Islam and Politics in Bangladesh: The Followers of Ummah 9811511152, 9789811511158

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Islam and Politics in Bangladesh The Followers of Ummah

Mubashar Hasan

Islam and Politics in Bangladesh

Mubashar Hasan

Islam and Politics in Bangladesh The Followers of Ummah

Mubashar Hasan University of Oslo Oslo, Oslo, Norway

ISBN 978-981-15-1115-8    ISBN 978-981-15-1116-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

This book is dedicated to the all organizations and individuals defending academic freedom, freedom of speech, and human rights in the world.

Acknowledgements

This is a very personal book. I like to think that I am writing this book after having the chance to live a second life. On November 7, 2017, following a meeting at the United Nations Headquarter in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and before being connected to a scheduled teleconference with a colleague working at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, I was kidnapped by a group of gunmen in open day light from a main street in Dhaka. They confined me for 44 days and neither my family nor my friends knew whether I was alive or dead. When I was allowed to walk free after 44 days, I came to know that countless ordinary people in Bangladesh and outside in countries like the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, India, and Norway joined my family in protesting my disappearance and praying for my safe return. So, I would like to acknowledge all my known and unknown well-wishers across the globe who wanted me to see alive, free of persecution, and able to continue doing what I love—writing and pursuing academic inquiry to understand society. However, it would be unjust not to acknowledge few people specially. I shall start by thanking my PhD supervisors: Professor Andrew O’ Neil and Associate Professor Halim Rane at Griffith University, as well as Dr. Martin Griffiths in Brisbane. Professor Arild Engelsen Rudd at Oslo University, Bethany Mcgann at the United States Institute of Peace, Professor Andrew Blum at the Kroc Institute for Peace at the University of San Diego, Professor Ali Riaz at Illinois State University, Associate Professor Christine C Fair at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, and Associate Professor Matthew Nelson at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,  are warmly ­acknowledged for their various roles in supporting my safety and vii

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advancing my academic career. I am also indebted to the Freedom House, Scholars at Risk (SAR), University of Oslo, San Diego University, Centre on International Cooperation in New  York University, PEN America, Amnesty International, Front Line Defenders, Freedom House, and Scholar Rescue Fund (SRF) for helping me in various capacities to make this book possible. I must also acknowledge Robert Quinn, the founding Executive Director of SAR and  Sarina Simon Rosenthal of SAR, Olga Palinkasev Gregorian, Laura Ormsby and Emily Elliot-Meisel and Emily Eckardt at the SRF; Karin Karlekar at PEN America, Nobel laureate Dr. Martin Chalfie at the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine in the United States (who turned out to be a strong supporter of my pursuit of academic inquiry); Marit Egner at the Norwegian chapter of SAR; Sameer Yasir and Professor Kenji Isezaki at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Edward Rees at the United Nations; Jack Mccarthy, Jim Della-Giacoma, Ashif Entaz Rabi, Shahed Alam, Mubin S Khan, Shariful Hasan, Zahid Newaz Khan, Zayadul Ahsan Pintu, Shafiqul Alam, Tasneem Khalil, Thomas Pope, Rokibul Shipon, Giti Ara Nasreen, Shabnam Azim, Kajalie Shehreen Islam, Robaet Ferdaous and Fahmidul Huq. I am also indebted to my friend Dr. Simon Leitch from Brisbane, who has been a critic, supporter, and reader of my work from day 1 of my PhD studies at Griffith University and to Dr. Lucy West, Dr. Lee Morgenbesser, Dr. Sharron Brincatt in Australia.  I  thank Pamela Gwynne Price, Maren Ase, Kristin Skare Orgeret, Vera Lazzaretti and kathinka frøystad for making Oslo experience memorable.  I further  warmly acknowledge Dr. Barbara Jasny who was a Deputy Editor of America’s prestigious Science magazine before retiring after 30 years and was kind enough to lend her expert hands for editing and proofreading support for this book voluntarily. I acknowledge my immediate family members including my parents, sister, daughter, and uncle who have gone through trauma due to my abduction and predicaments. Finally, it should be mentioned that the book incorporates significant parts of two of my previously published articles and a book chapter. These articles and the book chapter are being reprinted with the permission of appropiate copyright holders. The articles are: (1) Hasan, Mubashar (2011) ‘Historical Development of Political Islam with Reference to Bangladesh’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 47(2): 155–167 (Reprinted by Permission of Sage Publications Ltd.) and (2) Hasan, Mubashar (2011) ‘The Concept of Globalization and How This Has Impacted on Contemporary Muslim Understanding of Ummah’, Journal of Globalization Studies 2(2): 145–159 (Reprinted by Permission of

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Uchitel Publishing House). The bibliographic detail of the book chapter is: Hasan, Mubashar (2014) ‘Islamic Concept of Ummah, Transnational Network and Political Islam in Bangladesh’, in Being Muslim in South Asia. Eds. Jeffrey, Robin and Sen, Ronojoy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 224–248 (Reproduced with permission of Oxford University Press India). I thank Sage Publications Ltd., Uchitel Publishing House, and Oxford University Press India for allowing me to incorporate these articles and chapter in this book.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 1.1 A Case Study of the Evolution of Religious Politics in Bangladesh  2 1.2 Why Is Bangladesh Important?  6 1.3 A Brief Introduction to Bangladeshi Politics 10 1.4 Academic Literatures on Islam and Politics of Bangladesh: A Case for Ummah 12 1.5 From Ummah to Ummahs 19 1.6 My Background and Methods 20 1.7 Limitations 22 References 23 2 Beyond Clash of Civilizations and Post-­Islamism: Ummah(s) and the Muslim World 29 2.1 Introduction 29 2.2 The Debate: From the Clash of Civilizations to Post-­ Islamism 32 2.3 Ummah, Identity, and Muslim Politics 39 2.4 Ummah: From Theology to Political Consciousness 39 2.4.1 Modernity, Ummah Consciousness, and Trends in Muslim Politics 41 2.4.2 The First Phase: Ummah as a Critique of Colonization and Modernity 43

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2.4.3 The Second Phase: Construction and Expansion of Islamic Modernity 48 2.5 Conclusion 52 References 52 3 Geopolitics of Ummah(s) in Bangladesh: A Historic Narrative 57 3.1 Introduction 57 3.2 The Expansion of the Islamic Civilization to Ancient India: The Root of a Divided Ummah 58 3.3 European Colonization and the Formation of Ummahs in Bengal 61 3.4 Formation of Ummahs in the Colonial Period 62 3.4.1 The Faraizi Movement 63 3.4.2 Wahabi Movement 64 3.4.3 Institutional Establishment of Political Islam: The Deoband Madrasah 66 3.4.4 The Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement 66 3.4.5 The Taiyuni Movement 67 3.4.6 Muslim League and the Creation of Pakistan 68 3.5 The Socio-Political Reasons for the Rise of Ummah 69 3.6 The Creation of Bangladesh: A Tale of Divided Ummah 71 3.7 The Cold War, Oil Crisis, Arab-Israel War, and Formation of the Liberal Ummah in Bangladesh 74 3.8 Globalization of the War on Terror and Radical and Extreme Ummahs 78 3.9 Conclusion 79 References 80 4 Awami League, Ummah, and Political Islam 83 4.1 Introduction 83 4.2 A Historical Synopsis of the Awami League 87 4.3 Organizational Structure 89 4.4 Aims and Key Principles 89 4.5 Discrepancies between Rhetoric, Reality, and Practice 92 4.6 Ummah, Islamic Identity in the AL Leadership and Politics 95 4.7 Alliance and Divergence with Islamist Parties104 4.8 Conclusion108 References108

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5 The BNP, Ummah, and Politics in Bangladesh115 5.1 Introduction115 5.2 The Rise of Zia and BNP in Bangladesh Politics117 5.3 The BNP, Bangladeshi Nationalism, and the Search for an ‘Islamic’ State122 5.4 Party Structure127 5.5 Party Principles127 5.6 Thwarting Freedom of Speech: The Case of Taslima Nasrin and the Citizenship of Ghulam Azam128 5.7 Thwarting Equality and Liberty: BNP’s Moral Support to Hefazat-e-Islam (HI)131 5.8 Alliances with Conventional Islamist Parties134 5.9 Ummah, the BNP, and Politics135 5.10 Conclusion139 References140 6 Islamization, Ummah Consciousness and Mass Support for Political Islam145 6.1 Introduction145 6.2 The Five-Year Plans: The Policy Framework to Construct an ‘Islamic Society’146 6.3 Religious Schools—Madrasah(s): The ‘Castles of Islam’148 6.4 State-Funded Islamic Missionary Activities154 6.4.1 The Islamic Mission Targeting the Poor and Disadvantaged155 6.4.2 Department of Deeni Dawah and Culture155 6.4.3 Imam Training Academy—Targeting the Islamic Opinion Makers156 6.4.4 Publications Promoting Political Islamist Thinkers157 6.4.5 Mosque-Based Child and Mass Literacy Programme—Targeting the Poor159 6.5 Private Missionary Activities: The Tabligh Jamaat160 6.6 Islamization of the Public Sphere162 6.6.1 Mosques163 6.6.2 Public Islamic Preaching Sessions (Waj Mahfils)163 6.6.3 Shrines (Mazars)163 6.6.4 Removal of ‘Un-Islamic Sculptures’ from the Public Sphere164

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6.7 An Illiberal and Unsafe Society for Minorities165 6.8 Conclusion171 References171 7 Globalization and Transnational Ummah(s) in Contemporary Bangladesh177 7.1 Introduction177 7.2 Transnationalism and Ummah180 7.3 Transnational Ummahs in Bangladesh: The Typology183 7.3.1 Transnational Islamist Parties183 7.3.2 Islamic NGOs185 7.3.3 Cross-Border Movement of People186 7.3.4 Scholarly Networks188 7.3.5 The Internet191 7.4 Three Implications195 7.5 Conclusion197 References198 8 Conclusion203 References209 Index211

Abbreviations

ABT AL BGB BJI BJP BNP CPI DDC EC EIA FYPs HDI HI HuJI-B ICS ICT IF IFC ILO IMF IoJ ISIL JMB MEO NEC NGO NMSC

Ansarullah Bangla Team Awami League Border Guards of Bangladesh Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami Bharatiya Janata Party Bangladesh Nationalist Party Corruption Perception Index Deeni Dawah & Culture Election Commission Energy Information Administration Five Year Plans Human Development Index Hefazat e Islam Harkat ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh Islamic Chatro Shibir International Crimes Tribunal Islamic Foundation The International Finance Corporation International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Islami Oikyo Jot Islamic State of Iraq and Levant Jamaatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh Madrasah Education Ordinance National Executive Committee Non-Government Organization National Moon Sighting Committee xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

OECD OIC RAB RAS SC TJ UAC UNDP UNFP UNHCR UNICEF UNWOMEN USAID USIP WB WVS

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization for Islamic Conference Rapid Action Battalion Religion and state dataset Standing Committee Tabligh Jamaat United Actions Council United Nations Development Program United Nations Population Fund United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children Fund United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women United States Agency for International Development United States Institutes of Peace The World Bank World Value Survey

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In the post-9/11 world, discussions about the clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, Muslim identity,1 jihadism, multiculturalism, Islamophobia, and terrorism are highly publicized and reproduced in various popular media outlets as well as in academia. For an ordinary person, it has become difficult to weave through the many narratives to reach a conclusion about the relationship between Islam—a religion with 1.8 billion followers—and politics. Some narratives claim that Islam is a religion of peace, whereas others argue that Islam is a fascist religion that supports terrorism and sharia law, inhibits women rights and democracy, and persecutes homosexuals. In short, the existing debate on Islam and politics divides scholarship and popular opinion, but it is a necessary debate, given the size of the world’s Muslim population and its potential impact. An analysis of the situation in Bangladesh and how it has developed can help to shed light on this. This book explains why Bangladesh—a country born as a secular state in 1971—now upholds Islamic politics, undermines liberal democratic values, and does not tolerate atheism. Contrary to the dominant scholarly narratives about Bangladesh that express surprise or alarm about rising influence of religion into politics, increasing social religiosity, religious intolerance, and terrorism, this book argues that Bangladesh’s political 1  In this book I define Muslim as a human being who follows Islam and who prefers to interact in worldly affairs with his or her Islamic identity. Muslims do not need to be religious, but they may use their religious identity in politics.

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Hasan, Islam and Politics in Bangladesh, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5_1

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development is predictable. There should not be any surprise in Bangladesh’s political outcome. While scholars have described religious intolerance and extremism in Bangladesh, they have not been successful analysing the context upon which religious politics takes place. This book argues that certain conditions that have emerged within a contextual framework or concept establish the discourse of politics in Bangladesh or any other country. My book conceptualizes the politics of Bangladesh through the Islamic concept of ummah, or global brotherhood of Muslims, and demonstrates that despite the backdrop of capitalism and free flow of ideas, ummah at the level of the individual, institution, major party platforms and state has set the current political condition in Bangladesh in which religiosity, religious intolerance, Islamization and extremism take place. However, this book argues that while the core aim of ummah is to form solidarity among Muslims, the Bangladesh case shows that localization of this global religious-­political concept produces multiple ummahs (liberal, radical, and extremist ummahs) that set the framework for political contest and conflict in Bangladesh. In this chapter, I will set the stage for the discussions to come in the next six chapters. First, I will present a short case study that illustrates the contests and conflicts taking place in what started as a democratic, secular country followed by a brief overview of the context that makes the seeming contradictions understandable. This is followed by an analysis of why Bangladesh is a valuable country to study for scholars and the general public who desire to understand Islamization, a brief overview of the political parties in Bangladesh, and a review of the current literature in the field. Finally, I will describe my background and methods used in gaining the insights in the subsequent chapters.

1.1   A Case Study of the Evolution of Religious Politics in Bangladesh It was a quiet morning on May 6, 2013, in the Motijheel area of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. Motijheel is known as the business hub of the city where all major banks, and the Dhaka Stock Exchange, are located. That silence that morning was, however, abnormal. It was a result of several hours of mayhem that took place the night before as the area turned into a battlefield. Hundreds of paramilitary and police forces were deployed by the government of Sheikh Hasina to disperse over 500,000 conservative Muslim activists who were part of a movement called Hefazat e Islam (HI),

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or protect Islam. They staged a sit-in in Motijheel, demanding acceptance of a 13-point petition that included enactment of an anti-­blasphemy law with provision for the death penalty for writers who offend Islam and a ban on men and women appearing together in public. Hundreds of law enforcement agents, including the police, paramilitary force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and Border Guards of Bangladesh (BGB), fired hundreds of rounds of bullets and tear gas shells and used physical force to evict the stubborn illiberal groups from Motijheel. Many of the HI activists were injured and at least 50 were killed. Such brute force action led many observers to laud the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed as a leader who would turn Bangladesh into a ‘secular country’. Those opinions were not entirely unfounded, as Sheikh Hasina had set up a special tribunal to prosecute several top leaders of an Islamist party Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami (BJI) for committing crimes against humanity during Bangladesh’s independence war against Pakistan in 1971. Those top leaders of Jamaat were executed as a result and their party lost its registration at the Election Commission (EC). However, in 2018, a few months before another general election, those jubilant supporters of a ‘secular Bangladesh’ were disappointed to see Sheikh Hasina shaking hands with Allama Shafi, the spiritual leader of the HI movement who called the sit-in in 2013 and was behind the 13-point petition and was chairing that program. With hundreds and thousands of conservative Bangladeshis cheering, she announced that her government would build 560 model mosques across the country and establish a new Islamic university with Saudi funding. She also asked for their blessings for the upcoming election of 2018 and further said, ‘If Allah wishes, surely he will give me the opportunity to serve the people of Bangladesh again, and if Allah does not want, he will not give me that opportunity and I would not have any regret because I leave everything upon Allah’ (Hasina 2018). Before this meeting, Hasina saw through the enactment of a digital security law that made ‘offending’ religious sentiments a criminal act and stipulated 7–14 years in jail for committing such crimes. While this shift in policy was likely influenced by a desire to appeal to voters before the 2018 election, there are more complex factors at work in Bangladesh that remain underexplored and less understood. Clearly opposing HI’s stubborn demands and crushing BJI leadership did not directly translate to the Awami League (AL) being secular or Bangladesh being non-Islamic. Rather, in my view, the events in the history presented earlier that the AL may disagree with the more hard-line versions of Islam propounded by HI and BJI, it still espouses an Islamic identity for Bangladesh, the party, and the party leadership.

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Commentators such as Nasr (2005), Khasru (2016), and Gowen (2014) have lauded Bangladesh as a model Muslim country where secularism, democracy, and Islam work in tandem. However, the national government’s zero tolerance towards defamation of Islam; promotion of Islam through party platforms and the state machinery; and periodic killings of secular and atheist writers, publishers, bloggers, Westerners, liberals, Sufis, and non-Muslims by extremists have cast doubt on such claims. The support of hard-line illiberal Muslim conservatives, as mentioned previously, who are known for promoting a rigid worldview in which liberal values are strongly criticized, further undermines the idea of Bangladesh as a ‘model’ secular democratic country. Against the backdrop of this debate, widespread suppression by the Hasina-led Bangladeshi government of human rights civil liberties and political opposition have chipped away at Bangladesh’s image as a liberal-democratic state. Critics have even wondered whether Bangladesh is turning into a new Afghanistan (Karlekar 2005). Riaz analysed political liberalism in Bangladesh from 1990 to 2013, using such indicators as electoral competitiveness, democratic quality, press freedom, religious freedom, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Sources included the Polity IV database, the index of democracy of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the World Value Survey (WVS), the press freedom index of the Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House’s survey and the US State Department’s reports on Bangladesh (Riaz 2014: 120–121). Riaz concluded that ‘the country remains stubbornly beset by democratic deficiencies’ (Riaz 2014: 120). His conclusions were worrying enough but, from 2013 onwards, Bangladesh’s political state has only worsened. For example, a 2018 report by the German-based research organization Bertelsmann Stiftung called Bangladesh a ‘new autocracy’, although the government of Bangladesh refuted this claim (Stiftung 2018). However, after the massively rigged 2018 election (e.g., see Dalton 2018; Hasan and Ruud 2019), there is little scope to accommodate the government’s claim. Fair (2018), rightfully downplaying Bangladesh’s secular democratic portrayal, argues that ‘this view never rested on strong empirical ground’. Set against this backdrop, this book explains that one should not be surprised to see Bangladesh’s democracy move towards political Islam,2 as 2  This book defines “political Islam” in a broader perspective to make its point about ummah’s political implication. In the context of this study, political Islam refers to a form of anti-liberal politics using Islamic values and cultures. The fundamental intention of political Islam is to thwart liberal values but not necessarily, it always aims to establish a theocratic

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opposed to liberalism. It will criticize those post-Islamist scholars who argue that democracy necessarily transforms Islamists to post-Islamists (i.e., democracy moderates Islamists’ demands). While this claim may be true in some cases, Bangladesh has remained outside of this post-Islamism scenario. The logic of Bangladeshi politics is best explained not through Western experiences, but through an Islamic concept—the ummah or Muslim brotherhood. In Bangladesh, the ummah serves as an overarching framework for religious politics through which political leaders and the masses support Islamization. This Islamization entails massive Islamic identity mobilization projects for Bangladesh through foreign and domestic policies, state institutions, party platforms and Muslim civil society, with the aim of keeping Bangladesh a Muslim country and part of the broader Islamic ummah. Although the concept of the ummah will be explained in Chap. 2, it is worth noting here that the ummah forms the community of Muslims who are bound by the faith of Islam. The ummah, therefore, is part of a collective and individual Islamic identity. This community of Muslims has no geographic limit because this community exists only psychologically. People form their Islamic identity—being a Muslim— by identifying and internalizing certain values, cultures, and rituals associated with what they deem Islamic. The formation of collective identity takes place through socio-political and cultural rituals and behaviours, reinforcing the idea of the Muslim self as opposed to other identities (Hassan 2006: 314). Bangladesh’s case further establishes an intrinsic link between national politics, geopolitics, and the international projects of Islamization and Muslim states. This book further argues that politicization of the theological concept of the ummah may inhibit liberalization of the country, but fulfils Muslim expectations of Bangladeshi politics, because Muslims feel the need to bring Islamic values into politics. Those values express themselves through popular demands, and in a struggling democracy like Bangladesh, the popular demand is for some kind of religious politics. Bangladesh’s Muslim identity also drew it to geopolitical events elsewhere in the world and made Bangladesh open to outside influence. This influence comes from wealthy Muslim countries of the Middle East, transnational Islamist parties and international Muslim organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); their support helps the country continue to state. It even supports electoral politics. Therefore, Islamism and post-Islamism are parts of political Islam, which incorporates main stream Muslim politics thriving on anti-liberal values. For a detailed discussion on Islamism and post-Islamism, see Crowder et al. (2014).

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be Islamic. Thus, Islamization is not a purely domestic phenomenon but is connected to a broader strategy on the part of Muslim states, Muslim politicians and transnational organizations. Whereas Westerners see Bangladesh’s movement towards Islam as illogical, it is both politically logical for actors in Bangladesh and an inevitable outcome in a weak democracy with deep roots in political Islam. Given that, this book proposes a new way of understanding Bangladesh’s political trajectory. The influence of the ummah in Muslim politics has been well-explored by other scholars (e.g., see Roy 2004; Mandaville 2001; Saunders 2008; Shani 2008; Mcgilvray 2011) who focused on examples of traditional Islamist parties and Muslims as minority living in the Western societies. However, this book is unique in its identification of the ways in which major parties and the state use this concept in Bangladesh. Furthermore, this book shows that rather than being a unifying force, the ummah creates division by legitimizing different variants of political Islam and giving them public salience. In other words, political manipulation of the ummah may produce multiple ummahs or multiple networks (both complementary and adversarial) of political Islam at the local level. The ideological legitimization of political Islam by the masses leads Bangladeshi parties and voters to support the role of religion in public life, but it also divides the political spectrum, engenders radicalization and extremism, and inhibits political liberalization including democracy. Finally, this book rejects the religious-secular distinction in Bangladesh that has been incorrectly applied by scholars. As with most Muslim-­ dominated states, there are no major secular parties in Bangladesh; there are only Islamic parties—more or less Islamic. The purely ‘rational’ domain of politics in Bangladesh is long lost, and political Islam sets the framework for politics in the country. The reason behind this logic of Bangladeshi politics is formed, contained, and expanded by ummah.

1.2   Why Is Bangladesh Important? Geographically, Bangladesh is only a small country—it is much smaller (147,570 km2) than the state of California (423,970 km2). It is, however, populous and contains over 150 million Muslims. This exceeds the combined population of Iran (81.2 million), Afghanistan (32.6 million), and Saudi Arabia (27.7 million) (Fair et al. 2017). Recent estimates conclude that Sunni Muslims constitute 89% of the population and Hindus make up 10% (US State Department 2017: 2). The remainder of the population is

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predominantly Christian (mostly Roman Catholic) and Theravada-­ Hinayana Buddhist (ibid.). There are also small populations of Shia Muslims, Bahais, animists, and Ahmadiyya Muslims. Estimates of the numbers in these groups are unreliable and vary from a few thousand to 100,000 adherents per group (ibid.). Separately, there are approximately 900,000 unregistered Muslim Rohingya refugees in the southeast (UN Refugee Agency 2018). However, little has so far been written about Bangladesh and Islam. According to an estimate, ‘among the twenty-eight major anthologies published in the West in recent years on the experience of Islamic revivalism and Islamization in the Islamic world, only two have included chapters on Bangladesh’ (Ahmad 2008). The situation is only slightly better today, with no less than five monographs or edited volumes published on Bangladesh and Islam between 2008 and 2017 (e.g., see Riaz 2016; Siddiqi 2018; and Islam 2015). Apart from Islam (2015), these works are not exclusively situated within the scholarship of religion and politics. Bangladesh possesses geographic and strategic significance to India, China, and the West. It also has some strategic importance to the oil-rich Muslim monarchies and dictatorships of the Middle East and East Asia. Surrounded by India to its west, north and east, Bangladesh shares a 4096-km border with India, the fifth longest land border in the world (Zaman 2017). Bangladesh’s other neighbour is Myanmar with which it shares a 271-km south-eastern border (ibid.). Its south side is bound by the Bay of Bengal. Cookson and Joehnk (2018) argue that ‘Bangladesh is a transport corridor to India’s north-eastern states and a vital alternative route to the vulnerable Siliguri corridor that in the past has been threatened by China’s military, isolating all of northeast India’ (ibid.). India fears that ‘Islamic fundamentalism and jihadism in Bangladesh may spill over the border’ and for that reason it works actively with Bangladesh in countering terrorism and radicalization (ibid.; The Hindu 2017). However, in recent times, against the backdrop of a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy, there has been concern that China has gained significant influence in Bangladesh. According to Bhandari (2018), ‘China has committed to $31bn worth of projects in Bangladesh, making it the second-biggest recipient of money in South Asia behind Pakistan’. These projects include ‘roads, railways, coal power plants and water treatment facilities’ (Stacey 2018). Bangladesh also formally joined the China-led One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative by publicly voicing support for OBOR a day after the Trump administration joined India in its opposition

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to OBOR (Hashim 2017). Proposed by President Xi in 2013, ‘the OBOR program is an estimated $5 trillion infrastructure spending spree that spans 60-plus countries across Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa’ (Huang 2017). With China’s growing influence over Bangladesh, the country received renewed interest from the West. The United States made it explicit in its 2017 National Security Strategy that the US-China relationship is fundamentally competitive (Denmark 2018) and the US strategy pledged to ‘push back against Chinese efforts to spread its power and influence across the Asia-Pacific, and commits to compete with China across all elements of national power’ (ibid.). Hence, in August 2018, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced $300 million in new security funding that includes an initiative in the Bay of Bengal, where the ‘U.S. will work with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and others to respond to emerging threats’ (Share America 2018). This growing security relationship with the United States is accompanied by an ongoing political relationship with India, a relationship elevated by Indian fears of Chinese influence. The need for India to maintain good relations with Bangladesh was apparent in 2013 when, despite a controversial general election, India quickly endorsed the government, eschewing any criticism (Bergman 2014; Haider 2014). To explain the nature of Chinese influence, India and the West in Bangladesh, an adviser to the prime minister of Bangladesh said clearly that China is a development partner of Bangladesh whereas India is undoubtedly a political partner since both countries share intelligence and protect each other’s security (NDTV 2018). However, there are allegations that ‘China’s dubious loans for projects and bribes…have flooded the polity’ (Majumder 2018). This puts the effectiveness of Indian efforts under some sort of pressure. Various international organizations work in Bangladesh, including United Nations organs such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UNWOMEN) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFP). Other international agencies such as USAID, Save the Children, Action Aid and Oxfam are actively engaged in addressing issues such as poverty reduction, the Rohingya refugee crisis, disaster management, the protection of labour rights, women rights and so forth. The country is also one of the largest contributors of military and police forces in the UN peacekeeping missions, while the International Monetary

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Fund (IMF), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank (WB) are all actively engaged in ‘assisting’ Bangladesh in managing its finances and developing public works. Bangladesh is also a strong partner of Western efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism. Due to the transnational nature of terrorism and a few cases of Bangladeshis’ involvement in terror activities in Syria, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, closer cooperation between Bangladesh and the West is taking place and is being openly publicized. One example is this web statement of the US embassy in Bangladesh: ‘The United States stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Bangladesh in our effort to defeat extremism’ (U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh 2018). On the economic front, Bangladesh is a major textile exporter to the world’s leading brands, including H&M, Zara, Walmart, GAP, Target, TESCO, Levi’s Jeans and JC Penny. Bangladesh is the second largest textile exporter in the world by volume (after China) and this industry employs 3.5 million to 4 million workers. Estimates suggest that ‘the garment industry in Bangladesh accounts for about $20 billion in exports’ (Engel 2013). Of those exports, ‘about 59 percent go to the European Union, 26 percent go to the U.S. and 5 percent go to Canada’ (ibid.). ‘Bangladesh’s global market share in clothing was 6.4% in 2016’ (Ovi 2017) and in 2014 the country was listed among the five fastest growing economies of the world (Boumphrey 2014). Once damned as a ‘basket-­ case’ by Henry Kissinger, Bangladesh is now lauded by the WB and the IMF for its recent economic progress. In the WB’s view, ‘Bangladesh is undergoing a transformation from a low-income to a middle-income economy’ and about 20.5 million people escaped poverty between 1991 and 2010 (World Bank 2018). The IMF estimates that Bangladesh will ‘continue to generate strong growth—projected at around 7 percent for 2018—driven by consumer spending and investment’ (IMF 2018). Although neo-liberal organizations have lauded Bangladesh’s economic progress, income gaps have widened in the country and so has the desperation of people who live on the margins. Some local textile exporters to the West enjoy an annual turnover around US$200 million, while many citizens struggle to even earn $5 per day (Hasan 2015). With surges in prices of essentials, the hype about Bangladesh’s people getting over the poverty line (around US$2 per day) sounds hollow to some. In 2015, poor conditions at home caused many Bangladeshis to take rickety boats across the seas to illegally enter non-skilled job markets of East Asian countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore or even Australia. In recent

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times, Bangladesh has also become the single biggest country of origin for refugees on boats to Europe (Dearden 2017) and Bangladeshis are also found trying to illegally enter the United States through Mexico (Dinan 2018). These events indicate that something is very wrong in the distribution of wealth and employment opportunities and that has implications for East Asian countries and the West. This book does not address illegal migration, but it does show how capitalism’s winners and losers in Bangladesh contribute to the Islamization of politics and society, and the part played by the promotion of Bangladesh’s ummah identity. Bangladesh has a special relationship with the wealthy Middle Eastern and East Asian Muslim-majority countries. Historically, as shown in Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 6, some of Bangladesh’s state policies (including foreign policy) were framed to uphold Bangladesh’s ummah identity. Wealthy Muslim countries have opened their labour markets for Bangladeshis and funded religious development projects in Bangladesh. Major portions of Bangladesh’s US$15 billion per year of foreign exchange come from those who work in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and East Asia (BDnews24 2017). Bangladesh is an active member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), ‘the second largest inter-­ governmental organization after the United Nations with a membership of 57 states spread over four continents’. The OIC’s mission is to be the ‘collective voice of the Muslim world. It endeavours to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world’ (OIC 2018).

1.3   A Brief Introduction to Bangladeshi Politics The country emerged as an independent state on December 16, 1971, following a bloody nine-month war of independence against Pakistan, in which, millions of Bangladeshi lives were lost. During the British colonial period (1757–1947), Bangladesh was known as East Bengal and became part of Pakistan when British India received independence in 1947. East Bengal then became East Pakistan (1947–1971). Neither East Bengal nor East Pakistan was sovereign entity with its own domestic political institutions, hence it is only since 1971 that Bangladesh’s political parties and institutions have evolved to represent Bangladeshi interests specifically. Today, Bangladesh is constitutionally secular yet, paradoxically, it maintains Islam as the state religion. Although more than 40 parties were registered at the Election Commission (EC), until 2018 election, two parties—the Awami League

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(AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—dominated Bangladeshi politics. In 2018, the AL rigged the election by using the state machinery and established a hybrid regime (Riaz 2019). The AL won more than 80% of the seats in parliament, while the opposition was nowhere to be seen during the campaign or during the vote itself (Pritu 2018). Transparency International found serious irregularities in 47 of the 50 constituencies it investigated (Amin 2019). Most of the manipulation had been orchestrated during the weeks and months before the election, including the arrest of opposition activists on criminal charges and the refusal to accept nominations on the grounds of loan default (HRW 2018). These decisions were within the bounds of the law, but the law was clearly applied with a political bias. In the end, the election result was not a surprise. In Bangladesh, major Islamist parties include BJI and Islami Andolon (IA). However, before the 2018 election, the BJI was de-registered. Outside these mainstream parties ‘the number of Islamist parties in Bangladesh stood at 100 until 2006’ (Riaz 2008: 29). Many of these Islamists operate secretly and are outlawed by the government. Out of Bangladesh’s 48 years since independence, the military juntas directly and indirectly ruled the country for about 16 years (1975–1990 and 2006–2008). Among the parties, the BNP ruled the country from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006. By contrast, the AL ruled from 1972 to 1975, 1996 to 2000, and 2008 to 2018 and it is on course to rule until 2023. The country was technically a parliamentary democracy that saw regular competitive elections from 1991 to 2006, but the last major competitive election was held in 2008. The election of 2013 was boycotted by the BNP and BJI as they alleged that, without a caretaker government, an election under the AL would not be free and fair. In order to avoid voting irregularities, a non-partisan caretaker government system to administer a free and fair election was introduced in the mid-1990s, but it was overturned by the AL government in 2011, despite widespread protests from the opposition (BBC News 2011). Sheikh Hasina leads the AL and holds the prime ministership of Bangladesh. Hasina is the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujibur), known as the ‘father of the nation’ for his inspiring role behind Bangladesh’s war of independence. Mujibur ruled Bangladesh as the prime minister and president between 1972 and 1975. Hasina’s arch rival, Khaleda Zia leads the BNP. She is serving a jail sentence related to corruption charges in 2018, although supporters of the BNP claim that the charges were politically motivated. Khaleda was the prime minister of

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Bangladesh during previous BNP-led governments and she was also the wife of the late General Ziaur Rahman, a former president of Bangladesh. In the absence of Khaleda, her son Tarique Zia leads the BNP in capacity of an acting chairperson from exile in London. Tarique is living in London as he was convicted by a court in Bangladesh and sentenced to life imprisonment in October 2018 for supporting a grenade attack on AL leadership in 2004. Not surprisingly, BNP claims the verdict was ‘politically motivated’. The nature of Bangladeshi politics can best described as confrontational, in which violence by the state and political parties is a key feature (Rahaman 2007). In Rahaman’s opinion, this ‘confrontational politics’ is a result of personality cults in the leadership of BNP-AL, patrimonial politics, and the politics of profit for party kingpins (Rahaman 2007: 106). The manifestation of such confrontational politics includes boycott of parliament, general strikes (known locally as ‘hartals’), bombings, political assassinations, enforced disappearance and other serious forms of suppression of political and civil rights. According to a recent estimate, about 1028 people died and 52,000 were injured in political violence between 2012 and 2017 in Bangladesh (Raju 2017). Despite confrontational politics and hostility between the BNP and the AL, both parties and their leaders support political Islam and Islamization of Bangladesh because the leaders of the AL and the BNP as articulated in Chaps. 4 and 5 see themselves, their parties, and their country as part of the ummah. With that in mind, both parties frame foreign and domestic policies that support greater promotion of Islamic culture and values. For them, confrontational politics is a matter of political rivalry and part of everyday political life but a broader, shared goal is to maintain and support an Islamic society in the country. Within this political context, Islamic radicalism and extremism take place and different groups advocate for ­different types of ummahs. Before explaining the core thesis of this book, it is pertinent to revisit how Bangladesh’s relationship to Islam and politics have been addressed in academic literature so far.

1.4   Academic Literatures on Islam and Politics of Bangladesh: A Case for Ummah Until recently, three types of scholarly perspectives dominated discussions about Islam and politics in Bangladesh. The first is that Islam has emerged as a strong political force against the backdrop of a crisis of hegemony

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during the period 1975–1990 (Riaz 2003). The crisis of hegemony began with the brutal murder of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and more than 20 members of his family on 15 August 1975 (ibid.; The New York Times 1975). Mujibur’s two daughters, Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, survived that attack as they were outside Bangladesh at the time of the brutal killing. The killing of Mujibur was part of a coup that later installed the military regime of Ziaur Rahman. Ziaur served Bangladesh as president from 1977 to 1981 before being killed in another military coup (Rangan 1981). During his presidency, Ziaur founded the BNP. After Ziaur’s death, another general, Hussein Muhammad Ershad, ruled the country as president until 1990 (Riaz 2003: 309–313). Both Ziaur and Ershad were facing a legitimacy crisis because they did not have a popular mandate to rule the country. Riaz identifies this period of rule by military generals as a crisis of hegemony as people did not elect those generals; therefore, military dictators were lacking public legitimacy (Riaz 2003: 313). In power, Ziaur began the Islamization of various aspects of state policy to gain political legitimacy. If Ziaur could not rule through popular mandate, he could at least be mandated to rule as a custodian of Islamic values. Ershad merely followed this ‘Zia model’. Later, both the AL and the BNP came to power with public mandates, but they did not change this model of governance, a model that promoted Islam in the public sphere, party platforms, and state affairs. Their aim was to reinforce the point that Bangladesh is a Muslim country. This pattern of politics is termed by Riaz (2003) as the ‘politics of expediency’ whereby Islamists have become kingmakers in the sense that governments need their support, thus allowing them to dictate and influence policies upholding Islamic values (Riaz 2003: 315–316). The claim that Islamists can have a disproportionate influence due to the nature of the party system has gained popularity in Bangladeshi scholarship as many scholars before and after Riaz argued similarly (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990; Alam 1993; Karim 2004; O’Connell 2001). In my view, the politics of expediency is an important explanation for Bangladesh’s troubles but the central claim that Islamization was an outcome of the politics of expediency that enabled Bangladeshi politicians to tackle crises of hegemony, legitimacy or government stability requires more careful investigation. This book by contrast argues that the support of Islam with state and party assets was a moral choice for Bangladeshi Muslim leaders. As shown in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6, both Ziaur and Ershad only expanded the Islamization model initiated by Mujibur. Mujibur’s background, speeches and policies

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made it clear that he was a Muslim in his beliefs and another leader of the Muslim ummah; he was not merely a secular leader who needed Muslim support. The same can be said for Mujibur’s successors. However, recently Riaz (2016) has revisited his argument to underpin the point that Bangladesh was never a secular country and its democratic bona fides were never robust. Nevertheless, that account still falls short of explaining the deeper reasons behind Bangladesh’s Islamic credentials, which is that Bangladesh is situated within the conceptual archetype of ummah politics of the Muslim world3 and that is why the Bangladeshi state and major parties promote variations of Islamic politics. The second point of view is that Islam has been resurgent in Bangladesh as a reaction to secular suppression (Hossain 2012; Rashiduzzaman 1994; Khan 1985). In this view, Islam has reappeared in politics, culture, and society as a reaction to the secularization project taken on by the AL immediately after independence, which banned the participation of Islamist parties and endorsed secularism in the constitution (Rashiduzzaman 1994; Khan 1985). Hossain (2012) argues that Muslims who did not agree with secularization policies felt suppressed and aggrieved, and therefore supported state-led Islamization and the re-entry of Islamist parties into politics as approved by Ziaur. Hossain (2012) opines that systematic deprivation of economic opportunity and political inequality to Muslims during the colonial period led to an inevitable rise of ‘Muslim nationalism’ that culminated in the creation of Pakistan (Hossain 2012: 172). Later, economic deprivation of Bengalis living in East Pakistan facilitated the rise of secular Bengali nationalism. The secular aspect was short-lived and always tenuous, given the geopolitical factors affecting the Muslim world and gaining the attention of Muslims in Bangladesh. Those geopolitical factors include the Iranian Revolution, the oil crisis of 1973–1974 and Western attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan (Hossain 2012: 177–178). Bangladesh was not outside of the new wave of global Muslim consciousness and this new wave of Muslim assertiveness mounted a strong challenge to secular forces of the country (Hossain 2012: 170). Like Hossain (2012), scholars such as Rashiduzzaman (1994) and Khan (1985) have described the AL and its polity as the ‘secular’ party in Bangladesh whilst the other political forces, including the military juntas and the BNP, are 3  For the purpose of this study, Muslim World refers to those Muslim majority states and societies where not all Muslims are religious but they (Muslims) may prefer to identify themselves as Muslims above their state-given identity.

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termed as the ‘religious’ who have ‘resurged’. This view of a contest between a resurgent Islam and secular nationalism is well-supported by other scholars (Khan 1985; Rahim 2007) and the argument offers insights into the geopolitics of the Islamic consciousness and Islamization of Bangladesh. However, the ‘resurgent Islam’ argument is not novel; in my view, it reproduces the familiar secular-religious binary of scholarship. This is hardly a nuanced approach and it is a continuation of the liberal account of Bangladesh that ignores the Islamic agencies of Muslim political actors of the country. This book revises this binary approach. Chapter 4 shows that the AL’s idea of secularism is embedded in Islam. The AL pushes for an ‘Islamic secularism’ in the state polity and party platforms. This secular doctrine is biased towards the majority religion. This book shows that there are no secular parties in Bangladesh  where Islam sets limits on policy debates and political programs because the ummah provides an overarching framework for Bangladeshi politics. The third common argument about Islam in Bangladeshi politics is focused upon strategy, tactics, networks and ideologies of Muslim radicals and extremists. Analysts such as Fair et al. (2017), Lintner (2003), Hossain (2006), Riaz (2008), Shehabuddin (1999), Riaz and Aziz (2017), Fair and Abdallah (2017), Hossain and Curtis (2010), Riaz and Fair (2010), Ganguly (2006) and Datta (2007) fall in this group. Their findings show that the radicalization of women alongside men is a persistent theme (Shehabuddin 1999; Mohsina 2017; Fair and Abdallah 2017), a good number of people support suicide bombing, and that there is growing demand from Bangladeshis to infuse rigid sharia into politics (Riaz and Aziz 2017; Fair and Abdallah 2017). Some studies of this kind are based on thick qualitative descriptions; however, others are more empirically grounded in data extracted from more than 4000 respondents (e.g., Fair and Abdallah 2017; Riaz and Aziz 2017). Although findings in these surveys are not without problems, given the framing of survey questions, these data sets offer good explanations for rising religious intolerance and extremism. For example, using data from a nationally representative sample of 4067 people, Riaz and Aziz found that more than 55% of respondents supported harsh Huddud laws, including whipping and cutting off of hands as punishments for theft. Similarly, more than 60% of respondents supported stoning as punishment for adultery and 78% supported an increased role for sharia in Bangladesh (Riaz and Aziz 2017: 14–15). Fair and Abdallah (2017) find that, while overall support in Bangladesh for extremist groups and their violent tactics is low, a surprising number of

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well-to-do and well-educated Bangladeshis support terrorists’ aims of establishing a rigid sharia state (Fair and Abdallah 2017). On the whole, these arguments on Bangladesh have two major weaknesses. First, they offer a Eurocentric approach in which Islam is backward, radical and the ‘violent other’. This is not unusual, as there is a long tradition within academia, especially in the scholarship of politics and international relations (IR), of framing religion (particularly Islam) as destabilizing to liberal peace. Second, the ‘violent Islam’ narrative does not offer a complete picture of Islam and politics in Bangladesh. There are violent Islamists in Bangladesh, but there are other forms of mainstream Islamic politics that are peaceful and work to contain Islamist violence. In short, the aforementioned schools of thought on Bangladesh use Western referent objects (i.e., hegemony, secularism, security) while reinforcing a liberal discourse of religion, such as ‘religion has come back from exile due to secular oppression in Bangladesh’ and ‘religion is violently surging in Bangladesh’. A substantial drawback of these arguments though is that they don’t consider how Bangladeshi Muslim politicians may believe that Islam is essential for society and has multiple meanings when it is applied to local, international, and transnational politics. The result of not taking Muslims’ religious considerations into politics is confusion, in which some scholars are surprised to see an Islamic resurgence and can meaningfully wonder whether Bangladesh is becoming an Afghanistan. By understanding the significance of the ummah to Bangladeshi politics, one can remove a good deal of this confusion and see the inherent logic at work for Muslim political actors in Bangladesh. But why has the ummah not been used to understand Bangladeshi politics before? The reason in my view is that the source of existing scholarly approaches to Bangladesh is linked to how Islam is viewed in political science and international relations (IR) studies. In a world of post-­ ­ enlightenment philosophies, religion lost much of its significance for social scientists until the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US soil. Prior to 9/11, scholars expected that religious influence on society would continue to decline. The demise of the Church authority in Western societies is linked with such scholarly expectations. The trend in IR literature before 9/11 is strong evidence for my argument. Fox finds that ‘in about 1600 articles in four major international relations journals (International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, International Security and World Politics), only six articles featured religion as an important influence whereas only Millennium devoted a special issue to the topic in the 90s’ (Fox 2004:

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717). Fox explains aptly here why before 9/11 scholars ignored religion as an important factor: For most of the twentieth century, the dominant paradigm in the social sciences on this topic was that religion would have no role in modern society and politics. The political science version of this paradigm, modernization theory, posits that processes inherent in modernization should inevitably lead to the demise of primordial factors like ethnicity and religion in politics. These processes include urbanization, economic development, modern social institutions, growing rates of literacy and education, pluralism, and advancement in science and technology. In contrast, secularization theory, the sociological analogue of modernization theory, does focus on religion. It posits that the same factors cited by modernization theory will lead to the demise of religion, which is to be replaced by secular, rational and scientific phenomena. (Fox 2004: 716)

This scholarly scene was revised after the 9/11 attacks. As Fitzgerald (2011) argues, ‘9/11 is the most powerful source of the belief that religion has recently returned from its exile on the safe margins of rational politics’ and that it is ‘now violently surging’ (Fitzgerald 2011: 28). Within a few years of 9/11, ‘a considerable body of theory was developed, positing that religion remains important in the modern era’ (Fox 2004: 717–718). Nevertheless, the major trend in IR and political science is towards maintaining Eurocentric approaches to investigate the influence of religion in politics. Bangladesh is not outside this paradigm, as outlined earlier in the three existing schools of thought on Bangladesh, including (a) ‘Islam is violently surging’, (b) ‘religion was part of the politics of expediency’, and (c) ‘religion came back against the backdrop of secular oppression’. In my view, these are Eurocentric ways to investigate Bangladesh since a sense of othering is palpable when Islam’s role in politics in Bangladesh is analysed. For example, ‘Islam’s role as the hegemonic other’ or ‘Islam’s resurgence in the face of secular oppression’ is typical of how Islam is seen in the Western academia. The depiction of Islam as the other hegemonic force, or the ‘other’ that came back violently, makes the ideological construction of the modern, rational liberal West possible, but it misunderstands the agencies of Bangladeshi Muslim politicians and masses who are the subjects of my scholarly inquiry here. It should, however, be noted that other scholars (for example see Buzan and Little 2001; Chakrabarty 2009; Vasialaki 2012) have criticized the use

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of the European experience to explain non-Western countries with distinct histories and cultural values different to the West. For example, Bilgin argued that ‘Western approaches, even when they focus on the non-­West, have failed to be fully relevant to the concerns of people, states and societies in the non-West’ (Bilgin 2004: 11). In this regard, Bilgin (2004) rightly pointed out that the idea of ‘security’ has different meanings to social scientists and audiences based in the West and the people on the ground in the Middle East. If one applies this logic in Bangladesh’s case, it will be clear that the support for Islam in politics by Bangladeshi Muslim politicians from the BNP and the AL is an obvious choice, given their worldview, within which Islam plays an important role in their lives and politics is part of their lives. By contrast, to many social scientists Bangladesh’s turn to political Islam is ‘alarming’ because those social scientists have applied a Eurocentric approach to Bangladesh. To put it another way, a Quran is just another religious book to many Westerners whose idea of religion is tied with a particular European history of sidelining religion from the public sphere. To many Muslims, however, the Quran is more than a book; it is a precious symbol that signifies the reason for existence. Therefore, understanding how Muslims view the Quran is important in deciphering modern Muslim societies. In order to illustrate my point further, it is worthwhile to present a brief discussion on how non-Western political ideas relevant to politics and IR are sidelined, but not entirely ignored, in literature of politics and IR. Acharya and Buzan posed a rhetorical question that is worth citing here. They ask: ‘Why is there no non-Western IR theory?’ (Acharya and Buzan 2007: 289). They argue that almost all IR theory is produced by and for the West, and rests on an assumption that Western history is world history (ibid.). Such reading of the world history in Shani’s view ‘serves to reproduce the Eurocentric underpinnings and reinforce the hegemony of the West within IR, silencing subaltern and non-Western voices’ (Shani 2008). Not only IR, in political science literature, ‘non-Western thought is rarely considered to be a source through which to construct legitimate knowledge of the modern world’ (Stuenkel 2016: 5). Stuenkel argues that non-Western actors and thoughts are only recognized ‘if they pose a fundamental threat to the West such as the yellow peril emanating from China a century ago, anticolonial movements in Africa, terrorists coming from the Muslim world or a perceived nuclear threat posed by Iran’ (Stuenkel 2016: 5–6). Stuenkel’s argument has relevance to how Islam is depicted by many scholars after 9/11. This book revises this approach by

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understanding Islamization of Bangladesh through the Islamic concept of ummah. This theological concept, when translated into politics, offers a narrative that is based on the critique of modernity, liberal values, and the West.

1.5   From Ummah to Ummahs In the Bangladeshi case, contrary to popular conceptions that tend to consider the ummah a monolithic global community of Muslim believers, diverse actors have pursued several types of political Islam in the name of the ummah. Consequently, Bangladesh provides a story of unity and disunity regarding the ummah’s role. In this context, ummahs (plural) refer to the different groups of Muslims pursuing variations of political Islam with diverse cross-border political communities. These communities differ from each other in terms of their operational patterns and political goals. For example, in Bangladesh, three different styles of political Islam connected with three different political ummahs are identifiable. The first one is the liberal ummah, formed by the Bangladeshi state and major political parties that seek subtle changes to secular electoral democracies’ legal framework and political discourses, while maintaining an ‘apparently secular order’. Bangladesh’s two major political parties (the AL and the BNP) use party platforms and the state assets to support Islamization in Bangladeshi society to show to the wider Muslim world that they are part of the ummah. This ‘liberal ummah’ has relative openness and acceptance of electoral democracy, within which it operates and manipulates to create a religiously conservative state. The liberal version of the ummah is liberal only in the sense that it does not violently reject democracy or some secular laws. However, it undermines liberal ideals (equality, freedom of speech, human rights), hinders secularism, and promotes moderate political Islam. The second is the radical ummah, formed by conventional Islamist parties. The behaviour of these Islamists indicates that they construct an ummah of a different character than the aforementioned liberal ummah (which is advocated by states and major political parties). For example, the cross-border radical Islamist group Hizbut Tahrir proposes a political ummah that does not support democracy. As shown in Chap. 7, this group maintains cross-border connections with like-minded Muslims who support a similar political vision. Hizbut Tahrir aims to establish a global caliphate, whereby an Islamic government within states is the first step

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towards their global project. The case of Jamaat, again discussed in Chap. 7, shows that they too maintain networks with similar parties in other Muslim countries, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and En Nahda of Tunisia, to help influence local politics in Bangladesh. A common characteristic of this version of the ummah is that in the Islamists’ views, not all Muslims are members of their ummah. To them, only ‘true Muslims’—by that they mean activists of their party platform—are part of their ummah. The third is the extremist ummah, formed by transnational Muslim terrorist organizations that are prepared to resist and thwart democracy through violence. These Islamists endorse violence against members of the liberal ummah and the state in general. Chapters 3 and 7 demonstrate how groups connected to Al-Qaeda and ISIS form an extremist ummah. Members of this ummah see no problem with killing Bangladeshi Muslims and bombing local courts (with the aim of replacing them with Sharia courts). Ironically, the growth of radical or extremist ummahs is helped by the expansion of the liberal ummah because various state policies drive Islamists to reinforce their commitment to ummah. Even if these state-led Islamization initiatives are not designed to feed extremist ideologies, there is a natural positive feedback loop for Islamism—once a government legitimizes religious politics it is hard to define its ideological limits. Since the ummah taps into individual and group identity, the individual members of these ummahs can be termed as liberal, radical and extremist Muslims, although these identities are not fixed and static and should be considered only for analytical purposes. While there may not be a predetermined pattern to explain why individuals feel connected to these ummahs, these analytical prisms provide social scientists with a general pattern to deconstruct individual choices and preferences in politics. In summary, despite their difference in approaches, diverse Muslim political groups share a common goal in Bangladesh—they seek to inhibit liberalism and democratization. To them, religion  is political. It is also international because the ummah forms the moral basis for the Islamization of Bangladeshi politics.

1.6   My Background and Methods Although this book is primarily based on my PhD thesis at the School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University, Australia (2011–2016), I have re-convened most interviews in 2017 for the purpose

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of this book. In 2018 and the first half of 2019, I interviewed few more relevant people, collected new policy documents and party platforms. I have a deep and strong relationship with Bangladesh, where I was born and raised. I started my career as a journalist in 2001 when I was a journalism student at Dhaka University and later worked for an international humanitarian agency before moving into academia. I began to work on Islam and politics in Bangladesh in 2008 when I was a master’s student at the Al-Maktoum College of Islamic and Arabic Studies, Aberdeen University. Since then I have published more than 20 articles on Islam and politics in Bangladesh for leading academic journals and global media outlets. I taught media studies and journalism from 2015 to 2016 in University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh and political science in North South University in Bangladesh from 2016 to 2018. In 2019, my co-edited book on radicalization in South Asia was published. In November 2017, I was kidnapped by a group of plain-clothed armed men from a busy street of the capital city Dhaka. My powerful kidnappers held me captive for 44 days. During my captivity in precarious conditions, my unknown captors told me among many other things that my thoughts and writings are provocative. In other words, I was told to stop asking ‘dangerous questions’, though as an academic I think it is absolutely important to pursue questions that may seem uncomfortable to a section of the society including the most powerful. Following my kidnapping, a series of protests was lodged by international defenders of human rights, free speech and academic freedom such as Amnesty International, PEN America, Scholars at Risk, Front Line Defenders, the Human Rights Committee at the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine and the World Organization against Torture. Local human rights organizations such as the Ain of Shalish Kendra, Odhikar, and Shushashoner jonno Nagorik (shujon) also lodged their protests and concerns. The academic community of Dhaka University and global academics based in Brisbane, New York City, Washington DC, and Oslo further raised their concerns about my disappearance through letters, human chain, newspaper articles and op-eds. The media (apart from a handful of journalists who are embedded into the deep state) was also relentless in covering my news. As a result of this extensive campaign, I was freed on December 23, 2017. My captors (some of whom I know will read this book) left me free in a busy Dhaka street at midnight. In April 2018, I left Bangladesh to avoid insecurity and to recover from trauma. The University of Oslo was generous enough to offer me employment to write this book

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where I am indebted to Palgrave to publish this. In between my transition from North South University and Oslo University in 2018, I was graciously hosted and supported by the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Joan B.  Krock School of Peace Studies at San Diego University, the RESOLVE Network at the United States Institute of Peace at the Washington DC, Freedom House, Scholars at Risk, the Scholar Rescue Fund, and New York University. This book, therefore, is a testimony of my journey not only as a scholar who fell victim to one of the worst kinds of human rights violation, but also as a writer/scholar who was supported by numerous people and organizations across the world to carry out my scholarly pursuit. This book therefore is a rebuttal to those who believe in suppressing free speech and academic freedom. To find explanations for why parties in Bangladesh promote Islam in politics, extensive field research was conducted between February and July 2013, March–April 2017  and March–May 2019. Fieldwork included archival and online research on news stories published in various daily Bangladeshi newspapers from 1972 to 2019, and investigations of party platforms, political statements, posters, constitutions, declarations and press releases. In 2013, 18 interviews were conducted with academics, top party officials of the BNP, the AL, Jamaat and other Islamist parties, journalists, government officials, business elites, and staffers of non-governmental organizations. Later in 2017, I carried out a further 40 interviews while reconvening those 18 interviews collected in 2013. In 2019, I interviewed two exiled Bangladeshi writers in Berlin, Germany. These interviews were used to enrich my understanding of the psyche of the dominant parties and the forces driving the politics of Islam in Bangladeshi society. Interviewees have been kept unnamed for ethical reasons.

