Islam and Democracy : Perspectives on the Arab Spring [1 ed.] 9781443868747, 9781443847148

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Islam and Democracy

Islam and Democracy: Perspectives on the Arab Spring

Edited by

Aylin Ünver Noi

Islam and Democracy: Perspectives on the Arab Spring, Edited by Aylin Ünver Noi This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2013 by Aylin Ünver Noi and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4714-3, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4714-8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Figures and Tables ..................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Aylin Ünver Noi Part I: Regional Perspectives Chapter One ............................................................................................... 13 Arab Spring and Its Effects on Regional Alignments Aylin Ünver Noi Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 35 Youth Civic Engagement in the Arab Region: An Analysis of Key Outcomes Jon Kurtz and Ricardo L. Gómez Part II: Religious Perspectives Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 67 Rising Restrictions on Religion: Part of the Context of Arab Spring Brian J. Grim Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 87 Citizenship and Compatriotism in the Islamic Civil State: The Emerging Discourse of Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the “School of the Middle Way” David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore

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Table of Contents

Part III: Country Perspectives Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 107 The Foreign Keys to Tunisia’s Economic Recovery Seth Rau Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 131 Serve or Rule? The Security Sector in Egypt and its Much-Needed Reform Marija Marovic Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 147 Algeria, Arab Spring, and Waving the “Red Flag” of Islamism: Prospects for Genuine Change in Algeria Anwar N. Haddam Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 165 Post-Assad Syria Daniel Serwer Part IV: Comparative Perspectives Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 181 Turkey-Syria Relations Before and After Arab Uprisings Aylin Ünver Noi and Salam Kawakibi Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 203 Arab Spring and Iran Aylin Ünver Noi and Hooshang Amirahmadi Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. 227 Contributors ............................................................................................. 229 Index ........................................................................................................ 233

FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 2-1. Conceptual Framework for Youth Civic Engagement Projects ................................................................................................ 39 Figure 2-2. Associations Found for the Political Voice Theory of Change ............................................................................................. 44 Figure 2-3. Associations Found for the Social Capital Theory of Change ............................................................................................. 46 Figure 2-4. Associations Found for the Propensity Towards Violence Theory of Change ................................................................................ 49 Figure 2-5. Associations Found for the Economic Engagement Theory of Change ............................................................................................. 53 Table 3-1. Global Religious Affiliation: 1970 and 2010 ........................... 71 Figure 3-1. Religious Restrictions in 198 Countries.................................. 81 Figure 3-2. The Violent Religious Persecution Cycle ............................... 83

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea for this book emerged during an international conference, entitled, “The Arab Spring: Getting It Right,” convened in Washington, DC in May 2012. I would like to thank the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) and the co-sponsor of this conference the Georgetown University Democracy and Governance Program for organizing this international conference. This book is based on some of the proceedings of that conference. My special thanks go to Radwan Masmoudi, President of CSID, for his endorsement of this book. Some of the contributors to this book participated in the conference, and their conference papers were updated and revised according to changes that have since occurred in the region. Other contributors joined us in an effort to analyze and present additional perspectives, particularly comparative perspectives on the Arab Spring. My greatest thanks go to the contributors for their hard work on this book. Finally, I wish to express special thanks to our publishing editor for the careful attention given to the manuscript. I would also like to thank Carol Koulikourdi and Amanda Millar of Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Ltd., who provided support during the publishing process.

INTRODUCTION AYLøN ÜNVER NOI

Democracy, which is defined mostly with reference to the liberal democracies of Europe and the United States (Reis 2008, 6), protects freedom more than other systems of governing (Dahl 2010, 20, 64). Promotion of democracy and economic liberalization were determined as the main aims of both the US National Security Strategy (2002) and Europe’s Security Strategy (2003), and have been supported by both the European Union (EU) and the United States through several initiatives. Democracy promotion efforts by the EU and the United States concentrated on all institutions and processes but had little to do with the political reality of the respective country, where protection of freedom was often lacking (Asseburg 2012, 135). Their “prescription and deadline,” “top-down” and “wholesale import of western style democracy” approaches did not work, and dual standards implemented by the EU and the United States in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region damaged both their credibility and the image of the West in the eyes of Arabs. A Gallup survey conducted in 2008 revealed that “people of the MENA favor their own democratic model that incorporates Sharia instead of a wholesale adoption of a western model of democracy” (Reis 2008, 10). Another survey, the Zogby Poll’s Six Arab Nation Survey to the World Economic Forum and Arab Business Council of 2005 showed that, except for Lebanon, Sharia law is seen as one (not the only) source of legislation (Reis 2008, 10). These two transatlantic partners, which have had more or less similar projects with similar aims, such as promoting economic liberalization and democracy in the MENA, at the same time supported authoritarian regimes by neglecting opposition groups and civil societies in these countries (Mignon 2012, 4). They did so in order to maintain the status quo for their own interests and out of concern for or fear that democracy in the MENA might bring to power extremist religious groups with antiWestern and anti-democratic agendas. This concern was voiced by US

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Introduction

President Barack Obama in a speech at Cairo University in 2009 in which he stated, “There are some who advocate for democracy only when they’re out of power; once in power, they are ruthless in suppressing the rights of others” (The White House 2009). Their policies of backing authoritarian regimes and supporting democracy at the same time not only failed to yield results in terms of democracy but also increased anti-Western sentiments in the region. Yet it should not be ignored that their projects helped in the creation of a sense of democracy awareness, along with other developments in the rest of the world, such as democratic transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. For instance, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) conferences held on the promotion of democracy managed to draw attention to the issue of democratic transition in the region. These conferences also attracted wide participation on the part of civil society forces in the processes and dynamics they created around them and provided an additional framework to strengthen relations and increase coordination (No Peace Without Justice 2007). The wave of democratization that swept about the world from region to region in the 1970s and 1980s reached the MENA in 2011, twenty years later than had been foreseen by Huntington (1991, 315). Developments in information technologies made the spread of this awareness possible and fast all around the world. When the economic and financial crisis of 2008 showed its effects on the MENA, this awareness was raised in the MENA and led to uprisings that later covered the entire region. “Arab Spring” ignited when Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor who was a university graduate, set himself on fire to protest local authorities in Tunisia on December 17, 2010. His act epitomized the desperation among the youth in this region. When Bouazizi actually set himself on fire, he symbolically lit the fire of revolution among Arabs who shared a similar sense of frustration and powerlessness along with their demands for jobs, better living conditions, fundamental freedoms, human rights and democracy. Bouazizi thus became a catalyst of popular protests. The protestors of Arab Spring demanded democracy because they believed that the existing governments and their regimes were unable to give them what they deserved: a better life. Autocracy was a prevalent political regime in most of the MENA. Repression, limitation of opposition,

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and lack of basic rights and freedoms were major characteristics of these autocratic regimes (Nas 2007, 428). Freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, separation of powers and judicial independence were not sufficiently implemented in most countries in the region. The executive branch dominated the legislature and judiciary (Neugart 2005). Briefly, the people of these countries have suffered from a lack of democracy and transparency, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment, inequality and injustice. The political systems of the countries of the Arab world have been affected by these uprisings due to their potential to spread. As a reaction to protests and as pre-emptive action against possible uprisings, some of these MENA countries took steps. For example, the government has changed in Jordan; the state of emergency has been lifted in Algeria; and the Constitution has been amended in Morocco (Völkel 2012). Arab uprisings, which brought down Tunisian President Zine elAbidine Ben Ali on Janaury 14, 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, Libyan President Muammer Gaddafi on August 23, 2011, and Yemen’s President Ali Abdallah Saleh on November 23, 2011, still have potential to change remaining dictatorships in the region and make possible democratic elections in some of these countries. The electoral successes of Islamist parties in the MENA in the wake of the Arab Spring have been welcomed by their Islamist proponents that were under pressure of their former regimes. However, their successes have been met with concerns and fears by secularists and religious minorities of these countries. Opponents of the Islamists fear that Islamists have a hidden agenda that hides their true intentions. The question of whether this Arab Islamic awakening takes a step forward or backward for human rights and democracy came to the agenda because of the possibility of marginalization of those rights by fundamentalist religious political parties or groups. Many conflicts arise from mutual ignorance, the resulting stereotypes and ultimately rejection. Religious extremism that encourages intolerance, prejudice and violence poses a threat to a democratic society. Thus, democracy and religion need to be compatible. Democracy has proven to be the best framework for freedom of conscience, the exercise of faith and religious pluralism, while religion through its moral and ethical commitment, the values it upholds, its critical approach and its cultural expression, can be a valid partner of democratic society (Council of Europe 1999).

