Israel´s 70th Anniversary: Insights and Perspectives: Politics – Culture – Religion [1 ed.] 9783737012065, 9783847112068

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Religion and Transformation in Contemporary European Society

Band 19

Herausgegeben von Kurt Appel, Christian Danz, Jakob Helmut Deibl, Rüdiger Lohlker, Richard Potz und Sieglinde Rosenberger

Die Bände dieser Reihe sind peer-reviewed.

Regina Polak (ed.)

Israel’s 70th Anniversary: Insights and Perspectives Politics – Culture – Religion

V&R unipress Vienna University Press

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über https://dnb.de abrufbar. Veröffentlichungen der Vienna University Press erscheinen bei V&R unipress. Gedruckt mit freundlicher Unterstützung des Bundesministeriums für Europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten, des Forschungszentrums „Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society“, der Katholisch-Theologischen Fakultät sowie des Rektorats der Universität Wien. © 2020, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk und seine Teile sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zugelassenen Fällen bedarf der vorherigen schriftlichen Einwilligung des Verlages. Umschlagabbildung: RaT-Logo (Gerfried Kabas, Wien). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2198-5235 ISBN 978-3-7370-1206-5

Contents

Regina Polak Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Dr Denise Quistorp-Rejc Greetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Dr Talya Lador-Fresher Greetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Yedidia Z. Stern Divided we Stand: On the competing visions of Israel

. . . . . . . . . . .

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Eli Salzberger Israel at 70: The Relations Between Religion and State, Democracy, and the Israeli Legal System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Rachel Elior The Transformation of the Hebrew Language from a Religious Language of the Past into a dual Language of Secular Zionist Daily Life and Religious Messianic Revival of the Biblical Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Hana Bendcowsky Religion in Israel – The Holy Places as a Case Study

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Eran Kaplan Religious Cinema in Israel

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Contents

Gerhard Langer The Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of the State of Israel and its Importance for Christians and Jews. The Reflections of a Theologian and Jewish Studies Scholar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Regina Polak “New” Anti-Semitism with a Special Focus on Israel: A Challenge for Catholic Pastoral Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 The Authors

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Regina Polak

Preface

1.

Why it is necessary to deal academically with the 70th anniversary of the State of Israel

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel in 2018, the Research Centre “Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society” of the University of Vienna, in cooperation with the Faculty of Catholic Theology and its Institute for Practical Theology and the Jewish Community of Vienna, organised a symposium to honour and reflect academically on this momentous historical event. On November 12, 2018, the 100tth anniversary of the declaration of the Republic of (German) Austria, internationally renowned scholars from Israel provided exemplary insights and perspectives on the complexity of Israeli politics, culture and religion. There are manifold reasons for such an exceptional interdisciplinary and theological recognition of this anniversary of the State of Israel. First, because of Austria’s culpable entanglement in the Shoah, it has a special responsibility, in a spirit of solidarity, to take care of the State of Israel. The active participation of Austrians in the murder of 6 million Jews obliges academic researchers in Austria to engage with the ongoing history of the Jewish people. Second, religion played and still plays a fundamental role in this issue. It is not only that too many national socialist Austrians called themselves Christians, but that the Catholic Church and its theology played a significant part in the genesis of a murderous anti-Semitism. Despite the Jewish origins of Christianity, a centuries-old Christian anti-Judaism sowed the demonic seeds of hatred against Jews that laid the ground for a radical anti-Semitism that was the ideological heart of a barbarian regime. Too many Catholics were not averse to the politics of a totalitarian regime that strived to extinguish the Jewish people completely for their being Jewish. There were too few righteous people in Austria at that time. Third, this regime also opposed Judaism as a religion that was and still is inextricably linked to an ethos of equality for all people and the dignity of every

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human being – an ethos that provokes racist, authoritarian, and totalitarian politics. Looking at the global rise of authoritarian right-wing and populist politics in recent decades, it is clear that this ethos of equality and dignity is once again endangered. One cannot help but fear that human dignity will be in great danger in the aftermath of the so-called “Corona-Crisis” because of a likely rise in hatred against social, ethnic and religious minorities on a global level. The worldwide growth in anti-Semitism in new forms – especially in the phenomenon of a right, left, and Muslim Israel-related anti-Semitism – is a threatening prospect. This is another reason why researchers on religion have a duty to engage in academic research on Israel. Religion not only plays a significant role in history, but also in the present. Fourth, another reason for an academic focus on the State of Israel can be argued from the context of the existential significance that the land of Israel has always had for Jews – both those living in Israel and those in the diaspora. After the experience of the Shoah, the State of Israel is considered by the Jewish people to be a safe haven. Religion, therefore, is relevant to the foundation of the State of Israel because the Shoah, while not the only reason for the international recognition of the State’s establishment, was the decisive factor. Though the meaning of the land for Jewish people is heterogeneous, the religious meaning of Israel makes addressing it from interdisciplinary perspectives necessary. Religion has an enormous and growing impact on contemporary politics and culture in Israel. Though most Israeli people consider themselves secular, religion has shaped the atmosphere in Israel and also plays a crucial role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. So while the Middle Eastern conflict is not at the centre of this anthology, as the aim of the half-day symposium was to pay a critical tribute to the impressive achievements of the young State of Israel, the conflict was, of course, addressed by the authors. Fifth, the central role of religion in Israel and the religious meaning of the land still raise fundamental theological questions for both Jews and Christians. As anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism still exist among Catholic Christians – despite Catholic teaching rejecting any form of anti-Semitism and the obligation of the faithful to combat it – theology must reflect this religious dimension. Also, from a practical-theological point of view, contemporary Judaism and therefore the existence of the State of Israel are realities that challenge theological research. To be capable of such research, which is a future project, it is first and foremost necessary to listen to Israeli scholars. Interdisciplinary academic appreciation of the State of Israel is therefore not only a duty arising from responsibility in the past and present; it is also a great joy. Researchers are confronted with a young, dynamic state – full of social, cultural, economic, technical and academic innovations – which is seeking its way into the future. Israel is a fascinating and dazzling but also a contradictory

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country. It is much more than the tragic conflict between Jewish and Palestinian people. Sixth, therefore, is the aim of the symposium to offer insights unknown to many into the interior of this religious, cultural and political laboratory that is Israel. Too many people in Austria and Europe are unaware of this impressive side to Israel and associate the State of Israel only with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As we are convinced that people in Europe can learn a lot from Israel, this aspect is placed at the centre of the anthology. The handling of religious diversity within the country; the integration of more than a million Jewish immigrants; the development of a dynamic economy; a flourishing education and science system; a rich culture in the field of literature and above all film; and last but not least the lively, constant and conflictual struggle for democracy – one of the few democracies in the region of the Middle East and built in just seven decades – are all inspiring. Religion plays an important role in these matters. This does not, of course, mean that one can minimise or ignore the increasing challenges to Israeli democracy from right-wing politics and religious fundamentalism. These challenges include human rights violations, internal racism against minorities (including Jewish minorities), aggressive settlement politics and eroding democratic structures. Like many European countries in recent years, Israel too has been experiencing these problems. The scholars therefore refer to this dangerous situation and propose a more nuanced view. Although two years have passed since this symposium, we believe that its aims and academic contributions are still relevant. We therefore decided to publish them for a broader audience – both for scholars of religion from different disciplines and for opinion leaders in the Catholic Church. The symposium also had a unique relevance for the University of Vienna, which was highlighted by Rector Heinz Engl in his opening speech. Since the University of Vienna played a tragic and central role in the acceptance and establishment of the national-socialist regime in Austria, this symposium was another step in the self-critical review of the responsibility of this famous institution. It was an expression of its willingness to acknowledge the visible consequences of its guilt. Therefore, we decided to publish its excellent lectures, with the addition of two contributions from members of the Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society Research Centre. We believe that these academic reflections are an inspiring starting point for further interdisciplinary academic research.

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2.

Regina Polak

Overview of the Contributions

The anthology starts with greetings from Dr Denise Quistorp-Rejc, envoy of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs. After presenting an appreciation of the academic acknowledgement of the State of Israel over the past 70 years and referring to the friendly relations and close cooperation between Israel and Austria in the political and economic fields – especially in the cultural and academic spheres – she stresses the strategic meaning of the dialogue with science in the diplomatic realm: strengthening the capacities and visibilities of scientists, enhancing the prestige of universities and research institutions, and spreading knowledge that provides a basis for mutual understanding. She describes how cooperation with science lays a foundation for cooperation in culture, science and politics. Finally, she remembers the historical dimension, which is ever present in diplomatic relations with Israel. Dr Talya Lador-Fresher, the Ambassador of Israel to Austria, expresses her conviction that the symposium and this publication provide an opportunity to reflect at an academic level on the great achievements of the State of Israel in the last seven decades and to build bridges between Israel and Austria. She refers to Israel as the first and only true democracy in the Middle East, the diversity of Israeli society reflected in the political system, and the religious freedom declared in the Declaration of Independence. The anthology will encourage more Austrians to get to know Israel beyond what they see in news coverage and to visit and experience Israel first hand. The first academic contribution, “Divided we stand: On the competing visions of Israel”, deals with the critical question of the identity component of Israeli people, focusing on personal and group consciousness, which plays a significant role in the issue of national resilience. Professor Yedidia Stern analyses the strength and weakness of this identity component in Israeli society from different perspectives, embedded in the question concerning what it means when the State of Israel defines itself as “Jewish and democratic”. He discusses the conceptual tension prevailing between the two parts of this self-definition, describing and analysing what are almost ‘culture wars’ between various groups to unravel the constitutional definition evoked by the definition. After sketching the dispute between four main sections in Israeli society and their diverse visions of the State, he presents contemporary trends within Israel. He concludes that supporters of competing visions, through this conflictual diversity, potentially strengthen Israeli national resilience. In the contribution “Israel 70: Relations between Religion and State, Democracy, and the Israeli Legal System”, Eli Salzberger reflects on these relations. In his first section, he describes the unprecedented achievements of Israel in its 70 years of existence. He focuses on the fields of security and economy and

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describes some achievements in the realm of culture, science and the arts, most of all the revival of the Hebrew language. Finally, in his first section, he stresses the foundation and maintenance of an uninterrupted liberal, “thick” democracy since the establishment of the State in 1948. However, as this democracy is considered by him as being far from perfect, in the next section he discusses the extent to which liberal democracy has become distorted and flawed as a result of current developments. Referring to the focus of the symposium, he argues that the relationship between religion and state as well as freedom of religion can be perceived as one of Israel’s weaknesses vis-à-vis liberal democracy, which affects not so much the rights of minorities as it does those of the secular Israeli majority. In the third section, Eli Salzberger considers the process of the rapid deterioration of liberal democracy in Israel. Rachel Elior contributes another exciting perspective by reflecting on the question of the impact on Israeli politics if the holy language of Hebrew is transformed into a language of daily life. In her contribution, she describes how the Hebrew language became holy, explains what holiness means, and gives a historical overview of the different stages of the transformation of Hebrew from an ancient written language into a renewed, “actual”, secular spoken language. She discusses this topic in two parts: a theological-mystical section pertaining to the meaning of the Holy language in the past; and a second section in which she explores the crucial significance of the revival of an ancient mystical-messianic tradition in the secular Zionist present and its far-reaching political implications in the State of Israel. In her case study on the holy places in Israel, Hana Bendcowsky demonstrates how religion in Israel is not only an expression of religious identity, a belief system or a lifestyle committed to sacred law and religious authorities, but it is also inseparably linked to geographical places through sacred sites connecting religious people with land, history and tradition. Sacred places are therefore an important expression of religious experience, community and identity. The contribution “Religion in Israel – The Holy Places as a Case Study” – therefore explores the relations between the State of Israel and religion in Israel through the prism of holy places, discussing the laws, governance and conflicts that arise in the context of this tense relationship. “Religious Cinema in Israel” by Eran Kaplan was added after the symposium in 2018. Kaplan reflects the astonishing fact that religion has gained a more prominent role in Israeli cinema. In his contribution, he examines the reasons for this phenomenon by describing concrete films and their embeddedness in the broad social and cultural changes in Israel. He also explores some of the key features of this “religious turn” and tries to describe, using examples, which qualities make certain Israeli films Jewish.

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The next two contributions complete the aims of the anthology through an Austrian and a Christian perspective and were added after the symposium by two members of the Research Centre “Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society”. Gerhard Langer reflects on the challenges the State of Israel poses for Christian churches. As the Zionist movement and its hope for a homeland as the last refuge of a distressed and harassed Jewry crystallised in the establishment of the State of Israel with the crucial role of the Bible as an epitome of Jewish identity, many new theological and political questions arose for Christian churches. In his contribution “The Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of the State of Israel and its Importance for Christians and Jews” in “The Reflections of a Theologian and Judaic Studies Scholar”, Gerhard Langer first formulates claims for the Christian churches, such as the recognition of Jewish plans and hopes for the land as a legitimate expression of a relationship to God, the acceptance that Christianity has no claim to the land, and a commitment to combating any kind of anti-Semitism, including anti-Zionism. Second, he explores the question of Jewish existence in the context of Israel, referring to contemporary theoretical and empirical research. In my own contribution, “‘New’ anti-Semitism with a Special Focus on Israel: A Challenge for Catholic Pastoral Theology”, I deepen one of the arguments made by Gerhard Langer from a Catholic practical-theological perspective: the obligation to combat anti-Semitism in all forms, with a special focus on Israelrelated anti-Semitism. As “new” anti-Semitism can be found among Catholic Christians in the pastoral realm, the Catholic Church must deal with this issue, for both political and theological reasons. I therefore first provide an overview of the academic debate on anti-Semitism, including facts and figures of the Austrian situation. I then present important positions of the Catholic Church on combating anti-Semitism, including their theological foundation, political implications, and consequences. I conclude with pastoral-theological perspectives for a better future practice in Catholic pastoral work. Last but not least, we want to thank all our sponsors who made the edition of this volume possible: the Research Centre “Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society” of the University of Vienna, the Faculty of Catholic Theology of the University of Vienna, the Rectorate of the University of Vienna, the Municipal Department 7 of the City of Vienna and the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs. Special thanks also go to the team at the Research Centre “Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society”, in particular to Martin Eleven and Marlene Deibl, and to my study assistant Anna Davogg, who were responsible for the careful preparation of the publication. Vienna, 5 June 2020

Regina Polak

Dr Denise Quistorp-Rejc (Envoy of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs)

Greetings

Dear readers, The presentations and articles collected in this volume provide us with valuable scientific insights into Israel’s complexity, diversity and richness and allow a most appropriate academic acknowledgment of the remarkable accomplishments of the State of Israel of the past 70 years. Austria and Israel entertain friendly relations and cooperate closely in the political and economic fields – and especially in the cultural and academic area. It, therefore, was a great honour and pleasure to host the symposium ‘70th Anniversary of Israel: Insights and Perspectives. Politics – Culture – Religion’ at the University of Vienna. The contributions of the distinguished participants to the conference and to this publication will further enhance future prosperous relations between our two countries. For, apart from cultural exchange and dialogue, science has become an important ally of Austrian diplomacy. As science and technology touch everybody’s lives, they must also matter to politics and diplomacy. We need scientific thinking for evidence-based foreign policy decisions to promote our national interests and to encounter the global challenges through international cooperation. The latter is the domain of diplomacy. That is why science diplomacy is now a substantial working area in Foreign Affairs. We develop this new field of activity in close cooperation with our partners at universities and scientific institutions as well as in the ministries of education, science, research, digitalization, technology and innovation. In our experience, the interaction of science and diplomacy works as a twoway process with mutual benefits: on the one hand, there are encounters of researchers and partnerships of research institutions that strengthen the capacities and visibility of scientists and enhance the prestige of universities and research institutions. On the other hand, scientific collaboration and academic mobility spread knowledge that provides a basis for mutual understanding. Cooperation in any area – culture, science, or politics – can build upon it.

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Denise Quistorp-Rejc

Arts and science are essential aspects of Austrian culture and therefore integral parts of Austrian foreign policy. It is through Cultural and Science Diplomacy that we enter into dialogue with the rest of the world, thereby creating mutual trust and understanding as a basis for our bilateral relations and international cooperation. Over the years, Austrian Science Diplomacy has proven to be a stabilizing element in politics. Science always provides a positive agenda for cooperation, with its universal language keeping communication channels open, even in politically strained times. The historical dimension is ever-present in diplomatic relations. To know our own history and to understand other countries’ expectations towards Austrian foreign policy is indispensable for a successful dialogue. To ensure knowledge and scientific research both as internal and external aspects of foreign policy, we recently established a history unit in our ministry. Moreover, given the ever-growing importance of science and technology in global affairs, we have now strategically outlined the role of science in Austrian international cultural relations. The science-concept specifically aims at supporting Austrian diplomatic representations in science diplomacy. Their activities include the support of universities and scientific institutions in their international scientific co-operations; the organisation of scientific events as an opportunity for Austrian academic institutions to network with potential partners; furthermore, trending, facilitating, matchmaking, and starting-up support to identify new topics of collaboration and facilitate contact with potential partners in Austria; and most importantly: the co-operation with Austrian chairs and study centres. We are so fortunate as to closely collaborate with the Centre for Austrian Studies at the Hebrew University, which was established as a joint initiative of public and private Austrian sponsors. In memory of long-time Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek, who grew up in Vienna, the Kollek Jerusalem Vienna Chair for the Study of the Cultural Aspects of Vienna and Jerusalem had been established at Hebrew University as well as the Franz Cardinal Koenig Chair, named after the former Cardinal of Vienna. These invaluable academic ties, the encounters and partnerships of scientists and students, the exchange of culture and science, of knowledge and expertise, connect academia and peoples. They are an indispensable prerequisite for dialogue, and, in consequence, for friendly and constructive bilateral and international relations.

Dr Talya Lador-Fresher (Ambassador of Israel in Austria)

Greetings

Celebrating the 70th anniversary of the State of Israel was a great opportunity to show the diversity, the achievements and the challenges of the State of Israel – within the country itself and beyond. Us at the Embassy of Israel in Vienna have happily been celebrating this important milestone in various events throughout the year. The symposium, which took place on November 12th, 2018 at the University of Vienna, was another great opportunity to look at these issues from the academic level and to build new bridges between our two countries. The uniqueness of this seminar was its joint focus on politics, culture, and religion – three topics that may seem unconnected, but in fact are highly intertwined. Israel, the only true democracy in the Middle East, enjoys a very dynamic political scene. It is one of the first countries worldwide that allowed women’s suffrage (1928) even before the state was established. Golda Meir was the third female head of state after WWII worldwide. The political system reflects the diversity of Israeli society in terms of religion, personal histories and social backgrounds. It actually allows representation of ultra-orthodox and other shades of Judaism, Arabs as Muslims or Christians, and secular alike. All these have a place in the country and in politics. The Declaration of Independence also clearly mentions the importance of freedom of religion. This diversity is also reflected on the cultural landscape of Israel. We are known for our literature, with the highest number of publications per capita per year. Being the people of the Book, this is not surprising. Israel is a world power when it comes to modern dance and classical music as well. I hope that this symposium, and the publication following it, will encourage more and more Austrians to get to know Israel beyond news coverage and to visit and experience our country firsthand.

Yedidia Z. Stern

Divided we Stand: On the competing visions of Israel* ‘Israel’s spiritual character and her internal stability will be the primary factor in the future in determining our security and our international standing.’ David Ben Gurion, engraved on Shimon Peres’ tombstone1

Abstract The Article analyzes the strength and weakness of the identity component in Israeli society from one perspective: the attitude of the country’s citizens to the constitutional identity of the state, which is defined as “Jewish and democratic.” It presents the conceptual tension that prevails between the two parts of the definition according to the various interpretations of “Jewish State” and “Democratic State”. It describes the dispute between the four main sections of Israeli society – secular, ultra-orthodox, religious-Zionists and Israeli Arabs – regarding their visions of the state. It presents current trends, showing that supporters of competing visions of Israel are drawing closer, potentially strengthening Israeli national resilience.

1.

Introduction

A country’s national resilience is a result of many, mutually related elements. It comprises, inter alia, matters of economic resilience (such as the state of the economy, living standards, the availability of resources, the level of innovation), of social resilience (such as inequality, the availability and quality of education, the standard of health services, unemployment rates), of political resilience (such as the stability of the regime, political participation, trust in government institutions, the integrity of the government) and of national security (such as the sustained fostering of military power).2 * Ben-Gurion, David: Like Stars and Dust: Essays from Israel’s Government Year Book, Sede Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 1997, p. 303. 1 Translation: Batya Stein; Research Assistant: Gabriel Abensour. The article is a more detailed version of “Israel: Jewish, Democratic, and Resilience? On Competing Visions of Israel,” in: Cohen, Stuart / Kliemann, Aharon (eds.): Handbook on Israeli security, Routledge 2019. 2 For further discussion on the concept of national resilience, see: Eshel, Yohanan / Kimhi, Shaul: “A new perspective on national resilience: Components and demographic predictors,” in: Journal of Community Psychology, 2016/44 (7), pp. 833–844; Hall, Peter A. / Lamont, Michèle (eds.): Social resilience in the neoliberal era, New York: Cambridge University Press

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In this article, I will consider an additional component of national resilience, which is particularly critical in the Israeli context: the identity component. This is an abstract component that focuses on personal and group consciousness rather than on material elements or on institutional structures. Although identity is an elusive facet of national resilience, hard to define and to measure, it has proven to be, as will be shown, enormously significant. Identity is a crucial element in the mobilization of Israeli society into joint action in many areas.3 As this article shows, security matters have been at the center of Israel’s existence from the moment of its creation, when it confronted threats of immediate annihilation by surrounding states, and until this very day. The average Israeli constantly bears the security burden: compulsory military service for men and women (for longer than is usual in most countries);4 reserve duty (mainly, but not only, for men) over two decades and more; a significant allocation of taxes and national resources to security needs;5 and, most importantly – a continued consciousness, which is never eased, of life under a security threat to the individual and to the state. The ability to take a strong stand in these circumstances, over generations, is not self-evident. It is related, as noted, to all the elements of national resilience but draws – in my view, mainly – on the collective identity component. What is the collective identity component of national resilience? People are not isolated atoms, moving around without attachments to their surroundings. Everyone has a name, memories, a legacy, myths, and an ethos he or she shares with others, from which his consciousness is carved as well as her orientation in the world. Individuals, even in a postmodern global world, live within a history, a 2006; Canetti-Nisim, Daphna / Hall, Brian J. / Hobfoll, Steven E. / Galea, Sandro / Johnson, Robert J. / Palmieri, Patrick A.: ‘‘Trajectories of Resilience, Resistance and Distress during Ongoing Terrorism: The Case of Jews and Arabs in Israel,’’ in: Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 2009/77 (1), pp. 138–148; Canetti, Daphna / Cohen, Naor / Rapaport, Carmit / Waismel-Manor, Israel: “What does national resilience mean in a democracy? Evidence from the United States and Israel,” in: Armed Forces & Society, 2014/40 (3), pp. 504–520; Eshel, Yohanan / Kimhi, Shaul / Lahad, Mooly / Leykin, Dimitry: “National resilience: a new self-report assessment scale,” in: Community mental health journal, 2019/55 (4), pp. 721–731. 3 Some studies already discussed the link between resilience and identity in different national contexts, see for instance: Rorlich, Azade-Ayse: Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience, Stanford: Hoover Press 1986, pp. 157–176; Healy, Susan: “Cultural resilience, identity and the restructuring of political power in Bolivia.” Paper Submitted for the 11th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bali June 2006; Koudela, Pál: “National Identity and Social Resilience in the Case of South Korea,” in: Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, 2015/15 (2), pp. 159–167. 4 Defense Service Law – Consolidated Version 5746–1986, Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5745, p. 12, LSI vol. XXXIX, p. 15. 5 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Defence Expenditure In Israel 1950–2017, July 2019, [written by Ram Ben-David] available here: https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2019/1758/ e_print.pdf. [09. 01. 2020].

Divided we Stand: On the competing visions of Israel

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culture, and group attachments that they are born into or have chosen. Many of the actions we perform – including some seemingly “automatic” ones – convey our commitment to specific identity attachments. Nationality, religion, culture – among the most crucial forces driving human history – are identity attachments that join together the people who share them and distinguish them from others who belong to another nationality, religion, or culture. Some have tried to lessen the significance of these identity attachments invoking a universal, humanistic, neo-liberal approach. They hold that the good for individuals is independent of any garments of group identity, or even of his or her own beliefs or values.6 In their view, full self-realization compels detachment from commitments to any group and assuming responsibility for not hurting others is enough. This stance, which ridicules liberalism and actually backfires on it, represents a radical pole of liberal fundamentalism. Liberal thought, and certainly its communitarian version, decisively places individuals and their right to write their narratives as they wish within a concrete context of identity attachments, from which and in whose light they function.7 Indeed, the rebounding power of nationality and religion in the twenty-first century in both East and West is a counterreaction to this fundamentalist neo-liberalism. People do wish to see themselves as part of something greater than themselves, a collective identity, as manifest in the familiar phenomenon of “identity politics” with all its virtues and flaws.8 In my estimate, the State of Israel would not prevail were its citizens to sanctify only the value of individual self-realization. As John Donne aptly noted, “No man is an island, / Entire of itself; / Every man is a piece of the continent, / A part of the 6 Nussbaum, Martha: Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2006, pp. 69–80. “The capabilities approach is fully universal: the capabilities in question are held to be important for each and every citizen, in each and every nation, and each person is to be treated as an end.” (Ibid. 78). This approach is rooted in the eighteenth century enlightenment thought. For thinkers like Condorcet or Voltaire, the emancipation of individuals from their cultural, ethnic or religious bonds was a necessary step toward progress. See: Schlereth, Thomas J.: The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas Of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694–1790, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1977. 7 See for example: Walzer, Michael: Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality, New York: Basic Books 1983; Walzer, Michael: “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” in: Political Theory, 1990/18 (1), pp. 6–23; Kymlicka, Will: Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, pp. 201–289. 8 For further discussion on liberalism and particular identities, see: Kukathas, Chandran: “Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference,” in: Political Theory, 1998/ 26 (5), pp. 686–99; Baumeister, Andrea: Liberalism and the ‘Politics of Difference’, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press 2000; Kymlicka, Will: Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001; Ismail, Salwa: “Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics,” in: Government and Opposition, 2004/39 (4), pp. 614–631.

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main.”9 Were the State of Israel made up of eight million islands, it would not survive. What turns the individuals, the isolated islands, into a group that works together out of a sense of partnership and coherence, is the topic of my discussion here – the identity component of national resilience. If it were to crumble, the security of Israel – in the physical sense – would have collapsed long ago. In this article, I analyze the strength and weakness of the identity component in Israeli society from one perspective: the attitude of the country’s citizens to the constitutional identity of the state, which is defined as “Jewish and democratic.” In Section 2, I present the conceptual tension that prevails between the two parts of the definition according to the various interpretations of “Jewish” and “democratic”. In Section 3, I analyze the problem of consciousness evoked by this description of the State of Israel, leading almost to a culture war between the various groups and to pressures to unravel the constitutional definition; in Section 4, I describe the dispute between four main sections of Israeli society, regarding their visions of the state; in Section 5, I present current trends, showing that supporters of competing visions of Israel are drawing closer, potentially strengthening Israeli national resilience.

2.

A Jewish and Democratic State – The Conceptual Tension

The Declaration of Independence, which is the State of Israel’s foundational document, refers to “the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.” The term “democratic state” is indeed missing but, in its principles, the Declaration reveals the intention to establish a democratic state. It determines that “The State of Israel … will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex.”10 Forty-four years later, the Knesset enacted a Basic Law asserting that Israel is a “Jewish and democratic state.”11 This dual designation – “Jewish state” and “democratic state” – long ago breached the borders of the legal-constitutional discourse of rights and has also been accepted in the discourse of identity. As a matter of fact, the Israeli public identifies the state as integrating particularistic and universal elements that are symbolized through “Jewish and democratic.” But what is the meaning of this definition of the state, in both its parts? 9 Donne, John: The Works of John Donne, Volume III, London: John W. Parker 1839, p. 575. 10 Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, official text 1948, available here: https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/ declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx [19. 05. 2020]. 11 Clause 7A to the Basic Law: The Knesset 5718–1958, added to Basic Law: The Knesset (amendment 9), 5748–1985, Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5748, number 1155.

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When interpreting the “democratic state” concept, we can rely on a large trove of intellectual knowledge and human experience, given that there are many democratic states in the world and their functioning has been at the center of attention in recent centuries. There are disputes regarding the breadth of democracy’s content: some confine it to formal democracy, claiming it to be a regime, a set of “rules of the game” for a heterogeneous group to use when making decisions.12 Others broaden it and support substantial democracy. For them, democracy is an idea as well as an ideal; the democratic state must be committed to a concrete political doctrine (for example, liberalism) and to specific sets of arrangements (for example, the Declaration of Human Rights).13 Obviously, any decision regarding the breadth of democracy’s content and the depth of the democratic state affects the scope of the area open to influence by the values of a Jewish state. In any event, the challenge of understanding the practical implications of the democratic state is not specific to Israel. By contrast, a “Jewish state” is a unique phenomenon, and discussion of it has barely begun. Jews lived for thousands of years without sovereignty and, consequently, Jewish collective memory does not include political experience. There is an enormous philosophical and legal lacuna regarding the meaning, the behavior patterns, and the values of such a state.14 “Jewish” has invariably been perceived as denoting a people (a demographic criterion), a nationality (a national criterion), and a religion (a religious criterion). It is thus plausible to assume that a “Jewish state” is meant to reflect the diversity of Judaism itself: a state most of whose citizens are Jewish, which is the national state of the Jews and has a Jewish religious affiliation. In the course of history, most Jews viewed these three components as one integrated essence. Today, however, due to secularization and to the establishment of the State of Israel, the identity package has come apart. Many Jews in Israel do not view the circles of people, nationality, and religion as overlapping and, at times, they even experience friction between them. A question thus arises as to the relative weight to be assigned to each one of these components in the shared life of Jews (and of the non-Jewish minority) in the State of Israel.15 12 Dahl, Robert A.: On Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press 1998, pp. 32–80. 13 Barber, Benjamin: Strong Democracy, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1984. 14 Note that a group of prominent scholars is trying to fill this void, through a four-volume collective work on the Jewish political tradition, from Ancient Israel to the State of Israel. Three of them are already in print. See: Kochen, Madeline / Lorberbaum, Menachem / Walzer, Michael / Zohar, Noam J. (eds.): The Jewish Political Tradition, New Haven: Yale University Press 2000–2018. 15 According to the 2019 Israeli Democracy Index, only 31 % of Israeli Jews are in favor of the current balance between the two components. 41 % and 20 % think, respectively, the Jewish component and the democratic component are too dominant. See: The Israel Democracy Institute: 2019 Israeli Democracy Index, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller,

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Fundamentalist interpretations of “Jewish state” or “democratic state” fan the Israeli controversy and harm national resilience. Thus, for example, if a Jewish state must be a theocracy, drawing its authority from God’s sovereignty, it cannot be compatible with its being a democracy (even in its formal definition), drawing its authority from human sovereignty.16 Likewise, if Jews only can actively participate in the Israeli democracy, this ceases to exist.17 By contrast, if a democratic state is necessarily a state of “all its citizens,” neutral vis-à-vis national identities, it cannot be compatible with the classic notion of the ethnic nation-state and, in the Israeli case – the Jewish state.18 Even more moderate interpretations of the two concepts create tension. Thus, for example, the demographic criterion of the Jewish state concept, if it hints to a state commitment to engage in deliberate action to preserve the Jewish majority through immigration and citizenship laws that favor Jews;19 the national criterion, if it implies that the state’s self-realization requires it to endorse a policy of allocating rights and resources in a way that favors members of the Jewish na-

16

17

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Ella / Hermann, Tamar] available here: https://en.idi.org.il/media/13847/summary-theisraeli-democracy-index-2019-en.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. However, only 54.4 % of Israeli Arabs think that Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together, see: Smooha, Sammy: Still Playing by the Rules – Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2015, Haifa: Pardes 2017, p. 98, available here: https://www.idi.org.il/dataisrael/ J0045_StillPlayByTheRulesIndex2015OfArabJewishRelations_Eng.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. This approach is particularly common among the religious Israeli far right. For example, the far right activist Meir Kahane considered the Israel Declaration of Independence as “schizophrenic” and claimed that a Jewish state has to be theocratic. See: Rejwan, Nissim: Israel’s Place in the Middle East: A Pluralist Perspective, Gainesville: University Press of Florida 1998, pp. 177–179. This criticism is often expressed by the Israeli Arabs minority. For example, according to Smooha’s survey, 68.8 % of Israeli Arabs claimed Israel is first and foremost a Jewish state and only then a democratic state. Smooha, Sammy: Still Playing by the Rules – Index of ArabJewish Relations in Israel 2015, Haifa: Pardes 2017, p. 127, available here: https://www.idi.org. il/dataisrael/J0045_StillPlayByTheRulesIndex2015OfArabJewishRelations_Eng.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. Malakh, Assaf: From the Bible to the Jewish State: Jewish Nationalism and the Israeli Controversy, Tel Aviv: Yediot Sefarim 2019 (in Hebrew). In Israel, the most important ones are the Law of Return, which stipulates that every person with Jewish roots (and her or his family members) is entitled to immigrate to the State of Israel; and the Citizenship Law, which grants to all the Law of Return immigrants Israeli citizenship. See: Law of Return 5710–1950, Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5725, p. 270, LSI vol. XIX, p. 288; Citizenship Law 5712–1972, Sefer Ha-Chukkim of 5712, p. 146. See also: Rubinstein, Amnon / Yakobson, Alexander: Democratic Norms, Diasporas, and Israel’s Law of Return, Policy paper, New York: American Jewish Committee 2009. This notwithstanding, many democratic states have laws enabling them to reinforce their bonds with their kins outside their borders. This norm even has been formally recognized by European Commission for Democracy through Law, an advisory body of the Council of Europe, see: Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law): Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-State, October 2001, available here: https://www.venice. coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-INF(2001)019-e [10. 01. 2020].

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tionality over others;20 and the religious criterion, insofar as it compels a different attitude toward non-Jews and toward women or imposes religious obligations on Jews21 – all evoke, and this is an understatement, democratic unease. On the other hand, those holding that the democratic state requires full separation of religion and state or a liberal (as opposed to a republican) outlook emphasizing the individual ethos (while marginalizing the community), minimize the option of endowing the democratic state with Jewish content.22 Evidently, then, a conceptual tension prevails between the two characteristics of the state, which must be openly admitted. What is the translation of this conceptual tension in the Israeli reality?

3.

A Jewish and Democratic State: The Consciousness Problem

Israeli society comprises four main identity groups: Jews who are secular (a category that, in this article, includes traditionalists), ultra-Orthodox (Haredim), religious-Zionists (Modern Orthodox), and Arabs. The three Jewish groups live within a cultural duality: two civilizing suns illuminate their world – traditional-Jewish culture and Western-liberal culture.23 Ostensibly, this cultural duality is potentially enriching for Israeli society – a hidden treasure put to good use. In fact, Israelis experience the contrary – a confrontation between the two that is tantamount to a culture war.24 In the early decades after the creation of Israel, society was characterized by a relatively high level of intra-Jewish consensus. Israelis acted together out of a 20 For further discussion on this point, see: Jabareen, Yousef T.: “The politics of equality: The limits of collective rights litigation and the case of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel,” in: Columbia Journal of Race and Law, 2013/4 (1), pp. 23–54; Jabareen, Yousef T.: “The ArabPalestinian Community in Israel: A Test Case for Collective Rights under International Law,” in: George Washington International Law Review, 2015/47 (3), pp. 449–480. 21 Halperin-Kaddari, Ruth: Women in Israel: A State of Their Own, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2003, pp. 227–261; Maoz Asher: “The Application of Religious Law in a Multi-Religion Nation State: The Israeli Model,” in: Bottoni, Rossella / Cristofori, Rinaldo / Ferrari, Silvio (eds.): Religious Rules, State Law, and Normative Pluralism – A Comparative Overview, Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol. 18, Switzerland: Springer 2016, pp. 209–227. 22 For further discussion on the balance between the Jewish and the democratic components in Israel, see: Rubinstein, Amnon / Yakobson, Alexander: Israel and the family of nations: The Jewish nation-state and human rights, London: Routledge 2008, especially pp. 97–192. See also: Gavison, Ruth: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State: Tensions and Chances, Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad 1999 (in Hebrew). 23 Stern, Yedidia Z.: “Israeli Law and Halakha (Jewish Law) in Israeli Society,” Bar-Ilan Law Studies, 2002/19 (1), pp. 103–142 (in Hebrew). 24 PEW Research Center: Israel’s Religiously Divided Society 2016, Jerusalem, available here: https://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/ [12. 01. 2020].

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covenant of fate that was self-evident in light of the era’s challenges – it was only a few years after the Holocaust and Israel was facing existential security threats. Given these challenges, however, Israelis did not consider it a priority to address the definition of the covenant of destiny – the telos of Israeli sovereignty. In 1967, at the age of nineteen, Israel was bewitched: like the needle prick in the Grimm brothers’ tale of “Sleeping Beauty,” the conquest of Judea and Samaria that many viewed as a “return to the ancient homeland” and the controversy over their future placed Israeli society in a deep civil slumber. The fate of the territories became a black hole that entirely swallowed up the Israeli conversation. The key issue that has occupied Israelis in the last fifty years, for almost threequarters of their sovereign existence, is the future borders of their country.25 The political, ideological, religious, and civil leadership neglects the far more important question: whatever the borders, what state and what society will exist within them? What is the purpose of this shared endeavor and how will it be accomplished? Under the cover of the civil slumber and in the wake of various internal and external processes, the Israeli consensus gradually crumbled and Israel long ago became a democracy in crisis.26 The outcome is bleak: all are pushed into a pugnacious struggle in the market of ideas. In the absence of a serious conversation about a shared Israeli destiny, the public arena is dominated by brash loud voices that gain renown for fanning the controversy. Thus, on the one hand, the zealots of liberal truth who uphold a neutral democratic state that allows no Jewish expression in the public arena, seek to win the culture war and view this victory as a vital rite de passage that the country must undergo on its way to normalcy. In their view, the presence of Judaism in public life corrupts politics, violates human rights, makes rational discourse shallow, and diverts Israel from Zionism’s main course.27 On the other hand, zealots of the Jewish legacy in its religious-Haredi version, who advocate a 25 Waxman, Dov: The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of lsraeli Identity: Defending/Defining the Nation, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, pp. 109–144. See also: Kimmerling, Baruch: “Between the Primordial and the Civil Definitions of the Collective Identity: Eretz Israel or the State of Israel?” In: Kimmerling, Baruch (ed.): Clash of Identities: Explorations in Israeli and Palestinian Societies, New York: Columbia University Press 2008, pp. 85–103. 26 Cohen, Asher / Susser, Baruch: “From Consensus to Majoritarian Politics: The Decline of Israeli Consociationalism,” in: Mautner, Menham & others (eds.): Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State, Tel Aviv: Ramot Publishers 1998, pp. 675–701(in Hebrew); Cohen, Asher / Rynhold, Jonathan: “Social covenants: The solution to the crisis of religion and state in Israel?” Journal of Church and State, 2005/47 (4), pp. 725–745. 27 One of the leading spokesmen of this movement is Dr. Ram Vromen, the founder of the Secular Forum. See for example: Vromen, Ram: “The solution is an Israeli one.” Haaretz, [newspaper, online] 9 Feb. 2017, available here: https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premi um-1.3739020 [25. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew); Vromen, Ram: “How I rediscovered my Zionist Identity.” Haaretz, [newspaper, online] 22 Jan. 2018, available here: https://www.haaretz.co. il/opinions/.premium-1.5750633 [25. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew).

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Jewish state cleansed as far as possible from “alien” democratic influences, view the realization of values from Western culture in Israel as a loss of national identity, a betrayal of Jewish history, and as emptying the national revival of meaning.28 Each side is entrenched within one cultural truth. The price of one side realizing its dream implies a nightmarish reality for the other.29 The continued culture war makes the Israeli common denominator rather shallow, as clearly evident in the Israelis’ attitude toward the state’s definition as Jewish and democratic. We might have assumed that given a choice of three options regarding the state’s character – “a Jewish and democratic state,” a “Jewish state,” or a “democratic state” – the Jewish public in Israel would unequivocally favor the first over the others. Not only does this option fit the definition compelled by Israel’s current constitutional regime but it is also a compromise solution that avoids a clear choice and has both that and that. Surveys, however, reveal different findings. According to The Israeli Democracy Index 2015, only about one quarter of Jews in Israel (26.7 %) preferred the dual definition, while the rest split between those who favor the Jewish component (36.6 %) and those who favor the democratic one (35.3 %). Few years before, in 2010, 48 % preferred the dual definition, so the gap has widened vastly. A breakdown by religiosity levels, according to the subjects’ self-definition, point to sharp inter-group differences: a decisive majority of Haredim (98.1 %) and a large majority of the religious (70.7 %) favor the Jewish component.30 Whereas the 2015 Index asked Jews about their theoretical preference, a later one in 2019 asked them about their evaluation of the actual situation, a judgment on their surrounding reality. What emerged is that only less than a third of them (31 %) held that the Jewish and the democratic component were balanced, whereas 41 % held that the Jewish component defining the state is too strong and 20 % thought that the democratic component was too strong. Here too, the stance of the Haredi sector is prominent, when almost no one in it (6.7 %) viewed the Jewish component as too strong, and approximately two thirds (64 %) held

28 For example, see: Levinstein, Yigal: Our Family: Family values vs. Postmodern Culture, Israel: Bohi Haruakh 2019 (in Hebrew); Karpel, Motti: The Revolution of Faith, Alon-Shevut: Lekhatekhilah 2002 (in Hebrew). 29 Cohen, Asher / Susser, Bernard: Israel and the politics of Jewish identity: The secular-religious impasse, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press 2000; Yadgar, Yaacov: Israel’s Jewish Identity Crisis: State and Politics in the Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020, pp. 78–150. 30 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2015, [written by: Bublil, Dana / Cohen, Chanan / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] available here: https://en.idi.org.il/publi cations/4076 [12. 01. 2020].

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that the democratic component was too strong. Only a minority of Haredim (20.2 %) identified a proper balance between the two components.31 It is important to look at the Arab sector in Israel as well. When they were asked, on a series of topics, which of them constituted a serious existential threat to the country, the factor that was perceived as the most serious threat was the demands to make Israel more Jewish (73 %). Israel’s continued control of the West Bank is only in second place among Arabs who are Israeli citizens (57.5 %).32 When results from the most recent surveys dealing with the country’s character are compared with those of previous years, findings point to a greater polarization – either “Jewish” or “democratic”. The group preferring integration between the two is becoming smaller. Escalating polarization in the future is to be feared, due to the demographic make-up of Israel’s population: while Haredim constitute about 10 % of Israel’s population today and Arabs about 20 %, among first-grade children, these two groups constitute close to 50 % (25 % Arabs; 22 % Haredim) and together with the religious-Zionist group (15 %), they populate close to two-thirds (62 %) of future Israel.33 It merits emphasis that this is not a future projection but an account of the current state of Israel’s young generation. That is, the Israeli groups that are least supportive of integrating Jewish and democratic are those with the highest rates of growth. Should these two trends continue – the antithetical polar preferences of the Haredim and the religious on the one hand and of the Arabs on the other, together with these populations’ high rates of growth – pressures to unstitch the two parts of Israel’s definition as a state will intensify. What are the roots of the identity controversy in Israel that threaten national resilience?

31 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2019, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar], available here: https://en.idi.org.il/ media/13847/summary-the-israeli-democracy-index-2019-en.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. 32 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2016, p. 105, [written by: Bublil, Dana / Cohen, Chanan / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar / Omar, Fadi] available here: https:// www.idi.org.il/media/7799/democracy-index-2016.pdf [09. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew). 33 Haknesset: Research and Information Center: Structure of the Education System, Main Laws and General Data, [Vinigar, Assaf / Zared, Eliran] 2019, available here: https://fs.knesset.gov. il/globaldocs/MMM/2ecddbbb-0556-e911-80e9-00155d0aeebb/2_2ecddbbb-0556-e911-80e900155d0aeebb_11_12477.pdf [25. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew).

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The Vision Controversy

In a constitutive speech he made in 2015, President Reuven Rivlin determined: The demographic processes that are restructuring or redesigning the shape of Israeli society, have, in fact, created a ‘new Israeli order’. A reality in which there is no longer a clear majority, nor clear minority groups. A reality in which Israeli society is comprised of four population sectors, or, if you will, four principal ‘tribes’, essentially different from each other, and growing closer in size. Whether we like it or not, the make-up of the ‘stakeholders’ of Israeli society, and of the State of Israel, is changing before our eyes.34

As mentioned above, these “four tribes” are secularists, Haredim, national-religious, and Arabs. The members of these tribes differ from one another in various ways but, for the current purpose, I will emphasize the fact that they disagree on the State of Israel’s ultimate goals and on the proper interpretation of the Zionist move as a whole. The depth of the controversy and its chronic nature are the central internal threat to the national resilience of the State of Israel. Day-to-day challenges (such as the external security threat) do at times silence the controversy and push it out of active consciousness. In other cases, however, reality fans the controversy, which then surfaces in all its intensity. This is true regarding religion and state issues as well as regarding the future of Judea and Samaria and the peace agreements with the Palestinians. But the ongoing events dictating the fluctuations in the national consensus cannot conceal the crucial fact that there are ideological camps that disagree on the Israeli frame narrative: each one perceives the relationship between the past in exile and the present renewal in unique ways that bluntly contradict the other’s narrative. This article briefly describes the key visions prevalent in each of these four camps, beginning with the intra-Jewish controversy and then adding the Arab camp. Political Zionism succeeded in creating the State of Israel and establishing it as the nation-state of the Jewish people. But what are the features of the Jewish identity that is molding this nation-state? On this matter, the three tribes of Israel’s Jewish society are in fundamental disagreement. Some hold that political Zionism and the State of Israel were solely meant to enable continued Jewish existence as sustained over the last two thousand years in exile. In their view, after the Holocaust, creating a state was required in order to allow for a change in the conditions of the Jews’ lives, but the state entails no message whatsoever about the essence of Jewish existence. Others view the creation of the state as a historical revolution regarding Jewish identity: Jewish 34 Rivlin, Reuven: President Reuven Rivlin Address to the 15th Annual Herzliya Conference: “Israeli Hope: Towards a New Israeli Order,” 7 June 2015, available here: https://www.idc.ac.il/ en/research/ips/Documents/4-Tribes/PresidentSPEECH2015.pdf [12. 01. 2020].

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sovereignty implies a return to history that, to succeed, necessitates the creation of a “new Jew” whose identity differs from that of the exile Jew. These two radical positions characterize the ideological leadership at the time the state was created – Haredim on the one hand and secularists on the other. A third group, religiousZionism, attempts to interpret the success of Zionism through a mid-way course: contrary to the Haredi stance, they do not view the state as a continuation of the exile in the Land of Israel, and contrary to the secular stance, they do not experience it as detached from the Jewish tradition that preceded it. Instead, religious-Zionists ascribe religious value to the creation of Israel and view it as a further layer built on top of the Jewish existence in exile that preserved Judaism as a unique way of life through the practice of tradition. Let us look more closely at this controversy.35 The leaders of political Zionism in the generation of Israel’s creation, headed by David Ben Gurion, held that the success of Zionism required a new Jewish identity that would be uniquely Israeli in its character. They considered the traditional Jewish identity created in exile as an obstacle to the emergence of the brave, pioneering, independent, sovereign Jew. The members of this generation, therefore, launched a “holy rebellion”: a national identity instead of a religious identity; a state organization instead of a communal organization; values of enlightenment and secularism instead of values of holiness and tradition; a modern orientation towards the future instead of an orientation to past memory.36 Since almost all of post-biblical Jewish creativity developed in exile, the proper step is to deliberately renounce its products. The Talmud, Halakhah (Jewish religious law), philosophy, poetry, and all the works filling the shelves of Jewish libraries – were erased. The state’s founders attempted to base Israeli Jewish identity on the historical narrative of the Bible. Everything that happened between King David’s time and David Ben Gurion’s time – the shaping experience of two thousand years – became irrelevant and even an oppressive burden for the nation seeking renewal.37 Haredim, by contrast, did not ascribe any great importance to political Zionism. They did not seek renewal, but continuity. The holy ideal is the “old Jew” and fostering this ideal is the true task of the generation – both inside 35 For discussion on the different faces of Zionism, see: Avineri, Shlomo: The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State, Philadelphia: Basic Books 2017. 36 Almog, Oz: The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew, Berkley: University of California Press 2000. 37 Shapira, Anita: “The Bible and the Israeli Identity,” in: Shapira, Anita (ed.): The Bible and the Israeli Identity, Jerusalem: Magnes Press 2005, pp. 1–36 (in Hebrew); Sagi, Avi: “Religioussecular tensions – Between Rights Discourse and Identity Discoursem,” in: Ilan, Nahem (ed.): A Good Eye: A Jubilee Book in Honor of Tova Ilan, Israel: Hakibutz Hameuhad 1999, pp. 418– 419, p. 408 (in Hebrew).

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and outside Israel. Instead of the cultural revolution sought by the secularists, Haredim sought spiritual evolution. The State of Israel and the independence of the Jews, therefore, are not an aim but merely an instrument for the rebuilding of the Torah civilization destroyed in the Holocaust. The creation of the state is not a turning point in Jewish history and its influence on the quality of Jewish identity and culture is therefore insubstantial.38 These were preserved in changing circumstances from generation to generation in the course of two thousand years of exile and they should continue to be zealously preserved in conditions of Jewish sovereignty, under secular control, in the Land of Israel.39 The third camp, religious-Zionism, views itself as a full partner, with equal rights and obligations, to the political Zionism led by secularists. Like Ben Gurion, religious-Zionism is excited with the innovation of creating a Jewish nationstate and views it as the realization of a longstanding dream. Not only is the state not an “instrument” but, according to many of this group’s ideologues, it is actually a structure endowed with religious value. The secular state is, in their view, a stage in the process of messianic redemption that fulfills the divine promise to return God’s people to their ancient homeland on the way to amend the entire world. At the same time, religious-Zionists, like the Haredim, are committed to all the dimensions of the religious world as it developed over centuries of exile. The cultural heroes of religious-Zionism are the religious leaders of the Jewish people during the course of its history, thoroughly “old Jews” who had been active in Babylon, in Spain, in Ashkenaz, and in all the Jewish diaspora. The continuity between past and present is natural and necessary for them, but so is the desire to participate in the innovations of modernity and act in history as a national-political group. No wonder, then, that theirs is a hyphenated identification – religious-Zionists.40 It is fascinating to discover that all three groups succeeded in realizing their goals: secular political Zionism created the strong, independent, modern, technological State of Israel that, eventually, also became liberal. The State of Israel is unquestionably part of the Western world and, in this sense, it is as “normal,” as Ben Gurion wanted. Yet, Haredim also implemented their plan to flourish within 38 Ravitzky, Aviezer: “The Full Carriage and the Empty One: The Secular Zionist in the Orthodox Thought,” in: Ravitzky, Aviezer: Freedom Inscribed, Israel: Am Oved 1999, pp. 222–257 (in Hebrew). 39 Brown, Benjamin: “The Haredim and the Jewish State,” in: When Judaism Meets State, TelAviv: Chemed Books 2015, pp. 79–269 (in Hebrew). This was also the approach of Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who claimed: “Zionism is not defined or determined by social, moral, or religious values. Moreover, the realization of Zionism affords no guarantee of the actualization of these values.” See: Leibowitz, Yeshayahu: Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1992, pp. 115–117. 40 Schwartz, Dov: Religious-Zionism: History and Ideology, Brighton: Academic Studies Press 2009.