1.7   Limitations This book takes into consideration only a certain pattern of Bangladesh’s Muslim politics with international, transnational, and national dimensions. It acknowledges that Bangladeshi Muslim politics may have other dimensions such as governance, plutocracy, development, clientelism, democracy, secularism, and so forth but, by establishing the relevance of the ummah that defies expectations of liberal democracy in Bangladesh’s context, this book aims to illuminate the relevance of non-Western concepts in IR and politics. As described by Waltz (1979), to construct a theory, one must identify a pattern and then isolate one realm of the world from all others in order to deal with it intellectually. In social science, this

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is incredibly difficult; an analysis of the ummah of political Islam cannot tell us everything we want to know about a political system. It can, however, tell us several ‘big and important things’ (ibid.) and that the role of the ummah, Islamization and globalization in Bangladesh politics, is big and important.  Furthermore, readers should consider this book as an effort of a Muslim social scientist investigating socio- political behaviour of Muslims who use religious ideas into politics of Bangladesh and abroad, therefore, this book must not be considered as a study of Islamic theology since study of theology is beyond the scope of this book. 

References Acharya, Amitav and Buzan, Barry (2007) ‘Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7(3): 287–312 Ahamed, Emajuddin and Nazneen, D.  R. J.  A. (1990) ‘Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics?’, Asian Survey, 30(8): 795–808 Ahmad, Mumtaz (2008) ‘Islam, State and Society in Bangladesh’, in Esposito, John, Voll, John and Baker, Osman (Eds.) Asian Islam in the 21st Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–79 Alam, Shamsul S. M. (1993) ‘Islam, Ideology and the State of Bangladesh’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 18(1–2): 88–106 Amin Al Mehedi (2019) ‘11th General Election: TIB finds Irregularities in 47 Constituencies; EC Rejects,’ Dhaka Tribune, January 15, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/election/2019/01/15/tib-calls-for-judicialinquiry-into-election-irregularities (Accessed on 14/03/2019) BBC News (2011) ‘Bangladesh Ends Caretaker Government Arrangement’, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13973576 (Accessed on 17/08/2018) BDnews24.com (2017) ‘Bangladesh’s Remittance Inflow Rises 17 Percent in FY 2017–2018’, https://bdnews24.com/economy/2018/07/03/bangladeshsremittance-inflow-rises-17-percent-in-fy-2017-18 (Accessed on 17/08/2018) Bergman, David (2014) ‘Bangladesh Prime Minister: “Elections were Legitimate”’, The Telegraph, January 6, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ asia/bangladesh/10553249/Bangladesh-prime-minister-Elections-werelegitimate.html (Accessed on 16/08/2018) Bhandari, Amit (2018) ‘China in Bangladesh: Remaking the Financial Rules’, February 19, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/china-bangladesh-remakingfinancial-rules/ (Accessed on 16/08/2018) Bilgin, Pinar (2004) Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, London, UK: Routledge

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Boumphrey, Sarah (2014) ‘Top 5 Fastest Growing Key Emerging Economies in 2014’, Euromonitor International, March 3, https://blog.euromonitor. com/2014/03/top-5-fastest-growing-key-emerging-economies-in-2014. html (Accessed on 13/08/2018) Buzan, Barry and Little, Richard (2001) ‘Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About It?’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30(1): 19–39 Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2009) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Cookson, Forrest and Joehnk, Felix Tom (2018) ‘China and India’s Geopolitical Tug of War for Bangladesh’, East Asia Forum, April 11, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/04/11/china-and-indias-geopolitical-tug-of-war-for-bangladesh/ (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Crowder, George, Griffiths, Martin and Hasan, Mubashar (2014) ‘Islam, Islamism, and Post-Islamism: Rediscovering Politics after the War on Terror’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 60(1): 110–124 Dalton, Jane (2018) ‘Bangladesh Election Marred by ‘Vote-Rigging’, Deadly Violence and Fears of Media Crackdown’, The Independent, December 30, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bangladesh-election-parliament-latest-polls-vote-rigging-violence-hasina-internet-a8704146.html (Accessed on 24/06/2019) Datta, Sreeradha (2007) ‘Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh: The Threat from Within’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 30(1): 145–170 Dearden, Lizzie (2017) ‘Bangladesh is Now the Single Biggest Country of Origin for Refugees on Boats as New Route to Europe Emerges’, Independent, May 5, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisismigrants-bangladesh-libya-italy-numbers-smuggling-dhaka-dubai-turkeydetained-a7713911.html (Accessed on 4/08/2018) Denmark, Abraham (2018) ‘A New Era of Intensified U.S.-China Competition’, Asia Dispatches: Wilson Centre, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ new-era-intensified-us-china-competition (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Dinan, Stephen (2018) ‘Smuggling Cartels Fuel Surge in Border Jumpers from Terror-Prone Bangladesh’, The Washington Times, April 18, https://www. washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/18/illegal-immigrants-bangladeshaided-international-/ (Accessed on 16/08/2018) Engel, Pamela (2013) ‘Here are Some of the Biggest Brands that Make Clothes in Bangladesh’, Business Insider, May 13, https://www.businessinsider.com/bigbrands-in-bangladesh-factories-2013-5?r=US&IR=T&IR=T (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Fair, Christine C. (2018) ‘Political Islam and Islamist Terrorism in Bangladesh: What You Need to Know’, Lawfare, January 28, https://www.lawfareblog. com/political-islam-and-islamist-terrorism-bangladesh-what-you-need-know (Accessed on 15/08/2018)

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Fair, Christine C. and Abdallah, Wahid (2017) ‘Islamist Millitancy in Bangladesh: Public Awareness and Attitudes’, RESOLVE Network Research Brief, No. 4, Washington DC, USA Fair, Christine C., Hamza, Ali and Heller, Rebecca (2017) ‘Who Supports Suicide Terrorism in Bangladesh? What the Data Say’, Politics and Religion, 10(3), 622–661 Fitzgerald, Timothy (2011) Religion and Politics in International Relations: The Modern Myth, London and New  York: Continuum International Publishing Group Fox, Jonathan (2004) ‘The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945–2001’, Journal of Peace Research, 41(6): 715–731 Ganguly, Sumit (2006) The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Gowen, Annie (2014) ‘Bangladesh’s Political Unrest Threatens Economic Gains, Democracy’, The Washington Post, March 22, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/bangladeshs-political-unrest-threatens-economic-gains-democracy/2014/03/22/baf1807c-a369-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_stor y. html?utm_term=.99961e5eb687 (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Haider, Suhashini (2014) ‘Backing Bangladesh’, The Hindu, January 11, https:// www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/backing-bangladesh/article5563231.ece (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Hasan, Mubashar (2015) ‘Why Bangladeshis are Leaving the Country by Boats? Locating the Global Roots of a Local Problem’, Global Policy, https:// www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/06/2015/why-bangladeshisare-leaving-country-boats-locating-global-roots-local-problem (Accessed on 13/08/2018) Hasan, Mubashar and Ruud, Engelsen Arild (2019) ‘What Went Wrong with the BNP, Bangladesh’s Main Opposition Party?’, Al Jazeera, March 9, https:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/wrong-bnp-bangladesh-main-opposition-party-190309114329851.html (Accessed on 4/06/2019) Hashim, Mansur Syed (2017) ‘The Rise of OBOR’, The Daily Star, October 11, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/no-frills/the-rise-obor-1473943 (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Hasina, Sheikh (2018) Speech at Shokrana Mahfil, Channel I News, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFHnc3ASl3E (Accessed on 5/12/2019) Hassan, Riaz (2006) ‘Globalization’s Challenge to the Islamic Ummah’, Asian Journal of Social Science, 34(2): 311–323 Hossain, Maneeza (2006) The Road to a Sharia State: Cultural Radicalization in Bangladesh, Washington, DC: Hudson Institute Hossain, Akhand Akhter (2012) ‘Islamic Resurgence in Bangladesh’s Culture and Politics: Origins, Dynamics and Implications’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 23(2): 165–198

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Hossain, Maneeza and Curtis, Lisa (2010) Bangladesh: Checking Islamist Extremism in a Pivotal Democracy, Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation HRW (2018) “Creating Panic” Bangladesh Election Crackdown on Political Opponents and Critics, December 22, https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/ 12/22/creating-panic/bangladesh-election-crackdown-political-opponentsand-critics (Accessed on 01/01/2019) Huang, Zheping (2017) ‘Your Guide to Understanding OBOR, China’s New Silk Road Plan’, Quartz, May 15, https://qz.com/983460/obor-an-extremelysimple-guide-to-understanding-chinas-one-belt-one-road-forum-for-its-newsilk-road/ (Accessed on 13/08/2018) International Monetary Fund (2018) ‘Bangladesh: Building a Strong and Inclusive Economy’, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/06/06/NA060818Bangladesh-Building-A-Strong-Inclusive-Economy (Accessed on 6/08/2018) Islam, Maidul (2015) Limits of Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press Karim, Lamia (2004) ‘Democratizing Bangladesh: State, NGOs and Militant Islam’, Cultural Dynamics, 16 (2–3): 291–318 Karlekar, Hiranmay (2005) Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? New Delhi: Sage Khan, Zillur R. (1985) ‘Islam and Bengali Nationalism’, Asian Survey, 25(8): 834–851 Khasru, Munir Syed (2016) ‘The Real Face of Bangladesh—Moderate, Secular’, Straight Times, January 25, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-realface-of-bangladesh-moderate-secular (Accessed on 14/08/2018) Lintner, Bertil (2003) ‘Bangladesh: Extremist Islamist Consolidation’, Faultlines, 14: 1–28 Majumder, Abhijit (2018) ‘As Bachcha Andolan Rocks Bangladesh, is Sheikh Hasina Still India’s Best Bet?’, My Nation, August 5, https://www.mynation. com/world/as-bachcha-andolan-rocks-bangladesh-is-sheikh-hasina-still-indias-best-bet%2D%2Dpcz3w1 (Accessed on 1/01/2018) Mandaville, Peter G. (2001) Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Ummah, London, UK: Routledge Mcgilvray, Dennis B. (2011) ‘Sri Lankan Muslims: Between Ethno-Nationalism and the Global Ummah’, Nations and Nationalism, 17(1): 45–64 Mohsina, Nazneen (2017) ‘Growing Trends of Female Jihadism in Bangladesh’, The Diplomat, March 24, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/growingtrends-of-female-jihadism-in-bangladesh/ (Accessed on 1/05/2018) Nasr, Vali (2005) ‘The Rise of Muslim Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 16(2): 13–27 NDTV (2018) ‘India Shouldn’t Worry about China-Bangladesh Ties, Says Sheikh Hasina’, February 21, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-shouldntworr y-about-china-bangladesh-ties-says-prime-minister-sheikh-hasina1815352 (Accessed on 12/08/2018)

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O’Connell, Joseph (2001) ‘The Bengali Muslims and the State: Secularism or Humanity for Bangladesh’, in Ahmed, R. (Ed.) Understanding the Bengal Muslim, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 179–208 OIC (2018) ‘History’, https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en (Accessed on 17/08/2018) Ovi, Ibrahim Hossain (2017) ‘Bangladesh’s Global Market Share in Clothing was 6.4% in 2016’, Dhaka Tribune, August, https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2017/08/02/bangladesh-sustains-6-4-share-global-clothing-market/ (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Owen, John M. (1994) ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’, International Security, 19(2): 87–125 Pritu, Johura Akter (2018) ‘Election Campaign: No Presence of BNP, AL in Full Swing’, Dhaka Tribune, December 24, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/election/2018/12/24/election-campaign-no-presence-of-bnp-al-infull-swing (Accessed on 5/12/2019) Rahaman, Muhammad Mustafizur (2007) ‘Origins and Pitfalls of Confrontational Politics in Bangladesh’, South Asian Survey, 14(1): 101–115 Rahim, Aminur (2007) ‘Communalism and Nationalism in Bangladesh’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 42(6): 551–572 Raju, Fazlur Rahman (2017) ‘Five Years of Political Violence: 1,028 Deaths and 52,000 Injuries’, November 20, https://www.dhakatribune.com/ bangladesh/2017/11/20/1028-deaths-53000-injuries/ (Accessed on 17/08/2018) Rangan, Kasturi (1981) ‘Bangladesh Leader is Shot and Killed in a Coup Attempt’, The New  York Times, May 31, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/31/ world/bangladesh-leader-is-shot-and-killed-in-a-coup-attempt.html (Accessed on 13/05/2019) Rashiduzzaman, M. (1994) ‘The Liberals and the Religious Right in Bangladesh’, Asian Survey, 34(11): 974–990 Riaz, Ali (2003) ‘“God Willing”: The Politics and Ideology of Islamism in Bangladesh’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 23(1): 301–320 ——— (2008) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web, London, UK. Routledge ——— (2014) ‘Shifting Tides in South Asia: Bangladesh’s Failed Election’, Journal of Democracy, 25(2): 119–130 ——— (2016) Bangladesh: A Political History since Independence, London and New York, NY: I.B. Tauris ——— (2019) Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Singapore: Palgrave Pivot Riaz, Ali and Aziz, Syeda Salina (2017) ‘Democracy and Sharia in Bangladesh’, RESOLVE Network Research Brief, No. 3, Washington DC, USA Riaz, Ali and Fair, Christine C. (2010) Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh, New York: Routledge

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Roy, Olivier (2004) Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, New York: Columbia University Press Saunders, Robert (2008) ‘The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the “Cartoons Affair”’, Nation and Nationalism, 14(2): 303–321 Shani, Giorgio (2008) ‘Toward a Post-Western IR: The “Umma,” “Khalsa Panth,” and Critical International Relations Theory’, International Studies Review, 10(4): 722–734 Share America (2018) ‘Pompeo Outlines Indo-Pacific Security Initiatives’, https://share.america.gov/pompeo-outlines-indo-pacific-security-initiatives/ (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Shehabuddin, Elora (1999) ‘Beware the Bed of Fire: Gender, Democracy, and the Jama’at-i Islami in Bangladesh’, Journal of Women’s History, 10(4): 148–171 Siddiqi, Bulbul (2018) Becoming ‘Good Muslim’: The Tablighi Jamaat in the UK and Bangladesh, Singapore: Springer Stacey, Kiran (2018) ‘Chinese Investment in Bangladesh Rings India Alarm Bells’, Financial Times, August, https://www.ft.com/content/1ab2ebe6-85c311e8-96dd-fa565ec55929 (Accessed on 12/08/2018) Stiftung, Bertelsmann (2018) ‘Transformation Index BTI’, https://www.btiproject.org/en/data/rankings/status-index/ (Accessed on 15/08/2018) Stuenkel, Oliver (2016) Post Western World, Cambridge: Polity Press The Hindu (2017) ‘India, Bangladesh Resolve to Fight Terror Together’, October 22, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-bangladesh-resolve-tofight-terror-together/article19901477.ece (Accessed on 12/08/2018) The New York Times (1975) ‘Bangladesh Coup: A Day of Killings’, August 23, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/23/archives/bangladesh-coup-a-dayof-killings-account-depicts-how-young.html (Accessed on 23/11/2019) The UN Refugee Agency (2018) ‘UN Launches 2018 Appeal for Rohingya Refugees and Bangladeshi Host Communities’, March 16, http://www.unhcr. org/news/press/2018/3/5aabd2564/un-launches-2018-appeal-rohingyarefugees-bangladeshi-host-communities.html (Accessed on 2/04/2018) The World Bank (2018) ‘The World Bank in Bangladesh’, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview (Accessed on 3/08/2018) US Embassy in Bangladesh (2018) ‘US-Bangladesh Relations’, https://bd.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-histor y/u-s-bangladesh-relations/ (August 16, 2018) US State Department (2017) ‘Bangladesh 2017 International Religious Freedom Report’, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281262. pdf (Accessed on 15/08/2018) Waltz, Kenneth ([1979] 2010) Theory of International Politics, Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press. Zaman, Rashed Uz (2017) ‘Can Bangladesh Turn Its Burdensome Geography into a Blessing?’, East Asia Forum, September 1, http://www.eastasiaforum. org/2017/09/01/can-bangladesh-turn-its-burdensome-geography-into-ablessing/ (Accessed on 13/08/2018)

CHAPTER 2

Beyond Clash of Civilizations and Post-­ Islamism: Ummah(s) and the Muslim World

2.1   Introduction Following the terrorist attack of 9/11, a plethora of writings have invoked theses such as the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993, 1996) and Islam versus the West (Lewis 2003; Scruton 2002; Berman 2003). A key intention of these theses is that there are differences in values and norms between Western and Islamic civilizations and that Western states have triggered ‘Muslim rage’ against Western civilization. In this view, Muslims believe that liberal (Western) civilization ‘needs to be destroyed as quickly and violently as possible’ (Berman 2003: 42). Bernard Lewis and Samuel P Huntington did the most to pioneer these viewpoints and lay the foundations of future debate where scholars such as Sen (2006), Esposito (1995), and Bayat  (2007) critically oppose Lewis and Huntington. They argue democracy and Islam are compatible, Lewis and Huntington exaggerate fear about Muslims and Islam, and by doing that they stigmatize Muslims and Islam. In other words, theories of clash of civilizations, Islam versus West, Democracy and Islam, and post-Islamism became useful signifiers that characterize the debate about Islam’s role in world and local politics. However, they are not master signifier. A ‘master signifier’ is a term which ‘regulates and limits the meaning of other terms and also involves ideological ideas of how society is or should be structured’ (Parker 2005: 170). In my view, these theories are useful but also limiting reference points at which to start discussions on Islam and politics. This chapter introduces

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Hasan, Islam and Politics in Bangladesh, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5_2

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and explains the ummah—as a master signifier to explain Muslim politics. The overall objective of this chapter is to clarify the concept of ummah as an overarching framework to explain Muslim worldview and Muslim politics. Unlike the above-mentioned frameworks, the epistemology and ontology of ummah are rooted in Muslim history and Muslim imagination. This chapter further demonstrates how modernization and globalization have fostered the ideal of the ummah in the Muslim consciousness and identity but have produced a divided interpretation of the ummah’s constitution, relevance, and mission. To many observers, the following recent series of events are evidence of a clash between the West and Islam that may even be a clash of civilizations. On March 2019, an anti-Muslim Australian gunman opened fire in two mosques in New Zealand and killed 41 Muslims who had gathered to perform their Friday prayers. The gunman live-streamed the entire killing event for 16 minutes and 55 seconds on social media sites. Roughly 1.5 million copies of the video surfaced online within 24 hours of the attack before being taken down. According to a Washington Post report, within the initial hours of the attack, US President Trump tweeted a link to the anti-Muslim news website Breitbart—known for promoting white supremacy and Islamophobia (Klass 2019). It was not surprising that the Australian terrorist who killed unarmed Muslim civilians praised Donald Trump in his manifesto, since there has been sustained criticism in pro-­ Muslim media about President Trump for allegedly mainstreaming Islam versus West arguments through his speeches, policies, and tweets (Al Jazeera 2019). Less than three months after the New Zealand attack, while the world was still recovering from the shock of the brutality of the Australian gunman, disturbing news from Sri Lanka began to surface and dominate the social media and news airwaves. On April 21, 2019, three churches and three luxury hotels in Colombo were targeted by Muslim terrorists, killing more than 290 people (Anbarasan 2019). That attack was carried out on Easter Sunday, a significant day for the Christian faith. Not all the evidence of clashes involves armed conflict; some illustrate the level of tension between the West and Islam. For example, the controversial Dutch politician Greet Wilders, known for his anti-Islamic and anti-­ Muslim immigration policy, announced in 2018 that his Freedom Party would hold a Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest in their party office in the Netherlands. Thousands of Islamists in Pakistan took to the street to demand that their newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan sever diplomatic ties with the Netherlands and expel the Dutch ambassa-

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dor to Pakistan (Barker 2018). Later the parliament of Pakistan ­unanimously passed a resolution ‘condemning anti-Islam cartoon contest’ (Al Jazeera 2018). The Dutch ambassador to Pakistan was summoned by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry to register protest to what the Pakistanis see as ‘blasphemous competition and…a malicious attempt to defame Islam’ (ibid.). Imran Khan said he will take up this issue in the next general assembly of the United Nations. He said Westerners fail to understand ‘we feel pained when they do blasphemous things against Islam and our beloved Holy Prophet’ (Sikender 2018). The cartoon contest in the Netherlands was later cancelled. In an unrelated event in 2012, against the backdrop of the release of an internet film titled ‘Innocence of Muslims’ that was perceived to be anti-Islamic and hurting the image of the Prophet Muhammad, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, ‘urged the US government to impose restrictions on the anti-Islam film and punish its maker’ (IANS 2012). Thus, even heads of state value their Islamic identities and, if they deem it is important to their faith, do not shy away from asserting the significance of Islam in foreign relations. However, while the reactions of Khan and Hasina were within the bounds of civility, examples of violent attacks on writers, magazines, film makers, and artists in the name of revenge against their defamation of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad are well known. A series of historical events including the issuance of the Iranian fatwa calling for the killing of the British author Salman Rushdie for his novel Satanic Verses; the murder of a Dutch film maker, Theo van Gogh, in the streets of Amsterdam for making a film critical of Islam; and the grisly attack at the office of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris show a violent, brutal, and murderous manifestation of Islamic faith by some Muslims. The emergence of transnational Muslim terrorist outfits across the world as geopolitical manifestations of violent Islamic identity complicates the scene, as more Muslims are vocal in delegitimizing terrorists’ Islam as false Islam. However, to the terrorists, their version of Islam is the true Islam. At the same time, it is also a fact that most of the majority Muslim states are actively fighting Muslim terrorists alongside the Western states. So, the question is how to explain this scenario where on one hand we see a violent conflict between the West and Islam and on the other hand we see Muslims, while maintaining their critical stance towards the West, are fighting against violent Muslims as partners of the West. As mentioned, the ummah—the international brotherhood of Muslims—offers a better starting point to understand Islam’s effects on

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politics from the Muslim point of view. Against the backdrop of ­geopolitical events (such as the colonization of Muslim-majority lands) key Muslim thinkers, notably Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida and Jamal-al din al-­ Afghani, have constructed the ummah as a political ideology. This ideology is critical of modernity and the move towards liberal democracy in Muslim-majority states. Influenced by different aspects of globalization, the ummah offers a broad canvas for the Muslim political imagination and it accommodates liberal, radical, and extremist versions of the ummah within a discourse of Islamic modernity. In next section, I provide evidence that the ummah promotes theoretical unity among Muslims but encourages practical divisions when religious ideals are applied to local politics. In other words, Muslims can agree that they are part of the ummah but they cannot agree on its precise meaning for law, politics, and government. As a whole, this chapter explains why the ummah is a useful framework to explain Muslim politics. This sets the ground for a later discussion on the ummah’s influence in Bangladeshi politics.

2.2   The Debate: From the Clash of Civilizations to Post-Islamism For many, Bernard Lewis is the ‘world’s foremost historian of Islam and the Middle East’ (Lake 2006). After 9/11, Lewis, a Princeton University professor and historian, was reported to have provided advice to American policymakers that helped formulate their Middle Eastern policies. On the eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in a TV programme broadcasted on NBC, Vice-President Dick Cheney acknowledged Lewis for his intellectual support for the administration. Cheney said, ‘I firmly believe, along with men like Bernard Lewis, who is one of the great students of that part of the world, that a strong, firm U.S. response to terror and to threats to the United States would go a long way, frankly, toward calming things in that part of the world’ (Berman 2011). Likewise, in 2006, President Bush awarded the National Humanities Medal in recognition of Lewis’s ‘extraordinary contribution to humanities’ (Quiñones 2006). Samuel P. Huntington was a Harvard University professor of political science who founded the influential magazine Foreign Policy. Huntington served as president of the American Political Science Association (Lewin 2008) and was ‘without a doubt one of the most influential thinkers in politics for the last 50 years’ (ibid.). His ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis was

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popular even outside of academic circles and has been translated into more than three dozen languages (The Telegraph 2008). According to this view, Islam and the West are defined by different civilizational values and principles. In this case, ‘civilization’ refers to ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have’ (Huntington 1993: 24). Salient defining characteristics of a civilization include ‘common objective elements such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-­ identification of people’ (Huntington 1993: 24). In essence, civilizational values and principles form the framework for individual identity, characteristics of law, and the nature of politics. According to Huntington, ‘there are probably (with some room for argument) eight major contemporary civilizations: Sinic (China and other societies moulded by Chinese culture), Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox (especially Russia), Western, Latin American, and (possibly) African’ (Huntington 1996: 95–101). Huntington believed that countries from these civilizations, especially Islam and the West, will clash for several reasons. For instance, people of Islamic and the Western civilizations hold different views on politics, secularism, family values, and human rights. In Huntington’s view individualism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, and secularization are defining principles of the West (Huntington 1996: 17). By contrast, Islamic civilizations were thought to be inherently more totalitarian and illiberal. Although Huntington does not explain the nature of Islamic civilization, Lewis certainly does. Lewis (1990) observed that Islamic civilization is irreconcilable with Western liberal civilization because violence, bigotry, and politics, infused by religious doctrine, form the principles of Islamic civilization. Lewis noted, ‘there is something in the religious culture of Islam … which can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred … to espouse kidnapping and assassination, and try to find [inspiration] in the life of their prophet, approval and indeed precedent for such actions’ (Lewis 1990: 59). In Islam, Lewis (1993) argued that one of the major teachings of the Quran is that it enforces totality of God through the idea of tawhid or oneness of Allah. Lewis (1988) believed that, ‘in the juristic conception of the Muslim state, God alone is the supreme sovereign, the ultimate, indeed the sole legitimate source of authority’ (Lewis 1988: 30). In this framework, Lewis argued, God makes laws and only God confers, or at least

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legitimizes, the authority of rulers (ibid.). Therefore, in Muslim societies, secularism is impossible as there is no purely secular realm of politics for the Muslim person. For more than one thousand years, ‘Islam provided the only universally acceptable set of Islamic rules and principles for the regulation of public and social life’ (Lewis 2003: 13). This set of rules is known as sharia law or, more simply, sharia. Against the backdrop of globalization and economic liberalization, the movement of people across the boundaries of states has heightened civilizational consciousness, argues Huntington (1993). People are now more aware of their differences against the backdrop of increasing inter-­ civilizational relationships (Huntington 1993: 24) and inter-civilizational relations always contain dangers of conflict. That is because civilizations provide people with identities, and ‘identity at any level—personal, tribal, racial, civilizations—can only be defined in relation to an other; a different person, tribe, race or civilization’ (Huntington 1996: 129). The recent emergence of far-right groups in Europe and the United States due to increasing arrivals of Muslim refugees from the Middle East and Africa support this claim as the narrative of far-right depends on inter-­civilizational differences between Muslims and Westerners. Huntington believes that the non-Western civilizations, including Islamic civilization, would counter Western efforts to promote liberal democracy, Western military predominance, and economic interests in the non-West. Whether or not this is true, Western political influence has been deeply intrusive and has created a pushback from jihadists and Islamists because the West has supported unpopular dictators and tyrants in Muslim countries, so long as they cooperate with certain foreign policy initiatives (market access, oil stability, anti-terrorism). This double standard whereby the West preaches liberal democracy but supports authoritarianism is noticed by Muslims and is understood to contribute to their woes. The promise of removing tyrants and re-establishing governmental legitimacy fuels the popularity of the jihadists and Islamists and heightens the sense of civilization confrontation. Islamists calling for the return of totalitarian political institutions of the Islamic civilization naturally attempt to thwart ‘failed’ liberal or secular institutions in Muslim states, meaning, in Huntington’s opinion, that the causes of the renewed conflict between Islam and the West are based on fundamental questions of power and culture. ‘Who is to rule? Who is to be ruled?’ Who is ‘right and who is wrong?’ Huntington opines that ‘so long as Islam remains Islam and the West remains the West, this fundamental conflict between two great civili-

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zations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries’ (Huntington 1996: 211). Such views have received mixed reaction. Following Huntington and Lewis, scholars such as Scruton (2002), Pipes (2003), and Berman (2003) have expounded their theories of conflict between Islam and the West based on the literal analysis of some Quranic verses while referring to select theories of Islamists and select Islamist movements. Critics are quick to point out several weaknesses in these arguments. First, it is incorrect to say that secularism (in terms of strict separation of religion and state) exists unambiguously in the West. Hashemi (2009) argues that Huntington and Lewis overlook the diverse and flexible nature of liberal societies. The separation of church and state is not clearly defined in many Western liberal states, such as Denmark, Finland, Greece, Sweden, Norway, and the U.K., where constitutions or parliamentary bills acknowledge and uphold religion and religious authorities (Hashemi 2009: 125–127). State patronage exists for private religious education in the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany, while Christian-democratic parties have ruled in Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The religion and state dataset (RAS) of Fox and Sandler (2005) highlights the complex relationship between religion and politics in Western civilization by examining five aspects of religion and state in the West using data from Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, some Muslim-majority countries, and Israel. The five aspects are (a) the structural relationship between religion and the state (the existence of an official religion or the legal position of religion within the state); (b) the status of minority religions, the restriction or banning of religions, or the provision of benefits to some religions but not others; (c) discrimination against minority religion; (d) regulation of the majority religion; and (e) legislation of religion (Fox and Sandler 2005: 317–318). Fox and Sandler (2005) find that ‘there is clearly a significant amount of government involvement in religion in western democracies’ (Fox and Sandler 2005: 326). They argue that ‘the majority of western democratic states do not have anything near full separation of religion and state’ (Fox and Sandler 2005: 327). They state: 80.8 percent of western democracies support some religion over others either officially or practically; half restrict at least one minority religion or benefits to some religions and not others; 61.5 percent engage in some form

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of religious discrimination. Every western democracy …legislates some aspect of religion. The only type of religious practice eschewed by most western democracies seems to be the regulation of the majority religion and a minority (15.4 percent) of western democracies also engage in this practice (ibid.)

Fox and Sandler (2005) conclude that religion plays a significant role in liberal democracies. Such a finding questions the construction of the liberal-­secular paradigm by critics of Islam. Another reason to be sceptical of the civilizational approach to Islam is given by Sen (2006), who dismisses the ‘solitarist cultural approach’ taken by the clash of civilizations thesis. In Sen’s opinion, by ignoring the fact that an individual’s identity has many aspects whereas the clash of civilizations framework produces a ‘deeply misleading understanding of the people across the world and the diverse relations between them, and it also has the effect of magnifying one particular distinction between one person and another to the exclusion of all other important concerns’ (Sen 2006: 76). He argues, ‘there is no reason to think that whatever civilizational identity a person has—religious, communal, regional, national or global— must invariably dominate over every other relation or affiliation he or she may have’ (Sen 2006: 7). For Sen, the clash of civilizations framework ignores the fact that a person can be a Muslim, a Norwegian citizen, a person with Bangladeshi ancestry, a socialist, a woman, a vegetarian, a jazz musician, a doctor, a poet, a feminist, a heterosexual, a believer in gay and lesbian rights, AND one who believes that many of the most important problems that Norway faces today could be resolved if Norwegians could ‘take an interest in the game of cricket’ (Sen 2008: 6, 7). Such a multiplicity of identities must be accounted for in any theory. Sen has also criticized what he calls the ‘mind-boggling shortcut’ presentation of the history of Islam and the West by conservative theorists. Sen (2006) argues that Islam and West share a diverse history of interaction and constructive movements of ideas and influences across their borders in so many different fields including literature, arts, music, mathematics, science, engineering, trade, commerce, and other human engagement. Sen (2006) provides a list of the positive contributions of Muslims to the Western civilization. Some of those include contribution of the ninth century Arab mathematicians al-Khwarizmi, from whose name the term algorithm is derived; Muslims’ invention in irrigation technology which helped West to develop the technology further and cultivate crops, fruits, and vegetables; Muslim’s

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invention of decimal system and early results in trigonometry; and Muslims’ preservation of Greek philosophy (Sen 2006: 69–70). Overall, Sen raises a critical point about multiple identities of Muslim individuals but Sen’s criticism doesn’t invalidate the point that religious identity is important in politics. Both Huntington and Sen miss the point that there could also be diversity within religious identity and the politics infused by religious identity. The zero-sum approach of Huntington and Lewis in evaluating the relationship between Islamic and Western civilizations also needs more nuance. Huntington and Lewis are right when they argue that civilizational principles are significant in forming identity, culture, and politics, but they are wrong in claiming civilizational differences will always lead to contest and conflict. Bangladesh’s case shows that civilizational variances between Islam and the West have not discouraged cooperation between Bangladesh and the West even on politically sensitive issues. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Bangladesh is a significant partner for the United States in fighting Islamist terrorism while the UN agencies and other liberal NGOs find few barriers for operations in Bangladesh. Esposito (1995, 1998) argues that ‘there is a surprising dearth of information’ about the diversity of Islam within the clash of civilization perspective. Esposito criticizes Lewis and Huntington for selectively choosing Islamist theorists and Islamist movements. In Esposito’s opinion, liberal commentators ignore the thoughts of some modernist Islamists, such as Morocco’s Allal-al Fasi, who is known as the founder of Moroccan Islamic nationalist movement during French colonial period in Morocco, Tunisia’s abd al-Aziz Thalabi who is known for advocating rationalistic not literalist reading of the Quran and who was an activist of anti-French colonial movement in Tunisia, Algeria’s Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis, who offered a modernist interpretation of Quran, Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India who founded a Muslim school in Aligarh in 1875 and proposed Muslims against joining in politics and Muhammad Iqbal who is known as an influential poet and philosopher who advanced the idea of Muslim nationalism during the colonial period in the Indian subcontinent. Esposito (1995) argues these modernist Islamist thinkers show that reason, philosophy, and science are not foreign to Islam. Esposito notes: these modernists preached the need and acceptability of a selective synthesis of Islam and modern Western thought; condemned unquestioned veneration and imitation of the past; reasserted their right to interpret in (Ijtihad)

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in Islam in light of modern conditions; and sought to provide an Islamically based rationale for educational, legal and social reform to vitalize a dormant and important Muslim community. (Esposito 1995: 56)

Esposito further gives examples of many Islamist parties engaged in social services, health services, and other positive services in Egypt, Malaysia, Turkey, Indonesia, and Tunisia. Many of these Islamist parties participate in democratic election and denounce the totalitarian approach of political Islam. In recent times, with the much-hyped emancipation of Arab Spring and the formation of a ‘democratic’ government in Tunisia by En Nahda, the term ‘post-Islamism’ is being increasingly used to describe a complex phenomenon in Muslim societies across the Middle East and elsewhere. In his original definition of the term, Asef Bayat argued that it refers to a condition as well as a project. As a condition, post-Islamism emerges ‘after a phase [of experimentation], during which the appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted even among its once-ardent supporters. [Eventually], pragmatic attempts to maintain the system [require] abandoning certain of its underlying principles’ (Bayat 2007: 19). Bayat argues: As a project post-Islamism is [a] conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political and intellectual domains. Yet, post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular. Rather it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying principle of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past. (ibid.)

In their examination of the development of post-Islamism in Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey, Bubalo et al. (2008) measure it across six variables. These include a shift from the goal of establishing a sharia state to the promotion of sharia values; an increasing focus on good governance rather than Islamic governance; a growing concentration on the moral appeal of Islamic candidates rather than the purity of their message; a growing diversity of membership within Islamist parties and movements; an increase in toleration of those who dissent; and, finally, an increasing policy oscillation as different factions vie for control in shaping the agenda in a democratic context. In short, it is becoming increasingly problematic to identify

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a coherent and common project for Muslim politics. What is clear is that al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates do not represent the dominant trajectory of Muslim politics.

2.3   Ummah, Identity, and Muslim Politics One could see that the debate about Islam and politics is a debate about compatibility. Can Muslim politics fit within Western, liberal democracy? In Western academia, the idea of the West acts as the master signifier, the control case, or litmus test by which politics is measured as normal or abnormal. Gieben and Hall (1992) summarize how the West is perceived in academia when they call the West a category that allows academics to map out the world in terms of the West and non-West (Gieben and Hall 1992: 277). Huntington and Lewis have reinforced this point through their theses of then clash of civilizations and Islam versus the West. Gieben and Hall (1992) further opine that the West is a frontier around which positive and negative qualities are sorted and gathered and, finally, that the West is a term of standardization—it is developed, industrialized, urbanized capitalist, secular, and modern (ibid.) For Gieben and Hall (1992), conservative scholars define the West in a positive manner with reference to its secular and modernist expressions, even though critics such as Esposito and Bayat believe that Muslim politics could accommodate the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights and thus fit into that category. Therefore, even the critics of Islam are reinforcing Eurocentric hegemony when inquiring into Muslim politics. To understand Muslim politics, non-Western Islamic concepts need to be incorporated into explanations of the Muslim state, party, and voter behaviour. The next section explains why the ummah and its various interpretations are so important to Muslim politics.

2.4   Ummah: From Theology to Political Consciousness According to Al-Ahsan (1992), the term ummah occurs on 64 occasions in the Quran (Al-Ahsan 1992: 9) but the Quranic interpretation of the ummah is diversified in meaning. According to Hassan (2006), ‘the [theological] meaning of the ummah ranges from followers of a prophet; a divine plan of salvation; or, a religious group, a small group within a larger

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community of believers’ (Hassan 2006: 311–312). Denny (1975) argues that ‘a most agreed meaning of ummah is some sort of community’ (Denny 1975: 43). Al-Ahsan (1992) supports Denny’s claim and argues, ‘the general meaning of the term [ummah]—community—is clear’ (Al-Ahsan 1992: 11). There are several indications within the Quran about the characteristics of this community. For example, verse 10:19 refers to the ummah as the whole of humanity when it mentions ummatun wahidatan (Al-Ahsan 1992: 12) and verses such as 2:128 and 2:143 of the Quran refer to the ummah as the community of Muslims (Al-Ahsan 1992: 15–16). Throughout verse 3:110, the Quran considers Muslims as the best community when it mentions khaira ummatin, whose ‘role among humanity is to counsel others to do good deeds and to forbid what is evil’ (Al-Ahsan 1992: 17). In Islamic history ummah became a ‘transformative concept’ for Arab tribes after the establishment of the first Muslim state in Madinah in the seventh century and this ‘transformative’ paradigm is still operational. In brief, when Prophet Muhammad emigrated to Madinah, the Arabs were divided into different tribes. Their first loyalty was to their own tribe, but after the foundation of Prophet Muhammad’s ‘ummatu-l-Muslimin’, Al-Ahsan argues, ‘their supreme tribal loyalty was shifted to that of a new Islamic identity’ (Al-Ahsan 1992: 19). In a similar vein, Hassan (2006) argues that the ‘ummah became a transformative concept as it changes the identities of Arab tribes to Muslim and when Islam began to expand to non-Arab lands, different groups of Muslims [transformed] into a community of believers’ (Hassan 2006: 312). In Islamic history, this religious concept had political implications. Politically speaking, Prophet Muhammad established the concept of the ummah through the formation of the first Islamic state of Madinah by the documentation of the Madinah Constitution, which is also known as the Charter of Madinah. Article 1 of this charter establishes the ummah as a political community (Hasan 2011). Prophet Muhammad’s ummah was not exclusive, as article 30 of the Madinah Charter states that ‘the Jews will be treated as one community with the believers’. It is possible to argue that this article makes the whole charter inclusive to some degree. However, Al-Ahsan (1992) argues that the charter was developed in several stages and non-Muslims were not in view when it was first written. He argues that the Jewish tribes’ names were not cited in the early parts of the document, and as the city of Madinah needed to be guarded, an offer was

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made to the Jews to make them citizens in return for loyalty (Al-Ahsan 1992: 21). In a similar vein, Mandeville (2002) argues that the ummah of Madinah was a sort of a ‘defense pact’, which Al-Ahsan claims that the Jews were originally not part of the Madinah Pact. Nevertheless, in the end, the ummah of Madinah included non-believers, which created an inclusive vision, while Prophet Muhammad constituted the leadership of the ummah. From a theological and historical interpretation, the concept of the ummah contains the vision of inclusivity even though in general it refers to a community or a nation of Muslims who share a common faith—Islam. To be a member of the ummah, a Muslim must believe in the oneness of Allah and the prophethood of Muhammad alongside other essential foundations of Islam. In sum, the epistemology of the ummah is firmly based in Islam. Hassan (2006) argues that the ummah, as a community of believers, entails a consciousness of belonging to a community whose membership is open to all without any need for qualification and restrictions. In his view ummah ‘is a means of constructing and establishing a religious and cultural identity that was independent of a Muslim state’ (Hassan 2006: 312). Over time, ‘the ummah has become a state of mind—a sentiment, a form of social consciousness or an imagined community like that of a nation’ (ibid.). Saunders (2008) argues that the term ummah signifies a political affiliation, a united nation (not ‘nations’) that is the nation of the Islamic creed (Saunders 2008: 307). Today, it would be a mistake to consider the ummah as only a religious community. Despite modernization and globalization, Muslim citizens living in various Muslim-majority and minority states uphold their ummah identity alongside their national identities. This Muslim consciousness fuels the major parties in Muslim states promoting moderate versions of political Islam in government and politics. 2.4.1  Modernity, Ummah Consciousness, and Trends in Muslim Politics In modern times, Muslims have used the ummah as a political concept important within two distinct temporal periods. I call the first phase the ‘formation period’ and the second phase the ‘expansion period’. The formation period refers to the time (eighteenth and mid-nineteenth century) when Western societies were going through the Enlightenment and modernization processes domestically whilst managing colonial administrations in Muslim communities in Asia, Middle East, and Africa.

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Many of those communities were yet to become independent states. Against this backdrop, Muslim political theorists called for a united ummah and that could revolt against the colonial West to establish Islamic rule for their communities. Many modern day radical and extremist movements seek inspiration from these theorists. Some of the common patterns emerging from this phase include calls for unity among Muslims; calls for Muslims to adhere to a more puritan and rigid paradigm of Islam; delegitimizing some Muslims as ‘false’ Muslims if do not conform to an ideal, thus facilitating division within Muslims; promoting violence as a legitimizing force to topple the ‘Christian’ West’s unjust colonial regimes over Muslim communities; and transnational jihadism whereby Muslims from South Asia travelled to Turkey to fight British colonialists during the First World War. Violent protests by Muslims against their colonial oppressors were not been successful in bringing all Muslims under the umbrella of Islamist movements in colonial lands. These movements, however (as will be shown in the next chapter), did have some successes and played a pivotal role in facilitating the ummah consciousness among wider Muslim populations. An example is the case of the Muslim League, which promulgated moderate political Islam and sought to establish the independent Islamic state of Pakistan. The expansion period refers to the post-colonial period, when the ummah consciousness was expanded due to three geopolitical factors, the first of which was the oil crisis and Arab-Israeli War in early 1970s. After the defeat by Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the Middle Eastern countries begun to fund a global wave of Islamization in foreign countries. The goal was to develop public and government support across the world for the ummah identity of Muslim states so that they could resist the influence of Western liberals allied with Israel. The ummah formed the basis of international cooperation between Muslim states. Bangladesh participated in that initiative. The second geopolitical event to spur the formation of the ummah was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union during the Cold War in 1979. Following the invasion, the US-Saudi-Pakistani intelligence agencies supported Afghan jihadists in their fight against the Soviets. Muslims from various states travelled to Afghanistan to join the holy war, inspired to save the ummah from the godless Soviet Union. This influx was tolerated by Western states as the Afghan jihad was against the enemy of the West.

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Finally, the increased mobility of people and ideas after the fall of the Soviet Union also expanded the ummah consciousness through the ­standard drivers of globalization, such as the Internet and more open borders. Through websites such as the Muslim news and modern media, an Islamic version of modernity was constructed, which began influencing new generations of Muslims via the Internet. The Internet allows people to engage with their mental communities or interest groups around the world, and in real time, making it an important missionary tool for Islam as well as a place where Muslims can garner more information about the state of the Muslim world. One should note that, in both phases of the ummah—formation and expansion—geopolitical events played an essential role in the cultivating a political ideology. 2.4.2  The First Phase: Ummah as a Critique of Colonization and Modernity This section summarizes how Muslim theorists have used the ummah to awaken political imaginations against the backdrop of West’s colonization of Muslim communities. These theorists are influential in shaping ideologies of many modern Islamist movements too. Three theorists—Jamal-al din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Shah Wali Allah (1702–1763), and Ibn-­ Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792)—have best defined the ummah as a political ideology and used it for political mobilization. Even though Ibn-Abdul Wahhab had no knowledge of European colonialism in Muslim lands, his ideas were influential in shaping radical Islamist movements during the pre-modern and modern periods. Many contemporary, transnational, political Islamist movements initiate cross-border political collaborations with like-minded organizations in the name of strengthening the ummah, and they do so with inspiration from these Muslim thinkers. Afghani and Shah Wali Allah championed the idea of pan-Islamism through Islamic reformism across the ummah, whereas Wahhab championed the idea of revivalism in the ummah. In modern period their ideas are interpreted through Wahabism, Salafism, jihadism, and Deobandism, and it is useful to revisit what they said about the ummah and Muslim politics. Afghani imagined an ummah whose members should consider Islam as a rational religion. Rane (2010) argues that, ‘Afghani was opposed to ‘taqlid’, or the blind following of legal precedents, and encouraged Muslims to study Western languages and sciences and to adopt Western

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technology’; he also ‘stood for a pan-ethnic caliphate’ (Rane 2010: 52; Masud 2014: 5). Political programmes attached to Afghani’s view ‘went under the mantle of pan-Islam and deliberately invoked notions such as ummah rather than narrower nationalist sentiment’ (Mandeville 2007: 47). Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida later carried Afghani’s views forward. They ‘were part of an Islamic awakening, or renaissance, known as ‘al-Nahda’, a cultural and intellectual revival in the Muslim world in the nineteenth and twentieth century’ (Rane 2010: 52). In Mandevile’s assessment, this project of ‘Islamic intellectual reinvigoration’ possessed a distinctly political valence, insofar as it was understood to constitute a path out of colonial rule’ (Mandeville 2007: 46). Afghani’s call for a pan-ethnic caliphate later received momentum and was redefined by various Islamist theorists and movements ‘after the collapse of the caliphate of the Ottomans when they were displaced by the victors of World War I’ (Aslan 2005: 102). Presently, the transnational Islamist party Hizbut Tahrir, which has branches in over 50 countries (including Bangladesh, though presently banned), advocates for a return to a caliphate and rejects secular liberal democracy. Hizbut Tahrir uses Afghani’s thought as a premise for the promotion of radicalization of the ummah. This party does not promote violence, as per the assumption of Huntington or Berman, but it does not accredit as Muslims those who believe in democracy. One of the party’s manifestoes flatly argues that, ‘it is forbidden (haram) for Muslims to participate in elections and the democratic process’ (Hasan 2011: 109). Furthermore, it states, ‘this system of democracy is an outcome of polytheism (kufuri) as it is formulated by humans not by the Sharia of Islam. Therefore, a democratic system is against the Sharia’ (Hasan 2011: 109–110). What this means is that, for Hizbut Tahrir, those Muslims who are supporting democracy are not real Muslims because Muslims follow Sharia. Interestingly, Hizbut Tahrir recently denied the Islamic legitimacy of the terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIS), as the party thinks ‘ISIS was not established in the correct Islamic way’ (Mamouri 2015). Naturally, those Muslim terrorists who have travelled from afar to join IS in Syria and Iraq would not support Hizbut Tahrir’s claim. Clearly, those involved in ISIS believe they are engaged in violence in the name of Islam and bring glory to the ummah. This is a manifestation of the ummah power to divide Muslims. Another major influence on Muslim thought regarding modernity and the West is Shah Wali Allah. Against the backdrop of declining Muslim

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power on the Indian subcontinent, he called for a return to ‘the practice of ijtihad (independent thinking by theologians in matters relating to Islamic law) which hitherto had been curtailed’ (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013). The main tool of his policy was ‘the doctrine of tatbiq, whereby the principles of Islam were reconstructed and reapplied in accordance with the Quran and the Ḥ adith (the spoken traditions attributed to Muhammad)’ (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013). Hermansen (2004) notes that, ‘South Asian Muslims with an anti-Sufi, puritan outlook such as the Ahl-e Hadith, find in Shah Wali Allah’s return to the fundamentals of sharia and political rejection of alien influences, a precursor to their own reformist beliefs’ (Hermansen 2004). Shah Wali Allah’s thought also influenced scholars of the Deoband madrasahs—the Indian Muslim religious establishment which inspired Islamist movements in Bangladesh, based out of Qawmi madrasahs. Finally, Muhammad Ibn-Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792) left a longstanding impact on the use of the ummah by Muslim theorists. Even though he developed his theory at a time when Europe was gaining political, economic, and technological strengths, it is unlikely that al-­ Wahhab was aware of what was happening outside of his community (Mandeville 2007: 42). Nonetheless, his idea was instrumental in shaping many Islamist movements and, therefore, it is worth citing his thoughts here. Similar to Shah Wali Allah, Wahhab ‘sought to purify Islam and return it to its original essence through an intense and often very literal engagement with the original source’ (Mandeville 2007: 44). In his book, Kitab al-Tawhid, Wahhab argued that the socio-cultural context in Muslim community required an end to all ‘deviant practices’ associated with Sufism, including worshipping saints. The central premise of his thesis was that ‘the ummah had fallen into decline because Muslims had strayed away from the core teachings and practices of faith premised on ‘Tawhid’, or oneness of Allah’ (Mandeville 2007: 43–44; Rane 2010: 52–53). The essence of Wahhab’s argument was to identify the two adversaries of Muslim ascension: (a) false Muslims who shied away from pure Islam and (b) non-Muslim forces which subjugated Muslims. In Mandeville’s assessment, Wahhab ‘developed a fairly austere Islam’ and formed alliances with Muhammad Ibn Saud, the direct ancestor of Saudi Arabia’s present royal family. Wahhab’s idea was influential in setting up the ‘standard orientation of much of the religious establishment in present day Saudi Arabia’ (Mandeville 2007: 43). His ideas, when translated into political projects, were later popularized as Wahabism. The next chapter shows how

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Wahhab’s ideas were instrumental in providing the foundations of the ‘Faraizi movement’ and the ‘Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya movement’ in the 1820s and 1830s in Bangla speaking regions of colonial India. These movements mounted a direct challenge to the colonial administration. Following Ibn-Wahhab, Shariatullah, a Bengali peasant and the founder of the Faraizi movement, and Titumir, also a peasant and leader of the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya movement, argued that the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent forgot their glorious past of ruling many parts of the world due to their animistic beliefs, and thus, fell victim to colonialism. Inspiration from pure Islam was the only way to thwart British rule in Muslim lands. Both of these men were returnees from Saudi Arabia, and these movements are useful in demonstrating far-reaching impact of Wahabism since colonial times. Two more notable examples of the significance of Wahhab’s thought are Abul A’la Maududi, founder of the Jamaat e Islami movement in South Asia and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood. Both thinkers have constructed their ‘central theory for an Islamic state based on Tawhid, or oneness of Allah, following Wahhab’ (Ahmad 2009: 63). Rane (2012–2013) notes that ‘Maududi perceived a threat to the Islamic identity’ and called for the establishment of ‘hukumat-eilahiya’ (Allah’s government) ‘or an Islamic state in the Indian subcontinent in the years preceding partition’ (Rane 2012–2013: 500). Maududi’s ideas became central pillars of the Islamist movement by the latter half of the twentieth century and Rane (2012–2013) argues that Maududi’s ideas found support with Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Qutb’s radical ideas were partly responsible for the emergence of militant or extremist political Islam in the contemporary period. His ideas of jihad ‘led to the assassination of Egypt’s President, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, as well as the overthrow of Shah in Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979’ (Rane 2010: 178). Even though Maududi and Qutb created their theories in the post-colonial period, they clearly received inspiration from Ibn-­Wahhab. A common recurring theme between Maududi and Qutb is that they promoted exclusivity among the ummah by advocating a distinction between ‘true Muslims’ and ‘false Muslims’. In their view, only followers of their ideas were true Muslims. Those who did not adhere to their ideas and supported the West were false Muslims. This requires an explanation about the contexts behind the emergence of these theories. Both Maududi and Qutb formed a personal dislike of Western political ideas and non-Muslims, which they believed subjugated Muslims. Irfan

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Ahmad (2009) examined the evolution of Maududi’s life and he outlines the key reasons behind Maududi propagating the idea of true and false Muslims (Ahmad 2009: 58–59). Most importantly, Maududi’s distrusted the West and its Muslim collaborators because of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which he blamed on local nationalism and lack of Muslim unity. He regarded those Muslims who had not supported the Empire as false Muslims and Western collaborators. Sayyid Qutb began to form his distaste for the West in 1949, when he spent time in the United States as a student in Colorado State Teachers College, now the University of Northern Colorado. There, he became very critical of many Western values including what he deemed as ‘the West’s general racism towards Arabs’ (Irwin 2001). He evaluated ‘America as a soulless, materialistic place that no Muslim should aspire to live in’ (Siegel 2003). He was also critical of what he saw as the ‘hypocritical’ foreign policy of the West in the Middle East. In addition, the British control over Egypt also played a part in his anger towards the West. Later, on his return to Egypt, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and criticized those Muslims who supported Western values, culture, and politics, all of which created false Muslims in Qutb’s view. In the contemporary period, Mandeville (2007) argues that Wahhab’s ideas became a source of inspiration for Muslim terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Karen Armstrong (2014) believes Wahhab’s ideas formed the ideological base of the notorious terrorist outfit ISIS, which calls for the establishment of an extremist ummah. These examples are useful to understand how some Muslims have formed their radical and extremist political projects (against the backdrop of colonization) based on the ummah and carried these projects forward under various banners. These reactionary movements were influential in producing a third kind of Muslim response to colonialism—Islamic nationalism. This forms the basis of today’s liberal ummah fostered by Muslim governments and major political parties. Of course, there are nationalist tensions within and between Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, or Saudi Arabia and Qatar. However, in almost all cases, despite their differences, they promote a moderate version of political Islam which is critical of liberal values. Bangladesh is part of this group. While much has written about Islamists, this book demonstrates (in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6) how major parties and the government apply the ummah identity in politics.

