Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan and Bangladesh, 1980-2005

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ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALSIM IN PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH, 1980-2005

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Aliva Mishra

SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES DMSION Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian & Southwest Pacific Studies School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi-l10067 2009

CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST ASIAN & SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY NEW DELHI - 110 067

Phone Fax

Date:

5·

I () .

2670 4350 91-11-26741586 91-11-26742580

'l.ooq

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled "ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN P AKIST AN AND BANGLADESH, 1980-2005" submitted by me in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of lawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

AR·./Q. ~ ALIVA MISHRA

CERTIFICATE We recommend that the thesis may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

~~~~.,

~.-r-~ (Prof.Ganganath lha) Chairperson CHAIRPERSON . ('entre for South Central South East " ~nd South 'Nest Pacific Studies 01 of International Studies '1arlal Nehru University 11~lhi - 110067

~

(Prof Savita Supervisor

~ JNU

~

SUPERVISOR Centre for South Central South East Asian and South West F~. . Ires School of Internatiand '3 Jawaharlal Nehru UnlVe New Delhi - 110067

DEDICATED TO MY LATE PARENTS-IN-LAW

Acknowledgements Behind the successful completion of this work, the tireless efforts of my esteemed and most admired supervisor, Prof Savita Pande has been very decisive. She not only guided me through the entire process of this study, but also spared her precious time in reading and correcting the manuscript a number of times. lowe my deep gratitude to Prof Pande for her constant encouragement, insightful interventions and intellectual inputs, which inspired me to keep improving this study. She bore with my anxieties at every stage of this work with utmost patience. Her faith on my ability was the greatest motivating factor. I take this opportunity to tender my sincere thanks to all my teachers and the supportive staff at the Centre for South, Central, South East Asia and South West Pacific Studies (CSCSEASWPS) their unstinted help and cooperation. I am also grateful to the staff of the JNU library, Indian Council of World Affairs, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Nehru Memorial Library for their assistance in tracking down the required study materials. I am indebted to my parents. my husband and son. Yan. without whose support and understanding. I could not have completed this voluminous work at the first place. I would like to express my gratitude to my friends Manisha Saini and Kalyani Ramanathan for their .....co-operation. moral support and encouragement in the course of my study. I am also grateful to my juniors. particularly Nitish and Sitakant for their timely help at every stage. I am thanliful to Mr. A. D. Bahuguna who took great pains to type out parts ofthis thesis with great precision. For all the omissions and errors in this work. I am solely to be held responsible.

~vct~ Aliva Mishra

CONTENTS Page No i v vi-vii

Acknowledgements List of Tables Abbreviations

1-41

Introduction Fundamentalism and Islam Jihadism/Jihadi Islam Jihad in Islamic Traditions Characteristics Neo-fundamentalists Strategies and Goals Causation Contigencist Factors The Green Peril

Chapter I Islamisation in Pakistan: From Islamic Republic to Islamic State 42-111 Emergence of Pakistan Role of Jinnah in the Creation of Pakistan The Problems of State Building Position of Islam in the Constitution The 1962 Constitution Islam and Pakistan's 3rd Constitution Introduction of Islamic Provisions under Bhutto RiseofZia Consolidation of the Zia Regime External Environment Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation Mesures Islamic Economic Programme Islamic Penal Code Education Policy Saudi Arabian Assistance in Education Wahhabism Domestic Impact Polity Society

ii

Chapter II

Islamisation in Bangladesh: From Secular to Islamic State

112-167

War of Liberation The Language Movement Role of Literature Mujibur Rehman's Tenure as Prime Minister Secularism Reversed Failure of Secularism Awami League: A Divided House BAKSAL Naxalite Violence Role of Collaborators Bases of Bangladeshi Nationalism ZiaPeriod Hussain Muhammad Ershad Regime Bangladesh Jamaat e-Islami Jamaat's Operational Methods Financial Support The Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh Popular Islam Madrassas, Mosques and Shrines Saints and Shrines Other Islamic Traditions Peasant Islam Anti-Indianism and Political Islam Islam Oriented Parties

Chapter III

Post-Zia Pakistan: Drift into Extremism

The 1988 Election and Its Aftermath The 1990 Elections and Reign ofNawaz Sharif Benazir's Second term in 1993 Dominance of the Military Benazir's Dilemma Rise ofTaliban The Taliban Upsurge Terror Attacks in Kashmir Valley Rise ofIslamic Militancy in Pakistan's Tribal Areas Growth of Fundamentalist Forces during Sharifs Second Term Sharifs Sharia Bill Sectarian Violence during Sharifs Regime Politicisation of Sectarian Identities Pakistan's Taliban Policy The Kargil Episode Military Coup Rise of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) Madrassas iii

168-245

Acknowledgements Behind the successful completion of this work, the tireless efforts of my esteemed and most admired supervisor, Prof Savita Pande has been very decisive. She not only guided me through the entire process of this study, but also spared her precious time in reading and correcting the manuscript a number of times. lowe my deep gratitude to Prof Pande for her constant encouragement, insightful interventions and intellectual inputs, which inspired me to keep improving this study. She bore with my anxieties at every stage of this work with utmost patience. Her faith on my ability was the greatest motivating factor. I take this opportunity to tender my sincere thanks to all my teachers and the supportive staff at the Centre for South, Central, South East Asia and South West Pacific Studies (CSCSEASWPS) their unstinted help and cooperation. I am also grateful to the staff of the JNU library, Indian Council of World Affairs, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Nehru Memorial Library for their assistance in tracking down the required study materials. I am indebted to my parents. my husband and son. Yan. without whose support and understanding. I could not have completed this voluminous work at the first place. I would like to express my gratitude to my friends Manisha Saini and Kalyani Ramanathan for their .....co-operation. moral support and encouragement in the course of my study. I am also grateful to my juniors. particularly Nitish and Sitakant for their timely help at every stage. I am thanliful to Mr. A. D. Bahuguna who took great pains to type out parts ofthis thesis with great precision. For all the omissions and errors in this work. I am solely to be held responsible.

~vct~ Aliva Mishra

LIST OF TABLES

Page No.

1.1

Sectarian Clashes in Pakistan, 1989-94

109

4.1

Results of the 8th Parliamentary Election of October 1,2001

260

4.2

List of Bangladeshi Leaders & Intellectuals killed by JamatilJihadi Terrorists

274

4.3

Levels of Madrassas mBangladesh in 1998

296

4.4

Number of students in Bangladesh Madrassas in 1998

296

4.5

No. of Different Categories of Madrassas

298

4.6

List of the Islamist Terrorist Groups Active in Bangladesh

v

309-310

ABBREVIATIONS AL

Awami League

BAKSAL

Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League

BCL

Bangladesh Chattra League

EBR

East Bangal Regiment

EPCP

East Pakistan Communist Party

10J

Islamic Okiyya Jote

JI

Jammate Islami

PPR

Political Party Regulation

NAP

National Awami Party

BNP

Bangladesh National Party

ICS

Islamic Chattra Sangb

JSD

Jatiyo Samajtantric Dal

ML

Muslim League

PPP

Pakistan People's Party

lSI

Inter Service Intelligence

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

TNFJ

Tehrik-i-NiJaz-i-Fiqh-Jafaria

ASS

Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sahaba

SSP

Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan

MRD

Movement for Restoration of Democracy

OIC

Organisation of Islamic Countries

MI

Military Intelligence

MQM

Mohajir Quami Movement

JUIF

Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam-i-Fazlur

TNSM

Tehrik-i-NiJaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi vi

NWFP

North-West Frontier Province

LEJ

Lashkar-e-1han~

HUA

Harkat-ul-Ansar

SIM

Sipah-i-Mohammad

LOC

Line of Control

NAB

National Accountability Bureau

HUM

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

HUJI

Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islam

LT

Lashakar-i-Taiba

MDI

Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad

TJ

Tableeghi Jamaat

1M

Jaish-i-Mohammad

MMA

Muttahid Majlis-e-Amal

PML-N

Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz

LFO

Legal Frame Order

PML

Pakistan Muslim League

AHAB

Ahle Hadith Andolan Bangladesh

ARNO

Arakan Rohingya National Organisation

IIFSO

International Islamic Federation of Student Organisation

llRO

Islamic International Relief Organisation

RSO

Rohingya Solidarity Organsation

HUJffi

Harkat-ul-Jihad-ai-Islami Bangladesh

1MB

Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh

JMJB

Jagrata Muslim Jagrata Bangladesh

ICS

Islamic Chatra Shibir

WAMY

World Assembly of Muslim Youth

vii

INTRODUCTION

1

Religious fundamentalism is a new global phenomenon in world politics. It is in part the product of the political vacuum created by the demise of the Soviet empire and in greater part, the failure of the secular alternatives in 20th century, particularly in many post-colonial societies. While these societies continue to live in their cultural framework, the ruling elites have not paid sufficient attention to economic prosperity and political freedom required for the structural transformation. With the growing sense of discontent, people strive to seek refuge in religious roots as a panacea of prevailing ills. Fundamentalism, however, is not an expression of a religious revival, but rather a pronouncement of a new order based on the selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs and practices from the sacred past. As defined by Bruce Lawrence, fundamentalism is ''the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of neither criticism nor reduction; it is expressed through the collective demand that specific creedal and ethical dictates derived from the scriptures be publicly recognised and legally enforced."} The underlying idea, according to Ernest Gellner, "is that a given faith is to be upheld firmly in its full and literal form, free of compromises, softening, re-interpretation or diminution.,,2 Fundamentalism in the Western context is not new; the term was used for the first time in the 1920s with reference to a group of US Protestant churches and organisations opposed to 'modernism' within Christianity. As the pace of social change accelerated, Protestant Christians felt threatened by the higher criticism of the Bible and the spread of philosophical skepticism.3 They sought to reaffirm their belief in the literal text of the Bible, and advocated strict patriarchal moralism. While these Christians called themselves fundamentalists, the term acquired a strongly pejorative association in the minds of liberals and modernists. In the next few decades, the term came to be used for all religious revival movements outside the Protestant tradition that sought to return to "fundamentals" and to any movement seeking power for the purpose of governance according to religious values and principles. I Bruce Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modem Age (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), p. 78.

2 E.

Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 2.

3 lochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg (eds.), The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam (Boulder, Colorado: Pluto Press with Transnational Institute, 1995), pp. 84-85.

2

Fundamentalism and Islam

The use of fundamentalism in connection with Islam spread rapidly after Iran's revolution and comparable Muslim movements elsewhere - so much so that by 1990, the

Concise Oxford English Dictionary defmed it not only as "the strict maintenance of traditional Protestant beliefs," but also as "the strict maintenance of ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion, especially Islam. ,,4 By sheer dint of usage, Islamic fundamentalism has become the most cited fundamentalism of all. Journalists, ever on the lookout for a shorthand way to refer things new and unfamiliar, gravitated toward the term fundamentalism, which evoked the anti-modernism that Ayatollah Khomeini seemed to personify. Yet the more popular Islamic fundamentalism became in the media, the more scholars of Islam recoiled from it. Some thought that the term fundamentalism failed to capture the methodology and style of Iran's revolution and comparable Muslim movements. Others argue that its use in the context of Islam could be misleading, because fundamentalist is a Christian term, which denotes certain Protestant churches and organisations, more particularly those that maintain the literal divine origin and inerrancy of the Bible. In this they oppose the liberal and modernist theologians, who tend to be more critical of the scripture. Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur' an, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur'an, are in principle at least fundamentalists in the positive sense of the term. 5 Other scholars, particularly those who sympathise with the new Muslim movements have protested that the label of fundamentalist unfairly stigmatises forwardthinking Muslims. John Esposito, America's foremost apologist for Islam-driven movements, has made this argument against using fundamentalism in an Islamic context. Esposito has added that fundamentalism ''is often equated with political activism, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and anti-Americanism, a prejudgment by label.,,6 Unlike Bernard Lewis, who is prepared to make a concession to widespread usage, Esposito avoids using the term fundamentalism because he views the rise of Islamic

4

Concise Oxford Dictionary o/Current English, 8th rev. cd. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 477.

5 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language 0/ Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 117. 6

John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), P. 8.

3

movements since the 1970s as the latest resurgence of a cyclical phenomenon that has occurred thought-out the Islamic history.7 Likewise, Noorani in his book on jihad has argued, "the so-called Islamic fundamentalist is an imposter. He has misused a noble faith as a political weapon. Of course, Islam does have a political vision, but it is far removed from the Islam which many Muslims and most non-Muslims imagine it to be."g Mark Juergensmeyer contends that the term is less descriptive than it is accusatory; it is "an imprecise category for making comparisons across cultures". He prefers to call it as "religious nationalism" confronting the secular state in the post-Cold War global order. 9 So dose Nikki Keddie who has chosen a more neutral tenn to describe this phenomenon as the "New Religious Politics or NRP".IO However, Edward Said, defender of Palestine and critic of Western representations of Islam, has not so much objected to the tenn as to the way it has come to be employed against Islam. Instead of scholarship, the deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing. In this usage, claimed Said, "Fundamentalism equals Islam equals everything-we-must-now-fight-against, as we did with communism during the Cold War."lI In brief, Said argues that homo Islamicus does not exist; it is nothing more than Western invention. The term fundamentalism has a few academic defenders as well. In 1988, the University of Chicago, backed by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences launched the Fundamentalism Project, devoted to comparing trends in Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and even Confucianism. The project began with the hypothesis that the acceleration of modernity was forcing the faithful of all religions into a reactive (and sometimes violent) mode. Its organisers have defined fundamentalism as "a strategy, or

7

See John Esposito, Islam and Politics, 2nd ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987).

SA. G. Norrani, Islam and Jihad: Prejudice versus Reality (London: Zed books, 2002), p. ix. 9 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 1-2. 10 Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When and Why do Fundamentalism Appear?", Comparative Study of Society and History, Vol. 40, No.4 (October 1998), p. 697. In this essay, Keddie has attempted a comparative study of the religio-politicaI movements in south Asia. II

Edward W. Said, Covering Islam, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1997), pp. xvi, xix.

4

set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group ... by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past.,,12 Some 150 expert on diverse religious traditions have contributed to the project, and their papers appeared in five hefty volumes, bearing titles like Fundamentalisms Observed and Fundamentalisms and the State. Legitimising the term as a tool of comparison across religions, the research project has demonstrated that "those people and groups now known as fundamentalists emerge from different religions of the world, or different holy books, or have different interpretations of the same holy book, or follow no holy book at all but a venerable tradition instead." These fundamentalists "see themselves as actors in an eschatological drama unfolding in the mind of God and directing the course of human history.,,13 A leading American sociologist also claims that "I am not convinced by the arguments that advocate limiting the concept of fundamentalism to Protestantism or Christianity. Since all concepts originate in a particularistic historical setting and language from which they are abstracted - - - the concept of fundamentalism is not necessarily 'tainted' or impregnated by its Protestant origin, although·we do have to take pains to consciously eliminate Christian peculiarities in order to transform it into a universally

applicable

sociological

concept.,,14

The

strongest

argument

for

fundamentalism has been its sheer ubiquity~ In an entry entitled "Fundamentalism" published in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World in 1995, historian John Voll has enumerated the most common objections to the term and made a list of alternatives. These include Islamism, integrisme, neo-normative Islam, neo-traditional Islam, Islamic revivalism, and Islamic nativism. "However," he has added with a hint of resignation, "fundamentalism remains the most commonly utilised identification of the various revivalist impulses among Muslims. More technically accurate terms and

12 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, "Introduction," in Marty and Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 3 13 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 815-819. 14 Martin Riesebrodt, "Fundamenatlsim and the Resurgence of Religion", Numen, Vol. 47, No.3 (2000), pp.270-271.

5

neologisms have not gained wide acceptance.,,15 Similarly, Bassam Tibi has chosen to describe Islamic fundamentalism as a political ideology based on selective and arbitrary politicisation of the religion. It, according to Tibi, "does not address religious beliefs, but the nature of state, society and world politics, which are articulated in religious symbols.,,16 Given the controversy surrounding the use of the term, it has become conventional in the literature on Muslim societies to distinguish 'Islamic' from'Islamist' movements. The former refers to any religion oriented trend and the latter, the specific Islamic variety of fundamentalism that seeks to increase Islam's role in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state. 17 The term Islamism first appeared in French in the mid-eighteenth century. But it did not refer to the modem ideological use of Islam, which had not yet come into being. It was instead a synonym for the religion of the Muslims, which was then known in French as mahometisme, the religion professed and taught by the Prophet Muhammad. ls Islamism began to disappear from the lexicon from about the tum of the twentieth century, as many scholars simply preferred the shorter and purely Arabic term, Islam. In summation, the term Islamism enjoyed its first run, lasting from Voltaire to the First World War, as a synonym for Islam; Enlightened scholars and writers generally preferred it to Mohammedanism. Eventually both terms were replaced by Islam, the Arabic name of the faith and a word free of either pejorative or comparative associations. There was no need for any other. term until the rise of an ideological and political interpretation of Islam challenged scholars and commentators to come up with an alternative to distinguish Islam as modem ideology from Islam as a faith.

15 Quoted by Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalism or Islamism", Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 10, No.2 (Spring 2003). 16 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1998), p. 13.

17 For a definition of Islamism, see Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence ofIslamism (London: Zed Press, 1997), pp. 16-18. 18 For details, see Norman Daniel, Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960), pp. 277-300; H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (London: Home University Library, 1949), pp. 2-19.

6

In 1984, the French sociologist of Islam, Gilles Kepel, published an influential book with the subtitle Les movements islamistes dans Egypt contemporaine. In 1985, it appeared in English translation as Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The English translator had difficulty with Kepel's extensive use of islamiste and translated it as "Islamicist." A footnote in the translation made this apology: The tenn Islamicist is used throughout to render the French 'islamiste.' 19 Initially, the term encountered some principled resistance. The American anthropologist Henry Munson, Jr., in a book published in 1988 listed the disadvantages of fundamentalism, but decided to retain it anyway. "I cannot think of an adequate alternative tenn to characterise those Muslims who advocate a strictly Islamic policy. The tenn Islamist strikes me as a clumsy neologism.,,2o Clumsy or not, however, Islamism began to displace fundamentalism in specialised usage. It particularly appealed to scholars who disliked the supposedly pejorative associations of fundamentalism. Graham Fuller, a RAND analyst made an early statement in its favour. Fundamentalism, he tried to argue forcefully in 1991, "is an unsatisfactory term, suggesting as it does a strict reversion to the institutions of a medieval or even early Islamic state. This more recent phenomenon is better termed Islamism, suggesting not so much theology, whose implications are not at all oldfashioned, but thoroughly modern.,,21 In 1993, the political scientist Louis Cantori likewise argued that fundamentalism conveys a sense of extremism and dismissal. In reference to Islam, in the world of scholarship, and now internally within U.S. agencies, it is being abandoned as being prejudicial and polemical. Instead, the term Islamism is used increasingly to denote the political manifestation of the religion of I,slam. "Islamism" permits one to more dispassionately make distinction between extremist and mainstream Islam. While the tenn "Political Islam" generally refers to the movements

19 Gilles KepeJ, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharoah (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 22, n. 1. "Islamicist" is the term most often used to describe Western students of Islam on the model of physicist.

Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p.4.

20

21 Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries: An Integrative View (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), p. 2.

7

and groups within the broader fundamentalist revival with a specific political agenda, "Islamists" are Muslims with political goals. However, there are Islamists who operate outside the legal framework and espouse violence to achieve their aims are properly called extremists. As Islamism gained currency, it too became associated with benighted extremism, from the Taliban to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, culminating in the mega-terror of Osama bin Laden. Critics of Islamism have found it easy to add Islamism to the list of dangerous twentieth century "isms" that has defied the liberal West and gone down to defeat. "Islamism Is Fascism" - thus ran the headline of an interview with analyst Daniel Pipes. Islamism is the New Bolshevism" - thus went the headline of an op-ed column by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 22 The entry of Islamism into common English usage has not improved the image of these movements and paradoxically made it easier to categorise them as threats of the first order. As the Muslim equivalent of fascists or Bolshevists, they are clearly marked as the enemies of democracy and freedom. Ultimately, of course, the problem of these movements is not what they are called; it is what they do. As long as these movements continue to spawn, nurture, or tolerate the most violent forces in contemporary world, they would bring stigma to whatever term is applied to them. Jihadism/Jihadi Islam On the whole, the debate over usage in the West has borne little relationship to the

parallel debate in the Muslim world over what to call the new Islamic movements. The arguments on behalf of various Arabic, Persian, and Urdu terms are a topic that deserves its own treatment, based on other sources. From time to time, leaders of the new movements generally follow the lead of their Western sympathisers in rejecting the use of "fundamentalism." To all intents and purposes, however, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism have become synonyms in contemporary Western usage. Since the September 22 Eric Boehlert, "Islamism Is Fascism: An Interview with Daniel Pipes," Sa/on. com, November 9, 2001 at http://www.danielpipes.orglarticle/81; Margaret Thatcher, "Islamism Is the New Bolshevism," The Guardian, February I 2 2002. In the body of the article, Thatcher did not use the term "Islam ism." "Islamic extremism today, like Bolshevism in the past, is an armed doctrine," she wrote. "It is an aggressive ideology promoted by fanatical, well-armed devotees. And, like communism, it requires an all-embracing long-term strategy to defeat it."

8

11 terror attacks in the United States, the term 'jibadism' has been in vogue in the place of fundamentalism. At present, jihadism is used to refer to the most violent movements in contemporary Islam, including that of the al-Qaida.23 The concept of jihad otherwise refers to inner struggle of moral discipline or striving towards worthy goal, which is reintroduced in the fundamentalist literature as a form of political struggle through direct action. 24 It is the revolutionary path of Islam that not merely rejects the traditional notions of passivity, but also justifies the use of force to combat the Muslim backslider. It confers the right to revolt and hence, a readiness to fight by whatever. means to liberate the mankind from the present state of godless Jahiliyya- the pagan ignorance - comparable to the conditions of pre-Islamic Arabia.25 Among the Muslim thinkers and activists whose doctrinal vision of the world and revolutionary rhetoric inspire contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, the names of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi of Pakistan, Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj of Egypt figure prominently.26 Over the years, the theoretical formulations advanced by these men and circulated through educational networks, especially those supervised by the clergy have contributed to the moulding of the Muslim mindset to the idea that they are under constant threat from the West and from their jahiliyya rulers. No wonder the fundamentalists' call for ''the Return to Islam" and waging holy war to save the Umma from Satan, represented by the secular Western culture has incited direct action by the Sunni Muslims worldwide. Jafar Wafa, "Recalling Islamic Millennium," Dawn (Karachi), February 4,2000. For further insights into the change in description, see .Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Franyois Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam (London: Tauris, 2002). Burgat's book is a translation from a French original, entitled L'Islamisme en face. The author or the publisher decided against using "Islamism" in the English book title-perhaps evidence of doubt about the term's status in English. 23

24 The word Jihad which is derived from the trilateral Arabic rootjahad (to strive, to endeavour, to exert oneself) and the verb jaaahada means exertion of one's power in Allah's path, that is, to spread the belief in Allah and to make his word supreme over this world. For details, see Mustansir Mir, "Jihad in Islam" in Hadia Dajani -Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier (eds.), Jihad and Its Times (Ann Arbor: Centre for Near Eastern and 'North African Studies, University of Michigan, 1991), pp. 112-113; Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton, New Jersey: Markus Weiner publishers, 1998), pp. 2-6; D. Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 25 For an examination of the Jahiliyya, see William E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of Jahiliyya", International Journal ofMiddle East Studies, Vol. 35, No.4 (November 2003), pp. 521-545.

For a survey of Muslim revivalist thinkers, see Ali Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers ofIslamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1995).

26

9

Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), the founder of the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami party has, for example, given jihad a pivotal role in Muslims' struggle to establish God's universal sovereignty (hakimiyya) on earth. In his book AI-Jihad.fi Sabeel Allah (Jihad in Islam), he defines jihad as a total and continuous struggle in pursuit of "God's just order

in the World." Such a conception of jihad recognises no distinction between the offensive and defensive jihad -a theoretical-legal fonnulation worked out by the classical Muslim jurists. 27 In an offensive war, the religious duty of jihad is collective to be discharged by the Community as a whole, whereas jihad becomes an individual obligation when the Community is engaged in a war to defend itself. Influenced by Maududi' s ideas, the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) has underlined in his numerous writings the inevitability of jihad to bring about the universal Islamic system?S Jihad in Islam, according to Qutb, is pennanent, borderless and timeless. "In order to propagate the oneness of God on earth" writes Qutb, "and to put an end to the power of those who, by word or deed, challenge His omnipotence, Islam allows Muslims to fight. Such is the only war allowed in Islam".29 Implicit in this is his advocacy of jihad as a struggle between the believers of God and the non-believers in which the use of force in combating the latter is legitimised. Religious war, as Qutb forcefully argues in This Religion ofIslam, is the only form of killing that is morally sanctioned. 3o

27 For a critical assessment of Maududi's works, see, Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), Chap. 4, pp. 83-130; Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Maududi" in D. E. Smith, South Asia Politics and Religion (Princeton University POress, 1966), pp. 392-396; Seyed Vali Reza Nasr, Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

28 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival" in John Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam ~ew York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 62-71,

Sayyid Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1993), P. 10. Qutb was the leader of the Muslim Brethren, which split from President Nasser's secular socialist revolution in 1954. Consequently, he spent most of his remaining life in prison until he was executed in 1966. His brief stay in U. S. in the 1940s seems to have sharpened his ant-Western militancy and his contempt for Muslim modernists. See Adnan A. MusalIam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundation of RadicalIslamism (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 155-169. 29

30 Sayyid Qutb, The Religion ofIslam (Kuwait: Holy Koran Publishing, 1988), pp. 9-10. Qutb's basic ideas about Jihad are, however, found in his controversial work Ma'alim (Milestone), published in 1964, which has become a manifesto for Jihadi Islamists. For an analysis of Qutb's works on the issue, see Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 34, No.1 (Winter 1980), pp. 3-12.

10

On the whole, Qutb's message contains violence of tone, but he is not as explicit in recommending the acts of terror to the Islamic warriors as Abd al-Salam Faraj, a leading member of the Egyptian Jihad Organisation who was executed in 1982 for his part in the assassination of the president Anwar al-Sadat. Although Qutb is regarded as the intellectual prophet of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, it is Faraj's conceptualisation of jihad as "confrontation and blood" that has inspired many young Muslim activists, particularly from the Arab world to become istishhadi (he who martyrs himself) in defense of their faith. In his booklet, The Neglected Duty published in the early 1980s in Cairo, Faraj has presented a remarkably cogent argument for waging war against the enemies of Islam. By grounding the activities of the Islamic terrorists fIrmly on the sacred text of the Qur' an and the biographical accounts of the Prophet, he has accorded religious legitimation to the use of techniques of terror to fIght the apostates within the Muslim community and the enemies from without. 31 The statements and latwas issued since 1996 issued by Osama bin Laden, the fugitive Saudi fmancier accused by the U. S. of masterminding the September 11 airborne assaults, echoes the Qutbian perspective of virtue and violence, and ideas of Faraj on the Islamic obligation of jihad. No wonder, Western analysts have variously dubbed Sayyid Qutb as ''the philosopher of Islamic terror" and as ''the godfather ideologue ofOsama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.,,32 The text of his 1998 decree published in a London-based Arabic language daily, in which bin Laden cites Quranic verses to justify the killing of the uninvolved bystanders in a religious war bear this out amply.33 So does his 1996 "Declaration of War against the Americans", which provides useful insights into an ideology that draws on radical Salaftsm. In short, SalafIsm is a minoritarian tendency within Islam, whose central features were crystallised in the teachings of a 14th century scholar, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya. The essence of the Salaft ideology is to 3JFor an discussion ofFaraj's ideas on holy war, see Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty, the Creed of Sadat 's Assassins, and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986). 32 Paul Berman, "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror", New York Times Sunday Magazine, March 23,2003; Robert Irwin, "Is This the Man who Inspired Bin Laden", The Guardian, November 1, 200. 33 John C. Zimmerman, "Sayyid Qutb's Influence on the 11 September Attacks", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No.2 (Summer 2004), pp. 238-240. For the English text of bin Laden'sfatwa originally published in af Quds af Arabi, see Bernard Lewis, "License to Kill: Usama bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad", Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 6 (NovemberlDecember 1998), pp. 14-19

11

reform the religion by emulating the generation of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions who are referred to as al-salaf al-salih, (the pious ancestors), whence the name Salaji.34Another salient feature ofSalafism is that war against the Muslim rulers is permissible if they fail in their primary duty to rule according to the shari 'a (Islamic law), as its absence conduces to the pollution of Islam by idolatry. This stance is a significant departure from Sunni political traditions, which prohibit the right to rebel against a Muslim ruler howsoever bad he may be. In contrast, "right to rebel" against a ruler who compromises with Islam is justified by the Shiite traditional teachings, partly due to the injustice done to the House of Ali, the fourth Caliph, and partly, the spiritual political status of the Ulama. 35 In theological terms, Ibn Tamiyya is the main intellectual inspiration for the contemporary jihadists for two reasons: first, his resistance to the Mongol (tatar) invaders and crusaders settlers of his time; second, his willingness to declare the fellow Muslims who did not share his views as infidels.36 The latter is called the act of takfirthat is to judge someone as infidel. Historically, however, the mainstream Salajiyya has been much more concerned with the state of Muslim themselves than with relations between Islam and the outside world. For example, Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the late 1920s, argued that the menace of the West and its supporters in the Muslim Community could only be conquered by the wholesome adoption of Islam and inner renewal. 37 Although the al Qaeda organization of bin Laden grew out of similar religious movement, its prime focus is not the domestic enemy or those fellow Muslim infidels from within the Community, but the external threat represented by the "Zionist-Crusader alliance.,,38 In the interviews and fatwas of bin For a critique of Salafi traditionalism, see Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 96-97.

34

35 Emmanuel Sivan, "Islamic Radicalism: Sunni and Shiite" in E. Sivan and M. Friedman (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Politics in Middle East (New York State University, 1990), pp. 39-46. 36 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), pp. 109-114; Emmanuel Sivan, "Ibn Taymiyya: Father of the Islamic Revolution", Encounter, Vol. 60, No.5 (1983), pp. 34-42. 37 For a detailed discussion of the Organisation and its goals, see Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 44-47.

38 See Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War", Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no.l (January/February, 2002), pp. 23-24.

12

Laden, one can easily see this change in radical Salafi tactics. In fact, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York marked the beginning of a new phase of Islamist terrorism as it moved from internal arena of Muslim states to a global context under the banner of a pan-Islamic jihadi movement Jihad in Islamic Traditions In the Islamic intellectual history, the fundamentalist ideology including that of

radical Salafism has been marginal to and opposed by the mainstream Islamic thought. Contesting the radical interpretation of Islamic theology, the moderate Muslim intellectuals, for instance, insist that jihad essentially denotes a moral and spiritual quest rather than a military or terror campaign. Instructive in this connection is the claim by Khalil Abdel Alim of the American Muslim Mission that, ''jihad does not mean fighting a war; it means struggle for what is required of one in obedience to God.,,39 Likewise, Akbar S. Ahmad contends, "It is the desire to improve oneself, to attempt betterment and to struggle for the good cause. It is Tennysonian in its scope: to strive, to seek and not to yield." 40 The purpose of undertaking jihad, according to Fazlur Rahman, an eminent Islamic scholar "is to establish the Islamic socio-moral order." The Quran, he adds, does not make jihad as 'holy war' an article of faith, a designation that is applicable to the five pillars of Islam. It was the fanatic Karijites (the plural of Khariji, which means seceder) of the early Islamic period who raised jihad to the level of a "sixth pillar" of the faith.41 Although an increasing number of scholarly publications prefer the traditional medieval translation 'holy war', at a purely linguistic level jihad means 'exertion' .42 In fact, neither in Qur'an nor in the Hadiths (the record of Muhammad's sayings and actions) can one

39 Thomas W. Lippman, Understanding Islam: An Introduction to the Muslim World (New York: Mentor Books, 1990), p. 113. 40Akbar

S. Ahmad, Postmodernism and Islam (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 42-43.

Rahman, Islam, n. 37, p. 37. A fanatic Shia faction, the Kharijites had supported fourth Caliph Ali ibnabi-Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law in the famous 'Battle of Camel' at Siffin in 657 against Prophet's young widow Aisha and Muawiyah, the nephew of Ali's predecessor, Uthman and powerful governor of Syria. But, disillusioned with Ali's failure to punish Muawiyah, they assassinated him in Kufa in southern Iraq in 661. They justified their revolt against the Caliph by arguing that a leader who had transgressed Muslim precepts could be considered a non-Muslim. See Will Durant, The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith (New York, 1950), pp. 191-192. 41

42

Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism, n. 16, pp. 54-55.

13

find such expression as holy war, which

III

Arabic would sound like harb-al

muqaddasah.43 Moreover, jihad constitutes only 0.4 per cent of the whole of Qur'an, whereas

hadiths seem to suggest two aspects of jihad: spiritual striving and the fighting for Islam or the cause of Allah. The fonner is categorised by the Muslim scholars as the "greater jihad" (al-jihad al-akbar), the latter as the "lesser jihad" (al-jihad al-asghar), which is also known as the jihad of the sword (jihad hi-al-saif). The greater jihad has been further divided into 'Jihad of the heart", 'jihad of the tongue" and 'jihad of the pen", which together make the jihad a progressive achievement. Only when Islam is threatened and as a last resort, Muslims conduct the Jihad of the sword or the lesser jihad for defense.

44

Thus, from the perspective of the Islamic liberals, jihad is not obligatory upon all Muslims. Nor can it be declared by a single individual or groups claiming to defend the faith since the right to declare jihad belongs to the highest political authority, the Caliph th

(the head of the Community). It is further contended that in the second half of the 8

century, the Arab conquests transformed the concept of jihad into a productive expansionist tool and exalted the duty of jihad in the Islamic traditions. 45 The result was a doctrine in which jihad came to be equated with the 'jihad of swords' and was meant to be applied in the context of Dar aI-Islam (Abode of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (Abode of War).46 All the same, most historical examples have involved the use of jihad by such th

puritanical and revivalist groups as the Kharijites and the Wahhabis of the early19

century Arabia. If the members of the Kharijite sect were the first to turn the fury of their jihad against the established rule in pursuit of a transcendent and extreme idealism, the

43 44

Gabriele Marranei, Jihad Beyond Islam (New York: Berg Publishers, 2006), p 18. Ibid., pp. 21-23.

See Ann K. Lambton, "A Nineteenth C~ntury View of Jihad", Studio Is/amico, Vol. 32 (1970), p. 180; also see Noor Mohammad, "The doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction", Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 3, No.2 (1985), pp. 381-397. 4S

Roxanne L. Euben, "Killing (For) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action", Political Theory, Vol. 30, No.1 (February 2002), p. 13.

46

14

Wahhabi partisans carried on jihad against the "apostates" from within the Community.47 The former unleashed a series of terrorist acts that made life nasty, brutish, and short for many Muslims, while the latter destroyed everything that appeared to them to represent a deviation from authentic Islam, including the tombs in Medina. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Kharijite revolt, as much the Wahhabi legacy of religious zeal, remains an enduring source of inspiration for the present-day militant Islamists. 48 Unlike these ultrazealot puritans for whom jihad was meant primarily to rid the Community of moral laxity and apostasy, various Muslim reform movements active in other parts of the world, particularly South Asia, North Africa and Central Asia employed the institution of jihad to resist the against the encroachment of Western -imperial powers, Britain, France and Russia respectively. Indeed, jihad proved to be a potent technique of mass mobilisation for the liberation efforts of the secular-nationalist leadership during the latter part of the 19th century and the early 20th century.49 In all, Muslims have not shaped their contemporary idea of jihad only through the Qur'an and the Hadiths. The Islamic juridical traditions (fiqh), the history of Ummah (Community of believers), the rise of powerful Muslim states like the Ottoman Empire and the instrumental function of Islam as an expression of protest against imperialism have played a vital role in the fundamental shifting of the meaning of jihad towards holy war. 50 With the widespread Muslim reaffirmation of the duty of jihad, coupled with expressions of Muslim sympathy for al-Qa'ida, a local intra-Afghan conflict has been transformed into the pan-Islamic Jihadi movement under the banner of International Islamic Front for Jihad.

See Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (London: Faber & Faber, 1982), pp. 6067; for a critical assessment of Wahhabism, see Aziz AI-Azmeh, Islam and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), pp.l04-120.

47

Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), pp.l04-109.

48

49 Rudolph Peters, l~lam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (Mouton: The Hague, Paris & New York, 1979). 50

Paul L. Heck, "Jihad Revisited", Journal ofReligious Ethics, Vol. 32, No.1 (2004), pp. 95-128.

15

Characteristics One of the most significant attributes of Islamic fundamentalism is its

pervasiveness. The movement is a trans-national phenomenon; it has been occurring not only in the countries where Muslims are numerically dominant, but also among Islamic minorities in India, Philippines, China and even the Western countries. While its mass base is largely made up of the lower and lower middle classes, it enjoys greater level of support among the upper middle classes and upwardly-mobile groups. Second most striking aspect of the phenomenon is the persistence of tendency towards Islamic regeneration since the Western intrusion into the Dar ai-Islam in the 18th century. "For the first time in history", writes Brown, "Muslim societies and states confronted not just raw alien military superiority (as the Mongols and Tamerlane) and not just the broad challenge of alien civilization that seemed equally attractive and threatening to the true faith.,,51 It was instead a simultaneous military and civilizational challenge that brought a radical change in power relations between the West and the entire Muslim world. While the 1757 Battle ofPlassey, for example, marked the beginning of the decline of Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent, the powerful Ottoman Empire underwent a progressive territorial shrinkage since the signing of the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja with the Tsarist Russia and the Safavid Empire in Iran had split asunder much before the onset of the European penetration the in early 19th century. The powerful impact of European encroachments and Westernisation produced a tripartite Islamic reaction: revivalist, reformist and'radicalist. The revivalist Islam of the 18th and 19th centuries - exemplified by the Wahhabi revolt in Central Arabia, the purification movements of Shah Wali Allah and his son Shah Abdul-Aziz in northern India, Sayyid Ahmad's short-lived Imamate in northwestern India, the Fara'idis movement of Bengal, the Padri movement in Sumatra, and the Sanusiyya order in Libya - conducted a purely internal dialogue, centred on the tenets

51 L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 84.

16

and prescriptions of early Islam. 52 Rather than responding to the external challenges, purging Islam of its medieval· accretions and belief and practices borrowed from other religions (Hinduism, for instance) was the focus of these movements. In contrast, the reformist Islam, as articulated by the Iranian born Muslim thinker Jamal ai-Din alAfghani (1838-97), his closest Egyptian disciple Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and the Indian aristocrat Sayyid Ahmad Khan emerged during the 19th century in the wake of the European supremacy and expansion. 53 Prompted by the external stimuli, by the new Western-based order in ascendance, these modernist Muslim intellectuals directed their efforts to render Islam more applicable to changing environment. They asserted the need to revive the Muslim community through a process of a reinterpretation or reformulation of their Islamic heritage in the light of the contemporary world. 54 Unlike these liberal reformers who tried to modernise Islam to meet the changes and challenges triggered by the increasing Western hegemony, the radical Islamists of the 29th century such as Hassan al-Banna, and Qutb of Egypt and Maududi of Pakistan turned Islam into an instrument to resist the Western hegemony in the Muslim world. Even though Hassan aI-Banna argued for gradual change from within the society, the Muslim Brotherhood he established had become a political force during the 1940s in Egypt involved in acts of violence against the British and in support of the Palestinians against the Zionists. Qutb called for jihad as the method of liberation and overthrow of power to establish the Islamic state, which together with his concept of martyrdom inspired many Islamist groups in West Asia and beyond. 55

Likewise, Maududi referred jihad to

"revolutionary struggle" aimed at wresting control of government from the non-believers and establishing "God's just order in the world." He rejected the modernist view of jihad

52 Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), pp. 29-31. For details on the revivalist group of Islamic movements in 18th and 19th centuries, see Mortimer, Faith and Power, nA8, pp. 64-78.

Known in Arabic literature as the 'Sage of the East', Afghani was the first Muslim to realize clearly that the entire Muslim world, not just part of it, was threatened by the West, a powerful, dynamic entity; and the first to use the concepts 'Islam' and 'the west' as connoting correJatives- and of course antagonistichistorical phenomena. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, 1957), p. 49.

53

54

Esposito, Islam and Politics, n.7, p. 47.

Beverley Milton-Edwards, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, pp; 131-132.

55

17

as merely defensive means while emphasizing the distinctiveness of Islam. For him, the modernists' copying of the western-style progress reflected the "inferiority complex" and would lead to the cultural enslavement of Muslim World by the West. If Muslims were in disarray and vulnerable, it was, he forcefully argued, because of their departure from and non-abidance with Islam. The solution to the plight of Indian Muslims Maududi provided was the creation of a committed vanguard that would bring into existence a righteous community, a salih jama 'at. 56 On the whole, the influence of theses radical Muslim thinkers can be seen "in the two options- evolution of, a process which emphasizes revolutionary change from below, and revolution, the violent overthrow of established systems of govemment.,,57 Third major characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism is its polycentrism, which means the absence of a common centre or the core leadership. Even though the conditions in Islamic societies are largely similar and experiences common to them (the cultural enslavement by the West, or the hegemonic American policies, for instance) have contributed to the radicalisation of Islamist tendency, "the return to Islamic roots has a nativistic and localistic character; at least in part it developed in response to particular conditions existing in different national environments.,,58 In fact, at the early stage of its development, the movement had no single leader charismatic enough to provide focus in terms of spiritual unity and revolutionary activity. Nor did it have any traditional repository of authority to serve as a symbolic focus as did the Sultan-Caliph Abdulhamid

n towards the end of the 19th century leading the pan-Islamic movement. Even Ayatollah Khomeini of post-revolution Iran failed to rally Muslims as it was mainly confmed to the Shi'ite Muslims who make up roughly 15 percent of world's Muslim population. In the later half of the 1990s, Osama bin-Laden was to an extent successful in building up a transnational Islamist movement by bringing together under the banner of International Islamic Front for jihad a diverse range of Islamist groups with the al-Qaeda Brown, Religion and State, n. 52, p. 150; also see Willam E. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology", International Journal o/Middle East Studies, Vol. 19 (1987), pp. 316-317.

56

57

Esposito, The Islamic Threat, n.6, p. 129.

58 "Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict, and the Search for Islamic Alternatives", The Middle Eat Journal, Vol. 34, No.1 (Winter 1980), p. 34.

18

Fundamentalism and Islam

The use of fundamentalism in connection with Islam spread rapidly after Iran's revolution and comparable Muslim movements elsewhere - so much so that by 1990, the

Concise Oxford English Dictionary defmed it not only as "the strict maintenance of traditional Protestant beliefs," but also as "the strict maintenance of ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion, especially Islam. ,,4 By sheer dint of usage, Islamic fundamentalism has become the most cited fundamentalism of all. Journalists, ever on the lookout for a shorthand way to refer things new and unfamiliar, gravitated toward the term fundamentalism, which evoked the anti-modernism that Ayatollah Khomeini seemed to personify. Yet the more popular Islamic fundamentalism became in the media, the more scholars of Islam recoiled from it. Some thought that the term fundamentalism failed to capture the methodology and style of Iran's revolution and comparable Muslim movements. Others argue that its use in the context of Islam could be misleading, because fundamentalist is a Christian term, which denotes certain Protestant churches and organisations, more particularly those that maintain the literal divine origin and inerrancy of the Bible. In this they oppose the liberal and modernist theologians, who tend to be more critical of the scripture. Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur' an, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur'an, are in principle at least fundamentalists in the positive sense of the term. 5 Other scholars, particularly those who sympathise with the new Muslim movements have protested that the label of fundamentalist unfairly stigmatises forwardthinking Muslims. John Esposito, America's foremost apologist for Islam-driven movements, has made this argument against using fundamentalism in an Islamic context. Esposito has added that fundamentalism ''is often equated with political activism, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and anti-Americanism, a prejudgment by label.,,6 Unlike Bernard Lewis, who is prepared to make a concession to widespread usage, Esposito avoids using the term fundamentalism because he views the rise of Islamic

4

Concise Oxford Dictionary o/Current English, 8th rev. cd. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 477.

5 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language 0/ Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 117. 6

John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), P. 8.

3

Oliver Roy has characterised the contemporary fundamentalist leaders as "neofundamentalists", who in contrast to the earlier generation of leaders are more populist activists than religious scholars. "Militants who were previously striving for the Islamic revolution", according to Roy, "are becoming involved in a process of re-Islamisation from below; they preach an individual return to the practices of Islam and, with their prosharia campaign, resemble the traditional fundamentalist mullahs from whom they are

now distinguished only by their intellectual origins, professional insertion in modem society, and involvement in politics.,,61 The populist theme of the "return to Islam" is still just as powerful a motivator. It is more socio-educational than political; while playing the card of political integration. ''This neo-fundamentalism works its way deeply into the society before questioning the state." 62 When conditions permit, they advance under their own banner onto the political scene, forming parties and running for office unlike the strictly fundamentalist or quietist movements such as the associations of ulamas or the Tablighi Jamaat. Inspired by a pietistic movement born in South Asia in 1927, the Jama 'at al-tabligh (Society for the Propagation of Islam) set in motion a programme of

literal imitation of the example of the Prophet Muhammad in order to preserve and spread an Islamic identity in an area overwhelmingly dominated by the Hindus. The preaching of tabligh played an instrumental role in creating homogenous and exemplary communities resistant to any integration that would force Muslims to compromise with the most rigorous forms of Islam in the totality of its meaning. 63 Since the mid-1980s, there has been an observable drift of political Islamism towards a neo-fundamentalism in part because of the receding appeal of the Iranian model and in greater part, the twin state policy of containment and co-optation of the Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. While conservative countries like Saudi Arabia tried to control the Islarnist networks through generous funding, others adopted greater governmental adherence of Islamic law in an attempt to either neutralise

61

Oliver Roy, The Failure ofPolitical Islam (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), p 75.

62

Ibid., p. 76.

63 For further insights into this movement, see Rahman, Islam,n. 37, pp. 109-124; Kepel, Muslim Extremism, n.19, pp. 16·17; Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, n.53, pp. 69-78.

20

the leftist challenge or undennine the credibility of the Islamist opponents.64 All this, according to Roy, accounted for the retreat of political Islamism accompanied by the ascendancy of Islam as a social phenomenon. "If the Islamic society is above all based on the virtue of its members, then individuals and practices must be reformed. The spread of this Islamisation will necessarily lead to an Islamic polity.,,65 "Re-Isamisation" at the grassroots level takes place along two axes: individual reform through preaching and the establishment of Islamised spaces, either in purely spatial tenns (cities; neighbourhoods) or in terms of practical considerations and networks (Islamic banks and self-help societies). The Islamised spaces are replete with mutual help networks that aim at both founding of the "Islamic personality" and meeting societal needs, which the state has long neglected. Once such "Islamised spaces," the equivalent of the "liberated zones" of the liberation movements of yesteryear, are established, neo-fundamentalists endeavour to force the state to confirm its existence, with the idea of later spreading the principles on which it is founded to the whole of society. 66 Contesting, however, the analytical distinction made by Oliver Roy and Gilles Kepel between a revolutionary Islamisation from above and social Islamisation from below in the Muslim world, Francosis Burgat holds that there has been an almost constant coexistence of the two. ''The hypothesis of an initial revolutionary tendency that towards the end of the 1980s reappeared from below', he argues, "supposes that the movements of re-Islamisation from above of the 1960s and 1970s appeared from nowhere, and no religious or social mobilization had previously occurred in the area.'.67 Contrarily, the tactic of Islamisation from below adopted by the fundamentalists has helped them sustain their struggle whether it is pitted against external enemy (Israel in case of the Hamasand Hezbollah) or against authoritarian regime (the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and Jihad Organization and Islamic Jama 'a in Egypt), or directed at

establishing rule in conformity with the sunna (Pakistan's Jamiat - Ulema -i-Islam and Nazib N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 104-109.

64

65

66 67

Roy, The Failure, n. 61, p. 79.

TI-I-1 6 S23

Ibid., pp. 81-82. Burgat, Face to Face, n. 23, p. 54.

21

Jamaat Front in Bangladesh). Stressing the bedrock theme of "Islam is the solution", the

Islamists have forged close links with the community through networks of educational institutions, consumer cooperatives and study circles. The large, organised social base that they have created over the years would not easily succumb to external blows, military or political. The pacifist Tablighi Jamaat, for example, became the precursor of revolutionary Islamism even though its preaching had focused on individual conversions and puritanism. Similarly, many contemporary Islamist factions believe that Islamisation of society is the essential pre-condition of the cultural and political emancipation from what Ali Shari'ati, the leading theoretician of the Iranian Islamic revolution, calls ''westoxification'', which, like pestilence, kills the heart of Islamic sOciety.68 Moreover, popular Islam provides the populace with a :frame of identity and spiritual medium of escape from alienation, what Bassam Tibi calls ''the cultural anomie.'.69 It is characterised by a heightened sense of socio-spiritual religious commitment, more rigorous observance of Islamic practices and a general sense of Muslim fraternity. Although popular Islam is generally passive in political sense, it could become radicalized during the periods of external or internal crisis.70 All this explains why social action continues to be an important field of activity for the Islamists. Strategies and Goals

As noted, fundamentalist Islam has diverse manifestations, elements or components, and contextual historical and societal conditions. It is a multifarious movement with no "Comintern" to serve as an overall command imposing a unified structure and coherent ideology. Although the current wave of Islamic resurgence is marked by the proliferation of Islamist groups, their programmes, strategies and tactics

Ervand Abrahamian, "Ali Shari'ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution", MERlP Reports, (January 1982), pp. 25-28.

68

This refers to the crisis created by the imposition of a modern normative system on the indigenous social setting. Bassam Tibi, "The Renewed Role of Islam in the Politi val and Social Development of the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, v.ol. 37, No.1 (Winter 1983), p.39. For variety and changes in popular Islam ,see Patrick D. Gaffney, "Popular Islam", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 524 (November 1992), pp. 38-51. 69

70 R. Hrair Dekmejain, "Fundamentalist Islam: Theories, Typologies, and Trends", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 39, No.4, p. 30.

22

vary among and within countries. "For all the appearance of a single", writes Halliday, "pan-Islamic current, and the reality of co-operation and inspiration linking these movements, the Islamists varied considerably between countries, depending on the religious, political and social character of each.',71 In brief, politicised Islam is not a monolith; its spectrum is broad. Despite this multiplicity and the particularlist properties of each Islamist group, they share some ideological themes that are heavily influenced by the fundamentalist theoretical constructs provided by such prominent Muslim thinkers and actiyist as Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini. First of all, fundamentalists view Islam more than a 'religion' as in Western secular sense or the mystical interpretation of the Sufis. The faith must be the complete way of life with no separation from aquida wa

Shar'iah (belief and law), din wa-daulah (spiritual and temporal) and din wa-dunya (religion and world). In short, Muslims look towards the Islamic ideology as more than a code governing moral conduct; it instead is a comprehensive corpus of rules and guidelines that address to people's deeds and requirements. Seen from this overarching perspective, the faith has been increasingly seen capable of guiding the adherents in all situations and circumstances provided they are committed to following its teachings. Second, fundamentalists believe that departure from and non-abidance with Islam since its encounter with modernity has led to steady regression and decline of Muslim peoples. They advocate adherence to the original beliefs of the religion in their literal interpretations as fundamental and basic principles, transcending all social, economic, political, and cultural transformations which span a period of 14 centuries. Thus the fundamentalist call for ''the return to Islam" has for over three decades incited political involvement and 4ffect action across the Muslim world to bring about the re-Islamisation of the society and the establishment of nizam Islami (Islamic order) in the world modeled on the Medinian caliphate. 72 Most radical activists still look to the so-called golden age of the four caliphs for inspiration and for guidance on the implementation of an 'authentic' 71 Fred Halliday, "Review Article: The Politics of IsIam- A Second Look", British Journal of Political Sciences, Vol. 25, No.3 (1997), p. 402.

72 Aziz AI-Azmeh, lslams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), pp 97-99; also see Tibi, The Challenge, n. 16, pp. 54-55.