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Israeli society while preserving their self-segregated lifestyle. The state indeed serves, from their perspective, as a successful tool that enables and supports the community’s spiritual and physical development, so that the number of Torah students in Israel today is apparently higher than their numbers at any time in Jewish history. The same is true of religious-Zionism: the movement succeeded in shifting from the periphery of Israeli society to the center and its influence on all areas of action and thought in Israel far exceeds its members’ actual numbers. This is a particularly activist group, involved in all the big questions that occupy the State of Israel to the point that some – in a slight overstatement – view it as Israel’s new hegemony. Lurking behind the relative success of each of these groups in promoting itself and its own goals, however, is the significant threat posed by the absence of consensus regarding the Israeli frame narrative. None of them is satisfied with fostering and preserving their beliefs in a “little patch” of their own within the larger framework of the State of Israel. None of them finds it sufficient that the public space “tolerates” them or even accepts them, in a show of pluralistic openness. Indeed, each one of the bearers of these distinct visions wishes to impose one Israeli frame narrative on all. Each one operates out of a sense of “truth,” of “knowledge” – history is on its side. As a result, no significant efforts have been made in the seventy years of the state to bridge the various visions and these parallel worlds have prevailed, mutually alienated, each one waiting for the moment – which will surely come – that will make it possible to defeat its ideological counterpart. In the past, religious-Zionists and Haredim were cautious about promoting their vision too ambitiously (except on religion and state topics) because the secular hegemony was clear. Today, however, as the demographic facts show and as the “new Israeli order” set by President Rivlin indicates, each one of these groups feels it is a significant part of the society and, therefore, seeks to impose its vision on Israel’s public arena. This is the background of the culture war being waged in Israel in the last decade, a war that has significant potential to harm national resilience. Beside the three narratives of the Jewish tribes, there is also a fourth narrative supported by many among the fifth of Israeli citizens who are Arabs (a number not including the Arabs in Judea and Samaria who are not Israeli citizens). The contents of this narrative can be learned from four documents that were drafted about a decade ago at the initiative of Arab civil organizations. The vision documents deal with the future of the Arab-Palestinian population in Israel and with proposals for changing the character of the State of Israel and its regime.41 41 The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel: “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel,” Adalah.org 2006, available here: https://www.adalah.

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The most prominent among them is the vision of the National Committee for the Heads of the Local Arab Councils in Israel (The High Follow-Up Committee for the Arabs in Israel), which is the most significant non-political body of this sector, and appeared in 2006 as The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. This vision document states, inter alia, that “defining the Israeli State as a Jewish State and exploiting democracy in the service of its Jewishness excludes us, and creates tension between us and the nature and essence of the state.”42 This document, then, entails an absolute negation of the state’s definition as Jewish. Furthermore, according to the document, “Israel is the outcome of a settlement process initiated by the Zionist-Jewish elite in Europe and the west and realized by Colonial countries contributing to it and by promoting Jewish immigration to Palestine, in light of the results of the Second World War and the Holocaust.”43 The leaders who signed this document thus apparently view political Zionism as a tool of European-American colonialism and do not recognize the deep link between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel or, at least, ascribe no meaning to it as a driving force in twentieth-century history. In their view, true equality is unattainable so long as the state favors one national identity – Jewish – over another – Arab. Their demand is that all features of existence in Israel – sovereignty, territory, norms, and symbols – be neutral rather than Jewish. They are not limiting their claim to civil rights equality or to national, cultural, and religious rights as a minority group. They want the Jewish majority to erase its identity at the state level and preserve it only in substate contexts: communities, families, and individuals. Their vision is thus incompatible with any combination of “Jewish and democratic” and strives to shape Israel as a state with a universal character – “a state of all its citizens” in one version, or as a “consensual democracy” in another.44 org/uploads/oldfiles/newsletter/eng/dec06/tasawor-mostaqbali.pdf [12. 01. 2020]; Adalah: The Democratic Constitution 2007, available here: https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/ files/democratic_constitution-english.pdf [12. 01. 2020]; Mossawa Center: Constitution for All? On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in Israel, [written by Yousef T. Jabareen] 2007, available here: http://www.mossawa.org/eng/Public/file/02007%20An%20E qual%20Constitution%20For%20All%20(1).pdf [12. 01. 2020]; Mada Al-Carmel: The Haifa Declaration 2007, available here: https://mada-research.org/en/files/2007/09/haifaenglish.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. 42 The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel: “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel,” p. 5, Adalah.org 2006, available here: https://www. adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/newsletter/eng/dec06/tasawor-mostaqbali.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. 43 Ibid., p. 9. 44 Nevertheless, according to Smooha’s survey, Arabs are ready to take steps in order for the state and Jews to treat them with equality, respect, and trust. Among these steps, almost half of Arab citizens are ready to recognize the Jews’ right to determine the language, culture, symbols, and policy of the state, while recognizing the needs of the Arab citizens; 42.9 % will accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state under the same conditions. See: Smooha,

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In sum, we face a broad-ranged controversy concerning the proper definition of the state: whereas the vision of the Haredi public focuses on its Jewish character, the vision of the Arab public negates this character altogether. These two groups, as noted, are possibly meant to constitute close to half of Israel’s citizens in the next generation. The other two groups – the secular and the religiousZionist one – are willing to accept some combination of “Jewish” and “democratic” but their interpretations of this combination and the proper dosage of each of its two components are entirely different.

5.

Drawing Closer – From Adolescence to Maturity

The description of the controversy surrounding the vision for Israel clarifies the significance of the President’s tribe’s speech: The ‘new Israeli order’ is not a creative sociological differentiation; it is, rather, a reality with far-reaching consequences for our national strength, for the future of us all. (…) But, beyond all this, we must examine the social and moral implications of the ‘new Israeli order’. We must ask ourselves honestly, what is common to all these population sectors? Do we have a shared civil language, a shared ethos? Do we share a common denominator of values with the power to link all these sectors together in the Jewish and democratic State of Israel?45

Observing Israeli society, I have noted inklings of a move bringing the various tribes closer. Still rumbling in the dense Israeli space are four separate monologues that have trouble listening to one another. Nevertheless, it appears to me that the peak of the Israeli controversy is behind us and current trends, from which we can infer about the future, suggest attempts at commonality and cooperation. I do not mean to argue that the tribes have renounced their separate visions, but that life together softens the controversy and the common good becomes clearer to many Israelis. Here too, I present my view regarding each tribe separately. Secularism’s holy rebellion against Jewish tradition is long past its prime. Many secular Jews are uncomfortable and even distressed by the artificial detachment from the Jewish past46 and, therefore, now seek recourse to the troves of Sammy: Still Playing by the Rules – Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2015. Haifa: Pardes 2017, pp. 61–63, available here: https://www.idi.org.il/dataisrael/J0045_StillPlayBy TheRulesIndex2015OfArabJewishRelations_Eng.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. 45 Rivlin, Reuven. President Reuven Rivlin Address to the 15th Annual Herzliya Conference: “Israeli Hope: Towards a New Israeli Order,” 7 June 2015, available here: https://www.idc.ac.il/ en/research/ips/Documents/4-Tribes/PresidentSPEECH2015.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. 46 These are terms coined by Katz, Gideon: To the Core of Secularism: A Philosophical Analysis of Secularism within the Israeli Context, Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi 2011(in Hebrew).

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experience, memory, and meaning of Jewish existence throughout its history. For example, Jews in Israel gladly adopt various traditional practices – Jewish rituals, the Jewish calendar, Jewish symbols, and so forth. It is hard to locate a moving vehicle on Israel’s roads on Yom Kippur; almost everyone celebrates the Passover Seder; 92 % eat apple dipped in honey for Rosh Hashana (The Jewish New Year).47 Furthermore, according to a survey of the Israel Democracy Institute, about 80 % of Jews in Israel report that they are not atheists.48 These and many other facts do not point to a return to religion or to acceptance of the authority of religious law, but rather to the end of the rebellion against tradition and to a sense of feeling “at home” with a connection to the practices of previous generations, which are important for consolidating their identity as Jews – as individuals and as a group. A further indication is the movements of Jewish renewal led by secularists in Israel. Secular elites are busy studying classical sources from the Jewish library: Talmud, philosophy, Kabbalah, and more, to the point that we have today “secular yeshivot” and many gatherings of people interested in “Israeli Judaism.”49 But not only elites: popular Israeli culture reflects a growing interest in texts that Ben Gurion and his contemporaries tried to draw away from. Listening to Israeli radio stations will reveal the popularity of the Psalms, of medieval poetry in the Jewish Golden Age in Spain and of rabbinic homilies – accompanied by contemporary musical arrangements. Singers who are not religious fill halls when singing words that were originally written on parchment, accompanied by electric guitars.50 On the whole, understanding is spreading within Israel’s secular public that an Israeli society lacking a Jewish past and deprived of the culture of previous generations will also lack a future. The identification of Judaism with religion, which secularists do not accept, is replaced by the identification of Judaism with a cultural source, which is indispensable. 47 See: Rosner, Shmuel / Fuchs, Camil: #IsraeliJudaism: Portrait of a Cultural Revolution, Jerusalem: JPPI 2018, pp. 15–46. 48 Pfeffer, Anshel: “Haaretz poll: Most Jews Believe in God but Support Public Transports on Shabbat.” Haaretz 30 Oct. 2019, available here: https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/. premium-MAGAZINE-1.8055976 [15. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew); see: Rosner, Shmuel / Fuchs, Camil: #IsraeliJudaism: Portrait of a Cultural Revolution, Jerusalem: JPPI 2018, pp. 39–40. 49 Sheleg, Yair: The Jewish Renaissance In Israeli Society, Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute 2010. 50 For further discussion on the Israel Judaism cultural shift, see: Rosner, Shmuel / Fuchs, Camil: #IsraeliJudaism: Portrait of a Cultural Revolution, Jerusalem: JPPI 2018. See also: Raz, Carmel: “Tafillalt’s ‘Soulmate’ and the Israeli Piyyut Revival,” in: Davis, Ruth F. (ed.): Musical Exodus: Al-Andalus and Its Jewish Diasporas, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2015, pp. 165–180; Sadras-Ron, Efrat: Secular identification: The case of BINA and its secular yeshiva, Michigan: Michigan State University 2016; Troen, Ilan: “Secular Judaism in Israel,” in: Society, 2016/ 53 (2), pp. 153–162.

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Change is evident in the Haredi group too. True, Haredi rhetoric remains extreme, seeking self-segregation and attempting to preserve a separate and isolated Haredi existence “behind walls of holiness.” Most men still lack a basic general education and wish to study Torah as their central, and even exclusive, pursuit throughout their lives. They do not as yet have a significant share in the bearing of the country’s burden – be it in the army, the society, or the economy – and are engaged in a love-hate relationship with the Zionist project. Below the surface, however, tectonic changes are taking place, symbolizing the start of Haredi society joining the Israeli endeavor on all fronts. About half of the men and more than three-quarters of the women are now going out to work. What had been thought of as “a society of scholars” has turned in recent years into a “society of scholars and workers.”51 Despite the rabbis’ cries that higher education is a spiritual Holocaust “worse than Auschwitz,”52 Haredi men and women in their thousands seek entry at such institutions.53 The trailblazers are already there, and the rest are preparing to enter soon. True, they are far from internalizing liberal values, but the Rubicon has been crossed: Haredim are partners to national decision-making, they identify de facto with the Zionist enterprise, and they are kneaded by Adam Smith’s invisible hand that, within a generation, will spring this poor group to middle-class income levels.54 Despite the rabbis’ opposition, they use the Internet, the information highway, opening up for themselves unknown opportunities of choice that lead to the democratization of their lives, even if in limited levels at this stage. These beginnings mark a potential for continued ongoing changes that will enable a more harmonious integration of the Haredi voice within the Israeli spectrum of identities. No fusion should be expected between them and other Israelis – “the walls of holiness” will not be brought down – but a mixture will emerge.55 51 The Israel Democracy Institute: Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel – Employment, [written by Cahaner, Lee / Malach, Gilad] 2019, available here: https://en.idi.org. il/haredi/2019/?chapter=29393 [12. 01. 2020]. 52 Sharon, Jeremy: “Leading rabbi: Higher education for women more damaging than the Holocaust.” The Jerusalem Post, 6 Dec. 2015, available here: https://www.jpost.com/IsraelNews/Leading-rabbi-Higher-education-for-women-more-damaging-than-the-Holocaust-43 6420 [12. 01. 2020]. 53 The Israel Democracy Institute. Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel – Education, [written by Cahaner, Lee / Malach, Gilad] 2019, available here: https://en.idi.org.il/ haredi/2019/?chapter=29391 [12. 01. 2020]. 54 According to a 2018 survey, 69 % of ultra-orthodox Israelis claimed to be proud to be Israeli and 53 % claimed to feel part of the Israeli public mourning for the fallen in Yom Hazikaron (The Israeli Memorial Day). Raw data of the survey is available on the website www.dataisrael.idi.org.il, survey code U0043, “Modern Ultra-Orthodox”. 55 Rosner, Shmuel / Fuchs, Camil: #IsraeliJudaism: Portrait of a Cultural Revolution, Jerusalem: JPPI 2018, pp. 143–147; Zicherman, Haim: Black Blue-White: A Journey into the Charedi Society in Israel (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot 2014, pp. 333–348; Cahaner, Lee /

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As for religious-Zionism: The Six-Day War that enabled Jews to return to the territories occupied by the House of David’s mythological kingdom was perceived by the members of this group as clear proof that ours is the generation of redemption. Religious-Zionists expected a unidirectional redemptive move and turned to implement it with powerful messianic energy. This was the ideological engine that led religious-Zionism to settle in Judea and Samaria, to assume leadership positions in the public systems, and to become the ferment stirring up Israeli society. And yet, the hope of continuing the redemptive move was disappointed when Israeli governments were forced, after painful struggles, to give up parts of the areas that were conquered (or liberated, in the religious-Zionist version), be it as part of a peace agreement or unilaterally. The settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria is still ongoing, but the central motivation behind it no longer seems to be religious-messianic, as in the past, but driven by national, security, and economic considerations.56 The more messianic trend within this group is declining both quantitatively (only about 6 % of the religious-Zionist camp) and in its influence over the rest of the religious public.57 The threat posed by a redemptive agenda that does not look history in the eye has significantly lessened in recent years. Although the religious-Zionist group can be described as largely supporting the same worldview, right-wing in Israeli terms, it derives its views and preferences from an analysis of the concrete reality supported by its basic conceptions, just like any other group. A “normal” discourse thus becomes possible, even if their understanding of reality and that of other Israelis remains in dispute. Finally, Israel’s Arab citizens: As noted, the vision documents of Israel’s Arab citizens, which were formulated by the group’s political, intellectual, and religious leadership, demand the revocation of Israel’s Jewish character. Many of Israel’s Arab citizens agree with this demand: three-quarters of them do not agree that Israel has a right to be defined as the state of the Jewish people, and 76 % hold that there is no proper balance between the Jewish and the democratic compo-

Zicherman, Haim: Modern Ultra-Orthodox: The Emerging Haredi Middle Class in Israel, Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute 2012, pp. 145–162. 56 The Israel Democracy Institute: The National-Religious Sector in Israel 2014, p. 57, [written by Hermann, Tamar, Academic Director, Guttmann Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research] 2014, available here: https://en.idi.org.il/media/4663/madad-z-english_web.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. 57 The Israel Democracy Institute: The National-Religious Sector in Israel 2014, p. 30, [written by Hermann, Tamar, Academic Director, Guttmann Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research] 2014, available here: https://en.idi.org.il/media/4663/madad-z-english_web.pdf [12. 01. 2020].

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nents and that the former is too strong.58 Beside all these, however, there is evidence of a trend pointing to the surprising integration of Israel’s Arab citizens in Israeli society. A decisive majority (84 %) of this group’s members are optimistic or quite optimistic concerning the future of Israel; most (55 %) are proud or quite proud of being Israelis; and a similar number (52 %) hold that Israelis can rely on other Israelis to help them in times of trouble.59 Only 20 % report fear of the Jews (as opposed to 65 % of Jews who are afraid of the Palestinians living in Judea and Samaria). Their level of trust in the Supreme Court (56 %) and in the IDF (41 %!) is even higher than their level of trust in the High Follow-Up Committee (29 %),60 which wrote the vision document mentioned above. Nevertheless, only 42 % of the Arabs feel part of Israel and its problems (vis-à-vis 83 % of the Jews).61 At the identity level, when asked what the most important identity for them is, Arabs choose the religious identity (29 %), the Israeli (25 %!) and the Arab (24 %). Only a small minority, 12 % of Israel’s Arab citizens, choose Palestinian identity as the most important.62 Going back to the definition of the State of Israel: although Arabs in Israel, as noted, oppose the definition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, this datum should be read in light of the fact that no Palestinian nation-state exists today. Findings show that 87 % of Arabs in Israel support the two-state solution and, should it be implemented and should a Palestinian nation-state come into being, almost all Arabs in Israel (91 %!) would support granting mutual recognition to Palestine and to Israel as the national homes of their peoples.63 All in all, anyone willing to dim the loud voices at the extremes that have taken over the Israeli resonance box to listen instead to midstream voices typical of each of the four sectors making up Israeli society, will find reasons for optimism regarding the shared Israeli future. No, I do not mean that some wondrous deal 58 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2019, p. 162, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella /Hermann, Tamar] 2020, available here: https://www.idi.org. il/media/13846/the-israeli-democracy-index-2019.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. 59 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2016, pp. 69–71, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] 2016, available here: https://en.idi. org.il/media/13847/summary-the-israeli-democracy-index-2019-en.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. 60 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2019, p. 44, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] 2020, available here: https://www.idi.org. il/media/13846/the-israeli-democracy-index-2019.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. 61 Ibid., p. 38. 62 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2016, p. 78, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] 2016, available here: https://en.idi.org.il/ media/13847/summary-the-israeli-democracy-index-2019-en.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. 63 The Israel Democracy Institute: Referendum: An Israeli-Palestinian Survey, [poll conducted by: Hermann, Tamar / Shikaki, Khalil] 2016, available here: https://www.idi.org.il/media/4325 /%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%90%D7%99-%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%A8-%D7%9E%D 7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D.pdf [12. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew).

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can be envisioned that will release us from the controversy over the territories and awaken us from civil slumber. Unfortunately, such a scheme is not truly feasible in the foreseeable future. There are shadows splintering Israeli national resilience and I do not mean to blunt them. But the facts show that the sense of a social and identity rift is unjustified. Quite the contrary, the general drift suggests that the Israeli controversy is currently abating. The internal discourse within the various segments appears to be moving toward the center and the spin of the centrifuges distancing Israelis from one another is slowing down in its destructive course. This is promising news for Israel’s national resilience.

6.

Conclusion

When asked how they are, Israelis most often respond, “personally, just fine.” This is a dual statement, not only about their personal feelings but also, by implication, about the public general situation. Similarly, The Israeli Democracy Index 2019 found that three-quarters of Israelis report that their personal situation is good or very good.64 And yet, the general sense in the country is that shared existence is “stuck,” that the “togetherness” is flawed. For years, a sense of gloom has been quite pervasive, a mood of sourness, discouragement, a sense of self-criticism and having missed out. The Zionist project, as it were, has lost energy and is now caught in tangles that obstruct it and confuse its general direction. This intuition characterizes not only the Israeli left but the Israeli majority, as well as many on the right. In this article, I have tried to show that these feelings originate in the Israelis’ subjective perceptions concerning the worthy vision for Israeli society. The four sectors of Israeli society are in dispute as to the legitimacy of the state’s definition as “Jewish and democratic” and as to its meaning. Is this surprising? Not necessarily. Before the creation of Israel, Jews lived in communities spread out throughout the world without being asked to bear full responsibility for any public area. Jews in exile, therefore, were not required, as Jews, to make decisions on subjects beyond their family and their community circles. Their geographic spread did not compel them to shape a joint life as Jews and, in exile, diverse Jewish identities could thus coexist without any need to choose between them. The success of political Zionism and the creation of Israel posed a dual challenge to Jews, new in their history. First, the Jewish nation-state 64 The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2019, p. 177, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] 2020, available here: https://www.idi.org. il/media/13846/the-israeli-democracy-index-2019.pdf [09. 01. 2020].

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is a central arena for sustaining Jewish life where Jews bear political responsibility, are the cultural hegemony, administer the public space, and allocate public products to Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. The Jews’ transition from community life to state life dramatically broadened their field of action as Jews. Second, the political framework compels a shared decision-making process, the results of which are binding for everyone. Adaptation to these two innovations cannot take place in haste, and Israel’s absorption of about half of the Jewish people within a few decades does not make adaptation to sovereign life any easier. Nevertheless, a process has become evident throughout the last decade bringing the consciousness and the practices of people belonging to the central identity groups in Israeli society closer to one another. The struggles of recent decades may have been signs of society going through the hurdles of adolescence, resembling events in the soul and identity of the maturing individual, while the current process of drawing near denotes the transition from adolescence to maturity, whose welcome result has been the strengthening of Israel’s national resilience.

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Stern, Yedidia Z.: “Israel: Jewish, Democratic, and Resilience? On Competing Visions of Israel,” in: Cohen, Stuart/ Klieman, Aharon (eds.): Handbook on Israeli security, Routledge 2019. Stern, Yedidia Z.: “Israeli Law and Halakha (Jewish Law) in Israeli Society,” in: Bar-Ilan Law Studies, 2002/19 (1), pp. 103–142 (in Hebrew). Susser, Baruch / Cohen, Asher: “From Consensus to Majoritarian Politics: The Decline of Israeli Consociationalism,” in: Mautner, Menham & others (eds.): Multiculturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State, Tel Aviv: Ramot Publishers 1998, pp. 675–701 (in Hebrew). Troen, Ilan: “Secular Judaism in Israel,” in: Society, 2016/53 (2), pp. 153–162. Walzer, Michael: Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality, New York: Basic Books 1983. Walzer, Michael: “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” in: Political Theory, 1990/ 18 (1) pp. 6–23. Kochen, Madeline / Lorberbaum, Menachem / Walzer, Michael / Zohar, Noam J. (eds.): The Jewish Political Tradition, New Haven: Yale University Press 2000–2018. Waxman, Dov: The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of lsraeli Identity: Defending/Defining the Nation, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, pp. 109–144. Zicherman, Haim: Black Blue-White: A Journey into the Charedi Society in Israel, Tel-Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot 2014 (in Hebrew).

Internet Sources Adalah: The Democratic Constitution 2007, available here: https://www.adalah.org/uploads/ oldfiles/Public/files/democratic_constitution-english.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. Data Israel, survey code U0043, “Modern Ultra-Orthodox”, available here: www.dataisrael. idi.org.il. Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, official text 1948, available here: https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide /pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20f%20state%20of%20israel.aspx [09. 01. 2020]. Haknesset: Research and Information Center: Structure of the Education System, Main Laws and General Data, [by Vinigar, Assaf / Zared, Eliran] 2019, available here: https:// fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/2ecddbbb-0556-e911-80e9-00155d0aeebb/2_2ecdd bbb0556-e911-80e9-00155d0aeebb_11_12477.pdf [25. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew). Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Defence Expenditure In Israel 1950–2017, [written by Ram Ben David] July 2019, available here: https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/ DocLib/2019/1758/e_print.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. The Israel Democracy Institute: The National-Religious Sector in Israel 2014, [written by Tamar Hermann, Academic Director, Guttmann Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research] 2014, available here: https://en.idi.org.il/media/4663/madad-z-english_web. pdf [12. 01. 2020]. The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2015, [written by: Bublil, Dana / Cohen, Chanan / Heller / Ella Hermann, Tamar] available here: https://en.idi.org.il/ media/3585/democracy_index_2015_eng.pdf [12. 01. 2020].

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The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2016, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] 2016, available here: https://en.idi. org.il/media/13847/summary-the-israeli-democracy-index-2019-en.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2016, [written by: Bublil, Dana / Cohen, Chanan / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar / Omar, Fadi] available here: https:// www.idi.org.il/media/7799/democracy-index-2016.pdf [09. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew). The Israel Democracy Institute: Referendum: An Israeli-Palestinian Survey, [poll conducted by: Hermann, Tamar / Shikaki, Khalil] 2016, available here: https://www.idi. org.il/media/4325/%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%90%D7%99-%D7%A1%D7%A7 %D7%A8-%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C-%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9 D.pdf [12. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew). The Israel Democracy Institute: Israeli Democracy Index 2019, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] available here: https://www.idi.org. il/media/13846/the-israelidemocracy-index-2019.pdf [09. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew). The Israel Democracy Institute: 2019 Israeli Democracy Index, [written by: Anabi, Or / Cubbison, William / Heller, Ella / Hermann, Tamar] available here: https://en.idi.org.il/ media/13847/summary-the-israelidemocracy-index-2019-en.pdf [09. 01. 2020]. The Israel Democracy Institute: Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel – Education, [written by Cahaner, Lee / Malach, Gilad] 2019, available here: https://en.idi. org.il/haredi/2019/?chapter=29391 [12. 01. 2020]. Mada Al-Carmel: The Haifa Declaration 2007, available here: https://madaresearch.org/en/ files/2007/09/haifaenglish.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. Mossawa Center: Constitution for All? On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in Israel. [written by Jabareen, Yousef T.] 2007, available here: http://www. mossawa.org/eng/Public/file/02007%20An%20Equal%20Constitution%20For%20All% 201).pdf [12. 01. 2020]. The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel: “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel,” Adalah.org 2006, available here: https:// www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/newsletter/eng/dec06/tasawor-mostaqbali.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. PEW Research Center: Israel’s Religiously Divided Society 2016, Jerusalem, available here: https://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/ [12. 01. 2020]. Pfeffer, Anshel: “Haaretz poll: Most Jews Believe in God but Support Public Transports on Shabbat.” Haaretz, [newspaper online] 30 Oct. 2019, available here: https://www. haaretz.co.il/news/education/.premiumMAGAZINE-1.8055976 [15. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew). Rivlin, Reuven. President Reuven Rivlin Address to the 15th Annual Herzliya Conference: “Israeli Hope: Towards a New Israeli Order,” 7 Jun. 2015, available here: https://www.idc. ac.il/en/research/ips/Documents/4-Tribes/PresidentSPEECH2015.pdf [12. 01. 2020]. Sharon, Jeremy: “Leading rabbi: Higher education for women more damaging than the Holocaust,” The Jerusalem Post, 6 Dec. 2015, available here: https://www.jpost.com/ Israel-News/Leading-rabbi-Highereducation-for-women-more-damaging-than-theHolocaust-436420 [12. 01. 2020]. Smooha, Sammy: Still Playing by the Rules – Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2015, Haifa: Pardes 2017, available here: https://www.idi.org.il/dataisrael/J0045_StillPlayBy TheRulesIndex2015OfArabJewishRelations_Eng.pdf [09. 01. 2020].

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Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law): Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-State October 2001, available here: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-INF(2001) 019-e [10. 01. 2020]. Vromen, Ram: “The solution is an Israeli one.” Haaretz, [newspaper, online] 09 Feb. 2017, available here: https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.3739020 [25. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew). Vromen, Ram: “How I rediscovered my Zionist Identity.” Haaretz, [newspaper, online] 22 Jan. 2018, available here: https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.5750633 [25. 01. 2020] (in Hebrew).

Eli Salzberger1

Israel at 70: The Relations Between Religion and State, Democracy, and the Israeli Legal System

Abstract The article focuses on state-religion relationships in Israel in comparative perspective, using three main frameworks. The first is the constitutional/formal categorization, according to which Israel, like most central European countries is a multi-religions state (as opposed to a one official religion states and countries with separation between religion and state). The second, the degree of freedom of religion, in which Israel ranks high, and the third, freedom from religion, in which Israel ranks poorly. The main problem vis-à-vis freedom from religion in Israel is personal status law, which delegates the power to handle marriages, divorces and other personal statute issues to religious courts employing religious law. A second major problem is the Sabbath policies, especially the lack of public transportation on Saturday, and more generally the enforcement of Jewish law on the public sphere. The paper describes the various laws in these fields. Also addressed is the meaning of Israel as the “state of the Jews” (rather than “a Jewish state”) and its impact on the state-religion relationship. The Israeli situation is unique as lack of sufficient freedom from religion in fact violates the liberty of the secular majority of Israelis, in contrast to other countries in which the minority rights are violated as result of state-religion relationships. The first part of the paper celebrates Israel’s 70 years of uninterrupted democracy, which places it within a very small club of 20 countries. The last part of the paper discusses the erosion of democracy and the rule of law, and the rise of populism and nationalist-religious politics and rhetoric in Israel during the last decade. These developments also have a significant impact on the topic of the article – the status of religion and religious institutions vis-à-vis the state, bringing Israel further apart from a multi-religions state towards a one religion state.

1 I wish to thank my research assistants Nikol Vaisman and Shahar Shwartzman.

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Evaluating Israel at 70: An Introduction

Israel celebrated its 70th birthday in May 2018, and from a broad historical view and using a wide focus this is a reason for celebration and pride. Given the opening settings and external circumstances, the achievements of the state of Israel in its 70 years of existence are unprecedented. Prime focus is given to Israel’s achievements in the fields of security and the economy. Although Israel began its life as a fully legitimate new sovereign state, ratified by a United Nations resolution, it was attacked immediately by a broad coalition of Arab armies and Palestinians militias. David Ben Gurion made the declaration of independence in Tel Aviv because Jerusalem was under full siege. The country’s 600,000 Jews, many of whom had just survived the holocaust or lost their families to it, were fighting for their lives against the combined forces of several Arab armies and Palestinian militias. One in every 100 Jews – men, women and children – was killed in that “War of Independence.” Twenty years later, as a child in divided Jerusalem, I remember the weeks before the 1967 war (the waiting period), when we filled up sandbags to protect our house from Jordanian mortars. People were really uncertain of whether they would survive, whether Israel would survive. Today, despite occasional rockets from Gaza and Lebanon, despite attempts by terror groups to attack the heart of Israel, and despite the threat of long-range nuclear missiles from Iran, Israelis no longer fear an immediate existential threat. Israel is now a powerful country, a regional super-power, which can effectively defend itself. Young Israel was an extremely poor country, and in its first decade, austerity was the most frequent economic vocabulary. About a decade ago Israel was admitted to the prestigious club of the advanced economies – the OECD. Its economy is booming, and the Israeli Shekel has been one of the strongest world currencies in the past few years. It currently ranks 22nd in the Human Development Index,2 and 24th in GDP per person,3 although inequality in Israel, which was one of the most equal democracies until the 1980s, has increased sharply.4 The number of Israeli companies traded in the New York stock exchange is the second highest among non-American companies. The little country of less than 2 The Economist – World in figures: Human development index: highest 2017, [source: UN Human Development Report], available here: https://worldinfigures.com/rankings/index/52 [15. 04. 2020]. 3 The Economist – World in figures: Highest GDP per person 2017, [sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook & others] available here: https://worldinfigures.com/rankings/topic/9 [15. 04. 2020]. 4 World Bank, Development Research Group: GINI Index (World Bank estimate) 1967–2018, available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?most_recent_value_desc= false [15. 04. 2020].

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10 million souls is today one of the world’s top targets for international research and development investment. Its citizens, both Jews and Arabs, enjoy the 10th highest life expectancy rate in the world.5 This besieged society is number ten on the Economist’s world innovation index measuring business and research creativity.6 Israel’s achievements in the realm of culture, science and arts are, by no means, less impressive. The revival of the Hebrew language has no historical parallels. Today, more people around the world speak Hebrew as their major language, than those people who speak Austrian German. The export of Israeli literature, cinema, music and visual arts to the world is impressive according to every standard. Israel is on the frontier of scientific research both in theoretical and applied sciences. Its high-tech industry is one of the world’s leading industries. Despite all these accomplishments, I think that the most impressive achievement of Israel, which has been hardly discussed until recently because it was viewed as natural and fore-granted, is Israel’s success to establish and maintain an uninterrupted democracy from its establishment in 1948. And when I talk about democracy, I refer not only to a thin democracy, in which free elections are held periodically, but to a thick, liberal democracy, in which people enjoy basic freedoms. World analysts in 1948 were giving the Jewish state less than 50 % chances of surviving its first and bloodiest military ordeal. The young Israel was tiny in size and population, desperately poor in its economic capacities, short on technology, a deeply traumatized residue of a decimated people. Yet, David Ben Gurion stood there, barely 160 cm tall, and in his authoritative, yet non-radiophonic voice, read out the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (the Declaration of Independence) that was, and still is, one of the most liberal and humane constitutional documents of modern times. He vowed to create a true parliamentary democracy, a moderate and cultured society that will guarantee full and equal civil rights to all its citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, gender or religion; a state that will protect freedom of religion and safeguard the holy places of all religions. This declaration was signed unanimously by all members of the Interim State Council, representing the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox parties, on one extreme of the political map, and the Communist party, on the other extreme. This consensual declaration is the real Israeli constitution; but

5 United Nations Development Programme – Human Development Reports: 2019 Human Development Index Ranking, available here: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-devel opment-index-ranking [15. 04. 2020]. 6 Global Innovation Index (GII) 2019: Israel [Cornell University, INSEAD, and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)], available here: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pub docs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019/il.pdf [15. 04. 2020].

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unfortunately, today we witness initiatives by Israel’s government to undermine or change this credo. In a similar way to the Israelis’ natural attitude to the existence of a democratic political system, so do we relate to our day-to-day sense of freedom. The Israeli public sphere is a real market of ideas. The variety and intensity of the public discourse in Israel, and the freedom to criticize the authorities, are almost unprecedented around the globe. Even in the European heart of liberal democracy, the variety of opinions expressed on major media platforms is more limited than the variety of opinions of the public at large, due to self-censorship and more restrictive legal principles regarding freedom of speech.7 A decade ago, an important magazine – The Economist – published a book review on the new English translation of a novel by Yizhar Smilansky, written in 1949, in which the author expresses harsh criticism against the conduct of Israeli soldiers towards Palestinian civilians during the 1948 Independence War. The Economist’s reviewer was astonished to find out that the novel has been included for many years in the obligatory materials for the matriculation exam in literature in Israel.8 The club of countries that managed to maintain uninterrupted democracy (in its narrow definition) in the last 70 years is very small, smaller than the OECD club. It includes less than a tenth of the world countries.9 Most of the EU members are not part of this club, and I refer not only to the East and Central European countries, which were ruled by Communism until 1989, but also to countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. Israel is the only country established after WWII belonging to this exclusive club. The Israeli liberal democracy is far from being perfect. There are important areas in which it is crippled or flawed.10 More than 50 years of occupation and military rule of the West Bank is a major threat to Israeli democracy, and this occupation and military rule bares also indirect poisoning effects on Israel’s property. This paper will not deal with these deficiencies, but, as derived from the theme of the conference and its gracious hosts, will focus (Section 2) on the relationships between religion and state and freedom of religion in Israel, which 7 Salzberger, Eli / Oz-Salzberger, Fania: “The Tradition of Freedom of Speech in Israel,” in: Law, Society and Culture 2006, pp. 27–70, available here: http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/documents/ The%20Tradition%20of%20Freedom%20of%20Speech%20in%20Israel.pdf [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). 8 See: “The Good Soldier,” available here: https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2008/ 04/10/the-good-soldier [15. 04. 2020]. However, with the rise of nationalism and populism in Israel, the book disappeared from the matriculation exam materials. 9 In 1948, the year Israel was established, there were only 21 democracies. See: Roser, Max: “Democracy,” published online at OurWorldInData.org 2020, [online resource] available here: https://ourworldindata.org/democracy [15. 04. 2020]. 10 Indeed, according to The Economist Intelligence Unit, Israel is currently ranked 28th in the Democracy Index 2019, see: https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index [15. 04. 2020].

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can be perceived also as one of Israel’s weaknesses vis-à-vis liberal democracy. But paradoxically, unlike common deficiencies of democracies, it primarily affects not the rights of the minorities, but rather the rights of the secular Israeli majority. In the past several years we have witnessed in Israel a rapid deterioration of liberal democracy, and in this context, I am afraid that sadly, several countries, including Austria, follow us on this path. Section 3 of the paper will relate to these worrying developments and conclude.

2.

The relationship between Religion and State and Freedom of Religion in Israel in theoretical and comparative perspectives

2.1

The relations between state and religion: A formal approach

Characterizing the relationships between state and religion and where Israel is located in this context is contingent upon the theoretical paradigm one adopts for such an analysis. Formalist-positivist jurists and political scientists distinguish between three models of state-religion relationship: states with one official religion, multi religions states, and states with separation between religion and state.11 The first category includes theocracies, such as Iran, but also countries, such as Greece, the UK and some of the Scandinavian states, in which there is one official religion (and indeed in constitutional monarchies the head of state is also the head of the official religion/church).12 The USA and France are the prime examples for the separation model, which is usually entrenched by a constitutional norm indicating that the state is secular or does not adopt any recognized or official religion or religions. Most European countries (among them Germany, Austria and Switzerland) adopt a third model – the multi-religions one, which is also dubbed a cooperative model, reflecting strong ties between the state and several religions. According to this model, the state recognizes several official religions, might financially support them and in some of these countries the clergymen of the recognized religions are regarded as part of the civil service and a choice of religious classes is offered in school. Some of these countries, such as Germany, even collect religious tax, which is forwarded to the relevant religious institutions. 11 For a comprehensive survey see: Soper, Christopher/ Fetzer, Joel S.: Religion and Nationalism in Global Perspective, Cambridge: University Press 2015. 12 Sweden moved in 2000 from the one religion to the separation model. See: Sveriges Riksdag: The Constitution of Sweden. The Fundamental Laws and the Riksdag Act 2016, available here: https://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/07.-dokument-lagar/the-constitution-of-sweden-160 628.pdf.

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One might be surprised that according to this veteran categorization, Israel belongs to the multi-religions model. The Israeli arrangement originates from the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Palestine for 400 years (1517–1917), where autonomy was granted to recognized religious communities to handle their internal affairs, including the personal status matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance etc.) of their individual members. This was called the “Millet system.”13 British rule, which succeeded the Ottomans (1917–1948), preserved this arrangement. On the basis of Article 83 of the Palestine Order in Council (the “constitution” during the British Mandate) The Religious Community Act was legislated in 1926, empowering the Government to recognize religious communities, and granting adjudication powers in personal status matters to the religious courts of these communities.14 Israel inherited this legislative framework and currently 14 religious communities are recognized in Israel, including the Moslems, the Druze and numerous Christian denominations. The last two religions to be recognized by the Israeli Government in 1970 and 1971 were the Evangelist-Episcopal church and the Bahai community. Hence, Israel can be classified as a multi-religions state. The formalist framework of state-religion relationship is far from being a comprehensive paradigm to analyze state-religion relationship. First, it does not relate or correlate with the degree of freedom of religion. While the UK is a onereligion state, the degree of religious freedom there is very high,15 Turkey, in which there is a constitutional separation between religion and state, religious freedoms are squatter.16 Likewise, freedom of religion and from religion differ significantly among multi-religion states. In Israel, as will be elaborated later, while freedom of religion (the freedom to exercise one’s religious beliefs and practices) is high, freedom from religion (the freedom by religious norms) is low.

13 Aviv, Efrat: “Millet System in the Ottoman Empire.”Oxford Bibliographies, available here: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-978019539 0155-0231.xml [15. 04. 2020], Oxford: University Press 2016. 14 Article 51(1) of the Palestine Order in Council states: “Subject to the provisions of Articles 64 to 67 inclusive Jurisdiction In Matters Of Personal Status Shall Be Exercised In Accordance With The Provisions Of This Part By The Courts Of The Religious Communities. For The Purpose Of These Provisions Matters Of Personal Status Mean Suits Regarding Marriage Or Divorce, Alimony, Maintenance, Guardianship, Legitimation Of Minors, Inhibition From Dealing With Property Of Persons Who Are Legally Incompetent, And The Administration Of The Property Of Absent Persons.” 15 Weller, Paul: “Religious Minorities and freedom of Religion or Belief in the UK,” in: Religion and Human Rights, 2018/13, pp. 76–109. 16 As can be evident from Article 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. See: United States Department of State: Turkey 2018 International Religious Freedom Report 2018, available here: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/TURKEY-2018-INTER NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf [15. 04. 2020].

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Second, the formal constitutional dichotomy does not reveal what is the law in action, as opposed to the law in the books. It does not indicate whether all recognized religions in a multi-religions state get equal treatment and funding, which is not the case in Israel. It does not reveal the actual effects of religion on politics and policies. For example, the US is the prime case for the separation model and the courts enforce this constitutional article (the First Amendment of the Establishment clause) very diligently. However, the actual role religion plays in American politics, policies and society is arguably more significant than in many of the multi-religion states (the attitudes towards abortions is a good example in hand, but also the wording “In God we trust” that appears on every bank note). In addition, there is no necessary correlation between the constitutional role of religion and the actual religiosity of the population, which is bound to have an effect on the importance of religious considerations in politics and law. The range of religiosity around the world countries differs from 99 % (in Bangladesh and Niger) to 16 % in Estonia and Sweden, the most secular countries. Thus, while in some of the Scandinavian countries, including the one religion states, less than 20 % of the population define themselves as religious, in the US, the country of separation between church and state, this figure is above 65 %. Interestingly, in Israel, just 51 % of the people define themselves as religious (and among the Jewish population the figure is below 50 %), and in this respect, Israel is among a group of European countries in which about half the population defines itself as religious (40 % in Germany, 55 % in Austria).17 Returning to the formal three categories of state-religion relations, in the particular case of Israel one might ask: how can the Jewish State be defined as a multi-religions state? Well, the answer is that Israel is not a Jewish state, but rather the nation state of the Jewish people, and thus its Jewishness refers to nationhood rather than to religion. This was the notion used by the founders of Zionism,18 and also expressed in the Declaration of Independence, which opens with the words “The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books” (although later in the declaration the term “Jewish state” is mentioned, it should be understood in this context). This was also the Approach of the Israeli Supreme Court in interpreting the Law of Return 1951, which grants an automatic right to immigrate to Israel and citizenship to all Jews. This law is meant theoretically to be the only legal dis17 These figures are taken from a 2009 Gallop poll: “Religiosity Highest in World’s Poorest Nations.” Gallup, 31 Aug. 2010, [by Crabtree, Steve] available here: https://news.gallup.com/ poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx [15. 04. 2020]. 18 Herzl’s famous 1886 book was entitled Der Judenstaat – The State of the Jews.

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crimination between Jews and non-Jews, and it can be justified on the bases of a history of persecution against Jews elsewhere and the main manifestation of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. But who is a Jew for that purpose? The Law of Return did not provide a definition, and the question was put forward to the Supreme Court in 1962, in the famous Rufeisen case. Daniel Rufeisen was born as a Jew in Poland before WWII. During the war he found refuge in a Catholic convent and converted to Catholicism, although he risked his life several times in order to save fellow Jews. After the war he expressed his desire to immigrate to Israel on the basis of the Law of Return, but his application was rejected by the Minister of the Interior. The Supreme Court, by a majority decision, rejected his appeal, despite the fact that according to Jewish law, a Jew is a person born to a Jewish mother and conversion does not alter his classification as a Jew. By rejecting the appeal, the majority judges ruled that for the purpose of the Law of Return, a Jew should be interpreted not on the basis of religious definition, but on the basis of nationhood.19 To summarize, Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people can coincide with its categorization as a multi-religions state. However, as will be explored in the next section, its Jewish character bears on state-religion relationships, and one of the features of liberal democracy deterioration in Israel is an attempt by the current government to shift Israel’s identity from the state for the Jewish people to a Jewish state.

2.2

Freedom of and from Religion in Israel

Freedom of religion is the positive freedom to worship one’s religious practices and beliefs. It cannot be absolute as one’s religious freedom can clash with another’s religious freedom. Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court is often called to adjudicate disputes between different religious communities, be it regarding worshiping in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (disputes between different Christian denominations),20 or disputes regarding worshiping in the Temple Mount (clashes between Moslems and Jews),21 or worshiping in the Wailing Wall 19 HCJ 72/62, Rufeisen v Minister of the Interior, 1962/16 (4) PD 2428. See also: Fisher, Netanel / Shilon, Avi: “Integrating Non-Jewish Immigrants and the Formation of Israel’s Ethnic-Civil Nationhood: From Ben-Gurion to the Present,” in: Middle Eastern Studies, 2016/53 (2), p. 166. 20 E. g. LCA 8703/12, Albudiri v. The Orthodox Coptic Mutant of the Holy See in Jerusalem and the Middle East, available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/11087030-k05.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). 21 E. g. HCJ 2697/04, Solomon v. Commander of the Jerusalem District, IsrSC 58 (4), 572 (2004), available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/0402697-padi.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew).

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(disputes between different Jewish denominations).22 Freedom of religion cannot be absolute also because it might clash with other values, moral principles and rights, such as the right to dignity and the right to equal treatment, and more generally, the right to liberty. Freedom from religion is the freedom not to be bound by religious norms and institutions. It derives from the right to liberty and other basic rights. The nature of most religions is that they are inherently interested to enforce individuals (who are considered to be of the same religion, or, for some religions, even those from other religions) to conduct themselves according to their norms. Freedom from religion cannot be absolute too, as some practices like a weekly day of rest, should be coordinated on the collective level, thus infringing some individuals’ liberty to detach themselves from any religious practices or symbols. Had secularity (or atheism) been considered as a “religion”, freedom of religion and freedom from religion would have merged. In the Declaration of Independence, Israel vowed to respect basic rights, including freedom of religion. The Declaration states: “THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”23 Indeed, the positive freedom to worship one’s religion – freedom of religion – is effectively safeguarded in Israel, and in this respect, Israel might even score better than some European countries which ban religious practices or symbols, or religious artifacts in public places (e. g. bourka), or impose different limitations on religious prayer practices or houses (e. g. limiting mosques’ minarets).24 All these are allowed and accepted in Israel, although a legislative initiative, belonging to the nationalistic and anti-liberal era Israel is undergoing (see

22 E. g. HCJ 2410/90, Hoffman v. Director of the Western Wall, IsrSC 48 (2), 265 (1994) (in Hebrew), English translation available here: https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/hoffmanv-director-western-wall [15. 04. 2020]. 23 “Full Text of Israel’s Proclamation of Independence Issued in Tel Aviv,” available at: The Jewish Telegraphic Agency 1948, available here: https://www.jta.org/1948/05/16/archive/fulltext-of-israels-proclamation-of-independence-issued-in-tel-aviv [15. 04. 2020]. 24 Conseil fédéral Suisse: “Message relatif à l’initiative populaire ‘contre la construction de minarets’” 2008, available here: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2008/6923.pdf (in French); The Associated Press 2011: “Veiled women arrested at Paris protest,” CBC, 11 Apr. 2011, available here: https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/veiled-women-arrested-at-parisprotest-1.1004020 [15. 04. 2020].

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next section), to limit the sound of the Muezzin (Moslem call for prayer, which utilizes load speakers from mosques) was put forward, so far without success. However, Israel scores much lower in the realm of freedom from religion, i. e. one’s freedom not to be bound by religious rules and institutions. This is the consequence of two main factors: inheriting the Ottoman Millet system, and the increasing religious direction to which politicians are navigating the meaning and practices of a “Jewish state.” The Ottoman doctrine – granting religious communities the power to regulate personal status matters according to their religious rules and institutions – could have been considered progressive at the time adopted, but today it is the source of one of the major deficiencies vis-a-vis human rights. Jurisdiction in all marriages and divorces and related matters are granted to religious courts governed by their respective religious norms (save divorces of mixed couples, which is in the jurisdiction of the general courts). This means that there are no civil marriages in Israel and no mixed marriages. Israelis who want to get married civilly can do that outside Israel, and the state is obliged to recognize such marriage. But if a Jewish couple, even married abroad, wants to get divorced, they cannot avoid the Rabbinical courts. This arrangement violates the freedom of people not to be subjected to religious rules and tribunals and conflicts with various other rights. The religious tribunals are subject to basic principles, such as gender equality and due process, which are enforced by the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice.25 This arrangement maintains constant tensions between the religious tribunals, especially the Jewish Rabbinical courts, and the Supreme Court, which intervenes in religious proceedings when basic rights are deemed infringed, reflecting these tensions in the political and social realms.26 In addition, while numerous Christian denominations are officially recognized in Israel, for Jews, only one stream is recognized – the orthodox one. Special legislation established the Chief Rabbinate and national and local councils to provide religious services for Jews, and these are comprised by orthodox Jews. Reform and Conservative Jewish communities, which form the majority of the Jewish world outside Israel, are not officially recognized, and their members have to seek the 25 On the basis of a broad interpretation of the Supreme Court of Article 15 (d) (4) of Basic Law: The Judiciary, which empowers the Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice “to order religious courts to hear a particular matter within their jurisdiction or to refrain from hearing or continue hearing a particular matter not within their jurisdiction, provided that the court shall not entertain an application under this paragraph is the applicant did not raise the question of jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity; and if he had no measurable opportunity to raise the question of jurisdiction until a decision had been given by a religious court, the court may quash a proceeding taken or a decision given by the religious court without authority.” 26 E. g. HCJ 1000/92, Bavli v. The Great Rabbinical Court-Jerusalem, IsrSC 48 (2), 221, available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/padi-ng-2-221-l.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew).

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orthodox rabbinical courts, as secular Jews. As the majority of Israeli Jews define themselves as secular, this arrangement in fact violates the basic rights of the majority not to be bound by orthodox Jewish institutions and norms or freedom from religion. In some areas of religious services, such as burial, reform towards more freedom of religion took place following public and political pressure. Thus, in 1996, the Right to Alternative Civil Burial Law was enacted, ordering the state to establish non-religious cemeteries.27 However, the implementation of the law has been partial (too few such cemeteries were established) and brought the Supreme Court to intervene to secure its proper application.28 In the crucial areas of marriages and divorces, the political powers of the orthodox parties has prevented any significant change, and most Israelis regard this as the prime violation of their rights.29 A second area in which freedom from religion is violated is connected to religious practices in the public sphere and public institutions, and especially Sabbath policies. It is only natural that Saturday is the official weekly rest day in Israel, as Sunday is the official rest day in countries where Christianity is (or had been) the dominant religion of the population. This was formally stated in the first law enacted by Israel Interim Council in 1948 – the Law and Administration Ordinance (Section 18a). But the question is: what does this entail? And because of the Jewish religious restrictions on Sabbath (e. g. prohibition to drive or operate any mechanical tool), Saturday laws and policies in Israel are different from typical Sunday laws in other countries, and they bring about greater violation of freedom from religion and constant tensions between Jewish orthodoxy which want to enforce religious restrictions of the public sphere on Saturday and the majority of people who want to conduct various activities on their day of rest. The most controversial element regarding Saturday policies is that public transportation does not work in most areas in Israel on Saturday. The origins of this policy, which is not anchored in any legislation, dates back to an agreement made by David-Ben Gurion and the orthodox parties at the eve of Israel’s independence, according to which the status quo existed during the British rule will be maintained. Thus, for example, in Haifa, as a mixed city, public transportation operates on Saturday, but in all Jewish localities there is no public transportation on Saturday and this is true also to inter-city routes. Trains do not operate on 27 The Right to Alternative Civil Burial Law, 1996–5756, IsrBL 249, available here: https://www. nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/p200m3_001.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). 28 CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Chevra Kadisha GHSHA Rishon LeZion, IsrSC 53 (3), 600, available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/9706024.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). 29 Friedman, Shuki: “The most chaotic and tragic marriage and divorce system in the world,” in: The Israel Democracy Institute 2018, available here: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/23819 [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew).