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Introduction

This book explores relations between Islam and democracy in the postArab Spring era by focusing on the roles of newly established and democratically elected Islamist governments and their political, economic and constitutional programs; religious freedoms; relations between their security sector and the governments; and regional alignments based on sectarian differences. This book also aims to analyze changes in the MENA in the aftermath of the Arab Spring by giving a brief history of developments in order to enable the reader to make comparisons. Several chapters discuss the types of challenges that these countries have faced, and continue to face, during their democratic transitions. These include security sector reform; post-revolutionary economies; the role of youth in these uprisings; the effects on regional alignments; and the effects of new regional alignments on these democratic transitions. These topics are discussed from the perspectives of various disciplines, including program evaluation and outcomes research, sociology of religion, Arab studies, economics, security studies, diplomacy, and international relations, as well as from the perspectives of political and human rights activists. They are presented in four parts: regional perspectives, religious perspectives; country perspectives; and comparative perspectives. Together, they offer readers a more complete overview of the complex and interrelated aspects of the Arab Spring and the roles of Islam and democracy in these ongoing developments. In Part I, Chapters One and Two are devoted to regional perspectives on the significance of the Arab Spring for regional alignments and the role of youth. Changing foreign policy approaches of countries in the MENA and reshaping of regional alignments are evaluated, along with the role of youth activists who took an active part in the Arab Spring and became the major actors in the revolutions in the region. In Chapter One, Ünver Noi compares and evaluates regional alignments before and after Arab Spring by focusing on the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world and its ambitions to be a regional power. In this respect, the Arab Spring and its effects on Turkey’s foreign policy approach of “zero problems with its neighbors” is analyzed, along with the possibility of new regional alignments emerging under a Turkish model, referred to as the “Sunni Resistance Camp.” The features of a new regional alignment are given by comparing this model with the two existing regional alignments in the MENA: namely, the Iran-led regional alignment—the Shiite Resistance Camp—and the Saudi-led regional alignment—the Pro-Western Camp. The states that take part in these

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regional alignments are analyzed with respect to their foreign policy approaches and their position in these camps along with the contextual bases that shape their foreign policy approaches and regional alignments. Chapter Two focuses on the youth who have been at the heart of the Arab Spring through their involvement in the protests and demonstrations. Their frustration with existing institutions and norms, which denied them economic and social opportunities and a political voice, led to their participation in the Arab revolts. Kurtz and Gómez present a study by Mercy Corps that examined the degree to which civic engagement of Arab youth is linked to political actions, social capital, propensity for political violence, and their employability in the MENA region. In analyzing the relations, they find links between civic engagement and political activity and between propensities for violence and lack of economic opportunities. They conclude with a discussion of how the recent surge of self-assertion and political activism by Arab youth can be harnessed to promote more participatory governance and equitable development within the region. In Part II, Chapters Three and Four are devoted to religious perspectives on the Arab Spring. In Chapter Three, Grim presents an overview of restrictions on religion throughout the world and specifically in the MENA as part of the context of the Arab Spring and its aftermath. Until the 2009 report of the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, Global Restrictions on Religion, and its 2011 report, Rising Restrictions on Religion, no quantitative study had been undertaken to examine how governments and private actors infringe on religious beliefs and practices around the world. Based upon the findings of these studies, Grim points out that there are many restrictions on religious practices throughout the MENA that affect not only Jews and Christians but also Muslims. Although restrictions on religion may not have directly caused the unrest, it is clear that changes in religious restrictions are a part of the larger social and political forces shaping the MENA today. In finding that government hostility to religious minorities in the MENA is far above the world average, he emphasizes the importance of constitutional protections for religious freedoms and the significant role of anti-blasphemy and defamation laws, which play a role in perpetuating religious discrimination. Finally, he asks whether such laws will remain in place or whether the changes sweeping the region will change these laws as well. With respect to this changing context, the electoral successes of Islamic political parties after the Arab Spring have raised concerns among

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Introduction

religious minorities and secularists living in the MENA. In Chapter Four, Warren and Gilmore outline the position of “Islamic Centrists” with specific reference to their notions of citizenship and compatriotism in relation to Muslims and Christians in Egypt. They focus on the role and political discourse of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is popularly described as the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Spiritual Guide” or the “Egyptian Khomeini,” and its implications for a civil state. They discuss the position of nonMuslims in Muslim society in the wake of the Arab Spring, particularly focusing on the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. They emphasize the main contribution of al-Qaradawi to the field, which is conceptualization of the states of Muslim minorities living in the West as being parallel to the state of non-Muslim minorities living in the Muslim world. This conceptualization leads to a strong justification for the protection of religious minorities’ rights and their equal citizenship. They also find parallels between his theories of a civil state and his understanding of the philosophy of liberal secularism, suggesting that there is perhaps far more common ground among Islamists and secularists in discussions surrounding the nature of the state than is commonly believed. In Part III, Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight are devoted to the challenges faced by affected countries in the wake of the Arab Spring. Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Syria were selected to analyze their postrevolutionary era reforms. In Chapter Five, Rau analyzes Tunisia’s post-revolutionary period by focusing on Tunisia’s economy after the departure of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Rau compares the pre-revolution and postrevolution periods of Tunisia’s economy and lays out a number of suggestions for the recovery of Tunisia’s economy, ranging from regional investments by state and foreign governments to tourism and improved labor relations. He concludes by noting that the transition to democracy has had economic costs for Tunisia. The country is in the midst of recession mainly due to its revolution, rather than the global economic crisis; yet the revolution will greatly aid Tunisia’s economy in the long run. In Chapter Six, Marovic analyzes security sector reform (SSR) in Egypt by focusing on the post-Mubarak era and the military takeover during the transition process. She notes that the army in Egypt has maintained a position of political influence, which stems from its role in the formation of the modern Egyptian state. After former President Hosni

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Mubarak stepped down in February 2011, the Egyptian army again assumed a leading role in the politics of Egypt by suppressing uprisings and through the formation of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) for the democratic transition of Egypt. Marovic discusses the concept of security sector reform and the threats to democratization in Egypt based on political power yielded by the army. She claims that defining a new role for the army in the changed political landscape will be a major challenge for the establishment of a new political system in Egypt. In this connection, she offers recommendations to political actors and civil society in Egypt, as well as to actors in the international community, on how to approach the reform of Egypt’s security sector. In Chapter Seven, Haddam describes how Algeria experienced an earlier “Arab Spring” in 1988, known as Black October, with the victory of the Islamic Front for Salvation (FIS) in 1990. This earlier Arab Spring was aborted when free elections were cancelled, the FIS was banned, and its members arrested. These developments led to an armed campaign against the government, which turned into a bloody civil war in 1991. Although the Algerian government in the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011 took certain steps, Haddam criticizes the political reforms proposed by Algeria’s President on April 14, 2011. As a founding member of the Movement for Liberty & Social Justice (MLJS), and a former elected representative to the Algerian Parliament in 1991, Haddam presents the MLJS’s Platform of more extensive reforms advocated by Islamic political activists in Algeria. Echoing the challenges of security sector reform in Egypt discussed by Marcovic, Haddam emphasizes that civilian-military relations constitute the main obstacle facing a democratic change in Algeria. He also addresses the need for democratic reform of intelligence agencies in Algeria. Finally, he examines the prospects for change in Algeria’s political system, which may open for the country and the region. In Chapter Eight, Serwer looks forward to post-war democratic transition in Syria. When the Arab Spring reached Syria on March 15, 2011, nobody was expecting the contestation to last long. Support of the Assad regime by Russia and Iran and the opposition’s internal divisions— ideological, ethnic and sectarian—made the regime survive longer than that of Tunisia or Egypt. The messy military intervention in Libya, the participation of extremists in the Syrian rebellion, the lack of international

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Introduction

community consensus and the potential for spillover have made the Western powers hesitant to intervene militarily. Serwer argues that post-Assad Syria is going to require a massive and complex effort to achieve anything like a democratic state. His starting point is the National Covenant for a New Syria, laid out by the Syrian National Council. In analyzing issues that are likely to arise in a transition to democracy in Syria, he addresses five interrelated endpoints for achieving a democratic state: a safe and secure environment; rule of law; stable governance; a sustainable economy; and social well-being. Serwer concludes that, even with international support, Syrians must lead the way for a successful transition, which will be difficult to achieve. In Part IV, Chapters Nine and Ten are devoted to comparative perspectives on the Arab Spring, including a historical comparison of Turkey-Syria relations before and after the Arab Spring, and a crossnational comparison of the 2011 Arab uprisings with the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. Chapter Nine compares Turkey-Syria relations before and after the Arab Spring in the context of changing relationships between the two countries. Ünver Noi and Kawakibi commence with a discussion of the historical background and problematic areas between Syria and Turkey. Next, they trace changes in Turkey-Syria relations based on the changing international environment, which led to rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. Finally, in comparing Turkey-Syria relations before and after the Arab Spring, and their respective policies toward opposition parties, they attempt to discover whether it is possible to re-implement approaches based on theories of neo-functionalism and transactionalism to improve Turkey-Syria relations in the post-Assad era. In Chapter Ten, Ünver Noi and Amirahmadi compare the Arab revolts with the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In view of statements by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who describes the uprisings in the Arab world as an “Islamic awakening” that was inspired by the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s statements that the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia were inspired by Iran’s defiance against Western powers (The National 2011), the authors focus on pre-revolution and post-revolution eras to examine whether the Arab revolutions are similar to, or inspired by, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, or

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whether each of these recent uprisings has had its own dynamics, paths and outcomes. While there may be consensus about the outbreak of Arab Spring on the streets of Tunisia in December 2010, the contributors use a range of terms to discuss the sources, significance, and consequences of the protests and political upheaval across the MENA region. According to Haddam, Arab Spring is both a mindset and a tool for political change based on a concept of citizenship and human rights: “. . . the Arab Spring should be used to promote the right to a stable and inclusive governing system in the region.” Amirahmadi, Kawakibi and Ünver Noi use Arab Spring or Arab Uprisings to discuss the causes and consequences of political upheavals in the MENA region. Kurtz and Gómez use Arab Awakening in discussing programmatic approaches to youth civic engagement in the region, while Warren and Gilmore refer to Arab Revolutions of 2011 to discuss the intellectual foundations of an emerging Islamic political discourse. Finally, Rau, Marovic and Serwer use the terms recovery, reform and transition to address the challenges in the aftermath of political upheaval, whether in Tunisia, Egypt, or Syria. Together, we have attempted to offer our readers a broadly informed overview of the sources and ongoing challenges of the Arab Spring. The uncertainties that surround the outcomes of political upheaval in the MENA region make it difficult to unify the perspectives presented in this volume. In this dynamic situation, the significance of the Arab Spring will be decided at the interface between democracy and Islam in the changing context of politics, economics, law, religion and culture in the region.