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2.4.3  The Second Phase: Construction and Expansion of Islamic Modernity In the post-colonial period, members of the Muslim ummah have been absorbed into different states as citizens where, in some cases, Islam is not even the major religion. From an administrative point of view, national identity has often superseded Muslims’ ummah identity. Citizenship of most individuals, irrespective of their religion (apart from some stateless individuals like the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar or Palestinian refugees living in Israel and others with similar fates), is composed of three elements. First, they enjoy a legal status defined by civil, social, and political rights. Second, they act as political agents who are supposed to participate in maintaining political institution by paying taxes and obeying laws. Third, they receive a distinct source of political identity; that is, Australian, American, and British. In sum, the modern Westphalian world order is made of agents (citizens) and structures (state), and it is generally assumed that citizens would provide their highest political allegiance to the state. However, the ummah challenges this idea in a number of ways. For Sayyid (2000), the ummah ‘rejects the limit of nation states which are defined in terms of language, ethnicity, race, [territory], citizenship, and constantly reiterates the universality of Islam’ (Sayyid 2000: 36). Even though, in theory, modern states should try to undermine the possibility of rivals for a citizen’s loyalty, such as the ummah, many modern Muslims remain fascinated by the idea of the internationalist Muslim identity. This is well documented by Hassan (2006). Between 1997 and 2003, Hassan (2006) conducted a study of 6300 Muslims in seven Muslim countries— Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Kazakhstan—to measure what he calls their ‘ummah consciousness’. From that study, he constructed the ‘ummah consciousness index’, which he compares with the values of the Human Development Index (HDI) reported in the Human Development report of United Nation Development Program (UNDP). The HDI report was published in 2002 to determine the success of modernity in those seven Muslim countries and Hassan used HDI as an indicator of modernization. To determine ummah consciousness, Hassan’s key research questions focused on the following ideologies of participants: no doubt about the existence of Allah; firm belief in Quranic miracles; fasted in the month of Ramadan; belief in life after death; and belief that persons who deny the existence of Allah are dangerous. Hassan (2006) concludes that apart

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from Kazakhstan (which is at the lower end of UN HDI), the other Muslim countries adhere to a strong sense of ummah consciousness. His research finding raises a point that even amidst modernization most of these Muslim countries hold a high level of ummah consciousness. The meaning of ummah consciousness here is that individuals consciously make the choice to adhere to their religious (Muslim) identity, and by doing that they feel attached to what they imagine are fellow members of their religious community. Hassan’s research shows that, to many Muslims, the Westphalian package, including the idea of modern nation states and citizenship, holds less significance than their awareness of being Muslim. This finding is contradictory to the paradigm of modernization theory, and the premise that religion is dead and the progress of society would be dependent upon secularism and science. In the age of globalization, it is assumed that globalization and the market economy would accelerate the process of modernization by dispersing liberal values. However, Hassan’s research offers important empirical evidence to contradict modernization theory. Hassan’s study shows that individuals are actively harnessing an ummah consciousness. This has implications for Muslim states (like Bangladesh). This ummah consciousness for Muslims prevails around the world, not only in the Muslims states but also for Muslims living in Western countries. Saunders (2008) offers a nuanced analysis in this regard by demonstrating how Muslims living in the West and Muslims living in the Middle East and South Asia organized transnational protests against the West by manipulating the concept of the ummah after a Danish newspaper published a cartoon of Prophet Muhammad. The recent protest by Pakistani premier Imran Khan against a planned Dutch cartoon contest that was set to make caricatures of Prophet Muhammad underpins that even the heads of Muslim states harness the ummah consciousness. Two of globalization’s drivers—migration and the Internet—have played pivotal roles in sustaining this ummah consciousness by constructing an Islamic vision of modernity. Studies conducted by Ahmed and Donnan (1994), Kibria (2008), Kundnani (2008), Bowen (2004a, b), Saunders (2008), and Rai (2006) found that migration plays an important role in the context of ummahism in individuals. In this regard, Ahmed and Donnan (1994) assert that ‘as Muslims cross international borders, they also come face to face, perhaps, for the first time in their lives, with the vast diversity of Muslim practice and cultures’ (Ahmed and Donnan 1994: 13). These migrants reassert and re-evaluate their religious values, while some promote more radical or extremist versions of the ummah. Ummah

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consciousness has found fertile ground in the marginalized Muslim suburbs of European cities where ‘Muslim disenchantment persists with the minority experience, the ebbing of older forms of political and national identity, and the invigorating freedom of expression, movement, and religion in post-modern Europe’ (Saunders 2008: 310). In Muslim-majority countries, migration plays an important role in invigorating the ummah consciousness and weakening sense of nationalism. A study conducted by Kibria (2008) on Bangladeshi returning from Saudi Arabia finds that ‘returned migrants expressed support for the project of Islamization in Bangladesh, seeing it as a means to foster prosperity and social order in the country’ (Kibria 2008: 521). Kibria shows those migrants often conveyed disappointment in the lack of solidarity among Muslims living in different countries. This finding supports the claim that the ummah weakens nationalist and state-centric attachments. Chapter 7 will explain further the ways in which Muslim returnees in Bangladesh have initiated diverse transnational projects of political Islam. Appadurai (1996) explains that the contemporary ummah consciousness is a product of globalization and capitalism that received a boost from technology, the Internet, money, ideas, and mobility of people that is ‘incubating a powerful new form of associational allegiance based on ummah’. In other words, globalization facilitates an Islamic version of modernity. Theoretically, globalization’s discourse usually assumes that people from different countries and cultural backgrounds connect with each other economically, socially, and politically, and move towards a more homogenous culture—a globalized culture. The processes of globalization reduce national boundaries and Giddens (1990) states that ‘globalization is about the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (Giddens 1990: 64). Clark (1997) asserts: Globalization denotes movements in both the intensity and the extent of international interactions; in the former sense, globalization overlaps to some degree with related ideas of integration, interdependence, multilateralism, openness and interpenetration; in the latter, it points to the geographical spread of these tendencies and is cognate with globalism, spatial compression, universalization, and homogeneity. (Clark 1997: 1)

Clark argues that this process of intensification of contacts can also cause disintegration of previously stable political forms. Bauman (1998)

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explains: ‘[globalization] tends towards disaggregation, autarchy, and isolation as well as ethnic or nationalistic separatism and regional integration’ (Bauman 1998: 12). Therefore, it is globalization’s nature to create difference and disturbance parallel to its homogenizing tendencies. According to McGrew et al. (1992), the nature of this tendency has no ‘fixed political inscription; it can be either progressive or regressive and fundamentalist’ (McGrew et al. 1992: 217). Saunders (2008) argues that social isolation associated with migration (felt not only by the immigrants but also their descendants) has been the major factor in creating a common sense of the ummah. Globalization also makes it easier for radicals and terrorists to promote ideas of radicalism and extremism by manipulating the concept of the ummah, since they can contact and broadcast their messages through the web and digital media (Mandeville 2002). For example, a note written by one of the 9/11 hijackers was widely circulated on the web after his death. It reads: ‘Remember the battle of the Prophet … against the infidels, as he went on building the Islamic state’ (Chapman 2005: 3). In this case, a terrorist who was about to kill thousands of innocent people justified his action by comparing the victims to the infidels killed in establishment of ummatu-l-Muslimin by Prophet Muhammad. By all historical accounts, there is no evidence that Prophet Muhammad established the state of Madinah over the bloodshed of innocent people. It is mentioned that Prophet Muhammad’s ummatu-l-Muslimin included non-Muslims too. The history of the ummah has also shown ‘exemplary, almost unique models of multiracial, multicultural, multireligious, pluralist societies’ (Ibrahim 1991). Chapman observes that the rise of global terrorism in the name of establishing ummah can be interpreted as a failure of globalization. He asserts: Islamist’s grievances include the failure of the ideologies imported from the West—especially capitalism, communism/socialism and nationalism. These are perceived as ‘bankrupt ideologies foisted on them from outside’. While some aspects of modernity are enthusiastically embraced, others are vigorously rejected. (Chapman 2005)

To elaborate on Chapman’s claim, it can be argued that globalization creates a strong sense of rejection to liberalism in many Muslim countries. Some of these rejections are violent; some are radical and moderate.

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2.5   Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated how Muslims view the ummah as a part of political ideologies that use Islamic theology and history. The ummah is a non-Western, Islamic concept with a strong appeal that cuts across moderate, radical, and extreme Muslims. I have argued that a core condition for the ummah to operate as a political idea requires Muslims to adhere an ummah consciousness. The logic is straightforward. When a person becomes conscious of their ummah identity, they frame the boundary of their identity and politics in a religious manner. Ummah-conscious people imagine they are members of a global Muslim  community and consider themselves as Muslims first and citizens of a state second (or both identities go hand in hand). However, when this concept interacts with modernity, geopolitics, and globalization, its core essence (Muslim unity) becomes distorted, and diverse meanings (liberal, radical, and extremist) of the ummah are propagated. Despite a diverse narrative of the ummahs, a commonality is the Muslim critique of key Western ideas, though this doesn’t always mean a complete rejection of the West. There is conflict, contest, and cooperation with the West and the next chapters will demonstrate how geopolitics have invigorated the ummah on the Indian subcontinent.

References Ahmad, Irfan (2009) Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat e Islami, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Ahmed, Akbar and Donnan, Hastings (1994) Islam, Globalization and Post-­ modernity, London and New York: Routledge. Al Jazeera (2018) ‘Pakistan Condemns Blasphemous Dutch Cartoon Contest’, August 28, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/180827132837382. html (Accessed on 10/05/2019) ——— (2019) ‘New Zealand Mosque Attacks Suspect Praised Trump in Manifesto’, March 16, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/zealandmosques-attack-suspect-praised-trump-manifesto-190315100143150.html (Accessed on 13/05/2019) Al-Ahsan, Abdullah (1992) Ummah or Nation: Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation Anbarasan, Ethirajan (2019) ‘Sri Lanka Attacks: The Family Networks Behind the Bombings’, The BBC News, May 11, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-48218907 (Accessed on 12/05/2019) Appadurai, Arjun (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press

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Armstrong, Karen (2014) ‘The Myth of Religious Violence’, The Guardian, September 25, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/25/-spkaren-armstrong-religious-violence-myth-secular (Accessed on 23/10/2018) Aslan, Reza (2005) No God but God the Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam, London and New York: Random House Barker, Memphis (2018) ‘Muhammad Cartoon Contest in Netherlands Sparks Pakistan Protests’, The Guardian, August 29, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/aug/29/muhammad-cartoon-contest-netherlands-geertwilders-pakistan-protests (Accessed on 12/05/2019) Bauman, Zygmunt (1998) Globalization: The Human Consequences, New  York: Columbia University Press Bayat, Asef (2007) Islam and Democracy: What is the Real Question?, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press Berman, Paul (2003) Terror and Liberalism, New York: Norton ——— (2011) ‘Do Ideas Matter? From September 11 to the Arab Spring’, The New Republic, August 24, http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/magazine/94145/september-11-do-ideas-matter (Accessed on 01/07/2012) Bowen, John R. (2004a) ‘Does French Islam have Borders? Dilemmas of Domestication in a Global Religious Field’, American Anthropologist, 106(1): 43–55 ——— (2004b) ‘Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(5): 879–894 Bubalo, Anthony, Fealy, Greg and Mason, Whit (2008) Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey, Sydney: Lowie Institute for International Policy Chapman, Collin (2005) ‘“Islamic Terrorism”: How Should Christians and the West Respond?’, Encounters Mission Journal, 5, http://sydneyanglicans.net/ blogs/indepth/the_christian_response_to_islamic_terrorism_colin_chapman (Accessed on 23/09/2015) Clark, Ian (1997) Globalization and Fragmentation, Oxford: Oxford University Press Denny, Frederick Mathewson (1975) ‘The Meaning of Ummah in the Quran’, History of Religions, 15(1): 34–70 Encyclopedia Britannica (2013) ‘Chakma’, http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/104548/Chakma (Accessed on 25/01/2014) Esposito, John (1995) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, New  York: Oxford University Press ——— (1998) Islam and Politics, New York: Syracuse University Press Fox, Jonathan and Sandler, Shmuel (2005) ‘Separation of Religion and State in the Twenty-First Century: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies’, Comparative Politics, 37(3): 317–335 Giddens, Anthony (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press Gieben, Bram and Hall, Stuart (1992) Formation of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press

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Hasan, Mubashar (2011) ‘Democracy and Political Islam in Bangladesh’, South Asia Research, 31: 97–117 Hashemi, Nader (2009) Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press Hassan, Riaz (2006) ‘Globalization’s Challenge to the Islamic Ummah’, Asian Journal of Social Science, 34(2): 311–323 Hermansen, Marcia (2004) ‘Wali Allah, Shah (1703–1762)’, in Martin, Richard C. (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, Vol. 2, New  York: Palgrave Macmillan, 730 Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3): 22–49 ——— (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster IANS (2012) ‘Sheikh Hasina Condemns Anti-Islam Film’, First Post, https:// www.firstpost.com/fwire/sheikh-hasina-condemns-anti-islam-film-457638. html/amp (Accessed on 10/05/2019) Ibrahim, Anwar (1991) ‘The Ummah and Tomorrow’s World’, Future, 23(3): 302–310 Irwin, Robert (2001) ‘Is This the Man Who Inspired Bin Laden?’, The Guardian, November 1, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3 (Accessed on 7/12/2019) Kibria, Nazli (2008) ‘Muslim Encounters in the Global Economy Identity Developments of Labor Migrants from Bangladesh to the Middle East’, Ethnicities, 8(4), 518–535 Klass, Brian (2019) ‘A Short History of President Trump’s Anti-Muslim Bigotry’, The Washington Post, March 15, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/15/shor t-histor y-pr esident-tr umps-anti-muslimbigotry/?utm_term=.284e11d56567 (Accessed on 10/05/2019) Kundnani, Arun (2008) ‘Islamism and the Roots of Liberal Rage’, Race & Class, 50(2): 40–68 Lake Eli (2006) ‘Bernard Lewis Marking 90 At Grand Fete’, The New York Sun, April 28, https://www.nysun.com/national/bernard-lewis-marking-90-atgrand-fete/31807/ (Accessed on February 23, 2019) Lewin, Tamar (2008) ‘Samuel P. Huntington, 81, Political Scientist, Is Dead’, The New  York Times, December 28, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/ education/29huntington.html?_r=1&ref=samuelphuntington (Accessed on 07/06/2012) Lewis, Bernard (1988) The Political Language of Islam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press ——— (1990) ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, The Atlantic Monthly, 266(3): 47–60 ——— (1993) Islam and the West, New York: Oxford University Press ——— (2003) The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, New  York: Modern Library

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Mamouri, Ali (2015) ‘Explainer: What is Hizb ut-Tahrir?’, The Conversation, March 2, https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hizb-ut-tahrir-37963 (Accessed on 2/07/2015) Mandeville, Peter (2002) ‘Reimagining the Ummah? Information Technology and the Changing Boundaries of Political Islam’, in Mohammadi, A. (Ed.) Islam Encountering Globalization, London: Routledge, 61–90. ——— (2007) Global Political Islam, London and New York: Routledge Masud, Khalid Muhammad (2014) ‘Islam and Modernity in South Asia’, in Jeffrey, Robin and Sen, Ronojoy (Eds.) Being Muslim in South Asia: Diversity and Daily Life, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1–17 McGrew, T., Hall, Stuart and Held, David (1992) Modernity and Its Futures, Cambridge: Polity Press Parker, Ian (2005) ‘Lacanian Discourse Analysis in Psychology: Seven Theoretical Elements’, Theory & Psychology, 15(2): 163–182. Pipes, Daniel (2003) In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power, New  York: Transactional Publisher Quiñones, Eric (2006) ‘Fagles, Lewis Awarded National Humanities Medal’, Princeton Weekly Bulletin, November 20, http://www.princeton.edu/pr/ pwb/06/1120/1b.shtml (Accessed on 10/07/2012) Rai, Milan (2006) 7/7: The London Bombings. Islam and the Iraq War, London: Pluto Press. Rane, Halim (2010) Islam and Contemporary Civilization: Evolving Ideas, Transforming Relations, Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press ——— (2012–2013) ‘The Relevance of a Maqasid Approach for Political Islam Post Arab Revolutions’, Journal of Law and Religion, 28(2): 489–520 Saunders, Robert. (2008) ‘The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the “Cartoons Affair”’, Nations and Nationalism, 14(2): 303–321. Sayyid, Bobby S. (2000) ‘Beyond Westphalia: Nations and Diaspora—The Case of the Muslim Umma’, in Hesse, Barnor (Ed.) Un/Settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions, London: Zed Books, 33–50 Scruton, Roger (2002) The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat, Wilmington, DE: Continuum Sen, Amartya (2006) Identity and Violence, New York: W.W. Norton & Co ——— (2008) ‘Violence, Identity and Poverty’, Journal of Peace Research, 45(1): 5–15 Siegel, Robert (2003) ‘Sayyid Qutb’s America: Al Qaeda Inspiration Denounced U.S.  Greed, Sexuality’, NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=1253796 (Accessed on 12/10/2019) Sikender, Sardar (2018) ‘Imran Khan Says will take Up Caricatures Issue at UN’, The Express Tribune, August 27, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1788954/1senate-passes-unanimous-resolution-blasphemous-caricatures-netherlands/ (Accessed on 1/05/2019) The Telegraph (2008) ‘Samuel Huntington’, December 28, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/3999461/Samuel-Huntington.html (Accessed on 23/10/2018)

CHAPTER 3

Geopolitics of Ummah(s) in Bangladesh: A Historic Narrative

3.1   Introduction Chapter 2 has outlined few general points about the formation and expansion of ummah’s influence into politics. I have argued in that chapter that Muslims living in various nation states harness ummah consciousness. Alongside of the state-given identities, ummah has become an equally important, if not more important identity marker, for some against the backdrop of globalization. For that reason, transnational terrorist Muslim groups such as the Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or transnational radical Muslim parties such as Hizbut Tahrir are able to mobilize some in favour of agendas that are in direct conflict with liberal democracy and the modern concept of nation states. It is also a fact that the majority of Muslims do not participate in radical or extremist political projects of ummah. Among Muslims a more moderate form of political Islam in the form of Islamic nationalism (a direct implication of ummah consciousness) has found popularity in major Muslim nation states. When it comes to foreign policy, Muslim nation states have formed a pattern of Islamic international relations (IR) based on ummah with an aim of promoting Islamization in poor nation states against the backdrop of post-colonialism. These patterns (Islamic nationalism and Islamic IR) are not mutually exclusive to many values of the West but stand in contrast to the projects of extremists and radical political Islamists. For example, Saudi Arabia is a strong ally of the West but they support Islamization in developing Muslim countries like

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Bangladesh to deter hegemony of liberal values. Similarly, while the Bangladeshi government and politicians of major parties are actively engaged with the West in socio-economic and security sectors, the government and major party leaders are engaged in resisting liberal values by promoting Islamization (articulated in next three chapters). Within this context, it is important to note that geopolitical events are essential conditions for ummah to form and expand as political ideologies. This chapter focuses on geopolitics of the formation of ummahs in Bangladesh. It shows how Muslims in Bangladesh have configured variations of political Islam by manipulating ummah against the backdrop of multiple geopolitical events including expansion of Islamic empires in the Indian subcontinent, British colonization of the subcontinent, the First World War, Arab-Israel war, the cold war, fall of communism, 9/11, and the latest war in Syria. Through this thick descriptive, historic narrative, I aim to demonstrate that the emergence of Bangladesh as a Muslim-­ majority nation state and its ongoing journey as a state are deeply embedded in the geopolitics of the formation and expansion of the ummah. I begin this chapter with a discussion of Islam’s arrival in Bangladesh to show that the roots of various ummahs among Muslims in terms of their approaches to politics are products of history. Later, I describe how the diverse interpretations of ummah are rooted in a number of geopolitical events. To present this historical analysis, I use a framework called historic specificity. According to Alam (1993), ‘the notion of historical specificity shows how, for any specific situation, a series of historical conjunctures has led to a distinctive configuration’ (Alam 1993: 89). I will argue that through this framework of historic specificity, exploring geopolitical events and the formation and expansion of the ummahs in Bangladesh will be useful in understanding why contemporary Bangladesh defies liberal democratic expectations through various strands of political Islam and frames politics within a religious framework.

3.2   The Expansion of the Islamic Civilization to Ancient India: The Root of a Divided Ummah The history of the origin of Bengali Muslims shows that from the outset of Islam’s arrival in the Indian subcontinent, Muslims were divided in terms of their socio-cultural and political approaches to Islam. It is difficult to determine precisely when Islam was introduced to what is now

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known as Bangladesh in ancient India, a region inhabited by Buddhists and Hindus before the arrival of Islam. According to a Bangladeshi historian, Khan Raisuddin (1986), Arab traders and merchants began to arrive in Chittagong, a port city of Bangladesh, in the eighth century. They came for the spice trade, and many of those traders and merchants did not return home. Instead, they settled down in what is now Bangladesh and broader areas of medieval India. Through these migrant Arab traders and merchants, the people of that region came to know about Islam (Khan Raisuddin 1986: 166). Khan Raisuddin’s (1986) views on the early Islamization of Bangladesh is informed by a series of writings by classical Arab historians, such as Solaiman, Ibn Khudardbia, Idrisi, and Masudi, and each of these historians recorded the years and routes of Arabic spice traders. Khan Raisuddin also argues that the early presence of Arabs in this region explains the use of Arabic verbs in the local dialectic of Chittagong—a district located in the South Eastern district. Indeed, many areas of Chittagong are named with Arabic terms, for example, Al-Qaran, Suluk-­ ul-­ Bahar, Bakalia (Khan Raisuddin 1986: 167). Another Bangladeshi scholar, Khan Mojlum (2013), agrees with this account of early Islamization, arguing that the discovery of a few Arabic coins dating from the eighth and ninth centuries in Chittagong and Comilla is proof that ‘Arab merchants and traders had been visiting different parts of Bangladesh since the eighth and ninth century, if not earlier’ (Khan Mojlum 2013: 5). Those Arab traders might have introduced Islam to Bangladesh, but they did not make Islam the religion of the masses. The Muslim conquerors were much more significant in this regard. Historically, Islam was introduced in South Asia through the military conquests of the Seljuks and Mamluks (Sonn 2004: 87). Mahmud, a Seljuk Muslim ruler with a Turkish background, established Islam in what is now known as Afghanistan and Pakistan (Sonn 2004: 88). Sonn (2004) argues that this practice of expanding Islam as a faith (by war or missionary zeal) was common within the Mughal Empire (1530–1757) as well. This was the earliest form of political Islam in the Bangla-speaking region of ancient India. Alongside rulers, another group of people who were equally (or more) instrumental in the expansion of Islam in this region were the Sufis. They are best described as missionaries whose main objective was to convert people to Islam. The Sufi approach to Islam was spiritual, and Sufis converted people from all lifestyles in many different parts of Asia (Khan Zillur 1985: 835). Historical accounts state that ‘Sufis, such as Baba Adam Shahid of Rampal and Shah Sultan Rumi from Persia (Iran), visited the Bengali

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speaking region of India and inspired people to convert to Islam’ (Khan Zillur 1985: 835–836). In medieval Bengal, Hindus converted to Islam as a reaction to inequalities in the form of castes in Hindu communities. The universal ethos of ummah—‘brotherhood’ and, therefore, equal status— in Islam naturally attracted lower caste Hindus. As Khan Zillur asserts: ‘in response to the elitism of the Hindus, many common people, and certain sections of the higher castes and classes of Bengal, began to embrace Islam’ (Khan Zillur 1985: 836). However, conversions to Islam did not eradicate the problems of the caste system within the Muslim society of Bengal. It took a new form. Divisions among Muslims were rooted in a person’s route to becoming a Muslim. On the basis of the works of Eaton (2001: 1–26), Alam (1993: 88–106), and Ahmad Zafar (2000: 1–35), it is plausible to argue that one of the most powerful divisions within Bengal’s Muslim community came from whether they were ‘local’ or ‘foreign’. The two groups, the Ashrafs (Muslim settlers from Islamic heartlands) and the Atraps (local converted), had very different and enduring views of the ummah. Ashrafs, or ‘high born’ Muslims, were migrants from countries such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan who initially came to Bengal for purposes such as trade, conquest, administration, or Sufi missionary activities, and then settled in the region. These Muslims promoted an Arab-Persian Islamic civilization as the face of ‘authentic’ Islam. They established a perception that their approach to Islam was ‘true’ Islam because they hailed from the heartland of Islamic civilization. In contrast, Atraps, or ‘low born’ Muslims, were converts among the local Bengali Hindus. Their local culture for practicing Islam was deeply influenced by the pre-existing Hindu culture. Ashrafs and Atraps formed almost separate societies, and most Bangladeshi Muslims were converts or descendants of Atraps (Khan Zillur 1985; Eaton 2001). These Muslims hailed from a peasant society and therefore, ‘Islam became identified as a religion of the axe and the plough’ (Eaton 2001: 20). The peasants living in this part of the Ganges delta found themselves contending with a fertile but unpredictable and unkind natural world. Alam (1993) argues that the peasants’ vulnerability to nature made them more religious, but Ashraf Muslims frowned upon the low born Muslims’ primitive ideas and practices. Ali (1985), who has done extensive work examining the history of the Muslims of Bengal, concurs and suggests that ‘although in general, Muslims of Bengal followed the injunctions of Islam, certain innovations and un-Islamic practices were

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prevalent among them…’ (Ali 1985: 799). Alam (1993) supports Ali (1985) and states that ‘Hinduism had shaped Bengali Islam’ (Alam 1993: 90). The point here is not to judge what is Islamic or un-Islamic, as Alam and Ali do, but rather, to show that religious practices amongst Bengalis have been both divisive and unifying since the early period of Islam in Bengal. This divisiveness is based upon the debate regarding who is practicing a true Islam and who is a true Muslim while the unifying factor is that these diverse practices were adapted under the broader framework of Islam. The Ashrafs thought they were the legitimate representatives of true Islam and thought that the Atraps, whilst believing themselves to be perfectly Muslim, were not practicing Islam correctly. In modern times, against the backdrop of the European colonization of India, many Islamist (extremist and radicals in contemporary sense) movements have also denounced those ‘false’ Islamic practices.

3.3   European Colonization and the Formation of Ummahs in Bengal Colonial Bengal was part of the British Empire for about 200 years, starting from 1757. Throughout this period, several versions of the ummah expanded through political Islamist movements with radical, extremist, and/or liberal approaches to politics. For example, the pattern seen today in some radical and extremist Muslims of different states who travel abroad to fight for Islamic State or Al-Qaeda against ‘the West’ is not new, but an old phenomenon traceable from at least the colonial period through the Khilafah (Caliphate) Movement. In a later section, I discuss the history of Muslims from Bengal travelling to Turkey to fight against the West during the First World War to save the Ottoman Caliphate, whilst in Bengal itself, Muslims occasionally attacked British officials to roll back Western colonialism and establish the state of Allah in Bengal (and in the larger Indian subcontinent). The latter objective of establishing an Islamic state continues today with movements such as Jamaatul Mujahedeen of Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), which will be discussed further in Chap. 7. Of course, the dynamics, practices, and justifications for political Islamist movements have changed since the post-colonial period. The intent here is to demonstrate some narrow similarities within political Islam across time to show that the pursuit of several visions of the ummah in politics by Bengali Muslims is not new. Furthermore, the pattern of

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contemporary Wahabi-influenced politics in Bangladesh, as represented by Jamaat or Hizbut Tahrir, is identifiable in the history of political Islam in the colonial period through the Faraizi and Wahabi movements. Alongside these revolutionary and reactionary movements of political Islam, the root of the liberal ummah is also detectable in the colonial period with movements such as Tayuni and the Muslim League, and their plans for establishing an independent nation state for Muslims. These more liberal Muslims saw a Muslim state as part of the wider ummah but they did not want the state to be ruled by Sharia Law. The contemporary approaches of the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and their use of state assets, demonstrate that Bangladesh’s ummah commitment can be traced back to this period. Finally, establishment of the Deoband Madrasah (also called the Darul Uloom Deoband) in colonial India was a precursor to modern madrasahs (religious schools). Today, madrasahs act as bases for religious civil society and related political Islamist movements in Bangladesh. As explained in the opening chapter as well as in later chapters, followers of the Deoband Madrasah formed the basis of Hefazat e Islam (HI) among other groups who resists many values of liberal democracy including the freedom of speech, right to association, and so forth. In sum, the colonial era’s foundations for variations of political Islam have set the theoretical foundation and created the operational discourses of politics that are familiar today in Bangladesh. In the next section, a brief analysis of Islamist movements in colonial Bengal will be presented in a bid to define the motives and impact of these movements in shaping the idea of Pakistan, a nation state for Muslims.

3.4   Formation of Ummahs in the Colonial Period A key point to note in this summary of a particular period of the colonial history is to show that the radical and extreme Islamist movements propagating an exclusivist version of political Islam were instrumental in shaping a broader spectrum of ummah consciousness among Muslims in India. Those movements have campaigned for framing an ummah of Indian Muslims (including those living in the East Bengal) based on ‘a puritan true Islam’ infused by Wahabi values. According to their views, not everyone is Muslim even though they have Muslim names. If a person’s religious practice is influenced by local Hindu cultures they are ‘false Muslims’, argued these Islamists. These movements such as Faraizi, Wahabi, and Khilafat wanted to establish a ‘true Islamic state’ for ‘true Muslims’

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through violent insurgency. The British administration has managed to contain these movements. However, these movements were instrumental in igniting a broader ummah consciousness among apolitical Muslims. As I show in this section, the political party Muslim League was pivotal in hosting that consciousness in a more moderate and liberal form and was able to put forward a demand for separate land for Muslims in Pakistan. In 1947 Pakistan was born as an independent state and what is now known as Bangladesh today was part of Pakistan till 1971. 3.4.1  The Faraizi Movement In 1818, Hazi Shariatullah, a peasant from Faridpur (now a district in Bangladesh), in the name of establishing the Tawhid (oneness of God) and abolishing ‘traces of animistic and Hindu beliefs and practices from Muslim society’, founded the Faraizi movement in eastern Bengal (Alam 1993; Khan Zillur 1985). Deriving the movement’s name from ‘Faraiz’ (obligatory duties laid down in the Qur’an), Shariatullah preached a return to a more fundamentalist Islam, shorn of ritualistic appendages (Khan Zillur 1985). Shariatullah’s movement had a strong relationship with the Wahabi tradition. Khan Ahmed (2012), in Bangladesh’s National Encyclopaedia, states that: Shairatullah migrated to Makkah (Mecca) in 1799, stayed there for 20 years and studied religious doctrines under Shaikh Tahir Sombal, an authority of Hanafi School. The Faraizi movement spread with extraordinary rapidity in the districts of Dhaka, Faridpur, Bakerganj, Mymensingh, Tippera (Comilla), Chittagong and Noakhali as well as to the province of Assam [now part of India]. The movement, however, gained the greatest momentum in those places where the Muslim peasantry was depressed under the oppressive domination of Hindu zamindars [landlords] and European indigo planters. Furthermore, Shariatullah’s political campaign advocated for the establishment of a Muslim Caliph and termed British rule as ‘injurious’. (Khan Ahmed 2012)

Khan Zillur (1985) asserts that Shariatullah’s movement ‘rejected shirk (sinful innovation, or bidah), including the support or joining of Hindu rites and ceremonies; pir (spiritual leader) worship; and urs (the death anniversary of pirs which fell under fatiha, or death rituals)’ (Khan Zillur 1985: 839–840). All these practices were subject to objections from the Faraizi movement but these practices were well established in Bengal as

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Islamic. As mentioned before, Atraps or converted Bengalis were quite familiar with this version of Islam. After the death of Shariatullah in 1840, his movement lost momentum. However, its call for rejecting Western political concepts and reforming local Islam left a lasting legacy. These ideas are common amongst present-day Islamists. In my view, the ramifications of Shariatullah’s movement were multi-dimensional. Firstly, it shows that Islam prospered as a political force when its movements claimed to provide a voice to the oppressed; the Faraizi movement was particularly popular among oppressed Muslim peasants. At the time of the Faraizi movement, the average peasants were being squeezed by Hindu landlords as well as British rulers, leading some to conclude that Bengalis were ‘in all aspects …a race ruined under British rule’ (Ahmed Rafiuddin 2001: 19). Ahmed Rafiuddin (2001) asserts that: British rule created amongst Muslims a sense of deprivation. They thought the British had wrested power from ‘them’, as if to suggest that they had descended from ancestors who had ruled India long before the coming of the British! (Ahmed Rafiuddin 2001: 15)

Thus, this movement helped cultivate a strong sense of a Bengali Muslim identity. This identity trend is still dominant. Ahmed Rafiuddin (2001) argues that the rise of the Faraizi movement ‘was more directly linked to the social and political transformation produced by the dominant presence of colonial Europe… going back to the ideals of the pure faith was seen as the only road back to political glory [of Mughal and previous Muslim regimes]’ (Rafiuddin Ahmed 2001: 15). Secondly, this movement displays a heightened exclusivist ummah consciousness in Bengal for the first time and demonstrates the trend towards defining Arab Islam as pure Islam. In that way, this movement promoted an exclusivist, radical version of political Islam. 3.4.2  Wahabi Movement Almost simultaneously, and with similar aims of reforming Islamic practices and ending British and Hindu domination in Bengal, the 1820s saw the beginning of the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya movement in India. The British knew this movement as Wahabism (Rafiuddin Ahmed 2001: 15). Jones (1989) notes that the ‘Wahabi movement was preaching for both a return to past purity and an open struggle, a jihad with non-Muslims’

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(Jones 1989: 22). A Bangladeshi peasant, whose real name was Sayyid Mir Nizar Ali but who became known as Titu Mir, was, according to Riaz (2009), the leader of this movement in Bengal. Titu Mir met a Saudi scholar, Sayyid Ahmad, during a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1822 (Khan Muin-ud-Din Ahmed 2012). Khan Muin-ud-Din Ahmed (2012) claims that Ahmad ‘inspired [Titu Mir] to free his fellow countrymen from un-­ Islamic practices and foreign domination’. Jones (1989) states that on his return home, ‘Titu Mir expounded a fundamentalist doctrine that condemned elements of popular Islam as errors, called upon his followers to practice equality among their coreligionists, and to adopt a unique form of dress as an outward sign of their religious commitment’ (Jones 1989: 23). Based on the views of Khan Muin-ud-Din Ahmed (2012), Ahsan (2006), Jones (1989), and Riaz (2009), one may say the movement had the following characteristics. First, this movement managed to mobilize thousands of people in at least ten districts, which are now part of Bangladesh and India to engage in jihad with non-Muslims (including Hindu landlords and the British army). Second, informal cells were set up by this movement to raise funds from its supporters. Third, even though it had engaged in violent conflict with the British army, from around the mid-nineteenth century this movement began to slowly subside. According to James (2009), this movement instigated the assassination of the British Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court. Later, in 1863–1870, activists of this movement were brought to court through the infamous Wahabi trial. Trial documents reveal that Muslims in Bengal were already preparing for a Jihad before the Wahabi movement arrived, to the extent that some were already volunteering to fight in northwest India. Ahmed (2001) notes: The documents of the Wahabi trials reveal fascinating stories of journeys from Bengal to the frontier by many who chose to fight for Islam. They often came from humble rural backgrounds, had little formal education, and perhaps knew very little about the Islamic faith: to them, Islam was Allah’s chosen faith, an ideology of change that had been defiled and undermined by its enemies, and they were ready to fight for it. (Ahmed 2001: 15)

Similar to the Faraizi movement, this movement shows the influence of Arab-oriented Islam and revolutionary fervour for what they thought as safeguarding ummah. According to Ahmed (2001), ‘although this movement was inspired by the eighteenth century Wahabi movement in Arabia,

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whose message was brought home in different countries primarily by the Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, their rise was more directly linked to the social and political transformation produced by the dominant presence of colonial Europe in Asia and Africa’ (Ahmed 2001: 15). Going back to the ideals of the ‘pure’ faith that also excludes Muslims who do not follow ‘true Islam’ from ummah was seen as the only road back to political glory of the Mughal regime. 3.4.3   Institutional Establishment of Political Islam: The Deoband Madrasah Against the backdrop of these failed revolts by Islamists, the creation of the Deoband madrasah, near New Delhi, India, in 1857 is a landmark in the history of the development of political Islam in Bangladesh, as well as in south Asia. Presently, thousands of madrasahs in Bangladesh follow the Deoband curriculum. The Deoband Madrasah was ‘designed to produce Islamic scholars (Ulemas), theologians and political leaderships who will reassert the traditional understanding of Islam in practice’ (Faruki 1987: 54). Karim (2004) argues that, ‘the Deoband school strictly enforced Islamic jurisprudence based on medieval scholarship of Hanafi scholars, and any departure from that path was considered heresy’ (Karim 2004: 298). This madrasah was instrumental in making the role of Ulemas politically important in the region, including in Bangladesh, a trend initiated during the time of colonial period and carried forward by Ulemas in independent Bangladesh. Presently, these madrasahs are instrumental in providing: (a) institutional training in raising ummah consciousness, (b) the preservation of Islamic values and culture in Bangladesh politics, and (c) a support base to Islamist parties in Bangladesh. 3.4.4  The Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement Muslims in India, including Muslims from Bengal, launched the Caliphate movement, locally known as the Khilafat movement, in 1919 (Sayyid 1997: 61). During that time, prominent pan-Islamic leaders caused a great deal of tension in Bengal (Shah 2001: 101). These pan-Islamic leaders organized regular meetings and the main theme was to refer to the troubles of wider ummah in ‘Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and other Muslim countries, and suggest that the object of the British government was to drive out Islam from the Indian sub-continent’ (Shah 2001: 102). In

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addition to holding these meetings, Shah (2001) notes, ‘many Bengali Muslims from rural districts had travelled to Turkey to fight for the Turks during that period, a training camp was set in Afghanistan, and religious leaders were preaching against the British regime throughout the Bengal in Friday prayers’ (Shah 2001: 100). However, after the fall of the Turkish Caliphate, many Bengalis involved in the movement abandoned the quest for the unity of ummah (Sayyid 1997: 61). 3.4.5  The Taiyuni Movement The Taiyuni movement sought the establishment of ‘pure Islam’ in Bengal. By that they also excluded those who they thought were ‘false Muslims’ as, similar to the preceding movements, Muslim activists of the Taiyuni movement demanded the abolition of all Hindu-influenced beliefs from Bengali Muslim practices. The point of distinction between the Taiyuni movement and others is that while the Faraizi, Wahabi, and Caliphate movements rejected British rule as an enemy of Islam, the Taiyuni movement, by contrast, promoted itself as loyal to British rulers along with Muslim solidarity. They urged moderation and stressed the greater and immediate needs for Islamizing the masses of Muslim Bengalis. Ahmad Zafar (2000) noted that ‘this gradual emasculation of the spirit of external jihad and the exclusive preoccupations since then, with internal puritanical reformation, contributed much to the deepening of Islamic consciousness, quickening the pace of the unity of ummah, and a heightened perception of Muslim-Hindu differentiations’ (Zafar 2000: 88). The Taiyuni movement developed this sense of Muslim unity (ummah consciousness) in several ways. First, it provided a platform where rural gentry (Atraps) and urban educated upper class (Ashrafs) came together. Second, it initiated the publishing of cheap religious books of an instructive and didactic nature, written in Bengali for Muslim masses. Third, it began to publish a number of Muslim journals, imbued with the growing sense of cultural and political identity, and they appeared in the urban areas of Bengal. Fourth, this movement also penetrated organized Islamic preaching via the Deoband Ulemas and the dissemination of literature containing classical Islamic thoughts. The process of constructing this sense of ummah consciousness was explained by Benedict Anderson (1983) who argues, ‘print media plays an important role in helping the people to imagine themselves as nations (Anderson 1983: 17)’. Regular religio-political preaching and

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dissemination of Islamic literature jointly contributed not only to the dissemination of knowledge of classical Islam, it also fostered the bonds of Muslim unity in British India by underlining the differences between Islam and Hinduism. Thus, the Tayuni movement’s strategic policies raised the political consciousness of ummah to a new height. 3.4.6  Muslim League and the Creation of Pakistan The growing idea of a ‘Muslim nation’ with diverse political approaches served the purpose of the Muslim League, which was originally called the All India Muslim League, and was founded in 1906. The leaders of the League voted in favour of the partition of Bengal in the same year. The ramification of this decision was that Muslims of East Bengal (now Bangladesh) became a separate entity from their Hindu counterparts (who were a majority) in West Bengal (now part of India). During this period, ‘new institutions of higher learning were established which led eventually to a significant expansion of opportunities for Bengali Muslims in the areas of public administration, education, and business’ (Zillur 1985: 841). However, the decision to partition of Bengal was revoked in 1911, which Muslim league leaders read as a Hindu-British conspiracy. As an aftermath, several communal riots broke out between Hindus and Muslims, which eventually forced the British rulers to come up with a two-state solution— a secular India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, also known as the homeland, for Muslims in 1947. It should, however, be mentioned that while this section tends to demonstrate a dominant set of forces within political Islam that raised the demand for a Muslim state for ummah in the colonial period, there were other Islamist political forces opposing a modern Muslim nation state for ummah in British India. Two people are historically significant here. First is the Indian Muslim Maududi. I have explained his idea of an exclusivist ummah in the previous chapter. He founded the Jamaat e Islami movement in 1941 and his goal was to establish an Islamic rule Hukumat-i-­ Ilahiyaa in India. He was against the idea of a Muslim state of Pakistan because he preferred to imagine a world devoid of Western influence. He saw non-Muslims and Muslims who work within a secular model of a modern nation state as the enemy of Islam and not part of ummah. In his view until the world became Dar-al-Islam (world of Islam), ‘Muslims should withdraw from the institutions of secularism and democracy, forms of governance that denied the divine law’ (Metcalf 2007: 289). After the

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partition in 1947, Maududi’s Jamaat Islami immediately reorganized along national lines so that today there are four separate organizations: ‘Jamaat Islami Hind; Jamaat Islami Pakistan; Jamaat Islami Bangladesh; and Jamaat Islami Kashmir’ (Metcalf 2007: 290). The second person who was significant in opposing Pakistan in the British period was Maulana Hussein Ahmad Madani, who was the President of Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, a movement of Islamic scholars in India. Madani supported an undivided India as opposed to the Muslim League’s demand for an independent Pakistan because Madani saw the proposal of establishing Pakistan as a British ploy to divide Indians. He believed that the ‘fundamental institution of contemporary political life was the territorial nation-state’ and India was indeed such a state where the ‘message of Islam can shine’ (Dhulipala 2015; Metcalf 2007: 295). In Madani’s vision for a ‘free Indian state’ people from other religions and cultures could live side-by-side with Muslims, though each community would maintain separate languages, cultures, and legal systems and the Muslim ummah would be guided by an Islamic leadership. Madani’s Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind opposed Muslim League’s Pakistan on what they said anti-Islamic character of Muslim league (Dhulipala 2015).

3.5   The Socio-Political Reasons for the Rise of Ummah It is pertinent to ask why these movements were attractive to Muslims in the colonial period in the first place. Two underlying reasons are to be found here. Firstly, it was the sense that Muslims were socially, economically, and politically ineffective compared to their Hindu counterparts; this Muslim perception served to unite them to transcend their Ashraf and Atrap affiliations. Muslims had a growing feeling that the British, in collaboration with Hindus, were oppressing them. As Khan Zillur (1985) asserts, in ‘colonial India, an overwhelming number of Hindu elites were directing the socioeconomic, political, and administrative affairs for the majority of Bengali Muslims’ (Khan Zillur 1985: 842). The ‘permanent settlement system’ is a case in point. It was a land tenure system introduced by the British and formed under Regulation VIII of 1793. Under this law a peasant was turned into a non-resident cultivator, or ‘tenant’, without any propriety rights and could be ejected from his or her homestead at the will of the zamindar (land lord) (Rahim 2007: 559). As a result, the mostly Muslim peasants were subject to widespread abuse by

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mostly Hindu zamindars (Rahim 2007: 559). Kabir (1987) provides another account of the Hindu-Muslim disparity in Bengal before 1905: Only 4% of the Muslims were literate, out of which 0.25% had an English education. At the same time, the corresponding figures for the Hindu community were 11.9 and 1.8 % respectively. The upper caste Hindus had an even more disproportionate share in their favour. In higher education, the proportion of Muslims was still more deplorable. Although they had a majority in the population, only 4% of all bachelor degree awardees of Calcutta University were Muslims in 1900. Whereas the Banerjees and the Mukherjees, just two groups of Brahmin Hindus, representing less than 1% of the total population, had 12% of the total graduates. Associated with this uneven spread of English education was the glaring disparity in the representation of the two communities in government services and the professions. The monopoly of the Hindus, especially of the upper three castes, can be illustrated by the fact that they held over 80% of the covenanted services staffed by Indians in Bengal at the beginning of this century. Not only that, they also occupied the same proportion of all other high-paying jobs. The Muslim share of trade, industry, and commerce was even more insignificant. In 1911, out of 24 million people involved in trade, manufacturing, and other related professions, only 3,177 were Muslims. (Kabir 1987: 477)

On the basis of these accounts,  one can see a positive relationship between the emergence of ummah consciousness, religious politics, and the lack of political and socio-economic power and freedom for Muslims. As Muslims felt that they were deprived by the people of other religions, who colonized them or made alliances with colonial administrators, they thought only Muslims could bring back their past glories of political and economic freedom, as well as the honour of ruling the land like the Delhi Sultanate had. They expressed disapproval of Western civilization as they thought it stood for colonial oppression and deprivation of their socio-­ economic and political rights. Within this narrative, one could see the inherent tension between Muslims’ perceptions about the world system. They were politically united in the sense that they wanted an end to British rule and also divided in terms of their political approach under various movements such as the Faraizi, Khilafat Movement, Tariqa i Muhammadia, Muslim League, Tayuni movement, and so forth. However, at the same time politicization of their ummah identities enabled them to see local politics with global dimensions. That is why they travelled to the Middle East, the heartland of Islam, either to learn more about ‘pure

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Islam’ or to participate in jihad against enemies of Islam. Through political projects, that is, by Faraizi, Wahabi, Khilafat, or Tayuni, they manipulated the meaning of ummah and influenced local cultures and individuals’ preferences for identity and politics. Therefore, the colonial period was a great example of how the formation of various cross-border political projects of radical, extreme, or moderate natures influenced local politics before the formation of the modern-day nation state.

3.6   The Creation of Bangladesh: A Tale of Divided Ummah Unfortunately, though, the partition of India was not the successful conclusion that had been hoped for or dreamed of by most Bengali Muslims. Following the separation, Muslims of East Bengal, later turned East Pakistan, once again experienced discrimination, this time under their Pakistani rulers. Critics argue that it was in this period that Bengali nationalism became more dominant over the Muslim identity due to the oppression from the Pakistani government. For example, Alam (1993: 93) claims that ‘Islam as an ideology never played a significant role in the political process of the region as long as it remained within the united Pakistan’. This is not true as there were many instances in which the state deployed Pakistan’s ummah identity as a weapon to suppress demands by Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan. For example during the language movement in 1952, when Bengalis revolted at learning that Urdu would become their mother tongue, the then Prime Minister reacted sharply and said, ‘Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu… it is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language’ (Schendel 2013: 179). Bangladeshi scholars such as Khan (1985), Alam (1993), Anisuzzaman (2008), and Moniruzzaman (2009) have also pointed out how Islamic cultural products were promoted by the Pakistani rulers by banning Tagore songs from radio and television; as Tagore’s poetry, songs, and books were promoted as ‘Hindu India’s campaign’ with an aim of breaking the unity of the ummah of Pakistan. Pakistan’s rulers also imposed serious restrictions on the import of printed materials from West Bengal to keep the unity in ummah of Pakistan. On the other side, Bengali nationalists also did not ignore their ummah identity. For example, ‘the manifesto

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of the United Front, the electoral alliance of the Bengali nationalist parties in 1954 outlined in its principle that no legislation shall be enacted repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah, and steps shall be taken to enable citizens to order their lives in accordance with the principle of equality and brotherhood in Islam’ (Islam and Islam 2018: 6). Furthermore, Maulana Bhashani, a founding member of the Bangladesh AL, through his idea of Rabubiyat, preached for the undivided equality of all people. He believed ‘Man is only a custodian, whereas Allah holds ownership over all properties that exist’ (Custers 2010: 231–259). Bhashani’s movement inspired by Islam was able to mobilize masses in the hundreds and thousands. In this period, the case of the Islamist party Jamaat is also interesting. Ghulam Azam, head of the East Pakistan Jamaat e Islami, was imprisoned in 1952 for his contributing role in the language movement that defied government decision to make Urdu the official language (Rahim 2007: 239). He again suffered imprisonment in 1955 for speaking out against political repression by the Pakistani government (Rahim 2007: 239). Even Maududi, the founder of Jamaat and also the chief of Pakistan’s Jamaat e Islami, arrived in Dhaka in February 1956 to attend an all-party Islamic constitutional conference and ‘pledged his support for the recognition of Bengali as an official language and admitted that East Pakistan had suffered discrimination under the Pakistani government’ (Rahim 2007: 240). Thus, political Islam embraced the ethos of nationalism during the time of the language movement and it was similar to the colonial history of Bengal in cutting across all sides. At the time of Bangladesh’s war of independence against Pakistan in 1971, Jamaat’s political stance had shifted sharply. With some support from a fraction of educated young Bengalis in the 1970s, Jamaat launched a massive cultural and ideological offensive against AL’s nationalism. Jamaat positioned itself as authentic bearer of Islam by reasserting and framing the debate around true and false Islam. Ghulam Azam, ‘publicly called the AL an enemy of Islam when Sheikh Mujib announced the ‘Six Points Charter’ and proclaimed jihad against Kafirs (non-Muslims)’ (Rahim 2007: 244). These lines of political rhetoric, which branded the supporters of Bengali nationalism as Hindus and claiming that they were agents against Islam, were used throughout the Pakistan period (1947–1971) against Bengalis by the central government of Pakistan, although Bengalis never left Islam (this claim is backed by surveys conducted in the 1960s and explained in Chap. 5). Even during the war of independence, ‘West Pakistani soldiers were given to understand by their officers that Bengali officers were Hindus

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in disguise, and by waging war against these infidels they would serve the interests of Islam’ (Khan 1985: 837).So the war of independence to Pakistanis was a religious war—saving their perception of the ummah of Pakistan. Jammat, as part of their counter propaganda campaign against Bengali nationalism, before the 1970 election, ran an election campaign in mosques and religious fora but without any success as they’ve failed to secure a single seat. Further, ‘Jamaat began to circulate about 10,000 books and pamphlets per month on Islam and Pakistan free of charge’ (Azam 1968: 45–60). Jamaat said they wanted to purify thoughts of Bengalis and gradually became aggressive. In Regard to the latter, Moniruzzaman (2009) notes, ‘Jamaat even began talking of an Indonesian style civil war, prompting the Indonesia Ambassador in Pakistan to make an appeal at a press conference in Dhaka not to include his country’s name in the political controversies of Pakistan’ (Moniruzzaman 2009: 32–33). When the war broke out in 1971, in Rahim’s analysis, Jamaat undertook a two-level strategy—at one level they embarked on a massive international propaganda campaign to ask Muslim countries to support Pakistani military aggression against Bengalis. As part of their second-level strategy, Jamaat actively supported the Pakistani military (Rahim 2007: 244–245). Rahim (2007) further argues that: To directly bolster the regime’s military operations, the Jamat created several impromptu counter insurgency armed groups, notably, the al Badr, the al-Shams and the Razakars, who were trained and equipped with weapons by the Pakistan army to fight against the Bengali nationals. (Rahim 2007: 245)

During that war, ‘some 3 million civilians were killed by the erstwhile Pakistani occupying forces, while about 200,000 women were raped, and tens of thousands of homes were torched and plundered’ (Kabir 2010). Though these figures are not without criticism (e.g., see Bose 2011; Bergman 2016). Ghulam Azam, the then Chief of Jamaat e Islami East Pakistan and who was to become the ideological guru of Bangladeshi Jamaat e Islami in later years, defended Jamaat’s action in 1971 for six reasons (Azam 1968: 24): • Ideological differences: Jamaat believed that Islam is a complete way of life including politics. That was the premise for not supporting the movement for Bangladesh because it was a movement to establish atheist socialism and secularism. Jamaat believed that these philosophies are contradictory to Iman (faith).

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• Anti-Indian stance: India was not a friend to Pakistan. This was clear from the behaviour of the then Indian Premier Indira Gandhi. Jamaat was very concerned that India would expand its influence on East Pakistan if it were to become liberated and, as a result, supported West Pakistan. • Democratic aspiration not revolution: As the majority of the people of Pakistan lived in East Pakistan, Jamaat was in favour of a democratic contest instead of a military conflict. It thought if East Pakistan could achieve power in a democratic way, it could expand its influence to West Pakistan to pressure more political and economic rights for East Pakistanis. • Security premise: Jamaat believed that if East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan, it would become vulnerable to Indian expansion. Jamaat was concerned about the security of East Pakistan if surrounded by India. • Client state of India: Jamaat was afraid that if East Pakistan to became independent, it would become a client state of India. This would prolong the sufferings of the people of this region further. • Formation of an Islamic society: Jamaat wanted to solve political, economic, and social problems of Pakistan by forming an Islamic society. Jamaat had the firm belief that if honest people executed the law of Allah, socio-economic and political problems could be resolved. It is evident from Azam’s account that Jamaat’s role during 1971 was premised upon an aspiration that circulated around the ideas of Islam, nationalism, and security. Nonetheless, Jamaat failed to stop the creation of Bangladesh and was banned from participating in politics in the newly independent country for several years.