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Saturday. Lack of public transportation on Saturday is perhaps the most unpopular feature concerning Saturday and the public sphere, and in the last decades there were several private initiatives to operate mass transportation services through private and local initiatives. Just recently the municipality of Tel Aviv together with neighboring cities began operating such services on a large scale,30 so far without the intervention of the government. The arrangement regarding trade and commerce on Saturday is fairly liberal according to the law in the books. Thus, there is no general national law regulating this field and the power is delegated, by The Municipalities Ordinance, to local authorities to regulate their own arrangements. Many Jewish municipalities prohibit the opening of businesses on Saturday, save places of entertainment, restaurants and cafes, petrol stations etc., and these municipal regulations date back to the British Mandate. In some local authorities, convenience stores are also allowed to be open, and in some localities, mostly younger ones, there are no restrictions at all, a fact that attracted the construction of big shopping malls in these localities. Even in municipalities, such as Tel Aviv, where supermarkets are not allowed to open on Saturday, enforcement lacks and the situation on the ground changed significantly to more open businesses on Saturday, in comparison to the first decades of the state. In Jerusalem until the late 1980s even movie theaters and other cultural institutions were closed on Saturday and perhaps the turning point for the whole country was a Jerusalem local court decision, following an indictment of two movie theaters for screening movies on Saturday. The court ruled that the Municipalities Order does not allow local authorities to consider religious reasons for regulating the opening and closure time of businesses, and therefore the regulation which was the basis for the indictment was illegal.31 The decision prompted the Knesset in 1990 to amend the law and empower local authorities to include also religious considerations. Many localities reshaped their regulations, but this paradoxically resulted with more liberal policies and a ping-pong between local authorities, the Minister of Interior who has to validate local legislation and the courts.32 According to The Work and Rest Hours Law 1951, an employer is prohibited from employing his workers on their day of rest – Friday to Muslims, Saturday for Jews and Sunday for Christians, save some sectors and exceptions. Employers are also barred from discrimination or disadvantaging their workers because of their different rest day. In this respect, the Israeli arrangement maintains freedom of 30 Available here: https://www.tel-aviv.gov.il/en/Live/Transportation/Pages/PublicTransportai ton.aspx [15. 04. 2020]. 31 DC (Jerusalem) 3471/87, The State of Israel v. Kaplan, IsrDC (2), 265 (1988) (in Hebrew). 32 E. g. HCJFH 3660/17, General Merchants and Self-Employed Association v. Minister of Interior, available here: https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/general-association-merchantsand-self-employed-persons-v-minister-interior [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew).

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religion and infringes freedom from religion. In 2015 the Labour Court ruled that playing professional football on Saturday is a violation of the law,33 although this has been the practice since the establishment of Israel and has not changed, even after the ruling. Another aspect of enforcing Jewish religious norms on the public sphere, thus infringing freedom from religion, is maintaining Kashrut (Jewish dietary laws) in all public and semi-public institutions (e. g. universities, hotels), which characterizes Israel from its very establishment and is accompanied with a monopoly of the General Rabbinate on Kashrut Certificates also to private establishments.34 In the private sphere, though, the number of restaurants offering non-kosher food has risen sharply in the last decades. As can be understood from this short overview, although, the legal framework has not changed significantly along the years, the effectivity of Jewish religious norms in the public sphere has weakened, moving Israel in the liberal, towards the direction of freedom from religion. It can be argued that the unintended consequence of legal intervention to maintain restrictions on Saturday activities and other Jewish norms and restrictions in the public sphere resulted with an opposite trend, and perhaps more generally, the high percent of the public who declare themselves secular is an outcome of the involvement of religion and the political power of religious parties and institutions (such as the General Rabbinate and rabbinical courts) in politics. On the other hand, extreme Jewish orthodox voices are louder and broader, bringing to more conflictual situations in the public sphere. A good example is separation between men and women in events sponsored by public institutions for the orthodox community and exclusion of women singing at such events. Another example is gender separation in higher education in special programs for ultra-orthodox community, motivated to bring then on board of the work force. These latter developments lead me to the concluding section.

33 HCJ 7635/15, The Movement to a Jewish and Democratic State v. Attorney General of Israel, available here: https://www-nevo-co-il.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/psika_html/elyon/15076350-Z32. htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew, password neccessary). 34 Kashrut (Prohibition of Deceit) Law 1983. A few attempts to establish private Kashrut certification were of very limited success. See: Kramarow, Adam S.: “Synagogue and State: Bringing Balance to the Role of Religion in Israeli Law,” in: J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y, 2013/23, p. 157.

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Israel Liberal Democracy corrosion

In the beginning of the lecture I argued that it is the uninterrupted democracy that constitutes Israel’s greatest success in its 70 years of existence, and probably this political culture also paved the way (or at least significantly contributed) to the other impressive achievements of Israel. Liberal democracy promotes innovation, cultural and scientific flourishing and indeed economic success, as reasoned and rational decision making. In light of that, one cannot conclude without a few words about the present Israel, which, among other things, has been going through an enhanced process of populism, nationalization and corrosion of liberal democracy in recent years. Israel’s current government (2019) is the most right-wing, Jewish nationalist and religious government Israel ever had. It follows, or some would say, even pioneered a global anti-liberal trend. Various pieces of legislation and other policies put forward by the government or by its coalition Knesset members (not always successfully, because of the very fragmented and narrow coalition) are anti-liberal and nationalistic, pushing for the Jewish character of the state (in terms of both national and religious definition) at the expense of its democratic and liberal character. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel has been publishing periodic reports in recent years on all anti-democratic initiatives, which are too many to elaborate on here.35 These can be grouped to initiatives that harm the gatekeepers of democracy, and especially the independence and powers of the courts and the Attorney General office, initiatives that harm the status and rights of minorities, initiatives that harm freedom of expression, initiatives that harm pluralism, and initiatives intended to curtail the activities of human rights organizations and other NGOs. The Basic Law: Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, enacted in 2018, is just one example, but since it is a Basic Law, meant to be part of Israel’s constitution,36 and declaring its credo and character, it merits a special notice. Many countries entrench in their constitution the State’s identity, credo and symbols. The initiators of the law claim that this was their purpose. Indeed, the law stipulates that Israel is the national home of the Jewish people (rather than 35 For the recent report in English from October 2018 see: The Association of Civil Rights in Israel: Overview of Anti-Democratic Legislation Advanced by the 20th Knesset 2018, available here: https://fef8066e-8343-457a-8902-ae89f366476d.filesusr.com/ugd/0aadc5_0e26276882 014d77b77c0c6727bb3b1b.pdf [15. 04. 2020]. 36 Israel is one of only three countries (together with the UK and New Zealand) which does not have a formal constitution. According to a 1951 decision of the Knesset, Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset and have a superior status to regular law, will be amalgamated in the future into a constitution. The first Basic Law was enacted in 1958 and regulates the legislative branch of government (Basic Law: the Knesset). The current law is the 16th enacted since.

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declaring Israel as a Jewish state). But it does so in provocative wording that does not read as constitutional text but rather as a political text of a certain perception of Zionism, which certainly does not reflect its founding fathers’ vision, including the right wing of them, like Zeev Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin. The law negates the others, non-Jews, citizens of the state. For example, Article 1(c) states that “The right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people,” Article 3 states that “Jerusalem, complete and united,” is the capital of Israel, Article 4 downgrades the status of the Arabic language and Article 7 declares that the State will encourage Jewish settlements. Furthermore, the law fails to state that Israel is also a democracy in which all citizens enjoy equal rights. Although the law is mainly symbolic, and the legislated version is more moderate than the drafts put forward, it offends the nonJewish communities in Israel and, by omitting the equality principle, it can be seen as a stark departure from the Declaration of Independence, with which I opened this paper. Beyond the various pieces of illiberal legislation and policies, the rhetoric of politicians transformed in the last years towards a more patriotic, nationalistic and populist one, categorizing those who oppose the government policies as traitors, and we should all remember what this kind of rhetoric led to in 1995 – the political assassination of Israel’s Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin. One of the features of the current government conduct, that I view as one of the most worrying, is the fierce attacks on the various guardians of democracy – from the press, through the police and the Attorney General’s office, and perhaps the most significant is the attacks on the judiciary and its independence, attacks that are accompanied by various legislative proposals to change the procedure for judicial appointments, to limit standing and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and to introduce an overriding clause that will enable the Knesset to overturn constitutional decisions of the Court.37 For political scientists, Israel’s uninterrupted democracy is an enigma. In light of the fact that Israel has been in a constant state of emergency since its establishment, at times with existential threat, that it is one of the three countries in which there is no written constitution limiting the powers of government; in light of the fact that it inherited a non-democratic colonial legal system and most of ist founding fathers, as well as migrating citizens, came from countries lacking 37 Basic Law Proposal: Judgment (Amendment – Judicial Review of Legislation) 2018 https:// www-nevo-co-il.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/law_html/law04/5349_20_lst_492647.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew, password neccessary), and for the other initiatives see the ACRI report, Supra note 35. On the Independence of the Israeli judiciary and its role throughout the history of Israel, see: Salzberger, Eli: “Judicial Activism in Israel,” in: Dikson, Brice (ed.): Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts, Oxford: University Press 2008, pp. 217–271, available here: http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/Publications/SSRN-id957849.pdf [15. 04. 2020].

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democratic traditions, Israel’s democratic success is indeed surprising. How did Israel, under these circumstances, manage to establish a liberal democracy? I think that the key to this enigma lies with Israel’s legal establishments, primarily its judiciary and especially the Supreme Court of Israel, which together with other legal institutions, such as the Attorney General and the prosecution agencies, managed to construct important features of Israel’s democracy and protect the formal and substantive facets of the rule of law.38 The Israeli case indeed proves that a developed and independent judiciary is perhaps the most crucial condition for a successful democratic state. The Supreme Court of Israel did not hesitate to issue orders against Israel’s powerful first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, in the course of the Independence war, preventing what the court perceived as illegal decrees. It has been constructing as from 1949 a judicial-made bill of rights, in the absence of a constitutional one, it maintained the rule of law, invalidating acts of government and legislature by relaxing the very limited causes for judicial review inherited by the Mandatory-English Law. It opened its doors to every petitioner who has a grievance against the government, including petitions from the “Occupied Territories”, a world precedent (that an occupier is willing to open the doors of its court to the occupied population).39 The opening of the Court’s doors changed the landscape of Israeli civil society, incentivizing the establishment of hundreds of organizations promoting various causes whose legal avenue is one of the major tools for action.40 The world reputation of the Israeli Supreme Court is a crucial factor for the attitude towards Israel and its conduct by liberal democracies worldwide. I think that without this institution, we would have not been able to be proud of Israel’s 70 years old democracy and by derivation, of many other achievements in other fields. 38 See also: Oz-Salzberger, Fania / Salzberger, Eli: “The Secret German Sources of the Israeli Supreme Court,” in: Israel Studies, 1998/3 (2), available here: http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/ documents/he%20Secret%20German%20Source%20of%20the%20Israeli%20Supreme%20 Court.pdf [27. 05. 2020]. 39 When the Court ruled that a new Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories is illegal and should be evacuated, PM Menachem Begin whose government initiated the settlement, responded by declaring “there are judges in Jerusalem” and that the government will obey their ruling, a very different tone from the current government’s responses to courts’ rulings. See: Kremnitzer, Mordechai / Fuches, Amir: “Menachem Begin on Democracy and Constitutional Values.” The Israel Democracy Institute 2012, available here: https://en.idi.org.il/media/5101/ begin_booklet_final.pdf. [15. 04. 2020]. 40 This was indeed the motivation of the current government in enacting the NGO’s law targeting NGOs, who are funded by foreign governments, which are usually associated with liberal causes. See: Salzberger, Eli: “The New ‘Transparency Law’ and the operation of the German Political Foundations,” in: Abelmann, Anna / Konarek, Katharina (eds.): The German Political Foundations’ Work between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv, Wiesbaden: Springer 2018, p. 79.

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This is the reason that from all our government’s wrongdoings, I think that the conduct of our recent Ministers of Justice, backed by the Prime Minister, is the most dangerous with the longest lasting effects. Most ministers of justice in Israel’s history saw their primary role to defend the independence of the public legal institutions. The previous minister, Ayelet Shaked, and the current interim minister, Amir Ohana, explicitly took the opposite goal. They declared that the conduct of the Attorney General and Supreme Court are an obstacle to governability and the later also remarked that not all court rulings should be obeyed. Although they have not yet succeeded in limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or changing the very impressive procedures set by law for appointing judges,41 they managed to have unprecedented influence in the actual appointments of more conservative and religious judges, and their draft bill to change the procedure of appointing governmental legal advisors,42 if legislated, will have lasting effects much beyond the term of the current government. In addition, their insightful rhetoric has a significant influence on the public trust in these institutions; the judiciary has traditionally enjoyed the second highest trust of the public among all public institutions. This public trust provided the legal institution’s major share of their powers and was a key factor in their role in collective decision-making. We live in the darkest democratic period since the horrors of the mid20th century. What is happening in Israel might not be as bad as what is going on in some other established democracies, but this world trend has an enhancing domino effect, and together with the growing antisemitism from the far right and the far left as well as an Islamic one, the dangers to the future of Israel’s democracy are substantial. It should be stated that the primary threats and dangers are not external; they originate from within, enhanced by external soundings. I do hope and believe that we can overcome them.

41 Salzberger, Eli: “Judicial Selection in Israel: Constitution, Law and Politics,” in: Malleson, Kate / Peter Russell (eds.): Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from Around the World, Toronto: University Press 2005, p. 241, available here: http://law.haifa. ac.il/images/documents/Eli%20Salzberger%20-%20Judicial%20Selection%20in%20Israel-% 20Constitution%20%20Law%20and%20Politics.pdf [15. 04. 2020]. 42 Civil Service Law Proposal (Appointments), Amendment – Appointment of Legal Advisors of Offices 2017, available here: https://www-nevo-co-il.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/law_html/law04/20_ lst_381181.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew, password neccessary). The draft bill is currently before the first reading.

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Bibliography Fisher, Netanel / Shilon, Avi: “Integrating Non-Jewish Immigrants and the Formation of Israel’s Ethnic-Civil Nationhood: From Ben-Gurion to the Present”, in: Middle Eastern Studies, 2016/53 (2). Kramarow, Adam S.: “Synagogue and State: Bringing Balance to the Role of Religion in Israeli Law,” in: J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y, 2013/23. Salzberger, Eli: “The New ‘Transparency Law’ and the operation of the German Political Foundations,” in: Abelmann, Anna / Konarek, Katharina (eds.): The German Political Foundations’ Work between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv, Wiesbaden: Springer 2018. Soper, Christopher/ Fetzer, Joel S.: Religion and Nationalism in Global Perspective, Cambridge: University Press 2015. Weller, Paul: “Religious Minorities and freedom of Religion or Belief in the UK,” in: Religion and Human Rights, 2018/13, pp. 76–109.

Internet Sources The Association of Civil Rights in Israel: Overview of Anti-Democratic Legislation Advanced by the 20th Knesset 2018, available here: https://fef8066e-8343-457a-8902ae89f 366476d.filesusr.com/ugd/0aadc5_0e26276882014d77b77c0c6727bb3b1b.pdf [15. 04. 2020]. The Associated Press 2011: “Veiled women arrested at Paris protest,” CBC, 11 Apr. 2011, available here: https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/veiled-women-arrested-at-paris-pro test-1.1004020 [15. 04. 2020]. Aviv, Efrat: “Millet System in the Ottoman Empire.” Oxford Bibliographies, available here: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780 195390155-0231.xml [15. 04. 2020], Oxford: University Press 2016. Basic Law Proposal: Judgment (Amendment – Judicial Review of Legislation) 2018 https:// www-nevo-coil.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/law_html/law04/5349_20_lst_492647.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew, password necessary). The Right to Alternative Civil Burial Law, 1996–5756, IsrBL 249, available here: https:// www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/p200m3_001.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Chevra Kadisha GHSHA Rishon LeZion, IsrSC 53(3), 600, available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/9706024.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). Civil Service Law Proposal (Appointments), Amendment – Appointment of Legal Advisors of Offices 2017, available here: https://www-nevo-co-il.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/law_html/ law04/20_lst_381181.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew, password necessary). Crabtree, Steve: “Religiosity Highest in World’s Poorest Nations.” Gallup 2010, available here: https://news.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations. aspx [15. 04. 2020]. Conseil fédéral Suisse: “Message relatif à l’initiative populaire ‘contre la construction de minarets’” 2008, available here: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2008/ 6923.pdf.

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The Economist – World in figures: Highest GDP per person 2017, [sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook & others] available here: https://worldinfigures.com/rankings/ topic/9 [15. 04. 2020]. The Economist – World in figures: Human development index: highest 2017, [source: UN Human Development Report], available here: https://worldinfigures.com/rankings/ index/52 [15. 04. 2020]. Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index 2019, https://www.eiu.com/topic/democ racy-index [15. 04. 2020]. The Economist: “The Good Soldier”, available here: https://www.economist.com/booksandarts/2008/04/10/the-good-soldier [15. 04. 2020]. Friedman, Shuki: “The most chaotic and tragic marriage and divorce system in the world.” The Israel Democracy Institute 2018, available here: https://www.idi.org.il/articles/23819 [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). Global Innovation Index (GII) 2019: Israel [Cornell University, INSEAD, and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)] available here: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/ pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019/il.pdf [15. 04. 2020]. HCJ 72/62, Rufeisen v Minister of the Interior, 1962/16 (4) PD 2428, available here: https:// versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Rogachova%20v.%20Minis try%20of%20the%20Interior.pdf [15. 04. 2020]. HCJ 1000/92, Bavli v. The Great Rabbinical Court-Jerusalem, IsrSC 48 (2), 221, available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/padi-ng-2-221-l.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). HCJ 2410/90, Hoffman v. Director of the Western Wall, IsrSC 48 (2), 265 (1994), English translation available at: https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/hoffman-v-direc tor-western-wall [15. 04. 2020]. HCJ 2697/04, Solomon v. Commander of the Jerusalem District, IsrSC 58 (4), 572 (2004), available: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/0402697-padi.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). HCJ 7635/15, The Movement to a Jewish and Democratic State v. Attorney General of Israel, available here: https://www-nevo-co-il.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/psika_html/elyon/15076350Z32.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew, password necessary). HCJFH 3660/17, General Merchants and Self-Employed Association v. Minister of Interior, available here: https://www-nevo-co-il.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/psika_html/elyon/17036600C20.htm [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew, password necessary). The Jewish Telegraphic Agency: “Full Text of Israel’s Proclamation of Independence Issued in Tel Aviv” 1948, available here: https://www.jta.org/1948/05/16/archive/full-text-ofisraels-proclamation-of-independence-issued-in-tel-aviv [15. 04. 2020]. Kremnitzer, Mordechai / Fuches, Amir: “Menachem Begin on Democracy and Constitutional Values,” The Israel Democracy Institute 2012, available here: https://en.idi.org.il/ media/5101/begin_booklet_final.pdf. [15. 04. 2020]. LCA 8703/12, Albudiri v. The Orthodox Coptic Mutant of the Holy See in Jerusalem and the Middle East, available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/11087030-k05. htm [15. 04. 2020] Roser, Max: “Democracy”, OurWorldInData.org 2020, available here: https://ourworldin data.org/democracy [15. 04. 2020].

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Salzberger, Eli: “Judicial Selection in Israel: Constitution, Law and Politics,” in: Malleson, Kate / Peter Russell (eds.): Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from Around the World, Toronto: University Press 2005, p. 241, available here: http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/documents/Eli%20Salzberger%20-%20Judicial% 20Selection%20in%20Israel-%20Constitution%20%20Law%20and%20Politics.pdf [15. 04. 2020]. Salzberger, Eli / Oz-Salzberger, Fania: “The Tradition of Freedom of Speech in Israel,” in: Law, Society and Culture 2006, pp. 27–70, available here: http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/ documents/The%20Tradition%20of%20Freedom%20of%20Speech%20in%20Israel. pdf [15. 04. 2020] (in Hebrew). Salzberger, Eli: “Judicial Activism in Israel,” in: Dikson, Brice (ed.): Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts, Oxford: University Press 2008, pp. 217–271, available here: http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/Publications/SSRN-id957849.pdf [15. 04. 2020]. Tel Aviv Government. https://www.tel-aviv.gov.il/en/Live/Transportation/Pages/Public Transportaiton.aspx [15. 04. 2020]. Oz-Salzberger, Fania / Salzberger, Eli: “The Secret German Sources of the Israeli Supreme Court,” in: Israel Studies, 1998/3 (2), available here: http://law.haifa.ac.il/images/ documents/he%20Secret%20German%20Source%20of%20the%20Israeli%20Supreme %20Court.pdf [27. 05. 2020]. World Bank, Development Research Group: GINI Index (World Bank estimate) 1967–2018, available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?most_recent_value_ desc=false [15. 04. 2020]. Sveriges Riksdag: The Constitution of Sweden. The Fundamental Laws and the Riksdag Act 2016, available here: https://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/07.-dokument-lagar/theconstitution-of-sweden160628.pdf [27. 05. 2020]. United Nations Development Programme – Human Development Reports: 2019 Human Development Index Ranking, available here: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-hu man-development-index-ranking [15. 04. 2020]. United States Department of State: Turkey 2018 International Religious Freedom Report 2018, available here: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/TURKEY-2018INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUSFREEDOM-REPORT.pdf [15. 04. 2020].

Rachel Elior

The Transformation of the Hebrew Language from a Religious Language of the Past into a dual Language of Secular Zionist Daily Life and Religious Messianic Revival of the Biblical Past

Abstract The present article is discussing the peculiar transformation of the Hebrew Language from an ancient religious-national sacred language of the past, known as the ”The Holy Language”. This language was mainly learned from a written version and known by Jewish men, who were obliged to study it as a holy language and ritual language, from their childhood through their whole life. It transformed in the modern era into a dual modern language: a) A common national secular language of Zionist daily life, pertaining to men and women alike; and b) as a holy language of religious messianic revival of the biblical and mystical past, practiced by religious Jewish men, hoping for reviving the biblical period. The first part of the article explains how the Hebrew Language became a holy language and what the meaning of that holiness is in the Priestly Language of the first millennium BCE. It explains its centrality in the Jewish cultural communication and in Jewish history and delineates the lingual and cultural passage from priestly-angelic authority of the written law, into human sovereignty of the oral law. This transition of lingual strata’s and changing hegemony is reflected in ”The language of the sages” of the first Millennium CE. For the last two thousand years, the Jewish community anywhere in the world taught its male children to read Biblical Hebrew and Mishnaic and Talmudic Hebrew and the Aramaic translation. The Holy Language was the only communal language of religion and culture, cultural communication, prayer, and study, reading and writing. The second part of the article is concerned with the development of the mundane secular Modern Hebrew, as part of the secular Zionist revival, used by all residents of the Land of Israel, that emerged out of the Holy Language, from the last few decades of the 19th century onwards. The growing tension between the holy language of the past and the modern tongue of the present is described in the last part of the article, discussing the messianic revival of Gush Emunim.

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Introduction: The Jewish Library in the Holy Language

When the renowned Jewish-Russian-British philosopher and historian of ideas, Sir Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997), was asked during an interview in 1953: “What is the problem of the Jewish People?” He answered instantly: “The Jews have enjoyed rather too much history and too little geography.”1 This precise observation concerning “too much history” is well attested in the vast library of the Jewish people, one which reflects 3000 years of written history, revealing substantially more than any other evidence, the uniqueness of this long history. In the National Library in Jerusalem, there are 100,000 catalogued volumes of printed Hebrew books, spanning a period from the earliest Hebrew incunabula, first printed at 1475, up until the year 1900. In addition to the individual printed Hebrew titles, there are 70,000 Photostats or copies of Hebrew manuscripts from all over the world, as well as 7000 original Hebrew manuscripts, all of which are written in Leshon haKodesh, i. e. “The Holy Language”, commonly known as Hebrew.2 How did the Hebrew language become holy? What is the meaning of that holiness? When was the Hebrew language first mentioned as a holy language? What is the connection between this holiness and its first appearance as a transcendental verbal transmission or as an angelic written tradition? In which manner did the ancient Hebrew language depart from most other human languages, those usually serving for communication and contact in the present, or for conserving knowledge and culture and recording human deeds from the past for posterity? Who transformed this holy written language into a renewed, “actual”, secular, spoken language? The present article will address these questions in the first theological-mystical part of the discussion, pertaining to the meaning of the Holy Language in the past, and will explore in the second part, the crucial significance of the revival of this ancient mystical-messianic tradition in the secular Zionist present, and its far-reaching political implications in the State of Israel.

1 Berlin, Isaiah: “The Origins of Israel,” in: Laqueur, W. Z. (ed.): The Middle East in Transition, London: Routledge 1953. 2 The Mishna, the early stage of rabbinic literature, coined the expression “Leshon ha-Kodesh” or Holy Language, as the only language in which an individual Jew may pray. See: Mishna Sota 7:1.

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Part One: Theological-Mystical Perspective

2.1

The mystical tradition of the Holy Language

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According to the ancient biblical tradition, written in Hebrew three millennia ago, God created the world by means of words in the divine Hebrew language (Genesis 1). Further, God spoke to his People in the eternal Hebrew language at the Sinai covenant (Exodus 19–20) and gave them the sacred Torah that was written down by prophets and priests in the holy Hebrew language. Divine words and Holy Scriptures, divine law and sacred national history, defined by a series of covenants, as well as the biblical literary narrative and biblical sacred liturgy, were all written in the “holy tongue” and bound together by the Hebrew language. According to the post-biblical mystical tradition from late antiquity, the world was created by God through letters and numbers of the Hebrew language, as is demonstrated clearly in the following quotation from Sefer Yetzira (Book of Formation), presented here shortly. Sefer Yetzira, “The Book of Creation” or “The Book of Formation”, an anonymous rhythmical text written in poetical-narrative tone in post-biblical Hebrew in the middle of the First Millennium CE3, demonstrates beautifully the eternal foundations of this perception of the holiness of the Divine Hebrew Language.4 Sefer Yetzira relates to us for the first time, that the divine language is composed of 22 foundational letters and 10 infinite numbers, created by God. These letters and numbers could be composed and should be assembled in infinite combinations, by Hebrew readers, due to their divine source. The anonymous author reflects upon different aspects of the Hebrew language, its letters, divisions, sounds and pronunciation. According to this book, holy letters and sacred numbers are endowed with infinite creative power and are perceived as holy and eternal. The holy language, with which the world was created, is further perceived as possessing endless encoded meanings as well as containing numerous secret aspects that could and should be deciphered by the speakers of the infinite divine language, ‘leshon hakodesh’. The centrality of the holy language had been conceived in a religious culture that claimed that the entire process of creation had been taking place through letters and numbers of the divine language, that were pronounced by God. 3 Scholars debate the precise date of the “book of creation”. Some ascribe it to the first century, some to the six-century and others to the 8th-9th centuries. See a recent review of the different opinions: Weiss, Tzahi: Sefer Yesirah and its Context. Other Jewish Voices, Philadelphia: Penn Press 2018. 4 Kaplan, Arie: Sefer Yetzirah. The Book of Creation in Theory and Practice, San Francisco: Weiser Books.

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The unique holy status of Hebrew as a spoken and written language, as a language of creation and a language of the divine law, is reflected in the perception of eternal divine language and divine creative power expressed in sacred letters and numbers. The letters of the holy language have an eternal presence in all creation, according to the Book of Creation, as well as an eternal divine presence in the human and divine speech, breath and spirit: A few sentences from the translation of the first chapter of the Book of Creation, will explain clearly this fusion of 22 letters, 10 numbers and endless words, voices, creative thoughts and endless meanings, shared by God and man: 1:1 With 32 wondrous paths of Wisdom engraved Yah, the Lord of Hosts, [God of Israel, the Living God, King of the Universe, Almighty God, merciful and gracious, High and Exalted, dwelling in eternity, whose name is Holy], and created His universe with three books, with text [book] (Sepher), with number (Sephar), and with narrative [story] (Sippur). [The 32 wondrous paths of Wisdom are composed of] 1:2 Ten Sefirot of Nothingness (eser sefirot belima) plus twenty-two letters of foundation (twenty two-otiyot yesod): … 1:5 Ten Sefirot of Nothingness: Their measure is ten which have no end. A depth of beginning, a depth of end; a depth of good, a depth of evil; a depth of above, a depth below; a depth east, a depth west; a depth north, a depth south. The singular Master, God faithful King, dominates them all from His holy dwelling until eternity of eternities. 1:6 Ten Sefirot of Nothingness: Their vision is like the ‘appearance of lightening’ their limit has no end. His Word is in them, ‘running and returning to and fro’. They rush to His saying like a whirlwind, and before His throne, they prostrate themselves. 1:7 Ten Sefirot of Nothingness: Their end is embedded in their beginning, and their beginning in their end, like a flame in a burning coal. For the Master is singular, He has no second. Moreover, before One, what can you count? 1:8 Ten Sefirot of Nothingness: Bridle your mouth from speaking and your heart from thinking. And if your heart runs, return to the place, as it is written, ‘The Creatures running and returning to and fro’ (Ezekiel 1:14). Regarding this covenant was made. 1:9 Ten Sefirot of Nothingness: One is the Breath of the Living God, blessed and benedicted be the Name of the Life of worlds. Voice, Breath [spirit] and Speech. This is the Holy Breath [spirit] (Ruach HaKodesh).5

According to the Jewish mystical tradition, only God, angels and human beings alone, share among all living beings the divine language, consisting of letters and numbers, voice, inspiration, spirit, thought, speech, creative power, encoding and decoding endless meanings and combinations, movement and transformation. 5 See note 4 above.

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Only these three share verbal expression, written memory and speaking capacity, as well as the endless possibilities of writing and reading, combining and deciphering with letters and numbers. Every word of the holy language, derived from the creative and enlivening speech of the divine creator, engraved in the creation, and written in the Holy Scriptures, could be read as containing infinite meanings beyond the literal fixed letters.

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The central socio-religious role of the Holy Language.

The holy Hebrew language became the foundation of Jewish religious-cultural history, as well as the foundation of all Jewish communal ritual memory and unique mystical and liturgical traditions. The formation of Jewish history, as well as the formation of Jewish Law and Jewish culture, and the consolidation of the Jewish community as a distinct cultural unit in the traditional world in late antiquity, until the end of the nineteen century, was utterly dependent on the Hebrew Language. This distinct socio-religious identity was always associated with the mandatory use of Hebrew in communal education, in prayer and study in the synagogue, in daily blessings and nearly in all forms of cultural communication and ritual memory based on reading and writing, on communal liturgy and public ritual. Every traditional Jewish community from antiquity to the present insisted that all its male members, from the age of three to the age of thirteen, should be concerned with letters and numbers of the holy language on a daily basis. The male adults were expected to try to do so for the rest of their life. The divine command in Deuteronomy 11: 18–21, as stated in Hebrew was the basis of the stern assertion of the sages: Fix these words of mine in your hearts and minds; tie them as symbols on your hands and bind them on your foreheads. Teach them to your sons, talk about them when you sit at home and when you walk along the road, when you lie down and when you get up. Write them on the doorframes of your houses and on your gates, so that your days and the days of your children may be many in the land the Lord swore to give your ancestors, as many as the days that the heavens are above the earth.

The sages interpreted the above-mentioned verse: And teach them to your sons, to talk about them – your sons and not your daughters…: From here they said; when the little child begins to speak, his father speaks to him in the holy language and teaches him Torah, If he does not speak the Holy Tongue with him and does not teach him Torah, it is appropriate for him [to the father] to bury him [his child]; as it says: And you have taught your sons to speak and to study; If you have taught your sons to speak, your days and their days will be long

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If not, if you did not teach them the holy language, your days will be shortened. (Sifrei 11: 19).

All Jewish males in the traditional world understood clearly what they had to do as fathers and sons, and the Jewish community enforced all its male members, with no exception, to fulfil this divine commandment pertaining to all fathers and sons. The common norm was that every male child would spend ten years, approximately between the ages of three to thirteen, in order to acquire the Hebrew language as a foremost tool for communal cultural literacy and as a precondition for fulfilment of religious duties, as well as acquiring fluent reading capacity in Biblical Hebrew and Mishnaic Hebrew. The reading material for the young students only taught of the biblical past and its divine hero, the speaking God. Gradually the child acquires the capacity to participate in the Divine Liturgy in the synagogue, pertaining to the world of the angels (kedusha/Sanctus) and to the divine presence known in various names such as Shekinah, Makom and The Holy One blessed be He. In their prayers, the Hebrew readers were expressing apocalyptic hopes relating to the messianic future and concerning the direct connection between heaven and earth in time of redemption. They were praying for the restoration of the biblical past reflected in the returning of the Shekinah (divine presence) to Zion, (The Temple Mount or Jerusalem), for the establishment of the biblical kingdom of the house of David in Jerusalem and the rebuilding of the Temple on Mount Zion or the Temple-Mount in Jerusalem. The holy language focused on the mythical and historical written past as recorded in the biblical narrative and its post-biblical exegetical deliberations, and on the messianic-angelic future, devoted to the expected redemption, the Shekinah and the Messiah, described in the prayers and in the mystical, poetical and apocalyptic literature. Hebrew, which emerged from its very inception as a divine written language that transcended borders between heaven and earth, ancient past and meta-historic future, the concealed and the revealed, rarely served as a practical spoken language of communication for everyday life, that which is usually concerned with the mundane challenges of the present and daily existential obligations.

2.3

The Hebrew language – “the language of the creation” in the mystical tradition.

The holy origin of the Hebrew language was mentioned for the first time in an ancient priestly text known as The Book of Jubilees that was found in Hebrew among the Dead Sea Scrolls and was known previously in translation from the Pseudepigrapha.

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The Book of Jubilees, written in Jewish priestly circles in the mid second century BCE in the Land of Israel, relates in an angelic narrative, how the first historical Hebrew speaker, Abraham, learned to read and speak in Hebrew from his teacher, the Angel of the Presence. The angel is described as the new narrator of the plot of the Book of Genesis with priestly and angelic amendments. The angel is telling Moses on Mount Sinai, in the course of the 40 days that Moses had spent on the mountain, after he had been given the Ten Commandments, that which had transpired before his time, when God spoke to Abraham. In this conversation, recorded in Jubilees 12: 24–27, we find for the first time a direct reference to the Hebrew language, which is defined by the Angel of the Presence, in a remarkable name: “Hebrew … the language of the creation”: 1. And I will be a God to thee and thy son, and to thy son’s son, and to all thy seed: fear not, from henceforth and unto all generations of the earth I am thy God. 2. In addition, the Lord God said; ‘Open his mouth and his ears that he may hear and speak with his mouth, with the language which has been revealed’; for it had ceased from the mouths of all the children of men from the day of the overthrow (of the tower of Babel). 3. In addition, I opened his mouth, and his ears and his lips, and I began to speak with him in Hebrew in the language of the creation. 4. In addition, he took the books of his fathers, and these were written in Hebrew, and he transcribed them, and he began from henceforth to study them, and I made known to him that which he could not (understand), and he studied them during the six rainy months. Other than the first historical reference to the Hebrew language by its specific name, and the original understanding of its uniqueness as “the language of the creation”, first mentioned in the book of Jubilees, there is one more unexpected point in this chapter. The Angel of the Presence describes Abraham as a scholar who has a library, and not as a wandering shepherd, as he commonly appears in the biblical narrative. On the very interesting question, what are “the books of his fathers [that] were written in Hebrew”, the book of Jubilees offers a very interesting answer in chapter 4, where the history of the first ten generations of the world is recorded in a schematic way, with one exception, as noted in the parallel biblical text in Genesis 5: 21–24. The Book of Jubilees 4: 16–26 relates the following on the chosen member of the seventh generation, Enoch son of Jared: 1. And in the eleventh jubilee [512–18 A.M.] Jared took to himself a wife, and her name was Baraka, the daughter of Râsûjâl, a daughter of his father’s brother, in the fourth week of this jubilee, [522 A.M.] and she bare him a son

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in the fifth week, in the fourth year of the jubilee, and he called his name Enoch. 2. And he was the first among men that are born on earth who learnt writing and knowledge and wisdom and who wrote down the signs of heaven according to the order of their months in a book, that men might know the seasons of the years according to the order of their separate months. 3. And he was the first to write a testimony. And he testified to the sons of men among the generations of the earth, and recounted the weeks of the jubilees, and made known to them the days of the years, and set in order the months and recounted the Sabbaths of the years as we [the angels] made (them), known to him. 4. And what was and what will be he saw in a vision of his sleep, as it will happen to the children of men throughout their generations until the day of judgment; he saw and understood everything, and wrote his testimony, and placed the testimony on earth for all the children of men and for their generations. 5. And in the twelfth jubilee, [582–88] in the seventh week thereof, he took to himself a wife, and her name was Edna, the daughter of Danel, the daughter of his father’s brother, and in the sixth year in this week [587 A.M.] she bares him a son and he called his name Methuselah. 6. And he was moreover with the angels of God these six jubilees of years, and they showed him everything which is on earth and in the heavens, the rule of the sun, and he wrote down everything. 7. (….) 8. And he was taken from amongst the children of men, and we conducted him into the Garden of Eden in majesty and honor, and behold there he writes down the condemnation and judgment of the world, and all the wickedness of the children of men. 9. (….) 10. And he burnt the incense of the sanctuary, sweet spices acceptable before the Lord on the Mount. 11. For the Lord has four places on the earth, the Garden of Eden, and the Mount of the East, and this mountain on which thou [Moses] art this day, Mount Sinai, and Mount Zion (which) will be sanctified in the new creation for a sanctification of the earth. Through it, the earth will be sanctified from all (its) guilt and its uncleanness throughout the generations of the world.6

6 See: Charlesworth, James H. (ed.): The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Volume 2, Garden City: Doubleday 1985. See also: The Book of Jubilees. pp. 35–142.

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This foundational priestly-mystical narrative reflects the writing of authors who were primarily interested in seven sacred issues. In holy time in heaven and on earth, monitored and guarded by angels and priests. In holy place, guarded by priests and Levites; in holy language, learned from the angels; in Holy Scriptures, originated in heaven; in holy memory, recorded by angels and priests; in holy covenants and holy ritual, shared by angels and priests, known from the Pentateuch, the book of Jubilees and the Songs of the Sabbat Sacrifice. We need here to focus only on one subject – on the first human reader and writer of the holy language, Enoch (Gen. 5:21–24). Enoch, who did not die like all other human beings, had been transported from earth to heaven (cf. ibid. 5: 24), in order to learn in heaven to read and write and calculate in Hebrew from the angels. Enoch son of Jared, the first Hebrew reader and the first Hebrew writer and calculator, was the first human being who wrote in the Hebrew language that he learned to read and write and calculate from the angels. He wrote and read numerous books on everything that he had learned in heaven. His major subject of study was the eternal divisions of cycles of visible time, divided into twelve months, four seasons, and recurrent years of 364 days. The name of these visible eternal universal time cycles granted by God to all creation is “the heavenly chariots” (I Enoch 72). First, Enoch learned from the angels on the eternal universal heavenly cycles of unending visible time. Secondly, he learned from them, the calculation of the sevenfold holy appointed times of the Lord, which are eternal audible time cycles of rest and freedom, known as Moadei dror or “appointed times of liberty”, which are commanded only upon the Jewish people as part of the eternal covenant. Those seven-fold cycles of freedom and rest include the following four divisions. Shabbat every seven days. Seven biblically appointed times of the Lord in the first seven months of the biblical year commencing in the spring. A year of rest known as Shemita (the fallow year) (occurring every 7 years). And a year of Jubilee (every 49 years), which are marked as “re-counted the weeks of the jubilees, and made known to them the days of the years, and set in order the months and re-counted the Sabbaths of the years as we [the angels] made (them), known to him.” These calendrical calculations, based on recurrent counting of days and Sabbaths, on divisions of 12 months, seven festivals, years of 364 days and 52 Sabbath, 4 seasons composed of three months each, fallow years and Jubilee years – that were all synchronized by the priestly custodians in the Jerusalem Temple – were the books that Abraham had read when he was taught to read “in Hebrew in the language of the creation.” Numbers reckoned or calculated in Hebrew, pertaining to holy time and counted in the holy language, are divine, eternal, angelic, permanent and holy. These numbers are not changeable nor negotiable in the priestly lore, because they are the foundation of the covenant based on eternal cycles of holy times, com-

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memorated by letters and numbers. These numbers pertaining to the weeks (52), the months (12), the four seasons (91 days each) and the years (364 days). The numerical cycles commemorated in the holy tongue relating to fallow years (every seventh year) and Jubilees, (every 49 years) are calculated in relation to a solar year commencing in the spring, on Wednesday the first of the first month, the month of spring, Nisan. Every year has 364 days, four parallel seasons of 91 days, and 52 Sabbaths. Shabatot, Moadim, shemitot and yovlim are the names of the eternal sevenfold cycles.7 In the Babylonian Talmud, we find a new reflection on the language of creation. The narrator is describing Bezalel the son of Uri (exodus 31: 1–11), the gifted builder of the Holy Place, known as the “tent of meeting” in the desert in the book of Exodus: “Bezalel knew how to join together letters in which heaven and earth were created.” (Bavli, Berachot 50a). The holy tongue (leshon ha-Kodesh), was associated from late antiquity onwards with holy appointed times of the Lord (Moadei Kodesh), (Lev. 23, 25), with Holy Scriptures (the Hebrew Bible) (kitvei ha-Kodesh), and with holy community learning Hebrew (Kehilat Kodesh). It was further connected with the holy land (Eretz ha-Kodesh), with the holy city (Ir haKodesh; Jerusalem), with holy angels (Malakhei Kodesh), with holy covenant (Brit Kodesh), with holy worship (Avodat haKodesh) and with holy reading convocations (Mikraei Kodesh). Each one of these holy concepts was a subject of an ongoing elaboration, exegesis, interpretation and deliberation in reading and writing, in study and interpretation, in law and judgement, and in ritual and liturgy. Since the Jewish people lived in different continents during two millennia of exile, and did not have central authoritative leadership, every Jewish man who learned to read Hebrew could have participated in the cycles of the readers and writers, the interpreters or the poets, in his respective Hebrew reading and writing Jewish community. The priestly books of Enoch and Jubilees, as well as many of the prophetic and priestly biblical books, established a direct covenantal axis between heaven and earth. The covenant between angels and priests, or between God and his prophets and priests, took place between the world of the heavenly angels, known as “the world of the chariot” and the earthly participants in the praying circles in the synagogue, known as “the small Temple”. The transcendent mystical language in these books – rendered as the beautiful holy language of creation, offering a direct connection between heaven and earth, or between the hidden and the revealed, the mythical and the liturgical – had not been used as a communicative language of daily life of the present. It was used only as a mythical and mystical 7 On the priestly calendar see: Vanderkam, James: Calendars in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Measuring Time, London: Routledge 1998; Elior, Rachel: The Three Temples. On the Emergence of Jewish Mysticism, Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization 2004.

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language telling of the biblical past, from the days of creation. Moreover, the holy language was transmitted as apocalyptic, mystical, ritual, legendary or liturgical language, telling the readers about the heavenly transcendental perspective and the messianic-mystical future.

2.4

The gender perspective of the mystical tradition of holiness

For three thousand years, these concepts of holiness – pertaining to the biblicalmythical written past and to its eternal textual truth, to the holy angels and to the holy community that commemorates its past in ritual calendar and biblical covenant – were associated with the “holy language” that was reserved for Jewish men alone. Only men were engaged in studying, reading, writing, teaching and praying, ritualizing, analyzing, criticizing, leading and judging. For everyday life, Jews would have used the profane vernacular oral language of the mothers and not the written holy language of the fathers. Jewish female children did not go out of their house to learn to read Hebrew. They remained at home and learned from their mothers the vernacular language of the mothers, be it Aramaic, Yiddish, Ladino, Judeo-Arabic, or Judeo-Persian, all of which were written only in Hebrew letters, but were used mainly, first and foremost, as a spoken language for daily use and not as written language. Most young Jewish females never learned Hebrew, which was a strict obligation for all young Jewish males from an early age under close communal supervision. Consequently, before the modern era, most women did not know how to read and write in Hebrew, and many of them did not know how to read and write in any other language until the 20th century.8 In the traditional world, when life expectancy was much shorter, young women were expected to become betrothed at a very early age, usually in the first part of the second decade of their life, and to get married in the early years of the second part of this decade. Thus, any monetary investment in schooling seemed unreasonable and unnecessary for the young future mothers. There were no public institutions of Jewish study for observant Jewish girls in the eastern Moslem world where the enlightenment did not arrive until the late part of the 19th century, and in the Polish-Jewish world in 1917. In a community that consecrated literacy for all Jewish men, women were mostly left out of the study circles of students, scholars, readers and writers in the holy language. Consequently, they had no share in any communal life with regard to teaching and learning, leading prayer or judging, reading or writing, voting, electing or being given a chance to be elected. In the huge library 8 See: Elior, Rachel: Grandmother did not know to read and write, Jerusalem: Carmel Publishing House 2018.

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of the Jewish people that includes 100,000 printed books before the 20th century, there was not a single book that was written in the Hebrew language by a Jewish woman. This was the situation from antiquity until the very late part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century. There is no Hebrew book known to us in manuscript, nor a single Hebrew book that had been printed in the lifetime of its female author while being considered as valuable before the 20th century. There were many social and religious reasons for this patriarchal reality of female illiteracy and women’s absence from the public communal life of the literate male community; the monopoly on knowledge was restricted to men alone, but there was one ancient reason for this that was uncontestable. The holy language, recorded in the Holy Scriptures, was associated with God, with angels, with eternity and with a high degree of purity, from antiquity until the modern era. Writing a Holy Book or a biblical book on parchment scrolls, which was only done by men, required a high degree of purity from the writer, and reading from a Torah scroll was carefully regulated concerning purity and touching. Women, who were considered impure because of their monthly menstrual cycle, were not considered suitable to be present where holy scrolls were kept for public or individual teaching, or public communal reading, and were not considered fit to be present where pure holy angels are present as part of the prayer in the synagogue. The synagogue often served as the study class for male children, taught by male teachers alone. The Hebrew language was reserved as holy language of creation, divine law and commanded literacy, only for learned Jewish males, who were commanded to observe the 613 written commandments. The holy language of study and prayer was reserved only for those who were interested in the legal tradition, or in the far covenantal past, in the sevenfold holy festivals detailed in Leviticus 23 and 25 and their foundations in the book of Genesis. The written language was kept exclusively for men who were interested in the books of Enoch and the book of Jubilees and similar priestly books connected to angels and priests as well as to synagogue ritual angelic liturgy. In late antiquity, the Aramaic language had been used as a communicative language of the present for the benefit of all the community, and sometimes the Greek language or the Judeo-Persian language, and later on, in the Middle Ages, the Arabic language and later the Judeo-Arabic, Yiddish and Ladino. Those languages were not usually taught from books; they were the spoken languages of the different encircling communities that the Jews lived in, and the mothers, who grew up mostly only within spoken language spoke them. Most often men would write these languages in Hebrew letters if there was a need to write them for commercial reasons, family communication, or for literary and judicial reasons. It was only in German-Jewish communities, from the early modern period, that girls learned to read and write in Yiddish, in order to

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participate and help in the daily management of the family business, small shops or small banking, loaning and pawning, precious stones or used cloth that usually took place at home.

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Part Two: The crucial significance of the revival of this ancient mystical-messianic tradition in the secular Zionist present and its Political Implications in the State of Israel

3.1

The Holy language in the time of the Sages; written law and oral law

After the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in the year 70 CE, and the following rebellion against the Roman army that took place in 132–136 CE, a new cultural-religious reality had been formed by the Sages, who had to consolidate new responses to the various challenges of the termination of the biblical world. This process had emerged because of the loss of Jerusalem and the demolition of the Temple. It involved the end of divine worship by the priestly order and the Levitical service that marked the biblical era, and the cancellation of the priestly calendar that had been maintaining the eternal cycle of sacrificial worship in the Temple according to Sabbaths and the seven holy festivals. The Sages, who were first to realize the immense loss of all the tangible Jewish past of the biblical era, after the destruction of the Second Temple and the razing to the ground of Jerusalem, started their reign upon the new era by designating the biblical Hebrew language as Leshon ha-Kodesh, Holy Language. They started by demanding that every Jewish boy learn to read in the holy Hebrew language as it is written in the Torah, as the commemoration of the Jewish past and the foundation of Jewish identity, embedded in a textual reality of divine law and Holy Scriptures. Its next step was to canonize the Torah that every child had to learn in the first and second decades of his life, and to centralize the study of the Torah, the “Written Law” in a new way. The Sages characterized the new era by the new expression, “Oral Law”, or human sovereignty of free interpretation of the written law, which follow as the next stage of study, after mastering the reading of the literal version of the canonized written law. In the process of canonization, they excluded, censored and marginalized much of the previous angelic-priestly-covenantal written past that they labeled as “External Books” or apocryphal books. This new world of the “Sages of the oral law” was based on the “sealing” of the “Written Law” known as the Hebrew Bible (24 books), or canonization of the Holy Scriptures. Inevitably, this process included two major turning points: censorship of the previous priestly literature that could not be incorporated

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int the canon;9 asserting the end of prophecy and any other form of direct divine inspiration through dreams, prophetic visions, or angelic revelation. A new course of human sovereignty was developing together with a new freedom of interpretation and type of human authority. This new cultural and religious turning point created a new layer in the Hebrew language known as the “tongue of the sages” or Leshon Hakhamim. The new culture of the Sages, known also as the Rabbis, that based itself on human sovereignty, freedom of human exegesis and ending divine prophecy, refrained from mentioning angels in its early appearances in the Mishna and the Tosefta, eliminated the place and need of priests and prophets, and prohibited writing new holy books under divine inspiration. The Sages disputed with the priestly memories (the Sages denominated them in a negative way as Sadducees or Zadokim; obscured their original biblical name as “the priests, the sons of Zadok”), while asserting new human authority and new human freedom of interpretation, applied on the ancient holy written text. The interpretive and exegetical deliberations were conducted orally in Hebrew and Aramaic, in the new “house of study” or “beit midrash” house of exegesis and hermeneutics. The later written testimonies on these new interpretive and exegetical deliberations were written down in Hebrew and Aramaic well into the later part of the first millennium CE.10 The Aramaic that was the spoken language in the Land of Israel and Babylon gained greater importance in the new oral teachings. The sages, or the new interpreters of the sacred texts and the new legislators and masters of human hermeneutics, developed two major directions of intellectual activity, Halakha and Agadah. The Halakha, derived from the Hebrew word for walking, halikha, focused upon an ongoing analytical comparative study of the previous legal tradition and on its reorganization by new topics, new criteria and new themes. The new teachers engaged in detailed categorization of the texts into ideal principles and practical implementations, alongside divisions into systematic subjects and judicial issues, and analysis of its principles and minute material details. This multivalent judicial process conducted according to human sovereignty and human wisdom, took place in order to constitute a new order by setting clear 9 Parts of the ancient priestly literature were preserved in translation in the Christian Bible. They were known later as the Apocrypha or Pseudepigrapha. Parts of the Dead Sea Scrolls that were written in Hebrew and Aramaic correspond to the Apocrypha or Pseudepigrapha. Other parts of the rich priestly literature, historical, legal, liturgical and mystical, were unknown until they were found in Hebrew and Aramaic between 1947–1956 in the Judean Desert. 10 See: Sussmann, Yaakov: “‘Torah she-be-al peh’ peshutah ke-mashma’ah – koho shel qoso shel ˙ ˙ yod,” in: Sussmann, Yaacov, Rosenthal, David (eds.): Mehqerei Talmud III. Talmudic Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Ephraim E. Urbach, Part I, Jerusalem: Magnes 2005, pp. 209–384.