23

and uniquely Islamic form of popular government. While the radical Islamists' insistence on a return to the golden age is a reflection of the desire to emulate the pure practices of that era, it is also as much the outcome of a strategy which intends to place political power in the hands of the religious community. Thus, the 'ulama' under such circumstances come to represent a new (and largely immovable) political class, and one which, by virtue of being deeply tied to the traditions of Islam, enjoy legitimacy for their authority to interpret Islam. 73 Examples now abound in the Muslim world of the ulama using their spiritual authority for political gain. In Iran and Sudan they have done so quite openly, as also in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Afghanistan's Taliban leaders who used their control of Afghanistan in the second half of the 1990s to reject the modern state in its entirely and tie the country's fortunes to the promised land, the myth of a new Islamic caliphate. 74 Third, fundamentalists are united in opposition to modernity partly because it is a legacy of Western colonialism and imperialism. What is more, the fundamentalists find the social modernisation and secularism in particular inimical to Islam, a belief system deemed superior to Western materialism. Ironically, however, the fundamentalists are themselves nothing but a response to modernity. ''The identity of fundamentalism", as Bruce Lawrence has pointed out, "as both a psychological mindset and a historical movement, is shaped by the modem world. Fundamentalists - - - are at once the consequence of modernity and the antithesis of modernism.,,75

Fourth, for

fundamentalists, Western democracy is alien to Islam because the Islamic polity is based on hakimiyya, or divine sovereignty over all creation. In practice this means the supremacy of the shari'a, God's laws, which no person or group can alter or nullify. Thus, all other forms of human governance, such as Western democracy based on majoritarian principles would negate God's authority and command creating conditions comparable to the Jahiliyya of pre-Islamic Arabia. Underlining this basic contradiction, Bernard Lewis has claimed that "Islam is incompatible with liberal democracy as the 73 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Islam, Muslim Polities and Democracy", Democratization, VoUI, No.4 (August 2004), pp, 90-92.

Mark Huband, Warriors of the Prophet; The Stroggle for Islam (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998),pp.1l7-123.

74

75

Lawrence, Defenders of God, ll. I, p. 84.

24

fundamentalists themselves would be first to say: they regard liberal democracy with contempt as a corrupt and corrupting form ofgovernment.»16 Lastly, the core objective of political Islam has changed and changed fundamentally. During the de-colonization phase, Islam, for instance, was used functionally to reach certain goals, which were not immediately derived from Islam itself, and sometimes had nothing to do with it. Islam no longer serves the instrumental function either as a regime challenging (Egypt and Algeria) or regime legitimising ideology (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and Sudan).l1 Nor is it simply a rejection of modernity or a revolt against the universality of Western norms and values. It instead seeks to establish an alternative global order based on the idea of hakimiyyat Allah (God's rule). 18 The fundamentalists' assumptions that the future belongs to Islam are predicated on the belief that the moral bankruptcy within the Western civilization would soon precipitate its collapse and Islam by virtue of its superior capacity and noblest system would lead the whole of humanity.19 In pursuit of this fundamentalist utopia, which in any case entails the risk of

confrontation with the Christian West, acts of violence acquire legitimacy. For, jihad becomes a holy struggle between believers and non-believers and its enemies become satanised, so much so that it forecloses the options for negotiations and compromises. Causation: Culturalist and Contingencist Approaches

Islamic fundamentalism is a complex multi-dimensional phenomenon, which cannot be explained by single factor or sets of factors. Explanation and analysis provided by various scholars and researchers could be broadly divided into two main approaches:

76 Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview," Journal of Democracy, vol. 7 (April 1996), p. 54. 77 Jacques Waardenburg. "Islam as a Vehicle of Protest" in Ernest Gellner (ed.), Islamic Dilemmas (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1985), pp. 24-26. On the "double function" of Islam in politics, see Dwight B. Billings and Shaunna L. Scott, "Religion and Political Legitimation", Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 20 (1994), pp. 173-202.

For a discussion of the struggle between the West and Islam over who will provide the definition to the post-Cold War world order, see John Kelsay, Islam and War: The Gulf War and Beyond (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993), Chap. 5.

78

79 For an evaluation of Islamist discourse, see Salwa Ismail, "Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamism in Egypt", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30 (1998), pp. 199-225

25

cultural essentialist and the contingencist. The main focus of the former is the Islamic exceptional ism, whereas the latter rejects any universal framework and concentrates on the 'contingent' realities (the socio- political situation) that exist in each Islamic country. The adherents of the first include both proponents of true Islam and those in the West known as the 'orientalists' who view the Islamic world essentially different from the rest of the world, in general, and the West, in particular. The essentialists are those who argue that the Islamic world is dominated by a set of relatively enduring and unchanging processes and meaning to be understood through the texts of Islam and language it generates. 80 They, for instance, attribute the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism to Islam's inability to adapt to the modem age, which has left Muslim societies ill prepared and ill equipped to meet the challenges of globalization on their own. 81 According to Myron Weiner, "What is striking about Islamic resurgence is its rejection of much of what is generally regarded as modem in the 19th century: secularism, democracy and even nationalism. In this respect, Islam has come to play quite a different role from that of the religions of modernization -Christianity, Judaism, Confucianism, Shintoism, even Buddhism and Hinduism. Each of these religions, in its own way, has been interpreted or reinterpreted so as to induce people to modernization, or to function alongside of, without impeding, modern behaviour, yet to provide personal comfort, a sense of continuity with one's past, and group identity.,,82 Central to the culturalist approach is, however, the argument that in comparison with other major religions of the world, Islam is a political religion per excellence. It has from the very beginning united and governed the community of believers as a political religion. Unlike the founder of Christianity, who was crucified and whose followers saw their religion made the official faith of the Roman Empire only after centuries as a persecuted minority, Prophet Mohammed founded a state during his lifetime, and as ruler he collected taxes, dispensed justice, promulgated laws, commanded armies, and made 80

Halliday, "Review Article", n. 71, pp. 400-401.

81 See Bernard Lewis,What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (London: Phoenix, 2002).

Myron Weiner, "Political Change: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East" in M. Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p. 60. 82

26

and groups within the broader fundamentalist revival with a specific political agenda, "Islamists" are Muslims with political goals. However, there are Islamists who operate outside the legal framework and espouse violence to achieve their aims are properly called extremists. As Islamism gained currency, it too became associated with benighted extremism, from the Taliban to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, culminating in the mega-terror of Osama bin Laden. Critics of Islamism have found it easy to add Islamism to the list of dangerous twentieth century "isms" that has defied the liberal West and gone down to defeat. "Islamism Is Fascism" - thus ran the headline of an interview with analyst Daniel Pipes. Islamism is the New Bolshevism" - thus went the headline of an op-ed column by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 22 The entry of Islamism into common English usage has not improved the image of these movements and paradoxically made it easier to categorise them as threats of the first order. As the Muslim equivalent of fascists or Bolshevists, they are clearly marked as the enemies of democracy and freedom. Ultimately, of course, the problem of these movements is not what they are called; it is what they do. As long as these movements continue to spawn, nurture, or tolerate the most violent forces in contemporary world, they would bring stigma to whatever term is applied to them. Jihadism/Jihadi Islam On the whole, the debate over usage in the West has borne little relationship to the

parallel debate in the Muslim world over what to call the new Islamic movements. The arguments on behalf of various Arabic, Persian, and Urdu terms are a topic that deserves its own treatment, based on other sources. From time to time, leaders of the new movements generally follow the lead of their Western sympathisers in rejecting the use of "fundamentalism." To all intents and purposes, however, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism have become synonyms in contemporary Western usage. Since the September 22 Eric Boehlert, "Islamism Is Fascism: An Interview with Daniel Pipes," Sa/on. com, November 9, 2001 at http://www.danielpipes.orglarticle/81; Margaret Thatcher, "Islamism Is the New Bolshevism," The Guardian, February I 2 2002. In the body of the article, Thatcher did not use the term "Islam ism." "Islamic extremism today, like Bolshevism in the past, is an armed doctrine," she wrote. "It is an aggressive ideology promoted by fanatical, well-armed devotees. And, like communism, it requires an all-embracing long-term strategy to defeat it."

8

differences: church and organic religions; historical and ahistorical religions. 86 Islam fits into the category of "Organic religions", in part because of the absence of an autonomous religious organisation. More importantly, religious and political functions - what is God's and what is Caesar's - are not differentiated in the organic religions. "God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual and temporal authority have been a prevailing dualism in Western culture." In contrast, Huntington has contended, "In Islam God is Caesar.,,87 It is this fusion of religious and secular authorities that has turned Islam not merely a political religion, but also produces a political culture that can neither accommodate pluralism nor tolerate dissent. "Islamic civilization" according to Bernard Lewis, "has produced a wealth of theological, philosophical, and juridical literature on virtually every aspect of the state, its powers, and its functions. What is not discussed to any great extent is the difference between religious and temporal powers. The words for 'secular' and 'secularism' in modem Islamic languages are either loanwords or neologisms: 88 Thus, the only way that secularism can be kept alive in the Islamic world is by local Muslim dictatorship, supported by Western powers. Many Islamists already view the democratisation as a ploy to weaken Islam, just as the intrusion of Western materialism together with the modem nationalism and secularism has caused the degeneration of Islam today. For the fundamentalists, nationalist particularism is the negation of Islamic universalism and inhibits the unity of the Umma. Interestingly, even those Islamists who have been able to take advantage of pluralistic structures in various Muslim countries to gain access to levers of power are averse to diversity of political opinion. Their devotion to democratic principles can be expressed by the aphorism: "One man, one vote, one time. ,,89 In brief, it is argued that if democracy deficit in the Muslim societies accounts for the exponential growth of religious fundamentalism, it has its roots in Islam's fusion of divine revelation and state power.

86

Donald Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 7-8.

87 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o/Civilization and the Remaking o/the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 70.

88

Quoted in Ibid., p. 62.

89

M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism", World Politics, Vo. 55 (October 2002). pp. 4-35.

28

The prevalence of autocracies, according to the culturalists, is the product of the dominant political tradition of command and obedience. According to Bernard Lewis, one of the most prominent proponents of this view, medieval Islamic jurists, seeking to stave off the periodic revolts which marred early Islamic history (or, more plausibly, please the sultans at whose whim they served), decreed that obedience to political rulers, even unjust ones, was a religious duty - hence the famous admonition of Al-Ghazali: "Better one hundred years of the Sultan's tyranny than one year of the people's tyranny over each other." As a result, writes Bernard Lewis, "the political experience of the Middle East under the caliphs and sultans was one of almost unrelieved autocracy, in which obedience to the sovereign was a religious as well as a political obligation, and disobedience a sin as well as a crime. ,,90 Because Muslims often consider the early traditions of Islam to be part of the original message of revelation, they typically look to the way Muslims lived in the past rather than attempt to construct new ways based on both the original teachings of Islam and the realities of modem life. Although the meaning of Islam cannot be limited to the perceptions of Muslims or equated with their practices, neither can it be understood separately from these perceptions and practices.91 As a result of this political tradition, quietism is said to have become more or less an article of faith in Islam. The Muslim, according to G. E. von Grunebaum, "deeply feels man's insignificance . . . and the omnipotence of the uncontrollable power above him," and is therefore "more readily prepared than the Westerner to accept the accomplished fact.,,92 The absence of institutionalised channels of political participation always makes it easier for underground radical movements to gain support from disaffected sectors of the populations. Oppression by secular authoritarian regimes naturally enhances the attractiveness of untried Islamist rule as an alternative. After all, Islam, unlike Buddhism is, for instance, a historical religion, wherein history is viewed as divinely ordained. As Smith has contended, history is important for 90

Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p.48

91

Laith_Kubba, "Recognizing Pluralism", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No.2 (1996), p. 87.

92 G.E. von Grunebaum, Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a CulturaJ Tradition (New York: Barnes & Noble, 196 I), p. 70.

29

revealed religions, particularly Islam, because human institutions and relationship both within the community and outside have theological significance. Nothing better illustrates this concern with history than the adoption of A, D. 622, which is the year of Prophet Muhammad's Hijra from Mecca to Medina, as the beginning of the Muslim calendar. With the onset of the Western domination of the Islamic world in the 18th century, Islam has faced a serious spiritual crisis so eloquently described by Wilfred Cantwell Smith: The fundamental malaise of modem Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modem Muslims is how to reestablish that history: to set it going in full vigour, so that Islamic society may once gains flourish as a 93 divinely guided society should and must.

The nature of Islam as an "historical" and an "organic" religion makes it politically salient to be used either as a regime-challenging instrument or as regimelegitimising ideology in the authoritarian states. In other words, Islam is simply the vehicle and coinage of the struggle between the state and its challengers. In countries ruled by military junta such as Pakistan under Zia UI-Haq and Bangladesh under Zia urRehman in the early 1980s, Islam serves the instrumental function as the purveyor of legitimacy, while in the oil-rich Arab countries it represents the higher idea of state or the constitutive element of state identity. The oil boom of the 1970s was more than simply a politically pacifying factor (through distribution of revenues to appease larger sections of population) for the conservative Gulf monarchies; it provided the ground for constructing a new ideology to counteract the intrusive Pan-Arabism. Labelled as "petro-islam", it derives from the premise that "it is not merely an accident that oil is concentrated on the thinly populated Arabian countries rather than in the densely populated Nile Valley or Fertile Crescent, and that this apparent irony of fate is indeed a grace and a blessing from God that should be solemnly acknowledged and lived up to.,,94 An important ideological function of petro-Islam was to promote Muslim universalism, a safer doctrine than the geographically more limited but politically more troublesome idea of Pan-Arabism. It was in pursuit of this ideal that the leading Gulf States directed a substantial portion of

93

Smith, Islam, n. 54, p. 47.

94 Nazhi N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), p. 232.

30

their bilateral and multilateral aid towards the non-Arab states with large Muslim population through internal charity organisations, notably the Rabita-e-Alam-e-Islami, and trans-national bodies like the Organisation oflslamic Conference (OIC).95 Contigencist Factors

The Culturalist arguments are intellectually constrained by the old orientalist arguments that freeze cultures into unchanging essences; they also disconnect Muslims from their larger Third World global contexts.96 The mass appeal of Islamism as an ideology has its roots in secular circumstances even though they have been given a religious expression. Islamic fundamentalism is not a single idea; it has been articulated in response to historical phenomena as diverse as colonialism, the creation of nationstates, the process of modernization and Western political and economic hegemony.97 It is thus a product of a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. The first refers to the symptoms of the society in crisis (gross mal-distribution of political power, culture of corruption, mass unemployment, and chaotic urbanization). The second is related to the developments outside, notably the process of globalisation and Western politicocultural penetration spawning deep sense of alienation or marginalisation. Lacking political legitimacy, the ruling elite in many Muslim countries tends to deploy Islamic symbols and themes either for the purpose of legitimation or to discredit those hostile to the regime. Ultimately, the failure of modernisation policies has underscored the bankruptcy of the alien schemes and turned Muslims inward in search of indigenous ways of life and governance. 98 Despite all the modern ideologies that have been tried and found wanting, Islam remains the source of cultural authenticity and national identity for most Muslims. Aswini K. Mohapatra. "Accounting for Religious Terrorism", Journal ojContemporary Asia &Europe, Vol. 1, No.1 (January-June 2004), pp. 58-60, On the linkage between the oil boom of the 1970s and the growth of political Islam, see Daniel Pipes, In the True Path oj God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic Books, 1983), Chap. 2 & 3. 95

Anouar Majid, Unveiling Traditions: Postcolonial Islam in Polycentric World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), p. 7.

96

97 Jillian Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?" SAIS Review, Vol. 20, No.2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 1-17.

98 See the study by Tamara Sonn, Between Quran and Crown: The Challenge oj Political Legitimacy in the Arab World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), pp.l-29.

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Without question, the pervasiveness of the Islamic cultural fiber in the life of Muslims makes it an integral part of their national-self definitions. In fact, the ideologies of nationalism, socialism and socialism imported from the 19th century Europe never penetrated the deeper instincts of the Muslim masses. On the contrary, the process of modernisation initiated by the acculutured nationalist elite in post-independence years was seen as synonymous with de-Islamisation. By jettisoning institutions deemed as ''premodern" or potentially "anti-modem" even if they were part of the fabric of social identity, the nationalist elites tried to construct a new identity in which the religious discourse was increasingly disarticulated from hegemonic institutions. According to a critic, it increasingly "shifted towards the popular field formulating another oppositional narrative: an Islamic discourse which constructed Westernistlmodernist acts and

•

interventions and reforms by state as the symbol of a loss of faith and authenticity."

99

Central to this oppositional discourse is that Islamism is not a counterculture; it is a reaffirmation of an existing old culture. The ascendancy of the West represents a cultural-ideological invasion, or a new imperialism, which only Islam can combat. In the face of this onslaught, the fundamentalists stand fast against "cultural surrender" and "identity betrayal."lOO As aptly pointed out by Famcois Burgat, The sound of 'Praise be to God' rising from the mosques reflects not only ejection of the West, but also of the elites which are 'secular', which, according to Islamist logic, means hostility to the endogenous normative and symbolic system and, should the claim fit, corrupt and despotic, accused of prolonging the domination of the West. IOI

In any case, the post-independence leadership, secular or otherwise, failed to deliver on

their promises of national strength, socio-economic development and political freedom. Instead, they spawned authoritarian, repressive structure that stifled civil society, thwarted individual initiatives and nurtured bureaucratic inertia that resulted in undermining the regime legitimacy and widening the state-society gulf.

99 Mahmuit Mutman, "Under the Sign of Orientalism: The West vs. Islam", Cultural C1itique, Vol. 23 (Winter 1992-1993), pp.182-183. 100

See A. G. Noorani, Islam and Jihad: Prejudice versus Reality (London: Zed Books, 2002), p. 44.

101

Burgat, Face to Face, n. 23, p. 52.

32

reform the religion by emulating the generation of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions who are referred to as al-salaf al-salih, (the pious ancestors), whence the name Salaji.34Another salient feature ofSalafism is that war against the Muslim rulers is permissible if they fail in their primary duty to rule according to the shari 'a (Islamic law), as its absence conduces to the pollution of Islam by idolatry. This stance is a significant departure from Sunni political traditions, which prohibit the right to rebel against a Muslim ruler howsoever bad he may be. In contrast, "right to rebel" against a ruler who compromises with Islam is justified by the Shiite traditional teachings, partly due to the injustice done to the House of Ali, the fourth Caliph, and partly, the spiritual political status of the Ulama. 35 In theological terms, Ibn Tamiyya is the main intellectual inspiration for the contemporary jihadists for two reasons: first, his resistance to the Mongol (tatar) invaders and crusaders settlers of his time; second, his willingness to declare the fellow Muslims who did not share his views as infidels.36 The latter is called the act of takfirthat is to judge someone as infidel. Historically, however, the mainstream Salajiyya has been much more concerned with the state of Muslim themselves than with relations between Islam and the outside world. For example, Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the late 1920s, argued that the menace of the West and its supporters in the Muslim Community could only be conquered by the wholesome adoption of Islam and inner renewal. 37 Although the al Qaeda organization of bin Laden grew out of similar religious movement, its prime focus is not the domestic enemy or those fellow Muslim infidels from within the Community, but the external threat represented by the "Zionist-Crusader alliance.,,38 In the interviews and fatwas of bin For a critique of Salafi traditionalism, see Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 96-97.

34

35 Emmanuel Sivan, "Islamic Radicalism: Sunni and Shiite" in E. Sivan and M. Friedman (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Politics in Middle East (New York State University, 1990), pp. 39-46. 36 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), pp. 109-114; Emmanuel Sivan, "Ibn Taymiyya: Father of the Islamic Revolution", Encounter, Vol. 60, No.5 (1983), pp. 34-42. 37 For a detailed discussion of the Organisation and its goals, see Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 44-47.

38 See Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War", Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no.l (January/February, 2002), pp. 23-24.

12

enemy camp.,,103 In fact, the Islamic discourse has become so pervasive that even secular Muslim nationalists have invoked Islamist themes such as jihad (holy war) and iman (faith) in the struggle against the Western powers. But the use of religious idioms by nationalists should not be surprising; there has always been a strain of religious fervor in the many strands of political discourse in the entire Muslim world. Above all, Islamic fundamentalism is more a response to economic conditions than a desire to build a theocracy. The fact that it has flourished since the 1980s is an indication of the parallel socioeconomic crises in many Muslim-dominated countries, crises that exemplify for their victims the failure of modernisation. One such component of modernisation, education, turned out not to be the key to opportunities in the context of limited economics. The spread of education only swelled the ranks of unemployed and underemployed graduates in economies that offered few opening outside the bloated public sector. The waves of educated young people flooding into a saturated job market every year face a bleak present and an even bleaker future. Another component of modernisation, urbanisation, was fueled by spiraling population growth and rural migration. The deterioration and suffocation of urban life were inevitable. Further, the pull of the city for deprived millions in the countryside created"ruralised" enclaves within city confmes, changing the nature of cohesion and collectivity in many ways. One way was to transfuse village religious tradition and conservative ethos into the new setting. Cities now are mega-centers with few of their former positive cosmopolitan characteristics. But most distressing and dangerous are the immense and inexorably growing pools of angry surplus labor, and desperate people trying to extract an existence from nothingness. The masses of the migrant poor are kept "out" economically and politically. Their despondence, uprootedness, alienation, and traditional conservatism make for almost total susceptibility to the radical Islamic appeal. The fundamentalists translate their grievances, frustrations, and aspirations into language that is intelligible to them: the language of Islam. 104

103

Ayubi, Political Islam. n. 49, pp. 103-104.

Bruce Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam beyond Violence (Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 132-139.

104

34

Another component of modernisation, economic growth, especially during the oil boom of the 1970s, had induced structural imbalances and economic disequilibrium: a burgeoning public sector and increasing disparities in wealth. Most of the growth has been in the service sector of the economy, especially government services, and consumerrelated industries. This has worked to the detriment of agricultural and industrial expansion, which has lagged behind in most Arab countries. Equally consequential, the political and social structures in most of these counties along with the expanding population are not conducive to a more equitable distribution of income. Rather, the gulf between the beneficiaries of grow, the few, and those who are left out, the many, has grown ever wider, making for a greater polarization of the societies. In the end, rising expectations that accompanied the onset of modernisation have been crushed by harsh socioeconomic realities leading to what has been dubbed by critics as a "lost generation."I05 Caught between an uncertain future and the lure of the past, they constitute a chief recruitment pool for the Islamic movements. The swelling legions of malcontents among the young educated members of the middle and lower-middle classes have joined forces with the impoverished masses. The Islamic activists took up the cause of the poor and those with no "connections," articulating their demands. The lure of Islamism will persist so long as there exists the visible reasons for disquietude and chances are that the fundamentalists will press on with the injection of their moral vision into the world's business for it is implicit in their conception of Islam as a just, moral order that they carry on the struggle. All of the above factors have stimulated the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism. That Islamists have become assertive in Muslim countries as varied as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan and Bangladesh shows how pervasive their activism has become in political life. The psychological distance between the elite and the masses tends to create on unhealthy tend in politics and the social structure. The elites subscribed to the above mentioned views while the masses remain distant from them and susceptible to religious sloganeering, appeal to religious symbols and 105 Eric Davis, "Islamic Radicalism in Egypt" in S.Atjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 143-147. See also Michael M. Fisher, "Islam, and the Revolt of the Petty Bourgeoisie," Daedalus, Vol. III (1982), pp. 1-25.

35

leadership in the periphery.lo6 Although Islamic radicalism emerged as a reaction against colonialism, it gained momentum in the early 1970s partly due to the failure of the secular nationalist governments to measure up to the popular expectations and in greater part, the external set-backs, notably the Arab defeat in the 1967 June War against Israel and Pakistani defeat in 1971 war. Consequently, "Islamist movements are stronger not in traditional Islamic states like those of the Arabian Peninsula but in countries that have been disillusioned with westemised governments."I07 In some ways, Islamic radicalism as a modem political movement has more in common with other non-Islamic movements than with the Islamic intellectual traditions of the past. The socio-economic dislocations created by the process of modernisation generated a degree of discontent that was manifested in Islamic radicalism. However, the intensity and efficacy of such radicalism has depended on material and institutional capabilities of individual states. This is what in precise explains why the Islamist militancy poses a greater threat in countries like Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan and Bangladesh than in Jordan Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The masses, feeling threatened by the march of international capitalism and westernisation of their cultures and ways of life, feel exposed and, in response, criticise their own leaders for failing to deliver on their promises, attack them for their lack of accountability and transparency and for failing to follow the true teachings of Islam as the best way of protecting Muslims against their western neo-colonial enemies led by the United States (the 'Great Satan'). In this context, Islam is for some the liberator, for not only does it show the way of the struggle against the 'infidels' but it also points to a way of reconstructing Muslim societies.. Islam is seen as the solution for many of the problems besetting the Muslim world and also as the means of liberation from centuries of subservience. The Green Peril

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, pundits and policymakers touted fundamentalism-the Islamic "Green Peril"-as the principal threat to the so-called new 106 Charles. E. Butterworth, "Political Islam: The origins" Annals, AAPSS, Vol. 5-4, (Novemberl992), pp.36-37.

107 Nikki R. Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism", Comparative Study of Society and History, Vol. 36, No.3 (July 1994), p. 486.

36

world order. Contrary to the western fear of an Islamic threat, Francis Fukiyama has described the Islamic resurgence as a passing phase which would loose the popularity if and when liberal democracy strikes roots in the Muslim societies. lOS Introduction of democratic traditions would broaden the popular participation which would satisfy the political aspiration of the Islamists. Secondly, in the democratic selections if the Islamists come to power it would be difficult for them to provide as alternative socio-economic model to redress the popular grievances. This is glaringly evident in countries like Iran and Sudan, because the Islamists do not have a socio-economic blue-print. As Oliver Roy's study has revealed that in contrast to the earlier generation of leadership, the new leaders are political opportunists. They lack miserably any coherent view as regards the issue of re-organising society in the late 20th century; leave alone an alternative economic model, as a substitute to full market economy. He has also noted that Islamic movements have been taken over by a group of frustrated, half-educated youth who Roy has described as "lumpen-intellegensia", the activity of whom is now evident in the assassination of secular intellectuals and the violence against women .. 109 The increasing numbers of Islamists who adhere to a modem interpretation of Islam form a loose-knit group with little chance of making an impact in the short term. The long term is a diffet:'Cnt matter, however. Given time, these Islamists could become a stabilising and constructive force with great capacities for developing public institutions and modernizing Muslim societies. Although liberal Islamists are part of the mainstream of the Islamic movement, their presence has not yet been institutionalised. They receive neither support from governments nor endorsement from the traditional or radical political groups. Traditionalists see them as "Westernised, It radicals see them as "compromised," and authoritarian rulers see them as "dangerous."

110

Islamic fundamentalism, according to Graham Fuller "is historically inevitable, but politically tenable." Elaborating on this, he optimistically holds the view that opening up of the political system would prove to be more effective than suppressing and

108

F. Fukuyama, The end of History and the Last Man (New York: Harmittos, 1992). Pp. 19-21.

109

Roy, The Failure, n. 61, pp. 34-36.

110

Laith Khubba, "Recognizing Pluralism", Journal of Democracy• Vol. 7, No. 2{ April 1996), p. 88.

37

containing Islamic fundamentalists. For suppression, he notes "generally serves to strengthen the radicalism of Islamist and to increase their appeal to citizenry."

III

oppressed

Thus the issue here is not limiting the idea or political expression of

Islam per se but containing and eliminating the Islamic extremism in Muslim societies. In the long run, Fuller adds, the Islamic fundamentalism even represents ultimate political progress towards greater democracy and popular government. To counter the Islamic threat the existing political regime should concentrate on democratising society. For the real

democracy to take roots, there has to be a

cordial relation between a state and civil society. The maturation of civil society would provide strength to democracy by resisting the state's attempt to encroach on issue of human rights, oppression of dissidents and freedom of expression. Civil society would encourage the tolerance and respect for diversity or what is called the pluralism. True, democracy will open the political process providing the Islamists with a new avenue through which they would pursue their political agenda It is also true that democratisation in Muslim countries would sow the seeds of its own demise by giving the fundamentalists the handle to monopolise the political discourse and possibly take over power. As a result, the fear of Islamists' electoral success has led to ambivalent responses to Muslim societies' experiment with political pluralism. Policy-makers and academicians have either ignored the popular aspirations or tacitly approved the state crack-downs and even military coups. However, democracy may prove to be far more resilient than the challenge the Islamists pose to the state. Democracy instead could be the best means of containing the Islamist challenge. At a closer examination, the Jammat-i-Islami 9f Pakistan is, for instance, far less threatening than its rhetoric, which calls for an Islamic revolution and creation of an Islamic state in Pakistan. Participation in political process can do more to tame· the Islamist threat than the state repression. Exclusion is likely to radicalise it, reproducing the experience of the Iranian revolution, whereas participation is likely to constrict the

I"

Graham. E. Fuller, Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Tier Countries: An Integrative View (Rand research study, 1991), pp. 41,42.

38

growth of the Islamist forces in Muslim societies. II2 Ironically, the opponents try to divert public attention through state-sponsored IsIamisation, which creates conditions conduce to the surge of Islamic militancy and jihadi terrorism, as in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Where the Islamists have failed to capture state power, their focus has shifted to the public life of individual Muslims to bring about the re-Islamisation from below. The process is facilitated by the fact that Islam at the level of masses provides a frame of reference for their collective identity and a symbol of self assertion. In summation, Islamic fundamentalism is not homogeneous, since it is not like the

communist movement fighting a common global issue. It is a multifarious movement with diverse manifestations, components, and contextual historical and social conditions. Even the programmes, strategies and tactics of Islam groups vary among and within countries, as do their sometimes contending ideologies. The phenomenon, therefore, has to be studied in the specific context of the process of social change and social structures in relation to the changing external milieu. Regardless of their particularistic properties, all Islamist groups share some common denominators as they draw on key assumptions of themes such as the need for liberating mankind from the state of Godless jahiliyya and establishment of an Islamic order for the actualisation of Muslim life. Whether it is the decrees of fugitive Saudi financier Osma bin Laden or political agenda of the Pakistani lamaat-i-Islami and its counterpart in Bangladesh, all point to identical goals and unity of pmpose though they differ on strategies. Despite their cultural-linguistic differences, Islamists in Pakistan and Bangladesh have identity of views on issues.. Besides, Islam has also served in both countries the instrumental function for legitimation as well as consolidation of military regime apart from promoting nationalist sentiments vis-a-vis India. Yet another important characteristic that the fundamentalist movements share in all Muslim countries is their identical social base for recruitment: the lower middleclass comprising mainly the petty traders, the school teachers and the shopkeepers, whether it is in Pakistan or Bangladesh, they are the most fervent supporters of fundamentalist

112 S. V. R. Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism", Political Science Quarterly (PSQ), Vol.29 (Summer 1995), pp. 262-285.

39

movements. Furthermore, the fundamentalist organisations aided by the ''petro-dollars'' from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States in the wake of the oil boom established an impressive social infrastructure, which help them in offering a political alternative. l13 The lamaat-I-Islami of Bangladesh has, for instance, launched a good number of private schools, hospitals, publishing fIrms, socio cultural organisations and various other nonprofIt welfare societies. More than half of the fmances from Saudi Arabia have been directed to produce a new generation who would be the flag-bears of Wahhabi fundamentalism. In Pakistan, likewise, the roots of Islamist extremism lie in the radical

interpretation of theology promoted by and circulated through educational net-works supervised by the clergy. Over thirty thousand Islamic madrassas (religious seminaries) in Pakistan continued to preach a narrow and violent version of Islam, and many of them in the course of a protracted intra-Afghan war became the supply-line for jihad. Regardless of whether the fundamentalists fIght elections or boycott them, accept the democratic system or reject it, they remain a force to reckon with both in politics and society. Role of Islam, however, varies depending on the nature of the society, the structure of the polity and more importantly, their diverse experience in the historical process of state formation. With a broader overview of the phenomenon in the backdrop, this study sets out to examine the factors that have contributed in varying degrees to the fundamentalist upsurge in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and its socio-political implications. Apart from addressing such critical issues as the causal connection between the crisis of legitimacy and the rise of political Islam, and the function of regional and global developments in facilitating Islamic fundamentalism, the study also makes an attempt to highli.ght similarities and differences between the two countries in terms of Islamists' goals and objectives, strategy and methods. The present study proceeds on the following hypotheses:

Mark Huband, Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp.2-22; also see Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds.), Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report (New York: 1. B. Tauris, 1999), Chap. 2 & 5. 113

40

---- Regional/global developments and external linkages have played a greater role in the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan than Bangladesh; ---- Even though Islamist groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh share common organisational features, the circumstances (the context) that give rise to them and that motivate their actions vary widely from one setting to another; ideological ----Whereas in Bangladesh the fundamentalists encounter political and challenge from the secular nationalists, the conflict in Pakistan is centred on which variety of Islam - liberal/reformist or orthodox - should constitute the ideological basis of the Republic.

41

CHAPTER I

ISLAMISATION IN PAKISTAN FROM ISLAMIC REPUBLIC TO ISLAMIC STATE

Islamisation is a process, which involves a gradual transformation of state identity and polity and to an extent society oriented towards Islam. It is the product of the interplay between the structural (social, political and economic) conditions on the hand and the politicised version of the Islamic history on the other. In the case of Pakistan, the state-sponsored Islamisation processis is in a way organically linked to the basic problem pertaining to the state ideology and its identity. This has it roots in the conflict between the liberal and orthodox Islamic views that reside in the independence struggle for Pakistan. For the former, the ideology of Pakistan was not Islam, but rather the belief that Muslims and Hindus were intrinsically too different. It was Muslim nationalism, which became the vehicle for the achievement of Pakistan. But for the latter, the basis of Pakistan was Islam. Thus the ambiguity surrounding the role of Islam in the affairs of the state has left the field open for the adventurist rulers to resort to its absolutist interpretations either to legitimise their usurpation of power or to cover up their failings. A bulk of this chapter will discuss the historical process of state formation in Pakistan in an attempt to examine the national ideological ambiguity and explain as to how Zia ulHaq exploited this to consolidate his regime and set off the Islamisation process impacting all facets of state and society. The dream of a separate homeland for Muslims of the sub-continent led to the birth of Pakistan in 1947. For the Muslims, the political self-determination was an escape route from competitive Hindu compatriots. The entire movement for a separate state gathered momentum in the 1940s when differences between the Congress and Muslim League's approach towards Great Britain's plans to initiate responsible government and later independence of India became glaring and even incompanble. The All India Congress analysed the constitutional problems on economic lines and believed that the struggle for independence would result in politico-economic emancipation of the masses.' The 20th March 1940 Ramgarh session of the Congress, for instance, declared, "Britain is carrying on the war (World War II) fundamentally for imperialist ends and for the preservation and strengthening of her Empire which is based on the exploitation of

I Ziaul Haque, "Pakistan and Islamic Ideology", in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), Pakistan the Roots ofDictatorship (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 373.

43

the people of India as well as of other Asiatic and African countries ....,,2 In contrast, the approach of the Muslim League was based on the two nation theory, and articulation of the great cultural divide between Hindus and Muslims. Muhammad Ali Jinnah in the Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1940 March categorically stated: Islam and Hinduism are two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. Muslim and Hindus neither intermarry nor inter-dine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their outlooks on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different epics, different heroes and different episodes ... To yoke together two such nations under a single state - one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction ... Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu raj ... 3

The build up to the communal consciousness, however, owes its roots to much later date in history. The fall of the Mughal rule and the rise of the colonial power had a psychological blow to the Muslims who could not come to tenns with the loss of their historic conqueror's status. The renowned Sufi scholar Shah Waliullah was, for instance, so disturbed by the disintegration of Muslim power that he sent a provoking letter to the Afghan King Ahmad Shah Abdali to save Muslims from further distress. He wrote: -the Muslim community is in a pitiable condition. All control of the machinery of government is in the hands of the Hindus, because they are the only people who are capable and industrious wealth and prosperity are concentrated in their hands, while the share of Muslims is nothing but poverty and misery .... At this time you are the only king who is powerful, far sighted and capable of defeating the enemy forces. Certainly it is incumbent upon you to march to India, destroy Maratha domination and rescue weak and old Muslims from the clutches of non-Muslims. If God forbid, domination by infidels continue, Muslims will forget Islam and there will be nothing left to distinguish them from non-Muslims.4

It may be noted that the Sufi scholar launched the campaign to rid Islam of its

Hindu "accretions" in order to preserve the exclusive character of Muslims of the subcontinent Similar movements emerged in East Bengal around the same time (1831) popularly known as the Faraizi movement. The Faraizis were juristically Hanaji, they 2 C.H. Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1958-1947: Select Documents (London: OUP, 1962), pp.338-39.

lamiluddin Ahmad., Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah, vol. I (Lahore: Ashraf, 1960), pp. 176-180; also see "March 23, 1940: The Lahore Resolution", Pakistan Times, March 23,2005 at

3

http://pakistantimes.netl2005/03123/specailreport.htm Khaliq Ahmed Nizami, ed., Shah Waliullah Ke Siyasi Maktuba (Aligarh, 1951), quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed., Pakistan The Formative Phase, (London: OUP, 1968), p. 4.

4

44

Oliver Roy has characterised the contemporary fundamentalist leaders as "neofundamentalists", who in contrast to the earlier generation of leaders are more populist activists than religious scholars. "Militants who were previously striving for the Islamic revolution", according to Roy, "are becoming involved in a process of re-Islamisation from below; they preach an individual return to the practices of Islam and, with their prosharia campaign, resemble the traditional fundamentalist mullahs from whom they are

now distinguished only by their intellectual origins, professional insertion in modem society, and involvement in politics.,,61 The populist theme of the "return to Islam" is still just as powerful a motivator. It is more socio-educational than political; while playing the card of political integration. ''This neo-fundamentalism works its way deeply into the society before questioning the state." 62 When conditions permit, they advance under their own banner onto the political scene, forming parties and running for office unlike the strictly fundamentalist or quietist movements such as the associations of ulamas or the Tablighi Jamaat. Inspired by a pietistic movement born in South Asia in 1927, the Jama 'at al-tabligh (Society for the Propagation of Islam) set in motion a programme of

literal imitation of the example of the Prophet Muhammad in order to preserve and spread an Islamic identity in an area overwhelmingly dominated by the Hindus. The preaching of tabligh played an instrumental role in creating homogenous and exemplary communities resistant to any integration that would force Muslims to compromise with the most rigorous forms of Islam in the totality of its meaning. 63 Since the mid-1980s, there has been an observable drift of political Islamism towards a neo-fundamentalism in part because of the receding appeal of the Iranian model and in greater part, the twin state policy of containment and co-optation of the Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. While conservative countries like Saudi Arabia tried to control the Islarnist networks through generous funding, others adopted greater governmental adherence of Islamic law in an attempt to either neutralise

61

Oliver Roy, The Failure ofPolitical Islam (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), p 75.

62

Ibid., p. 76.

63 For further insights into this movement, see Rahman, Islam,n. 37, pp. 109-124; Kepel, Muslim Extremism, n.19, pp. 16·17; Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, n.53, pp. 69-78.

20

cultural nature. Sir Sayeed's western outlook and campaign for English education among Muslims stemmed from his realisation of the futility of resisting the powerful colonial state. The motive behind pushing Muslims towards learning English and western science was to bring them on par with Hindus who were the first beneficiaries of English education and to convince his folks about the rationality in Islam, in the absence of which it was difficult to command their love and loyalty to their faith. 1O In short, Sir Sayeed opted for a reconciliation strategy as much to avoid antagonising the colonial masters as to prevent further marginalisation of his community in the sub-continent. The efforts of Sir Sayeed Ahmed Khan resulted in the establishment of the first Muslim college at Aligarh along modern educational lines. "Aligarh Muslim University became the crucible of awareness for Muslims of India - a consciousness-raising centre that played an indisputable part in the struggle for Muslim identity and its logical consequences, Pakistan". I I More than the revivalist movements, the reformist trend had a long term implications in crystalising the distinctive identity among the Muslim elite partly because of access to the western education and partly, its exposure to such ideas as nationalism and protection of human rights.. While some Muslim intellectuals considered political and territorial nationalism as antithetical to basic ideology of Islam due to the confused political circumstances and heightened communal anxieties between the two main communities, others, notably Sir Sayeed Ahmad Khan, Dr. Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the Muslim League propounded the theories of separation based on ethno- nationalism. Nowhere in the Muslim world has the revivalist movement had deeper impact in stirring nationalist feelings as compared to the movement led by the western educated elite because the latter could provide well defined, logical, coherent ideological platform for rallying people to struggle for the long-term goal of a separate national identity. In brief, it is arguable that Pakistan is an illustrative example of what

10 With the development of industry, commerce and education Hindus marched ahead in all fields consequently a strong middle class aroused which was mainly Hindus. It is said that in 1878 "there were 3,155 Hindus as against 57 Muslims holding graduate and post-graduate degrees." See Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State (New Delhi, Select Book Service, 1986), p. 36; Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan The Formative Phase 1857-1948 (London, OUP 1968), pp. 14-15. II

Asghar Khan, Islam Politics and the State, n. 10, p. 36.

46

David Brown calls "situational nationalism" wherein the ideological myths of ethnic and national identity are constructed and employed by political elites in response to situational factors such as economic or power disparities. 12 What is important here to note is that even though the national identity in this case is depicted in the primordialist language of historical continuity, in reality it involves rational responses to changing situations. I3 Emergence of Pakistan Vague ideas and schemes were put forward by the British administrators, notably John Bright and Wilfred Blunt regarding the transfer of power as early as 1877 and 1883 respectively.14 But it was only in the year 1919 when the Government of India Act was passed that the intention of the imperial power regarding transfer of power by stages into Indian hands was made clear. A group of western-educated Muslim leaders had by then established the Muslim League in 1906 to safeguard their socio-economic and political rights. Many of them had already approached the British viceroy Lord Minto in 1906 to provide official positions for Muslims in all the provinces in proportion to their numerical strength. 15 The political mobilisation by the Muslim League was born out of an insecurity of being overwhelmed by Hindus. In presenting the vision of future Muslim state of Pakistan in the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in 1930, Sir Muhammad Iqbal said, "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self government within the British Empire or without 12 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Etnocultural and Multicultural Politics (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 19-20. 13 On the primordialist approach to nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalsm; The Quest for Understanding (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). The primordialists claim that nations are "real", not imagined or created by reviving and inventing traditions.

14 John Bright believed that Indians in different provinces would form independent states at the time of transfer of power. And Wilfrid Blunt suggested that provinces of North India should be under Muslim government and those of Southern India under Hindu government. See Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, n. 10, pp. 102-103. 15

C.R Philips, Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947 (London, OUP, 1962) pp. 191-193.

47

the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-west Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-west India".16 Likewise, Choudhry Rahmat Ali, another Muslim of South Asian origin and a student of Cambridge coined the word Pakistan for the first time in 1933. Rahmat Ali wrote, "Pakistan is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our home-lands - 'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is Punjab, Afghania (NorthWest Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan. It means the lands of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolises the religious beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland. It has no other origin and no other meaning, and it does not admit of any other interpretations". 17 At a time when the National Congress was taking up economic and political issues against the imperialist power, the Muslim League and its reactionary leaders supported communal issues like the partition of Bengal, demanded for a separate electorate and highlighted the interests of their community to be different from those of Hindus l8 The other major development during this period (1935) was the rejection of the federal plea of the 1935 Government of India Act by the Congress. 19 The National Congress decided to fight elections under the New Act of 1935 to show the unpopularity of the Act, and won seven out of eleven provinces. It formed coalition ministries in two others with the exception of Punjab and Bengal. The Muslim League too contested the elections to the provincial assemblies as required by the Government of India Act 1935 and the results were too shocking for the League. Out of 489 Muslim seats only 104 seats were won by the Muslim League. 2o Following the humiliating defeat, the Muslim League raised the spectre of 'Hindu raj' and the bogey of "Islam in danger." 16

Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, n. 10, pp. 103-104.

17

Ibid., p. 104.

18

Bipin Chandra, Modern India (Delhi: NCERT, 1971), pp. 254-255

19 The 1935 Government of India Act provided for the establishment of All India federation, provincial autonomy for all provinces including the princely states and a bicameral federal legislative. The National Congress rejected the Act on the ground that insurmountable power given to Governor General and provincial Governors in the Act. The Muslim League too disapproved the Act as being anti-Muslim. Ibid., p. 291.

20

Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 83.

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Furthermore, Congress rule was interpreted as the ascendancy of Hindu nationalism at the cost of minority interest. 21 Reflecting its growing disillusionment, the Muslim League in the Lucknow session of October 1937 condemned the reverence shown towards Bande Mataram and criticised the anthem as "positively anti-Islamic and idolatrous in its

inspiration and ideas".22 The League's divisive politics set off the process of sectarian polarisation, which was further precipitated by the historic Lahore resolution of 1940. Calling for the creation of a separate Muslim state, the Resolution declared, "geographically contiguous units (of British India) are to be demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.'.23 By highlighting the cultural and historical differences of the two communities, Jinnah sought not simply to convince the Muslim community of the near-impossibility of co-existence with the majority Hindus, but also underlined the need for the creation of a separate state for the Muslims. Role of Jinnah in the Creation of Pakistan

The entire sequence of events in the later part leading to partition of India based on the two nation theory was dominated by Jinnah. The entire machinery of the Muslim League backed him in his political propaganda but it was nevertheless true that Quaid-iAzam was a great balancing factor for the league. The ideology of the two nation theory,

however, did little to salvage the ethnic, linguistic geographic peculiarities and intraMuslim separateness. The weakness of the ideology was markedly evident "once exposed to the post-independence competition of other identities and loyalties, these centripetal forces have been often strained, although finally not broken".24 The fate of the party (Muslim League) before the partition in the provinces of Punjab and Frontier was far

21

Andrew Rippin, Muslims, Their Religious Beliefs and Practices (London, Routledge, 1990), p. 54-56.

22

The Pioneer, Lucknow 16 Oct. 1937 quoted in Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 88.

The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 11 March 1941 quoted in Muhammad A. Quddus, Pakistan: A Case Study of a Plural Society (Columbia, South Asia Books 1982), p. 24.

23

24 Alan Whaites, "Political Cohesion in Pakistan Jinnah and the ideological state", Contemporary South Asia, vol. 7:2, July 1998, p. 182.

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from assuring. Punjab, the pivot of Pakistan was, for example, not the stronghold of Muslim League, whereas in the Frontier province it tried hard to soften the attitude of the Pathans by resorting to the Islamic symbolism. Addressing the Pathans, Jinnah asked, "Do you want Pakistan or not? (Shouts of Allah 0 Akbar) (God is great) well, if you want Pakistan, vote for the League candidates. If we fail to realize our duty today you will be reduced to the status of Sudras (low castes) and Islam will be vanquished from India. I shall never allow Muslims to be slaves of Hindus. Allah-o-Akbar.,,25 Besides, Jinnah also sought the help of the Pir of Manki Sharif to mobilise public opinion of the frontier people in favour of Pakistan. The Muslim saint is believed to have extracted a promise from Jinnah that once Pakistan becomes a reality Muslim should not be dictated by un-Islamic laws. 26 After having failed to get electoral support Muslim League took recourse to Islamic slogans and phrases to garner support in the Muslim majority provinces. Subscribing to the two-nation theory, Jinnah only made use of Islam to rally support rather than making it the basis of the future state of Pakistan. In other worlds, Islam had an instrumental function in the build of distinctive Muslim consciousness in the sub-continent rather than being an ideological cornerstone of Jinnah's vision of Pakistan.

The two nation theory though considered a minority

province issue spread to Muslim majority areas. "It was the prospect of Congress power at the centre that enabled the majority provinces to think of themselves in minority terms on a national basis, a conceptual shift forced on minority province Muslims a century before.',27 The Congress Party was accused of imitating fascist methods, and the manner in which it belittled provincial governments by curtailing provincial autonomy.28 While remaining true to its ideological strivings, Muslim League under Jinnah whipped up provincial fears against the possibility of a strong central rule under the Congress Party, which was also accused of being pro Hindu.29 Exhorting regional groups to overcome See Muhammed A. Quddus, Pakistan: A Case Study of a Plural Society (Columbia, South Asia Books, 1982), p. 24.

25

26 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 9 March 1949, Vol. V, no. 3, p. 46 quoted in Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 198. 27

Whaites, Political Cohesion in Pakistan, D. 25, p. 187.

28

R. Coupland, The Indian Problem, Part II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 120-125.

29

Whaites, Political Cohesion in Pakistan, n. 25, p. 187.

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factional rivalry, Jinnah said, ''we shall have time to quarrel ourselves and we shall have time when these differences will have to be settled, we shall have time for domestic programme and politics, but first get the government." 30 Furthermore, Jinnah emphasised on Urdu being made the lingua franca of the Muslim League even though he himself spoke very little Urdu and his speeches were translated by the All India Muslim League's State President Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung. 31 Jinnah became the target of attack from more orthodox sections of Muslim population like the Jamaat-i-Islami chief Maulana Maudoodi and others like Maulana Husain Ahmad leader of Jamiyat al ulama 1 Hind for his western training and secular outlook on various issues.32 Undeterred by such criticism and conscious of the dynamics of Muslim politics, Jinnah tried to reach out to the powerful social forces of the time, notably the ulemas, pirs and landlords. For example, he assured the zamindars of Punjab by reiterating that "The League is not against any interests among Muslims.,,33 In 1946 a

Mashaikh Committee was constituted, which, made up of prominent ulemas and pirs, spread the Muslim Leagues agenda far and wide. Giving religious colour to the Muslim politics, prominent ulema, Maulana Osmani once said, "Any man who gives his vote to the opponents of the Muslim League, must think of the ultimate consequences of his action in terms of the interests of his nation and the answers that he would be called upon to produce on the day of judgement".34 The ulema thus played a decisive role in the Muslim League electoral campaign contributing to Jinnah's efforts at uniting a heterogeneous group consisting of Muslim elites, Pirs, ulemas, the Nawabs, the feudal lords and the masses with the common bond of Islam. The strength of the League was 30 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, ed. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, (Lahore: Ashraf Publishers, .1964), Vol. I, p.199. 31 The 1937 Lucknow session of the Muslim League formally recommended Urdu to be the language of the League.

32 Maulana Maudoodi doubted Jinnah's Islamic outlook while Maulana Husain Ahmed gave a fatwa in October 1945, asking Muslims to stay away from the League. He called Jinnah Kafir-i-Azam (the great heathen). see Sayeed, Pakistan the formative stage, 10, p. 199. 33

Ibid., p. 210

34 Liaquat Ali Khan, a prominent League leader openly acknowledged the help rendered by Maulana Osmani in the Central Legislative Assembly elections. Similarly, Muslim League won the referendum in the Frontier with the active co-operation of the Pir of Manki sharif and the help given by Maulana Osmani and Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi. Ibid., pp.203-205

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fundamentalists themselves would be first to say: they regard liberal democracy with contempt as a corrupt and corrupting form ofgovernment.»16 Lastly, the core objective of political Islam has changed and changed fundamentally. During the de-colonization phase, Islam, for instance, was used functionally to reach certain goals, which were not immediately derived from Islam itself, and sometimes had nothing to do with it. Islam no longer serves the instrumental function either as a regime challenging (Egypt and Algeria) or regime legitimising ideology (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and Sudan).l1 Nor is it simply a rejection of modernity or a revolt against the universality of Western norms and values. It instead seeks to establish an alternative global order based on the idea of hakimiyyat Allah (God's rule). 18 The fundamentalists' assumptions that the future belongs to Islam are predicated on the belief that the moral bankruptcy within the Western civilization would soon precipitate its collapse and Islam by virtue of its superior capacity and noblest system would lead the whole of humanity.19 In pursuit of this fundamentalist utopia, which in any case entails the risk of

confrontation with the Christian West, acts of violence acquire legitimacy. For, jihad becomes a holy struggle between believers and non-believers and its enemies become satanised, so much so that it forecloses the options for negotiations and compromises. Causation: Culturalist and Contingencist Approaches

Islamic fundamentalism is a complex multi-dimensional phenomenon, which cannot be explained by single factor or sets of factors. Explanation and analysis provided by various scholars and researchers could be broadly divided into two main approaches:

76 Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview," Journal of Democracy, vol. 7 (April 1996), p. 54. 77 Jacques Waardenburg. "Islam as a Vehicle of Protest" in Ernest Gellner (ed.), Islamic Dilemmas (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1985), pp. 24-26. On the "double function" of Islam in politics, see Dwight B. Billings and Shaunna L. Scott, "Religion and Political Legitimation", Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 20 (1994), pp. 173-202.

For a discussion of the struggle between the West and Islam over who will provide the definition to the post-Cold War world order, see John Kelsay, Islam and War: The Gulf War and Beyond (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993), Chap. 5.

78

79 For an evaluation of Islamist discourse, see Salwa Ismail, "Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamism in Egypt", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30 (1998), pp. 199-225

25

cultural essentialist and the contingencist. The main focus of the former is the Islamic exceptional ism, whereas the latter rejects any universal framework and concentrates on the 'contingent' realities (the socio- political situation) that exist in each Islamic country. The adherents of the first include both proponents of true Islam and those in the West known as the 'orientalists' who view the Islamic world essentially different from the rest of the world, in general, and the West, in particular. The essentialists are those who argue that the Islamic world is dominated by a set of relatively enduring and unchanging processes and meaning to be understood through the texts of Islam and language it generates. 80 They, for instance, attribute the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism to Islam's inability to adapt to the modem age, which has left Muslim societies ill prepared and ill equipped to meet the challenges of globalization on their own. 81 According to Myron Weiner, "What is striking about Islamic resurgence is its rejection of much of what is generally regarded as modem in the 19th century: secularism, democracy and even nationalism. In this respect, Islam has come to play quite a different role from that of the religions of modernization -Christianity, Judaism, Confucianism, Shintoism, even Buddhism and Hinduism. Each of these religions, in its own way, has been interpreted or reinterpreted so as to induce people to modernization, or to function alongside of, without impeding, modern behaviour, yet to provide personal comfort, a sense of continuity with one's past, and group identity.,,82 Central to the culturalist approach is, however, the argument that in comparison with other major religions of the world, Islam is a political religion per excellence. It has from the very beginning united and governed the community of believers as a political religion. Unlike the founder of Christianity, who was crucified and whose followers saw their religion made the official faith of the Roman Empire only after centuries as a persecuted minority, Prophet Mohammed founded a state during his lifetime, and as ruler he collected taxes, dispensed justice, promulgated laws, commanded armies, and made 80

Halliday, "Review Article", n. 71, pp. 400-401.