3.7   The Cold War, Oil Crisis, Arab-Israel War, and Formation of the Liberal Ummah in Bangladesh To understand contemporary Bangladesh within the ummah framework, it is important to examine the history of the period from 1972 to 1990 when Bangladesh started to amend its foreign policy priorities by shifting away from close cooperation with communist Russia to make new friends in the Middle East and the United States. Such amendments to the Bangladesh foreign policy are connected by two wars: the Yom Kippur War and the US-sponsored Taliban jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan

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(a ripple of the Cold War). This was the time when Bangladesh as a state framed specific foreign policy to be part of the ummah of Muslim states and used financial support from wealthy Muslim countries to develop itself under Islamic ethos. Therefore, this section will show how external policies for liberal ummah were framed through the Bangladeshi state under key political leaders. In Chaps. 4, 5 and 6, it will show in detail how the state became a significant actor in promoting Islamization of Bangladesh. Since all governments in power after 1990  in Bangladesh followed the similar pattern of politics, I have confined the historic description of the formation of liberal ummah within 1990. Immediately after independence in 1971, against the backdrop of an economic depression and quest to repair a war-torn country, the Bangladeshi government bid to attract foreign aid from the oil states of the Middle East by promoting its commitment to the ummah. However, there were problems. Bangladesh enshrined secularism in its constitution as a state principle. Against the backdrop of tension between the Middle East and Israel (with Israel being backed by the West) the Muslim countries of the Middle East perceived Bangladesh’s commitment to secularism is a demonstration of its non-commitment to ummah and commitment to the secular West. When Bangladesh chose to break away from Muslim Pakistan with the help of India (which is predominantly Hindu), this provided further evidence to some that Bangladesh was not committed to ummah. These perceptions were an outcome of an international campaign by Jamaat leaders who went abroad after the war of independence and wanted to delegitimize the AL government that had formed in the newly independent country (Rahim 2007). Jamaat was successful in this regard as Kamal Hossain, who was a Foreign Minister of Sheikh Mujib’s government in independent Bangladesh, asserted that Saudi Arabia kept pressuring Bangladesh to remove secularism from its constitution as the condition for having Saudi Arabia recognize Bangladesh and establish diplomatic relations (Hossain 2013: 191–196). In other words, Muslim countries did not see Bangladesh as a member of ummah immediately after the war of independence. However, in reality, secularism in Bangladesh was not devoid of Islam and the war against Pakistan was a rejection of economic and political oppression, not a rejection of the Islamic faith and identity of Bangladeshi Muslims. The core leadership of the AL have interpreted secularism as an Islamic concept, though there is a tendency within the leftist element of the AL to interpret secularism through a religiously neutral paradigm. There shall be an in-depth discussion on this in the next chapter.

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To counter the false perception that Bangladesh was not committed to ummah, Sheikh Mujibur prioritized a foreign policy trend after independence of promoting Bangladesh’s obligation to ummah. To gain the support and recognition of Arab countries, the government of Mujibur sent a ‘four member delegation to attend an Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Cairo in 1972’ to lobby Muslim countries (Kaur 2000: 156). In 1973, Mujibur ‘made personal calls on King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, President Sadat of Egypt, Col. Gaddafi of Libya and the Lebanese Prime Minister which resulted in what might be called the melting of the ice’ (Kaur 2000: 159). During the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 Mujibur used symbolic gestures that were designed to signify his deep commitment to ummah. Those gestures included strongly condemning Israeli aggression, sending 100,000 pounds of tea to Egypt and Syria as a token of love to the Arab Muslim brothers, and sending a team of doctors to help the Arabs (Jahan 1973: 134; Kaur 2000: 160). Mujibur’s support to Arabs during the Yom Kippur War gained Bangladesh Arab confidence. Though widely misunderstood as a secular leader (more will be explained in next chapter), Mujibur joined the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Pakistan in 1974. Due to Mujibur’s persistent demonstration of his commitment to ummah major Muslim countries such as Iraq, South Yemen, North Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Algeria, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, and Oman recognized Bangladesh before Mujibur’s death in 1975 (Kaur 2000: 158–161). Even Saudi Arabia, which did not recognize Bangladesh until 1975, took a softer approach and donated US$10 million as disaster relief to Bangladesh in 1974. Although Bangladeshi scholars argue that Mujibur’s approach to Muslim states was tactical and strategic, I dismiss the claim and show in next chapter that Mujibur was first and foremost a Muslim leader. His politics and biography demonstrate asserting ummah politics was a moral choice for him. After Mujibur’s death in 1975, when Ziaur Rahman, the founder of the BNP, came into power, he firmly aligned Bangladesh with the Middle East (more on this in Chap. 5). Later, President Ershad, who ruled the country from 1982 to 1990, maintained Ziaur’s foreign policy. After assuming power, Ziaur asserted Bangladesh’s allegiance to ummah through a constitutional amendment. The constitution reads that ‘the state shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve, and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity’ (Alam 1993: 100). This is the official formation and endorsement of what can be identified as liberal ummah. Its greater goal is to strengthen Islamic solidarity among Muslim

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states. To win the approval of Middle Eastern countries, the regimes of Ziaur and Ershad often collaborated with the Jamaat, which maintained healthy connections with the Middle East (Rahim 2007: 248). In time, these regimes became overwhelmingly dependent on foreign aid, the bulk of which came from Middle Eastern, oil rich, and more radical Muslim states (Alam 1993). The price of this aid was the acceptance of greater Islamic influence in Bangladesh that will be described further in Chap. 6. It was Bangladesh’s growing cultural and economic relations (aid and labour export) with the oil-producing Middle Eastern Muslim countries that spurred state-sponsored Islamic activities to promote Bangladesh’s ummah identity locally. In sum, due to Bangladesh’s commitment to ummah between 1972 and 1990, Bangladesh received visits from high-level dignitaries from various Muslim countries. These included: a three-day visit by Indonesia’s President Suharto in 1979; the visit of foreign ministers and officials from 41 Muslim countries to Bangladesh for the 14th Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conference, held in Dhaka on December 6–10, 1983; the visit of the president of the UAE and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat in 1984; and the visit of Turkish PM Turgut Ozal to Bangladesh in 1986. During this period, the country also signed a number of trade deals involving such things as shipping, manufacturing, and industrial cooperation with Muslim countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Indonesia. The Saudis offered $300 million in aid in 1979, and Turkey offered $60 million in loans to buy consumer items and capital machinery from Turkey. In 1985  in Riyadh, the Saudi-Bangladesh Joint Economic Commission offered a $62 million loan for oil and gas exploration. The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has offered loans to Bangladesh. According to an estimate of the Ministry of Planning, aid from OPEC countries from 1971 to 1978 resulted in total of US$186.3 million. However, following Bangladesh’s intense international campaign from 1981 to 1984, which underscored its deep commitment to ummah, OPEC aid to Bangladesh has increased to US$745.9 million. The major part of this aid was in the form of grants. In 1987, President Ershad paid an official visit to the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), which was the first visit by a Bangladeshi head of state and seen as a significant move towards opening up new avenues for trade, culture, and economic cooperation. Such visits aimed at increasing Bangladesh’s economic opportunity, opening the door for Bangladeshis to work in the Middle East and contribute to the inflow of remittances. As a result of these visits, Iraq agreed to recruit 11,000 Bangladeshi workers in 1984.

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Bangladesh also cultivated its ummah identity in multilateral forums. In 1978, Muslim countries fully backed Bangladesh’s efforts to attain a Security Council seat at the United Nations. Bangladesh’s candidacy was supported and endorsed by the ninth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held in Dakar in 1978. In 1986, at the 16th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), held in Morocco, Bangladesh’s foreign minister proposed a seven-point economic security programme for Islamic countries. Bangladesh also emphasized the inalienable rights of Palestinians. In the view of Chowdhury (2011), a prominent Bangladesh political scientist, wealthy Muslim states not only support Bangladesh through official channels of aid for the development of infrastructure projects but also fund ‘religious parties, madrasahs and Islamic NGOs’ to foster ummah consciousness in private capacities. Why did wealthy Muslim states initiate cross-border Islamization? The reason was embedded in the geopolitics of ummah. During the Yom Kippur War, the United States, and some other Western countries supported Israel and, in response, Arab countries imposed an oil embargo on the United States and Holland. The embargo was lifted in March 1974, but a shock went through Western economies. According to Macalister (2011), ‘the decision to boycott America and punish the west in response to support for Israel in the Yom Kippur war against Egypt led the price of crude to rise from 3 per barrel to 12 by 1974’. It was ‘during this time that oil became the Arab’s geopolitical lever, making the gulf monarchies the world’s nouveau riche’ (Khanna 2008: 237). Arab countries began exercising greater influence, and one of their tools of influence was the financing of missionary programmes in various Muslim countries (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990: 806). The Islamization of Bangladeshi society, politics, and culture should thus be read as a two-way process involving Bangladesh’s assertion of ummah ­foreign policy and an attempt by Arab states to use money and Islam to strengthen their geopolitical interests. This claim is well acknowledged by Villanger (2007: 19).

3.8   Globalization of the War on Terror and Radical and Extreme Ummahs Since end of the Cold War, and against the backdrop of the global expansion of the War on Terror, the growth of political Islam in Bangladesh has been phenomenal. According to one researcher, there were ‘up to 100 Islamist parties in Bangladesh in 2006’ (Riaz 2008: 29); however, only a few parties, which adhere to Islamic terms and symbols in their titles, participate in the election process. Among these parties, in the 2001 election,

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the Jamaat and the Islami Oikyo Jot (IoJ) won seats in parliament (the Jamaat claimed 17 and the IOJ another 2 out of 300 seats). During that time, the Jamaat became an influential coalition partner of the BNP (which had won 193 seats) to help it form government. Thereafter, two members of parliaments from the Jamaat held ministerial posts during the BNP-led government until 2006. However, in the 2008 election, the Jamaat was the only Islamist party to win any seat in parliament. The decline in the electoral fortunes of openly Islamist parties does not indicate the demise of political Islam in Bangladesh, nor does it reflect the level of influence of political Islamists. With changes in geopolitics fostered by the forces of globalization, Bangladesh is witnessing a new and different age of political Islam with radical and violent outfits. We can detect the beginnings of this age with the rise of militant groups who lodged terrorist attacks on a Bangladeshi court with the aim of replacing it with sharia court and democracy promoters such as the United Nation. More about these groups will be discussed in Chap. 7.

3.9   Conclusion It has shown that Bangladesh’s experience with ummahs is related to a complex web of geopolitical factors and historic junctures. This chapter further discussed that from the British period up to the formation of an independent Bangladesh in 1971, Bangladeshi population were positioned within the multiple waves of ummahs and nationalism. After the independence the Bangladeshi state made an alliance with powerful Muslim nation states by forming an Islamic foreign policy that had several implications for the domestic politics including Islamization by public and private entities. The first and most important ramification in this regard is that in the absence of an authoritative interpretation of how Islam can coexist with liberal freedoms and basic human rights, Islam was used by politicians to create the space for more radical (and violent) ummahs to influence the political game in Bangladesh. Secondly, framing public policies through religious terms and promotion of Islamic culture in the public sphere of the country has increased a dichotomous relationship between state-given identity and citizenship. As a result, surveys (more on that in Chaps. 6 and 7) indicate that most Bangladeshis support political Islam which means they are more inclined to the idea of ummah politically. Finally, the promotion of ummah consciousness has made both the AL and the BNP form alliances with traditional Islamist parties, thereby making them (the AL and the BNP) moderate political Islamist parties.

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The logic of the following chapters is premised upon two interrelated factors. First, Chaps. 4 and 5 will argue that major party leaders of the AL and the BNP harness an ummah consciousness as a result of seeing themselves as Muslims first. As mentioned in Chap. 2, ummah consciousness is the first stage of critiquing the Westphalian narrative and reinforcing Islamic values and ideas within individual, social and political realms. The second stage of that ummah consciousness is about making connections with like-minded international and transnational organizations and individuals to foster Islamic values locally. Within this multifaceted framework, the next three chapters will demonstrate how Bangladeshi Muslim politicians frame their public profiles, party platforms, and eventually, the state policies in Islamic terms. These three chapters will demonstrate how Bangladesh can be explained through the framework of liberal ummah. Chapter 7 will showcase how against the backdrop of mainstream support of Islamization of Bangladesh politics, non-state actors promote political Islam in the name of multiple ummahs. In short, the rest of the chapters of this book will show how Muslims in a Muslim-majority state frame their politics with inspiration from a non-Western Islamic concept in which Islam is used as a key reference point. In short, the ramifications of ummah(s) in Bangladesh explain how ummah shapes Bangladesh politics in a form that is neither liberal nor democratic, but Islamic.

References Ahamed, Emajuddin and Nazneen, D.R.J.A. (1990) ‘Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics?’, Asian Survey, 30(8): 795–808 Ahmad, Zafar (2000) Islam and Muslims in South Asia, India: Authorspress Ahmed, Rafiuddin (2001) Understanding the Bengal Muslims: Interpretive Essays, New Delhi: Oxford University Press Ahsan, Manzur (2006) ‘Tariqah Muhammadiya,’ Banglapedia, http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya (Accessed on May 12, 2018) Alam, Shamsul (1993) ‘Islam, Ideology and the State of Bangladesh’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 18(1–2): 88–106 Ali, Mohar (1985) History of the Muslims in Bengal, Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso Books Anisuzzaman (2008) ‘Claiming and Disclaiming a Cultural Icon: Tagore in East Pakistan and Bangladesh’, University of Toronto Quarterly, 77(4): 1058–1069 Azam, G. (1968) A Guide to the Islamic Movement, Dhaka: Azami Publications

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Bergman, David (2016) ‘The Politics of Bangladesh’s Genocide Debate’, The New York Times, April 5, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/opinion/ the-politics-of-bangladeshs-genocide-debate.html (Accessed on 17/12/2018) Bose, Sarmila (2011) Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, London: Hurst Chowdhury, Mahfuzul H (2011) ‘Muslim but Religiously Liberal’, Development and Cooperation, http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/saudi-money-makes-differencebangladesh-radical-islam-not-strong-political-force (accessed November 25, 2019) Custers, Peter (2010) ‘Maulana Bhashani and the Transition to Secular Politics in East Bengal’, The Indian Economic & Social History Review, 47(2): 231–259. Dhulipala, Venkat (2015) ‘How the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind Fought Against the Partition of India’, The Caravan, March 8, https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/madani-jinnah-muslim-league-partition (Accessed on 7/12/2018) Eaton, Richard M. (2001) ‘Who are the Bengal Muslims? Conversion and Islamization in Bengal’, in Ahmed, Rafiuddin (Eds.) Understanding the Bengal Muslims: Interpretive Essays, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 26–51 Faruki, Kemal (1987) ‘Pakistan: Islamic Government and Society’, In John Esposito (ed.) Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 53–78 Hossain, Kamal (2013) Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, Dhaka: The University Press Limited Islam, Md Nazrul and Islam, Md Saidul (2018) ‘Politics and Islamic Revivalism in Bangladesh: The Role of the State and Non-State/Non-Political Actors’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 19(3): 326–353 Jahan, Rounaq (1973) ‘Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State’, Asian Survey, 13(2): 199–210 James, Helen (2009) ‘The Assassination of Lord Mayor: The First Jihad?’, International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, 5(2): 1–19 Jones, Kenneth W. (1989) Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Kabir, M. G (1987) ‘Religion, language and nationalism in Bangladesh’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 17(4): 473–487 Kabir, Shahriar (2010) ‘Bangladesh Holocaust of ‘71’, The Daily Star, https:// www.thedailystar.net/freedom-in-the-air/stories/58023 (Accessed on 17/ 12/2018) Karim, Lamia (2004) ‘Democratizing Bangladesh State, NGOs, and Militant Islam’, Cultural Dynamics, 16(2–3): 291–318 Kaur, Jagir (2000) ‘Foreign Policy of Bangladesh’, PhD thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/19030 (Accessed on 16/12/2018) Khan, Muhammad Mojlum (2013) The Muslim Heritage of Bengal: The Lives, Thoughts and Achievements of Great Muslim Scholars, Writers and Reformers of Bangladesh and West Bengal, Leicestershire: Kube Publishing Limited

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Khan, Muin-ud-Din Ahmed (2012) ‘Faraizi Movement’, Banglapedia, http://en. banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Faraizi_Movement (Accessed on 9/03/2013) Khan, Raisuddin K.M. (1986) Bangladesh Etihash Porikroma (Bangladesh in the Course of History), Dhaka: Khan Brothers and Company Khan, Zillur (1985) ‘Islam and Bengali Nationalism’, Asian Survey, 25(8): 834–831 Khanna, Parag (2008) The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, New York: Random House Macalister, Terry (2011) ‘Background: What caused the 1970s oil price shock?,’ The Guardian, March 3, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/ mar/03/1970s-oil-price-shock (Accessed on December 16, 2019) Metcalf, B (2007) ‘Imagining Muslim Futures: Debates Over State and Society at the End of the Raj’, Historical Research, 80(208): 286–298 Moniruzzaman, Mohammad (2009) ‘Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh Issues, Manifestation and Consequences’, South Asian Survey, 16 (1): 81–99 Rahim, Aminur (2007) ‘Communalism and Nationalism in Bangladesh’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 42(6): 551–572 Riaz, Ali (2008) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web, London and New York: Routledge ——— (2009) Interactions of ‘Transnational’ and ‘Local’ Islam in Bangladesh in Transnational Islam, Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research Sayyid, Bobby S. (1997) A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London: Zed Books Schendel, Van W. (2013) ‘Party Over State’, in Guhathakurta, M. and van Schendel, W. (Eds.) The Bangladesh Reader: History, Culture, Politics (The World Readers), Durham: Duke University Press, 288–290 Shah, Mohammad (2001) ‘The Bengal Muslims and the World of Islam: Pan-­ Islamic Trends in Colonial Bengal as Reflected in the Press’, in Ahmed, Rafiuddin (Ed.) Understanding the Bengal Muslims, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 86–112 Sonn, Tamara (2004) A Brief History of Islam, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing​ Villanger, Espen (2007) Arab foreign aid: disbursement patterns, aid policies and motives. In Forum for Development Studies, CMI: Norway

CHAPTER 4

Awami League, Ummah, and Political Islam

4.1   Introduction Chapters 4 and 5 shows how Islamic agencies1 of key Bangladeshi leaders have shaped Bangladesh’s political context to be resistant to liberal democracy and promote rigid  (not enlightned) Islamic values. This chapter shows how top leaders of the Awami League (AL) see themselves as part of ummah and situate party platforms within the critic of Western modernity and democracy. The AL is one of the oldest and most influential political parties in the country. Many Bangladeshi scholars consider the AL to be the secular political force in the country. I argue that by emphasizing the secularity of the AL, this group of Bangladeshi experts misrepresent a dominant ideological character of the party. In short, this chapter argues that the AL should be considered a party that promotes political Islam. As an illustration of the philosophy of the AL, in the last week of April 2019 I made a brief trip to Berlin, Germany. The aim was to meet two ‘blasphemous’ writers and poets who had to leave Bangladesh because they offended Islam through their creative writing. For most of his adult life, the younger writer (in his mid-40s) thought the AL was a party that supports progressive ideas and disavows religious politics, but he later realized that he was very wrong. He was an atheist blogger who criticized the Prophet and Islam through his blog posts 1  In the context of the book I refer Islamic Agency refers to capacity of Muslim leaders to perform religio-political acts.

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Hasan, Islam and Politics in Bangladesh, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5_4

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r­ egularly. ‘Look at me! I had to flee Bangladesh in the middle of a night to India through a land border under the AL regime in 2015’, that young writer told me. We were discussing his story in a hotel lobby in Berlin. According to him, when the Islamist extremists had begun their killing campaign against the atheist writers, bloggers, and publishers in 2013, AL’s leader and Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said publicly that offense to Islam will not be tolerated because Islam is her religion too. She further said that she feels bad when someone is hurting Islam. ‘Hearing that I was afraid… so afraid’, that younger writer said adding, ‘in my view, by publicly stating that kind of statements Hasina was subtly encouraging militant activities against the atheist writers’. That writer told me that after Hasina’s public statement, intelligence agents and police regularly heckled him as if he was a criminal. Militants released a hit list of 80 atheist bloggers and writers in which he was featured. So at his first chance, he said he fled to India in 2015 and later to Germany. ‘I felt betrayed by the AL’, he said adding, ‘later in my exile life, when I have plenty of time to reflect upon those petrifying days in Bangladesh I came to realize that the AL uses secularism to thwart opposition, but they are as Islamic as BNP. In reality, AL does not believe in secularism’. That writer believes that a handful of a new generation of secular and atheist writers and bloggers were manipulated by the party; the AL was willing to make a temporary social alliance with them since those atheists were leading a social movement called Shahbagh in support of the death penalty of the convicted leaders of the Jamaat e Islam for committing crime against humanity during the 1971 war. However, ‘when the trial and death penalties were over AL thwarted the movement and they disowned us at a time when Islamist militants were on a killing spree’, that blogger said. Two days before that interview with the younger blogger, I met an ageing Bangladeshi writer and poet Daud Haider who also lives in exile in Berlin. He invited me for a late lunch in an Albanian restaurant in a migrant suburb in Berlin. That was the first time we were physically meeting though we had talked several times over the phone beforehand. He is around 67–68 years old—a medium built person with head full of grey hairs. To many Bangladeshi observers his story is odd, mysterious, and unexpected. In his young age, he was a supporter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—father of Sheikh Hasina. Daud’s  family members are well-­ known liberal activists and well-connected within the affluent middle-class Bengalis. In 1974 he was working as an editor of a literary page of a Bangladeshi newspaper Daily Sangbad. In that newspaper he published a

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poem titled Kalo Shurjer Kalo Josnar Kalo Bonnay (Haidar 1974: 20). A close translation of the title is dark flood under the dark full moon under the dark sun. ‘The point of the poem was to demonstrate that religion is the force of all darks or evils and prophets of all religions including Islam were master of deception,’ Daud was telling me after 45 years of the publication of that poem while we were walking in a tourist site at the remaining of the Berlin wall memorial. Daud said following the publication of that poem for a week there was no reaction. But after that ‘all hell broke loose on me, I was interrogated by intelligence officers, I was put in jail, and eventually I was kicked out of the country and since then was never been allowed to go back’, Daud said, who looked tired of his long exiled life. In his memoir Daud wrote he was among the masses with flowers in his hand to greet the return of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to the country after the war in 1972. During our conversations which lasted for two days, I asked Daud why did not he go back when the AL later came in power as it seemed to me he still nourishes sympathy for the party. In reply Daud said to me that he had an encounter to a top party leadership in Munich in 2013 and he was told the AL would not allow anti-Islamic writer like him back to the country. It is beyond my capacity to verify Daud’s claim. Interestingly both these writers had to flee Bangladesh at a time when the country was constitutionally secular and under the AL regime. These cases, however, demonstrate a pattern in which the AL disavows writers who in their view offend Islam or deem as anti-Islamic by public. This pattern of the AL politics is persistent and as we could see from Daud’s case it was in effect in the 1970s and it still is in effect. Although it may seem perplexing, there are reasons for this pattern. Until recently, any discussion about Bangladeshi secularism in academia and policy circles was associated with the AL. According to this view, the AL is the secular force of the country that is fighting to curb political Islam by keeping Bangladesh’s liberal credentials afloat. Three strong points are made in support of this argument. First, the party sets secularism as one of the state’s guiding principles by asserting it in the constitution in 1972 and again in 2011. Second, in its own constitution the party ‘pledges to build a secular, democratic society and state-system imbued with the spirit of Liberation War’ and for that reason it is perceived to appeal to the ‘secular voting base’ of the country (Lorch 2018: 1; Jahan and Shahan 2014: 432). Third, the party has set up a special court—an international Crimes Tribunal (ICT)—to try the ‘war criminals’ who collaborated with the Pakistani military during the 1971 war of independence in Bangladesh.

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Most of those convicted by the ICT were given the death penalty court and those convicted included several top leaders of Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami—the country’s largest Islamist party. At the time of writing this book, the election commission had cancelled Jamaat’s registration and there is a discussion going on to hold Jamaat responsible for its party’s role in committing crimes against humanity during the war of independence. To many, this is a manifestation of AL’s commitment to uphold the spirit of secularism as the AL evidently placed a check on the growth of Jamaat’s politics in Bangladesh. Furthermore, staunch and steady support to the AL by the country’s major secular social forces like Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmool Committee (the committee for the elimination of the collaborators of 1971) and Shammilito Shangshkritik Jot (or the United Cultural alliance) contributed in strengthening the perception of the secularity of the AL. In fact, AL’s secular image is so strong among researchers that when the AL recently was seen giving space to Hefazat e Islam, as mentioned in the opening chapter, researchers such as Lorch (2018) considered it as a recent shift, not an old phenomenon of Islamization by this party. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, this chapter showcases AL’s history of solid Islamic credentials and its firm commitment to promote political Islam in Bangladesh. This chapter further contradicts the claim that the anti-Jamaat politics of the AL is evidence of its commitment to secular politics. The history of the party confirms that the top leadership of the AL, namely Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his daughter Sheikh Hasina, see themselves first and foremost as Muslim leaders and members of ummah. For that reason, through state policies and party platforms both leaders have persisted in setting an Islamic political discourse in Bangladesh while maintaining Bangladesh’s commitment to ummah. While it is a fact that the AL harnesses secularism and maintains animosity with Jamaat, I argue that it is part of a strategic tactic and does not imply that the AL is committed to secularism. This strategy pays off well for the AL for a number of reasons. First, Bangladesh’s non-Muslim-majority neighbour, India, supports the AL unequivocally as India is very sensitive about Jamaat. Jamaat has an alleged history of working with India’s arch rival Pakistan and its intelligence agency ISI. Second, against the backdrop of the changing geopolitics after the horrific 9/11 terror attacks on US soil, as the Islamist politics came under more scrutiny from liberal democracies, AL’s ‘secular image’ (based on its constitutional commitment and anti-Jamaat politics) placed the party in the good books of

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the West. The AL and its associate forces have campaigned to portray BNP’s electoral alliance with Jamaat as a demagogic force that propounds political Islam and dislocates secular politics in the country, though in reality as this chapter shows the AL too is a supporter and promoter of political Islam. Third, following the Arab Spring, when the government by the Islamist party Muslim Brotherhood was ousted in Egypt with support from the monarchs of the Arab states, those monarchs and dictators have tolerated AL’s strategy of crushing the Islamist Jamaat in Bangladesh. Although Jamaat has maintained a strong influence among the Arab monarchs previously, the political dynamics of the post-Arab Spring where Islamists are seen as the enemy of the monarchs has shifted this international support paradigm for Jamaat. This chapter shows how the AL constituted itself as a moderate Islamist party, supported anti-Zionism in its foreign policy, aligned Bangladesh with Muslim-majority states in the Middle East, patronized the Islamization of Bangladeshi society, and extended its political support to other conventional Islamist parties and religiously conservative forums. Finally, this chapter will further demonstrate that in order to maintain its strategy of Islamization, the AL defines secularism as part of Islam. Within this policy framework, other parties’ politics and state policies are considered to have Islamic biases and AL’s idea of secularism could thrive. Therefore, AL’s version of secularism should be considered as an Islamic liberalism—a manifestation of its commitment to liberal ummah, not secularism in the Western sense.

4.2   A Historical Synopsis of the Awami League In 1949, a group of Bengali Muslim League2 leaders formed the AL after realizing that the Muslim League’s leadership in West Pakistan was intent on turning East Pakistan into a ‘new colony’3 even though 56% of the 2  Muslim League was founded in 1905 to represent the separate interests of the Indian Muslims in British India. Muslim leaders from what is now known as Bangladesh and Pakistan jointly proposed a separate state for Muslims, and their demand culminated in the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Engineer (1975) in Islam: Muslim: India gives a detailed account of the Muslim League’s aspirations for Pakistan, whereas Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s newly published memoirs outline how Bengali Muslim League leaders felt cheated by their Pakistani counterpart after the creation of Pakistan. 3  Maniruzzaman (2011: 10–11), Alam (1991: 470–476), Kabir (1987: 481–483), and Hossain (2013: 15–79) provide several accounts of the socio-economic disparity between

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total population of Pakistan used to live in East Pakistan (Hossain 2013: 6). In 1953, the word ‘Muslim’ was dropped from the party name to attract non-Muslim Bengalis of East Pakistan. The intention was to form a political platform that would foster the interests of East Pakistan. AL’s attempt was successful, and the accounts of Hossain (2013) and Maniruzzaman (2011) show that the AL led a series of political struggles by Bengalis of East Pakistan against the oppressive West Pakistani administration between 1950 and 1970. When these protests eventually culminated in a war between the two parts of Pakistan, Bangladesh was born as an independent country on December 16, 1971. The result of this was that East Pakistan ceased to exist and the AL leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, became prime minister (PM) and later president of Bangladesh as he had led various political struggles of Bengalis in the pre-independence era. However, unfortunately, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, on the night of August 15, 1975, Sheikh Mujibur and 17 members of his family were murdered in a military coup. His two daughters—Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana—survived the attack (they were both abroad at time) and Sheikh Hasina took over as AL’s leader in 1981 after her return to the country. Today, Hasina leads the party as party president. She is also the current PM of Bangladesh and installed a hybrid regime. This is not the first time that Hasina has been PM of Bangladesh; she was PM in 1996–2001 and 2008–2023. In total, since Bangladesh’s independence, the AL has formed the government of Bangladesh five times—1972–1975 (headed by Mujibur), 1996–2001 (headed by Hasina), 2008–2013 (also headed by Hasina), 2014–2019 (headed by Hasina) and currently 2019–2023 (headed by Hasina). The party has a wide and popular support base across Bangladesh. To some extent, its strength can be measured by the percentage of the total vote won by the AL in national elections held since 1990. Data received from the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) shows that the party captured 30.08% of total votes in 1991, 37.44% of votes in 1996, 40.13% in 2001, and 49.02% in 2009 (Ahmed 2010: 41–114, 231–232). Since all opposition boycotted 2014 election and the 2019 election the two regions of Pakistan. That disparity was acknowledged by the then Secretary-General of the People’s Party in West Pakistan, who publicly admitted in the 1950s that ‘we have seen that it is not a matter of offended sentiment but a hard fact that East Pakistan is indeed a colony’ (Maniruzzaman 2011: 11).

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was rigged, there is little point to present the voting share of the AL in those elections. This brief historical account of the AL shows that in Bangladesh politics the AL is a major stakeholder. Therefore, in order to understand the politics of Bangladesh, AL’s approach to the ummah, Islam, and politics requires greater attention.

4.3   Organizational Structure In the AL, a president heads the party and a 13-member presidium committee advises the party president. The executive body of the party comprises 32 members who manage the daily business of the party with the assistance of several other subgroups. These are the Bangladesh Women League; the Awami Volunteers League; the Awami Lawyers Forum; the Bangladesh Weavers’ League; the Bangladesh Youth League; the Bangladesh Youth League for Women; the Workers’ League; and the Students’ League. Thus, the support base of the AL is carefully crafted to cut across key segments of Bangladeshi society including students, youth, labour groups, and women.

4.4   Aims and Key Principles The party asserts that it pursues the following four aims (AL 2009: 1): (a) protecting the independence and geographic sovereignty of Bangladesh; (b) protecting the constitutional rights of the people because the general public owns the republic of Bangladesh; (c) ensuring freedom of all types including political, economic, social, and cultural for the people of Bangladesh and ensuring the welfare of the people; and (d) building a secular democratic society and state under the spirit of the Liberation War. In light of the above party goals, the AL in its constitution defines itself ‘as a political party committed to formulate and implement policies upholding progressive thinking of the Bangladeshi society’ (AL 1987: 21). The party claims that four key principles—democracy, secularism, socialism, and Bengali nationalism—form the foundation of AL’s progressiveness. Among these four principles, socialism has lost its relevance because of Bangladesh’s integration into the liberal market economy. The following paragraphs explain how the AL defines democracy, Bengali nationalism, and secularism. Democracy: According to the AL, it aims to develop a democratic system reflecting the spirit of section 11 of Bangladesh’s constitution (AL

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2009: 17).4 In order to establish such a system, the AL claims that it would take the following steps: (a) It will make sure freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion for all citizens is ensured. (b) It will ensure media freedom. (c) It will protect universal human rights for every citizen and defend against any attempt to violate human rights. (d) It will take action against corruption. (e) It will keep working to establish good governance. (f) It will keep parliament at the heart of any AL government’s structure. (g) It will establish gender equality, ensure women’s empowerment, and increase women’s participation at policy level. Bengali Nationalism: The AL constructs the idea of Bengali nationalism by reference to the political struggles of Bengalis in the pre-­ independence period. The party argues that a series of political movements, such as the 1952 language movement,5 the Six-Point Charter movement,6 and the non-cooperation movement,7 were instrumental in defining Bengali nationalism (AL 2009: 2–5). The party also asserts that Sheikh

4  Section 11 of the Bangladesh Constitution states: ‘The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person shall be guaranteed, and in which effective participation by the people through their elected representatives in administration at all levels shall be ensured.’ (Bangladesh Constitution 2011: 4). 5  The language movement refers to the resistance of Bengali students towards the Pakistani government’s official declaration that made Urdu the official language of Pakistan. Bengali was the mother tongue of East Pakistanis (Helal 2006). 6  In 1966, the AL, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur, created a six-point charter for regional autonomy. His six points included: (a) re-introduction of a parliamentary form of government and universal adult franchise; (b) the creation of a national government with only two departments—defense and foreign affairs—and for all residual powers to reside in the two Pakistani states; (c) separate currencies for the two states; (d) separate state banks; (e) control of taxation by the states and independence for them in international trade (Maniruzzaman 2011: 24). 7  Sheikh Mujibur announced a ‘non-cooperation movement’ in March 1971. This included the closure of all offices, courts, and educational institutions (Hossain and Hossain 2012).

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Mujibur Rahman was the founding father of Bengali nationalism (AL 2009: 17). Secularism: AL’s vision for secularism was first endorsed by Syed Nazrul Islam who, on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was acting president for the provisional  government of Bangladesh in India.8 Islam used the English word ‘secularism’ in his Bengali speech delivered on April 17, 1971, on the day of the formation of the Bangladeshi government in exile. In this regard, he said: After years of struggle we have reaffirmed our commitment to the great ideal of secularism before the world. You have to be committed to this great idea. You have to be vigilant about not associating names of any Awami League leaders with heinous crimes of religious discrimination. Secularism is democracy. A political context with religious discrimination can never be democratic. Today we believe in democracy and therefore we ought to believe in secularism. For that reason, you, the Awami League leaders, have to work hard to prove your commitment to secularism. By believing in secularism, you will be able to prove to every Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist and Christian of Bengal that you are their friends. (Islam Nazurl 1973a: 11)

In a separate speech, Nazrul Islam reiterated a similar explanation of secularism, ‘when Bangladesh is independent, there will be no religious discrimination. Every Christian, Muslim, and Hindu will enjoy religious freedom in their personal and social lives’ (Islam Nazrul 1973b: 1). Later, when Mujibur was released from a Pakistani jail after the birth of the independent Bangladesh, Mujibur explained AL’s definition of secularism more clearly (or somewhat differently). He said: Secularism does not mean the absence of religion. If you are a Mussalman, you perform your religious rites. The Hindus, the Christians, the Buddhists all will freely perform their religious rites. There is no irreligiousness on the soil of Bangladesh but there is secularism. (O’Connell cited in Ahmed 2001: 188)

The above-mentioned accounts of Islam and Mujibur underscore that, to the AL, secularism refers to freedom of practicing religion. 8  On April 10, 1971, AL leaders who fled from East Pakistan to India against the backdrop of West Pakistan’s military operation in East Pakistan formed a Bangladeshi government in exile to establish leadership of Bengali resistance against the Pakistani military (Faiquzzaman 2012).

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4.5   Discrepancies between Rhetoric, Reality, and Practice There is little doubt that on the surface AL’s aims and key principles tend to convey a message that it is a liberal democratic party that thrives on secularism. However, what these aims and principles mean in practice requires further investigation. There needs to be further theoretical exploration of secularism because one needs to identify key sentiments underneath the espoused secular values in order to appreciate the validity of AL’s practice of secularism in Bangladesh. It is widely agreed that one of the key proponents of secularism is separation of religion and state. Tschannen (1991) in his ontological essay argues that the paradigm of secularism is based on ‘differentiation’ or separation of religion and state and this principle of differentiation is at the centripetal of the evolution of a secular society. Such ideological rationalization of secularism has two significant implications for society. Firstly, a rational worldview promotes a hypothesis and testing view of the world as distinguished from one based on faith. Secondly, when this rational and scientific interpretation of the world is applied to human affairs, we witness a process which attempts to determine social life in a rational fashion (Tschannen 1991: 402). Tschannen argues that the emergence of this worldliness derives from un-belief in God against the backdrop of the emergence of rational science and rational socialization process. However, it is necessary to note that there are variations in degrees and magnitude in approaching this secularism theory in human societies. Similar to Tschannen (1991), Casanova (2009) opines that secular establishments include states, economy, science, art, entertainment, health, and welfare, and so on. By secularism, Casanova (2009) refers to a combination of varieties of secular worldviews constructed in particular times in the Enlightenment period of European history and applied in state projects until now. The key ethos of a secular state is to differentiate constitution and judicial systems from religious faith and practice. In other words, a secular state ideology sees religion as either an irrational force or a non-rational form of discourse that should be banished from the ­democratic public sphere. Casanova classifies secularism into two categories: (a) phenomenological secularism and (b) political secularism. The phenomenological secularism deals with the social consciousness of secularism. With reference to Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, Casanova

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(2009) argues that phenomenological secularism becomes an imminent frame, which constitutes an interlocking constellation of the modern differentiated cosmic, social and moral orders where all these orders are purely secular; here, God does not exist. In modern societies, Casanova claims that phenomenological secularism refers to a secular society in which people are non-religious, as naturalization of non-religion becomes a human condition in society (Casanova 2009: 1054). Political secularism, on the other hand, in Casanova’s opinion, keeps the public democratic sphere free from religion in a state in which the people can still be religious. Casanova argues that this is the basis behind any secular state doctrine. He argues that a society can be truly secular, but there is always the risk of mixing religion and secularism in terms of state doctrine. Casanova opines that secularism is implicated in two ways as a statecraft doctrine: principles of separation and the principle of regulation of religion in the society. These principles are reflected two practical models of secularism—in France, there is a version of secularism known as Laïcité. In the model ‘the French state systematic refuses to recognise the significance of any religion in general—and any religious right in particular’ (Ghez 2018)—and in the US model where religious freedom in the society is not discouraged but in general the state is kept free from any religious bias. Casanova (2009) further argues that the principle of separation depends on whether secularism is an end in itself or is a means to other end, that is, democracy, equal citizenship, or religious pluralism. On the basis of this brief theoretical discussion, it is plausible to argue that the spirit of secularism is reflected in AL’s documents. It is obvious from their manifestoes that the party conveys a message that the party and leaders believe in secularism, which would thrive in a social democratic polity in which there is no religious discrimination. However, one should note that a large discrepancy exists between AL’s rhetoric and reality. In reality, the party has not shied away from undermining secularism, asserting authoritarianism, and supporting political Islam. Some of its anti-­ democratic practices include a lack of internal democracy within the party,9 corruption among party leaders,10 a complete disregard for the strand of 9  Moniruzzaman (2009) presents a nuanced analysis about the absence of internal party democracy. He argues that a major reason behind the lack of democracy within the major parties of Bangladesh is that the AL, as well as the BNP, operates in a dynastic fashion where the top leadership isn’t determined by merit (Moniruzzaman 2009: 84). 10  A 2012 Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) study on 149 members of parliament (MP), most of whom are from the AL, found that 97% of 149 MPs were influencing

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public opinion is in favour of more representative democracy,11 massive human rights violations,12 interference in the judiciary,13 the subjugation of freedom of speech when it comes to offense to Islam,14 and assaults on minorities.15 These findings are highly significant for how we think about Bangladesh’s democracy, political Islam, and the AL. In my opinion, when a political party endorses liberal democracy in their electoral platform one could expect that the party would unleash liberal ideas that naturally push the party and the country closer to liberalization if the party runs the government for long as has the AL. By contrast, in practice, the AL tends to thwart liberalism, by establishing a soft Islamic authoritarianism. Importantly, despite its illiberal nature, the AL has maintained its levels of voter support and avoided possible electoral consequences of its behaviour because it tends to posit itself as a political Islamist party, and its leaders portray themselves as Muslims who support administrative acts, controlling educational institutions, misusing development allocations, involved in or supporting criminal activities, influencing public procurement, violating electoral codes of conduct, and seizing government land using false statements (The Daily Star 2012). 11  In 2014 the party went ahead in organizing an election by abolishing a neutral caretaker government, and all other major oppositions boycotted the election. Following the election of 2014, an International Republic Institute (IRI) survey found that 77% of Bangladeshis discredited the election (IRI 2014: 17) and surveys conducted before the election found that 82–90% advised against the AL even holding the election (Bergman 2013). 12  Human rights violations by political parties are common in Bangladeshi politics. Amnesty International (AI) and the United States’ State Department (USSD) provide a 1–5 scale of the rights environment, and Bangladesh has attained between a 3 and 4 during most years between 1991 and 2010 (Riaz 2011). The 2013 AL regime, however, had stretched the poor record of defending the human rights of Bangladeshis into a new nadir as over 500 people were killed in political violence or police shootings of the people who were protesting AL’s decision to hold an election (ABC News 2013). Two US-based organizations in 2013 lodged complaints against Hasina at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for gross violation of human rights (The Daily Star 2013). 13  The rule of law index 2019, compiled by the World Justice Project (WJP), finds that corruption and political interference have been two major problems in the Bangladeshi judiciary. Bangladesh was ranked at 112 out of 126 countries featured in the WJP index released in 2019 (WJP 2019). 14  For example, in 2013 the AL-led government closed printing of a daily paper and armed police raided newsrooms of another. These newspapers were printing criticisms of government oppression of opponents. In the same year the AL closed down private television stations on the grounds that they were criticising the government (The Daily Star 2013). 15  In many incidents of minority oppression taking place in 2013, AL men were found to be involved (The Editorial Board of the New York Times 2016).

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the Muslim ummah. As noted in Chap. 7, a series of survey findings relating to public support for Islam, political Islam, and illiberal values indicate that the AL doesn’t need to be a political party that promotes liberal democracy to be popular or legitimate because majority of voters do not bother about liberalism or secularism. Therefore, even though on paper the AL appears to support democracy and secularism, which may appeal to some external, international audience, internally there are great electoral benefits in promoting an Islamic party identity, with Islamic values, and projecting that image to the public to gain approval.

4.6   Ummah, Islamic Identity in the AL Leadership and Politics In the previous chapter, I have shown that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the first political representative of Bangladesh to endorse the country’s commitment to the ummah in international forums. It was also mentioned that while Mujibur was affirming Bangladesh’s ummah commitment internationally, at home Bangladesh was a secular country according to the constitution. This apparent contradiction could better be explained by the internal party dynamics and wider political context at that time. The provisional  Bangladeshi government known as Mujibnagar government  advocated for secularism led by a few leftist leaders of the AL during the turbulent months of the independence war in 1971 whilst Mujibur was in a Pakistani prison. AL’s early manifestoes after the independence were also reflective of that mind-set. It is plausible to argue that secularism was construed by leftist elements within the AL. Raghavan (2013), in his book 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, highlights some of the tensions between Mujibur’s family members and leftist elements within the party at this time of divided leadership and upheaval (Raghavan 2013: 60–70). These conflicts suggest why the leftist elements within the AL defected from the party immediately after independence and Mujibur’s return to Bangladesh. Indeed, they mounted an armed challenge to Mujibur’s leadership and demanded the establishment of ‘scientific socialism’ in the country through a newly formed Socialist Party named Jatiyo Shamajtantric DAL (JSD) (Hasan 2012). Secularism, to Mujibur and his daughter (Sheikh Hasina), was clearly not the same as socialist or Marxist secularism. It was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter that while Bangladesh was still a constitutionally secular state in 1974, Mujibur travelled to Lahore, Pakistan, to represent Bangladesh in a summit of the Organization

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for Islamic Conference (OIC), an international body of Muslim states set up in 1969 to promote the political interests of the Muslim ummah after the Six-Day War of 1967. What is not mentioned in the previous chapter is that during the OIC summit, Mujibur officially endorsed Bangladesh as a member country of the Muslim ummah by signing the summit declaration which began, ‘In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful’ and emphasized the ‘preservation of the common faith, Islam, among Islamic countries’, and the promotion of ‘solidarity among Islamic countries’ (OIC 1974). At that summit, Mujibur further said ‘75 million people of Bangladesh are fully committed to contribute in every way possible to the success of Muslim ummah’ and he hoped that ‘almighty Allah would crown the collective endeavour with success’. Furthermore, he proposed endorsing a new international Islamic order to end the domination of the West. Mujibur said: A distinctive contribution of the Muslim people to the problem of our day can be made if we can contribute to the generation of the eternal values of human brotherhood and the dignity of man, which the Holy Prophet bequeathed to mankind. It is upon these values that we can build a new international order based on peace and justice. It is important for us to emphasize that this conference can be useful not only to consolidate our unity in support of the cause of Arab brethren but we can at the same time declare our solidarity with the forces of peace and progress throughout the world with the non-aligned nations; with the oppressed people of the world, struggling against colonialism, imperialism, racialism and all those people who are struggling against domination and exploitation in all its forms. The historic injustices, which have been inflicted on our brethren, must be readdressed…We fully agree that a critical juncture in history has reached, but a concentrated and well planned action on our part can remove the historic injustices which have been inflicted on our brethren. By the Grace of Allah, today we are in a position to consolidate our resources and our strength behind a strategy, which can secure peace and justice for all of us. (Bangladesh Observer 1974a)

Even though Mujibur’s methods for asserting Prophet Muhammad’s teaching of peace and justice for achieving Muslim supremacy differed from the nineteenth and twentieth century radical Islamists’ hateful, violent approach to the West, Mujibur was still advocating a form of international order based on political Islam—a strange act if he was a secular leader of a secular state.

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To display Bangladesh’s serious commitment to the ummah, Mujibur’s government did not establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and subsequent governments of the country have followed that trend. It is noteworthy that the former prime minister of Israel, Golda Meir, offered to recognize Bangladesh soon after its independence but Bangladesh rejected Israeli overtures. This was because Bangladesh aligned itself with the Khartoum Resolution, a declaration made at the Arab League summit in Khartoum in 1967, a few months after the Six-Day War. The Khartoum Resolution declared a ‘no peace, no recognition, no negotiation with Israel’ policy (Habib 2011), and Mujibur respected the declaration and committed Bangladesh to it. Similarly, in a 1974 speech delivered in Egypt, Mujibur said that ‘people of Bangladesh would continue to stand firmly by their Arab brethren in their just struggle against Zionist aggression’ (Bangladesh Observer 1974b). Locally, in order to justify Bangladesh’s ummah identity, Sheikh Mujibur endorsed a series of policies to promote Islamic culture and values in public life in Bangladesh (Afzal 2010: 21). For instance: (a) He established the Islamic Foundation (IF) to undertake state-­ sponsored Islamic missionary activities. (b) He announced the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad as a national holiday. (c) He reformed the madrasah education board. (d) He introduced the trend of disbursing government funds to support Bangladeshi citizens in performing the Hajj, one of the ‘five pillars’ of Islam. (e) He announced the shutting of movie theatres on religiously significant days for Muslims, such as the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, Laylatul Qadr (the night Muslims believe that the Quran was first revealed to Prophet Muhammad), and Laylatul Barat (the 15th night of the Arabic month of Shaban, the night when some Muslims believe that prayers to Allah will be accepted). (f) He banned the production and consumption of alcohol, gambling, and horse racing, deeming these un-Islamic. (g) He ordered broadcasts of Quranic recitations on state television and radio. Some of these policies, such as the closure of movie theatres on Islamically important days, a ban on the production and consumption of alcohol, as well as prohibitions on gambling and horse racing, are highly discriminatory and not secular for non-Muslims.

