italian constitution adopted the term “parliament” only to indicate the national legislative assembly, but used the expression “regional council” to refer to the regional body vested with legislative functions;

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this choice was not accidental since, for the ItCC, “the nomen Parliament … enjoys a qualifying value, indicating, with the organ, the exclusive position that it [the organ] occupies within the constitutional organization” (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; see also Delledonne 2021; ItCC judgment 106/2002). As for the giunta regionale, article 121(3) indicates that it is the executive organ of the regions. Article 121(4) elucidates on the role of the regional president (sometimes also informally referred to as “governor”, thus borrowing a term deriving from US constitutionalism): he or she represents the region, supervises, directs and is responsible for the politics of the giunta, promulgates regional laws, enacts regional regulations, and supervises the administrative functions that the state delegates to the regions, abiding by the instructions received by the central government. • The regional form of government (article 122 Const.) Pursuant to article 122(1), the election procedures and instances of incompatibility and ineligibility of the regional president and of the members of the giunta and consiglio are set by regional law (not by regional charters), whereas the duration of the mandate for each body is established by national law. Before the amendment, the election system and instances of incompatibility and ineligibility were set by national law. Some instances of incompatibility are cited in article 122(2), which excludes the possibility that a member of the consiglio or giunta be, at the same time, a member of the national parliament, of the consiglio or giunta of another region, or of the European Parliament. Other instances of incompatibility are mentioned elsewhere in the constitution: for example, articles 104(7) and 135(6) provide that a member of the regional council cannot be, at the same time, a member of the Upper Judicial Council (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) and of the ItCC, respectively (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Pursuant to article 122(3), the president of the consiglio regionale and the Office of the President are elected among its own members. Article 122(4) indicates that the members of the consiglio regionale cannot be pursued for the opinions expressed and the votes given while in office, thus replicating the treatment reserved to members of the national parliament as indicated in article 68(1). Finally, article 122(5) provides that the

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regional president is elected by direct and universal suffrage, unless otherwise stated in the regional charters: once elected, he or she will appoint and remove the members of the giunta. Before 1999, the regional president was not directly elected but appointed (along with the other members of the giunta) by the consiglio regionale among its members. • Regional charters (or statuti) (article 123 Const.) Article 123 details the form and content of “fundamental regional charters” (statuti) of ordinary regions (Delledonne and Martinico 2009). According to par. 1, the scope of regional statuti is to determine, in compliance with the constitution, the “form of government” and the “fundamental principles of the organization and functioning” of the region. The provision is now more far-reaching than the one contained in the “old” par. 1, which merely talked about the “internal organization of the Regions” (Delledonne and Martinico 2011). Furthermore, the scope of the requested compliance is reduced, since the “old” version required these documents to comply not only with the constitution, but also with “the laws of the Republic” (Delledonne and Martinico 2009). Following the constitutional changes of 1999, some commentators have started considering regional statuti as examples of “regional constitutions” intended to define “the identity of each Region in a State which is becoming more and more complex and plural” (Delledonne and Martinico 2009). However, in 2004 the ItCC denied any assimilation between statuti and “regional constitutions”; accordingly, the provisions contained therein are merely “cultural statements” and their functions only “political” and “cultural” but not “legal” (Delledonne and Martinico 2009; see also Delledonne 2021; ItCC judgment 372/2004). In fact, for the ItCC, the 1948 constitution is the “highest source of law” in Italy, and thus, regional charters are nothing but “sub-constitutional sources whose scope is determined by the Constitution itself” (Delledonne and Martinico 2009). Thus, if a statuto contains a statement of “rights and principles”, this cannot be construed as a piece of “legislation” but only as “cultural statement”, that is, the expression of “the Region’s cultural and historical values” (Delledonne and Martinico 2009; see also Delledonne 2021). Furthermore, pursuant to par. 1, statuti also discipline the exercise of the right to legislative initiative and of referendum on regional laws

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and administrative provisions, as well as the publication of regional laws and regulations. Par. 2 implies that a statuto takes the form of a regional law (Delledonne and Martinico 2011), and is approved and modified by consiglio regionale by law approved by absolute majority of its members, in two subsequent deliberations at an interval not inferior to two months (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). No stamp by a commissioner of the national government is required for this law, but the national government can challenge the constitutional legitimacy of statuti before the ItCC within thirty days from publication. Pursuant to the “old” version of this paragraph, regional statuti needed the approval by national law, a requirement eliminated with the 1999 amendment. As per par. 3, regional statuti are subject to popular referendum if, within three months from their publication, such request is made by one-fiftieth of the voters of the region or by one-fifth of the components of consiglio regionale. Also, the statute subjected to popular referendum will not be promulgated if it is not approved by a majority of the valid votes. • The abolished article 124 Const. Article 124 has been removed from the constitution by constitutional law 3/2001. The “old” version of the article provided that “[a] commissioner of the government, residing in the region capital city, supervises the administrative functions exercised by the State and coordinates them with those exercised by the Region”. • Bodies of administrative justice (article 125 Const.) Pursuant to article 125, within each region there are bodies of administrative justice of first instance; sub-sections of these institutions can also be established outside of the region’s capital city. Constitutional law 3/ 2001 eliminated all forms of control over the legality of administrative acts of the region by an organ of the state, as previously required by par. 2, now abolished. • Dissolution of regional bodies (article 126 Const.) Article 126, dealing with the dissolution of consiglio regionale and the no-confidence to the regional president, was also radically modified by

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constitutional law 1/1999. Pursuant to article 126(1) (as amended), the termination of the consiglio and the removal of the regional president can be decided for acts contrary to the constitution, for other serious infringements of the law, or for national security reasons. According to par. 2, the consiglio regionale can express its no-confidence towards the regional president by motivated motion. The approval of the motion of no-confidence of the regional president, as well as his or her removal, permanent obstacle, death, or voluntary resignation, causes the resignation of the giunta and the dissolution of the council as well. Similar consequences occur in the event of contextual resignation of a majority of the members of the consiglio. This last paragraph introduces a principle dubbed simul stabunt, simul cadent (as they stay together, they will fall together) (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012).

3.2 The 2001 Constitutional Reform (Articles 114–120 and 127) The 2001 reform, approved with constitutional law 3/2001 under the leadership of the centre-left majority then in power, continued the decentralisation process begun in 1997 (Cartei and Ferraro 2002). The bill that contained the reform was approved by the House of Representatives in February 2001 and by the Senate in March 2001. It was then subject to “confirmative” referendum in October 2001 (Bull and Pasquino 2007; Pinelli 2006; Desideri 2014).1 Title V of Part II of the constitution (articles 114–133) pertains to the relationship between central and peripheral entities, and is titled “Regions, Provinces, Municipalities”. The core of the constitutional amendment, however, is represented by articles 114–120 and by article 127. The 2001 constitutional reform was partially implemented by Law 131/2003 (“La Loggia” Law).

1 Pursuant to article 138 of the constitution, if a constitutional law or a law amending

the constitution has not passed with a majority of two-third in each of the two Chambers at the second voting, a referendum can be requested by either a fifth of the members of one house, or half a million voters, or five regional councils. The turnout at the October 2001 referendum was very low, as only 34,1% of the voters participated in the consultation, with 65% voting in favor of the reform.

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The Component Units of Italian Regionalism (Article 114 Const.)

This article provides that Italy is now composed of municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, regions, and the state. It also provides that such local entities are “autonomous” with “their own statutes, powers and functions in accordance with the principles laid down in the Constitution”. Furthermore, it mandates that the status of Rome, as capital city of Italy, shall be regulated by national (state) law. Article 114 is innovative in many ways. First, it creates a new echelon of local government, the metropolitan city, placed between municipalities and provinces. It is also interesting to compare the current text with the pre-2001 wording, since the “old” version of article 114 simply mandated that Italy was “divided” into regions, provinces, and municipalities. Consequently, after 2001, not only has there been an increase in the number of component units and a change in terminology (Italy is no longer “divided” but “constituted” of the listed component units) (Mazzola 2012), but the order is reversed, starting from the entity that has a long-standing and established history and tradition in Italy and that is also closest to the citizens (municipality). However, in its decision 274/ 2003, the ItCC noted how the various levels of government indicated in article 114 are vested with powers that are profoundly different and, as such, they cannot be entirely equated. Similarly, in judgment 365/2007, the ItCC emphasised that the autonomy enjoyed by these different levels of government does not entail the creation of a federal or confederal state in Italy. Furthermore, the provision enshrined in article 114 is quite unique among federal or decentralised systems, as they rarely recognise in the constitution the presence of levels of government other than the state and the federal sub-units (states, provinces, cantons, etc.…). Municipalities have a very local, or city-based, dimension and are “the first and traditional level of the political organisation of a local community…” (Mirabelli 2006). Their origins can be traced back to the Middle Ages, where citizens of a municipality (or commune) “regarded themselves as a community that formed a political and administrative body which exercised public functions of authority, of government and of jurisdiction” (Mirabelli 2006). Provinces, on the other hand, can be defined as “district-type local authorit[ies] of a larger geographical scope” (Longo

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2021). Law 142/1990 on local governments defined provinces as “government entities of vast areas, representing the general interests of the territorial community, and entrusted with the coordination of local development” (De Martin 2009; see also Longo 2021). Differently than regions (which, as recalled in Chapter 2, were created with the 1948 constitution), provinces already existed at the time of unification, since they were created with the “Rattazzi Bill” in 1859 as the product of the French model of state organisation borrowed from the Kingdom of Piedmont and later extended to the whole Kingdom of Italy (De Martin 2009). However, differently than regions, municipalities and provinces only enjoy administrative (and not legislative) powers, except for the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano (Longo 2021). In any event, Law 56/2014 on metropolitan cities, provinces, union, and merger of municipalities (“Delrio Law” from the name of its proponent) has significantly reshaped the system of local self-government (ex multis, see Pizzetti 2015). Importantly, this law created the first ten metropolitan cities, which replaced provinces having the same name (Pizzetti 2015; Mobilio 2017; Longo 2021). In addition to creating metropolitan cities, the Delrio Law also reformed the existing provinces by reducing provincial representation and depriving them of several functions they previously had, redistributing them either to regions or to municipalities (Pizzetti 2015; Mobilio 2017; Longo 2021; Arban 2024). I will revert on some of the challenges posed by metropolitan cities in the last part of the chapter. There has also been a dispute over the idea of “rationalising” the number of municipalities, considering that, at the time of writing, the total count of comuni in Italy is 7901: among the solutions suggested by the Delrio law, there was the possibility to merge municipalities and create unions of municipalities (Pizzetti 2015). However, because of the old tradition with municipalities in Italy, which date back to medieval times and even before, there is resistance towards the merger or the unionisation of municipalities, reflecting the strong identity attachment that people often have with the municipalities where they reside. 3.2.2

The Abrogation of Article 115 Const.

The constitutional reform of 2001 abrogated article 115, whose terms were incorporated in article 114(2). In fact, the “old” version of article 115 provided that regions are autonomous entities with their own powers and functions, according to the principles laid down in the constitution.

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Differential Regionalism (Article 116 Const.)

The first two paragraphs of article 116 focus on regions enjoying special status, while par. 3 pertains to what has been dubbed “differential regionalism” (Dapelo 2002) or “regionalism having a variable geometry” (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012) or also “asymmetric federalism” (Barbera 2012). More specifically, article 116(1) indicates that Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste enjoy “special forms and conditions of autonomy pursuant to the special charters adopted by constitutional law”. The first paragraph echoes the terms already contained in the “old” version of the same provision. Article 116(2), on the other hand, specifies that TrentinoAlto Adige/Südtirol is composed of the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano. But the most interesting innovation is contained in article 116(3), mandating that additional and special forms and conditions of autonomy can be granted to ordinary regions by national law if certain requirements are present (Palermo 2021). This option, however, is granted only for the specific subject matters listed in article 116(3), namely: (a) all matters of shared jurisdiction between the state and the regions, as specified by article 117(3); specific subject matters normally falling within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the central state, such as: organisational requirements of the justice of the peace (article 117(2)(l)); general norms on education (article 117(2)(n)); and protection of the environment, eco-system, and cultural heritage (article 117(2)(s)). In other words, although article 116 preserves the classification between ordinary and special regions, it also allows further differentiation among ordinary regions (Palermo 2021). I will discuss this provision in light of recent developments in Sect. 3.5 below. 3.2.4

The Division of Legislative Powers (Article 117 Const.)

Article 117 enshrines the most innovative aspect of the 2001 reform. Deeply changing the original provision, it begins by mandating that legislative powers are now exercised by the state and the regions, in compliance with the principles laid down in the constitution, with EU legislation and with international obligations. Article 117(2) contains a detailed list of all subject matters falling within the exclusive legislative

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powers of the state, which now include: (a) foreign policy and international relations of the state; relations between Italy and the European Union; asylum rights and legal status of non-EU citizens; (b) immigration; (c) relations between the Italian state and religious denominations; (d) defence and armed forces; national security; armaments, ammunitions, and explosives; (e) currency; savings protection and financial markets; competition protection; foreign exchange system; state taxation and accounting systems; harmonisation of public budgets; equalisation of financial resources; (f) state bodies and relevant electoral laws; state referenda; election of members to the European Parliament; (g) legal and administrative organisation of the state and of national public agencies; (h) public order and security, with the exception of local administrative police; (i) citizenship, civil status, and register offices; (l) jurisdiction and procedural law; criminal and civil law; administrative judicial system; (m) determination of the basic levels of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed across the national territory; (n) general provisions on education; (o) social security; (p) electoral legislation, governing bodies and fundamental functions of municipalities, provinces, and metropolitan cities; (q) customs, protection of national borders, and international prophylaxis; (r) weights, measures, and standard time; intellectual property law; statistical and computerised coordination of data of state, regional and local administrations; works of the intellect; (s) protection of the environment, the eco-system, and cultural heritage. Similarly, article 117(3) details the subject matters of shared jurisdiction between the state and the regions. As specified in the paragraph, in such areas, “legislative powers are vested in the Regions, except for the determination of the fundamental principles, which are laid down in State legislation”.2 The following is the list of subject matters of shared jurisdiction: international relations of the regions with other countries and with the European Union; foreign trade; work safety and 2 In federalism theory, there is a difference between shared and concurrent powers, although the two are often confused and thus employed indistinctively. When powers are shared between two levels of government, normally the central government sets fundamental principles and then peripheral governments implement legislation on those subject matters in compliance with such principles set by national law, as is the case with article 117(3) of the Italian constitution. In matters of concurrent powers, on the other hand, peripheral units have powers to legislate on a certain subject matter as long as the central or federal government has not already exercised its legislative powers, as happens, for example, in Germany pursuant to article 72(1) of the German Basic Law.

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protection; education, except for vocational education and training and subject to the autonomy of educational institutions; professions; scientific and technical research and innovation support for productive sectors; health care; nutrition; sports; disaster relief; land-use planning; civil ports and airports; large transport and navigation networks; communications; national production, transportation and distribution of energy; complementary and supplementary social security; coordination of public finance and taxation system; enhancement of cultural and environmental properties, including the promotion and organisation of cultural activities; savings banks, rural banks, regional credit institutions, regional land, and agricultural credit institutions. Article 117(4) mandates that regions enjoy residuary powers (meaning legislative powers on subject matters not specifically listed in previous paragraphs). Another novelty introduced by article 117(6) is the recognition to regions of full regulatory powers in all subject matters that are not exclusive competence of the State. Article 117 represents a true innovation especially in comparison with the previous arrangement. In fact, the “old” text listed those areas or subject matters where regions were authorised to legislate, assuming that all other competences belonged to the state. With regard to residuary powers, article 117 now reverses the previous arrangement, which reserved to the state all non-enumerated powers. Insofar as shared competences, regions are bound by some limits. First, regional laws are bound by the provisions laid down in the constitution (the so-called constitutional limit) as per article 117(1); next, there are international and EU obligations, whereby all national and regional laws shall abide by the international and EU law provisions; finally, regional laws shall abide by the fundamental principles enshrined in the national legislation already in force (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). In addition to the list of subject matters of article 117(2), the ItCC has subsequently identified what have been dubbed transversal matters (materie trasversali) (Delledonne 2021). With this expression, the ItCC refers to “objectives” or “goals” that the central state shall attain, and that might cause an intrusion of the state in areas normally belonging to the regional legislative power, such as: competition, environment and cultural heritage, protection of public policy and security, etc. (Delledonne 2021). For instance, the ItCC has argued that transversal matters such as competition law can “condition other subject matters attributed to the concurrent or residual competences of the Regions, to the point

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that they can affect the entirety of the material spheres within which they are applied” (ItCC judgment 2/2014). These transversal matters seem an attempt made by constitutional judges to broaden the scope of state powers to the detriment of regional autonomy. 3.2.5

The Principle of Subsidiarity (Article 118 Const.)

Article 118 introduces for the first time in the constitution the principle of subsidiarity and provides that “administrative functions are attributed to municipalities, unless they are conferred to provinces, metropolitan cities, regions or to the state, pursuant to the principles of subsidiarity, differentiation and proportionality, to ensure their uniform implementation”. This is also referred to as principle of vertical subsidiarity. Conversely, article 118(4) deals with horizontal subsidiarity and provides that “the state, regions, metropolitan cities, provinces, and municipalities shall promote the autonomous initiatives of citizens, both as individuals and as members of associations, relating to activities of general interest, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity”. The “old” article 118, on the other hand, was infused with the principle of “parallelism”, meaning that regions enjoyed administrative powers only in those areas where they had shared legislative jurisdiction. The principle of subsidiarity ingrained in article 118 and the intriguing interpretations of it offered by the ItCC will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4. 3.2.6

Fiscal Federalism (Article 119 Const.)

Article 119 refers to “fiscal federalism”. Based on the “old” version of this article, regional finance comprised income deriving from regional taxes as well as from state grants (although the great majority of regional income derived from the latter). However, the capacity of regional governments to levy taxes was limited. Furthermore, the central government could determine both the type of taxes levied and the amount of the tax. In other words, under the “old” article 119, regional financial autonomy was exercised only within the limits set by the state (Cartei and Ferraro 2002), and state laws coordinated the financial autonomy of the regions with the finances of the state, the provinces, and the municipalities (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). The intention of the new provisions on fiscal federalism was thus to increase regional financial competences. Article 119(1) now provides

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that municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, and regions shall enjoy autonomy of revenues and expenditures. Article 119(2) mandates that municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, and regions have “autonomous financial resources”. They can also set and levy their own taxes, according to the provisions contained in the constitution and to the principles of coordination of public finance and taxation, as well as participate in the distribution of state grants for their territory (Valdesalici 2021). Article 119(3) provides for equalisation payments and mandates that “[s]tate legislation shall provide for an equalisation fund – with no allocation constraints – for the territories having lower per capita taxable capacity”. Article 119(4) explains that “[r]evenues raised from the abovementioned sources shall enable municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions to fully finance the public functions attributed to them” while, pursuant to article 119(5), the State “shall allocate supplementary resources and adopt special measures in favour of specific municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, and regions to promote economic development along with social cohesion and solidarity, to reduce economic and social imbalances, to foster the exercise of the rights of the person or to achieve goals other than those pursued in the ordinary implementation of their functions” (Valdesalici 2021). Finally, based on article 119(7), municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, and regions “have their own properties, which are allocated to them pursuant to general principles laid down in State legislation. They may resort to indebtedness only as a means of funding investments. State guarantees on loans contracted for this purpose are not admissible”. The provisions contained in article 119 have been partially implemented with Law 42/2009 on “fiscal federalism”. With constitutional law 2/2022, an important solidarity-based provision has been added to article 119 (contained in what is now par. 6) that acknowledges the peculiarity of the several Italian islands and supports all measures that help remove the disadvantages arising from insularity. 3.2.7

Substitution Powers (Article 120 Const.)

According to article 120(1), regions “may not levy import or export or transit duties between regions or adopt measures that in any way obstruct the freedom of movement of persons or goods between regions.

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Regions may not limit the right of citizens to work in any part whatsoever of the national territory”. These same provisions were contained in the “old” article 120. Similar limitations frequently appear in federal and quasi-federal constitutions. Conversely, article 120(2) was added with the 2001 reform to introduce the principle of loyal cooperation between state and regions in the ambit of the so-called substitution powers. Specifically, the central government can act for bodies of the regions, metropolitan cities, provinces and municipalities if the latter fail to comply with international rules and treaties or EU legislation, or in the case of grave danger for public safety and security, or whenever such action is necessary to preserve legal or economic unity and in particular to guarantee the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements regardless of the geographic borders of local authorities. The law shall lay down the procedures to ensure that subsidiary powers are exercised in compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and loyal co-operation.

This power is backed up by a similar provision enshrined in article 117(5), whereby the state can step in when regions and autonomous provinces fail to implement international agreements and EU measures (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Woelk 2021). 3.2.8

The So-Called Federalist Principle (Article 127 Const.)

It has been contended that article 127 introduces a “federalist principle” since it has eliminated the control of the state on regional laws (Dapelo 2002). Under the amended article, only an ex post facto review by the ItCC can be performed on regional laws allegedly infringing upon areas belonging to the state’s legislative jurisdiction and on state laws allegedly infringing upon the legislative jurisdiction of the regions. All references to a “national interest” provision have been elided (Groppi and Scattone 2006). Under the “old” provision, all regional laws had to pass muster before their implementation; furthermore, if the national government deemed that the law infringed upon state’s legislative powers or was in contrast with a national interest, it could send the act back to the regional government.

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To conclude this extensive overview of the 2001 constitutional reform, it shall be pointed out that the ItCC has played a fundamental role in trying to make sense of the new regional scheme, in particular with regard to division of powers between the state and the regions, thus contributing to reshape it (Delledonne 2021). Such drastic intervention, however, has not been exempted from criticism. In fact, scholars have questioned the role played by constitutional judges in this context, particularly considering that the reframing of the amended portion of the constitution was done by an organ, the ItCC, whose main role is “to adjudicate the legitimacy of the laws and not to rewrite … the parameters or even assessing … the ‘adequacy’ of a given regional or state intervention” (Barbera 2012).

3.3

The Post-2001 Constitutional Reforms of Title V

In the aftermath of the 2001 reform, several other reforms of Title V have been proposed and debated in parliament, some of them have been successfully implemented, while others have been rejected by popular referendum. This section revisits such proposals. 3.3.1

The (Failed) Constitutional Reform of 2006

Upon proposal of a right-wing coalition formed by Lega Nord, Alleanza Nazionale, and Forza Italia, in 2005 the Italian Parliament passed another reform intending to amend 53 of the 139 articles of the constitution (basically almost the entire second part which details the organisation of the Italian Republic) (Pinelli 2006; Desideri 2014). Never supported by the left-wing coalition on the ground that it would break up the country and ran counter the principle of solidarity (Desideri 2014), this proposal went under the name of “devolution” (Del Duca and Del Duca 2006). Its main purpose was to amend certain critical aspects of the 2001 reform, which LN never really supported as not federal enough. Because the proposed bill was approved by parliament only with an absolute majority (and not with two-thirds) of the votes, it was submitted to popular referendum in 2006 and, eventually, rejected by 61.3% of the voters (Pinelli 2006). Among other things, the proposed reform aimed at reintroducing a parliamentary scrutiny for regional laws in contrast to national interest

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(Pinelli 2006; Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). It also aimed at transforming the Senate into some sort of “federal Senate” or “Chamber of Regions” (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). With regard to division of powers, the proposed reform was basically aligned with the scheme implemented through article 117 as amended in 2001, the only difference being the inclusion of the so-called Bossi draft which assigned exclusive legislative powers to regions in areas like health services, organisation of schools and management of educational and training institutions (except for the autonomy of educational institutions), definition of educational and training programs of specific interest to the regions, and local police (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). Similarly, regional powers over “residual” matters were also considered “exclusive” (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). 3.3.2

The 2012 Reform (Constitutional Law 1/2012)

In 2011, EU institutions and leaders forced Italy to introduce some reforms to reduce public debt and promote growth. Because the Berlusconi government then in power did not take the necessary actions to move in the direction indicated by EU leaders, in August 2011 the European Central Bank (“ECB”) sent a letter to the Berlusconi cabinet with a list of reforms that needed to be implemented in order to “receive ECB support for keeping interest rates low on Italian bonds” (Fabbrini 2013). The ECB sought actions targeted to “increase the competitiveness of Italian economy” as well as actions intended to “make public finance sustainable” (Fabbrini 2013). In particular, the “introduction of a balanced budget by 2013” was seen by EU partners as necessary to promote growth, reduce public debt, and protect Eurozone partners from “financial market speculation on Italian bonds” (Fabbrini 2013; see also Boggero and Annicchino 2014). As a result, in 2012, constitutional law no. 1 was passed. However, it deeply eroded the financial autonomy of regions, with a consequent impact on the whole architecture of local autonomies (Cecchetti 2012). The modifications introduced by such law, which have become operative at the beginning of the 2014 fiscal year, partially (but significantly) amended articles 81, 97, 117, and 119 of the constitution. Specifically, article 81 was amended to introduce the principles of “balanced budget” and “sustainable debt” for the national budget. In light of such amendment, the central government can now resort to debt only

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in exceptional circumstances (and upon parliament approval by absolute majority) (par. 2). The two principles are extended by paragraph 7 to the budgets of all public administration (regions, provinces, municipalities, and metropolitan cities). The applicability to all public administration of the principles of “balanced budget” and “sustainable debt” is reiterated by the new article 97(1) (Cecchetti 2012; Boggero and Annicchino 2014). Furthermore, article 81 reserved to a procedurally “reinforced” national law the power to set the fundamental norms and criteria to implement the two principles of “balanced budget” and “sustainable debt”. This “reinforced” law shall be approved by an “absolute majority of the components of each Chamber in compliance with the principles defined by constitutional law”. In this way, the national legislator is free to impose limitations and obligations to the expenses of local autonomies (Cecchetti 2012; Boggero and Annicchino 2014). Constitutional law 1/2012 brought some changes also to article 117 discussed above. Specifically, the subject matter labelled “harmonisation of public accounts” was separated from that of “coordination of public finance and taxation system”. Therefore, while under the “old” version of article 117(3) (as amended in 2001), the two subjects were listed together under the shared competences of national and regional legislatures, the item “harmonisation of public accounts” has now been attracted to the list of subject matters of exclusive competence of the central state (article 117(2)) (Cecchetti 2012). Substantial modifications were also brought to article 119 on fiscal federalism. First, while article 119(1) reiterates that all local selfgovernments enjoy financial autonomy with regard to revenues and expenses, it also specifies that they shall guarantee their budgetary balance and respect the economic and financial obligations as stated in EU law (Cecchetti 2012). But article 119 has been amended also in another important aspect: par. 7 specifies that all local autonomies can now resort to borrowing only if they need to finance investments expenses, upon condition of the respect of the principle of balanced budget. In this way, their fiscal autonomy is further limited (Cecchetti 2012; Valdesalici 2021). 3.3.3

The (Failed) Constitutional Reform of 2016

In April 2016, the Italian Parliament approved another constitutional reform (the so-called Renzi-Boschi reform, from the names of its promoters) whose objective was to overcome perfect bicameralism,

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reduce the number of MPs, reduce institutional expenses, eliminate CNEL (Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro), and amend Title V of the constitution (Camera dei Deputati 2016). With regard to regionalism and similarly to the proposal of 2006 mentioned above, the 2016 reform intended to transform the Senate into a chamber of regional representation: while the Chamber of Deputies would continue to be composed by members directly elected by—and representing—the Italian people, the Senate would be transformed into a Chamber representing regional and territorial interests. To this end, the number of senators would be reduced from 315 to 100, with 95 senators appointed by regional councils among regional councillors and mayors, and 5 senators appointed by the President of the Republic for 7 years. Also, the legislative role of the two chambers would change, since only certain bills would require the approval of both the House and the Senate, and the Senate would vote only on specific subject matters affecting local interests. The new Senate would also appoint two judges of the ItCC. The reform would also remove provinces from the constitution as part of a broader restructuring of local self-government, and it would radically change the distribution of legislative powers between regional and state governments as enshrined in article 117. Finally, it would reintroduce a “supremacy clause” allowing a national law to legislate in the field of regional powers in case of overarching national interest. Article 116(3) on differential regionalism and article 120(2) on substitution powers would also be amended. In December 2016, however, the reform was rejected by popular referendum. 3.3.4

The Reform of the Number of MPs of 2020

Although this reform did not touch Title V of the constitution, it is nonetheless worth mentioning for its implications on regional representation in the Senate. Specifically, upon initiative of the Five Star Movement, the composition of both chambers of parliament (the House and the Senate) has been changed by constitutional law 1/2020 on the reduction of the number of members of parliament. The number of deputies was reduced from 630 to 400, while the number of senators was reduced from 315 to 200. As per article 57 as amended, the 200 senators are elected on a regional basis, proportionally to the local population. The minimum number of senators for each region is three, except for Molise

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(two senators) and Valle d’Aosta (one senator). Of the 200 senators, four are elected by Italian citizens living abroad. The election of senators on a regional basis does not mean that Italy has a regional or federal senate or that senators represent the interests of the regions of provenance. However, commenting on such reform, and particularly on the reduction in the number of senators, some constitutionalists have observed how this has an “anti-regional” effect and that it reduced the degree of regionalisation of the Senate: in fact, by cutting the number of senators, the minimum representation has been reduced to three senators per region, much less than the seven senators as was before the constitutional amendment (D’Atena 2022). In this regard, it should be pointed out that, absent a true regional senate in Italy (and thus a forum for institutional representation and involvement of regions at the centre), the Standing Conference of State and Regions, established by law in 1988, and more generally the “System of Conferences” as it is usually referred to, has become the principal interface for intergovernmental relations, consultation, and cooperation between the two main levels of government (Ceccherini 2021; Woelk 2021). Albeit not entrenched in the constitution, such system of conferences is nonetheless well rooted in the Italian institutional experience (D’Atena 2022). 3.3.5

The 2022 Reform

Finally, as already recalled above, in November 2022, par. 6 was added to article 119 on fiscal federalism to acknowledge the peculiarity of Italian islands and to overcome the disadvantages brought by their insularity status.