81 See Bernard Lewis,What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (London: Phoenix, 2002).

Myron Weiner, "Political Change: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East" in M. Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p. 60. 82

26

glaring than in the framing of the constitution of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan told the constituent Assembly in 1949, "Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of the subcontinent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam".43 As Abott has aptly put it, ''there was no agreement before or after the creation of Pakistan as to what in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam might mean.,,44 Pakistan was carved out as a state for Muslims, which in other words means, a state where Muslims are in a majority. That was indeed the basis of partition and the vision of the founders of Pakistan. Schooled in western ideas the latter envisioned a liberal state of Muslims but certainly not a theocratic Islamic state. Reflective of this. Quaid-a-Azam in his famous August 11, 1947 speech in the Assembly said, "You are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or places of worship of any kind. Whatever may be your religion, creed or race, it has nothing to do with the affairs of the state ... You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state".45 Ironically, however, all official versions about his life and this speech have deleted his references to religion not having a role in running the affairs of the state. 46 Scholars like Shahid Javed Burki wonders how the Hindus and Muslims would cease to be what they are in the political sense when Jinnah campaigned throughout his career regarding the great difference between the faiths? He asks, ''was Jinnah giving up the two-nation theory, the ideological foundations of the state of Pakistan, once the new state had come into.existence? Was the speech a clear signal to the people of Pakistan that the new state though founded to preserve Islam in South Asia, was to be run on secular grounds?,.47 The ideological ambivalence or confusion is traced

43 44

Freeland Abbott, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 110. Hayes, The Strugglefor Legitimacy, n. 37, pp. 66-67.

4S Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali linnah: Speeches as Governor General, 1947-48 (Karachi Pakistan Publications no date), pp. 8-9 as quoted in Samina Yasmeen, "'Pakistan and real Islam' in S. Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (ed.), Islam and Political Legitimacy (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 72-73.

46 Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 81-82. 47

Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making (Boulder: Westview press, 1986), p. 42.

54

to the independence struggle for Pakistan. The Muslim League leaders made use of Islam to build a communal identity of all Muslims in British India. While the desire and dream for a separate political entity called Pakistan emerged in Central India, the Islamic card was utilised to mobilise Muslims support from provinces like Punjab, North Western Frontier province, Sind Baluchistan, and East Bengal.48 Unlike Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, a great Islamic scholar and first education minister of independent India who did not ratify the two-nation theory, Maududi opted for Pakistan despite having argued that Islamic nationalism and political sovereignty were foreign concepts and contrary to the belief in Muslim Umma. The reason why Maududi chose to live in Pakistan could be his belief that the future state of Pakistan would be governed by Islamic laws and tenants. "Instead of adhering to the idea of a global Umma, Maududi and other scholars including Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Othmani of Jamiat ulama-i-Islam, came to emphasise that Pakistan was created as an Islamic state and not merely a state for Muslims. The emphasis on the theocratic nature of the state prompted them to demand that the primacy of divine will be acknowledged in the construction of the new political order. The orthodox interpretations of the Koran and prophetic traditions were to be the source of law in the new state and not some liberal notions of humans determining the constitution of pakistan.'.49 The utter confusion arose primarily from the diverse intetpretation of the nature and character of the new Pakistani state. Whereas the liberals used Islam for the pUtpose of political mobilisation, the latter decidedly settled for a state based on Islam. In brief Islam for the former was the means to achieve political goal and hence, had merely instrumental function, but for the latter it was the end. As a result, Pakistan did not have a constitution for nine long years. Although the first constitution was drafted in 1956, it was abrogated two and a half years later following a military coup which made Ayub Khan the ruler. 50

48 Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan and real Islam" in Akbarzadeh and Saeed (ed.), Islam and Political Legitimacy, n. 46, p. 73. 49

Ibid., p. 73.

50 For details, see Zulifikar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 179-180.

55

Position of Islam in the Constitution

During the formative years of the new state Pakistani society was ideologically divided into "fundamentalist" and "modernist" who clashed over their own version of Islam. The delay in adopting the constitution was attributed mainly to the protracted debates over Islamic provisions in the Constitutions. 5I Critics see Jinnah's role in deepening the ideological confusion as well as in the lack of proper understanding regarding the nature of political system in Pakistan. The pre-1947 Jinnah is said to be "Contentious, brilliant and divisive Indian lawyer politician who turned the two-nation theory - the idea that India's Muslims and Hindus constituted two separate nations, each deserving their own, separate state - into an effective political movement .... After Independence, Jinnah spoke of a Pakistan that would be democratic, tolerant of religious minorities, progressive socially and modern in the liberal western sense.,,52 Jinnah died in 1948 without his dream of a stable, democratic Pakistan being realised. His speeches in 1940 emphasising on separateness and his Presidential address in 1947 stressing secularism diffused the new nation's search for an Islamic identity. It is the lack of clarity about Islam's role in the affairs of the state which made Jinnah's appeal to religion "ambiguous.,,53 The objective Resolution which was passed in March 1949 had the following reference to Islam: The Government of Pakistan will be a state ... wherein the principle of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed; wherein the Muslims of Pakistan shall be enabled individually and collectively to order their lines in accordance with teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Koran and Sunnah, wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religion and develop their culture.54

51 Members of the fundamentalist group mobilized public opinion for making Pakistan a Islamic state. They favoured Islamic law and Islamic practices but the modernist as their name suggests took a liberal view of Islam and were opposed to enforcement of Islamic law and practices see Barter, South Asia: Politics and Government, n. 41, p. 172.

52 Stephen Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan", The Washington Quarterly, 25:3, Summer 2002. pp.110-111. 53 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore: Sarg-e-MeeI Publications, 1992), p. 5.

54 K.K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, 1949-58 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), pp. 48-50.

56

The Constituent Assembly faced great difficulty in the framing of the basic principles. The report of the Basic principles committee which was tabled after three years (1950) urged the President at the insistence of ulemas in Pakistan to constitute a body of 5 ulemas knowledgeable and 'well-versed in Islamic law' to re-examine the acts and provisions of the legislature. Laws found to be inconsistent with the holy Koran and Sunnah would be referred back to the legislature for necessary amendments. However, there was no mention of the Board of ulerna in the final Basic Principles Report or in the fmal draft of the 1956 Constitution.55 The 1956 Constitution named the Country to be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and stated in Article 25 that the state would endeavour to enable Muslims to lead their life individually and collectively in accordance with Holy Koran and Sunnah. The state was also to "endeavour" to ''prevent prostitution gambling, the taking of injurious drugs: and ... the consumption of alcoholic liquor other than for medicinal ... purposes." The Constitution made provisions for the President who would be a Muslim (Article 32) Article 197 made provisions to set up an Organisation for Islamic Research, and stated that no law repugnant to Koran and Sunnah would be passed, but this provision was not enforceable in the law courts. However, the President was empowered (by article 198) to appoint a Committee that would make recommendations to bring laws into conformity with Islam. 56 The Preamble reads "adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to profess freely and practice their religions and develop their cultures". 57 These constitutional guarantees were explained in details in various articles under part II of the Fundamental rights. The Constitution guarantees non-discrimination in respect of access to public place (Article 14). Another article which needs a special mention is. the article 27, which provided equal treatment to minorities as regards to their fair-representation in federal and provincial services. Article 18 guaranteed against discrimination to manage 55 GOP, Report of the Basic Principles Committee Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1952 cited in Baxter, Government and Politics, nAl, p.173.

Constjtution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956), articles 25, 28, 29, 197 & 198. See Kamal Azfar, Pakistan Political and Constitutional Dilemmas (Karachi: Pakistan law House, 1987), pp. 45-57.

56

57 David F. Forte, "Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan", in Safdar Mahmood, ed., Constitutional Foundations ofPakistan (Lahore: 2nd edition, 1975), p. 32.

57

religious institutions, whereas Article 21 guaranteed safeguards against taxation to protect any particular religion. The liberal approach towards minorities as provided by the 1956 Constitution was also reflected in the numerous speeches of Liaqat Ali Khan both at home and abroad. He told the United States Senate, "We have solemnly pledged that our minorities shall enjoy full rights of citizenship". 58 He told the Canadian parliament that Pakistan did not plan to become a stronghold of intolerance on Medievalism. Liaqat stated at New Orleans, "our ideals do not spell out a sectarian medieval, intolerant, theocratic society. We believe in God and his supreme sovereignty because we believe that civic life must have an ethical content and a higher purpose, which we cannot but conceive of as a fulfillment of the Divine will. But democracy, social justice, equality of opportunity and equality before the law of all citizens irrespective of race or creed are also articles of faith with us ... ,,59 The 1956 Constitution failed due to the military substitution of the civilian government. The coup d'etat led to the suspension of the Constitution and imposition of martial law. The reason for its failure is attributed largely to the pathetic state of affairs in the political parties.60 The weakening grip of the Muslim League stands out in sharp contrast to the role played by the Congress which emerged as the chief policy maker for India. The untimely death of Jinnah and Liaqut Ali Khan led to a void in both

organizational and ideological matters in the League.

The Muslim League which

assumed state power soon after partition was not a political party in the strict sense of the term. It was more of a movement under whose umbrella there was room for all sources of ideas and opinion, provided they remained undivided in their agenda of Mission Pakistan. 61 After the accomplishment of their mission there was no effort to transform the movement into a party, with a programme/consensus, on nation building.

The

manifold differences, kept in check under the "stress of necessity" erupted once Pakistan

58 See Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961) p. 191. 59

Tariq Ali, Pakistan, Military Rule or Peoples Power (London: Trinity Press, 1990), p. 80.

60

Kamal Azfar, Pakistan Political and Constitutional Dilemmas, n. 57, pp. 58-59.

61

Mustaq Ahmed, Politics o/Crisis (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1987), p. 120.

58

became a reality.62 Shortcomings and criticisms of the leaders amounted to lack of loyalty to the state. The party continued to live in the past and believed that no organization had the legitimacy to match it. The leadership perhaps did not feel the need for effecting changes in the organisation so as to cope with the new challenges and emerging social realities. 63 The League came under the influence and control of the land lord class in West Pakistan and the legislatures remained packed with their supporters and followers. The result was that Muslim League was used by the particular class for the fulfillment of their political and economic interests.64 While the lamaat-i-Islami wished to re-establish the days of the Orthodox Caliphate there were political disagreements over communicating the idea of a Islamic constitution. In the midst of unclear circumstances the objective of the religious groups was to press for the ''positive enactment of Islamic law, on what Islam commands rather than on what it forbids. The new strategy was to enter into the political arena directly through attempting to elect some of their own adherents to the National Assembly, rather than to try to work through the executive or judicial branches. The new tactics involved operating in the mode of a political party, joining forces with those willing to co-operate, and even openly opposing the government of the day".65 The struggle for an Islamic constitution ended with the coup in 1958, which was imposed by a

military~bureaucratic

complex with the connivance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).66 The New York Times appreciated the reason behind the suspension of civilian government. It stated, "In Pakistan both President Mirza and the army's head General Ayub Khan have stated clearly that what they propose and wish to do is to establish in due course a fine, honest and democratic government. There is no reason to doubt their sincerity.,,67

62

Ibid., p. 120.

63

Mustaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Co .. 1959), pp. 126-27.

64

Ibid., p. 131.

65

Binder, Religion and Politics, n. 59, p.374.

66

Ali, Pakistan, n. 60, p. 88.

67

New York Times, October 12, 1958 .

59

The 1962 Constitution The State of Pakistan was governed without the guidelines of a constitution from 1958 to 1962. The Second Constitution of Pakistan promulgated on March 1, 1962 was the brainchild of Field marshal Ayub Khan. The Pakistan army and the Civil Services appeared strong and relatively well organised to maintain much needed political stability in the absence of broad based political parties. As the Muslim League failed to measure up to the aspirations of the middle class, it began to look towards the bureaucracy, which nurtured and favoured the capitalist interests in Pakistan. The domination of the bureaucracy was further strengthened by the cohesiveness of the group which Humza Alavi says had caste-like characteristic traits. 68 In addition, a highly centralized government during Ayub's rule facilitated the ascendancy of the bureaucracy. A strong contingent of 400 odd members of Pakistan civil services dominated all facets of administration. 69 Ayub' s dependence on the bureaucrats stemmed from his conviction that politicians in Pakistan were a discredited lot and responsible for the deterioration of political and economic conditions in the country.70 Reflecting his negative attitude towards the politicians, Ayub promulgated the Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO) , which was used to debar politicians from active political participation for a period of eight years. 71 Paradoxically, the regime excluded all those politicians with organisational and mass support base from the realms of politics who could have made a difference to the administration but included those politicians who were politically irrelevant and hence remained subservient to the bureaucracy.72

68 Hamza Alavi, "Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan', International Socialist Journal, Vol. 3, no. 14 (March-April, 1966), pp. 14-29. 69 Charles H. Kennedy, "Prestige of services and Bhutto's Administrative Reforms", Asian Affairs, Vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 25-42.

Ayub in his autobiography said, "The army could not remain unaffected by the conditions around it, nor was it conceivable that officers and men would not react to all the political chicanery, intrigue corruption and inefficiency manifested in every sphere of life. Being a patriot and national army, it was bound to respond to the thinking of the people'. See Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements October 1958-June 1964, Friends not Masters, vol. I-VI, 1964. p. 58. 70

7I

Rounaq lahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (New York: Columbia Press, 1972), pp.54-55.

72

Ibid., p. 56.

60

While restricting political space for civilian leaders, Ayub regime initially pursued policies aimed at creating a secular state in Pakistan. The regime was opposed to the association of religion and religious leaders in politics. 73 The 1962 Constitution of Ayub referred to Pakistan as the Republic of Pakistan. But a constitutional amendment later changed the name of the republic to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The constitution was indeed amended as many as eight times during the first five and half years though Ayub while announcing the new constitution said, "I believe in every word ... And have complete faith in it".74 The Preamble, Part II, Chapter I were altered drastically in addition to thirty-nine Articles some of which were amended two to three times. 75 The 1962 Constitution designed the fundamental rights in the same manner as in the 1956 document, the Chapter 2 of Part n which contained the Directive Principles of State policy which were also similar to the 56' Constitution. The rights were "subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law".76

What was new was the Basic

Democracies framework and practices borrowed from parliamentary and presidential systems. Basic Democracies System was a scheme aimed to mobilise the rural masses for developmental activities. The emphasis upon local participation was aimed at creating institutional linkage between the governments and governed. It was based on the belief that Basic Democracies would train local leadership from below and were entrusted with a wide variety of social environmental and local functions. Besides, they would also act as the Electoral College for the presidential and assembly elections. Critics, however, argue that Basic Democracies were meant to spread the Ayub regime's ideals and goals and acted as their agents to gamer support from the masses. Part X of the 1962 Constitution dealt with Islamic Institutions. It made provision for an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology to make recommendations to bring the laws in conformity with the principles and concepts of Islam and also advise which laws were 73

Ibid., p. 65.

Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis Pakistan 1962-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.vi.

74

75

Ibid., p. 4.

76

See Hayes, The Struggle/or Legitimacy, n. 37, p.99.

61

repugnant to Koran and Smmah.. The Islamic ideology council was responsible for "enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam".77 The Council was also was required to facilitate Islamiyat or religious education. An Islamic Research Institute came into existence to assist the Council and also to work independently to spread Islamic ethos and ideas. The Council warned against transgression of Islamic tenets by the President, the Governors and the Assemblies, and advocated government policies in any event of Public controversies.78 Article 7 of the 1962 Constitution gave freedom to the minorities to practice their faith in absolute freedom. The law did not discriminate on grants or tax exemption for various communities. Critics evaluate Ayub's religious moves as a shift not exactly towards secularism but towards a "more liberal interpretation of Islam".79 Others explained the government's approach to Islam as "exclusionary corporatism".8o In other words, the ruling elites were forced to acknowledge the relevance of Islam in a limited manner, while the ''primacy of the secular state, and its right to interpret Islam, was asserted by excluding the spokesman of Islam from the political process". 81 As the state exercised its power to interpret as well as implement religion it created a lot of controversy on certain issues. One such was the Muslim Family Law ordinance of 1961 and to the Family planning campaigns. The introduction of Family laws according to the ulemas was not in conformity with the Koranic injuctions. The Muslim family law ordinance aimed to remove any kind of abuse of Talaq (divorce provisions) in Islamic law in case of conflict by referring it to the arbitration council. Ayub also made arbitrating council's permission vital in case of polygamy. In this case, the functions of the Council involved inquiring about the consent of the existing partner in a polygamous 77 Fazlur Rahman, "Islam and new Constitution of Pakistan", Journal of Asia and African Studies, vii (July and October), 1973 p. 201. 78

Mustaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988), p. 218.

79

Rubiya Mehdi, The lslamisation ofthe Laws in Pakistan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994), p. 94.

80 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "State, Society and the Crisis of National Identity", in Rasul Bakhsh Rais, (ed.), State, Society and Democratic Change in Pakistan (Karachi: OUP, 1997) p. 116. 81

Ibid., p. 116.

62

marriage. This move of Ayub affected both the Sunnis and Shias because Sunnis had legal provisions to marry four times while the Shias had the benefits of unlimited marriages for a fixed term only under the provision of mut 'ah marriage. 82 The religious conviction of the ulema was disturbed when the Ayub regime insisted on the scientific sighting of the moon on EM. They refused to accept the fmdings of the .Meteorological Department and mobilised public opinion in favour of the traditional method of sighting the moon. 83 All such reactions were indicative of the onset of the confrontation between the state on the one hand and the Islamist forces on the other hand. The latter led by the Jamaat-i-Islami tried to mobilise the public through its well organised and disciplined cadres against the state and the ruling regime's identity based on the modem interpretation of Islam. Despite Ayub's crackdown on the Jamaat leader, Maulana Maududi by opening the old charges against him in 1963 pertaining to his ambiguous attitude towards the Pakistani proposal, Maududi continued to command substantial following due to his large social welfare networks and ceremonial religious activities. 84 The entire state machinery was geared against Jamaat accused of fomenting student unrest in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Lyallpur. The numerous arrests of Jamaatis and finally the ban order on the party under the criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908 made it an unlawful association. However, Jamaat revived its fortunes when Supreme Court held that the ban could not be implemented in Pakistan. 85 In sum, Ayub Khan's strong preferences for a modernist interpretation of Islam did not prevent him from justifying his policies by invoking Islam. He tried to explain the necessity of a centralised leadership on the basis of his understanding of Islamic history in medieval India. He said, "Another feature of Islamic history which had found general acceptance was that the leader once he is chosen by the community, should have sufficient power to co-ordinate, supervise and control the activities of government.

82 See Savita Pande, Politics ofEthnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan (Delhi: Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), p. 151.

83

Ahmad, Government and Politics, n. 79, p. 310.

84 Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, n, 75, pp. 64-65; Kalim Bahadur, The Jama'at-I-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action (Lahore, 1983), p. 27. 85

Feldman., From Crisis to Crisis, n. 75, p. 65

63

enemy camp.,,103 In fact, the Islamic discourse has become so pervasive that even secular Muslim nationalists have invoked Islamist themes such as jihad (holy war) and iman (faith) in the struggle against the Western powers. But the use of religious idioms by nationalists should not be surprising; there has always been a strain of religious fervor in the many strands of political discourse in the entire Muslim world. Above all, Islamic fundamentalism is more a response to economic conditions than a desire to build a theocracy. The fact that it has flourished since the 1980s is an indication of the parallel socioeconomic crises in many Muslim-dominated countries, crises that exemplify for their victims the failure of modernisation. One such component of modernisation, education, turned out not to be the key to opportunities in the context of limited economics. The spread of education only swelled the ranks of unemployed and underemployed graduates in economies that offered few opening outside the bloated public sector. The waves of educated young people flooding into a saturated job market every year face a bleak present and an even bleaker future. Another component of modernisation, urbanisation, was fueled by spiraling population growth and rural migration. The deterioration and suffocation of urban life were inevitable. Further, the pull of the city for deprived millions in the countryside created"ruralised" enclaves within city confmes, changing the nature of cohesion and collectivity in many ways. One way was to transfuse village religious tradition and conservative ethos into the new setting. Cities now are mega-centers with few of their former positive cosmopolitan characteristics. But most distressing and dangerous are the immense and inexorably growing pools of angry surplus labor, and desperate people trying to extract an existence from nothingness. The masses of the migrant poor are kept "out" economically and politically. Their despondence, uprootedness, alienation, and traditional conservatism make for almost total susceptibility to the radical Islamic appeal. The fundamentalists translate their grievances, frustrations, and aspirations into language that is intelligible to them: the language of Islam. 104

103

Ayubi, Political Islam. n. 49, pp. 103-104.

Bruce Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam beyond Violence (Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 132-139.

104

34

responsibility. But once in the seat of authority he worked towards cleaning the political and economic mess in Pakistan and looked forward to a smooth and quick transfer of power to civilian authorities. 90 Yahya, however, failed miserably in dealing with the nationalist stirrings in East Bengal; some of his policy initiatives further radicalised the secessionist movement leading to the outbreak of the Indo-Pak war and birth of an independent Bangladesh in 1971.91 The event of 1971 was a huge blow to Pakistan's most powerful institution i.e. the army. Its humiliating defeat in the hands of the Indian counterpart raised serious doubts about its ability to hold the country together. 92 At the ideological level, the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate national entity posed a potent challenge to Pakistan's Islamic identity. It revealed the hollowness of religious symbolism either in providing national cohesiveness or containing the surge of separatism emanating from factors that have little to do with religion per se. In any case, the 1971 debacle facilitated the restoration of democracy in Pakistan as Yahya transferred power to Bhutto, who was then the most popular political figure in Pakistan. 93 Islam and Pakistan's 3rd Constitution

The 1962 Constitution was suspended in 1969 and abrogated in 1972. After the 1970 elections in Pakistan Bhutto emerged victorious and his official title upon assuming office was President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. The termination of martial law and the legalisation .of the 1973 Constitution redefined his position as the PrimeMinister of Pakistan. Every time Pakistan witnessed a change of regime it experienced severed ties with the past. This is due to the fact that each regime discredited the policies

90

Hayes, The Strugglefor Legitimacy, n. 37, p. 124.

91

See Jaban, Pakistan, n. 72, pp. 186-188.

92

Syed Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto (New York: St. martin's Press, 1980), p. 60.

Ibid., p. 61. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rose to become foreign minister in Ayub's Cabinet. Following the 1965 War with India, he broke away from him and openly criticised the General's foreign policy. He was the product of the anti-Ayub movement and thus had many supporters. Bhutto was the chief of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and had spearheaded democratic movement in the country. 93

65

and schemes of his predecessors. The 1973 Constitution called for a parliamentary system with a higher degree of provincial autonomy. Although framed by the elected representatives through intense debate and discussion among the political groups reflecting the ideological diversity, the1973 Constitution of Pakistan ultimately had more Islamic clauses,than the previous ones.94 For example, Article 1 declared Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic and Article 2 defined Islam to be the state religion of the Country, whereas Article 3 stated that elimination of exploitation would be the responsibility of the state. It stated, "from each according to his ability to each according to his work". This article highlighted the classic ideals of socialism. A synthesis of article 2 and 3 produced what came to be known as "Islamic Socialism.,,95 Bhutto indulged in Islamic rhetoric and believed that Islam could be an important tool for carrying out his ambitious socio-economic reforms. He made use of Islam's great ideals of egalitarianism to explain and introduce socialism. The 1973 Constitution laid down conditions for the President to be a Muslim and to take an oath stating his belief in Islam. Article 20 guaranteed each citizen the fundamental right to profess, practice and propagate his religion and Article 21 protected one against taxation to support any religion other than his own, whereas the Article 22 provided safeguards for religious institutions. Non-discrimination in access to public places and services was promised by Articles 26 and 27 of the constitution. Likewise, Article 46-48 called for elimination of prostitution, gambling, drug trafficking and consumption of alcohol. Chapter II of Part II dealt with the Principles of Policy similar to the earlier constitutions. Unlike the fundamental rights, these Principles of Policy did not have the backing of the legal court of law. Article 31 dealing with Principles of Policy emphasised the Islamic way of life. Article 36 guaranteed protection of minorities, while Article 40 called for strengthening of bonds with the Muslim word and international peace. Part IX of the constitution addressed the place of Islam in the state. Under Article 227, all existing laws would be brought in confonnity with the injections of Islam as laid down in the Holy Koran and Sunnah. Article 228 to 231 provided for a Council of

94

Pande, Politics of Ethnic & Religious Minorities, n. 83, p. 151.

95

Kamal Azjar, Pakistan, n. 57, p. 87.

66

Islamic ideology to be appointed by the President to identify laws repugnant to Islam and to make recommendations to bring the laws in accordance with Islam. 96

Introduction of Islamic Provisions under Bhutto

As noted above, officially the Constitution of 1973 stood for protection of minorities and all religious communities, but Pakistan's record in this context was not satisfactory. For example, Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslims in 1974 and subjected to discrimination of all kinds. All the minority provisions under the fundamental rights hav a foot note, which subject them to law and can be regulated, for reasons of Public morality or public order. The Constitution Committee, which had been signed by Jamaat-

i-Islami, Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Pakistan and the Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Islam, the country's main orthodox religious parties, stated "For the first time provision has been made to reflect faithfully the Islamic ideology in the country's constitutional structure".97 Thus the 1973 Constitution was a blend of modern democratic ideals and Islam. The framers of 1973 Constitution adhered to the principle of not-enacting unIslamic laws as reflected in the creation of the Council for Islamic Ideology (CII). The members of the CII were drawn from various schools of IsI~ic thought, which had the authority to advise the President on the proposed laws in the context of Koranic injunctions. Apart from presenting a list of thirty-one suggestions for an Islamic oriented society, the CII recommended for the establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA).98 Similarly, the oath of the President of Pakistan stating his faith in Islam was probably to embarrass the Ahmediyas.99 Bhutto wanted to score political points when he appeased the ulema and religious right by declaring the Ahmediya community nonMuslims in 1974. Bhutto's political philosophy became famous as Islamic socialism and the PPP campaigned on the principles of Islam, soCialism and democracy. Its populist slogan was Roti, Kapra and Makan (bread, clothing and shelter). The manifesto of the For details on Constitutions, see, Kamal Azfar, Pakistan Political and Constitutional Dilemmas (Karachi: Pakistan Law House, 1987).

96

97

Azjar, Pakistan, n. 57, p. 155.

Mohammad Amin, Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan (Lashore: Sang e MeeI Publication, 1989), pp. 4650.

98

99

Pande, Politics of Ethnic & Religious Minorities, n. 83, p. 151.

67

world order. Contrary to the western fear of an Islamic threat, Francis Fukiyama has described the Islamic resurgence as a passing phase which would loose the popularity if and when liberal democracy strikes roots in the Muslim societies. lOS Introduction of democratic traditions would broaden the popular participation which would satisfy the political aspiration of the Islamists. Secondly, in the democratic selections if the Islamists come to power it would be difficult for them to provide as alternative socio-economic model to redress the popular grievances. This is glaringly evident in countries like Iran and Sudan, because the Islamists do not have a socio-economic blue-print. As Oliver Roy's study has revealed that in contrast to the earlier generation of leadership, the new leaders are political opportunists. They lack miserably any coherent view as regards the issue of re-organising society in the late 20th century; leave alone an alternative economic model, as a substitute to full market economy. He has also noted that Islamic movements have been taken over by a group of frustrated, half-educated youth who Roy has described as "lumpen-intellegensia", the activity of whom is now evident in the assassination of secular intellectuals and the violence against women .. 109 The increasing numbers of Islamists who adhere to a modem interpretation of Islam form a loose-knit group with little chance of making an impact in the short term. The long term is a diffet:'Cnt matter, however. Given time, these Islamists could become a stabilising and constructive force with great capacities for developing public institutions and modernizing Muslim societies. Although liberal Islamists are part of the mainstream of the Islamic movement, their presence has not yet been institutionalised. They receive neither support from governments nor endorsement from the traditional or radical political groups. Traditionalists see them as "Westernised, It radicals see them as "compromised," and authoritarian rulers see them as "dangerous."

110

Islamic fundamentalism, according to Graham Fuller "is historically inevitable, but politically tenable." Elaborating on this, he optimistically holds the view that opening up of the political system would prove to be more effective than suppressing and

108

F. Fukuyama, The end of History and the Last Man (New York: Harmittos, 1992). Pp. 19-21.

109

Roy, The Failure, n. 61, pp. 34-36.

110

Laith Khubba, "Recognizing Pluralism", Journal of Democracy• Vol. 7, No. 2{ April 1996), p. 88.

37

Thus, ideological shift to Islam in the wake of 1977 elections ''was not accidental, nor was it a personal betrayal of the radicals on Bhutto's part.,,103

Moreover, Bhutto's

Islamic rhetoric was meant to counter pressure of the nine-party-coalition known as the Pakistan National Alliance, which called for the establishment of "Nizam-i-Mustafa" the order of the Prophet. 104 The PNA included both moderate political entities like the National Democratic Party and orthodox right wing parties like the Jamaat-i-Islam, Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Pakistan, and Jamaat-i-ulema-i-Islam. The Pakistan Muslim League

was less conservative than the above three was still willing to support the same ideological view point and rhetoric. lOS As the PNA election campaign gained momentum the emphasis shifted to Islam. The word socialism was dropped from Pakistan Peoples Party literature and substituted by "Musawat-i-Mohammadi", which means Islamic egalitarianism. "This was in sharp contrast to the concept of trinity propounded in the last elections - Socialism, Islam and Democracy',.106 The PPP won the 1977 elections amidst allegations of election fraud and blatant manipulations. The end of election however did not bring about an end to competitive politics. Protests against vote tampering resulted in wide spread violence leading to imposition of Martial Law in select cities of Pakistan. In the midst of nationwide protets against the result of 1977 elections, Bhutto announced the introduction of sharia laws, imposed total prohibition of alcohol and banned gambling in night clubs. He replaced Sunday as weekly holiday with Friday and thus hoped to counter strong opposition from right wing quarters. 107 Bhutto gave instructions to place a copy of Holy Koran in all hotel rooms. 108 Ironically, Pakistan's western educated and forward looking Prime-Minister made symbolic use of Islam the most. The freedom of speech and press guaranteed in 103 Akrnal Hussain, "Pakislan: The Crisis of the State", in Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State (New Delhi: Select Book Service Syndicate, 1986), p. 221. 104 William L. Richter, "The Political Meaning of Islamization in Pakistan: Prognosis, Implications and Queslions", in Anita Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), p. 131.

105 William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islam Resurgence in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. 19, no. 6, (June 1979), p. 55l. 106

Ibid., p. 551.

107 Anwar Syed, Pakistan, Islam, Politics and National Solidarity (Lahore: Vangaurd Books, 1987), pp. 149-50. 108

Ibid., p. 146.

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Article 19 was subject to a very disquieting clause, which read, ''to any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the interest of the glory oflslam, or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court". 109

This clause

empowered the executive to interfere in the name of Islam. By dividing the believers and non-believers, Bhutto took the spiritual divide to the legal sphere, thus ushering in the second stage oflslamisation. IIo Notwithstanding his flirtation with Islam, Bhutto could not endear himself to the religious oriented parties whose appetite for more Islamic injunctions increased with every stroke of Bhutto's public recitation of Kalina and such public statements as "Islam ... is our religion, the basis of Pakistan to religious groups." I I I Nor could he win over his liberal political opponents averse to the use of Islam as a ploy to cover up the government's failure to stem wide-spread corruption spawned by his socialist policies. "Indeed virtually all of Bhutto's popular policies - whether land reform, new legislation safeguarding the interests of labour, the nationalisation of key industries and the extension of state control over the banking and insurance sector - provided immeasurable opportunities for graft and corruption. Notwithstanding the lateral entry system, the main beneficiaries of Public sector expansion were for the most part the very civil bureaucrats whom the regime was supposed to be giving a much needed dressing down.,,112 What added up to Bhutto's problem was the inflationary pressure due to the oil price hike in the international market as a result of which the oil import bill soared from $85 million to $385 million. Lastly, Bhutto's decision to sack the governments in the North Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan on charges of anti-state activities in 1973 cost him

109 Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Some Reflections on the Democratization Process", in Rasul Bakhsh Rais (ed.), State, Society, n. 81, p. 15. 110 Juergen Kleiner, "Pakistan: An Unsettled Nation", Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 18, no. 1 (January 2007), pp. 1-25.

III Anwar H. Syed, "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Self Characterisation and Pakistani Political Culture", Asian Survey, vol. 18, no. 12, December 1978, p. 98. 112

Ayesha Jala1, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Cambridge University press), p. 82.

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dearly. The deployment of military to contain the civil-war-like situation in Baluchistan, for instance, paved the way for the military to interfere in national affairs. l13 Bhutto began with all the goodwill for his party (PPP), but failed to institutionalise it. Bhutto did precious little to put an end to the factional fights and leftright divide inside the party. In addition, the periodic purging of activists and the absence of internal party elections through out the 1970s weakened the party structure and correspondingly, the shrinkage of support base of the party.1l4 Bhutto's lack of interest in transforming the PPP from a mass movement into a strong and cohesive political party has been attributed by his critics to his growing dependence on the civil servants who he considered relatively efficient and bereft of ''political wrangling."ll5 Together with the structural weakness of the PPP, the erosion of the government's credibility turned Bhutto increasingly vulnerable, particularly when the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) launched a virulent campaign against his government by portraying it as ''un-Islamic and thus illegitimate.,,1l6 His vulnerability became all he more evident when he allowed the Saudi Ambassador to mediate between him and right wing opposition during the political deadlock in 1977.117 Bhutto like Jinnah had great political acumen and intellect, but "failed in his efforts to modernise Pakistan for the same reasons that Jinnah could not. Bhutto's brand of secularism like that of Jinnah's lay somewhere between the western perception of secularism - a separation of the church from the state - and India's approach to

113 Fighting continued until Bhutto was overthrown. After assuming power Zia released 6,000 to 11,000 Baluch leaders from jails, and gave amnesty for the guerillas who had fled to Afghanistan and Iran. For more details, see Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death ofa State (London: Penguin, 1983), pp. 115123. 114 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Democracy and the Crisis of GovernabiJity in Pakistan", Asian Survey, xxxii:6 (June 1992), p. 524.

115

Sayeed, "Some Reflections", n. 111, p. 12.

116 Anita M. Weiss, "The Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia", in Anita Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n.l06, p.l0. 117 See F.S. Aijazuddin, "The Shifting Qiblah", Paper presented at the Yale University 26-27 March 2004 available at http://www.yale.edulmacmillanlsouthasialevents/aijazuddin.pdf

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secularism."Il8 His use oflslam first as a political ploy and then as an economic gamble in the name of socialism aroused great deal of suspicion among the fundamentalists. As the Preamble of his Constitution (1973) read, "Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred truSt.,,1I9

Further, Bhutto

announced, "If any party is not to make Islam the main pillar of its ideology then that party would not be a Pakistani Party.,,120 At the same time he declared that Islam in the political context of Pakistan was irrelevant since both the exploited and exploiters were Muslims. All this goes to show not the confusion in Bhutto's mind, but the tactful use of as survival strategy in the face of the PNA-Ied protest movement of which the Jamaat-iIslami formed the main backbone. The centrality of Jamaat's role came to the fore when Bhutto visited Maududi' s house on April 16, 1977 to diffuse tension. 121 What is more, he appointed a General with strong Jamaat leanings as the Chief of Army, who subsequently approved his death warrant. Bhutto's policies impinged on the power and authority of the military. In an attempt to ensure democratically elected governments against the possibility of military usurpation he introduced provisions in the constitution which made imposition of martial law and subversion of the constitution illegal. 122 But when the popular disenchantment with the PPP rule was on the rise due to various reasons the military tried to cash in by covertly supporting his political opponents mainly the religious groups. In a bloodless coup, General Zia-ul-Haq became the Chief Martial Law Administrator on July 5, 1977. Thus, Pakistan is a typical example of "Military in Politics", which is the product of an interplay between the institutional strength and discipline of the military on one hand, and the weakness of the countervailing civilian forces on the other. In other words, the 118

Ib'd I .,p.8 .

119

Ibid., p. 9.

120

Syed, "ZuIfikar Ali Bhutto's Self Characterisation", n. 113, p. 98.

121 S. V. R. Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, no. 2 (1996), p. 276. 122 The makers of 1973 Constitution wanted to bury Martial Law for ever. As the Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution notes, "Any person who abrogates or attempts to abrogate or conspires to subvert the constitution by use of force or show of force or by other constitutional means shall be guilty of high treason."

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military intervention is the result of push of the military sub-system and the pull of the regime vulnerability. 123 The eclipse of the Bhutto regime coincided with the rise of Jamaat -i-islami in Pakistan politics owing to its vanguard role in the anti-Bhutto movement.. Islam as advocated by Jamaat began to emerge as an ideological alternative that could be utilised for political mobilisation. While Jamaat tried to expand its base through agitational methods, Bhutto began to rely on Islam to counteract Jamaat under the rubric of Islamic socialism. Islamic socialism was much more ambiguous than Jinnah's concepts of Pakistan. Bhutto tried to promote an ideology with which the people were not familiar and thus failed to strike with them. Thus, Jamaat worked hard to deny Bhutto's bid to usurp the ideological position of Jamaat by flaunting its Islamic credentials in a way politics in the pre-Zia period was centered on Islam in view of its potency for political mobilisation. When Zia came to power the state machinery was blatantly used to seize this ideology for the purpose of legitimation. Therefore, the state rather than suppressing Islam began to arrogate itself to the role of a guardian promote and protector of Islam thereby denying the legitimate role for other political groups like Jamaat or PPP to use Islam in opposition to the military regime. Islam in the preceding years of Bhutto's rule already had great popular appeal and Zia seized upon this to lead Pakistan towards its Islamic destiny.

RiseofZia As noted, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appointed Zia-ul-Haq as the head of the army bypassing the seniority of half a dozen army officers. The qualities which endeared Bhutto to Zia were "his piety, patriotism and professionalism".124 Two years

123 For a discussion of the phenomenon, see W. R. Thompson, "Regime Vulnerability and Military Coups", Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, no. 2 (1975), pp. 482-484; Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 73-84; Christopher Clapham and George Philip, "The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes" in C. Clapham and G. Philip (eds.), The Political Dilemmas ofMilitary Regimes (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 7-10. 124

Ian Talbott, A Modem History (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), p. 255.

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later the same general deposed Bhutto and charged him with conspiracy to murder Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan, father of PPP politician Ahmed Raza Kasuri.125 During the long trial in the court, Bhutto regretting his decision, stated, "I appointed a chief of staff belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami and the result is before all of us". 126 The execution of Bhutto otherwise famous as "Bhutto's judicial murder" wiped out the remnants of political opposition. The Supreme Court judgement referred to the doctrine of state necessity which led to the imposition of Martial Law, and justified all actions taken by the Chief Martial Law administrator by the above mentioned doctrine. 127 Firmly saddled by judicial references Zia relied on the coercive machinery of the army for long eleven years. He mobilised conservative forces that had no quarrels with him and deflected the participatory process till his death in office. Zia's military career remained apolitical till he was made the Chief of Staff, but the PNA-Ied Nizam-e-MustaJa agitation changed him from an apolitical army man to a clever usurper.128 Hasan-Askari Rizvi argues that once military commanders get comfortable to the use of supreme political power under the cover of martial law or any such martial law decrees, they remain extremely reluctant to give up or work out a power sharing deal with democratic forces. 129 President Zia ul Haq was no exception. ~e ruled Pakistan with a "messiah" and "saviour" complex while constantly deferring promised elections on some pretext or other. Interestingly, General Zia reiterated his commitment to "organise free and fair elections" which were to be originally held in October 1977. 130 But, sensing a PPP victory in the event of massive outpourings of public sympathy for

125 Mr. Ahmed Raza Kasuri survived an attack on his life, while his father died. A High Court inquiry cleared Bhutto of all charges, but Kasuri refilled the case against him after the military take over. The cause of his disenchantment seemed to be his failure to get a PPP ticket to fight elections. Eager to see his end, Zia ensured his rearrest on the same old charge and he was executed later. See, Benazir Bhutto, Daughter ojthe East, p. 58.

KaIid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction oj Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 162.

126

127 See Kamal Azfar, "Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan" in BurId and Baxter (eds.), Pakistan under Military: Eleven Years oJZia-ul-Haq (Boulder; Colorado, 1991), p. 84. 128

Talbott, A Modem History, n. 126, p. 255.

129

Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. 24, no.5 (May 1984), p. 536.

130 Zia ul Haq's first Press Conference, The New York Times, July 9,1977 as cited in Askari Rizvi, Ibid,. p. 538.

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Bhutto, Zia tried to divert public opinion from democracy and elections either by reopening old cases of graft and conuption against Bhutto or by referring to the unstable regional environment. At the same time, Zia tried to legitimise his military regime through his constant reference to Islam as the panacea for the ills that Pakistan was plagued with. According to Zia, Pakistan created in the name of Islam ''will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country".131 Zia relentlessly pursued Islamisation and justified it on the ground that the ideology of Pakistan was Islam and nothing but Islam, thus he emphasised on the preservation of Pakistan's basic ideology so that the country would not be influenced or exposed to secular ideologies. 132 Under the Zia regime, newspaper articles and scholarly works on Qaid-e-Azam omitted the famous Constituent Assembly speech of Md. Ali Jinnah. In addition, a resolution was moved in the Majlis-e-Shura that imposed a prohibition on any written or verbal comment that ''would in any way directly or indirectly detract from

or derogate (Jinnah's) high status, position and

achievement". 133 Parallel to Zia's Islamisation programme, efforts were made to bring certain amendments in the Constitution so as to consolidate his regime. The advisory council of Islamic Ideology made the observations that the Presidential form of government was the nearest to Islam and thus needed to be followed. 134 The President was empowered to nominate and remove the Prime Minister. He also had the power to dissolve the National Assembly. Provincial autonomy was severely curtailed and the parliament was given legislative powers in matters which come under the Purview of states. ''The doctrine of state necessity has thus become the slippery slope of legitimization of the overriding 131 Pakistan Times. July 7, 1977 cited in William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. XIX, no. 6, June 1979, p. 555. 132 C.G.P. Rakisits, "Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan under President Zia: The Government's and the Opposition's Approaches", Pacific Affairs, p. 79.

m Talbot, Modem History, n. 126, p. 49. Majlis-e-Shura means the parliament. This is cleared by Article 1 of the Constitution. The members of the Shura belonged to various interests groups, landowners, businessmen, professionals and even members of various political parties 134 The CII made certain tailor made recommendations for Zia. It said the President was supposed to be a true Muslim and knowledgeable in Islamic matters.

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power of the military in Pakistan.,,135 Zia ul Haq kept the 1973 Constitution under suspension, but the CII (Council of Islamic Ideology) was allowed to function. The twenty-member-CII put forward suggestions for new Islamic institutions. The military regime accepted the suggestions and established the Federal Sharia court (FSC) and the Islamic University. A Shari a Appellate Bench was also established in the Supreme Court. 136 Islamic University as the very name suggests undertook research on Islamic issues. It was also involved in the task of imparting knowledge based on Islamic law and Sharia.

Zia ul Haq's rule was a one man show till he placed the initial 286 member contingent in the Majlis-e-Shura in place of the dissolved National Assembly. 137 The unrepresentative body had the four main functions: to increase the pace of Islamisation; to make ground-work for Islamic democracy since Zia believed that western style democracy was not suitable for Pakistan; to manage and overcome socio-economic difficulties; to offer 'opinion and wisdom' on international affairs. 138 Since the real power to amend the constitution and bring about new legislative measures rested with the head of the military regime, the Majlis-i-Shura remained an advisory body only. Bereft of any law making or fmancial powers, the Shura for all practical purpose became a "grand debating society whose expenses are paid by the state treasury". 139 On the whole, Zia's Islamisation measures were not simply aimed at

consolidating the military rule, but also foreclosing the possibility of the return of the civilian actors to the political centre-stage. The hurried execution of Bhutto ignoring the appeals made by heads of state both from the Islamic world and West revealed that Zia's primary objective after the seizure of power was his survival. While his relation with the

135

Azfar, Pakistan, n. 57, p. 114.

136 Samina Yasmeen, Pakistan and the Struggle for Real Islam, n. 46, p. 71. The author writes that Zia undertook steps with the intention of Islamising Pakistan being heavily influenced by Maududi. He appointed ulema judges to the Federal sharia court which had the authority to examine laws suo moto. 137 138 J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, "Islamization and -Social Policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women'" Asian Survey, XXV, no. 6, June 1985, p. 590. 139

Askari Rizvi, The Paradox, n. 131, p. 547.

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PPP was strained beyond repaIr, he moved closer to the NAP, a right wmg conglomeration of nine political parties. The reason they preferred Zia was due to lack of reliable alternatives. With state patronage, many of them helped Zia in carving out a constituency for him. 14O He used the rhetoric of Islam to win over Islamic parties, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami. Growth of Jrnaat-i-Islami The Nizam-e-MustaJa movement against the People's Party government catapulted Jamaat to great political heights. Its role in bringing Islam to the political centre-stage was noticed by Ziaul-Haq and together they worked on an ideological engineering project to bring all the right wing forces under state authority. Jamaat not only endorsed Zia's Islamisation programme but also lent support in suppressing remnants of people's party resistance. The goodwill created between the military regime and religious orthodoxy created space for the Jamaat to be a part of the goveinment 141 • The question which comes to mind is why was Jamaat co-opted? In a way it was mutual dependence or the marriage of convenience between Zia in has search for legitimacy and Jamaat in its desperate bid to curve out a place for itself. The ideological commonality between Zia's Islamisation and Jamaat's ideological roots needs to be highlighted so as to explain their mutual dependence for survival in Pakistan politics. Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), the founder of Jamaat was the single most important personage who ensured that Islam remained in the foreground of Pakistan's politics and foreign policy since 1947.

142

Ironically, Maududi was opposed to Pakistan's founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League politics before partition in 1947, though he shared the Muslim League's views about religion constituting the basis of nationality. Maududi clarified his position regarding his apathy towards Muslim leagues when he said "our concern then

140

Rais, State, Society and Democratic Change, n. 81, p. xvm.

141 lamaat-e-Islamic enjoyed political power after thirty years of political activity in Pakistan. The PNA received the portfolios of information and broadcasting, production and industry, petroleum, water and power. 142 Syyedvali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat -i-Islami of Pakistan (London: 1. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 108.

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was Islam and the ability of those who sought to represent it.,,143 Maududi's Jamaat worked as a political party to safeguard the interests of the Muslims and the aim at as Islamic revolution Muslim society. To realise his project he worked towards bringing about an intellectual change among the people, secondly to discipline and organize them so as to make them fit to sustain a movement and thirdly to initiate refonns through various social and humanitarian works fmally work towards Islamising the leadership. Only when the government is inspired by Islam, Islamisation of the society could be carried out leading to an Islamic state. Maududi believed that mere declaration of faith was not enough instead every Muslim should strive hard to wage jihad in order to demonstrate the efficacy of god's kingdom in this world. His ideology on jihad can be understood for the following lines, This is the litmus test for the truth or certitude of your faith. If your certitude is genuine, then you will not be able to sleep peacefully being part of another din. To follow Islam and abide by the norms of another religion would mean that every moment in life would be like sleeping on a bed of thoms, food would be like poison and the desire to establish god's religion would be an all-consuming desire. But if one was at peace co-existing with another din, then one would not be a momin, no matter how many genuine prayers and other forms of worship one might perform or Islamic philosophy one might expound. l44

Such an orthodox distinction between believers and non-believers forecloses any space for catholicity in Maududi's brand oflslam. These views (against Ahmediyas, and non-Muslims) found the most energetic expression in Ziaul-Haq's policy measures focusing on Islamisation. Jamaat was steadfast in its demands to introduce an Islamic constitution and mobilised the ulema and the masses to pressurise the state to do the same. Maududi's ideological world-view was disseminated through education and other state institutions during under Ziaul- Haq, thereby rising the Jamaat's stature Besides, his talks were broadcasted on radio Pakistan and advice solicited. His views were highlighted in the front pages of the national print media and a number of thinkers, writers and journalists belonging to the Jamaat camp were patronised as the inner coterie of Zia's advisers to enable him to lay the footprints for an Islamic state. 145

Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, "Hamne Tehrik-i-pakistan ke sath nahin diya tha", Nawa'e waqt (August 15,1975), p.3 quoted in Ibid, p.19.

143

144

Ayesha Jalal, Partisans ofAllah Jihad in south Asia (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2008), p.254.

145

Nasr, The Vanguard, n. 144, pp.l93-194.

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had great loyalty and reverence to the Shariah and believed any kind of non-adherence to it as sacrilegious. 5 The purpose of the 19th century movement was ''the total destruction of a Pantheon of confused beliefs which had accumulated semi-divine deities from multireligious and cultural contacts, superstition, animism, demotic syncreticism, bhakti movements, Sufi tolerance, ontological monism poetic license and several other sources, Indian as well as foreign, but all of them alien to fundamentalist Islam". 6 The Farazi movement in Bengal espoused the cause of the poor peasantry and preached against all outside influence (local syncretic symbols and cultural elements) to be un-Islamic. "It was a fundamentalist movement involving poorer sections of agrarian society, and it was its particular emphasis on economic and agrarian questions that primarily distinguished it from the Waliullahi tradition of Delhi".7 Although the two movements were different in their outlook and flourished in separate geographical zones, historians do not doubt the possibility of these movements complementing each other on issues concerning their common goals, especially during Jihadi campaigns. 8 The colonial state ruled by the non-Muslims set off two types of responses among the Muslims. While the movements spearheaded by Shah Waliullah and the Faraizis were essentially conservative in nature, modem or adaptive response was represented by Sir Sayeed Ahmed Khan. The latter was part of the larger trend in the Muslim world centred on iftihad or 'reasoning', which is antithetical to taqlid or blind imitation and passive acceptance of the Koranic injunctions. 9 Regardless of their apparent differences in approach and expression, at the root of these responses lay the conscious effort at coping with the challenges posed by the British colonialism which was of both political and 5

Aziz Ahmad, An Intellectual History ofIslam in India (Edinburgh 1969), pp. 9-12.

6

Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (London, 1964), p. 210.

Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906 A Quest for identity, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981)p.40.

7

8 W.W. Hunter, The Indian Mussalmans (London, 1872), p. 9 quoted in Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, p. 42. Hunter writes ..that a network of conspiracy has spread itself over our provinces and that the bleak mountains which rise beyond the Punjab are united by a chain of treason depots with the tropical swamps through which Ganges merges into the sea".

The rise of the theological conflict between the two schools in the 18th century onwards contributed to the progressive decline of Islam. For details, see Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (London: Fiber & Fiber, 1982), pp. 56-61; Aziz AI-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London; Verso, 1993), Chap. V, pp.89-103. 9

45

sources of fmance and expenditure was perceived as harassment tactic on the part of the military ruler.. 149 Instead of proper participatory elections, Zia announced a referendum to be held on December 19, 1984, which required a 'yes' or 'no' vote from the electorate on the question of Islamization, and whether they supported the Islamic ideology of Pakistan.

An 'yes' vote would be interpreted as supporting Zia for a period of five years. The Martial law ruler claimed to have received a 98% affirmative vote. I50 Thus, ''through the referendum verdict, he claimed the power to amend it (Constitution) to impart an Islamic bias to its secular contents".151 The political parties under the MRD (Movement for Restoration of Democracy) banner refused to acknowledge the referendum results, Zia in a show of state power threatened to arrest them for criminal offence. Emboldened by the popular mandate President Zia announced in August 1983 the government's intention to go ahead with non-party legislative elections. The August 1983 speech of Zia triggered waves of discontent to spill into full scale rural uprising in the province of Sind. 152 Among the factors that accounted for 'the Sindhi anger against the state, the most important was the low representation of Sindhis in the· Central administrative secretariat as well as the military.153 However, the Sindhis' sense of deprivation owes its origin to the post-partition days when settlers (Mohajirs) from India were distributed property left behind by rich land owning Hindus. 154 Adding to the problem of the unequal land distribution system and the rising poverty as high as 65 percent, the demand for regional autonomy and preservation of their language created conditions conducive to the Sindhi upsurge precipitated by the manner in which the military dealt with Bhutto created lot of anguish against the Military rule. Powerful yet

•

149 Korson and Maskiell, /slamisation, n. 140, p. 596. Jamaat was the only party which escaped registration process with the Election Commission. 150

Baxter, Government & Politics in South Asia, n. 41, p. 214.

151

Mushtaq Ahmad, The Politics o/Crisis (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1987), p. 202.

Charles H. Kennedy, "Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. XXIV, no. 6 (June 1984), p. 698. The author highlights the urban-rural divide in Economic matters in Sind and links it to the rise of Provincial unrest in the state. 152

153

Rakisits, Centre-Province Relations, n. 134, p. 82.

154 See Adil Khan, Politics 0/ Identity: Ethnic Nationalsim and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage India Publication Ltd., 2005), p. 136.

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suppressed feelings of hurt, anger and pride exploded against Zia Regime, when the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) called for public protests and agitation against party-less elections. 155 Despite the boycott by MRD agitation, the military consolidated its position and engaged itself in power politics the political groups in Pakistan were in disarray.

