Ireland's UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era 3031327764, 9783031327766

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Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era t e r ry m . m ay s

Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era

Terry M. Mays

Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era

Terry M. Mays Department of Political Science The Citadel Charleston, SC, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-32776-6 ISBN 978-3-031-32777-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For My Lovely Lady Susan Weston Mays Her emerald eyes and soft red hair reveal roots from County Wicklow Her love for adventure and lust for life trace from the town of Arklow

Preface

“Do you know the difference between your army and mine?” I sat back in my chair and paused to ponder a response to this question posed to me. Wow, this question could lead us in many directions, and I wondered toward which I should direct a response. The man who asked the question sat back in his chair as well and smiled…hinting he would take our conversation into a path I could not predict. The walls behind his shoulders held frames and plaques from many years of military service. The gentleman in front of me, a Colonel in the Irish Army, patiently awaited my response. After offering him a smile to acknowledge surrender, he then added, “Your Army trains for war and you are very good at it. My Army trains for peace and we are very good at it.” I have rarely encountered a statement that was so short in duration yet so powerful in its revelation of political and military culture. To this day I utilize this conversation with Colonel Colm Doyle as a teaching point in classes I conduct in international relations and multinational peacekeeping. At the time Colonel Doyle commanded the Irish peacekeeping training school at the Curragh Military Camp in Ireland. Colonel Doyle graciously granted me permission to visit the school for a day, meet his officers and non-commissioned officers, ask many questions, and observe the center’s operations about 20 years before the publication of this book. I departed at the end of the day convinced that I needed to learn more about “how the Irish do it.” How does Ireland, a small state, structure

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itself to project such a powerful image in conflict resolution through the United Nations (UN)? Ireland projects a global reputation for its support of peaceful solutions to conflict across the globe. The country is well known, along with others, for its prolific deployment of peacekeeping contingents despite the small size of its military and the state itself. Ireland is proud of this support and even prouder of its peacekeepers. Nearly every American President from John F. Kennedy, who was elected to the office as Irish peacekeepers deployed to the Congo in 1960, has publicly praised Ireland, its leaders, and its military personnel for their support and sacrifices in the name of peaceful resolution to conflict. Many to most published pieces on peacekeeping tend to be case studies following the “on the ground” operations of a single mission. As a professor who has been writing about peacekeeping since the late 1980s, I developed an interest in national policies behind states accepting requests to deploy peacekeepers. In other words, what were the Government policies and structures upon which countries made their decisions whether to accept or decline the option to participate in an international peacekeeping operation? My interests gravitated to the decision making processes and policies of states when considering participating in a particular peacekeeping operation. We see Ireland sending peacekeepers to join UN missions dating back to 1958. Yet what do we not see before Dublin officially tells the UN, “Yes, Ireland shall provide personnel to support the peacekeeping mission”? We see proclamations in the press or in the UN that Ireland has agreed to support a particular operation. Yet, what really happens behind the closed doors? Many countries rely on the nod of one key individual for that decision; other countries rely on a much more complicated decision making process. When international organizations such as the UN understand the decision making processes in various countries, the task becomes easier as to how to request and what to expect as a result of requesting states to provide contingents to peacekeeping operations.

A Word of Thanks to Others Over the years, I have met many individuals who have expanded my understanding of Ireland and Irish peacekeeping. These include Lieutenant-General Gerry McMann, Colonel Colm Doyle, Dr. Ray

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Murphy, Dr. Michael Pugh, and Dr. Alan James. A special remark for Gerry McMann is in order. He was always ready to help me understand a unique point about the Irish Government or military and we chatted many times in both the United States and Ireland. Gerry was one of the brightest and kindest individuals I have ever met and is missed. Various librarians and staff have been very helpful over the years and include the institutions of The Citadel’s Daniel Library, Irish National Library, Trinity College Library, Irish National Archives, UK National Archives, King’s College Library, and Cypriot National Archives. Pamela (P.K.) King at The Citadel has been incredible at finding the odd resources I need for my research. The Citadel Foundation provided a much welcomed grant for research at the Irish National Archives. My wife Susan, to whom this book is dedicated, has been incredibly supportive of this project. I need to also add Gretchen, aka “Dr. G,” who allows us to take her to historical and nature sites across the state. We grow when we are able to help others grow. Charleston, SC, USA

Terry M. Mays

Contents

1

Introduction: Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy in the Cold War Era

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2

Potential Obstacles to an Irish UN Peacekeeping Policy

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3

Sinai 1957, Lebanon 1958, Palestine 1958

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4

The Congo 1960

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5

Cyprus 1964 and India-Pakistan 1965

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6

Sinai 1973

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7

Cyprus 1976–1977

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8

Lebanon 1978

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9

Afghanistan-Pakistan 1988, Iran-Iraq 1988, and Central America 1989

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10

Namibia 1989

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11

Conclusions at the End of the Cold War

213

Bibliography

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Index

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy in the Cold War Era

I am glad, therefore, that Ireland is moving in the mainstream of current world events. For I sincerely believe that your future is as promising as your past is proud, and that your destiny lies not as a peaceful island in a sea of troubles, but as a maker and shaper of world peace…The major forum for your nation’s greater role in world affairs is that of protector of the weak and voice of the small, the United Nations. —US President John F. Kennedy speaking to the Irish Dáil in 1963

Introduction What is the “peacekeeping policy” of a state? The framework behind this book declares that Ireland developed and maintained, yet modified upon necessity, a state policy toward participating in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping during the Cold War. There are many definitions of “policy” but essentially a policy represents the goals and decision making process of the state on a particular issue or set of issues and is driven by interests and resources. Thus, a policy can be seen as “how” and “why” a state makes decisions on an issue or set of issues. Peacekeeping-related publications tend to focus on case studies that follow the peacekeepers and their missions after deployment. These are useful tools permitting military and Government leaders as well as academics to seek “lessons learned” related to mandates, funding, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_1

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training, host state consent, levels of cooperation of the belligerents, relationship of the peacekeepers to the peace process, and many other factors that can help determine success or failure of peacekeeping operations. Yet they do not examine “how” or the process within the state for making the original decision to deploy a peacekeeping contingent. When it comes to publications examining contingent provider states rather than the operations on the ground, the focus primarily shifts to state “interests.” Again, this is another useful tool for those studying peacekeeping operations and offers the “why” explanation for state participation in peacekeeping missions. Some authors have concentrated on the application of models such as “realism vs. liberalism” to explain a state’s acceptance or decline to deploy peacekeepers. Are states hoping to gain some type of political or financial benefit? Are they participating because it mitigates conflict, saves lives, or is the right thing to do in the global arena? This author has examined Nigerian peacekeeping policy based on these types of questions in two different books arguing that the state deployed peacekeepers as a type of foreign policy tool in the last third of the twentieth century. In other words, Nigeria deployed personnel with UN, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mandated peacekeeping operations partially to fulfill its own foreign policy goals in West and Central Africa.1 Others have examined these questions as applied to different countries as they considered the deployment of personnel with international peacekeeping operations to support foreign and even domestic policy needs. Festus Aubyn and his co-authors wrote a piece in January 2019 for the Danish Institute of International Studies’ DISS Policy Brief that details similar findings in the just mentioned studies on Nigerian peacekeeping policy but applied to Ghana. They write, “…contributions to peacekeeping have served Ghana’s national security interests by preventing the spillover effects of conflicts in neighboring or nearby countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali.”2 The authors also mention that through anecdotal evidence the monetary reimbursements and allowances paid to Ghana for the deployment of its peacekeepers contribute to the state’s foreign exchange earnings as well as provide other economic advantages. Multiple authors have examined the Fijian deployment of soldiers in the role of peacekeepers as a means to counter unemployment and underemployment among Fijian youth while

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increasing foreign exchange.3 Research exists to explain “why” many other states contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations. US President Kennedy’s 1963 comments in the Irish Dáil offered his views on “why” Ireland stands out in its support for UN peacekeeping. Those examining “why” Ireland has continuously maintained peacekeepers in the field since 1958 structure their explanations in terms of Irish foreign and domestic policy with an emphasis on the former. Providing personnel for international peacekeeping missions supports Irish foreign policy goals. Katsumi Ishizuka writes that contributing to international peacekeeping missions supports four Irish state goals. The more liberalist goal is Ireland’s “commitment to sustain or enhance the authoritative status of the UN.” The other goals he lists are Ireland’s “desire to have prestige as an active member in the international system”; “desire to activate its defence forces”; and “desire to enhance politics in recognition of its neutral status in international politics.”4 Charles Flanagan, a post-Cold War Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, summarized Irish foreign policy into two points that are universal across nearly all states—“the protection of Irish citizens and the promotion of our values abroad.”5 All four of Ishizuka’s goals certainly fall into one, if not both, of these two categories. Flanagan notes that both of the foreign policy points represent Ireland’s foreign policy principles extending back to the 1916 Proclamation of the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State. Joseph Morrison Skelly wrote what can be considered the classic study of Ireland’s first ten years of UN membership. He and others attribute the formation of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping reputation to the foreign policy of Frank Aiken who served as the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1951–1954 and 1957–1969.6 Norman MacQueen echoes Skelly’s views on the importance of Aiken to the justifications behind why Ireland emerged as an early contributor to UN peacekeeping despite its small size compared to other states in the international arena. MacQueen credits Aiken with carving a path for Ireland to play an important role within the UN General Assembly as a state with an independent foreign policy intent on promoting “international order and security.”7 Contributing Irish personnel to UN peacekeeping missions supported Ireland’s position in these fields. Noel Dorr, a former Irish Permanent Representative to the UN, commented that the organization and its work lay at the center of Aiken’s view of Irish foreign policy after Ireland joined.8

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Many interests have emerged as points of discussion behind the “why” of Irish participation with UN peacekeeping. Each international situation presents its own set of issues that contribute to an Irish decision on whether or not to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation. These can range from Irish political goals or objectives to national resources. Ray Murphy of the National University of Ireland in Galway wrote: There is no evidence that the [Irish] government attaches greater weight to any one criterion. When a new deployment is being considered, an assessment is conducted which forms the basis of the advice to the government. While all of the factors are taken into account with some missions presenting particular challenges, it appears that risk assessment, mission resources and overall cost are significant factors.9

One should not discount domestic interests behind Ireland’s peacekeeping policy. Ireland’s 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy: Challenges And Opportunities Abroad highlights the training and morale value of peacekeeping for Irish army personnel. Domestic policy explanations focus on the value of the [peacekeeping] deployments on armed forces training ranging from soldier and unit skills to interoperability with the military units of other states. Some have highlighted the morale enhancement values for many soldiers that have an opportunity to serve outside Ireland.10 This book takes a different approach to Irish peacekeeping policy and examines the decision making political process itself rather than just the foreign policy interests of the state. While examining the interests of a state can help us understand the “why” behind participating in peacekeeping, looking into the actual political process of the policy can help us understand “how” states make decisions related to deploying peacekeepers with missions such as those organized by the UN. The two are related but not always employed together to understand state decisions in peacekeeping. By enacting the decision making process, leaders consider the interests, as well as resources, of the state. Yet, a perceived interest in deploying peacekeepers can be thwarted by a failure to move the issue from one point in the political process to the next or if a problem or question arises that has never been considered in line with the political process.

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This study contributes to the literature on Irish peacekeeping policy by following Dublin’s peacekeeping decision making, the “how” of peacekeeping policy, from the perspective of the state’s political process for accepting or declining UN requests for Irish peacekeepers. Ireland offers an excellent example for this type of study. It joined the UN in 1955…ten years after the founding of the global body and seven years after the fielding of the first UN peacekeepers. Ireland entered the organization without a formal peacekeeping policy process in place and had to develop one as early as 1957 when some in the UN mentioned that Ireland would be a good candidate for the United Nations Emergency Force I in the Sinai. It’s not just about developing an initial policy but rather also modifying the process when new situations or questions arise and new internal interpretations of the process emerge. States develop decision making processes based on their Government structures as well as political history and culture. This book establishes and follows this process from inception and then through modification from the beginning of the Cold War in 1948 to the end of the Cold War at the opening of the last decade of the twentieth century. While analyzing Irish primary documentation to understand the “how” of Ireland’s peacekeeping policy, this study will also examine the “why” of state interests to follow how these two aspects of political policy worked together to produce a state decision. To understand the development and evolution of Ireland’s peacekeeping policy process, it is important to first examine three points. First, what is peacekeeping? Second, what are the peacekeeping mandating procedures of the UN? Third, what is the structure of the Irish political system and the interactions of its components related to military issues and foreign affairs? From these three, the book then turns to Ireland’s development of a UN peacekeeping policy and its modification in subsequent chapters.11

What Is Peacekeeping? Peacekeeping is a tool to assist a peace process; peacekeeping does not make peace. This is why the term is “peacekeeping” and those deploying are “peacekeepers” rather than “peacemaking” and “peacemakers”. Peacekeeping is a process employed by the UN and now other organizations to deploy armed or unarmed personnel to oversee a peace process and provide a measure of stability in the area and often “face

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saving” measures for belligerents to justify not renewing hostilities. In other words, peacekeeping can be what is needed to support the peace process. Dispatching an internationally mandated peacekeeping operation provides benefits such as international legitimacy (a mandate from the UN or another international organization), international burden sharing in a peace process, and a visual representation of international concern to end or stabilize a conflict. The precise definition of peacekeeping altered as the mandates for the missions have changed over the years. In the period at the opening of this book (1955), they were often called “police forces” and seen as types of unarmed or later armed policemen observing and reporting violations of the peace process and then by the end of this book (1989) they had evolved to take the more generic name of “peacekeeping” and conducting missions that could be related to ceasefire oversight, election preparation and oversight, demobilization of irregular forces, or even withdrawal observation of foreign forces. They evolved from male military personnel to include civilian technicians, women, and civilian police…each category adding new assets to the mandated missions. Peacekeeping is a generic term but should be kept separate from peace enforcement. Peacekeeping is not covered in the UN Charter but rather is “interpreted” to be under Chapter VI which calls for the organization to pursue peaceful resolution to disputes among members. As a reminder, peacekeeping forces are not intended to be a peace process but rather support the peace process by providing observation or oversight of a separate peace process. When a peacekeeping mission is mandated with the authority to use force in support of its mission, it is often interpreted to be based on Chapter VII (a peace enforcement mission deployed to use force to restore order and save lives) or Chapter VI ½ (a non-existent chapter but used to indicate the mission is empowered to enter an area under Chapter VI to oversee a peace process but has the authority to use force when necessary to restore a situation). To be classified as a peacekeeping mission for this study, rather than peace enforcement, the operation should follow three basic foundations of the former rather than the latter. First, the peacekeepers should deploy with the consent of the belligerents or at least major belligerents. Not every country or intra-state group is accepting of all potential peacekeeping contingents. Second, the peacekeepers should be impartial meaning the state providing the contingent should be impartial in support of the peace process. Third, force should be utilized by the peacekeepers

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only in self-defense or in support of the operational mandate including the protection of non-combatants. These points arose multiple times in this study as Ireland considered roles in various UN peacekeeping operations.

What Is the United Nations Peacekeeping Process? To understand Irish peacekeeping policy, one must first turn to the UN peacekeeping process. What are the structures in the UN associated with peacekeeping operation proposals and mandates and how do they interact with contingent providing member states? Peacekeeping decision making is a two-way street. Before a state can enact its peacekeeping policy to decide on sending a contingent of peacekeepers, the UN must mandate the operation. The UN is responsible for the operation; the member states are responsible for the contingents. The two must work together for a successful deployment of peacekeepers to assist a peace process. The two policies are also symbiotic in another way. The UN must be willing to accept the type and size of a contingent based on operation needs; a state must be willing to provide the type and size of a contingent based on state resources. This relationship evolved into a serious political problem between Ireland and the UN in 1976–1977 when Dublin did not have the resources to meet a request by the UN and then the UN refused to accept an Irish contingent that did not meet its operational needs. Security Council The Security Council is the UN’s primary organ for addressing issues related to peace and security. Chapter V of the UN Charter lists the composition, functions, and powers of the Security Council. The UN specifically lists the powers of the Security Council as: to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations; to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction; to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;

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to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or Act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken; to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression; to take military action against an aggressor; to recommend the admission of new Members; to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas"; to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the SecretaryGeneral and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.12

Most of these duties impacted Ireland in some fashion during the Cold War. For example, the duty to officially recommend new members plays a role within this book and is examined in Chapter 2 when a Soviet Security Council veto prevented Ireland from joining the UN for nine years. Ireland served on at least two investigative teams for the Security Council prior to the deployment of peacekeeping missions. Irish personnel served as senior civilian UN administrators overseeing the peace process before and during peacekeeping operations. These and other connections to the UN Security Council and related to peacekeeping will be examined in upcoming chapters. In order to maintain peace and security, the Security Council is the UN organ that mandates peacekeeping, peace observation, peace enforcement, and other military-based operations of the global body. The UN employs a specific process when mandating peacekeeping (in the generic sense) operations. First, a situation involving a breach of peace and security is brought to the Security Council. This can be via a member of the Security Council, or a non-Security Council member may submit a request for the body to review a situation. When the Security Council discusses an international issue, a UN member being examined as part of the discussion has the right to petition to attend the meeting and speak but without voting rights.

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From the birth of the UN in 1945 to 1965, 11 states sat on the Security Council during a single session. These consisted of five permanent and six non-permanent members. Since 1965, the Security Council consists of 15 members with five permanent and 10 non-permanent states that rotate onto and off the Council during a two-year cycle. Half of the non-permanent members rotate off the Council each year to be replaced by five new members. The five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) wield vetoes with which they can automatically defeat any substantive (non-procedural) issue brought to a vote in the Security Council. For the Security Council to mandate the formation of a peacekeeping operation, a vote by the members must include a majority of the 15 total states (9 in favor) and no veto from any of the permanent members. A mandate, like other resolutions, might undergo many alterations in narrative before receiving the necessary composition of votes. Others are defeated and never adopted by the Security Council. It is rare but possible for a resolution to be moved to the General Assembly for approval but it is safe to note that practically all security-related resolutions are products of the Security Council. Security Council resolutions are theoretically mandatory for adherence by all UN members. As will be discussed within this book, a potential obstacle to Irish peacekeeping participation upon initial entry into the global organization involved the question of how the Irish Government’s policy of neutrality applied to Article 43 of the UN Charter which called for all members to provide support and personnel upon request from the organization.13 As actually applied to the UN membership, the deployment of personnel to support a peacekeeping operation is voluntary for each state. However, funding of the organization based on a scale set by the organization is mandatory…although there have been occasions when members have boycotted their payments for peacekeeping operations including during the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in which Ireland’s process for opting to participate is discussed in Chapter 4 of this book.14 General Assembly The General Assembly is the primary body for debate and oversight of the UN. Each member state holds a seat in the body and exercises a single vote without an option for a veto. The Holy See (Vatican state) and Palestine currently hold observer status with the right to speak in

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the body but without the right to vote. In contrast to the Security Council, General Assembly resolutions are considered recommendations rather than mandatory. When the UN Security Council mandates a peacekeeping operation, it is the General Assembly that apportions the costs among the UN member states “based on a special scale of assessments, taking into account the relative economic wealth of Member States, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”15 Apportionment and peacekeeping budgetary oversight occur with the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) of the General Assembly.16 The General Assembly also maintains a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that reviews all issues associated with peacekeeping.17 The UN Charter does not permit the General Assembly to formally debate security issues under discussion within the Security Council. The Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 does grant the General Assembly a special exception to this provision when the Security Council is deadlocked due to a veto. However, any resulting resolution is still a recommendation and not mandatory: …if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or Act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or Act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.18

The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in 1956 resulted from the application of the Uniting for Peace Resolution following British and French vetoes in the Security Council. More on this operation will be covered in Chapter 3 since Ireland was initially under consideration for providing a contingent to UNEF I during its first year as a member of the UN.19

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Secretariat and the Secretary-General The role of the secretariat is that of the UN’s administration and bureaucracy. It does not make decisions for the organization…other than administrative. Rather it carries out the decisions of the member states. Thus, once the Security Council mandates a peacekeeping operation, it becomes the job of the secretariat to oversee the administrative work to coordinate its movement and establishment at the destination. Operations are coordinated between the selected Force Commander, the SecretaryGeneral of the UN, the host state(s), the contingent providers, and the secretariat. The UN Secretary-General is the key individual associated with soliciting the contingents for a newly mandated peacekeeping operation, selecting a Special Representative and/or Force Commander, and serving as the “face” of the UN in the peace process. The Secretary-General approaches the UN member states in search of the right type and size of contingents. During the period covered in this book, the SecretaryGeneral was assisted by the UN Office for Special Political Affairs when working with peacekeeping operations. This particular office transitioned after 1992, and the Secretariat now includes a specific Department of Peace Operations.

What Is the Structure of the Irish Political System? A foundational understanding of the Irish political system is helpful at this point in order to follow the information flow related to UN peacekeeping decision making within the executive and legislative arenas of the Irish Government. Second, recognition of the Irish terms applied to Government and legislative offices and titles is highly useful. The Irish Constitution notes that Irish is the primary official language of the country and English is a secondary official language. In practical application, the former is spoken exclusively by fewer people (approximately 2% of the population) than those who exclusively speak English.20 Most Government records tend to be in English but are also available in Irish. Those records in English frequently use the Irish language terms for titles and offices. Thus, it can be difficult to comprehend office names, personnel titles, and follow the flow of documents and comments from

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office to office without knowing the Irish terminology for the more essential offices and positions. Some of the basic terms will be covered in this section. Oireachtas (Irish Legislature): The Irish political system is parliamentary in structure. Thus, it is similar to other parliamentary systems around the world but displays some differences. The Irish legislature is a twochambered body known as the Oireachtas which consists of the Dáil Éireann (Assembly of Ireland), the Seanad Éireann (Senate of Ireland), and the Uachtarán na hÉireann (the President of Ireland). 1. Dáil Éireann (Assembly of Ireland): This popularly elected house of the Oireachtas is commonly known by the single term Dáil. Members of the house are referred to as Deputies or “TDs” which is an acronym for Teachta Dála translated as “Deputy of the Dáil” in English. The number of Deputies can fluctuate since the constitutional provision for membership states there must be at least one for every 20 to 30 thousand people. The Constituency Commission of 2017 made the most recent change in total membership, setting it at 160 TDs beginning in 2020. A general election must be held at least once every five years. As Ireland’s peacekeeping process developed, the Dáil, as the legislature, emerged as an important third step when considering certain types of peacekeeping missions. A change in Government following elections raised issues of concern with the Irish peacekeeping decision making process on two occasions between 1955 and 1989. Both are covered in this study. Duties of the Dáil include: a. Debate a proposed law, called a Bill, and decide whether or not to pass it to the next Stage for further debate or vote. b. Ask questions of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister), or a particular Cabinet Minister. Any questions that are not answered in the Dáil receive written answers from the relevant Minister. c. Request a Government response on the progress of legislation. d. Raise Topical Issues, which are often specific constituency issues.21

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2. Seanad Éireann (Senate of Ireland): Often referred to as just the Seanad, the body is the upper (non-elected) chamber of the legislature holding 60 members referred to as Senators. The Seanad does not officially recognize political party membership. In practice, however, the body of the Seanad generally reflects the strength of the parties in the Dáil. Senators are appointed to the Seanad based on particular specialties they hold. Of the 60 seats: a. 11 are nominated by the Taoiseach; b. 6 are selected by the graduates of specific Irish Universities with 3 by the graduates of the University of Dublin and 3 by the graduates of the National University of Ireland; c. 43 from five special panels with each of the latter covering specific specialty areas: i. 7 on the Administrative Panel; ii. 11 on the Agricultural Panel; iii. 5 on the Cultural and Educational Panel; iv. 9 on the Industrial and Commercial Panel; v. 11 on the Labour Panel. The main function of the Seanad is to debate legislation proposed by the Government. The Seanad can amend a Bill that has been passed by the Dáil and delay, but not stop, it becoming law. Senators can also introduce their own Bills, which are debated in the Seanad and, if passed, are then debated in the Dáil. Although the Government has no constitutional responsibility to Seanad Éireann, a Minister or Minister of State attends the Seanad when it is dealing with Bills or debating Government policy.22 Uachtarán na hÉireann (the President of Ireland): The Irish people directly vote for and elect the President. The formal powers and functions of the President are prescribed in the Constitution. Many of the powers of the President can only be exercised on the advice of the Government, but the President has absolute discretion in other areas. It is the President who signs adopted Bills from the Oireachtas and places them into law. The President’s powers include: a. appointment of the Taoiseach, members of the Government, judges, and other officials; b. summoning and dissolving the Dáil, and convening the Oireachtas;

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c. signing legislation into law and/or referring Bills to the Supreme Court; d. representing the people of Ireland; e. acting as Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces.23 Rialtas na hÉireann (Government of Ireland): The Ministers of Government are nominated by the Taoiseach immediately after receiving formal appointment by the President.24 The Dáil then votes en bloc on the Taoiseach’s nomination list which is then forwarded to the President for appointment. Upon appointment, the Taoiseach assigns each to a specific Department. Each of the two major political parties selects members to hold ministerial office if that party wins a majority of the seats in the Dáil. The opposition party’s selectees remain as a “shadow government” to review, question, and offer alternative positions to Government policies. On more than one occasion between 1955 and 1989, a single party did not win the majority of seats in the Dáil forcing a party to form a coalition by bringing a smaller party into the Government and assigning that party at least one ministerial portfolio. Changes in ministers can have an interesting impact on personal dynamics in Ireland’s peacekeeping decision making process as will be seen in this study. At times, the Taoiseach will take the lead for the Government in pushing the ministers and the Dáil toward approving Ireland’s dispatch of peacekeepers and at other times the Minister for Foreign Affairs assumes the lead role. In one case study in this work, the Taoiseach and Minister for Foreign Affairs disagreed on Ireland’s response to a peacekeeping operation presenting an interesting point related to “how” Ireland accepts or declines a UN request for Irish peacekeepers. Iveagh House: The Dublin building in which the Department of Foreign Affairs is located is known as Iveagh House. The term itself is sometimes used in Irish correspondence to mean the “Department of Foreign Affairs” as the “White House” refers to the Office of the President in the United States or “Whitehall” refers to the British Government. Political Parties: Ireland’s two leading political parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, emerged from the politics surrounding Ireland’s independence and follow-on Civil War. The latter represented a military clash between those who supported the terms of Irish independence as

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a member of the British Commonwealth (Pro-Treaty) and those who disapproved the status quo as a means to acquire immediate sovereignty for the state (Anti-Treaty). Future Taoiseachs Eamon de Valera and Frank Aiken, along with others who were Anti-Treaty, formed Fianna Fail in 1926 in a split from Sinn Fein. The Pro-Treaty members dominated the Irish Government after the Civil War and merged with two other groups to form the Fine Gael Party in 1933. Fianna Fail dominated the Irish political system beginning with the 1932 election and governed as a minority (forming a Government with less than a majority in the Dáil) until 1938 when it sat as a majority Government. The Party sat until 1948 as either a majority or minority Government. The 1948 election resulted in the First Inter-Party Government with representatives from five political parties and one independent in the Cabinet. The year 1948 proved a watershed in Irish politics. As Basil Chubb discusses in his second edition of The Government and Politics of Ireland, the two major Irish political parties underwent important philosophical shifts beginning around 1948 and moving into the early 1950s when this book picks up the examination of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy. He writes, “By the 1950s, the national issues that had led to the salient division in Irish politics were either resolved or had ceased to have the same importance…New men began to come to the fore who were more concerned with urgent social and economic issues….”25 The Republic of Ireland Act 1948 marked the departure of Ireland as a member of the British Commonwealth and established the “descriptive” name of the state as the Republic of Ireland (with “Eire” and “Ireland” still the Irish and English names in the Constitution). The “descriptive” name established the country as an independent, sovereign republic responsible for all its formal and informal actions in foreign policy. When the Act came into force in 1949, the Uachtarán na hÉireann (President) rather than the British monarch became the official Head of State. This included placing all formal acts of foreign relations such as appointing and receiving diplomatic representatives with the Uachtarán na hÉireann rather than the British monarch. The Irish became “Irish citizens” rather than “British citizens.” The Party leaders who were prominent figures in the Independence movement and Civil War of 1922–1923 were aging and the sovereign republic vs. British Commonwealth member debate faded with the passage of The Republic Ireland Act 1948 when Ireland emerged into the post-World War II world as its own sovereign republic. This time frame is

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significant for discussion within this book. Ireland gained its sovereignty at the same time as the beginning of the Cold War. Thus, the development of Ireland’s foreign policy as a completely sovereign state emerged at the same time that pundits point to the beginning of the Cold War and the official emergence of the post-World War II global system. Most date the Cold War to the Truman Doctrine of 1947; others attribute the beginning to 1948 with the first applications of the Doctrine. In 1948, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael began diverting more attention from debates on the political status of Ireland to attracting voters based on domestic issues. At the same time, Ireland looked toward developing an independent foreign policy outside any constraints of Commonwealth membership and formal political alignments. This included attaining admission to the UN and participating in work of the organization.

Postscript This chapter sets the foundation for an examination of Irish UN peacekeeping policy during the Cold War. Chapter 2 turns to an examination of three issues present in 1948 that could possibly hinder Irish development of a UN peacekeeping policy. The following chapters present a way of examining the state’s UN peacekeeping policy through the policy decision making process itself. While earlier studies have presented useful academic tools by covering Irish peacekeeping via case studies that offer lessons learned and/or via interests of the state which explain “why” Ireland has been such a prolific participant in UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, this book tackles the “how” of Irish peacekeeping policy. How did Ireland develop a political policy process to consider and accept or decline UN requests for peacekeepers in the early years of the Cold War? How has this policy been altered during the Cold War to accommodate new considerations within Ireland’s Governmental system?

Notes 1. See Terry M. Mays, Africa’s First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981–1982, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002 and Nigerian Peacekeeping Policy: The Application of Peacekeeping as a Foreign Policy Tool 1960–1990, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010. 2. Festus Aubyn, Kwesi Aning, Fiifi Edu-Afful, Emma Kirikorang, Maya Mlynster Christensen, and Peter Albrecht, “The Many Implications of

1

3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

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UN Peacekeeping: Ghana’s Peacekeeping Efforts Abroad Have an Impact at Home,” DIIS Policy Brief , Danish Institute of International Studies, January 2019, pp. 2 and 4. “The Utility of Peacekeeping; Fiji,” The Economist (Vol. 384, Issue 8548), 29 September 2007, page 46. See also Jamie Levin, Joseph MacKay, and Abouzar Nasirzadeh, “Selectorate Theory and the Democratic Peacekeeping Hypothesis: Evidence from Fiji and Bangladesh,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2016), pp. 107–132 and Jone Baledrokadroka, “The Unintended Consequences of Fiji’s International Peacekeeping,” Security Challenges, Vol. 8, No. 4, Special Volume On ‘Security In The Pacific Arc’ (Summer 2012), pp. 105–116. The latter article, as well as others, also examines unintended negative effects of peacekeeping deployments on the state. Katsumi Ishizuka, Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960–2000: A Study of Irish Motivation, New York: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd, 2003, page 180. Charles Flanagan, “Identity and Values in Irish Foreign Policy,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 27 (2016), pp. 3–7. Morrison Joseph Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945–65. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1997, page 165. Norman MacQueen, “Frank Aiken and Irish Activism at the United Nations, 1957–1961,” The International History Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May 1984), page 222. Noel Dorr, “Frank Aiken and the United Nations: Some Personal Reflections,” in Bryce Evans and Stephen Kelly, eds., Frank Aiken: Nationalist and Internationalist, Sallins: Irish Academic Press, 2014, page 210. Ray Murphy, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping? Opportunities, Challenges and Ways Ahead—Ireland,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2016), page 725. 1996 White Paper on Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Abroad. For more on the altering definitions of peacekeeping and related terms, see: Terry M. Mays, The Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping, 4th edition, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2021. United Nations, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functi ons-and-powers For more information on the UN Security Council, see: David M. Malone, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004; Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 4th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2004; Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, eds., The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford University Press, 2010; Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of

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13.

14.