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Of course, not only did Mujibur endorse setting up policies and organizations to uphold Bangladesh’s (and his own) place in the ummah, he also made it clear that he saw himself as having the identity of a Muslim, not just a Bangladeshi, through various speeches given in national forums. For example, he frequently used Islamic terms to emphasize or advertise his Islamic psyche, such as ‘Insh Allah’ (‘if Allah wills’, ‘by the grace of Allah’, ‘I pray to Allah’), ‘Maghfirat of Shaheeds’ souls’ (salvation of the soul of the martyrs), and ‘Hashor’ (judgement day) (Bangladesh Observer 1975a). Mujibur’s recently published memoir confirms that he was not only overwhelmingly aware of his Muslim identity, he also never failed to miss a chance to infuse his politics with Islamic values. His political career began with the Muslim League, the party responsible for the struggle of establishing Pakistan as a separate land for Muslims. In his memoir, Mujibur explained why he was a Muslim League activist and why he wanted a separate territory for Muslims in British India. He stated: All I could think of was working for the Muslim League and the Muslim Students’ League. I believed that we would have to create Pakistan and that without it Muslims had no future in our part of the world. (Rahman 2012: 15)

Mujibur also acknowledged that he was supportive of Islamist movements in British India. Some of these movements, as mentioned in Chap. 3, wanted to establish a political ummah of Muslims and thwart the British Raj. Mujibur said: I knew all about the Sepoy Mutiny and the Wahhabi movement. I was aware of how the British had snatched away power from the Muslims and how almost overnight Muslims were deprived of their wealth and how Hindus flourished at their expense. I knew too how Muslims were driven out of their estates, businesses, the army and other jobs and how Hindus took their places. Muslims had been rulers of the country and therefore couldn’t tolerate the English. They would rebel whenever they found an opportunity to do so. I have read about the way the Wahhabi movement was launched by thousands of Bengali Muslim warriors. They have travelled all across India to Bengal and from there, had gone all the way on foot to the Frontier Province to take part in a holy war. I would narrate these events [in my speech] and then move on to the history of the movement for creating Pakistan. I would be scratching about the role of Hindu moneylenders. My speeches will be full of religious sentiments. (Rahman 2012: 23)

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These personal accounts of Mujibur support the contention that Mujibur’s endorsement of the ummah as a legitimate kind of international society and the subsequent framing of Bangladeshi policies, which upheld Islamic doctrines, were logical steps for him. He saw himself as a Muslim and member of the ummah, so liberal secularism was not a feasible option for him personally or politically. He wanted to re-establish Islamic cultural primacy in Bangladesh and didn’t shy away from seeing Bangladesh nationalism in essentially religious terms. Following her father’s footsteps to become the leader of the AL, Sheikh Hasina (allegedly a very pious person in her personal life), publicly asserted her Islamic identity in politics. In the past, political rivals of the AL have criticized the party because the party is against Islam, as evinced by the way it placed secularism in Bangladesh’s constitution and its aggression towards Islamist Jamaat. Although secularism is nominally one of the founding principles of the AL, Hasina has publicly stated that the AL sees secularism as part of Islam. In this way, Hasina has attempted to reinterpret the meaning of secularism in the Bangladeshi context. For example, in one of her election campaign speeches she claimed: People propagate against us on the ground that secularism is one of AL’s key principles. Secularism is the main essence of Islam. Secularism does not mean atheism. Rather secularism means religious freedom. (Daily Ittefaq 1991a)

She further justified her claims that there is ‘Islamic-style’ secularism by quoting from the Quran’s Surah Al-Qafirun, which states: ‘Lakum Dinukum Walyadin’ (‘for you your religion for me my religion’) (Daily Ittefaq 1991a). In her capacity as the Bangladeshi PM, Hasina recently reiterated that ‘Bangladesh will be run as per the Charter of Medina, where people from all religions will practice their own religion in a festive mood’ (The Daily Star 2015). As shown in Chap. 2, the Medina Charter is the document through which Prophet Muhammad established the norms of the first Islamic ummah over a community that includes non-­Muslims. Internationally, similar to her father Mujibur, Sheikh Hasina is persistent to ‘strengthen the unity among the Muslim ummah’ (Banglanews24 2019 and UNB 2018). For example, in a visit to Saudi Arabia in 2018, Hasina emphasized ‘protecting common interests… peace and stability in the Muslim world’ (UNB 2018). This is a statement that reaffirms her commitment to unity among the liberal ummah of the Muslim states. In a

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2016 visit to Saudi Arabia, Hasina also emphasized her Islamic identity by stressing the need to protect the dignity of the Islamic faith from critics who argue that Islam is a violent religion. Hasina further indicated the importance of delegitimizing the authority of Muslim terrorists over the Islamic faith by ‘convincing people about the true spirit of Islam’ that does not propound terrorism (The Daily Star 2016). In that visit Saudi Arabia’s Chief Intelligence officer indicated the appreciation of the government for Bangladesh for its commitment in upholding its ummah identity and he states, ‘Bangladesh is a very important Muslim nation… Jeddah wanted to further strengthen its relations with Dhaka’ (ibid.). In reply, a foreign ministry spokesperson under Hasina’s government indicated the government’s appreciation of Saudi Arabia’s role as ‘the leader of the Muslim Ummah’. Perhaps one of the most pivotal moments in the recent history of Hasina’s international politics of ummah was when she joined the Arab Islamic American Summit in 2017. Her photos with the Arab monarchs and Heads of Muslim states flooded Bangladeshi media after the visit. Internationally, the Arab states considered Hasina’s presence in that summit as evidence of her firm commitment to a more liberal Muslim ummah that thwarts Islamist radicalism and terrorists. However, locally images of Hasina’s cordial relationship with the leaders of the Islamic heartland, including the custodian of the two holy mosques (the Saudi king Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud), diffused the negative campaign against her government as being anti-Islamic. Before this meeting, many conservative Muslims and radical preachers criticized the AL for its assault on the Hefazat movement of Madrasah students and teachers as described in Chap. 1. However, images of Hasina warmly being accepted by influential Islamic leaders from the heartland of Islam have strengthened Hasina’s Islamic legitimacy at home. Publicly Hasina did not shy away from acknowledging her father Mujibur’s role in setting the discourse for Bangladesh’s ummah politics. In the inaugural ceremony of the Tenth Session of the Islamic Conference of Tourism Ministers held in 2018, in Dhaka Hasina said: Bangabandhu (Sheikh Mujibur) used to believe in the synergies of mutual cooperation and being imbued with collective notion joined OIC in 1974. Since then, Bangladesh continues to maintain friendly relations with all member-states and plays significant role to uphold Muslim Solidarity in pursuit of the great Islamic values of fraternity, justice, cohesion and inclusion as a whole. (Hasina 2018)

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In that speech Hasina also emphasized the need for expansion of an Islamic international economy that would open up trade opportunities among Muslims states around ‘halal foods, Islamic finance, halal pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, halal Tourism’ (Hasina 2018). Through these statements, Sheikh Hasina (like her father) has reaffirmed the fact that she sees herself as a Muslim, and a member of ummah, and sees Bangladesh as an Islamic country. Locally, the AL defends its Islamic credentials in a number of ways. For example, a government press release in 2018 sent after Hasina performed umrah Hajj states that ‘Hasina offered prayers seeking divine blessings for the people of Bangladesh as well as continued peace, progress and prosperity of the entire Muslim ummah’. This statement outlines the conceptual paradigm for Bangladeshi ummah politics. The statement not only asserts Hasina’s Islamic agency and her commitment to ummah but also publicly asserts that Hasina sees Bangladesh as a Muslim  state. In this state Hasina, as a bearer of the sovereignty of a modern nation state in the capacity of the PM, is not really sovereign because she requires divine blessings from Allah for ‘continued peace, progress and prosperity’ of Bangladesh. This further implies that the people of Bangladesh require the divine blessings from Allah for their well-being and they are member of ummah. This state-led publicity around a private religious ritual, reaffirmation of Hasina’s Muslim identity, and her dependence on the divine power of Allah for the welfare of the masses underscore that there is no differentiation between the sacred and profane here. Here publicity of the Islamic agency of Hasina, involvement of the state machineries with her religious travel (which includes expenditure of public money for arranging travel from and to Saudi Arabia, expense of accommodation, food and other expenses for the entourage of the PM, and dissemination of the photos and the prayers of PM in two of the holiest mosques for Islam) underscores the significance of the politics of ummah to the AL. This latest statement is additional evidence that the well-being of the Bangladeshi masses is tied with the well-being of the ummah. AL uses election campaign materials to refer to the significance of the ummah identity of the party. In a 2018 election manifesto, the party did not leave any doubt for its commitment to ummah. For example, in that manifesto the party states:

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Mutual fraternal relationship and development cooperation with the Muslim world together with Middle-eastern countries will be made stronger. Bangladesh will play a vital role jointly with these countries in matters of security and in fight against terrorism. The solidarity of the ‘Muslim ummah’ will be strengthened. (AL 2018: 77)

In that manifesto the party had also publicized its Islamic identity, as ‘Allah is Great’ is mentioned on the cover page and the inner cover page of the manifesto where the party made a commitment to frame ‘no law contrary to Quran and Sunnah’ (AL 2018: 55). Affirming Islamic identity is important because people cannot be attached to ummah if they do not adhere to Islamic identity. Similarly, it is worthwhile to discuss an older AL election poster as I believe it strengthens the way in which the party advertises its Islamic identity to voters. The top banner headline of that poster flashes AL’s slogan ‘Joy Bangla’ (‘Golden Bengal’) whereas the second headline states ‘La Ilaha Illallah Noukar Malik Tui Allah’, with the literal English interpretation of the Bangla slogan being: ‘there is no God but Allah and You, Allah, are the custodian of the boat.’ The Arabic words ‘La Ilaha Illallah’ are a part of the ‘shahada’, an Islamic proclamation through which a person becomes Muslim. Symbolically, this is an interesting poster because it not only uses Islamic rhetoric to project AL’s religious identity but also transforms Allah, the Muslim’s theological god, into a political god by referring to Allah as the custodian of AL’s election symbol (the boat). This publication came out ahead of the 2001 general election. The overall message of this poster is that the AL believes that Allah has the power to make the AL victorious in the election. The photo of a pious Hasina, who is wearing a hijab and praying to Allah for electoral victory, indicates that Allah holds the supreme power in AL’s fortunes, as opposed to simply the people who vote. This obviously contradicts their stated aims and key principles. From 2009 to 2018 the AL took several political decisions to make it clear that defending Islam is at the heart of its political agenda. For example, in 2010, they temporarily shut down the social networking site Facebook in protest of the site carrying caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (Al Jazeera 2010). Similarly, the party temporarily shut down the video-­ sharing website YouTube in Bangladesh in protest over its hosting of an anti-Islamic movie, The Innocence of Muslims, which defamed Prophet Muhammad (Devnath and Anwar 2012). During that period, Hasina even

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called the US president to bring the filmmaker to court for punishment (PTI 2012). This is significant because by publicly reaching out to the US president to punish a US-based filmmaker accused of defaming the Prophet Muhammad, Hasina reinforced her identity as a Muslim and upheld the idea of the ummah as a legitimate focus of government action. In 2013, under the AL regime, four atheist Bangladeshi bloggers were arrested and sent to jail while some blog sites were shut down due to accusations that they dishonoured Prophet Muhammad. Similarly in 2017, another atheist blogger, Asad Noor, was detained in Dhaka, charged and imprisoned after he was accused of ‘creating content on social media that hurt religious feeling by mocking Prophet Mohammed and making negative comments toward Islam’ (PEN America 2018). The government of the AL, after a series of public statements in which some ministers said that the party was reviewing possible amendments to an existing clause under the Information Act so as to include harsh punishment for those who defame the Prophet, enacted the Digital Security Act that now puts anyone convicted of such defamation in jail for 7–14 years for hurting Islam (Rahman 2013; PTI 2013; Mahmud 2018). A presidium member of the AL, who was also a former minister, explained AL’s Islamic identity in the following way: I know that our political opponents use propaganda against us and say we, as a party, are against Islam on the grounds that secularism is one of our party principles. It is an absurd accusation! We realize that this propaganda against us is one of our drawbacks and we’re working with Islamic scholars to devise a better-informed public message. I must make it clear to you. We see secularism as an integral part of Islam because religious freedom is an important concept of Islam. We believe in that Islam. You can call it a liberal Islam. It is different from radical Islam. How can we be against Islam? We do politics in a Muslim majority country. We need peoples’ vote to go into the power. Our party leader is a Muslim woman who prays 5 times a day. I’m a Muslim man too. Besides, we have a commitment to the Muslim world to defend the honour of Islam. (Interviewee A 2017)

Interviewee A thus makes it clear that that the AL believes it has a commitment to the Muslim world, the ummah, and a commitment to uphold Islam in some respect. With regard to this particular Islamic vision of secularism in the AL, Interviewee B, who teaches political science in a Bangladeshi  University and conducted his PhD thesis on the AL, said that ‘the AL is not a secular or religiously neutral party and religious

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neutrality is not the major agenda of the AL’ (Interviewee B 2017). Similarly, Interviewee C, a former adviser to the government, said: Islam has a heavy presence in Bangladeshi society so our politics is not devoid of religion. The Awami League infuses Islam into politics. Even though they had an absolute majority in the parliament they did not amend the state’s religion, Islam. The AL is not secular. (Interviewee C 2017)

Furthermore, AL’s constitutions and  election platforms have become more, rather than less, Islamic over time. For instance, covers of several AL constitutions and election manifestos from the 1970s to 2009, reflecting a change in the outlook of the AL and the increasing importance of Allah for the party’s election platform  (see  Bangladesh Awami League 1973, 1974, 1982, 1987, 2009 and 2018). For example, the covers of the 2001 election manifesto and the 2009 Constitution are different from previous ones in the sense that one can see the words ‘Allah is the most Powerful’ inscribed at the top centre of these documents. Previous manifestoes or party publications did not project the importance of Allah so explicitly. Furthermore, in order to underpin her party’s commitment to Islam, Hasina said, ‘No one would be able to snatch Bismillah (a recitation about Allah’s mercy) from the AL’ (Daily Ittefaq 1991b). In the view of a Bangladeshi analyst, Interviewee D, who has worked with the Dhaka Bureau of a foreign news outlet for over 11 years with a special focus on covering the AL, ‘It was only a matter of time before the AL would explain its Islamic secularism in manifestoes’ (Interviewee D 2017). In its recent manifestoes, the party consistently claims that the ‘AL will not enact any law against the Quran and Sunnah’. The AL might not be a radical Islamic party, but it is an Islamic party and not a secular party.

4.7   Alliance and Divergence with Islamist Parties A rationale for defining the AL as a secular party is that it banned some Islamist groups, including Jamaat, after independence (e.g., O’Connell cited in Ahmed 2001). However, whether the banning of Jamaat was an act of pure secularism is debatable because Jamaat collaborated with the Pakistani military and is alleged to have committed crimes against humanity during Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971. As such, the AL regarded them as war criminals. In this respect, it is worthwhile mentioning a 1975 parliamentary speech of Mujibur. At that time, Jamaat’s leader Ghulam Azam was leading an international propaganda effort against the

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AL regime on the grounds that the AL had introduced an atheist regime in Bangladesh through a constitutional assertion of secularism. The result of this was that Jamaat was banned from participating in electoral politics (Hossain 2013: 65). Ghulam Azam’s target audience was Middle Eastern countries, as well as influential Muslim associations and forums in the UK, such as the Muslim Council of Britain. In response, Mujibur made the following parliamentary speech vilifying Jamaat. He said: Those who do not love the country, who had betrayed the country, we have pardoned them all. We pardoned all those who had betrayed the independence movement, who become razakars. Such pardons were not granted in other countries after a revolution. Rather, they were totally uprooted. But we gave them a pardon and said: alright utter ‘tawba’ so that Allah gives you faith and you work for the country. But the devil does not listen to the scriptures. A group among them who is the same enemy responsible for the massacres in Bangladesh tried to create chaos in Bangladesh by spending money from London. What right have they to take part in politics in Bangladesh? We can pardon, but what right have they got to sit in safety of a foreign land and try to create chaos in Bangladesh, to undermine our independence, to try to make it a province of another country? In Bangladesh they will have no right to take part in politics and they cannot have that right, and we must be ruthless for that. (Bangladesh Observer 1975b)

This speech supports the claim that Sheikh Mujibur and the AL government banned Islamists for contesting the independence movement and acting against it, not because of secularism. This speech itself is even full of Islamic rhetoric, which would be strange if the Mujibur regime was genuinely committed to non-religious politics. For example, Mujibur was hoping that Islamists would utter Tawba (a significant Islamic act of ­ expressing repentance to Allah) and work for the country in ‘Allah’s faith’. Even his characterization of Islamists who committed massacres as ‘devils’ who do not listen to scriptures was, likewise, an Islamic reference. Mujibur saw himself as a Muslim, was expressing AL’s or Bangladesh’s Islamic values, or was constrained by public pressure to use Islamic imagery. In any case, his opposition to Jamaat did not translate to secularism in rhetoric or practice, and the fact that Jamaat was too radical for the AL does not make the AL secular. Notably, the AL and Jamaat were not always adversarial. The AL and Jamaat occasionally coordinated their efforts against the government of

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Pakistan before the creation of Bangladesh. For example, in the 1960s several East Pakistani politicians issued a joint statement criticizing the central government’s decision to amend the constitution. Both Sheikh Mujibur and Ghulam Azam were among the signatories of that joint statement (Khan 2013). Then, in January 1964, when Pakistan’s President Ayub outlawed Jamaat, 18 student leaders of East Pakistan issued a joint statement in protest of the government decisions, which they saw as ‘a brutal attack on democracy and an example that the government is conspiring to eliminate democracy from the country’ (Khan 2013). AL’s student wing leaders, Sirajul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzak, along with leftist student leaders, Motia Chowdhury and Rashed Khan Menon (both of whom are now members or allies of the AL), signed the joint statement (Khan 2013). Those leaders of the AL demanded the release of arrested Jamaat leaders. This political legacy shows that AL’s banning of Jamaat was the result of specific political antagonism that did not inherently stem from a religious-secular divide. Closer scrutiny of AL’s political legacy shows that striking political alliances with Islamist parties has been a key tactic for winning government. The nature of its political alliances includes mounting joint protests against the government (when in opposition) and signing political pacts with Islamists in which the AL demonstrates its support for various aspects of political Islam. While the AL has a ‘sweet and sour’ relationship with Jamaat, it regularly makes alliances with small, medium, or large groups of Islamists irrespective of their Wahabi, Salafi, or Sufi credentials. AL’s alliance with Jamaat came into the limelight in 1996 when both Jamaat and the AL formed a ‘liaison committee’ to pressure the BNP government to announce election dates. During that period, the activities of the AL-Jamaat alliance included holding regular meetings between Jamaat and AL leaders to develop a coherent political strategy,16 the issuance of joint statements,17 the announcement of identical political programmes

16  One of the venues for holding meetings was the residence of Abdus Samad Azad, a former AL presidium member (The Daily Star 1996b, c). 17  Here is a list of some joint statements issued by the AL and Jamaat: ‘Opposition’s Call: Stop Poll to Save Democracy’ (The Daily Star 1996d); ‘Opposition asks EC to send Army Back to Barracks’ (The Daily Star 1996e); ‘PM’s Speech Disappoints Nation’ (The Daily Star 1996f); ‘Govt. has Declared War Against its People’ (The Daily Star 1996g); ‘Govt Turns the Election Commission a Servant of BNP’ (Daily Ittefaq 1995a).

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(including labour strikes and non-cooperation drives),18 and the boycott of the election itself. By contrast, the BNP government during that time arrested both Jamaat and AL leaders, in some cases even engaging in street violence against these two parties (The Daily Star 1996a). However, when the BNP formed an electoral alliance with Jamaat in 2001, the relationship between the AL and Jamaat turned sour. There were even a few life-threatening attacks on Sheikh Hasina herself, and the AL believed that  few Jamaat personnel were masterminding the attacks (BDNews24 2017). The AL, after forming the government in 2009, established a local tribunal called the ICT to try ‘alleged war criminals of Jamaat’ (Linton 2010; Bergsmo and Novic 2011; D’costa 2012). Some of Jamaat’s top leadership were sent behind bars and several leaders were given capital punishment by ICT’s judges (The New Humanitarian 2013). Jamaat, on the other hand, alleged that the trial was nothing but a political vendetta by the AL (Jalil 2010). Regarding alliances with other, smaller conventional Islamist parties prior to the 2001 election, the AL signed a three-point political charter with ‘Bangladesh Khelafot Majlish’, a relatively small Islamist party (photo of the agreement is in Appendix 4). Conditions of that charter included: . The AL will not form any law against the Quran and Sunnas. 1 2. If the AL forms a government, it will take necessary steps to acknowledge degrees conferred by unregulated madrasahs. 3. Legal frameworks will be developed to ensure:

(a) Prophet Muhammad is recognized as the best and last prophet. (b) Certified Islamic scholars would be eligible to issue fatwas. (c) Criticism of the Prophet and his companions would be considered as an indictable crime.

Even though the AL couldn’t come into power in 2001, it now upholds two of the three religious issues mentioned above. Despite engaging in confrontation with Jamaat from 2008 onwards, the AL kept forming alliances with other Islamists—it did not work against Islamists as a standard practice. The AL supported the Bangladesh Tarikat Federation (TF), a new party composed of followers of Sufi Islam, which, 18  For detail information about the identical programmes, see The Daily Star (1996h, i, j) and Daily Ittefaq (1995b, c).

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according to Jamaat, promotes animistic beliefs. Alongside the TF, a subgroup of the AL, called the Awami Ulema League, was instrumental in changing the nature of political debates in the public sphere in 2013 when they argued that ‘Jamaat was not an Islamic Party, rather the AL represents Islam’ (Daily Manobkantha 2013; Daily Sangbad 2013). This can be considered as a ploy to delegitimize Jamaat’s Islamic outlook and a bid to legitimize AL’s Islamic outlook. Ahead of the 2018 election, a newspaper report said that out of 70 active Islamist parties, 61 were associated with the AL or its electoral alliance (Zahid 2018). 

4.8   Conclusion By offering an array of evidence generated through document analysis, interviews, discourse analysis of political speeches, and historical narratives, this chapter shows that a dominant political legacy of the AL has been oriented towards promoting Islam because its party leaders see themselves as Muslims, and Bangladesh as an Islamic country. These leaders strongly support the ummah. The AL framed many policies to shape Bangladesh into a state in which politics and society are not devoid of political Islam but, rather, where Islam is a key influence on the people’s identity and shapes their voting behaviour. AL’s readiness to strike regular political alliances with conventional Islamists is a manifestation of my claim that the scholarly consensus that the AL is a secular party is wrong.

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Bangladesh Awami League (1973) Election Manifesto, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1974) Constitution, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1982) Constitution, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1987) Declaration, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (2009) Declaration and Constitution, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (2018) 11th National Parliament Election-2018: Election Manifesto of Bangladesh Awami League, Dhaka, Bangladesh Bangladesh Observer (1974a) ‘Bangabandhu’s Speech in Lahore: Occupied Arab Land Must be Vacated’, February 27, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1974b) ‘Bangladesh will Stand by Arabs: Amity with Egypt will Grow— Mujib’, November 6, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1975a) ‘Texts of Bangabandhu’s Speech’, July 24, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1975b) ‘Text of Bangabandhu’s Speech’, June 21, Dhaka, Bangladesh Banglanews24 (2019) ‘Hasina Calls for the Unity of the Ummah’, January 16, https://www.banglanews24.com/national/news/bd/696044.details (Accessed on 5/05/2019) BDNews24 (2017) ‘Jamaat, BNP Colluded with Militants’ to Carry Out Grenade Attack on Awami League Rally’, October 24, https://bdnews24.com/politics/2017/10/24/jamaat-bnp-colluded-with-militants-to-carry-outgrenadeattack-on-awami-league-rally (12/12/2018) Bergman, David (2013) ‘Nielsen/Democracy International Polls on Bangladesh’, September 19, http://bangladeshpolitico.blogspot.com/2013/09/nielsendemocracy-international-polls-on.html (Accessed on 5/10/2019) Bergsmo, Morten and Novic, Elisa (2011) ‘Justice after Decades in Bangladesh: National Trials for International Crimes’, Journal of Genocide Research, 13(4): 503–510 Casanova, Jose (2009) ‘The Secular and Secularisms’, Social Research, 76(4): 1049–1066 Daily Ittefaq (1991a) ‘Sheikh Hasina in Three Big Rallies in Narshingdi: Make a Wave in Favour of the Boat in Villages’, January 30, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1991b) ‘Sheikh Hasina in Munshiganj–Tongibari: Nobody is Able to Snatch Bismillah Despite of False Propaganda: Sheikh Hasina’, March 12, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1995a) ‘The Government has Turned the Election Commission to its Servant’, August 10, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1995b) ‘Opposition Rally Today’, January 13, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1995c) ‘Dawn to Dusk Hartal Observed’, January 26, Dhaka, Bangladesh Daily Manobkantha (2013) ‘Tarikat will Go Ahead Organizing Rally in Shapla Chattar on 15th November Without Permission’, November 10, Dhaka, Bangladesh Daily Sangbad (2013) ‘Jamaat Devised Plan to Run Havoc in Hefazat Rally: Tarikat Federation’, April 2, Dhaka, Bangladesh

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D’Costa, B. (2012), ‘Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh: Remembering 1971’, Journal of Genocide Research, 14(1): 110–114 Devnath, Arun and Anwar, Haris (2012) ‘Pakistan, Bangladesh Block YouTube; Saudis May Follow’, Bloomberg, September 19, https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2012-09-18/pakistan-bangladesh-blockyoutube-torestrict-anti-islam-film (Accessed on 12/09/2019) Engineer, Ashgarali (1975) Islam: Muslims, India, Mumbai: Lok Vangmaya Griha Faiquzzaman, Mohammad (2012) ‘Mujibnagar Government’, in Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, http://en.banglapedia.org/index. php?title=Mujibnagar_Government (Accessed on 12/12/2019) Ghez, Jeremy (2018) ‘Debate: On Secularism in the 21st Century’, The Conversation, February 21, https://theconversation.com/debate-on-secularism-in-the-21st-century-91669 (Accessed on 18/12/2019) Habib, Mohshin (2011) ‘A Story of Israel Hatred’, Gatestone Institute, December 5, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2613/bangladesh-israelhatred (Accessed on 25/12/2019) Haidar, Daud (1974) ‘Kalo Shurjer Kalo Josnar Kalo Bonnay’, Daily Sangbad, February 24, Dhaka, Bangladesh, p. 20 Hasan, Mubashar (2012) ‘The Geopolitics of Political Islam in Bangladesh’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, 14(1&2): 60–69 Hasina, Sheikh (2018) Speech at the Inaugural Ceremony of Tenth Session of the Islamic Conference of Tourism Ministers, February 6, Pan Pacific Sonargaon Hotel, Dhaka, Bangladesh Helal, Bashir Al (2006) ‘Language Movement’, Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, Dhaka: Asiatic Society, http://en.banglapedia. org/index.php?title=Language_Movement (Accessed on 8/07/2019) Hossain, Kamal (2013) Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, Dhaka: The University Press Limited Hossain, Delwar and Hossain, Zayed (2012) ‘Non-cooperation Movement, 1971’, Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Non-Cooperation_Movement,_1971 (Accessed on 05/05/2019) International Republican Institute (2014) Bangladesh Public Opinion Survey January 12–27, 2014, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20 Februar y%2010%20Sur vey%20of%20Bangladesh%20Public%20 Opinion%2C%20January%2012-27%2C%202014_0.pdf (Accessed on 5/05/ 2018) Interviewee A (2017, September 23), Dhaka, Bangladesh Interviewee B (2017, July 28), Dhaka, Bangladesh Interviewee C (2017, August 3), Dhaka, Bangladesh Interviewee D (2017, June 24), Dhaka, Bangladesh

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Islam, Nazrul (1973a) Revolutionary Greetings (Biplobi Shuveccha), Dhaka: Directorate of Information and Campaign, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh ——— (1973b) New Fiery Oath at the End of Revolution (Biplob Sheshe Noya Ogni Shopoth), Dhaka: Directorate of Information and Campaign, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Jahan, Ferdous and Shahan, Asif M. (2014) ‘Power and Influence of Islam-Based Political Parties in Bangladesh: Perception versus Reality’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 49(4): 426–441 Jalil, Abdul (2010) ‘War Crimes Trial in Bangladesh: A Real Political Vandetta’, Journal of Politics and Law, 3(2): 110–120 Kabir, M. G. (1987) ‘Religion, Language and Nationalism in Bangladesh’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 17(4): 473–487 Khan, Mizanur Rahman (2013) ‘Historic Self-Denial in Banning Jamaat’, Prothom-Alo, March 23, Dhaka, Bangladesh Linton, S. (2010) ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation’, Criminal Law Forum: An International Journal: The Official Journal of the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, 21(2): 191–311 Lorch, Jasmin (2018) ‘Islamization by Secular Ruling Parties: The Case of Bangladesh’, Politics and Religion, 12(2): 257–282 Mahmud (2018) “Bangladesh editors protest ‘chilling’ Digital Security Act”, Al  Jazeera, October 16, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/ bangladesh-editors-protest-chilling-digital-security-law-181015122440417. html (Accessed on 20/12/2019) Maniruzzaman, Talukder (2011) The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, Dhaka: The University Press Limited Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (2011) Constitution of Bangladesh, Dhaka: Government of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh Moniruzzaman, Mohammad (2009) ‘Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh Issues, Manifestation and Consequences’, South Asian Survey, 16(1): 81–99 O’Connell, Joseph (2001) ‘The Bengali Muslims and the State: Secularism or Humanity for Bangladesh’, in Ahmed, R (Ed.) Understanding the Bengal Muslim, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 179–208 OIC (1974) ‘Islamic Summit Declaration’, Middle East Journal, 28(2): 171–173 PEN America (2018) ‘Detained Bangladeshi Blogger Asad Noor Should be Released and Given Protection’, January 11, https://pen.org/press-release/ bangladesh-detained-blogger-asad-noor-released-given-protection/ (Accessed on 12/05/2019) PTI (2012) ‘Bangladesh Blocks YouTube over Anti-Islam Film’, The Hindu BusinessLine, September 18, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/

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world/bangladesh-blocks-youtube-over-anti-islamfilm/article23088605. ece?test=1&textsize=large (Accessed on 19/12/2019) ——— (2013) ‘Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina Pledges to Punish Online Insults against Islam’, NDTV, March 31, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/bangladesh-pm-sheikh-hasina-pledges-to-punish-online-insultsagainstislam-517688 (Accessed on 23/05/2019) Raghavan, Srinath (2013) 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Rahman, Anisur (2013) ‘Bangladesh: Islam Defamation Online Punished with Tough Measures’, Gulf News, April 2, http://gulfnews.com/news/world/ other-world/bangladesh-islam-defamation-online-punished-withtough-measures-1.1165846 (Accessed on 8/08/2019) Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur (2012) The Unfinished Memoirs, Dhaka: The University Press Limited Riaz, Ali (2011, December) ‘A Conversation about the Future of Bangladesh Politics’, Guest Lecture, North-South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh The Daily Star (1996a) ‘Hartal Called as PM Due Today: BNP Clashed with AL, Jamaat in Sylhet’, January 24, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996b) ‘Opposition Warns: People will Foil Voterless Polls’, January 16, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996c) ‘Opposition’s Call: Stop Polls to Save Democracy’, January 30, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996d) ‘Opposition Now Set for All-Out Agitation’, January 18, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996e) ‘Opposition Asks EC to Cancel Polls’, January 22, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996f) ‘PM’s Speech Disappoints Nation’, March 4, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996g) ‘Govt. Has Declared War against its People’, March 2, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996h) ‘Opposition Announces 3-Day Non-Cooperation Program’, February 17, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996i) ‘Opposition Extends Program up to 2 PM Wednesday’, February 27, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (1996j) ‘Non-Cooperation Till Fall of Govt Begins Mar 9’, March 1, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (2012) ‘MPs Engaged in “Negative Activities”’, October 15, https:// www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-253840 (Accessed on 12/11/2018) ——— (2013) ‘Complaints Lodged against Hasina, 24 Others at ICC’, June 29, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/complaints-lodged-against-hasina-at-icc (Accessed on 12/12/2019)

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——— (2015) ‘Country to be Run as per Madinah Charter: PM’, March 8, https://www.thedailystar.net/country-to-be-run-as-per-madinah-charterpm-16759 (Accessed on 25/12/2019) ——— (2016) ‘Saudi to Recruit 5 Lakh More Bangladeshis’, June 7, https:// www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/saudi-recr uit-5-lakh-more-bangladeshis-1235485 (Accessed on 19/12/2019) The Editorial Board (2016) ‘Attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh’, The New  York Times, November 16, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/opinion/ attacks-on-hindus-in-bangladesh.html (Accessed on 10/05/2019) The New Humanitarian (2013) ‘Time to Reconcile in Bangladesh?’, March 27, http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2013/03/27/time-reconcile-bangladesh (Accessed on 23/05/2019) The World Justice Project (2019) ‘Bangladesh Ranked 112 Out of 126 Countries on Rule of Law, Rising One Position’, https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/ default/files/documents/Bangladesh_0.pdf (Accessed on 10/05/2019) Tschannen, Olivier (1991) ‘The Secularization Paradigm: A Systemization’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 30(4): 395–415 UNB (2018) ‘PM Offers ziarat at mazar of Great Prophet’, October 18, https:// unb.com.bd/category/Bangladesh/pm-offers-ziarat-at-mazar-of-greatprophet/4501 (Accessed on 13/05/2019) Zahid, Selim (2018) ‘Most Islamist Parties are with Awami League’, November 25, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/article/1565953/%E0%A6% 86.%E0%A6%B2%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%97%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%99%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%97%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%8 7%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A6%E0%A6%B2-%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B6%E0%A6 %BF (Accessed on 23/10/2019)

CHAPTER 5

The BNP, Ummah, and Politics in Bangladesh

5.1   Introduction “BNP confuses people by manipulating Islam to achieve the power to rule the country. However, the party never contributed anything positively to uphold the cause of Islam, unlike the AL,” the Information Minister of the AL government Hasan Mahmud said at a public event in Dhaka in 2019 (Daily Ittefaq 2019). Mahmud’s speech is a manifestation of the ongoing contest between the AL and the BNP.  The contest revolves around demonstrating which party is more Islamic and an authentic supporter of Islam to Bangladesh’s Islamic constituents. Nevertheless, Mahmud’s speech also reaffirms and offers hints to the BNP’s long-­ standing support for political Islam in Bangladesh. A contemporary example in this regard would be the BNP’s moral support for Hefazat-e-Islam (HI) in 2013 when HI was at loggerheads with the AL. In 2013, a few weeks before the BNP declared support for HI, the BNP’s now-­imprisoned chairperson Khaleda Zia came down heavily on atheist bloggers in the parliament. She said in her capacity as the leader of the opposition, ‘We have seen recently that a group of misguided people have offended the Islamic mindset of the majority Bangladeshis by defaming the Prophet, Quran, and Islam through their writings. No countries in the world will tolerate such kind of activity and it is unfortunate that the government has not taken any effective steps to stop them’ (Zia 2013). Khaleda’s speech was not surprising; rather, it was expected. Previously her government was pivotal in charging Taslima Nasreen, a female author in Bangladesh who © The Author(s) 2020 M. Hasan, Islam and Politics in Bangladesh, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5_5

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criticized Islam in her novel and newspaper commentaries, for offending Islam before offering her a safe passage to exile in the face of international pressures (Riaz 2008). In the opening chapter of this book, I have hinted that to most scholars and observers of Bangladesh, the BNP is the ‘pioneer’ of mainstreaming political Islam in Bangladesh after independence (e.g., see Alam 1996; Kabeer 1991; Murshid 1997; Karim 2004; Datta 2002). However, I disagree with this claim. Rather, I argue that BNP’s founder, Ziaur Rahman, and subsequent governments have expanded the model of ummah politics coined by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the AL as explained in the previous chapter. Therefore, this chapter will demonstrate how the AL’s arch-rival, the BNP, pursued a similar political ideal with a slightly different approach. For example, unlike the AL, which manipulates the word secularism and frames it as an Islamic principle, the BNP formed its political platforms with a straightforward allegiance to political Islam and open encouragement of a state-led Islamization. The BNP is an important stakeholder in Bangladeshi politics. The BNP formed in 1978, but its founder, the late General Ziaur Rahman, had been ruling the country from 1976 until his murder in a military coup in 1981. Since 1990, the BNP has formed government twice (1991–1996 and 2001–2006) under the premiership of Khaleda Zia, the widowed wife of Rahman. Public support for this party has consistently been high. In 1991, the BNP won 140 parliamentary seats out of 300 with support from 31% of 34,477,803 total voters. In 1996, the party won 116 seats with 33.60% of total votes. In 2001, the party won 193 seats and, in 2008, the party won 29 seats (Ahmed Burhan Uddin 2010: 43, 75, 93). Since the elections after 2008 were widely rigged and the BNP did not contest in one, there is little point to show those results. Nevertheless, these figures show the significance of the BNP in Bangladeshi politics; therefore, any study of Bangladeshi politics and Islam would be incomplete without an analysis of the BNP and its approach to Islam and political Islam. Though scholars have demonstrated the BNP’s policy support for Islamization and political Islam, a link between the BNP’s allegiance to the ummah, state-led Islamization, and the growth of political Islam in Bangladesh has yet to be established. The aim of this chapter is to establish that link. To illustrate it, first, I shall discuss the emergence of the BNP in Bangladeshi politics. Second, by analysing the party platforms, I shall show that the BNP defines itself as a party supportive of moderate political Islam. Third, two case studies will demonstrate that the party extends its

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support to illiberal Islamist groups in order to undermine key liberal values such as freedom of speech and personal liberty. In sum, this chapter, along with the previous one, demonstrates how political Islam sets the framework of mainstream politics in Bangladesh and that creates pressure on the state to promote Islamization.

5.2   The Rise of Zia and BNP in Bangladesh Politics Following the murder of Mujibur Rahman and his family members in 1975, Ziaur (Zia) Rahman, a military officer, ascended to the presidency of the country in 1977 (Wright 1996: 10; Lewis 2011: 82). Zia was born in the Bangladeshi district of Bogra on January 19, 1936, but he grew up and received his education in Karachi, Pakistan (Wright 1996: 2). After finishing his studies, Zia joined the military and was commissioned as a second lieutenant. He spent two years in the Punjab Regiment before transferring to the East Bengal Regiment in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1957 (Wright 1996: 3). In the view of Wright (1996), this was the first time Zia came in close contact with his birthplace, and discovering his true homeland left a permanent impression on him. Zia’s ambition for leadership of the country came to the public attention on March 26, 1971, a day after the brutal ‘Operation Searchlight’.1 Zia, through a local radio transmitter from the port city of Chittagong, announced the War of Independence against the Pakistani military forces and proclaimed himself the President of Bangladesh (Ali 2010: 59).2 However, the following day, he clarified his position through another announcement in which he said that he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Liberation Army and that the announcement of the independence was proclaimed on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. During the War of Independence, Zia led a team called ‘Z Force’ (named after the 1  On the night of March 25, 1971, through Operation Searchlight, Pakistani military killed unarmed Bengali students and political activists (Hossain 2013). 2  Ziaur Rahman was the second in command of the East Bengal Regiment of the Pakistani military and was posted in Chittagong at the time of his independence announcement. On the night of Operation Searchlight, he was sent by his commanding officer to unload a ship carrying arms which were to be used against Bengalis. Sensing that this plan was devised by his West Pakistani senior officials to eliminate him and his men, Zia defected from the military and moved his troops out to join the Bengali struggle against Pakistan (for a detailed account of this history, see Ali 2010: 55–60).

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first letter of his name). After independence, ‘Rahman [Zia] rose from the rank of brigade commander in 1972 to Deputy Chief of Army Staff in the same year, but was held back for the entire period of Mujibur’s administration from advancing any further’ (Ziring 1992: 136). However, after the assassination of Mujibur, Zia became Chief of Army Staff in 1975. After a series of coups and counter-coups,3 Zia assumed the role of the martial law administrator and, later, the presidency of Bangladesh with total control over the state. Upon his ascendency to the presidency, Zia faced two immediate challenges. First, he needed to change the economic philosophy of the country. Mujibur had faced violent, armed resistance by a group of radical socialists who defected from the AL and challenged Mujibur’s regime. They demanded the establishment of ‘scientific socialism’ in the country, although Mujibur had endorsed socialism as a key state principle (Hasan 2012: 61–63). In the view of those AL rebels, Mujibur had established a pseudo-socialist regime. A fraction of the military was also supportive of those radical socialists (Wright 1996: 10–13), and Zia’s immediate tasks were to push Bangladesh towards liberalization, break away from Mujibur’s ‘pseudo-socialist’ economic policy, and stabilize the military. In this regard, Ali (2010) argues that a key intention behind Zia’s move to liberalize Bangladesh’s economy was to generate wealth and revenue for the Bangladeshi military. In Ali’s analysis, Zia established ‘a symbiotic relationship linking the international money and arms markets dominated by the OECD donor countries which proved to be more generous to the new order’ (Ali 2010: 130). Under the guidance of the World Bank and other international donors, Zia begun to ‘rehabilitate the private sector’ formerly protected by Mujibur’s socialist regime (Lewis 2011: 82–83). For example, in the private sector, Zia raised the foreign investment ceiling from TK30 million to TK100 million and offered multiple incentives for domestic and international investors (Ali 2010: 139). High rates of money supply, bank credit, and incentives turned some traders into manufacturing entrepreneurs, ‘establishing a proto-national bourgeoisie that would be built on by his successors’ (Ali 2010: 139). Zia’s liberal trade policy also pushed private entrepreneurs to support religiosity in the country. According to an interviewee who works for a foreign news agency, 3  For details of coups in the military between 1975 and 1976, see Khan Zillur (1985: 551–552) and Lifschultz (1977: 1340–1350).

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and who worked as a ­business editor and a reporter for leading national economic daily papers in Bangladesh for over 20 years, ‘Rahman’s [Zia’s] trade liberalization policy left a deep impact in increasing religiosity in the country’. That Interviewee said: Up to the late 1970s, there was no dominant entrepreneur class in Bangladesh. With the help of the export boom backed by the trade liberalization policy of President Rahman [Zia], the textile entrepreneurs led Bangladesh’s industrial boom. This process motivated thousands of rural workers to come into the city. The cities grew, and new houses, new factories, new shops, new roads began to develop. These groups of entrepreneurs, including the textile exporters and local industrialists, are first generation entrepreneurs and never thought that they would be so rich. Therefore, they now thank Allah in many ways. For example, even before making a big business deal some of these entrepreneurs go to Mecca and perform Umrah Hajj to seek blessings from Allah. In short, in my years of experience, what I have seen is that top entrepreneurs support Islam. (Interviewee E 2017)

Agreeing with the account of that interviewee, another political analyst, who also edits a business daily in Bangladesh, said that the majority of the owners of top 10 local corporations in Bangladesh are religious. These groups employ millions in Bangladesh directly and indirectly (Interviewee F 2017). A major characteristic of these groups is that they promote practice of Islam within their own companies and in the society. That interviewee offered an example in favour of their claim by referring to an owner of a giant Bangladeshi conglomerate who used to host a weekly television programme on Islam. ‘Employees of these groups are given Islamic prayer breaks, they sponsor a section of employees to perform Hajj every year, the group also invested millions of Taka in madrasah education and the development of mosques across the country’ (Interviewee F 2017). Claims of these journalists are not new as scholars such as Alam (1996) have argued before that Zia’s policies were aimed at promoting Islam and capitalism simultaneously (Alam 1996: 50–51). Zia’s second major challenge was to legitimize his military regime, which was facing questions regarding its path to power. Zia ‘in part attempted to deal with this question through promulgating constitutional amendments that would win the support of certain parts of civil society’ and ‘he needed a political party’ that ‘would reflect his political thinking

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and support the direction in which he would take the country’ (Milam 2010: 54–55). The history of the BNP starts here. Zia identified that his political party needed to construct a different identity, rationale, and platform from that of the AL. Therefore, in 1978, Zia first founded a party named Jagodol and later the BNP, and asserted that Islam would be the guiding principle for the BNP (Ali 2010: 148). The logic of embracing Islam was that a large constituency did not like the far-leftist construction of secularism of the AL, though the reality was different as explained in the previous chapter in the immediate post-independence years. In newly independent and war-torn Bangladesh, the masses wanted more support from the government. For them, ‘this support had to come from Islam’ because the masses believed that ‘whenever nationalism has been allowed to relegate Islam to the status of a particularistic creed, development and change become retrogressive or short-lived’ (Khan 1985: 848). Well, Mujibur empathized with that, but his supporters from the leftist faction made it harder for him to present his vision for Islamic secularism more convincingly. Zia capitalized on that model of politics and made it more explicit. In Khan’s view (1985), the restoration of Islam in politics and public life was needed to satisfy the disenchanted public. Not much empirical data is available about the public attitude towards religion in Bangladesh in the early 1960s, 1970s, or even now. Therefore, much of the account of Bangladeshi public attitude towards religion or even secularism is rhetorical. However, Khan’s view has empirical grounding that is captured by an American sociologist Schuman (1972). Schuman’s survey was aimed at determining how ordinary East Pakistani-Bengali men perceived the idea of secular Bengali nationalism is of higher importance. In 1964, just seven years before the War of Independence, Schuman asked four questions to 1001 East Pakistani-­ Bengali men with little or no educational background, and who were employed as rural farmers and in urban factory workers. The interviews were carried out in Bengali from December 1963 until April 1964 (Schuman 1972: 291). His aim was to find the attitude of masses towards religion, secular nationalism, and identity. His survey questions were:

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(a) Are you a Pakistani? (b) Are you a Bengali? (c) Are you from districts (name)? (d) Are you from village (name)? Schuman found that a considerable part of the survey sample retained a largely local identification (42%), answering with the name of either their village or their district, but a surprisingly large proportion (48%) preferred to call themselves Pakistanis. A relatively small percentage of respondents identified themselves first, and foremost, as Bengalis (Schuman 1972: 291–294). Even then, those who identified themselves as Bengalis had little or no conflict with the idea of being a Pakistani. In Schuman’s opinion to the interviewees ‘Bengali identification was simply included in the more general and at least equally desirable identification as a Muslim Pakistani’ (Schuman 1972: 293). In order to elaborate this claim, Schuman offers an example of what one of his interviewees has said when they said ‘they are Pakistani’.       I love Pakistan and we got Pakistan as a kingdom.     Because my own village is part of Pakistan.     I am a Muslim.    I was Bengali, now this Bengal has become independent and I have become Pakistani.     I am the son of a Muslim so I am a Pakistani. (Quoted from Schuman, ibid.)

In conclusion of his research article, Schuman has argued that when ordinary Bengalis revolted against the Pakistani military, it was a natural reaction to the Pakistani military’s assaults on Bengalis in 1971 but it did not take place out of ‘secular’ motivations. In his view, ‘[Secular] Bengali nationalism usually took place amongst a small set of highly educated individuals who were very few in numbers’ (Schuman 1972: 295). Schuman’s opinion is thought provoking as another study by Jawed (2010), conducted in July 1969, just two years before the war of independence, found that out of the 50 East Pakistani Bengali professionals he interviewed, 20 respondents offered their allegiance to Islam (Jawed 2010: 19). This means that even in the middle-class professionals, the idea of Islam and ummah were pre-dominant before the war of independence, though Jawed’s sample size is much insignificant comparing to Schuman’s. Jawed

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(2010) noted that even those professionals who have identified them as secular did not reject the idea of ummah (Jawed 2010: 19–20). In this regard, it is worth quoting another interviewee who was a Bengali freedom fighter in 1971. At his residence in Dhaka, he explained how Islam was actually a motivational factor for him to join the Independence War: Can anybody establish that religion is not part of the independence movement? Many people, including me, went to war in the name of Allah. Our immediate concern was to resist the Pakistani military and save our families. And every day on the battlefield, and during military training, I prayed five times a day. On the battlefield, when a freedom fighter was dead, we buried them in accordance with Islamic rituals. They are now proclaimed as martyrs—an Islamic synonym for ‘fallen’. Islam was and is part of my Bangladeshi identity. The idea of secular Bengali nationalism is a matter of debate in leisure time among some middle class left oriented Bengali intellectuals. (Interviewee G 2017)

The analysis of Khan (1985), Jawed (2010), and Schuman (1972), and the interview offer important insights for understanding why Zia was successful in framing the BNP in an Islamic way as Islam was intrinsic to the identity of Bengali Muslims even if they were heading to a war of independence. In other words, the rise of the BNP in politics is a manifestation of the power of the pre-existing ummah identity among the masses in Bangladesh.

5.3   The BNP, Bangladeshi Nationalism, and the Search for an ‘Islamic’ State Through the BNP, Zia coined the idea of Bangladeshi Nationalism—a political vision that, in theory (not in practice as in practice, in my view, there is not much distinction between the AL and the BNP when it comes to religious politics), distinguished the BNP from the AL and highlighted Bangladesh’s ummah identity. A BNP publication states that ‘the party has professed Bangladeshi nationalism, described as the Islamic consciousness of the people of Muslim majority Bangladesh, in order to counter the secular Awami League’ (BNP 2009: 23). Even though the AL is not secular, by emphasizing the AL’s rhetorical construction of ‘secularism’, the BNP created an imaginary distinction between itself and the AL. Also, by

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focusing on the ‘Islamic consciousness of the people of the Muslim majority Bangladesh’, the BNP defined Bangladesh and Bangladeshis as part of ummah. In his definition of Bangladeshi nationalism, Ziaur Rahman argued that the BNP’s Bangladeshi nationalism has seven features. First, the territorial boundaries of the country form a critical component of Bangladeshi nationalism and the protection of the geographical entity of the Bangladeshi state is critical. In this formulation, Zia argued that ‘our people must learn to protect every inch of our land, as expansionists and colonialists might try to overtake our land in future’ (Rahman 2009: 7). In President Zia’s view, this ‘expansionist’ and colonialist’ force was India, although he did not mention India’s name directly. However, throughout 1976–1981, Zia’s policies made it clear that he saw ‘India as an expansionist and colonialist power’ (Halim and Ahmed 1996: 130–133). Second, the BNP’s Bangladeshi nationalism is an inclusive concept as it recognizes people of all kinds and religious backgrounds living within the territorial boundary of Bangladesh, as Bangladeshis. Unlike the AL’s version of nationalism, people do not have to be Bengali by ethnicity to be a Bangladeshi in the BNP (Rahman 2009: 8). An influential theorist of the BNP and an academic, Dr Emajuddin Ahamed (a supporter of Zia and critic of the AL’s Bengali nationalism), questions how Bengali nationalism can incorporate the identity of indigenous/Adivasi non-Bengalis (Ahamed, 2009). Emajuddin Ahamed refers to the first official protest against the AL’s Bengali nationalism, raised in the parliament on October 31, 1972, by an indigenous/Adivasi leader, Manabendra Narayan Larma, of the Chakma4 nation. Larma said in a parliamentary address:

4  The Chakma are the largest of the tribal populations in the Chittagong area in southeastern Bangladesh, numbering 350,000 in the late twentieth century. The Chakma dwell in the Kasalang and middle Karnaphuli valleys and are ethnically related to the Arakanese of southwestern Myanmar (Burma). Their original culture has been gradually obscured by their partial adoption of Bengali culture. The Chakma have discarded their original Burmese language and today speak a Bengali dialect. Lacking statehood, the Chakma have protected themselves by clan organization, not found in the other Chittagong-area tribes. They practice mixed shifting and permanent agriculture, growing rice, millet, corn (maize), vegetables, and mustard. The women weave distinctive fabrics to supplement family income and provide clothing. The Chakma have observed a mixture of animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism and today are almost entirely Buddhist. However, some pre-Buddhist traditions, such as sacrificing a pig when a bride arrives at the groom’s village, have been retained, along with a custom of eating pork, a practice Bengalis disdained (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013).

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I am a Chakma, a Chakma can never be a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh—a Bangladeshi. You are also a Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali. We (indigenous) can never be Bengali. (Ahmed 2010: 47)

Emajuddin Ahamed (2009) opines that President Zia consciously constructed a version of Bangladeshi nationalism, which could include non-Bengalis. Third, Zia (Rahman 2009) argues that language plays an important role in the idea of Bangladeshi nationalism. In his view, the people of Bangladesh needed to distinguish between the Bengali of Bangladesh from the Bengali of West Bengal, India. Referring to the Bengalis living in India, Zia argues that ‘there are other Bengalis who hold different nationalities and with whom we have a sea of differences in terms of history, values, norms and citizenship, even though we share same language’ (Rahman 2009: 8). He also claims that the history of the language of these two regions are different and the ‘people of Bangladesh must recognize that’ (ibid). The objective of distinguishing Bengali of Bangladesh from Bengali of India is to reinforce the ‘Islamic’ identity of Bangladesh’s Bengali in contrast to the ‘Hindu Bengali’ of India. Zia borrowed this idea of constructing an Islamic nation through language from the political history of the Indian partition of 1947. Before the partition of India, leaders of the Muslim League identified cleavages between Hindu and Islamic influence in shared languages and used this cleavage to construct a Muslim nation as separate to the ‘Hindu’ Indian nation. The protest by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the leader of the All India Muslim League; later the first President of Pakistan) against a song used by the Indian National Congress called Bande Mataram is worth mentioning here. The song was composed to uphold the greatness of Hinduism and Hindu goddesses. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, a leading Bengali literary and political figure of nineteenth century India, wrote the song. Part of its lyrics can be translated as: Mother, I bow to thee! Rich with thy hurrying streams, Bright with thy orchard gleams, Cool with thy winds of delight, Dark fields of waving, Mother of might, Mother free. […] Thou art Durga, Lady and Queen,

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With her hands that strike and her swords of sheen Thou art Laksmi lotus-throned Pre and Perfect without peer Mother, lend thine ear. (Quoted in Jones 2011: 377)

‘The song begins inclusively by describing the shared connection the population has with the land, but ends by defining the boundaries of the true people of the Bengali nation as those that recognize the land as an embodiment of the Hindu mother goddess [(Laxmi and Durga)]’ (Jones 2011: 377). In Jones’s opinion, this song excludes Muslim Bengalis ‘by casting the motherland in Hindu religious terms’. Jinnah did not miss this chance to attack the Hindu nature of Indian language. He said: What did the Congress do when it got powers? With all its pretensions, it straightaway started with ‘Bande Mataram’. It is admitted that ‘Bande Mataram’ is not the national song, yet it is sung as such and thrust upon others. It is sung not only in their own gatherings, but Muslim children in government and municipal schools are compelled to sing it…it is idolatrous and a hymn of hate against Muslims. (Jamiluddin 1942: 80)

Muslims in Bengal, in reply to Hindu influences over language in an undivided India, ‘oriented the Bengali language towards its Islamic heritage with deliberate and heavy borrowings of Arabic and Persian forms’ (Bhattacharyya 1983: 500). Zia’s reference to the distinction between the Bengali language of Bangladesh and India is embedded in this history. Fourth, Zia (Rahman 2009) also argued that the distinct nature of the Bengali language reveals distinct customs of Bangladeshi people as compared to Indian Bengalis. Zia, once again, mentions conservative Muslim customs of Bangladesh to make this point. Fifth, Zia opines that a ‘peaceful revolutionary economic system’ is a key proponent of Bangladeshi nationalism. In his view, Bangladesh’s socialist economy was on the verge of collapse due to years of colonial-­ style exploitation. Therefore, it needed revision. Zia’s peaceful revolutionary economic system was an outline for a capitalist system, about which I explained already. Sixth, Zia explained that Bangladeshi nationalism endorsed religious freedom in accordance to Islam. In this regard, he states that: Allah is one and second to none. We have fullest trust and faith in the most powerful Allah. That is why we believe, as per the vision of Islam, every

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people of this country has the freedom to perform their own religion. (Rahman 2009: 7)

This statement connects, Tawhid, or the oneness of Allah, to the BNP’s idea of Bangladeshi nationalism and reinforces the idea that freedom of religion in Bangladesh was conceived in an Islamic way, not a liberal secular way. However, at the same time, Zia rejected theocracy for the Bangladeshi state and claimed that ‘religion should not form the ideological framework of a political party but religion may contribute to politics’ (Rahman 2009: 11). However, this argument stands weak when the party says, the BNP believes that Allah and Prophet Muhammad play an important role in politics and that ‘an ideal society of Bangladesh could be constructed following Prophet Muhammad’s life’ (BNP 2009: 13). Prophet Muhammad’s life after he became prophet was an Islamic life. When a political party sets its political goals as following the model of a religious figurehead, such as Prophet Muhammad, and is keen to show their allegiance to Islam, it is a clear that they see themselves as part of the ummah. Finally, in Zia’s view, Bangladeshi nationalism would be incomplete without recognizing the Independence War of 1971, which provided the foundation of Bangladeshi sovereignty. Without the Independence War, Zia argued, there is no Bangladeshi nationalism (Rahman 2009: 12). Bangladeshi nationalism is grounded in traditional nationalist theories. Ahmad argues that Zia defined his idea of Bangladeshi nationalism after consideration of the theories of Ernest Renan and Max Weber (Ahmed 2010: 49). This book doesn’t need to verify Zia’s theoretical influences, but rather, the aim here is to understand how the BNP sees Bangladesh through its paradigm of Islamic Bangladeshi nationalism. In this assessment, a rhetorical strategy distinguishes the BNP from the AL, even though in practice there is not much difference because both parties promote political Islam and identify themselves as  part of ummah. Massive support for the BNP, which rhetorically constructed itself as a distinct party than the AL, makes sense if one sees the BNP through the frame of identity politics. Stuart Hall claimed that the ‘identity of a political party could work as a focus for loyalty and a means for mobilization and may also play a significant part in the development of rhetorical strategies in the context of party competition’ (Hall 1988: 85). This accurately sums up much of the BNP’s rationale for constructing Islamic Bangladeshi nationalism.

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5.4   Party Structure The BNP is structured so its member base reaches villages, sub-districts, and districts, even outside Bangladesh. Any Bangladeshi citizen who is 18 years old or older can become a primary member of the BNP. Every member must declare on his or her membership application that they adhere to the party ideology and the party Constitution (BNP 2009: 24). An elected chairperson leads the BNP. The chairperson is the head of the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the Standing Committee (SC). The NEC is a body of 251 members. The SC is the highest forum within the party and is responsible for providing strategic decision and guidelines (BNP 2009: 24). The SC has the power to amend and approve BNP declarations, constitutions, campaign materials, and policies. Similar to the AL, the BNP has several front organizations.5 They are the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Freedom Fighters; the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Youths; the Bangladesh Nationalist Party for Women; the Bangladesh Nationalist Forum for Social and Cultural Organization; the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Farmers; the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Volunteers; the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Weavers; Bangladesh Nationalist Ulema Party; and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Fishermen. Apart from these organizations, the BNP supports two associate organizations: the Bangladesh Jaityotabadi Chatrodol, or the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Students, and the Bangladesh Jatyiotabadi Sromik Dal, or the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Labourers. From the names of these fronts and associate organizations, it is apparent that the BNP established its support base in each strata of society.

5.5   Party Principles Belief in Islam, Bangladeshi nationalism, democracy, and capitalism are four key principles of the BNP. In terms of democracy, the party states that ‘a healthy environment for democracy could only be established through  According to the BNP, ‘these front organizations will have their own proclamation, constitution, flag and office, and this front organization will fall under the discipline of the main organization. The party chairman can take punitive measures against any official or member of any front organization at any time, or can expel them from the organization, postpone membership of the organization, or order or advise to rebuke them on charges of breaching disciplines, anti-organizational activities or misconduct. No organization will be considered as front organization of Jatiyatabadi Dal until getting approval as front organization from the chairman’. 5

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parliamentary democracy’ and it ‘acknowledges that a free market economy is essential for establishing democracy’ (BNP 2009: 2). This is not a unique ideological framework as parties sympathetic to political Islam elsewhere can be open to free market capitalism. Muslim politicians ‘have sufficient interests to deal with global financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; they do not have the luxury or ideological sensibility to be insular if their countries do not have access to huge rents and raw resources, especially petroleum’ (Gerges 2012). In the opening chapter, a review of the state of Bangladeshi democracy, within the period of 1990–2018, shows that Bangladesh has experienced a ‘democratic deficit’. BNP regimes were featured within that timeframe. The following section presents two brief case studies depicting how the BNP thwarts liberal values in the country.