156

The

conservative groups failed to put up a challenge to Zia because of their co-option in the state power structure.

157

Although some of the right wing parties left Zia's civilian

cabinet, they assured the military commanders of covert support outside the government. In such a relationship both benefited in some ways. The Jamaat enjoyed relative freedom

to extend its influence over the state institutions while for the military it acted as a legitimiser and spared it from the risk of political agitation. Zia went ahead with the referendum clearly ignoring the political parties' opposition. Interestingly, he sued the Jamaat's endorsement of the referendum to justify his political project in the name of Islam. 158 After the referendum in 1985, Zia lifted the Martial Law which was the longest Martial law in the history of Pakistan. Subsequent to the lifting, the 1973 Constitution was restored .subject to amendments. He appointed Junejo of the Muslim League as the Prime Minister. It is during this time that the highly controversial 8th amendment to the constitution passed.

159

The 8th amendment protected all actions of the President during

the Martial Law regime. All the Presidents orders, ordinances, martial law regulations, notifications, rules, Orders or bye-laws passed by the Martial Law regime since the 5th of July 1977 cannot be challenged in the court of law under any condition. 16O The 8th amendment was used by Zia as a tool to dampen the democratic institutions as evident in ISS

Christopher Jaffrelot (ed.), Nationalism Without a Nation (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), pp. 23-25.

156

Muhammad Waseem, "Election politics in 1985", The Muslim Vol. 9, nos. 10,11,12,22, April, 1985.

157

N asr, Th e Vanguard, n.144, p. 196.

158

Rizvi, ''The Paradox", n. 131, pp. 543-544.

159 The Revival of 1973 Constitution order empowered the President to appoint and dismiss the PrimeMinister secondly the President was given the power to dismiss the governors and federal ministers. Thirdly he had the authority to dissolve national and StatelProvincial assemblies.

For more on 8th Amendment see, Martin Lau, The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan (Leiden: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 2006), pp. 81-83. 160

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the dismissal of Muhammad Khan Junejo on the flimsy ground of "his lack of enthusiasm for theocratisation".161 The story of Zia's consolidation of power would be incomplete without reference to the army. The Pakistan army supported his moves and emerged as the biggest corporation in Pakistan. The army, in tum, benefited immensely from his patronage. The material benefits were far too many to be enumerated but some need mentioning. Appointments of army officials to top civil jobs, facilities for loans and lands for construction, provincial secretarial posts and other top administrative posts where the successful candidates from civil services, Pakistan foreign service and police services were required to join. That apart the army had a 10 percent quota of civil jobs reserved for them and numerous diplomatic assignments abroad as ambassadors. 162 All the provincial governors were military personnel until Muhammad Khan Junejo's became Prime Minister. 163 The Pakistani army's control during Zia was so extensive that no Islamic organisation was ever in a position to politically or militarily challenge its position. 164

On the other hand the army made use of Islam and Islamist organization to counterbalance the threats from main-stream political parties. General Ayub trained in the best traditions of British army believed that the responsibility of the army was to secure territorial integrity and national stability.165 General Zia, however, had an altogether different perception of the army's role. Along with defending the country's security, he sought an additional role i.e. the maintenance of Pakistan as an ideological state. He said,

161

"Sharifs Last Refuge", Newsline, September, 1998, p. 23.

162 Rizvi, "The Paradox", n. 131, pp. 549-550. The army in Pakistan has the fauji foundation the Air force Shaheen foundation and the navy has the Bharia foundation which expanded rapidly during Zia era. 163 R. Laporte, "Administrative Restructuring during the Zia period" in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter (ed.), Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia UI Haq (Boulder: Co., 1999), p. 129. 164

Burki, "Zia: Eleven Years" in Burki and Baxter Ibid., p. 42.

165 Ayub was a modernist thinker, and attached more importance to economic development. He intervened to stop the process of political decay. See, Wayne A Wilcox, "Pakistan Coup d'etat of 1958", Pacific Affairs, 38 (Summer, 1965), pp. 142-63.

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the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-west Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-west India".16 Likewise, Choudhry Rahmat Ali, another Muslim of South Asian origin and a student of Cambridge coined the word Pakistan for the first time in 1933. Rahmat Ali wrote, "Pakistan is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our home-lands - 'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is Punjab, Afghania (NorthWest Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan and Balochistan. It means the lands of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolises the religious beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland. It has no other origin and no other meaning, and it does not admit of any other interpretations". 17 At a time when the National Congress was taking up economic and political issues against the imperialist power, the Muslim League and its reactionary leaders supported communal issues like the partition of Bengal, demanded for a separate electorate and highlighted the interests of their community to be different from those of Hindus l8 The other major development during this period (1935) was the rejection of the federal plea of the 1935 Government of India Act by the Congress. 19 The National Congress decided to fight elections under the New Act of 1935 to show the unpopularity of the Act, and won seven out of eleven provinces. It formed coalition ministries in two others with the exception of Punjab and Bengal. The Muslim League too contested the elections to the provincial assemblies as required by the Government of India Act 1935 and the results were too shocking for the League. Out of 489 Muslim seats only 104 seats were won by the Muslim League. 2o Following the humiliating defeat, the Muslim League raised the spectre of 'Hindu raj' and the bogey of "Islam in danger." 16

Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, n. 10, pp. 103-104.

17

Ibid., p. 104.

18

Bipin Chandra, Modern India (Delhi: NCERT, 1971), pp. 254-255

19 The 1935 Government of India Act provided for the establishment of All India federation, provincial autonomy for all provinces including the princely states and a bicameral federal legislative. The National Congress rejected the Act on the ground that insurmountable power given to Governor General and provincial Governors in the Act. The Muslim League too disapproved the Act as being anti-Muslim. Ibid., p. 291.

20

Sayeed, Pakistan, The Formative Phase, n. 10, p. 83.

48

Bhutto's execution and secondly the army did not have a successful blueprint of radically reorganizing Pakistani Society.171 In a country where all democratic institutions were stifled, General Zia's military

stood like a colossus on account of its organization, discipline and indoctrination. The Pakistan army was predominantly Punjabi followed by Pathans.172 Compared to other ethnic groups inside Pakistan the Punjabis have effectively managed to control state power.173 This successfully explains their stakes in the preservation of state ideology and state survival more than anyone else in Pakistan. According to Cohen, "From the beginning these (military) officers claimed a special position in the new state of Pakistan: they stressed that the virtues of Pakistan were their virtues, that the Islamic character of Pakistan was reflected in the Islamic character of the military.,,174 The ideological indoctrination of the soldiers and officers was important because they are required to go into battle with their own people. As observed by Alvi, "Their minds and hearts must be infused with a sense of mission and national fervour. The exploitation of Islamic ideology and the labeling of dissidents as enemies of Islam fulfil a purpose here".175 Lacking political legitimacy the Zia regime continued to perpetuate itself in the name of a holy mission. The mission was to islamise the country and polity. He had the entire machinery of the army to back his political agenda. Last but" not the least, the Pakistani middle class was neither big nor strong enough to assert its strength and sustain democratic institutions against the Pakistani army.

I71

Cohen, The Pakistan Army, n. 169, p. 130.

172 Ibid., p. 42, p. 52. Cohen writes that in 1979 the Pakistani anny was 70% Punjabi, 14% from NWFP, 9% Sind, 3% from Baluchistan and 1.3% from Azad Kashmir. The percentages have not shown drastic changes since then. The greater emphasis on Punjab was explained in tenns of its being a core area in strategic terms. 173 Tariq Amin Khan, Economy, Society and the State in Pakistan", Contemporary South ASia, vol. 9, no. 2 (July 2000), p. 182. 174

Cohen, The Pakistan Army, n. 169, p. 42.

175 Hamza Alavi, "Part II: The State in Crisis Class and State", in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (ed.), Pakistan: The Roots ofDictatorship (Delhi: OUP, 1983), p. 68.

84

External Environment The most important external factor which helped Zia to consolidate his regime was the Soviet occupation of neighbouring Afghanistan in December 1979. Prior to the invasion Pakistan was somewhat isolated internationally. The issue of nuclear nonproliferation was the chief cause for concern between Pakistan-US relations. The United States had punished Pakistan for its secret nuclear programme which surpassed the thresholds set by American laws.176 Apart from this, Pakistani leadership took time to digest the American cold response during the 1971 war with India. Meanwhile, the USSR was considered a good friend of India and China, a trusted ally of Pakistan. There were certain limits to which China was prepared to go, especially when it had entered into a process of normalizing border and other disputes with India. I77 The violent execution of Bhutto and the Islamic character of the military regime. did little good to Pakistan's international image. But this state of affairs was a short lived one. Pakistan soon transformed itself into a frontline state to counter the Communist march. The massive influx of refugees from Afghanistan and the Pakistani gesture of feeding and sheltering them won Zia's Pakistan the much needed sympathy.178 In return for Islamabad's commitment to fight Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US administration restored the much needed aid which was both economic and military in nature. 179 With the Soviet invasion in 1979 the theatre of the Cold War shifted from Central Europe to South West Asia which in turn enhanced the geostrategic saliency of Pakistan

in the eyes of the US. Pakistan was important in the strategic calculations for reasons 176 For more details, see Teresita C. Schaffer, "US influence on Pakistan: Can partners have Divergent Priorities?, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26: 1, (Winter, 2002-03), pp. 170-71. 177 Frederic Grare, Pakistan in the Face of the Afghan Conflict 1979-85 at the turn of the Cold War (Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), p. 63. 178 The exodus of refugees took place through out the period of Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The influx was over 3 million. The Pakistani government bore the burden of shelter and a monthly allowance of 12 dollar per person. Later international aid agencies got involved in the aid programme. For details, see Grant M. Farr, "The effect of Afghan refugees on Pakistan", in C. Baxter (ed.), Zia's Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), pp. 93-110. 179 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 99. The US pledged $3.25 billion aid plan in addition to the sum promised by the UK and EU for the development of Bluchistan strategically.

85

more than one. It shares the international boundary with Afghanistan. However, the presence of Pushtuns along both sides of the Mortiiner-Durand line has remained a sensitive issue between both the countries. I80 The Pushtun issue involved big powers at one point of time, when the US supported Pakistan and the Soviet Union backed Afghan claims over the Pakistan part of North West Frontier Province for its homogeneous Pushtun people. The deadlock of the 1960s led to the total breakdown of diplomatic relations when Pakistan closed its ports for the entry of Afghan goods in protest against Afghan interference and encroachments on its territory. J81 The involvement of big powers had politicised the Pushtun factor and apart from those American interests in the area was primarily due to its Sunni Muslim population. After the 1979 Iranian revolution the US was apprehensive about similar revolution in the Muslim world particularly in the Gulf. In response to the challenge posed by Khomeini and his rhetoric about the "export of revolution" the US tried to build up a Sunni counterweight by promoting Sunni fundamentalism. In this scheme of things Zia's Pakistan fitted well and hence US had no hesitation in propping up the military junta in Islamabad, as a counter poise to the possible spread of Shite variety of fundamentalism. Under the full protection of United States of America General Zia played host to a number of radical Islamist groups. "During the first Afghan war the Inter-service Intelligence Agency's strategy was to support hard-line Islamic groups, and with American concurrence, the lSI characterized the war against the Soviet intruders as a religious struggle against atheistic communism".182 It is again with American encouragement that the Muslim youths were indoctrinated and recruited to fight for Jihad in Afghanistan, thereby creating fertile grounds for terrorist groups like AI Qaeda to grow. 183 Zia's support to the mujahideen through arms and ammunitions and guerrillas training camps raised his stature among the religious right while neutralising his civilan 180 The 1983 Mortimer-Durand line was rejected by the then Afghan Prime Minister in 1947. The latter consider the Durand Line unjust since it divides the same people who enjoy social cultural, linguistic and territorial unity. See, Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account (London: Verso, 1988), p. 30. 181

Grare, Pakistan in the Face ofAfghan Conflict, n. 179, p. 8.

182

Stephen Philip Cohen,The Jdea of Pakistan (Washington; Brookings Institutions Press, 2004), p. 31.

183

Ibid.

86

opponents. "The Jamaat-i-Islami criticised Zia on a number of other counts but gave full support to his Afghan policy. The Jamaat had strong support among the mujahideen groups operating out of Peshawar".184 The Jamaat played a crucial role in generating public opinion in favour of Islamic jihad against the Soviet occupation. What subsequently emerged was a unique partnership between the Jamaat and Pakistani security forces in pursuit of a common objective. This led to the involvement of the Jamaat in the sensitive areas like the flow of funds and arms to the Mujahedins, exposing its cadres to military training by the elite forces. I85 In the course ofthe Afghan war, the Jamaat was in some ways successful in projecting itself as the symbol of pan-Islamism in the Muslim world.

Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation Mesures Both the domestic and external factors highlighted above contributed in varying degree to the consolidation of the military regime until Zia's death in an air crash in 1988. But what helped Zia overcome the initial problem of legitimacy was the sate-led Islamisation programme, which included judicial reforms, introduction of Islamic economics, Islamic penal code and a new educational policy based on Islamic injunctions. Judiciary When Nusrat Bhutto evoked Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution terming the Martial Law interventions illegal, it was Chief Justice Anwarul Haq and his team which came to the General's rescue. The judicial bench legitimized Zia's intervention, ''by the highest consideration of state necessity',!86 Believing in Zia's 'Words or his "solemn Pledge" to hold national elections in 90 days as irrefutable truth the Chief Justice invested the Martial Law Chief the authority to change the constitution. Little did he realize that

184 Sbahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-1988", Asian Survey, vol. XXVIII, no. 10 (October 1988), p. 1097. 1~

.

Nasr, The Vanguard, n.144, p.195.

186 Pakistan, supreme Court Judgement on Begum Nusrat Bhutto's Petition Challenging Detention of Mr. Z.A. Bbutto and others under Martial Law Order 12 of 1977 (Lahore, 10 November 1977), p. 23 as quoted in Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad, NlllCR, 1994), p. 356.

87

''this extravagance would later cost the court much of its authority and jurisdiction.,,187 Zia used the ruling to his best advantage and set upon his mission through numerous measures of tampering with the constitution. In an utter disregard to his pledge of holding early elections, Zia shifted his

priority towards Islamising Pakistan in order to legitimise his regime. The lack of legitimacy was the major challenge to the regime, for politically he was not elected to the office of the president and thus was a usurper. Legally he had no power to become the head of the state. In religious terms he was not backed by people or their leaders according to the Sunni jiqh nor was he a mujtahid who had the power to interpret Shia jiqh. l88 What one witnessed was the programme of Nizam-i-Islam to convince the people

of the establishment of a sharia based society. In an address to the nation he said, "I must say that the spirit of Islam demonstrated during the recent [anti Bhutto] movement, was commendable. It proves that Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country".189 In other words, he tried to harp on the raison d'etre of Pakistan, which was the establishment of an Islamic state. In the process of Islamisation, Zia saw judicial activism as a serious road-block

which he tried to overcome through numerous constitutional amendments by the establishment of military courts and the provisional constitution order. The crackdown on judiciary in an attempt to undermine its autonomy was due to the increasing number of Public petitions against the Martial law interventions. l90 This was perceived as a direct threat to the military junta rule. Shariat benches in the High Court as well as Supreme Court were established in 1979. The purpose of the Shariat benches was to "examine and decide the question

187

Anwar- Syed, Pakistan: Islam Politics and National Solidarity (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), p. 162.

188

Weiss (ed.) Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 10.

189

Pakistan Times, July 6, 1977 quoted in A. Syed, Pakistan: Islamic Politics. n. 189, p. 165.

190 The Civil courts were full of cases of civilians trying to protect their interests against the Martial law regulations. The cases included Nusrat Bhutto's petition to challenging the Seizure of the Printing Press by Junta rulers, see Waseem, Politics and the State, n. 188, pp. 374-375.

88

whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam".191 The lawyers practicing in front of the Shariat bench were required to possess five or more years of legal experience in the high Court and were supposed to be "an Alim" which implies one having command over Islamic matters and the shariat. These Sharia courts had a limited role to play in the sense they remained passive players till a law was challenged as being repugnant to Islamic tenants, secondly the Shariat courts did not in any other way limit the authority and functioning of civil or military courts. And finally though laws were conformed to Islamic Sharia, the greater question of deriving the entire legal system from the Sharia was not discussed at all. 192 The Shariat benches were made subservient to the military courts which had the authority to bypass the opinion of the Shariat COurtS. 193 The Zia regime passed a law which debarred any other court to contest the ruling of the military court or issue any process against the Chief Martial Law authority.194 Thus, the common man could now be arrested without being told about his charges and could take no legal action against the military government since it was placed above the Islamic jurisprudence. Zia later replaced the Shariat benches by a Federal Shariat Court in Islamabad where the lawyers appearing before the court were required to "state, expound and interpret injunctions of Islam relevant to the proceedings. ,,195 The judges belonging to the entire legal setup were required to take an oath of loyalty to the military regime. In the year 1981, the junta ruler issued the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO). The new order limited the authority of the judiciary to the extent of making them superfluous. The judges could no longer quash detention orders of the military court, could not issue bail and stay orders on executions and floggings for want of evidence. The PCO ignored elections, Parliament and all other democratic moves. The fundamental rights ensured by the 1973 constitution were done away with 191

Weiss, Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 11.

192

Ibid. p. 12.

193 Oleg V. Pleshov, Islamism and Travails of Democracy in Pakistan (Delhi: Greenwich Millennium Press, 2004), p. 208. 194 On May 1980 the Junta ruler amended Article 199 of the Constitution stripping the High Courts from reviewing martial Law order.

195

Weiss,Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p.12.

89

and repression of any form of dissent became the order of the day.196 By making him and his cronies above the law of the land General Zia departed from Islamic traditions, which consider Sunnah to be supreme. By chocking all outlets of public opinion, he forgot the Koranic practices which enjoins the ruler to maintain close contact and consultations with the public. 197 Islamic Economic Programme

Pakistan's economy had developed along capitalist lines and thus islamising it would take long years. This basic fact was even acknowledged by the government of Pakistan when it prepared the Report of the Committee on Islamisation!98 Interestingly the report stressed on the basic idea of Islamic economic management which was the realization of al-adl-wal-ahsan (Justice and kindness). To achieve these goals the need for improving the quality of life by providing universal education, by increasing the employment opportunities and easy availability of consumer products etc were proposed. The report was critical of the establishment of an interest free economy and introduction of Zakat as ''undue obsessions". The reason for arguing against an interest free economy was that it would destabilize the distribution of income and lead to economic exploitation of the weaker sections in society.199 Although the objectives described by the committee were largely secular in their nature the larger objective was to connect with the core Islamic philosophy of promoting economic bettennent not by selfish measures but by bridging the economic inequality. Islam to the committee "would not - as it cannot - use widening income differentials as a policy instrument to promote capital formation and economic growth by virtue of its commitment to al-adl wal-ahsan. It was the responsibility of the state to prevent the occurrence of a situation in which the initial cost of promoting growth was borne by the

196

For details, see Waseem, Politics and the State, n. 188, pp. 374-376.

197 Zia dampened judicial activism, he maintained strict censorship of the Press, refused to hold national elections, and made political parties irrelevant. See Weiss, Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 13 198 The Government of Pakistan. An Agenda for Economic Reforms: The Report oj the Committee on Islamisation (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1980) quoted in Shahid Burki, "Economic management within an Islamic context" in Weiss, Islamic Reassertion, D. 106, pp. 50-51.

199

Ibid., p. 51.

90

under-privileged segments of society. To prevent the poor from paying such a price: the public sector will be called upon in an Islamic economy to assume among other things a predominant role as producer of "wage goods". For social welfare requires not only a transfer of fmancial resources from the rich to the poor, but a diversion of real resources to the production of basic necessities of life ... In other words, the very composition of the consumer goods basket in an Islamic economy will require the state to playa tangible role in it.,,200 The Committee advocated for a greater and penetrating role of the state in poverty alleviation programmes, in redistribution of land and meeting the educational needs of the poor, so as to enable them to have access to basic living standards. The government, however, did not consider these recommendations as catering to their agenda and thus picked up only those points which it considered Islamic. That included the levy of Zakat and Ushr.

Zakat is an Islamic alms tax and ushr an

agricultural tax is one of the core principles ofIslamic faith. Until Zia's time Zakat was a personal religious obligation in Pakistan, but in 1980 by introducing the Zakat and ushr ordinance the military rulers made it a legal obligation. The ordinance states "the prime objective of the collection of Zakat and Ushr and disbursements therefrom, is to assist the needy, the indigent and the pOOr',.201 The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance empowered the government to make deduction at source at the rate of 2.5 percent from savings account deposits fixed deposits, Time deposit accOlmts and shares held in National Investment Trust, Investment Corporation of Pakistan and other such companies where the majority of shares were owned by Muslims. Zakat was levied on Provident funds and insurance policies etc?02 Zakat deducted at source makes its way to Central Zakat Fund and distributed to provincial Zakat fund's various nation wide network. It is from the local Zakat committees funds were distributed to mustahaqeen. Beneficiaries of the Zakat

funds were widows, orphans, disabled students of Islamic schools (deeni madrasas) poor patients and many such needy people.

200

Ibid.• p. 52.

201 See. Grace Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr as a Welfare System" in A. Weiss (ed.) Islamic Reassertion. n. 106. p. 79. 202 See brochure of the Department of Information of the Government of Pakistan, 1987 quoted in Pleshov, Islamism. n. 195. p. 130.

91

The state intervention to make it obligatory brought to the surface the differences of opinion among members of various sects of Islam. It evoked protest and demonstrations from the Shia community who "claimed that it violated the right of Shias to distribute alms as dictated by their consciences and in accordance with the guidelines of Islamic law as interpreted in the jurisprudence of their own sect.,,203 Zakat Ordinance introduced by Zia triggered off a vicious cycle of sectarian animosity disrupting the fragile social mosaic. The Shias indulged in violent demonstrations and protests against Zakat laws and finally were successful in clairiUng exemption from governmental Zalmt.204

General Zia's claim that Zakat would usher in an egalitarian society by bridging the gap between haves and have-nots did not convince anyone. The total collected amount in 1980-81 was about 600 million rupees or $60 million which meant less than one dollar worth assistance per capita per year in Pakistan where more than half the population were needy.20S The Ushr tax traces its practice in societies at a very early stage of economic development. The emphasis being on agriculture, the produce from farms was therefore subject to taxes instead of other assets. Even though the Pakistani officials did not provide any justifiable economic grounds which led to imposition of the agricultural tax, the government went ahead with it due to its desire to revive Shariabased tax rules?06 The entire efforts of the state were to highlight Zalmt and Ushr tax as serving the social security network of an Islamic state. Muslim economists worked on the concepts of Zalmt and substantiated the state's approach that Zalmt would help in the establishment of social and economic justice through re-distribution of wealth, while others built their

203 Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan" in Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 72. Although both Shias and Sunnis believe in Zakat, there exist differences of opinion as to who collects Zakat, how it is put to good use and how it should be determined. 204 The Ministry of Finance issued a Notification on April 27, 1981 which exempted Shias from Zakat for jurisprudential reasons. Although Shias still complained about official bungling, on pen and paper the exemptions were put in place.

205

Syed, Pakistan Islam Politics, D. 109, p.178.

206

Mayer, "IslamisatioD and Taxation", n. 205, pp. 73-74.

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arguments that it led to the wellbeing of whole society.207 The vision of a just economic system, social security and a perfect Islamic society was propelled by the events of 1970s and 1980s. Political leaders throughout the Islamic world encouraged this dream and Zakat became a measure to determine the Islamic nature of a government. Zakat in

Pakistan which was based on precepts of Sharia was meant to meet the "Islamic expectations of the people and the government.,,208 General Zia also realised that an economy free from distress was essential for his survival in power. In a private discussion with Shahid Javed Burki, he said, "I agree that Ayub Khan would have lasted longer had the economy not taken a beating following the 1965 war with India, and that the agitation against Bhutto would not have been expressed with such vehemence if some of the important groups in our society had not felt economically so insecure. My instructions to Ishaq Sahib are quite clear. I really don't care what he does as long as the economy continues to function smoothly and the poor and the lower middle class continues to see some hope from him.,,209 Ishaq Khan's management of the economy was impressive and the vast majority of middle and lower class happy with the economic tranquility?IO Living up to the need of the then times, the economic genius Gulam Ishaq Khan highlighted the spirit of moralism and declared that Islam permits economic gains when it is done in a righteous way. He claimed that after the great economic depression of 1931 the supporters of capitalist system almost favoured the same conclusions which Islam had spoken of 1300 years ago. 211 Thus the sense of economic well-being created conditions for political stability, which enabled Zia to go ahead with his plans to mould Pakistan's political structure.

Muslim Economists like Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi and Ahmed Khurshid worked on economic development in an Islamic framework.

207

208

Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat", n. 203, p. 82.

209

S. Burki, "Pakistan under Zia, 1977-88", Asian Survey, vol. XXVll, no. 10, October 1988, p. 1092.

210 Between 1977-78 and 1985-86, the GNP increased by 76% and per capita income by 34%. The economy benefited from large flow of remittances sent by Pakistanis from the Middle East. From 1975 to 1985, Pakistan received a total of $ 25 billion in remittances from the workers in Middle East and a large percentage of it went to the deprived sections of society. Ibid., p. 1093. 211

Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, n. 188, p. 380.

93

Islamic Penal Code

Most significant and controversial change that the Zia regime brought about in Pakistan was the adoption of Islamic laws famous as the Hudud laws as part of the new panel code. The Hudud ordinance issued by the regime included punishments for certain major types of crime. (i) Saraka i.e. theft of private property; (ii) Zina or adultery and fornication; (iii) QazJwhich refers to bearing false witness to adultery and (iv) al -Sharab which means consumption of intoxicants.212 Factors like circumstances under which a particular act was perfonned; severity of the act and whether the act deserves Hudud or Ta 'azir punishment were some issues which needed to be reviewed before Islamic

punishments were unleashed. A criminal received the harsher had punishments for theft if the actual theft is equivalent or more than 4.467 grams of gold. Apart from one's own admission to the crime, the act needs to be testified by two honest Salah Muslim men. The thief is subjected to amputation of his right hand at the wrist. The Shias, however, advocate cutting off the fmgers only.

Punishment for aiding cattle theft includes

confiscation of all immovable property and jail up to a maximum of fourteen years, while punishment for murder is execution.213 Along with Hudud laws to check theft, the government guaranteed private property and industrial concerns from indiscriminate nationalization. The Zina crimes which involved crimes of adultery and fornication and the strict punishments for the acts attracted every strong criticism from allover the world. The legal definition of Zina follows: "a (sane) adult man and a (sane) adult woman are said to commit Zina if they willfully have sexual intercourse without being validly married to each other',.214 Another part of the ordinance refers to Zina-bil-jabr which consists of sexual relations without consent. The military general believed that a person may be

prov~

guilty of

Zina-bil jabr ''with or without the consent of the parties".215 The evidence for Zina

212

Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n.106, p. 13.

213

Ibid., 12-15.

Anita Weiss, "Women's position in Pakistan Socio Cultural Effects of Islarnzation", Asian Survey, Vol. XXV No.8, August 1985, p. 870.

214

215

Ibid., p. 870.

94

crimes included confession of the accused or testimonies of four morally strong Muslim men. In the absence of the above evidence, it was the discretion of the law courts to settle the matter. However, in the event of evidence the punishment prescribed was death by stoning. The most written about cases of Safia Bibi and Lal Mai showed that the laws were put to discriminatory practices. Safia Bibi a blind maid who registered a case of rape by multiple men was sentenced to 15 lashes in public, 3 years imprisonment and a fine, the men guilty of the crime were acquitted for lack of evidence. The issue of rape and adultery were not distinguishable to the law makers. "As the law stands, it protects rapists, prevents women from testifying and confuses the issue of rape with adultery. As a result, a women who registers a case of rape can by her own admission be prosecuted for adultery while the rapist goes free for lack of evidence,,?16 In the midst of world wide coverage of the issue the federal shariat court reviewed the case of Shafia Bibi and dismissed her sentence. However, Lal Mai was not as lucky; she earned the dubious distinction of being publicly whipped in front of eight thousand people for adultery. The Council on Islamic Ideology put forward the Law of Evidence (Qanoon-e-shahadat) which modified the earlier Evidence law. It equated the evidence of two females with that of one man, in cases other than those under the Hudud Ordinance. The final version of the interpretation restricted the testimony of two-women being equal to that of one man only to financial cases?l? Another proposal by the Council of Islamic Ideology which is not decreed is the law of retaliation (Qasas) and blood money (Diyat). In case a man is murdered, the law allows a diyat which is equivalent to 30.4 kilos of silver and when a women is murdered the diyat is reduced to half. If a women is harmed the compensation is half of what would be given to a man?18 The list would be incomplete without the mention of the Ansari Commission Report, which disqualified women from occupying position of head of the state. The 216 Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed, Women in Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back (Lahore: Zed Press, 1987), p. 101. 217

Ibid., pp. 106-111.

218

Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, pp. 102-103.

95

report put restrictions on women leaving the country or serving abroad as diplomats without therr male escorts. The minimum age for women to become member of the Majlis-e-shura was 50 years. The proposals of the Islamic Ideology Council and the

Ansari Commission met with great resistance from women and human right activists through out Pakistan. Some analysts including Charles Kennedy consider Zia's Islamisation as very unprofessional and not gender-biased. They also argue that the Hudud Ordinances had a negligible impact on Pakistan's middle classes, as between 1980-85 the decisions of the Federal Sharia Court were revised 27 times, and the judges in the FSC were mostly foreign educated with no or little exposure to Islamic law. Topping them all, hudud Ordinances in many of Pakistan's provinces were not even implemented?19 Notwithstanding Kennedy's observations, Zia's Islamisation measures severely undermined the democratic institutions in Pakistan. Before Zia introduced such retrogressive measures, women in Pakistan were not punished for adultery. By replacing civil laws with Islamic laws the state sent a very clear message that it is the custodian of Islam as well as its promoter. The very presence of such laws in society led to resurgence of Orthodox interpretation of Islam. By promUlgating Hudud laws the state interfered in the private lives of its citizens in the name of morality. The government also issued directives to women news readers and air-hostesses to wear a dupatta over their heads. Similarly teachers and female students were asked to use scarves.220 Thus, ''the state moved on to take over the lives of women, to control their bodies, their space, to decide what they should wear, how they should conduct themselves, the jobs they could take the sports they could play, and took it upon itself to defme and regulate women's morality. This "attempt to impose single interpretation of Islam, has pitted Islam against Islam, sect

219 Charles Kennedy, "Islamisation and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No.1, Spring 1990, pp. 62-77. Also see Charles Kennedy, "Islamisation in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. xxviii, no. 3, March 1988, pp. 312-313.

220 See J Henry Korson and Michelle MaskieIl, "Islamisation and the Social policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women", Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No.6 (June 1985), pp. 601-602.

96

against sect".221 The Hudhud laws remained even after the demise of President Zia. Both Benazir Butto and Nawaz Sharif could not change it in the face of stiff opposition from the right-wing parties. It is true that both set up commission to investigate the ordinances which recommended amendments but neither showed courage to follow it. The rape laws were altered under Musharff wherein death penalty for extra-marital relations and producing four witnesses to prove rape cases were abolished, thereby resorting to some extent the dignity of the womenfolk. Education Policy

Education was also not spared by the Zia regime in its attempt to secure consent of the people, both for the military regime as well as for its Islamisation programme. The political motive behind this was to create an ideological base to rally popular support for the regime through official narratives by distorting history manipulating facts and inventing myths. The Islamisation of Pakistani society was apparently the long term goal but underlying this regime survival was the objective. With educational institutions Zia sought to legitimise his regime through consent of the public rather than using the state corrosive apparatus. So the state under Zia in theory appeared to be more consensual even though the state continued to resort to corrosive methods, in order to suppress any potential opposition.

In its efforts to make the state-sponsored Islamisation program acceptable among the people, the works of Bhutto regime were ignored. Religious literature dealing with introduction of "Islamic system" in Pakistan was seen while books on science and secular literature disappeared from libraries.222 Zia on his many visits to universities, colleges and schools took a very nationalist stance and declared that his government would not tolerate any "anti-Islamic" and "anti-Pakistan" elements. He issued veiled threats that the government would take note of those who propagate the ideas of secularism and atheism?23 All this was in tune with the state's effort to maintain Pakistan as an 221 Nighat Said Khan, Voices Within: Dialogues with Women on Islam (Lahore: ASR Publications, 1993), p.89.

m Pleshov, /siamism, o. 195, p. 190. 223

Ibid., p. 190.

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ideological state. Zia spoke his mind when he said in 1982 ''the preservation of that Pakistan Ideology and the Islamic character of the country was ... as important as the security of the country's geographical boundaries".224 The liberal side of Quaid-i-Azam was suppressed and the entire media world in Pakistan had a selective amnesia about the historic speech of Jinnah to the Constituent Assembly, while bringing out news items on occasion of his birth anniversary. The state made an attempt to put a brake on scholars and eminent personalities who questioned the state's various actions to paint Jinnah as a Islamist. 225 A resolution was passed in the Majlis-i-Shura which banned all verbal and written comment that "derogates Jinnah's high status position and achievements.,,226 Textbooks highlighted the state narratives the father of the nation was portrayed as the Chief architect of an Islamic state: "The All India Muslim League, and even the Quaid-e-Azam himself, said in the clearest possible terms that Pakistan would be an ideological state, the basis of whose laws would be the Koran and sunnah, and whose ultimate destiny would be to provide a society in which Muslims could individually and collectively live according to the laws oflslam"?27 The education programmes stressed that the military have more right to rule the country than those elected in a democratic setup. ''Text books were full of the descriptions of the great battles which brought victories to the warriors of Islam, references to the heroic deeds of the Ghazis (those who fight for the faith) and Shahids (those who died in the fight for the faith)".228 The educational policy during Zia's period aim~

at altering the curricula and the textbooks to affmn its commitment to Islam. The

school curriculum provided fertile ground for the spread of extremist religious education Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publisher, 1986), p. 242.

224

Ex-Chief Justice Mohammad Munir in his monograph, From Jinnah to Zia wrote, "The Quaid-i-Az;im never used the words 'Ideology of Pakistan' and for 15 years the ideology of Pakistan was not known to anybody until in 1962 when the solitary member of the n used these words." Muslim League member Shaukat Hayat also objected to the state's efforts to colour Jinnah as an Islamists. 225

226

Talbott, A Modern History, n. 126, p. 256.

Azhar Hamid, et al "Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan" (Islamabad: Allana Iqbal Open University, 1983), p. 22 quoted in Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy and Abdul Hameed Nayar, "Rewriting History of Pakistan-Islam Politics and the State," in M.Asghar Khan (ed.), Islam Politics and State (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 175. 227

228

Pleshov, Is/amism, n. 195, p. 191.

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was made compulsory by the regime. In order to know the entire history of the Islamic world which involved the life of the Prophet, Umayyads Abbasids, it was recommended to follow one officially approved book - Tarikh-i-Islam by Dr. Hamid?29 In fact, Zia entrusted the right-wing Jamaat-i-Islami with the task of changing the school curriculum, which led to a heavy infusion of Maududi's vision and ideas in the textbook. Maududi believed that in an Islamic society all that is taught should be in the context of religious knowledge. Every subject thus became Isalmiat.,,23o The officially sponsored educational programme laid stress on military, jihad and violence. The post1979 textbooks erased the pre-Islamic heritage of Pakistan and the history of Pakistan became synonymous with the history of Muslims in the sub-continent. Its history began with Arab conquest of Sindh and Muslim conquerors from Central Asia. Similarly, there were understated instructions to condemn India and Hindus, eulogise Aurangzeb.policies and critical of Akbar's secular ethos so and so forth. 231 Urdu was made the language of instruction, and other measures included the establishment of an Islamic university in Islamabad, and a proposal for a women's university. The government of Zia ul Haq extended financial help to Islamic seminaries and officially recognized the certificates given by Madrasas as equivalent to Masters Degree in lslamiyat. Apart from governmental support in [mance, the provincial Zakat Councils also distributed large chunk of their collections to the seminaries?32 The story of educational refonn under Zia would be incomplete without the mention of the role played by the Pakistan University Grants Commission. The government directed teaching of Pakistan studies to all degree students including those in engineering and medical courses. The objective behind the introduction of the new course was to "induce pride for the nation's past, enthusiasm for the present and unshakeable faith in the stability and longevity ofPakistan".233 Clear directives were issued to authors

229

Mubarak Ali, "Teaching of History in Pakistan", View Point, December 12,1985, p. 15.

230

Massoud Ansari, "Lessons in Intolerance", Newsline, May 2004, p. 5

231 Ahmed Salim, "Historical Falsehoods and Inaccuracies" in A. W. Nayyar and A. Salim (eds.), The Subtle Subversion (Islamabad: SDPI Project, 2003), p. 83. 232

Talbott, A Modern History, n. 126, p. 279.

m Directives of the University Grants Commission in Azhar Hamid et al "Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan" p. xi.

99

''to demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic or geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion; to get students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan and to popularize it with slogans; to guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan - the creation of a completely Islamised state,,?34 For the creation of a state sponsored Islamic identity, steps like segregating the roles for men and women, enforcement of chadar (veil) in educational institutions, and compulsory teaching of Arabic as the seccmd language from class sixth onwards was implemented Reading of Koran (nazara Koran) was required for getting intermediate school certificate. 235 Congregational Prayers in the afternoon during school hours was made mandatory, and religious knowledge was made criteria for appointment of teachers. Even the definition of literacy included religious knowledge. 236 The state sponsored Islamisation encouraged "Islamic Scientists". They made discoveries highlighting the relevance of Koranic knowledge. Some of the so-called scientific breakthrough which was presented at the Islamic science conference in 1979 revealed that the heaven was moving away from us at a speed of only one centimeter per second less than the speed of light. It was also discussed with reference to a Koranic verse that prayer on a particular night is better than thousand nights of ordinary worship. This was said keeping the theory of relativity in mind.237 The scientists argued that Islamic science was a solution to socio-economic problems in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabian Assistance in Education In Zia's efforts to Islamise education the role of Saudi funds and logistics played a

major role. Deeply committed to the cause of Islam particularly the Wahabi variety Saudi Arabia chose Pakistan as its laboratory. Before analysing the role played by Saudi Arabia in the spread of Islamisation in Pakistan, it would be useful to examine the 234

Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

235 Not only women teachers and students, even women broad casters and airlines staff were asked to dress modestly see Korson and MaskieU, "Islamisation and Social Policy", n.222, p.610. 236

Hoodbhoy and Nayyar, "Rewriting History", D. 229, p. 1.

237 Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan", in Ashghar Khan (ed.) Islam, Politics and the State (London: Zed Books, 1985), pp. 187-189.

100

founding ideology of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and to the extent it influenced Pakistan's experiment in Islamisation.

Wahhabism Fundamentalist programmes and the heightened religious consciousness among the Pakistanis owe its origin to the orthodox strains of Islam such as Wahhabism, widely popular in Pakistan. The Saudi based extremely conservative Wahhabism is highly critical of political activism and emphasises on following a path with strict adherence to Sharia. Wahhabism has served as a legetimiser for the monarchical Saudi regime and the Saudi state. A number of policies supported and perpetuated by the Saudi kingdom to heighten Wahhabi influence wide across the Muslim world included sponsorship towards education law and governance, economy and all fields of human activity.238 A very short history of the religious movement would help in locating the source of Zia's Islamisation measures. The movement began by Islamic revivalist Muhammadibn Abd al-wahhab and a local ruler in Saudi Arabia Muhammad-ibn Saud of Diriyah in the Najd, which became famous as Wahhabism aimed at recreating Islam's early traditions and return to the practical of the prophet. The call was for the return to the pristine glory of pure Islam of the first few prophets who were their righteous ancestors. When Muhammad Ibn Abd-al Wahab joined hands with the local tribal ruler Muhammad Ibn saud missionary zeal and passion combined WIth military supremacy gave rise to the religion-political movement which attacked diversity of popular religious practices, cross cultural accommodations, equal rights to non-Muslims and even Muslims of different sects other than Sunnis. 239 Interestingly, during Zia's rule there was no other ideology which could offer an alternative to Wahabi totalitarianism. Funding from Saudi Arabia and other rich oil-rich Arab states were used to sponsor Wahhabism, and dissuade people from following other liberal strains of Islam like Sufism etc. Wahhabism spread through the numerous 238 Y. Admon "Saudis criticize their school curricula again", Middle East Media Research Institute (Inquiry and Analysis No.325) available at http://memri.org/biniartic1es 239 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (Karachi: _ Oxford University Publication, 2001), pp. 154-158.

101

networks of mosques and madrassas that mostly preached the ideology of hate and later degenerated into legitimising terror. Zia ul Haq's statist Islam followed the narrow precepts of Wahabi Islam, which was reflected in his policy-measures like curbs on literary works, art, media, viewing non-Wahabis as takfir, segregation of the second sex, introduction of Islamic. punishments like storing and lashing and similar regressive measures. 240

As explained above, the state sponsored indoctrination was most clearly visible in the field of education. The entire curriculum followed the Wahabi agenda like glorifying the Jehadis, creating deep antagonism among different Islamic sects like Shia-sunni and Ahmediyas.241 The spiraling effects of propagating this exclusionary world view generated "hypocrites, blindfolded zealots, fundamentalists, intriguers, time servers and ignoramuses with the highest degrees.,,242 The Wahabi networks across Muslim societies developed exclusionary tactics to isolate fellow brothers from other sects with periodic outbursts of extreme violence. The Saudis contributed lavishly to Wahabi based institutions across Pakistan. Wahhabism as a life style doctrine often took an inflexible stance towards pilgrimage to local tombs, veneration of saints, mystical experiences as non-Islamic practices, the channels through which General Zia executed wahabi Islam were education, press, polity judicial· and administrative machinery and states supported ideological engineering projects?43 In the words of Nayyar, "The full impact of what happened under General Zia is now being felt in rising religious military sectarianism and violence in our society and politics, and generation of young Pakistanis is going through the same education. 244 Following the huge set-back suffered by the Arabs against Israel, there emerged in. the region a power vacuum which Saudi Arabia with its enormous petro-dollars and 240 For details, see Iftikar H. Malik, State and civil society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority: Ideology and Etlmicity (Oxford: St Antony's Macmi1lan, 1997), pp.l39-167. 241

See K.K. Aziz, Murder of History (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1992).

242 "Letter

to the Editor", Frontier Post, May 11, 1992.

243 Stephen Vertigans, Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.l06-107. 244 A.H. Nayyar has made a critical study of the curricula and state of education and textbooks on Pakistan. The above quotation is from Massoud Ansari, "Lessons in intolerance", Newsline, May 2004, p.8.

102

political patronage sought to fill. The oil boom of the seventies provided the ground for constructing a new ideology to counteract Pan-Arabi sm. Labeled as "Petro Islam", the main aim of this ideology was to promote Muslim universalism, a safer doctrine than the geographically limited but politically more troublesome idea of Pan-Arabism?45

In

pursuit of this dream, the oil-rich Gulf States, Saudi Arabia in particular disbursed large amount of fmancial and multilateral aid to Muslim-majority countries like Pakistan. Internally, the leftist march in Pakistan during the 1960s and the early 1970s was viewed with alarm by the Gulf countries, which prompted them to provide aid to strengthen Islamic institutions in the country. The resultant linkages between the Pakistan-based religious bodies and their external patrons undermined the government control over the activities of the Islamist groups. 246 Apart from generous financial grants for Islamic institutions, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states also provided resources to train jihadi activists to fight the war in Afghanistan. The funds meant for the war against the Soviet gave rise to a growing number of militant madrassas with sectarian and lihadi base rather than any ethical scholarship. 247 The lamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan had very cordial relationship with Saudi officials. Thanks to the personal effort of A.A. Maududi who advised Saudi Arabia on various proposalS?48 The Jamaat was important for Saudi Arabia since it helped spread Wahabi Islam allover the Islamic world and Pakistan in particular. Maulana Maudoodi had the distinction of being the first foreigner to be honoured by King Faizal for outstanding contribution in the propagation of Islam. The Saudi media also highlighted his achievements as a 20th centmy reformer (mujaddid).249 In the Saudi campaign, Pakistan came to occupy a prominent place as an ideological playfield. The Saudi ruler provided consultancy, literature apart from infusing funds and advice in the name of Islam. Given

245

Douad Ajami, "The E~d of Pan-Arabism", Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2 (Winter 1978-79), p. 365.

S. V. R. Nasr, "Rise ofSunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in Society and Politics", Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), pp. 142-144.

246

Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 195-197.

247

Maududi had proposed to the Saudi Arabian King to establish an Islamic university in Medina. The blueprint of the institution as prepared by Maududi was duly approved by the royal family.

248

249

Pleshov, Islamism, n. 195, p. 182.

103

marriage. This move of Ayub affected both the Sunnis and Shias because Sunnis had legal provisions to marry four times while the Shias had the benefits of unlimited marriages for a fixed term only under the provision of mut 'ah marriage. 82 The religious conviction of the ulema was disturbed when the Ayub regime insisted on the scientific sighting of the moon on EM. They refused to accept the fmdings of the .Meteorological Department and mobilised public opinion in favour of the traditional method of sighting the moon. 83 All such reactions were indicative of the onset of the confrontation between the state on the one hand and the Islamist forces on the other hand. The latter led by the Jamaat-i-Islami tried to mobilise the public through its well organised and disciplined cadres against the state and the ruling regime's identity based on the modem interpretation of Islam. Despite Ayub's crackdown on the Jamaat leader, Maulana Maududi by opening the old charges against him in 1963 pertaining to his ambiguous attitude towards the Pakistani proposal, Maududi continued to command substantial following due to his large social welfare networks and ceremonial religious activities. 84 The entire state machinery was geared against Jamaat accused of fomenting student unrest in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Lyallpur. The numerous arrests of Jamaatis and finally the ban order on the party under the criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908 made it an unlawful association. However, Jamaat revived its fortunes when Supreme Court held that the ban could not be implemented in Pakistan. 85 In sum, Ayub Khan's strong preferences for a modernist interpretation of Islam did not prevent him from justifying his policies by invoking Islam. He tried to explain the necessity of a centralised leadership on the basis of his understanding of Islamic history in medieval India. He said, "Another feature of Islamic history which had found general acceptance was that the leader once he is chosen by the community, should have sufficient power to co-ordinate, supervise and control the activities of government.

82 See Savita Pande, Politics ofEthnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan (Delhi: Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), p. 151.

83

Ahmad, Government and Politics, n. 79, p. 310.

84 Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, n, 75, pp. 64-65; Kalim Bahadur, The Jama'at-I-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action (Lahore, 1983), p. 27. 85

Feldman., From Crisis to Crisis, n. 75, p. 65

63

Muslims, to "preach and propagate Islam" or "call his place of worship as Masjid." Any Ahmedi who fails to respect the sensitivity of the Muslims was liable to be punished under criminal charges?53 There are numerous instances of false cases being instituted against Ahmedis in Pakistan for displaying Kalima for calling Azan for posing as Muslims, for celebrating Ahmediya centenary and 100 years anniversary of the eclipse of Sun .and Moon that occurred in 1894 as a sign for the promised Mahdi, for commenting upon the anti-Ahmadiya Ordinance. 254 Their media publications were targeted under instructions of government authorities and their intellectuals dishonoured. 255 The other instances which foreclosed the options of a broader national identity was lowering of the status of other minorities, the strict imposition of Urdu and dissolving sectarian identity into a broader Islamic (Sunni) identity. One notorious law which had enough scope for its arbitrary enforcement was the Blasphemy law, which carried a death sentence for anyone using derogatory remarks against the sacred person Prophet Mohammad. The laws were basically used to intimidate the Christians and Ahmedis and settle scores. "In a country with such a tiny non-Muslim minority, as existed in Pakistan, such a law was totally unnecessary for no one would dare heap gratuitous insults on the person of the prophet, and that any such law would only be used to hound the minorities.,,256 Pakistan was confronted with the imposition of Urdu despite the fact that it had a rich history of regional languages. However, the ideology of the state was propagated through Islam, and Urdu. It was "imposed from the top to serve the nation state's need for a national language.,,257 The imposition of Urdu as a part of the Pakistani identity created the feeling of governmental indifference to regional cultures, history and its

253

For details, see Lau, The Role ofIslam in the Legal System, n. 162, pp.502-503.

254

Pande, Politics of Ethnic, n. 83, pp. 173-176.

255 The various publications headed by the Ahmediyas were 'AL-Fazl', 'Ansarullah', 'Misbah', 'Khalid'. The publishers and editors of these papers and periodicals were slapped with many charges. Ibid., p. 175. Pakistan's only Noble Prize winner physicist Dr. Abdus Salam was ignored both by the media and government. For details see P. Hoodbhoy, "Abdus Salam-Past & Present", The News, January 24,1996. 256 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 104. 257

Adeel Khan, Politics ofIdentity, n. 47, p. 71.

105

folklore in the name of national unity. Likewise, the state's attempt to dissolve sectarian identities through Islamisation led to the sharpening of the Shia-Sunni Schism. Pakistan being an Islamic state meant strict enforcement of Islamic laws by the State. Given the diversity of interpretations of various schools of Islamic law and thought, it was a complex question to decide as to which school of law would be supported by the state, and how that would affect followers of other school of Islamic law?58 Zia's imposition of Zakat (Islamic tax) on Muslims triggered waves of discontent among the Shias who refused to pay the tax based on the Hanaji School of Sunni law. This resentment later led to their political mobilization into an organised movement known as Tahrik-i-NiJaz-i-Fiqh (Movement for the implementation of the Jafari LaW)?59 The Shias also disagreed about certain kinds of punishments for offences in the Hudood ordinance. The Shia definition of theft was different from that of Sunnis and they followed a different punishment for the offense.

260

The other demands of the Shias

included enforcement of the Jajari jiqh, separate courses in their theology for Shias, appointment of a Shia judge in the Federal Shariat court, adequate Shia representations in higher level courts, establishment of a separate Shia trust and abolition of all unnecessary restrictions for azadari processions?61 The Pakistani Shias were inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution and the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The majority Sunnis were suspicions of Shia's revolutionary rhetoric and to counter militant activism of the Shias under the organization of Sipah-i-Muhammad the Sunnis had their own radical party known as Sipah-i-Sahaba. 262 One finds a striking similarity in their recourse to violent activity

258 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: Identities", Modern Asian Studies, 32, 3 (1998), p. 692.

The Radicalitation of Shi'l and Sunni

259 Shia law was developed under the guidance of Ja far al Sadiq (d. 765), who happens to be the sixth imam

Afak Haydar, "The Politicization of the Shias and the Development of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-fiqh-eJafaria in Pakistan", in Charles Kennedy, Pakistan: 1992 (Lahore: Pak Book Corp, 1993), p. 80.

260

261

Ibid., p. 87.

If the main aim of the Sipah-i-Muhammad was to preach Shi-ism in a predominantly Sunni state, the Sipah-i-Sahaba evoked Sunnism. The goals of the Sipah-i-Sahaba was to combat Shia influence in Pakistan, to declare Shias non-Muslims, to strive for state interventions during Muharram-processions, and to make Sunni Islam the officially recognized religion. The political goal of the organisation was to model 262

106

against each other. These religious motivated sectarian radicals target rival sects and are responsible for sectarian riots in Karachi and elsewhere in Pakistan. The fundamentalist orientation among Shias and Sunnis had, however, its roots in the historic conflict arising from the right of succession following the death of Prophet Muhammad?63 Thus, on the surface Islamisation appears to be a positive development in terms of contributing to the strengthening of the new Pakistani identity, but on closer scrutiny one fmds the sectarian schisms and ethnic divide between Punjabis vs. rest undermining the societal cohesion and political stability. Polity

The nexus between the fundamentalists and the army was already there, but Zia legitimised it which spelt danger for the restoration of democratic polity. The Islamic lamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan which commands heavily indoctrinated cadres supplied the Zia government the theoretical blueprint for Islamisation and the strength of the political organization to carry such a programme through out the state. The cadres of Jamaat had a strong presence not only in educational institutions but also in the anny and Civil services. The Islami Jamiyat-i-tulba which is the student wing of the lamaat-i-Islami controlled university student elections for long. Last but not the least, the steady flow of funds from Riyadh for the "Islamic movement" in Pakistan made the work easier. 264

Pakistan according to the rule of the "rightly-guided caliphs of early Islam." See Muhammad Q. Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan, n. 258, pp. 701-702. The name Shia is originally derived from Shiat Ali which means the Ali factions. It was first used during the Caliphate of Ali-ibn-abi Talib to distinguish his supporters from the partisans of the murdered third caliph, known as Shiat Uthman (faction). However, the term Shia came to be used in a broader sense to refer to those, who hold that legitimate authority rest with a member of the Prophet family.The denial of Ali's right to succeed the Prophet laid the seeds of a prolonged conflict between the two major factions within the Islamic community, Sunnis and Shia. The other historically significant event was the massacre of Ali's youngest son Al Hussain at Karbala about 100 kms south west of Baghdad, by the Umayyad army in 680 A.D. The killing of Hussain and his followers took place on the 10th day of the Muslim month Muharram, which turned into a tragic day of mourning and remembrance known in Shi'i religious literature as the Ashura day. Muharram has political significance for the Shias as the believers use the occasion to articulate their grievances against the followers of Sunni Caliph and this in some way constitutes the core of the Sunni-Shia animosity. See Etan Kohlberg (ed.), Shiism (Aldershot & Hants: Ashgate Publications, 2003); Heinz Halm, Shiism (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2004), pp. 1 to 27.