3.4

Italian Regions and the European Union

The strengthening of the institutional importance of Italian regions paralleled the development of regionalism at EU level, since Italian regionalism was partially encouraged and supported by the institutional recognition, at EU level, of the relevance of regions. As it is well known, the European integration process was initiated by “national States” through the conclusion of international treaties and governed by the same states (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). At this initial stage, little space was reserved to regions or other forms of local self-government (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri

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2012; Iacoviello 2014). A first recognition at EU level of the importance of local autonomies occurred with their involvement in the management of European Structural Funds (tools intended to pursue policies of economic and social cohesion) and with the introduction of some forms of partnership among regional levels (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Iacoviello 2014). But it was only with the creation of the European Union with the TEU of 1992 that there was an official “institutional” recognition of local autonomies at EU level: among other things, the TEU set up the so-called Committee of the Regions to permanently involve local governments for consultative purposes at the level of the EU Commission (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Iacoviello 2014). The TEU also codified for the first time the principle of subsidiarity at the demand of member states, worried that EU institutions might attain too much power to the detriment of national states. This progressive recognition of the relevance at EU level of local autonomies was somehow mirrored internally in each member state (Baraggia 2021). In Italy, the constitution as amended in 2001 displays various provisions that regulate the relationship between regions, the central state, and the EU. For example, article 117(2) mandates that the national government enjoys exclusive legislative competence with regard to the relationship between the state and the European Union; article 117(3) lists, as a shared power between the centre and the periphery, a legislative power on the relationship between the EU and the regions; similarly, article 117(5) provides that: The Regions and the autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano take part in the preparatory decision-making process of EU legislative acts in the areas that fall within their responsibilities. They are also responsible for the implementation of international agreements and EU measures, subject to the rules set out in State law which regulates the exercise of subsidiary powers by the State in the case of non-performance by the Regions and autonomous provinces.

In summary, article 117 articulates international competences between the centre and the periphery in providing (a) an exclusive competence of the national government in the area of foreign policy and international relations of the state (article 117(2)(a)); (b) a shared competence between the centre and the periphery in the area of international relations and regional relations with the EU, including international trade (article

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117(3)); and (c) a regional competence in concluding agreements with foreign states and understandings with territorial entities of other states in those subject matters of their own competence, pursuant to the forms set by national laws (article 117(9)). A national law shall determine the cases and the ways this power can be exercised. Moreover, according to article 117(5), regions are vested with the power to participate in the formation of EU normative acts, implement them as well as international treaties, always in subject matters belonging to their own sphere of competence, and following the procedures determined by a national law (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012). However, Baraggia points out how, in spite of the constitutional entrenchment of the European dimension of regions, the central state continues to remain blind towards it, since the actual implementation of the relevant provisions “has been weak and incapable of giving effectiveness to the constitutional text” (Baraggia 2021).

3.5

Future Trends of Italian Regionalism

The constitutional amendment of 2001 seemed the prelude to a more radical institutional transformation of Italy, with scholars coining powerful expressions to illustrate the changes occurring to the Italian institutional template. Some theorists talked about the 2001 reform as the “first step” towards a full federalisation of Italy (Cartei and Ferraro 2002). Others talked about an “Italian variant of federalism” (Grottanelli de’ Santi 2006) or of an “Italian way of federalism” (De Martin 2009). Some others spoke of a “federal solution” for Italy (Palermo and Wilson 2013). However, at the time of writing, the perspective of a full federalisation of Italy seems abandoned, federalism is no longer in the political agenda of major political parties (except for differential regionalism following article 116(3)) and, especially in these past couple of years, regionalism has entered what seems to be a centripetal phase. What speculations can thus be made on the future of Italian regionalism? It should be noted at the outset that the Italian and supra-national context has deeply transformed compared to 2001: the introduction of the Euro, globalisation, the change of political players (such as the rise of populist parties like the Five Star Movement or the establishment of right-wing coalitions like Fratelli d’Italia, the party of the current Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), the economic and financial crises started in

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2008 and, more recently, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Ukraine/Russia war are among the key factors that had a dramatic impact on the Italian socio-economic and political scene. Incidentally, the impact of globalisation has also radically changed the economic and industrial fabric especially in the North of Italy, as most businesses (both small and large) have either closed or delocalised: such middle-class composed of business owners represented, in the late 1980s–early 1990s, an important component of the LN electorate. At the time of writing, there are two major events unfolding that are affecting regionalism in Italy: differential regionalism pursuant to article 116(3) and the implementation of the national recovery plan following the COVID-19 pandemic. Another challenge worth mentioning deals with metropolitan cities. I will briefly describe each of them. • Differential regionalism As for differential regionalism, I noted above how one of the most interesting novelties of the 2001 constitutional reform was the introduction of article 116(3) that grants additional forms and particular conditions of autonomy to ordinary regions in certain subject matters listed in article 117 and following a certain procedure. Such provision has remained dormant for a long time. It was only in 2017–2018 that Emilia Romagna, Veneto, and Lombardia started the process of negotiating with the central government to acquire increased autonomy, signing preliminary agreements with the central government in 2018 (Arban 2018; Piccirilli 2018; Palermo 2021). To this end, both in Veneto and in Lombardia support for increased autonomy was also sealed by a consultative referendum, although this was not required by the constitutional text (and in fact it was not held in Emilia Romagna) (Arban 2018; Palermo 2021). A general bill was drafted by the central government in 2019, but discussions were then halted due to the COVID-19 emergency that broke up in early 2020. Since then, ten more ordinary regions have started similar initiatives one way or another (Palermo 2021). In these past few years, the two Conte governments (2018–2019 and 2019– 2021) and the Draghi government (2021–2022) have all struggled with issues of asymmetric regionalism, without, however, much progress in this regard. Conversely, the Meloni government that took over in October 2022 seemed to be more open to differential autonomy and has in fact

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revived the issue and resumed discussions with the three regions. In early February 2023, a draft bill signed by the Minister for Regional Affairs Roberto Calderoli was discussed and preliminarily approved in the Council of Ministers. The process of differential regionalism should now proceed more speedily. Of course, this comes at a cost: in fact, much academic and political debate exists on such claims for more autonomy. But this is an old debate, as the history of Italian regionalism sketched in previous sections of this book has tried to explain. The main fear of those who oppose it is that differential autonomy will deepen even more the socio-economic divide between the North and the South (to the point of even resembling a form of secession of the rich), while those in favour consider it as an opportunity also for the South to move forward. Prime Minister Meloni has reassured that differential regionalism will not create A-type and B-type territories, implying that the South will not be left behind. In any event, asymmetrical solutions like the one of article 116(3) often elicit solidarity-based concerns, something that will be more thoroughly illustrated and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of the book. • The National Recovery and Resiliency Plan (PNRR) A significant challenge to Italian regionalism, something that may have a long-term impact (Catelani 2022), has come in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and of the devastating socio-economic crisis that ensued. In fact, as it is well known, Italy was one of the first countries in Europe and in the world to be severely affected by COVID-19 infections in March 2020. Faced with a completely unknown event, the first Conte government then in power put in place a series of unprecedented lockdowns and limitations of fundamental freedoms and liberties to curb the impact of the pandemic on the people. Certainly, at least in the initial phases of the pandemic, the relationship between the centre and the regions has been quite conflicting, and regions have often been blamed for delaying or misinterpreting the instructions coming from the centre (Lerro 2022). The handling of the pandemic thus triggered heated debates about the virtues and flaws of the Italian regional model against the framework of a major crisis, especially considering the strong centralisation of decision-making powers in areas—like health care—normally under regional control. Although this centripetal reaction was common to many federal and quasi-federal systems, questions emerged in Italy

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whether regions are (or should be) able to provide an efficient counterpower vis-à-vis the central government. Likewise, it was asked whether such healthcare regionalisation propelled the rise of inequalities in the protection of fundamental socio-economic rights and the management of a health crisis of such proportions. A thorough analysis of the pandemic and the measures taken to control the infections is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, I limit my analysis to a few remarks on the role of regional powers in the aftermath of the pandemic. First, because of the dramatic socio-economic effects caused by the pandemic in Europe, the EU agreed to establish a policy instrument called “Next Generation E.U.” Recovery Fund (“NGEU”), capable of issuing common bonds on the financial market (Fabbrini 2022). The fund raised EUR750 billion of resources, which are then transferred in the forms of loans and bonds to EU member states in support of their economic recovery and in strengthening their resilience (Fabbrini 2022). Italy was a primary beneficiary of the NGEU, receiving EUR191.5 billions (EUR68.9 billions in grants and EUR122.6 billions in loans) (Fabbrini 2022). In order to plan the use and destination of such resources, in the spring of 2021 the Draghi government adopted the so-called Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza (National Recovery and Resilience Plan, or “PNRR”), which defines spending priorities and identifies key reforms to be carried out over five years (2021–2026) (Fabbrini 2022). The resources available through the PNRR focus on six missions: (i) digitalisation, innovation, competitiveness, and culture; (ii) green revolution and ecological transition; (iii) infrastructure for sustainable mobility; (iv) education and research; (v) inclusion and cohesion; and (vi) health; for each of these missions, there are specific objectives to be pursued (Fabbrini 2022). Second, while the PNRR represents an unprecedented opportunity for Italy to modernise, it also raises questions from the standpoint of regionalism, such as which role regions will play in managing such EU funds. In fact, according to the legislative framework set out in 2021, a key role will be played by central institutions, in particular by the national executive, in implementing the reforms and investments of the PNRR. A prime protagonist will be the so-called cabina di regia (control room), composed of the Prime Minister and of the Ministers in charge of the subject matters decided on a case-by-case basis; it is this control room that will take a leading role in the coordination and monitoring of the progress of the initiatives (Provvisiero 2022). And although regions and

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other local autonomies can participate in the meetings of the control room via the regional presidents or via the president of the conference of regions, their actual role until now has been rather marginal (Provvisiero 2022), although regions and other local governments should be involved in the implementation phase of the plan (Zanardi 2022). Furthermore, within this framework, it will be possible for the national executive to exercise substitution powers pursuant to article 120(2) of the constitution in the unfortunate event of failure by local autonomies to implement the PNRR (Lerro 2022). One last question raised by the implementation of the PNRR is whether it will offer an opportunity to close the gap—at least partially— between the North and the South of Italy, or whether it will deepen even more such divide (Staiano 2021). Since the reduction of the divides between different parts of the country is one of the transversal objectives of the PNRR, a significant portion of resources is destined to the Mezzogiorno (Sciortino 2022; Zanardi 2022). One of the risks is that many objectives will not be realised in practice, also because of the different standards of organisation and efficiency among the various regions and territories: this of course has the potential of worsening the North–South divide (Catelani 2022). • Metropolitan cities Finally, the challenge posed by metropolitan cities. As I have argued elsewhere (Arban 2024), the current constitutional entrenchment of metropolitan cities presents both virtues and problems. Certainly, such constitutionalisation is innovative from the standpoint of constitutional design, considering that cities and urban areas are almost never entrenched in (federal) constitutions (Hirschl 2020; Arban 2022). At the same time, it remains an incomplete model of constitutional entrenchment, one that prevents metropolitan cities from functioning to their full potential (Arban 2024). In fact, the Delrio Law was meant to be transitional and part of a larger reform of local governments which was included in the Renzi-Boschi 2016 constitutional reform detailed above; yet, the rejection by referendum of such amendment now places the Delrio Law in an unusual position (Mobilio 2017; Arban 2024). Furthermore, concerns have been raised regarding the actual scope of metropolitan autonomy: in fact, although the constitution mandates that metropolitan

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cities are autonomous entities with their own statutes, powers, and functions, in practice their statutory and financial autonomy remains rather limited (Arban 2024). In fact, on the one hand, the constitution does not enumerate the powers of metropolitan cities, which are thus established only in the Delrio Law: this implies that metropolitan powers could be reduced or limited by a simple act of the national parliament (Arban 2024). On the other hand, the fiscal and financial powers of metropolitan cities are also very limited and, in the silence of the Delrio Law, metropolitan cities remain highly dependent on upper levels of governments for financial transfers (Arban 2024). Other problems exist with the current scheme of constitutional entrenchment of metropolitan cities. For example, the constitution makes no mention of the criteria required to define a metropolitan city; consequently, the category presently includes both objectively large metropolitan areas (such as Milan or Naples) and much smaller and less industrialised centres (like Reggio Calabria) (Arban 2024). This has the potential to cause an unnecessary multiplication of metropolitan cities, but it also defeats the very nature of what a metropolitan city should be (Arban 2024). Finally, because the territory of the metropolitan city coincides with the territory of the (former) province with the same name, the nomen metropolitan city could just be another way to refer to the previously extant province. For this reason, the territory of metropolitan cities also includes rural areas—since it incorporates both urban and rural municipalities that belonged to the former provincial territory: again, this seems to defeat the idea of metropolitan city (Arban 2024). To conclude this overview of the past, present, and future of Italian regionalism, it is possible to assert that the regional model currently in place combines theoretical strands coming from federalism, sub-state nationalism, the unitary tradition, and the EU unification process, which have all contributed to shape a unique, asymmetrical scheme. As noted, the present state of Italian regionalism is confused, and its future trajectories are hard to predict, also because centrifugal forces coexist with a rather strong centralism among political parties (in fact, except perhaps for the first LN and Südtiroler Volkspartei, Italian political parties are mostly national parties, something quite unique among decentralised systems [Wilson 2021]). On the one hand, there are the challenges posed by differential regionalism; on the other hand, there are the opportunities offered by the PNRR, which, however, carries with it undeniable risks. Amid all this, lurks perhaps what is the most distinctive feature,

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the North–South divide, a gap inherited from history that has represented both a curse and a blessing. The spectrum of socio-economic, cultural, and political differences has often been politicised to promote decentralisation (mainly form the North) or to resist it (mainly from the South). In the next chapter, I will delve a bit deeper into such divide to situate the Italian case study at the intersection of what is called economic regionalism and sub-state nationalism. I will then describe in detail two constitutional law tools—asymmetry and subsidiarity—and discuss how they could be used to reconcile opposed interests.

References Amoretti, Ugo M. 2002. Italy Decentralizes. Journal of Democracy 13: 126–140. Arban, Erika. 2018. The Referenda for More Autonomy in Veneto and Lombardia: Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives. Perspectives on Federalism 10: 242–267. Arban, Erika. 2021. An Intellectual History of Italian Regionalism. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, ed. Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 13–29. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Arban, Erika, ed. 2022. Cities in Federal Constitutional Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Arban, Erika. 2024, forthcoming. The Entrenchment of Metropolitan Cities in the Italian Constitution. In The Past, Present and Future of the Canadian City. Lessons from History, Practice and the World, ed. Richard Albert, Alexandra Flynn and Nathalie Des Rosiers. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Baraggia, Antonia. 2021. The Italian Regions in the European Union: Story of an Unaccomplished Relationship. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, ed. Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 119–135. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Barbera, Augusto. 2012. Da un federalismo “insincero” ad un regionalismo “preso sul serio”? Una riflessione sull’esperienza regionale. Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali. https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/ima ges/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0340_barbera.pdf. Accessed 26 January 2023. Boggero, Giovanni, and Pasquale Annicchino. 2014. ‘Who Will Ever Kick Us Out?’: Italy, the Balanced Budget Rule and the Implementation of the Fiscal Compact. European Public Law 20: 247–261.

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Bull, Martin, and Gianfranco Pasquino. 2007. A Long Quest in Vain: Institutional Reforms in Italy. West European Politics 30: 670–691. Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Studi. 2016. La Riforma Costituzionale. Schede di Lettura. https://www.camera.it/temiap/2016/05/20/OCD1772110.pdf. Accessed 26 January 2023. Caretti, Paolo, and G. Tarli Barbieri. 2012. Diritto Regionale. Torino: Giappichelli. Cartei, Gian Franco, and Vincenzo Ferraro. 2002. Reform of the Fifth Title of the Italian Constitution: A First Step Towards a Federal System. European Public Law 8: 445–454. Catelani, Elisabetta. 2022. P.N.R.R. e ordinamento costituzionale: un’introduzione. Rivista AIC 2/2022. https://www.rivistaaic.it/it/rivista/ultimi-con tributi-pubblicati/elisabetta-catelani/p-n-r-r-e-ordinamento-costituzionaleun-introduzione. Accessed 15 January 2023. Ceccherini, Eleonora. 2021. Intergovernmental Relationships in Italy: A Feeble but Useful Model. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, ed. Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 65–81. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Cecchetti, Marcello. 2012. Legge costituzionale n. 1 del 2012 e Titolo V della Parte II della Costituzione: profili di contro-riforma dell’autonomia regionale e locale. federalismi.it https://www.federalismi.it/nv14/editoriale. cfm?eid=260&content=&content_auth=. Accessed 26 January 2023. D’Atena, Antonio. 2022. Dove vanno le regioni? Rivista AIC 4/2022. https:/ /www.rivistaaic.it/it/rivista/ultimi-contributi-pubblicati/antonio-d-atena/ dove-vanno-le-regioni. Accessed 1 February 2023. Dapelo, Carlo. 2002. The Trends Towards Federalism in Italy. St. Thomas Law Review 15: 345–352. De Martin, Gian Candido. 2009. Un ente strategico, ancorché misconosciuto: la provincia. federalismi.it. https://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-docume nto.cfm?Artid=13973&content=Un%2Bente%2Bstrategico%2C%2Bancorch% C3%A9%2Bmisconosciuto%3A%2Bla%2Bprovincia&content_author=Gian% 2BCandido%2BDe%2BMartin%2B. Accessed 27 January 2023. Del Duca, Louis F., and Patrick Del Duca. 2006. An Italian Federalism?— The State, Its Institutions and National Culture as Rule of Law Guarantor. American Journal of Comparative Law 54: 799–842. Delledonne, Giacomo. 2021. Federalism and Regionalism in Constitutional Adjudication. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, ed. Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 48–64. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Delledonne, Giacomo, and Giuseppe Martinico. 2009. Handle with Care! The Regional Charters and Italian Constitutionalism’s ‘Grey Zone.’ European Constitutional Law Review 5: 218–236.

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Delledonne, Giacomo, and Giuseppe Martinico. 2011. Legal Conflicts and Subnational Constitutionalism. Rutgers Law Journal 42: 881–912. Desideri, Carlo. 2014. A Short History of Regionalism in Italy Since the Republican Constitution. Italian Regionalism and Its Evolution. In Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary and Federal Processes, ed. Stelio Mangiameli, 35–65. Cham: Springer. Fabbrini, Sergio. 2013. Political and Institutional Constraints on Structural Reforms: Interpreting the Italian Experience. Modern Italy 18: 423–436. Fabbrini, Federico. 2022. Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Context, Content and Challenges. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 27: 658–676. Fabbrini, Sergio, and Marco Brunazzo. 2003. Federalizing Italy: The Convergent Effects of Europeanization and Domestic Mobilization. Regional and Federal Studies 13: 100–120. Groppi, Tania, and Nicoletta Scattone. 2006. Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle. International Journal of Constitutional Law 4: 131–137. Grottanelli de’ Santi, Giovanni. 2006. The Italian Variant of Federalism. In Patterns of Regionalism and Federalism. Lessons for the UK, ed. Jörg Fedtke and Basil S. Markesinis, 3–16. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing. Hirschl, Ran. 2020. City, State. Constitutionalism and the Megacity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Iacoviello, Antonino. 2014. Rules and Procedures for the Participation of Italian Regions in European Policymaking. In Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes, ed. Stelio Mangiameli, 249–280. Cham: Springer. Leonardi, Robert. 1992. The Regional Reform in Italy: From Centralized to Regionalized State. Regional and Federal Studies 2: 217–246. Lerro, Angelo. 2022. Governance del PNRR e rapporti fra centro e autonomie territoriali. Art. 12 d.l. 77/2021 in materia di poteri sostitutivi, quale impatto sul regionalismo italiano? Italian Papers on Federalism 2/2022. https://www.ipof.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/IPOF-222_09-Lerro.pdf. Accessed 16 January 2023. Longo, Erik. 2021. Local Governments and Metropolitan Cities: The Italian Experience and Its Comparative Relevance. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, ed. Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 152–169. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Maestri, Gabriele. 2011. Gianfranco Miglio: Il Contributo al Dibattito Federalista in Italia e il “Falso Federalismo” Tedesco. Federalismi.it https:// federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=19094&dpath=document&dfile= 31102011165259.pdf&content=Gianfranco%2BMiglio%3A%2Bil%2Bcontrib uto%2Bal%2Bdibattito%2Bfederalista%2Bin%2BItalia%2Be%2Bil%2B%27falso% 2Bfederalismo%27%2Btedesco%2B%2D%2Bstato%2B%2D%2Bdottrina%2B% 2D%2B. Accessed 10 February 2023.