15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

the UN Security Council, Methuen, 1971; Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise, Routledge, 2006. Article 43 of the UN Charter is essentially not in application within the UN system. Member states could not figure out how to implement the Article due to Cold War politics and a general desire to not utilize it to collectively call UN members to militarily defeat another state(s) that had violated global peace. For more information see: Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the UN Charter Be Raised From the Dead?, McNair Paper Nineteen, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, July 1993; Frederic Burkle, Jr., “United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 43: Now or Never,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 38 No. 4 (Fall 2017), pp. 25–30; James Rossman, “Article 43: Arming the United Nations Security Council,” N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics, No. 27 (1994–1995), pp. 227–263. For more information on issues related to non-payment of mandatory peacekeeping funding, see: Arthur J. Goldberg, “U.S. Finds U.N. Majority Unwilling to Enforce Article 19 [Concerning the Financing of United Nations Peace-Keeping Actions],” The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53 (1965), pp. 454–457; Richard I. Fine, “Peace-Keeping Costs and Article 19 of the UN Charter: An Invitation to Responsibility,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1966), pp. 529–539; Luke T. Lee, “An Alternative Approach to Article 19,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 1965), pp. 872–876; “Application Of Article 19 Of United Nations Charter (Loss of Vote for Failure to Pay Contributions to U.N. Regular Budget),” International Legal Materials, Vol. 8, No. 2 (March 1969), pp. 434–440; “United Nations: Legal Opinion on Interpretation of Article 19 (Loss of Vote for failure to Pay Contributions to U.N. Regular Budget),” International Legal Materials, Vol. 7, No. 5 (September 1968), pp. 1187–1192. United Nations General Assembly, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/roleof-general-assembly. Reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations can be found at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/sites/ctte/ spcmt_rep.htm. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) of 1950, https:// www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/otherdocs/GAres377A(v).pdf. Ibid. For more on the UN peacekeeping policy, see Lisa Sharland, “How Peacekeeping Policy Gets Made: Navigating Intergovernmental Processes at the UN,” International Peace Institute Report, 2018. The Official Languages Act 2003 states that all Irish documents and other material released for the public or a segment of the public must be either

1

21.

22.

23. 24.

25.

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in Irish or in English and Irish. In practical application, nearly all Government documents are published in English and Irish. As of January 2022, all European Union documents are translated and released in the Irish language as well as all official languages of the member states. As of the 2016 Irish census, approximately 55% of all Irish citizens reported they either do not speak any Irish or only spoke it in Irish language lessons in school. Approximately 2% of the population reported they spoke it daily. The Government’s explanatory booklet on the Official Languages Act 2003 can be found at: https://www.coimisineir.ie/userfiles/files/Gui debook4.pdf. For more information on the role of the Dáil Éireann, see: https:// www.oireachtas.ie/en/visit-and-learn/how-parliament-works/role-of-theoireachtas/Dáil-eireann/. For more information on the role of the Seanad Éireann, see: https:// www.oireachtas.ie/en/visit-and-learn/how-parliament-works/role-of-theoireachtas/seanad-eireann/. For more information on the role of the Uachtarán na hÉireann, see: https://president.ie/en/the-president/constitutional-role. The President’s appointment of the names on the recommended list approved by the Dáil is a separate action than the follow-on assignment of each to a Government department by the Taoiseach. For more information on the details of the Irish political system for forming a Government, see Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland, 2nd edition, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1981, pp. 182–205. Basil Chubb, page 103.

CHAPTER 2

Potential Obstacles to an Irish UN Peacekeeping Policy

[United Nations Secretary-General] Lie informed me privately that [Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations] Gromyko told him yesterday that he would vote against Portugal and Ireland. —Acting United States Representative at the United Nations Herschel Johnson’s message to United States Secretary of State James Byrnes, 23 August 1946

Introduction Ireland faced three potential obstacles that needed to be solved before it could develop a peacekeeping policy in order to contribute to UN operations after their first deployment by the organization in 1948. First, the Irish Government viewed itself as a neutral state, or perhaps better defined in many ways as non-aligned. The Irish Free State emerged during and after World War I and Ireland declared itself neutral during World War II. Ireland applied for UN membership one year after the end of World War II. Would Irish neutrality prevent the state from the mandatory adherence to the UN Charter required of all members? Would Irish neutrality prevent adherence with Article 43 of the UN Charter if the organization requested military assistance and/or basing or transit rights for other military forces? In other words, did Ireland’s concept of neutrality conflict

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_2

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with the UN concept of military-based peace observer operations after 1948 or armed peacekeeping missions after 1956? Second, Ireland needed to be a member of the UN to participate in the programs and operations of the organization. To deploy peacekeepers with the UN required membership in the global organization. However, Cold War politics resulted in policies resulting in a balance in voting power between the two blocs. The Soviet Union vetoed Ireland’s admission packet in 1946 and blocked its entrance to the organization for the next nine years. Third, Ireland maintained a “temporary” army that could not operate outside of its territory. What is meant by “temporary” in this description of the Irish Defence Forces? Every year the Dáil needed to renew the Defence Forces Act 1923, to legally continue the funding and operation of the small Irish army for another year. Would this annual procedure interfere with the UN requesting Irish military personnel? An even larger question involved the inability of the military to operate outside Irish territory. How could the Irish Defence Forces assist UN peace observation missions when it could not legally operate beyond the country’s own borders? This chapter examines how Ireland tackled each of these potential obstacles to its participation in UN peacekeeping operations and stymied the development of a state peacekeeping policy.

Neutrality Irish neutrality was the first of the three potential obstacles to the development of an Irish peacekeeping policy. How would Irish neutrality impact adherence to the UN Charter and its provisions for providing personnel for peace and security service with the organization?The Irish Constitution lays the foundation of Irish foreign policy within the first three sections of Article 29 (International Relations): Section 1: Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality. Section 2: Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.

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Section 3: Ireland accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other States.1

While the term “neutral” or “neutrality” is not directly included in the three sections, or later sections, many in Ireland have declared that Ireland is a neutral state when it comes to foreign policy. The perception of what it means for Ireland to be “neutral” has altered since independence and does not have the same application after 1955 when Ireland entered the United Nations (UN) as it does in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. This study examines the concept of Irish neutrality and its application to peacekeeping operations in the last half of the twentieth century as Ireland entered the UN and developed and matured a peacekeeping decision making policy during the Cold War period. The Irish Constitution, in its current amended format, dates to 1937. The document proclaimed Ireland abided by peaceful cooperation, pacific settlement of disputes, and international law in its policies with other countries as stated in Article 29. However, state neutrality evolved from statements of Government policy rather than the Constitution itself. When World War II erupted two years after the adoption of the constitution, the Irish Government proclaimed the state as neutral in the conflict. In actuality, Ireland can best be described as “non-aligned” rather than “neutral”. Many to most Irish citizens held sympathies with the Allied cause, tens of thousands of Irish citizens (technically also UK citizens by virtue of Commonwealth status) served in Allied military forces, the Irish Government provided special transit and refueling privileges to Allied aircraft and personnel that were not extended to German military forces, and Irish intelligence services cooperated with Allied intelligence. However, Ireland officially did not enter the war as a belligerent. Because Ireland did not formally join the Allied side in World War II, the Soviet Union vetoed Dublin’s bid to join the UN in 1946, despite the state’s membership in the League of Nations, as examined in the opening section of this chapter. The Irish Government maintained its position of neutrality during the Cold War. Ireland did not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) when formed although this has as much to do with the United Kingdom, a founding NATO member, occupying Northern Ireland as it did with neutrality in the Cold War. Some refer to Ireland’s position as that of “military neutrality” while not portraying a strictly neutral foreign policy when it comes to international politics. Ray Murphy wrote:

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While Ireland is ‘fully committed to and supportive of the UN based international rules system’, it continues to maintain a policy of military neutrality. This policy is characterized by non-membership of military alliances and non-participation in mutual defence arrangements. It continues to underpin engagement in all peacekeeping operations and explains the legal mechanisms governing participation that necessitate UN approval for any operation involving Irish forces.2

This position on neutrality can also help explain the careful nature behind the development and evolution of an Irish peacekeeping decision making process. As previously discussed, Ireland maintained its bid to enter the UN after the initial block laid against it in 1946. During the nine years Ireland sought membership, the state reviewed the organization’s charter and questioned whether its governmental policy of neutrality permitted it to adhere to the document. In particular, could Ireland meet and adhere to the following requirements of membership? Chapter 1, Article 2, (Section 5): All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. Chapter VII, Article 43, Section 1: All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.3

Do these UN membership requirements conflict with Ireland’s policy of neutrality? A test of this question arose as early as 1946, six months after the first opening session of the UN in January 1946. Taoiseach Eamon de Valera of the Fianna Fail political party, who simultaneously held the portfolio as Minister for External Affairs, addressed the Dáil on 24 July 1946 on this question.4 Taoiseach de Valera introduced his purpose in the Dáil with a reminder to the deputies:

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It was roughly this time last year, on the discussion of the League of Nations Estimate, that I was asked whether the Dáil would be given an opportunity of discussing the question whether we should or should not enter into the United Nations Organisation before definite action was taken by the Government. The purpose of this resolution is to give the Dáil an opportunity for that discussion.5

The resulting debate ranged from short comments to quips to lengthy heated remarks about the UN, the state of affairs facing the world, and whether any of this would help solve the problem of Ireland’s partition. Some deputies misunderstood the international politics of the immediate post-World War II era and remarked that it had to be highly improbable for Ireland not to be invited to join the UN. Waiting nine years for an invitation due to a Soviet veto must have come as a shock later to these deputies. Others noted that the question of neutrality held little meaning upon joining the UN. Deputy William Norton of the Labour Party stated: …it seems to me that it makes little difference to us whether we are members of the United Nations Organisation or not members of the United Nations Organisation. Global war, with the weapons available for waging it to-day, would be such that we could scarcely expect to escape from the consequences of it. One thing, however, is clear. I think that in the event of a global war which would follow the break-up of the United Nations Organisation, neutrality for this or any other small or large country would be an utter impossibility. In the event of a global war, neutrality would have no intelligent significance either for our people or for the other nations of the world.6

Deputy Patrick McGilligan of the Fine Gael Party assumed a more pragmatic approach to the question of UN membership and foreign policy neutrality during the debate: Reference was made to neutrality. Neutrality has been elevated in this country into something in the nature of a positive virtue— something like justice, honesty and truth. It is not any of those. Nor was it at any time in the past seven years at that level. It was a matter of expediency and, so far as this country was concerned, what was involved was only State neutrality. The State did not take any side but the people took sides. There was not ideological neutrality so far as this country was concerned. Whatever it was, even such a small part of neutrality as is encompassed in the term “State neutrality” must hereafter be given up if we join this organisation.7

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Following considerable discussion that led to few conclusions about membership in the UN and a state policy of neutrality, the Dáil adjourned until the next day. Little time elapsed on 25 July before Irish partition assumed a leading role in the discussion rather than the matter at hand followed by quips, insults, and the comparison of a particular deputy to bacon. Finally, a voice of reason arose and presented a portrait of the situation that most of the deputies held even if silent. Deputy Maurice Dockrell of the opposition party Fine Gael remarked: We all know the dangers inherent in this matter and it is no use in glossing over or trying to minimise them. The chief danger is that this country may find itself involved in war. That means an abandonment of the policy of neutrality which we followed during the last seven years. We must face that frankly. I think that danger is one we ought to accept with our eyes open, knowing fully to what we are committing ourselves. The United Nations Organisation is, as one Deputy has suggested, an instrument for promoting peace; it is not an instrument to make war. We may find that, by virtue of that membership, we are asked to do certain things, but I take it we will not be asked to do things which lie beyond our power. It is in that spirit I would face the obligations which our membership will impose upon us. The advantages of membership are very great.8

Toward the end of the debate, Taoiseach de Valera clearly noted his opinion on the issue of neutrality and the UN for the deputies to consider before voting: I said in my opening speech, and I have said it on many occasions in the past, that it is the small nations particularly that should welcome an organisation which is intended to give collective security. No nations ought to be more loyal to such an organisation than the small nations. But the small nations, just like the big ones, will, if they become members of such an organisation, have to be really loyal members of it. They will have to make up their minds that the obligations which are necessary, if the organisation is to be successful, will be fulfilled and carried out. It would be fatal for the small nations, including ourselves, who have any hope of collective security, to think that they can in the end dodge their obligations.9

The Question was put forward to the Dáil for voting. The body approved the motion indicating that upon acceptance by the UN for membership, the state had support of both the Government and the legislature for adherence to the provisions of the UN Charter. Yet, did this

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actually apply to an occasion when the UN might ask Ireland to provide armed military personnel for a mandated operation? This 1946 motion does not clearly indicate an answer to this question since it was hypothetical at that point of time when Ireland would not enter the UN for another nine years. The true test of how Ireland would handle a UN request for armed military personnel arose later. Although the Government and Dáil were not totally silent on the issue of Irish neutrality and compliance with the UN Charter over the next fourteen years, the key legislative affirmation occurred in November 1960.10 The Department of External Affairs re-examined the issue of neutrality in November 1960 during the period Ireland faced its own internal questions related to its first armed Defence Forces deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation. This decision making considerations and process behind the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) are covered in detail within Chapter 4 of this book. However, the placement of the November 1960 neutrality examination and resolution is applicable here in this Chapter. In many ways, the conclusions of the examination produced the answers and guidelines Ireland sought to justify its foreign policy position. The Department of External Affairs released a lengthy memorandum on 26 November 1960 detailing its review of Irish neutrality as applied to UN-mandated missions involving military personnel. The document declares: Membership in the United Nations does not depend on, nor is it directly related to, the underlying position of a particular state in international affairs; and, or specifically, it is not related to the factor whether or not a particular country follows a policy of “neutrality”. Indeed, this is one of the features that distinguishes the United Nations (like the League of Nations) from classical alliances…The United Nations is designed to maintain peace throughout the world and to ensure by cooperation the progress of all countries, and not to serve the aims of a particular country or a group of countries.11

The memorandum applied the concept of “neutrality” to obligations under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter. Does the Irish position of neutrality in international relations prevent it from adhering

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to the UN Charter as required of all members of the global organization? The response in the External Affairs memorandum stated: While acceptance of the obligations in the [UN] Charter might perhaps be said in some circumstances (vide particularly Article 2 (5) and Chapter VII) to result in commitments which might involve a departure from what would be regarded as the traditional view of neutrality (i.e. absolute impartiality) nonetheless a policy of neutrality or quasi-neutrality would not seem to be inconsistent with the Charter and in practice…12

Thus Ireland acknowledged a difference between neutrality or impartiality and absolute neutrality or impartiality in international relations. In the case of adherence to the UN Charter, the Department of External Affairs noted that participation in the UN did not involve a “fine assessment of the balance between rights and obligations” but rather on general considerations of the desire and moral duty to actively help and directly participate “in the achievement of the ideals and purposes inscribed in the Charter.”13 These include human rights and the guiding principles of international relations. The Irish Government and Dáil acknowledged that membership could involve supporting UN military action: It has always been recognized that membership [in the UN] might involve this country in joint military action under the Charter. This point was explicitly made and stressed during the debate in the Dáil which led to the unanimous adoption of a motion recommending the Government to take steps to seek [UN] membership.14

The document will be examined again in Chapter 4 to illustrate the Government’s justification for sending armed members of the Defence Forces to serve with ONUC in the Congo.15

Admission to the United Nations The lack of membership in the UN resulted in the second obstacle to the development of an Irish peacekeeping policy. To adhere to the UN Charter including providing military personnel for peacekeeping or peace observation missions, a state should be a member of the UN. While this is an obvious statement, it is also a nine-year void in which Ireland found itself between 1946 and 1955. Ireland was not a UN member in 1948 during the fielding of the first peace observation missions mandated and

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deployed by the global organization in support of international peace and security. As a member of the League of Nations and a neutral state, Ireland expected to be accepted into the new United Nations (or United Nations Organization as called in Irish Government documents and within Dáil discussions for many years after 1945).16 It would take nine years and a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War to bring Ireland into the UN. After the unexpected Security Council rejection of Ireland’s bid for UN membership due to a Soviet veto, Ireland regrouped for a new attempt in 1947. The International Court of Justice did not prove helpful; its advisory on how to consider new membership applications was ignored by the Soviet bloc. An Irish inquiry to the Soviet Mission at the UN received the following in reply: In considering the request of one or another state for admission to the United Nations, one cannot fail to take into consideration the behaviour of these states during the war years…Ireland, as it is known, had very friendly relations with the Axis Powers and did not give any help whatsoever to the Allies in their struggle against the fascist states…Ireland also did not and does not have any normal relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics…For these reasons, the Soviet Union delegation finds it impossible also this year to support the application of Ireland.17

Deputies in the Dáil regularly requested updates from the Taoiseach or Minister for External Affairs on the Government’s position regarding maintaining an application for admission to the UN. For example, in July 1950, the Minister for External Affairs addressed questions in the Dáil and informed the deputies that “Ireland applied for membership of the U.N.O. on 2nd August 1946, and that the position remained as stated in the Taoiseach’s reply on 17 May 1950.”18 An issue resulting from Cold War politics needed to be solved by Cold War politics. When the Soviet Union blocked Ireland and other states from the organization, the United States in turn prohibited Soviet leaning states from joining the UN as well. On the one hand, this maintained a rough status quo in Bloc voting and established a situation that placed entry into the UN for Soviet bloc states on par with those in the Western bloc.

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Although the United States viewed Ireland with benevolence, Cold War politics played a more important role in the UN politics of Washington. For the United States, the entry of Spain, Italy, and Japan weighed more than Ireland in terms of UN admission by 1955. For example, a 4 November 1955 telegram from the American Mission at the UN to the United States Department of State requested permission to make a press release regarding the next month’s vote on new members. The text of the press release stated: Thirteen deserving and qualified nations have been blocked from admission to the United Nations because of Soviet Russia’s abuse of the veto power in the Security Council. This list includes such important nations as Italy, Japan and Spain. It includes such small, but old and civilized, nations of the Western world as Austria, Finland, Eire [Ireland] and Portugal—nations whose sons have also contributed to much of our own national culture.19

The UN Security Council met on 10 December 1955 to discuss admission of new states to the body. They haggled over individual countries and procedures during two sessions on 10 December and two more on 13 December with little true progress. Much of the disagreement between the two blocs centered on the admission of Japan and Outer Mongolia. A test vote for each country under consideration for admission in 1955 resulted in a Soviet veto when then applied to Ireland in the second session of 13 December. The next day, the Soviet representative on the Security Council, Arkady Sobolev, called for a fifth session and delivered an announcement: Desiring to facilitate a solution to the long-drawn-out question of admission of New members, the Soviet Union withdraws the negative vote which it cast with respect to a number of States, and will vote for their admission.20

Mr. Sobolev added that Japan and Outer Mongolia should be left off the list for 1955 but specifically stated the Soviet Union supported admission for both countries in a 1956 vote for new members. The compromise resulted in the admission of Ireland to the United Nations setting the stage for Dublin to now evolve from debating the UN Charter to actually adhering to it.21

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Establishing a “Permanent” Irish Defence Forces Act The “temporary” status of the Irish Defence Forces provided the foundation of the third possible obstacle to the formation of a peacekeeping policy. The use of the term “temporary” has a specific meaning as applied here. “Temporary” means the Dáil needed to annually vote to extend the Defence Forces in terms of operational/command provisions under the Government rather than the legislature itself as outlined in the Constitution. It does not mean that the Defence Forces would be formed and disbanded depending upon state needs. Rather it is related to the legislature passing the original Defence Forces Act from a temporary bill that required annual renewal…for the next 31 years. To understand the situation of its military as Ireland worked to secure admission to the UN, one must look back to 1921. The War of Irish Independence from Great Britain (1919–1921) officially ended on 6 December 1921 with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in London. The Treaty called for one year of Dominion status during which Ireland would transition to self-government and independence. The Anglo-Irish Treaty permitted Irish independence but retained the Irish Free State within the British Empire. Those opposed to the Treaty and retention within the British Empire clashed with the Irish who supported the Treaty in order to gain immediate independence. The resulting Civil War lasted from 28 June 1922 to 24 May 1923 when the “Pro-Treaty” forces, backed by the British Government, prevailed over the “Anti-Treaty” supporters.22 The Dáil adopted the Irish Constitution of 1922 on 25 October and the Parliament of the UK adopted the document as the Irish Free State Constitution Act of 1922 receiving Royal Proclamation on 6 December 1922. At this point, the Irish Constitution essentially comprised two documents. The first was the main constitution of 83 Articles and the second was the Anglo-Irish Treaty under Article #83 of the Constitution of 1922. The latter provided for the military forces of the Irish Free State and read: With a view to securing the observance of the principle of international limitation of armaments, if the Government of the Irish Free State establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments

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maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain.23

The first part of the Constitution followed the direction of the AngloIrish Treaty in the second part of the document and assigned specific responsibility to the Irish legislature: The Oireachtas has the exclusive right to regulate the raising and maintaining of such armed forces as are mentioned in the Scheduled Treaty in the territory of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) and every such force shall be subject to the control of the Oireachtas.24

Thus, the Constitution of 1922 provided the Legislature with the original power and authority to establish and maintain a military defense force. However, the British “approved” Constitution also governed its size in relation to that of Great Britain. The Irish Dáil adopted the bill to approve the Constitution of 1922 in a very close vote on 7 January 1923. The Irish Government and the Dáil debated and adopted a bill to establish the provisions for a national army. The Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923 governed the Irish Defence Forces from passage until 1954. This “temporary” bill provided legislative provisions to transfer executive and administrative oversight of the Irish Defence Forces to the “Executive Council” (today’s cabinet) for one year and needed amendment or re-authorization the following and subsequent years by the Dáil.25 The Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923 included the following: 4. It shall be lawful for the Executive Council to raise and maintain an armed force to be called Oglaigh na hEireann (hereinafter referred to as the Forces) consisting of such number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men as may from time to time be provided by the Oireachtas 5. The commander in chief of and all executive and administrative powers in relation to the Forces including the power to delegate authority to such persons as may be thought fit shall be vested in the Executive Council and exercised through and in the name of the Minister who shall not however allocate to himself any executive military command and who may not be a member of the Forces on full pay.

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26. The whole or any part of the Forces shall at all times be liable to be employed on active service against an enemy anywhere in Saorstát Eireann or for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder within the State.26

While the Constitution of 1922 vested the maintenance of the military with the Irish legislature, the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923 passed that responsibility as well as command to the Government (Executive Council in 1922 terminology). Second, and important for this book on Irish peacekeeping policy, the 1923 Act stated the Irish military must remain inside the state borders when conducting active service against an “enemy” or internal disorder. Following a referendum across the country, Ireland adopted a new Constitution in 1937. Article 15 of the Constitution of 1937 retained the maintenance of the military forces of Ireland with the Legislature. The document included, “The right to raise and maintain military or armed forces is vested exclusively in the Oireachtas.”27 The Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923 and amendments added during its annual extensions still remained in place along with the provisions for the Government taking the lead in maintaining the military forces and the latter under restrictions to remain within the country. As of 1946 when Ireland first submitted an application to join the UN and debated whether its policy of neutrality permitted adherence to the organization’s charter, the Irish Defence Forces were authorized by the Constitution and overseen by the legislature. However, the Dáil fulfilled these responsibilities via a temporary legislative Act that required annual renewal for continuance. The Dáil did not experience any problems with annual renewal but it was possible and never 100% guaranteed. The Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill of 1948 can be seen as an example to demonstrate the importance behind the necessity to annually renew the original Act unless introducing a permanent Act. Defence Minister Thomas O’Higgens informed the Dáil upon presentation of the 1948 temporary bill, “As the House is aware, this Bill is required to continue in force the existing temporary Acts which authorize the maintenance of the Defence Forces. The existing Acts expire on 31st March 1948. It is, therefore, a matter of urgency that the Bill should go through by the 31st.”28 Borrowing from an article written by Tom Clonan of the Technological University of Dublin, “From the inception of the Free State Army until 1954, the Irish armed forces were legislated for under the

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1923 ‘Temporary Provisions Act’. This act was repealed by the Defence Act 1954.”29 To bring Ireland’s military policy to a new post-World War II level, the Government opted to submit a bill to the Dáil that would end the 25+ year temporary measures to renew the country’s military. The process lasted three years. The Government submitted a bill on 11 December 1951 to revise the Temporary Defence Act and replace it with a document that better met Ireland’s post-World War II requirements. Following a Third Stage of debate in January 1952, the Act moved to Committee Stage where it sat until 25 March 1954. It entered the Final Stage for debate in April 1954 within the Dáil and separately in the Seanad. Amendments and the Final Stage Debate in the Seanad occurred in May 1954. The Irish President signed the Act on 13 May 1954. Debate and committee work resulted in two alterations within the Defence Act 1954 that applied more as stages toward adherence to the UN Charter. First, the 1954 Act redefined “enemy.” The definition section of the 1954 Act read, “the word ‘enemy’ includes armed mutineers, armed rebels, armed rioters and pirates.” Second, the Act provided for a limited exception to the Defence Forces operating within the borders of Ireland. The new exception applied to the maritime and aviation forces and read, “Every officer and man of the Permanent Defence Force shall be liable at all times to render military service within the State and, if he is employed on a State ship or service aircraft, be liable at all times while so employed to render military service outside the territorial seas of the State.”30

Postscript The Soviet Union dropped its veto on 14 December 1955 and Ireland entered the UN. This solved one of the three potential obstacles facing Ireland in the development of an Irish peacekeeping policy. Admission of Ireland opened the door for Ireland to participate in peacekeeping and other activities of the organization. The potential issue of a conflict between Irish neutrality and the required adherence to the UN Charter began to solve itself as Ireland developed a political philosophy to define its concepts of neutrality and adherence to the UN Charter. This extended into late 1960. The President of Ireland signed the Defence Act 1954 in May 1954 and the country entered the UN in December 1955…18 months later.

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Chapters 3 and 4 of this book will pick up the Defence Act 1954 in 1956. The Government knew upon entering the UN that they needed to amend the 1954 Act to provide the legal justification for deploying any peacekeepers with UN operations. Chapter 4 examines the continued alteration of the defense acts continued until December 1960 with the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1960. Chapter 3 of this book turns now to the initial development and application of an Irish peacekeeping policy as the Government pondered the United Nations Emergency Force I of 1956 and deployed peace observation personnel with the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in 1958 and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization also in 1958. The latter UN missions helped establish the foundation of Ireland’s policy but it would not be formalized for the military until the Congo in 1960 and the national police until Namibia in 1989. Between 1960 and 1989, Ireland continually modified its policy based on changes in situations and conflicts.

Notes 1. The Irish Constitution, 1937, https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/cons/ en/html. 2. Ray Murphy, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping? Opportunities, Challenges and Ways Ahead – Ireland,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2016), pp. 722–723. 3. United Nations Charter, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/ full-text. 4. De Valera was one of the leading statesmen and architects of independent Ireland as well as a controversial figure. He served as a leader among the Irish during the 1916 Easter Rising against the British and was nearly executed by the latter at the collapse of the Rising. In 1926 he and others left Sinn Fein which had opposed the Treaty with Great Britain and founded the Fianna Fail political party. He continued as a leading member of Fianna Fail and served as Taoiseach on three separate occasions. De Valera played a significant role in the drafting of the 1937 Irish Constitution and was perhaps one of the best to understand the founders’ intent behind Article 29. In many ways, he was a chief architect of Ireland’s “neutrality” policy in World War II and helped maintain it during the Cold War. Although it should be noted, he called for a more pragmatic “neutrality” which was more along the lines of non-alignment with military alliances and global factions. He did support Ireland joining the UN and adhering to the UN Charter. For more information on the

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5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

life of de Valera, see: Diarmaid Ferriter, Judging Dev: A Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon De Valera, Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2007; John P. O’Carroll and John A. Murphy, eds., De Valera and His Times, Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 1986. Dáil Eireann debate, Remarks of Taoiseach Eamon de Valera, Subject: Membership of United Nations Organisation—Motion, Vol. 102, No. 10, 24 July 1946, https://www.oireachtas.ie/. Dáil Eireann debate, Remarks of Deputy William Norton, Subject: Membership of United Nations Organisation—Motion, Vol. 102, No. 10, 24 July 1946, https://www.oireachtas.ie/. Dáil Eireann debate, Remarks of Deputy Patrick McGilligan, Subject: Membership of United Nations Organisation—Motion, Vol. 102, No. 10, 24 July 1946, https://www.oireachtas.ie/. Dáil Eireann debate, Remarks of Deputy Maurice Dockrell, Subject: Membership of United Nations Organisation—Motion, Vol. 102, No. 10, 24 July 1946, https://www.oireachtas.ie/. Dáil Eireann debate, Remarks of Taoiseach Eamon de Valera, Subject: Membership of United Nations Organisation—Motion, Vol. 102, No. 11, 25 July 1946, https://www.oireachtas.ie/. One example of continued post-1946 discussions about Irish neutrality and responsibilities of UN membership can be seen within the Dáil in 1948. Department of External Affairs, Confidential Internal Memorandum, Subject: “Our Participation in Congo Operation and Neutrality Generally under U. N. Charter,” 26 November 1960. Ibid. Ibid. On a related point, Conor Cruise O’Brien offered an interesting insight into Ireland’s “neutrality” within the UN. O’Brien served as the first head of the UN section (headquartered in Dublin) of the Department of External Affairs. He also worked in New York and served as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Katanga before being recalled. O’Brien and others viewed Sweden as the model for Ireland’s role within the United Nations. He stated Sweden, a neutral state in World War II and the Cold War, presented more of a non-aligned stance in international relations. O’Brien wrote Sweden’s role was “independent, disinterested, and honourable” and “Sweden paid its share, and more than its share, for all the humanitarian and peacemaking aspects of the UN work and sent out its men, soldiers, and civil servants,” on the work of the organization. For more about his views on Swedish policies, see: Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962. Ibid.

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15. The definition of Irish neutrality is a well-examined topic in academia with a common conclusion that it does not carry the same meaning for Ireland as other states in the Cold War such as Austria, Finland, Switzerland, or Sweden. It is generally either “ad hoc” in nature or modified depending upon the needs of the state. For more information on the issue of Irish neutrality and its meaning and application in foreign policy, see: Ben Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle, Noel Dorr, Irish Foreign Policy. Gill & MacMillan, 2012; Ronan Fanning, “Irish Neutrality: An Historical Review”, Irish Studies in International Affairs. Royal Irish Academy, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1982), pp. 27–38; Neal G. Jesse, “Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective”, International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 2006), pp. 7–28; Raymond James Raymond, “Irish Neutrality: Ideology or Pragmatism?”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 1983–1984), pp. 31–40; Aonghus Cheevers, “Neutrality in Irish Mediation, One Concept, Different Meanings,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Vol. 37 (2020), pp. 253–272; Karen Devine, “Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructive Framework, International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 29, No. 4 (September 2008), pp. 451–488; Thomas Hachey, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Irish Neutrality,” New Hibernia Review/Iris Eireannach Nua, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 26–43; Bill Kissane, “The Illusion of State Neutrality in a Secularising Ireland,” West European Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003), pp. 73–94; Neal G. Jesse, “Contemporary Irish Neutrality: Still a Singular Stance,” New Hibernia Review/Iris Eireannach Nua, Vol. 11, No. 41 (Spring 2007), pp. 26–43; Karen Devine, “Irish Political Parties’ Attitudes Towards Neutrality and the Evolution of the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policies,” Irish Political Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2009), pp. 467–490; Trevor C. Salmon, “Neutrality and the Irish Republic: Myth or Reality?,” The Round Table, Vol. 290 (1984), pp. 205–215. 16. For more information on Ireland’s role in the League of Nations, see: Michael Kennedy, Ireland and the League of Nations, 1919–1946: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Politics, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996; Patrick Keatinge, “Ireland and the League of Nations,” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. 59, No. 234 (Summer 1970), pp. 133– 147; Stephen Barcroft, “Irish Foreign Policy at the League of Nations 1929–1936,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1979), pp. 19–29; Francis M. Carroll, “Ireland Among the Nations of the Earth: Ireland’s Foreign Relations from 1923 to 1949,” Études d’histoire et de civilisation, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2016), pp. 35–52.

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17. Department of External Affairs Internal Memorandum, Subject: Memorandum for the Minister, 4 June 1948. 18. Department of External Affairs Internal Memorandum, Subject: Summary of Parliamentary Questions on Ireland’s Application for Membership of U.N.O., 11 October 1951. 19. Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–455. Secret; Limited Distribution, 4 November 1955. 20. United Nations Security Council Records, 705th Meeting S/705, 14 December 1955. 21. Ibid. For more information on the 10, 13, and 14 December 1955 Security Council sessions to discuss the admission of new members, see also: Leo Gross, “Progress Towards Universality of Membership in the United Nations,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 50, No. 4 (October 1956), pp. 791–827. 22. For more information on the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, see: David Torrance, The Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921, UK House of Commons Library, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP2022, 9260/CBP-9260.pdf; Daniel Mulhall, The Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921, Ambassador’s Blog, Embassy of Ireland, USA, 6 December 2021, https://www.dfa.ie/irish-embassy/usa/about-us/ambassador/ambass adors-blog/the-anglo-irish-treaty-of-december-1921.html; Houses of the Oireachtas, “The Treaty in Context,” https://www.oireachtas.ie/ en/visit-and-learn/centenaries/treaty-debates/the-treaty-in-context/; Matthew Heintz, “The Freedom to Achieve Freedom: Negotiating the Anglo-Irish Treaty,” Intersections, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2009), pp. 431–451. 23. The Irish Constitution, 1922 https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/ act/1/enacted/en/print.html. 24. Ibid. 25. For example, the Defence Forces (Temporary Provision) Act 1935, is simply an annual renewal of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923, and its amendments up to 1935. The Act simply reads, “The Defense Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1923 to 1934, shall continue in force until the 31st day of March 1936, and shall then expire.” https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1935/act/11/ section/1/enacted/en/html#sec1. For more information on the origin of the Irish Defence Forces, see: Eoin Kinsella, The Irish Defence Forces, 1922–2022, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2023. 26. Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923, https://www.irishstat utebook.ie/eli/1923/act/30/enacted/en/html. 27. The Irish Constitution, 1937, https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/cons/ en/html.