References Asseburg, Muriel. 2012. Coordinating the Transatlantic Response to the Arab Uprisings: An Agenda for Sustainable Development. In Rethinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprisings, eds. Riccardo Alcaro and Miguel Haubrich-Seco, 135. Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura. Council of Europe. 1999. Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1396, Religion and Democracy. Strasbourg. Dahl, Robert. 2010. Demokrasi Üzerine [On Democracy]. Ankara: Phoenix. European Security Strategy. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World. December 12, 2003. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed April 12, 2009).

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Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Mignon, Jean-Claude. 2012. Conclusions of the President of the Parliamentary Assembly. European Conference of Presidents of Parliament, Strasbourg, September 20-21, 2012. Nas, Çi÷dem. 2007. Intercultural Dialogue: Turkey as a Facilitator. In Intercultural Dialogue and Citizenship: Translating Values into Actions A Common Project for Europeans and their Partners, eds. L. Bekemans, M. Karasinska-Fendler, M. Mascia, A. Papisca, C. A. Stephanou and P. G. Xuereb, 423-38. Venice: Marsilio Editori. Neugart, F. 2005. Uncertain Prospects of Transformation: The Middle East and North Africa. Strategic Insights IV, no. 12 (December). http://www.ccc.nps .navy.mil/si/2005/Dec/neugartDec 05.asp (accessed June 6, 2008). No Peace Without Justice. 2007. Roundtables on Civil Society Organisations’ Strategic Planning for Democratic Reform. June 17-19, 2007. http://www.npwj.org/No+Peace+Without+Justice/MENA+Demo cracy/History+of+the+Program/Amman+Roundtables+2007 (accessed January 15, 2009). Reis, B. C. 2008. Political Change in the Mediterranean–Impact on EuroMediterranean Relations. EuroMeSCo Paper, no. 70 (June). The National. 2011. “Invoking the Arab Spring, Iran Rewrites its Own History,” April 6, 2011. http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/ invokingthe-arab-spring-iran-rewrites-its-own-history (accessed August 16, 2012). Völkel, Jan. 2012. The BTI 2012: Looking Back on the Arab Spring-An Interpretation of Recent Political Developments. In The Arab Spring: One Year-After Transformation Dynamics, Prospects for Democratization and the Future of Arab-European Cooperation, eds. Armando Garcia Schmidt and Hauke Hatmann, 13-37. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. The White House. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ (accessed April 10, 2008) —. 2009. Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt. June 4, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-Presidentat-Cairo-University-6-04-09/ (accessed June 13, 2009).

PART I: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER ONE ARAB SPRING AND ITS EFFECTS ON REGIONAL ALIGNMENTS AYLøN ÜNVER NOI

Abstract The Arab Spring has changed not only autocratic regimes in the North Africa and Middle East, but also their foreign policies and regional alignments. In the wake of the Arab Spring, can we still say that the ideology and actors in the “New Arab Cold War,” which resurfaced with the Lebanon War of 2006, still prevail and maintain their existing positions? For instance, is Egypt still in the pro-Western camp? Or is it on its way to establish its own regional alignment? Since the departure of former President Hosni Mubarak, a visible shift from Mubarak’s antiHamas policy to a pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli stance has been observed. This change has also affected Egypt’s relations with its proWestern ally, Saudi Arabia. Other countries of the region that have been affected by Arab uprisings, or have the potential to be, have also made amendments to their foreign policy approaches and their regional alignments as a result of the Arab Spring. This chapter analyzes these changes by examining the two major regional alignments before the Arab Spring—namely, the Iran-led regional alignment, the “Resistance Camp,” comprised of Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Qatar; and the Saudi Arabialed regional alignment, the “Pro-Western Camp,” comprised of Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states—and the effects of the Arab Spring on emerging regional alignments. It focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy approach to the region since 2002, and its role in the emerging regional alignments.

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Regional Alignments in the Middle East before the Arab Spring The term “Arab Cold War” was introduced by Malcolm Kerr in 1971 to describe the inter-Arab rivalry between two regional alignments: the pro-Western monarchies of the time—Jordan and Saudi Arabia—and pre1958 Iraq; and the Arab-nationalist, revolutionary socialist states of the time—Egypt and Syria—and Iraq after 1958. Since then, the actors and ideologies of this Arab Cold War have changed according to changes in the international environment and the parameters of the Middle East.1 The latest form of the Arab Cold War resurfaced as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, as part of the G. W. Bush administration’s “unilateral” and “pre-emptive war” approach to US foreign policy, and was exacerbated by the 2006 Lebanon War (the Israeli-Hezbollah War). It resurfaced because of conflict between two more recent regional alignments: the Iran-led regional alignment, which is comprised of states that are unwilling to legitimize US hegemony over the region; and the Saudi-led regional alignment, which is comprised of states that are willing to work in various forms of strategic partnership with the United States, including those that have made peace with Israel since the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. So, this “New Arab Cold War,” or new regional rivalry, set the traditional allies of the United States in this region—that is, the Saudi-led regional alignment, also called “the proWestern Camp,” which includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the rest of the Gulf states—against the anti-American and anti-Israeli, Iran-led regional alignment, also called “the Resistance Camp,” which includes Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Qatar (Syria Comment, 2009). The Arab Cold War of 1950s and 1960s, which ended with a military defeat of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six Days War of 1967, not only brought detente to the Arab Cold War but also ended pan-Arabism (Valbjorn and Bank 2007, 242). Developments such as insufficient support 1

The prevailing idea of pan-Arabism had been based on anti-colonialism and revolutionary socialism. Hostility to Western influence was the major companion of pan-Arabism until 1958. According to Kerr, “Gamal Abd al-Nasir and the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba’th) Party believed in the imperative need for removal of all vestiges of foreign control in the Arab world and in Arab foreign policy of nonalignment between the Great Powers, in comprehensive Arab unity, and in social, political, and economic reconstruction under the stimulus of state action” (Kerr 1971, 1-6).

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of the USSR during the Yom Kippur War (1973) led to Egypt’s return to a pro-Western course. Egypt, which made a peace agreement with Israel in 1978, became part of pro-Western alliance in the region (Lundestad 1999, 101-2). Some form of Arab Cold War has remained, although the actors and ideologies have changed. Egypt’s temporary exclusion after making peace with Israel at Camp David in 1978 can be explained within this framework (Phillips 2009). Since 1979, Iran’s foreign policy, which is based on exporting the Islamic revolution and its ideology to other Muslim countries of the region, led to deterioration of Iran’s relations with Muslim countries ruled by monarchies since the Islamic Revolution ended monarchy in Iran. In addition, the Islamic government’s support for Shiites in the Middle East posed a threat for Muslim countries that have Shiite minorities (Beehner 2006). Moreover, Iran’s aspirations to regional hegemony posed a threat to Saudi Arabia in the post-Revolutionary era (Carmon et al. 2009). The disintegration of an alliance between Iran and the United States deepened the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Saudi government became a partner of the United States in its worldwide campaign against radical and leftist governments and movements. The Saudi’s gave financial support to a wide range of pro-Western or antiSoviet governments and movements. The religious ideology projected through Saudi foreign policy enabled the regime to mobilize its population against external threats. The projection of an Islamic role also enabled the Saudi government to advance claims to leadership in the Arab and Muslim world (Niblock 2006, 144-45), which led to rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Several factors have driven this rivalry or enmity between Arabs and Persians: First, ethnic and sectarian differences and cultural competition; second, geographic, demographic and resource disparities; third, competing nationalism and territorial disputes; fourth, ideological differences and diverging pattern of alliances; fifth, competing power ambitions; sixth, Iran’s Intra-Arab politics; seventh, the Israeli-Palestinian factor; and eighth, the post-Soviet international order and its impact on Arab-Iranian relations (Hunter 2010, 185-90). In the Post-Revolutionary era, this rivalry and enmity was furthered because of the Revolution’s feature that is targeting to export its values and Islamic regime to the all Muslim countries of the region.