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borders for the Jewish community wherever it may dwell. This process set binding legal authority, based on detailed discussions and final decision of the majority, while recording the opinion of the minority for future discussion of coming generations. The new teachers known variably as Pharisees, interpreters, Sages, Tanayim (teachers of oral law) and Rabbis, claimed a new source of authority: “the [oral] tradition of our fathers that we hold in our hands”. The significance of this anonymous source of human authority was anchored in the claim that alongside the ancient holy written tradition of sacred scriptures and the priestly library and ritual memory in the Holy Tongue, there was another unrecognized oral human tradition of great significance. The new oral source was called the “tradition of the fathers”, that would be revealed by the sages in the course of their oral scholarly discussion and legal exegesis. The Pharisees claimed new freedom of interpretation derived from the insightful and analytical study of the divine law in its ideal perception as well as in its earthly implementations. They were further concerned with the question what is the right way to commemorate many commandments which were no longer available after the destruction of the Temple and the termination of the priestly service of the divine worship. All the huge legal library of the Halakha, known as “oral law” had emerged out of the new source of authority (“oral tradition of our fathers”) anchored in human sovereignty (a decision made by a majority of opinions of what the right interpretation of the law is) and the new freedom of human interpretation in regard to the sealed divine law. The relation between the ancient written divine law (tora she-bichtav) and the new human interpretation (tora she-beal-peh) was perceived as a new textile woven out of unchangeable old warp and new creative weft or ancient lengthwise and new crosswise. Text, textile and texture all derive from the same Latin verb, texere, to weave. The biblical text was the sealed lengthwise threads and the new halakha was the interwoven crosswise threads woven into it. The binding authoritative biblical text was the fixed lengthwise threads, but the ongoing innovative dynamic human interpretation, including debates, arguments, ongoing exegesis and majority decision, that generated the Halakah, was constantly interwoven into it, creating new texts (new contents) and new textures (new forms), that generated an immense authoritative library and new layers of the Hebrew language. New human voices in new spoken Hebrew and Aramaic were joining with the ancient written divine voices of God and the angels, priests and prophets that wrote under divine inspiration in the Holy language of biblical Hebrew. Later on, these new voices of the sages, maintained that the “oral law” as was first introduced by the Pharisees, was actually given in Sinai, alongside with the “written law”, and argued that both Torah, the written version and the new oral one, enjoy the same authoritative sacred status.

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The Agadah [the legendary imaginative literature] on the other hand, expressed creative freedom and free imagination that were not bound by any previous authoritative text, freedom that created a new literary genre and a new expression of the Hebrew language. The masters of the Agadah, who were mostly the same masters of the Halakha, expressed a strong urge to retell the entire previous tradition in a new fragmentary dialogical way, where new human interpreters, poets and storytellers retold the “sealed” biblical text with innovative insights. The Halacha, or the legal tradition, was written, edited and assembled in the Late Roman and early Byzantine period, in the first half of the first millennium CE. Unlike the legal tradition that was binding and authoritative in its final reduction in the Mishna and the Talmud, the Agadah that was formulated in the same period, and continued through a few more centuries, was interested in the freedom of narrating biblical memory from a new perspective. The process took place by fragmentizing the biblical text and by breaking borders of time and space and adding new voices to the conversation of the generations. The masters of the Agadah, who claimed no binding authority, were interested in contemplating in depth all possible readings of the entire biblical corpus in a new manner, focusing on every individual word or any singular sentence, adding new interpretations and new exegesis, not bound by the biblical order or by legal principle commitment or practical implementation. They had conceived an imaginative new legendary layer that responded to the tragedy of the destruction of the Temple and the demolition of Jerusalem, as well as to the loss of national sovereignty and the reality of exile and slavery, which many of the Jewish people had experienced after the rebellion against the Romans in 70 CE and 132–136 CE. The new legends narrated by the masters of the Agadah constituted a new textual reality relating to the past and concerned with the future. The new legendary texts pertained to the hidden reality, that included the heavenly sanctuaries, the invisible Messiah and the holy Shekinah, the sacred angels as part of the heavenly court presided by God, Elijah the prophet and the various stages of the depths of exile and persecution and the hopes for redemption and salvation. As mentioned above, a completely new manner of expression had been added to the Hebrew language in the course of the first half of the first millennium CE. It was called Leshon Hakhamim, the “language of the sages” or the “tongue of the wise”, that constituted a new textual reality, adding a new mundane vocabulary to the holy language. It recorded diverse human deliberations in the rabbinic schools in The Land of Israel and Babylon, concerned with law and legend, with exegesis and interpretation, in Aramaic written with Hebrew letters and in Hebrew that incorporated Aramaic vocabulary. It included mundane concrete concerns in the legal tradition alongside the ancient divine foundations that were reconstructed anew in the legendary tradition. However, the ancient priestly and Levitical circles and others that joined them in the course of the generations

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continued to teach the small children in every Jewish community the holy language alone, so they would be able to read the ancient biblical written tradition. These priestly circles developed a new mystical language and continued to write angelic poetry in Hebrew about their heavenly counterparts, “the serving angels”. They wrote mystical and martyrological narratives in Hebrew about the entrance to Paradise in a vision or a dream or ascending into the seven heavenly sanctuaries of the “divine chariot” that had replaced in heaven the lost divine worship of the Temple on earth.11

3.2

Past and Future

In the course of most of the two millennia that had passed between exile and redemption, or between the years 70 CE to 1882, when the first Zionists started to return to the Promised Land, most of the Jewish people had taught all their male children to read Hebrew. They did it at the local Jewish school in the synagogue, at the house of the teacher, or at home, with private teachers, and many of those readers became Hebrew writers. This situation is evident by the fact that thousands of them had created 100,000 books in the Hebrew language. These Hebrew books have been collected and are preserved in the National Library in Jerusalem, together with 77,000 manuscripts. These books and manuscripts were written in the ancient holy language that incorporated various lingual layers in the traditional world during the course of history. This immense number of books pertains to numerous subjects and many different topics, in a language that focused on the ancient biblical past and its interpretation by the Sages. The Jewish community that had lived in exile as a persecuted minority under different socio-religious and political circumstances for the last two thousand years was focusing on conserving a separate identity anchored in the past, based on adhering to separate religion, society and culture that originated in the past. The community managed to keep the presence of the past through preserving the holy language in constant teaching of reading and writing, in encouraging communal reading and writing, and by studying, praying and blessing in Hebrew on a daily basis. The Jewish community further focused on the transcendental heavenly world, on the eternal divine law or on the Halakha and Agadah, or on religious philosophy and Kabbalah, or on the mystical-messianic national future that was refuting exile and defying arbitrary destiny, while promising an 11 See: Elior, Rachel: “From Earthly Temple to Heavenly Shrines – Prayer and Sacred Song in the Hekhalot Literature and its Relation to Temple Traditions,” in: Jewish Studies Quarterly, 1997/ 4 (3), pp. 217–267.

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imagined alternate reality known as national redemption or salvation, through the mystical and apocalyptic literature.

3.3

The ancient Jewish tradition in the modern era and the emergence of Zionism

The first turning point of this historical-cultural-religious reality of the traditional Jewish world in exile, anchored in the biblical past while yearning for a divine national redemption in the future, took place in the footsteps of the emerging enlightenment movement in Europe of the late 18th–19th centuries and the emancipation of the Jews that followed in certain parts of Europe. The enlightenment movement that hailed humanism, liberalism and national rights instead of conservative religious duties, demanded equal human rights and liberation from the authority of the church. The movement that criticized the values of the Christian world – church authority, royal supremacy, religious patriarchy, different rights to different social strata according to the patriarchal feudal order that did not allow equal knowledge and freedom to all men and women – had a great influence on the Jewish community. The literate Jews took great interest in liberal national identity associated with national language, as well as in freedom, equality and free access to knowledge and human rights. Many of the Jews were fascinated by the growing interest in national languages, national literature, national history and memory, national identities, as well as in scientific knowledge and art, free from religious supervision, taught in trans-national imperial language. They were interested in liberal manmade redemption or in better future for free, educated and equal people, and in the role of secular literature as well as in secular history and ideology. In the late part of the 19th century the Russian Government, which ruled over vast geographical domains where millions of Jews were living from Poland to the Ukraine, Lithuania and Byelorussia, insisted that all children would learn in modern schools under State supervision. The Jews, who resented external supervision on their ancient teaching system, compromised on Hadarim Metukanim, i. e. “reformed rooms” or revised Jewish elementary schools. The new reformed institutions were established around 1899. By 1903 they included around 934 schools that taught Hebrew in Hebrew and not in Yiddish translation. The teachers who taught only in Hebrew focused on the narrative of the biblical stories and not on the traditional legal parts and taught the daily parts of the prayer book alongside Jewish history, mathematics, Russian and Hebrew as a living language. Secular Zionism was born in these circles of the “enlightened” Jews, those who learned in the “reformed rooms”, or those who were affected by the national

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ideas of the Enlightenment, and studied Hebrew as a living language by private teachers. They grew up in the same time that the Zionist movement had developed. They belonged to those Jews who did not want to continue to live in exile as helpless persecuted religious minority, suffering from growing Anti-Semitism, cultivating hopes for heavenly redemption or divine salvation. They chose to leave the old world who spoke Yiddish and learned in Hebrew, and to return to the ancient holy land, speaking Hebrew as a living language, with new national secular aspirations, connected to the ancient-new language, and with new hopes for human redemption. In the last two decades of the 19th century, and the first two decades of the 20th century, the Jews – who had lived in exile as a persecuted minority for two millennia, and learned about the Holy Land in the Holy tongue and prayed in Hebrew every day for the return to Zion and Jerusalem – had started to gradually return to The Land of Israel, then governed by Moslem Ottoman rule, since 1517. These new arrivals that were known by the names “pioneers” (Halutzim) and “ascending immigrants” (Olim), were affected by the renewal of the spoken Hebrew language in the “reformed rooms”. They were inspired by the new lingual-nationalistic spirits in Europe of the “Spring of Nations” that were associated with national language, and by the new secular Hebrew literature emerging in the mid-19th century, all over Europe, that spread the new ideas of the enlightenment and the new liberal nationalism. The Jews had enjoyed new equal legal rights as citizens for the first time, in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, since 1867. They were also much affected by the visionary writings of Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), who wrote his visionary books on the Jewish future in Vienna. They were much influenced by the Dreyfus affair in 1894, and by the recurring pogroms, blood-libels and religious persecutions against the Jews in Russia and the Ukraine, that followed the assassination of Alexander the II (1818–1881), the Tsar of the Russian Empire, that were known as the “the southern storms”. These pogroms pre-figured the pogroms of 1903–1905, and were culminated by the 1500 separate pogroms and massacres between 1917–1920 in the regime of Symon Petliura (1879–1926) in 1300 Jewish communities in the Ukraine, pogroms that caused loss of several hundred thousand people.12 The intense course of the liberal political turning points and judicial events, on one side, accompanied by extreme anti-Semitic aggression and violence against the Jews on the other, clarified to them that there was no safe place for the hated “emancipated” Jews in Russia, Poland and the Ukraine or in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Jews, who had experienced a very short opportunity in order to enjoy the benefits of liberal emancipation before the old waves of Anti-Semitic 12 Abramson, Henry: A Prayer for the Government. Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999.

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persecutions violently reappeared, those who were saved from the assassinations, decided to run away for their lives. They immigrated to the New World in North America and South America, or returned to Zion, their ancient biblical homeland. Zion and Jerusalem always existed as a vivid textual reality and ritual daily reality and as a central part of Jewish religious and cultural identity for all readers, writers and speakers of the holy language and for all those who prayed daily in the synagogue or said the daily blessings. They called themselves Zionists and adopted the motto coined by the Zionist-Jewish-English writer, Israel Zangwill: “A Land without a People for a People without a Land”.13 One may certainly question the punctuality of the first part of this slogan, that one, which was based on observations of 19th century American tourists, and British travelers and writers, but the Jewish people who decided to immigrate to Zion, in the turn of the 20th century, identified with it with no doubts. Upon the following 66 years, 1882–1948, many individuals and families from many Jewish communities all over the world, approximately 600,000 people, followed the Ukrainian and Russian Jews that returned to Zion at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. They came to the Land of Israel as remnants of the horrible pogroms and two world wars. Most of the Jewish men knew the Hebrew language from their childhood study. However, most of the women, who did not go to school to study the Hebrew language before the secular reforms in education at the end of the 19th century in the Russian-Ukraine-Poland commonwealth, did not know Hebrew. However, the Zionist leaders that knew Hebrew as a spoken language from their childhood studies in the “reformed rooms”, decided at the very beginning of their arrival to the Land of Israel, that they would pursue and advance every effort to have a Hebrew State, a Hebrew Workforce, and a Hebrew Language. [Medina ivrit, Avoda Ivrit ve-Safa Ivrit]. The Hebrew language, old and new, religious and mundane, that was a central part of the new national secular aspirations, that followed the Zionist revolution, was the broad common denominator for the new national-secular revival. However, for daily communication, Jewish people, men and women alike, always used other Jewish languages, Yiddish, Ladino, Aramaic or Judeo-Arabic, and general European languages like Russian, French, German and Hungarian, in Christian Europe, and local languages in Moslem Africa and Asia, and in the Holy Land.

13 See: Garfinkle, Adam M.: “On the Origin, Meaning, Use and Abuse of a Phrase,” in: Middle Eastern Studies, 1991/27 (4), pp. 539–550; Muir, Diana: “A Land without a People for a People without a Land,” in: Middle East Quarterly, spring 2008, pp. 55–62.

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The Secularization of the Holy Language

In September 1889, Eliezer ben Yehuda (1858–1922) and his Zionist friends established in Jerusalem a new cultural association, called “Clear Language” that was devoted to the renewal of the Hebrew language as a language of daily communication, language of the new present, shared by all Jews in the Holy Land. The purpose of the new association was to revive the Hebrew speech in the Land of Israel. The major aim was to connect the Ashkenazim (Jews who came from Europe and spoke Yiddish as their daily language) and the Sephardim (Jews who came from the Balkans, Asia and Africa, who spoke Ladino as their daily language) and the local eastern Jews that spoke Judeo-Arabic or Yiddish as their daily language. The idea was to connect all the Jewish communities in the Land of Israel with one spoken Modern Hebrew language. Many of the newcomers from Europe knew Hebrew as a spoken language, having learned in one of the 934 “reformed rooms” in the Russian-Polish-Ukrainian Jewish communities, where often boys and girls studied together for the first time. Or they learned together in the higher schools known as Gymnasia “Tarbut” (Hebrew speaking secular educational system in Russia and Poland for the Hebrew speaking students, that was active between the two world wars and taught thousands of Jewish students) and taught modern Hebrew. This lingual and cultural education had a great effect on the revival of Hebrew as a modern spoken language for everyday needs in the Land of Israel. The amalgamation of the New Hebrew speakers from the “reform rooms” and Gymnasia “Tarbut” and the traditional religious students of Hebrew as a holy language, did not always work well. The secular newcomers, the Zionist “revivalists”, who managed to transform the holy language into a modern spoken secular Hebrew, tried to impose the new version of Modern Hebrew as an exclusive national language on all the Jews in the Land of Israel, while the conservative religious circles struggled against them. One further step that was demanded in the first decades of the second half of the 20th century was that all the other languages that the new immigrants brought with them from their birthplaces and hometowns, and all the different collective cultural memories that were embedded in them, were pushed aside, marginalized or even forbidden.14 14 The Zionists perceived the Yiddish language as embodying the Jewish life and culture of Exile, which in their eyes was debased and backward, a language that negates Zionism in its very essence of submission to life in exile. Yiddish was the mother tongue of most of the Jews who were born in Europe, and therefore in the negation of Yiddish the Zionists embodied the negation of exile. There were struggles on the supremacy of Hebrew, the prohibition of speaking Yiddish, and teaching in German in the new academic institutions during the first three decades of the 20th Century in the Land of Israel and in several Jewish communities in Europe. The ultra-orthodox circles in the four holy communities, Jerusalem Hebron, Tzfat

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The first children that were born in the Land of Israel to the Zionist pioneers of the first immigration (1881–1904), the second immigration (1904–1914), and the third immigration (1919–1923), were not usually taught to speak Hebrew by their mothers. Often the children learned to speak Hebrew from male Hebrew teachers, who not only knew Modern Hebrew well from the “reformed rooms” and “Gymnasia Tarbut” in Europe (1917–1939), but also Biblical Hebrew and Mishnaic and Midrashim Hebrew. They knew it from their studies in their youth in the Yeshiva, and could use old words from those written corpuses in a new way. The male teachers often worked together with specially trained female kindergarten teachers, some of whom grew up in the “reformed rooms” in Europe and some learned in the teacher’s seminars there. The teachers and the kindergarten teachers invented a new spoken Hebrew relating to the new, actual and secular present, for this new first generation of children. They asked for the help of experts in the Hebrew language and the assistance of Hebrew writers and poets. They engaged Hebrew teachers and scholars, philologists, librarians and dictionary editors, who were living among the new immigrants or were still living in Europe, to provide them with new Hebrew words pertaining to every secular dimension of actual life, which the holy language did not provide. They required new words for every practical aspect of secular life or for use for the needs of the present, and not for commemoration of the holy past and religious culture, or for cultivating national messianic hopes for the redemptive-heavenly future. The teachers and kindergarten teachers of the turn of the 20th century needed secular words for toys, for baby food, for cooking, for children’s songs, for children’s clothing, for new kinds of furniture, for kitchen utensils, for shopping, for daily provisions and for agricultural tools or daily housekeeping. Such words and many others were not readily available in the holy Language, and probably were well known to the mothers in Yiddish, Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Persian and Ladino, but not in the holy Hebrew language. As noted above, most of the holy Language of countless generations of readers and writers, focused on vocabulary that pertained to the sacred past, to holy abstract heavenly entities, to sacred covenants or to the holy mystical tradition and to the messianic future, but hardly ever paid attention to the needs of the secular mundane present. The new secular Hebrew language was developing in the Land of Israel in the circles of the pioneers and the newcomers, the teachers and the kindergarten teachers. At the same time it was developing in the “reform rooms” in Russia and Poland where the Hebrew language was taught as a spoken language, and a little later in the comprehensive Hebrew secular educational system of “Tarbut” in Europe. The newcomers integrated new modern secular components to the old holy language and Teveria, who used Yiddish as their daily language and Hebrew as a holy language, resented forcefully the secularization of the holy tongue.

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and created a new amalgamation of old religious vocabulary and new innovative secular words. The secular national revival of the new language and the new secular national identity was achieved by abandoning significant parts of the previous collective memory that was embedded in the holy language, and created a new library and generated various lingual initiatives. Many members of the Jewish community in the Land of Israel and in other Jewish communities all over the world, men and women alike, were trying to contribute to the secularization of the Hebrew language. They participated in the transformative process of converting the ancient holy written language of the fathers, Leshon ha-kodesh, the holy tongue, into a modern spoken secular language of children and mothers that was called Leshon ha-hol, “the secular tongue” or the “mundane vernacular”. Two great contributors among many others to this process were the Jewish national poet, Hayim Nachman Bialik (1873–1934), born in the Ukraine, who invented four hundred new Hebrew words, based on new conjugations of ancient rare words. (Among them, such words as airplane, camera, export and import, firefly, accident, response, fertility, simplicity, legislation, and demonstrate). The second one, Eliezer ben Yehuda (1858–1922), the author of the first modern Hebrew dictionary, invented about three hundred new words, based on adoption of words from other Semitic languages. Among his inventions are the New Hebrew words for ice cream, doll, bicycle, sidewalk, brush and train. This radical process of modern innovation of the Holy Language was involved in secularizing ancient holy idioms. The innovators did not pay attention to the ancient Talmudic instruction: “Things of profane nature are permitted to be said in the holy language, sacred things are forbidden to speak in profane language” (BT, Shabbat 40 a). Few examples will be sufficient to demonstrate the desacralization process of the ancient religious Hebrew. The new invention, electricity, was translated into an ancient rare mystical word Hashmal, found only once in the Bible in the “vision of the chariot” of the priest-prophet Ezekiel (Ez. 1:4). The name of the new building of the Israeli secular parliament is “mishkan”, “tabernacle”, referring to the biblical name for the sacred residence of the divine presence. The secular daily newspaper Maariv took its name from the priestly evening prayer at the Temple and later in the synagogue. The Merkava, the name of the main battle tank used by the Israel Defense Forces is a good example. The mystical meaning of its name is “chariot”, derived from the divine chariot of the cherubim – Cherub is the name of a winged being mentioned frequently in the Bible (Genesis 3: 24; Ez. 1: 5–28; 10: 1–22). This transformation of many sacred ancient words into secular new words was accomplished by many participants who did not understand the full ramifications of what they were doing when they

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participated in the modernization and secularization of the ancient holy language. Many new Hebrew children’s songs, children’s books, study books, children’s newspapers, alongside new local newspapers, new books in the new language for new generation of readers, as well as translations of many books from world literature, reflected the innovative process of turning the sacred Jewish language into a secular Zionist Hebrew. Naturally, this desacralization process raised a great deal of resentment among the observant Orthodox circles, who could not accept the spoken secularization of the holy written language or the marginalization of Yiddish, their daily language. The innovation of the ancient language by suppressing parts of its past and secularizing parts of its holy vocabulary raised concerns in secular scholarly circles as well. The scholars were concerned with the harmful consequences of this actualization and secularization of the holy language for the future.

3.5

The danger of suppressed religious vocabulary in modern secular language.

The great German-Jewish-Israeli scholar, Gershom Scholem (1897–1982), the founder of the modern scholarship of Jewish Mysticism, who was born in Berlin and immigrated to Jerusalem in 1924, was an eyewitness to the process of secularization of the holy language. This process took place when the first pioneers realized that every moment in the new-old land contained within it an intense encounter between the mythical biblical past and its messianic expectations, and the actual secular Zionist experience. That is to say, they understood the inevitable conflict between the ancient infinite religious memory of the Holy Land and its Holy Language, and the new Zionist secular reality and the New Hebrew language that suppressed and reinterpreted the Holy Language. Nearly a hundred years ago, in 1926, Gershom Scholem wrote a famous letter concerning the Hebrew language to the eminent German Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929). Scholem wrote remarkably perceptive observations about the great danger of the process of actualization and secularization of the holy language in the new settlement: Gershom Scholem On Our Language: A Confession – For Franz Rosenzweig. On the occasion of 26 December 1926 This country is a volcano, and language is lodged within it. People here talk of many things

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that may lead to our ruin, and more than ever of the Arabs. However, there is another danger, much more uncanny than the Arab nation, and it is a “Actualization” of the Hebrew language? That sacred language on which we nurture our children, is it not an abyss that must open up one day? The people certainly don’t know what they are doing. They think they have secularized the Hebrew language, have done away with its apocalyptic point. But that, of course, is not true: the secularization of the language is no more than a manner of speaking, a ready-made expression. It is impossible to empty the words so bursting with meaning, unless one sacrifices the language itself. The phantasmagoric Volapuk spoken in our streets precisely defines the expressionless linguistic space which alone has permitted the “secularization” of language. But if we transmit the language to our children as it was transmitted to us, if we, a generation of transition, revive the language of the ancient books for them, that it may reveal itself anew through them, shall not the religious power of that language explode one day? And when that explosion occurs, what kind of a generation will experience it? As for us,

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we live within that language above an abyss, most of us with the steadiness of blind men. But when we regain our sight, we or our descendants, shall we not fall into that abyss? And we cannot know if the sacrifice of those who will perish in that fall will be enough to close it again. The initiators of the Hebrew language renaissance believed blindly, almost fanatically, in the miraculous power of language, and that was their good fortune. Because if they had been clairvoyant, they never would have had the demonic courage to resuscitate a language destined to become an Esperanto. Even today, they continue to walk along, enchanted, above an abyss from which no sound rises; and they pass on the ancient names and signs to our youth. As for us, we are seized with fear when, amidst the thoughtless discourse of a speaker, a religious term suddenly makes us shudder, though it may even have been meant to console. This Hebrew is heavy with impending catastrophe. It cannot and will not remain in its present state: our children have no other language left, and it is truly they alone who will pay the price for that meeting we have arranged for them, without ever having asked them, without asking even ourselves. The day will come when the language will turn against those who speak it. There are already moments in our own life when this happens, unforgettable, stigmatizing moments, when all the presumptuousness of our enterprise is suddenly revealed.

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When that day comes, will there be a young generation able to withstand the revolt of a sacred tongue? Language is name. The power of language is enclosed in the name; the abyss of language is sealed within it. Now that we have invoked the ancient names day after day, we can no longer hold off the forces they contain. Once awakened, they will appear, for we have summoned them with terrible violence. Indeed, we speak a vestigial, ghostly language. The names haunt our phrases; writers and journalists play with them, pretending to believe or to make God believe that all this is really not important. Yet, out of the spectral degradation of our language, the force of the holy often speaks to us. For the names have a life of their own; if they did not, woe to our children, who would be abandoned, hopeless, to an empty future. Hebrew words all that are not neologisms but have been taken from the treasure-house of our “good old language,” are full to bursting with meaning. A generation that takes over the most fruitful part of our tradition – its language – cannot, though it may ardently wish to, live without tradition. When the day finally comes and the force shored up in the Hebrew language is unleashed, when the “spoken” the content of language, takes form once again, our people will find itself confronted anew with that sacred tradition, signifying the choice before them: either to submit or to perish.

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Because at the heart of such a language, in which we ceaselessly evoke God in a thousand ways, thus calling Him back into the reality of our life, He cannot keep silent. This inevitable revolution of language, in which the Voice will again become audible, is the only subject never discussed in this country. Because those who endeavor to revive the Hebrew language did not truly believe in the Judgement to which their acts are summoning us. May the levity that has accompanied us on this apocalyptic path not lead us to our destruction. Jerusalem, 7 Tevet 5687.15

Scholem’s wise, far-sighted and frightful prophecy materialized approximately 40 years later in the political reality in the State of Israel, when Jewish religious messianic national fundamentalism that returned to the holy language, emerged in the circle of Rabbi Zevi Yehuda Kook after the victory in the Six Day War in 1967. This victory was interpreted as a messianic moment that opened new religious horizons of returning to the biblical past and paving the way to a new unprecedented messianic future. The messianic feelings and the religious yearnings for the biblical past (reinstating the Jerusalem Temple on the Templemount, where today the Dome of the Rock is situated, re-establishing the Kingdom of Judea, crowning a king and resuming the Temple sacrifices and the priestly service) further consolidated following the 1973 war of the Day of Atonement. It started when certain extreme sections of the right wing national-religious population, known as the “settlers” or as “Gush Emunim”16, students of Rabbi Cook, adopted the ancient religious priestly language of the Temple Sacrifices and the divine worship of the High Priesthood of the Temple cult. They further 15 Translated from the German by Ora Wiskind. See: Scholem, Gershom / Wiskind, Ora: “On Our Language. A Confession,” in: History and Memory, 1990/2 (2), pp. 97–99. 16 Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) was an Israeli Orthodox Jewish, messianic, right-wing activist movement, committed to establishing Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights based on the belief that, according to the Torah, God gave it to the Jewish people and the Messiah will come when all the land will be settled.

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revived the messianic language of redemption and beginning of salvation and integrated it forcefully to the political reality of post-war secular Israel. What started as messianic revival attached to the new settlements in the occupied territories, which were perceived as part of the “Promised Land” or the biblical land of Israel, had ended in the tragic murder of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1922–1995). He wanted to negotiate peace with the Palestinians in return for giving them back most of the occupied territories, however, the messianic settlers perceived it as treason in biblical Israel and the apocalyptic horizon and they were determined to stop the peace process that required giving up on biblical territories in every way. A fundamentalist-messianic religious Jew, who believed that the Prime Minister was endangering the promised messianic revival with his intentions to sign a peace treaty that involved returning the occupied territories, assassinated Rabin in 1995. The right wing in Israel that supports the settlers or the biblical narrative and the messianic horizon, has been in power since 1996. Parties that support the rebuilding of the Jerusalem Temple and the renewing of the sacrifices are a legitimate part of the political discourse. Hanan Porat (1943–2011), one of the founders of “Gush Emunim”, expressed an apt example for this explosive language that tries to renew the holy past, on the expanse of annihilation of the secular Zionist present, in a public statement before the murder. He wrote explicitly about the purpose of the settlements in the occupied territories from the point of view of the messianic right wing who believes in the renewal of the religious biblical past at all costs. He delineated clearly the intentions of the hundreds of thousands of Israelis who live beyond the Green Line in illegal settlements: The ingathering of the exiles, the establishment of the state and its defense are only the first stages. We have other great goals, which are integral part of Zionism: First and foremost, the establishment of ‘a kingdom of priests and a holy nation’ (Exodus 19:6). The restoration of the Shekinah to Zion, the establishment of the kingdom of the house of David and the building of the Temple – as a key point in ‘the repair of the world in the kingdom of God.’17

This mystical-messianic expression, derived from the Holy Language, that became the foundation for the right wing national religious party, had been first cultivated in the Land of Israel by the mystical-messianic teacher Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen Kook (1865–1935), in the first third of the 20th century. His son R. Zevi Yehuda Kook (1891–1982) had promoted this messianic-mystical language uncompromisingly and vigorously within the new political entity of the State of Israel. His devoted students continued to promote the ancient messianic

17 See: Huberman, Haggai: Against all odds: 40 years of settlement in Judea, Samaria, Benjamin and the valley 1967–2007, Tel Aviv: Netzarim Books 2008, introduction to the book.

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language, the holy language that had been studied for thousands of years as a language of the biblical past and the messianic future. The religious students uncovered the ancient holy language under the secular modern Hebrew of Israel as democracy, and they integrated it into their biblical territorial aspirations in the third part of the 20th century, after the 1967 War. A position which has been forcibly integrated into the political discourse until today.18 The political-religious murder of prime-minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 was profoundly influenced by this very process that integrated ancient messianic hopes with the new settlements in the occupied territories that Israel held after the state victory in the war of 1967. The newly occupied territories were endorsed as a sign of the emergence of the new-old messianic era that was nurtured by the holy language for two thousand years. The crisis after the consequences of the war in 1973 generated the religious political activities of the right wing in the occupied territories. Israel today is profoundly divided between two factions, right and left, religious and secular, messianic and democratic. One faction responds to God’s voice from biblical times invested with messianic promises, kept in the holy language; the other faction listens to Modern Hebrew and adheres to the Declaration of Human Rights and the Israeli Declaration of Independence. The first faction wants to renew the biblical past and its messianic mystical context, as preserved in the ancient holy language and the sacred Jewish library – written in a transcendental language in which “every letter is full of worlds, souls and divinity.”19 The second faction holds to the imminent importance of the secular Zionist project as a homeland to the persecuted Jewish people, and the Modern Hebrew language as the foundation of the new vision of the Jewish-democratic State of Israel, a state belonging to all its citizens. All Jews share love and respect for the ancient holy language, the language of their ancestors. All Jews share love and respect for the common Jewish past and to the sacred ancient library, and most of them who are living in the State of Israel speak Modern Hebrew. However, all Modern Hebrew speakers are profoundly divided between those who are guided by their total commitment to the holy language of the past and its practical instructions in their political adherence and daily life as observant religious settlers, who wish to revive the biblical past, and to renew the messianic present and the renewal of the Temple; and between those who refuse to return to biblical Israel as a living practice in the present and to live 18 See: Feige, Michael: Settling in the Hearts. Jewish Fundamentalism in the Occupied Territories, Detroit: Wayne State University Press 2009; Inbari, Motti: Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012; Sprinzak, Ehud: “From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground,” in: Rapoport, David C. (ed.): Inside Terrorist Organizations, London: Routledge 2013, pp. 194–215. 19 As Israel Baal Shem Tov, the founder of Hasidism wrote in his “holy epistle” in 1746.

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within messianic-priestly horizon in the future. The voice of God and the voice of the covenant in the holy language is heard loud and clear by half of the population. The other half hears the voice of reason and compromise, the voice of liberal democracy and equal human rights. It seems, currently, that the two parties have had no common language in the last fifty years.

Bibliography Abramson, Henry: A Prayer for the Government. Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999. Berlin, Isaiah: “The Origins of Israel,” in: Laqueur, W. Z. (ed.): The Middle East in Transition, London: Routledge 1953. Charlesworth, James H. (ed.): The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Volume 2, Garden City: Doubleday 1985. Elior, Rachel: “From Earthly Temple to Heavenly Shrines – Prayer and Sacred Song in the Hekhalot Literature and its Relation to Temple Traditions,” in: Jewish Studies Quarterly, 1997/4 (3), pp. 217–267. Elior, Rachel: The Three Temples. On the Emergence of Jewish Mysticism, Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization 2004. Elior, Rachel: Grandmother did not know to read and write, Jerusalem: Carmel Publishing House 2018. Feige, Michael: Settling in the Hearts. Jewish Fundamentalism in the Occupied Territories, Detroit: Wayne State University Press 2009. Garfinkle, Adam M.: “On the Origin, Meaning, Use and Abuse of a Phrase,” in: Middle Eastern Studies, 1991/27 (4), pp. 539–550. Huberman, Haggai: Against all odds: 40 years of settlement in Judea, Samaria, Benjamin and the valley 1967–2007, Tel Aviv: Netzarim Books 2008. Inbari, Motti: Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012. Kaplan, Arie: Sefer Yetzirah. The Book of Creation in Theory and Practice, San Francisco: Weiser Books. Muir, Diana: “A Land without a People for a People without a Land,” in: Middle East Quarterly, spring 2008, pp. 55–62. Scholem, Gershom / Wiskind, Ora: “On Our Language. A Confession,” in: History and Memory, 1990/2 (2), pp. 97–99. Sprinzak, Ehud: “From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground,” in: Rapoport, David C. (ed.): Inside Terrorist Organizations, London: Routledge 2013, pp. 194–215. Sussmann, Yaakov: “‘Torah she-be-al peh’ peshutah ke-mashma’ah – koho shel qoso shel ˙ ˙ yod,” in: Sussmann, Yaacov, Rosenthal, David (eds.): Mehqerei Talmud III. Talmudic Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Ephraim E. Urbach, Part I, Jerusalem: Magnes 2005, pp. 209–384.

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Vanderkam, James: Calendars in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Measuring Time, London: Routledge 1998. Weiss, Tzahi: Sefer Yesirah and its Context. Other Jewish Voices, Philadelphia: Penn Press 2018.

Hana Bendcowsky

Religion in Israel – The Holy Places as a Case Study

Abstract Religion in the modern State of Israel is not only an expression of religious identity, a belief system or a lifestyle committed to a set of laws derived from sacred scriptures or religious authorities. Rather, religious identity in Israel is a multi-layered phenomenon, encompassing ethnic, national, cultural, linguistic, and historical features. Because holy places are a tangible expression of this multifaceted religious identity, their management and the manner in which they are treated by the authorities sheds light on the State’s attitude toward religion in general and the different religious communities in particular. It might be expected that in Israel, a country containing a plethora of holy places belonging to the three Abrahamic faiths as well as other religions, there would be a clear definition of what exactly constitutes a “holy place.” Although there are laws regarding the protection of holy places, the only sites that are explicitly defined as such are the Western Wall and a select group of 16 Jewish sites. The official legal recognition of the four Christian holy places mentioned in an Ottoman firman and the lack of a similar list of Muslim holy places whatsoever presents significant complications when dealing with violations of the “Law of Protection of Holy Places” (1967). Conflicting situations can be discussed in court, but inheritance from the British Mandate period renders some cases non-justiciable. Examining examples of cases that reflect the sensitivities around the holy places in Israel, intrareligious and inter-religion conflicts, and legal dispute, the conclusion emerges that although Israeli policy is not always clear-cut, creating space for maneuvering and personal agendas, in general, the place of religion is both central and respected.

1.

Introduction

In their article on religious freedom, Statman and Sapir argue that liberal democracies have a complex attitude toward religion. Historically, these systems of government all developed in countries where religion had a central place, and whose culture continued to be dominated by religious symbols and institutions generations after the decline of religion. In the Israeli context, the question of the status of religion has been a constant and prominent item on the public agenda

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since the establishment of the state, and indeed since the inception of the Zionist movement.1 Religion in Israel is not only an expression of religious identity, a belief system or a lifestyle committed to a set of laws derived from sacred scriptures or religious authorities. Religious identity in Israel is multi-layered, encompassing ethnic, national, cultural, linguistic, and historical aspects. Religious identities are often bound to a geographical place by sacred sites that connect the members of specific communities with each other and with land, history, and tradition. The Land of Israel is covered in – or perhaps scarred by – hundreds and thousands of holy places whose rationale is not related to practical uses, but which serve as ‘places of memory’ (lieux de memoire) (…) that is, sites that connect to a mythical past and a transcendent reality and are replete with spiritual and sacred significance. The population density in Israel is paralleled in the country’s landscape, with its mythical overload and meta-historical compression. This congestion of the sanctity of the territory in Israel appears to have shaped its history and the fate of its inhabitants more than any other factor.2

Since holy places are a tangible expression of religious experience, community, and identity, their management, and the manner in which they are treated by the authorities offers an indication of the state’s attitude toward religion in general and the different religious communities. This article will seek to explore the relations between state and religion in Israel through the prism of the holy places and their management by the state.

2.

Holy Places and National Identity

The ambivalent and conflicting attitudes towards holy places can be demonstrated in a spontaneous statement made in Jerusalem during the 1967 War. Rafi Amir, a reporter for the Voice of Israel, recorded himself on the third day of the war walking with the Paratroopers towards the Western Wall. He was recorded saying: “I am right now […] descending the stairs to the Western Wall. I am not a religious person, I have never been – but this is the Western Wall, and I am touching the stones of the Western Wall.”3 In Israel, a state with a majority of people who define themselves as non-practicing or secular Jews, 19 years of 1 Statemen, Daniel/ Sapir, Gideon: “Religious freedom, freedom from religion and protection of religious feelings,” in: Law Studies, 2004/21 (1), p. 5 (in Hebrew). 2 Bilu, Yoram: “Ritual and holy plan in the popular religions and civil religion,” in: Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Folklore, 2007–2008/19–20, p. 65 (in Hebrew). 3 Walla Branga: “Kol Israel reporter Rafi Amir passed away; Listen to the mythical text he broadcast.” Walla.co.il 2015, [video stream] available here: https://b.walla.co.il/item/2900768 [08. 12. 2019].

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longing for the Old City of Jerusalem inspired an outburst of national and religious fervor among many Israelis. This instinctive statement illuminates the wider meaning of holy places, which are not merely memorial sites for God’s revelation or places of theophany.4 Neither are they solely a Domus Ecclesiae where people gather for prayers. Holy places can be part of a distinct national identity. Most Israeli Jews perceive their identity as a blend of both Jewish and Israeli, and we might therefore assume that the connection to a place such as the Western Wall will be primarily Jewish and religious.5 For many, however, this is as a national site as well as a religious one, as a survey from 2017 indicates.6 Similarly, Arabs in the Holy Land have for centuries emphasized their special national commitment to protect Al-Aqsa, due to its important role in the Muslim world.7 Holy places play a role in preserving communities, especially minority communities. Local Christian communities in the Holy Land emphasize the importance of maintaining their presence near the holy places, quoting the Biblical letter to Peter: “You are the living stones built into a spiritual house” (1 Peter 2:5). The living stones retain the vitality of the standing still stones, from which the sites were built and keeping them from being a sole museum. Their role of the Living Stones gives meaning for their efforts to preserve the community in its location. The management or ownership of a sacred place is interpreted in the symbolic language of the pilgrims, as proof to justify the place holder, the authenticity of his connection to the place, and in general, his faith and tradition. Management facilitates the exercising of rituals, control the access, form the worship around it, and design it, it can be used as a religious argument for the owner, and a polemical argument against opponents.8 The events of the past 4 Eliade, Mircea: The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, New York: Harper & Brothers 1961, pp. 65–75. 5 Hartaf, Hagit: Being Israeli and Jewish: Social Education and Identity Building, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Haifa, Israel 2007, p. 165 (in Hebrew). 6 A survey conducted by the Schechter institute in 2017 found that 37 % of respondents believe that the Western Wall is both a religious site and a national site, 30 % think it is a historical site, 26 % believe it is a religious site only, and 4.4 % think it is a national site only. Gil, Yoav: “The Western Wall Prayer Survey: The Israeli public perceives the site as a national and historical place.” MyNetJerusalem.co.il, 24 May 2017, available here: https://jerusalem.mynet.co.il/local_ news/article/m_173385 [19. 05. 2020] (in Hebrew). 7 Cohen, Hillel: “Zionism and the Temple Mount, the Palestinian national movement and AlAqsa, comparative perspectives,” in: The New East: Journal of the Middle East and Islamic Studies, 2018/57, p. 109 (in Hebrew). Statements made by young people in recent years about the events in Al Aqsa indicate that their sense of commitment to protecting the Temple Mount is still in place. 8 Reiner, Elchanan: “The Exposed Lie and the Hidden Truth: Christians, Jews and Holy Places in the Land of Israel in the Twelfth Century,” in: Zion, 2008/63 (2), p. 161. Reiner demonstrates

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twenty years around the Temple Mount / Al Aqsa clearly reflect the importance of ownership, control, and presence at a holy place. For centuries, both ultra-Orthodox and Religious Zionists forbade visits by Jews to the Temple Mount. The site has been under Muslim control and use since the seventh century, while Jews have confined themselves to praying alongside the retaining wall, the Western Wall, for the last 500 years. When the possibility of visiting the Temple Mount became practical, there was consensus among rabbis that a visit to the Temple Mount plaza should be avoided. “Halachically the religious proscription against ascending the Temple Mount is related to matters of purity and impurity, but even without delving into them it should be clear that the sacred requires distance, not contact,” Chief Rabbi Kook and others wrote.9 The Al-Aqsa Intifada, the 2000 Camp David Summit, and rising tension around the Temple Mount have led to a change of attitude in Religious Zionists and some ultra-Orthodox concerning the Temple Mount. Activists offered theological and religious solutions to facilitate such visits, alongside practical solutions (concerning ritual impurity) and new archaeological findings regarding the exact location of the sacred area. Demonstrating a Jewish religious presence on the Temple Mount was perceived not only as a spiritual experience, but also an implementation of Israeli sovereignty over the plaza, Jerusalem, and Israel as a whole. Thus, in 2012 MK Yuli Edelstein, later to become Speaker of the Knesset, stated, “My job is to deal with the daily process of connecting and building the People of Israel, which leads to the Temple.” Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ze’ev Elkin went further: “It is important to remove [the Temple Mount] from the domain of the wild-eyed religious. We must explain to broad swathes of the people that without this place, our national liberty is incomplete.”10 In a survey from 2014 among Religious Zionists, 96.8 percent agreed that visiting the site would contribute to “strengthening Israeli sovereignty in the holy place.”11

how Jewish textual efforts were made to prove the unreliability of the Christian traditions attributed to the holy places and all pointed to the weakness of Christian grip on them and the entire land in the 12th century. 9 Persico, Tomer: “The End Point of Zionism Ethnocentrism and the Temple Mount,” in: Israel Studies Review, 2017/32 (1), pp. 104–121. 10 Persico, p. 115. 11 Persico, p. 111.

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Laws and Regulations

Since the management of holy places is a sensitive challenge that has political, national, cultural, and religious implications, and since Israel is home to countless places holy to the Abrahamic traditions, we would expect to find clear laws and regulations regarding the definition of these places and arrangements for their use. In practice, however, Israel has a number of laws, several of which were inherited from the British Mandate, regarding conduct in the holy places, but no definitive list of the places to which these laws refer. The Mandatory Mines Ordinance, the declaration of a nature reserve (section 22 of the National Parks Law), the construction of a water plant (section 70 of the Water Law, 1959), the removal or demolition of a sanctuary (section 51 of the Construction and Removal of Rehabilitation Areas Act 1965), and even the Road Sign (Signage) Law in 1966, all allow for the placement of a sign marking the presence of a “holy” or “sacred” place, but do not define the meaning of these terms. Following the application of Israeli law over East Jerusalem and the annexation of East Jerusalem, the State of Israel sought to emphasize its sincerity regarding the protection of the holy places. A day after the annexation, Prime Minister Eshkol addressed the religious leaders of all communities and assured them of Israel’s determination to protect the holy places. He mentioned the new Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727–1967,12 enacted just after the war. The goals of this law included the protection the holy places; the safeguarding of Jewish prayer rights mainly in light of the restrictions on prayers at the Western Wall prior to 1948, and the desire to demonstrate to the international community a commitment to protect the holy places and to treat the different religions equally, in the spirit of Israel’s Declaration of Independence. The law says that “The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything liable to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.” Those who violate the law are liable to imprisonment of up to seven years. The law also specifies who is responsible for its implementation: The Minister of Religious Affairs is charged with the implementation of this Law, and he may, after consultation with, or upon the proposal of, representatives of the religions concerned and with the consent of the Minister of Justice make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation.

12 Knesset 1967: “Protection of Holy Places Law 5727 (1967)”, available here: https://www. knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/HolyPlaces.htm [08. 12. 2019].

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However, this law is not what constitutes a holy place, who its representatives are, and what constitutes desecration. For example, HCJ ruling 257/8913 stated that the Regulations for the Protection of Jewish Holy Places would only be instituted after consultation with the Chief Rabbis. But do these rabbis necessarily represent the general Jewish view? What is their halakhic authority?14 If the law applies to any synagogue, does that include a Conservative synagogue – a place of worship the Chief Rabbi has avoided even acknowledging as a synagogue?15 Turning to the Christian religion, who should be consulted, given that Israel has 10 recognized Christian communities and many other unrecognized sects.16 The implementation of the law raises further questions. Does the law only protect places that were sacred before its enactment, or can it be applied to new places that were not previously sanctified? Can a holy place lose its sanctity, so that the law no longer applies to it? This question was raised during Israel’s “Disengagement” from the Gaza Strip, when the Minister of the Defense ordered the demolition of synagogues in the evacuated settlements, while the settlers claimed that a holy place cannot lose its holiness, and accordingly the synagogues should be protected. The question was also debated in court in the case of a Museum of Tolerance that is being built in Jerusalem over the ruins of what used to be a Muslim cemetery. The cemetery has not been used for more than 150 years, and as early as the 1920s, the Palace Hotel (today the Waldorf Astoria) was built by the Supreme Muslim Council on its land. In a petition to the Supreme Court, Muslims argued that the construction violated the Law of Protection of Holy Places. The court did not accept their petition, finding that the place had

13 Cordoza Law: “Anat Hoffman v. Western Wall Director HCJ 257/89 HCJ 2410/90,” in: Versa.cardozo.yu.edu 1994, available here: http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Hoff man%20v.%20Director%20of%20the%20Western%20Wall.pdf [08. 12. 2019]. 14 According to a survey from 2013, 67 % of Israeli Jews oppose the continued existence of the rabbinate in the current format. Gilhar, Ari: “According to Survey majority of Israelis oppose the Chief Rabbinate.” NRG, 15 Jul. 2013, available: https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/ online/11/ART2/490/351.html [08. 12. 2019] (in Hebrew). 15 Following the shooting at a synagogue in Pittsburg, the Chief Rabbi avoided saying that the victims were killed in a synagogue, since it is a Conservative one. Maltz, Judy: “Israel’s Chief Rabbi Refuses to Call Pittsburgh Massacre Site a Synagogue because it’s non-Orthodox.” Haaretz, [newspaper online] 28 Oct. 2018, available here: https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-israel-s-chief-rabbi-refuses-to-call-pittsburgh-massacre-site-a-synagogue1.6601043 [08. 12. 2019]. 16 The “recognized” Christian communities are the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, (Latin) Roman Catholic, Maronite, (Melkite) Greek Catholic, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Chaldean Catholic and, since 1970, (Anglican) Episcopalian.

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changed its purpose and that construction should continue while respecting the tombs remaining in the site.17 In 1981, the same month that the Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel was enacted, the Minister of Religions exercised his right to amend regulations and published regulations concerning the preservation of Jewish holy places.18 During the British Mandate, only two Jewish holy places were explicitly mentioned: the Western Wall and Rachel’s Tomb, the ownership of which was in dispute between Muslims and Jews, and which were subject to the status quo. During the British Mandate, Rachel’s Tomb was declared an exclusive Jewish site. Regarding the Western Wall, an investigative committee was set up following riots that erupted in the 1920s, confirming the existing status of the Western Wall. The British formalized the Western Wall’s status as a Muslim-owned site, while including Jewish prayer rights with limitations (no partition or chairs, no use of the shofar, etc.).19 The Western Wall’s status was changed after 1967 and is now enshrined in the 1981 regulations. These regulations include detailed rules of conduct, prohibited acts and restrictions, all of which apply only at the Western Wall. These include the prohibition of inappropriate clothes, respect for the Sabbath, and a ban on begging, speeches, or religious ceremonies that deviate from the traditional practice at the location or which injure worshippers’ feelings at the site.20

4.

Lists of Holy Places

The Appendix to the Regulations contains a detailed list of about 16 more holy places in the country, including Jewish sites in Peki’in, the Rambam’s tomb in Tiberias, the tomb of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai in Meron, the Sanhedrin tombs in Jerusalem, and more. With the exception of the 16 Jewish holy places enumerated in the Regulations for the Protection of Holy Places, the State of Israel has refrained from declaring 17 In November 2008, the Israeli Supreme Court decided to allow construction to proceed, based on the change in the use of the land. Supreme Court Decisions: “HCJ 52/06, 16/06, 1331/06.” Supreme Court Decisions 2008, [organizational website] available here: https://supreme decisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\06/520/000/r51&fileName= 06000520.r51&type=4 [08. 12. 2019] (in Hebrew). 18 Burg, Yosef: “Regulations file 16. 7. 1981.” Reshumot Minister of Interior 1981, [organizational website] available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/Law_word/law06/TAK-4252.pdf [08. 12. 2019] (in Hebrew). 19 George V of the United Kingdom: “Appendix I. Palestine (Western or Wailing Wall) Order in Council, 1931.” UNISPAL 1931, [organizational website] available: http://unispal.un.org/ UNISPAL.NSF/0/C2567D9C6F6CE5D8052565D9006EFC72 [08. 12. 2019]. 20 Added in 1989.

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additional holy places for Jews or holy places for other religions. After a Supreme Court petition demanded the formulation of a similar list of Muslim holy places, the state claimed that declaring a location as a “Holy Place” according to the law was not a necessary condition for applying the essential provisions of the law in practice.21 This question was addressed in court in 1998 when a Jewish right-wing activist planned to throw a pig’s head into the El-Aqsa plaza. In his trial, he claimed that the plaza was not a holy place, since the law relates only to the Western Wall and its surroundings, while the El-Aqsa esplanade is not mentioned by name. The court did not accept his argument on the grounds that it is “known and recognized” that the El-Aqsa plaza is a holy place. When it comes to the Christian sites, a list of seven holy places can be found in the Ottoman Firmans that established the Status Quo. The Ottoman Status Quo is the result of complex understandings evolved over the years between the various Christian denominations among themselves, and with the authorities, regarding practices at the seven most important Christian holy places in the Holy Land. Due to political constraints, especially after the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Ottomans “froze” the existing situation in a list of places of worship, the rights of worship and use of the churches in a Firman from 1852. The Ottoman Firman of 1852 mentioned the following holy places: 1. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher with all its annexes. 2. Deir al-Sultan on the roof of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. 3. The Sanctuary of the Ascension. 4. The Tomb of the Virgin (near Gethsemane). 5. The Church of the Nativity. 6. Milk Grotto. 7. Shepherd’s Fields. The Ottoman status quo was included in later international agreements and enshrined in the Paris Treaty (1858) and the Treaty of Berlin (1878). In the Mandate, the British were requested by the League of Nations to appoint “a Special Commission to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places.”22 However, this never transpired, and accordingly the list of the seven “obvious” holy places remained.

21 Adalah: “Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish v. Minister of Religions Affairs HCJ 10532/04.” Adalah the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel 2009, available here: https://www. adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/admin/DownLoads/SPics/7521736.pdf [08. 12. 2019]. 22 Council of the League of Nations: “‘The Mandate of Palestine’ section 13–14.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1922, [organizational website] available here: https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/ foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20mandate%20for%20palestine.aspx [19. 05. 2020].

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The State of Israel did not address this issue during the first 45 years following independence, but in 1993 it declared in the Fundamental Agreement between Israel and the Holy See: “The State of Israel affirms its continuing commitment to maintain and respect the status quo in the Christian Holy Places to which it applies and the respective rights of the Christian communities thereunder.”23 There seems to be no clear list of Christian holy places in Israel, and with the exception of the seven sites mentioned in the Ottoman Firman, of which only four are in Israel, the status of the other sites remains unclear. In Jerusalem alone, there are some 158 churches, of which 72 are in monasteries. These are obviously holy places – but does the Law of Preservation of the Holy Places apply to them?

5.