5.6   Thwarting Freedom of Speech: The Case of Taslima Nasrin and the Citizenship of Ghulam Azam Taslima Nasrin is a feminist Bangladeshi writer who is now living in exile in India. Under a BNP-led government (1991–1996), she was ordered to leave the country due to accusations that she defamed Islam through her writings and media interviews. The decision came against the backdrop of agitation by thousands of conservative Muslims in 1994. Nasrin published a novel titled Lajja (shame) at a time when India’s religious nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), initiated a protest in India against the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. BJP members claimed that the Babri Mosque should be replaced with a Hindu temple, and it was eventually demolished in 1992 amid a series of riots between Hindus and Muslims in India. This tension also reached Bangladesh as news of some Muslim Bangladeshis oppressing some  Hindu minorities soon surfaced. Many Hindus in Bangladesh were attacked and Hindu businesses were vandalized and looted by some Muslims. Nasrin’s fiction Lajja, depicted the plight of a Hindu family in Bangladesh against the backdrop of the Ayodhya riot in India. In that story, a Hindu woman was raped and her property taken by a group of Muslim hooligans in response to the riots. Overall, the novel depicts Muslims of Bangladesh as uncivil, backward, intolerant, and violent peo-

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ple who violate minority women and their rights. The book became ‘an instant best seller’ (Riaz 2008: 2); however, it received negative attention from conservative Muslims. Hashmi (1995) notes that a relatively unknown group at that time, calling themselves Sahaba Sainik Parishad (the Council of the Soldiers of the Companions of the Prophet), announced a Fatwa or ‘Islamic ruling’ stating that 50,000 Taka or approximately US$680 would be rewarded for Taslima’s head (Hashmi 1995: 42). However, this Fatwa received criticism from different quarters and against the backdrop of ongoing criticism, the group retracted its Fatwa. The situation became more problematic when a government-sponsored newspaper published a report claiming that Nasrin, in an interview with an Indian newspaper, said that the ‘Quran should be rewritten to safeguard the interests of Muslim women, otherwise Muslim women are repressed according to present teaching of Quran’ (Hashmi 1995: 42). Even though she denied saying that, hundreds and thousands of conservative Muslims took to the streets of Dhaka to protest Nasrin and to observe Quran Day on July 29, 1994 (Rashiduzzaman 1994: 982). Under the banner of the United Actions Council (UAC), these Muslims presented a series of demands to the BNP government. These demands included the hanging of Taslima Nasrin and other atheist and anti-Islamic writers, the enactment of a blasphemy law, and the assertion of control over anti-Islamic activities by Western NGOs and local collaborators (Rashiduzzaman 1994: 983). Rashiduzzaman (1994) argues that the UAC was a platform backed by an alliance of several known and unknown Islamist parties, including Islami Oikya Jote (IoJ), the Islamic Constitution Movement, Khilafat Majlish, the National Muslim Committee, Ahle Hadith, the Ulema Committee, Islamic Student Soldiers, and the Madrasah Teachers Association (Rashiduzzaman 1994: 982). Following nationwide strikes and agitation programmes, Nasrin went into hiding in fear of her life as a number of Ulemas (Islamic scholars) issued death threats in public forums. In response, many Western governments; human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International; civil rights organizations such as PEN’s Women Writers Committee; and foreign media, such as Australia’s ABC TV; supported Nasrin. Following several meetings between the BNP-led Bangladeshi government and Western governments, Nasrin came out of hiding, went to court, received bail, and left Bangladesh. While these events are known, Riaz (2008) has offered a more nuanced and analytical approach in deciphering root causes surrounding the pro-

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test and exile of Taslima Nasrin. In his view, both Jamaat and BNP collectively orchestrated the agitation against Nasrin in order to take attention away from another politically significant event taking place around that time. That was the citizenship application in court of Ghulam Azam, Jamaat’s ideological guru. He is a convicted war criminal, who went into exile to avoid punishment by the AL government after the independence war for collaborating with the Pakistani military. Azam’s citizenship was a very sensitive matter as a majority of Bangladeshi people (except his followers) grew up knowing that Azam was a traitor, a person who collaborated with the Pakistani military during the war. BNP founder Ziaur Rahman, despite being a freedom fighter, allowed Azam back to the country in the 1980s. Since then Azam had slowly been orchestrating the resurrection of Jamaat politics in Bangladesh. It should be noted that Zia also allowed Sheikh Hasina back into the country as during the time of Mujibur’s grisly murder in 1975, Hasina was away from Bangladesh and did not return until Zia ensured her safety. In 1991, Jamaat announced that Ghulam Azam would be their Amir (top leader). Families of war victims were offended by this announcement and they organized a massive mobilization. A Bangladeshi female writer Jahanara Imam, who had lost her husband and son during the war, led that movement, which resulted in massive mobilization against Azam. When his court hearing for citizenship was taking place, Imam handed down a symbolic death penalty to Azam through a symbolic court called Janatar Adalat or peoples’ court (Hossain 2017  and Tithi 2016). On June 22, 1994, the official court ordered the state to issue citizenship to Azam. Riaz (2008) argues that Jamaat stirred the Taslima Nasrin event to take attention away of Azam’s citizenship case (Riaz 2008: 6). The BNP government not only legitimized a highly controversial Islamist (Ghulam Azam) by giving him citizenship and thwarted the principles of free speech by disowning Nasrin but it also charged four senior journalists of a national daily called Janakantha for publishing an editorial criticizing radical Islamists for misinterpreting Quran to justify their illiberal attitude to Nasrin (Riaz 2008: 7). Those journalists were charged under 295A of Penal code, which stipulates that ‘whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of the citizens of Bangladesh, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both’ (The Penal Code 1860). It was the

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first time in the history of Bangladesh any newspaper was charged under this law (Riaz 2008: 6).

5.7   Thwarting Equality and Liberty: BNP’s Moral Support to Hefazat-e-Islam (HI) Nineteen years after the Nasrin saga, in 2013, the BNP again extended its support to a religious group similar to the UAC called Hefazat-eIslam (HI). Here is a brief background of the HI.  I mentioned in the opening chapter that it is a forum of thousands of unregulated Qawmi madrasahs (more on Qawmi Madrasahs will be discussed in the next chapter), teachers, and students, formed ‘in opposition to a government plan to give women the same rights of inheritance as men’ (Bouissou 2013). In 2008, the government formulated a national women development policy (NWDP) that included equal inheritance rights for Bangladeshi women (this particular policy vision is yet to become a law). In this particular instance of inheritance law, the country follows a strict version of Sharia law. According to this version of law, ‘a son will get a share which equals the share of two daughters’ (Issa Khan et al. 2016). This was a departure from the normal situation in which many Muslim Bangladeshi women do not receive any share of their inheritance. Some are forced by their families to turn their inheritance over to their brothers. Worse yet, many brothers take the inheritance and disappear from the lives of their sisters who have no closer male relative obligated to support them or capable of doing so. The activists of the HI fiercely opposed the proposed equal inheritance right in the name of protecting the honour of Islam. A series of violent protests erupted, activists of the HI clashed with police, and about 25 were injured in 2011 (The Telegraph 2011). In 2013, the HI again came into public attention against the backdrop of another movement, called the Shahbagh movement (a sit-in programme organized by a group of bloggers at a busy intersection named Shahbagh in the capital city. This movement demanded the death penalty for a few Jamaat leaders who were facing trial in the AL-led war crimes investigation (Bouissou 2013). The rise of the HI was facilitated by a targeted campaign by a national daily called Daily Amar Desh, which in 2013 published a series of reports claiming that the Shahbagh movement was being led by anti-Islamic and atheist bloggers (Al-Mahmood 2014). The newspaper even published several

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anti-Islamic blogs written by some of the bloggers who were leading the Shahbagh movement. To many Muslims, some of those blogs were offensive to their religion and the Prophet Muhammad. A blogger named Rajib Haider, who was connected to Shahbagh movement, was murdered by a militant Islamist group called Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) that had been inspired by the Al-Qaeda (Fair 2018). The ABT eventually embarked upon a killing spree that saw at least 40 secular writers, publishers, Sufis, moderate Muslims and non-Muslims being violently killed in the course of the next few years. While ABT members were silencing secular voices through violent criminal acts, the HI, on the other hand, raised the issue of ‘defamation of Islam’ politically. They issued a call to ‘hang the atheists’ and organized a huge rally in the capital city participated by half a million activists on April 6, 2013. In that rally, they raised 13 (highly illiberal) demands. The HI’s demands were (Mustafa 2013): • enactment of a blasphemy law with provisions for the death penalty • punishment for bloggers and others who ‘insult Islam’ • the cancellation of the country’s women’s development policies • a ban on erecting sculptures in public places • a ban on the mixing of men and women in public places • a ban on candlelight vigils • an end to what they call ‘shameless behaviour and dresses’ • a declaration that Ahmadiyas are ‘non-Muslims’ After the April 6 rally, the HI announced another programme, a long march and rally on May 2013. The forum had organized the movement from two major bases. One base was its headquarters at a well-known Qawmi madrasah called Al-Jamiatul Ahlia Darul Ulum Muinul Islam located in Hat Hazari, Chittagong, a southern city in Bangladesh. The other base was a Dhaka-based madrasah located in a suburb named Lalbagh in the old town of Dhaka. Through mobile phones, word-of-­ mouth, and social media, the leaders and the students of the HI mobilized over 500,000 people out of its strong network to stage the next sit-in in Dhaka’s business district Motijheel on May 5, 2013. Activists from other Islamist parties and opposition supporters joined that sit-in as well. They demanded that the government meet the 13 demands otherwise they would not leave Motijheel. In order to bar the HI activists from entering Dhaka, the government of the AL had virtually cut off all public transportation going in and out of Dhaka starting that morning. However, dedi-

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cated HI activists walked into the city in hundreds and thousands to join the sit-in. The business district of Dhaka-Motijheel looked like a sea of white-dressed Muslims wearing traditional attires. As mentioned in the previous chapters, on the night of May 5, 2013, the government of the AL employed thousands of law enforcement agencies including the paramilitary—Rapid Action Battalion, Police, Border Guard Bangladesh, and Detective Branch. More than a thousand rounds of bullets were fired on unarmed HI activists; at least 50 were killed and several hundreds were injured. After that event, 83 cases were filed against some 4000 people (Chowdhury 2018). Several of the HI’s top leadership were taken into police custody. Its spiritual leader, Shah Ahmed Shafi (alias Allama Shafi), a 99-year-old cleric, called for peace and reduced the tension between HI activists and the government. Following that event, the AL disowned the Shahbagh movement and made a strategic alliance with the HI. What role did the BNP play? The BNP extended moral support to the HI. At a press conference one day before the HI’s May 6 programme, the general secretary of the party, Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, announced that ‘the BNP has extended its full moral support’ to the HI (BDNews24 2013). In that press conference, Alamgir echoed his leader Khaleda by saying, ‘a group of misguided bloggers are offending majoritarian Islamic sentiment in an ill manner… this is unacceptable and intrusion to religious freedom’ (Prothom-Alo 2013). Referring to the HI movement, Alamgir said, ‘BNP extends its fullest moral support to the ulema’s demands of punishing the bloggers’ (BDNews24 2013). During the sitin of the HI, BNP activists were seen providing water and food to the HI activists and ‘two standing committee members of the party joined the rally and again expressed BNP’s solidarity with HI’s illiberal demands’ (Molla 2013). A close examination of these demands reveal that the HI’s 13 demands are highly discriminatory towards women, subordinate minority rights, call for restricting boundaries for artistic expression (i.e., the ban on sculptures and candle light vigils), and are contrary to the principles of free speech. HI also calls for a complete segregation between men and women in public places. Such a form of hard-line Islam is not being practiced in many other Muslim-majority countries. For example, in Tunisia, recently the cabinet approved an equal inheritance law and, in Turkey, women have enjoyed equal rights to property since 1926 (Middle East Monitor 2018; Toktas and O’Neil 2015). Men and women work together in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia. Sculpture has been part of Islamic civilization. In sum, the HI’s demands are similar to the hard-line

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Islamist doctrine of Saudi Arabia. Alternatively, many of such demands resemble those mandated in the Taliban-run areas in Afghanistan. The BNP’s moral support to such demands underscores a key characteristic of the BNP: if necessary they would support the harshest forms of Islamic society in Bangladesh for cheap political gain.

5.8   Alliances with Conventional Islamist Parties After the murder of Mujibur and his family members, Zia rehabilitated Islamist parties in Bangladesh through a constitutional amendment in 1976. This move was to ‘please Islamic bloc lobbies’, which considered ‘it as a step in the right direction’ (Ahmed 1995: 45). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the AL formed a political alliance with Jamaat before the 1996 election. However, following that election, Jamaat and the AL fell out and the BNP extended its support to Jamaat and the Islamic Oikko Jot (IoJ), finally forming a ‘Four Party’ electoral alliance. Following the formation of the alliance and through the publication of a 34-point declaration manifesto, the BNP and its allies emphasized, among other issues, that ‘politics must be inspired by Islamic values’, ‘politics is for the promotion of Islam’, and ‘political leadership is committed to Islam’ (Four Party Declaration 2001: 1–2). After the formation of the government by the Four Party Alliance in 2001, Bangladesh has witnessed a rise in terrorist attacks, such as Talibanand Al-Qaeda-style suicide bombings, and demands for establishing Sharia Law. Critics of the government, such as Alamgir (2009: 45–47) and Kumar (2009: 545–547), claim that the BNP’s ally, Jamaat, was directly involved in the rise of terrorism and, therefore, they held the BNP responsible. However, the BNP has consistently rejected terrorism and is publicly committed to ending acts of terror. In a cover page interview with the Time magazine, Khaleda Zia said that those advocating political violence in the name of Islam ‘are terrorists. They are using the name of Islam, they are not good Muslims’ (Green and Perry 2006). Referring to Jamaat when the Time magazine asked her whether the hard-line Islamist parties in her coalition compromised the BNP’s position as a liberal Islamic party, she replied in the negative, saying that ‘our allied parties are fine, they know we have to grab the terrorists’ (Green and Perry 2006). Indeed, her government arrested terrorists and most of them were executed. In 2012, the BNP extended its ‘Four Party Alliance’ into an ‘Eighteen Party Alliance’, and many of the new parties in that alliance were also Islamists.

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The core reason behind this increasing involvement with Islamists by the BNP is that (similar to the AL) the BNP leadership sees themselves, their party, and their state as part of the ummah and they feel hard-line Islamists who are educated in an Islamic education system such as madrasah are more authentic flag bearers of Islam.

5.9   Ummah, the BNP, and Politics In one of his earliest public announcements, the BNP founder, Zia, stated that ‘his politics is guided by wholehearted belief in Allah’. Simultaneously, Zia Islamized the Constitution by asserting Bismillah-ar-Rahman-ar Rahim (in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) above the preamble, and he replaced secularism, one of the fundamental state policies of the Constitution,6 ‘with the principle of absolute trust and faith in almighty Allah’ (Ali 2010: 140; Ahmed 1995: 58–61). As president, Zia began a trend of proclaiming all official pronouncements and addresses with an expression of his faith in Allah (Ali 2010: 141). In other words, Zia made it clear that he was primarily a Muslim, a member of the ummah. Through his foreign policy, he established a strong bond with Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Iran (Halim and Uddin 1996: 134). During Mujibur’s regime, even though Mujibur tried his best to portray Bangladesh as a member of the ummah, wealthy Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia, ignored Bangladesh because of its socialist and secularist foundations in the Constitution. For that reason, Bangladesh was not recognized by Saudi Arabia until secularism was omitted from the Bangladeshi Constitution by Zia (Hossain 2013: 191–194; Ahmed 1995: 61–62). Zia’s rhetorical devices and changes to the ideological foundations of the state were warmly welcomed by Muslim states (some examples were presented in Chap. 3). As the head of the Bangladesh state, Zia played an active role in the Third Islamic Summit, held in Mecca (Halim and Ahmed 1996: 136). In that summit, he proposed an 18-point programme to strengthen ummah solidarity and promote closer cooperation among Muslim countries (Halim and Ahmed 1996: 136). In recognition of Zia’s commitment to the Muslim ummah, Zia was made a member of the influential (three-member) Al-Quds Committee, given the task of forming ‘a

6

 Though, it was only rhetorical since Bangladesh was never really secular.

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new strategy to liberate Al-Quds Al-Sharif and to restore to the Palestinians their inalienable rights’ (Huq 1993: 259). Zia was also chosen by the OIC Peace Committee to undertake a peace mission to Baghdad and Tehran to explore possibilities of resolving the Iran-Iraq War, which was threatening Islamic solidarity at that time (Huq 1993: 260). Zia visited Baghdad and was planning to visit Tehran but he was killed by a military coup before his visit. In order to prove Bangladesh’s commitment to the ummah, I mentioned in Chap. 3 that Zia inserted a clause into Section 25(a) of the Constitution of Bangladesh which stated that ‘the State shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity’ (Bangladesh Constitution 2004). Zia’s ummah policy impressed leaders of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Bahrain, and others, and so they extended their support to Bangladesh in the form of trade and development incentives (see Chap. 3). One of the effects of this support was the creation of a job market for non-skilled Bangladeshi workers. As a result, according to a 2010 estimate, Bangladesh has sent more than 6.7 million workers to other Muslim countries since the 1970s (Mamun and Nath 2010: 1). Of these, 79.33% went to Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia (38.17%), the UAE (23.55%), Kuwait (7.11%), Oman (5.35%), Bahrain (2.84%), and Qatar (2.31%) (Mamun and Nath 2010: 22). Kibria (2008) interviewed several migrant workers returning from these countries to understand what motivated them to choose the Middle East as a work destination and what impact migration to that region had on migrant workers and Bangladesh. She found that, among other reasons, interviewees wanted to travel and work in the Middle East to ‘experience the birthplace of the great Muslim civilization…the land of the Prophet’ (Kibria 2008: 525). This finding shows Bangladeshis are generally sympathetic to Islam, as their sociological upbringings are overwhelmingly influenced by Islamic values. Kibria (2008) also discovered that on their return home, these migrant workers developed a more orthodox sense of Muslim identity—many of them claimed they came to know of a ‘pure form of Islam’ during the time of their stay in the Middle East (Kibria 2008: 519–520). Another researcher (Siddiqi 2006) agrees with Kibria and notes that: Migration to the Middle East—conventionally understood to be the site of authentic Islam—has exposed Bangladeshi workers to alternative ways of being and acting like Muslims. Many return with new ideas about what it

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means to be a good, authentic Muslim, including ideas about proper dress for women. (Siddiqi 2006: 9–10)

Kibria (2008) further found that these returned workers used their income not only for new houses and buying new properties, but also for investing in  local mosques and privately funded madrasahs. These are locally known as Qawmi madrasahs, and they form a strong institutional base for resisting liberal values. Their influence was apparent in the movement of the HI. The currently imprisoned leader of the BNP, the widowed wife of President Zia, also followed her late husband’s legacy in her approach to Islam and politics. She maintained the BNP’s stance on Islamic values as reflected in her speeches and actions. For example, before every election, Khaleda Zia visited the Shrine of Shahjalal (a Muslim Sufi shrine) in Sylhet to pray for the election victory, whilst her arch-rival, Sheikh Hasina, does the same (both are competing for a religious constituency). In the election manifestoes of 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008, the BNP explicitly mentions that it will protect Islam’s honour and that Islam will be its guiding principle for politics, and therefore, people should vote for them to ‘save and protect Islam’ (BNP 1991, 1996, 2001, 2009). Khaleda Zia maintained her husband’s legacy of saying Bismillah-ar Rahman-ar Rahim and Salam (an Islamic greeting) at the beginning of each speech and finishing off speeches with the name of Allah. The following statement issued by the BNP in 2010 is a good example of how the BNP shows its commitment to Islam and the ummah, and readers could see the similarity between the BNP and the AL in terms of the approach to Islam, ummah, and politics: Khaleda Zia offered special prayers at the shrine of Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH) at 10:00 pm Wednesday local time (BST 1:00 am Thursday) and sought blessings of Almighty Allah for peace, progress and prosperity of Bangladesh and its people as well as solidarity of Muslim ummah. Sharmila Rahman and Zahia Rahman, wife and daughter of Arafat Rahman, Koko [Khaleda Zia’s second son], Khaleda Zia’s youngest brother Shamim Eskander, his wife Kaniz Fatema, the BNP chairperson’s advisers Sabihuddin Ahmed and Mosaddek Ali Falu, press secretary Maruf Kamal Khan, special assistant Shimul Biswas, Khaleda’s personal secretary Saleh Ahmed, and some local leaders of BNP, accompanied Khaleda Zia during the ziarat. Khaleda Zia, who arrived in Madinah August 30 to perform holy umrah, offered prayers in congregation (jama’t) at the Masjid-eNabubi and took

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Iftar Thursday together with millions of Muslims from across the world. The BNP chairperson’s entourage, members and local leaders, including Madinah, the BNP President Nuruzzaman, its organizing secretary Altaf Hossain, Jubo Dal, President Noor Karim Bhutto and General Secretary Zaman Ahmed Sumon, also joined the Iftar. BNP chairperson and leader of the opposition in Parliament, Khaleda Zia, exchanged pleasantries with Bangladeshi expatriates in Saudi Arabia and leaders and workers of the local BNP and its front organizations during her way to and from the Masjid-e-­ Nabubi every day. Khaleda will offer Juma’tul Wida prayer at the Masjid-­e­ Nabubi Friday. She is scheduled to leave Madinah for Makkah via Jeddah after Asr prayer to perform Umrah Friday. (BNP September 4, 2010)

This statement is interesting for a number of reasons. This statement contains elements of the prayer offered by Khaleda Zia to Allah. Readers can see that Khaleda, similar to Hasina, sought ‘blessings of the Almighty Allah for peace, progress and prosperity of Bangladeshi people as well as solidarity of Muslim ummah’. Such purposeful statements, which include elements of prayers and advertisements of the religiosity of BNP leaders and specially Zia’s family member, (they ‘were fasting and performed Hajj’) indicate that the BNP, like the AL, sees no concrete distinction between politics and religion. Indeed, religion is an important part of their public relations campaign. In this context, Khaleda Zia’s prayer to Allah and the place of his prayer—the shrine of the Prophet Muhammad—transplants Islamic affiliations into the political campaign, making it an important part of the party platform. Zia’s prayer becomes a means to reassure the public and other members of the ummah that, at least to the BNP, Islam is a political force within the state and not just a private religion. The BNP released a similar type of statement in later years as well. For example, a photo released by the BNP in 2016 shows that Khaleda’s exiled son, Tarique Zia, was praying in Mecca with his daughter and Khaleda Zia (Sylhet News 24 2016). It is not only important for the party to demonstrate its Islamic allegiance through party platforms, but it is similarly important to persistently show the Islamic beliefs of the top leadership of the BNP.  The BNP’s top leaders are Muslims and to them, the role of Allah and the Prophet Muhammad are spiritual and political. Like the AL, the BNP’s leaders consider themselves, the party, and the country as part of the ummah. Even when the BNP is not in power, Khaleda Zia has ­regularly reached out to ‘Muslim ummah’ and hoped for ‘justice and peace in Muslim ummah’ (Bangla Tribune 2017).

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However, similar to the AL, the BNP sees itself as a ‘liberal’ Islamic party and makes every effort to distance itself from what it calls ‘extremists’ (usually defined by their use of violent methods, not their brand of Islam). For example, in a 1993 interview given to the New York Times, Khaleda Zia stated, ‘we are religious people certainly but we are not extremists or fanatics, and therefore we are more liberal’ (Crossette 1993). An interviewee, a vice-chairman of the BNP and associated with the party since its inception who I will call H, explained the role of Islam in BNP politics to me in the following ways: Things should be evaluated very simply. Human beings are not detached from the society and the society upholds the values of the majorities. In this lieu, Islam received a special attention in our politics since the people living in the society uphold Islam’s ethical and moral teaching in their lives. If you look into Bangladeshi society, you will find that people here are religious and they are ready to sacrifice many aspects of their lives for Islam. That is why Islam has important position in the BNP. The BNP believes that Islam is a progressive religion. For example, if you consider the scenario before the arrival of the Prophet Muhammad, you will see Islam has reformed many aspects of an anarchic and barbaric Arab society. The BNP takes the similar position and believes a progressive Islam could reform many aspects of Bangladeshi society and politics. (Interviewee H 2017)

Likewise, another interviewee, I, who is an adviser to the chairperson of the BNP, said to me that ‘Bangladesh is part of the Islamic ummah and the BNP makes every effort to maintain this. I can tell you the Islamic world relies more on the BNP than the AL because of our clarity in Islamic identity’ (Interviewee I 2017). Whether that is true or not is not the primary scope of inquiry here, but that interviewee’s comment reinforces the significance of Islam and ummah for the BNP’s politics.

5.10   Conclusion The particular Islamic pattern of politics in the BNP is no different from that of the AL. Like the AL, the BNP oriented itself towards promoting Islam because its party leaders see themselves as Muslims and part of the ummah, and see Bangladesh as an Islamic country. For strategic purposes, the BNP invokes a rhetorically distinctive approach to Islam and ­nationalism but, in reality, there is little or nothing distinct from the AL’s approach. The next chapter demonstrates how state-driven Islamization has occurred

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as a result of the BNP’s and the AL’s attempts to win the religious vote, and how this has radicalized Bangladeshi society, leading to ever-­increasing support for political Islamist movements.

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Kumar, Anand (2009) ‘Jamaat and its Agenda of Islamic State in Bangladesh’, Strategic Analysis, 33(4): 541–552 Lewis, David (2011) Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Lifschultz, Lawrence (1977) ‘Abu Taher’s Last Testament: Bangladesh, The Unfinished Revolution’, Economic and Political Weekly, 2(33/34): 1303–1354 Mamun, Khawaza and Nath, Hiranya (2010) ‘Worker’s Migration and Remittances in Bangladesh, Journal of Business Strategies, 27(1): 29–52 Middle East Monitor (2018) Tunisia Cabinet Approves Equal Inheritance Law’, November 26, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20181126-tunisia-cabinet-approves-equal-inheritance-law/ (Accessed on 03/07/2018) Milam, W. B. (2010), Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with failure in South Asia, Dhaka: University Press Limited Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (2004) ‘Constitution of Bangladesh’, Dhaka: Government of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh Molla, Mohammad al Masum (2013) ‘BNP Tells Activists to Support Hefazat’, Dhaka Tribune, May 5, https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2013/05/05/bnp-tells-activists-to-support-hefazat (Accessed on 04/07/2019) Murshid, Tazeen (1997) ‘State, Nation, Identity: The Quest for Legitimacy in Bangladesh’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 20(2): 1–34 Mustafa, Sabir (2013) ‘Hefazat-e Islam: Islamist Coalition’, BBC News, May 6, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22424708 (Accessed on 09/09/ 2019) Rahman, Ziaur (2009) ‘Bangladeshi Nationalism’, Thirty One Years of Struggle and Pride, Dhaka: BNP, 5–12 Rashiduzzaman, M. (1994) ‘The Liberals and the Religious Right in Bangladesh’, Asian Survey, 34(11): 974–990 Riaz, Ali (2008) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web, London and New York: Routledge Schuman, Howard (1972) ‘A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalism in East Pakistan’, American Journal of Sociology, 78(2): 290–298 Siddiqi, Dina (2006) ‘In the Name of Islam? Gender, Politics and Women’s Rights in Bangladesh’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, 10(1): 1–13  Sylhet News 24 (2016) ‘Khaleda to Visit Medina Today’, September 17, https:// www.sylhetnews24.com/%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%9C-%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%A 6%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BE-%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6 %9A%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%9B%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A8-%E0%A6%96%E0% A6%BE%E0%A6%B2%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%A6%E0%A6%BE-%E0%A6%9C%E 0%A6%BF%E0%A7%9F%E0%A6%BE/4216/4216 (Accessed on 05/07/2019) The Government of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh, Legislative and Parliamentary Affairs Division (ND) ‘The Penal Code 1860: Chapter XV of

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Offenses Relating to Religion’, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/sections_detail. php?id=11§ions_id=3116 (Accessed on 05/08/2019) The Telegraph (2011) ‘Dozens Injured as Bangladeshi Islamists Protest Women’s Equality Laws’, April 4, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ asia/bangladesh/8426149/Dozens-injured-as-Bangladeshi-Islamists-protestwomens-equality-laws.html (Accessed on 08/08/2019) Tithi, Nazneen (2016) ‘Gano Adalat’, The Daily Star, January 23, https://www. thedailystar.net/in-focus/gano-adalot-205765 (Accessed on 05/08/2019) Toktas, Sule and O’Neil, Mary Lou (2015) ‘Competing Frameworks of Islamic Law and Secular Civil Law in Turkey: A Case Study on Women’s Property and Inheritance Practices’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 48(January– February): 29–38 Wright, Denis (1996) ‘The Rise of Zia: From Soldier to Politician’, in Zafarullah, Habib (Ed.) The Zia Episode in Bangladesh Politics, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1–17 Zia Khaleda (2013) Speech at the Parliament, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=kglz0Sg3SuA (Accessed on 21/05/2019) Ziring, Lawrence (1992) Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretative Study, Karachi: Oxford University Press

CHAPTER 6

Islamization, Ummah Consciousness and Mass Support for Political Islam

6.1   Introduction This chapter explains the dominant national character of the Bangladeshi state and its multiple influences on the society. In order to reveal the characteristics of a nation state, analysts and political scientists apply multiple measures such as the level of freedom of expression, quality of life, political equality, economic growth, income distribution, and so forth. These are useful tools to differentiate between democracies and authoritarian regimes or poor and rich states. However, to understand the ‘national character’ of a state, they would require applying different sets of values other than democratic indicators to define the character of a state. The national character of a state can be defined as an ‘individual aspect of social life-simultaneously an internal dimension to the existence of individuals and an external one, observable through collective behaviour’ and ‘national situates the universal aspect of social life in the specific context of those social units known as nations’ (Frognier 2015: 10296). Frognier (2015) suggests that to demystify the national character of state scholars must locate a dominant cultural pattern. The role the state plays in defining the national character is important too because in Bangladesh, similar to developing countries elsewhere, ‘the state not only leads, it also, in a sense, embodies the society’ because diffusion of the nation state as a means for organizing social life is an unavoidable fact (e.g., see Osaghae

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1989: 32; Anderson 1983). This chapter demonstrates how the state mobilizes Islamic cultural values and products to construct Bangladesh’s national cultural character as a member of the ummah. The core objective of this chapter is to lay out a dominant pattern of the state-supported Islamization process. I will show how different mechanisms are at play at the state level to support a nexus of public-private partnerships under clear policy direction to form an Islamic society in which illiberal values and political Islam are encouraged and popularized. To start, this chapter reviews several Five-Year Plans (FYPs)—important policy documents for Bangladesh that set the political framework for socioeconomic development of the country (i.e., socio-cultural and economic investment priorities) during those periods. My reviews show that the state, irrespective of who is in power, has been facilitating expansion of Islamic values, culture, and institutes since late 1970s. From the late 1970s to the present day, the state investment in expanding Islamic culture and values in the society had increased over 6500%. These policy documents reinforced a strategic vision of the state that regulates and organizes an Islamic society—part of a broader ummah. Next, the chapter reviews the phenomenal growth of madrasahs (public and private) as an implication of Bangladesh’s official policy to support madrasah education. These madrasahs, as one interviewee described them, are now ‘the castles of Islam’—preserving and protecting Islamic culture and values in Bangladesh. Following the discussion on madrasah, I further review Islamic Foundation (IF), which is the state’s missionary organization designed to propagate and mobilize Islamic culture in the society. The roles of FYPs and IF have been unexplored in the study of Islam and politics in Bangladesh, although they offer significant insight behind the justification of an ‘Islamic Bangladesh’. A review of the private missionary activity Tabligh Jamaat follows. One of the immediate implications of such state-laden endeavours (followed by private initiatives) is Islamization of the public sphere by multiple means. The most significant impact, however, is the rising insecurity among minorities.

6.2   The Five-Year Plans: The Policy Framework to Construct an ‘Islamic Society’ An analysis of several FYPs from the 1970s to the present day shows that the government monopolizes promotion of the ummah consciousness of Bangladesh through Islamic education, culture, and values. Indeed, expanding Islamic culture and politics has been a consistent focus for all

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governments. Funding for religious activities and institutions has also been trending upward in the FYPs, irrespective of who is ruling. Supporting religious activities were first included in the government plan in the 1979/1980 period, with a modest sum of 20 million Taka1 allocated to support eight projects (Second FYP 1985: 351). Since then, state funding for religious activities has increased dramatically over 6500%. For example, the Sixth FYP (2011–2015) states that the Religious Affairs Ministry was to receive 1370 million Taka in 2011, 1950 million in 2012, 3590 million in 2013, 4180 million in 2014, and 4760 million Taka in 2015 (Sixth FYP 2011: 346). The latest FYP or the Seventh FYP has allocated 2.5 billion Taka in 2016 and in 2017, 2.9 billion Taka in 2018, 3.2 billion Taka in 2019, and 3.6 billion Taka in 2020 (Seventh FYP 2015: 606). A top bureaucrat turned government adviser told me that, ‘over 90% of state funds for supporting religious activities are spent on supporting Islamic activities’ (Interviewee J 2017). Furthermore, texts of these policy papers deliver a message that policymakers are critical of Western values and, as a reactionary socio-political force, they want to promote Islamic values in society. This is an indication that policymakers see the state as part of an ummah that thrives on the criticism of the West. For example, the Second FYP (1980–1985) states: Religious  values touch the conscience and harmonize the discordant elements in human nature. It has been at the root of all great civilizations. The people of Bangladesh are deeply religious. So religion which is meshed with day-to-day life of the people can play a vital role in moral development as well as economic and social growth. But the impact of Western civilization has eroded many of the value and caused moral degradation of the people, which needs to be arrested. (Second FYP 1983: 309)

Similar trends continue in the later FYPs. For example, the Third FYP (1985–1990) states that ‘unless evil forces in human nature are subdued and moulded by religious values, power derived from science and technology and fruits of economic development could be misused’ (Third FYP 1985: 351). The Fourth FYP (1990–1995) emphasized increasing the production of Islamic literature in Bangladesh, and explains the need for propagating Islamic moral values through literature to curb what the 1  BDT = Bangladeshi Taka. Taka is the currency of Bangladesh. The exchange rate as of May 5, 2019 was 1 US $ = 84.67 BDT

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­ overnment thinks is unethical behaviour (Fourth FYP 1995: XV–26). g The Fifth FYP outlines the government’s aim of promoting Islamic values in the society to cultivate good citizens, morality, ethics, and self-restraint against corruption and dishonesty (Fifth FYP 1998: 443). One of the aims of the Sixth FYP (2011–2015) is ‘to preach and propagate the Islamic Dawah philosophy…for the enhancement of moral and ethical education’ (Sixth FYP 2011: 343). Dawah means invitation to Islam. According to the Oxford Islamic Studies Online (OISO 2019), one of the trends in the modern Dawah activities is to politically orient individuals to Islam. Conservative Muslim states like ‘Saudi Arabia and Libya consider Dawah as state responsibility’ (OISO 2019). The Bangladesh government clearly believes in state-driven initiatives to promote Islamic consciousness. The latest FYP (the seventh) while cites plans to promote ‘pagoda based’ and ‘temple-based’ education programme (e.g., see Seventh FYP 2015: 603–604) they hardly receive any substantial attention in the sense that no comprehensive outline is presented in the plan while in relation to propagation of Islamic values, the Seventh FYP is specific. Some of the objectives of the Seventh FYP are (a) promotion of religious values, universal brotherhood (ummah), and good citizenship agencies, (b) to provide increased opportunities for the disadvantaged poor to learn about the Quran, which will uplift morality, social, and religious values, (c) to provide general people with an increased chance of studying the Islamic- and socio-economic development-related books free of cost to foster religious and social values and ideals (Seventh FYP 2015: 604). The policy further states the government will promote Islam in rural areas as ‘the Ministry has taken steps to construct mosques in district and upazila levels to improve and accommodate prayer services’ while it would construct three Islamic hill complexes to provide free education (Seventh FYP 2015: 604–605). These brief points of views of the state describe the state’s vision for constructing an Islamic society. As I will describe, the state has supported Islamic education through madrasahs, state institutions, and missionary activities.

6.3   Religious Schools—Madrasah(s): The ‘Castles of Islam’ Education is important for constructing a national social psyche. As Foucault argues, ‘knowledge is one of the manifestations of the presence of power’ (Foucault 1979: 27), and in Bangladesh the government’s influ-

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ence over knowledge is a critical part of its power. In the modern period, when liberal bourgeoisie states emerged, the dominance of liberal ideals in the West is connected to the replacement of the Church as the dominant ideological state apparatus (Althusser 2001: 103–104). In Muslim societies like Bangladesh, however, the scenario is different. Since independence, Bangladesh has carried forward legacies of Islamic teaching by religious schools, locally known as madrasahs, in parallel with more liberal curriculums in schools, colleges, and universities. Within this favourable atmosphere of Islamic education, parallel growth of the unregulated privately run madrasahs too are unprecedented. In Bangladesh, Islamic education is widespread, state-supported, and differs from a liberal education in important ways. Islamic educational institutions transfer knowledge, like all forms of education, but they also disseminate faith, mould character, and mobilize followers (Reetz 2010: 106–139). ‘The objective of an Islamic education is not only to impart knowledge but also to guide the recipients in their lives and ensure that the educational institutes are creating more followers’ (Riaz 2014: 14). An Islamic education tends to shape the lifestyles, peer groups, and worldviews of its recipients. The government supports Islamic education in Bangladesh so as to produce what it calls ‘moral and ethical citizens’, but such a policy stance also generates mass support for illiberal values. Muslims worldwide do not differ about the five basic tenets of the Islamic faith, but they differ greatly in how they see the socio-political implications of Islam and the role of madrasah education. Such differences in views are evident among Bangladeshi Muslims. Even if the government is pursuing a ‘soft authoritarian’ approach to political Islam, radical or violent extremist interpretations of Islam’s approach to politics are commonly produced in government-supported madrasahs. The government may be opposed to such groups, but until recently there was no instrument that would allow the state to filter radical interpretations of Islam out of Islamic teaching materials. Although the Seventh FYP asserts that madrasah education will be modernized and ‘text materials of Islamic and Arabic subjects will be updated/modified’ (Seventh FYP 2015: 541) no detailed explanation of these processes are provided. However, in another policy document titled ‘Annual activity plan agreement 2018–2019’ (signed by the Chair of the Madrasah Education Board and the Secretary, Technical and Madrasah Education Division) outlines modernization as digitization of administration and student registration for exams. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that traditionally, hard-line and extremist political

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Islamist parties find their support base in madrasahs (alongside other educational institutes such as universities and grammar schools) whether or not they are state-funded, and irrespective of state efforts to fight religious terrorism. While the majority of madrasah graduates are not terrorists, it is highly likely that they would prefer supporting illiberal values and cultures in the country. In Bangladesh, two types of madrasahs are responsible for Islamic education—the government-funded Alia madrasahs and the privately funded Qawmi madrasahs. The origin of the Alia madrasah system can be traced back to 1780, when a British colonial ruler, Warren Hastings, established the Calcutta Madrasah (UNESCO 2011: 5; Bano 2008: 10). Qawmi madrasahs follow the example of the Deoband Madrasah, which was established in India during the colonial period. At the time of Bangladesh’s independence, about 6000 madrasahs were already operating in the country (BEI 2011: 14). Some of these went on following the Alia madrasah tradition whereas some followed Qawmi tradition. The state, through the Madrasah Education Board, is responsible for supporting Alia madrasahs and the following objectives are behind its support for Alia madrasah education (National Education Policy 2010: 27): • To establish firm belief in Almighty Allah in the minds of the learners and his Prophet and to enable the learners to understand the true meaning of Islam • To train students for Islamic preaching and to inspire the students into Islamic codes of life • To train students in a way that they can know and understand the true ideal and spirit of Islam and, accordingly, become persons of sound moral character • To teach students general and compulsory subjects These objectives are consistent with the FYP’s aims of constructing ummah conscious among Bangladeshi Muslims. The underlying principle of these objectives is to orient students towards an Islamic life where they will not only establish firmer belief in Allah and Prophet, but also propagate Islam by preaching in the society. In other words, this government policy is focused upon producing religious change agents who will also defy liberal values. The Alia madrasah education system is broken into five levels: ibtedai (equivalent to elementary school education), dakhil (equivalent to secondary school education), alim (equivalent to higher second-

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ary school education), fazil (equivalent to a Bachelor of Artsprogram), and kamil (equivalent to a Master of Arts programme). At present, Bangladesh hosts the largest number of Alia madrasahs in South Asia (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009: 377). According to one estimate, the growth of Alia madrasahs over a period of 32 years (1972–2004) has been about 732% and student enrolment has jumped by 653% (Riaz 2008: 37). Asadullah and Chaudhury (2016) note that as per the government data of 2014, there were 17,540 government-­ run madrasahs (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2016: 58). As of 2002, 93% of the Alia madrasahs were located in rural areas, with 7% located in urban areas (BEI 2011: 21). The Ministry of Education’s data show that in 2006, about 1.77 million students were going to these madrasahs, amounting to 30% of students in regulated secondary education (National Education Policy 2010: 30). Interestingly, madrasahs account for 30% of the total female secondary school enrolment in Bangladesh (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009: 381). One of the major reasons behind this high enrolment of females in madrasahs is that ‘female students are waived of all tuition payments and additionally qualify for regular stipend from the government’ (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009: 385). Female participation in madrasah education has important implications for the ummah consciousness of Bangladesh because mothers play an important role at home in raising Bangladeshi children according to an Islamic way of life. The Madrasah Education Ordinance (MEO) of 1978 stipulates that the curriculum of Alia madrasahs will consist of reading the Qur’an; Islamiat, which is the combination of Tafsir (interpretation of Quran), Hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad), Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Kalam (Islamic scholastic theology), Usul (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), Maqulat (Islamic rational Science), Faraid (Islamic inheritance law), and relevant subjects (humanities, including Arabic language, and literature; Islamic history; general history, Bengali language and literature; science; commerce; and agriculture (MEO 1978: 21)). Researchers argue that this curriculum has been under reform since the 1980s2 and ‘the 2  The single most important motivation for madrasah reform has been the importance of life skill acquisition. In the pre-modernization era, students in all (including Qawmi) madrasahs in the country were taught Urdu, Persian, and Arabic (not Bengali) as the madrasah curriculum continued to follow the Deoband style. They then followed the stateapproved Dars-i-Nizami curriculum (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009: 379). This curriculum was developed by Molla Nizamuddin in colonial India and became a curriculum for Muslims that included mathematics, astronomy, medicine, logic, geography, history, chemistry, as well

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Madrasah Education Board has gradually developed a reformed madrasa curriculum3 in which secular subjects were given a prominent position’ (Bano 2008: 15). However, others dismiss this claim; for example,  the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI)  has argued that: In actual cases most of the general courses are not offered…[for example] higher mathematics at the Dakhil and Alim levels is hardly offered in most madrasahs. Similarly, economics, political science and sociology are also not offered at the Fazil level. The other point is that there has been some degree of customization in general courses like science that present topics like water, gravitation force more in religious perspective than in secular knowledge subjects (BEI 2011: 24). A World Bank report identifies two problems regarding an Alia madrasah education. First, these madrasahs may promote skills that are incompatible with a modern economy (Asadullah et  al. 2009: iii). In madrasah, ‘the academic standard attained is popularly perceived to be much lower than in general education…with little learning taking place, current attendance can only reinforce the curse of poverty in the future’ (Asadullah et al. 2009: iii). Second, madrasah education may not promote civic values that are essential for a functioning democracy, thereby causing concerns among policymakers with an interest in the relationship between education and citizenship (Asadullah et al. 2009: iii). In other words, by supporting this education system, the state itself is constructing a as the Quran, Hadith, Fiqh, jurisprudence, and Sufism. The curriculum later came to be known as Dars-i-Nizami, which at present Alia madrasahs use (BEI 2011: 13). 3  According to the present syllabus of the Alia madrasahs, in classes 1 and 2, 300 marks are allotted for Arabic and 200 for Bengali and mathematics. In classes 3 and 4, 300 marks are for religious studies and 500 for general studies. From classes 5 to 8, each class has 400 marks for religious studies, and in class 5 only 500 marks for general studies. In the other classes, 600 marks are allotted for general education. At the dakhil level, in classes 9 and 10 there are 500 marks for religious studies and 500 for general education. At this level, a student who wants to study science has to take chemistry and physics instead of Islamic history and social science. There are also 100 marks for additional studies, which include agriculture, biology, and higher mathematics. At the alim level, equivalent to higher secondary education, out of the 1000 compulsory marks 700 are allocated for religious studies and 300 for general education, which includes Bengali and English. At the fazil level, equivalent to a bachelor’s degree, of 1100 marks 600 are allotted to religious studies, 200 for Bengali and English, and the remaining 300 for any one subject chosen from economics, political science, Islamic history, philosophy, English, sociology, or social welfare. Then at the Kamil level, the distribution of the 1000 allotted marks is such that 800 marks are for subjects related to religion and 200 for Islamic history. Thus, even within Alia madrasahs, the secular content is reduced at the fazil (BA) and kamil (MA) levels due to the need to specialize (Bano 2008: 29).

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­ mmah-­conscious citizenship, which may  in many instances undermine u the idea of the state and liberal democratic politics. It is important to note that there is a perception albeit of being too generalized that the students of Alia madrasahs act as a support base of Islamic Chatro Shibir (ICS), the male student wing of Jamaat, and Bangladesh Islami Chatri Shangha, the female student wing of Jamaat. Bano’s (2008) in-depth, interview-based research found that ‘Jamaat provides an ideological support base to Alia madrasah and many teachers of the Alia madrasa are of the Jamaat mindset’ (Bano 2008: 23). Bano explains the connection between Jamaat and Alia madrasah: There is a logical connection. Jamaat’s philosophy is that religion has to be a way of life and the state has to be shaped by it. It does not believe in studying Islam just for the sake of becoming mosque imams and religious teachers. Its leadership comes from educated middle class professionals, who believe that Muslim students should take a lead in all professions but also have a good religious understanding. The Alia madrasas, with their emphasis on combining religious and secular education, thus found their support within a dominant religious force in the country. This gave the program greater legitimacy among the madrasas that were thinking of benefiting from the state-funded program. (Bano 2008: 24)

Bano’s account is a solid example of how state patronization of Islam benefits conventional Islamists. Still, even without state funding, madrasahs can thrive. The growth of Qawmi madrasahs (privately regulated Islamic schools) is phenomenal although most degrees conferred in these madrasahs are not state-sanctioned. These madrasahs are financially supported by religious endowments or by the zakat, sadaqa, and other donations from the faithful. Many of these madrasahs provide lodging and food to poor students, and the financial autonomy of the madrasah system has been a major source of the independent religious-political power base of the ulema (Islamic scholars) in Bangladesh (Ahmad 2008: 5–7). The government, while not directly funding these Qawmi madrasahs, allows them to be funded by both locals and foreigners and gives them the status of a charity. In 1978, a Qawmi madrasah board (independent of the Education Board) was set up in Bangladesh under the name of Wafaq ul Madaris Al Arabia, Bangladesh. This was a continuation of a process that started in West Pakistan in 1957, with the establishment of the Wafaq ul Madaris Al Arabia, Pakistan (Bano 2008: 17). The main purpose of this platform

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was to develop a standard curriculum for the Qawmi madrasahs, to conduct centralized exams, and to issue standard degree certificates (Bano 2008: 17–18). A national Bengali daily the Prothom Alo (2019), citing a document from the Wafaq ul Madaris Al Arabia, reported that the total number of Qawmi madrasahs was 15,250 with about 1,857,500 students taught by 132,150 teachers (quoted in Bhuiyan 2010: 27). However, expert testimony prepared on behalf of the International Crisis Group for the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on ‘Combating Terrorism through Education’, claims that Bangladesh’s madrasah sector has an estimated 64,000 madrasahs (including 48,000 without any government oversight) (Quoted in Asadullah and Chaudhury 2016: 58–59). The problem of the lack of statistics about these unregulated Qawmi madrasahs leads to such wide discrepancies about the actual size of the Qawmi madrasahs in the country. However, the discrepancy notwithstanding, the size of these madrasahs is significant. Islamist parties and radical conservative groups, other than the Jamaat and HI, use these Qawmi madrasahs as their support base (Bano 2008: 17–18). Interviewee K, who is a leader of an Islamist party explained that ‘graduates of Qawmi madrasahs are mostly employed in the religious sector i.e. mosques, madrasahs. They constitute influential Ulema groups in the country’ and that is why ‘Qawmi madrasahs are the castles of Islam in Bangladesh’ (Interviewee K 2017).

6.4   State-Funded Islamic Missionary Activities Alongside of the encouragement of Islamic education through state and private madrasahs, the state also supports public and private missionary activities to propagate Islam in society. The state supports, encourages, and funds private Islamic institutes, events, and Islamic movements such as Tabligh Jamaat (TJ). The state-run Islamic Foundation (IF) is a prime example demonstrating how state funds are spent to expand and organize Islamic society. In my assessment, the state-funded IF plays an important role in raising and protecting Bangladesh’s ummah consciousness in following ways (Islamic Foundation 2008: 8): (a) Propagating Islamic values and culture through mosques and institutes (b) Conducting research that glorifies the contribution of Islam and Muslims to world culture, science, and civilization (c) Promoting the Islamic concepts of tolerance, brotherhood, and justice

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(d) Disseminating research grants for projects related to issues such as Islamic politics, economics, history, philosophy, law, and justice (e) Disbursing funds to organizations whose operational strategies and philosophy align with the IF These objectives not only complement the state’s FYPs and education policy but also supporting an aggressive expansion of Islamic values and culture through networks of religious institutes and religious opinion makers. My investigation of the IF has found that several of its departments are strategically structured to reinforce Islamic values and political Islam. Research on the activities conducted by these departments reveals that Bangladeshi leaders’  vision of turning Bangladesh into a culturally Islamic country, as a manifestation of his ummah commitment, has been successful. Below is a succinct review of key IF departments to illustrate their activities and impacts. 6.4.1   The Islamic Mission Targeting the Poor and Disadvantaged Established in 1983, the objective of this division of the IF is to promote Islamic ethics and teaching among the poor masses through humanitarian works. The Mission provides free health check-ups, free medicines, free eye tests, skill training, and a free circumcision service to poor Muslims. In remote areas of the country, the Mission disburses interest-free loans to economically deprived people in order to encourage them to move to a ‘halal income’. The Mission teaches ‘Namaj’ (the prayer), reading of the Quran, ‘tafsir’, and provides general primary education to the poor. This department also organizes special mass preaching sessions to attract people to Islam. At present, 33 individual missions are operating in 30 districts. Offices of these missions are mostly situated in remote areas (Islamic Foundation 1990: 4). The logic of this department is to bring the hearts and minds of poor Bangladeshis into the path of Islam by helping them with their health, circumcisions (an essential bodily requirement for Muslim men), literacy for Islamic scriptures, and various other aspects of Islamic life. 6.4.2   Department of Deeni Dawah and Culture The role of this department in the Islamic life of Bangladeshi’s is extremely important. This department controls the National Moon Sighting

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Committee (NMSC), which is responsible for proclaiming Eid4 and other Islamic festivals in Bangladesh. The NMSC is formed by the Department of Deeni Dawah and Culture (DDC) with the participation of Islamic scholars, bureaucrats, and scientists from Bangladesh’s meteorological community. The same department also announces fasting time during Ramadan via the media. Each day of Ramadan, fasting times are broadcast on television and radio stations, and published on the Internet and in print media (Islamic Foundation 2008: 6). The DDC is also responsible for organizing nationwide Islamic programmes such as Eid e Miladunnabi (the birth and death anniversary of Prophet Muhammad), Islamic preaching sessions and seminars, endorsing ‘halal certificates’ to exportable products, and fixing the ‘fitra’ rate (the fitra is the annual compulsory payment that every Muslim pays to ensure that all Muslims are able to enjoy the day of Eid). Finally, it plays an important role in strengthening bonds between Bangladesh and the Islamic heartland (the Middle East) through religious education programmes. For example, it sends Bangladeshi teams of ‘qaris’ (people who recite Quran maintain appropriate rule of reading Quran) to various Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Malaysia, Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan. It also established an Arabic Language Institute (Islamic Foundation 2011: 5). In order to stimulate scholarly debate about Islam and political Islam, the DDC manages recruitment of Bangladeshi ­students who wish to study at the Al-Azhar University of Egypt, a place well known for producing influential theorists of political Islam. 6.4.3  Imam Training Academy—Targeting the Islamic Opinion Makers The IF has recognized the significance of imams as opinion leaders in religious matters in Bangladesh, especially those who work in rural and remote areas (Islamic Foundation 2011: 8). For that reason, starting in 1979, the IF undertook initiatives to train imams to preach about the importance of Islamic ethics and values in the socio-political lives of Bangladeshi Muslims. An analysis of official documents shows that the modules used for training imams cover a broad range of issues, including gardening, sanitation, family welfare, awareness of dowry payments, HIV 4

 A Muslim religious festival, similar to Christmas.

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AIDS, first aid, gender equality, anti-terrorism, counter-extremism, and computer skills training. This programme is designed to help imams teach ‘Islam as a complete way of peaceful life’ among the masses. 6.4.4  Publications Promoting Political Islamist Thinkers Several departments, including the Department of Research, Translation, and Islamic Encyclopaedia, manage the IF’s publications. The research division of the IF has published a total of 120 monographs on various aspects of Islam’s teaching about life, Islamic political thought, and other relevant issues (Islamic Foundation 2011: 6). It is also responsible for translating Arabic publications, including the Quran and Hadiths (the Prophet’s sayings) into Bangla so that the people of Bangladesh can understand the meaning of the Quran, hadiths, and tafsirs of Quranic scholars. The Bangla translation of the Quran is the most popular and widely sold version across Bangladesh (Islamic Foundation 2011: 7). The Department of Islamic Encyclopaedia has published the largest Bangla Islamic Encyclopaedia in 26 parts and 28 books (Islamic Foundation 2011: 7–9). Information on Muslim history, culture, jurisprudence, and architecture comprises this huge volume of work. At the time of the writing of this book, this department undertook a new project, entitled the Sirat Encyclopaedia, which aims to publish information on the lives and works of the prophets and their companions. In total, according to the estimate of Rashid (2008: 285–348) (who conducted his Ph.D. thesis examining the nature of the publications of the IF from 1980 to 2008; it should be noted the thesis is the only one of its kind, which I came across), the IF has published 181 books on the Quran and Tafsirs written by Quranic scholars of the Arab world and Bangladesh. The list features a Tafsir book on the controversial theorist of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb. The IF also published 90 books of Hadiths; 217 books about Islamic culture, literature, and architecture; 192 books on Islamic history in general and Islamic history in Bangladesh specifically; 202 books on Islamic economics and social policies; 24 books for children; 107 books on Prophet Muhammad; 246 biographies of Muslim prophets, companions of the prophet, Sufis, and great Bengali Muslim men; 85 books on Islamic jurisprudence; and 395 books on the importance of Islam in the lives of Muslims. The pattern of the IF publications shows that IF, as the state’s Islamic missionary organization, considers Islam as a complete way of life for

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Muslims in Bangladesh, glorifies Islamic civilization, promotes political Islam, and makes assertive distinctions between the Western and Islamic civilizations. Some of the following titles (original Bangla titles are written next to the translated titles) further illustrate the focus of IF (Rashid 2008: 259, 281,284, 356): 1. The Beauty of Islamic Teaching in our National Lives (Amader Jaityo Jibone Islamer Shikkha ebong Shoundorjo) 2. Communism and Islam (Communism ebong Islam) 3. Islam and Western Democracy (Islam ebong paschatto gonotonrto) 4. The Possibilities of Islamic Revivalism in the Contemporary World (Bortoman bishwe Islami punorjagoroner shomvabona)5 5. Islamic State (Islami Rastro Bebostha) 6. The Concept of Tawhid in Islam 7. Historical Materialism and Islam 8. The Clash between Islam and Communism (Islam ebong Communism er shonghat) 9. Ideals and Characteristics of an Islamic State (Islami Rastrer Boishishto ebong adorsho) 10. Interest is an Economic Curse (Shud ekti Orthonoitik Ovishap) 11. The Muslim Ummah in the Contemporary World 12. The Importance of the Medina Charter 13. Muslims on the Course of Victory (Bijoyer pothe Musulmans) 14. Islamic Philosophy in the Arabic Poems (Arbi kobitai Islami vabdhara) 15. The Role of Islam in Preventing Crime (Oporadh domone Islam) Many of these publications from the state-funded IF stand at odds with the concepts of modern nation states, democracy, and civic values while reinforcing ummah consciousness. According to the IF, the demand for the Quran, introductory books to Arabic texts (otherwise known as ‘kaida’), books explaining the basics of Islam, and the biography of the Prophet Muhammad are extremely popular in Bangladesh. In a 5  This work is by Delwar Hossain Sayedee, a controversial Islamic preacher and a leader of the BJI who, at the time of this writing, was given the death penalty by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) for crimes against humanity during the Independence War.