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28. Dáil Eireann debate, Remarks of Minister for Defence Thomas F. O’Higgins, Subject: Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1948—Second and Subsequent Stages, Vol. 110, No. 3, 9 March 1948, https://www. oireachtas.ie/. 29. Tom, Clonan, “Civil Control of the Military and Police in Ireland: The Armed Forces”, in TASC Audit Ireland, 2007: Power to the People? Assessing Democracy in Ireland, Dublin: TASC, 2007, page 1. 30. Defence Act 1954, https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1954/act/18/ enacted/en/html.

CHAPTER 3

Sinai 1957, Lebanon 1958, Palestine 1958

In the Minister’s view, to refuse such a request [for Irish peacekeepers] would be inconsistent with the position Ireland has always taken up, in relation to the preservation of peace by international collective action. —Department of External Affairs Memorandum to the Irish Cabinet

Introduction In January 1954, a Fine Gael Party-led coalition governed Ireland as the state neared its admission to the United Nations (UN). The Irish Department of Defence sent a note to the Department of External Affairs with a series of military-related questions prior to Ireland’s accession into the UN. The note reminded the Department of External Affairs that when becoming a member of the UN, the state would be obligated to follow and adhere to the provisions of the UN Charter. As a neutral state, what would be these obligations as applied to the Department of Defence? Would Ireland be obligated to host bases or permit transit facilities for foreign military units operating under Article 43 of the UN Charter? With the Korean War having ended the previous year and prosecuted by UN Article 43 forces (the UN military action itself was justified under Article 42), this was a good question for an officially neutral/non-aligned country to ask. As a reminder from Chapter 2 of this book, section 1 of Chapter VII, Article 43 of the UN Charter reads: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_3

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All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.1

Would Ireland be required to host foreign military forces operating under a UN mandate? Would Ireland be required to permit the transit of UN military forces through Irish territory? More importantly, would Ireland be required to provide Defence Forces personnel to the UN when requested? As examined in Chapter 2, this question had not been definitively answered by 1954. Rather members of the Dáil left the question open for further consideration when a need arose. At the same time, members noted that complying with the needs of the UN to preserve peace and security was in the foreign policy interests of Ireland.

United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) Background After Dublin accepted the invitation to join the UN, the Suez Crisis of October–November 1956 provided the situation for Ireland to ask itself the hard questions originally raised in January 1954. The political situation between Egypt and Israel continued to slowly deteriorate after the 1948 Armistice that confirmed Israeli independence and resulted in the UN mandating and deploying an unarmed peace observation force known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Palestinian guerrillas raided Israeli settlements from Gaza; the United States withdrew monetary support for the Egyptian Aswan dam project; Egypt restricted Israeli shipping; military support from the Western states arrived in Israel; military equipment from the Soviet bloc of states flowed into Egypt; and Egypt seized the Suez Canal under the banner of nationalism. The border area between Israel and Egypt lay as a powder keg awaiting the right spark and UN attempts to dampen the coming spark proved fruitless. By late October, the Israelis, French, and British developed a secret plan to strike back at Egypt. On 29 October 1956, the Israeli military launched an attack into and across the Sinai Peninsula. The British and

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French governments called upon Israel to withdraw its forces from the Sinai and requested Egypt to permit the two states to occupy three locations along the Suez Canal for the supposed purpose of protecting the waterway, ensuring the safety of global shipping, and separating the military forces of Israel and Egypt. Israel agreed to the proposal as planned with the French and British but Egypt rejected it. In response the British and French launched air strikes against Egypt on 31 October and landed military forces from naval vessels offshore. The UN convened the Security Council where the British and French applied their vetos to block a resolution submitted by the United States and then a second from the Soviet Union. In response, the UN shifted the issue from the Security Council to the General Assembly where each member holds a single vote and vetoes were not codified in the body. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, the General Assembly convened its first gathering of an emergency special session and adopted three resolutions before completing Resolution 1001 (ES-1) on 7 November 1956. The resolution mentioned a new type of UN peace mission…a lightly armed “emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956.”2 On 7 November, the General Assembly adopted a follow-on resolution, 1001 (ES-1), officially mandating what is now known as the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) and calling upon the Secretariat to begin recruiting contingents from UN member states. The resolution reads in part: Having established by its Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force, having appointed the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chief of the Command with authorization to him to begin the recruitment of officers for the Command, and having invited the Secretary-General to take the administrative measures necessary for the prompt execution of that Resolution. Noting with appreciation the second and final report of the SecretaryGeneral on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force as requested in General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-I), and having examined that plan, 1. Expresses its approval of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations

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2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Force as expounded in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General’s report; Concurs in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General’s report; Invites the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of member-States concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objective of its balanced composition; Requests the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force; Approves provisionally the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General’s report; Establishes an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from each of the following countries: Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which do not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command; Authorizes the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary administrative and executive action; Determines that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities defined for it in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Advisory Committee shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him under the present and other relevant resolutions; Decides that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which, in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself; Requests all member-States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved.3

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UNEF I began deploying to Egypt on 15 November 1956. Conceived by former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, UNEF I differed from the previous UN peace observation missions which arrived unarmed and performed observation duties in support of the peace process (one between India and Pakistan and UNTSO on the Israeli borders with its neighbors). UNEF I included the deployment of battalion sized contingents that were lightly armed.4 Planning Considerations for UNEF I On 9 November 1956, two days after the General Assembly adoption of Resolution 1001 (ES-1), the question as to whether Ireland would provide a contingent with UNEF I arose. The Irish Department of Defense sent a classified “secret” note to the Department of External Affairs not only reminding them of the January 1954 memorandum and a September 1955 briefing to the Government but also to raise new questions related to the 7 November 1956 resolution to support a peace process to end the Suez Crisis. The Minister for External Affairs, Liam Cosgrave, arrived in New York City that morning to attend the opening of the UN. Cosgrave spoke to the press upon arrival and Radio Éireann (officially known as Raidió Teilifís Éireann and more commonly referred to by its abbreviation RTÉ in the Irish media) carried his remarks in Ireland. Mr. Cosgrave told those at the press conference that Ireland had not yet decided whether to volunteer troops for the United Nations’ Forces proposed for the Middle East.5 At this point, the Government Departments knew they needed to address various concerns related to possible Irish hosting of transiting UN forces or providing its own contingent to the newly established UN mission. The Department of Defence’s 9 November memorandum laid out the concerns that legislative (modification of the Defense Act 1954) and other actions would be necessary before “the Defence Forces or any part thereof could participate in an International Police Force such as that at present under consideration by the United Nations.”6 These changes included, first, defining and permitting service outside the state. The modification of Defence Act 1954 applied to naval and air personnel. Second, resolving issues associated with “command” of Irish Defence Forces outside the state. Third, defining active service vs. reserve service availability for deployment outside the state. Fourth, establishing guidelines for field punishments and field courts-martial conducted outside the

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state. Fifth, redefining the concept of “enemy.”7 The lack of a direct UN approach for Irish troops for UNEF in 1956 resulted in little achievement for altering the Defense Act 1954 to accommodate participation in a UN peacekeeping operation at this point. Senator Roger Joseph McHugh, a member of the Seanad representing the National University of Ireland, addressed the concept behind the development of UNEF by the UN on 21 November and questioned whether Ireland would participate. Minister for External Affairs Cosgrave offered the Government’s opinion in response. His comments are enlightening for understanding the Government’s view on participation in UNEF in late 1956. According to Cosgrave’s comments, Ireland as a new member of the UN was not ready to volunteer yet. The Dáil must address the issue if the Government opted to provide Defence Forces personnel. Cosgrave’s comments seemed to indicate the Government was not fully clear on how easy it would be to secure legislative support for an amendment on short notice. He stated that public support in favor of Irish participation in a UN operation would help ensure the amendment would be easier to achieve in the legislature. However, if the UN approached Ireland and requested personnel for UNEF, the situation would be different than the state just volunteering on its own. In summary, Cosgrave believed Ireland should wait and observe how the UN’s first armed peacekeeping operation developed. While many in Ireland might support an Irish deployment, the situation for volunteering did not seem to be in the interest of Irish domestic politics at that time. If the Irish public overwhelmingly called for participation or if the UN directly approached Ireland for a contingent, the situation would obviously be different, and the Government would examine the decision in that new light. …we think that this is not the time when we should offer to contribute to the police force. It might be that, if matters developed and if we were requested to do so, considerations of a different character might emerge…The situation is new. We were not asked or requested to contribute, nor was it suggested that we should. In these circumstances, I think it would be better for us to wait and see how matters develop. It is perhaps something that should be considered, although if we felt morally obliged to make an offer of volunteers, it would be necessary to have an amendment of the law. That is not a very serious matter, if there was a very genuine view in the country that we should offer to support this international emergency force. I think it would be necessary to amend the

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Defence Forces Acts before we could send any troops. If there was a very large volume of public opinion desiring that we should make this gesture in the interests of international peace and as a small nation very vitally interested in the maintenance and preservation of peace, and also as being vitally interested in economic security, it would be easy enough to secure an amendment of the Defence Forces Acts. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, as a new member, and it not having been suggested to us that we ought to contribute something, and in the very unprecedented circumstances in which this force was evolved, I think it is better for us, as a small nation, and a new member of the United Nations, at least to await developments.8

Concerns re-awakened in July 1957 with the increased possibility Ireland would be asked to replace the Indonesian contingent in UNEF. A March 1957 change of Government re-introduced Fianna Fail to the political scene with Eamon De Valera returning as Taoiseach and Frank Aiken as Minister for External Affairs. The Department of External Affairs prepared an internal memorandum for the Government after receiving a note from Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (PMUN). The 29 July 1957 document alerted each Cabinet Department for a “likely” approach by the UN for a peacekeeping contingent: The Head of Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations has informed the Minister for External Affairs that it is likely an approach may be made to the Irish delegation by the Secretary-General to ascertain whether Ireland would be ready to contribute a contingent to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) at present stationed in Egypt.9

Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken made it very clear to the Cabinet that Ireland should be ready and willing to accept an approach by the UN Secretary-General: In the Minister’s view, to refuse such a request would be inconsistent with the position Ireland has always taken up, in relation to the preservation of peace by international collective action. The United Nations Emergency Force represents one of the best examples of such action being effectively taken.10

Serious consideration for amending the Defence Act 1954 moved to center stage. The Government realized Ireland could not dispatch a

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peacekeeping contingent until the Defence Act had been amended and that would require approval by the Dáil once the Government agreed on the wording. The Government approved another key question in July 1957—how to handle inquiries from the media, populace, and other governments relating to requests for Irish peacekeepers. Variations of this solution have been applied to inquiries for many years after 1957. The phrase to answer queries would include: The Irish Government would have no objection in principle to contributing a contingent to a United Nations Emergency Force. If requested to contribute such a contingent the matter as favourably as possible in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.11

Discussions between the Departments of Defence and External Affairs continued through August before the development of a memorandum for consideration at the Cabinet meeting on 3 September to review points that had been under discussion since the end of July. First, the Cabinet approved the specific wording of a statement to present as listed in the 29 July memorandum if queried for a Government opinion for answering a call by the UN for a peacekeeping contingent. Second, the Minister for Defence received permission to draft a bill for the Dáil to consider changes to the Defence Act 1954 in order to permit an Irish contingent to deploy overseas in support of UNEF in the Sinai. However, the Minister would not submit the bill to the Dáil “until the need for it in a more definite form.”12 The Departments of External Affairs and Defence developed and refined the amendments for the Defence Act 1954 through November. The Office of the Taoiseach made revisions at the end of November. On 21 March 1958, the Government Secretary issued a memorandum confirming the Department of Defence’s work to prepare amendments to the 1954 Defence Act the inclusion of a provision for requirement of Dáil approval “for the dispatch of an Irish contingent for service outside the state with an International Force of the United Nations,” and the requirement that the draft bill for the amendments would not be submitted to the Dáil nor reproduced into written form “without the prior authority of the Government.”13 The UN did not call upon Ireland to deploy a peacekeeping contingent to UNEF. While perhaps anticlimactic, the

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Government at least raised the issues and discussed their possible solutions for the future. Ireland needed to wait only four months before a UN request developed for Irish personnel to another peacekeeping mission.

United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) Background Lebanon, a charter member of the UN, achieved its independence from France at the same time as the formation of the global organization in 1945. The Lebanese Government functioned under a careful balance between the Christians and Muslims who lived in the country. Lebanon with its large Christian population existed under a National Pact which prohibited the former from aligning with Western states or seeking Western military intervention and the Muslim population from unifying the state with Syria. The Prime Minister would always be a Sunni Muslim; the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim; and the President and Commander of the Armed Forces Maronite Christians. The positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Speaker would be Greek Orthodox Christians. A Druze Muslim officer would serve as the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Parliamentary seats were held on a 6:5 ratio of Christian to Muslim deputies. The Suez Crisis of 1956 helped flame feelings of Pan-Arabism across the Middle East and the movement challenged the delicate balance of political and military power in Lebanon. Many Muslims questioned the continued application of the 1932 census, which set the Christians at 51% of the total population, in determining the population ratio with Christians. The situation in the state worsened in 1958 when the Christian President declared that he wanted to serve a second term in contrast to the National Pact which called for one term in office. The Muslim population protested the declaration and many openly called for Lebanese unification with Syria. On 22 May 1958, Lebanon requested the UN Security Council to examine its situation citing interference in the state by the United Arab Republic (a political union formed between Egypt and Syria in February 1958) and military intervention from Syria itself. The Security Council adopted Resolution 128 (1958) on 11 June 1958 calling for the UN “to dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to

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ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders.”14 Planning Considerations for UNOGIL The UN Secretary-General sent a note to the Irish Government via PMUN in June 1958 requesting Ireland to provide five of the expected 100 unarmed peace observers to oversee the mandate of UNOGIL. The Department of External Affairs forwarded the request to the Government which examined the question at a Cabinet Meeting on 24 June 1958. The Government agreed to the Secretary-General’s request and authorized five Defence Forces officers for the UN observation force.15 The officers departed for Lebanon three days later on 27 June 1958.16 The Secretary-General doubled the size of UNOGIL as a result of a related crisis in Jordan and requested five additional officers in the grade of major or captain for Lebanon from 29 July.17 At this point in the narrative, there needs to be a pause to examine what just happened in Irish political history. The UN requested Irish personnel to join a newly mandated peace observation mission and the Irish Government quickly approved it, assigned five Defence Forces personnel to the operation, and deployed them. In other words, Ireland received, responded, and deployed peacekeepers in less than one week without having joined a UN peacekeeping mission before this one. Ireland had not completely developed a peacekeeping decision making process yet had reacted quickly due to the emergency need of the global organization. We can see the first application of two steps in the process. Ireland received an official and formal request to dispatch five observers to UNOGIL. Second, the Irish Government met to consider the UN request and task the Department of Defence to select and deploy the requested assets when the operation to provide peace observers in Lebanon was within the foreign policy interests of Dublin. However, should the Dáil be involved in the decision making process? The Government opted to not involve the Dáil before deploying the Defence personnel, and this point raised a legislative question the following month. As Richard Heaslip of Dublin City University’s School of Law and Government noted, “…the issue was unlikely to be contentious for de Valera’s [Fianna Fail] government given the interest of Costello’s [Fine Gael] government the previous November [1956].”18

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Most, if not all, members of the latter Government would still be sitting in the Dáil as opposition party members. Mr. John McQuillan, an Independent in the Dáil who later in 1958 joined the National Progressive Democrats Party, raised a question for the Fianna Fail Minister for Defence, Kevin Boland, on 17 July. McQuillan asked Boland how many officers had volunteered to deploy to Lebanon with UNOGIL and noted The Irish Times reported the men were “volunteers” in its 27 June article.19 Boland chose his words carefully and responded: A general invitation was not issued to officers to volunteer for duty with the U.N. Observation Group in the Lebanon. Twelve eminently suitable officers were invited to volunteer and all of them did so. From these, five were selected, this being the number requested by the Secretary General of the U.N.20

Deputy McQuillan: Am I correct in suggesting that the reports in the daily papers in this connection were absolutely inaccurate in so far as they suggested that all Army officers were entitled to volunteer for service and that from the number of applications so received suitable members were selected? I have no objection whatever to the five selected but is it not a fact that the officer personnel of the Army were presented with a fait accompli?21

Minister Boland: The fact is that 12 eminently suitable officers were invited to volunteer and they all did so. From those 12, five were selected.22

Deputy McQuillan: Would the Minister tell me how he arrived at the idea of selecting 12 men from whom volunteers should then be selected?23

Minister Boland: It was the most practicable way of dealing with the matter. Twelve suitable people were selected.24

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Boland’s remarks in the discussion with McQuillan provided two points related to the deployment. First, Boland offered an indication that the Government was quickly responding to an urgent deployment. Second, the comments raised a question to be examined when the Government proposes amendments to the Defence Act. Defence Forces personnel should be selected from a pool of true volunteers of those willing to serve outside the country in a particular UN operation. During the same legislative day, Mr. Lionel Booth of Fianna Fail addressed then Deputy Liam Cosgrave during a Committee on Finance Meeting to offer his support for the Government decision to deploy the five peacekeepers. Booth commented: Deputy Cosgrave made a reference to the international situation. Here again I feel that the Government deserves great credit for its prompt answer to the appeal of the United Nations Secretary. I have long felt that we should take a more active part in international affairs and in the working activities of the United Nations. So far as I know this was the first occasion that a request came to an Irish Government from U.N.O. When we were asked to send observers to the Lebanon they were sent there at once. Those officers in the Defence Forces are probably now in a certain amount of danger but, knowing them as I do, and I know some of them, I am perfectly convinced that they will behave in an exemplary manner no matter what conditions may arise. I hope everybody will join in expressing our concern for them with our confidence that, whatever they are called on to do, they will do it as Irish soldiers should.25

The UN requested five additional Irish observers on 29 July, ten on 20 August, and ten on 17 September which was then increased to 25 on 18 September. The Government approved the deployment of 50 of these personnel between June and September. None of these requests were sent to the Dáil for consideration. Although there had been many discussions and plans developed to amend the Defence Act 1954 to permit a possible contingent deployment of armed personnel with UNEF, at this point there was not a requirement for the Dáil to approve the dispatch of unarmed observers. It can be said that the discussion in the Dáil and Seanad provided tacit approval of both houses for the deployment. Objections were not raised other than to question whether the Irish officers were actually volunteers for the UNOGIL mission. The UNOGIL mission ended in December 1958 following a 16 November request by the Foreign Affairs Minister of Lebanon to remove

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his country’s issue from the UN Security Council agenda. The next day UNOGIL recommended its termination. On 21 November the UN Secretary-General submitted a plan for UNOGIL’s termination and repatriation of observers to their home states. The withdrawal began on 26 November and completed on 9 December. Other than being the first UN peacekeeping or peace observation mission with which Ireland deployed personnel, UNOGIL can also be recognized for seeding the Irish contribution to UNTSO in December 1958.26

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Background Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948. The next day Palestinian Arabs and Israel’s Arab neighboring states militarily intervened in response to the declaration. The UN Security Council called for a cessation of hostilities on 29 May via Resolution 50 (1948) which included a provision for the deployment of military observers for verification of the cessation of hostilities process on behalf of the UN Mediator in Palestine. The first UN military observers arrived in June. Their numbers continued to grow and the organization remained in the area to oversee the 1949 Armistice Agreements.27 Planning Considerations for UNTSO Most Irish officers returned home at the termination of UNOGIL but two were transferred to serve with UNTSO on the borders of Israel and its neighbors. The release of the transfer announcement was made on 16 December. The two officers included Colonel Justin McCarthy who led the first five Irish officers to UNOGIL and later became deputy commander of the mission.28 Since the two men were already authorized as unarmed members of a UN observation force, the Government did not request permission of the Dáil for the further deployment of the two men. Ireland has maintained small numbers of unarmed observers with UNTSO since 1958. Some of these personnel later served as temporary advance party members of UNTSO deployed to open new observation missions in the Middle East and are covered in later chapters of this book.

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Postscript Ireland was not anxious to participate in a large-scale peacekeeping mission like UNEF I in 1956. First, UNEF I deployed during the first year of Ireland’s seating in the UN and despite years of waiting, the Irish delegation needed to develop an understanding for the politics within the global body. Although Ireland played important roles within the League of Nations, the UN was not the League of Nations and had operated for the past 10 years as more of a post-World War II club of the victorious Allied powers who were seriously divided between the two Cold War blocs. Irish and later UN diplomat Conor Cruise O’Brien covered this point well in his book To Katanga and Back. Perhaps equally in importance, the Irish army was very small by the standards of a country of its size and operated with antiquated equipment as of 1956. Lebanon in 1958 perhaps provided the best scenario for Ireland’s introduction to UN peacekeeping. Being a small unarmed peace observation mission, the Irish Government could justify accepting the UN request and dispatching the personnel without a formal vote in the Dáil. UNOGIL proved a good testing ground for Ireland in the receipt of a request and official Government procedure for acceptance, assembly, and deployment of Defence Forces personnel with a UN observation force. From the deployment with UNOGIL, it proved easy for the Government to transfer some personnel to the UNTSO in Palestine. Richard Heaslip mentioned the important role of UNOGIL in his journal article on this period. He wrote: In reality, the UNOGIL mission was a proving ground and a steep learning curve for the Irish state, its civil service and its Defence Forces. In New York, the staff at the Permanent Mission, using the limited communication means of telegram, air mail, diplomatic courier and the unreliable nature of the transatlantic telephone, maintained very effective lines of communication with their headquarters in Iveagh House.29

However, Ireland’s initial peacekeeping decision making process did not survive for more than two years after the UNOGIL deployment. In 1960, the UN found itself dispatching large numbers of armed peacekeepers into the newly independent Congo. Many individuals at multiple levels did not fully understand the complexity or magnitude of the situation in the Congo which quickly forced Ireland to re-examine its decision making process. Quite frankly, ONUC was not a UNOGIL or UNTSO.

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Ireland needed to twice amend its Defence Act and include Dáil approval under certain new conditions related to the deployment of Irish Defence Forces personnel in service with the UN. The next chapter turns to an examination of this process for Irish participation in ONUC.

Notes 1. United Nations Charter, section 1 of Chapter VII, Article 43, 26 June 1945. Article 43 calls upon UN member states to provide assistance and resources when the global organization must act to restore peace and security. Article 42 of the UN Charter permits the organization to conduct military operations to restore peace and security when non-military efforts have failed. Thus, military personnel in the Korean War were “Article 43 forces” conducting an Article 42 operation. For those wanting to read more on the UN’s justification for military actions, see: Nigel D. White, “From Korea to Kuwait: The Legal Basis of United Nations’ Military Action,” The International History Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 597–617. 2. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1000 (ES-1), 565th plenary meeting, 5 November 1956. 3. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1001 (ES-1), 567th plenary meeting, 7 November 1956. 4. For more details on the background to the Suez Crisis and the establishment of UNEF I, see Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, The Suez Crisis, Routledge Sources History, UK: Routledge, 1997; Guy Laron, Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle Over Third World Industrialization, 1945–1956, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013; Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964; Hanny Hilmy, Decolonization, Sovereignty, and Peacekeeping: The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 1956–1967 , Spring International Publishing, 2021. 5. The Department of External Affairs changed its name to the Department of Foreign Affairs on 3 March 1971. Reference Mr. Cosgrave: Liam Cosgrave was the son of a prominent founder of the Irish Free State and entered politics at an early age in 1943 with the Fine Gael Party. In 1954, he became the Minister for External Affairs and held that position through the entry of Ireland to the UN. However, he departed that position before Ireland deployed its first peacekeepers to Lebanon in 1958. He served as leader of Fine Gael from 1965 to 1977 and sat as Taoiseach from 1973 to 1977. 6. United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 43, section 1.

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7. Department of Defence memorandum to the Department of External Affairs, No Subject, S/502 Secret, 9 November 1956. 8. Seanad Éireann. Remarks of Minister Liam Cosgrave, “Adjournment Debate—United Nations Emergency Force,” Volume 46, No. 1, 21 November 1956, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 9. Department of External Affairs memorandum to the Irish Government, Subject: Memorandum for the Government: Irish Contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force, 305/173/1, 29 July 1957. Frank Aiken was a lifelong associate of Eamon de Valera beginning in 1977. Both men were members of Sinn Fein. Aiken served as an Irish Republican Army commander fighting the British for Irish independence and later with the anti-Treaty forces in the Irish Civil War. He departed Sinn Fein and joined the new splinter Fianna Fail Party with de Valera. Aiken held the portfolio of Minister for Defence from 1932 to 1939 and Minister for External Affairs 1951–1954 and then 1957–1969. During the latter term, he also served as Tanaiste 1965–1969. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Office of the Taoiseach, Cabinet Minutes, S.16137, 3 September 1957. 13. Office of the Taoiseach, Memorandum, No Subject, S.7359F, 29 March 1958. 14. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 128 (1958), S/4023, 11 June 1958. For more on the interventions and UN observation missions in Lebanon and Jordan, see: Bruce Riedel, Beirut 1958: How America’s Wars in the Middle East Began, Brookings Institution Press, 2019; Stephen Blackwell, British Politics and Society: British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955–1958, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2012; Kamal Salib, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958–1976, Caravan Books, 1976; Richard E. M. Heaslip, “Ireland’s First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 17 (2006), pp. 31–42. 15. Department of External Affairs Internal Memorandum, Subject: United Nations Observer Group in the Lebanon, 29 July 1958. 16. “Irish Officers Leave To-Day,” The Irish Times, 27 June 1958, page 1. 17. A 14 February 1958 political unification between Jordan and Iraq ended on 2 August following a July coup in Iraq. King Hussein of Jordan called for Western assistance resulting in a brief British military intervention in his country and an American intervention in Lebanon. Forces from the United States and Great Britain arrived in July. The Americans departed Lebanon in October and the British left Jordan in November. The UN increased the size of UNOGIL due to the rising tensions in Lebanon and resulting American intervention in the state. For more on Jordan in

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22.

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1958, see: Stephen Blackwell, British Politics and Society: British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis, 1955–1958, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2012. Richard E. M. Heaslip, “Ireland’s First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 17 (2006), page 37. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy John McQuillan, “Army Officers as U.N.O.,” Volume 170, No. 1, 8 July 1958, www.oireachtas-debates. gov.ie. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for External Affairs Kevin Boland, “Army Officers as U.N.O.,” Volume 170, No. 1, 8 July 1958. Kevin Boland served as Ireland’s Minister for Defence for the Fianna Fail Party from 1957 to 1961. Thus, he held this key position during Ireland’s first deployment of unarmed peace observers in 1958 as well as Ireland’s first armed peacekeeping deployment to the Congo in 1960. www.oireachtasdebates.gov.ie. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy John McQuillan, “Army Officers as U.N.O.,” Volume 170, No. 1, 8 July 1958, www.oireachtas-debates. gov.ie. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for External Affairs Kevin Boland, “Army Officers as U.N.O.,” Volume 170, No. 1, 8 July 1958, www.oir eachtas-debates.gov.ie. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy John McQuillan, “Army Officers as U.N.O.,” Volume 170, No. 1, 8 July 1958, www.oireachtas-debates. gov.ie. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for External Affairs Kevin Boland, “Army Officers as U.N.O.,” Volume 170, No. 1, 8 July 1958, www.oir eachtas-debates.gov.ie. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Lionel Booth, “Vote 3—Department of the Taoiseach,” Volume 170, No. 6, 8 July 1958, www.oireachtas-deb ates.gov.ie. For more information on Ireland in UNOGIL, see Ruairi Costen McCormack, “Engagement and Lessons Learned; Irish Defence Forces’ Involvement in United Nations Military Observation Missions UNOGIL, UNTSO and UNIPOM,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 30 (2019), pp. 153–169. For more information on Palestine, the UN, and the introduction of UNTSO, see: Danilo Di Mauro, The UN and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: American Hegemony and UN Intervention Since 1947 , Routledge, 2012; Willem-January Van Der Wolf, The United Nations and the Question of Palestine, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014.

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28. Colonel McCarthy died from injuries sustained in a traffic accident in October 1960 as a member of the Irish contingent deployed in support of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). 29. Richard E. M. Heaslip, “Ireland’s First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 17 (2006), page 37.