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Mazzola, Gianliborio. 2012. Le Regioni fra riforme costituzionali, crisi finanziarie e federalismo. Amministrazione in Cammino, 1–14. https://www.amministr azioneincammino.luiss.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Mazzola_Regioni_ riforme-Cost_crisi_federalismo.pdf Mirabelli, Cesare. 2006. Local Autonomies, Regionalism and Federalism in the Italian Experience. In Patterns of Regionalism and Federalism. Lessons for the UK, ed. Jörg Fedtke and Basil S. Markesinis, 249–258. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing. Mobilio, Giuseppe. 2017. Le Città metropolitane. Dimensione costituzionale e attuazione statutaria. Torino: Giappichelli. Palermo, Francesco. 2021. Asymmetries in the Italian Regional System and Their Role Model. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, ed. Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 136–151. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Palermo, Francesco, and Wilson, Alex. 2013. The Dynamics of Decentralization in Italy: Towards a Federal Solution? European Diversity and Autonomy Papers, EDAP 04/2013. http://aei.pitt.edu/41705/4/2013_edap04.pdf. Accessed 27 January 2023. Piccirilli, Giovanni. 2018. Gli “Accordi preliminari” per la differenziazione regionale. Diritti regionali 2: 1–24. Pinelli, Cesare. 2006. The 1948 Constitution and the 2006 Referendum: Food for Thought. European Constitutional Law Review 2: 329–340. Pizzetti, Franco. 2015. La Riforma degli Enti Territoriali. Città metropolitane, nuove province e unione di comuni. Milano: Giuffré. Provvisiero, Giovanni. 2022. Le Regioni nella governance del PNRR. Italian Papers on Federalism 2/2022. https://www.ipof.it/le-regioni-nella-govern ance-del-pnrr/. Accessed 25 January 2023. Rogoff, Martin. 1997. Federalism in Italy and the Relevance of the American Experience. Tulane European & Civil Law Forum 12: 65–96. Roux, Christophe. 2008. Italy’s Path to Federalism. Origins and Paradoxes. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 13: 325–339. Sciortino, Antonella. 2022. L’impatto del PNRR sulle diseguaglianze territoriali: note introduttive. Rivista AIC 3/2022. https://www.rivistaaic.it/it/rivista/ ultimi-contributi-pubblicati/antonella-sciortino/l-impatto-del-pnrr-sulle-dis eguaglianze-territoriali-note-introduttive. Accessed 20 January 2023. Spallino, Andrea, ed. 2017. Modello di Costituzione Federale per gli Italiani. Torino: Giappichelli. Staiano, Sandro. 2021. Il Piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza guardato da Sud. federalismi.it. https://www.federalismi.it/nv14/editoriale.cfm?eid=598. Accessed 28 January 2023. Valdesalici, Alice. 2021. Financial Relations in the Italian Regional System. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative

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CHAPTER 4

Theorising Economic Regionalism, Asymmetry, and Subsidiarity

At the end of Chapter 3, I observed how the whole history of Italian regionalism since unification has been characterised by attempts to bridge the socio-economic, political, and cultural gap between the North and the South. Although other reasons exist, the North–South divide has undoubtedly been a key factor in propelling discussions on centralism as opposed to regionalism and federalism, or asymmetrical solutions, etc. In this chapter, I sharpen focus on this divide and situate the Italian case study at the intersection of economic regionalism and sub-state nationalism as templates to constitutionally accommodate differences of various nature. One key aspect that distinguishes economic regionalism from sub-state nationalism is that, while the latter is mainly concerned with ethno-linguistic, religious, or other cultural factors that bind together people belonging to the same nation in multinational states or federations, economic regionalism is mainly concerned with socioeconomic and political divides. And differently than sub-state nationalism, which has received a great deal of interest in academic scholarship as testified by the burgeoning literature sketched in Chapter 1, economic regionalism has elicited much less attention, especially in constitutional law. The key argument I propose in the chapter is that, although at first blush economic regionalism appears to be less deserving special analysis, this cannot by itself eliminate its existence: therefore, the normative issues © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Arban, Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31543-5_4

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surrounding its recognition must be seen to revolve around both the validity of the claims and the value in taking these claims seriously. If the claims premised on economic regionalism can be taken seriously, then that is an important point in itself. And it is also important if recognising their real or perceived difference helps unlock other intractable issues in society. To this end, I will explore points of convergence and divergence between the two and look at how, starting from the late 1980s, Lega Nord (“LN”) has politicised this divide by resorting to, and often blending, economic regionalism and sub-state nationalism. I will then thoroughly analyse two key constitutional tools that have been ingrained in the Italian constitution to better deal with the North–South divide: asymmetry and subsidiarity. Some of the reasoning and solutions I discuss about economic regionalism bear some relevance also with regard to sub-state nationalism: in fact, sub-state national theory speaks of the need for constitutional recognition of sub-state national groups; the literature comes to this conclusion with conviction approaching certainty. At the same time, some of the reasoning and solutions I propose may work in the opposite direction to that just described. In all federal and regional polities, there are regions that are better off than others. Pressing questions naturally arise as to why better off regions should share their wealth with less well-off regions. Just as it was possible about sub-state national societies to simply observe their difference, it is possible here to simply observe the needs of well-off regions. In both cases, however, this may leave a political issue regarding the willingness of economically wealthier regions to act on behalf of or in favour of the other. Part of that political solution may lie in the ability to see differences which are not “national” in nature and needs which are not bottom-line financial. In other words, solutions for the one may be related to solutions for the other.

4.1 Economic Regionalism and the Italian Case Study As observed in Chapter 1, sub-state nationalism as a field of scholarly interest is a relatively recent phenomenon; one that has gained prominence with the emergence of nationalist and regionalist claims in various parts of the world. Sub-state nationalism necessitates the existence of a nation in order to be tested and applied. And while several definitions

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exist, I build on Tierney to point out that nations are usually characterised by (i) societal or cultural distinctiveness (territorial concentration, common history, language, religion, and societal institutions); and (ii) potential for self-government (Tierney 2004). The argument developed in this section will be that the ethno-linguistic or religious distinctiveness which is at the basis of all requests of accommodation of national communities may not be the only type of asymmetry that suggests different treatment, as the socio-economic or political differences that characterise economic regionalism equally call for forms of accommodation. In other words, regions which, to the outside observer, lack elements of (i) may nonetheless have a clear potential for (ii), based on features such as strong governance, strong economy, and strong social solidarity. 4.1.1

Defining Economic Regionalism

The expression “economic regionalism” has both a supra-national and a national or local dimension. At supra-national level, economic regionalism has long been used in international economic relations, when an idea to restructure the global economy into regional blocs was gaining traction (Gordon 1961). However, the focus in this book is on its local characterisation, to refer to economically wealthier regions or areas that mobilise politically to acquire increased powers and autonomy. In this sense, economic regionalism is an expression used to explain and describe the claims made by sub-national territories whose economic importance has increased in the past few decades: in other words, it addresses the role played by economic factors in territorial politics (Van Houten 2013). In the social sciences (particularly, economic geography, sociology, political sciences), economic regionalism is a well-studied phenomenon (ex multis, see Cruz and Teixeira 2010), but its “political and institutional effects” remain largely unexplored (Van Houten 2013). Economic regionalism can be used to define a constellation of different situations, from industrial clusters or districts (like the Silicon Valley or the media industry in California) to regional economies or local/territorial production systems (like small and medium size enterprises in the fashion industry concentrated in certain parts of Italy) (Van Houten 2013). But also the presence of natural resources like oil or gas in one specific territory (like oil in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, or the natural resources

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located in the Canadian province of Alberta) can be included under the umbrella term of economic regionalism. However, there may be a link between economic regionalism and political mobilisation: in fact, economic prosperity and well-being often increase self-esteem, leading wealthier regions to rebel against the state to improve their conditions, something that generally does not happen in poorer regions (Fitjar 2009). So, even absent a societal or cultural distinctiveness (which, as explained, characterises sub-state nationalism), economically strong regions can still at some point mobilise on the presumption that they are neglected, ignored, badly governed by central institutions, the latter often blamed to be indifferent to the specific needs of such regions. Such claims are further strengthened by the fact that economically strong regions also show potential for self-government and autonomy. This is where political mobilisation starts: while economically advantaged and to a certain extend privileged and socially and politically integrated, they nonetheless aspire to obtain more powers. The veracity of the claims made by richer territories is always hard to judge, of course. However, unless claims are obviously unfounded, their existence is a function of the relevant societies’ self-perception which is also relevant for sub-state national societies. Economically strong regions that mobilise thus share some similarities with nations that struggle to find ways to better acknowledge or recognise constitutionally their ethno-linguistic, religious, or cultural distinctiveness. After all, it could be argued that economic cleavages are indeed rooted in a different culture and mentality, so that the distinctive entrepreneurial and industrial drive is the consequence of a certain way of thinking that usually links together the people of a specific geographical territory. Consequently, this economic diversity is the result of social, cultural, or historical differences that are not dissimilar from those characterising sub-state national societies. At the same time, however, there are differences between the two types of claims. A first distinction that could be made is that the type of asymmetry that characterises forms of economic regionalism is not sufficient to generate a homogeneous sentiment of belonging within the community: in other words, the socio-economic or political type of cleavage is not rooted enough in the group, in contrast with what happens within sub-state national communities, where most individuals share a pervasive sentiment of belonging and identification supported by linguistic, cultural, historical, or social behaviours and beliefs. Furthermore, the

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“selfish” desire for more autonomy and financial emancipation that lurks behind claims made by economically strong regions seems to collide with the spirit of collaboration and solidarity that should characterise the relations among territories and regions of the same state: in fact, pure economic factors would only elicit the quest for more economic wealth to the detriment of other, solidarity-based values instilled in the constitution. I will revert to this point in Chapter 5. Another observation worth making relates to the territorial component. In fact, while in classic forms of sub-state nationalism, individuals belonging to the same nation are usually located within a specifically defined geographical area (like Flanders in Belgium; Catalonia or the Basque Country in Spain, etc.), economic regionalism may present less defined territorial aspects. Think about Canada: often claims for more autonomy come from the economically rich Alberta, but also by a less easily defined “West of Canada”. Likewise, in Italy the LN identified the area surrounding the Po Valley (the territory that was also dubbed Padania) as the geographic cradle whose inhabitants supposedly share similar work ethic or wealth (the “socio-economic” aspect) coupled with dedicated civil service, little corruption and, more generally, good governance (the “political” aspect). But which regions or territories exactly belong to the Po Valley or even the North of Italy that want to mobilise is not so certain. In other words, territorial boundaries may not be clearly fixated, they could transcend the territories of institutional units, or occupy smaller portions of such institutional units, or they could also fluctuate over time. Furthermore, I observed in Chapter 1 how, in addition to autonomy and representation at the centre, sub-state national societies usually seek accommodation by way of recognition of their distinctiveness, such as the constitutional recognition of their language or of other elements like flags, totems, etc. To this end, official bilingualism is a common strategy adopted in the event of linguistic diversity, thus attaining the dual objective of enhancing the voice of the minorities at the centre and increasing their participation in key institutions such as parliament, courts, and army (McEwen and Lecours 2008). Likewise, multinational states might appeal to the “dual national identity of national minorities” so as to “nurture citizens’ loyalty and attachment to the state” as national minorities usually feel a “sense of belonging” both to the nation they are part of and to the host state; this is done mainly to prevent extreme solutions like secession (McEwen and Lecours 2008). Such accommodation strategies, however,

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may not be very helpful when dealing with economic regionalism, as the ethnic or identity component is less present. What economically strong regions usually seek is, in fact, more tax powers, devolved administration, etc. Another aspect to consider is more political: who shall become the spokesperson for the interests of the economically strong regions? This aspect is of course related to political parties. In countries with forms of sub-state nationalism, usually one or more “nationalist” political parties across all the ideological spectrum try to promote national interests. However, they do not necessarily represent the interests and claims of the entire population belonging to the same nation: this means that not all Quebecers, Catalan, or Flemish people seek the same objectives when it comes to protecting their unique features. The same may be true in the case of economically strong regions: as better explained in the next section, in the case of Italy, while the LN was the political party that most convincingly advocated decentralisation for the North (at least in the beginning), not all Northerners identified themselves with the political agenda of the party. In any event, it shall be noted that, in many instances, sub-state nationalism and economic regionalism do not always emerge in a pure form, but often coalesce. For instance, claims for more autonomy in places like Catalonia, the Basque Country or Flanders, while coated with a whole array of linguistic and cultural elements, often present also marked economic components, considering how such regions are significantly better off economically and politically compared to other parts of the same country. To conclude this brief overview, my argument is that the most active instances of economic regionalism present patterns like those of sub-state nationalism, although the two also diverge in important aspects. At the same time, economic regionalism goes well beyond shifting interests as they periodically coalesce at election times around specific themes or issues, as it is much more deeply rooted in the specific socio-economic patterns of the state. It also differs from consociationalism as theorised by Arend Lijphart in the late 1960s: in fact, he was concerned with finding the ideal political tools that would help fragmented democratic societies (because of linguistic, religious, or other cultural cleavages) to reach a certain political stability (Lijphart 1969, 1977). To this end, he identified four elements that could help the quest: (i) government by grand coalition; (ii) mutual veto; (iii) proportionality; and (iv) autonomy for each

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segment. Consequently, consociationalism (or “power-sharing between groups”) mainly entails “proportionality in cabinet representation and consensual decision-making between the groups (which can be protected by mutual vetoes)” (McEwen and Lecours 2008). In the next section, I illustrate how theories of economic regionalism and sub-state nationalism played out in the trajectory of Lega Nord and the claims it advanced for increased autonomy for the North of Italy. 4.1.2

Lega Nord, Economic Regionalism, Sub-state Nationalism

The socio-economic, cultural, and political cleavage between the North and the South of Italy well reflects the peculiar history of the peninsula, for a long time a mosaic of variegated cultures, languages, and social and political realities. As observed by Mingione, it is difficult to find elsewhere the same type of social and territorial cleavages as they neatly appear in Italy, considering how the numerous inequalities among regions represent a unique socio-economic divide (Mingione 1991). And even if one can find economic-based asymmetries in other multinational states, unlike Italy economic regionalism is often sublimated by major linguistic or other ethnic prerogatives. In this sense, we can say the Italian case is unique. As previously observed, bridging the socio-economic gap between the North and the South has been a concern since the dawn of the Kingdom of Italy in the 1860s. However, it was in the late 1980s–early 1990s that the divide was politicised by LN, which at different moments brought together socio-economic and sub-state nationalism arguments to propose federalism or increased decentralisation. The political success of the LN was intriguing and controversial, but it prompted the scholarly interest of several observers from different disciplines, in Italy and abroad, as confirmed by the voluminous literature produced. Before talking about the LN, however, it shall be pointed out that smaller local parties like Union Valdotaine and Süd-Tirol Volkspartei were already able, in the aftermath of the Second World War, to contribute to the grant of special status to Valle D’Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige, respectively, regions characterised by the presence of French and German speaking minorities (Cavatorta 2001). These parties aspired to increase the autonomy of these regions grounded on local differences, and their claims justified based on local dialects, local cultural traditions, and ethnicity (Cavatorta 2001). To a certain extent, such experiences may

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fall within sub-state nationalism. But also in regions not marked by the presence of linguistic minorities there were regional parties known as “leagues” that furthered local autonomy although with the support of a very limited portion of the population (notoriously, the Lombard League and the Venetian League). In fact, the LN emerged in the late 1980s from the fusion of these local and regional leagues (Giordano 2000; Giordano and Roller 2001). In any event, the rise of LN was the result of a concatenation of factors. First, economic factors: the economic “miracle” of the 1960s touched the South only marginally, where the “[v]ast-scale industrialization” that marked the Northern economy did not take place, and organised crime (like mafia) disfavoured private investments; in such scenario, the public money that was funnelled South served only to advance clientelism (Cavatorta 2001). And this occurred while northern regions quickly developed “thanks to a mix of favourable geographic position, good local political administration, entrepreneurial spirit, and cheap southern immigrant labour” (Cavatorta 2001). In the early 1980s, the situation changed when public deficit forced an increase in fiscal pressure, something that exacerbated the dissatisfaction of the northerners towards the central government (Cavatorta 2001). The fact that state bureaucracy was composed mainly by southerners did not help either, since the northerners felt they were working just to support the “inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy” (Cavatorta 2001). Second, party politics factors: in fact, until the early 1990s, Italy was characterised by a “stable party system” which made it difficult for new parties to find their place, considering the enormous influence of traditional parties such as the Christian Democrats (“DC”), the Socialist party (“PSI”), and the Communist party (“PCI”) (Cavatorta 2001). In particular, the system moved by the need to keep PCI outside of power, thus allowing Italy to remain “anchored” to the western world (Cavatorta 2001). To this end, at least since the mid-1960s, a coalition between DC and PSI (plus other minor parties) took power and, to preserve their dominant position, they put in place a system that closely controlled the state apparatus, fostering clientelism and patronage (Cavatorta 2001). The system succeeded in keeping PCI out of power and guarantee economic growth to Italy despite the increase in corruption, maladministration, and links to organised crime (Cavatorta 2001). Things began to change when major political transformations occurred at the international level, like the disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe, which also

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disrupted the political equilibrium in Italy. In fact, the fall of communism put an end to the ideological confrontation between DC and PCI, with the former failing to produce an alternative project for Italy (Cavatorta 2001). But the fall of communism impacted also the ideology and structure of PCI, which broke up in 1991 (Cavatorta 2001; Giordano 2003). Third, changes in the international economic order, like globalisation, the technological revolution, and the increased importance acquired by financial economy, all pushed economic players to voice new demands (Cavatorta 2001; Cento Bull 2003). This was particularly evident in the North, historically one of the most dynamic and industrialised areas not only of Italy but of Europe and the world (Cavatorta 2001). The LN quickly understood the problems and demands of the productive class and became its spokesperson (Cavatorta 2001; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). But other factors contributed to the revival of regional sentiments, like the Tangentopoli scandals of the early 1990s, that is, a series of scandals caused by political corruption that implicated several politicians, causing a loss in the credibility—on the part of the electorate—in traditional political coalitions. The European integration process, which reached its apex in 1992 with the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht, also played a fundamental role in mutating the overall socio-political and economic landscape. The effect of Maastricht on Italy was to emphasise its “centralist inefficiency” and to show the failures of the model framed in the post-war era (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). But Maastricht had significant consequences across all Europe, as it entailed a decoupling of tasks, formerly concentrated in the hands of national governments, so that upper national interests became the concern of European institutions, while day-to-day services to citizens were progressively transferred to substate entities, also entrusted to address the political needs of the territory (Mazzola 2012). The increased importance acquired by regions across Europe was also buttressed by the complex system of EU funds made available to local sub-entities, which required the establishment of “direct relations” between regional and EU institutions (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). Similarly, the European cohesion policies required a direct involvement of regions: consequently, Italian regions began to open their own offices in Brussels, thus strengthening their lobbying and networking activities at the European level (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). This favoured the formation of a web of contacts among actors at regional level, as “the Europeanization process has legitimated the tendency to

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regionalism, particularly in those countries (like Italy) where this tendency has been justified by the poor performance of the unitary state model” (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003). Against this backdrop, the LN was initially perceived just as a “protest group” and even after its first electoral successes in the late 1980s it continued to be seen only as a minor player, one that would eventually dissipate (Giordano and Roller 2001). But it quickly raised to become “a territory-based political organization” whose main objective was the representation of the interests of the people living in the North (Cavatorta 2001). It also critically questioned some of the long-lasting Italian “illnesses” such as disproportionate state spending, widespread corruption, unsatisfactory performance of public services, an increased gap between North and South, or non-decentralisation of decision-making powers (Cavatorta 2001). To fix such illnesses, the LN resorted over the years to an array of institutional solutions, with federalism being prominent among them. But even its federalism project shifted over time, moving from the creation of three macro-regions as proposed by Miglio to a federal model premised on existing regions, to fiscal federalism, to simple devolution of powers. At some point, the LN even threatened the secession of Padania (Massetti and Toubeau 2013; Giordano and Roller 2001; Giordano 2003). In fact, while the fundaments of the LN’s political project rested mainly on the different economic and social performances between the North and the South, at some point it resorted to ethnic differences to strengthen and advance its agenda (Cavatorta 2001). The rich and industrialised North was seen as the home of “hardworking, wealth-producing and tax-overburdened people” who, with their industrial activities, were “sustaining the entire Italian economy” thus distinguishing itself from the South, more devoted to subsidies and money transfers coming from the centre (Cavatorta 2001). To delegitimise Italy’s historical centralism, the LN adopted various clichés to address people from Mezzogiorno, which were strategic in creating a feeling of “diversity” between the North and the South (Cavatorta 2001). In other words, the LN identified in the South of Italy (and in Rome as the centre of political power) the reason for all the wrongs existing in the country (Giordano 2000). Like other European nationalist parties (like Convergència i Unió, in Catalonia), the LN displayed sentiments against the centralisation of the state, perceived as inefficient and “a burden on economic growth” (Giordano and Roller 2001). One of LN’s favourite targets was the national fiscal system,

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portrayed as “iniquitous and harmful” for the northern economy, jeopardised by the “high levels of bureaucracy and taxation” and by the enormous deficit of the public sector (Giordano and Roller 2001). With the LN, a new “Northern question” began to ideally compete with the existing “Southern question”. But the mid-1990s were characterised also by the need for Italy to meet the criteria set by the EU for the single currency and thus enter the “Eurozone”. This is why the LN insisted on the idea that the North could be saved only if it entered Europe and the Eurozone independently from the South (Destro 1997; Giordano 2003; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The gist of LN’s propaganda always rotated around the fact that the riches of the North were wasted by the rest of the country, especially by the South, incapable of standing on its own feet and heavily relying on central assistance (Destro 1997). As noted, a distinguishing feature of the LN was that it included federalism and federal reforms into its political agenda, thus giving it great visibility and allowing it to differentiate from more traditional parties (Giordano 2000). Since small and medium sized firms demanded “more infrastructure, a sharp decrease in taxation, and less regulation” and workers demanded “lower taxes or better services” (Cavatorta 2001; see also Cento Bull 2003), LN proposed the introduction of federalism and the elimination of state aid, forcing in this way the South to find its own road to economic and social development (Cavatorta 2001). But when other political parties started to acknowledge the necessity of a reform in federal terms (Destro 1997), the LN began to embrace ethnonationalism, with the creation of a Padanian national identity and threats of secession of Padania from the rest of Italy (Destro 1997; Giordano and Roller 2001). This is where forms of sub-state nationalism come into play. Padania has never existed as an independent region in Italy. Such name, which, as previously mentioned, was used for the first time by Fanti, comes from the area around the Po Valley, which stretches across most northern regions from west to east. According to this invented Padanian nationalism, all northerners living in the Po Valley “were held to have a common Celtic ethnic background” different from and opposite to southerner’s ethnic composition, although in real life most Italians share “common mixed ethnic origin” (Cavatorta 2001). Based on such alleged common ethnicity, the LN advocated for a right of self-determination to be achieved through federalism or secession (Cavatorta 2001). The building of such Padanian identity would take place through “the creation

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of a northern parliament, the formation of a secessionist government, the organization of a referendum for independence in the north, the launch of Padanian TV and radio stations, and the promotion of annual Celtic Games” (Cavatorta 2001). There was also a declaration of the sovereignty and independence of Padania which took place along the Po River on 15 September 1996, which was then considered as the “symbolic birthday of Padania” (Destro 1997; see also Giordano 2000). An undefined deity called “Po god” was used to legitimise the birth of the new state (Destro 1997). The proclamations made along the river came with a variety of symbols, including armours, swords, samples of carroccio (a medieval wagon bearing the Padanian flag), the “green shirts” (to attest that Padania was endowed with an army) accompanying the whole parade (Destro 1997). The symbolic meaning of this demonstration was strengthened by the fact that the LN’s leader Umberto Bossi reached the source of the Po River to collect its waters into a Murano glass and transported to Venice, elected to be the place where the independence of Padania would be proclaimed (Destro 1997). A “Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of Padania” was read along with a “Bill of Rights of Padanian Citizens” (Destro 1997). The LN also drafted a constitution for Padania, and later changed its name from “Northern League” to “Northern League for the Independence of Padania” (Giordano 2000). Also, in an ultimate symbolic act, the Italian national flag was replaced with the “Flower of the Alps” (Destro 1997). As Destro observed, Italy had troubles finding a “myth to oppose that put forth by the Lega” thus exposing the lack of a true national identity in the country (Destro 1997). However, as noted by Giordano, differently from other nationalist parties in Europe, the LN’s nationalist project was invented and not based in an area with “historic claims to nationhood” (Giordano 2000). In other words, the LN invented “an ethnicity for the North of Italy … in order to justify its political claims for the protection of the economic interests of the region” (Giordano 2000). Economic regionalism and sub-state nationalism thus coalesced in such narrative. Over the years, LN has morphed, in strategy and identity, and today it is a very different party than the one that raised to national prominence in the 1990s (Passarelli and Tuorto 2022). Federalism is no longer part of its political agenda, although some of the regional governors that are behind the request for more autonomy in Lombardia and Veneto are exponents of the party. Also, the party’s stance towards the EU has radically shifted: if in the 1990s EU integration was seen as an opportunity

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for the North to emancipate from the corrupt central power in Rome, nowadays EU elites are seen with scepticism, and many LN activists play the sovranist card (Passarelli and Tuorto 2022). Quite importantly, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, the party has tried to expand its reach beyond its original stronghold, the North of Italy, to become a more “national” party and thus focusing on a national agenda: this is testified also by the change in the name, occurred in 2017, to Lega Per Salvini Premier (LSP) (Passarelli and Tuorto 2022). At the time of writing, LSP is part of the Meloni cabinet, but the 2022 elections showed a decline in electoral support after the success achieved in 2018 and especially in the 2019 European elections. Considering this, the party may decide to shift again on its traditional base in the North of the country.

4.2

Economic Regionalism and Asymmetry

In this section, I explore the concept of (constitutional) asymmetry as usually conceived in federal and quasi-federal systems and suggest that asymmetrical solutions could be proposed as a way to deal with economic regionalism. I will also elaborate on how asymmetry is entrenched in Italian regionalism. 4.2.1

Asymmetry in General

The antithetical concepts of symmetry and asymmetry, especially with reference to federal theory, received worldwide academic attention in the mid-1960s thanks to the work of Charles Tarlton, one of the first scholars who formally tried to define these notions in the ambit of federations. In Tarlton’s words, “symmetry refers to the extent to which component states share in the conditions and thereby the concerns more or less common to the federal system as a whole” (Tarlton 1965). Tarlton then defined symmetry as “the level of conformity and commonality in the relations of each separate political unit of the system to both the system as a whole and to the other component units” (Tarlton 1965). In the “ideal symmetrical federal system” conceived by Tarlton, there would be “political units comprised of equal territory and population, similar economic features, climatic conditions, cultural patterns, social groupings, and political institutions” so that “each of the separate political units would … be miniature reflections of the important aspects of the whole federal system” (Tarlton 1965). Similarly, there would not be

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significant differences between one state and the other, since “[e]ach state would … be concerned with the solution of the same sorts of problems and with the development of the same sorts of potential” (Tarlton 1965). Furthermore, in this “ideal symmetrical federal system” Tarlton suggested that “each state would maintain … the same relationship to the central authority” and “[t]he division of power between central and state governments would be nearly the same in every case” with equal representation in, and support of the activities of the central government for each subunit (Tarlton 1965). Consequently, “no significant social, economic, or political peculiarities would exist which might demand special forms of representation or protection” (Tarlton 1965). At the time, a common assumption was that federations were rather uniform and thus symmetrical (McGarry 2007), and traditional federal theory prefers symmetry, also as a tool for integration and as a safeguard to the stability of the federation (Tarlton 1965; Sahadzic 2021). Conversely, for him “asymmetry expresses the extent to which component states do not share in these common features” (Tarlton 1965). In an asymmetrical federal system, “the diversities in the larger society find political expression through local governments possessed of varying degrees of autonomy and power” (Tarlton 1965). Therefore, in such a system, “each component unit would have … a unique feature or set of features which would separate in important ways, its interests from those of any other state or the system considered as a whole” (Tarlton 1965), and it would be very difficult “to discern interests that could be clearly considered mutual or national in scope” (Tarlton 1965). For Tarlton, the component units of a federation significantly vary in size, culture, population, fiscal resources, etc., and this implies a certain asymmetry in the relations among them as well as in the relations with the central state, and the issues emerging from this asymmetry could not be understood through the classic symmetrical arrangement (McGarry 2007). In other words, Tarlton observes the intrinsic differences existing among and between the various units of a federation, usually greatly varying because of territorial size, population density, wealth distribution, etc. In recent years, the notions of symmetry and asymmetry initially elaborated by Tarlton have been further perfected by scholars (McGarry 2007; Sahadzic 2021; Popelier and Sahadzic 2019). As McGarry explains, an “asymmetrical federation is now usually understood as a state in which all parts have constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, but in which at least one part enjoys a different, usually enhanced, level of autonomy than

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the rest” (McGarry 2007). Asymmetry also defines situations in which “at least one part of a state enjoys autonomy, but the rest does not” (McGarry 2007). Drawing upon Tarlton, other theorists have elaborated on the concurrent concepts of de iure and de facto asymmetry. De iure (or constitutional) asymmetry refers to the asymmetry existing in laws and constitutions, which “correlate to differences in constitutional design and distribution of powers and competences” (Sahadzic 2021). De facto (or political) asymmetry, on the other hand, describes those differences among constituent sub-units regarding size of population and territory, economic features, resources, wealth or social, and political level (Sahadzic 2021). While in the past asymmetric solutions were often feared for their potential for disunity and breaking up of the country, Sahadzic now observes that In the twenty first century, constitutional asymmetry has become an increasingly noteworthy concept in regional and federal studies. What was once treated as a repugnant choice when discussing autonomy claims has slowly become a central concept in the structural reshaping of constitutional systems burdened with internal disputes (Sahadzic 2021).