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Saudi-Iranian enmity, which has historical roots, declined during the presidency of Rafsanjani and Khatami. During Khatami’s presidency, Iran strove to rejoin the international community by relaxing its efforts to export the revolution and by seeking to reconcile with its neighbors in the Gulf (Carmon et al. 2009). Iran’s foreign policy during the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidency has been a mixture of both Islamist ideology and ultranationalism. Iran’s nationalistic aims to emerge as the preeminent power of the region were complemented by its Islamist outlook that identified with Palestinian and Arab opposition forces struggling against both the United States and Israel (Takeyh 2009, 237). Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy, based on a more aggressive tone toward Israel and a more uncompromising stand on the Palestinian conflict, adversely affected Iranian-Gulf relations (Hunter 2010, 199). Iran’s support for Shiites also strained Iran-Arab relations because this policy has increased Iran’s influence on Arab countries that have Shiite populations. The rising influence of Iran over these populations led to concerns among several Arab leaders2 because “most of the Shiites in this region are loyal to Iran, and not to the countries they are living in” (Rubin 2006). The strained relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors deteriorated further over Iran’s nuclear issue owing to its potential to disrupt the existing balance of power in the Middle East by creating a strategic disequilibrium in the region (Beehner 2006). Nonetheless, several developments in the region have gradually increased the popularity of Iran and its leaders in the Middle East: First, secular ideologies of pan-Arabism, socialism and Marxism of the Cold War period were gradually abandoned by the intellectual class throughout the Middle East. Second, economic problems, political autocracy, and foreign policy humiliation led to a religious resurgence in the region. Iran’s foreign policy, which was based on defying the West and its monarchical surrogate and offering a path to salvation, appealed to Arabs (Takeyh 2009, 21). Ahmadinejad’s anti-imperialist, anti-Western discourse, his stand on the Palestinian issue, and his resistance during the 2 For example, Iran supported a plot to overthrow the Bahrain Government in 1981. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini expressed support for Shiites who bombed Western embassies in Kuwait in 1983. Iranian pilgrims rioted during the hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Iranian officials were involved in both training and assisting Saudi Hezbollah operatives in executing the 1996 terrorist bombing of the US military housing facility at Khobar Towers near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (Beehner 2006).

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Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006 all made him more popular among Arabs than among his own people, although Iran’s foreign policies toward the Middle East were viewed by the Gulf and other Arab states as part of a plan to dominate the Arab world (Hunter 2010, 200). When Ahmadinajead came to power in 2005 with an agenda that included exporting the revolution and re-establishing the great Persian Empire, the conflict re-emerged between the two regional alignments. Iran’s efforts to extend its influence into the Arab world by creating a “Shiite Crescent” in the very heart of the Sunni world escalated this rivalry (Carmon et al. 2009). After the Lebanon War of 2006, Egyptian Foreign Minister Al-Gheit said that Iran was trying to spread and impose its ideology over the region. He also accused Iran of “trying to use its Arab cards to realize interests and goals that are not [held by] Arabs.” In this regard, he declared, “It is necessary to ensure that Iran does not become a nuclear military power” (Carmon et al. 2009). In this rivalry, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Qatar were part of the Iran-led regional alignment, whereas Egypt, Jordan and other Gulf states were part of the Saudi-led regional alignment. Sunni countries and forces, such as Syria, Qatar, and Hamas, have had various motivations in joining the axis of Shiite Iran. Syria, whose standing in the Arab world is at odds with its self-perception as the cradle of Arab civilization and of pan-Arab ideology, has seen the Iranian axis as a framework for enhancing its regional status. In addition, it was probably motivated by considerations of political survival. Faced with the danger of conviction by the international tribunal for the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister al-Hariri, Syria hoped that its alliance with Iran would provide it with some backing against this tribunal. Hamas, which had few friends in the Arab world, received increasing support from Iran. Qatar also aligned itself with the Iran-led regional alignment and played a crucial role in the Resistance Camp by initiating the 2009 Doha Summit, to the dismay of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Qatar invited Ahmadinejad to the Summit against the will of several Arab Countries; it also called on Egypt to revoke its peace agreement with Israel, and on Saudi Arabia to withdraw its initiative for peace with Israel (Carmon et al. 2009).

Turkey’s Role in Emerging Regional Alignments Discussions of Turkey’s place in these regional alignments emerged when Justice and Development Party (AKP) abandoned Turkey’s non-

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actor status in the Middle East in 2002. Turkey’s new approach, based on a policy of “zero problems with its neighbors,” helped Turkey to normalize and then improve its relations with Syria, Iran and Iraq (Fuller 2010, 166). Normalization and improvement of Turkey’s relationships with Syria, Iran and Hamas coincided with deterioration of its relations with Israel, which began with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an’s heated exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos over Turkey’s support of the Palestinians following the 2008 Gaza War. It continued with “low chair crisis” and reached its highest point with Israel’s raid on the Gaza flotilla. These dynamics led to the perception that Turkey had joined the Iran-led regional alignment, or the Resistance Camp. The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Arab world for nearly four centuries, was an Islamic state (Kinross 1977, 613). Arab revolts embraced Arab nationalism and, with British support, defeated the Ottoman Empire (Fuller 2010, 21). Kemal Ataturk, founder of Republic of Turkey, transformed post-Ottoman Turkey into a Westernized nation-state, which was built on the principles of liberal and constitutional change born of the Tanzimat by adding secularism to it instead of being built on Islamic principles (Kinross 1977, 621). This newly established state turned its face to the West, while rejecting the backward and repressive nature of its Islamic past. Westernization was generally perceived as a form of modernization and self-strengthening, not as a form of cultural emulation (Fuller 2010, 14-15). This perception shaped Turkey’s foreign policy approach during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, although some steps were taken to improve strained Turkish-Arab relations in the 1980s and in 1996-1997. At various times, Arabs have perceived certain powers to be a threat against Arabs: Western imperialism in the 1950s, Israel in the 1960s and 1970s, and Iran in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the threat perception of Arabs had a possibility to turn toward Turkey. The Arab Summit of 1996 provided examples of this trend, although Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister, Erbakan, who was in power in 1996-97, attempted to further Turkey’s relations with Arabs (Davuto÷lu 2010, 412-14). Several factors raised tensions between Arabs and Turks during the Cold War and post-Cold War period: first, the Turkish alliance with the West against Soviet expansionist policies at a time when newly emerging Middle East countries might join the Soviet alliance; second, being one of

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the first countries that recognized Israel; third, Turkey’s attitude toward the Suez Channel crisis; fourth, the establishment of Baghdat Pact; fifth, tensions with Syria; sixth, Turkey’s strategic partnership with the West and its policies were parallel with those of the West at a time when Arabs were engaging in anti-imperialist discourses and struggles; seventh, the end of the Iran-Iraq War; eighth, Turkey’s support of the Gulf War by permitting use of the Incirlik airbase by the US Air Force and its closing of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline; and ninth, the Middle East Peace Process, which kept Turkey outside the process and Turkey’s improved relations with Israel (Davuto÷lu 2010, 410-14). However, since 2002, AKP, which has Islamic roots, has shifted Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Arab and Islamic world, while still maintaining its ties with the West (Bar 2006, 2). Turkey aims to have an independent foreign policy and a deepening of relations with all states, which makes for some shifts from its earlier Washington-centric and the Europe-centric policies (Davuto÷lu 2010, 550; Fuller 2010, 168). The reluctance of the EU to accept Turkey as a full member to the club has led not only to nationalistic views and skepticism among Turkish people and these kinds of discourses in the Turkish parliament but also led to debates on “axis change” in Turkish foreign policy (USAK 2009). With its policy based on “zero problems with its neighbors,” Turkey has sought to be a role model for the conflicting parties in the Middle East, and has begun to play a mediating role in solving crises in the region (Perthes 2010, 8). Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto÷lu’s “Strategic Depth” extends Turkey’s ties and interests into Asia, Africa and the West. He sees democratization and modernization as key instruments to liberate and empower the peoples of these regions. He also emphasizes the vital importance of a Turkish role in the Arab world (Fuller 2010, 169). With its new foreign policy orientation, Turkey has begun to demonstrate its new interests and concerns for the region and its peoples. Thus, under the AKP, an active Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East has made Turkey an important regional actor (Rabasa and Larabee 2008, 85). Turkey is trying to play constructive role and wants to use “soft power” ways to do so. Several factors have contributed to making Turkey a “force of attraction,” including Turkish soap operas that portray aspects of Turkish life in a very attractive way. These television serials have increased tourist flow from the Arab world to Turkey, which has led to greater cultural interaction between Arabs and Turks. These interactions may also have a positive impact on Arab perceptions of Turks. In addition,

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an “apolitical” Islamic movement has established schools and built business networks in this region. Both Turkish soap operas and Islamic schools serve Turkey’s cultural infiltration in the Arab world. In addition to these movements, which have a considerable effect on the Arab public perception of Turkey and on Turkey’s image, Turkey’s economic stature as one of the next tier of large emerging economies, known as MIST, and its success in combining Islam and democracy make it a force of attraction for other countries of the region.3 Strained TurkeyIsrael relations during the AKP government made Turkish Prime Minister Erdo÷an both the most admired world leader— having a rating of 20%, followed by Chavez with 13%, Iranian President Ahmadinejad with 12%, and Nasrallah with 9%—and the second most admired world leader in the Arab world with a rating of 19% (2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll). According to a 2010 Arab Public Opinion poll, the new active Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East has made Turkey the second highest rated (21%) country, after France (30%), for playing the most constructive role in the interest of the Middle East region (2010 Arab Public Opinion). Turkey’s increasing involvement in Middle East affairs—as a part of this policy effort to mediate between conflicting parties in the region and to export its “zero problems with its neighbors” foreign policy approach to the countries of the region, along with its efforts to increase interaction of the peoples of the region by removing visa requirements, establishing free trade areas, and so forth—has given political leverage to Turkey.4 Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria and Iran and its increasing involvement in Middle East affairs have also been described as an “axis shift.” Despite the view that Turkey is an emerging party in the Iran-led regional alignment, its increasing involvement in Middle East affairs is, at the same time, an indication of its intention to become a regional power. Such “neo-

3

The Goldman Sachs economist, Jim O’Neill, used the acronym BRIC for Brazil, Russia, India and China to describe these emerging major economies, which would overtake developed states like Germany, Britain, France by 2050. O’Neill came up with a new acronym–MIST—for Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey to describe them as the next tier of large emerging economies (Guardian.co.uk 2010). 4 Ankara’s multifarious endeavors include supporting activities to help stabilize Iraq; offering Turkish facilitation in opening the dialogue between Washington and Tehran; mediating in an effort to repair Syria’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other; and nudging the warring Palestinian factions towards reconciliation (Torbakov and Ojanen 2009, 6).