CHAPTER 4

The Congo 1960

Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations reads as follows: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter.” The Minister for External Affairs feels that in accordance with the spirit of this article it is incumbent on Ireland to take steps as it can to to comply with the Secretary-General’s request. —Irish Department of External Affairs memorandum for the Irish Government

Introduction The year 1958 marked the first overseas deployments of Irish peacekeepers. They arrived in Lebanon and Palestine as unarmed military observers. As a United Nations (UN) member since the end of 1955, Ireland had been eligible to consider an invitation of the SecretaryGeneral to participate in peace missions of the organization. A reexamination of what it meant to be a “neutral” state helped ensure Irish peacekeepers would not take sides in a conflict and could uphold the state’s foreign policy vision of supporting peace across the globe. Finally, the Defence Act 1954 provided Ireland with an army that did not need to be passed from the Dail to the Government for oversight on an annual basis. This ensured the UN and the Irish did not have to consider an © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_4

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unlikely time when the legislature might not extend the legislation that funded and provided for army oversight by the Government. However, it was the Congo Crisis of 1960 that played a major role in the Irish development of its peacekeeping decision making policy that until that year had moved slowly along the timeline since 1954.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) Background Independence from Belgium arrived for the Congo on 30 June 1960. The state was arguably the least prepared African colony at independence. The structures for an independent Government and the availability of Congolese individuals educated and trained to assume the various roles in government, the court system, police, and military were practically non-existent. The new Congolese army, the Force Publique, mutinied four days after independence. Many Belgian expatriates still lived in the Congo conducting business, prompting Belgium to return its military forces to the Congo to restore order and protect Belgian citizens. The chaos left the new Congolese President, Joseph Kasa-Vubu, and Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, entangled with taking control of the new Government, negotiating with the mutinous army, and dealing with the return of Belgian soldiers. As the situation deteriorated, Belgium, with the “invitation” of Moise Tshombe, moved military forces into the Katanga region of the Congo which had announced its independence from the new state on 11 July. Most of the Congo’s mineral wealth lay in Katanga and many European businessmen held interests in ensuring the region remained close to Europe if not under Belgium control. The next day, 12 July 1960, Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba officially requested assistance from the UN citing the uninvited Belgian military intervention in the Congo, a sovereign state, as a violation of the UN charter. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 143 (1960) calling for the removal of Belgian troops. The resolution itself marked the international division on the issue when the Security Council adopted it with the abstentions of France, the UK, and Republic of China on 13 July. To add fuel to the fire, Lumumba requested assistance from the Soviet Union which hurled the Congo Crisis into the Cold War. In response Kasa-Vubu dismissed Lumumba in early September. The latter refused

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to leave office and Kasa-Vubu dissolved Parliament. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) arrived in the middle of this political and military chaos. Ireland approached its first contingent-sized peacekeeping deployment in the midst of this state collapse. It might not have been foreseen before the summer of 1960 but ONUC played a major role in helping to define an Irish peacekeeping decision making policy and how its political system would evolve a series of “checks and balances” on their deployment. Government Receipt and Consideration of a UN Request for a Peacekeeping Contingent Ireland followed the “rough draft” of its initial peacekeeping policy from 1958. First, Dublin received a UN request for peacekeepers. An official request from the Secretary-General to the Irish Government for the allocation of an infantry battalion for deployment with ONUC arrived in the office of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (PMUN) on 17 July 1960, four days after the adoption of Resolution 143 (1960). PMUN immediately coded the message for telegram transmission to Dublin. Being the first official UN request for an armed Irish contingent for a peacekeeping mission rather than individual personnel for an unarmed observation operation, an examination of the message is worthy at this point. The UN message below is transcribed from the first person of the Secretariat to the third person for transmission from PMUN to Dublin. It is also transcribed by the author from the mid-twentiethcentury “telegramese” without punctuation and articles to plain English. The wording of the original telegram, which can be confusing to decipher, is included in the footnote: The Secretary-General suggests the Irish Government put at UN disposal one battalion with light arms and normal supporting services. If this is impossible or difficult to do, he asks the Government to instruct the Irish Permanent Mission so that it can discuss with the Secretary-General the best form for an Irish contribution to the force. He specified “to put at UN disposal”. Either way meaning he wants the troops in the Congo at the earliest date possible. Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, and Ethiopia are supplying five battalions between them. Service logistics and other personnel to support the battalions have been requested from African and non-African states. Please instruct us on an answer.1

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From the hasty telegram, it can be ascertained the UN officially requested one lightly armed Irish infantry battalion capable of providing the basic essential services of a unit that size (medical, food service, basic supply needs). Long-term logistics and supply services will be provided by contingents from other countries. If Ireland is not able to provide a battalion, the Secretary-General wants to know what it can offer in support of ONUC. Four African states have already offered five infantry battalions between them so Ireland would not be deploying alone to the Congo and awaiting reinforcements. Finally, it is important to the Secretary-General for an Irish contingent to arrive as quickly as possible in the Congo due to the collapsing situation in the new state. Joseph Morrison Skelly comments that Irish interests during the decision making process for ONUC can be attributed to two political views. While Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken strove to reduce the political conflict that helped fuel the Cold War, Taoiseach Sean Lemass’ foreign policy tended to follow an economic approach and “tilt to the West in the Cold War.”2 This included developing closer ties with the European Community which had been established in March 1957— the same month that Fianna Fail returned to power in Ireland. Since 1957, Aiken, acting more like an Irish Permanent Representative at the UN rather than a Minister of External Affairs in the eyes of Norman MacQueen, directed Irish foreign policy to be more assertive in terms of supporting the UN and its goals and programs. Tackling the Cold War, and war in general, through conflict mitigation and arms control were important tools in the eyes of Aiken who actively supported the seating of the People’s Republic of China on the Security Council and global disarmament to the discomfort of the American delegation at the world body.3 Conflict mitigation included active Irish support for UN peacekeeping operations as covered in the previous chapter. Politically within the General Assembly Ireland played a growing role in arms control and disarmament efforts during the period 1957–1961.4 This active stance on conflict related issues provided a foundation for Ireland to dispatch one, and later a second, battalion to the UN interest in deploying a peacekeeping operation to the Congo in 1960. Irish Government and the UN Request for Peacekeepers Having received a UN request for an Irish contingent for ONUC, the first step of the Government was not necessarily to immediately approve

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or disapprove the UN approach. Rather the Government needed to turn to its planning documents of 1957 and 1958 related to amending the Defence Act 1954 to permit the deployment of armed Irish peacekeepers outside of the state’s territory. This required legislative approval even before the Government could officially respond to the UN. The Department of Defense prepared a memorandum for the Government that outlined the steps required to amend the Defence Act 1954. In the 19 July 1960 document, the Department of Defense reminded the Government of the provisions in the September 1957 and March 1958 documents covered in Chapter 3 of this book. In writing the final copy of the bill for submission to the legislature: 1. The scope of the bill should be confined to only the contribution of an Irish contingent to a “United Nations Force which would be engaged in action of a police character.” 2. The bill should require “prior approval” of the Dáil before the deployment of an Irish contingent with a United Nations International Force outside the state. 3. The bill should not be submitted to the Dáil “until the need for it emerged in a more definite form.”5 The Government discussions in 1954 and 1957 resulted in four important points highlighted in the 19 July 1960 memorandum. First, Ireland will only dispatch troops outside the country if requested by the UN for a UN operation. Second, the mandate of the UN Force must be “police” related rather than a type of peace enforcement like the Korean War. Third, the Dáil must grant its approval before the Government could deploy the contingent. Thus, the Government could not send an Irish contingent on a mission outside the state and then ask the Dáil for permission after the fact. Fourth, the Government should not submit the bill with these amendments to the Defence Act until there is an actual need to address a UN request for Irish military personnel. With this document, one can see the origins of Ireland’s official threestep peacekeeping decision making policy of the late twentieth century. First, the Government must receive a request from the UN for an Irish peacekeeping contingent. Second, the Government must decide whether the state should accept the UN request. This included the ability of Ireland to logistically meet the request and whether it met Ireland’s

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foreign policy interests including the determination by the Government that the UN mandated it as a “police” type mission to support a peace process rather than a peace enforcement operation requiring the peacekeepers to use force to accomplish its assignment. Third, if the Government approved the deployment, it would then draft a bill for consideration by the Dáil where members of all parties in the legislature could question the Government on its decision and verify a deployment of Irish personnel not only met Ireland’s foreign policy goals and interests but also ensured the maximum support and protection of the Irish soldiers to be posted outside the state. The 19 July Irish Department of Defence memorandum also included the provisions requesting the Dáil to approve the deployment of an Irish battalion with ONUC in the Congo. The document stated: The International Force being assembled at the moment by the United Nations for service in the Congo is engaged in action of a police character. A draft bill has been prepared by the Parliamentary Draftsman, based on decisions understood to have been reached at discussions which took place on the 18th instant [18 July] between An Taoiseach and the Ministers for Defence and External Affairs. These decisions call for a temporary measure only, with life of six months, and limited in its application to member of Na Buan Oglaigh [Irish for the Permanent Defence Force].6

Debating the Defence (Amendment) Act 1960 Taoiseach Sean Lemass read the Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960 to the members of the Dáil on 20 July 1960 for their consideration and debate. If supported by the legislature, the bill would officially become an amendment to the Defence Act 1954. All of the provisions within the amendment applied to the overseas deployment of Defence personnel. However, due to the urgent nature of the UN request, the Government proposed the bill as a temporary measure which would cover the initial six-month deployment of Irish peacekeepers with ONUC. During this period, the Government planned to prepare a more comprehensive bill that could be introduced for debate. The latter bill, to be discussed later in this chapter, would then permanently apply to the Irish Defence Forces unless modified or repealed in the future. Lemass delivered his presentation to the Dáil in two distinct segments. First, he noted the Government agreed to accept a UN request for an

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Irish peacekeeping contingent for ONUC and sought Dáil approval of the action. Second, the Taoiseach outlined the need for legislative action to amend the Defence Act 1954 to permit the overseas deployment of Irish military personnel with UN police forces. Lemass opened with a direct statement of his first request: As Deputies are aware, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has requested the Government to contribute a Battalion of Irish troops to the United Nations Force which is at present being constituted for service in the Congo. The Government have decided to comply with this request and the purpose of this Bill is to enable them to do so.7

The Taoiseach then defended the Government’s decision to accept the Secretary-General’s request for Irish military personnel. First, he cited three provisions within the UN Charter that apply to all members of the organization. Article 2, section 5, reads, “All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.” Article 25 states, “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” Finally, the Taoiseach quoted Article 43, section 1, “All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” When examined together, the three Charter articles require members to accept and abide by the decisions of the UN Security Council, provide assistance to the UN in any action taken by the organization, and provide assistance in armed personnel, transit, and/or facilities to help the UN maintain global peace and security.8 Second, the Taoiseach justified the Government’s decision by noting ONUC is an international effort, and Ireland is just one of many countries answering the call of the UN Secretary-General. Lemass highlighted that “the present endeavour is a great co-operative effort of the world community, and we hope it proves a valuable precedent for the future.”9 Third, ONUC is a peace force mandated to protect the lives and property of those in the Congo. It is not a peace enforcement operation

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mandated to apply military force to compel disputants to accept and abide by a peace process. The Taoiseach informed the Dáil deputies: In brief, the purpose of the United Nations Force in the Congo will be to act as an independent entity for the purpose of protecting lives and property wherever they are endangered in consequence of the inability of the Government of the Congo to ensure such protection from its own resources. The role of the United Nations Force will be limited to that task. It will have no role to play in any problem of a political nature in the Congo, existing or future.10

Fourth, participation in ONUC is in the foreign policy interests of Ireland. In presenting this defense of the Government’s decision, Lemass reminded the deputies of Ireland’s recent experience in the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL): This is a situation in which Ireland has an opportunity of contributing to the maintenance of peace and order under the Charter of the United Nations…Two years ago we provided a force of 50 officers for service in the United Nations Observation Group in the Lebanon. All the reports I have received speak in the highest terms of the efficiency and the devotion to duty they displayed. Indeed, I might mention, as a matter of interest, that one of these Irish officers, Colonel Justin McCarthy, has just been appointed to replace General von Horn, now in the Congo, as Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East. I have no doubt that the battalion we propose to provide in response to the present request from the Secretary-General will maintain the high standard set by our officers in the Middle East, that it will redound to the credit of the Irish Defence Forces and uphold our reputation as a loyal member of the United Nations.11

Taoiseach Lemass turned to the second part of his introduction—the need to amend the Defense Act 1954 by the Dáil to permit the deployment of Irish personnel outside the state. At this point, Lemass sought temporary Dáil approval for the amendment. Before the expiration of the initial six-month mandate of ONUC, he promised to return to the Dáil with a permanent bill. He declared: The sending of Irish troops outside the limits of the State requires legislation by the Dáil. Foreseeing the possibilities that requests, such as the present, might be received, the Government have had legislation for this

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purpose under consideration for some time. It was proposed to ask the Oireachtas to pass a permanent Bill with a clause requiring approval of the Dáil by Resolution before it could be applied in any specific instance. The urgency of the present request from the Secretary-General has prompted the Government to seek the co-operation of the Dáil in the passage into law, for a limited period of six months, of the special temporary measure now before the House. The permanent measure the Government has in mind will be introduced before the termination of the six-months period. The purpose of the present measure may be simply stated. Its purpose is to authorise the sending of contingents of the Permanent Defence Force outside the State for duties of a police character on behalf of the United Nations and, secondly, to provide in respect of such members of the Defence Forces as may volunteer for service overseas during the period of its operation the same statutory conditions of service as apply to members of the Defence Forces stationed at home.12

Deputy James Dillon, the leader of the opposition Fine Gael Party, addressed the Taoiseach upon the completion of his introduction of the bill. Dillon offered Fine Gael Party support but provided a firm reminder to the Taoiseach that the Dáil needed more detailed information on the mandate and mission of ONUC and expected Lemass to provide it in a timely manner: Accordingly, we shall facilitate the Government in the passage of this Bill to make that contribution by us to this joint force within the shortest possible time. We feel, however, that though the Taoiseach has been in a position to read out for us some extracts from the statement by the Secretary-General as to the functions of the proposed international force acting under General von Horn, of which our battalion will form a part, the Government has not only a right but a duty to seek from the Secretary-General a further clarification of the scope and the duration of this assignment in the Congo. I do not think it is unreasonable in the circumstances, with the House about to adjourn for the Summer Recess, that we should ask the Taoiseach to reassure us that he will keep us informed of any information that may reach him. Subject to these observations, we accept our liabilities as members of the United Nations, recalling that Deputy Cosgrave attended there first on behalf of the Irish Government, and we shall provide the Government with the facilities it seeks to pass this Bill today.13

Deputy Brendan Corish, the Labour Party leader, spoke after Deputy Dillon. Corish also offered his general support for the Government’s

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effort to assist the UN and demonstrate Ireland’s commitment to global peace. At the same time, he expressed concern for the complexity of the Congo’s problems and the safety of Ireland’s volunteers for the ONUC mission. His remarks demonstrated awareness that there would always be dangers associated with deployments in UN operations but he wanted to make sure Ireland did not place its military personnel into excessive danger in an irresponsible manner: Our volunteers will be sent there in good faith by the Government, with the consent of this House, to police and patrol under the direction of a General appointed by the Security Council or by the Secretary of the United Nations. I would ask the Taoiseach to send someone there outside the Army, who would keep an eye on the situation to see that our volunteers are not involved in something in which they should not be involved. Our volunteers, as I say, are going as a peace force to patrol and police, to try and ensure that there will be law and order, but we do not know whether in two weeks’ time, or in two or three months’ time, there may be a different situation. None of us can pretend to understand fully what colonialism has been in the Congo, and Africa generally, and cannot know what developments might take place in time to come. For that reason I think there should be some member of our Diplomatic Corps appointed— if there is someone there already it is all right—to act as liaison officer to see that we do not become too involved.14

Deputy Joseph Blowick, leader of the Clann na Talmhan Party, offered his small party’s support for Ireland’s assistance to the UN through a contingent for ONUC. Blowick added his concern for the possible death or disablement of Ireland’s soldiers assigned to ONUC. He, too, wanted assurance for protection of Ireland’s personnel as well as proper compensation to support them or their families if injured or killed in the Congo.15 Deputy Frank Sherwin, an Independent member of the Dáil, proved to be one of the more pessimistic of the deputies while examining the Congo from a realist-based viewpoint. For him, the Congo was large with complex problems and ONUC would be small and not able to oversee the entire country which faced many problems. His one question related to the volunteers for the Irish contingent. “If men wanted to back out of this Force and return home, could they do so?”16 Deputy George Russell, another Independent member of the Dáil, perhaps expressed Sherman’s concern in a more direct manner related to the role of the Government.

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Russell asked the Taoiseach, “If the Government feel that the Irish troops are being used, or attempted to be used, for a purpose other than that for which they were sent out, have the Government the right to withdraw this Force?”17 Deputy John McQuillan, leader of the National Progressive Democrats Party, raised an important question for consideration by the Dáil. If the body does approve a bill to permit overseas deployments of Defence personnel with UN operations, will the latter be Government decisions? The Taoiseach has referred to the fact that the Government have been considering permanent legislation which would enable them to send our permanent Defence Forces outside the State. I am sure that comes as news to many Deputies. I am rather disturbed at hearing the Taoiseach say that this measure, which is only a temporary one, will be replaced, possibly, before the six months elapse, by permanent legislation. Is it envisaged, on that basis, that this contingent of 500 or 600 may be in the Congo for the next 12 months or two years? Is that his feeling when he suggests that this permanent legislation will come in before the temporary legislation lapses? That is the impression I get—that their stay will be very prolonged.18

Following additional comments by deputies, the Taoiseach addressed the various concerns and attempted to answer them based on what the Government understood about ONUC and the situation on the ground in the Congo from the UN. Debate within the Dáil in December 1960 will later verify that Lemass presented a rather simplistic understanding of the many issues plaguing the Congo at independence. Many in the Government did not fully appreciate the situation in the Congo within which Irish defence personnel would be entering. The Dáil examined and voted on individual sections of the Bill. The next day the Taoiseach addressed the Seanad (the Senate composed of appointed specialists in various fields). Members of the Seanad tended to offer verbal support for Ireland’s decision to respond to the UN request for a battalion earmarked for ONUC. Many of the Senators echoed a comment made the previous day in the Dáil by asking for a non-military Irish diplomat to accompany the Irish contingent in order to provide oversight for the unit and perhaps assist the Congolese government.19 The Dáil and the Seanad approved the bill following further debates. These actions provided legislative approval to amend the Defence Act 1954 for six months in order to permit a battalion (to be increased

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to two battalions in August) of Irish Defence Forces personnel to deploy outside Ireland in support of ONUC in the Congo. Receipt of a UN Request for a Second Irish Battalion The Irish Government received a cable from UN Secretary Dag Hammarskjold on 30 July 1960…only four days after the President of Ireland Eamon de Valera, the former Taoiseach and leader of Fianna Fail, signed the bill officially amending the Defence Act 1954. The wording of the cable illustrates the position Hammarskjold found himself at this time in relation to the urgent need to act in the Congo as well as his understanding that he was asking much from a small state that had been a UN member for less than five years. Following a “thank you” for agreeing to his request for the first Irish battalion, the Secretary-General moved quickly to his purpose with an emphasis on both of the points just mentioned. He wrote: It is with hesitation that I address you again, but a review of our needs undertaken here, along with the Commander, has led me to the conclusion that an increase of the military potential is necessary for a length of time which I cannot yet determine. It is of the highest importance that some balance is maintained in the force between African and non-African elements.20

The Secretary-General mentioned in the cable that he also requested a second Swedish battalion which would then replace the first Swedish contingent which temporarily transferred to ONUC from UNEF between Israel and Egypt. Hammarskjold added that his list of possible states for contingents was very limited. It should be noted at this point that all contingents faced the ‘test’ of the UN Security Council. If any of the five permanent members, with an emphasis on the United States and the Soviet Union, disagreed with a particular contingent due to Cold War politics or any other factor, the opposition could remove their consideration from the table. The Secretary-General also sought a geographical balance of states providing continents to peacekeeping missions. This demonstrates a form of global commitment to the UNbacked peace process. At the same time, the UN could not lean too heavily on Third World states. While their political commitment to the UN could be very strong, Third World states often lacked the equipment

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and training for major military deployments. Thus, the Secretary-General needed to ensure a balance between perceived global politics, geographical representation, and capabilities when requesting contingents. The Secretary-General informed the Taoiseach: You will have realized in our choice of troops from Europe we are limited by certain obvious political and technical circumstances. I have to rely in the first instance Ireland, and Sweden, and I see at present few if any possibilities to seek or to get support from other countries in Europe. This is my excuse when I address to you an urgent request to consider the possibility of organizing and sending to the Congo a second battalion. I know that I’m going very far in taxing your resources, your generosity and your spirit of international solidarity, but I trust you will believe me when I say that this appeal is not made light-heartedly or without due consideration of all the aspects of the problem.21

The Irish Ministers for External Affairs, Defence, and Finance reviewed the Secretary-General’s request in light of Ireland’s current situation and provided their opinions for consideration by the Government prior to actual discussion and a vote on how to respond. The Minister for External Affairs acknowledged the delicate position in which the UN SecretaryGeneral found himself. He noted contingent selection was very limited and that if the UN failed in the Congo, the organization would face a compromise of its ability and global value as a mediator in disputes. He recommended approval of Hammarskjold’s request. The Minister for Defence stated “…the Army authorities will make the necessary troops available” if the Irish Government agrees to deploy a second battalion to ONUC. The Minister for Finance did not offer any objections and remarked he would discuss finances in more detail at any Cabinet meeting addressing the question.22 The Cabinet met on 4 August 1960 to discuss the Secretary-General’s request for a second Irish battalion for ONUC. However, the Cabinet added a caveat to its acceptance to the request. Ireland acceded to the UN but informed the organization that the state would maintain two battalions in the Congo for only six months. Upon the end of the first battalion’s six-month mandate (in accordance with the Defense (Amendment) Act 1960 approved the previous week), Ireland would not replace it while another battalion was deployed in the Congo. In other words, the Government agreed to deploy two battalions but for only six months after which the state’s contribution to ONUC would return to one battalion.

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As of August 1960, even maintaining a single battalion in the Congo depended upon the Dáil approval of a new Defence Act amendment at the end of the calendar year.23 The next day, 5 August 1960, the Taoiseach dispatched his official reply to the Secretary-General via a cable to PMUN. The key points of the Taoiseach’s message read: …I am happy to inform you that the Government have decided to comply with your request that a second Irish Battalion should be sent to the Congo and an announcement to this effect was issued here yesterday…We keenly appreciate your difficulties and are anxious to cooperate to the utmost in helping you to meet them. However, I feel bound to advise you that it would not be possible for Ireland to keep two Battalions in the Congo for longer than six months. Accordingly, any Irish contingent remaining there after that period could not exceed one Battalion. You are, I think, aware that pending the enactment of further legislation the existing statutory authority for the despatch of Irish contingents is limited to a duration of six months.24

Turning to Irish poet William Butler Yeats and later the Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe, Irish participation in ONUC can be described in terms of “Things Fall Apart.” The first Irish peacekeepers entered Katanga Province in the Congo as the former declared its unilateral separation from the latter. Many argue that mercenaries who operated in Katanga in support of the separation did so under the encouragement, and pay, of special interests in Rhodesia, the UK, and France. While the politics and military operations related to Katanga are beyond the scope and purpose behind this book, the situation is important to mention due to its impact on Ireland one month before the Government submitted a new “permanent” bill to the Dáil and Seanad to extend Dublin’s Defence Forces in the Congo under ONUC. Nine Irish peacekeepers died in Katanga on 8 November 1960. These were the first overseas deaths of the modern Irish Defence Forces and it left Ireland stunned. Baluba tribesmen ambushed the peacekeepers and only one Irishman survived the attack. Developing details filled the pages of The Irish Times throughout the rest of November and into December…the same period of time the Dáil met to debate the new bill to replace the temporary Defence (Amendment) Act 1960. It was obvious before the Dáil met to consider the bill that the deputies who informed Taoiseach Lemass in July that the situation in the Congo was more

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complicated than he and the UN truly understood and portrayed to the public were ultimately correct. A somber mood could be witnessed in many areas of Ireland as the nine young men (literally…most were teenagers) who marched through Dublin months earlier to waving crowds returned to the same streets transported in coffins in the beds of trucks for burial. The press presented a ray of hope that echoed again among many in Ireland. Despite the incident, the Irish proudly remembered their soldiers as young men carrying out a UN mission that represented the state’s commitment to peace and the perceived values of the global organization. At this point of time, the Irish commitment to UN peacekeeping could have sat on thin ice that might crack at any point. The Dáil and Seanad could have voted to not approve the new permanent Defence Act Amendment bill. Ireland could have declared the state commitment to UN peacekeeping was too costly for the small country. But it did not.25 Noel Dorr, a junior officer in the Department of External Affairs UN section in Dublin at this time, wrote about the impact of Niemba on Ireland in his memoirs on serving in the Department of External Affairs and at the PMUN during Ireland’s early years at the UN: Ireland was sobered by the tragedy: this was no longer a great adventure; these deaths were real. But if the innocent idealism of the initial decision to join the UN force was tempered by the stark reality of Niemba, it was not diminished. I do not recall that there was any serious proposal at the time that the Government should withdraw the Irish contingent…Rather there was a kind of sad pride in the fact that the Irish peacekeepers had given their lives for an international ideal, and a belief that continuing the commitment would give meaning to their sacrifice.26

Approximately 10 days prior to returning to the Dáil for a permanent Defence Act amendment to permit the continued Irish participation in ONUC upon the termination of the temporary amendment adopted in July, the Department of External Affairs examined the Irish foreign policy of neutrality (covered in Chapter 2 of this book) and developed a statement applying the concept to ONUC. The resulting 26 November 1960 document stated: …in acceding to the request of the Secretary-General to send a contingent to the Congo, we were simply fulfilling the kind of obligation of the existence of which we were at all times conscious…Our experience

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of the United Nations since we became a member (five years earlier) had convinced us that the United Nations is a most valuable instrument for reducing international tensions and maintaining world peace…27

Debating the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1960 Taoiseach Sean Lemass returned to the Dáil on 7 December 1960 to present the bill that would replace the Defence (Amendment) Act 1960, if approved by the legislature. The former Amendment would expire in January 1961, six months after the President signed it in July 1960. Being a temporary measure governing the deployment of Ireland’s two battalions in the Congo, continuation of Irish participation in ONUC depended upon another Amendment to replace it. Irish peacekeepers were scheduled to depart the Congo by 25 January 1961 if the Dáil declined to support the new Amendment. Lemass opened his presentation with a review of the events leading to the passage of the temporary Amendment and its application to the two battalions already in the Congo. He also emphasized UN Secretary Dag Hammarskjold’s comments that the total contingents available to the UN were “far from adequate.” If Ireland did not continue its support with adoption of the new Amendment and new deployment of a single replacement battalion of peacekeepers, the decisions could have consequences for the UN’s efforts in the Congo.28 Lemass informed the deputies: If, as I hope, the Oireachtas approves the present Bill, the legislative basis will exist for dispatching one battalion to replace the two now in the Congo when they have been withdrawn. I wish to make it clear, however, that whether or not this new battalion will go to the Congo will depend on two conditions. The first is that, in the judgment of the Government, the situation there requires the continued presence of a United Nations force and of European contingents in that force. The second condition is that the objective of a United Nations force in the Congo will still be as it was when the first contingent was dispatched, that of helping to keep peace and order in the Congo while the Congolese people and leaders are getting themselves organised and able to carry that obligation themselves without United Nations help.29

Within his initial comments to the Dáil, Lemass presented a response to the questions many deputies certainly, if quietly, held at that point. Will

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Ireland hand its peacekeepers to the UN to direct as the organization wishes and will continued participation in ONUC jeopardize Ireland’s sense of neutrality and support for peace and security across the globe? Lemass assured the deputies that the Government will monitor the situation in the Congo and within the UN and will deploy Irish peacekeepers only if the situation warrants their expertise and geographical balance to maintain the perception of a truly global response. Also, and perhaps more importantly, the Government will monitor the situation to ensure the mission of ONUC remains one of peace support for the Congolese government as it works to establish itself and hold together the state. The recent memories of the Niemba Ambush certainly lay in the air of the assembly at the opening of the discussion and Lemass wasted little time in addressing the issue: Because of the tragic loss of Irish lives in the Congo operations of the United Nations, and because the preservation of order and protection of lives there have involved clashes with sections of the Congolese peoples whom we desire only to help, and the possibility that similar clashes may recur before order is finally restored under a functioning and representative Congo Government, it is understandable that we face the enactment of this measure, and the possible dispatch of another Irish contingent, after the battalions now serving there have been withdrawn, with greater anxiety, arising from clearer appreciation of the hazards attending the enterprise, than we may have had in July last. I feel, however, that all Deputies, like the vast majority of our people, understand the importance to mankind of the task to which we have been committed, and that we could not, in conscience or in honour, withdraw from it so long as there is, in the judgment of the United Nations, a continuing need for our help.30

Deputy James Dillon, leader of the Fine Gael Party, addressed the Taoiseach first as customary for the largest party not participating in the Government. He opened with comments about the countries contributing to the Congolese strife due to their own interests. He did not “name names” but noted outside interference hindered the UN mission. He also supported the continuance of Ireland’s participation in ONUC: I think it will be the duty of our Government, whenever and in whatever circumstances that duty may arise, having taken our full part in proportion to our resources, in the effort to establish the sovereignty of the Congo

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people in their own country, to name emphatically any power which seeks to frustrate the common purpose of the United Nations in which we have played our part.31

Labour Party leader, Brendan Corish, responded to the Taoiseach after Deputy Dillon. He agreed with the Amendment in principle but addressed the term “contingent.” As he noted, a “contingent” could mean all approximately 8,000 Irish soldiers and anything smaller than that number. This initiated a lengthy and sometimes confused discussion on the meaning of the word for the Amendment and how it would be applied to Government and Dáil decisions related to deployments of peacekeepers. Minister of Defence Kevin Boland and Fine Gael Deputy General Sean MacEoin (twice a former Minister for Defence) joined the debate. This is a rather important debate in terms of establishing precise numbers of Irish peacekeepers and which Irish Governmental structure (Cabinet and/or Dáil) has approval authority for the deployment. At times the debate can be rather confusing as different individuals applied their personal interpretations to the Amendment and in turn were “corrected” by others. Dáil deputies stepped forward to correct deputies perceived as being confused by the intentions of the Government’s deployment policy. Rather than going point by point across the debate that stretched into another day, it makes for better clarity to list the points upon which the Government and Dáil agreed applied to the term “contingent” and if, and when, the Dáil granted approval before the deployment of Irish peacekeepers with the UN. At the conclusion of debate, the following parameters were set: 1. The Government must receive a request from the UN for a contingent for a UN mission operating as a peace force in order to send Irish peacekeepers outside the state. 2. The Government can dispatch unarmed observers to UN peace observation missions without a requirement for Dáil approval. 3. The Government can dispatch up to 12 armed peacekeepers without the requirement for Dáil approval. 4. The Government must acquire Dáil approval for the deployment of a “contingent” or group of 13 or more armed peacekeepers to the same UN operation. This includes 13 or more being dispatched

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initially or an addition of more peacekeepers that would increase an existing deployment contingent above 12 in number. 5. The Government can replace Dáil approved contingents with new contingents (e.g., personnel replacement after six months) without a new Dáil resolution. The Government can increase the size of a contingent that has already been Dáil approved for over 12 peacekeepers without a new Dáil resolution. For example, the Government can increase the size of a Dáil approved contingent of more than 12 (e.g., 50 armed peacekeepers) to an even larger one (e.g., 150 armed peacekeepers) without an additional Dáil resolution.32 While discussion in the Dáil included reminders that some deputies warned the Government of the complexities in the Congo situation and the dangers posed to Irish peacekeepers prior to the initial deployment, no one presented serious opposition to the continued deployment of an Irish battalion with ONUC. The Irish Government and Dáil agreed to dispatch a new battalion of volunteers for ONUC.

Postscript In 1962, Ireland permitted two officers assigned to ONUC to temporarily transfer upon UN request from the Congo to West Irian. Indonesian forces invaded West Irian (the western half of New Guinea) as a result of a dispute with the Netherlands over the administration of the region. By August 1962, Dutch and Indonesian troops faced each other throughout the area. The UN brokered an agreement to transfer responsibility for West Irian to Indonesia. In the meantime the organization developed the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to administer the area until Indonesia assumed full political control of the area. The two Irish officers, from 37 Infantry Battalion, transferred from the Congo to serve as temporary observers for UNTEA. They joined other peacekeepers from Sweden, India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Senegal with the mission to arrange local agreements between conflicting parties and oversee the repatriation of Indonesian troops. The area is now the Indonesian Province of Irian Jaya. The Irish Government duplicated the decision making process it employed to transfer officers from the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to the United Nations Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO) at the end of the former mission in 1958 and covered in Chapter three. UNTEA remained on the ground from 21

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August 1962 to 4 October 1962 when it was replaced by the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF). Ireland maintained a battalion of peacekeepers in ONUC until June 1964. A total of 26 Irish soldiers died serving with ONUC in those four years beginning in July 1960. This represents the second highest Irish total for a peacekeeping mission and smaller than only the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The deployments included the heroic Irish defense at Jadotville from 13 to 17 September 1961. During the siege, 3,000 Katangese fighters and foreign mercenaries battled a force of 155 Irish peacekeepers. The Irish surrendered without any fatal casualties after exhausting their ammunition and drinking water. The Katangese suffered approximately 300 battle deaths. While military operations are not a function of this book, it is worth noting and honoring this group of Irish soldiers who were essentially ignored and forgotten by their Government until the early twenty-first century. A 2004 Defence inquiry cleared the unit of misconduct allegations that lay over the personnel since 1961. In 2016, the soldiers received an Irish Presidential Unit Citation for their gallant defense.33 On 17 September 1961, the last day of the engagement at Jadotville, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold died while attempting to negotiate an end to hostilities in Katanga. His plane crashed under mysterious circumstances, still believed today due to hostile fire, while heading to a meeting in what is now Zambia. Conflict continued until Katanga rejoined the Congo in February 1963 permitting the UN to plan the withdrawal of ONUC. The operation officially ended on 30 June 1964. Ireland’s commitment to the UN and UN peacekeeping did not go unnoticed during the ONUC deployment. In 1961, members of the UN General Assembly awarded Ireland with a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. During the same period, Irish Lieutenant-General Sean MacEoin (the two-time former Minister of Defence under the InterParty Government dominated by Fine Gael) served as the ONUC Force Commander between January 1961 to March 1962. Even as the last Irish battalion prepared to depart the Congo at the end of ONUC’s mandate, the Irish Government had already initiated discussions related to the possibility of deploying peacekeepers to Cyprus. This process is covered in the next chapter.34

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Notes 1. Permanent Mission to the United Nations telegram to the Department of External Affairs, Codified Telegram No. 63, 17 July 1960. The original request arrived from PMUN via a coded telegram. One can imagine having to read the urgent original message after it was decoded. For those not familiar with twentieth-century telegrams, the word “STOP” was inserted to indicate a break between two sentences when the electronic transmission was received and typed back into narrative form. Telegrams did not tend to include punctuation, often written in unusual abbreviations, and included typos. “Ori” is not an inclusion of an Irish word but rather is a typo. The following is the literal original telegram: He suggests Government put at UN disposal ori (one?) battalion with light arms and normal supporting services STOP If impossible or difficult to do this he asks Government to instruct Permanent Mission so that it can discuss with him the fist (best ?) form for a contribution to the force STOP cperified phrase quote to put (fly) at UN disposal unquote EW? Meaning that he wants the troops in Congo at earliest date possible STOP Morocco Tunisia Ghana Ethiopia supplying five battalions STOP service logistic and other personnel have been requested from other African and non-African states STOP Please instruct. 2. Joseph Morrison Skelly, Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945–65, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1997, page 216. Skelly notes in this book that the ONUC deployment “reflected Ireland’s commitment to international institutions, which it had exhibited since the foundation of the state…What’s more, it was a concrete expression of faith in the UN….” (page 268). 3. Norman MacQueen, “Frank Aiken and Irish Activism at the United Nations, 1957–1961,” The International History Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May 1984), pp. 214–217. 4. Catherine Manathunga, “The Evolution of Irish Disarmament Initiatives at the United Nations, 1957–1961,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 7 (1996), pp. 97–113. 5. Department of Defence memorandum to the Government, Subject: Defence (Amendment) Bill of 1960, S/7359, 19 July 1960. 6. Ibid. Being restricted to the Na Buan Oglaigh [Irish for the Permanent Defence Force] will raise a question in the 1988 deployment of Irish Garda [police] to Namibia. A new amendment to the Defence Act was required to add the police to the provision for overseas deployment with UN police forces. This is covered in Chapter 10 of this book.

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7. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Taoiseach Seán Lemass, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 8. Ibid and United Nations Charter. 9. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Taoiseach Seán Lemass, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy James Dillon, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 14. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Brendan Corish, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 15. Clann na Talmhan was a short-lived agrarian-based party with appeal to small farmers in the western area of the country. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Joseph Blowick, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtasdebates.gov.ie. 16. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Frank Sherwin, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 17. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy George Russell, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 18. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy John McQuillan, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 183, No. 14, 20 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 19. Seanad Éireann, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 52, No. 21, 21 July 1960, www.oireachtas-debates. gov.ie. 20. United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold cable to Taoiseach Sean Lemass, 30 July 1960. 21. Department of External Affairs memorandum to the Irish Government, Subject: “Request from UN for a Second Battalion for Congo Force,” S/ 384/2, 2 August 1960. 22. Ibid. 23. Department of the Taoiseach, Cabinet Minutes, S.16137, 4 August 1960. 24. Department of the Taoiseach cable to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 5 August 1960.