Conflicts over Holy Places

When a single place is perceived as holy by more than one religion, it is for the commissioner, the Minister of Religion, to decide who will use the site and how, in consultation with the relevant clergy. David’s Tomb, a site of religious importance to all three religions, is located outside the southwest side of the Old City walls, on Mount Zion. The building in which the tomb is located was built by the Catholic crusaders over a Byzantine Church as the Upper Room of the Last Supper and the Pentecost, and later expropriated by Muslims who turned it into a mosque in the sixteenth century, owned by the Dajani Daudi family. In 1948, after the war, Mount Zion came under Israeli sovereignty. The tomb and the surrounding buildings of the Dajanis were confiscated under the Absentee Property Law, and the property then passed to the Guardian of Absentee Assets, i. e. the State of Israel.24 Just like many other Muslim sites that were abandoned or neglected due to the displacement of the Arab population in 1948, David’s Tomb/Nebi Daud was not protected as a mosque, but was developed as a Jewish site, developed by the Committee for the Preservation of Holy Places, which worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Religion. Thus, David’s Tomb, which had been used as a church and later as a mosque for centuries, became a Jewish site and later a synagogue and house of study, from which every Muslim symbol was removed. This site was of particular importance between 1948–1967, when Jews had no access to other holy places such as the Western Wall, Rachel’s Tomb, and the Cave of the Patriarchs. The status 23 Holy See / State of Israel: “Fundamental Agreement Israel-Holy See.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993, available here: https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1993/pages/fundamental%20a greement%20-%20israel-holy%20see.aspx [19. 05.2020]. 24 Bar, Doron: “Re-creating Jewish Sanctity in Jerusalem: Mount Zion and David’s Tomb, 1948– 67,” in: Journal of Israeli History, 2004/23 (2), pp. 260–278.

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quo was maintained in the Room of the Last Supper on the second floor of the building. Although ownership was transferred to the Department for Christian Communities in the Ministry of Interior,25 and Muslims hardly visit the place, the limited prayer rights for Christians and the design of the building remained unchanged.26 The Ministry clearly favored Jewish worship at the tomb, just as the other two religions had granted prayer rights to their own respective communities in the past. The lack of a list of holy places is a problem when court intervention is needed, as noted above, and the Mandate called for the formation of a Special Commission. However, neither the League of Nations nor the British could determine the composition of such a commission, mainly due to disputes between the various Christian denominations. Accordingly, by 1924 the British had essentially abandoned the idea. Instead, they promulgated an Order in Council on July 25th, 1924 stating that no cause or matter in connection with the Holy Places or religious buildings or sites in Palestine or the rights or claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine shall be heard or determined by any Court in Palestine. If any question arises whether any cause or matter comes within the terms of the preceding Article hereof, such question shall, pending the constitution of a Commission charged with jurisdiction over the matters set out in the said Article, be referred to the High Commissioner … .27

In 1948, this authority was inherited by the government of Israel. In a case involving the Temple Mount, Supreme Court Justice Eliezer Goldberg explained: The reality on the Temple Mount is not simple; it is delicate and complicated, and the court cannot close its eyes to it and limit itself to the legal rules that it generally trusts… This is one of the cases where a judicial decision is not the reasonable way to settle the dispute, and the decision lies beyond the limits of the law. Otherwise the court will descend into the political arena when the necessary decision is between conflicting

25 The Ministry of Religious Affairs was established in 1949 and included departments that dealt with the non-Jewish religious communities. In 2003, the ministry was dismantled and attention to the non-Jewish communities moved to the Ministry of the Interior. A religious services ministry was set up to deal only with matters relating to Judaism. 26 The State of Israel changed the status quo by allowing both Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and Armenians to pray at Pentecost, in addition to Franciscans as well as the State permitting prayer on Thursdays for Christian unity. 27 George V of the United Kingdom: “The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 1924.” UNISPAL 1924, [organizational website] available here: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/ 0/FD455E412ACE30AD0525668E006EF702 [08. 12. 2019].

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feelings. This court politicization should be avoided, and the judicial solution, in this case, must give way to a political one, essentially by the political echelon.28

When the courts hear cases relating to the tension between the protection of a holy place and the preservation of individual rights, the problem intensifies. Such a question arose in the Ramban Cave affair in Jerusalem in 2000. The cave, which was owned by a Muslim Waqf (religious trust), served as a warehouse and was neglected until its owners sought to rent it to a car rental company that wanted to fence it for use as a parking lot. The National Center for Holy Places objected, claiming that it was a holy place and that a fence would deny Jewish worshipers access to the cave. The owners of the cave appealed to the court claiming violation of their property rights, while the National Center for Holy Places argued that the case was non-justiciable under the 1924 King’s Order, due to the site’s status as a holy place. The court was first required to decide whether the site in question indeed constituted a holy place, in consultation with the Minister of Religion. In this case, the Minister of Religion declared that the cave was identified as the place where the Ramban (Nachmanides) prayed and studied while visiting Jerusalem. He further argued that the Law of Protection of Holy Places and freedom of access outweighed the right of the owner of the property to close it.29A committee was appointed to examine the case and confirmed the Minister’s decision. A couple of years later, the Minister changed his recommendation as he could not provide the court with sufficient evidence that the place was a recognized holy place. Thus the court’s final ruling allowed the rental car company to put a fence around the cave.

6.

Defining Insult

The Israeli criminal code of 1970 dedicated an article to the protection of holy places and includes a prohibition against offense to religious sentiment and tradition. Article 7 of the penal code prohibits insult to religion and imposes penalties on anyone who destroys, damages or desecrates a place of worship or any object held sacred by a group of persons, with the intention of reviling their religion, or in the knowledge that they are liable to deem that act an insult to their

28 Berkovits, Shmuel: How Dreadful is this Place!: Holiness, Politics and Justice in Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Israel, Jerusalem: Carta 2006, p. 435. 29 Since the Minister of Religion’s decision was unilateral, the court demanded to establish a committee of professionals to examine the sanctity of the place. The committee concluded that the place was a place of worship for Jews. Berkovits, pp. 284–287.

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religion. It also outlaws the disruption of worship, unauthorized entry to a place of worship, and injury to religious sentiments.30 The law leaves it to the courts or the Minister to decide what constitutes a holy place, what type of entry will be considered an insult, and so forth. Once again, the law is aided by religious definitions given by religious leaders who do not necessarily represent the entire religious community. What should be the ruling in a situation where a place is sacred to more than one religion, and the exercise of the rights of worship of one religion constitutes a violation or desecration of the sanctity of the place to another? In the last few decades, the activities of the Women of the Wall challenged the court with similar question albeit one of an internal Jewish nature. Since 1988, this organization has held women-only prayer services at the women’s section of the Wall on the Jewish new month (Rosh Hodesh). The women insist on their right to wear prayer shawls (tallit) and phylacteries (Tefillin), and their prayers have met with violent opposition from other worshippers in the plaza. Following their petition to the court to allow them to pray according to their custom, the Minister of Religious Affairs amended the 1981 Jewish Holy Places Regulation on the Western Wall in order to state that a “religious ritual that is not in accordance with the local custom, which harms the sentiments of the worshippers towards the place, is prohibited.” The court agreed that the Women of the Wall’s prayers did not go beyond the scope of the Protection of Holy Places Law, but the justices were divided as to whether the prayers deviated from the custom of the place and hurt the feelings of other worshippers. The issue of the Women of the Wall is far from being resolved and continues to preoccupy the Israeli government, ministries, and the court. The legal questions involved are open to interpretation and force the court to make difficult decisions. In this case, the Israeli government in January 2016 approved a compromise plan providing for the establishment of an alternative site in an adjacent section of the Western Wall for egalitarian services. However, after political pressure from the ultra-Orthodox parties, the government retracted its support for the plan in June 2017.31 The struggle of the Women of the Wall illustrates the challenge of balancing the realization of conflicting fundamental rights in holy places. In the above case, the balance is between the protection of the religious sentiments of part of the public and the religious freedom and freedom of expression of another part.

30 State of Israel: “Penal Law 5737–1977.” OECD 1977, available here: https://www.oecd.org/ investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf, pp. 61–62 [08. 12. 2019]. 31 Women of the Wall: “Women of the Wall: Legal struggle”, available here: https://www. womenofthewall.org.il/legal-struggle/ [08. 12. 2019].

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The sensitivities and challenges the State of Israel faces in its management of holy places are reflected in the complicated situation at the holiest place for most of the Christians in the world. For over a century there has been a conflict between the Coptic and Ethiopian communities over the possession of the Deir el-Sultan monastery and two adjoining chapels on the roof of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The chapel also serves as a passageway used by pilgrims and tourists between the churchyard and the monastery, where Ethiopian monks and Coptic priests live. The chapels were recorded as one of the sites in the Status Quo Firman of 1852. At Easter 1970, the Ethiopians changed the locks on the doors of the chapels, preventing the Copts from entering. Although the site is non-justiciable in accordance with the 1924 Order, the courts issued a warrant to the police to restore the situation, but delayed its execution to allow the government to exercise its authority and solve the conflict. The conflict, 59 years later, is still on hold. The Israeli government has appointed two ministerial committees over the years, but these failed (and indeed barely even tried) to resolve the situation.32 In September 2017, some stones collapsed from the wall of one of these chapels, the Archangel Michael Chapel. The chapel was sealed and the passageway was not accessible. The negotiations over the renovations lasted for a year, with the involvement of the Ethiopians (who had used the chapel since 1970), Copts, the Greeks who own the chapel’s roof, the Israel Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and also the Israel Antiquity Authority (IAA), since the building dates to the twelfth century. The IAA was ready to oversee the renovations, which were supposed to be sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior,33 but this was possible only after the minister in question, a member of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, consulted Rabbi Shalom Cohen, the head of the Council of Torah Sages,34 to request permission to provide a budget for the renovation of a church.35 On the days before the renovations, the Copts protested, claiming possession of the chapel and the exclusive right to finance and undertake any renovations. 32 Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Boutros-Ghali tried to raise the Coptic demand for the return of chapels during the normalization talks with Israel, and the issue came up again in negotiations around the return of Taba, but to no avail. For details on the appeals to the HCJ see: Berkovits, Shmuel: The Battle of the Holy Places, Or Yehuda: Hed Artzi 2000, p. 278. 33 Since 2003 the Department for Non-Jewish Religions has been located under the Ministry of Interior and not the Ministry of Religious Services. 34 Moetzet Chachmei HaTorah (Hebrew: ‫ ;מועצת חכמי התורה‬lit. “Council of Torah Sages”) is the rabbinical body that has the ultimate authority in the Israeli ultra-orthodox Sephardic and Mizrahi Shas Party. 35 Cohen, Yishai: “The request of the Egyptian Ambassador and the decision of Rabi Hagaon Shalom Cohen,” in: Kikar Hashabat, 6 Oct. 2018, available: https://www.kikar.co.il/292366. html [08. 12. 2019] (in Hebrew).

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When IAA employees encountered the monks on the day scheduled for the renovation, they asked the police to intervene to prevent the Coptic monks from protesting and disrupting their work. The officers on the scene manhandled the protesting monks, and two were arrested. The event occurred in the early morning, when the churchyard was already crowded with pilgrims and visitors, who immediately filmed the incident and uploaded it to social networks. Within a short time, it was widely disseminated under the title “The State of Israel arrests a Coptic Monk from Egypt.” The incident was framed in the context of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and regarded as an example of Israeli aggression.36 As we have seen in this case, Israeli policy is influenced by the Mandate Regulations, diplomatic and political ties with neighboring countries, and the way the state is regarded by the international community. Dealing with numerous holy places for different religions, with their political, national, cultural and identity contexts, led the state to a policy that on the one hand recognizes and maintains the holy places of all religions, but on the other avoids clear definitions of which places are considered holy and how they are to be protected. This approach allows for varying interpretations according to different interests. Sovereignty over the Holy Land comes with great responsibility. On June 6, 1967, Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense, was standing with one of his colonels, Uzi Narkiss, on Mount Scopus looking towards the Old City with its bell towers and minarets. While Colonel Narcissus urged him to lead the army to the Old City, Dayan said: “Who needs all this Vatican?”37 Dayan was well aware of the great burden and responsibility that would come with the control of sites holy to hundreds of millions of people around the world. The issue of the holy places also reflects the tension between Israel’s desire to maintain a Jewish identity and prioritize the status of Judaism while protecting other religious minorities. It seems that 52 years later, the status of some Jewish places has been clarified, while the status of many others, and especially of nonJewish sites, remains blurred. In such sensitive cases, it would be advisable to have clear policy and specialists who can consult the authorities. The holy places are an effective case study for examining certain aspects of the relations between religion and state in Israel, highlighting the challenges and sensitivities brought by encounters between different religious communities. This issue also reflects multiple layers of religion and of cultural, national, and 36 Hasson, Nir: “Police Forcefully Arrest Coptic Monk, Evacuate Others From Jerusalem’s Church of Holy Sepulchre.” Haaretz, 24 Oct. 2018, available here: https://www.haaretz.com/ israel-news/.premium-police-forcefully-arrest-coptic-monk-at-jerusalem-s-church-of-holysepulchre-1.6591632 [08. 12. 2019]. 37 Ramon, Amnon: Christians and Christianity in the Jewish State Israeli Policy towards the Churches and the Christian Communities (1948–2010), Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies 2012, p. 70 (in Hebrew).

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historical identity. Although Israeli policy is not always clear in creating space for maneuvering and personal agendas, in general the place of religion is both central and respected.

Bibliography Bar, Doron: “Re-creating Jewish Sanctity in Jerusalem: Mount Zion and David’s Tomb, 1948–67,” in: Journal of Israeli History, 2004/23 (2), pp. 260–278. Berkovits, Shmuel: How Dreadful is this Place!: Holiness, Politics and Justice in Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Israel, Jerusalem: Carta 2006, p. 435. Bilu, Yoram: “Ritual and holy plan in the popular religions and civil religion,” in: Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Folklore, 2007–2008/19–20, p. 65. Cohen, Hillel: “Zionism and the Temple Mount, the Palestinian national movement and AlAqsa, comparative perspectives,” in: The New East: Journal of the Middle East and Islamic Studies, 2018/57, p. 109. Hartaf, Hagit: Being Israeli and Jewish: Social Education and Identity Building, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Haifa, Israel 2007, p. 165. Persico, Tomer: “The End Point of Zionism Ethnocentrism and the Temple Mount,” in: Israel Studies Review, 2017/32 (1), pp. 104–121. Ramon, Amnon: Christians and Christianity in the Jewish State Israeli Policy towards the Churches and the Christian Communities (1948–2010), Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies 2012. Reiner, Elchanan: “The Exposed Lie and the Hidden Truth: Christians, Jews and Holy Places in the Land of Israel in the Twelfth Century,” in: Zion, 2008/63 (2), p. 161. Statemen, Daniel/ Sapir, Gideon: “Religious freedom, freedom from religion and protection of religious feelings,” in: Law Studies, 2004/21 (1), p. 5.

Internet Sources Adalah: “Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish v. Minister of Religions Affairs HCJ 10532/04.” Adalah the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel 2009, available here: https:// www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/admin/DownLoads/SPics/7521736.pdf [08. 12. 2019] (in Hebrew). Burg, Yosef: “Regulations file 16. 7. 1981.” Reshumot Minister of Interior 1981, [organizational website] available here: https://www.nevo.co.il/Law_word/law06/TAK-4252.pdf [08. 12. 2019]. Cohen, Yishai: “The request of the Egyptian Ambassador and the decision of Rabi Hagaon Shalom Cohen,” in: Kikar Hashabat, 6 Oct. 2018, available: https://www.kikar.co.il/ 292366.html [08. 12. 2019]. Cordoza Law: “Anat Hoffman v. Western Wall Director HCJ 257/89 HCJ 2410/90,” in: Versa. cardozo.yu.edu 1994, available here: https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/ Hoffman%20v.%20Director%20of%20the%20Western%20Wall.pdf [08. 12. 2019].

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Council of the League of Nations: “‘The Mandate of Palestine’ section 13–14.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1922, [organizational website] available here: https://mfa. gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20mandate%20 for%20palestine.aspx [19. 05. 2020]. Eliade, Mircea: The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, New York: Harper & Brothers 1961, pp. 65–75. George V of the United Kingdom: “The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 1924.” UNISPAL 1924, [organizational website] available here: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL. NSF/0/FD455E412ACE30AD0525668E006EF702 [08. 12. 2019]. George V of the United Kingdom: “Appendix I. Palestine (Western or Wailing Wall) Order in Council, 1931.” UNISPAL 1931, [organizational website] available: http://unispal.un. org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C2567D9C6F6CE5D8052565D9006EFC72 [08. 12. 2019]. Gil, Yoav: “The Western Wall Prayer Survey: The Israeli public perceives the site as a national and historical place.” MyNetJerusalem.co.il, 24 May 2017, available here: https://jerusalem.mynet.co.il/local_news/article/m_173385 [19. 05. 2020]. Gilhar, Ari: “According to Survey majority of Israelis oppose the Chief Rabbinate.” NRG, 15 July 2013, available: https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/11/ART2/490/351. html [08. 12. 2019] (in Hebrew). Hasson, Nir: “Police Forcefully Arrest Coptic Monk, Evacuate Others From Jerusalem’s Church of Holy Sepulchre.” Haaretz, [newspaper online] 24 Oct. 2018, available here: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premiumpolice-forcefully-arrest-coptic-monkat-jerusalem-s-church-of-holy-sepulchre-1.6591632 [08. 12. 2019]. Holy See / State of Israel: “Fundamental Agreement Israel-Holy See.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993, available here: https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1993/pages/ fundamental%20agreement%20-%20israel-holy%20see.aspx [19. 05. 2020]. Knesset 1967: “Protection of Holy Places Law 5727 (1967),” available here: https://www. knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/HolyPlaces.htm [08. 12. 2019]. Maltz, Judy: “Israel’s Chief Rabbi Refuses to Call Pittsburgh Massacre Site a Synagogue because it’s non Orthodox.” Haaretz, [newspaper online] 28 Oct. 2018, available here: https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-israel-s-chief-rabbi-refuses-to-callpittsburgh-massacre-site-a-synagogue-1.6601043 [08. 12. 2019]. State of Israel: “Penal Law 5737–1977.” OECD 1977, available here: https://www.oecd.org/ investment/antibribery/anti-briberyconvention/43289694.pdf, pp. 61–62 [08. 12. 2019]. Supreme Court Decisions: “HCJ 52/06, 16/06, 1331/06.” Supreme Court Decisions 2008, [organizational website] available here: https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/ Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\06/520/000/r51&fileNae=06000520.r51&type=4 [08. 12. 2019] (in Hebrew). Walla Branga: “Kol Israel reporter Rafi Amir passed away; Listen to the mythical text he broadcast.” Walla.co.il 2015, [video stream] available here: https://b.walla.co.il/item/ 2900768 [08. 12. 2019]. Women of the Wall: “Women of the Wall: Legal struggle”, available here: https://www. womenofthewall.org.il/legal-struggle/ [08. 12. 2019].

Eran Kaplan

Religious Cinema in Israel

Abstract This article explores the recent outburst of Israeli films that deal with religious films and feature religious characters. The article looks at this fascinating recent development within the broader history of Israeli cinema. Israeli cinema, since its inception, has been consumed with chronicling the Israeli experience. And for decades, it featured mostly secular characters and dealt almost exclusively with secular social and cultural themes. This article examines the reasons that may explain the recent emergence of religiously inspired cinema in Israel: the broad social and cultural changes in Israel that brought religious Judaism to the Israeli screen. Moreover, the article explores some of the key features of this “religious turn,” while trying to answer, however rudimentarily, what are some of the qualities that make certain Israeli films Jewish. How can a religious tradition that shunned away from representational art, let alone modern visual art, find at itself both represented on the screen and a driving force in the Israeli film industry. How can religious filmmakers in Israel reconcile the prohibition on graven images and their desire to offer cinematic representations of their community and way of life.

Over the past two decades religion has become more prominent in Israeli cinema. After decades of near total absence, religious characters and themes are being explored in innovative ways on the Israeli screen that reflect both the complexity of the Jewish experience and also the problematic relationship between traditional Judaism and visual art. This article will look at this fascinating recent development in the history of Israeli cinema. It will examine the reasons that may explain its emergence: the broad social and cultural changes in Israel that brought religious Judaism to the Israeli screen; and it will explore some of the key features of this “religious turn”, while trying to answer, however rudimentarily, what are some of the qualities that make certain Israeli films Jewish. Avoda, a film which was produced in Palestine in 1935, is one of the clearest artistic representations of Zionist ideology, the ideological foundation of the modern state of Israel. Directed by Helmar Lerski, who trained with such luminaries of European cinema as Fritz Lang, the film, by using arresting visual compositions, offers a real time look at the emerging cultural and social foun-

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dations of the new Jewish community in Palestine. Avoda, which means labor in Hebrew, details the efforts of Zionist pioneers to settle the land, to create a new society of healthy, vigorous workers, who would negate centuries of Jewish diasporic civilization.1 As opposed to the Zionist perception of diaspora Jews as passive and weak, the offspring of a religious community that valued learning over nature and physical labor, the new pioneering society was meant to project a revival of the Jewish spirit of much earlier times, when Jews were independent in their ancestral homeland. The film’s opening scene condenses the entire film’s ideological message to a single long shot sequence. It depicts the journey of young man to Palestine. It includes shots of the man walking through harsh terrain, in which we only see his lower body and extremities. And then, once he enters Palestine, the camera pans up from his feet to reveal a smiling healthy face. While visually stunning, ideologically, this scene is quite simple, if not simplistic. Away from his ancestral homeland the Jew was not a person in full. He was the subject of hate and persecution, a person whose fate was always determined by others. But upon returning to his homeland, he becomes a full person, a subject in the fullest sense of the word. Perhaps surprisingly, the scene also includes several references to the Jewish tradition. The scene begins with a quote from the prophet Isiah that describes the ingathering of the sons of Israel from the four corners of the world. It then shows the young man crossing a body of water with a staff in his hand, a clear allusion to the biblical Moses. And, lastly, before the traveler enters Palestine, he takes off his shoes and washes his feet, as one does before entering a sacred place or land. However, when we see the face and head of the Zionist traveler (soon to become a pioneer), it is clean-shaven, and he wears no cap (or yarmulke) to cover his forelock that blows proudly in the wind. The traveler, who is a stand in for some universal Zionist subject, is clearly a secular Jew. And the society that he and his fellow Zionists created, as we see it on the screen, was based on secular ideals and principles. Why, then, the use of various religious symbols in this ideologically charged scene? The reference to traditional Jewish themes and images might explain why this traveler chose Palestine as his destination, a rather forsaken place then. It is his ancestral homeland and the bible, and the Jewish tradition, are the historical connection to the land – a connection that would also explain why he, and other Jews, have (from their perspective) the right to the land. And this, the combination of a secular view of history (the Jews as a religious community were persecuted, as a national group they can become independent and defend themselves) with elements of the Jewish tradition that were used for political ends 1 Horak, Jan-Christopher: “Helmar Lerski in Israel,” in: Talmon, Miri / Peleg, Yaron (eds.): Israeli Cinema: Identities in Motion, Austin: University of Texas Press 2011.

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was the hallmark of Zionist and later Israeli culture, including cinema.2 But the subjects of this ideological apparatus were thoroughly secular. And throughout Avoda, what we see on the screens are secular, Jewish pioneers – religious Jews are nowhere to be seen. For decades to come, until the turn of the 21st Century, religious characters would continue to be relegated to the margins of the Israeli screen as peripheral characters that often are no more than grotesque caricatures. For example in the movie Hill 24 Doesn’t Answer from 1955, an epic telling of the 1948 War, one of the characters is an American Jew, a very secular, if not outright anti-religious, young man, who came to Palestine to learn what was going on the ground in the lead up to the end of the British Mandate, and ended up joining the IDF. The young man is wounded in the battle for the Old City in Jerusalem and he ends up in makeshift hospital, where an older rabbi tries to offer him some succor. At first the encounter is tense: the young man is hostile towards the man of God, mocking his faith. But eventually, the skeptical young man gives in, he enjoys the presence of the rabbi, and even recites, with the rabbi’s aid, a Jewish blessing. The young man, through the Jewish tradition, finds a sense of meaning – that is the reason he came to fight for the land. At the same time, the rabbi looks and sounds like an anti-Semitic caricature of a Shtetl Jew, especially in contrast to the dashing young American Jew, who even in his hospital bed is a symbol of vitality and virility. The rabbi, the only religious Jew in this very long film about the birth of the Jewish State, is but a cartoon-version of traditional Judaism. These types of images, or caricatures, continued to prevail on the Israeli screen. In Two Kuni Lemel, from 1966, a musical comedy that is based on an older Yiddish play, Hassidic Jews are reduced to the basest of cultural stereotypes – as some kind of foreign objects that literally arrive in Israel from another place (from New York) and are nothing more than the object of curiosity. The Policeman, from 1971, which was nominated for the best foreign film at the academy awards and garnered a Golden Globe in the same category, was another commercially successful comedy in which religious characters are presented for comedic relief. The movie focuses on Officer Azoulay, a bumbling, yet highly literate, policeman, who is eager to please his bosses in order to gain promotion. At one point in the film, a group of religious Jews are blocking a road in protest of allowing traffic there on the Sabbath. Unable to reason with them, the police Chief dispatches Azoulay who begins to engage the religious Jews by starting a sort of battle of wits over who has a better mastery of scripture (part of it is conducted in Yiddish). Amazed by Azoulay’s knowledge (he is secular), the protesters lose all interest in the protest and the road re-opens. What is fasci2 Alush-Levron, Merav: “Creating a Significant Community: Religious Engagements in the Film Ha-Mashgihim (God’s Neighbors),” in: Israel Studies Review, 2016/31 (1), pp. 86–106.

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nating here is the fact that for most informed observers, this scene would make little sense. Ultra-orthodox Jews do not study Bible or engage in memorization of biblical passages; they study Talmud and Jewish law. The scene was meant for the general, secular audience, reducing the religious Jews to some exotic object, fulfilling what secular Jews perceive of as Jewish knowledge. The formula that was already established in the pre-State era was here on full display but in full parodic fashion: Israeli culture, as reflected on the screen is predominantly secular – religion is meant to give some flavor, a sense of connection to the place. As mentioned earlier, only in the 21st Century Jewish characters and Jewish themes would begin to gain a greater presence on the Israeli screen: the big and the small.3 This has been true in Israeli society more broadly, where the religious community has become much bigger as a share of the overall population.4 Also, politically, religious parties have come to occupy a more prominent role, holding important cabinet positions and controlling a larger share of the national budget. And indeed, the predominantly secular Israeli filmmakers could no longer ignore the religious segment of the Israeli population.5 Israeli cinema is mostly concerned with the Israeli experience. Israelis, by-and-large, do not produce action films, sci-fi adventures or romantic comedies. They make feature films about military service, about the traumas of past events, about life on a kibbutz, or family dramas where the national story is either at the forefront or at least impacts the psychic of the characters. By the 21st Century, the national experience itself was becoming more and more religious in nature. Another important change that started around the turn of the current century, which would impact the Israeli film industry, is that religious filmmakers, or those who come from a religious background, have started making movies in Israel. And this infusion of religious filmmakers and the growing interest to make films that depict the religious community have been aided, among other things, by the establishment in 1989 of the Ma’ale School of Television, Film and the Arts, which as its creators have stated, has the purpose “of providing religiously observant Jews with the opportunity to receive the appropriate training that would prepare them to become engaged in the world of Israeli film and television production in a manner that is informed by the spirit of religious Zionism.”6 Also, the Avi-Chay Foundation, which was created in 1999, has supported film and 3 Chyutin, Dan: “A Hidden Light: Judaism, Contemporary Israeli Film, And The Cinematic Experience.” PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh 2015. 4 Peled, Yoav / Peled, Horit Herman: The Religionization of Israeli Society, London and New York: Routledge 2018. 5 Peleg, Yaron: Directed by God: Jewishness in Contemporary Israeli Film and Television, Austin: University of Texas Press 2016. 6 Jacobson, David C: “The Ma’ale School: Catalyst for the Entrance of Religious Zionists into the World of Media Production,” in: Israel Studies, 2004/9 (1), pp. 31–60; p. 31.

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television projects that promote a positive image of religious Jews and Jewish themes on the Israeli screen.7 By the turn of the current century, it seemed that both social and material changes have created the right background for the emergence of cinema in Israel that focuses on the religion. Up until this point, I referred in very broad terms to the religious community in Israel. But, especially when dealing with visual culture, we must distinguish between two core elements within this community: the national religious, or modern-orthodox, component of the community and the ultra-orthodox. The former are Zionists, who adhere to a more lenient or progressive interpretation of Jewish law but are still part of the overall orthodox camp. The national-religious Jews are fairly integrated into Israeli society. By and large, they serve in the military (women less so), their education, while including traditional Jewish components, covers also science, math and foreign languages. Many of them go to college and then become part of the general work force. They dress in modern attire, and they consume visual culture: they mostly have TV sets in their homes and they go to the movies. The ultra-orthodox, on the other hand, remain apart from mainstream Israeli society. They dress differently and live in their own neighborhoods and enclaves. They do not serve (with minor exceptions) in the IDF. Their education focuses almost exclusively on traditional Jewish texts. And they face many restrictions with regard to visual culture. That culture is regarded as vulgar in that community, as morally dangerous. And moving images are dangerously associated with graven images, which are, in traditional Judaism, prohibited. It was then all but natural that the breakthrough for religious cinema in Israel would come from the national religious camp. And two films by Joseph Cedar, who grew up in the national-religious community of Jerusalem – Time of Favor from 2000 and Campfire from 2004, both winners of the Ophir Prize for best picture, the Israeli Oscar – heralded the new wave of religious filmmaking in Israel. Since the 1967 Six Days War, the national-religious camp in Israel was at the forefront of the Greater Land of Israel camp, and leading the settlement movement in the occupied territories. Infused by a kind of messianic zeal, leading rabbis from that camp (and more and more the general public of nationalreligious camp in Israel) described those settlements as a kind of religious mission to redeem the heart of biblical Israel. True to the history of Israeli cinema, Cedar’s films deal with these core issues that have dominated the national-religious camp. His first film, Time of Favor (2000), describes a plot by religious settlers to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem (the 7 Dardashti, Galeet: “Televised Agendas: How Global Funders Make Israeli TV more ‘Jewish’,” in: Jewish Film & New Media, 2015/3 (1), pp. 77–103.

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film was inspired by true events), while Campfire (2004) describes the attempts of a widow, the mother of two daughters, to join a new settlement in the West Bank. But while these political themes are crucial, what ultimately motivates the characters in both films are sex, desire and the limitations imposed on them in a religious community, where matrimony is required in order to consummate sexual urges. In Time of Favor, the young man who plans to blow up the mosques is clearly motivated to do so by the sermons of his rabbi and mentor, who tells his students that the pumping heart of the Jewish people is the Temple Mount. But what sets the plot (in both senses of the word) in motion is the decision made by the rabbi’s beautiful daughter, whom the rabbi intended to marry his prized student, to reject the young man in favor of a former student of her father’s, a handsome officer in the IDF. It becomes clear that wanting to show his manliness was what ultimately drove the bookish, fragile looking student to attempt his heroic (from his perspective) act. In a community in which sexual urges have to remain in check, Cedar suggests, young men face frustrations that often lead to violence. In Campfire, the difficulties that women face in a religious community are front and center. The mother, a widow, finds it hard to manage as a single parent in a traditionally patriarchal community. When she applies to join the new settlement, she is only granted a probationary status because she is told that her family will not make the same contribution to the group as others that have working males among them. Her daughters, both teenagers, also face challenges imposed by their community. After the older daughter allows her male date to stay over (though they do not sleep together) because it was too late for him to drive back home, her mother smashes her daughter’s bedroom door: there will be no going behind the back in this household she tells her daughter. The younger daughter, who enjoys the flirting of a teenager who lives on the “other side of the track,” in what appears to be a housing project, accepts the young man’s invitation to join him and his friends at a bonfire that they organize for the festival of Lag Ba’Omer. There, the young woman is practically raped (she is forced to touch the private parts of the young men), by teenagers who are unable to negotiate the presence of a woman among them. They do not know how to control their raging hormones. The tragedy of this community, as Cedar depicts it, is that these people are on the one hand part of modern society. They are exposed to modern culture and its celebration of sex. At the same time, they live in a community that expects them to control their urges, to wait until they are married to consummate them. And this tension, for some of them, proves untenable. And the result is violence, either political or sexual. Cedar’s view of the community from which he came is far from flattering. But unlike earlier caricatures of religious Jews on the Israeli screen, it conveys a sense of realism and intimate knowledge of the deep social and cultural currents that run through it.

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One of the first Israeli films to deal exclusively with the ultra-orthodox or haredi community in Israel was Amos Gitai’s Kadosh from 1999. Gitai, a prolific filmmaker who is secular, explored in the film the plight of women in that world, in a critical manner not too dissimilar from that of Cedar. At the center of the film is the doomed marriage of an ultra-orthodox couple who are unable to bring a child to the world, in a community where procreation is a mitzva of the highest order. The husband, who seems to be truly in love with his wife, is forced to divorce her in order to fulfill his manly duties (though we find out that he is likely the reason for the failure to conceive). Giati’s look at the ultra-orthodox world is unsparing, but he does give his characters volume and he seems keen to capture many of the nuances of the community. At the same time, Gitai also takes us, the viewers, into the bedroom, into the most intimate spheres of that world, which tries very hard to adhere to strict norms of modesty. With that, Gitai reveals himself as an outsider, as a kind of ethnographer who is amazed by the exotic and strange, and who is keen to uncover its mysteries, but not as someone who is sensitive to the inner workings of the world that depicts. In The Secrets (2007), Avi Nesher, another prolific Israeli director, took a similar approach to that of Gitai. He focused on a blossoming lesbian relationship between two ultra-orthodox women. A hodgepodge of new-age mysticism and coming-of-age rebelliousness, the film is far from a successful depiction of the ultra-orthodox world. It too utilizes a voyeuristic vantage point that scandalizes religious life and positions the director as an outsider. But in recent years, several filmmakers, who come from the ultra-orthodox community, have been able to offer a much more complex depiction of the world in which they live or from which they came. Fill the Void (2012), which tells the story of a young haredi woman, Shira, who is pressured to marry the husband of her older sister who died during childbirth, was directed Rama Burshtein, an ultra-orthodox woman. In the case of Rama Burshtein, her biography may be crucial in explaining her desire to make a film intended for the general public. Burshtein did not grow up haredi (ultra-orthodox). It was only after she graduated from film school that she became ultraorthodox. After her return to the faith, she did not pursue a career in the predominantly secular Israeli film industry. But eventually, she began to teach film in women’s religious schools, and she produced low-budget films that were meant to be watched only within the haredi world. Both the plot and the setting of Fill the Void are rather spare. And it resembles that of Kadosh and The Secrets: women have to battle social conventions that disregard their individual wants and desires. But in the case of Fill the Void the rebellion only serves to create the conditions whereby the main character can accept the social reality of her world on her own terms, not change them. Visually, the movie is mostly confined to domestic spaces, trying to replicate haredi culture. In fact, Burshtein said that she

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insisted that the prop and stage designers will be haredim, so they can provide an authentic feel of the haredi home. The movie creates a sense of intimacy; we the viewers are brought into intimate places – but unlike in Kadosh and The Secrets, these spaces are respected. Burshtein’s objective does not seem to unmask the ultra-orthodox universe. She only allows us, the general audience, a peek to a truly different place. Ushpizin, which was produced in 2004, is another Israeli film that was created by a haredi Jew. Gidi Dar, a secular Israeli, directed the film; but it was written by Shuli Rand, who also plays the lead role. Shuli Rand was not always a religious Jew. While he grew up in a national-religious family, after high school he adopted a secular lifestyle. In the late 1990s, Rand who was involved in the musical and cinematic scene of Tel Aviv, the beating heart of secular Israel, left the secular world and became a haredi. But Rand could not detach himself completely from his secular past; apparently, he wanted to continue his creative work, but from within the boundaries of the ultra-orthodox world. One of the great challenges in making Ushpizin was to ensure that it would not violate Jewish law. Rand sought and received rabbinical approval to make the film that was intended for the general public. The movie, for example, was not shown in theaters on the Sabbath. It was filmed in a haredi neighborhood (thus insuring that the production respects the ultra-orthodox lifestyle). And alongside Rand, who plays the lead role in the film, Rand’s wife in real life, Michal, who was acting in a movie for the first time, played the role of the lead character’s wife in the film, insuring that Rand would not violate the prohibition against touching a woman who is not his wife (here the distance between movie as a kind of fantasy that requires an element of suspension of belief and reality – that is grounded in belief – disappears, as real life considerations dictate the very nature of the fantasy). “Ushpizin” is an Aramaic word that describes visitors who come to visit your sukkah during the festival of sukkot. And the movie takes place during that festive time, as it describes the trials and tribulations of a poor ultra-orthodox couple, who cannot conceive a child, and whose faith and relationship are put to constant tests as characters from their past come to visit them during the holiday. The story is very much modeled on classic Hassidic tales, in which the faith of a believer is put to the test. And like those traditional tales, the movie ends on a happy note (the couple is blessed by a child) – faith has its rewards. Thusly, the message of the movie, which is rather crude, is certainly in line with the overall ethos of the religious world. But just as importantly, stylistically, this is a movie that adheres to certain religious restrictions. It is a “kosher” movie, thus allowing ultra-orthodox Jews to fully partake in the production of visual culture. Other recent Israeli movies that focus on religious themes and characters in their ultra-orthodox version offer more profound reflections on questions of

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faith from a distinctly Jewish and Israeli perspective. The question of providence is the core question in My Father, My Lord, David Volach’s extraordinary debut film from 2007. In a mere seventy-three minutes, Volach offers a thoughtful and at times excruciating meditation on the nature of belief and the meaning of the Jewish faith, while using modest, minimalist visual means (and in this regard staying true to the problematic relation between traditional Judaism and visual art). The movie focuses on three characters: a father, who is an ultra-orthodox rabbi, his wife, and their young and only son. Hardly anything plot-wise happens throughout the film, until its stirring conclusion. All we witness, until the dramatic denouement, are brief interactions among the characters that tend to focus on questions of Jewish law and faith. The film’s Hebrew title is Hufshat Kayitz (Summer Vacation). Assenting to his son’s supplications, the father takes the family on vacation from their Jerusalem ultra-orthodox neighborhood to the Dead Sea, where the film reaches its dramatic climax, when the young boy, Menachem (which in Hebrew means one who offers console) drowns and dies. Volach’s personal journey, unlike that of Rand and Burshtein, has taken him from the religious world to the secular one. He directed this movie as a secular person, without the type of religious concerns that have influenced the production of Fill the Void and Ushpizin. Yet, visually, My Father, My Lord has a lot in common with these two films. It depicts the kind of familial spaces that Volach knew intimately in his youth, and those spaces, from a perspective of a secular viewer, seem alien. In the small family described in the film – a rarity in the ultra-orthodox world where children are in abundance – there are two poles: an authoritarian father, who believes in the supremacy of the law as the essence of Jewish life, and a caring mother who believes that love and warmth are the true expression of faith. At one point in the film, Menachem, the little boy, spots a bird’s nest on a window seal in the building of his father’s yeshiva. Seeing this bird creates a contrast with the general surroundings of the neighborhood. It brings a certain exuberance and vigor that a child can relate to and appreciate. This was not the first time Menachem had an encounter with an animal. Earlier in the film he a saw a woman taken in an ambulance, but her dog was thrown out of the ambulance. Menachem was terrified and worried about the fate of the dog. His father told him that animals are of no concern – they know not of mitzvoth or sins. Not long after that incident, the father gives his yeshiva students (with Menachem present) a sermon on the difference between what he calls general providence and personal providence. Inanimate objects, as well as the plants and animals that populate our world, were created by God; they are part of his creation. But they fall only under general providence: God made them and put in motion the laws that regulate their physical being, but God is not concerned with their individual fate. If a bug is crushed, or a plant is torn, or a rock cracks – this is part of nature and God does

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not concern himself with that. Only human beings, who have a soul and can make decisions, are entitled to personal providence. And moreover, even among humans, only those who follow and fulfill God’s Torah, his laws, the tzadikim (the righteous ones), are those for whose sake that the world was created in the first place; it is only they who are watched and protected by God. The story of Isaac’s binding is present throughout My Father, My Lord. In Menachem’s class, the students learn about the story; and the family in the film – older parents with a young child – is not dissimilar to that in the biblical tale. The family’s patriarch lives his life as if he constantly needs to prove his faith. There can be no compromises or deviations. Everything in life is meant to serve one purpose. In this regard, he sees himself as a modern-day Abraham who is called to prove his devotion to his maker by willing to make sacrifices. And nothing, it seems, can come between the father and the fulfillment of the commandments. In the Dead Sea, Menachem is finally surrounded by nature, and the curious kid that he is he goes on exploring the nature all around him. The father, on the other hand, has no time for frivolity. Even on vacation, he devotes himself to prayer. And he is only torn away from his rituals, when he learns that his son has disappeared and died. In the film we do not see the son’s death; we only learn about what happened to Menachem by following the reaction on the face of the father when he hears the news. We do not see what had happened to the child: He is the offering, but we do not see the act of sacrificing. In the story of the binding, God interferes and spares the child. This is not the case here. The father who feels compelled to prove his faith again and again – the one who is entitled, according to his own view, to personal providence – suffers the worst punishment imaginable. And what we are left with are two grieving parents and the way they deal with their tragedy. Watching the mother after her son’s death is witnessing a person who has lost all sense that our world is governed by some kind of meaningful order. For the father, the only way to deal with the tragedy is to try and continue observing the laws and commands – to use the rituals prescribed in the Jewish tradition to deal with the loss of a loved one. For the mother, this offers no relief. She cries and screams. But the father scolds her, as if she were a child, that it is not allowed to cry on a Sabbath – the law precedes the most basic human reactions. You must fight your own urges, no matter what the circumstances are is his message. The father still seems to find comfort in the practice of the law – this is the only way he can handle his grief. My Father, My Lord raises one of the most difficult theological questions, that of theodicy: how do we account for divine providence in face of evil. How is it that god-fearing, loving parents lose their child. Valech’s rare achievement is that he does not use the cinematic platform to conduct lengthy, verbal disputations on the nature of faith, good and evil. Rather he uses the visual qualities of the

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medium to draw a series of contrasts: between the haredi neighborhood and nature; between humans and animals; between adulthood and childhood; and between love as an instinctive emotion as opposed to love that is expressed through works, that ultimately provide us with a rich and complex visual composite of the questions at the core of this film. This is a meditation on the very meaning of the Jewish faith: does it come down to legal obligations or is it a system that provides spiritual relief. According to Andre Bazin, cinema is a type of miracle.8 And from Bazin’s perspective, since its inception cinema was consumed by attempts (very Christian ones) to capture the divine, that which transcends reality. However, as Adorno and Horkheimer observed, Judaism stands against both that attempts at imitation and representation of the magical.9 It has no visual room for the sublime. And this limitation is only magnified in the case of Jewish religious cinema. In My Father, My Lord the divine is represented through the boy. But not by depicting him as a child who exhibits supernatural abilities – he does not project a kind of aura. It is his purity and naivete that sets him apart from his surroundings. And then, it is his disappearance – all that is left of him is a nameplate in his father’s yeshiva – that leads to the emotional conclusion of the film, where two distinct perceptions of our relationship with the divine, as represented by the mother and father, are presented to us. In this regard, My Father, My Lord is a religious film that offers a unique theological and aesthetic message from a distinctly Jewish perspective. A film that combines the Israeli and the Jewish cinematic perspectives in a profound manner is Menny Yaesh’s God’s Neighbors from 2012. The film’s Hebrew title is Ha-Mashgihim (The Watchers), and the watchers are Avi and his neighborhood friends from Bat-Yam, a suburb south of Tel Aviv. This is not a regular neighborhood watch, they are the enforcers of Jewish law in the neighborhood. If people violate the Sabbath in public or dress immodestly – they will feel the wrath of Avi and his friends, who do not preach God’s love and mercy in the spirit of Christ’s teachings. They enforce the law in the spirit of the Old Testament with brutal force. The setting for God’s Neighbors is very much the modern Israeli experience; this is not some isolated religious enclave that operates outside of mainstream Israeli history. The neighborhood in which Avi and his friends grew up was never fully part of the secular world; the Jewish tradition played a role in the social and cultural life of this rather traditional community – but it was very much part of modern Israel, with so many of the social tensions – between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim; Jews and Arabs – that have defined the modern Israeli experience and 8 Bazin, Andre: “Cinema and Theology,” in: The South Atlantic Quarterly, 1992/91 (2), pp. 393– 407. 9 Adorno, Theodor W. / Horkheimer, Max: Dialectic of Enlightenment, London: Verso 2010.

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have informed so many Israeli movies. However, Avi and his friends are undergoing a process of “strengthening”, of adopting a stricter form of Jewish practice. They attend classes and services led by a haredi rabbi, and they attach themselves to a group affiliated with Breslov Hassidim. But this process of moving from the Israeli to the ultra-orthodox world presents various challenges. For one, Avi and his friends grew up among criminals and hoodlums, and for at least the first part of the film it seems that Avi has not really changed much, he only uses religion as a cover to maintain his old way of life (he beats people up to enforce God’s laws; he smokes drugs to get inspiration to create new EDM tracks for his Hassidic sect). The transition from one world to another, it seems, is not an easy one. At some point in the film, however, Avi meets a young woman, an encounter that forces him to confront both his faith and his allegiance to his old life. At first, Avi and his friends find the young woman’s attire too provocative and try to intimidate her into adopting a more modest appearance in their neighborhood. But Avi also falls for her, and begins to court her. While she is secular, she questions Avi’s way of life: is he a true believer or merely a poser. Avi himself undergoes a crisis of faith as he questions his own commitment as a believer and practitioner of his new adopted brand of Judaism; and in the film’s dramatic climax, Avi goes to the beach, undresses and goes into the water while seeking answers from God. The man who emerges from this scene is a different Avi, one who renounces violence and embraces love in the deeper sense of the term. Before he met the object of his desire, his faith was mechanical. Love inspired him to look inwards and find a higher meaning of belief that gives him a sense of meaning (and peace of mind). Avi has forsaken his old lifestyle; he accepts limits and restrictions that are prescribed by religious law in the name of love. He stops consuming and seeking immediate gratification and instead devotes himself to love. He had finally understood the fuller meaning of Jewish law: to control oneself in the name of a greater thing. In 1998, Roni Parchak has described how up until that point in time, when Israeli filmmakers wanted to express a religious ideal or sentiment, they turned to Christian rather than Jewish symbolism.10 At the end of Life According to Agfa, Assi Dayan’s film from 1992 – a devastating and poignant critique of the Israeli cult of militarism and violence, a group of soldiers storm a Tel Aviv bar killing everyone inside. The violence in this scene is overwhelming and graphic, yet it 10 Parchak, Ronie: “Me’ever la-Gader: Ha-Regesh ha-Dati ba-Kolno’a ha-Ysraeli.” (Beyond the Fence: The Religious Sentiment in Israeli Cinema), in: Gerz, Nurith / Lubin, Orly / Ne’eman, Judd (eds.): Mabatim Fiktiviyim al ha-Kolno’a ha-Yisraeli (Fictive Looks on Israeli Cinema), Tel Aviv: Open University 1998, pp. 328–341. Ben-Zvi Morad, Yael: “From Binding to Crucifixion: The Political Role of Christian Motifs in Israeli Cinema,” in: Jewish Film & New Media, 2018/6 (2), pp. 137–157.

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feels hyper-realistic, switching between live action and slow-motion sequences; the violence comes across as staged. There is a kind of Christian quality, aesthetically, to the final scene of Agfa.11 The violence and blood evoke artistic representations of the crucifixion of Christ, as does Dayan’s choice to accompany the violence with Leonard Cohen’s song “Who by Fire”. There is an apocalyptic quality to the film’s final burst of violence, which viewers of earlier Israeli films from They Were Ten (1960), to He Walked the Fields (1967), to Hamsin (1982), to Avanti Popolo (1986), or to Night Movie (1986) would find familiar. In Israeli cinema, death served as the ultimate act of political redemption in a very Christian guise – one dies for the sake of the greater good. What the recent slew of Israeli religious films have offered is a new Jewish notion of loss and suffering that is rooted in Jewish perceptions of laws and limits that eschew grand visual statements (depictions of physical suffering and death) for much more subdued expressions of faith and devotion that express a Jewish visual sensitivity. In recent years, Israeli filmmakers continued to produce films that focus on religious themes and characters. The aforementioned Rama Burshtein directed The Wedding Plan in 2016, which like Fill the Void explored the difficulties that women face in the ultra-orthodox community. Mountain, from 2015, is also the story of a religious woman in a familial bind; this time a woman who discovers the life of sex workers. And The Unorthodox, which stars Shuli Rand, from 2018, follows the creation of Shas, an ultra-orthodox political party in Israel. Joseph Cedar, took his dual interest in politics and family dynamics to the academe in his 2011 film Footnote: where two Hebrew University Talmud scholars, a father and son, compete for a prestigious prize. Whereas Avishai Sivan brought an experimental approach to two films – The Wanderer from 2010 and Tikkun from 2015 – that explore tensions between faith and desire, between the strict haredi world and boundless bacchanalia. And while more and more films continue to explore various aspects of religious life in Israel, it has been the small screen, which in recent years has seen an explosion of shows dedicated to religious characters. Two of the most prominent shows have been Srugim, which was broadcast in Israel from 2008 to 2012, and Shtisel, which premiered in 2013. The former focused on a group of young national-religious Jews who look for love and marriage in Jerusalem, while the latter is set in the ultra-orthodox community and explores family dynamics in this strict environment. The success of these shows became international when the shows were released on the stream giants Amazon Prime (Srugim) and Netflix (Shtisel).12 These shows, which ex11 Munk, Yael: Golim be-Gvulam: ha-Kolnoa ha-Yisraeli be-Mifne ha-Me’ah (Exiles in their Own Land: Israeli Cinema at the Turn of the Millennium), Ra’anana: Open University of Israel 2012. 12 Weiss, Shayna: “Frum with Benefits: Israeli Television, Globalization, and Srugim’s American Appeal,” in: Jewish Film & New Media, 2016/4 (1), pp. 68–89.

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plore a rather small and marginal world (certainly for the non-Jewish public), have found a vast audience that was at once attracted to the exotic qualities of their characters, but also to the universal quest for love and happiness. As the religious becomes more and prominent on the Israeli screen, it becomes less foreign and more universal, expanding the scope of Israel’s visual culture. It also signals a sort of the return of repressed. The founding ideology of the modern state of Israel, Zionism, was predicated on the notion of the negation of exile, which also meant the negation of traditional Judaism as the defining form of Jewish communal life. And early Israeli cinema, from Avoda onwards gave a visual manifestation of this ideological injunction. In the movie Hill 24 that we discussed earlier, there is another brief moment in which a religious character appears. There is a rather surreal lengthy scene in that movie in which a young IDF soldier, who looks like the ideal Zionist subject – strong, healthy, confident – has an encounter with a severely wounded former SS officer who was fighting for the Egyptian army. The Nazi pleads for mercy from the bemused Israeli soldier, and as the German falls into a state of delirium, for a brief moment, he sees the Israeli soldier as a Shtetl Jew, with traditional Jewish garb. But this is a brief moment indeed. Soon the proud Israeli soldier in his IDF uniform towers over the dying Nazi. Negation of the Jewish past indeed. But in what some have described as a post-Zionist or neo-Zionist Israel, the negation of the Jewish tradition is no longer seen as part of the Israeli ethos.13 Quite to the contrary, traditional Judaism is more and more ubiquitous in contemporary Israel, and not as some strange menacing object, but as very much part of current Israeli identity. It would only seem natural that in a film industry committed to documenting (in feature films), the Israeli experience, that which was once repressed, would eventually occupy a dominant place.