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Ottoman” ambitions hinder it from becoming a part of the Resistance Camp under the patronage of Shiite Iran.

Arab Spring: Its Current and Possible Effects on Regional Alignments Arab Spring has changed not only autocratic regimes in the MENA, but also their foreign policies and regional alignments. The newly established governments, which have had a tendency to abandon their predecessors’ foreign policy approaches, indicate signals of new regional alignments. Divergences in reactions of regional states to these regime changes are also impacting the formation of new regional alignments in the MENA. The Arab uprisings that emerged in Tunisia with the “Jasmine Revolution” on January 5, 2011, and which spread rapidly to other countries of the region were unexpected, catching all concerned unprepared. Given these unexpected developments, and the previous relationships among the countries of this region, the reactions of countries to the changes in the countries faced with uprisings were inconsistent. For instance, in comparison with Turkey’s stance in support of change in Tunisia and Egypt, Turkey was much slower and reluctant to act in Libya, owing to its past investments in the country. Turkey has also preferred a cautious stance and has been silent on developments in Yemen (Stein 2011), whereas it supports a rapid regime change in Syria. Saudi Arabia’s reaction to the uprisings in the region has also been inconsistent. In the beginning of uprisings, the Saudi government acted as a counterrevolutionary due to the fear that these uprisings might hit the country and lead to the overthrow of the Saudi Monarch. In this context, it supported its allies in Egypt, Yemen and even took steps to halt democratic transition in Bahrain. Yet, when the uprisings spread in Syria, a major ally of Iran, Saudi Arabia changed its earlier counterrevolutionary position and strongly supported regime change in Syria. Iran, like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, has also had different reactions to the changes in the region. Uprisings in Egypt were described by Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as an “Islamic awakening” that was inspired by the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. However, Iran did not have the same reaction when the uprising spread to Syria. Regime changes and subsequent developments in the region that have led to changes in relations among Arab countries have also signaled the

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emergence of yet another regional alignment. This newest alignment may be called the “Sunni Resistance Camp.” It differs from both the Iran-led regional alignment, “the Shiite Resistance Camp,” and the Saudi-led regional alignment, “the pro-Western Camp.” In contrast to the proWestern Camp, both the emerging regional alignment—the Sunni Resistance Camp—and the Shiite Resistance Camp have anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian policies and favor an independent foreign policy; but the major difference between the two resistance camps is that the Sunni Resistance Camp is comprised of Sunni Islamists and democratically elected governments, as opposed to the Shiite Islamist state of Iran. Although Turkish Foreign Minister Davuto÷lu has stated, “Turkey is against all polarization, in the political sense of Iran-Arab tension or in the sense of forming an apparent axis,” Turkey is considered to be a role model of this emerging camp (jpost.com 2012). This view has been voiced by the Tunisian leader of Ennahda, Rashid Al-Ghannushi, during the election campaigns of 2011. He promised voters that if his party won, Tunisia could experience an economic boom like that of Turkey. He has also said that the Tunisian people consider the Turkish experience in democracy a model and an example for Tunisia’s postrevolution period (Today’s Zaman 2011a). Likewise, if the Assad government were to step down, Syria is likely to join this emerging alignment, as the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria favors the Turkish model. Hamas has already joined the alignment, because the victories of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia have led to the return of Hamas to its Arab friends. Since the AKP came to power in 2002, Turks have cultivated the panIslamic Muslim Brotherhood groups, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish businessmen, under “MUSIAD” (the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association), have provided financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Turkish charity “IHH” (the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief) has also networked extensively with Muslim Brotherhood representatives. In addition, the Arab Spring’s repercussions in Egypt and the fall of the Mubarak regime have provided opportunities for formerly restricted religious political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which won the largest share of seats in Egypt’s first freely-elected parliament. This development may create an environment in which Turkey could develop its relationship with Egypt (Aneja 2011). A 2012 Gallup survey showed that, although most Egyptians express skepticism toward external “models” and wholesale importation of any system, 11 percent of

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Egyptians cited Turkey as a political model for Egypt’s future government, whereas 22 percent of Egyptians saw Saudi Arabia as a model for Egypt’s political transition (Younis 2012). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood may play an important role in this newly emerging alignment. The Sunni Resistance Camp can be further differentiated from the Saudi-led regional alignment (the pro-Western Camp) in two important ways: First, the countries taking part in the Sunni Resistance Camp are neither monarchies nor dictatorships; they are democratically elected governments. Second, in favoring a much more independent foreign policy, the Sunni Resistance Camp differs from the Pro-Western Camp in its anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian stance, and it prefers cooperation with the West on economic and financial issues for the recovery of the post-Revolutionary economies (Ntvmsnbc 2012). Yet the same level of cooperation on political issues does not seem likely, particularly on Arab-Israeli issues. For instance, Egypt has opened its Rafah border with Gaza, which was closed during the Mubarak presidency, and an agreement was signed between Hamas and Al Fatah in Cairo (Ntvmsnbc 2011). After Mubarak stepped down, there were repeated attacks and disruptions on the Egyptian-Israeli natural gas pipeline, and the gas supply to Israel was suspended for several months. Egypt asked to renegotiate the terms of the natural gas deal between Egypt and Israel, before finally cancelling the deal with Israel (EconomyWatch 2011). Other important events—such as the attack on Israel’s Embassy in Cairo; the Egyptian Parliament’s decision to deport the Israeli Ambassador to Egypt; withdrawal of the Egyptian Ambassador from Tel Aviv; and a statement calling Israel an enemy of Egypt—have deteriorated the relationship between Egypt and Israel (Greenberg 2012). In this connection, the political victory of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has the potential to end or destabilize the Saudi-led regional alignment (the Pro-Western Camp) between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. For this reason, Saudi Arabia has been providing financial support to the Salafis in Egypt to counterbalance the Sufi Muslim Brotherhood. Salafis, which support implementation of Islamic law without interpreting it, see the Sufis as anathema and idolatrous. In this context, one should not ignore the rise of the Salafis in Egypt, who are supported by Saudis, and have some potential to lead a shift from the Sunni Resistance Camp to a

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more radicalized version of their own alignment, which might have some cooperation with the Saudi-led regional alignment. Egypt’s new policies in the post-Mubarak era – allowing Iranian warships to transit through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea for the first time since 1979- and deterioration of Egypt’s relationship with Saudi Arabia due to Saudi Arabia’s pro-Mubarak stance melded ices between Egypt and Iran and signaled a new relationship (BBC News, 2011). Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s participation in the 16th Non-Aligned Movements (NAM) summit, which was held in Tehran from August 26 to 31, 2012, and his words on “Syria” and failing to meet with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during his visit to Tehran showed the limits of emerging relationship between Egypt and Iran (The Daily Star, 2012). Egypt’s first official visit to Saudi Arabia also may lead to an interpretation of Egypt seeks a new regional role in the region (Al Arabiya News, 2012). In the post-Revolutionary era, a visible shift in Egypt’s foreign policy from an anti-Hamas stance to an anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian stance has occurred. If the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan makes a concession to its Muslim Brotherhood, which has the potential to end Jordanian-Israeli peace, it is possible also to see Jordan in the Sunni Resistance Camp. The Jordanian Parliament took steps to prevent realization of this scenario by voting to ban the establishment of any political party on a “religious basis.” With this act, they aimed to disqualify the Islamist Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party and Jordan’s largest political party, from taking part in the upcoming elections in Jordan (Hareetz.com 2012). In the Iran-led regional alignment (the Shiite Resistance Camp), rapprochement has taken place between Iran and Iraq as a result of the Iraqi War. This war took power away from the Sunni Arab community in Iraq, allowing Shiite and Kurdish states to emerge in the country. These developments in Iraq in the post-Saddam era have strengthened Shiites in Iraq and increased Iran’s influence over Iraq. This has affected relations between Iraq and Syria, as well. For instance, Syria, under Iranian pressure, supported Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to a second term and increased Syrian investment in Iraq. Maliki, under Iranian pressure, has also supported Assad regime. Two factors have contributed to this rapprochement between Syria and Iraq: first, fear of a regime change in Damascus and its possible effects on Sunni opponents of the Shiite Maliki