However, although it has been extensively studied in political science, legal research on constitutional asymmetries “remains both sporadic and scarce” with interest in it increasing only in the past few decades, basically parallel with the emergence of sub-state nationalism (Sahadzic 2021). 4.2.2

Features of Constitutional Asymmetry

Asymmetry has been celebrated as a “key resource to favour the dynamism of the actors operating in a multi-level context” as it “allows the management of diversity” (Martinico 2014), since it gives the possibility to model the constitutional scheme based on the specific needs and expectations of one or more entities composing the state (Palermo 2021). Constitutional asymmetry, however, can take different forms. A most classic indicator of constitutional asymmetry entails the division of powers or competences among different sub-units: in fact, legislative powers assigned to the various sub-units or territories may diverge in type, nature, or scope, especially when compared to the powers granted to

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other sub-units or territories (Sahadzic 2021). Such set of competences can be broader or narrower than the other sub-units. Differences may also exist in relation to the techniques of allocation of powers (exclusive, shared, or concurrent competences) (Sahadzic 2021). Because of the close link between constitutional asymmetry and sub-state nationalism, most often such different competences target areas such as language, culture, or educational issues (Sahadzic 2021). In certain context, it may also be possible that sub-units are given the option to opt-in or opt-out of specific competences (Sahadzic 2021). A variant of asymmetry in division of powers is asymmetry in fiscal powers (asymmetric fiscal federalism), meaning the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy of the sub-national units (Sahadzic 2021). Otherwise said, this specific indicator focuses on whether the autonomy enjoyed by the sub-unit in taxation, revenue raising and expenditure is the same as other sub-units, or larger/narrower in scope (Sahadzic 2021). Potential sub-indicators include the extent to which sub-national entities may rely on conditional or unconditional transfers, and whether forms of budgetary control over borrowings are in place (Sahadzic 2021). But other forms of constitutional asymmetry exist. For example, some regions or territorial units may be granted special status, meaning that the power of sub-units to define their position at central level can vary (Sahadzic 2021). If such special status is not included in the constitution, it could still nonetheless be recognised by law (Sahadzic 2021). Likewise, it may (or may not) entail a power on the sub-unit to “organize its own legislative and executive bodies independently of the central government” (Sahadzic 2021). Another way to ensure constitutional asymmetry is by granting one or more regions or territorial units some representation at central level, something that would put them in a different position compared to the rest of the territories, especially when this entails some decision-making capacity in central level institutions (Sahadzic 2021). A sub-national unit or territory could also be favoured based on its involvement in constitutional amendment procedures (Sahadzic 2021). In the same vein, certain regions or territorial units may be granted the benefit of veto powers at central institutions (Sahadzic 2021). Another element of asymmetry deals with the “presence of specific locks for the protection of autonomy at the central level” (Sahadzic 2021). Also the power of the central government to supervise the content of decisions made at regional level is an indicator of asymmetrical features (Sahadzic 2021).

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Constitutional Asymmetries in Italy

Italy is a highly asymmetrical country, not only constitutionally but also at political, economic, social, and linguistic levels. Before delving into constitutional (de iure) asymmetries, which are the focus of this subsection, it may be helpful to briefly sketch some of the most obvious de facto asymmetries. Throughout the book, references have been made to the socioeconomic differences between the North and the South, something that translates in practice in significant differences in GDP per capita, unemployment levels, human capital, etc., (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). But this is not the only type of asymmetry. As Palermo and Valdesalici observe, at territorial level, some of the regions are extremely populous (like Lombardia, with around 10 million inhabitants), while others are very sparsely populated (like Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste (just over 122.000 inhabitants) (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). Some regions are very large in size (Sicily for example, which is around 26.000 km2 ), while others are very small (Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste is less than 3.300 km2 ) (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). Population density also significantly varies, from about 427 inhabitants/km2 in Campania to 39/km2 in Valle d’Aosta/ Vallée d’Aoste (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). Some regions like Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste and Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol are entirely nested in the Alps, while in others like Apulia mountains cover only just 1.4% of the territory (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). Interesting asymmetries also exist at the level of political parties, considering that most political parties are national, and thus regional elites are weak, except for those regional parties representing national minorities in Alto Adige/Südtirol (Südtiroler Volkspartei), Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste (Union Valdôtaine), and Friuli Venezia Giulia (Slovenska Skupnost ). However, while regional parties catalyse significant support in Alto Adige/Südtirol and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste, in other special regions and at national level their impact on local politics is basically negligible (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019). As for constitutional asymmetries, the 1948 Italian constitution embeds insightful examples of constitutional asymmetries, all engineered with two main purposes in mind: on the one hand, manage linguistic and cultural minorities (as is the case with Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste and Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and, to a certain extent, Friuli Venezia Giulia); on the other hand, manage socio-economic disparities among

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territories. Some of these asymmetries were already present in the 1948 constitution, while others were added after the 2001 reform. As observed in previous chapters, the 1948 constitution created twenty regions, five of which enjoying a special status, as opposed to the remaining fifteen regions, considered “ordinary”. The classification between special and ordinary regions is a first example of asymmetry, but it is interesting to note how this asymmetric model is even more accentuated in practice: in fact, not only are the five autonomous regions vested with additional special powers compared to ordinary regions (this itself an element of asymmetry), but each special region has a unique degree of autonomy enshrined in their statute. And until the 1970s, the governments of these five regions were the only ones fully operative and functioning (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019; Palermo 2021). Although the 2001 constitutional reform confirmed the classification between ordinary and special regions, at the same time it has tried to bridge the gap between the two, by reshuffling the division of powers between the state and the regions in favour of the latter, as detailed in article 117 of the constitution. At the same time, I already noted how the 2001 reform also included another important asymmetrical element, that is, differential regionalism as ingrained in article 116(3). If the negotiations for increased autonomy that are currently undergoing between the state and the three regions of Veneto, Lombardia, and Emilia Romagna will be successful—as it seems the case now—this will lead to the emergence of a third genus of region, different from both special and ordinary regions. Such asymmetrical trait may further increase in scope if other ordinary regions will resort to the opportunities provided for by article 116(3). Another element of constitutional asymmetry is represented by the provisions on fiscal federalism of article 119, which grants autonomy of revenue raising and expenses to ordinary regions, thus increasing the scope of their fiscal autonomy. However, as already observed, the level of fiscal autonomy enjoyed by special regions is usually broader and is contained not in the constitution but in the regional charters or statutes, individually negotiated by each autonomous region with the state. This creates asymmetrical results also among special regions, since some of them (mainly Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and Valle d’Aosta/ Vallée d’Aoste) are highly autonomous, while others (like Sicilia and Sardegna but to a certain extent also Friuli Venezia Giulia) are much less autonomous (Palermo and Valdesalici 2019; Valdesalici 2021).

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One last point regarding constitutional asymmetries in Italy that is often overlooked relates to the organisation of local governments below the regional level, especially after the enactment of law 56/2014 that created metropolitan cities and reduced the powers of the provincial level. In fact, some regions are characterised by the presence of one or more metropolitan city to govern vast areas, in addition to still having provincial and municipal levels (like for example Lombardia, with the metropolitan city of Milan, 12 provinces and about 1500 municipalities). In other regions, like Friuli Venezia Giulia, the four original provinces have been replaced by four entities of regional decentralisation, coupled by just over 200 municipalities, and no metropolitan cities yet. This of course may create unbalances in the way local administration functions. 4.2.4

Asymmetry and Economic Differences

As noted, constitutional asymmetry is more likely to occur in multinational, rather than mono-national federations or quasi-federal systems (Sahadzic 2021), because sub-state national societies (i.e. nations within the multinational state) aspire to seek forms of constitutional accommodation that are unique and applied to the specific society only, as is the case with Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, or Belgium, for example (Popelier and Sahadzic 2019; Sahadzic 2021). However, as Conversi notes, asymmetrical solutions are not a prerogative of federal systems only: in fact, unitary states can also transfer “different degrees of autonomy” to regions or local sub-units, based on their specific demands and claims (Conversi 2007). De iure asymmetry thus becomes the unavoidable consequence of de facto asymmetry. Asymmetry can thus be considered a possible solution to explore in order to address the issue of diversity, including to accommodate claims for more autonomy coming from economically stronger regions and economic regionalism. But how can it be used for such purposes? The answer of course differs depending on the specific context. One possible way of meeting the unique interests of economically strong regions may be to grant them special (or asymmetrical) powers over taxation (the so-called fiscal federalism). By devising an autonomous way to levy local taxes, economically powerful territories would be in a better position to take charge of local interests. Enhanced control over taxation would also bring significant benefits to the entire economic framework, as taxes are used for different purposes, including a better management of the territory. Increased

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autonomy in the taxation system might also lead to more control over work relations (so that economically viable areas could enjoy additional flexibility in labour practices) or over infrastructures or natural resources. A critical aspect that often emerges when pursuing this strategy is that asymmetry, especially when it entails a differential fiscal treatment, might deepen the fiscal imbalances that already exist among and between the various territories, thus impacting solidarity. Consequently, fiscal or economic asymmetries need to be counterbalanced by some other measures at the national level, not to jeopardise the solidaritybased ties between regions and between the regions and the central state. Another critical aspect of asymmetry is that it is traditionally more easily accepted by the state-wide community when it entails cultural or linguistic traits (as it happens in the case of nations within multinational states or federations); but when asymmetry affects primarily the economic sphere, perplexities may arise, unless this “different” treatment is somehow explained to the rest of the country. Challenges to constitutional asymmetry will be explored more thoroughly in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.3

Subsidiarity

In addition to asymmetry, subsidiarity is another constitutional principle that can be used in instances of economic regionalism. In general terms, subsidiarity implies that legislative or administrative action should occur, whenever possible, at the lowest appropriate level of government at which a given objective can be achieved, with the central authority merely playing a “subsidiary” role, and thus performing only tasks that cannot be better completed at local level (Bermann 1994; Schütze 2009). In other words, this principle mandates that “governments need to delegate their powers, authorities, and duties to the smallest (or to the closestto-the-citizens) jurisdiction that can efficiently perform them” (Blank 2010). However, subsidiarity is also a complex and nuanced principle “that extends beyond supporting the autonomy of smaller units” and, as we will see, in its more sophisticated understanding it both tends towards decentralisation and mandates central intervention if certain conditions occur (Cahill and O’Sullivan 2022). In this section, I will briefly revisit the intellectual history of subsidiarity, and then I will move to illustrate how the principle has been entrenched and interpreted in the Italian regional

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system as a constitutional mechanism to deal with issues of economic regionalism. 4.3.1

A Brief Intellectual History of Subsidiarity

The term subsidiarity has its roots in the Latin word subsidium, meaning “aid” or “assistance” (Schütze 2009). Some scholars contend that the origins of subsidiarity shall be traced back to the thought of ancient philosophers like Aristotle and Saint Thomas (ex multis, Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994; Poplawska 1997; Burgess 2006). However, as anticipated in Chapter 1, the modern understanding of subsidiarity as a social principle rests on Roman Catholic social theory, in particular the papal encyclicals Quadrigesimo Anno and Pacem in Terris . The common element to these encyclicals was the preoccupation of the Catholic Church to lose control over the organisations of civil society, especially after the changes brought to the modern state by capitalism and socialism, the latter “blamed” for having a centripetal force (Arban 2013, 2015). In similar vein, also in the work of Johannes Althusius—recalled in Chapter 1—we can detect a seed of subsidiarity (Arban 2015). The transformation of subsidiarity from a social to a political and legal (constitutional) principle took place after the Second World War, particularly with the German Grundgesetz of 1949 (Marquardt 1994; Arban 2013, 2015). Although the term subsidiarity does not appear anywhere in the German constitutional text, its essence is nonetheless enshrined in article 72(2) which mandates that the federal government shall use its concurrent powers only “if and insofar as the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest” (Gardner 2008; Arban 2013, 2015). It was however in the ambit of EU constitutionalism that subsidiarity has gained universal recognition, although it was introduced incrementally as a fundamental principle. In 1975, during the preparation of the Tindemans report (a report prepared by the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans on how the term “European Union” should be understood), subsidiarity was proposed as a protective measure against the expansion of EU powers (Marquardt 1994; but see also Arban 2013, 2015). In 1986, the Single European Act was approved, bringing some changes to the Treaty of Rome, and establishing the common internal market by 1992:

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among other things, it introduced subsidiarity in relation to a provision in the field of environment (Marquardt 1994; Arban 2013, 2015). But it was with the Treaty of Maastricht (“TEU”) of 1992 that subsidiarity was recognised as a fundamental principle of EU law. It was the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors who, influenced by German federalism, stressed the role that subsidiarity could play in the balance of powers between EU and national institutions, especially considering the strong criticism at the time on the centripetal trends of EU institutions (Marquardt 1994; Arban 2013, 2015). The Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 now includes a Protocol (the “Early Warning Mechanism” on the application of subsidiarity as a form of political monitoring or compliance by EU institutions (Martinico 2011; Arban 2015), although its justiciability by the Court of Justice of the European Union remains limited (Martinico 2021). Within EU law, subsidiarity applies only to shared competences between EU institutions and member states. Article 5(3) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.

After the inclusion of subsidiarity as a fundamental EU principle, a burgeoning scholarship has emerged detailing the intellectual origins and evolution of this principle, mainly in the EU context but also beyond (ex multis, Cass 1992; Bermann 1994; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994; Schütze 2009; Brouillet 2011; Martinico 2011; Arban 2013). With the constitutional reform of 2001, the principle of subsidiarity was introduced as a principle of Italian regionalism in article 118. In this section, I will thus sharpen focus on this provision and on the peculiar interpretation that the Italian Constitutional Court (“ItCC”) gave to it.

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Subsidiarity in Italy

As mentioned in Chapter 3, with the entrenchment of subsidiarity in article 118 this principle entered the Italian constitutional discourse for the first time in 2001, although it had already been introduced by Law 59/1997 to guide the allocation of administrative powers between the centre and the periphery (Arban 2015). While constitutionally embedded in article 118 as the basis to allocate administrative (not legislative) powers, subsidiarity is also mentioned, along with loyal cooperation, in article 120(2), in relation to substitution powers (Martinico 2021; Woelk 2021). It shall be noted that the constitutional legislator often refers to the principle of subsidiarity along with the principles of “differentiation” and “adequacy” (Arban 2015; Martinico 2021). While the Italian constitution does not provide a definition of these principles, scholars suggest that “differentiation” refers to the fact that “local authorities belonging to the same category can be granted with different functions, differentiating the competences according to parameters related to their demographic, territorial and structural characteristics, also considering their associative dimension” (Tubertini 2006; see also Arban 2015). These actors, therefore, shall not be treated “equally” since differences exist, for instance, between more and less populated municipalities (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Arban 2015). Conversely, “adequacy” involves “an assessment in actual fact of the tangible ability of a local authority … to implement functions that must be assigned” (Tubertini 2006; see also Arban 2015). Furthermore, article 118 contains both the notions of vertical subsidiarity (par. 1) and horizontal subsidiarity (par. 4), as detailed below. 4.3.3

Vertical Subsidiarity

The concept of vertical subsidiarity (or ascending subsidiarity in the words of the ItCC, see ex multis ItCC judgment 384/2005) refers to “the distribution of powers among different layers of the public sphere” (Colombo 2008; but see also Arban 2015). Because it is used to “regulate territorial units”, some scholars like Føllesdal also referred to it as “territorial” subsidiarity (Føllesdal 1998; but see also Arban 2015). Article 118(1) states that administrative functions belong to the level of government closest to the citizens (e.g. municipalities), unless they are attributed to a higher level of government (provinces, metropolitan cities,

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regions, or the state) if there is a need for uniform interpretation in a given subject matter, and pursuant to the principles of subsidiarity, differentiation, and adequacy (or proportionality). The constitutional legislator thus chose municipalities as the favourite echelon of government for administrative functions (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Arban 2015). Consequently, municipalities decide whether, when, and how they need help from the upper entities (provinces, metropolitan cities, regions, or the state). As such, to have a “subsidiary intervention” from an upper level, the request shall come from the “bottom” (Fracanzani 2006; Arban 2015). Consequently, with the “new” article 118(1), the legislator preferred to reserve all administrative functions (regardless of how legislative competences are allotted) to the level of government closest to the citizens, unless there is a prevailing common interest (Arban 2015). 4.3.4

Horizontal Subsidiarity

Article 118(4) of the constitution also ingrains the less known horizontal aspect of the principle in the following terms: The state, regions, metropolitan cities, provinces, and municipalities promote the autonomous initiative of citizens, both as individuals and as members of associations, relating to activities of general interest, based on the principle of subsidiarity.

Horizontal subsidiarity thus “relates to the sharing of competences and initiatives between public and private actors” so that, in this sense, “subsidiarity could be conceived like a sort of ‘division of labour’ between public sector and civil society (person, family, non-profit organization, market)” (Colombo 2008). Accordingly, as vertical subsidiarity refers to the territorial aspect of the principle, horizontal subsidiarity “applies non-territorially (“horizontally”) to associations, social sectors, or social functions” (Føllesdal 1998). As suggested, this provision “aims to promote general interests” and is addressed to “public authorities and private bodies” (Tubertini 2006). Scholars have also alleged that, in practical terms, “it rests on the citizens to assume the autonomous initiative in the general interest” meaning that “the power of initiative belongs to the citizens” (Arena 2003). Despite such provision, the spirit of horizontal subsidiarity has rarely been exploited to its full potential (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Sterpa

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2010), also because the ItCC has never really engaged in sketching the meaning of such principle (Arban 2015). Nonetheless, horizontal subsidiarity should be read in conjunction with article 3(2) of the constitution, which dictates that it is the task of the Italian Republic to “remove all economic and social obstacles that … impede the full development of the human being and the effective participation of all workers to the political, economic and social organization” of the nation (Arena 2003). It should also be read alongside article 4(2) of the constitution, whereby “it is the duty of each citizen to perform an activity or function that contributes to the material or spiritual progress of the society, based on his or her own possibilities and choice” (Arena 2003). 4.3.5

Subsidiarity in the Interpretation of the Constitutional Court

With the constitutional entrenchment of subsidiarity, the role of the ItCC in interpreting article 118 has become crucial, as certain important decisions have contributed to partially reshape the principle (Delledonne 2021; Martinico 2021). Looking at such case law might help to better understand the scope that subsidiarity has acquired in Italian regionalism, but it also helps shedding light over a principle whose essence is not always fully grasped in general. To this end, judgment 303/2003 is one of the most relevant decisions not only on subsidiarity but also on some of the key aspects of the 2001 reform (Arban 2015; Delledonne 2021). Regarding subsidiarity, the judgment painted the framework to understand and define the scope of the principle in the Italian legal system. Among the issues raised before the ItCC was whether the national legislator could “undertake and regulate the exercise of administrative functions on subject matters in which it does not have an exclusive legislative power, but only a shared power” with the regions (ItCC judgment 303/2003; Arban 2015). The ItCC argued that the unifying role of the state shall not be limited to those areas where it enjoys exclusive powers pursuant to article 117(2), or to the definition of general guidelines in areas of shared jurisdiction according to article 117(3) (ItCC judgment 303/2003; see also Arban 2015). In fact, the principle of subsidiarity should be considered as a “flexibility” tool that the constitutional system offers to help derogating from the rigid division of powers ingrained in article 117, which would otherwise compromise the unity and indivisibility of the state (ItCC judgment 303/2003; see also Arban 2015).

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To this end, the ItCC has elaborated the notions of static and dynamic subsidiarity: the former relates to the allocation of administrative functions to municipalities as per article 118(1), while the dynamic dimension pertains to the flexibility element intrinsic in subsidiarity, which allows to derogate from the allocation of powers if there is a need to satisfy a unitary (or national) interest (ItCC judgment 303/2003; ItCC judgment 232/ 2011; Arban 2015). Such allusion to some sort of “national interest” or “unitary concern” is not accidental: in fact, as noted in Chapter 3, before the 2001 constitutional reform, article 127(3) enshrined the equivalent of a “national interest” clause, but since this provision was erased from the constitutional text in 2001, the ItCC deemed it appropriate to reintroduce it judicially (Arban 2015; Martinico 2021). Consequently, in areas falling within the exclusive competence of the state, or within shared powers, a national law can resort to subsidiarity to vest the state with both administrative and legislative powers if there is a need for a uniform discipline in a specific subject matter (Arban 2015). In practice, this means that the state can derogate from the division of powers set forth in article 117, since subsidiarity can be applied both to administrative functions and legislative powers (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Arban 2015). This is what the ItCC has dubbed “attraction in subsidiarity”: when the state has “attracted” to itself certain administrative powers because of a need of unitary discipline, then it shall “attract” to itself also the related legislative powers, instead of leaving them to the different legislative frameworks of individual regions (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Arban 2015). And although article 118 infuses only administrative functions with subsidiarity, for the ItCC the principle “operates on both sides, the administrative and the legislative”, if certain conditions apply (Caretti and Tarli Barbieri 2012; Arban). In the same judgment, the ItCC also identified which conditions shall be met by a state law to grant administrative and legislative powers to the state following the attraction in subsidiarity. On the one hand, the interest of the state to assume administrative functions normally belonging to the regions shall be “proportionate” and “not unreasonable”. On the other hand, there shall be an agreement between the state and the region(s) concerned (ItCC judgment 303/2003; see also Arban 2015). These two conditions are intended to protect regional autonomy, and to prevent an excessive expansions of state powers (Arban 2015). At the same time, the ItCC has emphasised the “chemistry” between subsidiarity and loyal cooperation between the state and local autonomies, in the form of

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concerted practices and agreements, in line with the “pluralist flavour” of subsidiarity (Martinico 2021). All in all, the ItCC has proposed a very articulate and original interpretation of subsidiarity, one that shows the agility and potential of this principle, but that at the same time goes perhaps in the opposite direction of the intended spirit of the 2001 reform that constitutionally enshrined it (Arban 2015). In its subsequent case law, the ItCC has “progressively eroded the original design” of judgment 303/2003. With judgment 6/2004, for example, the ItCC argued that the attraction in subsidiarity can occur also in the field of exclusive regional competences, but always subject to the principles of necessity, adequacy, and proportionality (Martinico 2021). In a string of ensuing decisions, the ItCC has extended subsidiarity also to non-legislative powers of the state (Scaccia 2009; Martinico 2021) and to state’s substitution powers (Mainardis 2007; Martinico 2021). 4.3.6

Subsidiarity Beyond Federalism

The principle of subsidiarity is somehow intertwined with federalism. Certainly, both federalism and subsidiarity “share some intellectual history and constitute a response to similar overlapping concerns about centralisation of the state” (Cahill and O’Sullivan 2022). For instance, Burgess contends that subsidiarity encourages a pluralist conception and a functional and territorial dispersion of powers, but also federations are premised on a pluralist view and on several tiers of authority and decisionmaking building up from below (Burgess 2000, 2006). At the same time, subsidiarity and federalism are not perfectly coterminous: in fact, subsidiarity does not vest authority at any specific level, but expresses a preference for proximity (Cahill and O’Sullivan 2022). In any event, while an implicit characteristic of many decentralised systems, the principle of subsidiarity is rarely explicitly entrenched in constitutional texts, thus this tool is not always exploited to its fullest advantage. In addition to article 118 of the Italian constitution, subsidiarity is also ingrained in article 5A of the Swiss constitution, which provides that subsidiarity “must be observed in the allocation and performance of state tasks”. But besides these two examples, it is very difficult to find subsidiarity embedded in federal constitutions, although its spirit may still lurk, as happens with article 72(2) of the German Basic Law.

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However, what is interesting to note is that subsidiarity has been recently introduced in a few constitutions that are prima facie neither federal nor quasi-federal. For example, article 6(1) of the Portuguese constitution mandates that “[t]he state shall be unitary and shall be organised and function in such a way as to respect the autonomous island system of self-government and the principles of subsidiarity, the autonomy of local authorities and the democratic decentralisation of the Public Administration”. Article 7(4) of the constitution of Georgia provides that “[t]he separation of the powers of state authority and self-governing units is based on the principle of subsidiarity”. Article 270 of the constitution of Bolivia provides that subsidiarity (along with several other principles) shall govern the territorial organisation and the decentralised and autonomous territorial entities. Article 203 of the constitution of Chad provides that the autonomous collectivities have exclusive powers and competences shared with the state, based on the principle of subsidiarity. But the most interesting provisions are perhaps ingrained in the constitution of Ecuador, where subsidiarity is enshrined as a general principle but also as a principle that assist in the case of economic resources. Specifically, article 238 provides that local self-governments “shall have political, administrative and financial autonomy and shall be governed by the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity, inter-territorial equity, integration and public participation …” Furthermore, subsidiarity shall be the guiding principle in the handling of shared competences among different levels of government. Likewise, article 270 mandates that “decentralised autonomous governments shall earn their own financial resources and shall receive a share of state revenue, on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity and equity”. More examples could be made, but the point I try to make is that subsidiarity is increasingly adopted as a constitutional principle. It could thus be a key tool also to deal with economic regionalism more effectively as, by its own nature, it brings the attention closer to the specific interests and needs of citizens. The entrenchment of subsidiarity at constitutional level could therefore offer a safe and convincing stratagem to better serve the requests of politically and economically strong regions.