263

Duran Khalid, "The final replacement of parliamentary Democracy by the Islamic System in Pakistan" in Zingel Lallemant (ed.), Pakistan in the 1980s: Ideology, Regionalism, Economy and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), p. 271. 264

107

The biradari bondage too played its role in bringing Zia closer to lamaat-i-Islami. Mian Tufail Muhammad like Zia belonged to the Ara tribe and the same village in Eastern Punjab. Zia had a mentor in Abd-al-Havy who belonged to the Tab/ighi Jamaat.

I

It is this supremely orthodox group which supplied most of its preachers to the army. A closer analysis of Tablighi Jamaat and lamaat-i-Islami brings to fore their differences and rivalry but looked from a larger perspective they may be regarded as allies. 265 This nexus between religious fundamentalist and the army proved to be an obstruction to successive civilian governments which could not function in the face of such a formidable combination.

Whether it was in the formation of the government or its

dismissal, the function of this nexus remained central. Inevitably, transition to democracy in the 1990s encountered the challenges that largely stemmed from this infonnal alliance. Consequently, Islamists parties which had remained peripheral began to exercise disproportionate influence whether in the fonnation of the government or in the mobilisation of public against the government. Secondly, despite their poor electoral performance they continued to influence the policymaking.266 This phenomenon explained why civilian governments failed to act against right-wing forces and more importantly initiate reforms towards the reversal of the Islamisation process set off by Zia. Society Zia's Islamisation created deep fissures in Pakistani society. The imposition of Hanafi law provoked sectarianism and led to the emergence of radical Shi'i and Sunni groups. The existence of hostile sectarian groups and their numerous clashes all over Pakistan exposed their fragile bonds and contributed to rising militancy in the state. (See

265 Ibid., p. 271. Also, a better understanding of Jamaat Tabligi, see Barbara Metcalf, "Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs", Social Service Research Councz1, Nov. 1,2004.

Saeed Shafqat, "Transition to Democracy: An Uncertain Path", in Rasul B. Rais (ed.), State Society, n. 81, pp. 241-245. Dr. Shafqat mentions the historical obstacles which undermined democratic institutions. He says if Ayub regime met the interests of the business community, military and bureaucracy Zia catered to the interests of the religious groups and trader-merchant group who developed powerful lobbies and threatened democratic norms. . 266

108

the Table 1.1)" In the year 2001-2002 Pakistan was home to fifty eight (58) religious political parties and twenty four (24) armed religious militias.

862

Total

629

267

208

Source: The Nation (Islamabad), September 1, 1994 The Islamisation process saw the legitimisation of violence in the name of Islam. Islam had a larger appeal as a new identity justifying non-democratic elections and use of violence to achieve political goals. Indicative of this was the increase in madrasas, encouraging the

yo~g

Pakistanis to fight for Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In this

context the separatist movement in Kashmir was increasingly viewed in Pakistan more as a struggle for Islam (religion) thereby attracting wider support cutting across the regional and class divide. Zia played a vital role in developing madrassa networks where the seeds of religious fanaticism were planted and allowed to grow. These seminaries were essential support base for the Jehadi groups in the 1980s. The International crisis group's report on Pakistani madrasas says, "Education that creates barriers to modem knowledge 267 Saeed Shafqat, "From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba" in Jaffi'elot (ed.), Nationalism without a Nation, n. 157, p. 133.

109

stifling creativity and breeding bigotry has become the madrasas defining features.,,268 At a time when there is the need for modernist educated intellectuals to counter Islamists, providing good education still remains low in the priority of the govemment.269 Militarisation of Pakistani society needed to project a pennanent enemy. The "ideology of Pakistan", which penneated all debates during Zia's tenure found its way to text books and was successful in focusing on India as its enemy. For reasons more than one Pakistan's neighbours other than India are not fit to be bracketed as enemies. Thus, keeping the insurgency in Kashmir alive by aiding and abetting the forces hostile to India and projecting the supreme importance of the Pakistan army fitted well into the scheme of things. 270 Equally significant was Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan conflict since the Soviet invasion. Afghan rebels were given access into Pakistani bases for sanctuary and logistical support. The lSI of Pakistan was the only party responsible for the transport of arms and nearly 40 percent of arms were diverted from reaching the mujahideen and. made their way into Pakistan. Small arms were openly sold in the local bazaars often with the complicity of the guerillas and their leaders.271 The proliferation of arms contributed in no mean measure to militarization of Pakistani society. In varying degree all this led to Pakistan's engagement in external misadventures. The acceptability of jihad was reflected in the limited resistance to Pakistan's external engagement in Afghanistan transforming the local resistance against Soviets into a global Islamist campaign. The role of civil society was negligent and its effectiveness waned due to Zia's authoritarian policies and Islamisation programme. Hence, there was limited space for the "Pakistan, Madrasas, Extremism and Military", International Crisis Group, July 29, 2002 at www.crisisweb.orgllibrary/documentslreport-archive/A400717-29072002. pdf.

268

India's expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP is 4.1 %, Bangladesh 2.5 and Pakistan is 1.8%. See, "Table 3", Human Development in South Asia 2003, (Islamabad: The Mahbub ul-Haq Human Development Centre, 2003). 269

The junta regime stirred the debate that Muslims of the subcontinent were a separate nation and reiterated the old Pakistani position that Kashmir is.an unfinished work of Partition and they have a cllJ.im over it. Backing their stance in action they sponsored cross-border terrorism and Jehadi groups to bleed India in the long run. See K. Shankar Bajpai, "Untangling India and Pakistan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No.3 (May/June 2003), pp. 191-122. 270

Marvin G. Weinbaun, "War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, No.1 (Winter 1991), p. 74.

271

110

autonomous associations to grow and articulate against the arbitrariness of the state. Given the strong nexus between the military and the landed elite, state elite could afford to ignore the need for land reforms, independent judiciary empowerment, free press and issues like legitimacy. As an analyst has aptly observed, "The landed elite, who have benefited from a politics of patronage and corresponding oligarchic polity, have consolidated their position and successfully transformed themselves into a trans-regional power group. The state, in alliance with the feudalists has evaded the urgency of an honorific social contract with civil society, and damaged itself to the extent that an autonomous, invisible government run by intelligence agencies has unleashed its own forces of blackmail, harassment and torture.'.272 In addition to the growth of private armies, the 1980s saw the mushrooming of

extreme right-wing militant organisations in Pakistan. Some of them were Harkat-ulJihad~i-Islami

and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and those groups involved in Afghan jehad.

The year 1993 saw the merger of these groups to form Harkat-ul-Ansar for carrying out subversive activities in Kashmir?73 The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen linked to the Deoband School of Islam was ideologically to the product of Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-ulema-iIslam. These jihadis were drawn from almost all strata of society. What was new about

them was that many came from non-weapon bearing areas as opposed to martial areas which indicated greater militarisation.274 In sum, Zia's Ishimisation created a new base for political consensus with limited opposition, supportive of Pakistan's external mission as well as its internal policies.

H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, (St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1997), p. 10.

272 -Iftikhar

273

Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism, TI. 256, p. 202.

274

Ibid., p. 202-203.

111

CHAPTER II

ISLAMISATION IN BANGLADESH FROM SECULAR TO ISLAMIC STATE

Bangladesh emerged as an independent country after a bloody civil war, with the active support of India in 1971. The country geographically known as East Bengal was the part of the eastern wing of Pakistan since 1947. If the movement for Pakistan led to the separation of the Muslim majority areas of India in 1947, the second partition of the sub-continent debunked the myth of religion as a stable basis of nation-state. What imparts distinction to the Bangladesh nationalist movement is the fact that in spite of fraternal relationship between the two wings of Pakistan, the Bengali East Pakistan found inspiration from its unique regional and local traditions to spearhead a movement against its relatively stronger wing. The people of Bangladesh attributed their social, cultural economical and political exploitation to the West Pakistani rulers and organised a national movement on secular issues. What lends motivation to the movement was not the alarm of Islam in danger but to restore and replenish their lost cultural glory as a distinct people and .to put an end to their economic degeneration in the hands of their Pakistani Masters.] The emotional attachment to their cultural traditions and distinct linguistic heritage has nuances that overshadowed the Islamic unity of the two wings at that point of time. Thus, Bangladeshi nationalism that emerged in the course of the liberation struggle led by Sheikh Mujib' Awami league was primarily rooted on the unique combination of land and language. Soon after its independence, Bangladesh adopted this East Bengali nationalism together with socialism, democracy and secularism as state ideology, relegating Islam to private sphere. However, the assassination of the fIrst elected Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman and the overthrow of his government by a military coup in August 1975 brought in an Islam-oriented state ideology by shunning secularism and socialism. Not long after his ascendancy as the new ruler in November 1975, General Ziaur Rahman replaced the secular "Bengali nationalism" with "Bangladeshi nationalism." Outwardly though inclusive, the new Bangladeshi nationalism essentially highlights the Muslim identity of the country, differentiating its Muslim majority Bengalis from their Hindu majority counterparts in West Bengal in India. With the patronisation of political Islam by the I See Craig Baxter, "Pakistan and Bangladesh" in Frederick L. Shiels (ed.), Ethnic Separatism and World Politics (Lanham, University Press of America, 1984), pp. 208-262. Also see, A.M.A. Muhith, Bangladesh: Emergence ofa Nation (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1978).

113

state, efforts were made by its protagonists to celebrate their Muslim-ness and protect Muslim interests. Ironically, however, Bangladesh unlike Pakistan has a long history of syncretistic cultural practices, as reflected in Bengali folk cult, literature, music and festivals? A brief historical overview of the phenomena would explain the peculiarities. Prior to the Muslim conquest at the beginning of 13th century, a number of religious cults along with tantric Buddhism had existed side by side in the area3 Islam and the Sufi saints were

accepted by the easy going folks who already had the past experiences of liberalism and pluralistic co-existences from ancient times'- It was in such favourable conditions that Islam grew in strength by adapting itself to the demands of local people and their local living conditions.4 "Initially in Bengal, Islamic cosmology was incorporated within the local belief system, and Islamic ideas and concepts were presented using familiar indigenous terms. Thus, the Prophet Muhammad was called an avatar and Allah was referred to as prabhu, gosai and niranjan (Bengali words used to refer to God.). 5 It is true that these words were later replaced by the orthodox Islamists nomenclature, but it nevertheless explains the catholicity of culture, which is not imposed but organic in its nature.6 This chapter begins with the discussion of the war of liberation leading to the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent sovereign entity followed by a critical examination of the post-liberation spirit and the state-ideology based on the principles of Mujibism to highlight the limitations and the reasons for the loss of its credibility. The

2

Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslim, 1871-1906, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 190.

Bengal first came under Turkish influence in 1204. Lakhnauti was the capital of Muhammad Bakhtyar Khalji. Sultan Ruknuddin KaiKaus conquered Satgoan and reigned from (1219-1300). Sultan Shamsuddin Firuz Shah extended the Conquest right upto Sylhet and slowly whole of East Bengal came under Muslim rule. See, Sheikh Rustani Ali, Islam in Bangladesh, 3

AminurRahim, "Communalism and nationalism in Bangladesh", Journal of Asian and African Studies, voL 42, No.6, p. 557.

4

5

Sufia M. Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vistaar Publication, 2006), p. 33.

Talukdar Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends," in Rafiuddin Ahmed, Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. 1990), p. 69.

6

114

chapter ends with an attempt to analyse the social location of Islam, which would help identify the roots of the fundamentalist challenge in contemporary Bangladesh. War of Liberation The war of liberation, which led to the emancipation of Bangladesh, was the product of the cultural and political aspirations long suppressed by the hegemonic Pakistani establishment. "Bengali pride was pronounced and easily identifiable. And pride was translated into cultural nationalism. A state of mind rooted in language and embellished by history would not yield to alien demands for confonnity with a more distant was culture. Urdu and Persian poetry were no substitute to Bengali rhyme and prose." Bengali Muslims were urged by the West Pakistani counterparts to memorialise Md Iqbal, while their beloved poets were ignored and even ridiculed. British imperialism had been overbearing and stressful, but by contrast, the conditions Pakistani establishment would foist upon Bengal were intolerable for the Bengalis. The Muslim League had come to symbolise the worst of tyrannies and the dream that was once Pakistan had become a night mare. 7 To channelise the over-whelming support of the Bengalis regarding their uniqueness, the Awami-League under the guidance of Mujib took charge. Maul ana Bhashani, another strong man of the party held the view that Awami league would be an alternative to the Muslim League. 8 The Awami League, however, had no opportunity to articulate the local grievances and highlight its programmes because President Ayub's Basic Democratic system kept it isolated. Despite being politically marginalised, Mujib made a deal with the West-Pakistani politicians according to which he promised to back them in their bid to oust President Ayub in return for their support for his "six point progfamme", which, among others, included the following: l. Pakistan should be a federationunder the Lahore Resolution of 1940. which implied the existence of two similar entities. Any new constitution according to the Bengalis had to reflect this reality;

Lawrence Ziring. Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad An Interpretative study. (Karachi: Oxford University press. 1992). pp.I-15.

7

8 See Craig Baxter; Bangladesh: p.23.

A New Nation in an Old Setting ( Boulder. Colorado: West view, 1984).

115

2. the federal government should deal solely with defence and foreign affairs; 3. there should be two separate but freely convertible currencies. East Pakistan would have a separate banking measure as well as separate fiscal and monetary policies; 4. The federal unit should have the sole power to tax; 5 Separate accounts from foreign exchange earnings would be maintained. federating units would be free to establish trade links with foreign countries; 6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia.

The

9

Rather than addressing the grievances of the East wing, then government of Ayub Khan and the West Pakistani opposition parties tenned the "six point" ofthe League as a secessionist ploy and a proactive policy was under way to frustrate the Mujib's plans. Mujib was arrested for conspiring against the state, known as the "Agartala Conspiracy case."IO Long years in prison and attacks on him for treason and conspiracy only raised his iconic status among his people who were determined not to give up their liberation struggle half way. It may be recalled that the deep seated anguish of the people of East Bengal was due to their subjugation in all fields of existence, at the hands of the Pakistani vested interest. To mention a few, the Muslim League ministry which ruled East Bengal until 1954, became unrepresentative and thus indifferent to the interests of East Bengalis. The Awami league favoured joint-electorates to make democracy more inclusive and broad based while the Muslim league was not sensitive to minority representation and their interests. II The Bengalis suffered from lack of parity in administration and bureaucracy too. The Bengali membership in the Military services was a mere 6 per cent. All high level post including that of the governor of East Bengal was held by Mohajirs and West PakistaniS. 12 Similarly, the economic grievances included channelisation of funds worth Rs.730 million on an average per year from the Eastern wing to the West. I3 In addition, substantial amount of foreign assistance went to the West wing to be invested in the 9

Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma ofPolitical Development (Kant: Dawson, 1980), pp. 185-87.

10 It was alleged that with explicit Indian support Mujib and his followers worked on an agenda for an independent country in the Indian town of Agartala located to its North-Eastern border. II Craig Baxter, South Asia Politics and Government (Colorado: united States of America, 1987), pp. 235236.

12

Ibid., p. 236.

13 S.R. Chakravarthy, "The National Liberation Movement: Problems and Prospects", in S.R. Chakravarthy and V. narain (ed.), Bangladesh: Volume Two Domestic Politics (Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 2.

116

Indus Basin project while East Bengal remained economically weak with no industries and no banking. Finally, the suppression of their linguistic and cultural identity strengthened Bengali particularism. According to a leading Bangladeshi analyst, "The pre-conception that Bengalis are inferior Muslims, susceptible to Hindu culture and language and therefore not reliable Pakistanis became linked in the minds of many West Pakistanis with almost Paranoid fear that the Indian government was constantly engaged in political and cultural subversion in East Bengal. These ideas, in turn, prevented those in power in Pakistan from viewing East Bengal's political demands positively.,,14 With such perception, the Pakistani regime formulated a board to re-orient textbooks on Islamic lines and censorship was imposed on the press. The biggest onslaught, however, was on the issue of Bengali language, which led to the upsurge of regional feelings and the movement saw massive mobilisation of student and youth power in Bangladesh. ls The assertion of Bengali national identity saw its high mark during the language movement and formed the basis of the liberation struggle. Predictably, the change of guard in Pakistani from Ayub to Yahya Khan did not change the ground realities in East Bengal. Apart from the language issue and six points programme, the Pakistani establishment was confronted with a host of controversial issues, notably the withdrawal of material law, limiting the role of the army, transfer of power to the people's representatives and an enquiry about political killings. A de facto Awami-League government was established in East Pakistan when Bangabandhu taking a cue from Mahatma Gandhi asked his people to start a week long civil-disobedience movement.

The movement saw a massive mobilisation of Bengalees leading to the

hosting of the national flag of Bangladesh. However, the course of the war was marked by extremely violent events including "ethnic cleansing" and the bloody massacre of the students and intellectuals. 16 The l~ge scale repression turned the people increasingly Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), p. 13. 14

15 The Pakistan Public Service Commission removed BangIa from the list of approved subjects, as well as from currency notes and stamps. The Central Government's proposal of writing Bengali in Arabic script further made the East Bengalis edgy. 16 To get a detailed eyewitness account of the slaughter of intellectuals bordering on genocide, see Kabir Chowdhury, Genocide in Bangladesh (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), p. 22 and Hamida Rahman, "Katasurer Badhyabhumi" (The killing ground of Katasur), Daubuj Azad (Dhaka), 2 JanuaryI972.

117

skeptical about the legitimacy of the Pakistani state, and streams of teeming Bangladeshis left their home for security to bordering India. The mass exodus gradually dragged India into the East-Bengalis conflictP The internal situation in Bangladesh was extremely volatile with pitched battle between Mukti bahini (Bangladeshi fighters) and East Bengal Regiment. IS Eventually, Indian intervention set off yet another round of military confrontation between the two countries. I9

The war of liberation witnessed the

historically inevitable result, the surrender of the Pakistani troops and birth of Bangladesh in December 1971. The Language Movement

The importance of the language movement, which laid the secular basis of the first government in Bangladesh and disturbed the national cohesion and solidarity of Pakistan, defined in terms of religion need to be further examined. The most distinctive features of the people of East Pakistan which fonned a common bond between them are racial and ethnic stock, historical identity, geographic contiguity, shared economic interest and last but not the least, cultural and linguistic unity. The Bengalis were the largest ethnic group in Pakistan and their ethnicity was prominently different from the Pakistanis. The people of the west wing had greater links with the Arabs and Turcomans while the Bengalis were bereft of any racial mixture. The shorter, darker and friendly Bengali was starkly different from the taller, fairer martial westerner. 20 Part of their discontent when East Bengal was a part of united Pakistan was the discrimination they faced on the basis of their presumed "non-martial" attributes. 21 Geographically, East Bengal was fonned by a delta of two major rivers, Ganga and Brahmaputra and the area receives the highest amount of rainfall in a year. A look at 17 The Indian involvement was officially aimed at creating a congenial situation in which the refugees could return, but in reality New Delhi hopes to gain influence over the new state by decidedly supporting the secession of East Bengal from Pakistan. To achieve its objectives, India offered military training to the Mukti Bahini guerillas and other logistical assistance to sustain their fight with the Pakistani army. 18

Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh, n. 13, pp. 82-99.

19 For details regarding Indian role in the Civil War, see Hasan Askari Rizvi, Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive publishers, 1981). 20

M. Rafiqul Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement (Dhaka: The University Press, 1987) p. 67.

21

Craig Baxter, Government and Politics in South Asia (Colorado: West view Press, 1987), p. 229.

118

later the same general deposed Bhutto and charged him with conspiracy to murder Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan, father of PPP politician Ahmed Raza Kasuri.125 During the long trial in the court, Bhutto regretting his decision, stated, "I appointed a chief of staff belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami and the result is before all of us". 126 The execution of Bhutto otherwise famous as "Bhutto's judicial murder" wiped out the remnants of political opposition. The Supreme Court judgement referred to the doctrine of state necessity which led to the imposition of Martial Law, and justified all actions taken by the Chief Martial Law administrator by the above mentioned doctrine. 127 Firmly saddled by judicial references Zia relied on the coercive machinery of the army for long eleven years. He mobilised conservative forces that had no quarrels with him and deflected the participatory process till his death in office. Zia's military career remained apolitical till he was made the Chief of Staff, but the PNA-Ied Nizam-e-MustaJa agitation changed him from an apolitical army man to a clever usurper.128 Hasan-Askari Rizvi argues that once military commanders get comfortable to the use of supreme political power under the cover of martial law or any such martial law decrees, they remain extremely reluctant to give up or work out a power sharing deal with democratic forces. 129 President Zia ul Haq was no exception. ~e ruled Pakistan with a "messiah" and "saviour" complex while constantly deferring promised elections on some pretext or other. Interestingly, General Zia reiterated his commitment to "organise free and fair elections" which were to be originally held in October 1977. 130 But, sensing a PPP victory in the event of massive outpourings of public sympathy for

125 Mr. Ahmed Raza Kasuri survived an attack on his life, while his father died. A High Court inquiry cleared Bhutto of all charges, but Kasuri refilled the case against him after the military take over. The cause of his disenchantment seemed to be his failure to get a PPP ticket to fight elections. Eager to see his end, Zia ensured his rearrest on the same old charge and he was executed later. See, Benazir Bhutto, Daughter ojthe East, p. 58.

KaIid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction oj Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 162.

126

127 See Kamal Azfar, "Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan" in BurId and Baxter (eds.), Pakistan under Military: Eleven Years oJZia-ul-Haq (Boulder; Colorado, 1991), p. 84. 128

Talbott, A Modem History, n. 126, p. 255.

129

Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. 24, no.5 (May 1984), p. 536.

130 Zia ul Haq's first Press Conference, The New York Times, July 9,1977 as cited in Askari Rizvi, Ibid,. p. 538.

74

say that the pent up discontent and disillusionment against Pakistan found a vent in protest movement against Urdu. The Bhasha Andolon or the language movement was successful in mobilizing large sections of the populace and the students in particular to launch a political agitation. Fearing mass mobilization against the new law the central government outlawed all public meetings and rallies. Several students and civilians died in police firing and police crackdown on February 21, 1952?5 This day is honoured in Bangladesh as the Language Martyr's Day and aptly described as the Mussalmaner

Swadesh Prattabartan (the home coming of the Bangal Muslims)?6 The attitude of the Pakistan government and the painful events of February 21 stirred the collective conscience of the young nation. The Awami Muslim League founded by Maulana Bashani, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Ataur Rahman and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had established itself as a political party and spearheaded the interest of the people of East Bengal. By the later part of 1950's it broadened its political base and welcomed non-Muslim Bengalis into its fold, corollary to its inclusive plans the party dropped the name Muslim and came to be known as Awami League only.27 The complete political death of Muslim League from the soil of East Bengal in the 1954 election was an indicator of the future course of events?8 The Central command in Pakistan was not ready to give up easily. To strike at the basis of ethno linguistic nationalism of the East Bengalis, the government sponsored institutions like the Pakistan Council, Bureau of National Reconstruction (BNR), Writers Guild Bengali Development Board and Nazrul Academy. The function of these institutions was to exercise censorship on secular literary works as un-Islamic, and Islamise Bengali language and culture.29 The result of this government effort was that poets like Rabindranath Tagore and his works were painted un-Islamic and Kazi N~

25 "Language Movement" (PHP), Banglapedia - The National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh at http://banglapedia.netJhtIL0063 .htm

26 27 2&

Badruddin Umar, Sanskritik Sampradaikata (Dhaka: Janamaitri Publications, 1996), pp. 8-11. Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n.5, p.121. "UF elections Victory" (PHP), Chronicles ofPakistan. http://tberepublicofrumi.com/54.htm

29 A.K. Roy, "The Role of Intellectuals -Pakistan Period" in Dilip Chakravarthy, A Nation is Born (Calcutta: C.V. Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti, 1974), p. 45.

120

Islam's works were considered highly Islamic.3o Rabindra Sangeet was banned on the basis that it was not in conformity with the ideology of Pakistan. Matching their actions with words Ayub Khan commented in 1967, "East Bengalis ... still are under considerable Hindu culture and influence.,,31 Suppressing the Bengali national identity by the Pakistani establishment boomeranged into a national movement which raw power was unable to quell. Two days after the fIring event on February 21, 1952, People built a column near a site closer to Dhaka Medical College were students were killed in the Police fIring. Bengalis recognise February 21 as Shaheed Dibash (Martyrs' Day). Though the police annihilated all traces of this people's monument within days of its birth and obstructed the construction of another minar which was being readied to remember the martyrs of Elrushey (21) the powerful images of Bengali struggle to protect their rich heritage remained unblemished. Abdul Gaffar Choudhury's poem Amar Bhaiyer rokte Rangano, which means My Brothers Blood Spattered became the most celebrated song allover East Bengal. The motif of the song is Can I forget the twenty-first of February incarnadined by the blood of my brother? The twenty-first of February, built by the tears of a hundred mothers robbed of their sons, Can I ever forget it? Wake up today, the twenty-first of February. Do wake you, please. Our heroic boys and girls still languish in the prisons of the tyrant. The souls of my martyred brothers still cry. But today everywhere the somnolent strength of the people have begun to stir and we shall set February ablaze by the flame of our fierce anger. 32 How can I ever forget the twenty-first of February?•

Many poems have been written on Ekushey but this song by Abdul Gaffar became the indelible melody of the Language movement. The song is sung every year on 21

30

Ibid., p. 45.

Philip Oldenburg, "A place insufficiently Imagined", The Journal of Asian Studies, 44, No.4, August 1985, pp. 711-733.

31

The poem is translated by Kabir Chowdhury. See HenryGlassie and Feroz Mahmud, Living Traditions: Cultural Survey ofBangladesh (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2008), Series-II, pp.578-579.

32

121

power of the military in Pakistan.,,135 Zia ul Haq kept the 1973 Constitution under suspension, but the CII (Council of Islamic Ideology) was allowed to function. The twenty-member-CII put forward suggestions for new Islamic institutions. The military regime accepted the suggestions and established the Federal Sharia court (FSC) and the Islamic University. A Shari a Appellate Bench was also established in the Supreme Court. 136 Islamic University as the very name suggests undertook research on Islamic issues. It was also involved in the task of imparting knowledge based on Islamic law and Sharia.

Zia ul Haq's rule was a one man show till he placed the initial 286 member contingent in the Majlis-e-Shura in place of the dissolved National Assembly. 137 The unrepresentative body had the four main functions: to increase the pace of Islamisation; to make ground-work for Islamic democracy since Zia believed that western style democracy was not suitable for Pakistan; to manage and overcome socio-economic difficulties; to offer 'opinion and wisdom' on international affairs. 138 Since the real power to amend the constitution and bring about new legislative measures rested with the head of the military regime, the Majlis-i-Shura remained an advisory body only. Bereft of any law making or fmancial powers, the Shura for all practical purpose became a "grand debating society whose expenses are paid by the state treasury". 139 On the whole, Zia's Islamisation measures were not simply aimed at

consolidating the military rule, but also foreclosing the possibility of the return of the civilian actors to the political centre-stage. The hurried execution of Bhutto ignoring the appeals made by heads of state both from the Islamic world and West revealed that Zia's primary objective after the seizure of power was his survival. While his relation with the

135

Azfar, Pakistan, n. 57, p. 114.

136 Samina Yasmeen, Pakistan and the Struggle for Real Islam, n. 46, p. 71. The author writes that Zia undertook steps with the intention of Islamising Pakistan being heavily influenced by Maududi. He appointed ulema judges to the Federal sharia court which had the authority to examine laws suo moto. 137 138 J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, "Islamization and -Social Policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women'" Asian Survey, XXV, no. 6, June 1985, p. 590. 139

Askari Rizvi, The Paradox, n. 131, p. 547.

76

This poem evokes joy, love, hope romance and sensitivity.

It highlights the

Bengali jest for life, and freedom. Yet in another poem, I Curse Them, poet Shamsur Rahman reflects anger and hatred against the genocide unleashed by the Pakistani junta: I curse today those devils of hell, who compelled me to run up the stairs with my feet deep in the blood of my parents. on rivers and make my bed in wild forests I curse them: let them forever wander with rotting bodies hung around their emaciated necks. I curse them: Their cup for quenching thirst will always fill to the brim with blood, the blood with which they flooded the soil of Bengal. I curse them!,,35

In the field of novel writing, the liberation war provided the core them. The novel Rifle Roli Awrat (Rifle Bread Women) by Anwar Pasha reverberates with secularism and human values.

The protagonists in the novel were people from different ideological

outlooks but they carry the message of national unity. It was the novelist's tragic fate that he was picked up by the Pakistani collaborators and killed just two days before the liberation of his beloved country.

Mujibur Rehman's Tenure as Prime Minister The state of Bangladesh was born in 1971 out of a mass movement based on nonreligious principles. Secularism therefore was officially declared to be one of the state's guiding principles India's role as a mid wife in the birth of a new nation was an established fact. Apart from the secular orientation of the freedom movement, the active involvement of USSR along with India in favour of Bangladesh also gradually influenced the leaders of the independence movement to adopt secularism as a state principle when

35 Kabir Chowdhury, "The Liberation War and Creative Writing", MUla-Mona (Freethinkers), December 16,2006, p.3 at http://mukta-mona.comlspecialeventl16decemberlkabir_chowdhury.11206.htm

123

the law of Bangladesh was framed in 1972.36 Being the chief spokesman of the people of Bangladesh, the Awami League was given an absolute majority to exercise power and thus fr~g of the Constitution was an uncomplicated affair. 37 Awami League rode like a colossus on the principles of Mujibism which is a political philosophy and includes nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism as its core principles. Keeping with the spirit of the liberation movement the right wing parties which were suspected of collaborating with the occupational army were banned. The left however were officially permitted to function owing to their supportive role in the nationalist war. 38 As the young nation set out to build its institutions, Prime Minister Mujibur Rehman explained the secular plank of a predominantly Muslim populated nation. "Secularism", he said, "does not mean the absence of religion; Hindus will observe their religion. Muslims will observe their religion; Christians and Buddhists will observe their religions. No one will be allowed to interfere in other's religion. The people of Bengal do not want any interference in religious matters. Religion cannot be used for political ends.,,39 To achieve the lofty ideals of secularism the Constitution of Bangladesh laid down several provisions. Article 41, for instance, gives every citizen the right to profess, practice or propagate any religion. Religious education in institutions of learning was not compulsory and formation of religious parties prohibited.4o Article 12 stood for the implementation of secularism by eradication of a) communalism in all forms; b) the granting by the state of political status in favour of any religion; c) the abuse of religion

36 Ahmed ShufiquI Haque and Md Yeahia Akhter, "Bangladesh, The Ubiquity of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 4, p. 203. 37

Avul Fazl Huq, "Constitution making in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No.1, pp. 59-76.

3&

Rounaq Jaban, Bangladesh Politics Problems and Issues (Dhaka: University Press, 1980) p. 73.

Government of Bangladesh, Parliament Debates, October 12, 1972 (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, 1972) p. 20.

39

Ministry of Law, Parliamentary Affairs on Justice, Government of the .Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh (January 1975) (Dhaka: Govt. Printing Press, 1975).

40

124

for political purposes; and d) any discrimination against or persecution of persons practicing a particular religion. 4) As already noted, religion was the shield for the protagonists of Pakistani nationalism to ignore/deny the legitimate economic, linguistic and cultural aspirations of East Bengalis. Even brutal massacres were carried out by the AI Razakars, AI Sham and AI Badr against the people of East Bengal to stamp out their un-Islamic dreams. The emphasis on secularism was thus a product of the spirit of the movement. To realise its brand of nationalism Sheikh Mujibur Rehman discontinued the old practice of recitations from the Holy Quran and substituted it with a programme based on morality and ethics called the "speaking the Truth".42 He instructed the state controlled media to give equal opportunity for religious citations from Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity. This over exposure of other religious ideology other than Islam was not accepted among the Muslims and there was a backlash.43 The policy of the government which aimed at distributive justice maligned the concept of secularism and Mujib's tough stance against the religious right led to clandestine activities and the Awami League faced opposition from the "far right".44 Secularism Reversed

Although the political structure and the constitution were secularized, the dynamism to make secularism a successful institution was missing. The nature of society remained primarily Islamic. The heightened nationalist feelings during the liberation struggle were sustained by the colonial repression of the West Pakistanis. "In the resultant struggle for emancipation, as Mujibur Rehman called it, they clutched at every mark of Bengali individuality. The hatred towards the Bengali was total: his culture was belittle, his efficiency suspected and even his eating habits and way of life were held in

The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Ministry of Law, Government of Bangladesh, 1972), p. 5.

41

Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends", in Rafiuddin Ahmed, ed., Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1990), p. 69.

42

43

Ibid.

44

Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 73.

125

Maududi's ultimate mission was "to establish God's kingdom on earth and enforce the system of life received from him."

146

Without controlling sources of power

and authority, Maududi argued that the state's polity, civil society and ideology cannot be based on Islamic principles. Thus, the new found political arrangement with the military regime helped Jamaat to influence important institutions of the state and all facets of lives. Mere declaration that

~akistan

is an Islamic state meant nothing to Maududi who

believed that Islam should form the edifice of social, economic political, ideological moral and cultural life. 147 After having served under Zia for nine years, Jamaat reevaluated the pros and cons of its association with the regime, and subsequently tried to distance itself. Its decision to move away had little to do with its commitment to or desire for restoration of democracy as was the case with other mainstream parties, it was on the contrary prompted by its realisation of being used as an instrument by the regime for legitimating and more importantly the receding hope for capturing state power with the help of the military. Ironically, Jamaat rather than taking advantage of its rapport with the Zia regime to occupy political centre-stage was used by Zia in his bid to secure popular legitimacy to petpetuate his hold on power. Consolidation of the Zia Regime • Zia distrusted politicians and accordingly placed severe restrictions on political activity.

The disqualification tribunals followed his agenda of barring hundreds of

politicians from fighting elections. A former minister in the Bhutto government and other office bearers were prohibited from contesting elections by bringing amendments in the political parties Act. 148 His call for registration of all political parties (1979) just two months before the scheduled date of national elections was not complied by major political parties. The act of registration which involved giving a complete account of

146 S. Zainuddin, "Economic Intemationalisation and Islamic resurgence in India", The International Scope Review, vol.2, No. 4 (winter 2000), pA. 147 "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military", Initernational Crisis Group (ICG: Asia Report, No.49 (March 20, 2003),p.7. 148

Baxter, Government & Politics in South Asia, n. 41, p. 214.

79

of education.

Following the guidelines of the 1973 Interim Report of Education

Commission the government of Mujibur Rehman, introduced sweeping changes in the educational textbooks. Pakistani heroes were deleted from history text books, religious instructions from grades one to eight was abolished, while it was made an optional course for students belonging to humanities only from grades nine to twelve. There were provisions for the minorities to study their own religion. The political idealism or high ground was rejected by the people.

Responding to questionnaires distributed by a

government sponsored commission on Education, 75 percent of Bangladeshis indicated their support for the continuation of religious instruction as a part of their curriculum. 52 Mujib revived the Islamic Academy which was banned in 1972 and upgraded it to a foundation to propagate the ideals oflslam. To meet the growing Islamic aspirations of the people the government of Mujib increased the annual budgetary allocation for Madrassas; from 2.5 million in 1971 to 7.2 million Taka in 1973. 53 The change in the State's approach to religion was perceived to be too little and a belated gesture, and Mujib was accused of plotting to rob the sense of identity of the Bengali Muslims which kept them united. 54

Among the other pro-right gesture which established the self

contradiction of the Awami League was Mujib's visit to Lahore to be a part of the Islamic Summit in 1974 and his role at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference held in Jeddah to initiate the process towards setting up Islamic Development Bank. 55 Failure of Secularism

Mujibism as a political philosophy underwent radical changes just a few years of its initiation due to a variety of factors and forces hostile to it. One of the most important challenges of the post liberation government was the re-construction of the war ravaged 52 The Commission circulated a 551 Questionnaires Professors, teachers, principals, V.Co's, student organization, journalists and Islamic teachers. See, the Bangladesh Sikkha Commission Report (Dacca, May 1974), p. 61. Also, see Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics", n. 6, p. 193.

53 B.M. Monoar Kabir, "The Politics of Religion: The Jamaat-Islami in Bangladesh", in Ahmed ed., Religion Nationalism, n. 6, pp. 124-125. S4 Matiur Rehman, Bangladesh Today: An Indictment and Lament (Wellinghborough, 1978). The author describes Mujib's secularism as positive hostility to the Church.

ss Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh and the Islamic Countries 1972-82" unpublished paper presented at the i7'h Bengal Studies Conference at the institute of World Affairs. Salisbury, USA, July 10, 1982, p. 29.

127

economy. There were fears about Bangladesh's survival owing to the total collapse of infrastructure in the 9 month war and economic colonization by Pakistan prior to that. 56 A UN report estimated the cost of reconstruction in Bangladesh at $938 million. 57 The priority before the A wami League government was to provide swift relief and rehabilitation to returning refugees, reconstruction of economic infrastructure and creating conditions for a socialist economy to flourish. 58 A number of successful operations created semblance of economic stability but expectations were soaring and there were some glaring failures. 59 Bangladesh under Mujib witnessed the politics of patronage. Sheikh Mujib was extremely large hearted when it came to distribution of benefits be it direct financial assistance, professional placements, various appointments, permits and licences etc, to Awami Leaguers. This according to Mujib was a minor compensation for their great sacrifices for the independence of Bangladesh. 60 In the words of an observer, "The creation of a parasite, affluent class, divorced from production and squandering easy money on conspicuous consumption, only aggravated the economic problems ... With the people's swollen aspirations and the very unfavourable resource/population ratio, government patronage satisfied only a few but alienated many.'.61 When basic industries like banking jute, sugar, textiles and insurance was nationalized all appointments to high posts were Awami League activists, who being non-professionals led the industries to losses.62 There was large scale smuggling and black marketing of goods near the Indo-Bangladesh border and these belied hopes of a mutually beneficial co-operation and economic trade between India and Bangladesh. The

At in~ependence Bangladesh was described as an "international basket case". The enormity of economic problems had made Bangladesh totally dependent on external assistance.

56

57

Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p.75.

58

Ibid., p. 75.

Also, see Bangladesh Observer, March 26, 1974.

59 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), p. 159. 60

Ibid., p. 161.

61 Q.K. Ahmed, "Aspects of the Management of Nationalised Industries in Bangladesh" Bangladesh Development studies, Vol. 11, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 678-679.

62

Ibid. p. 671.

128

high rate of smuggling reduced percentage of official trade through right channels and the high price of the finished product in the Bangladeshi market remained high.63

The

natural disaster of 1974 when people died of starvation dampened the spirit of the people towards the new government un-official sources estimated the number of famine related death at 100,000 by the end of October 1974.64 The state of affairs led to a massive exodus of villagers to towns and cities in search of relief. The Awami League government, however, ordered for their forceful exit from the national capital. The Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini was given the orders to keep them outside the cities limits. 65 The Rakhi Bahini, a para-military force consisting of the former Mukti Bahini members and unemployed youths had no discipline or rigour of the army and they

indulged in mindless looting of the villagers. In the midst of such chaotic state of affairs, the army bereft of prestige and power nurtured a deep sense of resentment against the Awami League leadership. The cycle of events which unfolded in 1975 in the form of a coup eliminated the father of the nation and his entire family (with the exception of his daughters who were outside the country) without a murmur of public protest. 66 Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's ideas and programme prior to 1971 had provided the basis of Bengali nationalism, but his failure to address the pressing economic issues undermined its legitimacy and along with it Mujib's secularism lost its popular appeal. 67 The departure ofMujib from the national political scene encouraged pro-Islamic forces to regroup under the cover of various social welfare organizations with the purpose of helping the poverty sticken masses during the famine. The internally generated coup leaders installed Khondokar Mostaq Ahmed as the President. But after months of army

63

Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 76.

64

Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 162.

The Jatiyo Rakhi Babini or the National Security Force was bought into being by Mujib amidst rumours that it is a substitute for the Bangladesh army. For details, see Ziring, Bangladesh from Mujib, n. 7, pp. 103-4.

65

66

Ibid.,p.l04.

67

Jalal, Democracy, n. 24, pp. 87-89.

129

unrest and political uncertainty, Genral Zia-ur-Rehman declared himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.68 Awami League: A Divided House Mujib's secularism project could not be implemented with sincerity partly due to lack of unity among the Awami League leadership. The student wing of Awami League were divided into two factions one group supported Mujibism while the other split on the Question of supporting scientific socialism. A new party under the name of National Socialist party or the Jatiyo Samajtantric Dal was formed. The various key divisions within Awami League were brought about by a former student League leader, Serajul Alam who formed the Bangladesh Communist League. 69 Following the split in the Awami League's student wing in 1972, the AL Labour front and AL-affiliated Association for Freedom Fighters was also divided. 7o Most of the splinter groups came together to protest against economic hegemony and political imperialistic designs of countries like Russia, India and others on Bangladesh. To keep up the mask of unity the term Mujibbad was popularized by Awami League. Mujibbad which meant Mujib's ideals was projected to be the answer to the ill-effects of capitalism and communism. "This attempt to develop and ideology based on a personality cult however hurt Mujib's image. By identifying the new political structure too closely with his personality, Mujib is held responsible for all the deficiencies of the new system. Even the personal failing of the Awami Leaguers are blamed on Mujib and MUjibbad',.71 The factionalism inside Awami League posed a serious challenge to Mujib's leadership and at the same time undermined the credibility of the party which was generally seen as the rightful heir of the liberation war.

Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (England: Dawson, 1980), pp. l31l32.

68

69

Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 47, pp. 167-68.

70

Ibid., p. 168.

71

Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, D. 38, p. 73.

130

BAKSAL Mujib was bogged with not only dissidence within Awami League but also by violent excesses committed by the Rakhi Bahini. The para-military force which enjoyed the blessings of Mujib and Awami League

~ained

notoriety for annihilating those rural

leaders who dared the League's candidates in polls or posed any kind of a political threat to them. The indiscipline displayed by the para-military organization who had taken upon themselves the role of eliminating Mujib's detractors was also accused of murdering Awami Leaguers.72 The Bangladesh anny was called in to deal with the domestic situation, re-establish law and order, and restore credibility of the nation in the eyes of its own people. Mujib not only initiated a role for the Bangladesh anny in its internal affairs, he also altered the political process by declaring a state of emergency on 28 December 1974.73 Faced with internal challenges to his leadership and governance Mujib dissolved the Awami League party and turned increasingly dictatorial. He altered the high ideals of liberation movement by taking retrogressive steps lice destroying the judicial independence, suppressing fundamental rights, thwarting democratic proceedings and resorted to totalitarian control. In his scheme of absolute authority the ideals of secularism was also sacrificed. Mujib amended the Constitution to provide for a Presidential form of government and the President had the authority to form one national party and debar any of the political groups who oppose this arrangement. The emergency order ensured a five year term for Mujibur Rehman as President from the date of the constitutional amendment.14 The new national party imposed on the people was the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, workers and peoples League) or BAKSAL. By imposing BAKSAL Mujib went against the pop~ar aspirations of the people and against his own ideology of Mujibbad. "BAKSAL was not only a coercive assembly; it was predicated on the elimination of other organizations. BAKSAL was Mujib's way of expressing his one-party state. Thus in a more significant way, BAKSAL was meant to 72

Anthony Mascarenhas, Bangladesh: A Legacy ofBlood (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), p. 44.

73

Ziring, Bangladeshfrom Mujib, n. 7, p. 101.

74 "The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary December 28, 1974" cited in Maniruzzaman's Bangladesh Revolution, n. 47, p. 178.

131

serve the purpose of the Bangladesh's personal dictatorship, not the cause of national development and unity - - - Mujib heralded the establishment of BAKSAL with the phraSe the second Revolution.,,75 Commenting on the objectives of the "Second Revolution" which stood to wipe corruption, to increase agricultural and industrial production, to control population pressure and to bring about national unity, scholars like Rounaq Jaban felt that the above mentioned goals were reformist by nature and failed to explain the need of a revolution to achieve them. 76 The system initiated by Mujib led to curtailment of civil liberties and people's fundamental rights. Press censorship was established, some dailies were banned while some were nationalized.77 Mujibur Rehman rationalized these policies as the need of the time since the nation faced multiple challenges from anti-systemic forces. 78 But the factional fights within Awami League were no less cause for concern. The result was contradiction in policy matters and bad governance which led to loss of credibility of the leaders. Last but not the least the authoritarian tendencies has much to do with erosion of his popularity. Naxalite Violence One of the major forces which were directly responsible for the failure of Mujibism was the violence unleashed by he extremist factions of left parties. The fear of ultra left was deeply entrenched in their minds. There were a number of ordinances directed against the extremist factions by the AL government. They included (a) establishment of special tribunals to prosecute unsocial elements for disturbing law or administration in any manner; (b) To arrest without warrant on suspicion of having committed the above offences; (c) removal of any governmental employee, even the police from service without right to appeal; (d) exemption of the above law from un constitutionality; (e) giving the President special power to declare emergency when the

75

Ziring, Bangladeshfrom Mujib. n. 7, p. 105.

76

Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 118.

June 16, 1975 saw the closure of 20 daily newspapers. While Ittefaq and The Bangladesh Times were nationalised, many others like Holiday was banned.

77

78

See, The Statesman (Weekly), Calcutta, December 21,1974.

132

security or economy is threatened by war or internal disturbances; (f) to enable the Jatiya Rakxld Bahini JRB to arrest or search without warrant, with no appeal against these

actions; (g) to authorise the government to ban Unions, associations or parties if their activities were found prejudicial to national interest; (h) to detain a person to prevent him from committing the prejudicial act. 79 The mindless acts of looting, sabotage and rising incidence of political violence was fixed on the ultra leftists like the Sarbohoras headed by Siraj Sikdar. The ideology of the Sarbohora Party was to initiate a revolution by forming a united front of peasant workers and of the down trodden linguistic and national minorities. The party was highly critical of Awami League for its closeness with India which in their perception was an expanding imperial power. 80 Parties having the similar world view were other left forces likethe Sammobadi Dal and East Bengal Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (EBCPML).

They held the view that socialism has failed to meet the aspirations of the people and the only hope which remained was a social revolution engineered by the poor of the country. Role of Collaborators

Mujibur Rehman was exceptionally harsh on the collaborators of Pakistani army who belonged to the right-wing parties. These collaborators had acted due to their ideological convictions, recruited by the Jamaat-i-Islam and Pakistani forces to undermine the liberation war. Though the noose was tightened around their necks just after independence, they continued their work in secrecy.8l Mujib established special Tribunals to ensure punishment for the 1971 collaborators of Pakistani army, but the laws against them were not full proof as a result of which out of 37,471 cases against them, only 2,848 were decided by October 31, 1973. Out of 2,848 accused only 752 were punished and the remaining 2096 were proclaimed not guilty.82 This liberalism towards the collaborators ended with Mujib's general amnesty towards them which exempted the 79 The provisions of the Special Power Act 1974 were taken from the proceedings of the Jatiyo Sangsad as quoted in Maniruzzam, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 176. 80

Ibid., p. 236.

See, Ekattorer Ghatak Ke Ko thaye (Dhaka: Center for Spreading the Consciousness of liberation war, 1987), pp. 70-71.

81

82

Ibid., p. 69.

133

under trials as well those convicted from any kind of punishment. Their release from prison according to official sources was to enable them to participate in the third anniversary of Bangladesh's victory celebrations on 16 December 1973.83 While critics describe the release of collaborators as a calculated measure on the part of Mujib's government to counter the radical violence unleashed by the left parties allover Bangladesh.84 Whatever may be the motive of the government their release and soft treatment towards the collaborators indicated that Mujib and the leaders within Awami League were not prepared to stretch the entire exercise any more. The national elite failed to carry forward the ideology of the liberation war and looked for policy reversals. The end product of their action resulted in the rehabilitation of the collaborators inside Bangladesh, who later became the torchbearers of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, Mujibism which stood for the principles of Nationalism, Socialism, democracy and secularism underwent radical changes, after a few years of its initiation. Commenting on the reasons for the failed secular experiment critics give a number of reasons, prominent among them was the Islamic identity of more than 80010 of its population, the lack of compatibility between secularism and forces needed to sustain it and some identify with the overdose of secularism during the initial years of Mujibur Rehman's regime. Scholars like Talukdar Maniruzzaman argue that the cultural conditions to nurture the ideology of secularism is absent in Bangladesh.

According to him, "secularism in

Bangladesh did not reflect Bangladesh's societal spirit and history and it arose as a utilitarian expediency in the political field".85 Refuting the culturist argument of Maniruzzaman, Ali Riaz has contended that culture/spirit is an abstraction which emerges from the material basis of society. He further adds secularism as practiced in the Indian sub-continent is distinctly different from the western variant of secularism. Unlike in the West, secularism entails polity separation, which in other words means distinction between sate and the church, in the 83

Ibid., p. 22.

84

Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 22.

85 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics Secular and Islamic Trends", in Rafiuddin Ahmed. Religion Nationalism, n. 6, p. 69.

134

sub-continental case, it, however, advocates a role for the state in religious affairs. In some ways the state is neutral in so far as individual faiths are concerned, and in other ways state plays a positive role in protecting and ensuring equal treatment to all. According to Ali Riaz secularism in context to Bangladesh and India is not an alien concept, instead it is home grown, suiting to the imperatives of multiple identities.86 Secularism to be successful in a given society does not require any pre-condition. Its success or failure depends on the composition and commitment of the ruling elite. There may be variation in practices depending on the political exigencies, but secularism nevertheless is not culturally driven. Ali Riaz also considers such explanations as the reaction to secular experiment, legitimacy crisis, and external aid as too generalised without any analytical depth. The crisis of legitimacy is for instance not simply political or constitutional; it has had its roots in the failure on the part of the ruling elite, to build and sustain its ideological hegemony.87 A stable polity is dependent on the ability of the leadership to forge an ideology which enjoys a larger societal consensus. In a short span the post independence elite of Bangladesh had difficulty in establishing the ideological hegemony of the ruling elite. The crisis had its beginning with Mujib faltering in his commitment and pursuit to realise his goals, and the state of affairs aggravated with the ouster of Mujib from the political scene. Bases of Bangladeshi Nationalism Soon after Mujib's death there was a perceptible shift in the emphasis from syncretistic, linguistic nationalism and secular ideology to the search for a new identity shaped by distinctions such as ''we'' vs ''they''. Reflective of this trend, ancient texts were researched by historians to highlight the differences between the Indian part of Bengal and the contemporary Bangladesh notwithstanding the fact that both of them belong to the same geographic area, share the same written and spoken language, have the same food habits and living conditions. Curiously, few scholars even came with the theory that there were two Bengals and Bengal in historical and cultural terms is not Ali Riaz, "God willing": The Politics and Ideology ofIslamism in Bangladesh", Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and Middle East, VoL 23, No.1 & 2, 2003, pp. 302-305.

86

87

Ibid.

135

monolithic.88 The author of the work on Bangladesh nationalism, M Anusuzzaman, for instance, begins with the political history of the rulers and the dynasties, which influenced in different ways the history of the two Bengals. He defmes political culture of the two sides in three directions: social equality, localisaton and vernacularisation. He argues that West Bengal in the ancient times was known as Radha, Sushma, Uttar Radha, and Dakshina Radha, while areas around the present Bangladesh was known as Harikela, Pundravardhana and Varendra.

Regarding the rulers, he brings in the distinctiveness by insisting that West Bengal and adjoining area were under Hindu ruling dynasties like king Sasanka and later, the Guptas, while Vanga/Bangladesh was under the Buddhist rule. He opines that the title of Maharajadhiraja held by the Vanga kings reveals then fierce independent orientation, while the history of present West Bengal/Gauda was inconsistent. The author differentiates between the two Bengals by asserting that the ancient people of Bengal were non-Aryans but there was marked Brahmancal influence in their culture because the Aryan rulers invited and patronised Brahmins from northern regions of India. While the Aryan rulers were anti-Buddhists, the Vanga kings were Buddhists. Bengali language and literature had the same literacy style but the Buddhists scholars of Vanga developed Bengali by writing charyapads in local Buddhist-Sanskrit (Magadh-prakrit), which was ignored by the Hindu rulers of Sen Dynasty.89 The real transformation came during the Muslim period (12th century A.D.) when the entire region was named as Bangladesh. 90 Bangladesh under the Muslim rulers, according to Aniruzzaman, attained greater social equality because Islam was based on equality, and there were mass conversions of low-caste Hindus to Islamic faith. Second, there was localisation, which to the author is proved by the fact that the Muslim rulers assimilated with the native by learning their language and cultures, by altering their food habits and using locally available materials for housing. Local people were appointed to key-posts and they faced no discrimination 88 M. Aniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Nationalism" in Emajuddin Ahamed (ed.), Bangladesh Politics (Dhaka, Centre for Social Studies, 1980), pp.92-82. 89

Ibid., p. 83.

M.A.Rahim, Social and cultural History of Bengal, Vol. I (1201-1576), (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1963), pp. 1-6.