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government of Iraq; and second, Syria’s need for an economic partner, such as Iraq, to lessen the effects of Arab and EU sanctions against Syria (Syria-Today 2012). Recent developments, such as Tehran’s offer to hold a second round of nuclear talk with the P5+1 in Baghdad, show that rapprochement between Iran and Iraq is deepening. From this perspective, Iraq has the potential to fill the vacuum that may emerge if Assad were to fall by joining the Iranled regional alignment (the Shiite Resistance Camp). The same situation is valid for Bahrain. Since the beginning of uprisings in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries have accused Iran of interfering with Bahrain’s internal affairs by trying to stir Shiite unrest there. In response, one of the leading clerics of Iran, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, accused Saudi Arabia of having committed “savage crimes” against the people of Bahrain and demanded that Saudi Arabia withdraw its forces from Bahrain (Haaretz.com 2011). In short, the uprisings in Bahrain have escalated existing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If Shiites come to power in Bahrain, the vacuum that emerged when Qatar abandoned the Iran-led regional alignment (Shiite Resistance Camp) and joined the Saudi-led regional alignment (the ProWestern Camp) is likely to be filled by Bahrain. Qatar, which held a place in the Iran-led regional alignment, seems no longer to be a member of this regional alignment in the wake of the Arab Spring. An interesting shift in Qatar-Israeli relations commenced with secret meetings between Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar al-Thani and his Israeli counterpart, Prime Minister Netanyahu, in London on May 8, 2011. Qatar offered to supply liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Israel.5 Qatar-Syrian relations are another indicator of Qatar’s shift away from its alignment with the Iran-led Shiite Resistance Camp. Qatar has played an influential role in events in Syria. Syria’s Permanent Representative to the Arab League, Ambassador Ahmad Youssef, expressed the strained relations between the two countries in the following terms: “There are substantial reasons and considerations related to the biased and negative role played by Qatar both in terms of politics and media (Al Jazeera) towards the events in Syria which constitute escalation and instigation 5

Natural gas was formerly supplied by Egypt, but disrupted after the Arab Spring.

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against Syria” (cnsnews.com 2011). He concluded his remarks by expressing Syria’s reservation on the Arab League’s resolution, including its wording and particularly naming Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister as head of the Arab Ministerial Committee to oversee the process. Qatar also called for Arab countries to send troops to Syria (USA Today 2012), while the Syrian regime blames rebel groups working with Saudi Arabia and Qatar (The Telegraph 2012). Yemen is another country that illustrates the regional rivalry between Iran-led Shiite Resistance Camp and Saudi-led Pro-Western Camp in the region. Before the Arab Spring, the government of Yemen, along with Turkey and Italy, was one of the co-sponsors of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), which was part of the US-led Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative (BMENA). The capital city of Yemen, Sana’a, hosted several BMENA conferences aimed at promoting democracy. These activities were organized under the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdallah Saleh. Arab uprisings reached Yemen with Yemeni elections in February 2012 that ended thirty-three years of rule by Ali Abdallah Saleh. Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, who served as vice-president under Saleh, became Yemen’s new president. He had the support of regional powers and the United States, as well as the leading Islamic party, al-Islah, the Yemeni member of the Muslim Brotherhood (Alsis, Allison, and Cordesman 2012, 49).6 His election is seen as a continuation of the status quo and is not supported by factions of the youth or regional factions such as the Houthi, Southern Yemenis, and other tribal and religious factions that supported al-Qaeda. (Alsis, Allison, and Cordesman 2012, 50). Iran is an influential player in Yemen owing to its support to the Houthis, who practice a quasiShiite form of Islam. Iran condemned the proponents of Saleh for their attacks on the opposition (New York Times 2012). Although Saleh has gone, his regime, supported by Saudi Arabia, remains alive with the election of his former vice-president; and Yemen is likely to maintain its position in the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Developments following the events of the Arab Spring—particularly the Turkish government’s pressure on the Assad regime through a package 6

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Yemeni leader, Sheikh al-Zindani, who has proven unreliable and is a potential challenger to the Islamic legitimacy of the Saudi regime, was not in a position to be preferred by Saudi Arabia (IR Diplomacy, 2011). Hadi was the only candidate of Yemeni elections.

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of sanctions; its hosting the Syrian National Council (SNC) on its territories; and deploying its military along the Syrian border—have deteriorated the only recently formed good neighbor relations not only between Turkey and Syria but also between Turkey and Iran. If the Syrian uprising succeeds in bringing down the Assad regime, Iran may not only lose its Arab ally but also its supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition to Turkey’s approach to Assad regime, the NATO missile defense system agreement signed between NATO and Turkey and Turkey’s rising star in the MENA have led both to deterioration of Turkey-Iranian relations and competition between Iran and Turkey. Patriot missiles to be deployed by NATO on Turkey’s border with Syria have exacerbated the existing tension between Turkey and Iran.

Repercussions of Arab Spring on Kurds The Arab Spring, which emerged with a call for democracy, not only has affected Arabs of the region but also has had repercussions on Kurds. Speculation that Kurds across the Middle East could follow suit was raised when uprisings began to spread throughout the Arab world. This speculation became partly true when the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) imitated the Arab Spring by attempting to bring about a “Kurdish Spring” in the region. Hence, an analogy between the Kurdish situation and Arab Spring was voiced by the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Öcalan, when he told his advocates on February 14, 2011, “The Kurds could only be free if they pour onto the streets and call for their rights in the Kurdish cities, like Diyarbakir” (Today’s Zaman 2011b). The PKK had hoped Kurds would pour out on the streets on a massive scale in a popular Kurdish Spring. A Kurdish Civil Disobedience Campaign for broader rights thus began in southeast Turkey. This campaign widened the confidence gap with Ankara, which had initiated the “Kurdish Opening” to give broader rights to its Kurdish citizens, and led to deadly PKK attacks on police, despite the ceasefire that had been declared by the PKK in 2011. An escalation of Kurdish separatist violence between August and November 2011 pushed Turkey to meet terrorist attacks by military efforts, deploying its special forces to the Iraqi border and leading trans-border military strikes against Kurdish PKK targets in northern Iraq. Since the AKP government has embraced a foreign policy approach based on “zero problems with its neighbors” along with other developments in the region, a shift from confrontation to collaboration on Kurdish issues among Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq has been observed. Yet, the Arab

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Spring, which changed regimes in the region, has now reached Syria, deteriorating, first, Turkey-Syria relations and then Turkey-Iran relations. Under the current circumstances, maintaining collaboration does not seem possible. For instance, in reaction to Turkey’s current anti-Assad position, the Syrian regime does not take action against the PKK. The Assad regime is using the PKK card as leverage against Turkey. The PKK has done little to dispel such suspicious, and some statements made by Kurds seem to verify this argument. For instance, in an interview, Bayk, one of the group’s leaders, warned that if Turkey were to intervene against Assad, the PKK would fight on Syria’s side (TimeWorld 2011). Furthermore, the Assad regime uses the PKK to control Syria’s Kurds and prevent Kurds in Syria from taking an active part in Syrian uprisings. Kurds worry that the opposition against the Assad regime is being dominated by Islamists, as the Muslim Brotherhood does not support Kurdish demands for local autonomy (Deutsche Welle 2011). Turkey’s active role in Syria’s uprisings also raises concerns with the Kurds (Pravda 2011). The PKK’s increasing activity in Syria was one of the major issues discussed with the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) leader Barzani during his visit to Turkey. The KRG’s relations with the Shiite central government, which has been in dispute with Kurds over territory and oil, were strained further when vice-President Hashemi fled Baghdad for the Kurdish north to avoid prosecution because the KRG refuses to hand over the fugitive vice-President Hashemi to the central government. Hashemi left Iraq for a regional trip to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey (Today’s Zaman 2012). The bitter exchange between Erdo÷an and Maliki came after Barzani’s visit to Turkey and Prime Minister Erdo÷an’s remarks that “Turkey would not remain silent if a sectarian conflict erupted in Iraq.” In response, Maliki said “Turkey was becoming an enemy state in the region in a sign of growing tensions between Turkey and Iraq and Turkey had started to intervene in Iraqi internal affairs” (Turkishweekly 2012). As a result of these developments since the Arab Spring, Turkey’s “zero problem with its neighbors” approach, which had helped Turkey to normalize and then to improve its relations with its southern neighbors, namely Syria, Iran and Iraq, seems to have lost its validity. In this

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changing context, it approach has been become one of “zero neighbors without problems.”

Conclusion The removal of autocrats in the Arab world through the Arab Spring revolts gave Islamic parties, which had been under pressure from these autocratic regimes, a chance to govern their countries. Islamic parties, which have made gains in free parliamentary elections in this region in the post-revolution era, seem to be more receptive to public opinion and less submissive to Western demands (International Crisis Group I 2011). In other words, contrary to their predecessors, they have a tendency to embrace an independent foreign policy. The successes of these Islamist-led governments in combining Islam and democracy and good governance in political and economic terms will be major indicators of the survival of the post-Revolutionary regimes in the MENA. The emergence of Turkey as an independent regional power and its role model in this newly emerging international environment is likely to be one of the determining factors in the future relations among the MENA countries, which previously had been polarized into a Shiite camp under the patronage of Iran, and a Sunni camp under patronage of Saudi Arabia. A new regional alignment, which may be referred as the “Sunni Resistance Camp,” includes organizations and nations that are proPalestinian, appears to be emerging in the region. The states that are taking part in this emerging regional alignment have democratically elected governments and have a tendency to cooperate with the West in economic terms in order to alleviate their economic problems in the postRevolutionary era; yet they do not have the same level of willingness to cooperate on political issues as long as they do not have a vital interest to act together. In this connection, the role model that each of the states of this region chooses to follow is likely to be a major determining factor in its respective regional alignment in the post-revolutionary era. Their new regional alignments are likely to be based not only on sectarian differences—Shiites versus Sunnis—but also on differences in the form of

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political regimes; that is, democratically elected Islamist governments of the Arab world versus the remaining monarchies.