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129

Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced economic regionalism, first in general terms and then in relation to the specific Italian case study. I also pointed out similarities and differences between economic regionalism and substate nationalism, arguing that the two often conflate. If the claims for more autonomy that come from economically strong regions are real and not imaginary, and thus deserve to be taken seriously, the next question to address relates to the constitutional responses that can be offered to accommodate such aspirations to more autonomy. I then sharpened focus on two constitutional tools that could be of value when issues of economic regionalism emerge, whether or not they are accompanied by sub-state nationalism claims: asymmetry and subsidiarity, looking again at the Italian example. However, economic regionalism as described here, especially when it leads to asymmetrical solutions, can elicit an important issue, that is solidarity. In fact, one of the problems that emerged when the LN was pushing in the direction of federalism was that the emphasis on differences that were political and economic in nature would jeopardise the spirit of solidarity that should inform the relationships among regions. In other words, there is a connection between economic regionalism and solidarity, as recognition and support within a federal or regional system includes obligations of solidarity and mutual support. Incidentally, solidarity issues are not entirely foreign in the context of sub-state nationalism. The next question thus becomes: how is it possible to reconcile economic regionalism with general principles such as fairness, equality, and solidarity? This question will be the topic of the next chapter.

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Blank, Yishai. 2010. Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance. Fordham Urban Law Journal 37: 509–558. Brouillet, Eugenie. 2011. Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora’s Box? Supreme Court Law Review 54: 601–632. Burgess, Michael. 2000. Federalism and the European Union: The Building of Europe 1950–2000. London: Routledge. Burgess, Michael. 2006. Comparative Federalism. Theory and Practice. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Cahill, Maria, and Garry O’Sullivan. 2022. Subsidiarity and the City. The Case for Mutual Strengthening. In Cities in Federal Constitutional Theory, ed. Erika Arban, 54–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Caretti, Paolo, and Giovanni Tarli Barbieri. 2012. Diritto Regionale. Torino: Giappichelli. Cass, Deborah Z. 1992. The Word That Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within the European Community. Common Market Law Review 29: 1107–1136. Cavatorta, Francesco. 2001. The Role of the Northern League in Transforming the Italian Political System: From Economic Federalism to Ethnic Politics and Back. Contemporary Politics 7: 27–40. Cento Bull, Anna. 2003. Collective Identities: From the Politics of Inclusion to the Politics of Ethnicity and Difference. Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2: 41–54. Colombo, Alessandro. 2008. The ‘Lombardy Model’: Subsidiarity-Informed Regional Governance. Social Policy and Administration 42: 177–196. Conversi, Daniele. 2007. Asymmetry in Quasi-Federal and Unitary States. Ethnopolitics 6: 121–124. Cruz, Sara C.S., and A.C. Aurora Teixeira. 2010. The Evolution of the Cluster Literature: Shedding Light on the Regional Studies-Regional Science Debate. Regional Studies 44: 1263–1288. Delledonne, Giacomo. 2021. Federalism and Regionalism in Constitutional Adjudication. In Federalism and Constitutional Law. The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, ed. Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 48–64. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Destro, Adriana. 1997. A New Era and New Themes in Italian Politics: The Case of Padania. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 2: 358–377. Fabbrini, Sergio, and Marco Brunazzo. 2003. Federalizing Italy: The Convergent Effects of Europeanization and Domestic Mobilization. Regional and Federal Studies 13: 100–120. Fitjar, Rune Dahl. 2009. The Rise of Regionalism: Causes of Regional Mobilization in Western Europe. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

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CHAPTER 5

Reconciling (Economic) Regionalism and Solidarity

In the previous chapter, I mapped the concept of economic regionalism using Italy as a case study. I then proposed two constitutional law tools— asymmetry and subsidiarity—as possible mechanisms to accommodate the claims for more autonomy coming from economically wealthier regions. In the conclusion, I noted how one of the major concerns linked to the theorisation of economic regionalism is the reconciliation of the needs of these economically strong regions with general principles of fairness, equality, and, particularly, solidarity: in fact, the recognition and support of socio-economic differences within a federal or quasi-federal system includes obligations of solidarity and mutual support. Solidarity-based concerns were immediately raised in Italy when federal reforms were proposed in the early 1990s. Simply put, because in those years the requests for increased autonomy were voiced by a political party firmly rooted in the wealthiest area of the country, and thus embedded in the economic disparity existing between the (richer) North and the (poorer) South, one of the strongest censures made to Lega Nord (“LN”) was that its federal project aimed at furthering the economic and financial greed or selfishness of certain territories, while overlooking the needs of the poorer areas of the country. In other words, that part of the country that was pursuing federal solutions was believed to seek more powers without obligations towards the rest of the country (specifically, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Arban, Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31543-5_5

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the South). One of the reasons why federalism was ostracised was thus this conviction that it would discourage solidarity. As a result, the clash between federalism and solidarity became inevitable. As I noted elsewhere, solidarity is a fascinating concept: broadly used at EU level, it is scarcely studied especially in its purest legal sense, probably because of the challenges in clearly separating the legal meaning of the principle from its more moral or religious one (Arban 2017). In this chapter, I build on some of my previous work and explore the relationship between solidarity and federalism; to this end, I engage with the question whether federalism and solidarity are antithetical concepts (as it has emerged in the Italian experience), and speculate on possible forms of reconciliation between solidarity and the need for more autonomy in the context of economic regionalism. The connection between federal theory and economic regionalism is relevant because, as explained, solutions borrowed from federalism are helpful to meet the interests of politically and economically strong regions. To benefit the discussion, I explore the legal meaning of solidarity particularly in systems characterised by a federal or decentralised scheme and inspect which are the main tools that such systems have devised, so that solidarity and federalism may find full harmonisation. I begin with a brief intellectual history of solidarity, its meaning in the legal sphere, and how the principle is enshrined in a selection of federal and quasi-federal constitutions. Next, I sharpen focus on the different meanings of solidarity in federal theory. I then offer a case study of Italy and illustrate how solidarity is encapsulated in the Italian constitution; I also detail the various sets of issues that have emerged in the Italian experience and that caused an ideological clash between federal ideas and the solidarity principle. Finally, I argue that solidarity and federal theory should not be construed as antithetical or hostile concepts, as they serve different purposes. For the same reason, the protection and accommodation of economic regionalism does not, in and of itself, infringe upon the spirit of solidarity: however, when presented with instances of economic regionalism, not only vertical, but also horizontal solidarity (that is, solidarity-based relations among constituent units or different groups) should be strengthened through its constitutional entrenchment.

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Solidarity in General

As I have explained elsewhere, solidarity is a universal value, a virtue, a meta-principle that has had various meanings, synonyms, and conceptualisations throughout history; likewise, it is multi- and cross-disciplinary and displays moral, ethical, political, and legal/constitutional implications (Arban 2023a). Such semantic richness and polymorphism, and its epistemological link to friendship, charity, fraternity, loyalty, cooperation, or cohesion, makes it challenging to define solidarity and invites a distinction between solidarity and close (but not identical) notions: as such, solidarity is a fluid and elusive concept that presents numerous conceptual and normative challenges (Arban 2023a). On the one hand, solidarity displays facets that are of great interest to a variety of disciplines, including religion, law, politics, or philosophy: as such, it can signify different things to different observers (Arban 2017). For example, the characterisation that a jurist or a political scientist offer of this principle may differ from that proposed by a philosopher or a theologian (Arban 2017). Likewise, the same perception of this concept might evolve with time, so the understanding of solidarity in the eighteenth century might be substantively different from the one existing in present days (Arban 2017). In any event, even though solidarity can assume different nuances based on the different lens used to analyse it, it might be difficult to clearly distinguish one perspective from the other, as they often tend to conflate (Arban 2017). For example, solidarity as a legal or political principle may still be interspersed with moral or spiritual sentiments (Arban 2017). Therefore, while the underlying essence of solidarity can be easily captured (it usually triggers positive values such as equality, fairness, mutual help, benevolence, sympathy, compassion, brotherhood, kindness to others, and assistance) (Ottmann 2008; Arban 2017), it is much more complex to shape a universally accepted definition of it, especially in its legal/constitutional understanding, and to translate solidarity-based principles into real policies (Arban 2017). The idea of solidarity is quite old and had already appeared in the work of some of the most prominent ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle (Gonthier 2000). If we look at its literal meaning, the Oxford English Dictionary defines solidarity in these terms: “[t]he fact or quality, on the part of communities, etc., of being perfectly united or at one in some respect, esp. in interests, sympathies, or aspirations; spec. with reference to the aspirations or actions of trade-union members”. Such

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literal explanation of solidarity focuses on the personal dimension of the principle, which connects individuals sharing similar sentiments and aspirations. A first conceptual distinction that can be made is thus between moral and legal/constitutional solidarity (Arban 2017, 2021, 2023a). To this end, solidarity can be construed as a voluntary charitable act premised on mutual assistance or philanthropy (Ottmann 2008; Arban 2017, 2021, 2023a). Rieder refers to this as an expression of “altruistic solidarity” as used especially in the religious context (Rieder 2021). Conversely, legal solidarity can be construed as an “obligatory act based on legal rights and duties” (Ottmann 2008) although always combined with sentiments of mutual assistance (Arban 2017, 2021, 2023a). This type of solidarity is based on reciprocity, or do ut des (Rieder 2021). It is this reciprocal quality that distinguishes legal solidarity from concepts like charity, philanthropy, or altruism (Arban 2023a). This means that solidarity is not exactly coterminous with altruism (Hilpold 2015; Arban 2023a), although there might be shared common sentiments: in fact, solidarity “refers to the common exercise of interests, for example in risk prevention or in a political struggle, while altruism finds its roots in an individual attitude which is totally unselfish” (Hilpold 2015; see also Arban 2023a). Egoism is thus a key element in discerning solidarity and altruism, since the latter “is characterized by a total lack of egoism” whereas—and perhaps paradoxically—solidarity “has many egoistic traits” (Hilpold 2015; see also Arban 2023a). Furthermore, Rieder posits that reciprocal solidarity is a form of cooperation and, as such, it requires mutual trust (Rieder 2021; see also Arban 2023a). As a legal principle, solidarity may also take different meanings, based on whether it is discussed in international law, private law, public/ constitutional law, or federalism theory (Arban 2017, 2021, 2023a). First, in international law, solidarity is intimately related to the French concept of fraternité which, along with liberté and égalité, represented epitome values of the French revolutionary political engineering (Gonthier 2000; Arban 2021, 2023a). Such values were later ingrained in the French constitution and then in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Gonthier 2000; Arban 2021, 2023a). Conversely, in private law, solidarity can be traced back to the Latin concept in solidum which connoted a shared responsibility for the whole common objective (solidum) and not just the care for an individual; Roman civil law institutionalised the “obligation in solidum” implying

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that each debtor owed an identical thing to that to which his co-obligor is held (Arban 2021, 2023a). Finally, in its public law understanding, solidarity can be construed as “an aspirational principle and all-encompassing concept” that promotes equality, social rights, well-being, and friendship among and between constitutional actors (Arban 2021, 2023a). To this end, solidarity may inspire welfare provisions or provisions on socio-economic rights (Ottmann 2008; but see also Arban 2017, 2021, 2023a). As it is known, the expression “socio-economic rights” incorporates a bundle of rights such as private property, health, education, work, social security, and equality of salary between men and women for the same job, but most of all welfare provisions: in fact, it is in relation to the national welfare state that the legal acceptation of solidarity has mostly been developed, with issues of redistribution acquiring a prominent relevance (Ottmann 2008; see also Arban 2021). Here, the spirit of solidarity fills those mechanisms offered by central governments to help citizens protect and enjoy these rights, such as national programmes providing health and social services on a universal basis (Ottmann 2008; see also Arban 2017). Drawing upon thinkers like Durkheim, theories of solidarity have been developed within nation states, with community (or nation) members linked by a “social bond” which becomes the basis for “social solidarity” (Ottmann 2008). Consequently, legal solidarity is inherent in socio-economic rights (or welfare regulations) developed in the ambit of this idea of nation (Ottmann 2008), and solidarity becomes a “common value” linking together member states and the people living in them (Ottmann 2008). Another common public law area where solidarity emerges is in relation to the responsibility of an individual towards the community: in this sense, political solidarity may entail a duty to vote, socio-economic solidarity suggests a duty to obtain proper education, work or contribute to public expenses, etc. (Arban 2017, 2021, 2023a). But the essence of solidarity can also infuse provisions on natural or man-made disasters and emergencies, or terrorist attacks (Arban 2017, 2021). This is probably the most obvious example of solidarity, most intimately connected with sentiments of mutual aid and assistance or, as some theorist suggests, “empathy” (Ottmann 2008, see also Arban 2017), binding actors at all levels: local and national governments and institutions, states in the international community, etc. A similar understanding of solidarity infuses, both at national and international levels, areas like border control, human rights, asylum rights, or even the energy sector (Arban 2023a).

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Historically, solidarity appeared prominently in the papal encyclical Pacem in Terris of 1963, already mentioned in Chapter 1, where Pope John XXIII seemed to acknowledge the existence of two meanings of the principle: a religious one, with human solidarity as a synonym of Christian charity in the specific ambit of migrants rights (par. 107), and a more political one, with active solidarity (Arban 2017). Paras 98 and 99 state the following: 98. Since relationships between States must be regulated in accordance with the principles of truth and justice, States must further these relationships by taking positive steps to pool their material and spiritual resources. In many cases this can be achieved by all kinds of mutual collaboration; and this is already happening in our own day in the economic, social, political, educational, health and athletic spheres—and with beneficial results. We must bear in mind that of its very nature civil authority exists, not to confine men within the frontiers of their own nations, but primarily to protect the common good of the State, which certainly cannot be divorced from the common good of the entire human family 99. Thus, in pursuing their own interests, civil societies, far from causing injury to others, must join plans and forces whenever the efforts of particular States cannot achieve the desired goal. But in doing so great care must be taken. What is beneficial to some States may prove detrimental rather than advantageous to others.

In other words, for John XXIII, relationships among states shall be informed by sentiments of truth, justice, and mutual collaboration in a variety of ambits (economic, social, political, education, health, and athletics). The international and constitutional dimensions of the principle seem to conflate here. Since then, solidarity has progressively become one of the primary principles receiving constitutional recognition in several European legal systems (Arban 2017). Finally, solidarity assumes a rather unique characterisation in federal theory, which interests our discussion more closely. Here, solidarity often inspires equalisation provisions whose purpose is to curb socio-economic imbalances among territories (Arban 2021). In this sense, solidarity is justified more by an “economic approach to redistribution” rather than an altruistic sentiment (Ottmann 2008, but see also Arban 2017). But solidarity in federal theory is also intertwined with the German doctrine of Bundestreue, whose literal meaning is fidelity or loyalty to the federal

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compact: in this specific understanding, federal solidarity implies a duty of the various echelons of government to respect the federal character of the state, with its division of powers and responsibilities and the duty to work harmoniously and constructively together (Arban 2017, 2021, 2023b). A third concept of solidarity as brotherhood in federations will also be discussed later in the chapter. 5.1.1

Constitutional and Federal Solidarity: A Comparative Overview

Some federal constitutions have integrated solidarity as one of the fundamental principles informing their respective legal systems, with solidarity-based provisions surfacing throughout various sections of their fundamental laws. This is the case, for example, of Spain, Germany, and Italy, although it is in the EU Treaties that solidarity stands out as a quintessential component (Arban 2023a). Conversely, this principle does not seem to permeate in the same way classic federations in the AngloSaxon world, like the US, Canada, or Australia, although other legal tools exist that can be traced back to this principle. • Solidarity in the European Union What is now the European Union emerged in the early 1950s as a community of six states, who agreed to come together for economic purposes and to rebuild a common social and economic fabric devastated by the Second World War: the need to strengthen solidarity among states and people was thus a necessity (Arban 2023a). Solidarity has therefore inspired the European project since the beginning, as also confirmed by the Schuman Declaration of 1950 which talked about the creation of “de facto solidarity” in Europe, and of “solidarity in production” for coal and steel. In Schuman’s words, “[l]’Europe ne se fera pas d’un coup ni dans une construction d’ensemble: elle se fera pour des réalisations concrètes, créant d’abord une solidarité de fait” (as cited in Hilpold 2015; see also Arban 2023a). As such, it does not come as a surprise that solidarity was recognised by the European Court of Justice as a paramount value in the legal architecture of the first European Economic Communities: in Commission v France of 1969, the Court mandated that solidarity is “at

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the basis of these obligations as of the whole of the Community system …” (as cited in Hilpold 2015; see also Arban 2023a). In the EU Treaties, solidarity is referred to both as a “principle” and as an “objective” (Hilpold 2015; see also Arban 2023a). Solidarity is solidly ingrained in article 2 TEU, which provides that The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

Beyond that, solidarity now occupies a prominent role in the communitarian acquis (Arban 2023a). For example, the TEU preamble aspires to deepen the “solidarity between their peoples” while article 3(3) TEU mandates that the EU shall—among other things—promote “solidarity between generations and … among Member States”. Article 3(5) TEU invites the EU to “contribute to … solidarity and mutual respect among peoples”. Title V of TEU (on the EU external action and on common foreign and security policy) mandates in article 21(1) that solidarity as a fundamental principle shall guide the “Union’s action on the international scene”. Article 24(2) TEU posits that the EU shall develop “mutual political solidarity among Member States” while the next paragraph dictates that each member state shall “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”; furthermore, member states shall “work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity”. Articles 31(1) and 32 also refer to solidarity among member states when acting in the EU scene (Arban 2023a). The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, also accentuates in different ways the relevance of solidarity for the EU. The preamble emphasises how solidarity “binds Europe and the overseas countries”. Article 67(2) TFEU (included in Title V on Freedom, Security and Justice) posits that the whole EU common policy on asylum, immigration, and external border control shall be based on solidarity among member states. Article 80 mandates that EU policies in this area shall be governed by the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between member states. Article 122(1) on economic and monetary policy provides that a solidarity

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spirit among member states shall guide decisions on economic measures, particularly in the energy sector. Title VII (devoted to the EU external action) contains a solidarity clause among the EU and member states in the event of a terrorist attack or of a natural or man-made disaster. Finally, Protocol (No. 28) on Economic, Social, and Territorial Cohesion recalls article 3 TEU and its objectives to promote economic, social, and territorial cohesion and solidarity between member states (Arban 2023a). The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also enshrines references to solidarity, particularly in Chapter VI entirely devoted to this value, which protects several rights (like workers’ right to information and consultation; right of collective bargaining and action; right of access to placement services, etc.) (Arban 2023a). The scope of solidarity in the EU acquis is further supported by the provision embedded in article 7 TEU, which provides for a special procedure in case of breach (or risk thereof) by a member state of one or more of the values ingrained in article 2 TEU. Normatively, article 7 includes a preventive and a sanctioning mechanism. It could be asked whether this mechanism would be appropriate to enforce solidarity: since the relevant status of solidarity is legally materialised with its inclusion among the fundamental values listed in article 2 TEU, the basic normative requirement to trigger the proceedings of article 7 TEU seems to be fulfilled (Arban 2023a). As often happens with similar broad-reaching principles, one of the problems of solidarity is its justiciability, and in fact the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has generally been “unwilling to develop a general understanding of solidarity as a discrete ground for European obligations” (Linden-Retek 2021; see also Arban 2023a). In a thorough survey of the CJEU’s case law engagement with solidarity, Schiek has compellingly proved how the CJEU has until recently missed the opportunity to clarify the many hues of solidarity as an EU constitutional principle, thus failing to develop a “consistent approach” towards the principle (Schiek 2020; see also Arban 2023a). It was only recently that the CJEU made a direct reference to article 2 TEU and the values listed therein (including solidarity) as part of the EU identity. In case C-156/ 21, the CJEU alleged that “Article 2 TEU is not merely a statement of policy guidelines or intentions, but contains values which … are an integral part of the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order, values which are given concrete expression in principles containing legally binding obligations for the Member States”. The same idea of

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article 2 TEU containing values that express the very identity of the EU as a legal order was replicated in case C-157/21 (Arban 2023a). This overview of solidarity in EU law well illustrates the relevance and maturity that the principle has acquired at EU level: as such, solidarity is (or should be) the animating force of all types of dynamics, among citizens, among member states, among member states and central institutions, and between the Union and the international community (Arban 2023a). Within the EU context, solidarity is mostly characterised by a “strongly reciprocal nature, a do ut des character” (Hilpold 2015; see also Arban 2023a). However, in recent years, solidarity bonds among EU member states have been frequently questioned, as was the case with the refugee and asylum policies or with the most recent energy procurement following the sanctions imposed to Russia because of the Ukraine/ Russia war. As Hilpold suggests, when member states “are required to act prevailingly in an altruistic way and no reciprocity is in sight, the ‘island of solidarity’ is in danger of being washed way …” (Hilpold 2015; see also Arban 2023a). At the same time, the recent implementation of the Next Generation EU fund to curb the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on EU member states and their economies (which I briefly introduced in Chapter 3) is seen by many as an unprecedented solidarity-based financial mechanism that will strengthen the solidarity bonds among member states (Fabbrini 2022). • Germany: solidarity and Bundestreue Solidarity as a fundamental federal principle is well ingrained in the German Grundgesetz. First, and similarly to other federal states, articles 107(1) and (2) contain provisions on distribution of tax revenue, financial equalisation among Länder and supplementary grants (Arban 2023a). Article 104b further provides that “the Federation may grant the Länder financial assistance for particularly important investments by the Länder and municipalities” in certain specific circumstances, such as when necessary to “avert a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium” or “equalise differing economic capacities within the federal territory” or “promote economic growth”. Also, always in accordance to article 104b(1), “the Federation may grant financial assistance even outside its field of legislative powers in cases of natural disasters or exceptional emergency situations beyond governmental control and substantially harmful

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to the state’s financial capacity”. References to solidarity in emergencies are also pervasive in the Grundgesetz. For instance, article 35 details the legal and administrative type of support that Länder shall offer to each other in the event of an adversity, but also article 91(1) deals with solidarity-based provisions in case of internal emergency (Arban 2023a). However, German federalism has bequeathed us the doctrine of Bundestreue, which is particularly relevant to the present discussion. Although it has not been crystallised as such in the 1949 Grundgesetz, solidarity as Bundestrue has been recognised judicially by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in its case law (Arban 2017).1 Literally, Bundestreue means fidelity, loyalty, or faith (Treue) in the federal structure (Bund). As such, it invites the various levels of government and organs of the state to collaborate with each other while at the same time refraining from hindering each other’s responsibilities and tasks (Arban 2023b). In this sense, it is also referred to as federal loyalty. I will revert to Bundestreue later in the chapter. Here, I will just say that, similarly to the EU, also the German Basic Law articulates a rich notion of solidarity, one that links central institutions with the periphery, particularly through equalisation payments or supplementary grants, as well as Länder among themselves, although it does so mainly in case of adversity (Arban 2023a). • Spain Following the European tradition, the Spanish constitution of 1978 also offers interesting insights on solidarity (Arban 2023a). First, in addition to protect several basic socio-economic rights (e.g. right to employment (article 35); socio-economic and legal protection of the family (article 39); social security system (article 41); health protection (article 43)), article 40(1) mandates that

1 In a 1958 decision, the Bundesverfassungsgericht explained that “In a federal state the federal government and the Lander have the common duty to preserve and maintain constitutional order throughout the entire union. Where the federal government does not have the power in its own right to maintain constitutional order, but is dependent on the co-operation of the Lander, such Lander are obliged to act. This follows from the unwritten rule of the duty of Bundestreue” (excerpt cited in De Villiers 2012; see also Arban 2017).

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The public authorities shall promote favourable conditions for social and economic progress and for a more equitable distribution of personal and regional income within the framework of a policy of economic stability. They shall devote special attention to carrying out a policy directed towards full employment.

Furthermore, article 2 provides for a general duty of solidarity among the nationalities and regions that compose the Spanish nation, while at the same time acknowledging their right to self-government (“[t]he Constitution … recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them all”). Article 138(1) postulates how to implement the solidarity principle of article 2. Specifically, it mandates that [t]he State guarantees the effective implementation of the principle of solidarity vested in Article 2 of the constitution, safeguarding the establishment of a just and adequate economic balance between the different areas of the Spanish territory and taking into special consideration the circumstances pertaining to those which are islands.

Finally, article 158 provides for the well-known solidarity-based tool of equalisation funds (here referred to as clearing fund) to redress “interterritorial economic imbalances” and implement “the principle of solidarity”. This brief survey of the Spanish constitution proves that solidarity has acquired a certain prominence within this regional model as well. Particularly interesting for the present discussion are the combined provisions of articles 2 and 138, as they constitutionalise the solidarity principle among the various comunidades autónomas, but at the same time they spell out how to translate the principle into practice. • Canada In Canada, neither the Constitution Act, 1867 nor the Constitution Act, 1982 pinpoint solidarity as one of the fundamental principles of the federation. However, the Constitution Act, 1982 introduces a section

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(Part III) devoted to “Equalisation and regional disparities”. More specifically, section 36(1) refers to a general “commitment to promote equal opportunities” and mandates that: Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and (c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.

Furthermore, section 36(2) creates equalisation payments and indicates that: Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalisation payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.