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more recent estimate, in only two years (2009–2011) the IF had to print 50,000 new copies of the Quran, 16,500 copies of kaida, 45,250 copies of the Bukhari Hadith, and 31,500 copies of the tafsir of the Quran by Qasir (Islamic Foundation 2011: 59). 6.4.5  Mosque-Based Child and Mass Literacy Programme— Targeting the Poor The IF initiated a mosque-based child and mass literacy programme in 1991–1992 (Rahmani 2012: 107) through an education programme carefully structured to disseminate Islamic values to the recipients. A Foundation document states: This is the biggest mosque based education program initiated by the government. Before the inception of this program there was no institutional setup for running a mosque based child and mass literacy program for the poor and deprived people. Participants of this program can learn Bangla, English, Arabic, mathematics and Islamic jurisprudence. (Rahmani 2012: 107)

This statement not only highlights the government’s objective to promote Islamic teaching among poor and deprived children (targeting children in rural areas), it also demonstrates the government’s high regard for its programme as being very large and sophisticated. At present, the education programme is available for two age groups: 4 to 5 years; and 15 to 35 years (Rahmani 2012: 108). Mosques are the main place for disseminating knowledge in this programme and qualified imams perform the role of educators. According to the most recent estimate available, a total of 35,000 imams are employed in this programme and a total of 9,290,200 people received education (Rahmani 2012: 100–111). Learning to read Quran is one of the most popular choices among the students, a clear sign of the importance of Islamic ideas and culture to average people. The IF’s education programme is designed to foster a long-lasting Islamic impact on the psyche of the young and older participants in a number of ways. First, the place of education—the mosque—is of extreme importance as learning here imparts special sympathy and respect for Islam among the students. If they are receiving something of value in the mosque, they cannot help but feel some psychological attachment. Second, this programme acts as the catalyst for increasing the religiosity of partici-

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pants. According to a survey of 300 participants conducted by the IF, all participants believed that it was important to have Islamic education in their lives in order to live in an Islamic way (Rahmani 2012: 124). One may see from this brief review of the IF’s activities that Islamic culture and education are now the focus of state institutions, and the general public is ever more deeply inducted into (and respects) Islamic norms. Recently, the IF has undertaken another massive project called the ‘560 Model Mosques and Islamic Cultural Centre Project’ that will oversee establishment of mosques and Islamic cultural centre projects in all districts and sub-districts of Bangladesh. In next section I discuss private missionary activities conducted by the  Tabligh Jamaat (TJ) movement—a privately funded Islamic Dawah mission. This movement complements the state in Islamization of Bangladesh’s public spaces, and the public sphere more generally, to display Bangladesh’s Muslim identity. The state encourages and provides logistics supports to the movement.

6.5   Private Missionary Activities: The Tabligh Jamaat Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas, a graduate of the Deoband Madrasah, founded the TJ movement in 1920s. Its objective is to conduct the moral reform of Muslims. It is a global programme and has gained momentum in Bangladesh. In a newly published book on TJ, Siddiqi (2018) underpins that converting non-Muslims to Islam is one of the key goals of this movement (Siddiqi 2018). The core intention of the TJ, however, is to revive Islamic ideals among those who have deviated from the Islamic way of life in search of materialistic gains (Huque and Akhter 1987: 217). To this end, Muslims are called upon to spend a specific period of time (3–120 days) living in a mosque with a group of Muslim associates. Sikand (1999) argues that ‘Tabligh, ideally, should be done outside one’s village or town, so that one’s attention can, in this period at least, be focused entirely on God alone and not be encumbered by domestic worries’ (Sikand 1999: 103). Sikand (1999) further states that: while on tabligh, the activists themselves seek to improve their own knowledge of Islam, in particular of the basic Islamic rituals such as namaz (prayer) and various Arabic incantations and supplications (dua) that are considered

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to be appropriate for various different occasions. They are also expected to teach the Muslims whom they come into contact with the basic Islamic beliefs and instruct them in various Islamic ritual practices as enjoined by the sharia. (Sikand 1999: 104)

Mumtaz Ahmad (2008) notes that its growth and popularity in Bangladesh is spectacular, and Ahamed and Nazneen (1990) note that this movement draws large crowds from all walks of life including politicians, students, teachers, doctors, engineers, officials, and ordinary people (Ahmad 2008: 62; Ahamed and Nazneen 1990: 799). However, Sikand (1999) argues that the TJ’s strongest support base is constituted ‘by the people from rural areas’, and in Bangladesh, rural people constitute over 80% of the population. A mosque situated in the Kakrail area, known as the Kakrail Mosque, manages the TJ movement in Bangladesh. The TJ’s three-day annual summit, the Biswa Ijtema (world assembly), is said to be the second largest gathering of Muslims in the world after the Hajj. Currently, the Biswa Ijtema takes place over four days (Daily Prothom Alo 2019). The state supports the Biswa Ijtema because its very nature is a practical manifestation of the religious ummah and it is good for Bangladesh’s standing in the Islamic world. Each year about three to five million Muslims from around the world joins this event. According to a recent estimate, devotees from up to 90 different countries have attended (Björkman 2010: 16 and Opu 2018) and the range of nationalities broadens every year. Participants now come from India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Bhutan, Syria, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Jordan, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Turkey, Spain, Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, United States, Canada, and Australia (Björkman 2010: 19). Even foreign diplomats of Muslim states posted in Bangladesh participate in the Biswa jtema (Björkman 2010: 17). The state supports the event in a range of ways, including allocating space for the crowds, altering traffic routes and provision of security, health services, and sanitation support for participants (Sikand 1999: 121–122; Björkman 2010: 16). The local Bangladeshi field of Biswa Ijtema becomes a space for connecting global ummah. Although Björkman (2010) argues that ‘the Biswa Ijtema rejects politics and focuses on reviving the tenets of Islam and promoting peace and harmony; [here the devotees] discuss the Quran, pray and listen to bayans (sermons) by Islamic scholars from around the world on fundamental issues of Islam’

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(Björkman 2010: 17), I disagree because the heavy involvement of the state and political leaders in successfully organizing this event underscores the political significance of this movement. Sikand (1999) in this regard states that leading Bangladeshi politicians from both the ruling as well as opposition parties generally make a point to be present on the occasion of the Biswa ljtema and seek blessings from the Tablighi leaders, including, and most importantly, the amir of the movement (normally based in Delhi). At the same time, there is a long tradition that the chiefs of all three military wings—the army, navy, and air force—do not fail to attend or connect via Internet to Biswa ljtema’s final prayer session, while it is a ritual that the president and prime minister issue congratulatory messages for the successful organization of the event. Sometimes, heads of state are present at the final prayer session known as the Akheri Munajat, but even if they cannot be present physically, they join the prayer session from their offices or residences via online video application (BDnews24 2013). These prayers seek Allah’s guidance and support for the wellbeing of Muslim ummah among other issues (Akand 2019). The participation of state officials in supporting the movement and endorsing its prayers are an encouragement to Bangladesh’s political commitment to ummah. There is also an electoral and public relations value for the Bangladesh leadership to see and be seen at the gathering of the faithful.

6.6   Islamization of the Public Sphere State support for Islam is often targeted at Islamizing the ‘public sphere’— public spaces, symbols and buildings. In many secular countries, these areas cannot be overtly religious, except those places of historical significance. For instance, government buildings are often not allowed to display religious symbols or partake in religious ceremonies. This is not the case in Bangladesh where the public sphere (and, therefore, the identity of public institutions) is Islamized through the state’s active patronage of the mosques, public preaching sessions on Islam, and the construction of majars across the country. The Bangladeshi state’s Islamization project is a manifestation of the power of the ummah, which encourages people to identify the public sphere as Islamic. Due to public affection for Islam, the state can hardly refuse to participate in supporting the Islamization of the public sphere, which in turn, only increases the legitimacy of Islam as an object of state support.

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6.6.1  Mosques The state supports the construction of new mosques and within the past year government has aimed to build 560 mosques (Shaon 2018). In the private sphere, the permit for constructing a new mosque is easy to obtain, and for that reason the number of mosques in Bangladesh has grown quickly. According to a parliamentary statement by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the country has 250,399 mosques spread over its territory (BDnews24 2011). Five times a day in most cases, via a loud sound system, Muajjins (people who sing the Azan) recite the Azan from the mosques, projecting the name of Allah and the prophet to the masses (including non-Muslims). The constant repetition of the prayer builds the sense of Islamic community. The architectural structure of most Bangladeshi mosques also resembles Arabic architecture, a fact that makes the transnational heritage of international community of Islam obvious even to the uneducated. The capital city Dhaka is also known as the city of mosques (Steel 2016). 6.6.2  Public Islamic Preaching Sessions (Waj Mahfils) Public Islamic preaching sessions, known as waj mahfils, play an important role in promoting Islamic knowledge in the country, especially in the rural areas. Usually, such preaching sessions are organized privately, but the IF also supports waj mahfils. Preachers at waj mahfils speak about the glory and superiority of Islam and the greatness of the Prophet. The contents of such speeches are circulated by word of mouth to people who fail to attend (Huque and Akhter 1987: 216). Conventional Islamists can use waj mahfils to promote more radical political Islam in Bangladesh. For example, Riaz (2008) conducted a content analysis of speeches given at various waj mahfils by Delwar Hossain Saidee, a former MP of Jamaat and now in jail for committing crimes against humanity in 1971. Riaz concluded that Saidee provided an ideologically driven, politically motivated interpretation of Islam in such sessions (Riaz 2008: 57). He believes that ‘for potential Islamist militants, these speeches act as source and motivation’ (Riaz 2008: 58). 6.6.3  Shrines (Mazars) Not only does the state support orthodox (Arab-oriented) Islam, it also supports Sufi Islam. As noted in Chap. 3, Sufis played an important role in

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spreading Islam in Bangladesh, and this continues today. Huque and Akhter (1987) defined Sufism as ‘a mode of religious life in Islam in which the emphasis is placed not so much on the performance of external rituals as on the activities of the inner-self—in other words it signifies Islamic mysticism’ (Huque and Akhter 1987: 214). Ahmad (2008) argues that Sufism in Bangladesh is represented in two levels: the populist folk Sufism of the masses, and the intellectual Sufism. Today, Sufism rearticulates Islamic metaphysics as an answer to Western materialism and, although Sufis preach a more liberal and inclusive brand of Islam, it is not like Western liberalism as it is embedded in Muslim history and political culture. Sufis, dead or alive, are known in Bangladesh as Pirs (masters) and Murids (disciples). The graves of Pirs are known as Mazars (shrines) and Urs (annual celebrations) take place in such shrines. Ahmad (2008) argues that quite a large number of Muslims in Bangladesh identify themselves with some Pirs and that Pirs exercise enormous spiritual, but not political, influence over their Murids (Ahmad 2008: 60). Indeed, many Pir families have tried their luck in politics but failed (Ahmad 2008: 60). Hundreds of Shrines of Pirs are distributed across the country and Urs are supported by masses of common people as well as by leading national political figures. Presidents, cabinet ministers, generals, top-level bureaucrats, and many university professors are frequent visitors to Urs (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990: 800), thus making it an accepted social practice, which the government can hardly oppose in the future. Although hard-line Islamists reject the idea of majars, the point, however, is these establishments and building contribute in reinforcing an Islamic public sphere. 6.6.4  Removal of ‘Un-Islamic Sculptures’ from the Public Sphere Two examples are significant to mention here, which show the state’s tolerance for intolerant Islamist groups who want to keep Bangladesh’s public sphere free from other religious and secular symbols. The first case is the removal of a Baul (amystic minstrel living in rural Bangladesh) sculpture from the front of the international airport in Dhaka in 2008 and the second is the removal of a sculpture of a Greek lady representing justice from the front of the premises of the Supreme Court in 2017 (Boyle 2017). In both cases, the state has given way to the demand of the hard-­ line Islamists to protect ‘the Islamic integrity’ of the Bangladeshi public sphere. In summary, the state has installed an Islamic public sphere in

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Bangladesh, and made the symbols, rituals, and values of Islam inseparable from those of the state. The following quote by Interviewee L, a journalist and noted historian, explains the contemporary nature of the public sphere of Bangladesh. His observation also shows how modernity and globalization brought challenges to liberalism in a Muslim country by transforming the nature of public sphere. In the 1970s, modernity in Dhaka dwellers meant drinking whisky, beers, playing bridge, wearing suits. Now it is Islamic modernity here. If you walk through the capital city, you will find many Islamic symbols—mosques and mazars are everywhere. You will see thousands are flocking towards mosques in Dhaka for Friday prayer. Many roads are blocked because mosques fail to provide space for prayers and people pray on the street. If you take a lift in a high rise building you will see a paper glued in the lift door stating the prayer you are required to read when the lift is going up and the prayer you are required to read when the lift is coming down. You will see prayers and advice about participating salah (prayer) written on the back of the bus and three-wheelers. You’ll see the word Allah printed in buses, offices…everywhere. It is as if you are literally walking in the land of Allah. (Interviewee L 2017)

As a result of the Islamization of the public sphere, an unwritten perception has developed in the national psyche that makes it impossible for a non-Muslim to be president, prime minister, or the head of a branch of the defence forces because public opinion and the bureaucracy have become more rigidly attached to Islam as a state ideology.

6.7   An Illiberal and Unsafe Society for Minorities Perhaps one of the major rationales behind state patronization of the Islamic national consciousness is that Bangladeshis will consider that they are born into an ummah. From childhood, Islamic values are so strongly pressed upon them that the state and state encouraged entities are able to transform their private Islamic identities into political corporate (politically similar) identities. That is, the private identity of Muslim person is easily manipulated by parties, leaders, and states for their electoral gain by politicizing their commitment to Islam. Another reason for state support for Islam is simply that the state is run by Muslim people and they naturally support their own religious values.

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The socialization of Bangladeshi children into an Islamic way of life starts early and is indirect but consistent until the ages of eight or ten years. Children become Muslims without understanding Islam, and a child’s participation in the rituals of Islam begins at birth. For example, ‘a male member of the family recites the Azan (call for prayer) as soon as the child is born’ (Huque and Akhter 1987: 209) and, later, parents are careful to choose Islamic names. The women in the house often recite verses from the Quran and hymns praising Allah and the Prophet Muhammad to the children, and they are also taught Islamic etiquette and greetings, see their parents performing Islamic rituals, and follow their example in early childhood. In the view of Huque and Akhter: Islamic influences build upon strength long before political, economic, or other social forces are able to leave impressions in the minds of the citizens; thus in the later life of Bangladeshi citizens it becomes extremely difficult for the other influences to overcome or remove Islamic values. (Huque and Akhter 1987: 209)

The problems with such patronization of public Islam from the state are twofold: (a) people are divided over multiple interpretations of Islam and (b) they form an identity of us (in this case Muslims) versus them (in this case non-Muslims). Within this context, surveys have concluded that Bangladesh is a conservative and illiberal society (Riaz and Aziz 2017; Fair and Abdallah 2017). Key findings of their surveys were cited in the opening chapter. A series of other international surveys and reports also indicate that Bangladesh hosts a highly illiberal, conservative Muslim society in which an overwhelming number of people offer their support in favour of the political role of Islam. In other words, Bangladeshis want their state and politics infused by Islamic values and culture. For example, over 98% of Bangladeshi Muslims in 2009 said in a Gallup poll that ‘religion plays a very important role in their lives’ (Naurath 2009). A Pew Survey in 2012 found that 71% of Bangladeshis displayed Quranic verses in their homes to highlight the importance of Islam in their lives (Bell 2012: 79). Another Pew Survey found that 82% of Bangladeshi Muslims favour making Sharia the official law of the country and 71% said they wanted religious judges deciding family and property disputes (Bell 2013: 15, 19). Fifty per cent of those Muslims who favoured Sharia Law also supported corporal punishment (such as whipping or cutting off the hands of thieves and robbers) and 55% supported stoning as punishment for adultery. Forty-four per

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cent of those same Muslims favoured the death penalty for converts to different religion (Bell 2013: 52, 54, 55). Not all aspects of Bangladeshi law follow Sharia and ‘83% of Bangladeshis believe that not following Sharia law is a bad thing’ (Bell 2013: 58). It first became apparent that many Bangladeshis wanted Sharia as the state’s legal framework in a 2006 Gallup poll, which found that 52% Bangladeshis wanted to see Sharia as the ‘only source’ of legislation and 39% said they wanted to see Sharia as ‘a source’ of legislation (Mogahed 2006: 19). This meant in 2006, 91% of Bangladeshis wanted the constitutional and legislative framework of the country infused with religious values. Although Bangladeshis differed about the degree of inclusion of Sharia in the state and in politics, in general, they agreed that Islam should play a significant role in the country’s socio-political structure. The meaning of Sharia may vary widely; however, it would not be inappropriate if one argues that these findings only confirm that Bangladesh hosts a conservative society which demands politics is not devoid of Islam. I have observed in some instances that these surveys are criticized in public forums in Bangladesh or even from anonymous reviewers because they have been conducted by Western agencies funded by Western states and therefore are not reflective of the general sentiment of the population. However, these criticisms are flawed on two grounds. First, the surveys show a persistent pattern over several years. Worldwide, Pew and Gallup have a reputation for conducting surveys maintaining acceptable research ethics. Therefore, an ad-hominem rejection of these surveys, because of Western funding, does not stand in my view. These organizations conduct surveys in other countries too and (more or less) their findings are accepted, although not beyond criticism as with any survey. Second, locally funded data are scarce. Especially, there is not much attention given to collection of data that is related to the religious behaviour of Bangladeshis. There are many reasons behind such scarcity but I shall mention two here. One reason is lack of research support and another is that the state is very suspicious of this line of inquiry. For example, I was a fellow of a research project funded by a US-based RESOLVE Network at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in 2017. The research teams consisted of a combination of local and foreign researchers. The team design was purposeful so that the conclusions would not be devoid of local interpretation of data. The project aimed to understand the behaviour of young people with regard to Islam and politics in Bangladesh. That project had two streams: quantitative and qualitative. The collection of quantitative data was

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stopped in the middle of the project because police thought the researchers were asking ‘sensitive questions’ and it was a grand conspiracy of the West (especially the United States) against Bangladesh. As a result, instead of the original plan of collecting information from 8000 Bangladeshi youths, the quantitative researchers prepared their reports on the basis of 4000 samples. Against this contextual backdrop, relying on the findings of the Pew and Gallup surveys is not only reasonable, but sometimes it is the only option. So, what are the impacts of this illiberal mindset among the general population? In many cases where rigid interpretation of Islam is the norm, members from minority communities are discriminated socially and systematically. For example, minorities in Bangladesh have demanded state-­ funded minority religious institutions like that of the IF but they have been denied by the state; instead the state had set up the Hindu Welfare Trust, Christian Religious Welfare Trust, and Buddhist Welfare Trust. Operations of these trusts are largely restricted to managing a few religious festivals and maintaining historic places of worship. This is very different from the IF’s role in propagating and disseminating Islamic teaching and culture. To press their demand for establishing minority religious foundations similar to Muslims’ IF, the minority lobby group Hindu-­ Buddhist-­Christian unity council said that ‘if the government does not establish separate foundations for Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity, the minorities will consider the government decision disrespectful and discriminatory to the minorities’ (Daily Ittefaq 1991). However, as stated before, the state did not listen. The structural distinction between the IF and other minority faith-based organizations underscores the state bias for Islam. The state’s role in abusing the property rights of the Hindu minorities is another case in point regarding how religious discriminations are normalized. After independence, Bangladesh did not fully repeal the Enemy Property Act legislated by the Pakistan government against the backdrop of the India-Pakistan War of 1965.6 Because of the Act, ‘Hindu property owners in East Pakistan had been deprived of their ownership of 6  Against the backdrop of Pakistan–India War, the Pakistani government formulated the Enemy Property Act which included following major components: (a) India was declared an enemy country; (b) all the interests of enemies (nationals/citizens of India, those residing in territory occupied, captured or controlled by India) whether they are firms, companies, lands or buildings in Pakistan, are to be taken over by the Custodian of Enemy Property for control or management; (c) the benefits arising out of trade, business, lands and buildings

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property rights, the right to ensure the title of his or her property, and the right to transfer, including sale, gift, will, entrusting with power of attorney etc.’ (Barakat et al. 2008: 49). After 1971, these lands were declared as vested properties and the state became their owner (Barakat et al. 2008: 52). On 11 April 2001 the parliament passed the Vested Property Return Act 2001 (Barakat et al. 2008: 53). However, as of today, this Act is still in bureaucratic limbo and no property has been returned to Hindus; it is unlikely to be returned any time soon. People with a variety of political affiliations acquired these properties, once owned by Hindus, and the state has ignored this. An ‘estimated 536,950 grabbers/beneficiaries throughout the country have been occupying a total of 2.6 million acres of vested land which lawfully belongs to 1.2 million Hindu households’ (Barakat et al. 2008: 108). According to M (a top leader of a minority civil society organization), the problems of marginalization for minorities persist mainly because of the pro-Islam campaigns by the state. Endorsing Islam as the supreme religion further degrades the social position of Hindus in various strata of society, including civil administration and other important sectors. In an interview at the Supreme Court in Bangladesh, M said: The implications of Islam promotion by the state have several serious effects on us. Hindu assets are being snatched away. Public administration itself became a discriminatory machine as, per my knowledge, many Hindus are not being deployed in important ministries because of their religion. They are not receiving well-deserved promotions. Even in the trade sector they are neglected by the state. No Hindus sit as a member in the Public Service Commission as or as the head of the armed forces. As a whole we feel as second- or third-class citizens. (Interviewee M 2017)

Interviewee N (a former high ranking military official) said that there is no scope for any minority person to become (a) head of either the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) or the Awami League (AL), (b) president or prime minister, or (c) head of any arms battalion (Interviewee N 2017). Against this backdrop, minorities, especially Hindus, are leaving Bangladesh, mostly to neighbouring India. This has ignited a debate in the West Bengal about ‘illegal immigrants from Bangladesh’ (BBC News should not go to the enemy, so that it may not affect the security of Pakistan or impair its defense in any manner (Barakat et al. 2008: 50).

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2019). On the basis of census data, Barakat et al. (2008: 67) finds a total of 1.8 million Hindus left in the period 1964–1971, while 1.9 million left between 1971 and 1981, 1.6 million left during 1981–1991, and 2.8 million left between 1991 and 2001 (Barakat et al. 2008: 67). In other words, according to this analysis, 8.1 million Hindus departed Bangladesh between 1964 and 2001. The approximate volume of Hindu emigrants was as high as 705 persons per day during 1964–1971, 521 persons per day during 1971–1981, 438 per day during 1981–1991, and 767 per day during 1991–2001 (Barakat et al. 2008: 67). According to a newspaper report, 900,000 Hindus either went missing or left the country between 2001 and 2011 (Morol 2012). These datasets are not without their criticism and critics have raised serious concerns about methods of Barakat et al. (2008) without offering any substantial  alternative data to challenge Barakat et  al.  I have shown elsewhere how minority religious faith, practice, and cultural symbols are being rendered problematic in everyday lives as one of the results of the state’s support for Islam as the majoritarian religion (Hasan 2017). In an interview, a female Hindu student living in a suburban Dhaka flat with six other women noted that her Muslim roommate, whom she described as ‘liberal’, from a nonIslamic educational background, and prone to skipping prayers, had removed a Hindu idol from their shared room because she believed it would undermine any Muslim prayer she might have chosen to perform. ‘My roommate is busy with the dignity of her own religion, but she does not think of mine’, the Hindu student complained. ‘She has no respect; she considers my Hindu statue merely a doll!’ Despite her strong sense of grievance, however, she felt obliged to accommodate the views of her Muslim roommate (Hasan 2017: 5). When these minority concerns were shared with few Muslim interviewees, most were unconcerned. They saw this attitude as normal and believed that the protection of majority values was common in democracies around the world. As one leader of the HI explained, ‘Idol-worshipers can place their idols in their private places and in their mandirs’—their Hindu temples. He added that Islam instructed its followers to protect the houses of worship of other religions (ibid.). Other young Muslims interviewed also saw protecting minority religious practices as part of their Islamic faith. At the same time, however, they expected religious minorities to defer to majority sentiments. As one madrassa graduate said, ‘I see no problem with this bias toward Islam’ (ibid.). I acknowledge that these accounts are not the only accounts and there are people who may feel no problem with practicing their minority faith or their cultures but the point of this chapter is to demonstrate a dominant cultural pattern and both quantitative and qualitative survey findings support that pattern.

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6.8   Conclusion This chapter and the previous two chapters accomplish three things. First, they demonstrate the Islamic national character of Bangladesh and a coherence between the political rhetoric of the BNP and AL leadership and the strategy of the state in terms of shaping Bangladesh as part of the ummah. Through education, politicization of public space and multidimensional missionary activities, the state has supported Bangladesh’s ummah identity. Second, this chapter demonstrates that governments in Bangladesh, whether military- or civilian-led by AL and BNP, have established their political legitimacy on the basis of Islam. One should note that the danger of establishing political legitimacy based on religion, of course, is the absence of any authoritative interpretation of what religion requires in terms of public policy and how it can coexist with basic liberal freedoms and human rights. Finally, this chapter demonstrates that due to the state-­ sponsored Islamization project, a large number of Bangladeshis reject liberal ideas. Within this milieu, ordinary minorities are being subjected to state and social oppression. The attack on Hindu minorities, particularly cases of land grabbing and gender-based violence after the 2001 election have been well documented (Ethirajan 2011). The state-sponsored promotion of ummah consciousness not only contributed to the composition of a highly illiberal society in Bangladesh but also influenced the power relation between majorities and minorities. The next chapter will demonstrate how various strands of political Islam use ummah in the age of globalization to mount challenges to the idea of citizenship, state security, and modern politics in Bangladesh. In this regard, it is relevant to reiterate the central proposition of this book—that Bangladesh situates itself within the narrative of post-Western political rhetoric through Islamization and transnationalism. The next chapter describes the transnational aspect.

References Ahamed, Emajuddin and Nazneen, D.  R. J.  A. (1990) ‘Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics?’ Asian Survey, 30(8): 795–808 Ahmad, Mumtaz (2008) ‘Islam, State and Society in Bangladesh’, in Esposito, John, Voll, John and Baker, Osman (Eds.) Asian Islam in the 21st Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–79 Akand, Raihanul Islam (2019) ‘54th Ijtema Ends with Akheri Munajat’, Dhaka Tribune, February 19, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/

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2019/02/19/54th-ijtema-ends-with-akheri-munajat (Accessed on 30/05/ 2019) Althusser, Louis (2001) Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Canada: Monthly Review Press Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities, London: Verso Asadullah, Mohammad Niaz and Chaudhury, Nazmul (2009) ‘Holy Alliances: Public Subsidies, Islamic High Schools, and Female Schooling in Bangladesh’, Education Economics, 17(3): 377–394 ——— (2016) ‘To Madrasahs or Not to Madrasahs: The Question and Correlates of Enrolment in Islamic Schools in Bangladesh’, International Journal of Educational Development, 49: 55–69 Asadullah, Mohammad Niaz, Chaudhury, Nazmul and Josh, Syed Rashed Al-Zayed (2009) Secondary School Madrasas in Bangladesh: Incidence, Quality and Implications for Reform (Human Development Sector), South Asia Region: World Bank. Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (2011) Modernization of Madrasa Education in Bangladesh: A Strategy Paper, Dhaka, Bangladesh, http://www.bei-bd.org/ images/report/whc4f30f4c4d469d.pdf (Accessed on 4/01/2013) Bano, Masooda (2008) Allowing for Diversity: State-Madrasa Relations in Bangladesh, Working Paper, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK Barakat, Abul, Zaman, Shafiq, KhanShahnewaz, M.  D., Poddar, Avijit, Hoque, Saiful and Uddin Taher, M. (2008) Deprivation of Hindu Minority in Bangladesh: Living with Vested Property, Dhaka: Pathak Shamabesh BBC News (2019) ‘People in groups are entering in Bangladesh from India,’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jgkATwsClHk (Accessed on 10/01/ 2020) BDnews24.com (2011) ‘Country has 250,399 Mosques: Minister’, http://devbd.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=188644&cid=2 (Accessed on 28/01/2014) ——— (2013) ‘Hasina Khaleda Join Ankheri Munajat’, http://bdnews24.com/ bangladesh/2013/01/13/hasina-khaleda-join-akheri-munajat (Accessed on 24/01/2019) Bell, James (2012) The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, Pew Research Center, http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-anddiversity.aspx (Accessed on 3/04/2014) ——— (2013) The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, Pew Research Center, http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-religionpolitics-society.aspx (Accessed on 10/10/2014) Bhuiyan, Nurul Momen Md (2010) ‘Creating “Good Muslims”: Qawmi Madrasa Schooling’, PhD thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, Brunel University, UK Björkman, Nina (2010) ‘The Biswa Ijtema’, Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis, 22: 9–23

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Boyle, Darren (2017) ‘Greek Goddess of Justice Statue is Removed in Bangladesh as Outraged Religious Extremists Claim it is “Un-Islamic” and Amounts to “Idolatry”’, Daily Mail, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4544 468/Greek-goddess-justice-statue-removed-Bangladesh.html (Accessed on 23/05/2019) Daily Ittefaq (1991, April 10) ‘Demand for Hindu, Buddhist and Christian Foundation’, Dhaka, Bangladesh Daily Prothom-Alo (2019) ‘Biswa Ijtema Begins Today’, https://en.prothomalo. com/bangladesh/news/191177/Biswa-Ijtema-begins-tomorrow (Accessed on 29/05/2019) “Dawah” (2019) The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Esposito, John L. (Ed.) Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/ t125/e511 (Accessed on 29/05/2019) Ethirajan, Anbarasan (2011) ‘Bangladesh “Persecution” Panel Reports on 2001 Violence’, BBC News, December 2, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-15987644 (Accessed on 13/10/2019) Fair, Christine C. and Abdallah, Wahid (2017) ‘Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: Public Awareness and Attitudes’, RESOLVE Network Research Brief, No. 4, Washington, DC, USA Foucault, Michel (1979/1991) Discipline & Punish: The Birth of Prison (Translated by Sherridan, Alan), New York: Vintage Frognier, A. (2015) ‘Nation: Sociological Aspects’, in International Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 10292–10296 Hasan, Mubashar (2017) ‘The Language of Youth Politics in Bangladesh: Beyond the Secular-Religious Binary’, RESOLVE Net Research Brief, No. 1, Washington, DC, 1–18 Huque, Ahmed Shafiqul and Akhter, Muhammad Yeahia (1987) ‘The Ubiquity of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh’, Pacific Affairs, 60(2): 200–225 Interviewee J (2017, May 7) Dhaka, Bangladesh Interviewee K (2017, May 3) Dhaka, Bangladesh Interviewee L (2017, March 28) Dhaka, Bangladesh Interviewee M (2017, March 29) Dhaka, Bangladesh Interviewee N (2017, March 20) Dhaka, Bangladesh Islamic Foundation (1990) Introduction to Islamic Mission, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (2008) Introduction to Islamic Foundation, Dhaka, Bangladesh ——— (2011) Introduction to Islamic Foundation, Dhaka, Bangladesh Ministry of Education (2010) National Education Policy, Dhaka: Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (1978) The Madrasah Education Ordinance, Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Mogahed, Dalia (2006) Islam and Democracy (Gallup Muslim Studies Series), http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153866/Abu-Dhabi-GallupForum-Key-Findings-Muslim-West-Relations.aspx (Accessed 23/11/2012)

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Morol, Shishir (2012) ‘0.9 Million Hindu population reduced in last 10 years’, Daily Prothom Alo, September 22, Dhaka: Bangladesh Naurath, Nicole (2009) ‘Religion, Secularism Working in Tandem in Bangladesh’, GALLUP World, http://www.gallup.com/poll/121937/ReligionSecularism-Working-Tandem-Bangladesh.aspx (Accessed on 12/01/2019) Opu, Hossain Mahmud (2018) ‘Millions Attend World’s Second-Largest Muslim Gathering’, Al Jazeera, January 24, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ inpictures/millions-attend-world-largest-muslim-gathering-180123064824287.html (Accessed on 29/05/2019) Osaghae, E. E. (1989) ‘The Character of the State, Legitimacy Crisis and Social Mobilization in Africa: An Explanation of form and Character’, Africa Development/Afrique et Développement, 14: 27–47 Rahmani, Abdul Kader (2012) Problems and Possibilities of Mosque Based Mass-­ Literacy Program: A Survey, Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Rashid, Harunur Mohammed (2008) ‘Analysis and Determining the Character of the Publication Activities of Islamic Foundation’, PhD thesis, Dhaka University, Dhaka Reetz, Dietrich (2010) ‘From Madrasa to University-The Challenges and Formats of Islamic Education’, in Ahmed, Akbar S. and Sonn, Tamara (Eds.) The Sage Handbook of Islamic Studies, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 106–139 Riaz, Ali (2008) Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web, London and New York: Routledge ——— (2014) ‘Madrassah Education in Bangladesh: Contestations and Accommodations’, in Buang, Sa’eda and Chew, Phyllis Ghim-Lian (Eds.) Muslim Education in the 21st Century: Asian Perspectives, London and New York: Routledge, 12–36 Riaz, Ali and Aziz, Syeda Salina (2017) ‘Democracy and Sharia in Bangladesh’, RESOLVE Network Research Brief, No. 3, Washington, DC, USA Shaon, Ashif Islam (2018) ‘PM Hasina: Islamic university, 560 model mosques to be built,’ Dhaka Tribune, November 4, https://www.dhakatribune.com/ bangladesh/dhaka/2018/11/04/pm-hasina-islamic-university-560-modelmosques-to-be-built (Accessed on 4/05/2019) Siddiqi, Bulbul (2018) Becoming ‘Good Muslim’: The Tablighi Jamaat in the UK and Bangladesh, Singapore: Springer Sikand, Yoginder (1999) ‘The Tablighi Jama’at in Bangladesh’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 22(1): 101–123 Steel, Tim (2016) ‘The City of Mosques’, Dhaka Tribune, https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/heritage/2016/09/24/the-city-of-mosques (Accessed on 30/05/2019) The Bangladesh Planning Commission (1983, May) The Second Five Year Plan (1980–1985), Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh

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——— (1985, December) The Third Five-Year Plan (1985–1990), Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh ——— (1995, June) The Fourth Five Year Plan (1990–1995), Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh ——— (1998, March) The Fifth Five Year Plan (1997–2002), Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh ——— (2011, December) The Sixth Five Year Plan (2011–2015), Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh ——— (2015, December) The Seventh Five Year Plan (FY 2016–FY 2020), http://www.lged.gov.bd/UploadedDocument/UnitPublication/1/361/ 7th_FYP_18_02_2016.pdf (Accessed on 30/05/2019) UNESCO (2011) World Data on Education: Bangladesh, unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0021/002112/211299e.pdf (Accessed on 23/08/2019)

CHAPTER 7

Globalization and Transnational Ummah(s) in Contemporary Bangladesh

7.1   Introduction Friday afternoon of the February 22, 2013, was a memorable day for many Bangladeshi observers. On that day, people were shocked to see several angry, young Bangladeshi men burning national flags and demolishing Shaheed Minars (highly nationalistic monuments) in various parts of the country, including Sylhet and Bogra districts, in protest against what they said were disrespectful writings about the Prophet Muhammad and Islam by a few young Bangladeshi bloggers (The Daily Star 2013). Those angry young Muslims were participating in a countrywide protest organized by Hefazat e Islam (HI) to demand the death penalty for those bloggers and enactment of a blasphemy law. This incident took place at a time when some of those ‘blasphemous’ bloggers were leading the Shahbagh movement to demand the death penalty for leaders of the largest Islamist party, the Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami (BJI), who were facing trial for committing crimes against humanity during Bangladesh’s war of independence from Pakistan in 1971. For the first few weeks, thousands of people from all walks of life, who otherwise did not participate in political rallies, flocked to the busy city intersection of Shahbagh in the capital Dhaka to express solidarity with the movement for justice over the memory of 1971. Almost all the major newspapers and television channels had covered ‘Shahbagh Square’ as a story of the highest importance, although later surveys found that actual public support for the movement was not that high. For example, a survey © The Author(s) 2020 M. Hasan, Islam and Politics in Bangladesh, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5_7

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among 3000 respondents was conducted by Daily Prothom-Alo, and a local research organization called the Org Quest from April 9 to 20  in 2013. The survey area covered 30 districts, with 750 respondents from cities and 2250 respondents from villages. Among the respondents, 1488 were females and 1512 were males (Sharif 2013). The survey was conducted at a time when, week after week, television footage had been showing people hoisting national flags, and singing national anthems, and country songs were broadcast nationally and internationally round the clock. Hundreds of such images were published in national dailies. An aura of media-constructed high nationalism and patriotism was seemingly sweeping across the country. However, the survey found that 57.5% of the respondents said they do not support Shahbagh whereas a significant 16.7% said they do not know about Shahbagh and 2.4% respondents said they would not express their opinion. Only 23% said they were in favour of Shahbagh. Once it was publicized that some of those bloggers who were leading Shahbagh had offended Islam and Prophet Muhammad through their writings, the movement slowly lost its momentum (Mahmud and Roy 2013). Nevertheless, the images of burning flags and disrespect for the highly significant monument of nationalism, the Shaheed Minar, had triggered either criticism or support depending on the political allegiance of the audience. Attacks on Shaheed Minar and the national flag were also an act of rejection of the core nature of the media-constructed nationalism by those conservative Muslims. To control and contain damage of Shaheed Minars, the police opened fire on the protesters on February 22, 2013. As a result, at least 4 people were killed and 1000 more were injured. In the aftermath, the clashes with police continued under different political banners of Islamists who accused the AL government of being a government against Islam. Although the AL is not against Islam as I have been demonstrating throughout this book, in the eyes of the Islamists, AL is not Islamic enough. To calm the situation, on February 26, 2013, the government sent a text message to all Bangladeshi mobile phone users stating that the government of Sheikh Hasina was determined to stop abusive and disrespectful remarks about Islam and the Prophet. While the nature of that particular 2013 protest of demolishing nationalist Shaheed Minars in favour of upholding the ummah identity was not militant in nature, three years later, Bangladesh saw a different scenario. In 2016, five young Bangladeshi Muslim men stormed into an upscale restaurant in the diplomatic zone called Gulshan in Dhaka and took diners as

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hostages (Marszal and Graham 2016). In that terror mission, 29 people, including 9 Italians, 7 Japanese, 1 US citizen and 1 Indian citizen were killed. A team of Bangladeshi military commandos killed all the attackers. The transnational terrorist group ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack though later the government quashed the claim based on a theory that these were home-grown local terrorists who wanted to catch the attention of the ISIL. However, competing views exist in this regard. According to a Swedish-Bangladeshi journalist, Tasneem Khalil, ISIL-inspired Bangladeshi attackers targeted three groups of people to kill in order to advance their claim to establishing the Caliphate of the Islamic State in Bangladesh. They targeted (a) foreigners, ‘who were described as crusaders or allies of the crusaders; (b) non-Sunni Muslims, including the Shias and the Ahmadis, who were described as Rafida (those who reject sunni version Islam) and apostate sects and (c) Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians (primarily converts), who were described as pagans, idolaters, cow-­ worshippers, and apostates’ (Khalil 2016). The nature of the Gulshan attack and the profile of victims of that attack fell within this narrative of ISIL. Less than a week after that grisly attack a video was released by ISIL featuring three Bangladeshi ISIL fighters who were seen to address Bangladeshi jihadists in a supposedly ISIL-occupied place in Syria or Iraq, applauding the Gulshan attack. An interesting aspect about the video is that one Bangladeshi fighter was seen justifying the attack in the name of protecting ummah and as a retaliation for the Western foreign policies in the Middle East. One of the militants said: According to the teaching of Prophet Muhammad, our ummah is like one body. If any part of the body is attacked, that attack spreads all over the body. Our Mujahedeen brothers are pained when they see the coalition of international crusaders are killing hundreds of innocent Muslim women, men, and children by air attack in Sham, Iraq and Libya. That is why wherever they will find crusaders they are gonna kill them. (ISIL Video 2016)

Another militant was recorded saying, ‘I want to ask the government and its officials, how do you use a concept like democracy that empowers people to enact the law of the land, don’t you know Allah said only he has the power to enact law?’ (ISIL Video 2016). He issued threats to the government by stating ‘the type of Jihad has landed in Bangladesh, the type of Jihad you are watching now, you haven’t seen this type before’. To these terrorists, the boundary of nation states, the idea of state-given ­citizenships

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and so forth have little meaning. Their statements underline the significance of ummah and the boundary they see between Muslims and nonMuslims. Their common enemy is the liberal West and even Bangladeshis state that although Bangladesh is neither democratic nor liberal, it is in many ways Islamic. However, to those Muslim terrorists Bangladesh is not Islamic enough. Why were some Bangladeshis so upset that they did not hesitate to burn and demolish national symbols such as flags and the Shaheed Minar? Why were some other Bangladeshis killed innocent civilians of various nationalities and religions who have nothing to do with the Western foreign policy in the Middle East? The objective of this chapter is to offer a typology of transnational drivers and forces that ignite ummah identities in Bangladesh in a political climate where major parties and the state promote and support ummah. My typology of transnational drivers includes the transnational Islamist parties, Islamic NGOs, people who are moving across borders, transnational scholarly networks and the Internet. I should, however, mention that this typology is not exhaustive, rather the purpose of offering this typology is to invoke thoughts. Finally, this chapter argues that such varied transnational waves of ummah have three significant implications for Bangladesh: (a) weakening of the state-given identities and attachment towards citizenship, (b) increasing threat to state security, and (c) challenging the idea of modern-day politics. In other words, this chapter demonstrates how ordinary Bangladeshis, by passing traditional ‘high’ political structure such as the state and major parties, mount multiple criticisms to the post-Westphalian narrative using a non-Western Islamic concept as referent object to justify their ways of politics.

7.2   Transnationalism and Ummah Transnationalism is another way of understanding globalization’s effect at the local level and how it facilitates the advancement of ummah. According to Mandeville (2007), ‘transnational’ refers to ‘a wider range of social formations and transactions which are structured across the border and spaces of nations but which do not necessarily entail a primary role for sovereign governments’ (Mandeville 2007: 276). Al-Rasheed (2005) argues that ‘transnationalism’ is often used interchangeably with ‘globalization’. She asserts that ‘while globalization is a process from above, the concept of transnationalism embodies activities and process from below’ (Al-Rasheed 2005: 5). In this way, an ordinary person, through various

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transnational flows, challenges the capacity of states to behave in ways consistent with traditional, state-centric, realists’ views. Thus, it is fair to argue that transnationalism focuses on non-state actors and entities operating across the borders of states. Rudolph (1997) describes the transnational process: It is a self conscious construction of networks of knowledge and action by decentred, local actors that cross the boundaries of space as though they were not there, and of heterogonous networks, differentiated from each other in terms of specialization: there is not a single network, but many, each fulfilling a different function. (Rudolph 1997: 9)

The point here is that transnational processes combine various networks that initiate people-to-people contact. In the view of Grillo (2004), ‘transnationalism refers to social, cultural, economic and political relations which are between, above or beyond the nation state’ (Grillo 2004: 864). For example, online networks among diaspora and migrants, various cross-border social movements, and emerging online political forums could undermine the control of a state over its territory because the idea of space/territory is fluid and abstract in communication on the Internet as online space is everywhere yet physically nowhere. The faith and the politics of Islam are often transnational. Mandeville (2007) argues, based on Verse 49:13 of the Quran, that the ‘Quran itself enjoins transnationalism by encouraging travel when it says people were made into nations and tribes so that you come to know each other’ (Mandeville 2007: 277). Mandeville (2007) and Voll (1997) argue that ‘one of the famous Hadiths exhorts believers to travel far and wide–even in China in search for learning’, which exhibits the essence of transnationalism (Mandeville 2007: 277; Voll 1997: 235). The expansion of Islam can also be interpreted as a transnational process. In early Muslim history, after Prophet Muhammad’s death in the seventh century, different Muslims dynasties—the Ummayad (661–750), the Abbasid (750–1258) and the Ottoman (1299–1924)— expanded beyond Arabia to Europe, Africa, and Asia. Levitt (2001) argues that Islam expanded on the backs of various transnational actors—traders, sufis, conquerors, and colonial administrators. Expansion of Islam in that sense was indeed transnational. In the modern period, many political Islamists are transnational and ummah offers the basis of their transnational movements. For example, a series of violent events such as the riots against the film Innocence of Muslims in 2012, the terrorist attack against the French satire magazine

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Charlie Hebdo in Paris in 2015, the Taliban’s ‘holy Jihad’ against the west, the rise of Hizbullah in Lebanon, the car bomb attack on the World Trade Centre complex in Manhattan in 1993, the 9/11 attack in New York, and 7/7 bombings in London—underpins not only the political significance of ummah for Islamists but also the transnational movements of violent ideologies across national boundaries. Most of these terrible acts were carried out under the banner of ‘Muslim’ identity: any state-given identity— for example, Sudanese and Egyptian—seemed inconsequential for the people who carried out these attacks. These events indicate that political Islam as a transnational force embedded in ummah is capable of disrupting, though not necessarily changing, the normal flow of international currents across nations and between states. However, these events suggest only one side of political Islam. As Esposito notes, ‘there are Islamists and Islamic organizations that reject violence and espouse limited political liberalization and democratization’. In Chap. 2, I presented arguments for the idea that many Muslims in the world like to think they belong to the nation of ummah alongside their other identities. That ummah consciousness is the source of a transnational bond in the contemporary period. The political relevance of ummah arguably became effective when influential Islamist theorists, such as Mawdudi of the Jamaat e Islami movement in the subcontinent and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, distorted the concept. They declared that there was a dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims and between true Muslims and false Muslims. For these political theorists, the ummah was limited to ‘true Muslims’ who accepted the political interpretation of Islam of Mawdudi and Qutb. For them, the brotherhood of true Muslims across the world must fight false Muslims and their non-­ Muslim collaborators. As a result, various orthodox Islamist movements justify their transnational movements and political goals on the basis of this narrow perception of ummah. The basic tenet of these parties is to establish an Islamic state where the law of the land would derive from Allah in the form of Sharia law, and the ruler of this Islamic land would establish a Caliphate where a Caliph would rule. In Muslim history, after Prophet Muhammad’s death, Muslim territory expanded under the first four Caliphs, considered as ‘rightly guided’ because they all knew Muhammad personally and were companions (sahaba) of the Prophet. Thus, they knew sunna as directly as possible. The period of the rightly guided Caliphs ended in 661 of the Common Era with the assassination of Caliph Ali (Jackson 1997: 20). Sadiq (1991)

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asserts that ‘the inception of the Caliphate system through the Umayyads in the seventh century inaugurated a movement for a new civilization and for a dynamic, forward looking culture which was destined to create a composite, corporate human identity, viz., the Islamic identity’. Langman (2005) argues that this was a Golden Age for Islam. Abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 by Kemal Atatürk formally marked the end of this civilizational model. After the fall of the Ottomans, the classical form of Islam, which provided a composite identity to Muslims, gave way to a narrow, territorial, national identity. For Muslim political thinkers, the notion of a Caliphate has always remained an inspiration, direct or otherwise, to revivalist movements. Indeed, Jackson (1997: 20) argues that this memory of Muslim history, featured through the writings of Muslim political thinkers, is a memory determined by authority. Some Islamists believe in establishing a separate region in the world for Muslims, borrowing a concept from Sayyid Qutb who advocated such an Islamic bloc, an amalgam of different nation states. He saw ‘no necessity for having a single Islamic nation’ (Haddad 1983: 71). The terrorist attacks on Bangladeshi soil by Bangladeshis and their support from an ISIL spokesperson from ISIL-occupied territory in Syria and Iraq are further a manifestation of how terrorists advance the idea of an extremist ummah transnationally. There are other sides of transnational Muslim political movements that are moderate and civil, and I shall discuss those in this chapter. Nonetheless, a basic precondition for these movements, whether radical, extreme or moderate, is paramount allegiance to a Muslim identity over state-given citizenship and this interpretation of ummah is the driving force behind the establishment of cross-border contacts among Muslims.

7.3   Transnational Ummahs in Bangladesh: The Typology At least five transnational networks were found to be instrumental in the expansion of political Islam in Bangladesh. They are transnational Islamist parties, Islamic NGOs, people who move across borders, transnational scholarly networks, and the Internet. 7.3.1  Transnational Islamist Parties In contemporary times, transnational Islamist parties and extremist organizations form the basis of radical and extremist ummahs in Bangladesh.

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For example, with an aim of establishing an Islamic government, the Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB) emerged in Bangladesh in 2001. The HTB does not believe in elections; it expands its support through ‘dawa’, a popular method among the Islamists to increase activists across the world via peaceful invitation. The HTB used to have very strong support among a section of academics and students in various universities in Bangladesh until it was banned by the government (Hasan 2011: 101). HTB is a local chapter of the Hizbut Tahrir (HT), a transnational political organization formed in 1953 as an Islamist party in Jerusalem. According to the organization’s website, ‘HT works at all levels of society to restore to Muslims a means of living an Islamic life under the shade of the Khilafah State (Caliphate)’. The website also claims that, ‘HT is active throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, South-East Asia, Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Europe, Australasia and the Americas’. However, it is banned in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt as well as in Pakistan, Tunisia, Libya, Turkey, and in the former Soviet states in Central Asia (Hasan 2011). It is now banned in Bangladesh even though it was not banned at the outset of its operations (Hasan 2012a). Another example is that of the Al-Qayeda and Taliban linkage with a banned Bangladeshi Islamist group, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B). This group came to the forefront through a press conference held in 1992 when they demanded that Bangladesh should be transformed into an Islamic state (Hasan 2012b: 163). Huji-B was reportedly formed with funds from Al-Qayeda leader Osama Bin Laden. Its transnational connection was made clear when ‘Fazlul Rahman, a leader of the HuJI-B, signed the official declaration of “holy war” against the US on February 1998. Other signatories included Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt), Rifa’i Ahmad Taha (aka Abu-Yasir, Egyptian Islamic Group), and Sheikh Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat Ulema Pakistan)’ (ibid.). The groups issued a slogan: ‘Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan’ (We will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan) (ibid.). This group is what Riaz (2016) identifies as the first generation of transnational jihadists. The new generation of extremists include groups such as (a) the Jamaatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) who ‘blasted 450 homemade bombs throughout the country and conducted a number of suicide attacks’ in demand of establishing an Islamic state and (b) Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) who have murdered secular bloggers, writers, and publishers, foreigners  and Bangladeshi Muslims who do not believe in extreme ideologies (Riaz 2016).