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Deutsche Welle. 2011. Syrian Kurds Take Up Anti-Assad Struggle. November 4, 2011 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6652453,00.html (accessed December 1, 2011). Economy Watch. 2011. Is Egypt about to Cut off Israel’s Gas? May, 18, 2011. http://www.economywatch.com/in-the-news/is-egypt-about-tocut-off-israels-gas.18-05.htm (accessed October 18, 2011). Fuller, G. E. 2010. The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Greenberg, S. 2012. Passover Highlights Strain in Israel-Egypt Ties. April 6, 2012. http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/blog/2012/04/passoverhighlights-strain-in-israel-egypt-ties (accessed April 7, 2012). Guardian.co. 2011. After BRIC Comes MIST, the Acronym Turkey Would Certainly Welcome. February 1, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/ povertymatters/2011/feb/01/emerging-economies-turkey-jim-oneill (accessed March 3, 2011). Hareetz.com. 2011. Iran Cleric Urges Protesters to Resist Bahrain Government Crackdowns. April 6, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/iran-cleric-urgesprotesters-to-resist-bahrain-government-crackdowns-1.354461 (accessed April 6, 2011). Hunter, Shireen T. 2010. Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. International Crisis Group. 2011. Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious? February 24, 2011. http://www.crisisgroup .org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/northafrica/egypt/101-popular-protest -in-north-africa-and-the-middle-eastI-egypt-victorious.aspx (accessed April 6, 2011). IR Diplomacy. 2011. The Arab Spring and the Role of Regional Powers. July 6, 2011. http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/52/bodyView/14412/The.Arab .Spring.and.the.role.of.regional.powers.html (accessed July 1, 2012). Jpost.com. 2012. Turkey Warns Against Shiite-Sunni Cold War. January 4, 2012. http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=252207 (accessed January 4, 2012). Kerr, M. 1971. The Arab Cold War: Gamal’Abd al-Nasir, 1958-1970. London: Oxford University Press.

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Kinross, L. 1977. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks. Lundestad, G. 1999. East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. New York Times. 2012. With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role. March 15, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middle east/aiding-yemenrebels-iran-seeks-wider-mideast-role.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (accessed August 17, 2012). Niblock, T. 2006. Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival. New York: Routledge. Ntvmsnbc. 2011. Yeni Dönem, Yeni Dengeler [New Era, New Balance]. June 29, 2011. http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25227628/ (accessed April 1, 2012). Ntvmsnbc. 2012. Müslüman Kardeúler’den Batya YeúilIúk [Muslim Brothers Give Green Light to the West]. April 6, 2012. http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/ id/25337474/ (April 7, 2012). Perthes, V. 2010. Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: An Outsider’s Perspective. Insight Turkey, 12, no. 4:1-8. Phillips, Chris. 2009. Can Syria End the Arab Cold War? July 14, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/14/syria-saudiaarabia-cold-war (accessed April 7, 2012). Pravda. 2011. Syrian Kurds Want Bashar Assad to Stay. October 12, 2011. http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/12-10-2011/119307kurds_syria-0/ (accessed December 1, 2011). Rabasa, A. and F. S. Larrabee. 2008. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey. Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation. Rubin, B. 2006. Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power. The Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/ jv10no3a10.html (accessed February, 22, 2011). Stein, D. 2011. Turkey Looks at Yemen Protests from a Distance. October 28, 2011. http://www.linkedin.com/share?viewLink=&sid=s671350029&url =http %3A%2F%2Flnkd%2Ein%2F32-9TG&urlhash=-hDa&uid =5536694702914416640&trk=EML_nus_share-F17&ut=0Xyw UW214eM4Y1 (accessed November 3, 2011). Syria Comment. 2009. End of Arab Cold War Makes Syria Man in the Middle. December 25, 2009. Syria Comment: Syrian Politics, History, and Religion http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=4895 (accessed September 25, 2010).

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Syria Today. 2012. The New Middle Eastern Alignment: A Rapprochement Between Syria and Iraq a New Balance of Power of the Region. February 2012. http://syria-today.com/index.php/politics/18428-thenew-middle-eastern -alignment (accessed April 7, 2012). Takeyh, R. 2009. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Telegraph. 2012. Syria: Assad Regime Blames Saudi Arabia and Qatar for Bomb Attacks. March 18, 2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ middleeast/syria/9151888/Syria-Assad-regime-blames-Saudi-Arabiaand-Qatar-for-bomb-attacks.html (accessed June 10, 2012). The Daily Star. 2012. Iran Visit by Egypt Leader Still Stears Debate. http://www.dailystar.com.Ib/News/Middle-East/2012/Sep-09/187257iran-visit-by-egypt-leader-still-stirs-debate.ashx#axzz263P5Hb5Z (accessed September 10, 2012). TimeWorld. 2011. Syria’s Kurds: Are they about to Join the Uprisings against Assad? October 21, 2011. TIME. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2097529-1,00.html (accessed November 26, 2011). Today’s Zaman. 2011a. Al-Ghannushi Says Turkey’s Democracy a Model for Tunisia. February 23, 2011. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_get NewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=236392&link=236392> (accessed October 27, 2011). —. 2011b. Noam Chomsky on Kurds’ Arab Spring. July 21, 2011. http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-251259-noam-chomsky-onkurds-arab-spring.html (accessed December 21, 2011). —. 2012. KRG Leader Barzani Visits Turkey as Alliance with Iraqi Kurds Deepens. April 18, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-277894krg-leader-barzani-visits-turkey-as-alliance-with-iraqi-kurdsdeepens.html (accessed May 12, 2012). Torbakov, I. and H. Ojanen. 2009. Looking for a New Strategic Identity: Is Turkey Emerging as an Independent Regional Power? May 7, 2009. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper 30. www.upi-fiia.fi/ assets/publications/UPI_Briefing_Paper_30_2009.pdf (accessed March 20, 2011). Turkishweekly. 2012. Babacan: Problem in Iraq Stems from Baghdad. April 28, 2012. http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/135095/babacanproblem-in-iraq-stems-from-baghdad.html (accessed May 2, 2012). USAK. 2010. USAK Axis Change of Turkish Foreign Policy and Neighborhood Relations Perception Survey December 2009. In USAK

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CHAPTER TWO YOUTH CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE ARAB REGION: AN ANALYSIS OF KEY OUTCOMES JON KURTZ AND RICARDO L. GÓMEZ

Abstract In the wake of the Arab Awakening, development actors are increasingly looking to civic engagement initiatives to harness the recent surge of political activism by Arab youth and to promote more participatory forms of governance and equitable development within the region. However, the impacts of these programs are largely untested, leaving program planners and policymakers to rely on assumptions and conventional wisdom when designing strategies for promoting civic engagement among Arab youth. To help fill this evidence gap, Mercy Corps1 recently undertook research into successful promoting of and expected benefits from youth participation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The study provides strong evidence on what changes to Arab youth's political voice, social capital, propensity towards political violence, and employability are likely to result from increasing their levels of civic engagement. The results show that few of these changes are automatic. Rather, youth civic engagement initiatives must make deliberate efforts to influence these areas, including doing more to reach young women, youth from rural areas, and at-risk youth whose voices are 1

Mercy Corps is an international, non-profit, non-religious humanitarian and development organization. Its mission is to alleviate suffering, poverty and oppression by helping people build secure, productive and just communities. Mercy Corps currently works in over 40 countries across the world, primarily in fragile and transitional contexts, such as those affected by or recovering from conflict or natural disasters.

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the most underrepresented in public debates and decisions. The findings carry important implications for government, donor, and development agencies' thinking and priorities regarding youth policies and programming in the MENA region, and for additional avenues of research.

Background and Rationale Youth have been at the heart of the many of the recent movements for political change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). These movements include the dramatic revolutions in places like Egypt and Tunisia, as well as less visible yet significant calls for reform in countries like Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine. Young people's involvement in the protests and demonstrations has stemmed largely from their frustration with the existing institutions and norms that have denied them economic and social opportunities and political voice. Young people have high expectations that these movements will bring with them greater and more equitable access to decent jobs, relevant education, engagement in the public realm, and more responsive and accountable governance (Khouri and López 2011). Failure by national governments to make timely and tangible progress in these areas—or at least to demonstrate a real effort to do so—risks pushing more youth towards violent means to achieve the types of change they seek (Mercy Corps 2011a). Yet addressing the endemic corruption, nepotism, political oppression, and other deep-seeded issues that lie at the roots of youth marginalization in MENA countries will not happen simply as a result of a new head of State or even a new constitution. What appears to be important to youth in the MENA region is influencing the changes taking place in their societies, and in particular on their economic and political landscapes (Khouri and López 2011). Mercy Corps, along with other agencies engaged in youth development in the MENA region, have been working for over two decades towards this end by promoting young people's civic participation, and by extension their agency, voice, and opportunities for activism. Such efforts are a core part of Mercy Corps’ work to develop inclusive and effective civil society groups. Programs that increase young people's opportunities to be civically engaged can be critical to enabling more participatory governance in the wake of the Arab Awakening, especially given the history of civic society repression in many countries in the region.