While its real scope is still debated among constitutional scholars, section 36(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 could be seen as a clear solidarity-based provision binding together the constituent units of the federation (the provinces) and the federal government in helping the promotion of a variety of services and tools that should help contain inequalities among the various areas of the federation. On the other hand, section 36(2) employs a common solidarity-based tool usually referred to as equalisation payment: in fact, considering the diversities existing between Canadian regions, these payments made by the central government to the provincial level significantly facilitate the reduction of the unbalances (Brun et al. 2008). However, when it comes to the so-called socio-economic rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (which constitutes Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982) follows the North American tradition whereby more emphasis is given to “individualism” over “communalism” as former Supreme Court Justice Gonthier, a proponent of the idea of fraternity, noted (Gonthier 2000). Accordingly, other than the general

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protection assured to the right to life, liberty, and security of the person ingrained in section 7 of the Charter, not much is said in regards to welfare, health, work, personal property, or other social rights, a common approach among Anglo-Saxon constitutions. 5.1.2

The Three Meanings of (Federal) Solidarity

The overview of solidarity presented here allows us to conclude that the principle of solidarity as a federalism principle may acquire three different meanings: (i) solidarity as Bundestreue; (ii) solidarity as brotherhood or fraternity; (iii) solidarity and equalisation (fiscal federalism). I will briefly treat each of them separately. As anticipated above, solidarity as Bundestreue, or federal loyalty, refers to a concept of trust among institutions and levels of government and respect for their reciprocal tasks and powers as enshrined in the constitution. It also refers to a duty of loyalty and respect for the principles embedded in the constitution, and for the constitutional structure in place (Arban 2023b). It further means collaboration and support, and amicable resolution of disputes, to avoid legal proceedings among different branches of government (Arban 2023b). Because of this, scholars like Tierney prefer to use the term “reciprocity” rather than solidarity as Bundestreue (Tierney 2022): the phenomenon described, however, remains the same. This understanding of solidarity builds on the idea that in a federal or quasi-federal state there are multiple centres of power, which should not be seen in competition against each other, but working together towards the same objectives (usually, the reconciliation of unity and diversity) (Arban 2023b). From its German origins, Bundestreue has become a common graft of many federal and quasi-federal systems (Arban 2017). For example, article 143(1) of the Belgian constitution mandates that “[i]n the exercise of their respective responsibilities, the federal State, the Communities, the Regions and the Joint Community Commission act with respect for federal loyalty, in order to prevent conflicts of interest” (Arban 2023b). Likewise, article 44 of the Swiss constitution provides that 1. The Confederation and the Cantons shall support each other in the fulfilment of their duties and shall generally cooperate with each other.

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2. They owe each other a duty of consideration and support. They shall provide each other with administrative assistance and mutual judicial assistance. 3. Disputes between Cantons or between Cantons and the Confederation shall wherever possible be resolved by negotiation or mediation. Article 41 of the South African constitution spells out a comprehensive illustration of federal loyalty in the following terms (Brand 1998; see also Arban 2023b): 1. All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere musta. preserve the peace, national unity, and the indivisibility of the Republic; b. secure the well-being of the people of the Republic; c. provide effective, transparent, accountable, and coherent government for the Republic as a whole; d. be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic, and its people; e. respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers, and functions of government in the other spheres; f. not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; g. exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional, or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and h. cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith byi. fostering friendly relations; ii. assisting and supporting one another; iii. informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest; iv. co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; v. adhering to agreed procedures; and vi. avoiding legal proceedings against one another. Although the two share some common traits, and one could be seen an expression of the other, Bundestreue differs from cooperative federalism, the latter referring to formal and informal mechanisms of interaction and collaboration in policy-making between different levels of

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government—usually at the executive level (Arban 2023b). While cooperative federalism is premised on collaboration and interaction, solidarity as Bundestreue encompasses a broader spirit of mutual respect, support, trust, and loyalty (Arban 2023b). Bundestreue also differs from shared rule which, as recalled in Chapter 1, is a distinctive feature of federalism, as it fosters the participation of the federated entities in decision-making at the centre (Elazar 1987). Shared rule encourages collaboration, of course, and in that it expresses federal loyalty; however, like cooperative federalism, federal loyalty also goes beyond such institutional mechanisms to refer to a broader spirit of mutual trust and respect (Arban 2023b). Like subsidiarity, also solidarity as Bundestreue may operate both vertically and horizontally (Arban 2023b). Vertical solidarity mediates the relationships between central and peripheral institutions, which are required to respect their reciprocal duties and responsibilities without interfering with each other’s authority (Arban 2017, 2023b). Tierney characterises this phenomenon as vertical reciprocity or comity (Tierney 2022). Conversely, horizontal solidarity runs among peripheral institutions (Arban 2017, 2023b). An example of horizontal solidarity is represented by article 48(3) of the Swiss constitution which allows intercantonal agreements, although such agreements should not be contrary to the law, to the interests of the confederation or to the rights of other cantons, and the confederation must be notified accordingly (Arban 2023b). Tierney brands horizontal solidarity as inter-territorial solidarity or horizontal reciprocity (Tierney 2022). At any rate, solidarity as Bundestreue, both in its horizontal and vertical understandings, runs among institutional bodies, not among private individuals, since individual members of the collectivity are rather bound together by the spirit of solidarity as fraternity (Arban 2023b). In this sense, solidarity as brotherhood or fraternity loses its institutional nature to refer to the sentiment of unity, harmony, and trust among people of various communities, or between citizens and institutions: solidarity thus closely resembles notions such as fraternity or brotherhood (Arban 2023b). Even in such moral or aspirational meaning, solidarity as brotherhood still represents a feature of many constitutional texts, like, for example, article 2 of the Spanish constitution discussed above (Arban 2023b). Likewise, the preamble to the Swiss constitution features solidarity as fraternity where it provides that “[t]he Swiss People and the Cantons … resolved to renew their alliance so as to strengthen liberty,

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democracy, independence and peace in a spirit of solidarity and openness towards the world” (Arban 2023b). In South Africa, the desire to overcome apartheid led to the inclusion in Article 41 cited supra of the requirement that all spheres of government and organs of the state shall foster the national unity and indivisibility of the country (Arban 2023b). Although other examples of solidarity as fraternity could be offered, those just outlined here are sufficient to illustrate this concept of solidarity as an element of inter-communal cohesion. Implicit illustrations of solidarity in this sense can be found also in those constitutional references to principles such as unity, equality, mutual help, fairness, democracy, and respect for one another (Arban 2023b). Finally, I noted how federal and quasi-federal constitutions often contain constitutional provisions entrenching equalisation mechanisms intended to grant the transfer of funds from the central government to the regions and territories that have lesser fiscal capacity and sometimes also between wealthier and poorer sub-entities. Such equalisation mechanisms are typically grounded on solidarity because they allow—at least ideally—to level deep economic differences among territories. Later in the chapter, I will revert to the relationship between solidarity and federalism, but now I move to a discussion of solidarity as ingrained in the Italian constitution.

5.2 5.2.1

Solidarity in Italy

Federalism and Solidarity as Antithetical Concepts

In previous chapters, I have reiterated how federalism has always lurked amid Italian intellectual and political circles since the years preceding the unification in 1861. In fact, because of the deep economic, social, political, and linguistic fragmentation, a federal structure reflecting such divides appeared to be a possible solution to accommodate the needs of such a diverse polity. Yet, while federalism was contemplated by the fathers of the Italian unification, the idea of a highly centralised state based on the Napoleonic model eventually won out. In fact, at a time intensely imbued with ideals of state sovereignty inherited from the French Revolution, federal ideas were received rather hesitantly because they were viewed as having the potential to disrupt the unity of a state and consequently as not responding to the spirit of solidarity that should connect together the different areas of the newly formed country (Ciuffoletti 1994).

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This robust centralisation was slightly reversed only with the constitution of 1948, but it was in the early 1990s that federal ideas emerged again as a topical subject of discussion when LN included federalism in its political agenda. But, once again, federalism assumed a negative connotation in many parts of Italy. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 4, LN was a regional party, one that had emerged from the fusion of several local leagues and whose main supporters resided in Northern Italian regions; it was not a national party with an electorate spread across the whole peninsula (Lecours and Arban 2015). Therefore, the ideology and rhetoric of LN, including federalism, was construed as the expression of a certain economic and political mindset distinctive of Northern Italy only (Lecours and Arban 2015). By association, federalism was understood, by non-LN voters, as the expression of a regional party, one that would foster the interests of a specific segment of Italy to the detriment of the rest (Lecours and Arban 2015). This aspect alone strongly contributed to the lack of popularity of federal ideas outside traditional LN strongholds. As it fed into the North/South divide (Roux 2008; Lecours and Arban 2015), the LN asserted that each region should be responsible for its own money, and should deal with all local aspects without depending on interventions from the centre, thus seeking to implement some form of fiscal federalism (Lecours and Arban 2015). The consequences of this federal project were seen as dire for the South, considering that the wealthier Northern regions would end up better off than Southern regions (Lecours and Arban 2015). Hence, the federal ideas advocated by the LN were understood by many as a form of selfishness of the North towards the South and as a lack of solidarity between richer and poorer regions (Destro 1997; Lecours and Arban 2015). By vesting individual regions with more powers, especially in the fiscal ambit, the wealthier areas of the North would become even wealthier to the detriment of the poorer regions in the South, which would be severely penalised in such a context (Lecours and Arban 2015). Furthermore, this scenario would also jeopardise the solidarity-based relationships among the various territories of the country, as richer regions would begin to think more in terms of profit increases rather than of fairness and equality. This explains why, at some point, the LN’s proposal was perceived as “egotistic and secessionist federalism” by certain political fringes (Lecours and Arban 2015). The constitutional reform of 2001 implemented a very “mild” federal system, with provisions calling for the increased autonomy of local selfgovernments mitigated by others that required a stronger control on

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the centre. In the next section, I sharpen focus on the various hues of solidarity as ingrained in the constitution. 5.2.2

Solidarity in the Italian Constitution and Constitutional Case Law

The Italian constitution explicitly mentions the principle of solidarity in two different contexts: among the fundamental principles of the constitution (article 2) and in the ambit of fiscal federalism (article 119) (Arban 2021). I will consider each of them separately. Article 2 provides that: The [Italian] Republic recognises and protects the inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and in the social groups where human personality is expressed. The Republic expects that the fundamental duties of political, economic, and social solidarity be fulfilled.

This article categorises two types of solidarity: political and socioeconomic. Political solidarity includes duties such as voting, homeland defence, and military service; as for socio-economic solidarity, this comprises the duty to get proper education, to work, to contribute to public expenses, etc. (Razzano 2011; Arban 2017). Duties of political and socio-economic solidarity mainly refer to a general duty of the individual towards the community at large where he or she belongs. Such “interpersonal” or “intergenerational” solidarity (as it has been defined by the ItCC, especially in judgment 203/2013) can be implicitly found also in other constitutional provisions (Arban 2021). Quite importantly, article 3(2) mandates that one of the duties of the Republic is to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic, and social organisation of the country.

Article 9(3), which was very recently added with constitutional law 1/2022, introduced another element of intergenerational and interpersonal solidarity by constitutionalising the protection of the environment, biodiversity, and eco-systems also in the interest of future generations

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as one of the duties of the Republic; such form of environmental solidarity requires both citizens and public administrators to protect the environment (Montaldo 2022; Bartolucci 2022). But the essence of solidarity permeates also provisions related to the socalled socio-economic rights: for instance, article 31(1) on family matters, in the part providing that the Republic shall “assist[s] the formation of the family and the fulfilment of its duties, with particular consideration for large families, through economic measures and other benefits” (Arban 2021); article 32(1) on the right to health, where health is protected as a “fundamental right of the individual and as a collective interest” thus guaranteeing “free medical care to the indigent” (Arban 2021); and article 38 on welfare. With specific regard to this last norm, article 38(1) provides that “[e]very citizen unable to work and without the necessary means of subsistence is entitled to welfare support”. Consequently, individuals who cannot work and who do not have enough means to live have a right to social assistance and support. Similarly, article 38(2) mandates that “workers have the right to be assured adequate means for their needs and necessities in the case of accidents, illness, disability, old age and involuntary unemployment”. To conclude, such interpersonal or intergenerational solidarity dynamically moves vertically from the individual to the central institutions (and the community as a whole), and from central institutions to the individual, thus bringing reciprocal benefits to all parties involved (Arban 2021). Article 119(3), on the other hand, refers to fiscal solidarity, and provides that: State legislation shall provide for an equalisation fund – with no allocation constraints – for the territories having lower per-capita taxable capacity.

Furthermore, article 119(5) provides that: The State shall allocate supplementary resources and adopt special measures in favour of specific municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions to promote economic development along with social cohesion and solidarity, to reduce economic and social imbalances, to foster the exercise of the rights of the person or to achieve goals other than those pursued in the ordinary implementation of their functions.

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Contrary to the interpersonal or intergenerational connotation of solidarity just discussed, pursuant to article 119 the central government is called to play a pivotal role in assisting disadvantaged regions through equalisation payments. As noted, equalisation funds are not infrequent in federal and quasi-federal systems, being a common solidarity-based mechanism, whose role is to contain the imbalances (especially on a fiscal basis) between richer and poorer areas or territories. As noted in Chapter 3, article 119 on fiscal federalism is one of the key innovations brought to Title V by the constitutional reform of 2001 (Arban 2021). It is interesting to observe how the pre-2001 version of article 119 contained a paragraph, removed in 2001, positing that the national government could grant by law special contributions to single regions, particularly in order to valorise the Mezzogiorno (the South) and the Islands (Arban 2021). In critically analysing the changes brought to Title V by the constitutional reform of 2001 through the prism of solidarity, one constitutional scholar observed how the new Title V is filled with provisions “betraying” the spirit of solidarity, to the point that the regional scaffolding as emerged in the aftermath of 2001 included some elements that are “in tension” with the principle of indivisibility of the state as evidenced, among other things, by the elimination of the “southern question” clause and by the provision on differential regionalism of article 116(3) (Patroni Griffi 2010). In fact, solidarity-related concerns have recently emerged both in debates on differential regionalism and also in regard to the implementation of PNRR. To partially remedy the problem, constitutional law 2/2022 added a paragraph to article 119 that acknowledges the peculiarity of the several Italian islands and supports all measures that help remove the disadvantages arising from insularity, as noted in Chapter 3. Although the text of par.6 is more limited in scope than the one existing in the pre-2001 text, it remains an important solidarity-based addition. To conclude, from the analysis outlined above, and similarly to other European contexts, it emerges that the principle of solidarity is crucial within the Italian legal system. In fact, it constitutes the foundation on which the whole package of constitutional provisions on socio-economic rights and on fiscal federalism is built. In fact, solidarity has emerged almost as an obsessive concern for Italian decision makers since the time of unification in the 1860s, so that solidarity-based mechanisms have persistently been invoked to limit or reduce these imbalances.

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But also the ItCC has at times engaged with solidarity: here, I will briefly mention two decisions issued in recent years by the Court. The first (judgment 331/2010) elaborates on the principle of solidarity enshrined in article 2 of the constitution, whereas the second (judgment 176/ 2012) investigates the scope of solidarity-based mechanisms as contained in article 119 on fiscal federalism. Judgment 331/2010 is interesting in that the ItCC invokes the principle of solidarity as entrenched in article 2 to soften self-centred behaviours of certain regions faced with legislation enforced at the national level in the interest of the whole country (in the case at issue, the sector at stake was that of energy production) (Arban 2021). According to the ItCC, the national government might decide to implement legislation at the national level in order to foster “an effective development of nuclear energy”. But regions cannot “unilaterally back out of the sacrifices required from them” thus openly violating the binding duty of socioeconomic solidarity enshrined in article 2. In this decision, it seems that the position taken by the ItCC is to consider the solidarity duty of article 2 as some sort of “national interest” clause justifying measures taken by the central government in the interest of the whole country. Thus, socioeconomic solidarity goes beyond the traditional approach whereby central governments are required to create institutions, mechanisms, and platforms allowing citizens to foster their own individuality. Rather, solidarity is construed as the animating force of all actions and decisions taken at central level. Judgment 176/2012, on the other hand, relates to the scope of article 119(5) and offers a slightly different approach compared to the previous decision analysed. In particular, the ItCC was called upon to elaborate on the wider scope of this provision and determine whether there is some legal duty upon “virtuous regions” to sustain the financial consequences of special interventions in favour of less advantaged regions (Longo 2012; see also Arban 2021). In other words, the issue addressed was whether the Italian legal system enshrines some (horizontal) solidarity-based duty binding one region to the other, so that the duty to support less developed regions falls not only within the jurisdiction of the state, but also within richer regions (Longo 2012; Arban 2021). In its decision, the ItCC made it clear that solidarity-based strategies and equalisation interventions shall come only from the central state (not from the regions), in the logic of the “vertical” equalisation embraced by the constitutional legislator in 2001 (Arban 2021). Consequently, wealthier regions are not

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legally bound by some sort of “solidarity call” to financially support less virtuous regions; only the central government shall do that through the mechanisms implemented by the constitutional and legislative framework (although clearly the resources available to the central government may be overwhelmingly provided by certain wealthier regions) (Arban 2021). We can thus see how the ItCC limits the scope of horizontal solidarity.

5.3

Reconciling Federalism and Solidarity 5.3.1

Horizontal and Vertical Solidarity

After extensively exploring in previous sections the meaning and use of solidarity in a selection of federal and decentralised systems in Europe and North America, which conclusions can be drawn and how can we address the opening questions, that is, whether solidarity and federalism are conflicting ideas, and how can we reconcile solidarity with the need for more autonomy, especially when it comes to the acknowledgement of economic regionalism? In my opinion, what has emerged from this study is a pervasive concern about disparities and cleavages among territories. This is the reason why solidarity-based provisions are included in the various constitutions that I have examined, in order to help level these differences. I suggested that solidarity-based mechanisms can be found at three different levels: in the ambit of socio-economic rights, between central institutions and individuals; fiscal federalism, with equalisation payments funnelled from the centre to the periphery; and in case of unfortunate events, at all levels (centre-periphery, among constituent units, or in the international arena). With specific regard to the welfare state, I noted how solidarity is its animating principle as it reconciles the weaker and the stronger, the poorer and the richer, etc. (Ottmann 2008). But also the doctrine of federal loyalty, building on Bundestreue, helps reconciling the different interests of the various echelons of government with the unity of the state. Another aspect worth noting is that, similarly to subsidiarity, solidarity also presents a vertical and a horizontal aspect. Vertical solidarity can be found in unitary and decentralised states alike and refers to a variety of duties of central institutions towards the individual, and of the individual towards the collectivity and central institutions. This is the most classic understanding of solidarity, and several tools are used to articulate this

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idea in practice: from the protection of socio-economic rights to equalisation funds. Horizontal solidarity, on the other hand, specifically pertains to the relationship between the component units of a federation or of a decentralised system. In other words, the concept of horizontal solidarity within a federal or decentralised state poses the question whether constituent units are legally bound by a solidarity duty to help and provide mutual assistance to each other in difficult situations. However, as mentioned above, this distinction is not always so firm, because it may happen that regions can either be asked to directly contribute to other regions in case of disasters (an example of horizontal solidarity), or the same regions could be taxed on their greater wealth allowing the centre to contribute to the region in difficulty (in which case it would fall within the vertical type of solidarity). But while vertical solidarity is a well-articulated concept that can be found in many constitutional arrangements, less attention is usually given to the horizontal aspect of the principle. Some of the European constitutions studied above contain provisions enshrining this type of bond, but this aspect remains less studied. 5.3.2

The Alleged Clash Between Federalism and Solidarity

The idea emerged in Italy over the past decades that a federal model would exacerbate the socio-economic cleavage between the North and the South, and thus frustrate solidarity among the different constituent units, can certainly be challenged in light of the above. Federalism is a very resilient scheme in that it is meant to reconcile unity with diversity, as diversities are intrinsic in the federal idea: they can be linguistic or cultural (as in the case of Spain or Canada), or more economic and political (as in the case of Italy and the EU). However, such imbalances are not a prerogative of federations only: even unitary states, especially if geographically vast or with a diverse social fabric, display a certain degree of non-homogeneous distribution of resources. A metaphor can help us to better illustrate the point: federal or decentralised systems can be conceived as the equivalent of families.2 Although 2 I hereby acknowledge that the analogy is imperfect in one important sense: ideally, federalism does not imply that the center is more important than the regions. Legal federalism has the center and the regions with different powers, not superior and inferior powers. So when we talk about children, we can imagine them not necessarily as

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part of the same family, each child in the family is unique in his or her physical traits, and distinctive in experiences, aspirations, talents, interests, or priorities. Ideally, each child is bound to develop in a way so that he or she can fulfil specific desires, skills, or aptitudes. The innate characteristics that differentiate each child do not prevent him or her from still being part of the family and maintaining close relationships with parents and siblings. But attempting to render uniform or homogenise at all costs these unique traits would amount to a distortion of their true self, and sibling sentiment would be thereby jeopardised. Federalism and solidarity are reconcilable, since neither a federal model nor economic regionalism promote self-serving behaviours among constituent units, or discourage solidarity-based attitudes. After all, constituent units are unique in their connotations and might aspire to different things in different ways. Also Bundestreue seems to co-exist with the unity and indivisibility of the country, actually, it is meant to foster unity. Therefore, contending that the federalism feeds disunity denotes in my opinion a radical misunderstanding of what federalism really entails. Federalism and solidarity thus do not represent contrasting ideas, as they serve different purposes: but how does economic regionalism relate to solidarity and federalism? My argument is that the acknowledgement of the interests of politically and economically strong regions does not pose a threat to the family-like bonds that unite the various components of a federal or decentralised scheme. On the contrary, recognition of difference is an important part of strengthening those bonds. In the ambit of economic regionalism, it is important to understand that, without commitment to the larger whole (for instance in the form of vertical solidarity), there is little incentive for the state and for other regions to try to find ways to recognise the existing differences.3 However, if solidarity becomes an issue when discussing economic regionalism, the less explored mechanism of horizontal solidarity can be

infants depending on the parents, but as adults with their own rights and duties, yet still belonging to the same family and committed to the welfare of the members of that family, both individually and collectively. 3 Likewise, sub-state national groups need to understand that, without commitment to the larger whole (for instance in the form of interest in the institutions of the central state or interest in the differences existing elsewhere in the state), there is less incentive for the state and other regions to make the effort to find ways to recognise the political and socio-cultural difference that is a reality for that national region.

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employed to address the problem: horizontal solidarity may help tighten the bonds of unity. As noted, horizontal solidarity is a less explored and exploited principle than its vertical counterpart. This is probably something that needs to be changed: entrenching horizontal solidarity in the constitution of federal states or when economic regional claims are present would probably be a good idea if we think of constituent units as members of the same family. In fact, it would be the translation into practical terms of a natural connection that characterises a federal arrangement. Furthermore, entrenching solidarity at constitutional level would offer the perfect platform to define the principle in the legal ambit: the constitution itself, or a national law linked to the constitution, would be the ideal place to define the principle, its meaning and its contours, so that the role of the constituent units would not leave room for misinterpretation, and territorial units would know well when they are called upon to offer their help. Finally, it could be asked whether the constitutional entrenchment of horizontal solidarity is enough, or whether there would also be a need to legalise the solidarity duty to make it binding and enforceable. In fact, I noted how one of the elements that allow the distinction between moral and legal solidarity is the fact that the latter should create enforceable rights, whereas the former relies more on voluntary actions. More challenging is to address the issue of which horizontal solidaritybased provisions could serve my purpose. First, any provision that would be included should provide for an “occasional” intervention: this means that territorial units should be bound by solidarity-based provisions towards each other only occasionally, or in exceptional cases. Systematic interventions would in fact distort the uniqueness of their variegated natures, but they would also trigger the discontent of more “virtuous” territories if they must constantly take charge of the problems affecting other areas. Similarly, horizontal solidarity-based provisions should not be used in the event of financial or economic difficulties of other territorial units: in these situations, only the central government should come into play with the mechanisms mentioned above (e.g. equalisation funds). In fact, asking other territorial units to be financially responsible for one or more units in difficulty is more challenging because of the inequalities that already exist between the various territories. This is probably one of the reasons that brought the ItCC, in the decision discussed above, to assert that wealthier regions are not legally bound to financially support less virtuous regions,

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and only the central government shall do that through the mechanisms existing within each legal framework. If nothing else, it would be difficult to identify which criteria to use to determine which territory is richer or wealthier than the others. A natural way to implement horizontal solidarity-based provisions is in the event of natural or man-made disasters, as some constitutional texts studied above have illustrated: in this sense, the moral and legal facets of this principle are intertwined and overlap. But there are other sectors in which horizontal solidarity-based provisions could be entrenched: energy, natural resources (and, by extension, the environment), water supply, or immigration. With specific regard to the environment, the recent Italian history has been a fruitful source of examples in this sense: one of them was the emergency in the garbage crisis in the Naples area, when bordering and non-bordering regions were called by the Italian government to assist Campania to dispose of the enormous quantity of waste that was scattered all around the city of Naples, as the situation was going out of control. The lack of clear horizontal solidarity-based provisions caused the emergence of tensions in the relationships among regional governments, since their rights and duties were not clearly defined.

5.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored the legal meaning of solidarity with specific regard to federal or decentralised systems, also considering issues of economic regionalism. I outlined the difference between vertical and horizontal solidarity (although the distinction is not always so firm) and tried to solve the riddle of whether federalism and solidarity are clashing ideas. I argued that these two ideas are compatible, because they serve different purposes: federalism brings together unity and diversity, while solidarity fortifies the family-like relationships interconnecting the various actors of the complex federal model (Arban 2021). There is one last aspect that still needs to be discussed, one that allows to bring together federalism, regionalism, sub-state nationalism, and solidarity. Reverting to the Italian example, it could be argued that it is unfair that the wealthier North is required to contribute to, or maintain some type of solidarity-based attitude, towards the South, without a parallel re-evaluation of its own powers in line with its own political and socio-economic distinctiveness. Perhaps, the willingness of the North to show solidarity is linked to the central state’s recognition of the North’s

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unique contribution. For this reason, achieving asymmetrical powers for the North may be linked to the recognition of the South’s unique social and economic position, and the need for transfer of wealth that comes with that. Similar conclusions could be reached for multinational states like Canada: sub-state national societies are intrinsically different from the rest of the country and this difference needs to be constitutionally recognised; this inward-looking need to have the difference recognised at constitutional level does not eliminate the more outward-looking side of federalism, solidarity, and both of the horizontal and vertical type: for example, it would be unfair to expect Quebec to be fully part of Canadian federalism and care about the rest of the country, while at the same time be quiet about the distribution of federal powers. Quebec willingness to show solidarity may be linked to Canada’s recognition of Quebec’s unique contributions. Furthermore, in many federal and regional polities, the difficulty in recognising one type of difference (the political and sociocultural) may be made easier by recognising that which has been largely ignored (politically and economically strong regions); in any case, all need to be reminded of (vertical and horizontal) solidarity obligations. All this will be discussed in the next chapter.