90

136

opponents. "The Jamaat-i-Islami criticised Zia on a number of other counts but gave full support to his Afghan policy. The Jamaat had strong support among the mujahideen groups operating out of Peshawar".184 The Jamaat played a crucial role in generating public opinion in favour of Islamic jihad against the Soviet occupation. What subsequently emerged was a unique partnership between the Jamaat and Pakistani security forces in pursuit of a common objective. This led to the involvement of the Jamaat in the sensitive areas like the flow of funds and arms to the Mujahedins, exposing its cadres to military training by the elite forces. I85 In the course ofthe Afghan war, the Jamaat was in some ways successful in projecting itself as the symbol of pan-Islamism in the Muslim world.

Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation Mesures Both the domestic and external factors highlighted above contributed in varying degree to the consolidation of the military regime until Zia's death in an air crash in 1988. But what helped Zia overcome the initial problem of legitimacy was the sate-led Islamisation programme, which included judicial reforms, introduction of Islamic economics, Islamic penal code and a new educational policy based on Islamic injunctions. Judiciary When Nusrat Bhutto evoked Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution terming the Martial Law interventions illegal, it was Chief Justice Anwarul Haq and his team which came to the General's rescue. The judicial bench legitimized Zia's intervention, ''by the highest consideration of state necessity',!86 Believing in Zia's 'Words or his "solemn Pledge" to hold national elections in 90 days as irrefutable truth the Chief Justice invested the Martial Law Chief the authority to change the constitution. Little did he realize that

184 Sbahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-1988", Asian Survey, vol. XXVIII, no. 10 (October 1988), p. 1097. 1~

.

Nasr, The Vanguard, n.144, p.195.

186 Pakistan, supreme Court Judgement on Begum Nusrat Bhutto's Petition Challenging Detention of Mr. Z.A. Bbutto and others under Martial Law Order 12 of 1977 (Lahore, 10 November 1977), p. 23 as quoted in Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad, NlllCR, 1994), p. 356.

87

Zia Period Major General Ziaur Rahman inserted the Islamic invocation "Bismillah-ir Rahman-ir Rahim" (In the name of Allah the Beneficent, the Merciful) above the preamble of the Constitution.92 Zia ur Rahman amended Article 8(1) of the Constitution and removed secularism from the principles of state policy. The amendment changed the state's approach to religion. It not only included absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah, but also affirmed its faith on nationalism, democracy and socialism "meaning economic and social justice, together with principles derived from them . . ... shall constitute the fundamental principles of state policy',.93 A new clause which was clipped to Article 25 stressed that ''the state shall endeavour to consolidate preserve, and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity.,,94 The amendment ordered that the citizens of Bangladesh would be termed as "Bangladeshi" and not as a ''Bengalee'' as described by the 1972 Constitution. (Article 6) Zia ur Rahman shunned linguistic nationalism and opted for territorial and religious nationalism. By coining the term Bangladeshi, he tried to forge a distinct identity of his people as different from their ethnic cousins in the Indian part of Bengal. After the ruling military elites interpretation of nationalism Awami League and few left parties who spearheaded the liberation war were branded as supporters of secular nationalism, while Zia's new party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and all the right wing Islamic parties irrespective of their political differences were known to be supporters of Bangladeshi Nationalism. 95 By using political Islam President Zia got the much needed legitimacy for his rule. Article 38 of the Constitution was amended to bring back religious based politics. The prominent Islam based parties who were allowed to come into being were the Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami, Nizam-e-Islam, Islamic Democratic League, 92 Zia ur Rahman felt that the Constitution needed he amendments since "there is much resentment among the people". For the full text of President Zia's Speech see Th~ Bangladesh Observer, April 23, 1977.

93

"The Proclamation [Amendment] Order. 1977", The Bangladesh Observer. April 23. 1977.

94

Ibid.

Sayeed Iftekhar Ahmed, "Resurgence of Islam in Bangladesh Politics", South Asian Journal. January 2002 at http://www.Southasianmedia.netlmagazine/Journalillresurgenceoflslam.htm

95

138

Islamic Party, Jamaat-e-ulama-e-Islam, Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan National United Front and Freedom Party etc. These Islamic parties were banned by Mujib due to their role during the liberation war (Mukti Joddha).96 Their presence however was legally endorsed by Ziaur Rehman who ratified the political parties Regulations of 1976. The state patronization of Islamic parties allowed them to expand their agenda in civil society. All the right wing parties have their student and youth wings too, prominent among them include the Islamic Chatra Shibir and Jubo Shibir. These student organizations along with their parent bodies strive for the establishment of an Islamic society. They began to increase their social base through various socio-cultural and socio-religious organizations 97 like the Bangladesh Masjid Mission, Masjid Samaj and Bangladesh Islamic centre. These socio-cultural religious groups support, propagate and highlight the Islamic heritage of Bangladesh by undertaking large scale publications of Islamic literature. 98 The government of Ziaur Rehman created a party of its own known as the Bangladesh Nationalist party. In its efforts to be radically different from the Awami League, the BNP took the services of Anti-Awami League elements like the Muslim League. The military junta appointed Shah Azizur Rahman of the Muslim League as the Prime Minister and received the good will and services of Maulana Abdul Mannan, Chief of Jamiat-i-Mudarresin (Association of madrassa teachers) the pirs of Sarsina, Jaunpur noted for their rabid hatred for the Awami League and India into their party.99 In later years, it was this party of Ziaur Rahman which with the active cooperation of Islamic forces worked towards enhancing the Islamic identity of Bangladesh. Apart from constitutional amendments to restore the supremacy of Islam, Ziaur Rahman undertook some cosmetic measures to increase the visibility of Islam in national life. They include hanging of Islamic posters and writings from the Holy Koran in public 96 See M. Kabir, Experiences of an Exile at Home: Life in Occupied Bangladesh, (Dhaka: The Author . Press, 1972), pp. 103-120. 97 K.M. Mohsin, "'Trends ofIslam in Bangladesh in S.R. Chakravarthy and Virendra Narayan. Bangladesh: History and Culture, Vol. 1 (Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p. 109.

The low cost of books on various aspects of Islam make them popular among the masses. Some of the popular journals include the islamic Foundation Patrika and periodicals like Sabuj Pata, Sampan, Saptadinga, Mayur Pankhi etc.

98

99 Taj ul Islam Hashmi, Islam is Bangladesh Politics in Hussain Mutalib and Taj ul Islam Hashmi (ed.), Islam, Muslim & Muslim State Case Study of 13 Countries, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1994), p. 112.

139

whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam".191 The lawyers practicing in front of the Shariat bench were required to possess five or more years of legal experience in the high Court and were supposed to be "an Alim" which implies one having command over Islamic matters and the shariat. These Sharia courts had a limited role to play in the sense they remained passive players till a law was challenged as being repugnant to Islamic tenants, secondly the Shariat courts did not in any other way limit the authority and functioning of civil or military courts. And finally though laws were conformed to Islamic Sharia, the greater question of deriving the entire legal system from the Sharia was not discussed at all. 192 The Shariat benches were made subservient to the military courts which had the authority to bypass the opinion of the Shariat COurtS. 193 The Zia regime passed a law which debarred any other court to contest the ruling of the military court or issue any process against the Chief Martial Law authority.194 Thus, the common man could now be arrested without being told about his charges and could take no legal action against the military government since it was placed above the Islamic jurisprudence. Zia later replaced the Shariat benches by a Federal Shariat Court in Islamabad where the lawyers appearing before the court were required to "state, expound and interpret injunctions of Islam relevant to the proceedings. ,,195 The judges belonging to the entire legal setup were required to take an oath of loyalty to the military regime. In the year 1981, the junta ruler issued the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO). The new order limited the authority of the judiciary to the extent of making them superfluous. The judges could no longer quash detention orders of the military court, could not issue bail and stay orders on executions and floggings for want of evidence. The PCO ignored elections, Parliament and all other democratic moves. The fundamental rights ensured by the 1973 constitution were done away with 191

Weiss, Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 11.

192

Ibid. p. 12.

193 Oleg V. Pleshov, Islamism and Travails of Democracy in Pakistan (Delhi: Greenwich Millennium Press, 2004), p. 208. 194 On May 1980 the Junta ruler amended Article 199 of the Constitution stripping the High Courts from reviewing martial Law order.

195

Weiss,Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p.12.

89

policy sphere for instance Zia made concerted efforts at courting support of Muslim countries not simply for material benefits, but also for distancing Bangladesh from the India centric policy of his predecessors. Interestingly the new foreign policy of Zia served the twin purposes of asserting its autonomy and at the same time building bridges with the US and its allies in West Asia. This in a way marked the U-tum in Bangladesh's foreign policy from a pro India - Soviet to increasingly pro-West in a block divided cold War era. The consequences of this policy change were reflected deeply in strengthening the Islamist elements inside the country, especially by creating the material base for the Islamist resurgence. The pro-Western leaning drew Bangladesh closer to the Islamic World, particularly the US allies in the Gulf, which, in tum, facilitated the steady flow of funds from the oil rich Gulf countries, contributing to the Islamist consolidation. The petro-dollars, which various Islamist organizations received to preach an orthodox narrow version of Islam, were invested in various farms and business establishment, thus sustaining the Islamist organisations to carry forward their mission. lOS The role of Ziaur Rahman in the Islamic revival of Bangladesh would be incomplete without a mention of the retum of the Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, Golam Azam. The chief of Jamaat gained notoriety for collaborating with the Pakistani army to massacre Bengali intellectuals during the war of liberation. The Pakistani army and paramilitary units known as the al-Badr and ai-Shams were aided in their gruesome task of killing Bengalis with the help of adherents of right wing parties like the Muslim League and Jamaat-i-Islami in 1971.106 Golam Azam fled to Pakistan during the liberation movement and returned with a Pakistani passport. His return in 1978 during Ziaur Rahman's tenure, his safe stay in Dhaka in spite of serious allegations against him and his continued stay even after the expiry of his visa- all indicated Ziaur Rahman's desire to rehabilitate him politically. 107 105 For details see, "Rise of Fanatic Extremism in Bangladesh", Awami League News Letter, vol. 4, no. 12, December 31, 2005,p.l0. 106 The Pakistani army and their right wing E. Bengal collaborators carried out their operations in three phases (a) Operation search light, (b) operation search and destroy and (c) operation scorched earth. They also took to raping Bengali women. In the genocide operations the intellectuals were taken to Rayerbazar, a marshy wet land in Dacca and gunned down blindfolded. See Bangladesh Genocide Archive http://muktadharar.netlplllhtml

107

H. Karlekar, Bangladesh the Next Afghanistan? (New Delhi: Sags publications, 2005), p. 52.

141

The controversy regarding Golam Azam's homecoming was triggered off by Jahanara Imam, who authored the popular book, Ekattorer Dinguli. A public trial of Golam Azam in the people's court on the national day of Bangladesh in 1992 took place where 2000,000 people witnessed the trial. lOS In brief, the entire Golam Azam episode reveals how political moves were closely linked to Islam which served as a legitimiser for Zia, for consolidating his regime. In all the post-Mujibur Rahman period saw active Islamic symbolism to assuage the feelings of fellow Bangladeshi who suffered from the psychology of neglected faith. 109 Zia's death in 1981 in a violent coup brought another military general to power. What appeared to be a pattern in Bangladesh at that period of time was to capture power through unconstitutional means and then form a party, use government machinery to create support base and finally utilize Islam to gain legitimacy. General Ershad who succeeded Ziaur Rahman could not be any different from his predecessor.

Hussain Muhammad Ershad Regime The right wing forces unleashed during Zia's regime further consolidated under General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1983-1990) who like his predecessor persisted with the policies of institutionalising Islam. General Ershad was convinced of the role of Islam in the national life of his people and expressed his views before even before assuming the office of the President. He said, "Islam being the religion of the majority of the population will be given the highest place in the country's future constitution and Islamic provisions will be included wherever necessary.110 Both the regimes of Zia and Ershad respectively created space for the Islamists to be a part of mainstream politics, and raised Islam to be the highest ideology and agenda of the state. l ]]

108 For details, see, "Nirmul On the March", Dhaka Courier (April 3-16), pp. 14-16 and (May 7, 1993), Vol. 9, No. 40.

M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Liberals and Religious Right in Bangladesh", Asian Survey, vol. XXXIV, no. II, (November 1994), p. 984.

109

110

See Bangladesh Observer, January 15, 1983.

III

Ali Riaz,lslamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 103.

142

Ershad often used emotive Issues like Israeli attacks on Muslim Shrines in Jerusalem and called upon complete refrain from all public activity on some days as a mark of solidarity for fellow Palestinians. Similarly, the Farakka water crisis with India was given an Islamic colour by him. He played the Indian card to build up an united front among Bangladeshis. He once stated, "It is being said today that if we do not get water from Farakka the northern and southern regions of Bangladesh will turn into a desert, but I want to remind every body concerned that Islam was born in a desert, but Islam didn't die. Islam could not be destroyed".i12 In one of the study it was indicated that majority of Bangladeshis would like to see non-cleric, western English educated, anti Indian and Islam loving politicians to take over as administrators of their country.ll3 Ershad perhapd tried to fit into this description. He declared Friday as weekly holiday and introduced the Zakat fund (charity collections) for the needy. Ershad wanted to give an Islamic colour to the Shahid Minar or the Martyrs Monement. He objected to the paintings on the premises of the historic monument un-Islamic and declared that it should be substituted by recitations from the Koran. 114 He tried to keep with popular traditions like frequenting mosques, shrines and places of Islamic faith, and flaunted his close relationship with some influential pirs like the Pir of Atrashi, Charmoni and Sarsina. 115 Ershad stressed on a mosque-based society and ensured liberal grants for their upkeeping. He encouraged mosques to receive foreign assistance for their development. ll 6plush with funds from Saudi and Gulf-based organizations, the Islamists were able to spread their network and increase their politicoreligious clout in the days ahead. General Ershad's most significant step towards Islamising Bangladesh was the 8th amendment of the cons.titution which established Islam as the state religion of 112 Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends" in Charavarthy (ed.), Bangladesh History, n. 47, p. 71.

JJ3

Razia Akter Banu, Islam in Bangladesh (Leiden E.1. Brill, 1992), p.

114

Karlenkar, Bangladesh, n. 107, p. 53.

115 See, Syed Abdul Maksud ed., Gono Andolon 1982-90 (Bengali) (Dacca: 1991) as quoted in Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh" in Mutalib and Hashmi, Islam, n. 99, p. 114. When People at the helm of affairs take the blessings of Pirs, it reveals the kind of influence they could yield in society. 116

-

Karlekar, Bangladesh, n. 107, p.

5~.

143

The state intervention to make it obligatory brought to the surface the differences of opinion among members of various sects of Islam. It evoked protest and demonstrations from the Shia community who "claimed that it violated the right of Shias to distribute alms as dictated by their consciences and in accordance with the guidelines of Islamic law as interpreted in the jurisprudence of their own sect.,,203 Zakat Ordinance introduced by Zia triggered off a vicious cycle of sectarian animosity disrupting the fragile social mosaic. The Shias indulged in violent demonstrations and protests against Zakat laws and finally were successful in clairiUng exemption from governmental Zalmt.204

General Zia's claim that Zakat would usher in an egalitarian society by bridging the gap between haves and have-nots did not convince anyone. The total collected amount in 1980-81 was about 600 million rupees or $60 million which meant less than one dollar worth assistance per capita per year in Pakistan where more than half the population were needy.20S The Ushr tax traces its practice in societies at a very early stage of economic development. The emphasis being on agriculture, the produce from farms was therefore subject to taxes instead of other assets. Even though the Pakistani officials did not provide any justifiable economic grounds which led to imposition of the agricultural tax, the government went ahead with it due to its desire to revive Shariabased tax rules?06 The entire efforts of the state were to highlight Zalmt and Ushr tax as serving the social security network of an Islamic state. Muslim economists worked on the concepts of Zalmt and substantiated the state's approach that Zalmt would help in the establishment of social and economic justice through re-distribution of wealth, while others built their

203 Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamisation and Taxation in Pakistan" in Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion, n. 106, p. 72. Although both Shias and Sunnis believe in Zakat, there exist differences of opinion as to who collects Zakat, how it is put to good use and how it should be determined. 204 The Ministry of Finance issued a Notification on April 27, 1981 which exempted Shias from Zakat for jurisprudential reasons. Although Shias still complained about official bungling, on pen and paper the exemptions were put in place.

205

Syed, Pakistan Islam Politics, D. 109, p.178.

206

Mayer, "IslamisatioD and Taxation", n. 205, pp. 73-74.

92

their being suspects revolves around their dubious role during the massive national movement. 121 The party remained underground for a few years only to emerge as a political force under the watchful eyes of the junta rulers. Secondly its participation in the movement for the restoration of democracy (1990) against the junta rule of Ershad gave it the much needed political legitimacy. Its staying power in Bangladesh politics is subject to great research and holds the key in deciding the trajectory of the nation's political destiny. Apart from its role in bringing about "awakening among Muslims" according to the demands of their faith, Jamaat desires that ''the sovereignty of Allah must be established in all fields of human existence. Mosques and Parliament taqwa and addl.

dikr and shariah are inalienable dimensions of the same reality.,,122 The objectives of Jamaat-e-Islam is the establishment of the Islamic system in all spheres of life, the first step dikr therefore is to preach Islam as a revolutionary ideology and then organize and train those who accept the ideology through complete submission, and then the trained Muslims commit themselves to the task of capturing state power in order to replace the un-Islamic regime with an Islamic leadership.123 The whole idea of an Islamic polity is to implement Islamic social, economic, political ethical, moral and penal laws, and if necessary enact new legislations only in the spirit of Holy Koran, Sunnah and Prophet's traditions. 124 Seen from this perspective an Islamic community is only empowered to propel an Islamic state and therefore, Jamaat has its doors open only for Muslims who are committed to the above cause. The Jamaat in Bangladesh is an Islamic nationalist party and its ultra conservative cadres work to counter Bengali nationalism and socialism. The Bangladeshi Islamists have an unfavourable attitude towards the syncretic traditions and liberalism of Bengali culture. In a profound shift from the relatively plural Bengali 121 The Jamaat-i-Islami now accepts he independence of Bangladesh, and does not want any kind of a reunion with Pakistan. 122

See Jammat website, www.jamaat-e-Islami.org

123 The guidelines and strategy to bring about an Islamic Revolution is mentioned in Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, The Process of Islamic Revolution (Bengali translation from Urdu) (Dacca: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1962) mentioned in U.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, "Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges and Prospects", in Mutalib and Hashmi (ed.), Islam Muslims, n. 99, p. 84.

124 See, Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1961), pp.70-109.

145

religious and cultural practices the Islamists in Bangladesh consciously incorporate the exclusive principles of their faith in its undiluted form. 125 The role of Jamaat during the liberation days was highly unimpressive. Cadres from Jamaat and other right wing parties had formed action groups namely the Razakars, Al Badr, and Al sham to massively sabotage the liberation movement both in rural and urban areas. Targets of their attacks were not only the Mukti Bahini guerillas but also all liberal thinking intellectuals so that the new state remains deprived of their services in nation building. 126 The most dreaded of Jamaat leaders was Abdul Kader Molla who was famously called the butcher of Mirpur (a place on the outskirts of Dacca).

Though

considered a war criminal, he was never persecuted and occupied the post of publicrelation secretary of Jamaat in Bangladesh.127 Thus, Jamaat has survived the hostile environment of post liberation days owing to the general clemency granted by Mujibur Rahman and later allowed to flourish openly by general Zia. In fact the Jamaat and other allied parties never had it so good under the martial law. Here were generals in politics, who not only indulged in Islamisation and Islamic rhetoric, but also put them at the political centre-stage. The phase of benevolence towards Islamists was manifested when General Ziaur Rahman allowed Golam Azam to enter Bangladesh with a Pakistani passport. The Chief of Jamaat was declared as the enemy of the' nation and his citizenship was cancelled in 1973. The restoration of his political status rose the question as to how would a foreign national be allowed to preside over the fate of a Bangladesh based party?128 To counter the Islamic ideologues and their patrons the Nirmul Committee or the National Coordination Committee for the implementation of the spirit of the Liberation War and elimination of the killers and· collaborators of 1971 was formed. The committee

125

Sayeed Iftekhar Ahmed, "Resurgence ofIslam", n. 95 , p. 4.

126 Eyewitness accounts of the relatives of People who were picked up by Razakars and Al Badr forces describe them as Bengalis. The only survivor of the Rayerbazar killings describes the captors and murderers of Bengali intellectuals as fellow Bengalis. See Dilwar Hossain, Ekottorer Ghatok-dalalera ke kothay (Dhaka: MJCBK, 1989), P. 37. 127

Abdul Kadar MolIa was accused of killing hundreds of people in 1971.

128 For a detailed account of the role of Jamaat and Golam Azam, see Shahriar Kabir, Bangladesh Amraa Ebong Ora (Dhaka: Ananya, 2005), pp. 11-16.

146

was non-political and held Gano Adalats (people's court) to try Azam for sedition. Many prominent citizens of civil society heard the case for days and on March 26, 1992 the people's court held a public trial and held him guilty.129 The government ignored the people's verdict, and charged him with a technical case of non-possession of a passport. A three member bench of the Bangladesh High Court rejected the executive order of 1973 and passed a judgment declaring him a citizen of Bangladesh. Golam Azam's legal rehabilitation points to the greater political strategy of Begum Zia, who used him to dent the political constituencies of the Awami League. As the government had repealed the collaborators Acts to save the anti-liberation agents and appointed them to high ranking government posts, the liberation forces seemed to have lost half the battle.130 In addition, the internal feud among the pro-liberation parties had always made their struggle against Jamaat a weak one.

Jamaat's Operational Methods The Jamaat-e-Islami seeks to make mosques the centre of all Islamic activities. To give impetus to preaching Islam as a revolutionary ideology Jamaat places emphasis on the establishment of educational institutions, spread of adult education and set up reading centres for the common man. l3l The ideological engineering project requires control over schools colleges, madrassas and the student wing of the party. Jamaat-eIslami has as very strong student organization known as Islamic Chatra Shibir. Apart from Shibir, bulk of its members comes from madrassas. The Jamaat has kindergarten schools in every district and has separate English medium schools like the Manarat School and University.132 It also has coaching centres to help deserving poor students to get into various professional courses. 133

129

See, Dhaka Courier (Dhaka), Vol. 9, May 7,1993.

130 BNP or the Bangladesh National Party has the support of Jamaat and Islami Oikya Jote (lOJ) in the Jatiyo Sangsad. They have been given ministries and other responsible posts. 131 The programme of the party is written under the sub section heading "Social Reform", at www.jamaate-islami.org 132 Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Ascendancy of the Religious Right in Bangladesh politics: A study of Jamaat-eIslami", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33, no. 2, March 2009, p. 277.

133

Ibid., p. 277.

147

The Islamic Chatra Shibir like its parent body Jamaat has a wide network and has many serious academics from Bangladesh's schools and universities as its cadres.134 These foot soldiers of Islam later percolate into all spheres of life and all sectors of the state including education and army services. Jamaat's student front Shibir were all out to undermine the position of the united opposition parties among students in various university campuses. 135 It has its alternative media in the form of a newspaper called Sangram and exercise great influence on the Islamic Research Institute. Shibir

encourages the students to take up Islamic studies and prepares hem to fight the ideological battle for an Islamic state.136 Shibir members have strong student fronts in the universities of Rajshahi, Chittagong, Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Khustia Islamic University and Jahangir Nagar, The ICS has close ties with similar

Muslim groups in Pakistan, Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia. It is suspected to have ties with Islamists groups within India and Pakistani intelligence services.137 It has links with terror outfits like the Arakan Rohingya National organization on extremists Islamist group of Burmese Muslims and AI Qaeda outfits in Bangladesh. Inside Bangladesh it has secret and deep association with home bred Islamist organization like the Harkat ul-Jihad Bangladesh (HUJIB) Jagrata Muslim Janata (1MB) and other Islamists groupS.138 A look at its Karmashuchi (programme), however, reveals that the ICS is an organisation which seeks to spread Islam among the student community, to train and organise them for an Islamic order, to produce men with great morality and ethics, to create and sustain Islamic education and to free humanity from all kinds of exploitation by an Islamic-revolution. 139 Even though the ICS appears to be a benevolent and a cultural organization committed to raise Islamic consciousness among the students, its other activities and external networks makes it a militant outfit, comparable even to the 134

V.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, "lamaat-i-Islami''. n.99, p. 85.

135 The Islamic Chatra Shibir has impressive victories in the student elections in the various universities. It has a indoctrination plan and puts special emphasis on character building, disciplined action to generate Islamic consciousness. 136

South Asia Terrorism portal, Shibir section, available at http://www.satp.org

137

Ibid.

138

Ibid.

139

See their website, www.jamaat-e-islami.org and www.shibir.com

148

Taliban. 140 In his comprehensive study on Islamists in Bangladesh, Karlekar has forcefully argued that Jamaat and its associate outfits are comparable to Taliban not only on matters concerning theocracy and following the basic tenants of Islam, but also in matters related to women, recreation, entertainment and socio-cultural practices. He admits that the implementation of the retrogressive measures have not yet taken place in Bangladesh, but if conditions remain favourable to empower, it politically the possibility of a 'joyless' Bangladesh is not far. 141 Financial Support

Major portion of financial support came from donations from external sources and through the Islamic NGO's controlled by them. The main patrons are Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. The Saudi based Muslim world League (Rabita al Alam al-Islami) and the AI-Haramayne Foundation (AHF) are major donors. The AI-Haramaine Foundation which was banned in September 2002 after UN marked it as a terror network is said to have brought TK 20 crore through the NGO Affairs Bureau from 1997 to 2001. AIHaramaine has TK 19 crore more to be utilized on Islamic education in 38 distracts of Bangladesh.142 Jamaat also received funds from Islami Bank and AI-Arafa Bank for its madrassas. 143 Intelligence sources say that other militant groups received funds from UAB based welfare organisation Al Fuzaira, and Khairul Ansar Al Khairia, Kuwait based Doulatul Kuwait, and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society Bahrain based Doulatul Bahrain, and Benevolence International Organisation registered with the NGO bureau raises funds for Bin Laden. It is reported that ''no organization in Bangladesh received any assistance from any of these without recommendation from Jamaat-Shibir."l44 The external funding which flows into Bangladesh is justified in the name of social welfare activities like building madrassas, mosques and orphanages, but behind 140

Karlekar. Bangladesh. n. 107. pp. 138-140.

141

Ibid.

142 Zayadul Ahsan. "Inside the militant Groups: Foreign funding. Local Business keep them going'. The Daily Star online edition at htlp://www.thedailystar.netl22 August 2005.

Sources from Abu Sayeed, Aghashito Judher Blue Print (Blue print of an Undeclared war) 2nd ed. (Dhaka: Agami Publication. 2005). p. 253 as mentioned in Karlekar. Bangladesh. n. 107. p. 156. 143

144

Karlekar. Bangladesh. n:107. p. 109.

149

report put restrictions on women leaving the country or serving abroad as diplomats without therr male escorts. The minimum age for women to become member of the Majlis-e-shura was 50 years. The proposals of the Islamic Ideology Council and the

Ansari Commission met with great resistance from women and human right activists through out Pakistan. Some analysts including Charles Kennedy consider Zia's Islamisation as very unprofessional and not gender-biased. They also argue that the Hudud Ordinances had a negligible impact on Pakistan's middle classes, as between 1980-85 the decisions of the Federal Sharia Court were revised 27 times, and the judges in the FSC were mostly foreign educated with no or little exposure to Islamic law. Topping them all, hudud Ordinances in many of Pakistan's provinces were not even implemented?19 Notwithstanding Kennedy's observations, Zia's Islamisation measures severely undermined the democratic institutions in Pakistan. Before Zia introduced such retrogressive measures, women in Pakistan were not punished for adultery. By replacing civil laws with Islamic laws the state sent a very clear message that it is the custodian of Islam as well as its promoter. The very presence of such laws in society led to resurgence of Orthodox interpretation of Islam. By promUlgating Hudud laws the state interfered in the private lives of its citizens in the name of morality. The government also issued directives to women news readers and air-hostesses to wear a dupatta over their heads. Similarly teachers and female students were asked to use scarves.220 Thus, ''the state moved on to take over the lives of women, to control their bodies, their space, to decide what they should wear, how they should conduct themselves, the jobs they could take the sports they could play, and took it upon itself to defme and regulate women's morality. This "attempt to impose single interpretation of Islam, has pitted Islam against Islam, sect

219 Charles Kennedy, "Islamisation and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No.1, Spring 1990, pp. 62-77. Also see Charles Kennedy, "Islamisation in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. xxviii, no. 3, March 1988, pp. 312-313.

220 See J Henry Korson and Michelle MaskieIl, "Islamisation and the Social policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women", Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No.6 (June 1985), pp. 601-602.

96

belonged to this group. In 1981 67 percent of its top leaders had college or university education and in 1987 71 percent of its top ranking leaders had access to college or university education. The scholar found out that 90 per cent of its members and associate members came from a common social background - the lower middle class. Jamaat has a vibrant Islami Chattri Sangstha (Islamic girl student organization) and the women wing of the party is fairly educated. According to the 1987 survey 79 percent of the women party elite were matriculates. Thus, Jamaat commanded support and allegiance from younger, recently educated lower middle class members of Bangladeshi society who shared Jamaat's dream and efforts for an overwhelming revival ofIslamic ideology. In the general elections of 1991, the Jamaat won 18 seats in the 300-seated

Parliament. Formation of a government by a party requires 151 seats in the Parliament. Since none of the mainstream parties secured a majority in the 91 elections, Jamaat turned to be a king maker by extending its support to BNP to form the government. The political recognition of Jamaat as a legitimate force gave it an opportunity to expand its support base and helped other militant organisations to flourish inside Bangladesh. The 2001 general elections also had a role cut out for the Jamaat and the Islamic Okiye Jote (101). The BNP which already had a majority of 193 seats awarded two ministries to the Jamaat to be a part of the government. 151 Needless to mentio~ it was during the BNP-Ied alliance government that Bangladesh witnessed a prolific expansion of militant fundamentalist Islamic organisations and their activities shaking off the secular fabric of the country and raising the spectre of Talibanisation of the polity. For, Jamaat's presence in the government emboldened the Islamists groups and freed them from official harassments. 152 Meanwhile, the Jamaat-e-Islami, earlier opposed to the creation of Bangladesh fracturing the Muslim fraternity had become a systemic political force by joining the antiErshad agitation along side the Awami League and BNP and participating in the national elections. Critics attribute the Jamaat's conciliatory approach to its receding political salience in an increasingly polarised Bangladeshi polity. Thus, its deliberate silence on 151 The 2006 general eJections also saw a repeative political dominance of the BNP and Jamaat alliance. See Election Commission Website. www.bd.ec.org/stat/parliament 152

See Ali Riaz. Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh; A Complex web (New York: Routledge. 2008). Chap. I.

151

charges of corruption and graft against BNP and electoral alliance with the BNP were part of lammat's long-term strategy of becoming a politically potent force at the national level while making inroads in rural Bangladesh to expand their sphere of influence. "In doing so, they began to utilise local traditional institutions to further their particular interpretation of Islamic practices. The sudden increase of salish (village arbitration) and

latwa (religious edicts) at the beginning of 1991 through out the decade bears testimony to the fact.,,153 It was the latwa issued by a group called Shahaba Sainik Parishad from shyllet against author Tasleema Nasreen in 1993 that drew international attention to the controversial phenomenon oflatwas in Bangladesh. The year 1993-94 saw hundreds of

latwas issued against the activities of the NGO's, especially the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) - a leading agency supported by international and private donors. Likewise, the Grameen Bank became the primary targets for its campaign for women emancipation and empowerment. Smaller NGO's like Friends in Village Development of Bangladesh (FIVDB), Proshika and Nigera Kori also came under attacks. There are reports of schools run by the NGOs being set on fire, teachers being attacked and teaching aids destroyed. The rise in the incidence of such attacks against NGO activity has been highlighted by the Amnesty International. In 2002, it reported that parents of nearly 700,000 children attending schools run by BRAC were asked to withdraw their wards or face latwas. I54 The latwas have become a potent source of mobilising popular support for the islamists in Bangladesh. Predictably, the lamaat in Bangladesh have organized political protest whenever the judicial system tried to put a brake on it. I55 "The lamaat-i-Islam, the largest orthodox Islamic party in Bangladesh was blamed for instigating conservative

IS3 Riaz Ali, "Traditional Institutions as Tools of political Islam in Bangladesh", Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 40, No.3, 2005, p. 176. IS4 "Fundamental Rights of Women violated with virtual impunity", The Amnesty International on Bangladesh (London: 1997) at http://www.amnesty.orgiailib/aipub/1994/Asal130994.ASA.txt Also, see "violence against women", iin 0 Salish Kendro (ASK). 2002 at www.ret.for/alindexlasklwv/ole.htm ISS Jamaat leader, Delwar Hussaini Sayedee, an MP and ally of BNP is quoted in Daily Janakartha as warning that "the courts won't be allowed to control fatwas. instead fatwas would control courts", Daily Janakartha, January 4, 2001.

152

forces against certain NGO'S".156 The Islamist tirade is not confmed to the NGOs or the judiciary alone; they have successfully campaigned in January 2001 for imposing a ban on films made on liberation war themes, or even those in which Islamic themes are reviewed critically. The director of the movie "Ekatturer jishu" whose film faced stiff resistance to being screened is quoted as saying, "I have had the honour of participating in the liberation war - - - I can in no way demean the great war of liberation in the film".157 Other movies which failed to get the official sanction include Nadir, Madhumati and Dhusara Jatra. Recently Matir Moina was banned by BNP under Jamaat's pressure for its critical portrayal of Islamic education in the madrassas. 158

The Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh If Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh is the strong face of political Islam, Tablighi

Jamaat (TJ) is an apolitical organisation, which represents Islam from below. Nevertheless, the TJ influences the social support base of the political Islamists. The

Tablighi movement is one of the most widespread Islamic movements in the world and in Bangladesh it has made the most rapid expansion. While the Jamaat-e-Islam and other Islamist groups required political patronage from unstable illegitimate rulers to establish themselves, Tablighi Jamaatis did not evoke any hostility for its role in 1971, by isolating themselves from the political involvement in the course of the liberation struggle. "Even at the peak of fighting, Jamaats carried on with their preaching tours and in their speeches made no reference to the dramatic happenings around them except to exhort Muslims to follow the path of Allah in this time of crisis - - - This seems to have made a lasting impression on the minds of many Bangladeshis, an impression that lasts till this very day". 159

The Tablighis make a distinction between din (religion) and duniya (worldly activity) and are basically Islamic preachers involved in the ethical and moral aspect of 156 M. Rashiduzzaman, "The LiberaIsand Religious Right in Bangladesh", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. II, November 1994, p. 975.

Mahdud AI Faisal, "Censor Board Crucifies Ek a-tturer Jishu", Dhaka Courier, Vol. 9, No. 40, (May 7, 1993).

157

158

See, Jai Jai Din (Dhaka), January 15,2002.

159

Yoginder S. Sikand, "The Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh", South Asia, VoL XXII, No.1 (1999), p. 114.

153

their faith. The reason for the growth of TJ is said to be the solace and peace it offered amidst the ravages of a war and extremely challenging conditions after the war in 1971. 160 The· importance of Islam in public life which increased after 1975 coincided with the increased popularity of TJ in Bangladesh and thus the two factors must have influenced each other. 161 Tablighis have a rich oral tradition and stories of miracles saints, the pleasures of Zannat (heaven), and tales of hell, easily transmits knowledge about their religion among ruraI folks with little or no educational exposure. Other activities of the Tablighi Jamaat

include holdings of the alami iftema (annual gathering) every year before Ramadan on the banks of river Tir at Tongi. The Tongi gathering is considered to be the largest gathering of Muslims after the haj pilgrimage at Mecca. 162 Such congregations and religious functions organised by the Tablighi Jamaat and numerous other Islamic revivalist groups in East Bengal have impacted Bengali Muslim customs, rituals and institutions, sharpening religious consciousness at popular level. 163 No Bangladeshi governments, whether BNP or the Awami League, would afford to ignore the political importance of the gathering at Tongi. Accordingly, authorities make elaborate arrangements for health camps, transport, sanitation, drinking water and better roads and bridges to make the ijetma a success. 1M The Tablighi Jamaat with its reformist agenda aimed at purifying Islamist practices came into being in response to the aggressive reformist agenda of the Arya Samaj of Hindus. 165 With no threat from any quarters today, the Tablighis who work for effective implementation of Islamic practices has increased religiosity among the Muslim masses in Bangladesh. It is worth mentioning

160

Ibid.

161 B.K. Jahangir, Violence and consent is a peasant society and other Essays (Dhaka, 1990), p. 58 quoted in Sikand, "The Tablighi", n. 159, p. 116. 162 It is reported that the Tongi ijtema gathered 2.5 milJion Muslims from 70 different countries in the year 1994. Every year the numbers register an increase.

163 For details, see Peter J. Bertocci, "Islam and Social Construction of Bangladesh Countryside" in R. Ahmed (ed.), Understanding Bengal Muslim, n. 6p. 71-85. 164

The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka, January 15 and January 18, 1994.

165 Md. Rashiduzzaman, "Islam Muslim Identity and Nationalism in Bangladesh", Journal of South Asia and M.E. Studies, Vol. 18, No.1, 1994, pp. 36-60.

154

that in view of the political nature of the religion, the thin line separating religiosity and extremism in Islam often gets blurred.

Popular Islam The growth of popular Islam in Bangladesh is evident from the number of Waz

Mahjils (religious gatherings) and religious debates called bahas in the country. Waz Mahjils are a regular feature in small towns and villages through out Bangladesh. These religious gatherings invite baktas or Islamic orators who help in the spread of Islamic values. One such popular bakta who came to limelight in the 1980s was Maulana Delwar Hossain Saydee, a member of the lamaat-e-Islami's central committee and Member of Parliament. His retrogressive public speeches and video tapes with titles like "Purdah. and Women's right in Islam", "Rights of Husbands and wives", "Women and NonMuslims in Islam" are available both within and outside Bangladesh. 166 The Muslim orators are often "invited one-or two nights long waz mahjils in the dry season during November to February. They cast a magical spell on their audiences, mostly arousing a fear of hell, in conformity with the popular culture which glorifies death and the hereafter. The Baktas invariably portray women as the main source of evil and corruption and justify beating of wives in accordance with the Sharia law.,,167 The contribution of these religious meetings to the spread of Islamic values in society is duly acknowledged by politicians. 168 The reason behind waz mahjils is to bring back deviant Muslims to the core ideology of Islam and awaken the spiritual consciousness of the Muslim masses. The subject matter of the speeches, in the gathering is not the existing economic, social or political problems but the glory and supremacy of Islam and the prophet. 169 The religious debates or bahas which began way back in 1860's are still popular practices in Bangladesh. Originally, the purpose of bahas tradition was to address 166 Taj Hashmi, "Popular Islam and Misogyny: A case study of Bangladesh", A Social Science Journal, Vol. 2, No.1, 2006, p. 34. 167

Ibid., p. 35.

Golam Azam, Bangladeshe Islami Andolon (The Islamic Movement in Bangladesh), 3rd edi (Dhaka: Islamic Publication, 1981), p. 14. \ 168

169

A.S. Huque and M.Y. Akhter, The Ubiquity of Islam, p.216.

155

misconceptions about various Islamic practices. The bahas were generally not about lost glory or injustices inflicted on Muslims but to teach the faithful correct norms of Islamic behaviour. It is true that many debates ended into ugly quarrels, but it gave the Bengali Muslims a chance for social interaction with Muslims beyond their village border, led to greater mobilisation and gave them a better understanding of their religious identity.17o Rafiuddin Ahmed in an exhaustive study of Bengal Muslims (1871-1906) traces these religious meetings to the traditional practices of earlier reformists of Bengal and argues that these waz mahfils united the Muslim masses, enlightened them to be better Muslims, but often alienated the non-Muslims of the villages, and thus undermined the syncretic cultural traditions in Bengal. l7l The present fate of Bangladesh's minorities (discussed in detail in the succeeding chapter) also indicates their socio-cultural isolation from the majority community. The enhanced religious consciousness of the Muslims have coincided with the rise of orthodox Islam and the corresponding mental and physical oppressions of Hindus at various levels. Madrassas, Mosques and Shrines As already discussed, madrassas are Islamic seminaries or educational institutions which imparts religious based knowledge in particular. The students from these seminaries are largely brain-washed with a kind of world view incompatible with and markedly different from those pass outs from secular educational institutions. The ideological indoctrination makes them fit recruits for extremist organisations fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state. The products of madrassas outside government control often harbour a dogmatic mindset and act as cultural policemen. l72 The torchbearers of political Islam in Bangladesh are financed from multiple external sources and the government has no control over the channeling of money and resources for charitable and religious purposes.

Religious education seems to have made great

progress with the suppression of secular education. It is reported that "In 84,000 villages 170 Asim Roy, "Impact ofIslamic Revival and Refonn in Colonial Bengal and Bengal Muslim Identity", in Asim Roy, n. 46, Islam in History, p. 66. 171

Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, n.2, pp. 103-104.

172 It may be noted that the_dreaded Taliban was born in similar Madrassas in Pakistan. See "Refonning Madrassas" Bangladesh Observer, February 28, 2006.

156

of Bangladesh the number of madrassas is 74,000. While students in the primary schools have doubled in the last decade, the number has multiplied by thirteen times in madrassas.,,173 There are 3,312 government approved madrassas.174 Unofficial statistics

show that there are 8,000 private madrassas under the Bangladesh Qawmi madrassa Education Board and thousands more which are beyond governmental control and thus are not registered nor have their curriculum approved by the state. 175 Scholars working on madrassas and the pattern of education point out that nearly 3.34 million students are now studying at Bangladesh's thousands of madrassas, which is five times higher as compared to Pakistan. 176 It may be noted that Bangladesh has the highest ratio of mosques per kilometers. It is reported that there are over 200, 000 mosques spread over approximately 55,26 sq. miles of territory. 177 Apart from mosques, there also exist a number of socio-culturallreligious organisations, which work for popularizing Islamic ideals. Prominent among them are the Islamic Foundation, Bangladesh Islamic Centre, Islam Prachar Samity, Koranic School society, world Islam Mission, Bangladesh Jamaitul Mudorresiz Itlehadul Ummah and the Council for Islamic Socio-cultural Organisation. The above organisations have varied roles like preaching Islam, pUblication and research of Islamic literature, study of Koran and Hadith etc. The Islamic Foundation, for instance, imparts training and coordinates the functioning of the Imams. It sponsors and encourages discussions, seminars and workshops and carries out research on aspects of Islam. It's most significant work being the publication of the Islamic Encyclopedia. The Bangladesh Masjid mission works to transform mosques into centres of socio religious aWakening. The Islam Prachar Samitis work in the field of conversion to Islam among non-believers, and helps deviant

Muslim youth in rehabilitation and vocational trainings. The Koranic schools stresses on

173

Asim Roy, "Introduction" in Is/am in History, n. 46, p. 12.

174 Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 1984-85: Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1985).

175

"lehadi Terror in Bengladesh", Asian Centre for Human Rights, September 7, 2005.

176 K.M. Mohsin, "Trends ofIslam in Bangladesh" in S.R. Chakravarthy and V. Naraina, (ed.), Bangladesh History and Culture Vol. 1, (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 35. 177 Salahiddin Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present (Delhi: A. P. H. Publishing Corporation, 2004), p. 315.

157

character building and inculcating moral values and the Bangladesh Islamic centre undertakes translation works from foreign language to Bengali, and extends financial support to those working in this field. The Bangladesh Jamaitul Muddare has a Wide network of teachers and students of various madrassas as its members and uses their services for promotion of ideals of Islamic way of life. The world Islam Mission has a humanistic mission of helping the poor, orphans and disabled, whereas the Ittehadul Ummah and the Council of Islamic Socio-cultural Organisation try to coordinate and

bring about unity among Islamic bodies in Bangiadesh. 178 Saints and Shrines There are numerous tales of holy men who brought Islam to Bengal from West Asia. It is reported that manuscripts as old as 17th century tell the story of Saint Shah Jalal of Sylhet. The saint is believed to be a Yemeni Arab who brought with him a sample of soil from his land to search and settle in a region that had the same soil quality. The story needs mentioning owing to its popularity through oral traditions in Bangladesh, regarding the advent of Islam. 179 There are numerous shrines to Shah Jalal along with other Saints allover Bangladesh. The commonality found from the oral traditions about the saints is the supernatural powers associated with clearing the tiger, snakes and crocodile infested forests and the power to breathe life into another or travel great distance with lightening speed. 180 It is the devoted followers of saints who build Mazars and mosques and the sites soon acquire a mystical aura and attracts pious Muslims for Ziyarat (visitations). Bangladesh has a rich Sufi cultural tradition of respecting a roving

mendicant or the pirs. The Shrines and Dargahs of the pirs are places of venerations. God-fearing Bangladeshis throng these sites to be helped by the saints, ''to receive training as well as knowledge through Tareeqat (mystic procedures and practices), at the feet of divine, well versed and well accomplished in the knowledge and practices of

178

Ibid.• pp. 35-36.

179

S. Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n. 5, pp. 146-148.

180

Ibid.

158

Sharia who is capable of imparting the same to those who approach him desiring such knowledge and discipline".lsl With the growth ofWahhabism and Islamist parties, the sufi practices have come under attack. ls2 There are sign boards, which remind visitors not to indulge in forbidden practices like prostrating and performing vows at shrines. IS3 Despite the protests from fundamentalists, sufi traditions remain indelible aspects of Bengali Islam. Chittagong in the South Eastern part of Bangladesh has a rich history of sufi practices and mystical orders, and thus has not been a comfortable place for Tablighi activists who insist on a rigid sharia-centered Islam. No wonder, there are often media reports about the Tablighi preachers being prevented from entering the area and even physically assaulted by the local people. l84 Other Islamic Traditions The analysis of popular Islam in Bangladesh today would remain incomplete without a mention of the liberal traditions and practices of rural Bengal. Notable among them are the buffalo sacrifices, music and songs and dikr (chanting of

God'~

name),

which persist even today despite the fundamentalist upsurge. Such traditions represented by the better known maijbhandari sufi brotherhood, which commands one of the largest spiritual groupings in Bangladesh today. ISS The maijbhandari cult reveres the memory of Hazrat Shah Sufi Syed Golamur Rahman, who was popularly known as Baba Bhandari. Hazrat Shah's teachings along with that of five other holy saints form the spiritual basis of the Maijbhandari tariqa (order). To mark Baba's birthday commemoration, lakhs of people visit the forty odd shrines and fmally, the main centre to be a part of the ritual ceremonies. 186 The celebrations begin with the chanting of the names of the saints, the Nafeesuddin Siddiqui, Mystic procedures and Practices in Proceedings of the Islamic Cultural Studies Conference, August 11-12, 1979. North Brisbane, Vol. II, p. 70.

181

182 Wahhabis do not believe in sainthood and the role of a saint as a mediator on ·their behalf and God. They totally surrender to the five pillars of Islamic faith only. 183 184

Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n. 5, p. 148. Sikand, "The Tablighi", n.159, p. 118.

185 Peter J. Bertocci, "A Sufi Movement in Bangladesh: The Maijbhandari Tariqa and Its Followers", Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2006), p. 1. 186

Ibid., pp. 6-8

159

networks of mosques and madrassas that mostly preached the ideology of hate and later degenerated into legitimising terror. Zia ul Haq's statist Islam followed the narrow precepts of Wahabi Islam, which was reflected in his policy-measures like curbs on literary works, art, media, viewing non-Wahabis as takfir, segregation of the second sex, introduction of Islamic. punishments like storing and lashing and similar regressive measures. 240

As explained above, the state sponsored indoctrination was most clearly visible in the field of education. The entire curriculum followed the Wahabi agenda like glorifying the Jehadis, creating deep antagonism among different Islamic sects like Shia-sunni and Ahmediyas.241 The spiraling effects of propagating this exclusionary world view generated "hypocrites, blindfolded zealots, fundamentalists, intriguers, time servers and ignoramuses with the highest degrees.,,242 The Wahabi networks across Muslim societies developed exclusionary tactics to isolate fellow brothers from other sects with periodic outbursts of extreme violence. The Saudis contributed lavishly to Wahabi based institutions across Pakistan. Wahhabism as a life style doctrine often took an inflexible stance towards pilgrimage to local tombs, veneration of saints, mystical experiences as non-Islamic practices, the channels through which General Zia executed wahabi Islam were education, press, polity judicial· and administrative machinery and states supported ideological engineering projects?43 In the words of Nayyar, "The full impact of what happened under General Zia is now being felt in rising religious military sectarianism and violence in our society and politics, and generation of young Pakistanis is going through the same education. 244 Following the huge set-back suffered by the Arabs against Israel, there emerged in. the region a power vacuum which Saudi Arabia with its enormous petro-dollars and 240 For details, see Iftikar H. Malik, State and civil society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority: Ideology and Etlmicity (Oxford: St Antony's Macmi1lan, 1997), pp.l39-167. 241

See K.K. Aziz, Murder of History (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1992).

242 "Letter

to the Editor", Frontier Post, May 11, 1992.

243 Stephen Vertigans, Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.l06-107. 244 A.H. Nayyar has made a critical study of the curricula and state of education and textbooks on Pakistan. The above quotation is from Massoud Ansari, "Lessons in intolerance", Newsline, May 2004, p.8.

102

appeal is waning due to the rise of political Islam since the lifting of ban on religionoriented parties in 1976. Peasant Islam In explaining the peasant factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in contemporary Bangladesh, some analysts have underlined the role played by the ruralbased pedantry from historical perspective. A leading Bangladeshi scholar has, for instance, tried to locate Islam in the peasant society where Islam has not only provided an identity but also constitutes their ''moral economy." In other words, Islam is considered as integral part of Bangladesh, which is primarily agrarian with more than 80 percent of people being rural-based having no access no modern method of cultivation. A majority of them are landless or semi-landless and traditionally "known for their unpredictability, their vacillating and non-committal nature and their propensity for violence, anarchy and factiousness typical of most peasant societies.,,191 It is perhaps the raw and strong emotion in them that help in the mobilisation of peasant by various groups, from Islamic reformists through secular nationalists to fundamentalist and orthodox ullemas. The peasants with their historical proclivity towards participatory means of protest have th

played significant role even in the Faraizi and Wahhabi movements in the early 19

century, the Pakistan movement of the 1940s and later, the Bangladeshi nationalist struggle and in the upsurge of orthodoxy in Bangladeshi society. To begin with, the 1947 partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan saw massive peasant mobilisation against the exploitative and oppressive Hindu Zamindars, bhadrolok-Mahajan triumvirate. In the struggle for existence Hindus and Muslims were seen as separate entities. 192 The Islamists got the opportunity to win away the peasantry

and created a support base for themselves in the countryside. Birth of Pakistan and Islamic fraternity did very little to pull them from despair and the only change noticeable was the replacement of the competitive Hindus with the West-wing elites. The disenchantment with Muslim League politicians after partition gave way to nationalist 191

Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh Politics", n. 51, p. 101.

192 The social consciousness of the Bengal Muslims was high especially due to revivalist movements, spread of education political mobilization/activism and Muslim solidarity against Hindus. See, Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, n. 2, p.160.

161

movement for the separation of East Bengal from its West wing. In this struggle, the ethnic identity of the Bengali Muslims proved to be a unifying factor and which led to the installation of a secular regime and initiation of a secular ideology for governing the new nation. The secular experiment soon became defunct with the imposition of statist Islam. With an extended social network, Islam in Bangladesh gained wider acceptance in the wake of the state failure to deliver welfare measures. The resultant poverty and insecurity of the people of Bangladesh turned them towards religion. ''Their religiosity and inherent peasant culture are conducive to the growth of fatalism as well." 193 It is thus argued that Islamic fundamentalism has relatively strong societal roots, which provides the staying power and cannot be contained by force, without making serious attempt at the transformation of society. It is the societal Islam in Bangladesh which has played a significant role in providing legitimacy to the Islamists and influencing both the state policy and official discourses, particularly concerning national identity.