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37

Broadening the base of youth civic engagement in MENA is a major priority among donors and development agencies, perceived as a possible pathway towards political reform and more equitable development in the region. A number of positive outcomes are believed to be linked with increased involvement of youth in civic activities. These include: 1) decreased likelihood of involvement in violent and extremist movements; 2) stronger social and civic values, which are important foundations for good governance; and 3) increased employability. However, these assumed relationships are largely untested, especially within the current context of the MENA region. Lacking reliable evidence, program planners and policymakers are left to rely on assumptions and conventional wisdom when designing strategies for promoting civic engagement among Arab youth.

Purpose and Scope Mercy Corps undertook this research to better understand what benefits can realistically be expected from increased youth civic engagement in MENA countries—to both the youth who participate in civic activities and their broader societies. To do this, the research identified key assumptions underlying Mercy Corps' youth civic engagement programs in the MENA region. Through extensive analysis of existing data from survey of youth in the Middle East, the research set out to examine the following question: What are the outcomes of youth civic engagement in MENA? Specifically, the study examined the extent to which civic engagement is linked to: 1) political voice, including confidence in being able to influence government and actions taken towards this end, such as petitioning and demonstrating; 2) social capital, including a shared sense of identity, tolerance for others, trust in local officials and institutions, and attitudes towards democracy; 3) peacebuilding-related outcomes, such as attitudes towards the use of violence for political causes; and, 4) employment-related outcomes, such as employment status, type, and job satisfaction. Mercy Corps undertook this research across multiple countries within MENA, including Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen, with the intent of generating generalizable evidence to inform donor and policy makers regarding priorities and approaches for youth civic engagement programming across the region. It is acknowledged that this approach may have yielded conclusions that overlook important geopolitical and cultural differences between and within each country.

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There are many studies on civic engagement within individual Arab countries that provide such specificity. The intention of this study was contribute to region-wide analysis on the topic, for which there is a much greater gap in the knowledge base.

Conceptual Framework Civic engagement, as defined by this study, includes both community service activities and political actions. Civic engagement can take many forms: volunteering in a community service project; being involved in an organization working to address a social issue, like corruption; voting; and joining with others to raise concerns through actions such as protesting. A core set of strategies and intended outcomes are common across a number of Mercy Corps youth civic engagement projects. The conceptual framework developed for this study, presented in Figure 2-1, attempts to capture these elements and the relationships between them. It illustrates the main assumptions believed to connect the program interventions to their intended intermediate and longer-term outcomes. Based on the conceptual framework and a review of literature and existing studies on youth civic engagement, the researchers identified a set of assumptions, or theories of change that reflect how youth civic engagement programs are expected to work. The purpose of this research was to explore whether or not these theories appear to hold true within the current MENA context. The study aimed at finding evidence to support or challenge the assumptions uncovered in the literature and previous studies. The theories of change tested are: Theory 1: Political Voice. If young people are involved in civic activities in their communities, they will be more likely to be actively (and non-violently) engaged in political life. Theory 2: Social Capital. If young people are civically engaged, they will be more likely to develop and exhibit forms of social capital that are conducive to the functioning of democracy, and to peaceful co-existence. Theory 3: Propensity Towards Political Violence. If young people are civically engaged, they will be less likely to become involved in or support the use of violence to promote political objectives.

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Theory 4: Economic Engagement. If young people are civically engaged, they will gain important skills, contacts, and experience which make them more employable, or attractive to potential employers, than their non-civically engaged peers. Figure 2-1. Conceptual Framework for Youth Civic Engagement Projects Civic Engagement

Outcomes Tested

Local Civic Action

Social Capital

(volunteer/community service, civic group membership)

(shared social identity, trust, tolerance, respect for pluralism)

Electoral Activities

Propensity towards Political Violence

(voting, participation in campaign meetings or rallies)

Political Voice (petitioning, protesting, or joining together with others to raise an issue)

(views on use of force to promote political objectives, stability)

Economic Engagement (employment status, income, plans to pursue a career)

Political Efficacy (belief in ability to influence the actions of policies and governments)

These four theories were chosen for analysis based on their centrality within Mercy Corps’ youth civic engagement programming; these are the intended impacts, either explicit or implicit, of such programs. This analytical approach is rooted in the practices of theory driven evaluation (Donaldson 2007). Measures of the constructs contained within the conceptual framework were developed using data from the sources described below. Definitions of the key concepts within the conceptual framework, and how each of them was measured within this study, can be found in Appendix 2-A.

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Methodology This research utilized existing sources of data, including previous studies and recent surveys of youth in the Middle East conducted by other organizations, to answer the research questions. The three major sources of quantitative data analyzed by the study were the Arabbarometer Round 1 surveys for Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen conducted during 2008;2 the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) conducted by the Population Council in 2010;3and surveys from 2010 on the Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa (SWMENA) in Lebanon, Yemen, and Morocco, commissioned by International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR), see Appendix 2-B.4

Data Collection and Analysis The first step was to search for current literature on the key concepts and theories being examined, as well as evidence from recent studies regarding the predictors and outcomes of youth civic engagement. In addition to external sources, the literature review included relevant Mercy Corps proposals, reports, evaluations, and guidelines. The key findings from literature are summarized below under each of the theories of change. Most Mercy Corps youth civic engagement programs are based on some explicit causal logic, often reflected in the project proposal. Through taking stock of the design documents for a number of these programs, the research was able to develop an overall, generic model reflecting the main outcomes and assumed links between them.5 Based on this model and findings from the literature review, the researchers defined a set of broad theories of change, which appear to be applicable to many Mercy Corps youth civic engagement programs. The researchers developed operational definitions for the key concepts in the theories of change, and then identified available datasets that could be used to measure the concepts and analyze the relationships between 2

http://arabbarometer.org. http://www.popcouncil.org/projects/SYPE. 4 http://swmena.net. 5 This approach of reconstructing program theory is increasingly practiced as part of program evaluation (Donaldson 2007; Leeuw 2003). 3

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them. Measures were developed and statistical tests were used to determine if there were significant interactions between the key factors being examined and the strength of the relationships. The choice of the tests to use was based on the type of data for each variable, and included loglinear and logistic regressions, independent sample t-tests, and chisquared tests. The researchers considered several potential moderators of these relationships and associations, including gender, level of education, employment status, and country, as well as urban/rural status. The researchers solicited input from experts—both subject-matter and Middle East specialists—to identify the most plausible explanations for the results. Key regional and technical Mercy Corps staff members were also engaged in determining the implications of the findings for its programs and strategies, and recommendations for Mercy Corps and other agencies working on youth development in MENA.

Limitations It is not possible to attribute causality based on the cross-sectional data used in this study. Where significant relationships between factors were found, the direction of the relationship is unknown. To try to explain the causal directions, this research relies on the strength of the underlying theories as evidenced by the existing studies and literature. Some hypotheses are grounded in well-established theory; for example, Putnam’s theory supporting the contributions that civic participation makes to individuals' and groups' political efficacy. For other hypotheses where the theoretical basis is thinner, such as the contributions of civic engagement to future employment, making strong causality claims is more difficult. One strength of the study was that the data was taken from representative samples of youth in multiple countries in the MENA region, using standardized instruments and questions, which contributed to the external validity of the findings. However, the lack of usable data from Mercy Corps' programs may limit the generalizability of the findings to the specific groups of youth being targeted by its programs, who may differ in significant ways from the overall youth population in the countries. For example to date, pre and post-tests have not been consistently implemented in Mercy Corps youth civic engagement programs, making it challenging to reliably test the programs’ effects on the intended outcomes.

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Findings and Discussion For each theory of change explored, evidence from the literature and other studies is presented first to determine if there are theoretical, logical, or existing empirical bases for the theory of change. This is followed by the results of this study’s tests, and a discussion of possible explanations for the key findings. Theory 1: Political Voice. If young people are involved in civic activities in their communities, they will be more likely to be actively (and non-violently) engaged in political life. The major factors believed to connect civic engagement and political participation are civic skills, political efficacy, opportunities for interaction, and social trust (see Appendix 2-A for definitions of key components). People who participate in civic activities develop skills, such as the ability to organize a meeting and articulate demands, which increases their sense of political efficacy (Wilson and Musick 2000). They are also more likely to have opportunities for engaging in political discussions with other association members (Knoke 1990). Putnam's (2011) theory claims that active membership in voluntary associations contributes to the social trust that is necessary for people to organize effectively and act collectively in the wider political sphere. This theory appears to be relevant within the context of MENA, as evidenced by a recent study of political behavior in the Arab world which found that people who are involved in civic associations are more likely to extend their involvement to the political realm, in both conventional (e.g. voting) and unconventional (e.g. rallying) forms of participation (Tessler, Jamal, and de Miguel 2008). The data analyzed by this study strongly support the political voice theory of change. Membership in civic associations was found to be significantly and positively associated with both electoral and political activism. Compared to non-members, youth across the seven Arab countries6 included in the study who are members of civic associations were: (a) seven times more likely to attend a political campaign or rallies (Ȥ2(1) = 228.2, p