References Arban, Erika. 2017. Exploring the Principle of (Federal) Solidarity. Review of Constitutional Studies 22: 241–260. Arban, Erika. 2021. Italy: The Principle of Solidarity as a Principle of Equality. In The Principle of Equality in Diverse States. Reconciling Autonomy with Equal Rights and Opportunities, ed. Eva Maria Belser, Thea Bächler, Sandra Egli, and Lawrence Zünd, 101–129. Leiden and Boston: Brill Nijhoff. Arban, Erika. 2023a, forthcoming. The Principle of Solidarity Forging the Constitutional Identity of the European Union. In European Yearbook of Constitutional Law. Vol 4. The Constitutional Identity of the European Union, ed. Jurgen de Poorter, Gerhard van der Schyff, Maarten Stremler, and Maartje De Visser. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Arban, Erika. 2023b. Proposing a Solidarity-Based (Federal) Solution for Sri Lanka. In Constitutional Resilience in South Asia, ed. Swati Jhaveri, Tarun Khaitan, and Dinesha Samararatne. New York: Bloomsbury. Bartolucci, Luca. 2022. Le generazioni future (con la tutela dell’ambiente) entrano “espressamente” in Costituzione. Forum di Quaderni Costitutionali. https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/ uploads/2022/05/03-Bartolucci-FQC-2-2022.pdf. Accessed 9 February 2023.

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Brand, Dirk. 1998. The South African Constitution: Three Crucial Issues for Future Development. Stellenbosch Law Review 9: 182–195. Brun, Henri, Guy Tremblay, and Eugénie Brouillet. 2008. Droit Constitutionnel. Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais. Ciuffoletti, Zeffiro. 1994. Federalismo e regionalismo: da Cattaneo alla Lega. Roma and Bari: Laterza. Destro, Adriana. 1997. A New Era and New Themes in Italian Politics: The Case of Padania. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 2: 358–377. De Villiers, Bertus. 2012. Federations: Shared Rule and Self-Rule in the Search for Stable Governance. Politikon 39: 391–410. Elazar, Daniel. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press. Fabbrini, Federico. 2022. Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Context, Content and Challenges. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 27: 658–676. Gonthier, Charles D. 2000. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: The Forgotten Leg of the Trilogy, or Fraternity: The Unspoken Third Pillar of Democracy. McGill Law Journal 45: 567–590. Hilpold, Peter. 2015. Understanding Solidarity Within EU Law: An Analysis of the ‘Islands of Solidarity’ with Particular Regard to Monetary Union. Yearbook of European Law 34: 257–285. John XXIII. 1963. Pacem in Terris. Encyclical on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html. Accessed 13 January 2023. Lecours, André, and Erika Arban. 2015. Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: The Cases of Italy and Nepal. Regional and Federal Studies 25: 183– 201. Linden-Retek, Paul. 2021. The Refugees We Are: Solidarity, Asylum, and Critique in the European Constitutional Imagination. German Law Journal 22: 506–533. Longo, Erik. 2012. Le Regioni ricche non possono finanziare le più povere. La Corte Costituzionale esclude la “chiamata in solidarietà” prevista dallo Stato nella l. N. 148 del 2011. Giurisprudenza costituzionale 5: 3740–3749. Montaldo, Riccardo. 2022. La tutela costituzionale dell’ambiente nella modifica degli artt. 9 e 41 Cost.: una riforma opportuna e necessaria? federalismi.it https://www.federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=47139&dpath=doc ument&dfile=04052022141030.pdf&content=La%2Btutela%2Bcostituzio nale%2Bdell%E2%80%99ambiente%2Bnella%2Bmodifica%2Bdegli%2Bartt% 2E%2B9%2Be%2B41%2BCost%2E%3A%2Buna%2Briforma%2Bopportuna% 2Be%2Bnecessaria%3F%2B%2D%2Bstato%2B%2D%2Bdottrina%2B%2D%2B. Accessed 9 February 2023.

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Ottmann, Juliane. 2008. The Concept of Solidarity in National and European Law: The Welfare State and the European Social Model. Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 2: 36–48. Patroni Griffi, Andrea. 2010. Federalismo, Mezzogiorno e sviluppo solidale. Forum di Quaderni costituzionali. http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wor dpress/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0247_patroni_griffi. pdf. Accessed 12 January 2023. Razzano, Giovanna. 2011. La materia concorrente della produzione, trasporto, e distribuzione nazionale dell’energia nella recente giurisprudenza costituzionale, fra leale collaborazione e doveri di solidarietà. federalismi.it. http://www.federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=18394&dpath=doc ument&dfile=28062011112903.pdf&content=La+materia+concorrente+ della+produzione,+trasporto+e+distribuzione+nazionale+dell%27energia+ nella+recente+giurisprudenza+costituzionale,+fra+leale+collaborazione+e+dov eri+di+solidariet%C3%A0+-+stato+-+dottrina+-+. Accessed 30 January 2023. Rieder, Clemens M. 2021. The Relationship Between Solidarity and National Identity. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391 8269. Accessed 6 February 2023. Roux, Christophe. 2008. Italy’s Path to Federalism. Origins and Paradoxes. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 13: 325–339. Schiek, Dagmar. 2020. Solidarity in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice. Opportunities Missed? In Transnational Solidarity. Concepts, Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Helle Krunke, Hanne Petersen, and Ian Manners, 252–300. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tierney, Stephen. 2022. The Federal Contract. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Reconciling Federalism, (Economic) Regionalism, and Solidarity

In previous chapters, I retraced the constitutional history of Italy from the years preceding unification, with particular attention to the debates and possible solutions to reconcile the many asymmetries that exist between the various areas of the peninsula, the socio-economic divide between the North and the South being the most obvious one. I then suggested that such divide can be categorised as an example of what scholarship defines economic regionalism. Next, I observed how the tensions that emerge within economically and politically strong regions are not dissimilar from those described by the literature on sub-state nationalism, to the point that the two often conflate. In other words, the list of characteristics that fit into the sub-state national mould (in the sense of distinct linguistic, religious, or, more generally, ethno-national traits) does not capture all the reasons why regions feel different: in fact, they may feel unique for reasons that bear a socio-economic nature. The Italian example is a case in point. I observed how scholarship has developed a tendency to speak the language of sub-state nationalism and assume that only linguistic, religious, or otherwise ethno-national factors justify statehood and deserve attention: in fact, the ethno-national type of asymmetry has elicited significant attention both in academia and in socio-political circles, almost to the point of monopolising the whole discourse on diversity, while

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economic regionalism has largely been ignored or treated only superficially. Next, I identified two possible constitutional tools that could be used to help appease such claims for more autonomy on the part of economically strong regions: asymmetry and subsidiarity. However, in Chapter 5 I explained how it often happens that the claims for more autonomy raised by economically successful or resource rich regions are associated to self-interest or egotistical desires that strikingly collide with the sense of collaboration and solidarity that should inform the relationships between the state and the various territorial components (vertical solidarity) as well as among the territorial components themselves (horizontal solidarity). Furthermore, while richer regions seek to emancipate from the central government, poorer regions need to rely on transfers from the centre and this, as Fitjar posits, might cause a sense of frustration in both groups, as richer regions “feel that they are paying heavily and getting little in return” while poorer regions feel that the spirit of solidarity is betrayed and self-interest prevails (Fitjar 2009). In this final chapter, I will bring together federalism theory, economic regionalism, sub-state nationalism, and solidarity and engage with several questions, such as: why is it important to acknowledge the existence of economic regionalism? Is there a legal or moral obligation to accommodate the interests of politically and socio-economically strong regions? And how can this be done in away that respects the “other” territorial units and protects the integrity of the state? This same set of questions has already been asked regarding sub-state nationalism in the plentiful literature on the subject, though the final question—how can this be done in a way that respects other territorial units and protects the integrity of the state—has not always been emphasised, much less answered. Accordingly, while in previous chapters my observation point was that of politically and economically strong regions, in this chapter I broaden the perspective and include also the viewpoint of the state-wide community. The objective, as indicated, is not only to accommodate the different parts, but to do so in a way which is compatible with the integrity of the state. Likewise, while previous chapters extensively focused on Italy, this final chapter will take a larger perspective and make claims of broader application to instances of economic regionalism and sub-state nationalism: in other words, the goal is to virtually exploit some of the debates occurred in the Italian institutional context—as detailed in previous chapters—so they may become valid points of discussion and application on a larger scale.

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6.1 Acknowledging Economic Regionalism and Economic Differences As several examples drawn from the Italian experiences have suggested, claims for more autonomy coming from economically powerful regions are often regarded as morally wrong or unacceptable—mainly on solidarity grounds—also because these regions resist the idea of sharing their wealth with the centre and with less successful regions: the North/South clash in Italy is much telling, also in light of recent developments in regionalism triggered by the use of article 116(3) of the constitution by of Emilia Romagna, Lombardia, and Veneto and detailed in previous chapters. The alleged moral wrongness of such claims, as opposed to similar claims made by sub-state national societies, can be explained in several ways. First, ethno-national asymmetries go at the core of the very identity of the people belonging to a group. Socio-economic differences, on the other hand, have prompted less attention in academic literature probably because they are often perceived as expressions of self-centred, even greedy, behaviours of the wealthier segments of the population, thus bringing to the fore concerns such as solidarity and/or the moral legitimacy of such claims. Linked to this, socio-economic asymmetries are less discussed also because, from the outside, they are seldom the source of grave discriminatory behaviours, and do not trigger forms of oppression on other territories: in fact, in ethnically torn countries, ethno-cultural divisions often lead to serious forms of persecution and discrimination, so that constitutional accommodation becomes necessary to sooth such tensions and pursue equality and justice. Finally, the specific socio-economic and political circumstances of a region are not necessarily static and fixated, but may fluctuate and change profoundly over a short period of time, making the accommodation of autonomist claims more challenging (Fitjar 2009). At the same time, some forms of economic regionalism have the potential to generate tensions and pressures that are very similar to those usually described by sub-state national theory. In proposing a normative case for the accommodation of socio-economic asymmetries, however, my claim is that not all forms of socio-economic cleavages necessarily need to be accommodated in some way, but only those that are accompanied by sentiments of rebellion towards the central state or the other parts of

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the territory, thus causing dangerous internal tensions that can eventually escalate to unmanageable proportions. In the next section, I identify three reasons that support the necessity to take more seriously the claims for more autonomy coming from economically strong regions: (i) reasons of principle; (ii) reasons of prudence and reconciliation between diversity and social cohesion; and (iii) unlock the willingness to show solidarity. 6.1.1

Reasons of Principle

A first concern that often emerges in the case of economic regionalism is whether the claims for more autonomy raised by politically and economically strong regions are justified or not. Another way to put this is asking whether the alleged political and economic diversity of certain regions is real or imaginary. In previous chapters, I used the Italian case study to sketch the attempts made by Lega Nord to use Padanian nationalism to justify the socio-economic differences between the North and the South of the country. But beside this example, there may be other instances where such differences are accompanied by real grievance, something that should not be plainly ignored. Federal systems are often reluctant to respond to such claims for fear that the balance in the federal architecture will collapse, with the result that federations often live with these problems for long periods of time. Regional systems, on the other hand, are more flexible in addressing these challenges. The principled argument suggests that, if the claims for more political and economic autonomy and visibility made by economically successful regions are felt real by the group, it makes them real. In other words, if a given legal system has the potential for being flexible in this regard, then flexibility should be employed, especially when real grievance accompanies such claims. However, some reader may say that political and economic difference is not important enough to differentiate, and therefore disagree with the position of principle just discussed. But even in this case, there are still prudential reasons that suggest considering the interests of politically and socio-economically stronger groups.

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Reasons of Prudence and the Reconciliation of Diversity and Social Cohesion

This cautionary argument proposes that economic asymmetries need to be taken more seriously to avoid eliciting sentiments of discontent, disharmony, and intolerance to the rules on the part of the people belonging to the region. In fact, inherent economic asymmetries (regardless of whether they are based on natural resources or otherwise on economic success) also render a community more viable for nationhood provided there is sufficient social glue. Challenging economic and political circumstances are always a fertile ground for discontent and frustration to grow: therefore, finding a solution to tame these claims would probably be a responsible way to deal with these crises. Two major concerns will be discussed here: (i) threats to the integrity of the state; and (ii) populism. • Threats to the integrity of the state The presence of politically and socio-economically strong regions seeking more autonomy might elicit two types of reaction. On the one hand, these regions can react and decide to walk alone, thus seeking to become independent or to secede: in this case, the threat comes from within the region. On the other hand, when the asymmetrical interests of politically and economically strong regions find some real form of acknowledgement or recognition, a reaction may ensue from the statewide community that can take various forms: by alleging that values such as solidarity, fairness or equality are being disregarded, or by declaring that they too present some specificity, the latter having the potential of instigating a dangerous domino-effect. In this case, the threat to the integrity of the state comes from outside the territory or region. Here, I limit my analysis to threats to the integrity of the state coming from within the region. Threats to the integrity of the state can take many forms: they can go from milder concerns for equality and solidarity, as discussed in Chapter 5, or they can take the more dramatic shape of secession, where the detachment and subsequent independence of one part of the territory is at stake. Secession is often controversial both at the domestic and international levels: in fact, besides all questions pertaining to international law and not discussed here (for example, the right to self-determination, recognition by the international community of the existence of a nation,

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or membership in international organisations), secession represents first and foremost a defeat for the state, unable to find a suitable way to manage internal tensions arising from and within sub-state units or territories (Arban 2023; Mancini 2012; Bossacoma Busquets 2020). This is why it is important (from the perspective of the state, at the very least) to carefully pinpoint all premonitory signs that could put at risk the integrity of the state: in fact, although most secessionist threats will never lead to the actual break-down of the state, the risk should not be overlooked. Without overemphasising the danger of secession, the perspective on the issue can radically change depending on the observer. Here, I am looking at things mainly from the perspective of the state, for which secession almost always represents a loss. However, it is very likely that the region or territory that is willing to secede does not see all the ills of secession; rather, it considers it a very advantageous solution. Like what happens with sub-state national societies, however, the issue remains that of finding appropriate ways to accommodate claims coming from economically wealthier regions in order to make the resort to secession unnecessary. While this may be harder to do in a federation (where formal equality has a greater value), it is easier to do in a regional arrangement, as administrative solutions may provide more flexibility for a particular region. Once again, the Italian experience can offer some useful insights. In previous chapters, I briefly revisited the propaganda that animated Lega Nord on the secession of Padania in the early 1990s. While Padanian secessionism catalysed the attention at the time, it is fair to say that secessionist claims having a more limited geographical scope periodically make the news, especially at critical economic or political junctures. The same creation of five special regions with the 1948 constitution was in part justified by the presence of autonomist groups in certain peripheral territories, so that the enhanced autonomy that was granted to these local governments intended to limit their actions and power (Delledonne and Monti 2019). But even more recently, in 2014 the Veneto region under the leadership of Luca Zaia of Lega Nord, passed law 16/2014 which set the scheme for an advisory referendum on the secession of Veneto from Italy, so that Veneto could become an independent and sovereign republic (Arban 2018; Delledonne and Monti 2019). Incidentally, this law was part of a “package” that included also regional law 15/2014, which painted the background to the referendum for differential autonomy under article 116(3) of the constitution, which I have

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described in previous chapters. The Italian government immediately challenged the constitutionality of both regional laws before the ItCC. The ItCC assembled the two challenges together and rendered its decision in judgment 118/2015. As expected, the ItCC declared the unconstitutionality of regional law 16/2014. The reasoning of the constitutional judges was that such law had a direct impact on some fundamental choices of constitutional nature that are outside the reach of regional referenda (ItCC ruling 118/2015; Arban 2018; Delledonne and Monti 2019). Furthermore, the ItCC argued that secession questions like the one contained in the regional law of Veneto are incompatible with the fundamental principles of unity and indivisibility ingrained in article 5 of the constitution, which provides that the Italian Republic is “one and indivisible” although it recognises and promotes local autonomies (ItCC ruling 118/2015; Arban 2018). Recalling a 1988 decision, the ItCC further contended that the unity of the Italian Republic is an essential and fundamental value and, as such, it is outside of the reach not only of regional referenda, but also of constitutional amendment (ItCC ruling 118/2015; Arban 2018). As a result, even if article 5 of the constitution enshrined the principle of institutional pluralism and autonomy, referenda seeking the secession of a region from Italy will never be constitutional, as contrary to the unity of the Italian Republic (ItCC ruling 118/2015; Arban 2018; Delledonne and Monti 2019). While such initiatives do not reflect the sentiments of a majority of the population (in fact, often a significant segment of the population derides such secessionist attempts), in a way it would be unwise, and risky, to plainly disregard their relevance, the point being that challenging economic and political circumstances are always a fertile ground for discontent and frustration to grow. Therefore, finding a solution to appease these claims, while at the same time preventing an even more risky “domino-effect” involving other territories, would probably be a responsible way to deal with the crisis. These activities bear some close resemblance with the quest for recognition and accommodation made by sub-state national societies, as secession or independence are often part of their political agenda (Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country, and Catalonia being notable examples). Incidentally, in these past couple of decades, and especially in the aftermath of the Secession Reference issued in 1998 by the Supreme Court of Canada (Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217), a thriving scholarship has emerged on referenda and secession: this has been

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particularly the case in countries like Canada, Spain and the UK (and to a certain extent the EU after Brexit) (ex multis, Tierney 2013; Delledonne and Martinico 2019; Bossacoma Busquets 2020; Martinico 2020). Also, a debate on the constitutionalisation of a right to secede has been extensively discussed in recent years (Weinstock 2001; Haljan 2014; Abat i Ninet 2023). In this sense, the boundaries between sub-state nationalism and economic regionalism are more blurred than one might expect and, for this reason, certain solutions devised for the latter might be of some utility when trying to accommodate the former. • Populism A link could also be made between economic regionalism and the rise of populism, which commonly responds and feeds into this discussion. As Sadurski posits, populism “is a vague and contested concept” but, as the expression suggests, it generally refers to the fact that rulers “care about popular support” and is thus distinguishable from authoritarianism, which “rules by resort to bare force” and does not seek popular support (Sadurski 2018; see also Martinico 2021). Following Sadurski, effective populism combines some or all of the following: a sense of economic insecurity and a consequent sentiment of loss of social cohesion; xenophobic attitudes, particularly towards migrants and refugees; support of nationalism and resentment towards globalisation; distrust of political correctness and multicultural tolerance; anti-establishment sentiments; illiberal impatience, or impatience with liberal constraints upon governments where forms of checks and balances are perceived as obstacles to the will of the people and to effective and prompt governance (Sadurski 2018). For purposes of this discussion, it is particularly the first element (economic insecurity and sense of loss of social cohesion) that feeds into the discussion on economic regionalism. Consequently, when tensions emerge, it would be ill-advised to plainly ignore or dismiss autonomist claims, as they might lead to internal conflicts that disrupt domestic cohesion and threaten unity, and thus pave the way to the rising to power of populist leaders.

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Unlock the Willingness to Show Solidarity

Acknowledging economic regionalism may serve not only the purpose of unlocking the accommodation of economically strong regions, but it may also serve the purpose to unlock the willingness of politically and socio-economically strong regions to show solidarity: in fact, their willingness to recognise other regions’ needs may be affected by the state’s ability to recognise their own needs and distinctiveness. Consequently, if some reader is still sceptical regarding both the reasons of principle and of prudence just outlined, and therefore whether economic differences are real or imagined, the reason just provided should justify the utility of their recognition. I will elaborate further on this in the last part of the chapter, but now I move to discuss the morality of claims for more autonomy as they emerge in economic regionalism.

6.2 The Morality of Autonomist Claims in Economic Regionalism Previously, I observed how, at first blush, claims made by socioeconomically and politically strong regions seem to be less deserving or even undeserving special analysis and treatment unless they are matched by a parallel nationalism-related component to strengthen the argument. Yet, this assertion does not eliminate the fact that different socio-economic visions do matter to statehood: consequently, although ethnicity, race, language, and/or religion remain relevant, federalism is more and more required to address issues related to unequal distribution of resources and other types of economic asymmetries. The next question thus becomes: is there, as a matter of principle, some legal or moral obligation to acknowledge this difference, or should there be a refusal to do so? To address this question, we need to revert to the principle of solidarity as illustrated in Chapter 5. Thus far, my argument has revolved around the importance of acknowledging the asymmetrical interests of politically and socio-economically strong regions: if the difference is real rather than imagined, as I contend, and if the system has potential for flexibility, then that flexibility should be employed. Ultimately, what matters is to avoid threats to the integrity of the state, but it is also important to use flexibility as a component in the interconnected logic of the nation state.

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The question thus becomes: is it wrong—on moral grounds—that these regions refuse to share with other regions and why is it so? In other words, do richer regions have a duty to help the rest of the state and where is this principle grounded? Here, my argument is that it is morally wrong only if the legal system at issue entrenches a duty to help grounded on (federal) solidarity: in fact, it is this principle that represents the legal basis on which certain behaviours on the part of the better-off regions shall be expected. This means that accommodation shall not go in one direction and granted only to the obviously distinct group: this delicate exercise of reconciliation should consider the entirety of the national territory. Likewise, too much emphasis on asymmetry (and on asymmetrical solutions) and not enough on common values would raise the issue of social cohesion. Consequently, it is important not only to pay attention to the genuinely asymmetrical interests of the socio-economic groups, but also to find a point of reconciliation between them and general principles of equality, fairness and, most importantly, solidarity. The component units of a federal or quasi-federal system can be seen as members of a big family or other association and, as such, they are bound by reciprocal rights and duties. As Miller posits, what links members of an association is a “set of shared understandings about what it is that they are members of, and what distinguishes them from outsiders” (Miller 2005). However, these rights and duties should not be unidirectional, in the sense that they should not run only vertically (from the central government to one or more peripheral unit) but also horizontally or transversally (among peripheral units) in an ideally continuous do ut des. Whatever their nature, asymmetries bring inequalities; consequently, in federal systems where constituent units are bound by a duty of federal loyalty and solidarity to each other, economic asymmetries should not necessarily work to the disadvantage of poorer territories. But the relationship between federal and peripheral governments shall be conducted on fair and clear terms that benefit as much as possible all the parties alike: in this way, richer or more successful regions would not feel exploited and would be administered in the best and most effective manner, while poorer regions might benefit from the richer without abuse and in the respect of (federal) loyalty and solidarity. To sum up, the family- or association-like relationship that binds the various component units of the federal or quasi-federal system triggers rights and duties, as embodied by (federal) solidarity construed in broad

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terms, thus including federal loyalty or Bundestreue as well as fiscal solidarity and equalisation. This is a transversal duty, running both vertically and horizontally; yet, it should also be construed as reciprocal, meaning that rights and duties should be granted to, and expected from, all parties involved, in different manners. Most importantly, the principle of (federal) solidarity so construed could be strengthened by other constitutionally entrenched twin principles such as those of unity and/or indissolubility of the state. In other words, when understood in this very broad sense, federal solidarity implies duties of reciprocity—distilled in the expression do ut des—among the component units of the federation, vertically and horizontally: to preserve the unity (or social cohesion) of a country through a federal or quasi-federal scheme, compromises, and concessions from all sides are required. But can this broad duty of (federal) solidarity be forced or superimposed? Or, put differently, what happens if it is not the project of the resource rich or economically successful regions to help the others? This question is strictly related to the issue of justiciability of solidarity. My argument is that the explicit or implicit entrenchment of (federal) solidarity into a legal scheme as a pure aspirational principle is not sufficient to achieve the goal: this concept needs to be given some practical and concrete sense as a directive constitutional principle and be translated into actual legal stratagems, otherwise the risk is that it remains a sterile ideal. One way of doing this would be to revisit the equalisation scheme in place and/or stress the fiscal equalisation tool on solidarity grounds. For example, these equalisation tools are usually understood as running vertically (from the centre to the more disadvantaged regions), but they could also be understood horizontally. Such solutions, variously framed, could be employed to foster solidarity, and strike a balance between equality and accommodation of socio-economic diversity. (Federal) solidarity thus represents the legal foundation upon which certain rights and duties shall be expected from all the component units, richer and poorer. But how can this be pursued?

6.3 Suggesting Strategies to Explain Asymmetrical Interests As noted, one problem that often arises when devising strategies that consider the different interests of political and socio-economically strong regions is that this might elicit the resentment of the other regions and

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territories, who might see such moves as attempts to acquire more powers to the detriment of the rest of the country. Consequently, if until now my attention has focused on the (asymmetrical) interests of economically strong regions, consideration should now be paid to the other territories. In the case of Italian economic regionalism, I have detailed the claims for more autonomy coming from some regions in the north, but the principle of solidarity sketched in Chapter 5 invites us to mediate and find points of reconciliation also with the interests of the regions in the centre and in the south of the country. Incidentally, similar considerations emerge in the ambit of sub-state nationalism, where in fact it might be politically or institutionally challenging to recognise the national society, as such recognition risks displeasing the rest of the state community. In fact, while the claims of sub-state national groups are often very legitimate, it might be very difficult, both at political and institutional level, to accommodate their claims. The problem is of course not within the sub-state national group, which is more than eager to have their claims accommodated, but with the rest of the population, which usually finds it very complicated to understand why the sub-state national group seeks accommodation: often, it is difficult for them to understand why the sub-state national group is unhappy without some form of recognition, but they may also fear that the sub-state national group is using its special status as a way to blackmail the central government to ask for more special treatment. In multinational federations like Canada or Spain, for instance, we have the clearly distinct nations (Quebec, Catalonia, and the Basque Country, respectively) seeking special constitutional (and political) accommodation reckoning and protecting their uniqueness, due to a bundle of linguistic, social, and cultural differences that make them distinctive communities. Yet, the rest of Canada or Spain is far from homogeneous: and even if the other provinces, territories, or autonomous communities all share the same language, there are other elements that might distinguish each of them from the rest. In fact, most human beings would be ready to give up something they cherish only if there is some prospect that they too will receive something at some point in the not-too-distant future. This can probably be explained because they perceive that there is something special in them that needs to be acknowledged, whether that something is conventionally considered special or whether it is simply the more everyday uniqueness that characterises each of us: only at that point they will be ready to make concessions.