Anti-Indianism and Political Islam Anti-Indianism among Bangladeshis is another important factor that has contributed in no mean way to the rise of political Islam. Historically, the "Hindu phobia" of Bengali M~lims, a legacy of the British colonial days, transforming into "Indophobia" during the Pakistani period remained embedded in the psyche of the average Bengali Muslims even though India acted as midwife in the birth of the new nation. The close proximity of the nationalists with New Delhi became a political liability for the Mujib government, so much so that its failure to deliver was attributed to interference and pressure of India. The secular measures of the new government such as the constitutional ban on religious parties and neutrality of the state in matters of faith were seen as attempts to please the rulers in Delhi. "Bengali nationalist sentiment", according to an

193 Taj-ul Islam Rashmi, "Islamic Resurgence in Bangladesh: Genesis, Dynamics and Implications" in S. P. Limaye, M. Malik and R. G. Wirsing (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu Hawaii: Asia Pacific Centre of Security Studies, 2004), p. 71

162

its past political ties with the Saudi Kingdom and their proximity to USA, Saudi campaign in Pakistan was welcome. There are instances where Saudi officials numbering as many as 20 who participated in symposium organised by the 11 in Peshawar (1979). The objectives of the meet was to discuss the (1) greatness of Islam as a means of solution to all the problems. (2) the state of Pakistan's economy; (3) Jihad and Islamic renaissance. 250

Domestic Impact Zia's Islamisation programme embracing all spheres of public life had implications for Pakistan's future identity, polity and society. First of all, Zia was reasonably successful in institutionalising the country's Islamic identity. "The official lies of the Pakistani state present the country as one united nation with a common history, common culture, common language and common religion,,?51

In other words, Zia's

Islamisation was meant to reinforce this myth of Pakistan as a homogeneous state based on a shared cultural patrimony. However, the ideological engineering undertaken by the Zia regime to realise this purpose of creating a homogeneous Pakistani state included both the corrosive and persuasive methods. The official patronage to Islam, for instance, dissolved the dichotomy between a Muslim majority state on one hand and Islamic state on the other. It put an end to the lingering controversy surrounding Pakistani identity since its inception?52

In a way this new official identity both at the discursive as well as the empirical level narrowed down the scope for flexibility to define Pakistani national identity in nonIslamic terms. This was reflected in the most violent agitation against the Ahmadis who became targets of religious right wing groups as well as government persecution. Zia ulHaq inserted section 298-B and 298-C into the Pakistan Penal Code, which prevented the Ahmedis to use Islamic terminology and made it a criminal offence for them to ''pose'' as 'US Involvement in the Islamic countries", Documents form the U. S. Espionage Desk 9460, Tehran, n.d, pp. 27-28.

250

251

Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity, n.47, p. 25.

252 Early years of Pakistan were ruled without a constitution. It took the leaders 9 years to frame and adopt its first constitution. The main reason for its delay was the contention over the role of Islam in the new state. Pakistan saw three constitutions in the first 26 years of its birth. All constitutions declared Pakistan to be an Islamic state but a lot of ambiguities surrounded the term and its implementation.

104

Faraizi movements were a result of communal tensions and responsible for the growth of

a coherent Muslim religious identity and heightened Muslim activism. l99 The anti-India sentiments found its favourite flogging horse in the IndoBangladesh friendship Treaty signed by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman on March 19, 1972. The treaty was meant to promote mutual friendship, cooperation and peace in the region for a period of twenty five years. The Joint Declaration signed in Dhaka sought ''to give concrete expression to the similarity of views, ideals and interest" between India and Bangladesh.2OO The treaty was claimed to be "inspired by common deals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and nationalism".201 The treaty of friendship was badly misinterpreted. Weird images of India using Bangladeshi territory in case of a war with China were drawn. The entire propaganda mills created an Indian phobia and whipped the pathological hatred of Muslims against Hindu India The fear of being dubbed an Indian agent was great among political parties and even mainstream parties. This explains why the A wami League chose to maintain silence in the face of various criticism and clarifications on renewing the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty. Finally, the Bangladesh economy faced great challenges and the nationalist fervour triggered during the liberation war was not enough to wish away problems of hunger, famine and rehabilitation. India along with numerous other countries provided assistance, but the vilifying campaign did not stop.202 The increased smuggling between India and Bangladesh made India look like a country with hegemonistic designs, out to dominate economy of small neighbours?03 The obsession of Bangladesh with the Indian state strengthened the Islamists and led towards ideological polarisation within the country. In a show of open defiance towards India, the junta rulers after the 1975 coup undertook corrective measures to set right all that had gone wrong during Mujib's tenure. 199 Gopal Krishna "Islamisation in Nineteenth century Bengal" in Gopal Krishna (ed.), Contribution to South Asian Studies, (New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1979), pp. 88-10. 200

See the Text of the Treaty in Foreign Affairs Record, March 1972, pp. 61-63.

201

Ibid., p. 63.

202 Total $ 850 million was given to Bangladesh in addition to food assistance worth $ 173 million and multilateral aid worth $ 350 million. Bangladesh Observer, March 26, 1974.

203

Ziring, Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad, n. 7, p. 91.

164

President Ziaur Rahman, for instance, envisaged an independent foreign policy, which made Bangladesh less dependent on India and drew Muslim countries closer to feel connected with the Islamic Umma and meet the aspirations of the majority community in the country. 204 Likewise, in the domestic plane Zia introduced linguistic-territorial-Islamic nationalism, which he called "Bangladesh nationalism" in the place of linguisticterritorial-secular nationalism as it was felt that recognition of Islam was necessary to counteract Indian influence. The imposition of a Bangladeshi Islamic identity as different from its earlier Bengali identity assured his people that their country's identity would not to be swamped with the Bengali identity, which explained the status of their ethnic cousins in the Indian side of the border. Islam Oriented parties As noted, political isolation of the religion-based parties in Bangladesh ended

with the lifting of the ban in 1976. In the following decades, their number rose steadily with almost identical goal of turning Bangladesh an Islamic state. The Government intelligence sources in the later half of the 1970s revealed the existence of about 100 Islamic parties and organizations since the lifting of the ban. 2os However, only 30 Islamic parties contested elections after the withdrawal of restrictions on them, which include the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Bangladesh Islami Front, Bangladesh ](hilafat Andolon, Bangladesh Krishak Raj Islami Party, Bangladesh Muslim League (Jamir Ali),

Bangladesh Tanjimul Islam, Islami Al Zihad Dal, Islami Oikya Jote, Islami Shashantantro Andolon, Islamic Dal, Zaker Party, Jamiate ulumaye Islami Bangladesh, Islami Dal (Saifur), Bangladesh Inquilab Party, Bangladesh Islami Republican Party,

Muslim People Party, Bangladesh Khelafat Party, Muslim League (Yousuf), Muslim League (Matin), Muslim league (Quader) and Jamayate Ulamaye Islami Front. The Muslim League is one of those political parties in Bangladesh today that traces its roots to Pakistani Muslim League in Bangladesh. It continues to nurture the

204

J.N. Dixit, Liberation and Beyond (Dhaka: University Press limited 1996), pp. 280-282.

205

Shakhawat Liton, "Islamic Parties Boom After the 1976 Ban Lifting", at http://www.thedailystar.net

165

dream that Bangladesh should be an Islamic state and campaign for changing the flag and national anthem. Hostile to towards India, the Muslim League of Bangladesh has often accused the government of being subservient to India.206 Committed to similar ideas and goal, the Islamic Democratic League, the Justice Party and Nizam-e-Islam advocate the principles of Islamic justice and talk of bringing present legal procedures and codes in accordance with holy Koran and sunnah. They support closer ties with all the Islamic countries. The Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan (BKA) is a new political outfit, which also stresses on the introduction of Koranic instructions in education, reorganisation of Zakat and wakfs. It needs mentioning that the BKA put up its candidate for the 1981 Presidential election and secured third largest share ofvotes.207 The mushrooming of Islam-based parties and organisations could be partly attributed to the oil boom of the 1970s in West Asia, which enhanced the role and status of Muslim states in global politics. The oil-led prosperity and its impact on the global economy encouraged the Muslim groups to throw up an alternative political order based on Islamic precepts and ideals. Highly dependent on the largesse from these oil rich Islamic countries, Bangladesh remains susceptible to the policy directives of the Islamic donors from outside. To sum up, a variety of factors discussed above accounts for the Islamisation in Bangladesh notwithstanding its local syncretistic cultural practices and unique historical experiences including its emergence as an independent entity in defiance of a national identity defined by Islam. While the failure of post-independence leadership prompted Mujib's dictator-successors to sponsor Islamisation from above, the activities of the Tabligh Jamaat • a grassroots-based puritan movement together with attempts at whipping up Indophobia and mobilising the "peasant Islam" facilitated the process in Bangladesh from below. Capping them all was the spread of Wahhabi school of thought through thousands of Islamic seminaries (madrasas), which together with the culture of Jatwas

206

See Bangladesh Islamic parties at www.country-data.com!cgi-biniQuery/r-1199.html

207 The election manifestos of these parties were published in Bangladesh Times, December 25, 1979 cited in Emazuddin Ahamad and D. R. J. A. Nazneen, "Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXX, No.8, August 1990, p. 796.

166

and the delivery of Islamic justice by the rural ulema through traditional local institutions like salish (village arbitration) underpinned the fundamentalist challenge in Bangladesh. With the growing clout of the Islamist political parties and the disproportionate influence they wielded in the 1990s onwards, the government failed to combat Islamic extremism effectively, setting off the region-wide fear of Bangladesh as the "next Afghanistan." The chapter IV makes an attempt to identify the factors that contributed to the surge of Islamic extremism since the restoration of civilian rule in 1991 and brings to the fore its baleful consequences on the society, particularly on the minority, women, NGOs and the intelligentsia.

167

CHAPTER III

POST ZIA-PAKISTAN DRIFT INTO EXTREMISM

As discussed in the chapter I, the military establishment after Zia's death continued to maintain a powerful grip over Pakistani politics. More importantly, the unholy alliance between the anny and the clergy cemented under Zia's authoritarian rule was not disturbed despite the restoration of democracy. In fact, the alliance continued to grow in strength partly because of the Islamic basis of the state institutions and in greater part, the absence of any dramatic development in the external environment. While Jihad in Mghanistan had qualitatively transformed an essentially local conflict into global concern, domestically the legitimation function of the Islamist groups was bolstered by both weak institutions and the lack of broad consensus among the mainstream political parties as regards the rules of the game. As they made the political system increasingly dependent on networks of patronage and personal loyalty, the "over-developed state" failed miserably to implement legislations thereby rendering it vulnerable to interference of the military, which remained as before the paramount force and ultimate arbitrator in Pakistan. I In brief, the two main factors which would account for the failure of the Pakistani

democratic experiment after Zia include firstly, the primacy of the military in politics as well as policy-making process, and secondly, the mutual interdependence of the clergy and the military elite for the protection and preservation of their entrenched interests. This chapter discusses the developments from the restoration of democracy in 1988 until the rise of General Musharraf to power. Broadly, it is argued that the short-lived democratic experiment and its fmal eclipse in the aftermath of the Kargil crisis reveal the fragility of the both democratic institutions as well as the civil society, along with it, the receding confidence of people on the ability of the civilian political actors to deliver. In fact, it was their failure to evolve a set of norms and means to resolve political differences made them susceptible to the manipulation by both the influential religious bodies and the institutionally powerful military.

I Hamza Alavi, "Class and State" in Hassan Gardezi and J. Rashid (eds.), Pakistan:, The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy ofa Praetorian State (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 42-43.

169

the Table 1.1)" In the year 2001-2002 Pakistan was home to fifty eight (58) religious political parties and twenty four (24) armed religious militias.

862

Total

629

267

208

Source: The Nation (Islamabad), September 1, 1994 The Islamisation process saw the legitimisation of violence in the name of Islam. Islam had a larger appeal as a new identity justifying non-democratic elections and use of violence to achieve political goals. Indicative of this was the increase in madrasas, encouraging the

yo~g

Pakistanis to fight for Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In this

context the separatist movement in Kashmir was increasingly viewed in Pakistan more as a struggle for Islam (religion) thereby attracting wider support cutting across the regional and class divide. Zia played a vital role in developing madrassa networks where the seeds of religious fanaticism were planted and allowed to grow. These seminaries were essential support base for the Jehadi groups in the 1980s. The International crisis group's report on Pakistani madrasas says, "Education that creates barriers to modem knowledge 267 Saeed Shafqat, "From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba" in Jaffi'elot (ed.), Nationalism without a Nation, n. 157, p. 133.

109

away with the 8th Amendment to the Constitution but faced fonnidable constraints in the fonn of opposition from fellow colleagues. The old partners of the PPP did not press for the repeal of the amendment which they believed would help PPP politically and the HI struck to its old position that the eight amendments "aimed at creating a balance between the two offices of the president and Prime Minister.,,6 The role of the lSI was no less important in widening the gulf between the Prime Minister, President and other centers of power. The Inter Service Intelligence (lSI) had a dubious role in effecting an alliance of right wing parties headed by Nawaz Sharif to counter Benazir Bhutto, and make things difficult for her by IJI opposition.7 First the opponents of Benazir were allowed to fonn government in Punjab and then they encouraged the Nawaz Sharif and his coalition to directly challenge the central government. The spirit manifested in the rivalry proved damaging to the growth of democracy in Pakistan and weakened her position. The charges against Benazir by her adversaries were that she was seeking to topple the Nawaz Sharif government by unconstitutional means. Her political rival on the other hand campaigned for provincial autonomy which led to the creation of provincial banks and strengthened his position in Punjab politics. Needless to mention, Sharif had developed contacts with the Military elite and had a relatively wider acceptability among them. Instead of working against the common enemy both the parties created conditions for the latter to intervene in national politics in blatant violation of democratic nonns. 8 When they tried to remove Nawaz Sharif in Punjab the country witnessed the worst kind of horse trading and political vulnerability among political parties. The HI also indulged in intrigues to dislodge the federal government of Bhutto. Adding to Benazir's woes was the breakd9wn of political coalition between PPP and Mohajir Quami Mahaz (MQM) and the rise of ethnic and See Mohammad Waseem. Politics and the state in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. 1994), p. 444.

6

7 Hamid Gul the Chief of the lSI often described Nawaz Sharif to be the product of their agency. He was quoted as saying, "although we could not take Ialalabad, we managed to save Punjab". See Abbas, Pakistan's Drift, n. 5, p. 137.

8 The PPP started the politics of 'no confidence motion' in Pakistan. See Shafqat, The Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, n. 4, p. 232.

171

political strife in Sindh. 9 Not to mention the charges of corruption against her husband Asif Ali Zardari and her close associates. The media trial of Mr. Zardari before the actual trial earned him the reputation of a master depleter of state treasury and the famous title of "Mr. Ten Percent".10 This humiliated and tarnished Benazir Bhutto's image before her people. The relentless drive against Benazir from all quarters gave Ghulam Ishaq Khan the opportunity to evoke his redefined powers under the eighth amendment of the constitution. II He dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed Benazir Bhutto's government on charges of corruption and undemocratic practices on August 6, 1990.12 The premature collapse of the PPP's government was a pointer to the inherent institutional weakness of Pakistan's polity, and the privileged position of the military. Thus despite the restoration of civilian rule Pakistan failed to rid itself of the military control and influences.

Consequently Benazir as PM was unable to bring about

significant changes both in the body politic as well as in the socio-economic sphere undercutting the pernicious effects of Zia's Islamisation programme. It was high nigh impossible to act against the entrenched interest or for that matter defy the institutional primacy of the military which ironically had already defined the political parameters for the civilian actors.

9 See Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage publications 2005) pp. 152-155 and 174 to 179. The Sindhi-Mohajir alliance was not a natural alliance since the Mohajirs undermined the separate ethnic and regional identity the Sindhis were fighting for. Sindh was in turmoil owing to the severe animosity between the two above ethnic groups and apart from that rural Sindh was unmanageable due to the docait manace. The army operation in Sindh led to accusations of excesses and the lSI role in stroking the fire of hatred led to anti PPP feelings. Urban terrorism and illegal arms menace led to total collapse of government machinery in Sindh and gave rise to a parallel government run by MQM mainly in cities like Hyderabad and Karachi. \0 ArifNizani. "A Balance Sheet in the Defecit"; The Nation, December 2, 1989 in Safqat, Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, n. 4, p. 233.

The 8th amendment of the constitution was like the Damocles sword over elected civilian governments. The amendment apart from giving legal protection to all martial law regulations provided immunity to all the actions of military since the coup. It empowered the president to appoint the Chief Justice, the Chief of the army and Supervise the functioning of the Executive and Legislature. He can question the Prime Minister on various issues of governance and dismiss the Prime-Minister and dissolve the Parliament if in his view the constitution is not followed. For an overview see Hamid Khan, It' Amendment Constitutional and Political crisis in Pakistan, (Lahore: WajidaIis, 1994). II

12 Major charges against Benazir were horse trading confrontation with Provinces, civil disturbances in Sindh, use of derogatory statements against senate and failure to convene meetings of National Finance Commission and Council of Common Interests.

172

The 1990 Elections and Reign of Nawaz Sharif The dismissal of Benazir Bhutto in 1990 was followed by worst style of political intrigue. Accountability proceedings were brought against Benazir amidst apprehensions of the whole process being unfair and partial. Though she retained her political right to lead her party to polls she was made to appear before tribunals in Lahore and Karachi during the period of elections. 13 Her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, was arrested on criminal charges and his father, Hakim Zardari, too was charged. President Ishaq Khan far from being neutral patronised the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad ofNawaz Sharif as an alternative to PPP. The Inter Services Intelligence Directorate is believed to have carried out an elaborate survey to locate the political standing of various parties before the 1990 elections. 14 What was perceived was that the entire government machinery was geared to find a suitable and docile Prime Minister who could easily be manipulated. The caretaker government organised elections within three months and the main contest was between PPP and a broad alliance led by UI's Nawaz Sharif.

"With

remarkable deftness, it managed an overwhelming victory for the IJI coalition in the national and provincial assemblies, including the usual PPP stronghold Sind."15 The role of the caretaker government and lSI came under attack not only from People's Party who alleged vote rigging and election fraud even international observers from US and France were critical of the entire election process, and certain practices. 16 The 1990 elections elevated Nawaz Sharif from the position of Chief Minister to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, but there were no changes in the basic framework of the Constitution. The checks on elected representatives of the people still remained. The seemingly peaceful relationship belied the deep undercurrents of insecurity and suspicion

13

See Salamat Ali, "Selective Justice", Far Eastern Economic Review (October 4, 1990), pp. 30-32.

14 Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 281.

15 Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 216. Also see How an Election was Stolen: PDA Whitepaper on Elections 1990 (Islamabad, 1990). 16 The various observer teams in the 1990 elections included the 16 member team from SAARC the four member team International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) and 40 member team sponsored by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

173

between Sharif and his benefactor Ishaq Khan. Within a year of his stay in office strains were seen in the relationship. The reason for the strain was Sharifs efforts to assert his position as an elected representative of the people and Gulam Ishaq Khan's intolerance to proactive democratic leaders. Transition to democracy in Pakistan however did precious little to resolve old political issues. Although originally raised under previous civilian governments, such issues as ethnic unrest, unequal distribution of scarce resources, lack of a single binding political and economic ideology, the unstable nature of regional and global politics, the overbearing nature of military in a civilian setup and the constitutional impediments for a smooth functioning of a democratic state continued to haunt Nawaz Sharif. 17 Both the Pakistani army and the lSI followed their respective agendas and no civilian government had the temerity to dilute or question them. The Pakistan army stuck to no roll-back of its nuclear policy, even in the face of severe American sanctions and the lSI pursued its programme of installing an Islamic government in Mghanistan and infiltrating trained armed guerillas into Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif behaved like a faithful disciple of the President and the army, initially to find a toe-hold in national politics, his aggressive campaign against PPP in collusion with the army can be explained as political opportunism. Benazir Bhutto was their target since she happened to be the common enemy of both UI and the army. After the initial bonhomie, Nawaz Sharif differed from his patrons not only on strategies and devices, but also on issues pertaining to external policy of the country. He had differences of opinion with the army general on the issue of supporting Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. lS In addition, he entered into a conflict with the President over the question of appointment of a new Chief of Army staff. Above and all, Nawaz Sharifwas increasingly uncomfortable with the lSI activities beyond the boundaries of the state. Despite UN sanctions, the lSI was believed to have airlifted sophisticated military hardware and missiles to Bosnian Muslims, and encouraged rebel Muslim separatism

17

Newberg, Judging the State, n. 15, p. 218.

18 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005) p. 222. Mr. Haqqani writes that while general Beg talked of "strategic defiance" against the American hegemony Nawaz Sharif suspected the chief of planning a coup against his government.

174

CHAPTER II

ISLAMISATION IN BANGLADESH FROM SECULAR TO ISLAMIC STATE

Sharif asserted himself as a liberal autocrat at the cost of democratic practices. Even though Sharif became popular in certain section of society his political activities rendered the Institutions rather fragile. 24 At the same time his independent attitude stirred fear in the President and the army about his political ambitions and the chances of the upstaging the military bosses. Nawaz Sharif who went to court challenging his dismissal got a historic verdict in his favour. 25 Sharif rejoined office after the court's decision but the domestic political scene was far from normal. 26 The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the main opposition party of the country led the agitation for fresh elections. In the chaotic state of affairs the army stepped in to be the lead actor.

Benazir's second term in 1993 Pakistan went to polls under the supervision of Moeen Qureshi and Benazir Bhutto's PPP emerged as the single largest party in the national Assembly.27 Her second stint as Prime Minister began with a cautious note. Farooq Leghari a trusted friend of Benazir and PPP member since 1970's was elected to the post of President. She was eager to form new political coalitions and not disturb the Military-civil relationship. Benazir looked to be in control being relatively relaxed from the structural constraints of Zia's system but she still had many hurdles originating from weak political institutions and absence of democratic culture in Pakistan due to many years of military dominance. Her regime was not different from Nawaz Sharif's in terms of pursuing corruption and cases of misconduct against opposition leaders.

N. Sharif worked to restore the confidence of the business community. He liberalized the investment procedures and took steps to denationalize loss making inefficient public sector industries and encouraged private banks. He was eager to bring an end to sanctions so that aid and development can resume. Sharif commanded considerable influence among the business and educated middle class. 24

25 Martin Lau, The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), pp. 78-79. 26 PLD 1993 SC 473 Cited in Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, n. 14, p.291. 27 In the 1993 Elections the PPP got 86 seats PML (Nawaz) 73 out of 202 seats and rest to small parties. Dawn, October 8,1993 cited in Mohammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1994), p. 201.

176

On the domestic front, her term witnessed massive violence in Karachi internal

bickerings in her party and charges of corruption particularly against her husband Asif Zardari. Karachi became Benazir's sorrow. The city which was popular as the financial centre of Pakistan was home to majority of refugees from India who settled there after partition. The remainders were the Punjabis, Pathans Sindhis Baluchis etc. The Urdu speaking migrants from India called the Mohajirs had always asserted themselves for being the pillars of strength of the Pakistan Movement, and to protect their shrinking share in politics and economy they mobilized themselves under the banner of Mohajir Qaumi Movement headed by MQM supreme Altaf Hussain. 28 The support base of the

MQM though limited to urban centres, it was able to alternate its political alignment with both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif's party at the behest of the lSI, and thus was able to

share power with the federal government. 29 Apart from fighting for their lost status, they aimed towards the creation of a fifth Pakistani province in Sindh, to be controlled exclusively by the Mohajirs. Critics however suspect them to be harbouring separatist dreams for Karachi.30

Organisationally the MQM was not a coherent body. The army engineered many splits inside the party and promoted various factions within it. Over a period of time the MQM gained notoriety for resorting to extortions and intimidation for raising funds and silencing dissidents.

With its resources and militia led network it ran a parallel

government in Karachi and Hyderabad. The brutality of the MQM was highlighted when the Pakistan army chanced upon torture cells run by them. 31 It two factions, MQM Altaf and MQM Haqiqi who indulged in factional killings and sectarian violence in Karachi threatened the stability of Benazir's government. Adding to the problem was the

28 Mohajirs in Pakistan enjoyed proximity to official positions owing to their proactive role during the Pakistan movement, and secondly due to high educational standards. Their prominence eroded due to shifting of the National capital from Karachi to Islamabad. The introduction of the employment Quotas in government jobs for Sindhis and other ethnic peoples affected them too. 29 Hassan-Askari Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan", Survival, vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 101. 30

John Bray, "Pakistan at 50: A State in Decline", International Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 2 (1997), p. 328

31 Ibid., p. 328. The Pakistan Army launched a massive security crackdown in Sindh and was successful in arresting hundreds ofMQM activists but it could not quieten the movement. The exiled MQM leader Altaf Hussein continued to direct the strife in Karachi through its organized cells.

177

resentment and hostility of the Sindhis to their loss of control of Karachi. The volatile ethnic population and their pent up discontent resulted in a severe civil war which lasted for more than a decade. The over~stay of the Mghan refugees in Karachi and other cities of Pakistan not only altered the demographic profile of the city but also added to the economic and civil chaos. The war in Mghanistan gave a boost to the underground economy run by mafias who smuggled arms and drugs from the strife tom region into Pakistan.32 The Bhutto government had a different take on the MQM issue. Benazir was reluctant to enter into any kind of settlement with them calling them terrorists. She held the view that the organisation which was charged with criminal acts should eschew violence and honour judicial proceedings before the initiation of any political dialogue. 33 If the PPP was successful in highlighting the terrorist nature of MQM the latter highlighted the atrocities committed by the government on Mohajirs and drew international attention towards violation of their human rights. "Clearly, the human and economic cost of PPP-MQM conflict in Karachi has been phenomenal and deepened the crisis of legitimacy of Bhutto~s government".34

Despite a large presence of the army in 1995 nearly 2,095

people got killed and the city earned the reputation as the 'city of death' .35 Continued violence, deaths in custody and extra-judicial executions raised serious doubts of reestablishing the harmonious relations between various ethnic groupS.36 Needless to mention, the rise ofMQM in the urban centres ofSindh owes largely to the encouragement and official patronage to the organization by the military regime of Zia. 'The reason was to undermine, the political base of Pakistan Peoples Party in Sindh.37 The PPP fell into the trap of nurturing unwarranted hostility towards MQM to preserve its 32 Ikramul Haq. "Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective", Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 10 (October 1996), pp. 944-45. The writer highlighted the commercial cultivation of opinion in Afghanistan which later found its way into Pakistani cities. The narcotic trade benefited the underground groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the money was used to fund insurgent warfare. 33

Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. p. 244.

34

Ibid., p. 244.

35

··City of Death", Herald, Special Map, 1996 quoted in Khan, Politics ofldentity, p. 180.

Amnesty International, Pakistan: Human Rights Crisis in Karachi (AI Index: ASA 33/01196), February 1996.

36

37

Shafaqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, n. 4, p. 243.

178

own constituencies and thus Karachi unrest became one of the main reasons for her dismissal from power in 1996. Dominance of the Military The relationship between civil-military bureaucracy and the political leadership in Pakistan was never an easy one and during Benazir's second tenure in office it was no different. The forced friendship showed signs of tension when lSI under Hamid Gul indulged in covert anti-government activities to defame her. There was no love lost between Benazir and the lSI even during her first tenure in office. It was believed that phone calls were being monitored and tapped, files were manipulated and her co-workers were threatened by the ISI. 38 Benazir Bhutto challenged the hostile lSI by replacing Hamid Gul and placed Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf Qazi to help her reign tlie Islamists. The lSI was instructed to keep away from guerilla insurgency in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani army officers who were involved in the war in Mghanistan were asked to join the old units and many were retired. Majority of the lSI officials who were cold-shouldered by the government extended their help to various jehadi groups as consultants, and thus neutralised the government's plan to silence them. 39 The change of political guard however, did not alter military's grip over politics. The games were played but with a great deal of subtlety. It is well known that no civilian leader could dilute Pakistani involvement in Kashmir. "The insurgency in Kashmir was rooted in the ideology of Pakistani Islamists, carefully nurtured for decades by the Pakistani military" and ''the level of military support for elected civilian leaders depended on their willingness to support the jihad in Kashmir".4o Consequently, leaders of both the mainstream parties were forced to compete with the Islamists in their show of affection to the Kashmiri cause.

Though the public postures of the government was extremely

cautious which maintained that it offers only moral support to the groups fighting in 38 See Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, n. 18, p. 204. The author mentions as incident how even the ciVIl-servants ignored the presence of the civilian head of state and took national security decisions like allowing a high jacked Soviet plane to land in Pakistan. 39

40

Abbas, Pakistan S Drift, n. 5, p. 153. Haqqani, Between Mosque and Military, n. 18, p. 235.

179

Kashmir, the truth was that material as well as logistical support was given in a massive scale through various lines of transnational support across the border.

41

Both the military

and religious groups inside Pakistan share great interests on Kashmir. They invested both resources and energy in recruitment, indoctrination and training of radical groups to pursue its strategic agenda in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Extremists groups thrived due to 42

steady help from the lSI, Pakistan army and its Military Intelligence Services.

Over a period of time the Pakistani army was highly successful in projecting its image as a force capable of wresting Kashmir from Indian domination. In pursuit of the emotive dreams of thousand of Pakistanis, it justifies its hegemonic position inside the state. The propagation of Kashmir issue reinforces its legitimacy and demonstrates its primacy in the eyes of its people. The absence of strong party system, political structures and effective institutions makes them final arbiters in politics.

43

Thus, the hegemony of the military and the bureaucracy became primarily responsible for ensuring what Huntington calls "political order" and "political stability'. This, however, led to further fragmentation of political parties and weakening of interest groups. In other words it is the weakness and ineffectiveness of the political structures like weak parties, Election Commission, unstable Parliament and other democratic institutions which enabled the military to play a domineering role.

Therefore, if the

military and the bureaucracy remain dominant it is as much due to ineffective political structure as the relative autonomy and skillful organizational superiority of the army. This process which allows little space for articulation and aggregation of interest gave rise to forces hostile to the political system.

44

41 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan and the Post-Cold War environment" in Baxter and Kennedy (eds.), Pakistan: 1997 (Delhi: Harper Collins, 1998), p. 42. Apart from official support various Islamic groups, extended material support to various Kashmiri groups and many also sent Jehadislvolunteers to participate in the war against Indian government.

42 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), p. 305. Also see 'Terrorists' Being Trained in Pakistani Kashmir: India", Agence France Presse, July 30,2003.

Gerald A. Heeger, "Politics in the Post Military State: Some Reflection-s on the Pakistani Experience", World Polities, vol. XXIV, No.2, January 1911, pp. 242-262.

43

This explanation is largely drawn from Huntington'S, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 250-255.

44

180

Benazir Bhutto perfonned under such state of affairs. Her government though democratically elected was constantly under the surveillance of the president and military. It is said, "the Bhutto government operated against the backdrop of a hostile military establishment that was prepared to use any opportunity to remove her from power',.45 The entire sequence of military-bureaucratic domination in the context of Pakistan was explained to highlight the fragility of democratic institutions and difficulties of the civilian leaders to push their agenda of reforms and modernization. Consequently, governance under civilian leaders often resulted in military blacklash. Benazir Bhutto performed under the watchful eyes of military leaders who were highly contemptuous of politicians and their intentions.46 Even when Benazir projected a modern image of Pakistan and spoke of encouraging democratic trends, the army perceived a threat to their control over the country. Her call for direct foreign investment along with aid from USA was well received in the US and implied her wider acceptance among western circles. But in the domestic arena it led to the negation of the military's model of seeking aid. She departed from tradition by emphasising not on Islam as the only source of national unity but on democracy - a bitter pill to shallow for the military.47

Benazir's Dilemma Benazir's tenure was also marked by personalisation of offices and vanous institutions. This included numerous appointments not on the basis of merit but on patronage and loyalty. Her lack of democratic approach while dealing with the judiciary led to a political crisis. The lamaat-i-Islam spearheaded a campaign to remove her from office when she appointed twenty four new judges with a doubtful professional

Samina Yasmeen, "Democracy in Pakistan: The Third Dismissal", Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No.6 (June, 1994), p. 573. The author gives a list ofBenazir's mistakes and to top it all her challenge to the army sealed her fate.

45

Babar Sattar, "Pakistan: Return to Practorianism", in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role o/the Military in Asia (Stanford: 2001), p. 400. .

46

Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque, n. 18, pp. 210-11. Haqqani states that Benazir's moves at normalising ties with India also signaled the army's loss of control. He opines that Benazir disturbed the age old formula of the army of keeping the nation's attention focused on an external enemy.

47

181

reputation. The main charge against her was that she manipulated the high office of the judiciary with her sympathizers and SUpporters. 48 Benazir's judicial crisis may have been due to her insecurities regarding the longevity of her government but she definitely had the opportunity to redefine and re direct pillars of democracy under the most trying circumstances. The Supreme Court ruling on March 20, 1996 negating her appointments strengthened the President's hands.49 A chain of tragic events like assassination of Benazir Bhutto's estranged brother allegedly at the hands of security forces on September 20, 1996 and anti-Shia violence in Multan threatening to spread to other cities and the Karachi crisis were episodes, which convinced the then President, a former PPP stalwart, to dismiss Benazir's government before the expiry of its term on November 5, 1996. 50 ''The main reason was the "shoot to kill policy adopted by the police against members of the MQM in Karachi, which was a violation of our Islamic faith and all canons of civilized Government.,,51 The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the other causes like corruption nepotism, complete breakdown of law and order interference in judicial matters and illegal phone-tapping as grounds sufficient to justify Benazir's dismissal. "Islam did play an important part in the case: The President had mentioned in several places of his order dismissing Bhutto's government that her actions had been in violation of Islam. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court. ,,52 Rise of Taliban and other Fundamentalist Groups during Benazir's Second Term

Benazir's second term in office was a story of struggle towards the path of constitutional democracy. The parameters of Pakistani politics, however, left little space to challenge directly the destructive legacies of Zia uI Haq. While civilian leaders were 48John

Bray, "Pakistan at SO: A State in decline",International Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 2 (1997), p. 323.

49 The Supreme Court while not allowing Benazir Bhutto to dictate the judiciary laid down conditions for their promotions and appointments. But Benazir failed to honour the court's order in the AI-Jehad Trust Case.

50 Murtaza Bhutto had differences of opinion on various political matters and had set up his own faction of PPP. The theory given by the government that police fired in self defence which killed him had no takers, The interim government named Asif Zardari Benazir's husband as the prime suspect. 51

Martin Lau, Role of Islam, n. 2S, p. 8S.

52

Ibid., p. 8S.

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preoccupied with the anxiety of 8th Amendment to the Constitution, riding the state of religious bigotry looked a distant dream. Perennial Bonapartism and its nexus with the Islamists forces further leaves little scope for independent, democratic political process to flow unhindered. This, however, does not keep the political leaders away from blame. It is said, "Every prominent politician of the country has indulged at one time or another in the uncivilised practice of scuttling the constitutional process, in active collusion with dictators. While the military dictators invariably oppose the continuation of constitutional democracy, the overwhelming majority of politicians have acted as a pliable tool for the 'cause' and in the hands of the former.',s3 Benazir's term would be better remembered for her direct encouragement to Talibani forces in Mghanistan. The political scene of Mghanistan after the Soviet tanks rolled out of the country (1989) was one of utter chaos. Various ethnic groups fought against the pro-communist regime ofNajibullah until he was overthrown in 1992. Kabul fell to Tajik leader Burhanuddin Rabbani and his military commander Ahmad Shah Masud, and Uzbek forces from the north under General Dostum. Pashtuns, by far the largest ethnic group, rallied to regain control over Kabul, under the command of Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. Mghanistan was a virtual war zone with various tribal warring factions hitting out against each other ion the most barbaric traditions. ''The warlords seized homes and farms, threw out their occupants and handed them over to their supporters. The commanders abused the population at will, kidnapping young girls and boys for their sexual pleasure robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the streets. Instead of refugees returning from Pakistan, a fresh wave of refugees began to leave Kandahar for Quetla". 54 In this state of affairs Taliban emerged in Mghanistan by the end of 1994. The

emergence of Taliban was the product of time as their agenda was to restore order, bring peace, disarm the highly armed society, enforce Sharia and protect Mghanistan's Islamic character. 55 The Taliban as their name suggests are Islamic students and were composed 53

Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, n. 14, p. 318.

54 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban Islam, oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p.21. 55

Ibid., p. 22.

183

skeptical about the legitimacy of the Pakistani state, and streams of teeming Bangladeshis left their home for security to bordering India. The mass exodus gradually dragged India into the East-Bengalis conflictP The internal situation in Bangladesh was extremely volatile with pitched battle between Mukti bahini (Bangladeshi fighters) and East Bengal Regiment. IS Eventually, Indian intervention set off yet another round of military confrontation between the two countries. I9

The war of liberation witnessed the

historically inevitable result, the surrender of the Pakistani troops and birth of Bangladesh in December 1971. The Language Movement

The importance of the language movement, which laid the secular basis of the first government in Bangladesh and disturbed the national cohesion and solidarity of Pakistan, defined in terms of religion need to be further examined. The most distinctive features of the people of East Pakistan which fonned a common bond between them are racial and ethnic stock, historical identity, geographic contiguity, shared economic interest and last but not the least, cultural and linguistic unity. The Bengalis were the largest ethnic group in Pakistan and their ethnicity was prominently different from the Pakistanis. The people of the west wing had greater links with the Arabs and Turcomans while the Bengalis were bereft of any racial mixture. The shorter, darker and friendly Bengali was starkly different from the taller, fairer martial westerner. 20 Part of their discontent when East Bengal was a part of united Pakistan was the discrimination they faced on the basis of their presumed "non-martial" attributes. 21 Geographically, East Bengal was fonned by a delta of two major rivers, Ganga and Brahmaputra and the area receives the highest amount of rainfall in a year. A look at 17 The Indian involvement was officially aimed at creating a congenial situation in which the refugees could return, but in reality New Delhi hopes to gain influence over the new state by decidedly supporting the secession of East Bengal from Pakistan. To achieve its objectives, India offered military training to the Mukti Bahini guerillas and other logistical assistance to sustain their fight with the Pakistani army. 18

Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh, n. 13, pp. 82-99.

19 For details regarding Indian role in the Civil War, see Hasan Askari Rizvi, Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive publishers, 1981). 20

M. Rafiqul Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement (Dhaka: The University Press, 1987) p. 67.

21

Craig Baxter, Government and Politics in South Asia (Colorado: West view Press, 1987), p. 229.

118

security of their men and material.60 Husain Haqqani quoting various sources puts forward the idea that Benazir Bhutto was "slowly sucked" into supporting the Taliban by the lSI, and that the government of Pakistan had second thoughts about encouraging them. Besides, there were also media reports about Benazir's Interior minister Nasirullah Babar assisting the Taliban with funds and logistical help.61 Both Bhutto and Babar were keen not to involve the lSI in Afghan affairs, consciously aware of its dubious role in fueling discontent against her during her fIrst stint in office.62 Babar provided official funds from government ministries for logistical support to the Taliban under the guise of facilitating a trade route to central Asia. The Afghan Trade Development Cell was set up for this purpose. The Director of the above Cell along with Pakistani officials from Civil aviation, telecom railway services, Pakistan radio and national bank of Pakistan traveled by road from Quetta to Turkmenistan after the capture of Heart by the Taliban fIghters in 1995. Various government corporations and ministries re-directed funds to help Taliban in new projects from resources meant to develop Pakistan's economy.63 Thus, Pakistan delivered almost everything from tin plates to rucksacks to communication lines with the Islamists. The ultimate design was the creation and sustenance of a well equipped army which Pakistan can call its own. 64 So great was the bonhomie with Afghan forces that not only were their airports repaired, internal wireless network setup and road and electric supply lines restored - but also work was done bringing Kandahar under the Pakistan telephone grid. This implied that Kandahar could be connected from any part of Pakistan as a domestic call using the Code 081, just as is done for Quetta. 65 Even technical support was provided to Radio Afghanistan by Radio Pakistan. Thus continuous inputs from Pakistani side forged deep

60

Haqqani, Between Mosque and Military, n. 18, p. 240.

61

See, Times ofIndia, September 8,1998.

Rashid, Taliban, n. 54, p. 184. The author says that Naseerullah Babar wanted to free the Afghan policy from the lSI.

62

63

Ibid., p. 185.

64 Tara Kartha, "Pakistan and the Taliban: Flux in an Old Relationship?, Strategic Analysis, VoL XXIV, NO.7, October 2000, p. 1310. 65

See, Rashid, Taliban, n. 54, pp. 184-185.

185

links with the Taliban whose families m refugees camps carried Pakistani identity cards. 66 Apart from ideological reasons the intense Pakistani interest in the 1990's was to ensure a pro-Pakistani regime in Kabul and enjoy "strategic depth" against its enemy India. Strategic depth for the Pakistani army meant a military strategy which enables the soldiers of Pakistan to retreat in a safe place with arms and ammunition support in case of a prolonged war with India.67 Secondly, for Pakistan a friendly regime in AfghaniStan would provide a safe haven for training Kashmiri militants and facilitate the lehadi campaign in the valley.68 Pakistan believed that the Taliban would recognise the Durand line or drop Afghanistan's claims to parts of NWFP. More significantly, Pakistan's search for military parity with India and the desire to pay India back for its alleged role in dividing East Pakistan in 1971 accounts for its support to lihadi forces against its neighbour. 69 A brief story of the Pak-Afghan relations in context of the Durand line would make things clear. Afghanistan soon after Pakistan's creation refused to recognise the Durand Line as the legitimate international boundary between the two states. It cast a solitary vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations and called for establishment of Pakhtoonistan. The year 1950 saw extremely tense relationship when Afghan parliament called the Durand Line an imaginary one and condemned the

66 For a detailed discussion on Pakistani assistance to the Taliban, see William Maley Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and Taliban (London: Hurst, 1998).

(ed.),

General Mirza Aslam Beg, explained the concept of strategic depth which meant· ... hiding Pakistan's military assets in Afghanistan beyond the current offensive capabilities of the Indian military its pursuit has five assumptions: (a) in a crisis, Pakistan would have the leisure of time; (b) Pakistan would transfer its equipment to a place of its choosing; (c) logistical support for such an undertaking would always remain available; (d) the places west of Durand line would safe from Indian attacks; (e) Pakistan would dominate, maintain and sustain huge safe houses in areas hundreds of miles deep into Afghanistan. See, Rizwan Zeb, ·War Against Terror: Lessons for Pakistan', Unpublished paper, p. 304. 67

Partha Pratim Basu, ··India and Post-Taliban Afghanistan", India Quarterly, Vol. LXIII, No.3 (JulySeptember 2007), p. 105.

68

Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture", Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6, Nov.IDec. 2000, p. 115. The extent to which the Pakistani policy-makers were motivated by the irredentist dreams is explained in a defense review. See Defence Journal, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4-5, 1990.

69

186

accidental bombing of an Mghan village close to the Pakistan border.7o Kabul made efforts to incite the local tribesman on the other side of the border to rise in open revolt against the Central Government leading to closure of the border. The Afghan nurtured deep resentment when they sensed that Pakistan after joining SEATO and CENTO has diverted much needed military assistance to Afghanistan. 71 The Taliban Upsurge

The Taliban which fostered Pashtun nationalism with a severe Islamic nature certainly influenced the Pashtuns. Recognising the Taliban and Sheltering them led to the dilution of border, between the two countries.

Apart from opening up great

possibilities of inter-regional trade and economic interdependence, it led to large influx of arms, local militias, drugs and narcotics. Many agreed that a Lebanon like civil war among various militias groups of Afghanistan would carry security risks and a possible involvement of foreign powers in the region. 72 Talibanisation spilling into the porous borders pose a great threat to Pakistan's stability. Besides drugs and arms smuggling, the radical Islamists have also made a strong presence in the region.

Taliban rule in

Mghanistan strengthened and reinforced the influence of the Deobandis, led by Fazlur Rehman's JUI, who not only baptized the religious fighters but was also the Chief political influence in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is reported, "The entry of secular politicians into FATA is practically banned whereas the Mullahs enjoy free entry',.73 The influence of the Mullah owes its origin to state patronage to Mosques and Madrassas and secondly to the principle of not allowing secular/non religious parties to extend their services in the region?4 The space created by the lack of participatory institutions and official patronage to Islamist radicals gave rise to Islamic militancy 70 For a discussion of Afghan - Pakistan border problem, see Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, AI-Qaeda and the Holy War (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp. 14-16. 71 Marvin G. Weinbaun, "Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Strategic Relationship", Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6 (June, 2001), p. 496.

72 Ibid., p. 500. In an ethnically divided Afghanistan, the bloody civil war involved all major factions such as the Phastuns, the Northern Alliance Ahmad Shah Masud, the Shi'ite Hazaras and numerous other ethnic factions.

73 See, "Pakistan's Tribal areas: Appeasing the Militants", International Crisis Group (ICG): Asia Report, No. 125, December 11, 2006,p.ll.

74

Ibid., po' II. This view was that ofHRCP activist Mr. Tariq Khan.

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which was trans-national in character, and this made the region a cocoon for local regional and international terrorists. 75 Driven out of Sudan's capital Khartoum due to American pressure Bin laden was brought to lalalabad and given refuge as an honoured guest. 76 Soon after that AI Qaida became the umbrella organization of all jehadi outfits including Taliban and numerous Islamists groups fighting in the Kashmir valley like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizb-ul-Mujahidden and many other groups based in Pakistan.77 "The battle inoculation" training, official support networks and flow of funds from oil rich west Asian states and affiuent Muslim expatriates have sustained the AI Qaeda - Taliban combine and led to 'religious mobilization and an extremists Islamist reorientation,.78 The partnership between AI Qaeda and Taliban sounded the death-knell for peace and stability not only for the region but to world at large. His jehadi volunteers wreaked havoc at the time and place of their choice. The Taliban and the AI Qaida groups were primarily accused of the 9/11 attacks, the 13 Dec 2001 Indian Parliament attack, the London bombings, half a doze assassination attempts on president Musharraf and numerousfidayaeen (suicide attacks) on political leaders and places of importance. The Taliban fighters have a formidable presence in Pakistan's tribal zones and militant leaders like Haji Mohammad Omar and Baitullah Mahsud move freely and carryout training and recruitments in South Waziristan. 79 The strategy adopted by the AI Qaeda supremo, Bin Laden to placate the Taliban was one of "luck, money and diplomacy."gO His method of flattery and See, Frederic Grare, "Pakistan-Mghanistan Relations in the Post 9111 Era", Carnegie Papers, no. 72, October 2006, p. 6. According to the author, hundreds of Taliban and al-Qaeda Operatives moved via mountain passes into many districts of FATA like North and South Waziristan.

75

See, Pradip Thakur, "Monster She created came back to take her life",. Times of India, December 29, 2007. 76

77

B. Rman, "laish-e-Mohammad", South Asia Analysis Group. No. 332.

Ajay Sahni, "South Asia: Extremist Islamist Terror and Subversion", in K.P.s. Gill and Ajai Sahni (eds)., The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material and Political Linkages (New Delhi, ICM Books, 2002), pp. 181-235. 78

79 For details on Al Qaida and Taliban, see Intikhab Amir, "Holes in the pact", The Herald (Islamabad), October 2006, pp.32-33.

Osama constantly flattered the Taliban leader, (Mullah Omar) building him a palace and going along with his rudimentarily educated hosts pretensions as commander of the faithful (which were formalized in a public ceremony in which he donned what was purported to be the prophet's cloak, Piously preserved in

80

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persuasion worked, and soon he became the hegemon of hundreds of foreign Islamists organisation under AI Qaeda, in Afghanistan. The lSI of Pakistan trained its volunteers (in the mid 1990's) in the same camp which Osama bin Laden used for his Islamist recruits. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) chief Yasin Malik had acknowledged the role of lSI chief in the Kashmiri insurgency, so did the POK JKLF Chief Amanullah Kahn who talked of a gentlemen agreement with lSI. In 1989 the lSI received vast tracks of land to be used as militant training camps.81 This was evident when the Pakistani recruits for Kashmir were the ones who succumbed to their injuries in the American cruise missile attacks in 1998. 82

Terror Attacks in Kashmir Valley Ever since partition of India in 1947 Kashmir problem is the single major political issue which continues to dictate the parameters of Indo-Pakistan relations. The issue of Kashmir is deeply rooted in history. The state of Jammu and Kashmir became a part of Indian Union when the Maharaja of Kashmir, backed by Sheikh Abdullah (leader of Kashmir National ,Conference and popular leader of Kashmiri Muslims) of that time acceded to be an integral part of India. While accepting the accession of Kashmir the political leadership of India made it known to the Maharaja of Kashmir that after clearing the invaders from across border the issue of accession should be on par with the wishes of the people. It is this condition which was attached as a footnote that was exploited by Pakistan in all international forums including the United Nations. Contesting India's claim, Pakistan has built up a case that accession of Kashmir to India was against the wishes of the overwhelming Muslim population. Thus, the issue of plebiscite or

Kandahar). Osama never lost an opportunity to publicly praise Taliban rule as the sole paragon of a genuinely Islamic state, the very model of the caliphate whose abolition by Ataturk in 1924 had cast the umma into a new period of Jahiliyah, the pre-Islamic era of ignorance and darkness. Jonathan Randal, Osama: The Making ofa Terrorist (London: IB Tauris 2005), p. 239. 81 Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) chairman Yasin Malik had acknowledged the contribuiton of lSI chief towards the cause of Kashmir. So did the POK JKLF Chief Amanullah Kahn who talked of a gentlemen agreement with the lSI. In 1989, the lSI received vast tracks of land to be used as Militant Training Camps. See Amir Mir, "Past imperfect", Newline, July 2005, pp.44-46

Ibid., p. 46. According to Amir MiT, the military leaders in Pakistan who as a matter oftradition keep the civilian leadership in dark about its operations have advised them to tell the Americans that they know nothing about Osama. The political leaders in their national interests never questioned the army bosses. 82

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referendum was raised by Pakistan every now and then even after Nehru withdrew the commitment to plebiscite after the 1954 USA-Pakistan defence agreement. 83 There are numerous instances of cross border infiltration of lehadi forces at different times. The Pakistan army, the Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI) and its Kashmir cell are allegedly behind planning and execution of infiltration plans. The infiltrated people consist of well trained recruits from various terrorist training camps with linkages to extremists' organization both inside and outside Pakistan. Trained in the "schools of hate", Pakistani nationals and Afghan lihadis had joined the Kashmiri struggle in large number by the year1992. The Government of India estimates that nearly 3,000 to 4,000 Mujahideen have infiltrated into the valley and out of the total figure of extremists 40

percent of the militants in Kashmir are Pakistani or Afghan and 80 percent are teenagers. 84 Thus, the indigenous, non-religious movement of the people of Kashmir was given the colour of Islamists crusade as attempts were made to bring the entire movement under Pakistani control. 85 Very few would disagree that the recruitment of the jehadists from Pakistan's side took place much before Benazir Bhutto took office and that she was not powerful enough to challenge the strong nexus between the military Islamists combine. But it is an over simplification to believe that a western educated independent women of her caliber, who is also the scion of an influential political dynasty had no say in managing her country's foreign affairs with two important neighbours India and Afghanistan. The perilous legacy of Benazir Bhutto's regime was the encouragement given to Taliban and the results were before all of us to see, and secondly, making Kashmir a

83 For a detailed story on Kashmir see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir; A Study in Indo-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 123. Also see J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making ofIndia's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Allied, 1984), pp. 291-298.

Media reports in 2001 revealed that four out of the five leading militant gropups active in Kashmir valley were based in Pakistan. They were trained and supported by the Paksiatni military in cross-borer terrorism. See Ghulam Hasnaun, "Inside Jihad", Time Asia, February 5, 2000. Also see, Stem, "Pakistan's Jehadi Culture", n. 69, p. 118.

84

Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man who Declared War on America (California: Prima Publishing, 1992), pp. 23-24.

85

190

jehadists playground. 86 The highly politicised state of Kashmir witnessed political unrest and insurgency in 1989, which remained largely a secular and issue-based such as the local demands for more jobs, more developmental aid, and Kashmiri reassertion in politics.87 But the movement was hijacked by heavily armed and ideologically brainwashed Islamists. The Kashmir policy of Benazir Bhutto made way for even foreign jehadists and their patron, the lSI to unleash terror in India When the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) which was in the forefront in spearheading the Kashmir movement gave up violence as a means towards achieving freedom, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was organised in 1990 to take command with aid from across Pakistan. Pakistan was more than happy to do away JKLF owing to its secular ethos and call for complete independence. The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, on the contrary, advocated Kashmir's merger with Pakistan and Islamisation of the valley. Moreover, Pakistan preferred Hizb because it was not an indigenous player from the valley itself and thus easier to control. Nevertheless Hizb had a local face to camouflage the foreign connection and many Hizb leaders were assassinated under suspicious circumstances for opposing Pakistan-based Hizb-ul leaders. Abdul Majid Dar, who headed Hizb and opposed fidayaeen attacks, for instance, was killed mysteriously.88 The lSI, which faced considerable problems while handling various militant groups in Afghanistan and their aspirations to region, did not want "a Kashmir PLO" In short, the resistance movement in Kashmir was hijacked by Pakistan, which did not leave it to the local commanders. 89 Slowly the movement transformed from a self-determination struggle and became

86 The policies advocated by the Taliban took Afghanistan into dark age. Some of the extremely retrogressive after effects of their rule was that women were made to disappear from Public view. Total segregation of sexes was ordered and punishments like flogging etc were given to those who dared to challenge. Clapping, kite flying, dancing & Music were banned, schools were shut down, photography stopped, and employment opportunities for women limited to the medical sector. No other interpretation of Islam other than theirs was tolerated. Continuous warfare led to psychological wounds visible in lowering of life expectancy, infant mortality and a maimed society. The plight of non-Muslims was one of sheer torture. The easy availability of arms and drugs deprived their society of peace and happiness and affected the regional stability. See Dupree Nancy Hatch, 'Afghan women under Taliban' in Maley William (ed)., Fundamentalism Reborn (London: C. Hurst, 1998).