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25. For more information on the Niemba ambush, see: Tom McCaughren, The Peacemakers of Niemba: The Full Story of the Congo Ambush, Ireland: Somerville Press, 2018; David O’Donoghue, “Army’s Congo Mission Casts a Long Shadow,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 17 (2006), pp. 43–59. 26. Noel Dorr, Ireland at the United Nations: Memories of the Early Years, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2010, page 75. 27. Department of External Affairs, Confidential Internal Memorandum, Subject: “Our Participation in Congo Operation and Neutrality Generally under U. N. Charter,” 26 November 1960. 28. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Taoiseach Sean Lemass, Defence (Amendment) Bill 1960—Second and Subsequent Stages, Volume 185, No. 6, 7 December 1960, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Dillon. 32. Compiled from multiple points of agreement between the Government and Dáil involving multiple speakers. 33. For further reading about Jadotville, see: Declan Power, Siege at Jadotville: The Irish Army’s Forgotten Battle, Ireland: Blackstone Publishing, 2016; Rose Doyle, Heroes of Jadotville: The Soldiers’ Story, Ireland: New Island Books, 2016. 34. For further reading about ONUC in the Congo, see: Michael Kennedy and Art Magennis, Ireland, the United Nations and the Congo: A Military and Diplomatic History, 1960–1, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2014; Andrew Hudson, Congo Unravelled: Military Operations from Independence to the Mercenary Revolt 1960–68, Africa at War #6, Warwick, UK: Helion and Company, 2019; Alanna O’Malley, The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations During the Congo Crisis 1960–1964, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2019; Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A U.N. Case History, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963; Nina Heathcote, “Ireland and the United Nations Operation in the Congo,” International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 11 (1971), pp. 880–902; Richard E. M. Heaslip, “Ireland’s First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 17 (2006), pp. 31–34.

CHAPTER 5

Cyprus 1964 and India-Pakistan 1965

The Government of Ireland have agreed in principle, subject to the adoption by the Dáil Éireann of the resolution required by Irish law, to comply with the Secretary-General’s request to contribute a Battalion of approximately 500 men to the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. —Irish Government Memorandum to the United Nations

Introduction The 1964 Irish decision to deploy peacekeepers in Cyprus represents two interesting factors related to the establishment of an Irish peacekeeping policy. First, the decision is the initial test of this policy after its development in 1960 for the United Nations Operation in the Congo and compelled the Government to follow the procedures laid down that year. Not everyone in the Dáil fully understood the process and questioned whether they would have a role in the decision related to dispatching an Irish peacekeeping contingent to Cyprus. Taoiseach Sean Lemass and Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken of the Fianna Fail political party, held the same Government positions in 1964 as they did in 1960 when developing Ireland’s policy for armed peacekeepers. However, in 1964, the Government was divided with Lemass in favor of sending Irish peacekeepers to Cyprus and Aiken against the proposal. How would this

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particular change impact decision making behind the dispatch of Irish soldiers overseas under a United Nations (UN) mandate? Second, the peacekeeping deployment decision making process lasted nearly four months between January and April 1964. Following the application of Irish peacekeeping policy as related to Cyprus permits a review of not only the questions raised about its post-1960 application but also how it can be seen as a political decision over a lengthy period of time.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Background Cyprus is an island state in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with a population that is primarily ethnic Greek (approximately 77%) but with a sizable Turkish minority (approximately 18%). The island became a British crown colony in 1925. Many of the ethnic Greek Cypriots longed for unification of the island with Greece while many Turkish Cypriots desired to join Turkey. Violence erupted in the 1950s as nationalists within both ethnic groups pressed for their preferred option. Opposition by both sides to the British occupation persuaded London to begin seeking a means to achieve a peaceful solution on the island. Turkish Cypriots called for partition of the island rather than accept any plan that included annexation by Greece. The British included Greece and Turkey (known as the Guarantor states) in the discussions for a solution which resulted in an agreement between the three countries as well as leaders of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots referred to the Treaty of Guarantee. A plan for sovereign independence of Cyprus included a constitution that granted considerable power to the Turkish Cypriots compared to their population numbers. Civil service positions would be distributed on a proportion of 70% Greek Cypriot and 30% Turkish Cypriot and the latter could block many types of unfavorable legislation in the parliament. A Treaty of Guarantee stated Cyprus would not be annexed to another country and remain under the protective eyes of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey with all three states retaining the right to militarily intervene to guarantee this provision. Cyprus achieved independence from Great Britain on 16 August 1960. In November 1963, the Cypriot government of Archbishop Makarios III initiated constitutional reforms to negate many of the privileges guaranteed to the Turkish minority in 1960. Fighting between the two

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communities erupted on 21 December 1963 as extremist groups on both sides turned on each other resulting in the death of over 500 people. Small garrisons of Greek and Turkish soldiers stationed on the island in accordance with the treaty at independence joined British troops permanently based in Cyprus to conduct joint patrols to help stem the violence while accusations of some Turkish units fighting with Turkish Cypriots abounded in the press. Tensions increased as Turkey threatened to intervene in accordance with its treaty rights and the United Nations Security Council convened on 27 December to discuss the crisis.1 Civil strife continued as both Cypriot sides refused to adhere to calls for a cease fire. Greece declared its concern of an imminent Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the crisis on the island brought two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the brink of war. The United States and Great Britain sought means to stem the conflict before the situation deteriorated into open warfare. The joint British-Greek-andTurkish patrols were the first attempts at a multinational solution. On 30 December, Britain’s Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, proposed the establishment of a British-manned neutral zone across the island that would essentially divide the island between the two factions.2 The first official Cypriot note of acceptance for a UN presence on the island occurred on 6 January 1964. Cyprus informed Secretary-General U Thant that it agreed to welcome his personal observer to the island. At the time this offer extended to the one personal representative of the Secretary-General and not any type of peacekeeping operation. Talks continued as the British offered new proposals for an international force to deploy to Cyprus due to inaction by the UN on mandating a peacekeeping operation. The United States and Great Britain looked at the possibility of dispatching troops from NATO countries. However, the inevitability of the United States being seen as partial toward the Greeks or the Turks could easily result in cracks in the military alliance and even American expulsion from military bases in either country. Some American diplomats, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, expressed concern in a meeting with the British ambassador to the United States on 24 January that any hostilities between US and Turkish troops on Cyprus could result in Turkish military attacks on US bases in that country.3 Ideas shifted from a NATO-based operation to one that would be Commonwealth-based before the UN actually mandated a peacekeeping operation for Cyprus. Both the United States and Great Britain desired

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for any international force, even one essentially NATO in origin, to include at least one neutral state. Frequently the discussions mentioned Ireland as a choice for that neutral state due to its prior peacekeeping experience in Lebanon and The Congo and status as a non-NATO West European state. Peacekeeping Policy Step One: Receipt of a United Nations Request for Contingent Support Discussions regarding the establishment of an international force for Cyprus continued through January and February 1964. The first public statement directly connecting Ireland with any international or peacekeeping force destined for Cyprus appeared in the British newspaper The Observer on 19 January 1964. The paper quoted an Irish officer “freely discussing the possibility that Irish troops may be called on to replace the British in Cyprus.”4 On 28 January, the Irish Independent carried a story from the Cyprus Mail noting that the Cypriot Government declined a British suggestion for an international police force on the island and suggested a UN force. The same article mentioned the British informally named Ireland along with Canada and Scandinavian states as participants in the proposed international force.5 The Irish Times reported a similar story the same day. The article within this newspaper quoted a correspondent who stated “it is almost certain that Irish troops will be requested” if an international force for Cyprus is formed. When queried about Ireland being mentioned in connection with this operation, the Irish Government Information Bureau declared the country had not received an invitation to participate in any international force bound for Cyprus.6 The articles printed on 28 January helped prompt the Department for External Affairs in Dublin to dispatch a telegram on 29 January to the Irish delegation at the UN providing the Irish Government’s position that the Cypriot Constitution and situation were “unworkable” and declaring that Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, “would not be anxious to receive a request for Irish troops.”7 On 30 January, Mr. T. O’Sullivan, the Acting Irish Permanent Representative at the UN, conveyed Aiken’s message to Ralph Bunche, the chief mediator for the UN Secretary-General.8 Irish foreign policy interests behind a decision on Cyprus were divided. In particular, Dublin did not want to see a partition of Cyprus as the British had partitioned Ireland itself.9 The Irish government tended to

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lean more favorably toward the Greek Cypriots rather than the Turkish Cypriots since the 1950s. The former were the leaders in pushing for independence from Great Britain or union with Greece while the latter tended to be more in favor with the status quo, partition, or union with Turkey. Irish sympathies for the Greek Cypriots were based on their own historical struggle for independence from Great Britain. At the same time, many Turkish Cypriot leaders called for a partition of the island by the British which would establish Greek and Turkish exclusive territories on the island. This plan reminded the Irish of the distasteful division on their own island between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland which remained under British rule. Ireland would directly raise this issue with the UN in February. O’Sullivan dispatched a confidential letter on 4 February to the Department of External Affairs informing Dublin he heard from the US delegation that Archbishop Makarios “twice inquired regarding the possibility of having an Irish contingent in the [proposed UN] force [under discussion for Cyprus].”10 O’Sullivan also reported that he presented the Irish position to Robert Blake of the American delegation and added: I told him [Blake] that our Government doubted the wisdom of sending a UN force to Cyprus in present circumstances and that we had in fact let it be known to the Secretariat that we were not anxious to receive a request to contribute troops to such a force.11

Someone leaked the conversation between O’Sullivan and Robert Blake of the American UN delegation to the Irish Independent which then published the story a week after the meeting indicating the latter officially requested Dublin’s participation in a peacekeeping operation. O’Sullivan informed Dublin on 17 February in response to this article, “A casual question was put to me by a member of the US mission but this cannot be regarded as an official approach of any kind.”12 Despite Aiken’s desire to avoid an official request for Irish peacekeepers, other countries continued to place Ireland on the short list as a contingent provider. O’Sullivan transmitted another message to Dublin on 7 February warning: The name of Ireland is increasingly mentioned in conversation with a possible non-NATO peace force in Cyprus. We have used every effort to discourage this in conversation with colleagues and journalists who have

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approached us on the subject. The line we have taken is that our Government doubts the wisdom of sending a UN force to Cyprus in present circumstances and would therefore be reluctant to serve in such a force.13

The Department responded the next day and informed O’Sullivan: Minister [Aiken] not in today but pending instructions you should not, repeat not, speak to journalists about our attitude. For your information, press inquiries here have been met with a simple statement that we have had no request from the UN for an Irish contingent. You should not go beyond this pending instruction.14

The press continued to print speculation on the situation. Leo Muray of the Irish Independent wrote on 7 February (the same day O’Sullivan sent his message to Dublin) that the American and British representatives at the international talks on the Cypriot crisis being held in London proposed to Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou that Irish and Swedish contingents should be included in an international force. Muray wrote: No sounding of the Irish or Swedish governments will be made, however, until the Cyprus government has agreed and the whole plan for an international force, including expenditures, has been agreed upon in detail between the US, British, and Cyprus governments.15

An unattributed handwritten note on the above article stored in the Irish National Archives offered a government position: It is disturbing to see the way Mr. Leo Muray keeps up the pressure on the question of Irish troops for Cyprus. I suppose on balance it’s better to take no position as far as he is concerned, especially in view of our UN démanche.16

The Observer printed a story on 9 February that quoted Cypriot Prime Minister Archbishop Makarios saying that he wanted Ireland to be a participant in any international force deployed to Cyprus. Thus, despite Irish reluctance, Cyprus and the states involved in settling the crisis continued to include Ireland as a favored troop providing state.17 The next day, 10 February, US Under Secretary of State George Ball telegrammed the American Secretaries of State and Defence from the

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American embassy in Greece. Ball mentioned Ireland as a possible participant in an international force led by Great Britain and not under either NATO or UN direction. Although more cautious than other international reports mentioning Ireland, the telegram clearly indicated the US viewed Ireland as a desired contributor to any international force bound for Cyprus.18 Cornelius (Con) Cremin, the Irish Ambassador to Great Britain, met with Sir Arthur Snelling of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) on 10 February—the same day Ball sent his telegram from Greece to Washington, D.C. The Ambassador prepared a secret memo of the conversation outlining the discussion points and forwarded a copy to Dublin. The memo highlighted the problems the US and Great Britain faced in securing contingents for the proposed international force. France would not contribute while German and Italian soldiers would face an unwelcome atmosphere due to World War II. The US considered a single battalion but could not see a way around the perception of bias by either Turkey or Greece. The British felt the tensions of imperial overstretch with its military forces deployed in Northern Ireland, East Africa, and Malaya. Archbishop Makarios rejected a heavy NATO member-based force driving the British to look at adding Commonwealth troops to those of smaller NATO countries and two other states—Ireland and Sweden. Thus inclusion of an Irish contingent emerged as an even more important element for successful acceptance and deployment of an international force bound for Cyprus. If acceptable to Archbishop Makarios, the British proposed that he can personally contact each contingent providing state and request participation before the Security Council voted whether to grant its blessing to the non-UN operation. Principal Point #14 in the document covered Ireland and stated, “An Irish Battalion would be desired [under the non-NATO formula]; and the British Government would very much like that it should be made available.”19 The document also mentioned US Under Secretary Ball’s meeting in Greece to persuade the Greek Government to accept an [preferably NATO-based] international force.20 With the “hand writing on the wall,” the Irish Department of External Affairs prepared a confidential memorandum the next day, 11 February, titled “Note on Considerations Relating to a Possible Request for a Contingent of Irish Troops for Cyprus.” The document opened with an overview and background of the Cyprus crisis and the four types

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of possible peacekeeping operations (UN, NATO, British Commonwealth, and the original Treaty of Guarantee states along with Cypriot forces). The memorandum directly stated, “It is quite possible, and it has in fact been suggested in the press, that Ireland might be asked to contribute a contingent of troops to one or other of the foregoing types of peacekeeping forces for Cyprus.”21 It should be noted at this point that the Irish peacekeeping policy developed in 1960 stated a request must come from the UN. Thus, any of the possible peacekeeping missions would need to be accompanied by a UN resolution backing it. At the same time, debate would have probably ensued as whether Step 1 of the peacekeeping policy literally meant a UN mandated, tasked, and commanded operation or one that just had UN support for its existence. The document also outlined the points behind the peacekeeping policy as a reminder this could be the first test of the procedure since the 1960 approval to dispatch Irish peacekeepers to the Congo. The memorandum bluntly declared, “The disposition of the Minister for External Affairs is against sending an Irish contingent to Cyprus.”22 The Minister’s rationale included: 1. The probability of a lengthy time peacekeepers would be deployed on the island awaiting a political settlement. 2. The possibility Ireland could be called upon to maintain its contingent in the Congo beyond the 30 June 1964 operational end of the peacekeeping mission there. Ireland would find it challenging to support two large overseas contingents. 3. The possibility that Irish troops would be drawn into a situation where they would be viewed as supporting the partition of Cyprus. The document stated: The Minister would also be reluctant to send Irish troops into a situation where they might be accused of supporting the type of partition that exists at present in Cyprus, or some other form of partition that might be agreed upon there in the future. The dispute involves great bitterness between all the parties concerned and, if the position were to get out of hand, it is possible that an Irish contingent might attract blame for a situation it could do little to remedy.23

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The only positive point offered for the deployment of an Irish contingent noted: The main argument which may be advanced in favour of urging us to send an Irish contingent to Cyprus is that we are one of the very few countries acceptable to all the parties involved. This in itself would not be a sufficient reason to outweigh the considerations outlined above against our sending a contingent to Cyprus.24

The Department of External Affairs clearly proved reluctant to support a military contingent in any international force approved for Cyprus. At the same time, the Department re-validated its earlier decision on handling media inquiries in reference to the Irish position. Again, the Department would simply answer that a request for Irish troops had not been received from the UN.25 O’Sullivan’s 17 February confidential letter to Dublin, mentioned earlier, addressed accusations his office had been “sounded out officially” for Irish participation in an international force to which the acting Irish representative denied.26 The continued rumors and press reports resulted in Taoiseach Lemass and Minister for External Affairs Aiken facing questions from the Dáil on 20 February. Deputy Jack McQuillan of the National Progressive Democrats asked whether the Government received a request for peacekeepers and, if so, by whom. Aiken replied a request had not been received for Irish troops. Deputy Brendan Corish of the Labour party questioned whether a request would be answered by the Government alone or would it also come before the Dáil. Lemass informed the Deputy that the policy process developed for sending Irish peacekeepers to the Congo in 1960 still applied and a request for Irish troops in Cyprus required Dáil approval.27 Ironically, the Government received a confidential unofficial UN inquiry, but not a request, for Irish peacekeepers the same day Lemass and Aiken answered questions in the Dáil. O’Sullivan forwarded a memo from UN Secretary-General U Thant and noted he received it “on confidential basis and should be treated as secret.”28 O’Sullivan added he met with Bunche the previous day and the latter informed him the UN needed to intervene in Cyprus before the situation escalated into a European war. According to O’Sullivan, “He said that it would be premature to discuss the possible composition of a peacekeeping force but he made a rather interesting remark about the possibility of Irish participation

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in such a force.”29 O’Sullivan attached the Secretary-General’s memo on the establishment of a three-month peacekeeping force to the letter. Secretary-General U Thant requested a meeting with O’Sullivan four days later and asked about Irish policy toward the Cyprus issue. The latter reported to Dublin that he repeated his instructions of 29 January to U Thant. The Secretary-General responded that “any talk of partition would not be part of the UN.”30 O’Sullivan wrote: I then asked the Secretary-General whether I could take it that this interview represented a sounding operation and that no request for a contingent was being made to the Irish Government at this time. He confirmed that this was the case.31

This is an important point for clarification for Irish peacekeeping policy. Upon receipt of an official request for peacekeepers, the Irish Government must then officially respond. A public negative reply to the UN could be seen as an embarrassment to both parties. Thus the parties tended to “sound out” each other unofficially before reaching an understanding that would result in an official request for troops. The official request for Irish peacekeepers arrived on 2 March when U Thant called O’Sullivan at 5:30 pm for a meeting. O’Sullivan phoned Dublin at 9:15 pm and then met with U Thant, Bunche, and Jose Rolz Bennett, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. U Thant requested an Irish contingent for the UN peacekeeping operation bound for Cyprus and added that Ireland would pay only the overseas allowances and uniforms of the troops. The Secretary-General requested a reply from the Irish Government in the next three days. O’Sullivan phoned Dublin again at 11:30 pm and forwarded U Thant’s request.32 Secretary-General U Thant’s formal request of 2 March met step one of the policy. Peacekeeping Policy Step Two: Approval by the Irish Government Two days after officially requesting Irish peacekeepers, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution mandating the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation to be known as the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Taoiseach Lemass convened a meeting of the Government on 6 March 1964 to consider Secretary-General U Thant’s request for Irish peacekeepers. The Department of External Affairs prepared a memorandum the previous day to outline the points

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of discussion behind the request for Irish troops. The memorandum included the steps of the peacekeeping policy to remind the Ministers of the details behind the 1960 compromise for dispatching armed Irish peacekeepers outside the state and outlined the problems with agreeing to the UN request. The document also reviewed the rationale behind the Department of External Affairs reluctance to send Irish troops to Cyprus including the possibility of partition: It has been ascertained from the Secretary-General that a recommendation by the mediator to partition the island as a possible solution of the problem cannot be excluded. The Minister [Aiken] would not only be concerned at having Irish troops maintain the existing Constitution, which gives the minority a right of veto on Government action and the right of Britain, Greece, and Turkey to intervene militarily when they so decide, but would be even more concerned at our troops being asked to assist in the geographical partition of the island.33

The meeting resulted in the drafting of a letter requesting clarification of five points before the Government could make a decision on the Secretary-General’s request. First, Ireland requested assurance the Guarantor states would not militarily intervene in Cyprus while UN peacekeepers were deployed on the island. Second, the government of Cyprus needed to return to the status quo before the crisis. Third, the government of Cyprus must undertake steps to ensure the safety of UN personnel deployed to the island. Fourth, Ireland needed to understand the nature of the peacekeeping force and whether the UN would provide equipment for Irish troops. Fifth, Ireland questioned the financing of the operation and requested that it be similar to the system applied to ONUC.34 Four days later, on 10 March, Minister Aiken answered questions in the Dáil regarding the UN request for Irish troops. Deputy Corish asked whether the Government had officially received a request from the UN and how did it respond. Aiken replied the Government did receive and review a request but asked the Secretary-General for several clarifications before making a decision. Deputy James M. Dillon of the Fine Gael opposition party and others raised concern about Irish troops enforcing a partition of the island. Aiken informed the deputies that the Government would present the details of the UN mission to the Dáil if the cabinet agreed to the Secretary-General’s request. In response, Deputy,

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and future Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave of the Fine Gael party, requested and received Aiken’s assurance the Dáil would formally consider and vote on the matter if the Government deemed the UN request acceptable.35 Ireland’s External Affairs Department received appeals from other countries between 11 and 12 March 1964 supporting a favorable Irish response to Secretary-General U Thant’s request. The Swedish ambassador declared his country would not provide troops for Cyprus unless another neural state offered to join the operation. A note in the Irish archives on the comment states, “In the ambassador’s opinion…his authorities had Ireland in mind when they spoke of another neutral country.”36 The British ambassador approached Aiken about Cyprus and expressed concern that an insufficient number of countries had committed to the peacekeeping mission. He repeated the British desire for Irish participation.37 The Government received a letter from Secretary-General U Thant on 13 March 1964. In the urgent message to External Affairs Minister Aiken, the Secretary-General emphasized he was “…appealing most earnestly for a prompt and favourable reply to my request [of 2 March] regarding the provision of an Irish contingent…”38 U Thant informed Aiken that other countries had already agreed to send peacekeepers to Cyprus and other states acknowledged their intent to help fund the operation and added: Ireland, as a faithful member of the United Nations, has invariably given its wholehearted support to the peace-keeping efforts of the Organization. Once again, I am calling upon you on behalf of the United Nations in the confidence that Ireland will also assist the United Nations in this vital effort to preserve peace, and request Your Excellency to let us have your reply at the earliest possible time.39

Aiken, unmoved by U Thant’s personal appeal, drafted a negative reply to the Secretary-General regarding his request for Irish troops. The External Affairs Minister reminded U Thant of Ireland’s peacekeeping policy and that the Dáil served as the final approval step for dispatching Irish troops overseas. He added that many members of the Dáil and the press foresaw heavy sacrifices in participation. More importantly, UNFICYP’s short mandate of three months could establish the temporary restraint in the crisis that could be required by others to partition the country. Aiken declared Ireland needed firm assurances that the Guarantor states would not intervene in Cyprus nor move to partition the

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state. Finally, he noted Ireland’s misgivings about funding UNFICYP through voluntary contributions.40 These points were not conditions in the draft reply but rather justifications for the negative response to the Secretary-General. When Aiken brought his draft to the cabinet meeting of 13 March, he left with a very different document. Lemass disagreed with Aiken’s response and the resulting final document provided the Secretary-General with a tentative positive Irish response: The Government of Ireland have agreed in principle, subject to the adoption by the Dáil Éireann of the resolution required by Irish law, to comply with the Secretary-General’s request to contribute a Battalion of approximately 500 men to the United Nations peace-keeping for in Cyprus.41

The agreement “in principle” hinged on four questions posed to the Secretary-General. First, UNFICYP should remain a peace force to support conditions in Cyprus and not become a participant in developing a settlement or enforcing it. Second, the Irish government requested an assurance that the Guarantor states would not intervene or partition the island. Third, the Secretary-General should make every effort to ensure Greece and Turkey place their troops on the island under UN command. Fourth, if the peacekeepers needed to remain on the island beyond three months, the UN should solicit additional contingents and that Ireland would be free to remove its troops.42 Lemass ensured Ireland’s concerns were addressed in the document but acknowledged Ireland conditionally agreed to provide troops. Aiken’s defeated draft did not provide any type of agreement to the Secretary-General’s request. After the cabinet meeting, Taoiseach Lemass received his own visitor. The American ambassador called upon him and requested “a favorable response from Ireland expressing the view that the Irish decision would be the ‘key decision’.” Lemass provided a positive response to the ambassador “subject to certain understandings” and asked him to inform Secretary of State Dean Rusk of Ireland’s position.43 Sweden officially approved sending its troops to Cyprus after receiving word of Ireland’s approval “in principle.”44 On 19 March 1964, UN Secretary-General U Thant forwarded his reply to Aiken’s memo of 13 March [as decided in the meeting of the Government]. Aiken found the responses to three of the Irish Government’s points acceptable. However,

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the External Affairs Minister did not agree with the Secretary-General’s response to the second point asking for assurances that the Guarantor states of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey would not move to partition the island. U Thant wrote: As to your point (2), both the Security Council and I have been assured by the Governments of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey that they accept and will support the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March and their positions on this were reaffirmed in their acceptance and support of the Security Council resolution of 13 March 1964 (S/5603). I have no reason to doubt the good faith of these three Governments in giving these assurances and therefore I feel confident in assuring you in turn that the conditions set forth in your point (2) have been adequately met.45

Aiken believed the Secretary-General’s restatement of Guarantor State acceptance of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus did not equate to a guarantee from each that it would not intervene or move to partition the island. The Minister held additional information that certainly persuaded him of this belief. The archival collection of the Department of External Affairs contains an isolated re-typed cable from the Irish embassy in Washington, D.C., hand dated on 20 March. The Irish ambassador to the United States notes in the cable the Americans are not able to secure a promise from Turkey that it would not intervene on Cyprus despite the existence of the Security Council resolutions. The Irish ambassador wrote: …Turks cannot give [the United States] Government assurance, even secretly, such as we want…[The United States] Administration feels, in view of Turkish temper, that Secretary-General [U Thant] cannot go further than he has regarding assurances…46

Taoiseach Lemass viewed Secretary-General U Thant’s memorandum as an adequate assurance that met Ireland’s concerns on a partition of Cyprus. This position established another confrontation with his External Affairs minister on the issue. Lemass dispatched a letter to Aiken on 20 March offering three options and related questions. First, what are the consequences of declaring the Secretary-General’s response did not meet Irish conditions? Second, what are the chances the Guarantor states would provide acceptable assurances if the Irish government approached them? Third, if the Guarantor states do not provide solid assurances, should

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Ireland withdraw from participation or then accept Secretary-General U Thant’s memorandum as meeting the Irish requirement?47 The Taoiseach apparently utilized the note to make a point with Aiken rather than actually present him with three foreign policy options for a decision. The Government already knew the Guarantor states and the United States would not provide direct assurance on the partition issue. Despite the active recruitment of Ireland by Great Britain for participation in UNFICYP, Dublin did not fully trust the British who had partitioned Ireland. The cable from the Irish embassy in Washington, D.C., verified the Turks would not provide a guarantee related to nonintervention in the conflict. The same cable included a promise from the United States to carefully note the Irish opposition to partitioning but not a guarantee to oppose dividing the island in Security Council deliberations.48 Three questions actually pointed toward two obvious options—accept the Secretary-General’s points in the 19 March memorandum or publicly decline his request for participation in UNFICYP. The latter option would place the Irish Government in the embarrassing position of vocally supporting the UN and its global peace efforts yet publicly refusing to contribute more than words when approached by the organization and other countries for assistance in these endeavors. Aiken replied to Lemass in a letter of the same day. The External Affairs Minister informed the Taoiseach that it would be better for the Government to state it supported sending Irish troops to Cyprus without any preconditions than to declare the Secretary-General’s reply adequately met Ireland’s concerns. He added that the Government should request the United States and Great Britain, and possibly even the Soviet Union, to exert pressure on Greece and Turkey to provide the assurances. Aiken reminded Lemass that if Ireland did not receive adequate assurances after approaching these states for assistance, other countries would know Dublin did all it could to alleviate its concerns and would understand why the Irish could not participate despite a formal request from the SecretaryGeneral.49 Lemass’ letter clearly did not persuade Aiken to accept U Thant’s response. The exchange of notes outlined the positions of the two men. Lemass indicated a readiness to contribute Irish troops despite a lack of solid assurances from the Guarantor states and Aiken continued to oppose participation. He even offered the Taoiseach an honorable way for Ireland to back out of the situation. The Government met on 24 March to discuss the two positions on Irish participation in the peacekeeping mission bound for Cyprus. Lemass

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drafted a response for review by the Ministers that accepted the SecretaryGeneral’s comments about the Guarantor states while Aiken submitted his own document that called for seeking direct responses of assurance from the Guarantor states. Lemass prevailed following debate by the Ministers. Peacekeeping Policy Step Three: Approval by the Dáil After the Easter break, Taoiseach Lemass and External Affairs Minister Aiken appeared before the Dáil on 7 April 1964 and requested the body approve the Government’s decision to dispatch an Irish battalion for the peacekeeping operation headed to Cyprus. Aiken opened with a lengthy review of the crisis, the Secretary-General’s request for Irish troops, and the Government’s deliberations. He then outlined the purpose of approaching the Dáil in accordance with the 1960 peacekeeping policy and explained the Government’s position on the one incomplete assurance from the Secretary-General: …the Government decided to seek the approval of the Dáil for sending a battalion to join the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus for a period of three months and the Secretary-General was so informed on 24th March. It was made clear when informing the Secretary-General of this decision that if during the presence of the United Nations force in Cyprus the Governments of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, or any one of them, should intervene, or attempt to impose by force or by threat of force a solution of the problem, and particularly a solution by partition, the Government expected that immediate steps would be taken to withdraw the Irish contingent. At the same time it was decided to increase the strength of the battalion from 500 to 600 all ranks.50

Deputy Dillon responded to Aiken’s presentation offering praise for the Irish army and reminding the assembled Deputies: I think the House should face with perfect clarity of mind that in undertaking to participate in the Cyprus situation, we are not sending Irish troops on a holiday to the Mediterranean. We are sending Irish troops to participate in what may be an extremely difficult and dangerous operation.51

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Dillon continued his discussion by informing the Deputies and the Government that the Dáil should take specific issues under consideration when reviewing the Government’s motion to dispatch Irish soldiers to Cyprus. First, determining UN policy is not a function of the Dáil. The Minister for External Affairs conveys Dáil opinions by his oversight of Ireland’s permanent representative in the UN General Assembly. The deputies are deciding whether to support the UN’s “effort to maintain peace while solutions to the political problems are found” and not the global body’s policies toward the island. Dillon’s purpose for this statement included ensuring the deputies separated a consideration for deploying Irish troops from their personal opinions toward any discussions for partitioning the island. Second, Dillon reminded the Dáil that the government of Cyprus had ceased to function for all practical purposes. Third, interacting and disarming non-regular military forces on the island could be challenging and the Government needs to ensure the Irish troops are properly armed and prepared to defend themselves to prevent disasters they experienced in the Congo. Fourth, Dillon questioned the UN’s decision to fund UNFICYP with voluntary contributions due to French and Soviet refusal to pay for operations they did not politically support. He remarked to Aiken that this financial arrangement placed burdens on the smaller countries such as Ireland that contributed contingents to the UN missions.52 The latter comments led to a short debate among Aiken and Deputies Dillon and Corish on Ireland’s financial responsibilities for the proposed deployment.53 Dillon concluded by declaring, “subject to the above observations,” the Fine Gael party supported the Government’s motion for deploying Irish peacekeepers.54 Deputy Corish of the Labour party addressed the Government after Dillon. Corish extended the support of the Labour party for the Government’s motion but offered several observations and requests. First, he asked the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence Gerald Bartley to ensure a better flow of information to the public on Ireland’s peacekeepers and echoed Dillon’s remarks about the hazards of service in Cyprus and concern for the UN method of financing the operation. Second, Corish stated the Government needed a civilian representative with the army on the ground in Cyprus. Taoiseach Lemass disagreed with the point and exchanged comments with Corish on the issue after the latter’s statement. Third, the deputy reminded the Government of the tense nature of the crisis on Cyprus and noted the Secretary-General’s plans to deploy the peacekeepers for three months was not realistic. Fourth, he commented

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on the possibility of the UN partitioning Cyprus and how this act would complicate Ireland’s position on the island given its own history under this type of political arrangement. Fifth, Deputy Corish also questioned the practicality of the UN’s plans for financing UNIFYCP and the Irish Government’s statements concerning not accepting money from a fund established by other countries to help support the mission.55 Deputy Cosgrave of Fine Gael expressed similar concerns to the Government. The Taoiseach provided an extensive response to Deputies Corish and Cosgrave and outlined the Government’s similar concerns and how they were addressed with the UN. Lemass discussed in particular that the UN peacekeeping force would be separate from the peace negotiation process on Cyprus. Even today, peacekeeping should be a tool to promote conditions conducive for a peace process rather than an element of the negotiations. Following a discussion of concerns by other deputies, the Dáil voted and approved the Government’s motion to contribute a contingent to UNFICYP.56 Ireland dispatched an advance party followed by the main contingent to Cyprus soon after the Dáil approved the action of the Government to send Irish troops as peacekeepers on the island. Ireland reduced its original battalion size peacekeeping contingent from 420 to 150 during a later period of better relations on the island between 1970 and 1972. A reduced Irish contingent remained in Cyprus until the fall of 1973 when the Government withdrew it in order to participate in the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in the Sinai between Egypt and Israel. A handful of Irish peacekeepers did remain in Cyprus assigned to the UNFICYP headquarters. Nine Irish soldiers died while assigned to UNFICYP between February 1965 and July 1969.57

United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) It is worth noting within this chapter that less than 18 months after the Dáil debate on Cyprus, the UN requested Ireland to provide unarmed observers for a six-month observation mission along the border between India and Pakistan following a brief conflict between the two states. Unresolved border claims between the two states devolved into an August 1965 conflict along the 1949 international ceasefire line in Kashmir. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 209 on 4 September

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1965 calling for a return to the ceasefire line of 1949 and cooperation with the United Nations Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The latter observer mission deployed to the region in January 1949 to observe the original ceasefire line between India and Pakistan. On 6 September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 210 which requested the Secretary-General to strengthen UNMOGIP during this period of conflict. Based on Security Council Resolution 210, the Secretary-General called for the temporary transfer of military observers assigned to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) along the borders of Israel and its neighbors. Ireland originally deployed unarmed observers in UNTSO in 1958 following the closure of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). In addition, the SecretaryGeneral requested the deployment of additional peacekeepers from UN member states, including Ireland, that were deemed acceptable by the belligerents in accordance with Security Council Resolution 211 of 20 September 1965 calling for a return of all armed forces to their positions held prior to 5 August. At this point UNMOGIP’s mandate applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the UN needed to provide military observers along the entire ceasefire line. How the Irish Government quickly responded to this short notice deployment of peacekeepers is a good example of careful adherence to its peacekeeping policy. First, Ireland granted permission to the UN for the temporary transfer of two Irish UNTSO peacekeepers to UNIPOM. This action, in accordance with Irish peacekeeping policy, did not require approval of the Dáil since it involved unarmed observers who were already assigned to UNTSO. Second, the UN requested additional peacekeepers to be deployed from Ireland. The Government settled on 12 unarmed Irish soldiers which also did not require Dáil debate. Not needing a resolution in the Dáil ensured faster Government approval and deployment. The Dáil raised the issue of UNIPOM deployment in a parliamentary question on 20 October 1965. Mr. Brendan Corish of the Labour Party requested the Taoiseach to provide details on the Irish deployment to UNIPOM. Mr. Corish also wanted to know if additional Irish military personnel would be requested by the UN for UNIPOM in the future. In answering the question, Sean Lemass also explained how the Irish peacekeeping decision making process was applied:

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…the Government acceded to a request from the Secretary-General for the services of 12 officers of the Defence Forces of rank between lieutenant and lieutenant-colonel to act as military observers with the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission. Pending the arrival of the 12 officers, the Government also agreed to accede to a request from the SecretaryGeneral for the services of two officers of the Defence Forces who are at present serving with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East and who had volunteered to serve as temporary observers with the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission. The Secretary-General has not indicated to the Government that the services of additional members of the Defence Forces will be requested.58

Irish peacekeepers served with UNIPOM until the termination of the mission in March 1966.