Bibliography Adorno, Theodor W. / Horkheimer, Max: Dialectic of Enlightenment, London: Verso 2010. Alush-Levron, Merav: “Creating a Significant Community: Religious Engagements in the Film Ha-Mashgihim (God’s Neighbors),” in: Israel Studies Review, 2016/31 (1), pp. 86– 106. Bazin, Andre: “Cinema and Theology.” The South Atlantic Quarterly, 1992/91 (2), pp. 393– 407. Ben-Zvi Morad, Yael: “From Binding to Crucifixion: The Political Role of Christian Motifs in Israeli Cinema,” in: Jewish Film & New Media, 2018/6 (2), pp. 137–157. 13 Ram, Uri: “Post-Zionist Studies of Israel: The First Decade,” in: Israel Studies Forum, 2005/ 20 (2), pp. 22–45.

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Chyutin, Dan: “A Hidden Light: Judaism, Contemporary Israeli Film, And The Cinematic Experience.” PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh 2015. Dardashti, Galeet: “Televised Agendas: How Global Funders Make Israeli TV more ‘Jewish’,” in: Jewish Film & New Media, 2015/3 (1), pp. 77–103. Horak, Jan-Christopher: “Helmar Lerski in Israel,” in: Talmon, Miri / Peleg, Yaron (eds.): Israeli Cinema: Identities in Motion, Austin: University of Texas Press 2011. Jacobson, David C: “The Ma’ale School: Catalyst for the Entrance of Religious Zionists into the World of Media Production,” in: Israel Studies, 2004/9 (1), pp. 31–60, p. 31. Munk, Yael: Golim be-Gvulam: ha-Kolnoa ha-Yisraeli be-Mifne ha-Me’ah (Exiles in their Own Land: Israeli Cinema at the Turn of the Millennium), Ra’anana: Open University of Israel 2012. Parchak, Roni: “Me’ever la-Gader: Ha-Regesh ha-Dati ba-Kolno’a ha-Ysraeli.” (Beyond the Fence: The Religious Sentiment in Israeli Cinema), in: Gerz, Nurith / Lubin, Orly / Ne’eman, Judd (eds.): Mabatim Fiktiviyim al ha-Kolno’a ha-Yisraeli (Fictive Looks on Israeli Cinema), Tel Aviv: Open University 1998, pp. 328–341. Peled, Yoav / Peled, Horit Herman: The Religionization of Israeli Society, London and New York: Routledge 2018. Peleg, Yaron: Directed by God: Jewishness in Contemporary Israeli Film and Television, Austin: University of Texas Press 2016. Ram, Uri: “Post-Zionist Studies of Israel: The First Decade,” in: Israel Studies Forum, 2005/ 20 (2), pp. 22–45. Weiss, Shayna: “Frum with Benefits: Israeli Television, Globalization, and Srugim’s American Appeal,” in: Jewish Film & New Media, 2016/4 (1), pp. 68–89.

Gerhard Langer

The Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of the State of Israel and its Importance for Christians and Jews. The Reflections of a Theologian and Jewish Studies Scholar

Abstract With the rise of the Zionist movement, the hope for a homeland as the last refuge of a distressed and harassed Jewry tortured by pogroms began to crystallise at the end of the nineteenth century. Biblical times were recalled, indeed the Bible itself became the epitome of Jewish identity, that had been long forgotten and – in the diction of many Zionists – repressed in the gloom of the Talmudic consciousness of the galuth. As they saw it, history exists only where Jews can determine and organise their lives for themselves, i. e. on their own territory. This gives the outline for the following considerations: the first part looking at the challenges the state of Israel poses for the Christian churches, while the second part explores the question of Jewish existence in the context of Israel. A last part analyses the situation in Austria, growing antisemitism and anti-Zionism, including the BDS movement and mentions a 2018 study commissioned by the Austrian parliamentary council surveying 2700 people: for Austria, ten percent of respondents demonstrated manifest anti-Semitic attitudes, while thirty percent were at least latent. This article is a reminiscence of Marko Feingold z”l (1913–2019), the survivor of 4 concentration camps, the organizer of the Bricha, the president of the Jewish community in Salzburg for many years.

On September 19th, 2019, Marko Feingold died in Salzburg at the age of 107. He was the oldest contemporary witness of the Shoah in Austria, the survivor of four concentration camps. I had known him for many years. His support was instrumental in establishing the interdisciplinary Centre for Jewish Cultural History in Salzburg. Never shy of posing critical questions and keenly aware of developments, he was a fatherly friend and a great supporter in the struggle against forgetting. Back in 2008, on January 17th, to mark the Day of Judaism, I gave a lecture in his honour: ’60 Years of the State of Israel and its Importance for Christian-Jewish Dialogue.’ Subsequently published in the journal Dialog1 in April 2008 (32–54), here I present a reworked and expanded version for an academic publication. 1 Langer, Gerhard: “60 Years of the State of Israel and its importance for Christian-Jewish Dialogue,” in: Dialog–DuSiach, Vienna, 2008/2, pp. 32–54.

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Dwelling in the land

“Dwelling in the land is over and against all of the mitzvoth in the Torah.”2 We read this and similar formulations in the literature of the Jewish tradition. The land is integral to the beginnings of the Jewish promise and the essence of the relationship with God. Through the experiences of exile and diaspora the land became the distant heritage that would be first set right again with the advent of the Messiah.3 The medieval philosopher and scribe from Cordoba, Moses Maimonides, declared thirteen principles (Heb. iqarim) of faith to be obligatorily true for every Jew, as he put it so expressly.4 These rules covered five metaphysical truths such as the existence and incorporeality of God, while the other seven concerned the divine origin of the Torah, the prophecies, the Messiah and the resurrection of the dead. Remarkable here is the lack of a reference to the promised land, to one of the central components of the old biblical and rabbinic hope. This impression is not misleading, but in fact substantiates an important insight. The land Israel is not a subject of direct religious faith, it is secreted behind the paramount hope of the arrival of the Messiah, who will then bring about the return home of the exiled. In many ways, Maimonides was reflecting a rabbinic tradition. Put in extreme terms: one does not need land to be a Jew. One can live always and everywhere as a Jew by living according to the rules of the halakha, presupposing that the respective conditions make this possible. For Maimonides, the mission of the Messiah was – formulated in the simplest terms – to end the domination of alien powers over the Jews, finally making it possible to study in peace and devote themselves to wisdom, the rational knowledge of the truth that he saw as forming the very core of Jewish identity. For several centuries this position remained defining for the majority of Jews. While there were movements emphasising on a return to the land of the fathers at various intervals, up until the late nineteenth century they remained somewhat isolated and did not develop into a mass movement. The life of Jews played out existentially and culturally not in Eretz Israel, but in the galuth, the Diaspora. This did not mean that the hope to return to their own territorial identity has been lost entirely; rather, it was remembered – for instance at Pesach – and called 2 Cf. Sifre Devarim 80; Avoda Zara 5.3–6. 3 See the Babylonian Talmud Ketubbot 110b–111a, a text that would become especially important for the orthodox understanding of land. 4 God exists: God is One; God is incorporeal; God precedes the world (creation); only God may be worshiped; there is prophecy; Moses is the greatest of all prophets; the Tora comes from heaven; the Tora is immutable and inconvertible; God knows all humans individually; the righteous will be rewarded and evil punished; the Messiah will come; the dead will rise – commentary on the Mishnah Sanhedrin 10.

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up into the present in the diverse forms of the positive experience of Diaspora communities (one thinks of the many Jerusalems in the Diaspora, e. g. Vilnius as the Jerusalem of the north, and others, like Sarajevo). With the rise of the Zionist movement the hope for a homeland as the last refuge of a distressed and harassed Jewry tortured by pogroms began to crystallise at the end of the nineteenth century. Biblical times were recalled, indeed the Bible itself became the epitome of Jewish identity that had been long forgotten and – in the diction of many Zionists – repressed in the gloom of the Talmudic consciousness of the galuth. As they saw it, history exists only where Jews can determine and organise their lives for themselves, i. e. on their own territory. This gives us the outline for our considerations: the first part looking at the challenges the state of Israel poses for the Christian churches, while the second part explores the question of Jewish existence in the context of Israel. I would like to begin my considerations with a reminiscence of Marko Feingold.

2.

Exodus across the alps to the promised land

In the summer months of 1947, thousands of Jewish “displaced persons” – in groups of around 200 persons – fled to South Tyrol over the 2 634 m-high Krimmler Tauern pass, heading for Genoa where they then sought passage to Palestine. At the end of the Second World War Salzburg had become an important hub of exodus for 200 000 Jews from Central and Eastern Europe. They were barred from crossing the border into Italy. The ten-hour trek across the High Tauern (15 hours from the town of Krimml) was the most arduous and spectacular refugee route for 5000 men, women and children, in which Marko Feingold played a very important role. In 1997, together with Marko Feingold, the former heads of the refugee organisation Bricha, Ascher ben Natan and Abba Gefen, unveiled a bronze plaque. Its inscription reads: “At this point in 1947 persecuted Jews from eastern Europe had to illicitly cross the border between Austria and Italy in order to reach Eretz Israel.” The Krimml branch of the Alpine Association had eventually ensured that this plaque was erected at the Krimml Tauern pass in the summer of 1997, visible for everyone who took the effort to hike up, from where with the active and resourceful help of Marko Feingold the refugees were smuggled into the neighbouring Ahrn Valley. Already in 1997 a ‘Nach(t)begehung’ (a commemorative walk at night) of the historical route was a highlight of a project called “überGehen” carried out by “KunstMyst”, an association of artists and scholars. A symposium – its proceedings published by the historian Thomas Albrich – was another important step, which was then followed in 2007 by the “Alpine Peace Crossing” initiated by Dr Ernst Löschner, a programme held between the 28th and 30th June 2007 by the

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High Tauern National Park in cooperation with the municipal authorities of Saalfelden, Krimml (Salzburg) and Ahrn Valley (South Tyrol). The series of events opened with the unveiling of a memorial plaque in Saalfelden, the starting point for the flight across the Alps was the Givat Avoda camp, today the Wallner military barracks. On 29th June 2007, the focal point of the project took place, the commemorative crossing of the Krimml Tauern, accompanied by mountain guides. 155 people took part in the 10-hour hike. Overall, around 1000 people from several different countries were involved in the peace programme (including the hike back via the Birnlücke). Of special significance was the participation of Marko Feingold, 94 at the time, and nine other contemporary witnesses from Israel (Avraham and Sylvia Weiss, Jaffa Levi, Margarita Weinberg, Moshe Talit, Jacov Shwartz, Ahuva Shamir, Lili Segal and Moshe Frumin). And with this, a bridge was built that leads from Salzburg into the Ahrn Valley and onto Israel, for so many the last hope after all the murdering. Since then, the hike is repeated every year.

3.

Israel and the (Catholic) church(es)

As far as Israel is concerned, the hope for a secure homeland is still very much a dream. There is still no peace solution in sight for Israel, and at regular intervals missiles and rockets land on Israeli territory; a deep divide still exists between Jews and Arabs, with hatred and mistrust dominant, often then vented in mutual disdain, in harassment and discrimination, violence and acts of revenge. Within Jewish society, the divide between the religious and the secular is no less severe, indeed at times it seems to be deepening and shifting in an orthodox direction, solely due to the weight of population; on the Palestinian side, a disillusioned, frustrated and in part latently violent young population sees itself confronted with deeply-divided political representatives and a system characterised by corruption and nepotism. The Christians are caught in a debilitating dilemma, grinded down by the partly coerced solidarity with concerns they share with Palestinians and an Islamic renaissance. Their numbers are constantly dwindling. As a Catholic theologian and advocate of Jewish-Christian dialogue, I would first like to take a look at the problems crystallising around the importance the State of Israel has for the Christian churches. Here I will focus on the Germanspeaking region, thus passing over the somewhat different situation in the United States for example. One key difference is that evangelist congregations play a relatively minor role in Central Europe.

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For the Christian churches, the founding of the state of Israel was a challenge perceived in very different ways. I have described this in detail elsewhere.5 Here I will outline the problematic – put in very simple terms, the Protestant churches understood the return of Jews to the promised land and the founding of a state to be a theological challenge, one they included into their reflections on their relationship to Judaism in general. This is succinctly summarised in a declaration issued on October 30th, 1991 by the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany: Christian and Jews II. On the theological reorientation of the relationship to Judaism. The biblical promised land is a fundamental element of the Jewish tradition. The chosen people and the promise of the land are closely connected. Unlike for Christians, for whom God’s promise of salvation is not tied to a specific land, for Jews the land of Israel has religious significance, whereby different views exist about the borders of this land… The Rhine Synod declares ‘that the enduring existence of the Jewish people, its return home to the promised land and the establishment of the state of Israel are signs of God’s allegiance towards his people.’ The remaining statements given by the Synods and Church leadership are more restrained. They affirm and advocate the right of the state of Israel to exist in just and safe borders, but do not place this in a theological framework. They respect however the history of suffering and hope of the Jewish people, over which the land of Israel is unnegotiable.6

In recent times, critical voices on the state of Israel have increased in Protestant circles as well, and a number of statements clearly reveal a close correlation between comments on Middle Eastern politics and the opinions of individual Church representatives. At the conference ‘Churches for Peace and Justice in the Middle East’ convened in Amman in June 2007 by the Ecumenical Council of Churches, Wilfried Neusel, a member of the High Consistory, remarked: “After four decades of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, these Churches, supported by Ecumenical Council, are seeking to form a broad as possible ecumenical front of solidarity against the ongoing human rights violations Israel is committing against Palestinians, in particular those arising from the excessive settlement policies on the west bank and the course taken by the partition wall contravening international law as well as extrajudicial arrests and executions.”7

5 Cf. Langer, Gerhard: “Einige Steiflichter zum katholisch-theologischen Umgang mit dem Staat Israel,” in: Ritzer, Georg (ed.): Mit euch bin ich Mensch… Festschrift anlässlich des 60. Geburtstages von Friedrich Schleinzer O.Cist, Innsbruck / Vienna: Tyrolia 2008, pp. 149–198. 6 Henrix, Hans Hermann / Kraus, Wolfgang (eds.): Die Kirchen und das Judentum. Vol. 2: Dokumente von 1986 bis 2000, Paderborn: Bonifatius / Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verl.-Haus 2001, pp. 636. 7 Cf. Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland: “Palästina: Nüchtern, aber auch hoffnungsvoll”, NewsArchiv 2007, available here: https://www.ekir.de/www/service/6412.php [20. 04. 2020].

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I shall refrain from criticising this statement here. On the Catholic side, there were a few remarks made by local bishop conferences and above all addresses given by Pope John Paul II, which considered the state of Israel in terms of its importance for Jewish identity; it took until 1993 however before the so-called basic treaty between the Apostolic See and the state of Israel officially recognised the existence of the state and diplomatic relations could be initiated. In my view, there were several reasons why it had taken so long for the Catholic Church to recognise the state of Israel, even though in the 1960s – not exactly early itself but nonetheless – the decisive breakthrough in relations to Jews was made possible by the Second Vatican Council declaration Nostra aetate, and the Church has never since been able to take a retrograde step. But unlike the Protestant tradition, the Catholic line never emphasised the close connection between Jewish identity and the promised land. In this context the document “Notes on the correct way to present Jews and Judaism in Preaching and Catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church” from 1985 needs to be mentioned, where the somewhat vague statement is made: 25. The history of Israel did not end in 70 A. D. (Guidelines, II). It continued, especially in a numerous Diaspora which allowed Israel to carry to the whole world a witness – often heroic – of its fidelity to the one God and to ‘exalt Him in the presence of all the living’ (Tobata 13:4), while preserving the memory of the land of their forefathers at the heart of their hope (Passover Seder). Christians are invited to understand this religious attachment which finds its roots in Biblical tradition, without however making their own any particular religious interpretation of this relationship (Declaration of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, November 20, 1975). The existence of the State of Israel and its political options should be envisaged not in a perspective which is in itself religious, but in their reference to the common principles of international law. The permanence of Israel (while so many ancient peoples have disappeared without trace) is a historic fact and a sign to be interpreted within God’s design. We must in any case rid ourselves of the traditional idea of a people punished, preserved as a living argument for Christian apologetic.8

Without wanting to disentangle the snares of this document, it is undoubtedly positive that it responds to the centuries-old verdict condemning the Jewish expulsion from the promised land and exile as punishment for being the murderers of Christ or God.

8 Kommission für die religiösen Beziehungen zum Judentum (1985): “Hinweise und Richtlinien für eine richtige Darstellung von Juden und Judentum in der Predigt und in der Katechese der katholischen Kirche”, Vatikan, section 25.

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The Church Father John Chrysostom (d. 407) formulated this in an exegesis on Psalm 8: It is not one place that they inhabit; now they are scattered in all parts of the earth. If you ask the reason, you will find none other than the crucifying of Christ. (…) there is no relief from those troubles, in thrall as you are to the laws of the Romans as vagabonds and exiles and fugitives, roaming earth and sea, wanderers and nomads, homeless and enslaved, having forfeited freedom, fatherland, priesthood and all the rights you enjoyed before, dispersed amidst savages and countless other races, hated by all people, loathed, vulnerable to abuse by everyone. And rightly so (…). (PG 55, 110).9

Even in 1904, Pope Pius X rejected Theodor Herzl’s request for support of the Zionist idea by arguing that the Jews had not recognised Jesus. Theologically, the idea persisted that the possession of land and the acceptance of Jesus belong together. In addition, and this is just as grave, the close relationship with the Arab Christians was a strongly dominant requirement that blocked, delayed and inhibited recognition. At this point, the views of Palestinian Christians need to be considered. The Anglican pastor of East Jerusalem, Naim Stifan Ateek,10 and the Lutheran pastor of Bethlehem, Mitri Raheb, are regarded – along with the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Michel Sabbah, in office until 2008 – as the most prominent voices. Constitutive for their position is the distinction between the Jewish people and the state of Israel. The real-existing state of Israel is clearly denied a theological claim to the land. The Catholic patriarch Michel Sabbah has taken a stance on several occasions in pastoral addresses (cf. pastoral letter ‘Reading the Bible today in the Land of the Bible’, 1st November 1993). Sabbah’s words are significant. Firstly, they are directed against the violent struggle and call for peace and reconciliation; secondly, they contain however the utterly problematic characteristics of a Christian ideology of disinheriting and surpassing Jews, one that was believed to have been consigned to the past. The cliché of the violent Jewish Bible and the non-violent New Testament is rolled out, while the special covenant relationship between Israel and God is noticeably played down, and salvific history is reduced to a defined timeframe. This cannot simply be accepted unchallenged. To do so would be akin to preparing the ground for a Christian

9 English translation Hill, Robert C. (1998): St. John Chrysostom: Commentary on the Psalms Volume, Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, p. 159. 10 On his debate with Paul van Buren, see position strongly sympathetic with Ateek put forward by Gräbe, Uwe: “Christlich-jüdische Begegnung und israelisch-palästinensischer Kontext. Zur Schwierigkeit eines mehrdimensionalen Verstehens,” in: Günther, Wolfgang (ed.): Verstehen und Übersetzen. Beiträge vom missionstheologischen Symposion Hermannsburg, Hermannsburg: Missionsverlag 2000, pp. 109–123.

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theology of the land that adroitly circumvents the special Jewish context of the promised land. Not only Church representatives but also intellectuals and scholars have given their views on the theological significance of the state of Israel in recent years, without however any consensus prevailing as to if such a consideration is even appropriate. I shall cite just a few examples supporting the theological consideration of the issue: the spiritual father of the conciliar declaration Nostra aetate, prelate Johannes Oesterreicher, declared in 1971: “The state of Israel seems to me to the visible expression of the divinely ordained permanence of the Jewish people. Like Judaism, the state is also a banner of God’s continuous allegiance.”11 Franz Mussner has characterised Israel as a “sign of hope”, for both Israel itself and the Church.12 He writes: In any case a Christian must be convinced that Israel’s return to the land of its fathers would never have been possible without the will of God … Every day the existence of the state of Israel makes the world and the Church aware that the Jew exists and God has not released him from his guidance. The state of Israel is an undeniable sign of this.13

With these statements Mussner goes a long way towards formulating a theological justification of the state of Israel and thus comes close to Protestant positions. Key figures voicing these positions are Friedrich Wilhelm Marquardt, in particular in his study Die Juden und Ihr Land,14 and Paul van Buren. Van Buren’s interpretation of the state lifts it out of the earthly world as it were by emphasising the importance of God’s promise of land for the existence of the state of Israel even in its secular form.15 Van Buren calls for Church solidarity with Israel and Zionism because the main hope of Israel requires this state, which is the expression of the constant existence of the Jewish people. The postulated solidarity with Jewish Israel is often confronted today with the question of “justified” or “unjustified” criticism of political actions taken against Palestinians. There is also much mention of a “double solidarity”, i. e. one embracing both Israel and Palestine.

11 Österreicher, Johannes: Die Wiederentdeckung des Judentums durch die Kirche, Meitingen: Kyrios Verlag 1971, p. 66. 12 A good description of Mussner’s theology is to be found in Nieswandt, Reiner: Abrahams umkämpftes Erbe. Eine kontextuelle Studie zum modernen Konflikt von Juden, Christen und Muslimen um Israel/Palästina, SBS 41, Stuttgart: Verl. Katholisches Bibelwerk 1998, pp. 225– 228. 13 Mussner, Franz: Traktat über die Juden. 2nd Edition, Munich: Kösel 1988, pp. 33. 14 Marquardt, Friedrich Wilhelm: Die Juden und Ihr Land. 3rd Edition, Gütersloh: Mohn 1987. 15 Von Buren, Paul M.: A Christian Theology of the People Israel. Part II. A Theology of the Jewish-Christian Reality, New York: Seabury Press 1983, p. 204.

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Before taking a brief look at the “Jewish side”, I would like to conclude my considerations on the Christian side with a few proposals – from which perspective and on what basis? A few reasons would undoubtedly be helpful for nonCatholic readers and those unfamiliar with the scholarly discipline of Judaic Studies. I would personally wish to see the following: 1. The Churches should recognise Jewish plans and hopes for the land to be a legitimate expression of a relationship to God and learn about this. 2. They should recognise that the overwhelming majority of Jews across the globe – including in the Diaspora – view the state of Israel to be an indispensable component of Jewish identity. 3. They should accept that Christianity has no claim to the land. Simultaneously ensuing from this is the necessity to actively support free access for all denominations to religious sites, as is set out in the basic treaty. 4. The Churches are to take a firm stance against every form of antisemitism, including the form that uses antizionism as a camouflage. 5. At the same time, the Churches are to acknowledge their broad responsibility stemming from history and support and promote Jews living in a diverse array of national home countries.

4.

Israel as the (un)disputed home of Judaism

Upon considering the Jewish side, it is noticeable today that, with a few exceptions in ultraorthodox circles, there is a deeply felt solidarity with the state of Israel as a home for Jews. This does not mean however that life in other countries is denigrated. There are scores of instances showing that decisive and influential impulses for science and scholarship, culture and not least religion emanate from the so-called Diaspora and enrich the life of Jews around the world. Moreover, not all Jews wish to move to the holy land. As Marko Feingold put it pointedly in his autobiography: […] I wasn’t interested in Palestine – there are too many Jews there! I grew up in a mixed population, one I live together with, that’s something I master, and it suits me. At least we once had a mixed population, and after 1945 there were at least around five hundred Jews in the city of Salzburg. They then first left once Austria was becoming increasingly antiSemitic. … In any case, if I’d gone to Israel, I would have had to start all over again, and I already felt too old for a new beginning.16

16 Feingold, Marko M.: Wer einmal gestorben ist, dem tut nichts mehr weh. Eine Überlebensgeschichte, Vienna: Otto Müller Verlag 2000, p. 290.

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Due to the declining birth-rate numbers amongst the Jews of the United States, Britain and France in particular, in 2050 more Jews will be living in Israel than in the Diaspora for the first time in history.17 What is at the same time fascinating about this development is that the Jews in Israel mainly responsible for the population growth are to be found primarily amongst strict orthodox Jews, and it is precisely these Jews who are culturally rooted in the Diaspora. Israel is facing an enormous test of its inner cohesion and strength. The diversity of this society is immense. Even if we disregard the Arab minority for the moment, there are numerous developments in today’s Jewish-Israeli society which could well turn into problems. If at the beginning of the twentieth century it was mostly leftist secular Europeans who shaped Zionism, developing on its basis a pioneer society oriented on liberal and socialist values, religious Jews have brought with them a focus on questions revolving around the everyday influence of religious laws on life, on personal freedoms and rights, marriage, divorce, etc., and not least the question of who even is to be considered a Jew. The discussion of this issue continues unabated today and the gap between secular and religious Israelis seems to be widening. And a word on Arab-Jewish relations in the land, which in recent decades, thanks above all to intensive research in Israel, not least by committed so-called post-Zionist scholars, has been examined in great detail. This research has triggered a lively discourse in Israel because it has prised open many traditional views and brought with it a rewriting of the history of the twentieth century. Tom Segev for instance has analysed Arab-Israel relations in several books. In One Palestine Complete18 he leaves no doubt that conflicts existed long before the founding of the Israeli state and outbreaks of violence were inevitable. Displaying great intuition to appreciate the situation, the Israeli historian deals with all three sides, the British, the Arab and the Jewish, thus allowing us to participate in the unfolding of dramatic events. He convincingly shows that it was not the Shoah – the defining experience of European Jews – that ultimately gave birth to the state of Israel, as is so often claimed. In the long years of effort to establish a Jewish home in Palestine, the Zionists were obviously interested in saving Europe’s Jews, albeit they focused on 17 Cf. the PEW surveys: PEW Research Center: Israel’s Religiously Divided Society. Deep gulfs among Jews, as well as between Jews and Arabs, over political values and religion’s role in public life, PEW Research Center 2016, available here: https://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/ israels-religiously-divided-society/ [20. 04. 2020]. In most surveys the hypothesis is put forward that the majority of Jews will already live in Israel in just a few years. The European Jewish population will reduced dramatically to 0.2 % of the total population. In 2050 around 8.18 million Jews will live in Israel. 18 Segev, Tom: One Palestine, Complete. Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate, New York: Metropolitan Books 2000.

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recruiting mainly male Jews capable of and willing to work, and who would prove instrumental in building a viable state able to defend itself. A few years before Ben Gurion had taken the following position on rescuing Jewish children from Germany: “If I knew that it was possible to save all the children in Germany by transporting them to England, but only half of them by transporting them to Palestine, I would choose the second – because we face not only the reckoning of those children, but the historical reckoning of the Jewish people.” He was speaking in December 1938, a short time after Kristallnacht. To make sure he was not misunderstood, Ben Gurion added, “Like every Jew, I am interested in saving every Jew wherever possible. But nothing takes precedence over saving the Hebrew nation in its land.”19

There is just as little evidence to suggest that British policy was either pro-Arab or pro-Zionist. Rather, efforts were made to reconcile interests and remain a reasonably stable power keeping peace and order under increasingly deteriorating conditions. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that a large number of British soldiers, including officers, were no strangers to anti-Semitic prejudices. Above all General Sir Evelyn Barker, the GOC of the British Forces, made no secret of his views: Just think of all this life and money being wasted for these by Jews. Yes I loathe the lot – whether they be Zionists or not. Why should we be afraid of saying we hate them – it’s time this damned race knew what we think of them – loathsome people.20

His brutal course of action and mass arrests during “Operation Agatha” were the catalyst for the attack on the King David Hotel. The situation scarcely improved after the war. A look at the Arab side shows: perhaps the more educated classes did not hate Jews per se, but the Zionists, and there were certainly Arab families who protected Jews from anti-Jewish riots, putting their own lives in danger. And yet, just a few sparks were needed to ignite a firestorm. The tensions begin to escalate as early as the 1920s, in Tel Chai 1920, most tragically in Hebron in 1929. Even back then it is clear that peaceful life together is basically impossible between Jews and Arabs, unless one group subordinates itself to the other. The views of life and culture and the role of the state were simply too different. It may seem like a simplification, but ultimately it mirrors the main conflict when I claim that the genuinely unbridgeable divide was cultural, and indeed probably still is. For the Arabs, the Jewish immigrants were – in so far as they were not Sephardic or at least orthodox – members of an alien European culture, strongly influenced by the heresies of secularism and socialism. And for Jews, the Arabs appeared backward. 19 Ibid., p. 394. 20 Ibid., p. 480.

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The Zionist movement arose in Europe, drew its inspiration from Europe, and was part of Europe’s history. Its nationalism, romanticism, liberalism, and socialism were all products of Europe. The movement’s founding fathers had from the outset charged it with a cultural mission. The Jewish state in Palestine, Theodor Herzl wrote, would be Europe’s bulwark against Asia. …Writer Max Nordau believed the Jews would not lose their European culture in Palestine and adopt Asia’s inferior culture, just as the British had not become Indians in America, Hottentots in Africa, or Papuans in Australia. … The Jews in Palestine defined their European self-image in contrast to the Arabs and to the Jews from Arab countries, such as Yemenite Jews, who had settled in Jerusalem.21

The divides were crystallising long before 1948 and it became apparent that Jews and Arabs could only live together if enormous efforts were mustered, if indeed it was desired at all. There were first beginnings of rapprochement, but no consequential and continuous willingness to continue the process. Alone the ideas on the territories for which Arab or Jewish self-determination were to be claimed revealed enormous disparities. Ultimately, each side saw itself as the loser. In the long-term, the Jewish-Zionist campaign proved to be more successful and led to a state that was Jewish in its majority, even if it had to deal with inner tensions and conditions prevailed that sometimes bordered on civil war. In contrast, the Arab national movement failed to generate the international backing and the organisation necessary for setting up a durable and stable Palestine. In addition, Arab interests outside of Palestine and those pursued by European powers were not conducive for achieving this outcome. I’d like to conclude my considerations on the history of Palestine/Israel at this point. Of course, not because there is nothing more to tell. The detour into the historical dimension was necessary in order to make it clear that a critical and profound consideration on the situation in the contemporary Middle East requires a view that is ready to span a longer timeframe, a perspective that goes back beyond 1948. It is simply impossible to allocate one side as the victim, the other as the perpetrator today, and give one side the blame for the failure of an idea that we could understand as peaceful coexistence. In the intellectual discourse, Israel is subjected to a very complex set of perceptions on the Jewish side as well. There are radical Jewish exponents of a stance that ranges from criticism of Israel through to outright hostility. Pertinent names here are Noam Chomsky, Norman Finkelstein or Judith Butler. They idealise the Diaspora, portray Israel to be an apartheid or repressive state, and in part deny its right to exist. It is of course not for me to characterise these approaches as extremely problematic and quite often crossing the threshold to antisemitism

21 Ibid., p. 150.

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without being able to make my own contribution to the debate.22 It is my view however that a great deal is “tolerated” in this area by the intellectual left (-liberal) elite, while positions to the right of centre are viewed much more stringently and quickly condemned as anti-Semitic. A critical consideration of the media and portrayals of Israel23 are also necessary and permissible, also an analysis of the often biased anti-Israeli policies of institutions like the UNO.24 In recent years a great many Israeli scholars have begun to break open the Zionist conception of history. These post-Zionist approaches have produced fascinating multi-layered ideas, set off new discourses and debates, and have done so in a spirit that is worthy of a democratic state and in Austria only recently possible. For many a European state is yet to undertake such a critical and consequential account of its historical past. Known as the “new historians”, they include Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, Avi Shlaim, Shlomo Sand and Tom Segev. While amongst themselves very much at loggerheads, they take critical stances towards the long-prevailing narrative of Israeli historians, towards the war of independence, the expulsion of Arabs and the halting of the peace process. The propositions put forward by the “new historians”25 are mostly rejected by both Zionist historical scholarship as well as pro-Arab authors, who accuse them of making the conflict seem harmless. One of the leading critics of this movement is Efraim Karsh,26 who reproached them with distorting historical facts due to their political interests. One frequent criticism levelled is that the “new historians” frequently see the blame as residing solely on the Israeli side and condemn historical figures according to contemporary moral standpoints without giving sufficient attention to the specific historical context. They have also been accused of researching and writing from a radical leftist and Marxist standpoint.

22 Important in the German-speaking context is the essay collection: Heilbronn, Christian / Rabinovici, Doron / Sznaider, Natan (eds.): Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2019. 23 Here I need to point to the important corrective by the platform mena-watch. Der unabhängige Nahost Think-Tank, [think tank] available here: https://www.mena-watch.com [20. 04. 2020]. It critically shows how one-sided and problematic coverage is. 24 Cf. Feuerherdt, Alex / Markl, Florian: Vereinte Nationen gegen Israel. Wie die UN den jüdischen Staat delegitimiert, Berlin: Bentrich & Hentrich 2018. 25 There is a vast literature that does not need to be mentioned here. A brief overview is to be found in: Jewish Virtual Library 2020: “Zionism: ‘New Historians’ and Post-Zionists”, available here: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ldquo-new-historians-rdquo [20. 04. 2020]. See also: Westbye, Tor Øyvind: The Historiography of Israel’s New Historians; rewriting the history of 1948, [master’s thesis] 2012, available here: http://bora.uib.no/bitstream/ handle/1956/6335/101130399.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [20. 04. 2020]. 26 Cf. for example Karsh, Ephraim: Fabricating Israel’s History. The New Historians, London: Frank Cass 1997.

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But this aspect of critical historical scholarship is only one – albeit immensely important – angle for viewing a state in which so many citizens long for “normality” and yet continues to bear the nimbus of being something exceptional. A phenomenon attracting just as much attention as the state is the close interweaving of the claim to the land with the problems surrounding the question of Jewish identity, the belongingness of the converted (conversions that are nonorthodox) and the fundamental question of the interweaving of religion and politics. One crucial question arising in connection with the self-understanding of Israeli politics is if coexistence in a democratic country between Jews and Arabs is a feasible goal given that in the near future the Arab population would be in the majority, or if Israel, as the Zionists envisaged, is to remain a Jewish homeland with a dominantly Jewish character. Whereas a minority of politically leftleaning idealists still consider the former to be possible, a large majority – including the critical intellectuals – tend towards a two-state solution and thus ultimately push the second model. That, moreover, the annexation of autonomous areas – and not only in the politically active settlers’ movement – is being discussed once again, also needs to be mentioned here to complete the picture.27 It is not my task to assess the situation. But it is important to point out that it is the task of politicians and Church leaders and members in the so-called Diaspora to do everything they possibly can to support and foster Jews in being an indispensable part of our culture and fight against every form of antisemitism, including that camouflaging under anti-Zionism.

5.

“Our” task here in Austria: to remain unbiased when working against anti-Zionism

There is a lot to say about Austria’s ambivalent stance on Israel, but this is not possible here. It may suffice to point out that an important turn for the better has begun, marked by the visit of the former Austrian chancellor Franz Vranitzky, later the Federal President Thomas Klestil and the setting up of the ‘National Funds of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism’. 27 Benjamin Netanjahu’s announcement of the intent to annex a part of West Bank was noted in: “Benjamin Netanjahu will Jordantal annektieren.” Die Zeit online, 10 Sept. 2019, available: https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-09/israelischer-premierminister-benjamin-netanja hu-wiederwahl-jordantal-annexion [20. 04. 2020]. I am not able to discuss the plan Whitehouse Government here (2020): Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People, available here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf [20. 04. 2020]. Washington: Whitehouse Government, commonly known as the Trump peace plan.

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Earlier the Waldheim affair and Bruno Kreisky’s political line had already shown that involvement with Israel and discussions about the nature of the relationship were inseparable from domestic politics, and these in turn were connected with debates on Austria’s responsibility in National Socialism and the post-war integration of former Nazis. Today the European-wide phenomenon exists on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. And both are markedly increasing. As I write these lines, shock reverberates at the news that in Halle a 27 year-old neo-Nazi has murdered two people while trying to storm a synagogue during Yom Kippur and kill praying Jews. Faced with such dangers, it is understandable that more and more Jews are speaking of packing their bags again. On the other hand, the “new” antisemitism no longer solely takes place within the tried and true structures, but has as its gravitational centre a demonising of Israel and an amalgamating of “Jews”, “Israelis”, “Zionists”, “racists” and even “Nazis”. As a relic of the Soviet and Palestinian propaganda of the 1960s and 1970s, “Zionism” is equated with “racism” and the equation then supplemented with accusations like “imperialism”, “colonialism”, “apartheid” and even “genocide”. Pierre-André Taguieff,28 a historian of ideas, has described how in countries like France, Islamists and leftists have formed a coalition to take up the fight against liberalism, globalisation and hegemony, which they perceive as incarnated by the “American-Zionist conspiracy”. Here Israel is no longer a state whose politics are discussed and whose internal debates can be observed – it is once again the epitome of the “other”. Taguieff dares to draw parallels: “The genocide the Nazis committed against the Jews was the solution of the ‘Jewish question’, the solution the radical antiSemites in Europe dreamt of. A genocide of Israelis is the criminal dream shared today by radical anti-Zionists, globalised by the Islamists and their companions.” (245) He comes to the conclusion that consequential anti-racism today means fighting the global radical anti-Zionism, which represents one of the main forms of contemporary racist thinking, and entails a programme to eliminate the demonised enemy. This thus means it is also necessary to simultaneously combat Jihadism, one of the main factors in the construction of this thinking.29 In the Arab world, anti-Semitic opinions coalesce with the classical codes of Christian anti-Judaism, for instance when the notion that Jews murder children and use the blood for rituals is increasingly adopted into propaganda. Devel-

28 Cf. Taguieff, Pierre-André: Une France antijuive? Regards sur la nouvelle configuration judéophobe, Paris: CNRS Éditions 2015. 29 Rezension zu Taguieff, Pierre-André: Une France antijuive? Regards sur la nouvelle configuration judéophobe, Paris: CNRS Éditions 2015, H/Soz/Kult 15 Dec. 2016, available here: https://www.hsozkult.de/review/id/reb-24961?language=de [20. 4. 2020].

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opments of this kind must be registered with concern and alarm, while greater information and more effort is needed in education to resolutely counter them. At the very least, rampant and growing antisemitism and anti-Zionism, including the BDS movement, are to be vehemently opposed. A 2018 study commissioned by the Austrian parliamentary council surveyed 2700 persons: for Austria, ten percent of respondents demonstrated manifest anti-Semitic attitudes, while thirty percent were at least latent.30 On Israel the report stated: Quantitatively, the agreement expressed to statements representing Israel-related antisemitism varies. Every third respondent (34 %) agrees to the statement that ‘the Israelis treat the Palestinians no differently than the Germans treated the Jews in the Second World War’. The statement that ‘given the politics Israel implements I can understand why one can have something against the Jews’ is affirmed by 29 %. 11 % of the respondents agree with the statement that ‘if the state of Israel no longer existed, then peace would come to the Middle East’, which implies the extinction of Israel.31

And that if that was not enough – a special survey of 300 Turkish – and 300 Arabspeaking persons, all of whom have lived for a long time in Austria, shows that in comparison to the overall population they agree many times over to such statements. Under the heading “imported anti-Semitic narrative”, the report states: Turkish- and Arab-speaking respondents consistently express far stronger agreement with anti-Semitic statements than the overall population of Austria. While some 11 % of the overall number of respondents say that ‘they know whether someone is a Jew within a few minutes of meeting them’, amongst Arabic speakers the number is 43 % and Turkish speakers 41 %. The statement that ‘if the state of Israel no longer existed, then peace would come to the Middle East’ finds agreement amongst only 11 % of respondents in the Austrian-wide survey; amongst Arabic speakers though the number is an enormous 76 %, while 51 % of Turkish speakers agree.32

These figures show how urgent it is not to turn a blind eye to a phenomenon that right-wing populists are only too glad to pounce on and exploit. The situation needs to be taken very seriously to take appropriate measures. Such measures need to be initiated in schools, thus also educational programmes must be supported.

30 Zeglovits, Eva / Unterhuber, Paul / Sommer, Franz: “Antisemitismus-Studie 2018: Ergebnisanalyse im Überblick.” IFES / Demox Research 2018, [research center] available here: https:// www.antisemitismus2018.at/wp-content/uploads/Antisemitismus-in-%C3%96sterreich-2018_ Ergebnisanalyse-im-%C3%9Cberblick.pdf [20. 04. 2020]. 31 Anti-Semitism 2018: Facts and Figures at a Glance 2018, available here: https://www.anti semitismus2018.at/ [20. 4. 2020]. 32 Ibid.

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Bibliography Von Buren, Paul M.: A Christian Theology of the People Israel. Part II. A Theology of the Jewish-Christian Reality, New York: Seabury Press 1983. Feingold, Marko M.: Wer einmal gestorben ist, dem tut nichts mehr weh. Eine Überlebensgeschichte, Vienna: Otto Müller Verlag 2000. Feuerherdt, Alex / Markl, Florian: Vereinte Nationen gegen Israel. Wie die UN den jüdischen Staat delegitimiert, Berlin: Bentrich & Hentrich 2018. Gräbe, Uwe: “Christlich-jüdische Begegnung und israelisch-palästinensischer Kontext. Zur Schwierigkeit eines mehrdimensionalen Verstehens,” in: Günther, Wolfgang (ed.): Verstehen und Übersetzen. Beiträge vom missionstheologischen Symposion Hermannsburg, Hermannsburg: Missionsverlag 2000, pp. 109–123. Heilbronn, Christian / Rabinovici, Doron / Sznaider, Natan (eds.): Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2019. Henrix, Hans Hermann / Kraus, Wolfgang (eds.): Die Kirchen und das Judentum. Vol. 2: Dokumente von 1986 bis 2000, Paderborn: Bonifatius / Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verl.Haus 2001. Hill, Robert C.: St. John Chrysostom: Commentary on the Psalms Volume 1, Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press 1998. Karsh, Ephraim: Fabricating Israel’s History. The New Historians, London: Frank Cass 1997. Langer, Gerhard: “60 Years of the State of Israel and its importance for Christian-Jewish Dialogue”, in: Dialog DuSiach, Vienna, 2008/2, pp. 32–54. Langer, Gerhard: “Einige Steiflichter zum katholisch-theologischen Umgang mit dem Staat Israel”, in: Ritzer, Georg (ed.): Mit euch bin ich Mensch…Festschrift anlässlich des 60. Geburtstages von Friedrich Schleinzer O.Cist, Innsbruck / Vienna: Tyrolia 2008, pp. 149–198. Marquardt, Friedrich Wilhelm: Die Juden und Ihr Land. 3rd Edition, Gütersloh: Mohn 1987. Mussner, Franz: Traktat über die Juden. 2nd Edition, Munich: Kösel 1988. Österreicher, Johannes: Die Wiederentdeckung des Judentums durch die Kirche. Meitingen: Kyrios Verlag 1971. Segev, Tom: One Palestine, Complete. Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate, New York: Metropolitan Books 2000. Taguieff, Pierre-André: Une France antijuive? Regards sur la nouvelle configuration judéophobe, Paris: CNRS Éditions 2015.

Internet Sources Anti-Semitism 2018: Facts and Figures at a Glance 2018, available here: https://www. antisemitismus2018.at/ [20. 4. 2020]. Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland: “Palästina: Nüchtern, aber auch hoffnungsvoll”, NewsArchiv 2007, available here: https://www.ekir.de/www/service/6412.php [20. 04. 2020]. Jewish Virtual Library 2020: “Zionism: ‘New Historians’ and Post-Zionists”, available here: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ldquo-new-historians-rdquo [20. 04. 2020].

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Mena-Watch. Der unabhängige Nahost Think-Tank, available here: https://www.menawatch.com [20. 04. 2020]. PEW Research Center: Israel’s Religiously Divided Society. Deep gulfs among Jews, as well as between Jews and Arabs, over political values and religion’s role in public life, PEW Research Center 2016, available here: https://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/israelsreligiously-divided-society/ [20. 04. 2020]. Taguieff, Pierre-André: Une France antijuive? Regards sur la nouvelle configuration judéophobe, Paris: CNRS Éditions 2015, H/Soz/Kult 15 Dec. 2016, available here: https:// www.hsozkult.de/review/id/reb24961?language=de [20. 04. 2020]. Westbye, Tor Øyvind: The Historiography of Israel’s New Historians; rewriting the history of 1948, [master thesis] 2012, available here: http://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/ 6335/101130399.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [20. 04. 2020]. Whitehouse Government. Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People, Washington 2020, available here: https://www.whitehouse. gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf [20. 04. 2020]. Zeglovits, Eva / Unterhuber, Paul / Sommer, Franz: “Antisemitismus-Studie 2018: Ergebnisanalyse im Überblick.” IFES / Demox Research 2018, [research center] available here: https://www.antisemitismus2018.at/wp-content/uploads/Antisemitismus-in-%C3%96 sterreich2018_Ergebnisanalyse-im-%C3%9Cberblick.pdf [20. 04. 2020]. Die Zeit. “Benjamin Netanjahu will Jordantal annektieren.” Die Zeit online, 10 Sept. 2019, available here: https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-09/israelischer-premierminis ter-benjamin-netanjahuwiederwahl-jordantal-annexion [20. 04. 2020].

Regina Polak

“New” Anti-Semitism with a Special Focus on Israel: A Challenge for Catholic Pastoral Theology

Abstract The article reflects the claim to fight any kind of anti-Semitism, especially Israel-related anti-Semitism, from the perspective of a Catholic pastoral theology: What does this claim mean for the Catholic Church theologically and practically? In a first step, the author discusses the concept and phenomenon of ‘new anti-Semitism’, which is deeply connected with various forms of hostility and hatred towards the State of Israel. Although there is a lack of representative empirical studies on anti-Semitism among Catholics, the situation in the Catholic Church in Austria is delineated as an example. In a second step, important positions of the Catholic Church on combating anti-Semitism are presented, including the theological foundations that set the framework for that task. The Catholic Teaching judges anti-Semitism as a kind of racism, but also as a sin against God and mankind. In the last step, pastoral-theological questions and concrete tasks are identified that must be undertaken in the future.

1.

Introduction

In this anthology, Gerhard Langer lists five wishes for the Christian churches that refer to the theological and political relationship of the churches to the Land and State of Israel.1 In addition to his postulation for the recognition of the fundamental existential and religious meaning of the Land of Israel for Jews, the waiving of the Christian claim to the Land and a commitment to free access to religious sites for all religious communities, Langer wants the churches to fight any kind of anti-Semitism, especially anti-Zionist anti-Semitism. In my contribution, I will reflect in depth on these claims from the perspective of a Catholic pastoral theology. Methodologically, this requires a first step in which I outline the concrete empirical state of anti-Semitism among Catholics in society and in the pastoral realm (“Cairology”). Second, a “Criteriology” is 1 Cf. Langer, Gerhard: “The Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of the State of Israel and its Importance for Christians and Jews. The Reflections of a Theologian and Jewish Studies Scholar”, in this volume, pp. 129–146.

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required to define the theological framework within which the Church must meet the challenge of anti-Semitism, with a special focus on Israel-related anti-Semitism (“Criteriology”). The results of these first two steps then form the basis for the creation of questions and suggestions for an improved pastoral practice (“Praxeology”). Like all Christian churches, the Catholic Church has its own historical and theological tradition of dealing with Judaism and anti-Semitism. Therefore, I will reflect on Gerhard Langer՚s claims only in the context of the Roman Catholic Church. In addition, I will concentrate on the “new” forms of anti-Semitism, with a special focus on Israel-related anti-Semitism, which I consider to be a better concept than “anti-Zionism”, as the latter can lead to misunderstanding. Though there is almost no empirical research on these types of anti-Semitism among the Catholic population, the Catholic Church has a duty to deal with the issue. The rise of anti-Semitism in Europe demands a Catholic reaction, and the fight against this anti-Semitism will prove if the Church is serious in its theological commitment to the Jewish people since Nostra Aetate (Declaration on the Relation of the Church with Non-Christian Religions) was published in 1965. My contribution is structured as follows: – “Cairology”: In this first step, I will discuss the concept and phenomenon of ‘new anti-Semitism’, which is deeply connected with various forms of hostility and hatred towards the State of Israel. Although there is a lack of representative empirical studies on anti-Semitism among Catholics (broadly in Europe and more specifically in Austria), in the second stage of this step I will attempt to delineate the situation in the Catholic Church in Austria as an example. – “Criteriology”: In this next step, I will present some important positions of the Catholic Church on combating anti-Semitism, including the theological foundations that set the framework for that task. – “Praxeology”: Finally, I will identify pastoral-theological questions and concrete tasks that must be undertaken in the future. To date, there has been no systematic research on the immensely important issue of anti-Semitism, from either a practical-theological perspective. Catholic theology deals with Judaism, and the magisterium of the Catholic Church commits itself to combating anti-Semitism, but in concrete pastoral work the issue of “new” anti-Semitism is widely ignored, both theologically and practically. Therefore, my considerations cannot present more than a first programmatic outline, which aims at alerting Catholic leaders and disseminators to their responsibility in dealing with this complex issue. I want to demonstrate that this responsibility arises from genuine theological foundations that make action obligatory.

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Cairology

2.1

The concept and phenomenon of anti-Semitism

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To be able to fight “new” anti-Semitism, the Church must know the phenomenon in question. A first glance at research reveals an apparently unmanageable and complex reality. As Evelien Gans put it: “In short, to make antisemitism an object of study is to enter an academic, political, social and emotional minefield”,2 while Doron Rabinovici and Natan Sznaider liken the attempt to understand antiSemitism to sinking into “quicksand”.3 Though the phenomenon has been around as long as Jews have been living,4 the notion of anti-Semitism was invented by the German journalist Wilhelm Marr in 1879. Inspired by the aims of the Enlightenment, he wanted to justify antagonism to Judaism and answer the “Jewish Question” from the perspective of modern research. According to the Age of Enlightenment and its interest in secularisation, the dividing line between the “We” and the “Others” should not be drawn by religion, but rather by nature, ethnicity and affiliation.5 This new notion enabled people to continue a centuries-old Christian anti-Judaism on an academic level and to use it for social and political interests. Wolfgang Benz argues that anti-Semitism is therefore more than just a plain prejudice, but must be seen as a “construct of the respective majority society” that uses Jews “to define and stabilize the respective position through exclusion, defence and accusation”.6 Anti-Semitism takes over sociocultural and sociopolitical functions and has therefore been a highly adaptable and historically malleable phenomenon throughout history. Hence, these continuous metamorphoses make it exceedingly difficult to identify anti-Semitism precisely. Attempts to define this multi-faceted phenomenon thus range from more individual-oriented concepts to more functional political definitions. So the German Independent Expert Group on anti-Semitism describes anti-Semitism, as a “collective notion for all attitudes and behaviours that insinuate negative characteristics of individuals, groups or institutions perceived as Jewish because 2 Gans, Evelien: “Epilogue, Instrumentalising and blaming ‘the Jew’, 2011–2016,” in: Ensel, Remco / Gans, Evelien (eds): The Holocaust, Israel and “the Jew”. Histories of Antisemitisms in Postwar Dutch Society, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2017, pp. 499–544. 3 Rabinovici, Doron / Sznaider, Natan: “Neuer Antisemitismus. Verschärfung einer Debatte,” in: Rabinovici, Doron /Sznaider, Natan / Heilbronn, Christian (eds): Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte, Frankfurt a. M.: Edition Suhrkamp 2019, pp. 9–27. 4 Nirenberg, David: Antijudaismus. Eine andere Geschichte des westlichen Denkens, München: C. H. Beck 2015. 5 Zimmermann, Moshe: “Im Arsenal des Antisemitismus,” in: Rabinovici et. al. (eds): Neuer Antisemitismus? Berlin, Suhrkamp 2019, pp. 31–58. 6 Benz, Wolfgang: Was ist Antisemitismus? München: C. H. Beck 2005, p. 17.