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In this section, I explore possible ways to “explain” economic regionalism—and as such the claims for more autonomy coming from economically strong regions—to the state-wide community: this should help tame the emergence of sentiments of rejection or intolerance to the new way of doing things. As noted, this might bear some benefits also to multinational states, as it potentially helps unlock the solution to making the necessary constitutional changes to solve the recognition issue for other communities. In fact, mainstream literature usually focuses on the claims advanced by the obviously different group, but little or no attention is reserved to the rest of the state community. Some of the proposed solutions directly borrow from the Italian regional experience. 6.3.1

Asymmetrical Solutions

The legal meaning of asymmetry, and its interconnectedness with federalism, has already been explored in previous chapters. Here, I will just recall that, in federal and quasi-federal states, asymmetry refers to the intrinsic differences in shape, size, population, wealth, socio-economic patterns, etc., characterising the various constituent units, such type of asymmetry also being referred to as de facto asymmetry. De facto asymmetries can be of various types (economic, social, political, linguistic, religious, etc.) and may exist in different degrees, but they are a normal facet of most countries worldwide: in fact, it may be difficult to locate a state where all areas or territories are perfectly identical to one another. I also observed how asymmetry does not trigger, in and of itself, claims for more autonomy, but it may become an issue when the perceived distinctiveness is coupled with some identity factor and with some form of frustration or dissatisfaction—a sentiment that the region would be better off doing things its own way—within the same region, usually channelled through the specific narrative of one or more political parties. This is where the asymmetric element and requests for accommodation coalesce with political aspects like the potential for statehood. But it often happens that such asymmetrical traits become constitutionally entrenched, and thus affect the balance of powers among different units and between the units and the centre: consequently, one or more constituent units may enjoy different powers or an enhanced level of autonomy compared to the rest (Sahadzic 2021): this is what has been dubbed de iure asymmetry. Throughout the book, I have highlighted the extent to which is Italy is “irreversibly different” (Palermo and Valdesalici

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2019) both de iure and de facto. But similar de iure and de facto asymmetrical feats exist in many other multinational federal and quasi-federal states (Popelier and Sahadzic 2019). In Chapter 4, I put forth asymmetry as a constitutional mechanism to deal with the claims for more autonomy coming from the politically and socio-economically stronger regions. In this sense, asymmetry can take different forms, and range from enhanced powers over fiscal matters to asymmetrical legislative and administrative powers over specific subject matters of interest to the local community. In discussing asymmetry, however, I noted how it remains a contested topic of discussion, as many believe that asymmetrical solutions have an intrinsic potential of deepening existing divides even more, to the point of exacerbating secessionist trends. Still, I argue that asymmetry remains perhaps one of the best ways to deal both with claims for more autonomy and as a balancing tool for opposing interests emerging in the rest of the territory, as the next paragraphs illustrate. • Solutions à la carte A “solution à la carte” is an artificial expression referring to the possibility of negotiating special forms and conditions of autonomy with the central government in certain specific areas. This strategy directly builds upon article 116(3) of the Italian constitution on differential regionalism as previously described in the book. Some scholars have identified the rationale behind this provision in the fact that asymmetrical regionalism can be specifically useful when confronted with a reality of deep socioeconomic differences or diversified preferences towards the federalisation process, since it may help “attenuating tensions and conflicts” that usually come into play when such reforms are being implemented (Zanardi 2006). Moreover, asymmetric regionalism could be linked to the requests coming from the wealthier areas of the country for an “adjustment of the inter-regional redistribution of resources made by the central government” which could thus address the autonomist aspirations coming from certain regions (Zanardi 2006). Finally, it could propel “forms of experimentation in the formulation and application of public policies” (Zanardi 2006). This last point is important: so understood, differential regionalism could offer opportunities not only to the economically wealthier

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territories (or to the ethno-linguistic-cultural-religion groups in multinational states), but also to all the other regions, who could exploit such tool and devise unique solutions to fit their own realities. A provision somehow mirroring the one contained in article 116(3) could thus be adopted in contexts characterised by strong economic regionalism as a mechanism to embed diversity in the system. Similar solutions could also inspire changes in multinational federations dealing with the asymmetrical treatment granted to a sub-state national society. To a certain extent, these solutions amount to a sort of opting in/opting out, where the asymmetrical region has automatically opted in, and where the same potential for opting in is made available to regions which may (or may not) perceive the need to do so. This way of organising things takes the emphasis off whether difference is objectively made out and leaves it to the regions in question to determine whether, according to their perception of themselves and their place in the larger whole, they wish to avail themselves of the potential for asymmetry. The scheme devised in article 116(3) does not need to be reproduced in its entirety, as each system willing to mediate between concurrent interests can adopt the language deemed to be more appropriate and reflective of the nature and type of cleavage that gives rise to the specific local tensions. In any event, drafting a provision in general terms would have the advantage of better adjusting to the evolving and changing interests of the state-wide community. As noted, economically wealthier regions are usually the first to mobilise from a political perspective to make their claims and seek more autonomy. However, through asymmetry, the benefits of such mobilisation do not have to be unidirectional only, rather, they could be transversal and bring advantages also to the less wealthy territories. In fact, asymmetrical solutions as those discussed here can be construed in such a way as to significantly improve the opportunities of more successful and less successful regions alike. In other words, economic divides can be used as an opportunity to rethink and reshape the balance of power (fiscal and non-fiscal) among all levels of government and thus encourage all regions—depending on the circumstances—to take more control over their economies, so that their dependence from the central government is reduced and their freedom is not limited. Of course, this is a general argument that does not necessarily consider the fact that there are regions that objectively are poorer or less populated than others, so their economic capacity is obviously inferior. With that in mind, my argument is to

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develop a state-wide culture of taking more responsibility and control for the economic administration of local resources and business, thus limiting dependence on other sources of income to the maximum extent possible. In fact, a rigid centralised control over economic aspects, fiscal matters, and/or natural resources is not always a guarantee for equal distribution or equal access to wealth. Of course, solutions à la carte have both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, local administrators are responsible to negotiate the special forms and conditions of autonomy, thus limiting the possibility to create disagreement: they would all be placed in the same departing condition since they could “choose” in which areas to acquire special powers. Another advantage is that this tool would strengthen the relationships and the reciprocal engagement of the various local institutions, and which would probably be ready to collaborate promptly with one another in critical situations. By performing more autonomously in the chosen areas, each local government would be valorised for the contributions it can give to the rest of the country. This would also strengthen solidarity among all parts of the state: in fact, instead of looking at each other with a sense of jealousy or resentment, they would be certainly ready to collaborate more eagerly because they would feel valorised. But such mechanisms also present challenges and risks. First, forms of differential regionalism as proposed here require the demonstration, on the part of local administrators, of maturity and awareness of the primary needs of the territory. They also require careful planning and organisation of the human and financial resources to calibrate them in the direction most wanted. Furthermore, they would require nerve and audacity on the part of the constitutional legislator, as well as a certain amount of reciprocal trust between central and peripheral institutions, matched by a shared intention to work for the good of the country and not only of just one specific portion of it. • Offering favourable conditions on services depending on the state Another strategy that could be used is to offer a “package” of favourable conditions on services depending on, or provided by, the central state. This mechanism would help softening the tensions that arise when claims for more autonomy are voiced in contexts like economic regionalism. For example, if in a certain country health, education, or

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other services are managed and distributed at the central level, citizens of the state-wide community might receive such services at reduced price, without a parallel reduction of the quality of the service provided. In other words, depending on the balance of power sharing between levels of government, certain services totally or partially provided by the central state can be offered at more favourable conditions. One possible variant of this mechanism involves taxation discounts: the tax rate applied by the central state on certain services can be reduced to compensate for the asymmetrical treatment reserved to some territories. This stratagem is different than other “compensation tools” that already exist in certain federal states like Canada, for instance, where the idea of compensation obeys to the logic that a province that opts out of a service usually provided by the central government and the government compensates the region on a per capita basis according to what the centre would have spent. Also such mechanism, however, presents advantages and disadvantages. First, while there are many ways in which such strategy could be perfected, the local governments benefiting from such option should not be simply “inundated” with resources freely coming from the centre: rather, they would receive services from central institutions at favourable conditions, thus the economic advantage would come in a very tangible fashion, with a consequent reduction of the potential risk of misusing or mismanaging public funds, paralleled by a more limited risk of engaging in corrupted behaviours on the part of central and local administrators. Another potential advantage is that this mechanism would greatly limit all grievances based on lack of solidarity which, as recalled above, is the glue cementing the relationships among the various territories of the state. In fact, when the state-wide community realises that the central government is striving to compensate for the asymmetrical treatment, they would be less incentivised to complain that the economically strong regions are moved by reasons of selfishness and self-interest. Consequently, the state-wide community would be more willing to help and collaborate. Incidentally, this might be seen as an expression of the idea of horizontal solidarity discussed above. Most importantly, this solution also requires a careful planning and management of financial and non-financial resources, both at central and peripheral levels. In fact, by offering services at more convenient cost, the financial burden on the centre would dramatically increase: consequently,

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a prior, careful evaluation of the impact that such strategy would have on budgets is necessary. • Methods of monetary compensation In contexts of economic regionalism or sub-state nationalism, while the economically wealthier regions or the specific nation claim and obtain more autonomy in certain areas reflecting their specificity, the central state may compensate other regions with additional monetary transfers. This type of monetary compensation, however, should not be confused with equalisation payments, which are solidarity-based mechanisms typical of many federal states, whose purpose is to help balancing the fiscal inequalities between the richer and the poorer sub-units: in fact, the goal of equalisation is to make up for the reduced fiscal capacity of certain regions or territories. With monetary compensation, on the other hand, the central state would grant a given amount of money to local governments to compensate for the enhanced autonomy of certain territories. The rationale behind the two tools is thus different. Like the other proposals suggested above, forms of monetary compensation would present some risks and challenges. First, this method necessitates to prudently gauge the amount and frequency of the compensation to the requirement of a balanced budget at central level: it thus requires a careful planning of the financial resources on the part of the central state in order not to destabilise the financial resources of national and local institutions. Furthermore, monetary compensations might create abuses of power and increased corruption if the funds received from the centre are not adequately managed by local and central institutions. One possible remedy to reduce such risks would be to “attach” some conditions to the money transferred from the centre to the periphery, so that the local governments would be forced to utilise the grants (and be entirely accountable for) only in specific ways or for specific objectives. Similarly, these grants or payments could be linked to a specific project: in other words, it is possible to submit detailed projects that, once approved, can be financed with money coming from the centre. One last alternative

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would be that peripheral governments be asked to prepare and submit a spending report justifying how the funds are used. • Mutual concessions Finally, one last tool to potentially deal with the issue of helping along the asymmetrical treatment is what I call mutual concessions. This solution combines the asymmetrical scheme modelled on article 116(3) (because it would grant specific, increased, and differential powers in specific subject matters) with monetary compensation (because it would involve the idea of compensation, although not monetary in nature). If implemented, the mechanism of mutual concession would create a situation of profound asymmetry. Although questionable to a certain extent, the advantage of this tool is that it would foster the reciprocal acceptance of the differences among territories. Incidentally, I do not think that this solution would jeopardise the unity and integrity of the state, as detractors of asymmetrical solutions often maintain; rather, all societies and groups present in the territory would enjoy a stronger sense of belonging towards the national state because they would feel more accepted and recognised by it. It should also be said, a point made earlier, that such flexible use of asymmetry is more easily implemented in a regional version of federalism rather than in a classic federation. To conclude this section on possible constitutional and political strategies to explain and justify claims and asymmetrical solutions in the context of economic regionalism (and, by extension, sub-state nationalism), it may be worth pointing out that the strategies presented here do not in any way exhaust the array of possibilities that could be used, but serve only an illustrative purpose. Furthermore, I am aware that it may be very difficult to implement them for at least two reasons: (i) because of budgetary concerns, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic that has put national budgets under lots of pressure; and (ii) forms of rigid constitutionalism that make it challenging to carry forward constitutional amendments. All this notwithstanding, the key point remains that solidarity-based arguments, in their horizontal and vertical dimension, suggest to consider solutions that would accommodate not only the claims coming from the wealthier territories, but also the concerns emerging in the remaining regions.

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6.4

Conclusion

The principal goal of this book was to use the Italian case study to analyse federalism and regionalism on a spectrum rather than as discrete opposites, to theorise economic regionalism in a way which builds on the voluminous literature on sub-state nationalism, and to show that the type of asymmetry that characterises it is as important as the one that distinguishes sub-state national societies, although the two groups also present some profound divergences. In this way, I tried to show the interconnectedness between federalism, regionalism, sub-state national theory, and solidarity. In this final chapter, I delved a bit deeper into some issues triggered by economic regionalism and focused specifically on the importance of acknowledging the asymmetrical interests of economically strong regions. Among the various reasons behind this necessity, there is a principled willingness to find solutions, should they be found to exist, and a prudential need to limit sentiments of rebellion coming from within, along with the willingness to unlock the desire to show solidarity. However, I also observed how, when the asymmetrical interests of economically strong regions are acknowledged in one way or the other, sentiments of jealousy can materialise from the outside, that is, from the other regions and territories. In order to be consistent both in the principled position and in the prudential desire to limit the risk of dangerous consequences for the integrity of the state, but also with the willingness to show solidarity, I suggested some strategies that may conduce to the creation of de iure asymmetrical schemes that however help mediate the various cross-sectional interests and players; this may also facilitate the cohabitation and sharing of the same territory by communities with different priorities. I also noted how acknowledging the asymmetrical interests of economically strong regions can have a secondary, but not less important, benefit: helping to unlock the answer to making the constitutional changes necessary to accommodate and recognise sub-state national groups in nation states where they exist. In fact, while the nature of the latter is radically different in one sense, at the same time the two groups might be presented with similar challenges and concerns in, for example, their sense of grievance and frustration and in their viability as independent nation states should they ever choose that route. In other words, the dynamics existing in the ambit of economic regionalism might parallel those existing in the ambit of sub-state nationalism. As a result, some of

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the solutions devised for the former might well be applied and adapted to the reality of the latter. I also noted how asymmetrical solutions used to mediate between antagonist’ interests are not always welcomed by scholars, mainly because of the potential risk that asymmetry carries of fragmenting even more an already divided society. Besides these fears, other negative consequences might emerge from asymmetry, and that would eventually need to be dealt with. The past and recent Italian experience with federal theory and federal solutions has served as the backdrop against which I have developed this research and the various arguments, but at the same time I also tried to position my narrative within a broader framework, so that the Italian experience could be of some utility to other, similar situations. In bringing together federalism, regionalism, sub-state national theory, and solidarity, however, I did not expect to provide easy answers, as every situation is different, as different are the various players, their needs and priorities, and the legal/constitutional environment in which they are situated. In conclusion, I would like to raise one final point. Could a discussion on economic regionalism lead to a conceptualisation of “spatially concentrated economies” (Van Houten 2013) that could become the basis for the creation of federal/regional units premised on economic and political force, thus transcending the present boundaries as they have been drawn in most federal and quasi-federal states? In other words, would it be worth rethinking geo-political and authority boundaries of federated units in such a way that considers issues of economic strength, or natural resources or, otherwise said, the spatial concentration of economies, to better deal with local pressures as those examined in the book? Of course, this could be done easier in emerging constitutional (federal) democracies rather than in older federations, or in regional systems rather than in federal ones, considering that constitutional rigidity often plays a determinative role in preventing changes. This argument would perhaps go in a different direction than the one traced in this book: rather than finding accommodation by looking at existing legal/constitutional frameworks, we would have to be creative and think outside of the box. After all, spatially concentrated economies can represent an element of fragmentation, which should be considered in allocating powers over resources, since the way boundaries are drawn has important consequences for the populations living therein. But it often happens that the territorial entities considered do not coincide with

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institutional federal units but they can occupy a smaller portion of traditional units or transcend unit boundaries, or otherwise lack any formal constitutional status, personality, or representation. Because of this, such territories are not always ideally placed to adequately respond to local tensions and issues, as they lack the power to do so. I end my discussion here, intentionally leaving the question partially open for other scholars who would like to continue the debate from where I left it.

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Index

A Absolute state, 53 Althusius, Johannes, 3–5, 7, 37, 121 Ambrosini, Gaspare, 46, 52, 55 Argentina, 8 Articles of Confederation, 5, 6 Associated states, 13 Asymmetry, 11, 26, 95, 102–104, 107, 113–120, 135, 165–167, 169, 174, 177–179, 183, 185 de facto, 115, 117, 119, 177, 178 de iure, 115, 117, 119, 177, 178, 184 Australia, 9, 141 Austria, 9, 16, 36, 40, 55 Austrian Empire, 36, 40 Autonomous provinces, 18, 76, 77, 82, 88 Autonomous regions, 57, 118 Autonomy, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18–22, 25–28, 36, 39, 41, 44, 48–59, 68, 75, 77, 79–81, 84, 85, 90, 91, 94, 103–107, 112, 114–116,

118–120, 126, 128, 129, 135, 136, 152, 157, 166–170, 173, 177–180, 182

B Bassanini Laws, 69 Berlusconi, Silvio, 68, 84 Bicameral Committee, 68, 69 Bobbio, Norberto, 38–42 Bodin, Jean, 4 Bossi, Umberto, 67, 84, 112 Bozzi Committee, 69 Brazil, 8 Bullinger, 3–5

C Case law Constitutional court of Italy ItCC judgment 106/2002, 71 ItCC judgment 118/2015, 171

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Arban, Italian Regionalism and the Federal Challenge, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31543-5

189

190

INDEX

ItCC judgment 176/2012, 156 ItCC judgment 2/2014, 80 ItCC judgment 203/2013, 153 ItCC judgment 232/2011, 126 ItCC judgment 274/2003, 75 ItCC judgment 303/2003, 125–127 ItCC judgment 331/2010, 156 ItCC judgment 365/2007, 75 ItCC judgment 372/2004, 72 ItCC judgment 384/2005, 123 ItCC judgment 6/2004, 127 Cattaneo, Carlo, 9, 35, 36, 38–43, 46–48, 50, 51, 53, 56 Cavour, Camillo Benso Conte di, 42, 46, 56 Coming together federations, 17 Committee of the regions, 88 Common market, 13 Comuni. See Municipality(ies) Confederation, 2, 3, 6, 38, 42, 148–150 Conferences. See System of conferences Congress of Vienna, 35, 36 Consiglio regionale (regional council), 60, 70–74, 86 Consociational polity/ consociationalism, 13, 106, 107 Constituent Assembly, 36, 45, 53–57, 66, 67 Conte, Giuseppe, 90, 91 Corte costituzionale italiana/Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC), 70–72, 75, 79, 80, 83, 86, 122, 123, 125–127, 156, 157, 171 Covenant, 2, 3, 19, 67

Craxi, Bettino, 69

D D’Alema, Massimo, 68 De Gasperi/Gruber Agreement, 55 Delrio, Graziano, 76, 93, 94 De Mita/Iotti Committee, 69 Democrazia Cristiana (DC), 54, 66, 108, 109 De Sismondi, Sismonde, 37 Devolution, 13, 20, 26, 41, 66, 83, 110 Differential regionalism, 77, 86, 89–91, 94, 118, 155, 178, 180 Draghi, Mario, 90, 92 Dukedom of Lucca, 36 Dukedom of Massa Carrara, 36 Dukedom of Modena and Reggio Emilia, 36 Dukedom of Parma and Piacenza, 36

E Economic regionalism, 95, 101–107, 112, 113, 120, 128, 129, 135, 136, 157, 159, 165–167, 172, 173, 176, 179, 182, 184, 185 Equalisation, 140, 144–148, 151, 155–157, 160, 175, 182 Equality, 129, 135, 137, 139, 142, 151–153, 167, 169, 170, 174, 175 Equalization, 78, 81, 147, 154 Ethiopia, 9 Ethnic nationalism, 23 Ethnofederalism, 11 European Union (EU), 13, 14, 26, 77, 78, 82, 84, 85, 87–89, 92, 109, 111, 112, 121, 122, 136, 141–145, 172

INDEX

F Fairness, 129, 135, 137, 151, 152, 169, 174 Fascism, 52, 53 Federacy, 13 Federal culture, 20 Federalism, 1–5, 7, 9–13, 22, 28, 35–44, 48, 50, 51, 55, 60, 66–68, 78, 89, 94, 101, 107, 110, 111, 127, 136, 138, 148, 150–152, 158, 159, 162, 173, 183–185 Federalist principle, 43, 82 Federation, 2, 6, 7, 9–14, 16–21, 25, 27, 40, 41, 43, 51, 101, 114, 120, 141, 144, 147, 158, 168, 175, 185 Fides, 2 Fiscal federalism, 80, 81, 85, 87, 110, 116, 118, 119, 148, 152, 153, 155–157 Five Days of Milan, 40 Foedus, 2 Fortunato, Giustino, 49 Forza Italia (FI), 68, 83 G Germany, 3, 9, 15, 16, 43, 54, 55, 78, 141, 144 Gioberti, Vincenzo, 38, 43 Gioia, Melchiorre, 37 Giunta regionale (regional executive), 70, 71 Grand-duchy of Tuscany, 36 H Habsburg Empire, 40 Hanseatic League, 2 High Commissioner for Sicily, 54 Hobbes, Thomas, 4 Holding together federations, 17

191

Holland, 3 Holy Roman Empire, 2 House of Savoy, 36, 41

I India, 9, 11, 13, 24 Intergovernmental relations, 87 Israeli tribes, 2

K Kant, Immanuel, 5, 9, 51 Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia, 36 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 36, 48

L L’Abbé de St. Pierre, 5, 9 Leagues, 2, 5, 67, 68, 108, 152 Lega Nord (LN), 65–68, 83, 102, 106–108, 110–112, 129, 135, 152, 168, 170 Locke, John, 4 Lombardy-Venetia, 36 Loyal cooperation, 82, 123, 126

M Madison, James, 6 Malaysia, 9, 24 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 35, 41, 43, 45, 46, 56 Meloni, Giorgia, 89–91, 113 Metropolitan cities, 16, 18, 75, 76, 78, 80–82, 85, 90, 93, 94, 119, 124, 154 Mexico, 8 Minghetti, Marco, 46, 56 Multinational states/federations, 11, 21, 24, 25, 27, 105, 119, 120, 162, 176, 177, 179

192

INDEX

Municipality(ies), 14, 16, 18, 21, 44, 46, 48, 49, 52, 58, 69, 75, 76, 80, 81, 85, 119, 123, 124, 144, 154

Province, 4, 16, 18, 21, 27, 28, 36, 44, 52, 53, 56, 58, 69, 75, 76, 78, 80–82, 85, 86, 94, 119, 123, 124, 154, 181

N Napoleon, 36, 37 Nation, 5, 11, 21–23, 25, 26, 37, 41, 52, 102, 104, 105, 119, 120, 125, 139, 173, 176, 182, 184 National interest, 60, 82, 83, 86, 106, 109, 121, 126, 156 Native American Tribes, 5 Nepal, 9 Nigeria, 9, 103

Q Quadrigesimo Anno, 7, 8, 121 Questione meridionale. See Southern question

O Old Testament, 3 Ordinary regions, 57–60, 70, 72, 77, 90, 118

P Pacem in Terris , 7, 8, 121, 140 Padania, 66, 105, 110–112, 170 Padanian nationalism, 111, 168 Papal encyclicals, 7, 121, 140 Papal States, 36 Paradiplomacy/protodiplomacy, 26 Parallelism, principle, 58, 80 Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), 54, 66, 108, 109 Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), 54, 66, 69, 108 Permanent conference, 18 Philadelphia, 6 Plurinational states/federations. See Multinational states/federations Presidente di regione (regional president), 66, 70–74, 93 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 7, 43

R Region, 14, 15, 18, 19, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 52, 55–58, 60, 66–73, 75, 76, 78–84, 86–88, 91–93, 102–111, 116–120, 124, 126, 129, 136, 146, 148, 152, 155–161, 165–171, 173–179, 181–184 Regional charters, 57, 70–72, 118 Regionalism, 1, 13–15, 26, 28, 35, 56, 58–60, 65, 66, 86, 87, 90, 91, 94, 101, 110, 113, 122, 161, 167, 178, 184, 185 Rerum Novarum, 7, 51 Risorgimento, 35, 38, 41–43, 45, 52 Roman Empire, 2, 43 Rome, 35, 52, 68, 75, 110, 113, 121 Rosmini, Antonio, 38 Rossi, Ernesto, 53

S Salvemini, Gaetano, 36, 42, 47–51 Secession, 25, 28, 91, 105, 110, 111, 169–171 Self-rule, 10, 12, 22 Shared rule, 10, 12, 22, 150 Solidarity, 81, 83, 103, 105, 120, 128, 129, 135–146, 148, 150–162, 166, 173–176, 181, 184, 185

INDEX

South Africa, 20, 151 Southern question, 47, 48, 111, 155 Sovereignty, 3, 4, 6, 7, 19, 20, 25, 53, 112, 151 Spain, 11, 14, 17, 19–21, 24, 28, 55, 65, 105, 119, 141, 158, 172, 176 Special regions. See Autonomous regions Spinelli, Altiero, 9, 53 Statuti regionali. See Regional charters Statuto Albertino, 45 Sturzo, Don Luigi, 51, 56 Subsidiarity, 8, 16, 69, 80, 82, 88, 95, 102, 120–129, 135, 150, 157, 166 Sub-state nationalism, 1, 23, 24, 28, 35, 60, 65, 94, 95, 101, 102, 104–108, 111, 112, 115, 116, 129, 161, 165, 166, 176, 183, 184 Substitution powers, 82, 86, 93, 123, 127 Switzerland, 3, 8, 16, 39, 41, 43, 46 Symmetry, 113, 114 System of conferences, 87

193

T Terre redente, 52 Transversal matters (materie trasversali), 79, 80 Treaty of Lisbon, 122 Treaty of Maastricht (TEU), 68, 69, 88, 109, 122, 142–144 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 142 U Union, 6, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 54, 76, 122, 142, 144, 145 United States (US), 3, 5, 9, 13, 17, 39, 41, 46, 48, 50, 53, 56, 141 US constitution, 2, 6, 8, 10 V Ventotene Manifesto, 53 W Westphalia, 3, 4 World war I, 51 World war II, 9, 23, 52, 56, 107, 121, 141