Postscript This study turns in the next chapter to an examination of the Irish decision making process for the deployment of a peacekeeping contingent to UNEF II in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt. This decision included the transfer of the remaining 150-man Irish infantry company from UNFICYP to UNEF II and represents the first time a Fine Gael Government (in a coalition) employed the Irish peacekeeping decision making process developed after 1958.

Notes 1. For more details on the Cyprus crisis, see Bill Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005 and Andrew Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 2. Hamilton, Thomas J., “Cyprus Approves a U.N. Peace Role,” The New York Times, 7 January 1964, page 1. 3. Department of State, Secretary’s Memorandum of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Originally Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved on 8 February 1964. 4. “Irish Troops for Cyprus,” The Observer, 19 January 1964, page 1. 5. “Ireland Not Asked to Send Contingents,” Irish Independent, 28 January 1964, page 1. 6. “Britain Calls for Peace Force To End Cyprus Crisis,” The Irish Times, 28 January 1964, page 1.

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7. Telegram from the Department of External Affairs to the Irish United Nations representative, 305/148/9, 29 January 1964. 8. Letter from T. O’Sullivan to H. J. McCann (Department of External Affairs), 305/148/9, 30 January 1964. Some of the documents cited in this book chapter are handwritten notes or typed copies of handwritten notes serving as internal correspondence within Irish government Departments. These documents often lack the structure of more formal correspondence and do not always include titles. All of the documents were released by the Irish Government and are stored in the National Archives. 9. For more on the partition concerns, see “Kutchuk Threatens Cyprus Partition,” The Irish Times, 11 January 1964, page 1. Related to the political points, Norman MacQueen offered a thoughtful examination of how the Irish public viewed the Cyprus question. MacQueen wrote, “Moreover, the Turkish preference for the division of the island into two ethnically distinct statelets (with or without the eventual aim of a ‘double enosis’) seemed in Ireland to parallel rather too uncomfortably its own territorial disposition, the adjustment of which was the principal declared aim of national policy.” [Norman MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9 (1983), page 96]. Ireland also looked at participation in Cyprus in terms of the probable financial costs. The UN informed contingent providers they would need to cover more of the costs associated with their soldiers than in previous operations due to financial constraints placed on the mission by UN member states. Additionally, the Irish casualties associated with ONUC led many to consider the human costs on Irish youth who might deploy to Cyprus. 10. Confidential letter from T. O’Sullivan to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 305/148/9, 4 February 1964. 11. Ibid. 12. Confidential letter from T. O’Sullivan to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 305/148/9, 17 February 1964. 13. Cable from T. O’Sullivan to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 305/148/9, 7 February 1964. 14. Cable from the Secretary, Department of External Affairs to the Irish UN Mission, 305/148/9, 8 February 1964. 15. “Want Irish in Peace Force,” The Irish Times, 7 February 1964, page 1. 16. Ibid. Source is handwritten notes on The Irish Times article, 305/148/9. 17. Cable Irish Embassy in London to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 10 February 1964. 18. Telegram US Embassy in Athens to the Secretaries of State and Defence, 10 February 1964.

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19. Memorandum from Ambassador Cremin in London. “International Force in Cyprus: Conversation with Sir Arthur Spelling of the C.R.O. on 10th February,” 305/148/9, 10 February 1964, paragraph 14. 20. Ibid., paragraph 17. 21. Department of External Affairs. “Note on Considerations Relating to a Possible Request for a Contingent of Irish Troops for Cyprus,” 305/ 148/9, 11 February 1964, paragraph 5. 22. Ibid., paragraph 6. 23. Ibid., paragraphs 6–8. In 1962, Irish peacekeepers were falsely accused of shooting hospital patients in the Congo. Once the charges were unjustly leveled, the Irish found it difficult to secure retractions of media stories that carried the accusations. 24. Ibid., paragraph 9. 25. Ibid., paragraph 10. 26. Confidential letter from T. O’Sullivan to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 305/148/9, 17 February 1964. 27. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Taoiseach Seán Lemass, Minister Frank Aiken, Volume 207, 20 February 1964, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 28. Letter from T. O’Sullivan to H. J. McCann (Department of External Affairs), 305/148/9, 20 February January 1964. 29. Ibid. 30. Cable from T. O’Sullivan to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 305/148/9, 24 February 1964. 31. Ibid. 32. Internal memorandum, Department of External Affairs, 305/148/9, 3 March 1964. 33. Department of External Affairs. “Request for the Provision of an Irish Contingent for the Proposed United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus,” 305/148/9, 5 March 1964, paragraph 5(iv). 34. Memorandum on the meeting of the Government, “Cyprus: Request by UN for Irish Contingent,” 305/148/9, 6 March 1964. 35. Dáil Éireann. Questions. Oral Answers. - Cyprus: UN Request for Irish Troops. Vol. 208 No. 4, 10 March 1964, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 36. External Affairs Internal Memorandum. 305/148/9, 13 March 1964. 37. Ibid. 38. Letter from UN Secretary-General U Thant to Frank Aiken. 305/148/9, 13 March 1964. 39. Cable United Nations Secretary-General U Thant to Frank Aiken, Minister for External Affairs, Dublin. 305/148/9, 13 March 1964. 40. Draft letter from Frank Aiken to UN Secretary-General U Thant. 305/ 148/9, 13 March 1964. 41. Letter from Frank Aiken to UN Secretary-General U Thant. 13 March 1964.

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42. Ibid. 43. Internal Memo of the Taoiseach. S16230, 13 March 1964. 44. Memorandum from the Swedish Embassy to the Department of External Affairs, Dublin, 305/148/9, 16 March 1964. 45. Letter from UN Secretary-General U Thant to Frank Aiken. 305/148/9, 19 March 1964. 46. Cable from Irish Ambassador to the United States. 305/148/9, 20 March 1964. 47. Letter from Sean Lemass to Frank Aiken, 305/148/9, 20 March 1964. 48. Cable from Irish Ambassador to the United States. 305/148/9, 20 March 1964. 49. Letter from Frank Aiken to Sean Lemass, 305/148/9, 20 March 1964. 50. Dáil Éireann. Despatch of Army Contingent to Cyprus: Motion of Approval. Vol. 208 No. 7, 7 April 1964. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. For more information on Irish operations with UNFICYP, see Norman MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 95–108; Oliver P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations, General Editor Michael Pugh, London: Frank Cass, 1988; Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development, New York: Palgrave, 2001; Alan James, Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963–64, New York: Palgrave, 2001. I would like to thank Alan James for a conversation many, many years ago during which he sparked my interest in the work of the UN in Cyprus. Later I lived in Cyprus for a total of 12 months and frequently explored along the UN Green Line in Nicosia. 57. Irish concerns about Cyprus devolving into another Congo, did not materialize. Norman MacQueen wrote on this point quite effectively. He noted, “The suspicion and reserve with which Ireland approached the Cyprus operation in contrast to the enthusiasm of the first phase of the Congo operation proved ultimately unjustified. Where participation in the Congo force led to considerable military losses, involvement in UNFICYP did not. Where the political complexities of the Congo situation forced Ireland to operate in the context of the cold war, Cyprus could not. And where the Congo affair created quite bitter political conflict at home, Cyprus raised no ideological hackles in the Dail. Superpower rivalry over Cyprus was minimal. Armed engagements involving the UN and significantly threatening the safety of Irish soldiers were rare.”

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Norman MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 9 (1983), page 105. 58. Dáil Éireann. Questions. Oral Answers. - India-Pakistan Ceasefire, Vol. 218 No. 1, 20 October 1965. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie.

CHAPTER 6

Sinai 1973

I explained the embarrassment which would be created if our offer were not accepted. —Irish Ambassador to the United Nations Con Cremin following a meeting with United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Brian Urquhart

Introduction Irish decision making for participation in the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in 1973 represented the first application of Ireland’s peacekeeping decision making process by a Government led by a party other than Fianna Fail. In this case, Fine Gael (in coalition with the Labour Party) assumed the reins of Government in March 1973 and seven months later found itself a prime United Nations (UN) candidate for the dispatch of peacekeepers to UNEF II in order to help secure an end to the hostilities between Israel and a coalition of Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states. As developed in Chapter 1, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael represent the remnants of the political disagreement Ireland faced at independence from Great Britain. As Ireland moved into the post-World War II period covered by this book, the two parties had evolved and concentrated on post-independence domestic and foreign issues. In many ways, both © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_6

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Fianna Fail and Fine Gael were amid the political center. Some might say both were slightly to the right of center and others might say slightly left of center…leaving room for the smaller right-wing and left-wing political parties of Ireland. Regardless of any debate on this point, it is interesting to see how each party viewed Irish support for peacekeeping operations. While both parties viewed general Irish support for UN peacekeeping as an international duty and honor for Ireland, there were some differences of opinion among members depending upon the conflict and external circumstances at the time of the UN requests. The year 1973, presented Ireland with a new test of its peacekeeping decision making procedures of 1958, 1960, and 1964. The Fine Gael political party replaced Fianna Fail in Government in March of 1973 placing a new Taoiseach into the position as Head of Government. In 1958, Eamon de Valera, the founder of Fianna Fail, served as Taoiseach during the deployment of unarmed Irish soldiers to Lebanon. Fianna Fail’s Sean Lemass, followed de Valera in 1959 and oversaw the process to dispatch armed Irish soldiers to the Congo in 1960 and Cyprus in 1964. With the Fine Gael and Labour succession to Government in March 1973, the new coalition placed Liam Cosgrave into the office of Taoiseach. Would a new Taoiseach and party bring a different thought process into the Irish peacekeeping decision making process? Frank Aiken of Fianna Fail served as Minister for External Affairs during the dispatch of Irish troops to Lebanon in 1958, Congo in 1960, and Cyprus in 1964. This consistency faced a possible challenge after March 1973 when Fine Gael’s Garret FitzGerald assumed the position, known as Minister for Foreign Affairs after 1971. Would a new Foreign Minister bring a different thought process and outlook into the Irish peacekeeping decision making process? The Fianna Fail Government in 1964 faced a four-month process between the first mentioning of Ireland as a possible candidate for a UN peacekeeping contingent to final Dáil approval to conclude the decision making process. In 1973, that entire process lasted only nine days for Fine Gael due to the international urgency to secure a viable ceasefire and truce to the Yom Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states. Thus, not only does this case study involve a new political party and new ministers holding power but also provides an opportunity to see the application of the decision making process in a matter of days rather than months as in 1964. Would the accelerated

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need for a quick decision bring a different thought process into the Irish peacekeeping decision making process? This is a good point at which to examine Irish interests in the Middle East which in turn influenced Irish considerations behind participating in UN peacekeeping operations between Egypt and Israel in 1973 and later in Lebanon after 1977. Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973. The next month Irish voters went to the polls and Fianna Fail lost its majority hold in the Dáil. In March, Fine Gael formed a Government via a coalition, often referred to as the National Coalition, with the smaller Labour Party. The National Coalition Government included Fine Gael’s Liam Cosgrave as Taoiseach and Garret FitzGerald as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Other EEC members were more politically and economically engaged in the Middle East than Ireland and Dublin sought to make up some of this distance as it approached its turn in the rotating EEC presidency in early 1975. Between January 1974 and January 1975, Ireland established or upgraded diplomatic relations with nine Middle Eastern countries. The reliance of EEC members on Middle Eastern oil imports, and the Arab oil embargo after the Yom Kippur War, played a major role in the general political and economic interest in the Middle East. Ireland’s trade with the Middle East increased from 1.6 to 6.2% of total Irish trade between 1975 and 1981.1 Irish policies in the UN General Assembly enhanced its image among Middle Eastern states while participation in the UNEF II peacekeeping operation served to spotlight the image of Ireland in the region.2

United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) Background On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian Army surprised Israeli military units with the speed at which it stormed across the Suez Canal and seized the fortifications of the Israeli Bar Lev line in what is often referred to as the October War or the Yom Kippur War. In cooperation with Egypt, armored units of Syria, as well as token forces from other Arab states, rolled across the 1967 ceasefire line in the Golan Heights and initiated a roll back of Israeli forces occupying the area. The UN Security Council met on 8 October and over the next few days proved unsuccessful in stemming the conflict. Within two weeks, Israel managed to turn its early

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reversals into tactical successes on both fronts as its armored columns crossed to the west bank of the Suez Canal in the south and advanced toward Damascus in the north. The United States and the Soviet Union submitted a joint proposal for a ceasefire to the Security Council on 22 October followed the next day by a resolution asking the Secretary General to provide UN observers to oversee the process. The belligerents continued fighting despite the appeals of the Security Council for a ceasefire. Israeli forces strengthened their positions on the west bank of the Suez Canal and in the process encircled the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to militarily intervene in enforcement of a ceasefire. The United States refused the request but the Soviet Union responded favorably. In turn, the United States expressed its opposition to a unilateral Soviet intervention and both Superpowers threatened action. As the threat of a confrontation between the Superpowers hung in the balance, the Security Council adopted Resolution 340 (1973) on 25 October calling for an immediate ceasefire, an increase in UN observers, and the establishment of a new peacekeeping operation in line with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) fielded after the 1956 conflict between Israel and Egypt. Military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), located along Israel’s borders since 1948, were urgently reinforced by peacekeepers from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).3 Peacekeeping Policy Step One: Receipt of a United Nations Request for Contingent Support Monday 22 October 1973 The UN Security Council call for a ceasefire in the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel occurred on 22 October with the joint American and Soviet appeal to the belligerents. Although a ceasefire did not materialize until three days later following threats of Soviet unilateral intervention and counter threats by the United States, solicitation for contingents to man a peacekeeping operation began in earnest, if quietly, on 22 October. An unofficial group of nine states supporting a peacekeeping mission to monitor a ceasefire formed and initiated contacts with UN delegations considered acceptable by the belligerents as contingent providers in the crisis.

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An unsigned memo, dated 23 October to Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Garret FitzGerald, reported an unofficial inquiry the previous night.4 The working group of the nine states interested in the peacekeeping operation met in London on 22 October. A British representative of this group approached an Irish diplomat and “inquired informally what our [Ireland] attitude would be on the question of contributing a contingent to any United Nations peacekeeping force which might be established to guarantee demilitarized zones in the Middle East.”5 The diplomat replied that Ireland needed to hear “specific proposals on the nature and composition of the force” rather than respond to an unofficial inquiry of interest and wanted to be satisfied with the method for financing the contingents in the operation.6 Tuesday 23 October 1973 Ireland’s UN delegation reported the 22 October informal encounter to the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin prompting the memorandum of 23 October. The Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Department of Defense and asked for an unofficial opinion of that organization regarding Irish participation in a peacekeeping operation destined for the Middle East. An Assistant Secretary of Defense replied that the “Army’s present commitments at home have already overstretched existing manpower requirements.”7 Although the British contact represented an unofficial attempt to ascertain Irish opinion toward participation in the peacekeeping operation, the inquiry prompted the Department of Foreign Affairs to initiate preparations for a formal request from the UN including sending the previous note to the Department of Defense. Dr. FitzGerald penned a personal note across the top of the 23 October memorandum stating “We may be asked to contribute to a Middle East force. The preliminary Defense reaction is negative. Our approach to that Department was however tentative.”8 Thursday 25 October 1973 With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 340 (1973) on 25 October, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim commenced personal inquiries for contingents. The war between Israel and its neighbors brought the Superpowers to the brink of a possible confrontation over a unilateral Soviet intervention. Soliciting and fielding contingents for a peacekeeping operation could take weeks and the UN realized that time

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was of the essence to move peacekeepers into the Sinai to physically separate Israeli and Egyptian forces. A possible solution involved the transfer of peacekeepers from other UN operations to the Sinai. In particular, thousands of peacekeepers were overseeing the ceasefire on Cyprus, an island state located just northwest of Israel in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Peacekeepers from this operation could be quickly transferred to new duties in the Sinai within days rather than weeks for military forces fielded directly from their home countries. However, the UN could not simply move the forces without the permissions of the contingent contributing countries. Secretary-General Waldheim, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 340 (1973), immediately approached Austria, Finland, and Sweden for permission to transfer elements of their forces to the Sinai. The delegates of the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN reviewed the chances that the Secretary-General would approach them for a transfer of the Irish company from Cyprus to the Sinai since Ireland had already been informally approached three days earlier. The Irish delegation believed that it was unlikely that they would be formally solicited for permission to transfer peacekeepers from Cyprus. The countries transferring troops from Cyprus to the Sinai would probably be requested to replace the forces moved from the island. Ireland had unilaterally reduced its contingent on Cyprus to a single company of approximately 125 soldiers in 1971 due to its own needs for internal security along the border with Northern Ireland. Dublin would be reluctant under the circumstances to tap its already thin forces at home for a contingent to replace any troops transferred from Cyprus to the Sinai. Based on the need to maintain its undermanned army at home, Ireland would likely refuse a request of the Secretary-General to transfer and replace its troops on Cyprus. The Irish delegation believed that the SecretaryGeneral would not approach them for the transfer in order to save Dublin from any embarrassment at having to publicly refuse the request.9 This opinion of the Irish delegation, although initially wrong, proved to be unusually prophetic seven months later when Dublin unilaterally withdrew all its military forces from UNEF II in the Sinai and returned them home in response to a series of terrorist bombings in Ireland.

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Friday 26 October 1973 The UN did elect to directly solicit Ireland for the transfer of its peacekeepers from Cyprus to the Sinai on 26 October despite the Irish delegation’s belief they would not be contacted for a contribution of military manpower to the operation. The UN Secretariat launched an initial effort to request Irish participation in UNEF II below the Secretary-General/ ambassadorial level with an “informal inquiry” rather than an official request. Brian Urquhart, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, telephoned Mr. F. O’Riordan of Ireland’s UN delegation at 10:45 p.m. and requested the “immediate transfer of our UNFICYP contingent to Egypt.”10 Urquhart demonstrated an understanding of Ireland’s concerns as discussed internally by the Irish delegation the day before his call. According to O’Riordan, Urquhart informed him, “They [the UN Secretariat] wonder if the Irish Government would agree to move our contingent from Cyprus to the Middle East…There would be no question of replacement by us in Cyprus and our troops might indeed be back in Cyprus very quickly.”11 Urquhart emphasized again in the call that he understood Ireland’s concerns reference replacing its troops in Cyprus. O’Riordan informed Ireland’s Ambassador to the UN, Con Cremin, of his reply to Urquhart and wrote the following: I said I knew we would be anxious to help in principle and I thought it could be possible [the] Government might not be unwilling, since [the] question of finding more [underlined emphasis in the memorandum] troops did not arise. I could not of course be sure—it would obviously need [a] Government decision. Mr. Urquhart wondered if I could contact you and if we could get [a] decision from Dublin.12

O’Riordan clearly noted in his report (written at 2:00 a.m. the next morning) that Urquhart’s call constituted a “preliminary inquiry but they would like to know [a response] early in the morning [27 October].”13 Ambassador Cremin attended a French delegation evening function at the Waldorf on 26 October, the same day as Urquhart’s telephone inquiry. Approximately 15 minutes after the telephone call to O’Riordan, Mr. Ismat Kittani, the Chief of Staff to Secretary Waldheim, approached Cremin at the party and informed him of the inquiry from Urquhart. Kittani explained that O’Riordan had the details of the inquiry. After the party, Cremin met O’Riordan at the official ambassador’s residence and discussed the details behind the phone call with Urquhart.

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Saturday 27 October 1973 Ambassador Cremin and O’Riordan agreed they should immediately inform Dublin via telephone and the latter prepared a memorandum outlining his conversation with Urquhart. Due to a telephone strike in Dublin, Cremin could not place a call for an hour. Finally, Cremin’s call went through at 3:00 a.m. (8:00 a.m. in Ireland) on 27 October and he informed Paul Keating, Deputy Secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs, of the UN inquiry.14 Now that Ireland had received an inquiry directly from the UN, the first stage in its political process had been nearly completed. The Irish Government needed to provide the UN with reasonable assurance that it would allow the transfer of its contingent from Cyprus to the Sinai. At that point, it would receive an official and public request from the Secretary-General. Peacekeeping Policy Step Two: Approval by the Irish Government Saturday 27 October 1973 Although the Irish Government had been made aware of the interest in its peacekeepers for the Sinai on 22 October, it was not until 8:00 a.m. on 27 October that a direct, albeit unofficial, contact from the UN reached Dublin via the Irish delegation to the world body. Government officials huddled in Dublin to review the UN inquiry for the transfer of peacekeepers from Cyprus to the Sinai. By 11:45 a.m. the Department of Foreign Affairs had drafted an internal note, essentially a summary of their discussions to produce an unofficial position of the Government to the request. The note outlined decisions, actions, and remarks to the request as well as four tentative Government decisions. First, the Government agreed to the transfer of Irish peacekeepers from Cyprus to the Middle East provided that the Turkish and Greek governments, as opposing sides in the Cypriot situation, concurred to the action. This was a sensitive issue with Ireland since its peacekeepers had been part of UNIFYP since 1964. This point emerges again during parliamentary debate on the transfer. It did not make sense to the Irish Government to fan the conflict on Cyprus due to transfer of peacekeepers to help settle a crisis in the Middle East. Simply stated, Ireland made Greek and Turkish agreement to the plan a requirement for Dublin’s approval to transfer its peacekeepers to the Sinai.15 Second, the Irish Government declared that it would agree to a transfer of peacekeepers only if UNEF II formed as a “police force.” While Ireland

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supported multinational peacekeeping over the years, the Government was not willing to provide its soldiers for a military operation that would become part of a conflict. This situation materialized during the country’s participation in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) when the mandate of the mission shifted from police type functions to offensive operations in support of the recognized government of the country. Twenty-six Irish soldiers died during the ONUC peacekeeping operation between 1960 and 1964 and Dublin did not intend to walk into a repeat situation. Third, the Irish Government agreed to a separate UN request to provide two officers in the rank of colonel to the organization—one for service in the headquarters of UNTSO as the Chief of Staff and one in the UNEF II headquarters as the Deputy Chief of Staff.16 Fourth, the Government note also listed several actions that needed to be taken in support of its response. First, a coded telex should be sent to Ambassador Cremin in New York informing him of the three decisions listed above. Coded telegrams should be dispatched to the Irish embassies in the nine countries that comprised the informal working group that had originally approached Ireland on 22 October. Each Irish ambassador was instructed to inform the local Foreign Ministry of the following: Government has been approached by UN and had agreed to transfer Irish contingent with UNFICYP for duty with UNEF in Middle East. Decision is subject to agreement of parties in Cyprus and on assumption that UNEF will be a police force only, and to necessary arrangements being worked out.17

The Government acknowledged that a resolution must be quickly introduced within the Dáil in accordance with the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1960 in order to officially seek full approval for the transfer of Irish peacekeepers. Those involved in the discussions outlined in the note recognized that the Government needed to prepare a speech for Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave to address the Deputies in the Dáil and that the business day of the Dáil would have to be altered to accommodate the introduction of debate on the resolution on short notice. It is interesting to note that the issue of the Government’s own party support within the Dáil was questioned during the morning discussion. The internal note indicates that this issue was raised but those in attendance did not develop a conclusive answer leaving it open as to whether the Government needed

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to seek support from all of the majority Fine Gael Party deputies in the Dáil.18 All Irish peacekeepers serving in Cyprus were volunteers. The Government, and later the Dáil, expressed concern that transferring Irish peacekeepers from Cyprus to the Sinai would violate their volunteer agreements. Those individuals attending the 27 October discussion noted that these agreements needed to be reviewed and that Irish soldiers might have to be asked to volunteer for the transfer to the Sinai since they originally agreed to serve with the mission in Cyprus.19 The Government reiterated that Irish peacekeepers should not be transferred from Cyprus without securing agreement from the disputing parties on the island as discussed earlier.20 The officials reviewing the UN inquiry also raised four special “remarks” in their internal note. Each remark served as a reminder of what the group needed to accomplish next or outlined the circumstances of their discussions. First, the note clearly stated that the decisions, listed above, “are not [underlined emphasis within the original document] to be given publicity yet.”21 The officials made a special emphasis to remind each other that the discussions on the UN inquiry were not to be released since they had yet to receive an official request for peacekeepers. At that point, the Government would need to provide an official and public response and allow the Dáil to vote on the matter in accordance with the Defence Act (Amendment) (No. 2) 1960. Second, the Government “expected” the UN to provide “necessary clothing and any equipment” for service in the desert that was not available in the Irish military inventory. This is actually a common request from many smaller countries when providing peacekeepers to the UN. Third, the group noted that Irish peacekeepers were “acceptable” to both Israel and Egypt. This statement reinforced the Irish position of neutrality in the conflict and the recognition by Israel and Egypt that they viewed Irish soldiers as being impartial. Fourth, the note included instructions to telephone the contents of the memo to Ambassador Cremin.22 Three hours later, Mr. Keating called Ambassador Cremin and relayed the positive results of the discussion in Dublin with special emphasis on four points (UNEF II should be a peace force; a resolution must be introduced in the Dáil; the UN should provide desert uniforms and other equipment; and Irish peacekeepers who joined the military prior to 1956 will have to give their consent to the transfer).23 In turn within 30 minutes Ambassador Cremin called Under-Secretary-General Urquhart

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who was occupied with preparations for a pending closed session of the Security Council. Cremin decided that the Irish response could not wait so he opted to go to the UN building to speak directly with Urquhart. Unfortunately, Urquhart could not see him prior to the opening of the Security Council session and the former’s secretary suggested that Cremin meet with Urquhart’s assistant, Mr. F. T. Liu. Liu received the reply from Dublin and responded to each of the Irish Government’s four points. First, Liu reassured Cremin that UNEF II would be a “police force” mandated to only oversee the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt. Second, Liu stated that the UN understood Ireland’s requirement to have the Dáil, as well as the Government, approve a request to transfer the peacekeepers from Cyprus to the Sinai. However, he urged that this be accomplished quickly due to the need for Irish peacekeepers. According to Cremin, “[Liu] emphasized the great importance of maximum speed both for psychological and practical reasons—psychological because the Irish troops would be most acceptable [by the disputing parties] and practical because their presence would widen the basis of UNEF.”24 Liu also mentioned the need for a quick approval from the Dáil so that the UN could alert the British that the Irish would need to transit through their sovereign base area on Cyprus and the United States in order to provide the airlift between Cyprus and the Sinai. Third, Liu confirmed that the UN would provide clothing and bullet proof vests although he assured Cremin that Irish soldiers would find the climate of the Sinai similar to what they were already experiencing in Cyprus. Fourth, Liu noted that he understood the need to query Irish soldiers for a transfer to the Sinai. He informed Cremin that the UN had already experienced this same issue with the Swedish contingent.25 Liu also noted that the Secretary-General might mention the request to transfer Irish peacekeepers to the Sinai and Dublin’s tentative agreement, pending Dáil approval, to the closed session of the Security Council. Ambassador Cremin telephoned Keating at approximately 1:20 p.m. and relayed Liu’s responses to Ireland’s four points. In turn, Keating replied that the Irish Government would not object to a statement by the Secretary-General to the Security Council regarding his inquiry for peacekeepers from Ireland. He also assured Cremin that the Government viewed Dáil approval as “certain” and that the UN Secretariat should begin the initial coordination plans with the British and Americans for logistical assistance in the transfer of Irish peacekeepers. Cremin went back to Liu and delivered Keating’s response. Liu showed Cremin a draft

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statement that he had prepared for the Secretary-General to deliver to the Security Council that afternoon about the request for Irish peacekeepers in UNEF II. The announcement read: I [the Secretary General] have approached the Irish Government and have enquired whether it would agree, as a temporary measure, to the transfer of the Irish contingent in Cyprus to Egypt. The Irish Government has agreed in principle. Some practical arrangements have yet to be worked out. It hopes that the Irish contingent can be made available very shortly.26

The Irish delegation to the UN informed the representatives from the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Italy, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China that Ireland will tentatively accept a UN request to transfer peacekeepers to UNEF II. At 1:00 p.m. the Turkish ambassador informed Cremin that he had heard rumors of the Irish transfer of peacekeepers from UNFICYP. Turkey wanted Ireland to replace its contingent. Cremin noted, “I explained to him our problem about replacement which he entirely appreciated without however abandoning the hope that we might replace.”27 Cremin returned to his official residence and called Keating at 3:40 p.m. informing him of the draft statement text from the Secretary-General. Cremin relayed his concern that with so many delegates attending the closed Security Council session that it was probable that news of Ireland’s tentative acceptance would be leaked outside the chambers. Keating reassured Cremin and noted that reports of the transfer were already circulating in Dublin despite the attempt to keep the news out of the press. Sunday 28 October 1973 The next morning, 28 October at 10:30 a.m., Liu called Cremin to inform him that UNFICYP and the Irish contingent were standing ready for the transfer and requested the opportunity to begin the move. Forty minutes later Cremin passed the request to Keating who asked that Liu be reminded that Ireland could not act until the Dáil approved the transfer. At 8:00 p.m. that evening, Urquhart phoned Cremin with a new request. Despite previous statements made by the Irish Government about Irish military commitments, the Secretary-General would like Dublin to double its force destined for the Sinai by dispatching an additional 125 soldiers directly from Ireland to join the peacekeepers

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transferring from Cyprus. However, the Secretary-General would accept a later arrival of the additional soldiers. Monday 29 October 1973 Cremin passed this new request to Dublin at 5:30 a.m. the next morning, 29 October. Ireland’s Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister for Defense expressed puzzlement over the Secretary-General’s new petition for additional peacekeepers. Their request for a clarification arrived at the Irish delegation by 10:00 a.m. Cremin passed this note to Urquhart 30 minutes later who replied that the Irish contingent with UNFICYP was inadequate to meet the needs of UNEF II. The Irish ambassador forwarded the reply to Dublin and received a telephone call at 1:00 p.m. followed by a telex five minutes later. Cremin mentioned the response from Ireland in a note: …there was irritation in Dublin at the apparent change in attitude of the [UN] Secretariat and that, when conveying the context of the telex message, I might make this known in polite fashion, e.g. express surprise.28