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of this affiliation”,7 whereas Samuel Salzborn defines anti-Semitism as a “cognitive and emotional system” that aims “at an ideologically universal claim”.8 While an individual-oriented approach perceives anti-Semitism as a form of prejudice, xenophobia, misanthropy or racism that involves hatred of Jews because of their affiliation, a systemic definition argues that it is an attitude and world view that blames anything inexplicable and incomprehensible in politics and society on “the Jews”.9 Academic conflict on a definition of anti-Semitism implies political conflict too. This can be demonstrated through the confrontations arising from the working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). The IHRA working definition describes anti-Semitism as “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or nonJewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”10 In a practice-oriented enumeration, this definition lists eleven examples of anti-Semitic manifestations that are intended to help one identify anti-Semitism. This working definition is not legally binding. Up to now it has been adopted by more than 30 member countries, including Austria and Germany. There has been significant conflict concerning the process of its creation and reception, however. Pro-Palestinian activists consider four of the eleven examples as restricting criticism of Israel and the Israeli government. The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union, whose predecessor organisation had developed this working definition, had to remove it from its homepage. It was only after the jihadist attacks in Denmark and France that the IHRA leveraged this working definition. There is also an intense debate among researchers on anti-Semitism as to whether this working definition is suitable for research at all for several reasons: it is perceived as too vague; it excludes institutional anti-Semitism; it satisfies neither the heterogeneity of players nor the plurality of phenomena.11 7 Unabhängiger Expertenkreis Antisemitismus: Antisemitismus in Deutschland – aktuelle Entwicklungen, Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern 2017, p. 24. 8 Salzborn, Samuel: “Das Instrument des Antisemitismusberichts und die aktuelle Entwicklung von Antisemitismus in Deutschland,” in: Haviv-Horiner, Anita: In Europa nichts Neues? Israelische Blicke auf Antisemitismus heute, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019, p. 22. 9 Ibid., p. 21. 10 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance: “Working Definition of Antisemitism”, IHRA 2016, available: https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisem itism [20. 04. 2020]. 11 Embacher, Helga / Edtmaier, Bernadett / Preitschopf, Alexandra: Antisemitismus in Europa. Fallbeispiele eines globalen Phänomens im 21. Jahrhundert, Wien: Böhlau Verlag 2019, pp. 38– 39.

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Helga Embacher and her colleagues state that “the definition of anti-Semitism – or rather especially if a phenomenon can be called anti-Semitism – can only ever be an approximation to the phenomenon, which proves to be extremely flexible and historically adaptable”.12 Another problem must be taken into consideration. In societies where antiSemitism and the memory of the Shoah have merged into a “system of thinking and acting”,13 anti-Semitism has become a taboo. Therefore, its identification has become even more difficult, because no one wants to be judged to be an antiSemite. Additionally, over the centuries the “rationality of affects”14 has been transformed and, consequently, the expression of anti-Semitism after the Shoah has changed. As hatred can exist in an affective as well as in a rationally encoded form, which means anti-Semitism is either compatible with the self-concept (I-syntonic) or dissociated from the I (I-dystonic), it is expressed differently by diverse social or cultural groups. In a post-Shoah society, therefore, right-wing extremists and Muslim anti-Semites express their hatred affectively, whereas people shaped by the collective negative assessment of anti-Semitism utter their anti-Semitic attitudes pseudo-rationally and in conjunction with strategies of defense and reinterpretation as well as denial and trivialisation. So do people from the political left, well-educated conservatives, and reflective believers. An Idystonic anti-Semitism is therefore a modern phenomenon linked to the Enlightenment and rationalisation. Since the abyss of Auschwitz, I-dystonic antiSemitism dominates within the majority of post-Shoah civilisations such as Germany and Austria.15 Practically, this means that one must not simply imagine anti-Semites as hateful people, but must understand anti-Semitism as a cognitive pattern of perception and thinking, which can but need not automatically be accompanied by devaluation, contempt or hatred. Anti-Semitism can appear in rational guises. Because of the public condemnation of anti-Semitism, it is not always easy to recognise prejudices against Jews. People are afraid to say something wrong about “the Jews”, and so they suppress their anti-Semitic attitudes. Christians, while aware of the theological relevance of Judaism for Christianity, while admitting to Christian co-responsibility for the Shoah, and while understanding anti-Semitism as a sin, can nevertheless be affected by antiSemitic patterns of perception, and thinking.

12 Ibid., p. 39. 13 Rabinovici, Doron / Sznaider, Natan / Heilbronn, Christian: Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte, Frankfurt a. M.: Edition, Suhrkamp 2019, p. 12. 14 Schwarz-Friesel, Monika: “Judenhass 2.0: Das Chamäleon Antisemitismus im digitalen Zeitalter,” in: Rabinovici / Sznaider / Heilbronn: Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte, Frankfurt a. M.: Edition Suhrkamp 2019, p. 402. 15 Ibid., p. 404.

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Finally, the centuries-long tradition of anti-Judaism must be mentioned: rejection, resentment and hatred of Jews and Judaism for religious – even “Christian” – reasons.16 Research on anti-Semitism does not usually distinguish between anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism, as the effects on Jews are the same. This ignorance results in a problematic lack of empirical research. But as the Christian hatred of Jews forms the spiritual and social-historical basis for the political and racial anti-Semitism of the 19th century and is therefore co-responsible for the Shoah, it must be discussed explicitly. This is even more important because some Christians use this distinction internally to evade the Church’s co-responsibility by portraying both as completely distinct and separate phenomena. Therefore, the distinction makes perfect sense. In pastoral theology especially, anti-Judaism is an essential concept because it focuses on the genuine religious and theologicallybased anti-Semitic patterns of perception that can be found not only in history, but also in contemporary pastoral work.

2.2

The concept and phenomenon of “new” anti-Semitism

Reflections on anti-Semitism and Church become more complex if the so-called “new” anti-Semitism is taken into consideration. Helga Embacher states that “[t]o date, there is no consensus on the nature and extent of anti-Semitism, there is also no generally accepted scientific definition”.17 She describes how the debate on “new” anti-Semitism began in the 1970s, flared up again in the context of the Second Intifada in 2000 and remains controversial territory today, in particular in relation to the debate around whether and to what extent this is actually a “new” phenomenon. During the riots of the 2000s, some academics compared rising anti-Semitism with the anti-Semitism of the 1930s. Some doubted there was a difference, while others recognised “novelty”, especially among the leftwing and Muslim perpetrators, finding that Israel was perceived as a new “collective Jew”, seen as the “Jew among the States”. But despite these observations, the term “new” anti-Semitism was critically rejected, since contemporary antiSemitism is still based on traditional stereotypes. However, the quantitative increase in anti-Semitism in the public space is as new as its quality. So is the intensity of extreme anti-Israelism and its widespread acceptance.18

16 Benz, Wolfgang: Was ist Antisemitismus? München: H.C. Beck 2005, p. 65. 17 Embacher, Helga / Edtmaier, Bernadett / Preitschopf, Alexandra: Antisemitismus in Europa. Fallbeispiele eines globalen Phänomens im 21. Jahrhundert, Wien: Böhlau Verlag 2019, p. 22. 18 Schwarz-Friesel, Monika / Friesel, Evytar / Reinharz, Jehuda (eds): Aktueller Antisemitismus – ein Phänomen der Mitte, Berlin: De Gruyter 2010, p. 3.

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2.2.1 Two examples Two examples may illustrate how difficult it is to find a unique definition of Israel-related anti-Semitism, which is connected to the understanding of antiSemitism and to the close correlation between historical and contemporary political developments and their evaluation from the perspective of political ethics. First example: Samuel Salzborn considers the Islamist terrorist attacks of 9/11 to be an “important turning point in the history of anti-Semitic resentment”.19 These attacks targeted not only the US, but also Jews, as Osama bin Ladin and other terrorists emphasised. In the aftermath of 9/11, Salzborn noticed a massive “delimitation”, “trivialisation” and “banalization” of anti-Semitism, closely related to Israel. According to him, the terror attacks were interpreted as the initial igniting of a global anti-Semitic mobilisation in the Arab world and worldwide.20 The demonstrations in numerous German cities in the summer of 2014 – the time of the so-called Gaza War – are an example of this process of “delimitation”. Under the leadership of Palestinian organisations, Islamist anti-Semites, German neo-Nazis and left-wing anti-imperialists demonstrated together against Israel, ignoring all ideological differences. Anti-Semitism became their unifying world view. For Salzborn, Israel-related anti-Semitism is therefore the dominant contemporary type of anti-Semitism. According to Natan Scharanski’s 3-D test, this anti-Semitism can be identified by three characteristics: a) delegitimising the State of Israel, for example denial of the State’s right to exist; b) demonising Israel as a representation of and even the epitome of evil, by comparing Israeli politics with the Nazi regime – “child murderers” or “Satan”; c) application of double standards in the assessment of Israeli politics, for example criticising the human rights violations of Israel while not addressing those of other countries such as China. This criteriology is useful when arguing against the trivialisation of anti-Semitism by pretending that it is merely a criticism of Israel. Finally, “trivialisation” of anti-Semitism can be seen in claims that it is “only” a problem for Jews and is therefore a marginal problem. In this view, it is not the antiSemites but the Jews who are the problem. The fact that anti-Semites threaten the values of an enlightened, democratic world is ignored. Salzborn describes these world views as three “grand narratives” that are currently clashing in the global political realm: a) radical Islamism, with the idea of an all-compassing umma and an associated order of unity between politics and 19 Salzborn, Samuel: “Das Instrument des Antisemitismusberichts und die aktuelle Entwicklung von Antisemitismus in Deutschland,” in: Haviv-Horiner, Anita: In Europa nichts Neues? Israelische Blicke auf Antisemitismus heute, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019, p. 22. 20 Ibid.

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religion; b) (populist) right-wing extremism, with its aim of segmenting the world ethnically and, together with its enemy, the radical Islamism, combating the liberal foundations and universalistic claim of the Enlightenment; c) finally, liberalism, with its idea of an enlightened universality, which often reacts far too passively and defensively. Second example: According to Moshe Zimmermann, anti-Semitism is not part of a world view, but rather more limited “as a general negative assessment of ‘the Jews’ as a putative race, nation, religious community or social group”.21 Like Salzborn, he diagnoses an “expansion” or “increase” in anti-Semitism after the Second World War, referring to the intensive debates on the measurability of antiSemitic tendencies in Germany. In this debate, scholars distinguished between “classical” and “secondary” anti-Semitism: while the first included traditional anti-Semitism, the second related to the denial and the relativisation of the Shoah. In a further step, these two concepts were supplemented with the category of “Israel-related anti-Semitism”. For Zimmermann, these categories pose numerous problems. He considers the questions with which the two post-war categories are measured to be problematic. It therefore makes a difference whether the questions refer to “Jews” or “the Jews”. A statement measuring “secondary anti-Semitism” – “Israel uses the commemoration of the Shoah to influence Germany’s attitude to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” – was agreed to by 31.5 % of Israeli Jews in a 2009 survey in Israel. For Zimmermann, therefore, it is questionable whether and to what extent “an Israeli-critical attitude actually belongs in the category of anti-Semitism”.22 He states that not every criticism of Israeli politics is anti-Semitic. At the same time, for him it is a fact that the establishment of the State of Israel has redefined the problem of anti-Semitism. It plays an important role as a projection screen in the transformation of latent anti-Semitism into manifest anti-Semitism: the State of Israel as a Jewish state, and Israeli politics in particular, often give anti-Semites an excuse to express antiSemitic positions more frankly.23 In Zimmermann՚s opinion, the debate on Israel-related anti-Semitism started in the 1960s, when left-wing radical forces of the so-called ’68 generation declared the fight against the politics of Israel to be part of the anti-imperialistic fight, which then took on anti-Jewish characteristics. This anti-Jewishness was called “anti-Zionism” or “new anti-Semitism”. Zimmermann argues that these concepts originally served primarily as a weapon against Israeli politicians on the right, especially those in the right-wing nationalist governments since 1977. This 21 Zimmermann, Moshe: “Im Arsenal des Antisemitismus,” in: Rabinovici et. al. (eds): Neuer Antisemitismus? Berlin, Suhrkamp 2019, pp. 31–58, 36. 22 Ibid., p. 40. 23 Ibid.

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history of the concept of “anti-Zionism” is the reason why I prefer to talk about “Israel-related” anti-Semitism. The term “anti-Zionism” raises one-sided, leftwing associations. Moreover, the term “Zionism” opens another ideological– political minefield within Israeli politics, which I cannot discuss here.24 Zimmermann also stresses that the debates around this multi-layered “leftwing anti-Zionism” overlook the strength of right-wing anti-Semitism when compared with left-wing anti-Semitism, including Israel-related anti-Semitism. He demonstrates that the new “love” for Israel, which many right-wing extremists and right-wing populists highlight, shows an unmistakably instrumental character. This new passion cannot be understood without the newly discovered image of the enemy in “the” Muslims and “Islam”, not to mention the still growing attacks in this political scene. Concerning 9/11, Zimmerman also refers to an increase in the “new” antiSemitism in its Muslim form. According to him, its “discovery” is linked to rising awareness of the presence of Muslim population groups in Germany. This forced the impression that Muslims were the main actors in anti-Semitism in Germany and Europe. Indeed, in the course of the Middle East conflict and the conflict with European Islam-politics, anti-Semitism became an important tool for Muslims, in particular Arab Muslims. Many of them used it to combat political Zionism and the US. In doing so, the terms “Zionist”, “Israeli” and “Jew” were increasingly used as synonyms.25 At the same time, many migrants from North Africa and the Middle East imported anti-Semitism to Europe, which had been exported to their countries by the national social propaganda in the Arab world.26 Finally, the public debates in Europe, which since then have focused mainly on Muslim-Arab anti-Semitism, must also be seen in the context of the political shifts taking place after 9/11 and the associated rise of right-wing and populist political parties. For them, anti-Semitism has become another weapon to stigmatise all Muslims as enemies – in their respective countries and worldwide. These two examples prove how difficult it is to define and measure new and Israeli-related anti-Semitism. The description of the IHRA therefore abstains from a precise definition and limits itself to four examples that focus on criticism of Israel or the Israeli government. These examples relate to the delegitimisation and demonisation of Israel, as well as the application of double standards to 24 Hertzberg, Arthur: The Zionist Idea. A Historical Analysis and Reader, Philadelphia, PA (US): Jewish Publication Society 1997, 1972; Hertzberg, Arthur: The Fate of Zionism: A Secular Future for Israel & Palestine, New York: Harper Collins Publisher 2003. 25 There are, of course, immanent religious motives for Muslim anti-Semitism that I cannot refer to here, cf. Nirenberg, David (2015): Antijudaismus, pp. 145–190. 26 Küntzel, Matthias: “Von Zeesen bis Beirut: Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus in der arabischen Welt,” in: Rabinovici / Sznaider / Heilbronn 2019: Neuer Antisemitismus?, pp. 159– 181.

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Israel and its politics. Given the political conflicts and academic doubts around them, Helga Embacher appreciates their significance as a “valuable orientation guide”. She speaks of a “grey zone”, which means “that the transition from a harsh or unjust critique of Israel to anti-Semitism can be defined theoretically but may be difficult to handle in respective case classifications”.27 Therefore, I conclude my considerations of this issue with the hope that they will raise pastoral awareness of a serious anti-Semitic threat and of the need to understand the complexity of this phenomenon. In any case, the churches must be aware of the fact that the State of Israel and its politics can be used by the majority of societies as a construct “to define and stabilize their own positions through exclusion, defense and assignment of debt”28 and thus be anti-Semitic. Church members will therefore be affected by this phenomenon too. Research on anti-Semitism demonstrates that Israel represents a new and central projection screen for hatred of Jews and plays a key role in all recent forms of anti-Semitism – in the political left and right spectrum, in Muslim antiSemitism and in secondary anti-Semitism. The close connection with concrete political events is evident in the fact that Israel-related anti-Semitism is currently the most widespread type, both globally and regionally.

2.3

Anti-Semitism: An indicator of the human condition in danger

As already mentioned, anti-Semitism is not a problem for Jews alone. As a complex phenomenon, it is also a historical and contemporary indicator of social and political problems in which the human condition itself is in danger. Anti-Semitism reveals that the uniqueness and dignity of the human person is threatened by erosion and even disposal. There are several causes for this. Omer Bartov lists them as follows: the rise of “nationalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-immigration rhetoric”; the “renewed rise of populism, racism, white supremacy thinking as well as radical right movements and governments”; “the erosion of democracy, tolerance and respect for human rights”; and a loss of “a sense of responsibility towards refugees and other people in need” in association with the “growing concern for one’s own physical and economic security”.29 Wolfgang Heitmeyer demonstrates that the “new” attitudinal patterns are closely related to “anomie”, that is, the lack of social and ethical standards of people living in an “unstable decade” with neither an overview nor future 27 Embacher, Helga et. al. 2019: Antisemitismus in Europa, pp. 39. 28 Benz, Wolfgang 2005: Was ist Antisemitismus? p. 17. 29 Bartov, Omer: “Der alte und der neue Antisemitismus,” in: Rabinovici / Sznaider / Heilbronn: Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte, Frankfurt a. M.: Edition, Suhrkamp 2019, pp. 28–62.

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prospects.30 The perception of contemporary global and national developments as increasing insecurity also fosters authoritarianism and an orientation towards social dominance, which are also basic dimensions of anti-Semitism.31 Anti-Semitism can therefore be interpreted as a “smoke detector” among political processes that endanger social cohesion. Different historical constellations and political interests – such as colonialism or the influence of the commemoration of the Shoah – then shape the specific national and cultural expression of anti-Semitism. So, left-wing anti-Semitism dominates in the UK, while French anti-Semitism is more strongly influenced by colonial history, and Austrian anti-Semitism is influenced by the country’s National Socialist history. The challenge to identify anti-Semitism becomes even more difficult in a context in which Israeli governments, since 2004, “increasingly refer to the Holocaust to justify their oppression of the Palestinians while at the same time, they have also aggravated the violence of this oppression.”32 Like many states in the world, Israel is experiencing an erosion of democracy, a strengthening of racism and an undermining of the rule of law.33 Despite this complexity, it is not “the Jews” or “Israel” who are responsible for anti-Semitism. Prejudice, rejection, and hatred must always be responded to by those who suffer from such attitudes – even if they are a reaction to actual misconduct by a Jew. No misconduct justifies the conviction of a person because of their belonging to a social, national, cultural, or religious group. Whoever justifies their hatred on the basis of the behaviour of the other denies their own ability, responsibility, and duty to relate to the behaviour of others in ethical freedom. Of course, human behavior is determined by social, biological, psychological, and other variables – but there is always the duty to act ethically.

2.4

The Jewish Perspective

Finally, the view of Jews on anti-Semitism must also be recognised. Of course, there is no uniform “Jewish” perspective, since biographical experiences, subjective perceptions, and interpretations as well as political attitudes shape Jewish 30 Heitmeyer, Wolfgang: “Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit in einem entsicherten Jahrzehnt,” in: Heitmeyer, Wolfgang (ed.): Deutsche Zustände. Folge 10, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2010, pp. 15–41, 15. 31 Leibold, Jürgen / Thörner, Stefan / Gosen, Stefanie / Schmidt, Peter: “Mehr oder weniger erwünscht? Entwicklung und Akzeptanz von Vorurteilen gegenüber Muslimen und Juden,” in: Heitmeyer, Wolfgang (ed.): Deutsche Zustände, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2010, pp. 177– 198, 190. 32 Bartov, Omer 2019: “Der alte und der neue Antisemitismus”, p. 59. 33 Ibid.

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reflections on anti-Semitism too. Nevertheless, anyone who deals with the topic of anti-Semitism must place an emphasis on the perception of those affected by anti-Semitism. Anita Haviv-Horiner34 presented an empirical insight into this, using 15 lifehistory interviews to provide insights into how Israeli Jews react to anti-Semitism, with a special focus on the role Israel plays in dealing with anti-Semitism. The spectrum of statements ranges from ‘anti-Semitism is an incurable disease unrelated to other forms of racism’ to the observation that “people who exclude others do not limit this to one group. If someone is anti-Semite, then it is likely that she or he also rejects refugees and gays”.35 The role of Israel is also perceived in diverse ways: for some, Israel is a “safe haven for Jews”; others do not feel safe at all and consider Israel’s future to be at risk. All interviewees agreed that there are anti-Semitic forms of criticism of Israel, but their assessments diverged. Many criticised Israeli politics, but by no means the State of Israel itself. Some think that Israeli politics fuel hatred of Israel, while others see Israeli politics as a pretext for anti-Semitic feelings. And some are afraid or hopeless: “For the first time in my life, I do not know how to fight anti-Semitism and racism”.36 AntiSemitism was a massive difficulty for all respondents. At this point it must also be emphasised that anti-Semitism is a problem for Jews, but it is still not their problem. This is evidenced by the fact that anti-Semitism can be found in regions where no Jews live, and, moreover, is also often more pronounced there. The claim that Jews are responsible for anti-Semitism would imply that hatred and rejection of people are generated by the victims of such behaviour. But this must be judged to be both a reversal of perpetrator–victim relations and an extinction of the ethical responsibility for misanthropic attitudes. Anti-Semitism would have to be identified as a ‘natural’ reaction. Actually, it is not and never has been.

2.5

The situation in the Catholic Church in Austria

The latest representative study on anti-Semitism in Austria was conducted in 2018 on behalf of the Austrian parliamentary directorate.37 According to this study, among the 2731 respondents, about 10 % of the Austrian population can be considered manifestly anti-Semitic and about 30 % latently anti-Semitic. The results on Israel-related, secondary, and religious anti-Semitism are particularly relevant to the issue of my contribution. 34 35 36 37

Haviv-Horiner, Anita 2019: In Europa nichts Neues? Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 18. Anti-Semitism 2018: Facts and Figures at a Glance 2018, available here: https://www.anti semitismus2018.at/ [20. 04. 2020].

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Thus 34 % agree with the statements that “the Israelis do not treat the Palestinians differently than the Germans treated the Jews in the Second World War”; 29 % support the statement that “[w]ith Israeli politics, I can well understand that some people reject Jews”, and 11 % agree with the statement that “[i]f the state of Israel no longer exists, there will be peace in the Middle East”, which implies the extinction of Israel; 36 % are of the opinion, that “[t]oday, Jews try to take advantage of the fact that they were victims during the Nazi era”; 37 % admit to the statement that “I am against the rekindling of the fact that Jews died in the Second World War”; and 14 % affirm the statement that “Jews are still responsible for the death of Jesus”. A strong correlation can be seen between anti-Semitic and right-wing authoritarian preferences. Moreover, younger, and more educated respondents are less likely to agree with anti-Semitic statements. A nonrepresentative in-depth study of Arabic and Turkish speaking persons revealed that their agreement with anti-Semitic statements was almost consistently much stronger than was agreement among the Austrian population, especially in relation to Israel-related antiSemitism. However, the study design does not make it possible to make final statements as to whether or how new anti-Semitism is distributed among the Austrian population. It is also not possible to state that Muslim anti-Semitism is stronger than right-wing anti-Semitism. This would require in-depth research into certain sociodemographic groups and milieus in Austria. In her contribution, Helga Embacher presents studies of anti-Semitism in Austria.38 According to the study ‘Global 100’ conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in 2014, 28 % of all Austrians display anti-Semitic preferences, which puts Austria slightly above the western European average. According to the ADL Study of 2002, the number of Austrians with anti-Semitic preferences has increased significantly (2002: 19 %). In contrast, a study conducted by the CNN states that there was a decline in “hard” anti-Semitism from 24 % to 13 % for the time period between 1991 and 2002, with anti-Semitic preferences significantly more frequent in the extreme right-wing and right-wing populist milieu. Comparing the quoted studies, Helga Embacher concludes that these few studies do not allow generalised statements to be made about anti-Semitism in Austria. The questions often fall too short, qualitative studies are lacking, and the studies focus only on certain groups and regions. She also criticises the ‘Antisemitism 2018’ study by the Austrian Parliamentary Directorate, which claims that the climate of public opinion on anti-Semitism in Austria has changed sustainably for the better, locating anti-Semitism primarily in the so-called “imported” anti-Semitism of Muslims. She states that there is a continuity of traditional anti-Semitic preferences in Austria and identifies “several groups of 38 Embacher, Helga et. al. 2019: Antisemitismus in Europa, pp. 286–288.

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central actors of anti-Semitic preferences, whereby the majority of anti-Semitic criminal acts are still committed by right-wing extremists”.39 Comparing antiSemitism in Austria with that in the UK and France, she identifies two characteristics in Austria. First, anti-Semitism is shaped by the role of the right-wing populist party FPÖ, which has already been a governing party twice and thus has massive influence on discourses about anti-Semitism. This has led to internal uncertainties and debates within the Jewish community. Second, there is no powerful discourse on left-wing anti-Semitism in Austria. Therefore, the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign in Austria has hardly achieved any success so far.40 In 2017, under the former Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz, the Working Definition of the IRHA was adopted. Given the unsatisfactory situation in relation to data, the amount and quality of anti-Semitism among Catholics in Austria unfortunately remains completely unexplored. Considering the sociodemographic composition, political attitudes, and tendency towards right-wing authoritarian preferences among Catholics,41 one must certainly assume that anti-Semitism will also be found among Austrian members of the Catholic Church. One must assume that neither its doctrinal and theological change concerning the Church’s relationship to Judaism nor the obligation to combat anti-Semitism has been sufficiently noticed among Catholics. An almost completely unknown factor is the amount of religiously based antiSemitism, that is, the amount of anti-Judaism. Despite curricular content in the academic training of priests, deacons, laypeople and teachers, there is no empirical evidence that this education has an impact in pastoral practice. Personal experience suggests that much still needs to be done here. Therefore, the following phenomenology is based on personal observation during my engagement in Christian–Jewish dialogue in the Coordination Committee for Christian–Jewish Cooperation. Secondary anti-Semitism Secondary anti-Semitism can be observed in the context of commemoration of the Shoah, which has ambivalent characteristics. On the one hand, one can find credible and deep consternation and mourning. On the other hand, often simultaneously and behind closed doors, people want commemoration to come to 39 Ibid., p. 288. 40 Ibid., p. 289. 41 Cf. Arts, Will / Halman, Loek: “Value Research and Transformation in Europe,” in: Polak, Regina (ed.): Zukunft. Werte. Europa. Die Europäische Wertestudie 1990–2010: Österreich im Vergleich, Wien: Böhlau Verlag 2011, pp. 79–99, 89. The authors demonstrated that people who define themselves as particularly religious show significantly more authoritarian attitudes and deprecate social and cultural minorities more than non-religious people do.

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an end, claiming that a never-ending remembering prevents reconciliation. From this perspective, it is the Jews who are responsible for lack of reconciliation. By referring to the Christian value of reconciliation, the presumptuous accusation is even grounded theologically. Another indicator of secondary anti-Semitism is the rhetorical use of phrases like “the unfathomable” and “the incomprehensible” when referring to the Shoah. Describing the murder of six million Jews with such vague adjectives is ambivalent since it can be associated with a refusal to reflect on the reasons for the Shoah and the role of Church and theology before and during the genocide. Giorgio Agamben wrote that people who reject the indispensable struggle for the ethical and theological meaning of the Shoah prove right those who “want Auschwitz to remain forever incomprehensible (un-understandable)”.42 According to my experience, secondary anti-Semitism is more likely to be found among older than younger Catholics. It is very often rooted in a lack of historical education or can be traced back to intra-family circumstances and narratives. At the same time, younger Catholics are usually openminded towards the encounter with Jews and endeavour to understand Judaism as a contemporary and multifaceted reality. They have problems with identifying Judaism exclusively with the Shoah – a matter of concern they sometimes share with some younger Jews.43 This phenomenon needs deeper qualitative research. Israel-related anti-Semitism Israel-related anti-Semitism is a topic that is hardly ever reflected on by the Austrian Catholic Church, but it does pose a challenge. It can be encountered among Catholics with a highly idealised image of Jews and Judaism that they cannot reconcile with the current politics of the Israeli government towards the Palestinians. Not infrequently, such Israel-related anti-Semitism can be found alongside an Israel-philia, which reduces the State of Israel to the “Holy Land”, ignoring the historical, social, and political reality of Israel. Unlike the situation in the Austrian Protestant Church, left-wing Israel-related anti-Semitism, for example, supporting BDS, is poorly received among Catholics. In 2017, Bishop Scheuer resigned as president of Pax Christi Austria because he classified the organisation’s position on the State of Israel as antiSemitic.44 Anti-Semitic resentments are explicitly expressed more often when orthodox and ultra-orthodox Judaism is debated. In such debates, some 42 Agamben, Giorgo: Was von Auschwitz bleibt. Das Archiv und der Zeuge (Homo sacer III), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 2003, p. 3. 43 Menasse, Peter: Rede an uns, Wien: edition a 2012. 44 Kathpress: “Bischof Scheuer legt Vorsitz von Pax Christi zurück” 2017, available here: https:// www.kathpress.at/goto/meldung/1521283/bischof-scheuer-legt-vorsitz-von-pax-christi-zu rueck [20. 04. 2020].

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Catholics reuse the old stereotype of Jesus Christ, who has abolished any kind of “piety to the law”, a traditional anti-Judaist “argument”. Left and right anti-Semitism in its political form seems to be rather marginal among Catholics. For politically right-wing Catholics, it is instead Muslims and Islam that are at the centre of rejection, and their support for Israel can therefore be seen as an expression of anti-Muslim resentment. The anti-Semitism of leftwing Catholics becomes more visible in the rejection of circumcision, the consideration of kosher eating habits or the use of Old Testament texts in the liturgy, in which violence is (allegedly) positively connotated. Religious anti-Semitism Religious anti-Semitism – or more precisely, Christian anti-Judaism – can still be encountered in the Austrian Church despite massive improvements in knowledge of Judaism and an increased appreciation of the Old Testament. In homilies, one can hear about the opposition of love and law, mercy and justice. The malicious Pharisees are still a negative template used to highlight the Christian truth. The rhetoric of superiority about Christianity having abolished the Jewish law is still alive among believers, as is an unreflective praising of the Church as the “new Israel”.45 These few examples prove the need to distinguish between antiSemitism and anti-Judaism as independent phenomena in the Church. Shame, guilt, and insecurity In general, I repeatedly encounter an atmosphere of diffuse feelings of shame and guilt in the pastoral realm. Most believers are deeply shaken by the murder of the Jews and the role of Austria in their murder. Thus, many people are anxious to reject the idea that they might display anti-Semitic attitudes themselves. This emotional complexity complicates the necessary confrontation with anti-Semitism as well as the identification and transformation of genuinely theologically founded anti-Judaist patterns of perception and thinking. Among many Austrian Catholics, this anxious defence against a self-critical accusation of anti-Semitism may also be reinforced by unknown and unreflective family biographies.46 Thus, even the transgenerational transfer of real guilt that has not been reflected upon or the un-mourned collaboration of the generation of (great-grand) parents can also generate massive resistance and impede educational processes. Last, but not least, one genuine but often ignored religious root of antiSemitism is the insecurity in one’s own faith. This insecurity can be triggered or 45 More examples can be found in: Petzel, Paul / Reck, Norbert (eds): Von Abba bis Zorn Gottes. Irrtümer aufklären – das Judentum verstehen (2. Auflage), Ostfildern: Patmos 2017. 46 Keil, Martha / Mettauer, Philipp (eds): Drei Generationen. Shoah und Nationalsozialismus im Familiengedächtnis, Wien–Innsbruck: Studienverlag 2016.

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intensified by an encounter with Judaism – especially when Christians become aware of their theological proximity to Judaism. It was not without reason that Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt thought that Christian anti-Judaism would only come to an end when Christians would not only tolerate a Jewish No to Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, but also “affirm it as a substantive contradiction to the whole of their teaching of God, world and man”.47 For someone whose faith is not deeply rooted, both the pious and the secular Jew can become the object of rejection. Also, the idealising countermovement – the embracing of Jews (for example, by imitating Pessah-celebrations in communities, overemphasising similarities, negating or ignoring differences) – can be a symptom of an inability or unwillingness to bear the difference. Such mostly unconscious emotions can turn into anti-Semitism at any time. Catholic Migrants The growing presence of Catholic migrants and migrant communities within local communities and dioceses is a new and special challenge for the Church too. Depending on their origin, the sensitivity towards Jews that migrants encounter in Austria and Germany is often new and strange. Some regard it as exaggerated. Simultaneously, many of the international Catholic students, for example, demonstrate traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes. This phenomenon reveals a structural problem in the Catholic Church. There are other countries, in Europe as well as worldwide, which have not dealt with the Shoah to the same extent as the Germanspeaking countries. Theological education on the issue of Judaism and anti-Semitism is not standardised worldwide. Therefore, it is not only Muslim migrants, but also Christian migrants, who display all forms of antiSemitism, old and new and not least religious, which, depending on their country of origin, have their own specific patterns of “argumentation”. Christian Palestinians Finally, the situation of Christian Palestinians in Israel and Palestine must be mentioned. Responsibility for Christian Palestinians has affected and continues to affect attitudes towards the State of Israel. Catholic doctrine, however, rejects any kind of Israel-related anti-Semitism. Simultaneously, a theological approach towards the State of Israel is explicitly denied. This will be discussed further in the “Criteriology”. It is doubtful whether Catholic believers are aware of this difficult distinction. To my perception, Catholics are divided concerning the question of responsibility for the Palestinians, and anti-Semitic attitudes are evident. Even merito47 Marquardt, Friedrich-Wilhelm (1981): Verwegenheiten. Theologische Stücke aus Berlin, München: Kaiser, p. 197.

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rious practical theologians like Ottmar Fuchs demonstrate anti-Semitic patterns. One of the rare practical theologians, deeply shaken by the Shoah, claiming explicitly the constitutive role of Judaism in the pastoral realm too,48 wrote: “Israel has problems with integrating the other with itself in an equal legal state of existence and is therefore risking the same militant superiority towards Muslim and Christian Palestinians Christianity has suffered from throughout history.”49 Despite claiming “double solidarity” for both Israel and Palestine, he puts the blame only on “Israel” and accuses Israel of being fixated on its status as victim. The Palestinian situation also raises new ecumenical conflicts. In the Austrian Coordination Committee for Christian–Jewish Cooperation, disagreements arise repeatedly on questions concerning the State of Israel and its policies. Catholics, because of their theological and doctrinal position, grant Judaism a special position as a sister religion with which the Church is leading an “inner” and ecumenical dialogue. The dialogue with Judaism for Protestants is theologically central but is nevertheless an inter-religious rather than an ecumenical question. Among others, this different theological approach is one of the reasons why there are confrontations on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

3.

Criteriology

3.1

The teaching of the Catholic Church on anti-Semitism

After the abyss of the Shoah, the Catholic Church started to confront its centuries-long anti-Judaic history, which – after internal conflicts and considerable hesitation and ambivalence – resulted also in the condemnation of anti-Semitism.50 Two main lines of argument can be identified. On the one hand, anti-

48 Fuchs, Ottmar (2009): “Wie verändert sich die Pastoraltheologie, wenn sie ihren eigenen inhaltlichen und methodischen Kernbereich im Horizont der Geschichte und Gegenwart ‘Israel’ begreift?” in: Langer, Gerhard / Hoff, Gregor Maria (eds): Der Ort des Jüdischen in der katholischen Theologie, Göttingen: Herder Verlag, pp. 157–203. 49 Fuchs, Ottmar: “Ein praktisch-theologischer Versuch zum Verhältnis von Altem Testament bzw. Judentum und der Pastoraltheologie,” in: Hünermann, Peter et. al. (eds): Methodische Erneuerung der Theologie. Konsequenzen der wiederentdeckten jüdisch-christlichen Gemeinsamkeiten (Quaestiones disputatae 200), Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder Verlag 2003, pp. 212–263, 263. 50 Though throughout Church history there were singular bishops and popes who condemned the pogroms against the Jews and interdicted ritual murder legends (e. g. Eugene III, during the second crusade in 1146; Innozenz IV in 1247; and Martin V in 1422), the anti-Judaic theological tradition itself was not withdrawn. It persisted in the allegation that the Jews had murdered the Lord, and in the conviction that the persecution of the Jews was the just punishment for this crime. Even those church leaders who engaged in the protection of the

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Semitism is rejected as a partial phenomenon of racism, since it negates the equal dignity of all human beings; on the other hand, it is seen as an independent, even theologically interpreted, phenomenon. The following section explicates the development of these position in detail. I start with the form of condemnation of anti-Semitism as an independent, irreducible phenomenon, because from a theological view I consider this more significant. 3.1.1 Phases and positions of the Church’s condemnation of anti-Semitism In his Allocution to the Belgium Pilgrims on 16 September 1938, Pope Pius XI professed the proximity of Christianity and Judaism and confessed: “Spiritually, we are Semites”.51 He stated that for a Christian it is impossible to take part in anti-Semitism. In 1937, he had started to prepare a major encyclical condemning both racism and anti-Semitism, and his successor, Pius XII, adopted parts of this for his first encyclical, Summi Pontificatus (1939). Though he did not criticise the ongoing persecution of the Jews, he repeated his predecessors’ position that it is impossible for Christians to condone anti-Semitism. Referring to Henri de Lubac, he stated that being anti-Semitic signifies being anti-Christian too. In his encyclical Mit brennender Sorge52 (“With deep anxiety”) he also condemned the Nazi doctrine. In a critical retrospect, though, one must conclude that these condemnations were half-hearted and weak. Latest research on this pontificate demonstrates that Pius XII was aware of the mass murder in east Poland and was informed about the liquidation of the ghetto in Warsaw. But because of diplomatic and Catholic self-interest, he did not protest, even distrusting the information he received, because “there is often exaggeration amongst Jews”.53 In a meeting with representatives of the Jewish community in Paris in 2008, Pope Benedict XVI referred to Pius XI and Pius XII and confirmed these statements as the official position of the Church: “The Church therefore is opposed to every form of anti-Semitism, which can never be theologically justified.”54 This

51 52 53 54

Jews were not able to end this tradition. Only after the mass murder of six million Jews did Christian anti-Judaism become an issue of self-critical confrontation. Pius XI: Allocution to the Belgium Pilgrims, Vatican 1938. Encyclical of Pope Paul XII: Mit brennender Sorge, Vatican 1937, available here: http://www. vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_14031937_mit-brennend er-sorge.html [20. 04. 2020]. Pope Pius XII was personally informed about the Holocaust, available: https://oe1.orf.at/ programm/20200422/595542/Papst-Pius-XII-Angelika-Ritter-Grepl?fbclid=IwAR18II8urmR 0BUl3zdb6IJOZwQfpflmT4X6XyZywqxRZoTmzHfRpZXGfsf8 [20. 04. 2020]. Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI: Meeting with Representatives of the Jewish Community. Paris 2008, available here: http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/ 2008/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080912_parigi-juive.html [20. 04. 2020].

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formulation too might be perceived as ambivalent, as it can raise the question: what if there were a theological justification? Shattered by the Shoah, the Church underwent a profound conversion after the Second World War, which resulted in a redefinition of the relationship to Judaism.55 Nostra Aetate (Declaration on the Relation of the Church to nonChristian Religions) confessed: Furthermore, in her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel’s spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone. (NAe, 4)

The fourth chapter of Nostra Aetate then initiated a decades-long reformulation of Christian theology in dialogue with Judaism.56 Through the recognition of the common origin of Jews and Christians and the election of the Jews by God; the acknowledgement of Israel’s role in the history of salvation; the emphasis on the fact that Jesus and the Apostles were Jews; and the confirmation that God still loves the Jews – and rejecting any kind of theology of condemnation – the foundations for a deep theological conversion were laid. The Second Vatican Council thus overcame the Church’s centuries-old “theology of contempt” (Jules Isaac) that was the spiritual source of anti-Judaism. It started a fundamental conversion resulting in countless doctrinal statements,57 though this conversion has not yet been completed, especially in the pastoral realm. The pontificate of John Paul II cannot be overestimated in this revolutionary transformation. While he was in office, numerous documents were published stating clear positions on anti-Semitism, the responsibility of the Church for its genesis, and the obligation to combat it. These positions are deeply inspired and

55 Renz, Andreas: Die katholische Kirche und der interreligiöse Dialog. 50 Jahre “Nostra Aetate”. Vorgeschichte, Kommentar, Rezeption, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 2014. Henrix, Hans Hermann: “Von der Konzilserklärung ‘Nostra Aetate’ zum Pontifikat Benedikts XVI. Entwicklungen im Verhältnis der katholischen Kirche zum Judentum und Staat Israel,” in: KZG 2008/21, pp. 39– 65. 56 The different stages of this process are described in: Henrix, Hans Hermann 2008: “Von der Konzilserklärung ‘Nostra Aetate’ zum Pontifikat Benedikts XVI”. 57 Henrix, Hans Hermann / Rendtorff, Rolf (eds.): Die Kirchen und das Judentum (Band 1). Dokumente von 1945–1985, Paderborn: Bonifatius Verlag und München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag 1988; Henrix, Hans Hermann / Kraus, Wolfgang (eds.): Die Kirchen und das Judentum (Band 2). Dokumente von 1986–2000, Paderborn: Gütersloh; Online-Publikation: Die Kirche und das Judentum (Universität Tübingen) 2001, available here: https://uni-tuebingen.de/ fakultaeten/katholisch-theologische-fakultaet/lehrstuehle/religionspaedagogik/dialogerinne rung/online-publikation-die-kirche-und-das-judentum/ [20. 04. 2020].

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guided by the theological redefinition, developed by John Paul II, of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity.58 These theological foundations were also stated by the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews in the Preamble of the “Guidelines and Suggestions for Implementing the Conciliar Declaration ‘Nostra Aetate’ (n. 4)” in 1974: While referring the reader back to this document, we may simply restate here that the spiritual bonds and historical links binding the Church to Judaism condemn (as opposed to the very spirit of Christianity) all forms of anti-Semitism and discrimination, which in any case the dignity of the human person alone would suffice to condemn.59

The “Notes on the correct way to present the Jews and Judaism in preaching and catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church” by the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews (1985) transfer these principles into practical consequences for homilies and catechesis, stating: The urgency and importance of precise, objective and rigorously accurate teaching on Judaism for our faithful follows too from the danger of anti-Semitism which is always ready to reappear under different guises. The question is not merely to uproot from among the faithful the remains of anti-Semitism still to be found here and there, but much rather to arouse in them, through educational work, an exact knowledge of the wholly unique ‘bond’ (NAe, 4) which joins us as a Church to the Jews and to Judaism.60

Consequently, it is not sufficient to avoid anti-Semitism in the Church’s proclamation and doctrine alone. Rather, the presentation of Jews and Judaism will be correct theologically only if it is characterised by a vivid consciousness of the theological significance of Judaism for the Christian faith. In 1993, the Pontifical Biblical Commission rejected anti-Jewish presentations and interpretations of the Holy Scripture. It emphasises: Of course, any contemporary interpretation contrary to the Gospel’s message of justice or love must be rejected, e. g. interpretations that seek to derive apartheid, anti-Semitism, male or female sexism from the biblical texts. Sharply, and according to the spirit of the Second Vatican Council (NAe, 4), one must prevent any interpretation of certain

58 Ernst Fürlinger gives an overview in: Fürlinger, Ernst. I cannot present this theological redefinition here. 59 Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews: Guidelines and Suggestions for Implementing the Conciliar Declaration “Nostra Aetate” (n. 4), Vatican 1974, available here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/relations-jews-docs/rc_pc _chrstuni_doc_19741201_nostra-aetate_en.html [20. 04. 2020]. 60 Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews: Notes on the correct way to present the Jews and Judaism in preaching and Catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church, Vatican 1985, available here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/relationsjews-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_19820306_jews-judaism_en.html [20. 04. 2020].

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texts of the New Testament that could raise or encourage hostile attitudes towards the Jews.61

In an address to a symposium ‘On the roots of anti-Semitism’ in 1997, John Paul II stepped forward and explicitly addressed the theological roots of anti-Semitism, naming the guilt of Christians and saying: In fact, in the Christian world – I do not say on the part of the Church as such – erroneous and unjust interpretations of the New Testament regarding the Jewish people and their alleged culpability have circulated for too long, engendering feelings of hostility towards this people. They contributed to the lulling of consciences, so that when the wave of persecutions inspired by a pagan anti-Semitism, which in essence is equivalent to an anti-Christianity, swept across Europe, alongside Christians who did everything to save the persecuted even at the risk of their lives, the spiritual resistance of many was not what humanity rightfully expected from the disciples of Christ. Your lucid examination of the past, in view of a purification of memory, is particularly appropriate for clearly showing that anti-Semitism has no justification and is absolutely reprehensible.62

Therefore, anti-Judaism must be recognised as the historical origin of pagan antiSemitism because it had not weakened the Church as such, but had weakened the conscience and spiritual resilience of many Christians. In 1998, the Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews published the document “We Remember: Reflections on the Shoah”63 and stated self-critically: “The fact that the Shoah took place in Europe, i. e. in countries with a long Christian culture, raises the question of the relationship between persecution by the Nazis and the preferences of Christians towards the Jews in all centuries.” Preparing the Pontifical pleas for forgiveness in 2000, the International Theological Commission published the document “Erinnern und Versöhnen: Die Kirche und die Verfehlungen ihrer Vergangenheit” (Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and its Misdeeds in the Past). The Pontifical Commission stated that: The Shoah, the murder of the Jews, was admittedly the result of the completely pagan ideology of National Socialism, which, driven by a merciless anti-Semitism, not only despised the faith of the Jews, but negated the human dignity of the Jewish people.

61 Päpstliche Bibelkommission: Die Interpretation der Bibel in der Kirche, Rome 1993, available here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/pcb_documents/rc_ con_cfaith_doc_19930415_interpretazione_ge.html [20. 04. 2020]. 62 Address of his Holiness Pope John Paul II to a Symposium on the Roots of anti-Semitism 1997, available here: http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1997/october/ documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19971031_com-teologica.html [20. 04. 2020]. 63 Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews: We Remember: Reflections on the Shoah, Vatican 1998, available here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_ councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_16031998_shoah_en.html [20. 04. 2020].

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Nevertheless, one may wonder whether the persecution of the Jews by the National Socialists was not after all also favored by anti-Jewish prejudices that were alive in the minds and hearts of some Christians. Did the Christians give any possible help to the persecuted and among them especially to the Jews?64

In 2000, these processes of reflection resulted in pleas for forgiveness of John Paul II, which also included a confession of guilt to Israel. The Pope lamented the suffering of the people of Israel and named the sins of Christians against the Jews. Although there were critics claiming that these formulations were too weak and did not reflect the structural guilt of the institution as such, they can be considered a historical milestone. The most substantial condemnation of anti-Semitism can be traced back to John Paul II. It names the crucial theological dimension of anti-Semitism: “AntiSemitism is a sin against God and mankind.”65 Anti-Semitism, therefore, is not only a moral misconduct affecting a special religious or ethnic group, but targets Godself directly, including humankind and the Lord’s order of creation. AntiSemitism aims at a godless reality. In 2004, in memory of 40 years of Nostra Aetate and the 60th anniversary of the liberation from the Nazi concentration camps, the International Catholic–Jewish Liaison Committee in Buenos Aires stated in a joint declaration: On the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi death camps, we declare our determination to prevent the reemergence of anti-Semitism which led to genocide and 64 International Theological Commission: Erinnern und Versöhnen: Die Kirche und die Verfehlungen in ihrer Vergangenheit, Vatican 2000, available here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_ curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000307_memory-reconcitc_ge.html [20. 04. 2020]. 65 It is hard to ascertain the original source of this condemnation, to which Church documents and theologians refer regularly. According to Hans Hermann Henrix, John Paul II characterised anti-Semitism this way for the first time when he honoured the Jewish martyrs in the Shoah on the occasion of his encounter with the Hungarian Jews on 18 August 1991, cf. Henrix, Hans Hermann (1997): “Ihre Klage klingt noch fort”. Äußerungen von Johannes Paul II zu Antisemitismus und Schoa, Freiburger Rundbrief 2, p. 122. Henrix propagates this sentence as the summary of the view of Israel of John Paul II. In his latest publication, Henrix quotes this condemnation without a source: Henrix, Hans Hermann: Israel trägt die Kirche. zur Theologie der Beziehung von Kirche und Judentum, Münster: LIT-Verlag 2019. He refers to: Henrix, Hans Hermann: Zuspruch aus fremden Quellen. Begegnungen mit Persönlichkeiten aus Judentum und Christentum, Topos 2012, pp. 88–101. In his contribution: Henrix, Hans Hermann: “Ein Christ kann kein Antisemit sein,” in: ICCJ: Insights and Issues in the ongoing Jewish–Christian Dialogue, available here: http://www.jcrelations.net/Ein_Christ_kann_ kein_Antisemit_sein.6459.0.html?L=2&page=1&pdf=1 [20. 04. 2020], Henrix quotes this sentence without citation. This sentence is also quoted by the Jewish side. In 2015, in the declaration ‘Between Rome and Jerusalem’, the Conference of European Rabbis and the Rabbinical Council of America, Rome and Jerusalem refer to the ‘repeated affirmation’ of it through Pope John Paul II: CER / RCA (2017): “Between Rome and Jerusalem”, available here: http://www.jcrelations.net/Between_Jerusalem_and_Rome_-.5580.0.html [20. 04. 2020].

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the Shoah. We stand together at this moment in time, following major international conferences on this problem, most recently in Berlin and at the United Nations in New York. We recall the words of Pope John Paul II that anti-Semitism is a sin against God and humanity.66

Pope Benedict XVI and Pope Francis have continued this tradition of condemning anti-Semitism. However, when it comes to theological reflections on the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, one sometimes cannot avoid the impression that there is a certain ambivalence towards the Jews in the writings of Benedict XVI. One of his latest writings, “Gnade und Berufung ohne Reue”67 (Grace and Calling without Repentance), for example, caused severe conflict with the Jewish community and was perceived more than critically by participants in Christian–Jewish dialogue. Reacting to the latest document on Catholic–Jewish relations published by the Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews – “‘The Gifts and the Calling of God are Irrevocable’ (Rom 11:29): A Reflection on Theological Questions Pertaining to Catholic–Jewish Relations on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of ‘Nostra aetate’ (n. 4)”68 – the Pope emeritus questioned the theological theory of the unrevoked covenant of the Jews with God and claimed that there has never been a theology of substitution in Christian tradition. From the Jewish perspective, however, both of these Christian theological positions are fundamental to combating anti-Semitism. So, for example, Rabbi Walter Homolka, rector of the Abraham Geiger College in Potsdam, did not accuse the Pope emeritus of anti-Semitism, but stated that his article “builds the foundation of a new antisemitism based on Christianity”.69 For Rabbi Arie Folger, the former Chief Rabbi of Vienna and head of the international commission that composed the statement “Between Jerusalem and Rome”, the evaluation of the theory of substitution is an “ahistorical revisionism”.70 Catholic theologians have also rejected the positions of the Pope emeritus. Christian Rutishauser SJ and Gregor Maria Hoff, both engaged in Christian– 66 International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee 2004: Joint Declaration on the 18th Meeting, available here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/relationsjews-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20040708_declaration-buenos-aires_en.html [20. 04. 2020]. 67 Ratzinger, Josef / Benedikt XVI: “Gnade und Berufung ohne Reue. Anmerkungen zum Traktat Judaeis,” in: IKaZ 2018/47, pp. 387–406. 68 Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews: “The Gifts and the Calling of God are Irrevocable” (Rom 11:29). A Reflection on Theological Questions Pertaining to Catholic–Jewish Relations on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of ‘Nostra aetate’ (n. 4), Vatican 2015, available here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstu ni/relations-jews-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20151210_ebraismo-nostra-aetate_en.html [20. 04. 2020]. 69 Homolka, Walter: “Wir sind kein unerlöstes Volk.” Die Zeit, 19 Jul. 2018. 70 Folger, Arie: “Gefahr für den Dialog?” Jüdische Allgemeine, 15 Jul. 2018, available here: https:// www.juedische-allgemeine.de/religion/gefahr-fuer-den-dialog/ [20. 04. 2020].