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Further evidence suggests that moderate Islamist parties in different states have contact among each other. The driving force behind this cross-­ border linkage is ummah consciousness—recognition of the importance of being Muslim and belief in the similar values in politics. A press release issued by the Egyptian Islamist party Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 2013  in support of the Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami (BJI) leaders facing trial for committing crimes against humanity in Bangladesh in 1971 is worth mentioning in this regard. The press release states: One of the purposes of our Sharia (Islamic law) is to safeguard people’s lives and honour. God Almighty also prohibited injustice for all believers. We must uphold Islam’s high values, principles and ideals, which certain parties talk about as they apply them only selectively….while we reject and condemn these unjust and unfair trials that violate all international norms and conventions, we call upon all States, and in particular Muslim countries…to apply all pressure to put right these trials and lift the injustice befalling political detainees in Bangladesh and to apply pressure, politically and morally, to stop this human tragedy. (MB 2013)

This MB release was a continuation of pressure by the Islamist parties from different countries to the AL government to release leaders of the BJI, who were perceived to be the legitimate representatives of Islam in Bangladesh by these transnational Islamist parties. Similarly, in November 2012, the International Conference of Islamic Leaders in Sudan called upon the Bangladesh government to ‘immediate[ly] stop of [sic] the ongoing torture and injustice on the Islamist opposition leaders in Bangladesh’. Globally known Islamist leaders and thinkers, including Raachid Ghanouchi (of the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda), Dr. Muhammad Badie (general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood), and Munawar Hasan (president of the Jamaat e Islami Pakistan) warned the Bangladesh government that ‘if the repression to Jamaat leaders do not stop… Bangladesh might be segregated from the Muslim world’ (Bangladesh  Jamaat e Islami 2012). But it did not become segregated; rather, Bangladesh as ruled by Sheikh Hasina has now become more integrated into the ‘Muslim World’. 7.3.2  Islamic NGOs Various transnational charity organizations have been active in propagating the ideology of political Islam as well as channelling international

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money to local Islamists. The transnational Muslim dawa and solidarity organizations such as ‘Rabita al-Alam al-Islami’ or World Muslim League and Nadwa al-Alamiya lil-Shabab al-Islami or the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) are among such transnational Muslim charities who have been involved with the discourse of political Islam. The driving force behind these NGOs is to reach Muslim brothers and sisters who are part of ummah in foreign lands. In Bangladesh, Rabita alongside the Al-Harmain Foundation (a Saudi-based international NGO) provided generous funds through various Islamist parties to build mosques, run madrasahs, and organize Islamic NGOs in education and social welfare to neutralize the influence of secular and Christian-sponsored international NGOs (Riaz 2008; Mumtaz Ahmad 2008). The Islami Chatro Shibir (ICS), the student wing of the Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami, was a member of the world assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). Members of the ICS visited similar student wings of Islamist parties around the world. These charities and forums have deepen the transnational character of Muslim identity by reaching out to targeted group and promoting people-to-­ people contact across the state boundaries. The case of British Charity Green Crescent is also pertinent to cite here. The charity was founded by students of Britain and Bangladesh in 1998 and it was registered as a charity in Manchester, England (BBC 2009). The charity operated in Bangladesh’s remote southern island Bhola and was said to run an Islamic school. In addition to Islamic education, the charity claimed to support ‘youth from poor ethnic backgrounds … build confidence and responsibility by sports and social events’ as well (Brandon 2009). However, in 2009, Bangladeshi security forces raided the charity and claimed to find ‘weapons, army uniforms, large quantities of ammunition and explosives’ (Nawaz 2009). According to Bangladeshi officials, this charity was a ‘mini-ordinance factory’ (BBC News 2009). 7.3.3  Cross-Border Movement of People Perhaps one of the most significant features of transnational political Islam in Bangladesh is the cross-border movement of people. When people travel in and out of Bangladesh, in many instances, political ideas also travel with them. This section features some of the Bangladeshi cases to demonstrate how transnational phenomena such as migration foster ummah consciousness in Bangladesh and beyond. I shall start with Asadullah Ghalib, a former chair of the Arabic studies in Rajshahi University

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and a graduate of Madinah University, who formed the radical Ahl al-Hadı̄th outfit Bangladesh (AHAB) in 1994. In February 2005, Ghalib was arrested on charges of bombings and possession of explosives (Ahmad 2008: 68). According to Ahmad (2008), a government investigation found that some of the AHAB members travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s after the Soviet invasion to fight with the Taliban to save Islam. The transnational connection established between the Taliban and AHAB continued until government crackdowns after 2009 (Hasan 2011). Furthermore, the history of the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir in Bangladesh (HTB) shows that the party founder in Bangladesh, Golam Mowla, returned from London after making acquaintance with the London chapter of the Hizbut Tahrir (HT) (Hasan 2011: 101). It was also mentioned previously in Chap. 3 that around 3000 Bangladeshis during the time of the Soviet invasion crossed international boundaries to fight with the Taliban. On their return, they further pursued Taliban-styled political Islam in Bangladesh (Riaz 2008: 82). More recently, transnational movements of Bangladeshi Muslims across nation states within the past ten years have not only heightened the sense of the ummah in Bangladesh, but also increased migration of Bangladeshis to and from other countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia. This makes the scenario more complex. It turns out that some Bangladeshis who offer supreme allegiance to their ummah identities not only pose challenges to the Bangladeshi state, but also pose challenges to the country to which they migrate. The following are a few examples to make this point. Akayed Ullah was a 28-year-old Bangladeshi male who migrated to the United States in 2011. He entered the country by means of a family migration visa. He was living in Brooklyn with his family and working as an electrician in New York City. Akayed Ullah was probably a nobody in the United States and Bangladesh until in December of 2017, ‘he detonated a pipe bomb in a crowded subway corridor near the Times Square with an aim to blow up a New York City’s major bus terminal’ (Weiser and Palmer 2018). The homemade pipe bomb exploded and caused panic during the early morning rush hour ‘filling parts of nearby Port Authority terminal with smoke and sending thousands of commuters fleeing’ (ibid. 2018). Five people sustained minor injury. A US court has found him guilty of six criminal counts including ‘using a weapon of mass destruction and providing material support to the ISIL’ (BBC News 2018). In that court, Akayed Ullah said he was ‘angry with Donald Trump’ because he

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had said Trump would ‘bomb the Middle East’ (Weiser and Palmer 2018). This shows that in the face of his ummah identity Akayed Ullah’s allegiance to his fellow ummah members of the Middle East, his Bangladeshi or American citizenship did not matter to him. Another case similar to Akayed Ullah is that of Shoma Momena. She went to Australia for higher study after graduating from the North South University, a Bangladeshi private university. Shoma Momena started to live as a home-stay guest in an Australian’s home in Melbourne in February 2018. One day she stabbed the homeowner who was sleeping with his five months old daughter. After that horrendous attack, Australian police arrested Momena. In an Australian court, Momena said that ‘she wanted to trigger the West and attacked the homeowner while he was sleeping because he was vulnerable and an easy target’ (Morris 2018). Three days before the attack, she sent a text message to her friend saying that ‘she needed to gather more courage… to carry out his [Allah’s] blessing’ (Farnsworth 2019). To Momena she was ‘advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, namely violent jihad’ (Oaten 2019). By doing this, Momena had offered her allegiance to ummah. In a separate case, on July 12, 2016, four Bangladeshis ‘who plotted to finance terror attacks in Bangladesh were sentenced to between 24 and 60 months’ by a Singaporean court (Chelvan 2016). According to Chelvan (2016), that was the first conviction under the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act in Singapore. These four Bangladeshi men in Singapore, similar to the other cases mentioned, had formed their ummah allegiance through the terrorist outfit of ISIL. These examples illustrate how certain interpretations of ummah drive transnational political Islam in Bangladesh and abroad to subvert democratic political culture. 7.3.4  Scholarly Networks Various transnational scholarly initiatives in Bangladesh have encouraged the growth of ummah identity and Islamic academic inquiry to further strengthen the ummah consciousness. According to Banglapedia, Bangladesh’s encyclopaedia, which is published by the locally respected research organization Asiatic Society, a conference of the Organisation of Islamic countries (OIC) held at Mecca in 1977 recommended the establishment of Islamic universities in different Muslim countries. As a result, the government of Bangladesh took initiatives for the establishment of an Islamic University (IU) in Bangladesh. With generous aid received from

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the OIC, the IU started its operation in 1992. The following account captures the history behind the establishment of the IU: The Heads of States and Governments of Muslim Countries in a summit organised by the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) held in Makkah from 31 March to 8 April 1977 recommended for establishing Islamic Universities in different member countries. On the basis of that recommendation, Professor ANM Momtaj Uddin Chowdhury was appointed Project Director on 9 February 1997 for establishing an Islamic University in Bangladesh. Late President Ziaur Rahman laid the foundation stone of the Islamic University on 22 November 1979. (Siddiqui 2014)

As such, the establishment of the IU can be seen as opening a connection by which Bangladesh was linked with transnational Muslim scholarly networks. The website of the IU indicates that a few departments within the Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies (the departments of Al-Qur’ān and Islamic Studies; da‘wah and Islamic Studies and Al Ḥ adı̄th Islamic Studies) have had regular visits from foreign Muslim scholars as lecturers or guest speakers. However, establishment of the IU in Bangladesh was not an extraordinary event. The worldwide development of scholarly networks through institutional linkages has provided influential platforms for the expansion of political Islam where advocates can exchange ideas about its nature and future. After the establishment of the IU, a number of private universities were established in Bangladesh with transnational linkages and Islamic names. From the websites of such private universities, it is apparent that they have significant connections and collaboration programs with similar foreign institutions established to promote Islamic pedagogy at the university level. One such private university, for example, had a collaboration program with the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) which was funded by eight member countries of the OIC in 1982 and became ‘a major platform where Muslim scholars from the United States, Sudan, Pakistan and many other countries [were] involve[d] in debates about political Islam through its faculty and alumni network’ (Voll 1997: 236). Similar institutions exist in Pakistan (e.g., the International Islamic University of Islamabad) and Saudi Arabia (the University of Medina). These universities have close connections with the great forbear of Islamic educational cosmopolitanism, Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which has produced scholars and activists for political Islam for hundreds of years.

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Hassan al Banna (founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (co-founder of Hamas), Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (founder of Hizbut Tahrir), Muhammad Abduh, and Jamaal Afghani (philosophers of Islamic Modernism) were all said to be associated with this university (Hasan 2014: 239). Even a government-run Islamic foundation was willing to manage the recruitment of Bangladeshi students who wanted to study at the Al-Azhar University. It should also be mentioned that the OIC supported the establishment of a technology-intensive university known as the Islamic University of Technology in Gazipur. Furthermore, credit transfers for the students of another private Islamic university, taken as a sample for this chapter, reveal that they can be transferred to the Islamic Foundation in Leicestershire, which was established with an initial aim of having the Pakistani scholar Khurshid Ahmad, an activist of Jamat e Islami Pakistan translate Maududi’s work into English. Ahmad ‘helped raise the Islamic consciousness of young Muslims in Malaysia, South Africa, Great Britain, the United States and in many other places’ (Voll 1997: 236). Voll (1997) notes: His visits to Muslim groups in South Africa helped define the nature and goals of emerging Muslim Youth Movement, and in Malaysia he was an important element in bringing together the leaders of the majority Malay political party whereas he was also the man behind the establishment of the Islamic Foundation in Great Britain, which has been in the forefront of publishing works that help define role of Muslims as minorities and Islamist classics like the Maududi commentary on Quran. These activities help create a cosmopolitan, global set of linkages that are crucial in defining the worldview foundation for political Islam in many different areas. Khurshid Ahmad is only one of a relatively large number of internationally and globally active Muslim intellectuals who are important links in the cosmopolitan networks of the contemporary Islamic world. (Voll 1997: 236)

Thus, it is plausible to argue that the establishment of the state-run IU opened a new corridor for the scholarly growth of transnational political Islam in Bangladesh through institutional linkages. However, these linkages were not significant in promoting rich scholarly debate in Bangladesh about transnational political Islam. In this regard, Ahmad (2008) asserts: There is no dearth of polemical writing—mostly journalistic—that seek to belittle the significance of Islam as a focal point of public life in Bangladesh

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or to cast aspersions of some orthodox Islamic practices but a serious and sustained critique of the foundational structure of Islamic orthodoxy and its intellectual inadequacies has yet to come. (Mumtaz Ahmad 2008: 64)

Even though Bangladesh has yet to make significant contributions to transnational scholarly debate about political Islam, these institutions, through their international collaboration, were able to access significant resources, including theses and publications about political Islam. These resources enabled young academics and students to form intellectual circles to discuss issues of Islam and political Islam. Ahmad (2008) argues, ‘these circles resemble a spontaneous movement rooted in deep yearning for Islamic intellectual renaissance, but it is equally engendered by dissatisfaction with the current state of Islamic scholarship among the known Islamist groups in Bangladesh’ (Ahmad 2008: 67). According to Ahmad, the reading lists of such groups include Edward Said’s work on orientalism; Malek Bennabi’s Islamic self-criticism; Muhammad Arkoun’s Islamic deconstructionism; Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s and Seyyed Ali Ashraf’s Islamic neo-traditional mysticism; and Yousuf al-Qardhawi’s ijtehadic legal thought. Ahmad argues that ‘one can also see elements of Ali Shariati in this generation of young Bangladeshi Muslim intellectual activism; their scholarly pursuits burst with passion’ (Ahmad 2008: 67). Such growth in transnational institutional linkages has contributed in strengthening ummah consciousness in the country. 7.3.5  The Internet As a transnational space, the Internet has become an important instrument for propagating the idea of ummah. In addition to party websites, social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, video-sharing sites like YouTube, and Internet-enabled smart phone apps like Telegram and Whatsapp are increasingly in use to proclaim the importance of political Islam in Bangladesh. These tools enable Bangladeshi Islamists to connect with foreign Islamists or Bangladeshi diaspora Islamists to emphasize the importance of political Islam by strengthening pan-Islamism, forming militant Islamist cells, and promoting critical views about the West and modernism. In one of my earlier studies (see Hasan 2014), I found that the home page of the HTB in 2009 announced its pan-Islamic aim by stating, ‘O Muslims! Hizb ut-Tahrir calls upon you to reject the current kufr government system and fulfil the shari’a obligation of re-establishing the Khilafah’. On its

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homepage, the site hosted a large image of an HTB procession in the streets of Dhaka. The writing on a banner held by activists was hard to overlook. It said in English, ‘Support and work with Hizbut Tahrir to establish the Khilafah’. The HTB website in 2012 and 2013 also hosted political manifestoes written in Bangla. The following titles illustrate their aims: • Hizbut Tahrir, Khilafat Sharkar Protishta, deshr shartho rokha ebong gono manusher odhikar adayer lokhe Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh er Islami Ishtehar (with an aim of establishing Caliphate Government, safeguarding the national interest, and establishing the rights of the masses: the Islamic Manifesto of Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh and Hizbut Tahrir). • Political Thought in Islam (Islamer rajnoitik chinta). • Apart from these manifestoes, the HTB also has uploaded images of their posters. One poster reads ‘Rajab conference Khilafah for Bangladesh’. This website was used as a key resource for activists or interested persons and enabled them to get involved with the party. The website also updates images, videos and news items under the headline of Latest Updates. During a one-month study of the website, the website updated between three and seven news, photo, and video items each week. The headlines and contents of those items showed the transnational nature of pan-Islamism: –– Three news items about government oppression of Hizbut Tahrir activists in Turkey –– One eight-minute mobile video about the rajab conference in Bangladesh –– A picture of a conference of Indonesian Ulama –– A press release, titled ‘The imperialist kufr powers have failed to suppress the call for the Khilafah; so will their agents’, about a conference in Bangladesh –– A manifesto of the HTB calling for rejection of democracy in Bangladesh because it is the brainchild of the West –– A press release from Pakistan Hizbut Tahrir that condemns the arrest of its activists by the Pakistani government –– A press release from the HTB that reads, ‘Government of Bangladesh has joined hands with Britain in the war against Islam’

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HTB used Facebook too. Its page title, ‘The struggle for Islam in Bangladesh’, was in effect an extension of their website. I monitored this page from 2011 to 2015. My observation was that that group promoted political goals beyond Bangladesh. In summary, the page aimed to (a) disseminate its global press releases to its Bangladeshi followers; (b) transmit directions and suggestions from HT’s UK and Australia chapter leaders to Bangladeshi followers; (c) disseminate video documentaries about the crisis of the ummah; and (d) display digital posters, images, and videos of conferences held in Australia and the United Kingdom, which focused on the crisis of Islam. Through the Internet, the HTB in Bangladesh has been able to extend the idea of the ummah to propagate pan-Islamist thought. The Internet allowed it to bring home to Bangladesh news, images, and videos of its counterparts working in other countries, and, at the same time, to keep its overseas counterparts informed of developments in Bangladesh. The more mainstream Islamist party than the HT, the BJI, also uses the Internet to promote its agenda. At the peak of the Bangladesh’s international Crimes Tribunal, using its website, the BJI campaigned against the AL government. Various Internet-based tools enabled the party to campaign about local politics globally. For example, a letter written by BJI’s former Assistant Secretary General, Barrister Abdur Razzaq, to the ‘Leaders and Scholars of the Ummah’ was published in the Muslim Observer1 on September 14, 2010. The title of the letter was: ‘Briefing on Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami’s Current Situation: Ultra-Secularist Government’s All-Out Systematic Attack in a Bid to Ban Jamaat & Execute its Top Leaders.’ The letter argued that: (a) The AL was an ultrasecular government working against Islam to establish secularism. In this process it set out to crush the BJI by executing its top leaders. (b) The International Crimes Tribunal was a ‘drama’ led by communists and secularists and aimed against Islam and BJI. (c) Saudi Arabia should intervene to save the BJI cause because it was a movement for Allah’s cause.

1  Muslim Observer claims to be an alternative to the corporate media focusing on the issues of Islam and Muslims. For further information please visit http://muslimmedianetwork. com/mmn/?page_id=2 (Accessed on 2/05/2019).

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Any reader of the letter without prior knowledge of Bangladesh would conclude that BJI was the legitimate representative of Islam in Bangladesh and the AL was a party that stood against Islam. However, this book has already demonstrated how deeply the AL supports Islam. In addition, the BJI’s student wing, the Islami Chatro Shibir (ICS), maintains a Twitter and Facebook account entitled Basherkella (Bamboo Castle). Basherkella was named after Titu Mir, leader of Bengali resistance to British rule, who was killed by the British in 1831. The Basherkella was his fortress of bamboo, which the British found surprisingly difficult to overcome. The Facebook page, Basherkella, generated countrywide protest against the government’s indiscriminate shooting of supporters of the BJI and ICS who took to the street to protest the verdict of capital punishment to one of their top leaders Delwar Hossain Sayedee in February 2013. With over 150k followers (now over 500k followers) in 2013, this group uploaded photos, videos, and news of resistance across the country round the clock. Militant Muslims too have used social media sites and smart phone-­ based Internet telephone apps to expand extremist ummah in Bangladesh. In recent times, Bangladeshi diaspora played a vital role in communicating and radicalizing Bangladeshi Muslims. For example, a Bangladeshi Japanese Hindu (Sajit Debnath), who later converted to Islam under the name of Muhammad Saifullah Ozaki, an Australian Bangladeshi man (A.T.M Tajuddin aka Abu Saad), and a Canadian Bangladeshi (Tamim Chowdhury) organized recruitment of Bangladeshi jihadists by setting up online jihadi cells. These Bangladeshi expatriates used an ex cadet college graduate to run a Facebook group called ‘Ex-cadet Islamic Learning Forum’. This group played a major role in encouraging interested Bangladeshi jihadists to travel to Syria and Iraq to fight for the ISIL (Labu 2017). In addition to using Facebook, Bangladesh’s followers of extremist ummah have used Twitter and the smartphone app Telegram. Parvez (2017), in an elaborate study on how militant Muslims use social media, finds that at least 13 twitter handles were used by militant Islamist groups who posted content supporting murders of bloggers, atheists and non-­ Muslims (Parvez 2017: 94). In 2015, when police arrested an alleged mastermind for plotting a murder of a secular blogger, one Twitter user demanded ‘release of that person’ and issued a threat to arresting officer stating, ‘the responsible person will be beheaded publicly’ (Parvez 2017: 95). Reports further suggest that militant groups have used encrypted chat apps like Telegram to avoid surveillance of law enforcement agencies (Mahmud and Rabbi 2017).

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7.4   Three Implications The discussion in this chapter underlines how ummah thrives against the backdrop of globalization and through transnationalism. It reinforces the point that ummah is not monolithic and ranges across a political and ideological spectrum. In my assessment, transnational ummah poses three major implications for Bangladesh. First, transnational ummah that bypasses the state threatens state security. Diverse transnational networks fostering Muslim-to-Muslim contact undermine the dominant state-centric concept of managing security for Bangladeshi citizens. For many years, states were the units of action, the definers, and guarantors of security (Rudolph 1997: 4). However, the emergence of transnational terrorist networks such as HuJI-B, Al-Qayeda, and ISIL signify a fading role for the state in managing security. When a self-proclaimed global jihad against the United States and the West in general became local, terrorists blamed their actions on defending the honour of the ummah. This brought challenges to Bangladesh. The Jamaatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) is a case in point. It is not clear when the JMB launched its chapter in Bangladesh. Pressure from donors and diplomatic quarters led the BNP–BJI government to ban the JMB on February 23, 2005. However, the group made its presence felt by detonating 500 bombs simultaneously throughout Bangladesh on August 17, 2005 and claimed responsibility for further acts of violence, including suicide bombings in courts and throwing grenades at foreign diplomats. In 2007, seven members were convicted of crimes and executed. It was reported that when the judge was reading the death sentence, one of the JMB members said that ‘it was a farcical trial on the basis of British laws and false witnesses’. He continued: ‘I think you [judges] have shown that you are disloyal to Allah. It’s you who should be condemned to death’ (Manik and Islam 2007). The denunciation of Western law by a convicted terrorist further underscored the similarity that Bangladeshi Islamists shared with transnational jihadists. Similarly, the case of the ISIL-affiliated Bangladesh group that carried out a terrorist attack in Gulshan, Dhaka in 2016 highlights the challenge transnational ummah continues to pose to the security of the Bangladeshi state. But Bangladesh is only one of the many Muslim countries fighting a global war in a local context. Second, the contested relationship between nationality and ummah, as seen in some cases, challenges modern politics and leads to demands for the establishment of a ‘traditional Islamic political system’. For example,

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the HTB and Huji-B, as well ISIL, reject democracy and demand establishment of a Caliphate. For influential Muslim political thinkers, the memory of Muslim political authority in the Golden Age is above all a conceptual inspiration. Such a political concept seems idealistic in the twenty-first century. However, the dream of Caliphate is still very much live among groups such as HTB who promote the idea in a non-violent way whereas the ISIL uses violent tactics. Such facts only emphasize the challenges modern politics faces from older forms of politics and political allegiance in Bangladesh. The expansion of older form of politics, however, is a modern phenomenon and owes much of its potency to the transnational possibilities of the twenty-first century. Finally, the power of the Internet has had profound implications for Bangladesh by enabling the expansion of transnational social, political, and extremist calls for ummah. This requires further elaboration. Traditionally, Bangladesh used to be an agrarian country with a vast rural landscape where Internet penetration was very low. However, when Sheikh Hasina came into power in 2008, her party embarked upon an aggressive digitization program called ‘Digital Bangladesh’ that primarily aimed at speeding up service delivery of government agencies (Chowdhury et al. 2018). However, in addition to digitizing government service, the country has experienced increased Internet penetration. Statistics for increased Internet use in the country has been staggering. According to a government estimate, at the end of February 2012, there were 31,140.804 thousand Internet subscribers in Bangladesh which shot up to 93.102 million at the end of March in 2019 (BTRC 2019a, b). At the same time, mobile penetration also increased astoundingly. For example, at the end of February 2012, numbers of mobile phone subscribers in Bangladesh were 86.559 million which increased to 159.780 million in March 2019 (BTRC 2019a, b). These statistics not only demonstrate the increasing use of Internet and mobile phone by Bangladeshis, but also further showcase a cultural change in the Bangladeshi population in which more and more people are connected online. According to a 2017 report, Dhaka has the second highest number of Facebook users globally, with 22 million active users (Murad 2017). This level of digital consumption has taken place in the country against the backdrop of rapid urbanization. Once known for its vast farmland and underdevelopment, the country is now going through faster urbanization than the rest of the South Asia (Hasan 2017). Farms, fields, and parks are being replaced by apartments, bridges, facto-

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ries, and shopping malls, and affordable housing is becoming a problem. Lack of enough space for social gathering in the physical world has serious implications for the behaviour of Bangladeshi youths and this is an important point to note because only 7% of Bangladesh’s huge population are over 60 years of age. Against the backdrop of this diminishing physical space for socialization, more and more youths choose to meet online. That is a problem for a number of reasons. According to a Rand Corporation study, the Internet acts as an echo chamber (a place where individuals find their ideas supported and echoed by other like-minded individuals), the Internet accelerates the process of radicalization, and it allows radicalization to occur without physical contact (Behr et al. 2013). Within this milieu, the role of the Facebook (Bangladesh’s most used social media app) is problematic. Facebook has fuelled intolerance and radicalization in the name of ummah, not only in Bangladesh but also in other places  in the name of other religions and ethnicities. Researchers have found that heavier Facebook use led to intolerance and violence in the United States, New Zealand, Germany, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, India to name a few countries (Taub and Fisher 2018; Frenkel 2018; Mirchandani 2018). In sum the Internet, Facebook, and other social media networks facilitate the exchange and expansion of radical and extremist ummah. In Bangladesh, the implication is not only an increasing threat to state security, but also to citizenship as we have seen in the cases of flag burnings, denial of legitimacy of the court system, and so forth.

7.5   Conclusion This chapter offers a typology of transitional networks to demonstrate how individuals pursue multiple ummahs in and beyond Bangladesh and ignore political structures centring on state, legislative and judicial, civil-­ military relations, or political parties. This approach to identity politics has several implications for Bangladesh and beyond as argued above. The state penetration of Islam, and its aggressive development plan through digitization has further complicated the scenario. In an environment where the state encourages Islamization and  supports  religious  majoritarianism, ­multiple waves of religious modernity on the back of translational mediums have weakened nationalist state-based citizenship and strengthen ummah identities in radical and extreme form. This is a challenge Bangladeshi state will continue to endure in the coming days.

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07/18/technology/facebook-to-remove-misinformation-that-leads-to-violence.html (Accessed on 14/06/2019) Grillo, Ralph (2004) ‘Islam and Transnationalism’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(5): 861–878. Haddad, Yvonne Y. (1983) ‘Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival’, in Esposito, John L. (Ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 67–98, p. 71 Hasan, Mubashar (2011) ‘Democracy and Political Islam in Bangladesh’, South Asia Research 31: 97–117 ——— (2012a) ‘The Geopolitics of Political Islam in Bangladesh’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, 14(1&2): 60–69 ——— (2012b) ‘Historical Development of Political Islam with Reference to Bangladesh’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 47(2): 155–167 ——— (2014) ‘Islamic Concept of Ummah and Transnational Networks of Political Islam in Bangladesh’, in Jeffrey, Robin Bannerman and Sen, Ronojay (Eds.) Being Muslim in South Asia, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 224–248 ——— (2017) ‘Threats of Violent Extremism in Bangladesh are a Symptom of Deeper Social and Political Problems’, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/threats-of-violent-extremism-in-bangladesh-are-a-symptom-ofdeeper-social-and-political-problems-70420 (Accessed on 7/06/2019) ISIL Video (2016) Call for Jihad in Bangladesh Jackson, Roy (1997) Nietzsche and Islam, London: Routledge Khalil, Tasneem (2016) ‘What ISIS Wants in Bangladesh’, July 22, https://tasneemkhalil.com/https-tasneemkhalil-com-what-isis-wants-in-bangladesh20e9de5feb5a (Accessed on 21/05/2019) Labu, Nururzzaman (2017) ‘How Many Bangladeshis have Joined IS?’, Dhaka Tribune, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2017/06/28/ many-bangladeshis-joined/ (Accessed on 2/06/2019) Langman, Lauren (2005) ‘The Dialectic of Unenlightenment: Toward a Critical Theory of Islamic Fundamentalism’, Critical Sociology, 31(1–2): 243–279 Levitt, P. (2001) Between God, Ethnicity, and Country: An Approach to the Study of Transnational Religion, Working Paper WPTC-01-13, Transnational Communities, Oxford Mahmud, Iftekhar and Roy, Kuntol (2013) ‘What are Thoughts of Masses About the Current Situation of the Country’, Daily Prothom-Alo, May 11, Dhaka, 10 Mahmud, Tarek and Rabbi, Arifur Rahman (2017) ‘Militants Using Secured Messaging Apps to Dodge Cops’, Dhaka Tribune, October 1, https://www. dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2017/10/01/militants-secured-appsdodge-cops (Accessed on 23/05/2019) Mandeville, Peter (2007) Global Political Islam, London and New York: Routledge

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Manik, Julfikar Ali and Islam, Shariful (2007) ‘Six JMB Militants Hanged’, The Daily Star, March 31, http://archive.thedailystar.net/2007/03/31/d7033 101011.htm (Accessed on 21/06/2019) Marszal, Andrew and Graham, Chris (2016) ‘20 Hostages Killed in “Isil” Attack on Dhaka Restaurant Popular with Foreigners’, The Telegraph, July 2, https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/01/gunmen-attack-restaurant-in-diplomatic-quarter-of-bangladeshi-ca/ (Accessed on 30/05/2019) Mirchandani, Maya (2018) ‘Digital Hatred, Real Violence: Majoritarian Radicalisation and Social Media in India’, ORF Occasional Paper: 167, https:// www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ORF_Occasional Paper_167_DigitalHatred.pdf (Accessed on 23/05/2019) Morris, Madeleine (2018) ‘“I Attempted Murder” on Behalf of Islamic State, Student Momena Shoma Tells Police’, ABC News, August 1, https://www. abc.net.au/news/2018-08-01/momena-shoma-court-case-islamic-stateattempted-murder-claim/10060550 (Accessed on 7/06/2019) Murad, Mahmud (2017) ‘Dhaka Ranked Second in Number of Active Facebook Users’, BDNEWS24.com, April 15, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/04/15/dhaka-ranked-second-in-number-of-active-facebookusers (Accessed on 7/06/2019) Muslim Brotherhood (2013) ‘Muslim Brotherhood Statement on Unjust Trials for Leaders of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’, Ikhwan Web, February 8, http:// www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30637 (Accessed on 23/03/2019) Nawaz, Maajid (2009) ‘Charity or Extremist Group?’, The Guardian, March 31, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/mar/30/religion-islam-green-crescent-bangladesh (Accessed on 7/06/2019) Oaten, James (2019) ‘Bangladeshi Student Momena Shoma Sentenced to 42 Years for Terror Attack on Homestay Landlord’, ABC News, June 4, https:// www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-05/bangladeshi-homestay-guest-sentencedfor-engaging-in-terror-act/11180560 (Accessed on 6/06/2019) Parvez, Saimum (2017) ‘Internet and Radicalization in Bangladesh’, Democracy and Governance: Contemporary Issues in Bangladesh, Public Policy and Governance Program, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 85–118 Razzaq, Abdur (2010) ‘Briefing on Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami’s Current Situation’, The Muslim Observer, July 1, http://muslimobserver.com/briefingon-bangladesh-jamaat-e-islamis-current-situation (Accessed on 2/03/2019) Riaz, Ali (2008) Islamist Millitancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web, London and New York: Routledge ——— (2016) ‘Who are the Bangladeshi “Islamist Militants?”’, Perspective of Terrorism, 10(1): 1–17 Rudolph, H. Susanne (1997) ‘Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society’, in Rudolph, H. Susanne and Piscatori, James (Eds.) Transnational Religion and Fading States, Oxford: Westview Press, 1–24

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Sadiq, Mohammad (1991) ‘The Turkish Revolution and the Abolition of the Caliphate’, International Studies, 28(1): 25–40 Sharif, Sajjad (2013) ‘The Background of the Survey’, Daily Prothom-Alo, May 11, Dhaka, 1, 10 Siddiqui, A. B. M. Saiful Alam (2014) ‘Islamic University’, Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title= Islamic_University (Accessed on 25/05/2019) Taub, Amanda and Fisher, Max (2018) ‘Facebook Fueled Anti-Refugee Attacks in Germany, New Research Suggests’, The New York Times, August 21, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/world/europe/facebook-refugee-attacksgermany.html (Accessed on 23/04/2019) The Daily Star (2013) ‘Attacks, Rampage in Major Cities’, February 23, https:// www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-270132 (Accessed on 12/12/2019) Voll, John (1997) ‘Relations among Islamist Groups’, in Esposito, John (Ed.) Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?, London. Lynne Rienner: 231–247 Weiser, Benjamin and Palmer, Emily (2018) ‘Akayed Ullah Guilty of ISIS-Inspired Bombing Near Times Square’, The New  York Times, November 6, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/nyregion/port-authority-bombing-verdict. html (Accessed on 7/06/2019)

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

By exploring the effects of ummah in Bangladeshi politics, this book has shown how political Islam is mainstreamed. The Bangladesh case adds an important lesson for the Western political scientists, international relation (IR) specialists, and even to Bangladesh experts because it is evident throughout this book that politics in a Muslim-majority country like Bangladesh draws its strength through non-Western, Islamic concept-­ ummah. This book has demonstrated that, in the Bangladeshi case, ummah supports two separate, yet, to some extent interconnected, political patterns: a state-led Islamization of domestic politics on the one hand and the actions of inter-government and transnational networks of political Islamists on the other. This model of political Islam turns traditional democratization and globalization theories on their head by turning a Muslim-majority state against liberal, secular ideas in pursuit of a political order infused with  religious traditions. The ummah, as a trans-historical and transregional ideological group, provides an alternate vision to fulfilling the legitimate goals of international and domestic politics, thereby inspiring state and non-state actors to strengthen religious ideology in state law and the national consciousness. According to standard democratization theories, free markets, Western states, liberal political parties, international organizations (such as the UN and World Bank), and transnational actors (such as liberal non-government organization (NGOs)) form a global structure to promote liberalism and democracy abroad (Grujel 2002: 46–138). Collectively, these actors aim to form a global community of © The Author(s) 2020 M. Hasan, Islam and Politics in Bangladesh, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5_8

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democrats (Oren 1995: 147) and promote a common, liberal, democratic identity across states by fostering similar values about citizen rights, civil liberties, and socio-political liberalization (Owen 1994; Kahl 1998). This model is not a complex one to understand. Within this structure ‘free association of capital and labour intensifies and extends worldwide connectedness’ (Pasha 2002: 122). Pasha argues that ‘open markets and the unfettered spirit of enterprise, in turn, pave the way for democratic politics’ because ‘economic globalization, global democracy and a global commercial culture are closely intertwined’ (ibid.). This narrative can be contested through the Bangladesh case. Bangladesh’s experience shows that wealthy Muslim states of the Middle East, and Muslim international organizations, such as the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Islamic NGOs, transnational Islamist parties, and terrorists, can manipulate the ummah and form multiple cross-border political collaborations to contest Western liberal ideals, including secularism and civil liberties. These collaborations are linked to geopolitical events (as shown in Chap. 3). Such Muslim collaboration based on ummah underscores that the ummah is not confined within a nation state ‘rather it is an association of Islamic societies which share the same thick values and seek to integrate [Islam] into social and political life’ (Shani 2008: 729). This point requires further explanation. For Muslims, the ummah is arguably as powerful, if not more powerful, than Western liberalism because it taps into Muslim’s Universalist individual and collective identity and suggests a broader community beyond states and time periods. Individual members of the ummah are able to construct an Islamic identity and expressing one’s identity necessitates consenting to forms of local, international, and transnational politics that encourage political Islam at national, international, and transnational levels. How can one identify as a Muslim without identifying with the ummah? How can one identify with the ummah and deny its political expression? These questions will continue to bring challenges for Bangladesh. This book has shown that there are several strands of political Islam within the politics of Bangladesh, each equipped with its own historical and political narratives. Each strand is based upon an ummah, with national, international, and transnational dimensions. The ummah members of each strand seek to influence local actors and state structures to reinforce Islamic identity and undermine secularism. Global waves of imperialism, colonialism, democratization, liberalism, and Islamization

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have affected Bangladesh’s political structures and their influence continues to this day. In other words, this book looked at how Bangladesh’s politics has coped with external forces, especially transnational political Islam, and how this has prevented Bangladesh’s political system from looking like a Western democracy. Although there are certainly uniquely indigenous aspects to the Bangladeshi experience of democracy and politics, the presence in Bangladesh of those who promote democracy and those who promote Islamization has put Bangladesh on the frontline between liberals and Islamists, and within strands of Islamists. It might not be a clash of civilizations in the Huntington sense, but it is certainly a battle of money, ideas, and organizations in which political Islam has gained significant ground at the expense of secularism and liberalism. At the introductory chapter, it was mentioned that Bangladesh was a multiparty electoral democracy from 1990 to 2006. Conventional liberal theories of democratization and international relations would expect Bangladesh to become more liberal, but this was not the case. Illiberal laws, media restrictions, and human rights violations continued, and more recently, Bangladesh has even moved in the direction of authoritarianism. We are likely to see political Islam remaining as a powerful force. Sceptics might claim that Islam and the ummah have little to do with Bangladesh’s illiberalism. After all, there are other reasons for Bangladesh’s democratic deficit, including the interrelated factors of poverty, corruption, political dynasties, and nepotism. In addition, there are many examples of non-­ Muslim countries and cultures that produce authoritarian regimes across space and time. However, Bangladesh’s problems cannot be reduced to the secular, but rather must include the religious elements. It’s illiberal political culture is partly a product of political Islam, specifically, the idea that Muslims citizens and the state are part of the ummah; the idea of the ummah creates political goals for its members and implicitly endorses a political system in which human rights, secularism, and free speech can only be conceptualized within the boundary of Islamic framework. This is inherently illiberal, but as long as voters see themselves as part of a broader ummah, that will work. This point broadly sums up this book. Therefore, it is no surprise that politicians of the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) receive massive popular support for their Islamic platforms because the masses in Bangladesh also consider themselves as members of the ummah. They too offer support to many illiberal values and their views are reflected in the series of polls cited. The

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Bangladeshi state permitted Islamic groups to operate missions within its borders and also pumped millions of Takas into aggressive and diverse Islamic missionary activities through public policies, the Islamic Foundation, and madrasahs. No ‘religiously neutral’ countries would heavily invest in state-driven missionary activities and construct ummah consciousness the way Bangladesh does. The promotion of Islamic education through madrasahs, and addition of compulsory Islamic education for Muslim students in the general education system, were (and are) significant forces in constructing the national Islamic consciousness as an ummah consciousness. This process of disseminating Islamic educational material that is critical of liberal values is intrinsically linked to the construction of the Islamic individuals’ view of themselves, the role of the state, and their own place in the ummah. In turn, this affects the construction of the political sphere in Bangladesh. Indoctrinating people to believe that they have a place in the ummah could be explainable by the concept of ‘docile bodies’ coined by Michel Foucault. Foucault (1991), in Discipline and Punish, argues that nations and societies are made of human bodies and every society has a body of rules to regulate human bodies because ‘human bodies are the object and target of power’ (Foucault 1991: 136). Foucault argues that educational institutions, such as schools, socialize humans and turn them into docile bodies through various physical, social, and academic disciplines.1 Social norms and ideas, such as regimented seating arrangements in schools, training in various academic disciplines, and promotion of a particular worldview, are all part of the process of turning humans into docile bodies. In Bangladesh, the madrasah education and Islamic education in general

1  Schwan and Shapiro (2011) explain Foucault’s project of docility, which has two dimensions. Foucault thinks individual bodies are subjects of manipulation that can be ‘shaped, trained [and] which obeys, responds, becomes skillful’ and the object of analysis ‘ which uses calculations and quantifications, mainly gathered from armies, schools and hospitals, to make bodies submissive and controllable’ (Schwan and Shapiro 2011: 98). The project of docility forms when the ‘manipulable body’ and ‘analyzable body’ conjoins together. Foucault (1991) argues that ‘a body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’ (Foucault 1991: 136). In other words, ‘docile bodies’ refers to submission and use of human bodies to change behavior. Bodies are spatially enclosed, partitioned and ranked so as to maintain ‘order and discipline’. Therefore, the docile human body serves the ‘machinery of power’ that defines ‘how one may have hold over other bodies so that they may operate as one wishes with the techniques, the speed, and the efficiency that one determines’ (Foucault 1991: 138).

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schools, via their curriculum, and discipline construct Islamic individuals and shape their Muslim identity. This scenario is further complicated by the multiple waves of modernity and globalization, which, as shown in Chaps. 3 and 7, has fostered several kinds of ummah. The migration of workers to and from the Middle East, the religious and scholarly networks, and new Internet platforms for radicalization create opportunities for people to resist the growth of liberal democracy in Bangladesh through multiple interpretations of ummah. Modernization and globalization, therefore, have played a role in strengthening political Islam in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh case further reconfirms the fact that Western-styled liberal democracy does not have a universal attraction. People here appeared to be more concerned about preserving Islamic culture and values. Such a mentality might partly be naturalistic, but it has also evolved through the deliberate efforts of the major party and state-led Islamization as well as by Islamist movements. New ideas about the ummah have continued to be shaped by the state and Islamist movements in the era of the Internet and globalization, with Islamist movements increasingly able to paint themselves as defenders of tradition. Whether or not this claim to Bangladesh’s political culture and religious values is legitimate, it is certainly powerful. Defending Bangladesh’s Islamic identity and perceived traditions are probably more important for most people than enhancing its democratic system and liberal civil rights. Obviously, Bangladeshis do not need to support fringe Islamist parties to create the political conditions for Islamic government policies, as both the AL and the BNP are upholding elements of political Islam to meet the demands of the masses. This demand, however, is also partly conditioned and reinforced by the patronage of Islamic institutions and organizations run by these parties. Such favourable political conditions open up spaces for conventional Islamist parties, because political Islam already has legitimacy within the government. Islamic studies scholars may debate whether Islam hinders democracy. Scholars frequently claim that Islamic philosophy such as adl or justice do not diverge significantly from most of the values of liberal democracy (e.g., see Ibrahim 2006 and Masmoudi 2003). Some cite examples of Turkey’s AKP or Tunisia’s En Nahda parties to show that Islamist parties can administer a somewhat liberal polity. In this regard, Rane (2010) illustrates convincingly how Islam’s higher philosophy of Maqasid (not using

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literal interpretation of religious scriptures) could be applicable in twenty-­ first century Muslim politics, which means that Islam is neither fully compatible with the liberal democracy nor in stark contrast to it. Other Muslim scholars (Osman 2002; Safi 1999) explain how Islam’s example of the shura or consultation may bridge Islamic and Western philosophies of democracy. However, in my view the core problem remains with Islam’s interpretation and its contextual application in the socio-political lives of Bangladeshis. Unlike Catholicism, in which the Pope and Vatican are a central authoritative figures and institution, respectively, for representing a particular version of Christianity in today’s world, in Islam there is no central authority. Islam’s role in politics is malleable and driven by individual actors and organizations that use it for their own purposes and have different interpretations of scripture that are each as valid as the next. In Bangladesh, where Arabic—the primary language of Islam—is on the list of least spoken foreign languages, this problem of interpretation is even more acute. More radical teachings of Islam are commonplace because the meaning of scripture is not carefully controlled. The penetration of Islamic values and its political application through various mediums—the state, the AL, the BNP, and other Islamist parties—have largely been authoritarian and devoid of any enlightening philosophy of Islam that supports democracy, human rights, and co-existence. Rather, they follow politically motivated and strict interpretations of Islam inspired by Wahabism and Salafism. Finally, in the Bangladeshi case, contrary to popular conceptions that tend to consider the ummah a monolithic global community of Muslim believers, this book has explained that diverse actors have pursued several types of political Islam in the name of the ummah. Consequently, Bangladesh provides a story of unity and disunity regarding the ummah’s role. Though these ummahs are diverse in terms of accomplishing their political goals, as this book has shown, their common goal is to thwart liberal values and mainstream political Islam in Bangladesh. So what does the future look like for Bangladesh? There is no easy answer. However, it is plausible to argue that Bangladesh will continue to be an illiberal, highly conservative, Muslim state in which mainstream parties continue to offer their support to Islam in politics. For that reason, political Islam in Bangladesh will continue to be a dominant force and allegiance to ummah or ummahs will remain a normative political behaviour.

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References Foucault, Michel (1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press Grujel, John (2002) Democratization, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ibrahim, Anwar (2006) ‘Universal Values and Muslim Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 17(3): 5–12 Kahl, Colin H. (1998) ‘Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace’, Security Studies, 8(2–3): 94–144 Masmoudi, R. A. (2003) ‘What is Liberal Islam? The Silenced Majority’, Journal of Democracy, 14(2): 40–44 Oren, Ido (1995) ‘The Subjectivity of the Democratic Peace: Changing US Perceptions of Imperial Germany’, International Security, 20(2): 147–184 Osman, Fathi (2002) ‘Democracy and the Concept of Shura’, in Race, Alan and Shafer, Ingrid (Eds.) Religions in Dialogue from Theocracy to Democracy, Aldershot: Ashgate, 81–97 Owen, John M. (1994) ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’, International Security, 19(2): 87–125 Pasha, Mustapha Kamal (2002) ‘Predatory Globalization and Democracy in the Islamic World’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 581(1): 121–132 Rane, Halim (2010) Islam and Contemporary Civilization: Evolving Ideas, Transforming Relations, Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press Safi, Louay (1999) ‘Shura and Democracy: Similarities and Differences’, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), Washington, DC (November), http://louaysafi.blogspot.com/p/ blog-page_66.html (Accessed on 23/02/2018) Schwan, Anne, and Shapiro, Stephen (2011) How to Read Foucault’s “Discipline and Punish”: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Pluto Press Shani, Giorgio (2008) ‘Toward a Post Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth and Critical International Relations Theory’, International Studies Review, 10(4): 722–734

Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS 9/11, 16–18, 29, 32, 51, 58, 86, 182 18-point program, 135 295A of Penal code, 130 A Abduh, Muhammad, 32, 44, 190 Afghani, Jamal al Din, 43 Ahl-e Hadith, 45, 129 Ahmadi, 179 Alia madrasah, 150–153, 152n2, 152n3 Al-Qayeda, 57, 184, 195 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 47, 184 Anderson, Benedict, 67, 145 Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), 132, 184 Anti Indian stance, 74 Arab Spring, 38, 87 Ashrafs, Seyyed Ali, 60, 61, 67, 69, 191 Atraps, 60, 61, 64, 67, 69 Awami League (AL), 3, 10–15, 18, 19, 31, 62, 72, 75, 79, 80, 83–108,

115, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123, 126, 127, 130, 132–135, 137–140, 169, 171, 178, 185, 193, 194, 205, 207, 208 Ayodha riot, 128 Azam, Ghulam, 72–74, 104–106, 128–131 B Bande Mataram, 124, 125 Bangladeshi bloggers, 103, 177 Bangladeshi Nationalism, 122–127 Bangladesh Jamaat e Islami (BJI), 3, 11, 86, 158n5, 177, 185, 186, 193, 194 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 11–14, 18, 19, 62, 76, 79, 80, 84, 87, 93n9, 106, 107, 115–140, 169, 171, 205, 207, 208 Basherkella, 194 Baul, 164

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Hasan, Islam and Politics in Bangladesh, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1116-5

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INDEX

Bengali nationalism, 14, 71–73, 89–91, 120–123 Bhashani, Maulana, 72 Biswa Ijtema, 161 C Caliphate, 19, 44, 61, 66–67, 179, 182–184, 196 Chakma, 123, 123n4, 124 Charlie Hebdo, 31, 182 Civilizational Identity, 36 Clash of civilizations, 1, 29–52, 205 Cold War, 42, 74–78 D Daily Prothom-Alo, 133, 178 Dars-i-Nizami, 151n2, 152n2 Darul Uloom Deoband, 62 Deoband Madrasah, 62, 66, 150, 160 Deobond Ulemas, 67 E East Bengal Regiment, 117, 117n2 Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmool Committee, 86 Enemy of Islam, 67, 68, 72 Enemy Property Act, 168, 168n6 Energy Information Administration (EIA), 78 En Nahda, 20, 38, 207 Ershad, Hussein Muhammad, 13, 76, 77 Ex-cadet Islamic Learning Forum, 194 Extremism, 2, 6, 9, 12, 15, 51 Extremist Ummah, 2, 20, 47, 183, 194, 197 F False Islam, 31, 72 False Muslims, 42, 45–47, 62, 67, 182

Faraizi movement, 46, 63–65 Far-right, 34 Four Party, 134 G Gallup poll, 166, 167 Geopolitics, 5, 15, 52, 57–80, 86 Globalization, 23, 30, 32, 34, 41, 43, 49–52, 57, 165, 171, 177–197, 203, 204, 207 H Haider, Daud, 8, 85 Hajj, 97, 101, 119, 138, 161 Hanafi scholars, 66 Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), 61, 184, 195 Hasina, Sheikh, 2, 3, 11, 13, 31, 84, 86, 88, 95, 99, 101, 107, 130, 137, 178, 196 Hefazat e Islam (HI), 2, 3, 62, 86, 115, 131–134, 137, 154, 170, 177 Hindu-Buddhist-Christian unity council, 168 Hinduism, 61, 68, 123n4, 124, 168 Historic specificity, 58 Hizbut Tahrir, 19, 44, 57, 62, 184, 187, 190, 192 Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), 184, 192 Hossain, Kamal, 14, 15, 75, 87n3, 88, 90n7, 105, 117n1, 135 Human Development Index (HDI), 48 I Ijtihad, 37 Imam, Jahanara, 130 Innocence of Muslims, 31, 102, 181 Inter-civilizational, 34 International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), 85, 158n5, 193

 INDEX 

International relations (IR), 16–18, 22, 57, 203, 205 ISIL, 179, 183, 187, 188, 194–196 ISIS, 44, 47, 57 Islamic agency, 15, 83, 101 Islamic bloc lobbies, 134 Islamic civilization, 29, 33, 34, 58–61, 133, 158 Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), 78 Islamic Conference of Tourism, 100 Islamic cultural values, 146 Islamic Foundation (IF), 97, 146, 154–160, 163, 168, 190, 206 Islamic identity, 1n1, 3, 5, 31, 40, 46, 95–104, 124, 139, 165, 183, 204, 207 Islamic IR, 57 Islamic nationalism, 47, 57 Islamic Oikko Jot (IoJ), 79, 129, 134 Islamic secularism, 15, 104 Islamist parties, 5, 6, 11, 14, 19, 38, 66, 72, 78, 79, 83, 86, 87, 94, 104–108, 129, 132, 134–135, 150, 154, 177, 180, 183–186, 193, 204, 207, 208 Islamists, 5, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 30, 34, 35, 37, 42–47, 51, 57, 61, 62, 64, 66, 79, 84, 86, 87, 96, 98, 100, 108, 117, 130, 132, 134, 140, 153, 157–159, 163, 164, 178, 181–186, 190, 191, 194, 195, 203, 205, 207 Islamization, 2, 5–7, 10, 12–15, 19, 20, 23, 42, 50, 57–59, 75, 78–80, 86, 87, 116, 117, 139, 145–171, 197, 203, 207 J Jagodol, 120 Jamaat e Islami, 46, 68, 72, 182

213

Jamaatul Mujahedeen of Bangladesh (JMB), 61 Jatiyo Shamajtantric DAL (JSD), 95 Jihadist, 34, 42, 179, 184, 194, 195 K Kalo Shurjer Kalo Josnar Kalo Bonnay, 85 Khan, Imran, 14, 15, 30, 31 The Khartoum Resolution, 97 L Language movement, 71, 72, 90, 90n5 Larma, Manabendra Narayan, 123 Laylatul Barat, 97 Laylatul Qadr, 97 Liberal democracy, 22, 32, 34, 36, 39, 44, 57, 62, 83, 86, 94, 95, 207, 208 Liberalization, 5, 6, 34, 94, 118, 119, 182, 204 Liberal Muslim, 62, 100 Liberal politics, 203 Liberal ummah, 19, 20, 47, 62, 74–78, 80, 87, 99 M Madani, Maulana Hussein Ahmad, 69 Madinah Pact, 41 Madrasah Education Ordinance (MEO), 151 Mamluks, 59 The manifesto of the United Front, 71–72 Master signifier, 29, 30, 39 Maududi, Abul A‘la, 46, 47, 69, 72, 190 Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas, 160

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INDEX

Modernist Islamist thinkers, 37 Mughal regime, 66 Mujibur, Sheikh, 12–14, 76, 84–86, 87n2, 88, 90n6, 91n7, 95–100, 104–106, 116–118, 120, 130, 134, 135 Multiple identities, 37 Muslim League, 42, 62, 63, 68–70, 87, 87n2, 98, 124 Muslim nation, 57, 68, 79, 100, 124 Muslim supremacy, 96

78, 79, 83–108, 115–117, 126, 128, 145–171, 182, 183, 185–191, 203–205, 207, 208 Post Islamism, 5, 29–52 Pure Islam, 45, 46, 64, 67, 70–71

N National Education Policy, 150, 151 National Humanities Medal, 32 National Moon Sighting Committee (NMSC), 156 National women development policy (NWDP), 131 The non-cooperation movement, 90, 90n7

R Rabubiyat, 72 Radical, 2, 15, 16, 19, 20, 32, 42, 43, 47, 49, 51, 52, 57, 61, 62, 64, 71, 78–79, 96, 100, 103–105, 118, 130, 149, 154, 163, 183, 187, 197, 208 Radicalization, 6, 7, 15, 21, 44, 197, 207 Radical Muslim, 57, 77 Radical Ummah, 19 Rahman, Ziaur, 12, 13, 76, 98, 103, 116–119, 117n2, 123–126, 130, 137, 189 Religious framework, 58 RESOLVE Network, 22, 167 Rida, Rashid, 32, 44 Rumi, Shah Sultan, 59

O One Belt One Road (OBOR), 7, 8 Operation Searchlight, 117, 117n1, 117n2 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 5, 10, 76, 96, 100 Org Quest, 178 Ozaki, Muhammad Saifullah, 194 P Pakistan period, 72 Pan-Islamic leaders, 66 Pan-Islamism, 43, 191, 192 Pew Survey, 166 Political Islam, 4, 4–5n2, 6, 12, 18, 19, 23, 38, 41, 42, 46, 47, 50, 57–59, 61, 62, 64, 66, 68, 72,

Q Qawmi madrasah, 45, 131, 132, 137, 150, 151n2, 153, 154 Qutb, Sayyid, 46, 47, 157, 182, 183

S Salafism, 43, 208 Satanic Verses, 31 Sayedee, Delwar Hossain, 158n5, 194 Secularism, 4, 14–16, 19, 22, 33–35, 49, 68, 73, 75, 84–87, 89, 91–93, 95, 99, 103–105, 116, 120, 122, 135, 193, 204, 205

 INDEX 

Secular voting base, 85 Seljuks, 59 Shahbagh movement, 131–133, 177 Shaheed Minars, 177, 178, 180 Shah Wali Allah, 43–45 Sharia, 1, 15, 16, 20, 34, 38, 44, 45, 62, 79, 131, 134, 161, 166, 167, 182, 185 Shariatullah, Hazi, 46, 63, 64 Sheikh Rehana, 13, 88 Six Point Charter movement, 90 Sovereignty of Bangladesh, 89 Sufism, 45, 152n2, 164 Surah Al-Qafirun, 99 T Tabligh Jamaat (TJ), 146, 154, 160 Tagore, 71 Taliban, 74, 134, 182, 184, 187 Tawhid, 33, 45, 46, 63, 126 Tayuni Movement, 68, 70 Titu Mir, 65, 194 Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 93n10 True Muslims, 20, 46, 61, 62, 182

215

U Ulemas, 66, 129 Ummah consciousness index, 48 Ummah identity, 10, 39, 41, 42, 47, 48, 52, 71, 77, 78, 97, 100, 101, 122, 171, 178, 188 Ummahs, 2, 6, 12, 19–20, 52, 58, 78–80, 183–194, 197, 208 United Actions Council (UAC), 129, 131 United States Institutes of Peace (USIP), 22, 167 W Wahhab, Ibn-Abdul, 43, 45–47 War on Terror, 78–79 Western civilization, 29, 33, 35, 37, 70, 147 Z Zamindar, 63, 69, 70 Z Force, 117 Zia, Khaleda, 11, 115–126, 130, 134–139