Despite the concern and “irritation” among members of the Irish Government, Dublin did agree to add approximately 100 men to the unit being transferred from Cyprus to the Sinai. However, Ireland informed the UN that it would take at least two weeks to solicit volunteers, prepare, and dispatch the reinforcements for their contingent. Ambassador Cremin relayed the message to Urquhart at 1:20 p.m. who thanked Ireland for its agreement but expressed concern about the delay in Irish reinforcements. Urquhart met with Secretary-General Waldheim and then called Cremin at 3:45 p.m. to relay the UN response. The Secretary-General viewed Ireland’s position on reinforcements as a serious problem. Urquhart informed Cremin that the UN could not justify transferring Irish troops from UNFICYP to the Sinai if it would take at least two weeks to reinforce the small contingent. At the same time, the organization faced “heavy pressure from Cyprus” not to reduce the size of UNFICYP. If Ireland agreed to participate in UNEF II, it would need to transfer its soldiers and reinforce them that week. Cremin passed this information to Keating at 4:00 p.m. who informed the Irish ambassador that “Dublin suspected there was some political element in the apparent change and wondered whether it might not have to do with NATO; reaction at home would be likely to be very

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bad.”29 The Irish Government displayed sensitivity toward the SecretaryGeneral’s apparent rebuff of its peacekeepers if it would take at least two weeks to reinforce them. The Irish viewed this as a political embarrassment following an impassioned inquiry into the availability of their soldiers for transfer to UNEF II. Cremin informed Keating that he would seek a personal meeting with Waldheim to discuss the issue. However, the Secretary-General was fully engaged that afternoon so Cremin arranged a meeting with Urquhart for 4:45 p.m. According to Cremin: I explained the embarrassment which would be created if our offer were not accepted. He quite understood this and he replied that he personally felt very badly. In fact, he said he had advised the Secretary General against approaching us as he was aware of the small size of our UNFICYP contingent (as we had indeed assumed)…He gave me the distinct impression that the situation which had now arisen was due to the Secretary General’s having failed in the first instance to give full consideration to the question and in particular not having taken account of the minimum requisite in UNEF having regard on the one hand to the high competence of our troops, and on the other to the fact that, exceptionally, Egypt had immediately conveyed agreement to our being included. He would like to appeal to us to make a statement that we would do our utmost to boost the contingent up to 200 as soon as possible; the fact that we might not get the additional troops there very quickly would not matter so much— the Secretariat could “fudge” it. He told me at the same time that there would be no problem of meeting the extra and extraordinary costs of the contingent.30

With this conversation, Urquhart arranged a compromise with Cremin. If Ireland agreed to provide reinforcements as soon as possible, the UN would not withdraw its request for Irish peacekeepers in UNEF II. As Urquhart remarked, the UN viewed the Irish as competent peacekeepers and the disputing parties, especially Egypt on whose territory the mission would be located, acknowledged their perception of Irish neutrality in the conflict. Cremin telephoned Keating at 5:30 p.m. and informed him of Urquhart’s offer of a political compromise for the fielding of an Irish contingent in UNEF II. The Irish Government weighed the compromise in wording and Keating called Cremin at 8:15 p.m. During the conversation, Keating informed Cremin of the Irish Government’s three point response to the Urquhart compromise. First, Ireland would do its best to

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field additional troops in Egypt as soon as possible after the transfer of Irish peacekeepers from Cyprus. Second, the UN should accept the Irish contingent in Cyprus as the organization originally inquired. “[N]ot to do so would be very bad for us and also for the UN.” Third, the UN should be assured that a resolution supporting the transfer of Irish peacekeepers from Cyprus and the fielding of reinforcements is expected to easily pass in the Dáil on 30 October.31 Cremin passed the response to Urquhart’s secretary at 9:00 p.m. Tuesday 30 October 1973 Cremin spoke with Urquhart at noon on 30 October. Urquhart informed the Irish ambassador that the Irish Government’s position was acceptable to the UN and asked to be informed as soon as the Dáil passed a resolution approving an Irish contingent for UNEF II. At this point, the Irish Government had provided its acceptance of the UN inquiry for troops and the UN had accepted all conditions outlined by Dublin the previous evening. The fielding of Irish peacekeepers in UNEF II now depended on a decision by the Dáil—the final stage in Ireland’s three step political process for participation in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping Policy Step Three: Approval by the Irish Dáil Tuesday 30 October 1973 Minister for Foreign Affairs FitzGerald assumed the lead in the Government’s discussion with members of the Dáil for passage of a resolution backing the transfer of Irish peacekeepers from UNFICYP to UNEF II and the fielding of reinforcements.32 FitzGerald opened the discussion with a reminder to the Deputies that the Defence Act (Amendment) (No. 2) 1960 required requests from the UN for more than 12 armed Irish peacekeepers must be approved by both the Government and the Dáil. He remarked: As Deputies are aware, the Government have received a request from the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide an Irish contingent to participate in the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. The Government have decided to meet the Secretary General’s request, subject to approval of Dáil Éireann which is being sought in this motion…The total strength of the Irish contingent will be in the region of 240 all ranks, of whom approximately one half will be transferred from

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Cyprus. If the House approves this motion, arrangements will, it is hoped, be put in train for the immediate transfer of our Cyprus contingent to the Middle East and the balance of our force will follow as soon as possible…a primary basic objective of Irish foreign policy is to help maintain world peace and reduce tensions. For that reason we are anxious to support the United Nations and the Security Council in the measures they are pursuing to bring a settlement to this troubled area of the world. It is an honor for Ireland to be asked to make this practical contribution to deal with his situation, which has not only disrupted the peace of the Middle East but which has serious repercussions far beyond the immediate area of conflict, and particularly for Europe which is so closely connected to it.33

The mood among the Dáil Deputies supported the transfer of the Irish contingent from Cyprus to the Sinai and recruiting reinforcements for this contingent. Michael O’Kennedy, a Fianna Fail party Deputy in 1973 and later Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1977 to 1979, emerged as the primary spokesman among opposition party members during the discussion.34 Although he spoke as a member of the political opposition, O’Kennedy clearly stated that the Government Fine Gael and Labour Party coalition would receive support from the other parties in the Dáil. O’Kennedy opened his initial questioning of the Government ministers by announcing: The Minister [FitzGerald] can be assured of the support of this side of the House in giving approval to this motion…I welcome this opportunity and am confident that our forces will play an effective role in peacekeeping in the troubled areas. We, on this side of the House, will support this motion and any further motion the Minister may feel necessary to introduce to the House from time to time to fulfill our role in the cause of international peace and security.35

Although everyone offered support for the motion, Deputies in the Dáil raised three points for the Government during the debate. First, Deputies asked about the protection and safety of the Irish peacekeepers being sent to join UNEF II. O’Kennedy expressed concern for the Irish soldiers as well as troops from other countries deployed with UNEF II. “We would like to be assured that our forces there…will be protected and be given guarantees in the performance of their duties to the best possible extent.”36 Dr. Conor Cruise-O’Brien, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, responded to O’Kennedy’s comments. Cruise-O’Brien, speaking

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with experience in peacekeeping as a Special Representative of United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold during the Congo Crisis, reminded the Deputies that peacekeeping is a dangerous activity and that no one can guarantee the safety of troops assigned to these missions if the belligerents renewed hostilities. He also very clearly reminded Deputies of their responsibility in these issues. We should be clear about this. If there is anyone here who feels that this risk should be run, let him say so. Let no one come back afterwards in other circumstances and say that these men [Irish peacekeepers] should not have been asked. I said this was not a no-risk operation but I do not want to suggest that these risks are excessive for the great purpose of maintaining the peace and giving an opportunity for lasting peace to the restored area.37

Deputy Neil Blaney agreed with Cruise-O’Brien and reminded him as well as the other Deputies that no one in the legislature should have “any illusions that it is a picnic or that there are no dangers.”38 In turn, the Government did agree to inform the Dáil if any situation developed that indicated a breakdown in the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt. Second, O’Kennedy raised the issue of seeking volunteers for UNEF II and noted, “The individuals concerned and their families may be anxious that they would be given the option, as they would be given before signing on for any operation, of accepting or rejecting the opportunity of serving in this particular operation.”39 Minister for Defence Patrick Donegan assured the Deputies that all Irish soldiers recruited after 1956 and currently serving in Cyprus had signed volunteer agreements and could be transferred to the Sinai. Those soldiers who joined the military prior to 1956 would be offered the option to transfer with their unit from Cyprus to the Sinai.40 Third, Deputies questioned the Government about the opinions of the disputing parties in Cyprus. As the Government earlier, Fianna Fail Deputies displayed concern that the removal of peacekeepers, Irish and non-Irish, from Cyprus could endanger the ceasefire on the island. O’Kennedy reminded the Government, “If it were necessary up to now to maintain the peacekeeping force in Cyprus it is equally necessary to do so now despite the urgent and serious demands which exist for a peacekeeping force in the Middle East.”41 Minister FitzGerald responded, “I can only add that the Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot Governments have

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agreed to our troops being transferred…The Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish Governments recognized there was a particular need for our forces but perhaps it may be somewhat easier to find alternative forces in Cyprus than in the even more controversial area of the Middle East.”42 The Dáil approved the transfer of Irish peacekeepers from Cyprus and the dispatching of additional soldiers directly from Ireland. The backing of the Dáil officially completed Ireland’s three-step process for deploying Irish soldiers outside of the country.

Postscript Irish peacekeepers deployed to the Sinai in support of UNEF II and the peace process between the Egyptians and Israelis. One interesting point emerged during the Government and Dáil debates related to deploying an Irish peacekeeping contingent to UNEF II while removing the last company of Irish soldiers from UNFICYP. The differences between ministers in the same political party could be greater than between the two parties themselves when looking at deploying Irish peacekeepers. Thus, the early questions of some about how Fine Gael might handle the peacekeeping decision making process compared to Fianna Fail evolved into observations of the Fine Gael Taoiseach and the Fine Gael Foreign Affairs Minister following the peacekeeping procedures developed in 1960 by the Fianna Fail Government. The Irish Government initiated its deployment of peacekeepers to UNEF II in the Sinai at the end of October 1973 and withdrew nearly all of the country’s peacekeepers in May 1974 following terrorist bombings in Dublin and Monaghan. The few remaining Irish peacekeepers in UNEF II returned to Ireland in September 1974. The Government viewed the return of Irish troops as a confidence builder for the Irish public as the country dealt with the crisis. Once the situation stabilized, Ireland sought to contribute to peacekeeping again. The first opportunity emerged in 1977 when the UN requested Ireland to return peacekeepers to Cyprus. This work turns to an examination of the procedures associated with this request and the resulting confusion as the Irish Government changed between political parties during the process.

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Notes 1. Marie-Violaine Louvet, “Shedding Light on the Arab World: The ‘IrishArab News ’ 1975–85,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 23 (2012), page 192. 2. For more information on the increasing interactions of Ireland and the Middle East during this period, see Marie-Violaine Louvet, “Shedding Light on the Arab World: The ‘Irish-Arab News ’ 1975–85,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 23 (2012), pp. 191–203 and Rory Miller, “The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland’s Evolving Relationship with the Muslim Middle East,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 15 (2004), pp. 123–145. 3. For more information on the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, see: Abraham Rabinvich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East, Shocken, 2005; Asaf Siniver, The October 1973 War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy, Hurst Publishers, 2013; Frank Aker, October 1973 The Arab Israeli War, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985, among other books. 4. The Department of External Affairs changed its name to the Department of Foreign Affairs in March 1971. 5. Department of Foreign Affairs memo, 305/148/30, 23 October 1973. Some of the documents cited in this chapter are handwritten notes or typed copies of handwritten notes serving as internal correspondence within Irish government Departments. These documents often lack the structure of more formal correspondence and do not always include titles. All of the documents were released by the Irish Government and are stored in the National Archives. 6. Ibid. Ireland has exhibited an ongoing sensitivity toward United Nations delays in contingent reimbursement in peacekeeping operations. The issue was raised more than once in the Dáil reference Ireland’s contingent in Cyprus. 7. Ibid. Ireland maintained a company sized unit with the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. The remainder of its small army guarded the border with Northern Ireland in the attempt to prevent any conflict spillover as well as bank heists and terrorist acts by the belligerents in that troubled British territory. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations confidential memorandum to Paul J.G. Keating, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 305/148/30, 8 January 1974. 11. Ibid.

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12. Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations memorandum from Mr. F. O’Riordan to Irish United Nations Ambassador Con Cremin, 305/ 148/30, 27 October 1973. Cremin’s name was Cornelius Cremin but tended to go by “Con” which was a shortened version of his first name. He served as the Irish Charge d’Affaires to Vichy France 1940–1943 and then Germany during 1943 and 1945. He served as Ambassador to the UK in 1956–1958 and again in 1963–1964. 13. Ibid. 14. Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations confidential memorandum to Paul J.G. Keating, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 305/148/30, 8 January 1974. 15. Department of Foreign Affairs internal note (27 October 1973). 305/ 148/30. This note is a crudely typed record with handwritten additions simply listing the results of the discussions on 27 October in order to formulate a reply to the United Nations inquiry. The note provides a brief but candid record of the discussions. 16. Ibid. The informal inquiry for the two officers accompanied the United Nations request to transfer the Irish contingent from Cyprus. An official request arrived in Dublin via the Irish delegation to the United Nations on 20 November 1973. See Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations memorandum to the Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, 305/148/30, 20 November 1973. 17. Department of Foreign Affairs internal note, 305/148/30, 27 October 1973. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations confidential memorandum to Paul J.G. Keating, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 305/148/30, 8 January 1974. The review of volunteer agreements resulted in a decision that all soldiers recruited into the military prior to 1956 had to provide consent for each individual overseas peacekeeping assignment with UNFICYP and UNEF II being two different operations. Those who entered the military after 1956 required only a single volunteer statement for the assignment and could be transferred without their consent as long as they did not exceed the 6-month length of the deployment. The Irish peacekeepers currently assigned to UNFICYP had just arrived prior to the outbreak of fighting in the Middle East and thus had the majority of their deployment yet to be completed. 24. Ibid. 25. Approximately 180 of the 250 Swedish peacekeepers in UNFICYP agreed to transfer to UNEF II.

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26. Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations confidential memorandum to Paul J.G. Keating, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 305/148/30, 8 January 1974. 27. Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations confidential memorandum to Paul J.G. Keating, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 305/148/30, 8 January 1974. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Government ministers in parliamentary systems are also members of the legislature itself although there are limited exceptions in some countries. Ministers of the Irish Government in 1973 were also deputies in the Dáil. It should also be noted here that Garret FitzGerald served as the Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1973 to 1977 and the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Ireland from July 1981 to February 1982 and December 1982 to March 1987. 33. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. FitzGerald). Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 34. On 30 October 1973, discussions concerning the introduction of Irish peacekeepers to UNEF II occurred during the 20th Dáil or 20th parliamentary government of Ireland. The Government during the 20th Dáil consisted of a Fine Gael and Labour political party coalition. Michael O’Kennedy was a Deputy with the Fianna Fail political party. Thus, in a parliamentary system, O’Kennedy spoke to the Government as a member of the political opposition. It should be noted that the opposition Deputies in the Dáil supported Ireland’s fielding of a contingent with UNEF II but it was their duty to lead any questioning of the Government in its actions. 35. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Michael O’Kennedy. Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 36. Ibid. 37. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Posts and Telegraphs (Dr. CruiseO’Brien). Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 38. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Neil Blaney. Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 39. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Michael O’Kennedy. Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 40. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Defence (Patrick Donegan). Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 41. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Michael O’Kennedy. Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 42. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. FitzGerald). Volume 268, 30 October 1973. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie.

CHAPTER 7

Cyprus 1976–1977

…It is considered that the original communication from the UN and subsequent exchange of messages constitute a request in the proper sense on the part of the UN…Also that their present position, representing a reversal of a request on which we had acted with greatest possible urgency, is unacceptable. —Irish Government message to the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations

Introduction The Fine Gael Government of Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave oversaw the transfer of Irish peacekeepers from Cyprus to the Sinai in 1973, their withdrawal back to Ireland in 1974, and the attempt to reintroduce Irish peacekeepers in 1976. The 1974 withdrawal from peacekeeping, taken reluctantly by the Government as a means to bolster Irish morale and public confidence during a period of internal trouble and terrorism, was seen by many in Ireland as a challenge to the state’s important foreign policy goal of promoting Irish ideals of peace globally. Ireland did continue to provide very small numbers of military personnel in missions such as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) after 1974 but did not maintain any unit-sized formations with United Nations

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_7

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(UN) peacekeeping missions. As the internal situation in Ireland stabilized after 1974, many called for a return of the state to supporting UN peacekeeping operations. However, deployment of peacekeepers can be seen as a two-way street. UN member states can offer to deploy contingents based on skills and numbers that correspond to their ability to provide; the UN can request contingents based on skills and numbers that meet its needs for a peacekeeping operation. This is the nature of the symbiotic relationship of the UN and contingent providing countries and can be seen in the first attempt of Ireland to provide peacekeepers for an operation after 1974. The UN did not want to accept what Ireland could offer and Ireland did not want to provide what the UN said it needed.

1976: The First Irish Declination of a UN Request for a Peacekeeping Contingent This case study adds a new element to the Irish peacekeeping decision making process. From 1958 (and technically 1956–1957) the UN informally approached Ireland about contributing troops to peacekeeping operations. The year 1976, represented a reversal with Ireland making the first informal approach to the UN. The first serious attempt to reintroduce large numbers of Irish military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations since 1974 occurred in the spring of 1976. On 7 May 1976, Patrick Donegan, the Fine Gael Minister for Defence, approached Minister for Foreign Affairs Garrett FitzGerald with a request to consider returning Irish soldiers for unit-sized deployments to UN peacekeeping. The memorandum, actually a document written to FitzGerald’s Administrative Secretary (aide) by Donegan’s Administrative Secretary (aide), served as a sounding board on the issue. Donegan presented his rationale for returning to peacekeeping and sought FitzGerald’s position before a formal approach to the Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave. Finland announced that it intended to unilaterally withdraw 130 of its peacekeepers from Cyprus sometime around July 1976. This would leave other Finnish peacekeepers in Cyprus but at the same time reduce the size of the peacekeeping force by approximately one infantry company. The Irish Department of Defence noted the withdrawal should prompt the UN to seek replacements and this could prove an opportunity for Ireland to return a unit-sized peacekeeping contingent into an area where Ireland is already familiar due to its experience there between 1964 and

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1973. The Department of Defence memorandum acknowledged that a deployment of 130 Irish peacekeepers would have benefits for the military and if the Government is approached by the UN to provide a contingent to replace the withdrawing Finnish unit, they would be acceptable to providing Irish soldiers. This specific memorandum did not detail the benefits but did request the Department of Foreign Affairs to approach the Taoiseach on the matter. The Secretary of the Department of Defence concluded by stating: I am to request your Department [Department of Foreign Affairs] to be good enough to seek the views of the Government in relation to the foregoing proposal and to make tentative enquiries with the United Nations as to the possibility of a request being made for an Irish contingent in the circumstances stated.1

Essentially, the Minister for Defence is communicating to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, through their aides, for the latter to raise the peacekeeping issue to the Taoiseach. In addition, the Permanent Mission of Ireland at the UN (PMUN) is an organization of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the Department of Defence is asking the Department of Foreign Affairs to request the PMUN to make inquiries at the UN regarding how the organization planned to handle the replacement of the Finnish peacekeepers. It is interesting to note the political clout held by Minister for Foreign Affairs Garrett FitzGerald (a future Taoiseach) with Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave as perceived by Minister for Defence Patrick Donegan. The Department of Foreign Affairs prepared a memorandum for record on 10 May 1976 to address the question related to returning Irish peacekeepers to UN service. That morning the Department of Defence raised the issue with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Private Secretary at their Management Committee meeting. FitzGerald stated he would introduce the issue to the other members of Government at their meeting on 11 May 1976. At the same time he directed that there should not be any inquiries made at the UN until the Government had discussed it. The memorandum for the Government included a brief comparison of the benefits and liabilities of returning a contingent to Cyprus compared to the Sinai. While the latter offered greater guarantees of financial reimbursement by the UN (continually a very important concern for Ireland), it would also be “a more politically delicate matter.” A handwritten note

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at the bottom of the memorandum stated the Minister did not raise the question at the Cabinet meeting the next day as planned. A second note asked for the Minister to be reminded the following week.2 Informal discussions related to Ireland’s return to peacekeeping continued during the next four weeks. While not directly stated in the records, the delay in further formal consideration may have been related to the challenges facing the six-month renewal of UNFICYP in June 1976. Each UN peacekeeping operation undergoes a periodic mandate renewal within the global body that is related to a review of the operation and its relationship to the peace process as well as a funding renewal passed to the General Assembly. Most of the time this is a routine resolution introduction followed by discussion and a vote. However, the introduction of the Security Council resolution for renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate in June 1976 proved to be challenging and the operation’s mandate came extremely close to expiring without a renewal. The Security Council adopted the agenda for the renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate and began deliberations on 11 June, four days before the expiration on 15 June. The final meeting and vote on the extension lasted from 9:30 pm on 15 June to 2:00 am on 16 June demonstrating the division facing the deliberating body. Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey participated in the three days of deliberations and essentially dominated the discussion during the first two days which was related more to the political situation on the ground. A detailed examination of the final meeting is beyond the scope of this book but worth noting that the Security Council adopted the resolution shortly after the meeting convened at 9:30 pm. However, the body remained in session until 2:00 am the next morning as representatives addressed particular concerns and rebuttals related to the situation. The 15-member Security Council adopted the resolution to extend the mandate of UNIFYP by a vote of 13-0-0 (13 in favor; 0 against; and 0 vetoes) on 15 June 1976. The People’s Republic of China and Benin opted to “not participate” in the vote rather than veto (the former) or vote against it (the latter). The UN released the 15 June vote to renew UNFICYP’s mandate on 16 June after the meeting concluded. Two days later, Irish Minister for Defence Patrick Donegan sent a formal memorandum to Minister for Foreign Affairs Garrett FitzGerald on the advantages of returning an Irish military unit to UN peacekeeping duty…with an emphasis on Cyprus. Donegan reminded FitzGerald of a recent but unspecified informal discussion between the two about the issue. Donegan also reminded FitzGerald of discussions in 1975 related

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to returning Irish peacekeepers to the Sinai from where they were withdrawn in 1974 and that conversations in 1976 focused on a return to Cyprus. Donegan’s 18 June explanation and appeal for FitzGerald’s support is a direct letter between the two men and is much deeper in detail than the memorandum of the previous month sent through aides. The document provided Donegan’s justification for not only returning Irish military forces to peacekeeping but specifically to Cyprus rather than the Sinai or Golan Heights. The Minister for Defence justified Cyprus as the location based on the training Irish units would receive there and the extra costs Ireland would incur with a deployment to UNEF II or the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria. He wrote: From the point of view of military unit training the Cyprus terrain is superior to that of the Middle East and the military side here have appreciated the beneficial effects on the training of units which have, over the years, served in Cyprus…Because of the hostile terrain and the absence of facilities considered essential for the welfare of troops we would have to take into account in any study of such a proposal the level of the compensation payable to our personnel by way of overseas allowances and the necessity to establish a rest camp outside the operational area. These would not [underlined in the original] be insurmountable difficulties but, because of the nature of the financial arrangements for troops serving with the U.N. Forces in the Middle East, the favourable balance which arose in the case of the Irish units which served in the area previously could be upset.3

Despite favoring a deployment of Irish peacekeepers to Cyprus, Donegan made it clear to FitzGerald that the Department of Defense would not refuse an assignment to UNEF II or UNDOF if either was the only option. He added, “If a request came from the United Nations for a unit with service for the United Nations Force in the Middle East (either in UNDOF or UNEF) we would, of course, consider it.”4 FitzGerald backed Donegan’s appeal and the Department of Foreign Affairs dispatched a coded message (classified Secret) two weeks later to Ireland’s delegation at the UN. The 1 July 1976 electronic message informed Ireland’s Permanent Representative at the UN that FitzGerald approved of Donegan’s request and the PMUN should “make informal soundings” in reference to Dublin’s desire to return a military unit to peacekeeping duty. It is interesting to note that the Government itself

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had not made a formal decision at this point. The message stated, “…The Minister [FitzGerald] has given his agreement in principle to the sending of troops and has directed that soundings be made. A final decision would of course be made by the Government [the Taoiseach and the Cabinet].”5 The message acknowledged to the UN delegation that initial discussions began in Dublin upon hearing of the Finnish decision to withdraw 130 of its soldiers from UNFICYP and that by now (two months later), the UN might have already made arrangements for their replacement. If so, the delegation should make it known “at the appropriate level” that Ireland is tentatively prepared to provide a similar sized unit for UNFICYP upon future need. However, if the UN insisted upon requesting an Irish contingent for UNEF II, “We would then have to hive [sic] serious consideration to such a suggestion.”6 The message from the Department of Foreign Affairs clearly indicated more than once that Ireland preferred to return to Cyprus and not the Sinai. The concluding paragraph of the message very clearly provided a summary of the Department’s instruction, “At this stage, therefore, the sounding should be on the basis of the availability of a unit of 130 troops approx. for service in UNFICYP.”7 The PMUN replied by electronic message a week later on 8 July 1976. Ireland’s UN delegation approached Mr. F. T. Liu, Director of the UN Office of Special Political Affairs, upon receiving the Department’s message of 1 July. On the morning of 8 July, they received his reply. As requested, the delegation made an informal sounding of 130 soldiers for Cyprus. However, Liu apparently “suggested” two alterations to the sounding—increasing the UN request from Ireland’s offer of 130 soldiers to 150 and then again to 325 (battalion strength). The message stated in its opening paragraph: In conversation today with Liu on another matter, he referred to our recent approach and said that Prem Chand [UNFICYP Force Commander 19701976] had asked Secretariat to ascertain if Ireland would be in a position to supply a contingent of 325 all ranks for Cyprus which information I promised to obtain soonest. Both Force Commander [Prem Chand] and Secretariat continue to regard a contingent of 150 [sic] too small.8

Liu provided more details to justify his request for doubling the Irish troop offer:

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Liu indicated however that if the Finns merely reduce their contingent by approximately 130 personnel, the SG’s [Secretary General] first preference would be not to replace them at all and if unsuccessful in this, to ask for existing field contingents to be increased to compensate…On the other hand if the Finns withdraw completely as I am told they are contemplating doing, the SG would probably be forced to seek a full replacement contingent (again of 325 approx.) and this might allow us the entree we are seeking.”9

The possibility that Finland was considering withdrawing its entire contingent in Cyprus proved to be something Ireland had not contemplated due to the information that the state planned to remove only 130 personnel. Informal discussion between the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs covered only a scenario related to Finland removing half of its contingent. Someone in the Department of Foreign Affairs placed a large question mark “?” next to the comment on the original message received from the PMUN indicating they questioned the remark or viewed it as a new consideration. The Department of Foreign Affairs dispatched a formal memorandum to the Department of Defense the same day they received the message from Ireland’s PMUN to officially communicate the response. FitzGerald sent a personal letter to Donegan covering the same information but in a more personal format. The latter document added a section with FitzGerald’s personal summary for Donegan’s consideration. First, the UN is not able to answer Ireland’s request until it knows the precise decision of Finland regarding its contingent in Cyprus. Second, the initial UN response indicated reluctance at accepting an Irish contingent as small as 130 personnel. Third, the UN provided an exploratory inquiry whether Ireland was willing to offer a unit of approximately 325 personnel for peacekeeping service.10 There were three considerations in the puzzle as of the second week of July 1976. First, Ireland wanted to provide a peacekeeping contingent to the UN. Second, the UN viewed a contingent of 130 personnel (company-sized unit) not within the needs of the UNFICYP. Third, the UN countered with a request that Ireland offer 325 personnel if it wanted to return to peacekeeping with a unit-sized contingent. Thus, Ireland found itself in the quandary introduced at the opening of the chapter. The UN did not want a small contingent; Ireland did not want to provide a large contingent.

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A month later, the UN asked Ireland’s PMUN whether the state had developed a response to the global organization’s offer to accept a 325 member unit for Cyprus. In turn the delegation sent a message to Dublin asking for guidance and stating, “Secretariat are awaiting word on whether we can supply a contingent of 325 all ranks before examining further.”11 Ireland provided a response another month later on 10 September in a message to the PMUN for relay to the UN Secretariat. The Department of Foreign Affairs informed the PMUN: The substance of the reply [to the UN Secretariat] is as follows: Concerning the possibility of a unit of the Defence forces being made available for service with the United Nations Forces in Cyprus, I am directed by the Minister for Defence to state that the present time would be inopportune for releasing a unit for the purpose. The matter will however be kept under review.12

The Department of Foreign Affairs’ message of 10 September is the first document in the official records that directly connects a decision of the Taoiseach with this 1976 process. The final paragraph of the message is a confidential note to Ireland’s Permanent Representative and not for sharing with the UN. The Department informed the ambassador that the Taoiseach made the final decision when queried by the Minister for Defence. The Taoiseach referred to the domestic circumstances not being ready for a large deployment but also stated this could change after at least six months.13 Three days later on 13 September Ireland’s Permanent Representative forwarded a response to Dublin from UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Brian Urquhart. The message read: When I saw Urquhart today, I also conveyed orally information in your C256 [number assigned to the message of 10 September 1976]. He expressed understanding and welcomed hope that we might participate again when circumstances permit…14

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1977: The First UN Declination of an Irish Offer to Provide Peacekeepers The Department for Defence raised the issue of an Irish peacekeeping contingent again on 18 January 1977. The Department prepared a detailed and lengthy memorandum for the Government justifying a deployment of Irish soldiers to a UN peacekeeping operation. The memorandum lamented the departure of Ireland from UN peacekeeping operations, other than small deployments of observers or headquarters staff, since 1974. The document directly tackled the Irish rationale for withdrawing its peacekeepers from the Sinai in 1974 and for offering 150 peacekeepers but not increasing them to the UN requested number of 325 six months earlier in July 1976. The Department recognized that recent increases in the Irish Defence Forces made the larger number of personnel a viable option: When the troops were withdrawn [from the Sinai] in 1974 it was indicated by the Government and since then reiterated, that when conditions allowed we would be glad and willing to supply a unit for service with the United Nations. One of the determining factors in deciding to withdraw was, presumably, the necessity to strengthen the Defence Forces in the light of an apparently deteriorating internal security situation. A comparison of present strengths again in May 1974 figures shows a net increase of over 3,000 all ranks or more than 25%. This strength, if maintained, is adequate to deal with our present operational commitments. A viable unit of say 350 all ranks would comprise an insignificant fraction of the total strength.15

The Minister for Defence attached the 18 January 1977 memorandum to a March 1977 document which offered more detailed justification for an Irish return to peacekeeping operations with the UN. The Government examined the request and approved it on 11 March 1977: …the Government authorized the Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform the United Nations that they are now in a position to make available a complete contingent, if required, to the United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces.16

On 18 March 1977, Ireland’s PMUN informed the Secretary-General of Ireland’s readiness to participate in UN peacekeeping with a large (battalion) size contingent. The mission sent a classified message to

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Dublin on 14 June 1977 indicating that the Secretary-General was considering asking Ireland for peacekeepers in Cyprus. Ireland’s Permanent Representative stated in the 14 June message: I gained the distinct impression from a conversation last evening with Brian Urquhart that the SEC GEN [Secretary-General] may now be thinking of asking us for troops for UNFICYP. I shall report further as soon as more concrete information crystallises.17

The 1977 General Election in Ireland occurred two days later on 16 June 1977. The Fine Gael-Labour coalition of Liam Cosgrave lost to the Fianna Fail Party which secured a majority of seats in the Dáil and selected Jack Lynch as the next Tasoiseach. Thus the Fine Gael team that had negotiated with the UN throughout the past 12 months to return Irish peacekeepers to Cyprus departed office after four years in power. Fianna Fail formed a Government under Lynch on 5 July 1977. On 17 June, the day after the General Election, Eammon Kennedy, Ireland’s Permanent Representative at the UN during the four year Fine Gael-Labour coalition, forwarded a message he received from the Secretary-General via Brian Urquhart on 16 June. The message informed Ireland that the mandate for UNFICYP had been extended for another six months and requested Irish continued support: The Secretary-General requests the Government of Ireland to maintain its contingent in Cyprus for this further period and would appreciate its favourable consideration of the matter. The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express once again to the Government of Ireland his appreciation for the co-operation and support it has given to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus.18

Mr. Kennedy’s forwarding note stated two important points: 1. “We enclose herewith a copy of the Note of 16th June 1977 received from the Secretary-General requesting the Government of Ireland to maintain its contingent in Cyprus for a further period until 15th December 1977.”19 2. “We presume you would wish to reply positively to this request and should be glad if you authorise us to do so. I feel that it is not satisfactory to leave these communications unanswered.”20

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The 16 June note from the UN (forwarded from the PMUN to Dublin on 17 June) arrived after the general election leaving Fine Gael now as a Caretaker Government. As quoted, the document requested Ireland to maintain its personnel (six individuals) until December 1977 in accordance with the newly renewed mandate for UNFICYP. However, the Irish received a second message from the UN also dated 16 June. PMUN coded Telex C153 of 16 June documented a second UN request—this one related to deploying a battalion-size contingent for UNFICYP: 1. Under Secretary General Urquhart phoned Mission this morning and asked me to ascertain whether our Government would not consider sending a contingent to Cyprus. Ideally what they would like would be an advance party from 60–80 in July with the balance of a total contingent of about 300 to go in October… 2. I explained of course that we have general elections today and that it would not be possible to give my response until the Government had been formed. He appreciated that but asked us to start thinking about it nevertheless. Presumably you would like to inform Defence of this request.21 Following consultation between the Department for Defence and other elements of the Government, the Department for Foreign Affairs crafted a response to the UN and forwarded it to PMUN on 30 December. The Fine Gael Cabinet served as a Caretaker Government until the seating of the new Dáil and the formation of a Fianna Fail Government. Caretaker Governments in parliamentary systems tend to avoid major policy decisions while awaiting the change in government after an election. Also, the decision to send 300 + armed peacekeepers to Cyprus required legislative approval. The Dáil dissolved itself for the general election and preparation for the establishment of a new legislature before the UN responded on 16 June. The 30 June document (Coded telex C132) to PMUN explained this delay to the UN: 1. Further to our telephone conversation we are concerned to ensure that any delay here occasioned by factors of which you are aware [general election and change of government] should not lead the UN to look elsewhere for a contingent.