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Jewish dialogue for decades, criticised his doubt concerning the consensus in the Christian–Jewish dialogue according to which Israel stands in an unrevoked covenant with God.71 While in subsequent debates the Pope emeritus clarified some of his positions, disturbing elements remain. The latest document of the Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews, “‘The Gifts and the Calling of God are Irrevocable’ (Rom 11:29)” (2015) stresses that “another important goal of Jewish–Catholic dialogue consists in jointly combating all manifestations of racial discrimination against Jews and all forms of anti-Semitism, which have certainly not yet been eradicated and re-emerge in different ways in various contexts”.72 The documents proclaim that: “[b]ecause of the strong bond of friendship between Jews and Catholics, the Catholic Church feels particularly obliged to do all that is possible with our Jewish friends to repel anti-Semitic tendencies.”73 Pope Francis continues the Catholic relationship with the Jews along the path that John Paul II initiated. He regularly states that Christians can never be anti-Semites. In his memorial address in Yad Vashem in 2014, he achieves a deep theological quality in associating the murder of the Jews with Gen 3:9:74 the tormented search in the garden for the man and woman after the fall. This meditation describes – without explicitly mentioning the word “sin” – the abyss into which humanity fell during the Shoah. This sin is described as an offence against God: an idolatry, a renunciation and negation of Godself. In the mass murder of their own brothers and sisters, humans had declared themselves to God. Unlike Pope emeritus Benedict, who calls for God and laments his absence, Pope Francis places the blame for this abomination solely on humanity. It is not God, but humanity, that is to be held responsible. Pope Francis also supports concrete impulses to fight anti-Semitism within the Church. Thus, he initiated a congress on ‘Jesus and the Pharisees: An Interdisciplinary Reappraisal’75 (2019). For him, “research on literary and historical questions concerning the Pharisees” is an important contribution to developing a 71 Rutishauser, Christian SJ: “Benedikt XVI. ruft den Juden zu: ‘An Christus führt kein Weg vorbei!’” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 Jul. 2018; Hoff, Gregor Maria: “Gottes Treue gilt auch Israel.” Die Zeit, 19 Jul. 2018. 72 Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews: ‘The Gifts and the Calling of God are Irrevocable (Rom 11:29)’, n. 2015/ 47. [20. 04. 2020]. 73 Ibid., n. 38. 74 Memorial Address of Pope Francis: Visit to the Yad Vashem memorial 2014, available here: http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/may/documents/papa-francesco_ 20140526_terra-santa-memoriale-yad-vashem.html [20. 04. 2020]. 75 Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Pontifical Biblical Institute: Jesus and the Pharisees: An Interdisciplinary Reappraisal (conference) 2019, available here: http://www. vatican.va/content/francesco/de/speeches/2019/may/documents/papa-francesco_20190509_ pont-istitutobiblico.html [20. 04. 2020].

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more truthful view of this religious group, which is often stereotyped in antiSemitic tones in the pastoral realm. 3.1.2 Anti-Semitism as a type of racism The second strain in combating anti-Semitism in Church positions can be found in the fight against racism and misanthropy. In the documents relevant to this theme, anti-Semitism is considered as a variation of racism. Thus, the second section of Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom) 76 can also be interpreted as a rejection of anti-Semitism, though rather indirectly, of course: It is in accordance with their dignity as persons – that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility – that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth. However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a manner in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion as well as psychological freedom. Therefore, the right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature.

As the right to religious freedom is founded in the nature of humankind, Christians have no right to despise, persecute or attack Jews because of their faith. This connection between anti-Semitism and racism can already be found in the encyclical “With deep anxiety” (1937) by Pope Pius XI, who condemned the doctrine of National Socialism: “Whoever exalts race, or the people, or the State, (…) or any other fundamental value of the human community (…) whoever raises these notions above their standard value and divinizes them to an idolatrous level, distorts and perverts an order of the world planned and created by God.” As I alluded to earlier, in 1937 Pius XI had begun writing another encyclical on the human race, in which racism and anti-Semitism were to be condemned explicitly. After the death of Pius XI, Pope Pius XII adopted parts of it for Summi pontificatus and his first Christmas message in 1942. He referred to the hundreds of thousands “who are condemned to death or gradual eradication without any guilt simply because they belong to a certain race or nationality” – but he did not mention the Jews explicitly.

76 Declaration on Religious Freedom, Vatican 1965, available here: http://www.vatican.va/ar chive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae _en.html [20. 04. 2020].

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The association between racism and anti-Semitism can also be discerned in a 1988 document on racial prejudice published by the Pontifical Commission Iustitia et Pax of Pope John Paul II, “The Church and Racism”. It states: Among the manifestations of systematic racial distrust, specific mention must once again be made of anti-Semitism. If anti-Semitism has been the most tragic form that racist ideology has assumed in our century, with the horrors of the Jewish “holocaust”, it has unfortunately not yet entirely disappeared. As if some had nothing to learn from the crimes of the past, certain organizations, with branches in many countries, keep alive the anti-Semite racist myth, with the support of networks of publications.77

Pope Francis also links anti-Semitism to racism. In his address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in 2019, which focuses on the issue of growing nationalism, he warned against false forms of justified love for the homeland “when focused on exclusion and hatred of others, when it becomes hostile, wall-building nationalism, or even racism or anti-Semitism”. With great concern, he notes the reemergence of aggressive tendencies “toward foreigners, types of migrants, as well as that growing nationalism that disregards the common good”.78 3.1.3 Conclusion Generally, it can be stated that the Catholic Church asserts a clear and unambiguous rejection of anti-Semitism. Christian anti-Judaism is named and acknowledged and the duty to combat it is established. The most important theological foundation was formulated by John Paul II, who defines anti-Semitism as a sin against God and humankind. Looking at some argumentations and formulations, however, one sometimes cannot avoid the impression that there is a degree of restraint and ambivalence. The Catholic equating or subordinating? of anti-Semitism to racism can therefore be problematic, not least because it conceals the special relationship between Judaism and Christianity. Although anti-Semitism contains elements of racism, such a perspective could ignore the fact that anti-Semitism is discussed as a unique and independent phenomenon within research. There may be several reasons for this hesitation. First, it may derive from the tension between the Christian belief in the universal meaning of Jesus Christ and 77 Pontifical Council for Justice and peace: The Church and Racism: Toward a more Fraternal Society, Vatican 1988/2001, p. 18, available here: http://www.humandevelopment.va/content/ dam/sviluppoumano/pubblicazioni-documenti/archivio/diritti-umani/The%20Church%20 against%20Racism%202001-1988.pdf [20. 04. 2020]. 78 Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to Participants in the Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Clementine Hall 2019, available here: http://www.vatican.va/content/ francesco/en/speeches/2019/may/documents/papa-francesco_20190502_plenaria-scienze-so ciali.html [20. 04. 2020].

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the particular position of Judaism for Christians. This tension raises the question as to how universality and particularity can be brought together in anthropological terms while recognising the equality of all human beings. Second, this tension becomes crucial in the question of how the Shoah and other genocides – against Armenians and other ethnic groups – relate to each other. This is a question that is also discussed in science. If one acknowledges the uniqueness of the Shoah, the restraint of the Church can be a matter of concern. On the one hand, the Church must, of course, protest against any kind of mass murder and protect all human ethnic groups. On the other hand, some Church representatives have an obvious problem with accepting the uniqueness of the Shoah, worried that the acceptance of its uniqueness could be a favouring or preferential treatment of Jews over other human beings. Perhaps these worries are based on ignorance of the character of uniqueness. This does not refer to any preference for the suffering or the Jewish people, but to the fact that the attempt to annihilate the Jewish people was systematically organised and industrialised by means of the law and by the State. It aimed to destroy not only the Jews of that time, but also the memory of Judaism, and was justified, without any other moral or political reasons, purely on the basis of the existence of a Jew and the affiliation of a Jew to the Jewish people. Perhaps the understandable striving of the Church for justice towards all peoples and the abstract universalisation of “being human” is one of the reasons why resistance against the mass murder of the Jews has been so weak and indecisive. The unique extent of this catastrophe was misunderstood. Another reason may be found in the still noticeable difficulty in clearly and decisively naming the role of Christian anti-Judaism. Especially in the pastoral sphere, this results in failure to identify appropriate and necessary theological consequences. In pastoral work – especially outside the German-speaking countries – one therefore still encounters a lot of timidity or even resistance around facing up to personal responsibility. Some Catholics from the global south consider the Shoah to be a European problem and can barely understand the German sensitivity. In this respect, the Catholic Church is still confronted with a great challenge. AntiSemitism is not just a societal problem, it is an inner challenge.

3.2

Church statements on Israel

Ambivalence in dealing with inner anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism becomes vivid in the relationship towards the State of Israel.

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As demonstrated by Gerhard Langer,79 this relationship is quite complex. On the one hand, it concerns the religious and theological relations between the Church and Judaism as religious communities. On the other hand, there are also political relations between the Holy See and Israel, and this therefore affects relations with the entire Middle East, where the situation of Christians is problematic and endangered. As a result, theological positions and political selfinterests are mixed up in the primary concerns of the Catholic Church in Israel, which are to protect the Christian churches and minorities and to ensure free access to the Holy Places so that Christians from all over the world can make pilgrimages to the Holy Land – all based on Christian ideas about the Holy Land. Catholic Christians usually find it difficult to understand what “the Land” means to Judaism. They often refer to Israel as the Holy Land, but in doing so they do not adopt the Old Testament promises of the Land. The early Church spiritualised, universalised and transferred the biblical promises into the eschatological sphere – not least against the background of the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans and as a result of the growing dominance of the Gentiles in the Church, as told in the Acts of the Apostles. The promise of the Land and the meaning of Jerusalem were related to the eschatological Kingdom of God, and the vision of the heavenly Jerusalem as a reality for which Christians yearn was strengthened. In the 4th century, the country itself became a destination for pilgrimages. The Holy Jerome would then call the Land of Israel the “fifth gospel”. This did not mean that Israel became more significant theologically, as for Christians there is no special place to live a Christian life in a “better” way. But it was considered a place where Christians could experience the closeness of the Lord in a special way. Similar tendencies to spiritualise the Land of Israel can, however, be found in the rabbinical tradition.80 Famous rabbis linked the hope of returning to Israel and the rebuilding of Jerusalem with the coming of the Messiah after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, the fall of Masada, and the failed Bar Kochba Uprising. It was the political developments in the 19th and 20th centuries that resulted in a controversial revision of this messianic interpretation as to whether the establishment of the State of Israel could and should be interpreted as the realisation of messianic desires. But however divisive these debates were and still are, the close religious connection to Israel has always been an inseparable part of Jewish self-understanding.

79 Cf. Langer, Gerhard: “The Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of the State of Israel and its Importance for Christians and Jews. The Reflections of a Theologian and Jewish Studies Scholar ”, in this volume, pp. 129–146. 80 Cf. Hertzberg, Arthur 1972/1997: The Zionist Idea.

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When Christian–Jewish dialogue started after the Second World War, this important aspect of Jewish identity was left out, however. A lack of knowledge, poor understanding of the theological meaning of the Land and the political developments in Israel resulted in ignorance. Neither the Seelisberg Theses,81 founding the International Council of Christians and Jews (ICCJ), nor Nostra Aetate, referred to this important dimension of Judaism. At that time, the Christian perspective was that political issues should not play a role in religious contexts (and to some extent, this attitude still exists today). Christians had to learn that the Land, along with God, the Torah and the people of Israel, has always been one of the foundations of Jewish faith. Catholic positions – such as that of the theologian Jacques Maritain – which considered the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine to be necessary and legitimate, were an exception to the rule. So, the position of the Vatican and Catholic teaching on the newly created state of Israel developed very slowly and with a lot of ambiguity.82 In 1904, Pope Pius X rejected Theodor Herzl’s request for papal support of the Zionist movement. In his diary, Herzl quotes the Pope: We are not able to support this movement. We cannot prevent the Jews from going to Jerusalem – but we can never approve it. As head of the Church, I cannot answer you any other way. The Jews did not acknowledge our Lord. Therefore, we cannot recognize the Jewish people, and so, when you come to Palestine and settle your people there, we will be ready with our churches and priests to baptize you all.83

This reaction was not only led by a mean anti-Judaic sense of retaliation, but also by political self-interests. As the UN partition plan was adopted by a large majority of participating states in 1947, the Vatican was afraid that the conflict between Jews and Arabs would worsen. Because the Pope aimed at a fair solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, the Jewish interest in their own State as a place of refuge was ignored. However, the Vatican approved the partition plan in 1947, and theological and political concerns, motives and positions were brought together in a “gradual process of clarifying positions”.84

81 Seelisberger Thesen 1947, available here: http://www.cja.ch/wer-sind-wir/seelisberger-thesen. html [20. 04. 2020]. 82 This illustration follows Henrix, Hans Hermann: “Von der Konzilserklärung ‘Nostra Aetate’ zum Pontifikat Benedikts XVI. Entwicklungen im Verhältnis der katholischen Kirche zum Judentum und Staat Israel”, 2008, p. 56ff. 83 Fisher, Eugene: “The Holy See and the State of Israel,” in: Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 1987/ 24, pp. 191–211, 196f. 84 Henrix, Hans Hermann: “Von der Konzilserklärung ‘Nostra Aetate’ zum Pontifikat Benedikts XVI. Entwicklungen im Verhältnis der katholischen Kirche zum Judentum und Staat Israel”, 2008, p. 57.

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Again, Pope John Paul II brought about a turning point in the recognition of the State of Israel. In a 1984 apostolic letter “Redemptionis anno”,85 he emphasises the importance of the Holy Land for Christians, but also appreciates the religious relations of the Jews with the Land of Israel, focusing in particular on the meaning of Jerusalem as the symbol of their nation. He acknowledges the State of Israel’s right to exist and the associated right to live in safety and peace. At the same time, he demands the right of the Palestinians to “find a home again so that they can live together in tranquility and peace with other peoples of the region”. In the Notes on the correct way to present the Jews and Judaism in preaching and catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church (1985),86 published during his pontificate, John Paul II calls on Catholics to learn to understand the religious commitment of Judaism to the country. But the “Notes” also warn against “adopting a particular religious interpretation of this relationship”. They state: The existence of the State of Israel and its political options should be envisaged not in a perspective which is in itself religious, but in their reference to the common principles of international law.87

The Notes therefore acknowledge the soteriological dignity of the Jewish diaspora, which implies the rejection of any theology interpreting the Jewish diaspora as God’s punishment. Despite this position, the Notes remain silent about the role of the Church during this diaspora. The theological view on the Land and State of Israel is ambiguous and ambivalent. Philip Cunningham has referred to this tension and formulated some critical enquiries,88 arguing that on the one hand the Notes exclude an explicitly religious view and demand the perspective of general principles of international law, while on the other hand, in the next section, they describe the continued existence of Israel as a sign to be interpreted “within God’s design”, which would consequentially demand a theological interpretation. In theological language, the description of Israel as a sign “within God’s design” must therefore be interpreted as a cautious but theological interpretation. While it is not clear whether such an interpretation should refer to the Land or the State, the Notes nevertheless open the door to a deeper theological approach. 85 Apostolic Letter of John Paul II: “Redemptionis Anno” 1984, available here: http://www. vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/apost_letters/1984/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_20041984_re demptionis-anno.html [20. 04. 2020]. 86 Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews: Notes on the correct way to present the Jews and Judaism in preaching and catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church’ Vatican 1985, n. 25. 87 Ibid., n. 25. 88 Cunningham, Philip A.: “Christian–Jewish Dialogue: Theological and Practical Challenges,” unpublished manuscript of a lecture at the University of Vienna 2016, held on 14 November 2016.

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Parallel to the development of theological positions, a long process was taking place in which political concerns, motives and positions were discussed. So, the approval of the partition plan of the UNO in 1947 and the encyclicals published by Pope Pius XII were followed by fundamental redefinitions of the theological relation to Judaism. These doctrinal changes enabled the Church to develop a new perspective on the Jewish relationship to the Land of Israel. The Six-Day War in 1967 then stagnated these processes. Consequently, the protection of Christians in Israel, free access to the Holy Places, and the status of Jerusalem became the priorities. With Pope John Paul II and his theological innovations, reflection on the Land and State of Israel could resume. In this period, the North American Church and the Church of France were among the first to present theological approaches to this topic. Thus, in 1970, the Diocese of Albany acknowledged the Jews’ longing for the Land as a result of their fidelity to the Covenant, which is inseparable from the gift of the Land.89 Without deriving any political assessment from this theological approach, Christians are encouraged to understand and acknowledge the religious significance of the bond between the people and the Land. In 1975, the US Episcopal Conference also promoted the understanding of this bond without agreeing to religious interpretations or denying the rights of other parties in the region.90 Last, but not least, the Catholic bishops of France91 encouraged the faithful to acknowledge the religious significance of the Land and to respect its Jewish interpretation. But like the Notes, they warn against too hasty a theological interpretation. At last, after a long process of negotiations, the Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel was signed in 1993. Through this, the Vatican paid tribute to the Oslo Agreement, which was also signed in 1993. In addition to passages of constitutional law, this treaty speaks of the “singular

89 Diözese Albany: “Richtlinien für katholisch-jüdische Beziehungen von 1970,” in: KuJ I 1970, pp. 135–141, 137. 90 Nationale Konferenz der katholischen Bischöfe der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: “Erklärung über katholisch-jüdische Beziehungen,” in: KuJ I 1975, pp. 164–170, 169. English: National Conference of Catholic Bishops: Statement on Catholic-Jewish Relations 1975, available here: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/ecumenical-and-interreligious/ jewish/upload/Statement-on-Catholic-Jewish-Relations-1975.pdf. [20. 04. 2020]. The US National Conference of Catholic Bishops has since then published numerous statements, documents and guidelines on Christian-Jewish relations, as most of the Jewish population worldwide lives in the US. Available here: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-andteachings/ecumenical-and-interreligious/jewish/catholic-jewish-documents-and-news-re leases.cfm [20. 04. 2020]. 91 Französische Bischofskonferenz: “Die Haltung der Christen gegenüber dem Judentum. Pastorale Handreichungen,” in: KuJ I, pp. 149–156, 154.

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character” and the “universal significance of the Holy Land”.92 It emphasises the special relationship between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people and recalls the “historical process of reconciliation and the growing mutual understanding and friendship between Catholics and Jews”.93 However, it must be observed that this contract is neither a theological letter nor a contract between two religions; rather, it is an international contract. Accordingly, it regulates cooperation in the protection of religious freedom, the fight against anti-Semitism, the position of Catholic communities, institutions and organisations in Israel, and access to the Holy Places. Regarding political issues, the Vatican commits itself to “remaining a stranger to all merely temporal conflicts, which principle applies specifically to disputed territories and unsettled borders”.94

3.3

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the processes leading to the recognition of the State of Israel, many documents, guidelines, and letters were published which I cannot refer to here. On the whole, it can be stated that there is a clear commitment to the existence of the State of Israel. Recently, Pope Francis also recognised an outright attack on Israel as a new, pervasive and even fashionable form of anti-Semitism – a statement that was quoted by the Conference of European Rabbis and the Rabbinical Council of America, Rome and Jerusalem in the declaration ‘Between Rome and Jerusalem’.95 The Pope stated: “There may be political disagreements between governments and on political issues, but the State of Israel has every right to exist in safety and prosperity.”96 Nevertheless, the relationship between the Catholic Church and Israel is extremely fragile and strained. Hans Hermann Henrix speaks of a “persistent work disorder”,97 which is related to the increasingly difficult relationship between Israel and Palestine. Conflicts over tax and income issues, visa problems and not least the stagnation of negotiations between Israel and Palestine exacerbate this situation. Additionally, the more than 45 years of non-recognition of the State of 92 Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel 1993, available 1993: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-st_199312 30_santa-sede-israele_en.html [20. 04. 2020]. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid., n. 2. 95 Conference of European Rabbis and the Rabbinical Council of America: “Between Rome and Jerusalem” 2017. 96 Ibid. 97 Henrix, Hans Hermann: “Von der Konzilserklärung ‘Nostra Aetate’ zum Pontifikat Benedikts XVI. Entwicklungen im Verhältnis der katholischen Kirche zum Judentum und Staat Israel” 2008, p. 64.

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Israel represents the result of a long history of theological contempt. Statements such as the Kairos document (2009),98 in which the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem was significantly involved, worsen this situation – even if its theological arguments do not agree with those of the Catholic Church and the call for boycott is rejected by the latter. While for the Catholic Church the right of Israel to exist is beyond question – that is, the right to secure and internationally recognised borders must not be at stake – the right of the Palestinians to a sovereign homeland and a life in dignity and with freedom of travel is also of great concern. Pope Benedict XVI and Pope Francis opt for a two-state solution, demand religious freedom for Jews, Christians and Muslims in the entire region, and oppose any discrimination in society and politics based on religious affiliation. Particular attention is paid to the protection and well-being of Christian minorities throughout the region. In any case, the threat to Israel from terrorist attacks is condemned. The question of a theological perspective on the State of Israel remains open too. Though theological interpretations of history belong to Christian faith constitutively, the Catholic Church presents itself as quite hesitant on this issue. Such caution may have its origin in self-critical reflection on the disastrous consequences of the sacralisation of political structures in European history. The Church had to learn to meet political messianisms, hasty interpretations of salvation history and associated political demands with scepticism. Perhaps this is why “‘The Gifts and the Calling of God are Irrevocable’ (Rom 11:29)” does not offer a theological perspective on the Land nor mention the State of Israel at all. This evasion of an issue that is of enormous religious significance for Jews, though understandable, is nevertheless problematic. Tentative attempts on a theology of the State of Israel were recently presented by renowned theologians,99 98 Kairos Palestine: A moment of Truth. A moment of Faith, Hope, and Love from the Heart of Palestinian Suffering 2009, available here: https://www.kairospalestine.ps/sites/default/files/ English.pdf [20. 04. 2020]. 99 Some examples: Among other authors, Christian Rutishauser SJ reflects on the question of Ersetz Israel as a theological reality in his contribution: Rutishauser, Christian SJ: “Eretz Israel– ein Land, das Christen heilig ist,” in: ‘Israel. Heiliges Land – für wen?’, in: Zeitschrift für christlich-jüdische Begegnung im Kontext 1(ZfBeg) 2019; Winkler, Ulrich: “Theologische Haltung gegenüber dem Staat Israel. Ein Beispiel einer Religionstheologie nach Auschwitz,” in: Kirche und Israel 2012/31, pp. 154–166; Garry, Michael B.: “The Land of Israel in the Cauldron of the Middle East: A Challenge to Christian-Jewish Relations,” in: Boys, Mary C. (ed.): Seeing Judaism Anew. Christianity’s sacred obligation, Lanham: Sheed & Ward 2005, pp. 213–224; Cunningham, Philip A.: “A Catholic Theology of the Land? The State of the Question 1,” in: Studies in Christian–Jewish Relations 2013/8.1, pp. 1–15; Cunningham, Philip A.: “Biblical Land Promises and the State of Israel. A Challenge for Catholic (and Jewish) Theology,” in: Cunningham, Philip A.: Seeking Shalom. The Journey to Right Relationship between Catholics and Jews, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2015, pp. 220–233.

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and while I cannot discuss them here, they must be at least mentioned while they await reception in German-speaking theology and pastoral work. Overall, the development can be assessed as quite positive. Compared with other Christian denominations, the Catholic Church demonstrates great appreciation of Israel. Christians are obliged to respect and recognise the singular relationship of Jews to the Land and State of Israel. They have the duty to engage for Israel’s right to exist and to fight anti-Semitism, including antiSemitism in its Israel-related form. They must understand why Israel is a constitutive part of Jewish identity, both in Israel and in the diaspora. Catholic teaching must demonstrate awareness of its responsibility to combat antiSemitism in all its forms. In Pope John Paul II’s condemnation of anti-Semitism as a sin against God and humankind, there is a deeply theological foundation that Catholics are no longer allowed to ignore. Receptivity to these positions in pastoral work, however, is still quite weak – in Austria, Europe and worldwide. Moreover, not all Catholic doctrines show the clarity and lack of ambiguity that distinguishes John Paul II. Thus, anti-Semitism as an independent historical phenomenon is sometimes presented too quickly as a ‘case’ of general misanthropy or racism whereby the specific character and the question of the guilt of the Church can be dodged. The genuine character of anti-Judaism and a self-critical reflection on its role in the history of anti-Semitism are not always given enough space in daily pastoral work. Rather, one gets the impression that anti-Semitism is considered a problem for ‘the others’ outside the Church rather than for Christians themselves. In my experience, questions of guilt often appear in the guise of complaints or questions, for example: “How long do we have to deal with the Shoah?”; “Is it not necessary for the Jews to be willing to reconcile?”; “What about the suffering of other nations?” Also, the language is not always as concrete and clear as one might expect when reflecting on guilt. Even John Paul II avoided mentioning the ecclesiological and structural aspects of anti-Judaism. He made a strict separation between the guilt of the Church and the guilt of the individual faithful; only the latter were responsible for the sin of anti-Semitism. But if the Church as such cannot fail, why then should contemporary Christians deal with the past crimes of their ancestors? Such a view is based on the sacramental view of the Church. But it contains serious problems that are perceived as exculpation by nonCatholics. That is why I am now concluding this article with some exemplary questions and suggestions for pastoral work, which the Church and theology must confront in the coming decades.

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4.

Praxeology

4.1

Pastoral-theological questions

If confronting anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism is a mandatory task for Catholics, those leaders responsible for pastoral work must accept the task first. Their consciousness must be sensitised to this duty. A number of questions and obligations can be derived from the exemplary results of research on anti-Semitism and from the position of the Catholic Church in relation to anti-Semitism. a) Does pastoral work take the combating of anti-Semitism seriously, and does it perceive its specific nature and singularity sufficiently? As I demonstrated, anti-Semitism denies the equality of all human beings and the unity of humankind. Anti-Semitism must therefore be discussed ethically and politically in connection with racism and misanthropies of all kinds, including any hatred of Muslims and Islam that exists within the Church. At the same time, the debate is not limited to this ethical and political legitimisation. Anti-Semitism is deeply connected to religion and theology. The historical, sociological, and psychological characteristics of anti-Semitism must, of course, be examined, but so too must the history of the Church and Christian theology, including the relationship with secular anti-Semitism, and above all the relationship with genuine Christian anti-Judaism. b) Does pastoral work reflect the theological dimension of anti-Semitism and antiJudaism sufficiently? Awareness that anti-Semitism is an attack on and even a denial of God and the ethos inseparably linked with Christian faith must be awakened. This means dealing not only with theological questions, but also with the concrete history of God with humankind, which results in the recognition that the people of Israel are the first chosen people of God. Christians must therefore learn to position themselves differently in history as the second chosen people, participating in the Covenant of God with Israel. This is an extremely demanding task, as it obliges Christians to learn to practise more modesty and humility in relation to Jews. They must also face the question as to why they have had so many problems with Jews and Judaism in the past and present. In doing so, they will come across psychological and political explanations, but also theological explanations. They will have to acknowledge that the theological similarity can lead to a kind of sibling rivalry, envy and hatred; that they might project their own doubt and disbelief in Christ’s nature on the Jews; and that they themselves might suffer from racism, xenophobia and other forms of misanthropy against minorities.

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In Orthodox Judaism, there is an explanation100 that refers to the theological roots of anti-Semitism. Throughout history, Jewish rabbis interpreted antiSemitism as a fight against God revealed in the Torah and against God’s ethical principles. Anti-Semitism was therefore identified with rejecting the equal dignity of all human beings and the fundamental plurality of humankind. AntiSemitism implies ignoring the duty to do justice to the poor and marginalised through the establishment of a just and legal order in society. It also denies the freedom given by God to the human being. Translated into secular language, anti-Semitism denies the uniqueness and equality of all human beings and hates the particularity as much as the universality of humankind. Anti-Semitism thus represents a threat to the discovery and promotion of humanity for which the people of God has been standing since the beginning of its existence. Although Christianity shares the theological ethos of equal dignity, this Jewish heritage has been repeatedly forgotten or ignored in the course of history. In this respect, anti-Semitism hits Christianity right at the heart, for anti-Semitism among Christians would then imply that the faithful do not believe in the God of Revelation. Christian faith is only authentically practised when the biblical ethos is acknowledged. Unfortunately, this is not only a historical problem. Even today there are Christians who triumphantly consider themselves, their faith, and the Church as superior to all other religions. In addition, empirical studies prove that many Christians indulge in the idolatries of nationalism and problematic attitudes towards their homelands.101 This situation demands a fundamental pastoral reflection on the relationship between religious self-understanding and political attitudes. Christians must learn that Christian faith has a political dimension, but must never be associated with racism, xenophobia and nationalism. Christians must regain their ethical freedom, as there is no “natural” hatred of others. Referring to anti-Semitism, the Jews can never be responsible for any kind of hatred or aggression towards themselves, as it is those who hate that are responsible for their own actions. Even if the behaviour of other human beings, including Jews, might justify criticism, no one is entitled to be anti-Semitic. This learning process is a hard one and one that has a spiritual dimension, as people are confronted with their own moral limits and their own tendency towards evil. The process of learning aims to encourage free and reflective ethical assessment and behaviour, regardless of the affiliation of the other person.

100 Prager, Dennis / Telushkin, Joseph: Why the Jews? Reasons for Antisemitism, New York: Touchstone 2003, pp. 13–24. 101 PEW-Research Center 2018: “Being a Christian in Western Europe”, available here: https:// www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christian-in-western-europe/ [20. 04. 2020].

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c) Does the confrontation with anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism have a corresponding impact on the content and form of theological activities? Concern and grief when confronting anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism are the preconditions for any theological and pastoral transformation. But they are not sufficient. The Christian proclamation and its underlying theologies in pastoral work must also undergo a self-critical analysis. This challenge applies not only to the special area of the “relationship to Judaism” but also to the content of Christian theology and the way in which Christian theology is conducted on the whole. An honest willingness to repent must be expressed through a fundamental reflection on daily life as well as through engagement in academic theology. In concrete terms, such a learning process would determine how Christians proclaim their truth, define their identity and claim the universality of Christian faith. Do these proclamations despise or even exclude others, or are they able to respect and recognise permanent differences, fundamental strangeness and indissoluble separations? This question challenges Christian preaching and catechesis, religious education, and other educational work with the need for a fundamental transformation. When proclaiming their faith, Christians are challenged to speak and act in a way that makes their constitutive relation to Judaism always visible. Christian language must strive to develop a dialogical character that can prove itself when listened to by Jews. This does not mean that the permanent differences must be concealed or obscured. The decisive question lies in how these differences are addressed. All forms of proclamation, in daily pastoral work or theology, that emphasise one’s own truth by presenting the Jewish view as less valuable or even as one to be overcome, must come to an end. Classical examples for this pastoral practice are the use of the Pharisees as a template for negative reaction to Jesus of Nazareth, or the opposition of Christian love and mercy to Jewish law and justice. The claim to universality must not manifest itself in the form of an all-encompassing claim to power, but must become truly “Catholic”, that is, it must become relational and concrete, and must always be thought of and explained in terms of the relationship with Judaism. Of course, the sticking point of the Jewish non-recognition of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah remains. But even this can be understood as an incentive to approach one’s own Christian demands in a self-critical way in dialogue with Judaism. d) Does pastoral work deal with the question of guilt sufficiently? For understandable reasons, no Christian wants to be perceived as an antiSemite. But after two millennia of anti-Jewish self-understanding, no one can avoid the fact that anti-Semitic patterns of perception and thinking are deeply inscribed in the collective memory of the Church’s self-understanding, and thus

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have an impact on each one of us. Therefore, in daily pastoral life, we can repeatedly come across more or less anti-Judaist formulations or figures.102 This does not necessarily mean that such formulations express an existential antiSemitism. But the phenomenon must be tackled. In discussions on the Land and State of Israel especially, a still present affective anti-Semitism becomes visible in the pastoral realm. Many faithful people are not aware of the anti-Semitic implications when they claim their legitimate right to criticise ‘the Jews’. Confronting Christians with this problem is a challenging task. In Austria, for example, there has never been a fundamental confrontation with anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism on the level of society and families. Dealing with the question of both historical and contemporary responsibility in combating anti-Semitism is therefore extremely complex. While most Austrian Catholics are deeply affected by the Shoah and its victims, it is a common pastoral experience to face a tense mixture of unresolved feelings of guilt, a diffuse guilty conscience and an aggressive rejection of a deeper and self-critical reflection on anti-Semitism. Among students of Catholic theology, one is also sometimes confronted with an idealisation of historical Judaism as a predecessor that never existed historically. This prevents these students from having any awareness that their own thinking may itself contain anti-Semitic stereotypes. In Austria, one can also encounter an unconscious identification with the victims, as most of the post-war generation experienced severe suffering in the aftermath of the war. As the sufferings during this period have never been acknowledged in public discourse, many Austrians and their descendants reject the recognition of the singularity of the Shoah. This situation is an important emotional source of secondary anti-Semitism. People enviously compare their quality of suffering and ignore the ethical and political difference arising from their own political co-responsibility for this suffering. Additionally, there is a lot of ignorance of contemporary Judaism. All of these circumstances impede a serious confrontation with anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism within the population, and therefore within the Austrian Catholic Church too. The leading pastoral-theological question for the future sensitisation necessary to combat anti-Semitism therefore is: how can the confrontation with guilt, anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism be experienced as a liberating and healing experience? In a European context, where questions of guilt are generally taboo, not only within society, but also within the Church, this is a fundamental pastoral issue.

102 Petzel, Paul /Reck, Norbert (eds): Von Abba bis Zorn Gottes. Irrtümer aufklären – das Judentum verstehen (2. Aufl.), Ostfildern: Patmos 2017.

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e) How can Catholic Christians do justice to the constitutive significance of the Land and State of Israel for Jews, both religiously and culturally, without having to give up the Christian perspective on the Land? There is a deep and constitutive difference between the Jewish and Christian perspectives on the Land of Israel, not only between Jews and Christians, but also internally within both Judaism and Christianity. Christians are challenged to learn how to live with indissoluble difference and strangeness, with ambivalence and tension. Withstanding these difficulties and being true to the Christian perspective without prematurely dissolving the contradictions – either through idealisation or anti-Semitic defense – will be hard work, both spiritually and theologically. In this respect, Christian Rutishauser’s theological attempt at comparing the Jewish understanding of the Land with the Catholic theology of the sacraments must be mentioned.103 Unfortunately, the dialogue between such remarkable theological studies and concrete theological education in the pastoral realm is very weak.

4.2

Practical consequences

a) Training, education and experience Given the pastoral-theological questions, one must first stress the fact that there are already numerous theological studies that discuss them on a theoretical and academic level. The outcomes of research must now be implemented in pastoral practice. First, the issue of anti-Semitism must become a matter that cuts across all educational processes of the Catholic Church: in religious education and catechesis; in universities and colleges; and in the training of priests, church officials and teachers; and this must include the processes of education at the level of dioceses, communities, movements and religious orders. It is necessary to raise awareness of the sociopolitical and theological virulence of the issue of anti-Semitism and to initiate processes of self-critical reflection. Where can anti-Semitism be detected in daily life and culture outside, but above all inside, the Church? Sermons, liturgy, the Catholic realm of pictures and art, songbooks, educational work, and everyday communication must be evaluated critically and seriously for anti-Semitic traces. Where do anti-Judaic and antiSemitic stereotypes endure, even where they are not deliberately sinister? The appropriate knowledge of the nature, forms, conditions and effects of anti-Semitism past and present must therefore be acquired. Goodwill and the intention not to be an anti-Semite will not suffice. Christians must learn to 103 Rutishauser, Christian SJ: “Eretz Israel– ein Land, das Christen heilig ist,” in: Zeitschrift für christlich-jüdische Begegnung im Kontext (ZfBeg) 2019/1, pp. 14–25.

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understand these phenomena from their inner rationale. Political education and historical education therefore play an important role. Though it is necessary to deal with anti-Semitism explicitly, learning processes should not be isolated from learning about historical and contemporary Judaism. Therefore, possibilities to encounter contemporary Judaism should be offered, in face-to-face encounters but also in learning about and discussing the numerous texts, videos, films and books available. In my experience, it is easier to reflect on anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism when this confrontation is embedded in a learning process about Judaism in its vivid contemporary diversity, both past and present. Christians must also (re)learn the fact that, even though theological, historical, and political questions need to be distinguished from one another, they must never be reflected on separately. When it comes to Israel-related anti-Semitism in particular, this principle becomes crucial. It is not possible to reflect on this form of anti-Semitism without appropriate historical and political education on the Land and State of Israel. The theoretical debates must be accompanied by reflection on personal attitudes. By opening a mutual dialogue between personal preferences, theoretical knowledge, and the impact of historical and social patterns of perception, it may become easier to identify the mechanisms of one’s own judgement without impeding feelings of guilt. The aim of educational processes is not to blame people, but to promote cognitive and emotional empathy. Strengthening empathy makes it easier to reflect on personal socialisation and to identify one’s own anti-Semitic stereotypes.104 Education does not aim to trigger feelings of guilt, therefore, especially among the descendants of the generation of the war. Rather, it aims to sensitise people to the complexity of the topic, and to support them in developing awareness and the ability to differentiate. The examination of biographies of Jewish women and of Jews and their experiences with antiSemitism can be helpful. b) Culture of memory In the third and fourth generation after the Shoah, the further development of a culture of memory is another important pastoral task, as the mass murder was the most catastrophic consequence of anti-Semitism in centuries. Given the contemporary reinvigoration of anti-Semitism, Aleida Assmann calls for ethical standards that must be developed for a just culture of memory.105 Such ethical 104 Cf. Haviv-Horiner, Anita: In Europa nichts Neues? Israelische Blicke auf Antisemitismus heute, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019, offers didactical principles for such learning processes. 105 Assmann, Aleida: Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur, Ein Interview, München: C. H. Beck 2013.

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standards are necessary, because it is currently possible in Europe to attend commemoration ceremonies of the Shoah, to stand up for Judaism and the State of Israel, to refer to Christian–Jewish values, but at the same time reproduce antiSemitic stereotypes that are broadly unsanctioned. Moreover, European rightwing politicians have started to link pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli statements with racist migration politics, including the stigmatisation of Muslims collectively as scapegoats. In Austria, for example, many Catholics vote for right-wing parties that instrumentalise the fight against anti-Semitism in anti-Muslim politics, and there is a strong need for reflection on this matter of serious concern. In addition, the death of the last witnesses, the reality of a migration society and current political developments in the form of right-wing populism also create new challenges for an ethically responsible culture of memory. In the societies of the perpetrators, such as Austria and Germany, the displaced and murdered persons must not be forgotten. Furthermore, the next generations in Austria and Germany – regardless of their origin – must learn from the historical experience how the breakdown in civilisation became possible. Christians, therefore, must deal with their history too. c) Justice and “double solidarity” Without the Shoah, the State of Israel would never have been established. Nor would contemporary Jews in Israel suffer from the great fear of another attempt to exterminate them. The rapid secularisation of many Jews, who cannot believe in a good Lord guiding history, must probably be read partly as a particular consequence of Christian failure too. Therefore, the relationship of Catholics with the State of Israel can never be simply “neutral” or like that of their relationship with other states. Neutrality would ignore the genesis of the State of Israel. Catholics must be committed to solidarity. In concrete terms, this means resolutely opposing any denial of the legitimacy of the right to the existence of the State of Israel and promoting understanding for this country. Of course, solidarity and understanding do not imply that one has to position oneself as politically biased or even exclusively pro-Israel. Nor are Catholics obliged to avoid any criticism of the political measures of an Israeli government. As with any political criticism, solidarity and understanding mean taking historical, political, legal, cultural and religious circumstances into account when judging politically. Therefore, Catholics must interpret Israeli politics in the broader horizon of history, including the heritage of Christian anti-Judaism. This does not mean excusing political measures that violate democratic politics or human rights. But moralising judgements of the kind “the Jews should know better” are simply forbidden because they are anti-Semitic. Instead, remembering anti-Judaism and its effects on the Jewish people teaches humility

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regarding the habitus of any political judgement. Moreover, Israel is more complex than the Middle East conflict alone, and the region should not be reduced to that conflict. The legitimate demand of Catholics in Israel for solidarity with Christians in this region makes the whole issue of double solidarity more complex. Often, Christians are threatened by being crushed between the fronts in the Middle East conflict. This second solidarity – to represent the interests and concerns of Christian Palestinians in Israel and Palestine – requires a reflective religious and political sensitivity. It is important that competition among victims, which repeatedly arises in this conflict, should not also be intensified. Rather, Christians should open up spaces in which there can be a struggle for the reconciliation of the enemies, amid the pain and the tears. The stories of the suffering of the individual must be brought into focus and the parties must learn to see history through the eyes of the others. Christians who are committed to such processes, however, are not neutral and sublime bringers of peace. Because of their history of guilt, they are part of these processes of reconciliation. These processes include the difficult and differentiated clarification of the historical truth, the naming and recognition of guilt and evil, and the courage of repentance and grief. Moreover, clear reflective ethical standards are required that can bring together universality and particularity, so that the individual tragedy can come into view as well as the impact of religious, cultural and political affiliations and contexts. To bear pain and tension in such processes is a spiritual learning task. d) The relationship to Muslims and to Islam Despite Catholic teaching on Islam, many Catholics are affected by anti-Muslim racism. Simultaneously, anti-Semitic attitudes are widespread among many Muslims, especially among refugees from Arab countries. Their anti-Semitism in public debates is often used to make Muslims responsible for the rise of antiSemitism in Europe.106 Catholics also use this phenomenon to absolve themselves from the duty to reflect on their own anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli attitudes. Pastoral work must deal with this complicated connection. Again, this does not lead to ignorance towards anti-Muslim anti-Semitism and mitigate ethical irresponsibility. Catholics must fight both phenomena, but without arrogance of any kind. This topic becomes particularly important in Christian–Islamic dialogue. For Catholic Christianity, Islam belongs to the monotheistic religions and therefore must be theologically appreciated. Nostra Aetate, n. 3, stated that:

106 Zimmermann, Moshe: “Im Arsenal des Antisemitismus,” in: Heilbronn / Rabinovici / Sznaider (eds): Neuer Antisemitismus 2019, pp. 431–458, 431f.

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The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the day of judgment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting.

As he did with Judaism, John Paul II opened a deep theological dialogue with regard to Islam, which I cannot describe here.107 Therefore, to use the theological relationship with Judaism at the expense of valuing Islam and Muslim communities is not a viable path for Catholics. But to ignore Muslim anti-Semitism in Christian–Islamic dialogue is also impossible – for ethical and political reasons, but also for theological ones. From a theological perspective, the relationship between the Catholic Church and Islam is not equivalent to that of Judaism, as Catholics always sit with Jews “at the table”, while being in dialogue with Muslims.108 Trilateral dialogue is therefore another precarious space for combating anti-Semitism, especially in its Israel-related form. But perhaps Catholics can contribute to addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in trilateral dialogues. The self-critical examination of the anti-Jewish history of the Christian faith could thus become fruitful in a paradoxical way.

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The Authors

Hana Bendcowsky Hana Bendcowsky, Program Director of the Jerusalem Center for JewishChristian Relations at the Rossing Center for Education and Dialogue P.O.B: 53234 ZIP: 9153102, Jerusalem Email: [email protected] Hana Bendcowsky holds a B.A in History and M.A in Comparative Religion from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her field of work and research includes Jewish–Christian relations in the Israeli context, education about Christianity in the educational program of the Education Corp of the IDF, and education about Christianity in the Israeli Education system. Rachel Elior Rachel Elior, Professor Emerita, The John and Golda Cohen Chair in Jewish Philosophy Department of Jewish Thought, Institute of Jewish Studies, Faculty of Humanities. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905 Israel Email: [email protected] Rachel Elior is John and Golda Cohen Professor of Jewish Philosophy and Jewish Mystical Thought at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where she earned her PhD Summa cum laude in 1976 and where she has taught since 1978. She has served as the head of the Department of Jewish Thought a number of times in the last four decades. She has been a research fellow and visiting professor at University College London, The University of Amsterdam, and The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, The Oxford Center of Jewish Studies, Case Western University, Yeshiva University, Tokyo University, Princeton University, Chicago University and Lomonosov Moscow State University.

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Prof. Elior has written ten books on various periods of Jewish mystical creativity, six of which have been translated into English, Spanish and Polish, including of The Three Temples; On the Emergence of Jewish Mysticism (2004); The Mystical Origins of Hasidism (2006); Jewish Mysticism: The Infinite Expression of Freedom (2007). She has edited eight books, transcribed from manuscripts, edited, and annotated three books and authored some hundred articles on this subject. She has received many awards, among them the Friedenberg Award of Excellence of the Israel National Academy of Sciences and Humanities, the Beracha-Yigal Alon Prize for Academic Excellence, the AVI Fellowship – Geneva Award, the Warburg Prize, the Federman Foundation Award, the State University of New York Research Foundation Award, The Littauer Fund Award, the Oxford Jerusalem Trust Visiting Fellowship, the Wolfson Foundation Award and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Studies Fellowship. In 2006 the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities awarded her the Gershom Scholem Prize for Research in Kabbalah, and in 2016 she was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati and Jerusalem. On International Women’s Day in 2017 she received the WIZO Jerusalem Award for pathbreaking women in recognition of her work on behalf of Israeli society. Her book Israel Ba’al Shem Tov and His Contemporaries: Kabbalists, Sabbatians, Hasidim and Mitnaggedim was published in 2014 in Jerusalem by Carmel Publishing House. Her most recent book is titled Grandmother Did Not Know to Read and Write. On Learning and Illiteracy: On Slavery and Liberty (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2018). Research areas: Jewish Mysticism, Hasidism, Sabbatianism, Kabbalah, Heikhalot, Dead Sea Scrolls. Her Research areas are: History of Freedom, history of the Hebrew Language and history of Jewish Women. Eran Kaplan Eran Kaplan, Goldman Professor in Israel Studies Department of Jewish Studies San Francisco State University 1600 Holloway, Ave. San Francisco, CA 94132 Email: [email protected] Eran Kaplan teaches Israel Studies at San Francisco State University. Before that he taught at Princeton, the University of Cincinnati and the University of Toronto. His research interests include the history of Modern Israel, modern Jewish political ideologies, and Israeli cinema. He is the author of several books, including Projecting the Nation: History and Ideology on the Israeli Screen (2020) and Beyond Post Zionism (2015).

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Gerhard Langer Gerhard Langer, Professor of Jewish Studies at the Department of Jewish Studies University of Vienna Spitalgasse 2, Hof 7.3 1090 Vienna, Austria Email: [email protected] Langer was born 1960 in Salzburg, Austria. He studied Catholic Theology, OldSemitic Philology and Judaic Studies in Salzburg and Vienna. He worked as an assistant and later associate professor at the Department of Biblical Studies and Church History in Salzburg. Between 1993 and 2001 he acted as president of the Coordinating Committee for Christian-Jewish Co-operation, an ecumenical society serving the Jewish-Christian Dialogue. 2000–2001 he was professor at the Institute of Jewish-Christian Research in Lucerne (Switzerland), 2001–2002 professor at the Oriental Seminary at the University of Freiburg (Germany). 2004–2010 he filled the position of the head of the interdisciplinary Center of Jewish Cultural History at the University of Salzburg. Since 2010 he has been full professor for Jewish Studies at the Department of Jewish Studies in Vienna. His main research fields are: Rabbinic Studies: Narratives, Midrash; Education and identity; Modern Literature and Jewish tradition, and Jewish-Christian and Jewish-Islamic relations. His publications include Midrasch: Ein Lehrbuch (Lehrbuchreihe Jüdische Studien, 2016); Menschen-Bildung. Rabbinisches zu Lernen und Lehren jenseits von PISA (2012); Editor of “Let the Wise Listen and Add to Their Learning” (Prov 1:5). Festschrift for Günter Stemberger on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday (with Constanza Cordoni, 2016). Regina Polak Associate Professor Regina Polak, Dr. theol. (University of Vienna), Mag. Phil. (University of Vienna), MAS (Spiritual Theology in the interreligious process, University of Salzburg) Head of the Department of Practical Theology (University of Vienna) Head of the Postgraduate Course (University of Vienna): “Muslims in Europe”, University of Vienna Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions Department of Practical Theology Catholic-Theological Faculty University of Vienna Schenkenstrasse 8–10 1010 Vienna, Austria

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Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel 31905 Email: [email protected] Associate Professor Regina Polak graduated at the University of Vienna and the University of Salzburg (Austria) in philosophy, Catholic theology, and spiritual theology in the interreligious process. For her dissertation on “The return of Religion” (2005) she was granted the “Future Award” of the University of Vienna. She is the head of the Department of Practical Theology at the Catholic Theological Faculty of the University of Vienna. Since 2013 she has been assoc.-prof. for Practical Theology. Her research focuses on the following topics: religion in the context of migration and urbanization; religion and values; socio-religious transformation processes in Europe; Christian-Jewish and Christian-Islamic dialogue, and fundamental theological questions of a church in transition. She published four monographies, edited 13 anthologies, ca. 140 articles in academic publications and journals, including of Religion kehrt wieder (The Return of Religion, 2005), Flucht, Migration und Religion (Flight, Migration and Religion, 2017), Antisemitismus als pastorale Herausforderung (Anti-Semitism as a Pastoral Challenge, Theoweb, 2019). Currently she leads a project on the European Values Study reflecting the relationship between religious and political attitudes from an interdisciplinary perspective. Another research project deals with “Scriptural reasoning”, a method of interreligious dialogue. She leads the postgraduate certificate course “Muslims in Europe” and is currently OSCE-Personal Representative for combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination. She is a member of the Research Center “Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society”, in charge of the research cluster “Transforming Urban Spaces: Migration and Religion” and a member of the Interdisciplinary Research Network “Value Studies”. She is a member of the Coordinating Committee for ChristianJewish Coordination and organizes lectures, seminaries and public events on Christian-Jewish and Christian-Muslim dialogue regularly. Eli Salzberger Professor Eli M Salzberger, Dr.Phil (Oxford), Dr. h.c (Hamburg) Director, the Minerva Center for the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions Faculty of Law University of Haifa Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel 31905 Email: [email protected] Professor Eli Salzberger was the dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Haifa and the president of the European Association for Law and Economics, as well as the director of the Haifa Center for German and European Studies

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(DAAD). He is a graduate of the Hebrew University Faculty of Law (1st in class). He clerked for Chief Justices Aharon Barak and Dorit Beinish. He wrote his doctorate at Oxford University on the economic analysis of the doctrine of separation of powers. His research and teaching areas are legal theory and philosophy, economic analysis of law, legal ethics, cyberspace, and the Israeli Supreme Court. He has published more than 50 scientific articles. His books include The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property in the Digital Age: The Limits of Analysis (co-authored with Niva Elkin-Koren, 2012), and Law, Economics and Cyberspace (2004). He was a member of the board of directors of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, of the public council of the Israeli Democracy Institute and of a State commission for reform in performers’ rights in Israel. He was awarded various grants and fellowships, among them Rothschild, Minerva, GIF, ISF, Fulbright, ORS and British Council. Salzberger was a visiting professor at various universities including Princeton, University of Hamburg, Humboldt University, University of Torino, Miami Law School, University of St. Galen and UCLA. Currently, he is the director of the Minerva Center for the Study of the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions. Yedidia Z. Stern Professor Yedidia Stern at the Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law, The Israel Democracy Institute Senior Fellow, Center for Religion, Nation and State Academic Director, Human Rights and Judaism Program Bar Ilan University Ramat Gan, 5290002 Israel Email: [email protected] Professor Yedidia Z. Stern is a full professor and former dean of the law faculty of Bar-Ilan University. He is a Graduate of Bar-Ilan Law School and got his SJD from Harvard Law School. He was chairman of the Committee to Determine the Legal Status of Insurance Agents in Israel; chairman of the National Committee for Civic Studies; chairman-elect of the Coalition Committee to Enact an Israeli Constitution; chairman of Israel Science Foundation’s Committee for Assessment of Legal Research; a member of the government’s commission of inquiry into the state’s treatment of the residents of Gush Katif after the disengagement from Gaza and northern Samaria; an advisor to the Ministry of Justice on the Companies Law (2001–2007); and the president of the Institute for the Advanced Study of Israeli Judaism. He is a member of multiple committees and boards of public organizations, including Bank Leumi.

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His areas of expertise are: Religion and state; law and Jewish religious law; constitutional law; justice system; corporate law, corporate acquisition, and finance; corporate governance and structure. Among his publications two shall be highlighted: Stern, Y.: (Eds.): When Judaism Meets the State (2017); Stern, Y.: (Eds.). Essential Israel: Essays for the 21st Century.