87 88 89

The Hurriyat Conference is a conglomeration of thirty-odd Kashmir-based political parties. Daily Times (London), March 24, 2003. Haqqaai, Pakistan, p.287

191

increasingly Islamic

ill

tone and got linked to all secessionists and underground

organisations.90 Although the issue of Kashmir is deeply embedded in the official ideology of the Pakistani state, the jehadis from Pakistan are not involved in fighting for Kashmir alone. Many of them have established their presence in Philippines, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Yemen, Egypt and Algeria. But for the fear of a backlash from entrenched Islamists from within Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto did precious little despite western pressure to rein in the forces already unleashed during her tenure. 91 Although the Harkat

ul Ansar was placed in the U. S. State Department's list of global terrorist organisations, Benazir avoided taking action against the group operating under a new name, Harkat-ul-

Mujahideen. 92 Conversely, her government tried hard to convince the world leaders with the standard Pakistani explanation that the brutal killing of all Kashmiris by the Indian anny had attracted such groups to join the insurgency in the valley.93 According to sources, some 80,000 Pakistani volunteers who joined the Taliban to realise its dream of an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan also provided the ground for a Taliban-type interpretation of Islam inside Pakistan. 94 Rise of Islamic Militancy in Pakistan's Tribal Areas The areas in Pakistan which come under Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA include (1) Tribal areas of Peshawar district; (2) Tribal areas adjoining Kohat district; (3) Tribal areas adjoining Bannu district; (4) Dera ismail Khan district; (5) Bajaur Agency; (6) Orakzai Agency;· (7) Mohmand Agency; (8) Khyber Agency; (9) Kurram Agency; and (10) North and South Waziristan Agency.95 Mid 1990s witnessed

90

A.G. Noorani, "Contours of the militancy" Front-line, 17-20, September 30,2000, p.9

91

John F. Burns, "Terror Network Traced to Pakistan", New York Times, March 20,1995.

92

Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Exporting Jehad", News Line, September 1998, pp. 36-37.

93

Husain Haqqani, Pakistan between Mosque and Military, n 18, p. 237.

See, Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Coup: Planting the seeds of Democracy?" Current History, December 1999, p.413.

94

95

The above mentioned FATA areas were referred as such in Article 246(c) of the 1973 constitution.

192

an Islamic movement in these areas which challenged the state, its political authority its right to define criminal behaviour and judicial institutions.96 The movement which emphasized on the socio-religious reform was spearheaded by Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) and Tanzeem-i-Ittehad-i-ulema-iQabali (TIUQ). The movement of TNSM which was headed by Sufi Muhammad

emphasized on Shariah and Quran to be made sole basis for restructuring the society. The activists led the Pakistani government to rethink on Pakistan penal code. A ''near insurgency" and ''virtual rebellion" started in Malakand, Peshawar and Swat valley in pursuit of its demand for a Shariah-based system in place of Pakistan penal code. 97 Although the movement by TIUQ and TNSM looked overtly religious since Islamic symbolism was widely used and the various programmes demanded by the two parties was determined by Islamic interpretation, the base of the movement was wider since it aimed at economic and social development issues also. 98 The TIUQ, for instance, owed its growth to "a deep sense of deprivation, unemployment, delay in dispensation of justice and the role of vested interests." 99 The Pakistan Government's suspension of "transit trade" between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1995 and the state's assertion over controlling the border economic transactions put the inter-regional trading activity in jeopardy. The Pakistan Government by imposing national customs act on all cross-border trade and creating the new police posts reversed the 1965 Afghan Transit Trade agreement, which had provisions for Afghanistan to receive goods and shipments through Karachi which were not traded in exchange of Afghan products needed by Pakistan. In any case, the rise of Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan also had its influence in the growth of radical Islam in the

Robert Nichols, "Challenging the State: The 1990's Religious Movements in the Northwest Frontier Province" in Craig Baxter and Charles Kennedy (ed.), Pakistan: 1997 (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1998), pp.123-124.

96

97

Ibid., p. 127.

According to Sufi Muhammad, leader of the TNSM, whosoever accepted Pakistani law, supported democracy or who did not wear the black turban was a Kafie.

98

99

Frontier Post, July 9, 1995, p. 1.

193

tribal areas.

In fact, the TNSM had some external support from Arab and Afghan

mercenaries who were the by-product of the Afghan civil war. 100 The Pakistani support to extremist forces during the anti-Soviet jihad, during the civil war and later to the Taliban rule had sufficiently radicalized local Islam in the entire regIOn. Another issue which supplemented Islamic conservatism was that during the Afghan civil war there were hundreds of foreign militants who had entered into matrimonial alliances with th~ local tribes in the FATA region. Even after the ouster of Taliban, many fugitive militants continued to retreat into FATA areas and made generous monetary rewards in exchange for support and shelter provided by the local tribal people. The village elders explain this warmth of sheltering outsiders as a part of their religious tradition. 101 This unprecedented sympathy for the Islamic cause is perhaps one of the causes of Osama bin Laden's presence in the area and Al Qaida's successful operations against Western and un-Islamic forces. I02 Growth of Fundamentalist Forces during Sharif's Second Term After Benazir's premature dismissal from office in November 1996, Nawaz Sharif's PML-N emerged the winner in the polls held in February 1997.103 After the demise of Zia in 1988, power in Pakistan alternated between the two main stream political parties, the PPP and PML. The right wing considered as marginal third force played an extremely important role in street politics, whipping public emotions on issues like Kashmir. Afghanistan, nuclear weapons and Islamisation. Between the PPP and Nawaz Sharif-headed Islamic Democratic Alliance, the latter was considered a favourite 100 Robert La Port, "Pakistan in 1996: Starting over again" Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No.2 (February 1997), p.120.

See, Pakistan's Tribal areas: Appeasing the Militants Crisis Group", Asia Report, No. 125, December 11,2006,pp.13-14.

10J

102 Pakistani authorities have avoided an all out war with local militants (Taliban) groups in the tribal areas for fear of alienating Pashtuns who constitute more than 15 per cent of Pakistan's population. The Pashtuns make up 25 percent in the Pakistan army. The government of Pakistan despite US pressure has kept the Punjabi elite units away from the tribal war zone. The fear is to prevent the transformation of the Afghan autonomy movement into full fledged call for Independence. See, Haroun Mir, "It's Payback Time", Times of India, April 4, 2008. 103 The 1997 general elections saw a very low voter turn out at around 30 per cent which indicated voter's fatigue or disillusionment with the periodic dismissal of elected representatives before their term. Nawaz Sharif returned to power in 1997 with a two-third majority.

194

to champion the cause of Islamisation. For the Islamists were apparently impressed by the gesture ofNawaz Sharif who visited the grave of General Zia ul-Haq and had pledged to complete the Islamisation of life in pakistan. 104 The legacy of Zia' s decade long military rule continues to hover like a multi-headed monster over Pakistan's civil-democratic institutions. History repeated itself when the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif government was dismissed in 1999 October in a bloodless coup by General Pervez Musharaff. His rule did not reflect a severance of ties with the past policies, nor was it a trend-setter for democratic conventions. In short, his years in power or pattern of governance reflected that it was "old wine in an old bottle with just a new label".105 Nawaz Sharif hardly made any conscious actions to improve the prevailing political culture of Pakistan which

w~

that of hounding opposition members, judges, journalists and businessmen who opposed him. Benazir's husband was made answerable before the Accountability Commission and he ensured that the opposition People's Party fails to launch a movement against him. His attempt to gag free press was highlighted when he punished Friday Times editor, Najam Sethi for criticising his rule. Finally, his clash with the judiciary triggered a political crisis. 106 He engineered divisions within the judiciary and the disgraceful conduct of PML-N supporters outside the Court premises further weakened the pillars of democracy. It is rightly said, "for a transition to move from military to civilian rule, and hence toward democracy, the country requires an impartial and unimpaired judicial conscience and a clear sense of the place and predilections of civil society. It therefore, also requires a legislative -- indeed constitutional - foundation that ensures the judiciary an autonomous place in the state. Although the Courts have helped define this process, grounding has yet to be firmly established".107

104 Nawaz Sharif who led the anti-PPP Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) was considered a protege of General Zia-ul Haq. He was more acceptable to the army than Benazir though he fell out with his benefactors over certain issues later.

105

Abbas, Pakistan's Drift, D. 5, p. 159.

106 Nawaz Sharif slowly moved towards Political dictatorship when he took away the right of the legislators to express dissent. The undemocratic move was opposed by the Supreme Court and thus Sharif was eager to avenge it. 107

Newberg, Judging the State, n.15, pp. 231-232.

195

Sharif's personal aggrandisement plans were successful after he deprived the President of the right to dissolve elected governments and parliament and armed the Prime Minister the right to appoint the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution empowered him to secure any possible political interference by the President, but instead he used this constitutional safeguard to entrench himself in power. 108 The 14th Constitutional Amendment though meant to check political horse-trading aimed at inculcating great fear among his party members for violating party discipline and its rules of behaviour. The punishment which the elected members attract for abstaining or violating party's policy towards a Bill was immediate disqualification. This earned the parliamentary faction of the ruling PML the title of being an "enslaved majority',!09

The country's optimism of getting back to democratic traditions was

dampened by his stand off with the judiciary which engaged the government in avoidable tension and derailed its agenda on good governance. The centralisation of power and denial of political rights to members of parliament led to alleged arbitrary rule and exposed his government to military intervention. Another issue of incalculable significance to the balance of power in the region was the issue of Pakistan going nuclear. First of all, it was linked to Pakistan's bid to elevate its status and prestige in the eyes of the Muslim world. Even though the nuclear programme traces back to the days of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the status changed on May 28, 1998. it is on this day Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the Chagai hills of Baluchistan in response to India's detonations in Thar desert.

The unprecedented

celebrations allover Pakistan on the issue of Pakistan matching India's nuclear status explains the importance of the India factor in its politics and to the extent Pakistan's policies are determined by it. I 10 The decision to expose its nuclear status even at the face of stringent economic sanctions from the US and West was largely due to pressure from the religious right which was too much for the government to ignore. As the Nawaz Sharif government pondered for 17 days, there were massive protests by the conservative 108

See. John F. Burns. "Pakistan Acts to Cut Power of President", New York Times, Apri12, 1997.

109 OIeg V. Pleshov, Islamism and Travails of Democracy in Pakistan (Delhi: Greenwich Millennium Press, 2004), p. 230.

110 See, John Kitner, "Nuclear Anxiety: In Pakistan; Complex Pressures, Dominated by Islam, led to Testing", New York Times, June 1, 1998.

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elements with the backing of the people who urged the government to retaliate or perish. Il I

Sharif's Sharia Bill Nawaz Sharif introduced the 151h Constitutional Amendment meant to make the Holy Quran and Sunnah supreme law of the land. The bill was passed with a two-third majority in the National Assembly, even as minority organisations human right groups and certain civil society association publicly opposed the move. The clauses of the CA-15 bill are 1. the holy Quran and Sunnah of the HolyProphet shall be the Supreme law in Pakistan; 2. The federal government shall be under an obligation to take steps to enforce the Shariat, to establish salat (prayer), to administer Zakat, to promote what is right (according to the Quran) and to forbid what is wrong; 3. The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the constitution, any law or judgment of any court. I 12 The 15th AriIendment notes that for the purposes of Islamisation only a simple majority is required. The government which claims to be true torch bearers of Islam actually was criticized for converting the absolute mandate to a virtual dictatorship by using Islam. In a hard hitting editorial Newsline editor wrote "Islam is in danger in Pakistan, yet again. But not from the country's masses, the majorities of whom follows the tenets of their faith and are good human beings, besides being Muslims, Christians or Hindus. It faces a threat from its arrogant, self-seeking, corrupt leaders who have milked this country dry, sown the seeds of corruption ethnicity, sectarianism and violence .... Now that the country is reaping the wages of their unlimited greed and excesses Mr. Sharif waves the flag of Islam as if it were a magic wand that could sweep away the

III

Mayed Ali. "Failings ofNwaz Regime". The Nation, October 24,1999.

112

Pleshov, Islamism and Travails ofDemocracy, D. 109, p. 232.

197

country's economic meltdown in ajiffy."ll3 The editor remained critical of Sharif's who she says had visions of becoming all powerful Ameeul Momineen Zia is long dead, but his spirit still hounds Pakistan's democratically elected leaders. The 15th Amendment to the Constitution was seen as a threat to federation and the smaller provinces were apprehensive of Punjabi domination over them. The bill sought to empower the federal government to issue directives and make laws for the implementation of Islamisation. The bill gave overwhelming authority to punish any state functionary for non-compliance with its order and there is no judicial restraint on the powers of the federal government to enforce principles of Quran and Sunnah. The bill proposed to re-establish Salat committees set up by Zia ul Haq and form vigilant committees to enforce Islamic practices. 1l4 The state machinery was to be used to crush any opposition to Islamisation measures and this raised fears of a civil war and imposition of the Taliban version of Islam in Pakistan. The threat of sectarianism and a civil war was perceived because not all Muslims have monolithic views on Shariat. There exist various schools of Islamic jurisprudence and each school or Fiqh determines different norms of behaviour.

"Some of them

consider Fiqh a part of Shariat, others - its concretisation, while the third maintain that the Fiqh begins where Sharia ends. There is an opinion that Shariat is only a composition of the rules regulating external conduct of the Muslims having no concern of their inner motivation and religious consciousness.,,115 There is major difference on this issue between Shias and Sunnis and thus the fear of sectarian clashes. The bogey of Talibanisation was raised because Islamic zealots were sure to get state patronage, and Pakistan being a friend of the Taliban was prepared at that point of time to bear with the spiritual spill over in the own country even though it w~uld adversely affect the religious minorities and women. 1l6 113 See. Rehana Hakim. "Editor's Note", Newsline, September 1998, p. 7. The writer makes a passionate plea to Mr. Sharif who was playing to the gallery and was ready to trigger a civil war to grab complete power, not to indulge in low politics since it is not Islam but Pakistan - which is n danger. 114

See "Cover Story". Newsline, September 1998.

115

Pheslov, Islamism and Travciilsof Democracy, n. 109, p. 233.

116 For a discussion of the impact of Islamisation on the lives of Pakistani women, see Anita Weiss, "Women's Position in Pakistan", Asian Survey, XXV, No.8 (August 1985), pp. 867 -880.

198

The multifarious interpretation of Islam regarding the status of minorities along with unbridled power to interpret Islam was bound to make lives of minorities miserable. Doubts were raised that the minorities may be asked to pay Jazia (tax) and labeled Zimmi or there could be laws prohibiting their employment in the anny or other higher offices. Last but not the least attempts could be made to restrict their religious activities. I 17 There were fears that the majority -minority divide would increase and the bill would ensure a second class status to the minorities in the country of their birth. The Shariat bill had provisions which made constitutional amendments much simpler. The bill empowered the government to remove all obstacles towards Islamisation by an amendment. Such a process was not to require a two-third majority, but only a simple majority of members taking part in the voting. In an event of rejection by either House of the Parliament to the proposed amendment, the bill could still be enforced in a joint-session of the parliament by a simple majority. Nowhere in the world was the procedure of amendments made so easy and simpler. It needs mentioning that constitution after all is an extremely serious document, which lays down the guidelines for governing the country. Amendments to the constitution are carried out in extreme cases according to the need of time, but after great deal of discussion and critical review, Critics in Pakistan viewed this move as an attempt to negate the role of the Upper house which safeguards the right of the federal units. The fear of Punjabisation spread among the federating units since Punjab enjoyed majority in the National Assembly. Thus the nagging apprehension that Shariat Bill carried the seeds of disintegration of the federal system was not an exaggeration. The'real purpose behind introducing the Shariat Bill was to create an absolutely powerful executive, which could force the judiciary to endorse its. moves without a murmur of protest. Asma Jehangir, Chairperson Human Rights Commission of Pakistan exposed the real intention of the government by calling their entire efforts as ''typical Zia style of functioning." She added, ''The government claims that the real purpose of the

Jl7 The fears about the persecution of minorities were sounded by Bishop Bonaventure of Pakistan. See Zaman Khan, "This Amendment will give tbe Rulers unbridled power to Interpret Islam", Newsline, September 1998, For blasphemy cases against minorities, see "The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan", leG Asia Report, No. 95 (April 18, 2005), p. 26.

199

bill is to adjudicate, to provide justice to the people. If that was the case, so many other amendments to the Constitution could have been carried out instead of the Shariat Bill. In fact what the bill does is provide the executive with the power to get rid of any judge it deems undesirable.,,1I8 As both of his grand experiments, the speedy trial courts in 1992 and the anti-terrorist bill to combat terrorism met with judicial disapproval, Nawaz Sharif became wary of the judicial activism. His obsession with judicial activism had much to do with the fear of the old corruption cases crumbling from the cupboards and resulting in his removal from office. 119 Sharif, however, seemed determined not to give up and set out to clip fIrst the powers of the President army, Parliament and then the judiciary.12o Moreover, the timing of the bill brought to the fore Nawaz Sharifs political compulsions, especially in the wake of the breakdown of his political alliance with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement both at the federal and provincial level, leading to a vicious cycle of blood bath in Sindh. At the same time, problems facing the country were no less formidable: severe economic distress and the countrywide agitation by the fundamentalist parties and their fIery sermons and anti government, anti-American protests following the US missile attack on Osama bin Laden's hide -out in Afghanistan. 121 Nawaz Sharif used his Islamic card in an effort not to lag behind the fundamentalists. He extolled hundreds of religious leaders who had gathered in Islamabad for a government sponsored convention on the implementation of Sharia, to be true warriors of Islam. Addressing the gathering Sharif asked the religious leaders to spread allover Pakistan and stand against all the forces who are opposing the bill. 122 This show of strength of the religious right can be compared with the besieging of the 118

See, "Ashma Jehangir's Interview to Asha'ar Rehman", Newsline, vol. 10, no. 3, (September 1998), p.

26. 119 The bill gave police the authority to conduct raids without search warrants and even had provision for death penalty. While Sharif believed that the bill was the "only option" to combat terror, others condemned the legislation, which would allow police to make "arbitrary arrests on mere suspicion." Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly the Keeising's Contemporary Archives): Pakistan, Vol. 43 (August 1997), p. 41775.

See, John F. Burns, "Army Take Over Feared as Pakistan Leaders Act to Bolster Power", New York Time, November 2,1997.

120

121

Hasan Mujtaba, "Friends, Foes or Masters?", Newsline, vol. 10, no. 3 (September 1988).

122 Nawaz Sharifs appeal was echoed by Senator Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi who raised the religious tempo by demanding that all opponents of the proposed amendment be hanged. Ibid.

200

Supreme Court, during his standoff with the judiciary. The bill was passed in the lower house with minor changes but he could not get it passed in the senate owing to the issue of retirement of senators. Sharif had no options but to wait for fresh elections of the senators in 2000, which were to give him the much needed support. As his political fate would have it, his government fell in 1999 and with it, the Shari at bill was kept a backburner. Sectarian Violence during Sharif's Regime Nawaz Sharif's rule witnessed escalation of violence between the rival Sunni and Shia sects, which reached the peak in 1997 when Pakistan was all set to celebrate 50th anniversary of its independence. 123 In Punjab alone more than 170 people were killed in a few weeks and the nature of killings often involved bomb blast and bloody massacres during prayers and religious services. The unending spate of sectarian violence which swept Pakistan and Punjab in particular led to the passage of the controversial antiterrorist bill designed to cope with the fratricidal war. The Bill signed by President Leghari on August 18, 1997 gave the security agencies wide ranging powers to carry out raids without search warrants, to arrest and even evoke severe punishment measures like death penalty for involvement in terrorism. 124 The Sunni-Shia animosity with its resultant sectarian crisis owes its origin to the imposition of statist Islam. Pakistan being a Sunni majority country patronised Sunni Islam and this gave an impetus to Sunni fundamentalism. Sectarian conflict in Pakistan is related to the place ofIslam in public life. Zia ul Haq's Islamic rule left behind painful memories of ethnic and sectarian violence. The exploitation of Islam for political gains is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. Successive rulers both civilian and military used Islam to mobilise public support and win political legitimacy. Article 2 of the 1973 Constitution declares Islam as the official state religion and sovereignty belongs to Allah:

123

Kessings' Record of World Events: Pakistan, Vol. 43 (August 1997), p. 41775.

124 The Provincial government in Punjab had also taken a series of measures like establishment of local protection committees and imposing a ban on adult males riding pillions on bikes etc. But these measures were not enough to combat violence. See, Keesings Record of World Events: Pakistan, Vol. 43 (August 1997), p. 41775.

201

All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the holy Quran and Sunnah .... And no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions (Article 227).

Thus, the ultimate objective of the constitution is Islamisation and Islam is also the basis of state legitimacy. However, the terminology, functions, designs and implications of an Islamic system is subject to endless debates and sectarian interpretations. Official patronage of Islam has led to "political, cultural and ideological confusion".125 When the state interferes in matters of personal belief and debates on issues like who is a Muslim and who is not, it sends shivers down the spine of minority sects like the Ahmedias, Shias and others. 126 Between the Shias and Sunnis, for instance, there exist certain core historical, jurisprudential and ideological differences, which turn the fonner suspicious of the majority Sunnis and strengthen particularist identities. The sectarian flare-ups in Pakistan during the 1990s were thus the result of the deepening sense of alienation and mutual fear even though the both communities had contributed equally to the creation and economic development of Pakistan. 127 As discussed in the chapter I, it was during the Zia period the religious lobby mainly the Deobandi ulema and the Jamaat-i-Islami lobbied for rigid interpretations of Islamic injuctions and jurisprudence which were perceived by the Shia community as partisan. The Hudood ordinances, the Blasphemy laws, the promulgation of zakat and ushr ordinance and many other divisive drives like reserving seats for Sunni ulema in the Council of Islamic ideology (leading to resignation of Shia members), filling up the Sharia courts with members of the conservative Sunni clergy, establishment of the Sharia faculty in the Islamic university with no Shia presence, propagation of official Islam in the state media and print medium, propagation of Islamic values in schools, making prayers mandatory in offices and educational institutions thereby making the Sunni-Shia identification visible/perceptible and discriminatory rules and regulations requiring job 125 Khalid bin Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam: Oxford, 1997), p. 126. 126

Challenge and Response (London:

See Rubya Mehdi, Islamisation ofLaw in Pakistan (Richmond, 1994), p. 20.

127 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father of Pakistan was a Shia and many of his associates were Shias. Even after independence three head of states Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1947-48) Iskander Mirza (1956-58) and General Yahya Khan (1969-70) were Shias. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also came from a Shia background. They contributed immensely towards the economic well being of their nation. The Shias like the Gokals Habibs and Ispahanis have made their mark in the field of shipping, Banking and air lines.

202

BAKSAL Mujib was bogged with not only dissidence within Awami League but also by violent excesses committed by the Rakhi Bahini. The para-military force which enjoyed the blessings of Mujib and Awami League

~ained

notoriety for annihilating those rural

leaders who dared the League's candidates in polls or posed any kind of a political threat to them. The indiscipline displayed by the para-military organization who had taken upon themselves the role of eliminating Mujib's detractors was also accused of murdering Awami Leaguers.72 The Bangladesh anny was called in to deal with the domestic situation, re-establish law and order, and restore credibility of the nation in the eyes of its own people. Mujib not only initiated a role for the Bangladesh anny in its internal affairs, he also altered the political process by declaring a state of emergency on 28 December 1974.73 Faced with internal challenges to his leadership and governance Mujib dissolved the Awami League party and turned increasingly dictatorial. He altered the high ideals of liberation movement by taking retrogressive steps lice destroying the judicial independence, suppressing fundamental rights, thwarting democratic proceedings and resorted to totalitarian control. In his scheme of absolute authority the ideals of secularism was also sacrificed. Mujib amended the Constitution to provide for a Presidential form of government and the President had the authority to form one national party and debar any of the political groups who oppose this arrangement. The emergency order ensured a five year term for Mujibur Rehman as President from the date of the constitutional amendment.14 The new national party imposed on the people was the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, workers and peoples League) or BAKSAL. By imposing BAKSAL Mujib went against the pop~ar aspirations of the people and against his own ideology of Mujibbad. "BAKSAL was not only a coercive assembly; it was predicated on the elimination of other organizations. BAKSAL was Mujib's way of expressing his one-party state. Thus in a more significant way, BAKSAL was meant to 72

Anthony Mascarenhas, Bangladesh: A Legacy ofBlood (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), p. 44.

73

Ziring, Bangladeshfrom Mujib, n. 7, p. 101.

74 "The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary December 28, 1974" cited in Maniruzzaman's Bangladesh Revolution, n. 47, p. 178.

131

Pakistan marched on to various government ministries for the enforcement of Shia fiqh for Shias, not to enforce Zakat according to Hanafi law and pressed for the effective representations of Shias in govemmentIran's policy of "export of Shi'i revolution' coincided with the new found activism of the Shias, who were already accused of harbouring plans to implement Shi'i laws. This state of affairs was perceived by the majority Sunni community as threatening. However, what precipitated the sectarian divide was the US policy of containing post-revolution Iran. American interests mainly lay in protecting the oil rich gulf Sheikhdoms against the deleterious effects of Khomeiniled revolution. To counteract the potential Iranian influence in its surrounding region, America covertly and overtly encouraged the Sunni brand of Islam already active in Pakistan. This explains why the US chose not to react to the march of Taliban actively backed by Pakistan and its subsequent seizure of power in Kabul. 13l During the years 1994-96, the US was supportive of the Taliban since Washington saw the latter as anti-Iran and anti-Shia. Apart from trying to neutralise Iran's potential influence in Mghanistan, the US Mghanistan policy was also guided by its interests in securing energy sources in Central Asia. The American oil giant UNOCOL's proposed gas pipe line project from Turkmenistan to Pakistan in someway compelled US decisionmakers to tolerate the presence of the Taliban militants and their backers in Pakistan. The Clinton administration was not favourably inclined towards an Iranian role (whether as an interlocutor or backer of warlords competing for hegemony) in post-Soviet Mghanistan. President Reagan was also influenced by the same conceptual frame- work when he encouraged Sunni fundamentalists against the Soviets in the aftermath of the latter's invasion of Mghanistan. 132 The role of print media and proliferation of sectarian literature, growth of sectarian affiliated mosques and madarasas and along with it, the sectarian organisations like the Sipah-i-Muhammad for the Shias and Sipah-i-Sahaba for the Sunnis radicalised the two \31 Soon after Taliban forces announced their capture of Kabul in 1996 September the US State department made friendly overtures towards it and sent an official to Kabul in its bid to establish diplomatic relations with the Pakistan backed Militias. State department spokesman Glyn Davies described the TaJiban anti modern rather than anti-western and found nothing objectionable in the imposition of Islamic codes. See Rashid, Taliban, n.54, p. 166.

132

"US sending Envoy to Taliban", Reuters News, October 1, 1996.

204

communities. Further, the efforts of sectarian organisations in introducing "new urban, text based and relatively standardized religious identity among people hithergo acquainted only with local forms of religious belief and practice" led to fundamentalist upsurge in the countryside. 133 The Islamic activism of both Sunni and Shia groups found great support in the Persian Gulf monarchies. There were entrenched links between Saudi Arabia and Sunni Pakistani activists and the Iranian Ulema and Shi'i madarasas in Pakistan. Most of these organisations operated independently of government control and 1,700 out of 2,463 registered Madrassas received financial grants and infrastructural support from outside Pakistan. 134 Rabita Alam-i-Islam (Islamic World League) of Saudi Arabia spearheaded the funding programmes in an attempt to influence Islamic intellectual and cultural life across the Muslim world. In Pakistan their agenda was to promote Wahabism. The Saudi support to Sunni madrassas in Pakistan fitted well wit its anti-Iranian regional policy. Primarily concerned at the growing Iranian influence among the Shias, Saudi Arabia used Pakistan for creating the "Sunni Wall" around Iran. The Saudi attempt to harden Sunni identity was thus based on its vested interests in pursuit of which, it tried to entice the lamaat-i-Islam. But the Jamaat committed to the cause of forging Shia-Sunni fraternity under the rubric of Islamism since 1988 refused to be drawn into the Saudi game plan, which was exclusivist in nature.135 However, determined to put up an anti-Shi'i front, the Saudis invested in self-styled Islamist, Muhammad Salahuddin alias Israr Ahmed of Ahl-

i-Hadith organisation. 136

\33 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni identities", Modern Asia Studies, Vol. 32, no. 3 (1998), pp. 688-690.

134

Herald (October, 1996), p. 54.

135 The broad exclusivist approach of the Jamaat was evident in Maududi's (Jamaat's Amir) interpretation of Islamic history. He interpreted the "Martyrdom as a struggle of Islam in the path of justice and for the establishment of Islamic state. He eviscerated the battle of Karbala of all its symbolism myth, meaning tbat Shi'is associate with it transforming it into an Islamist episode that presaged his own". In 1995 Jamaat leader Qazi Hussain Ahmad met Iranian President before uniting all Islamist parties to end sectarianism. See, Nasr, "The Rise ofSunni Militancy in Pakistan", n. 137, pp. 158-159.

136 The Alh-i-Hadith publications are Takbir, Muhaddith (Lahore), Tarjumanu'l-Hadith (Faisalabad), Sahifa-i-Ahl-i-Hadith (Karachi) al-Aitisam (Lahore) Ahl-i-Hadith (Lahore) and al-Badr (Sahiwal). Some of the anti-Shi'i books published during the period include Shi'; Hazrat ki Quran se Baghavat (Revolt of the Shi'is against Quran), Din Main Ghulluw (Extremism without Religion) and Shi'J Hazrat Ki Islam se Baghavat (Shi'is Revolt against Islam). Ibid., pp. 160-161.

205

Apart from Ahl-i-Hadith other Sunni based orgaisations like Irshad'u Dawah (guidance and call to Islam) its militant cousin, Lashkar-i-Tayyibah (Army of the pure), and the Deobandi Darul-ulem (seminary) raised the pitch of sectarian confrontation in Pakistan. The Wahabbis of Saudi Arabia and the Deobandis established a synergistic relationship. The extremist attitude of the Deobandists permeated the Tablighi Jamaat. The followers of Tablighi ''were intolerant of other Muslims and especially Shi'ites, let alone adherents of other faiths. - - - They rejected modernity as anti-thetical to Islam, excluded women, and preached that Islam must subsume all other religion. The creed grew in importance after Pakistani military dictator Zia ul Haq encouraged Deobandis to Islamise Pakistan.,,137 The Wahabbis who ignored other schools of Islamic thought singled out the Tablighi Jamaat for praise. The late Sheikh Abdal Aziz ibn Baz, who was the most influential Wahabi cleric in the late 20th century praised the Tablighis for their good work and encouraged the Wahabi preachers to follow them in their missions so as to get their valuable guidance and advice.138 The Saudis took upon themselves the task of fmancing their transportation and all other expenses. It is true that the financial transactions of the Tablighi Jammatis are wrapped in mystery but there is no doubt that Saudi funds from the World Muslim League have benefited them. 139 The interplay between Shia-Sunni and Sunni doctrinal differences, the divisive role played by the external actors and the Sunni-specific Islamisation measures of Zia ul Haq resulted in the politicisation of sectarian identity. All this manifested in the growth of fundamentalist organisations from both the sects which carried the fatricidal war to unmanageable limits. The Islamic seminaries across Pakistan and particularly in Punjab produced militant sectarian groups, which actively participated in the sectarian war. Prominent of them are Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf's international Islamist network, Harkat ul 137 Alex Alexiev, "Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions", Middle East Quarterly, vol. XII, no. 1 (Winter 2005), p. 2. 138 See, "Fatwa of Shaykh 'Abdul' - Azeez ibn Bazz regarding the Jamaa'ah at Tableegh", FatwaOnline.com, Safar 11, 1414 (July 31,1993). 139 Alex Alexiev in his study· has revealed that the Saudi organisations subsidised the Tablighi Jamaat's mosque in Dewsbury England, which is the headquarters of all Talighis in Europe and he quotes Wahabi sources which paid Tablighi Missionaries in Africa Salaries higher than the European union pays teachers in Zanzibar .He has shown that Tablighis operate from Deobandi and Wahabi centers in the US and Europe. See Alexiev, "Tablighi Jamaat", n. 145, p.3.

206

Ansar (movement of the helpers of the Prophet), the Sunni Tahrik (Sunni Movement) Tanzim-i-Da 'wah (organisation of the call), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (Jahangvi's army), Sawad-i-Azam-i-Ahl-i-Sunnat (majority of Sunnis), the Sunni Council, Sunni Jamiat-iTulabh (Sunni student Association), Pakistan Sunni Ittihad (Pakistan Sunni Alliance), TahaJfuz-i-Khatm-i-Nubuwwat (protection of Finality of Prophethood), the Pakistan Shariat (Islamic Law Council) and the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP Pakistan's Army of the Companions of the Prophet).140 Shias who constitute nearly 15% of the population have a highly organised movement led by the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-fiqh-i-Ja jariyya (Movement for the implementation of the Jafari law). The other Shia parties include the Imamia Student Organisation (ISO) and the militant Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan. Both the sects indulged in an aggressive confrontational style of politics and the madrassas-trained ulemas of both the sects incite their respective followers to "rise take up arms and seek paradise by eliminating the enemies of Islam.,,141 The Shia-based TNFJ had a religio-political agenda to assertain their separate identity to protect their different religious practices and prevent the Sunni majority government from binding them with Shari a-based interpretation that clashed with their fiqh Jafariya. Apart from demanding complete autonomy for Shia religious endowments and total freedom for public observance of Shia rituals like Azadari processions, the TNFJ also insisted on developing Pakistan's closeness with Iran. It advocated for a policy where prominent Mujatahids and other Shia scholars from Iran should be invited to Pakistan just as Sunni scholars are welcomed from Saudi Arabia, and stressed that Pakistan should be rid of American control. 142 Internally, the Shias were critical about the Zia's Islamisation wherein the Shia jurisprudence was totally neglected or ignored. Asserting their rights as equal partners the, TNFJ demanded that any law enforced in Pakistan in the name of Islam had to be in 140

Nasr, "The Rise ofSunni Militancy in Pakistan", n. 137, pp. 141-142.

141 See Mumtaz Ahmad, "Revivalism, Islamisation, Sectarianism and violence in Pakistan", in Baxter, Kennedy (ed.), Pakistan: 1997 (India: Harper Collins, 1998) p. 101. The author highlights various sectarian pamphlets one such Urdu pamphlet distributed by the activists of Sipah-i-Sahaba in Rawalpindi 1995 urged the Sunnis to wake up. "Jago jago Sunni Jago". The author quotes an editorial from Deobandi monthly AI-Haq which castigates the Shias for conspiring against Pakistan by Conspiring with Jews and masterminded the separation of East Pakistan. -

142 See various demands of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-JaJaria (TNFJ) mentioned in Afak hayder, "The Politicisation of the Shias and Development of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-JaJaria in Pakistan" in Charles Kennedy ed., Pakistan: 1992 (Lahore: PBC, 1993), pp. 79-84.

207

accordance with the Hanaji jiqh for Hanafis and Shia jiqh for Shias. Furthermore, the party demanded Shia interpretations in the Council of Islamic Ideology and introduction

ofjiqh-e-Ahl (the fiqh of the Prophet's Household that is thejiqh Jalan) to be studied in the Islamic University syllabus. The absence of Shia publications from the governmentcontrolled Institute of Islamic Research and the lack of Shia point of view in the Federal Shariat court were the other two issues raised by the organisation. 143 The Shia counterpart of Sunni Sipah-I Sahaba, the Sipah-i-Muhammad operated with lot of vengeance, it believes in "Khoon ka badla Khoon" (an eye for an eye and exhorts its followers to eliminate the enemies of dushmanan-i-Hussain (enemies of Hussain) and attained martyrdom. This inevitably resulted in the periodic violence involving Sipah-i-Sahaba and Sipah-i-Muhammad in parts of Pakistan.

144

The most

aggressive among Sunis is the Sipah-i-Sahaba, which was an offshoot of Jamaat-ulemai-Islam, Fazlur Rehman group. The Sunnis were startled by the active mobilisation of their counterparts. Muhammad Qasim Zaman swns up the Sunni consternation in this way. He writes, "That Islam and its fundamental sources are to mean different things to different people is disquieting, for instance; it takes away the Sunni majority's ability to prescribe what the religious law of the land would be, and perhaps even more grievously, it suggests that 'Islam can, and should, have several competing yet equally valid because officially recognized forms' .145 The Sunni-Ied Sipah-i-Sahaba though formed as a local organisation to fight Shia land mafias in Jhang district in Punjab, spreads its roots throughout Pakistan. The madarassa trained highly orthodox ulemas of the SSS provided leadership to combat Shi'as at all levels and ensure a declaration from the state calling them non Muslims. Maulana Muhammad Tariq of the Sipah-i-Sahaba introduced a bill in the lower house of Pakistani Parliament which proposes to make any attack on the honour of the Prophet's companions and his family a crime punishable by death.l46 The intention behind the proposed bill according to the Sipah-i-Sahaba is to ensure sectarian 143

Ibid., pp. 87-90. These were enlisted in the demands ofTNFJ under AJlama Moosavi group in 1992.

144 See, Mumtaz Ahmed, "Revivalism" in Baxter and Kennedy (ed.) Pakistan 1997, n. 41, p. 113. The author argues that the animosity between the two groups reached such a pitch that bombing of a Shia Mosque would lead to bombing of a Sunni Mosque and the assassination of their leaders. 145

Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan", n. 141, pp. 696-697.

146

Ibid., p. 702. (The bill was quoted from Khalafat-i-Rashida mothly organ of Sipah-i-Sababa).

208

sub-continental case, it, however, advocates a role for the state in religious affairs. In some ways the state is neutral in so far as individual faiths are concerned, and in other ways state plays a positive role in protecting and ensuring equal treatment to all. According to Ali Riaz secularism in context to Bangladesh and India is not an alien concept, instead it is home grown, suiting to the imperatives of multiple identities.86 Secularism to be successful in a given society does not require any pre-condition. Its success or failure depends on the composition and commitment of the ruling elite. There may be variation in practices depending on the political exigencies, but secularism nevertheless is not culturally driven. Ali Riaz also considers such explanations as the reaction to secular experiment, legitimacy crisis, and external aid as too generalised without any analytical depth. The crisis of legitimacy is for instance not simply political or constitutional; it has had its roots in the failure on the part of the ruling elite, to build and sustain its ideological hegemony.87 A stable polity is dependent on the ability of the leadership to forge an ideology which enjoys a larger societal consensus. In a short span the post independence elite of Bangladesh had difficulty in establishing the ideological hegemony of the ruling elite. The crisis had its beginning with Mujib faltering in his commitment and pursuit to realise his goals, and the state of affairs aggravated with the ouster of Mujib from the political scene. Bases of Bangladeshi Nationalism Soon after Mujib's death there was a perceptible shift in the emphasis from syncretistic, linguistic nationalism and secular ideology to the search for a new identity shaped by distinctions such as ''we'' vs ''they''. Reflective of this trend, ancient texts were researched by historians to highlight the differences between the Indian part of Bengal and the contemporary Bangladesh notwithstanding the fact that both of them belong to the same geographic area, share the same written and spoken language, have the same food habits and living conditions. Curiously, few scholars even came with the theory that there were two Bengals and Bengal in historical and cultural terms is not Ali Riaz, "God willing": The Politics and Ideology ofIslamism in Bangladesh", Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and Middle East, VoL 23, No.1 & 2, 2003, pp. 302-305.

86

87

Ibid.

135

In sum, the protracted Shia-Sunni hostility that at one stage threatened fragmentation of Pakistan had its causation deeply entrenched in rigid sectarian division radicalised by the state through its policy of Islamisation. This explains why the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif failed in its efforts to contain the recurrence of sectarian violence. Backed by strong political support in his home province of Punjab, when Sharif undertook strict measures against the sectarian extremists, he became the target of an assassination attempt allegedly by a militant Sunni group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in 1999. 150 The fratricidal war not only undermined the social fabric and the prospects of cohesive national identity, it also posed serious challenges to the governance and state stability.

Pakistan's Taliban Policy Pakistan under Nawaz Sharif persisted with a pro-active policy towards Mghanistan first by patronising the Taliban and then, encouraging it to occupy areas from its rivals. The Pakistan-Mghanistan border became the easiest route for Taliban forces to operate and a major portion of training infrastructure for Pakistani jihadis was relocated across the border into Mghanistan. 151 .Eventually, Pakistan was successful in attaining its long-term objective of establishing a vassal regime in Kabul in 1997. By the end of 1998, Taliban had not only consolidated its hold over Kabul, but also occupied the northern town of Mazar-i-Sharif thereby bringing the entire Mghanistan except Panjshir valley under its control. With a client government in its backyard, Pakistan pursued a low-intensity proxy war against India for the liberation of Kashmir and at the same time keeping Kabul outside the orbit of New Delhi's influence. "Pakistan's military establishment", writes an analyst, "has always approached the various wars in and around Mghanistan as a function of its main institutional and national security interests: first and foremost, balancing India, a country with vastly more people and resource, whose elites at least in Pakistani eyes, do not fully accept the legitimacy of Pakistan's existence.,,152

150 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a splintered group from Sipahe Sahaba which is an orthodox Sunni based sectarian party. 151

Haqqani, Between Mosque and Military, n. 18, p. 299.

152

Barnett Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan"~ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, no. 1 (January-February 2007), p. 62.

210

In the deadly war of captures and betrayals, the Taliban was backed by the lSI and

the Pakistani diplomats. When 2,500 heavily armed Taliban troops moved into Mazar eSharif, officials from the Pakistani establishment flew into Taliban territory in an effort to help them negotiate various terms of agreement with its rival factions. Mazar-i-Sharif fell after a bloody battle and massacres of at least 2,000 Hazara civilians. 153 The Taliban's assault on Mazar evoked strong Iranian outrage since Taliban captors killed all the nine Iranian diplomats held hostage from the Iranian consulate after seizing the city. Iranian anger was directed against the Taliban guerillas and the failure on the part of the Pakistani government which had promised a safe exit for their diplomats. 154 Despite Pakistani denials of any kind of role, Teheran continued to assert that Pakistan's game plans in its immediate neighbourhood was to contain the Iranian influence. In the immediate aftermath of the Taliban victories, the foreign minister Gohar

Ayub Khan issued a statement on 25th May 1997 extending official recognition to the extremist forces. He said, "We feel that the new government fulfils all criteria for de jure recognition. It is now in effective control of most of the territory of Afghanistan and is representative of all ethnic groups in the country.,,155 Not only did Pakistan legitimise the government of Taliban calling it "broad based", it also persuaded the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to follow Suit. 156 Further, Pakistan's lSI extended logistical assistance worth Rs. 2 billion and lSI officers made number of visits to Kandhar to reinforce Pakistani and Afghan soldiers to facilitate the fall of Bamiyan from the Hazaras.157 In short, Pakistan's role in Afghan affairs was not limited to indoctrination by its religious parties; it provided base, volunteers, arms and other logistical support to the Taliban. If Taliban made steady advances into Mazar-i-Sharif and other areas of westem and Northern Province in spite of hostile neighbours like. Iran, 153 "Afghanistan: Crisis of Impurity: The Role of Pakistan. Russia and Iran in Fueling the civil war". Human Rights Watch (July 2001).p.14 154 Fifaat Hussain. "Pakistan and Central Asia". in Ijaz khan and Nasreen Ghufran (eds). Pakistan's Foreign Policy Regional Perspective: A Critique (peshawar: University of Peshawar. 2000). p.89.

155

See. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban. n. 54. p. 58.

156 Pakistan was impatient to see the end of the Afghan civil war with Taliban as its head and in the process the establishment overlooked Talibans over-domineering attitude while dealing with the Uzbeks and Hazaras. The Taliban regime was anything but not broad based. 157

Rashid. Taliban. n. 54. p. 73.

211

Russia and Central Asian republics, it was largely due to the direct involvement of Pakistani army and its security agencies. 158 In West Asia, the Muslim Brethren and the Saudi-based World Muslim League

organised "Islamic" humanitarian aid for the Mghan resistance, and established an "Islamic legion" made up of Arab volunteers, who were received by the Pakistani intelligence service, the lSI and Jamaat-i-Islami in Peshawar before sending them to join the mujahidin groupS.159 As aptly described by Oilver Roy, Taliban rise to power in Mghanistan was the culmination of a "joint venture between the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami put together by the ISI".160 The Taliban experiment in Mghanistan encouraged its Pakistani counterparts to articulate their demand more forcefully for strict Islamic order in the country, while the religious parties openly provided the support structures to continue Jihad, thus forging close ties between the Taliban regime and Pakistan's Sunni fundamentalists. 161 The West in general and the U. S. in particular woke up to the Taliban menace when groups associated with AI Qaeda issued a manifesto under the tutelage of 'the International Islamic Front for jihad against Jews and Crusaders' .162 The manifesto read ''for more than seven years the US has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian peninsular, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the peninsular into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim people." The manifesto appealed to all practicing Muslims to "confront, fight and kill" Americans and Britons. 163 It was in fact when

158 Taliban's sweep over Afghanistan deeply unsettled its neighbours. The Massacre of Hazaras and killing of 11 Iranian diplomats infuriated Iran. Similarly the Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russian officials met in Tashkent on August 25!h, 1998 to jointly work against Taliban's advance. 159 The establishment in Pakistan had given strict instructions to all its embassies abroad to give visas to anyone who is eager to come and fight along with the Mujahideens. See, Rashid, Taliban, n. 54, p. 130.

160

Oliver Roy, The Failure a/Political Islam (London: I.BL Tauris, 1994), p. 109.

161

Samina Ahmed, "The (Un) holy Nexus", Newsline, Vol. 10, No.3, (September 1998), pp. 31-34.

162

Pankaj Mishra, "The Mghan Tragedy", The New York Review 0/ Books, January 11, 2002, p. 6

163 Dilip Hero, "Islamic Militants, Once Encouraged by the US, Now Threaten it", The Nation (New York), February 15,1999.

212

Osama Bin Laden executed his threats as seen in the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998; the Americans began demonizing Bin Laden. 164 The US cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan on August 21, 1998 destroyed not only bin-Laden's hideouts around Khost and Jalalalbad, but also the AI Badr and Harkat ul Ansar camps. The US military actions against Afghanistan and Sudan triggered off a wave of pro Osama and anti US sentiments allover Pakistan. In any case, the US bombing campaign brought to the fore the existence of Kashmiri guerilla camps on Afghanistan soil to train volunteers for jihadi activities against India contrary to the constant Pakistani denial regarding its direct role in uprisings in the Kashmir valley. Indeed, Pakistani jehadi recruits for Kashmir accounted for majority of those who died in the US cruise attacks. The air strikes did nothing to dampen the spirit of the radical Muslim groupS.165 Refusing to be cowed down by the use of force, the Harkat commander said, "Our Operations have not been disrupted by the air-strikes. Thousands of Mujahideen have already been trained and our cadre is intact. The killing of 22 persons cannot affect our task.,,166 The US military action, however, threatened the wobbly civilian government of Nawaz Sharif.

The domestic pressures from the religious right began to cloud the

government's ability to govern. Parties like the Jamaat-ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur) and Sipah-

e-Sahaba got a perfect pretext to mobilise public support against Sharif and vigorously campaigned for the imposition of Shariah and replacing the parliamentary democracy by a Taliban type theocracy. In an overt attempt to placate the conservative elements and cover up its political and economic failure, it decided to revive the legacy of late General Zia ul Haq.167 Worse still, the Kargil misadventure of the Pakistani army in May 1999

164 The internal state department in August 1996 described Osama as "one of the most significant financial sponsors of extremist Islamic activities in the world today." He was not described as a terrorist at all. Washington was supportive of the Taliban between 1994 and 1996 because it viewed the later anti Iran, anti-Shia and pro-west. See Washington Post, October 3, 2001 165 The message of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri read, "Tell the Americans, we aren't afraid of bombardments ... The war has only just began. The Americans should now await the answer." Jonathan Randal, Osama (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 144. 166

Behroz Khan, "Remains of the Day", Newsline (Karachi), Vol. 10, No.3 (September, 1998), p. 40.

167

RahimuIIah Yusufzai, "Myth and Man", Newsline (Karachi) Vol. 10, No.3 (September 1998), p. 34.

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cost Nawaz Sharif dearly in terms of international isolation as well as the erosion of his popularity at home.

The Kargil Episode Under the guise of Kashmiri "freedom fighters", the Pakistani army occupied the Kargil heights in the far north of Indian side of Kashmir just across the LOC, thus posing a threat to Indian supply routes. Although border tensions and exchange of fire across the Line of Control was not new between the two countries, the Kargil adventure in 1999 by the Pakistani army was different in terms of strategic planning and tactical moves. 168 The Indian side was taken by surprise when military personnel from the Pakistani Northern Light Infantry Regiment intruded into vacated Indian Military posts in Kargil and occupied the snowy peaks. They struck at a time when political situation in India was in a state of suspended animation and when Indian surveillance in the region was slack. 169 The intruders commanded the great advantage of height and there were numerous reports of how the well-entrenched intruders directed artillery fire on the Srinagar-Leh highway, seriously affecting movement of army convoys carrying arms and ammunitions and supplies. The military game plan of the intruders was to paralyse the supply lines which are of incalculable significance since they function as reinforcement routes for the large contingent of Indian armed forces present in the area. 170 Severance of these routes would trap the Indian soldiers on the Siachen Glacier and the eventual evacuation of Indian forces from Siachen would partially avenge the Pakistani loss in 1971. 17I Finally as the Pakistanis took up positions in the Kargil heights,

168 Kargil extends 168 Kms along the LOC from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La. The topograpby is characterised by high mountains and extremely cold and glaciated weather conditions. Lack of tracks and harsh weather dictated the Indian policy of abandoning their bunkers in winter and re-occupying it in summer and spring. The Pakistanis took advantage ofthe Indian absence by making intrusions in the area. 169 During the Kargil intrusions, India was in political turmoil because the National Democratic Allianceled government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had lost the no confidence motion in the Parliament. 170 See, Harinder Baweja, "Decisive Push" India Today, July 19, 1999, p. 29; Nitin A. Gokhale, "Turning Point", Outlook, July 12, 1999, p. 34. For a Pakistani version of the episode, see Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan and Its Army and the War Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 507-523. 171 Pakistan army was still unable to recover pre-emptive capture of Siachen in 1984, since then it is a point of contention. The Indian army spent Rs.3.5 corea day to retain its hold-over Siachen. By recapturing

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they must have calculated the benefits accruing from the internationalization of Kashmir issue. If they succeeded in Kargil with minimum casualties and least cost the Pakistani side intended to extract optimum mileage from India for the post conflict negotiated settlements. By calling the intruders Kashmiri Mujahedeen, they thought they had a perfect camouflage for their shocking moves. The masterminds of the Kargil operation were driven by the belief that their nuclear capability demonstrated a year before would provide a protective shield to Pakistan. Their nuclear status would put pressure on the international community to expedite efforts at settling the Kashmir imbroglio. Secondly, they assumed that the world leaders would refrain from being judgmental and buy the Pakistani position on Kargil. Little did they know that Kargil episode boomranged and severely dented its diplomatic standing world wide. I72 As the Indian army mounted combat operations and recaptured vital peaks and government of Pakistan was cold shouldered by allies like the US, the civilian Prime Minister started looking for an honourable way-out. The political and economic cost of the war also weighed heavilyon him. Politically, he would be thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the Islamists and his people who link Kashmir to a religious issue, and thus rightfully theirs. A 'sell out' on Kargil would encourage fundamentalist and militant outfits to raise the banner of revolt against him and the assumptions did not go wrong either. In the economic front, Pakistan was made to realise that default on external payments would lead to suspension of loans and financial grants, triggering off an unmanageable inflation. Sharif was told that prolonging the Kargil conflict had the potential to render the country's foreign exchange reserves completely dry in a period of three months. 173 All in all, the Kargil episode reveals the inextricable link between the state particularly the military establishment and the jihadi groups on the one hand· and the issue of Kashmir on the other. The Kargil in reality was the culmination of a process that

Kargil the glacier can be successfully used as a trade off. See, V.N. Rhagavan, Siachen Conflict without end (New Delhi: Viking, 2002). J72 The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto expressed the collective views of her people in an article. Pakistan's denials of involvement except for moral support to the Mujahideen, she wrote, were exposed by the Indian Government which outflanked the Pakistani leadership at all levels. Benazir Bhutto, "Kargil was Pakistan's Biggest Blunder", Asian Age, August 5,1999. 173

See, Mariana Baabar, "Pakistan's Dilemma", Outlook, July 12, 1999, pp. 22-25.

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places, flying of Eid-Mubarak cutouts along with the national flags on Eid, issue of messages on religious festivals like Fd-i-Miladunnbi, Shab-i Barat, Muharram. Azan (call to prayer) and principles of shariat was telecast through the mass-media. President Ziaur Rahman laid the foundation of the Islamic University in Kustia, and a full-fledged ministry under the Division of Religious Affairs. The Islamic Academy was pumped with funds for research facilities and upgraded into a foundation. 1oo Ziaur Rahman was conscious of his country's self esteem and the under current of resentment against Mujib's overtly pro-India-Soviet Union foreign policy stance. 101 Islam was a powerful rallying cry for all those who criticized Mujib for his overdependence on India. While addressing the officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zia said, ''the most significant development in the field of foreign policy of Bangladesh was that Bangladesh was now in a position to make her own decisions and formulate her own independent policy to serve her national interests."I02 This policy won him much acclaim among the intelligentsia, high and middle ranking civil and military officers, journalists teachers and others. I03 Ziaur Rahman expanded Bangladesh's relations with brother Muslim countries. After 1975 there were a number of economic and good will delegations from Bangladesh to Islamic countries and in 1977 President Zia paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia Apart from aid close relations with the Islamic benefactors gave rise to increased use of Islamic symbols in national life. In other words, there has been quantum growth in "institutional Islam" followed by the inflow of petro-