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2. We should therefore be grateful if you could confirm to Urquhart that the request is receiving most sympathetic consideration and that a decision will be taken with the minimum possible delay. You could also confirm that the suggested arrangements for an advance party in July with the balance in October are acceptable in principle to the military authorities.22 Late the same day, PMUN sent a reply coded telex (C160) back to Dublin. This telex documented the UN’s response and understanding to the message from Dublin that morning. The PMUN telex read: UN appreciate present factors causing delay and understand that our final decision can only be made over the next week or two. They are flexible regarding the advance party which could be dispatched late July/early August. At the moment we are the only country being considered for a contingent.23

Dr. FitzGerald met with Members of Defence and Foreign Affairs and updated them on the situation. Some concern emerged that Ireland’s “tough” stance for demanding prompt repayment for reimbursable expenses related to peacekeeping could hinder the state’s selection for UNFICYP which operated under voluntary UN member contributions. The Attorney General’s office reminded all that not only a Government approval was required but also that of the Dáil since the number of Irish personnel currently assigned to UNFICYP was six in number and would break the threshold of twelve with the additional armed peacekeepers. The Dáil would enter a recess after the seating of the new legislative members and this could lengthen the process if the new Government did not act quickly. A 15 July review of the process noted: Accordingly, Dr. FitzGerald spoke to the incoming Taoiseach, Mr. Lynch, on the matter and reported back to the Dept. for Foreign Affairs that the Taoiseach-to-be had directed that the matter should be submitted for consideration by the newly formed Government at the first meeting to be held in Aras an Uachtarain [official residence of the President of Ireland] on the evening of 5 July; and that this should be done on the basis that “all options were to be kept open.”24

The new Fianna Fail Government assumed power on 5 July. On that day and in the Government’s first meeting, the ministers approved the

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dispatch of an Irish contingent for UNFICYP. Fianna Fail, which held the majority of seats in the Dáil, arranged on the same day for the latter body to consider a bill to authorize the deployment of the armed peacekeeper contingent to Cyprus. Mr. Michael O’Kennedy, the new Fianna Fail Minister for Foreign Affairs, presented the bill to the Dáil as well as explained its significance for Ireland why the deputies should support it: That, pursuant to section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960 (No. 44 of 1960) Dáil Éireann approves of the despatch of a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force for service outside the State as part of the United Nations Force in Cyprus which pursuant to a Resolution on Cyprus adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on the 4th day of March, 1964, reaffirmed by subsequent Resolutions of the Security Council, has been established by that Council for the performance of duties of a police character. The purpose of this resolution is to enable the Government to give a positive response to an approach made to us by the United Nations Secretariat regarding the provision of an Irish contingent for service with the United Nations Force in Cyprus…The Dáil originally approved the despatch of a contingent for service with UNFICYP on 7th April, 1964. Under the terms of the Defence (Amendment) No. 2, Act 1960, further Dáil authority was not required for the replacement and rotation of these troops in succeeding years. However, as the number of Irish troops serving with UNFICYP has fallen below 12 since 1973, doubt has arisen as to whether the Dáil resolution of 1964 provides authority for the despatch of a full contingent at this stage. The Government have therefore thought it desirable to table this resolution before the Dáil today…Talks have recently been held by representatives of the two communities under the aegis of the Secretary General of the United Nations, but no agreement has yet been reached on future political arrangements for the island. In these circumstances the Secretary General, on 7th June last, expressed the view that "in existing circumstances the continued presence of UNFICYP remains essential. The Force is an indispensable factor in keeping the potentially explosive situation in the island under control, supervising the cease-fire, maintaining the status quo in the area between the lines and helping to defuse incidents and other problems arising between the parties. In helping to maintain quiet in the island the Force also facilitates the continued search for a peaceful settlement”...In the circumstances the Government have decided that they should respond favourably to the UN approach. I am sure that all Deputies will agree with me in the view that service with the United Nations has been of benefit to the Defence Forces and has contributed substantially to the essential peacekeeping functions of the United Nations. The Government

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are satisfied that a contingent can be made available without prejudice to the ability of the Defence Forces to carry out their other tasks, given the increase in their strength in recent years…Should the Dáil approve the present motion, the Government would intend to make available to the United Nations a contingent of some 300 men for service in Cyprus. The practical arrangements would of course be a matter for discussion with the United Nations. On present indications an advance party of 60-80 would be required in late July or early August with the balance of the contingent in October next…The continued desire of the United Nations to have Irish participation is a tribute to the excellence and effectiveness of past Irish contingents…I should like to acknowledge that the decision that I am now proposing to the House was, I understand, taken by the former Administration and the Minister. The fact that it was perhaps the first formal decision taken by the incoming Government is merely confirmation of the fact that we intend to follow what would have been the response of the previous Administration in this matter. I am sure the Leader of the Opposition will respond on this basis and that the House will adopt the resolution.25

Dr. Garret FitzGerald, who served until the previous day as the Fine Gael Minister for Foreign Affairs, accepted the invitation to speak and offered his party’s support for the bill: First, I should like to offer my personal congratulations to the Minister whose appointment I think will be widely welcomed and to offer him any help or assistance within my power. The area of Foreign Affairs is, to a very large extent, bipartisan and I shall be happy to provide any information or knowledge that I have acquired during my period in office to assist him in what is certainly, from my own experience of it, a very onerous task. The previous Government deeply regretted the need for the decision to withdraw our forces from Cyprus several years ago. It was at a time when our own armed forces were not at sufficient strength here with a sufficient number of trained personnel to enable us to provide adequately for our own security in a situation of considerable danger to our people in this part of the island. This decision was forced on us by those facts but the intensive recruitment pursued by the previous Government and the training of these recruits to a high level of attainment and efficiency made it possible for the previous Government last year to offer to the United Nations a small contingent or partial contingent if the UN felt that such a contingent would be useful to them but the UN feeling was that a full contingent was necessary and that a partial contingent might not be as useful to them. We, therefore, waited until the position of our own

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forces here was such that we could offer a full contingent certain that this would not in any way weaken the security of this State. I think it was in March last year this offer was made. Recently a positive response has come from the United Nations. It was at this point just before the Government changed that a question arose as to whether we would be legally entitled to dispatch such a contingent without a Dáil resolution. Therefore, I got in touch with the then Leader of the Opposition, who was about to become Taoiseach, to point out to him this difficulty and to suggest to him that he might wish to bring this motion in here today to clarify this matter and to make sure that the fact that the Dáil was in recess would not stand in the way of this force being sent. Therefore, naturally I am very glad to support this resolution. Our troops have been popular in Cyprus and in the Middle East, the Congo, and elsewhere. Indeed, in my contacts with the Greek and Turkish Governments I found on both sides a strong desire that our troops should play their full part, a desire, may I say, shared also by the Governments of the Middle East who would also like to see an Irish contingent of the UN force there…I have pleasure in welcoming this motion and I hope the force in question will be able to get to Cyprus and get down to the job as soon as the Minister indicated in his opening statement.26

The Dáil approved the bill to send Irish personnel to Cyprus under the banner of UNFICYP on 6 July 1977. The next day, the Department for Foreign Affairs dispatched a coded telex to PMUN informing the office of the Government and Dáil approval to the UN’s request for Irish peacekeepers. PMUN replied the same day with a message that startled the new Government: Positions here [at the UN] at present is that major financial contributors have applied pressure to the S.G. [Secretary-General] and questioned the necessity of providing a replacement for the Finnish contingent. Urquhart has requested written confirmation from General Quinn [UNFICYP Force Commander] that the Finns must [sic] be replaced. Quinn expected to provide this written confirmation…This has led to a delay in the UN sending us an “official” request for a contingent. To further delay matters, Quinn is apparently ill with bronchitis at the moment. I will keep you informed of any developments.27

A 20 July internal memo traced the process behind the conflicting opinions of Ireland and the UN on the issue. The document recorded

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that Ireland sent notification to the UN (in particular Under-SecretaryGeneral Urquhart) on 7 July indicating the Government and the Dáil approved the dispatch of an Irish peacekeeping unit to Cyprus. An 11 July message from Urquhart requested more information from Dublin related to the state’s estimated cost [reimbursable by the UN] for the contingent. Dublin answered the question on 13 July. Urquhart replied the same day that a reassessment of the UNFICYP Force Commander resulted in a decision that replacement peacekeepers for departing contingents were not needed. Thus, the UN did not have a need for Irish peacekeepers. The Irish Government sent a memorandum to PMUN on 13 July raising a question about the latter’s 16 June note and the SecretaryGeneral’s request for Irish troops in Cyprus. The document makes the following inquiry of the PMUN: I am to refer to your minutes of the 17th June enclosing a copy of a Note from the UN Secretary-General [the first 16 June UN message] requesting the Government to maintain its contingent in Cyprus for a further period until 15 December 1977 and to inform you that a positive reply may be given to this request. It is assumed that the request refers only to the contingent of six Army personnel currently serving in Cyprus and is separate from the approach recently received from the UN about the provision of a complete contingent.28

It is not clear but it can be interpreted that Dublin displayed confusion when receiving Urquhart’s note about not needing an Irish peacekeeping contingent leading to a message attempting to better ensure the relationship of the Irish offer of peacekeepers with the UN favorable response, the Irish request for delay following the General Election, the UN request for extension of the six Irish peacekeepers at the UNFICYP headquarters, and the note from Urquhart declaring the UN did not require an Irish peacekeeping contingent for Cyprus. Obviously, this study should not assume a policy or thought direction without facts but the wording of Dublin’s 13 July message to PMUN in reference to a clarification of the UN’s 16 June memorandum on extending a “contingent” for Cyprus does lead to questions on the exchange of messages during the past two months. PMUN phoned the Department for Foreign Affairs the next day, 14 July, and reported a telephone conversation with Urquhart about Dublin’s message of the previous day. Urquhart confirmed in the latter phone call that the UN did not now require an Irish contingent for

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UNFICYP due to “redeployment arrangements” made by the Force Commander. The Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs met with the Taoiseach to develop a response to the news. The response to be relayed by PMUN to Urquhart declared that Ireland viewed the change as “unacceptable.”29 The Irish Government dispatched a message to PMUN on 15 July outlining its position on this issue. The message conveyed a very direct tone for PMUN to relay to UN Secretariat: …It is considered [by Ireland] that the original communication from UN and subsequent exchange of messages constitute a request in the proper sense on the part of the UN…Also that their [UN] present position, representing a reversal of a request on which we had acted with greatest possible urgency, is unacceptable. Minister has accordingly decided that Charge [Charge d’Affaires] should call on Urquhart to convey this to him in the strongest possible terms. He should emphasise that UN request was only business considered by Government at its first meeting and by Dáil at its first sitting: that proposal to sent [sic] contingent has been widely publicised here: That Army has already begun to make preparations and that morale of Army will be very adversely affected if present UN position is known. Minister also requests that latest development be regarded as most confidential and wishes avoid any reference to it in media. Charge should also mention this aspect to Urquhart.30

The message lays out the Irish Government’s position on this issue. The UN clearly requested Irish peacekeepers in detail; the UN unilaterally and unexpectedly reversed its position despite Ireland’s diligent and urgent efforts to meet the request; the UN’s reversal has placed the Irish Government in an embarrassing position with the Irish people and media; and the reversal will demoralize the Irish army. PMUN returned a message to Dublin the same day after a meeting with Urquhart. The message summarized the meeting and noted: Urquhart confessed that this was the first time he was aware that the matter had been the subject of a Dáil motion, even though A) His office was told in July that a Dáil motion was necessary and B) Written notification of that motion and its adoption was sent to him by this mission on July 7. A copy of the cutting on the Irish Independent of July 8 with the heading “Force of 300 Irish Troops for Cyprus” was given to him by me to emphasise the publicity already given to this matter in Ireland. After reading the two

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column press cutting, Urquhart said he was as “extremely sorry” that he had allowed matters on the Irish side to develop so quickly.31

The next day, 16 July 1977, the Department for Foreign Affairs sent another message to PMUN covering the exchange of messages between the UN and Ireland since March 1977. The message outlined in more detail Irish concern that pressure from other UN members who provided much of the voluntary funding for UNFICYP and Ireland’s active insistence on prompt receipt of reimbursements for peacekeeping expenses played a role in the UN reversing its offer to accept Irish personnel in Cyprus: …I would add that it seems to me that precisely because we have at least some reason to suspect that the last minute change of mind by the UN may be a response to private pressures from others such as the USA (for financial reasons) and the UK (for political reasons nearer home). We in our turn must put on very firm pressure to ensure we are not treated in this unacceptable way by the UN which we have supported so well in its peacekeeping efforts over the years.32

Brian Urquhart departed New York on UN business after 15 July and further discussion on this topic passed to his deputy Mr. F. T. Liu who proposed not deploying but earmarking an Irish battalion as a “stand by” force in case it was needed. The Irish soldiers could train and remain in Ireland awaiting a UN call up if required. This offer would provide Ireland with a face saving measure and allow the UN to reduce UNFICYP personnel in Cyprus. The UN would list the Irish battalion as an integral component of UNFICYP as though based in Cyprus but remaining in Ireland. As part of the agreement, the Secretary-General could make a public announcement praising and thanking Ireland for its contingent contribution to UNFICYP. The compromise offer did not impress an already politically embarrassed Ireland but did provide some benefits to the state. PMUN raised four advantages to both sides within this compromise offer. 1. It would help appease the United States and other major voluntary contributing states that the UN was achieving cost-cutting measures in Cyprus.

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2. The details offered Ireland a means to officially acknowledge the UN had accepted an Irish contingent for Cyprus even if based in Ireland. 3. The plan provided a foot in the door for Ireland to deploy its peacekeepers to Cyprus if UNFICYP troop reduction did not materialize. 4. Ireland would hold a next-in-line position to replace a contingent that opted to depart UNFICYP in the future.33 When Brian Urquhart returned, he prepared a formal letter for Ireland’s PMUN officially offering the compromise to Ireland on behalf of the Secretary General. The document outlined the compromise as detailed in the 16 July memorandum. Both Ireland and the UN politically saved face.34

Postscript The process between May and September 1976 included an Irish Government offer of a peacekeeping contingent considered too small in size by the UN to warrant acceptance and deployment to Cyprus at the time. In return, the UN requested Ireland to provide a military contingent more than twice the size of its original offer for which the Irish Government declined the request due to its own internal needs at the time. This might seem to be an insignificant exchange of a contingent offer followed by a counteroffer but the events held greater political significance for Ireland than might be obvious at first glance. First, the events illustrate the political nature between the UN and contingent providing states. Just because a member state has a military contingent to offer to the UN does not mean the organization is going to accept its deployment into a peacekeeping operation due to political, financial, or military structural needs including perceptions of neutrality by the conflicting parties, limits on force size as codified in mandating resolutions, or funding limitations. At the same time, and more evident, specific UN requests to states for military personnel are not necessarily answered favorably due to various reasons including domestic politics, military training/structure, and foreign policy related to the conflict in which the peacekeepers are or will be deployed. Although Ireland’s

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foreign policy included an important foundation in promoting peace and stability among other states, its own domestic troubles on the border with Northern Ireland and the small size of its army dictated a limitation in its participation in peacekeeping during this period of time. At the same time the UN has requirements to maintain peacekeeping forces at levels commensurate with the needs of the peace process and within limits of the mandates and available financing. In particular, financing for the mission in Cyprus is based on voluntary contributions. Additionally, a battalion size force of 325 peacekeepers is a more coherent military organization compared to two or more 130 personnel companies from different countries with varying training, equipment, perception toward adhering to UN directives. The UN wanted to maintain a military, political, and financial status quo by replacing the Finnish battalion with one from Ireland. Second, the events represented the first time the UN officially requested Irish peacekeepers and received a declination in return. (In 1957, there were unofficial discussions before Ireland declined.) While the Irish found a declination difficult to deliver for policy reasons as seen in the records, their current domestic political situation dictated the response after the UN stated a 130-personnel unit would be too small for the situation on the ground. What did this demonstrate about Irish peacekeeping policy? The Irish Government did not view consultation with the Dáil a requirement for declining a UN request for peacekeepers just as it did not view Dáil consultation a requirement to withdraw its peacekeepers from UNEF II in 1974. While the point seems obvious, the 1976 declination of a UN request demonstrated this as a political reality rather than an assumed theory behind a decision making process. Third, Ireland’s declination of the UN request for 325 peacekeepers in September 1976 played an important role in what can be considered as the state’s greatest embarrassment in peacekeeping the following year in 1977 when an offer of a peacekeeping battalion (as requested by the UN in 1976) was accepted and then declined after the new Irish Government and legislature backed it…an event that resulted in a serious political misunderstanding between the Irish Government and the UN. The following chapter will cover the long awaited return of Ireland in 1978 to UN peacekeeping at the contingent level.

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Notes 1. Department of Defence memorandum to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 3/67799, 1 May 1976. 2. Department of Foreign Affairs internal memorandum, 10 May 1976. 3. Department of Defence memorandum to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 18 June 1976. 4. Ibid. 5. Department of Foreign Affairs electronic message to the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, Subject: Availability of Troops for Service in UNFICYP, Classified Secret, 1 July 1976. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations electronic message to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Subject: Availability of Troops for Service in UNFICYP, Classified Confidential, 8 July 1976. 9. Ibid. 10. Minister for Foreign Affairs Garrett FitzGerald personal memorandum to Minister for Defence Patrick Donegan, 8 July 1976. 11. Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations electronic message to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Subject: Availability of Troops for Service in UNFICYP, Classified Confidential, 11 August 1976. 12. Department of Foreign Affairs electronic message to the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, Subject: Availability of Troops for Service in UNFICYP, Classified Secret, 10 September 1976. 13. Ibid. Concern about the domestic situation is not unwarranted. When Minister for Defense Donegan presented his 1976 annual defense budget justification to the Dáil, he informed the body that at least 60% of the Irish army were connected in some way with border guard or border patrol duties between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland to counter cross-border movement of terrorists and criminal elements. These are the same conditions that prompted the withdrawal of the Irish peacekeepers in UNEF II in 1974. 14. Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations electronic message to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Subject: Availability of Troops for Service in UNFICYP, Classified Confidential, C526, 13 September 1976. 15. Chief of Staff, Department of Defence Memorandum to the Minister for Defense, “Service with the United Nations,” 18 January 1977. 16. Internal Government Routing Slip, No Title, 161370, 11 March 1977. 17. Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations electronic message to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Subject: Cyprus, Classified Confidential, C151, 14 June 1977.

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18. Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart Memorandum to the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN, 16 June 1977. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Irish Government Internal Memorandum, Subject: Developments in Regard to Proposed Irish Contingent for UNFICYP, 15 July 1977. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Foreign Affairs Michael O’Kennedy. “Supplementary Estimate, 1977- Cyprus Peace-keeping Force: Motion”. Volume 300, No.2, 6 July 1977. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 26. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Garrett FitzGerald. “Supplementary Estimate, 1977- Cyprus Peace-keeping Force: Motion”. Volume 300, No.2, 6 July 1977. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 27. Irish Government Internal Memorandum, Subject: Developments in Regard to Proposed Irish Contingent for UNFICYP, 15 July 1977. 28. Department of Foreign Affairs memorandum to Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, Subject: UNFICYP, 305/148/8, 13 July 1977. 29. Ibid. 30. Department of Foreign Affairs electronic message to Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, Subject: UNFICYP, Classified Confidential, C146, 15 July 1977. 31. Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations electronic message to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Subject: Irish Troops for Cyprus, Classified Confidential, C176, 15 July 1977. The unflattering article written about the event read in part, “Department of Defence sources have revealed that a Department of the last Government informed the Taoiseach, Mr. Lynch, that a peacekeeping force for Cyprus must be treated ‘as a matter of urgency.’ The Dáil motion said the soldiers would move out this month. But later the Government realised that a request had not been made, and they had been wrongly informed. ‘It was a total mess up,’ said one Department official.” 32. Department of Foreign Affairs electronic message to Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, Subject: Irish Troop Contingent for UN Force in Cyprus, Classified Confidential, C148, 16 July 1977. 33. Department of Foreign Affairs electronic message to Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, Subject: Irish Troop Contingent for UNFICYP, Classified Confidential, C179, 18 July 1977. 34. Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart Memorandum to the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN, Subject: Letter of Under-SecretaryGeneral Urquhart to Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN, 21 July 1977.

CHAPTER 8

Lebanon 1978

Clearly from our point of view, it is unsatisfactory that we have been kept “hanging” in this way and that there have been changes in the UN’s approach. However, it would appear that there is little we can do in the matter since the Secretary General is trying to cope with a difficult, complex, and changing situation as between Israel and the Arab States. —Noel Dorr, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

Introduction Attempts to return Irish peacekeepers in a contingent size unit to United Nations (UN) service failed in 1976 under the Fine Gael-Labour coalition and in 1977 under Fianna Fail after Dublin’s withdrawal from peacekeeping in the Sinai in 1974. Fianna Fail viewed the formation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) as another opportunity to place Irish troops in a UN peacekeeping mission. The political process related to receiving a formal request from the UN could be seen just as frustrating as the complications experienced in 1977. The sixweek period between mid-April 1978 and early May 1978 taxed many as the Irish Cabinet and the Permanent Mission at the United Nations (PMUN) faced multiple offers and withdrawal of offers by the UN for Irish peacekeepers.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_8

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Irish interests behind participation in Lebanon leaned heavily on the state’s absence from unit-sized peacekeeper deployments since the Sinai in 1974. Many in Ireland lamented that the state needed to withdraw its contingent for domestic security reasons and viewed the Irish role in UN peacekeeping as a point of international pride for the small state. Although peacekeeping in Lebanon would eventually produce more casualties among Irish personnel than any other single UN operation, Irish interests in the state made sense for Dublin. Ireland established formal diplomatic relations in January 1975 at the opening of its year-long diplomatic initiative in support of European Economic Community cooperation mentioned in Chapter 6 on the Sinai. Rory Miller comments that Ireland held a keen reputation along the Eastern Mediterranean due to its policy of non-intervention in the various political and military troubles facing Lebanon in the 1970s. Miller notes, “In the case of Lebanon, this policy of non-intervention in inter-Arab affairs was most evident in the refusal of successive Irish governments to condemn or even refer to Syria’s role in domestic Lebanese affairs…”.1 Unfortunately, belligerents kidnapped and/or killed numerous Irish peacekeepers over the next two decades of on-and-off again deployments to Lebanon.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Background Lebanon was a simmering pot ready to boil over into violence. The state consisted of many ethnic, religious, and other cultural/political groups who tended to clash with themselves and others across Lebanon’s international frontiers. Going back only to 1970, the Jordanian Government expelled many members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) following an attempted coup known to many as Black September. Many PLO members moved to exile in Lebanon. By 1975, violence between the left-leaning Pan-Arabist Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Christian Phalange increased in the state. By December 1975, open fighting between the two groups and their allies engulfed Lebanon. The PLO sided with the Lebanese National Movement. Fighting increased, perpetrated by both sides. Syria intervened in June 1976 and the Arab League mandated the Syrian forces and smaller numbers from other Arab states as the Arab Deterrent Force. Although the smaller token Arab forces departed soon after arriving, the situation in Lebanon showed some

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measure of calm compared to the bloody attacks and reprisals of the previous year. Some estimates place the death toll around 60,000 since the outbreaks in 1975. Lebanon could be said to be divided between the various groups after 1977 with the PLO and Lebanese National Movement affiliated Muslim militias controlling southern Lebanon and West Beirut. The PLO conducted raids from southern Lebanon into northern Israel after 1977. On 11 March 1978, a PLO team landed on the shoreline of northern Israel where they ambushed and hijacked two Israeli civilian buses. The incident, known as the Coastal Road Massacre, resulted in the deaths of 37 Israelis and the wounding of another 76. The Israeli Army invaded Lebanon on 14 March 1978 in a mission known as Operation Litani. The UN Security Council met and adopted Resolution 425 calling for an Israeli withdrawal and the mandating of the UNIFIL to oversee the movement of Israeli forces.2 Peacekeeping Policy Step One: Receipt of a United Nations Request for Contingent Support Mr. John Molloy, the Irish ambassador to the United States and temporarily the Charge d’Affaires in the Irish PMUN office at the UN, phoned the Department of Foreign Affairs in the mid-evening of 18 March 1978 to inform Dublin of the latest developments related to the conflict in Lebanon. The Desk Officer in Dublin prepared a written internal memorandum of the conversation the next day. Mr. Molloy reported that he expected the United States to present a resolution calling for the Security Council to mandate a UN peacekeeping force for Lebanon. He also felt certain that Ireland would be asked to provide a battalion size contingent. According the Desk Officer’s report, Molloy relayed: …that he heard privately that Under-Secretary-General [Brian] Urquhart had mentioned privately to the Americans that Ireland would be one obvious country which could be approached. Mr. Molloy requested me to inform relevant officials that it was possible Ireland might be approached over the weekend informally or formally (if the Council adopted the resolution on Sunday) as to whether we would participate in such a force. He also requested that I inform him of our views as to the line he should take if informally approaches.3

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The Desk Officer contacted Jeremy Craig and explained the phone call he received. At this point, Ireland would not take any formal action related to the peacekeeping operation since there had not been an informal or formal approach made by the UN for a contingent. The instructions passed to Molloy requested that he simply respond to any informal questions that the Government must make any comments about an Irish peacekeeping contingent. During Dublin’s return phone call late that night, Molloy updated the Desk Officer as to which countries had been mentioned as contingent providers. Ireland was not on the list at that time. Dublin received another phone call in the early evening of the next day to report the resolution mandating a peacekeeping operation for Lebanon had been adopted. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia abstained and China did not participate in the voting. The abstentions stemmed from disagreements related to financing the operation and not necessarily the necessity of the mission itself. The Desk Officer reported: Following the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Molloy approached Under Secretary-General Urquhart (who was sitting beside him) and asked whether he would be approaching Ireland with a request to participate in the new force. Urquhart replied that it would be premature to regard the resolution as allowing him to at the moment to approach governments but that he would probably [underlining of the word is in the original] be approaching Ireland tomorrow…He also added that if Ireland were approached, the UN would be interested in a battalion.4

Molloy added that he spoke with the Israeli ambassador to the UN who noted that Israel would not have an objection to an Irish contingent in the UN mission. Ireland did not make initial decisions related to acceptance of a possible request from the UN for a contingent. On 20 March, Ireland began asking its ambassadors to ascertain the opinions of states that had already been mentioned by the UN for contingents. The Department of Foreign Affairs queried the Irish ambassador to Austria for that state’s thoughts on participation. The electronic message informed the Irish embassy: Given the circumstances existing in Southern Lebanon involving forces other than those directly under the control of Governments, we are naturally somewhat concerned about the precise role that a UN force may be expected to play…We should be grateful for any information that you may

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be able to obtain informally from your contacts informally [sic] regarding their approach to this operation, the role which they see the force playing and any safeguards they may be considering requesting in relation to possible participation by their troops. You will appreciate that any enquiries should be low-key as we would not wish to cast any doubt on our basic disposition to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operation.5

PMUN sent a message to the Department of Foreign Affairs on the same day as the messages to the Irish embassies. The PMUN expressed concern that the Secretary-General had contacted several countries to request contingents for UNIFIL. The PMUN had not been contacted although some sources indicated Ireland was still under consideration. As discussed in the last chapter, Ireland desired to return a contingent-sized unit to a UN peacekeeping mission and the efforts failed with Cyprus in 1977. Thus, Ireland looked at Lebanon in 1978 as a possible opportunity. PMUN inquiries were directed to Mr. F. T. Liu of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Liu assured Mr. McMahon of PMUN that the UN still envisioned Ireland as a contingent providing state for UNIFIL and wanted to extend an informal approach to Dublin. However, the situation turned against Irish participation: Liu phoned back about an hour later and withdrew his earlier informal approach. He was very apologetic and said that he did not at this stage wish us to act on his earlier approach. The situation had now changed and discussions were continuing regarding the geographical balance of the force.6

Five European states had already been approached (Austria, Sweden, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom) and there were some concerns adding Ireland would throw the geographical balance off with a preponderance of European countries. UK said the SECGEN’s [Secretary-General’s] office was clearly under considerable pressure to accept wide geographical distribution in the constitution of units for the force…In UK view, hoping for offers from Africa and Asia to give UNIFIL necessary balance. UK felt they were correspondingly less anxious to encourage troop offers from countries like ourselves. UK view was that if we wanted to be considered, we should contact Uruqhart or Guyer and make our position clear, if only because

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some of the SECGEN’s initial “contacts” might not produce positive results.7

The responses received from the Irish embassies in Austria and Sweden provided useful information to help Ireland understand the path being taken by the UN Secretariat in establishing contingents for UNIFIL. Two days later on 22 March, Craig prepared a message for the PMUN in response to the note from the latter on 20 March. Craig specifically referred to the 20 March note (labeled as PMUN C89) in his new message (labeled as C51 of the Department of Foreign Affairs). Craig urged caution in PMUN discussions related to UNIFIL. Craig requested PMUN not to make any approaches to the UN Secretariat about an Irish contingent for UNIFIL. He informed PMUN: For your confidential information, we have learned from Vienna and Stockholm that neither Government has yet responded positively to UN request that troops serving with UNEF and UNDOF be made available as advance contingent. Further, for your most confidential information, US Embassy approached us this morning on instructions expressing hope that we would respond favourably to UN request. Embassy seemed surprised that we had not approached. We shall be grateful if on the basis of public statements and reports and without making any specific enquiries you could let us have any information on individual Arab (including PLO) and EE [an acronym applied at this period to mean ‘Eastern Europe’] reactions for setting up of the force. No doubt you will let us have records of SECCO [Security Council] debates soonest by bordereau [detailed memorandum].8

PMUN responded the same day with a very detailed update to UNIFIL planning at the UN. The document covered three areas for Irish planning related to having a contingent of its forces requested and deployed with UNIFIL. First, PMUN provided an update on the UN’s concerns about “geographical representation” in UNIFIL. The Secretary-General envisaged a UNIFIL deployment with approximately 3,000 infantry represented by five or six battalions of 500–600 personnel per unit and a separate logistics unit of approximately 1,000 personnel. In accordance with standard UN practice for a peacekeeping or peace observation mission, the organization selects contingents in coordination with the Security Council and the parties involved in the conflict. Thus the UN needed to find contingents from states acceptable to the Security

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Council and the belligerents while also striving to balance the geographical representation. Ireland seemed it could meet the acceptance of the Security Council and the belligerents but faced a problem with geographical balance with the UN already accepting contingents from Austria, France, and Norway from its West European and Others Group. Small contingents from Austria, Sweden, Iran, and Canada temporarily transferred from UNEF II and UNDOF and were already on the ground awaiting the arrival of the main UNIFIL contingents. As of the previous day (21 March), the Secretary-General announced to the Security Council that he had accepted offers of contingents from France and Norway representing Western Europe and Nepal of the Asian group of states. From the Latin American Group, the Secretary-General received a refusal from Venezuela and Bolivia had not made a decision. Senegal, of the African Group, had not responded to a request for a UNIFIL contingent as of 21 March. Romania of the Eastern Europe Group turned down the Secretary-General’s offer. The United Kingdom offered to route logistics through its bases in Cyprus but declined sending its logistics personnel to Lebanon. Canada turned down a request to dispatch logistics personnel beyond the early arrival of their soldiers temporarily transferred from other UN missions.9 PMUN reported their view of the Secretary-General’s UNIFIL strategy from his comments and a report he delivered to the Security Council. The PMUN message noted that despite the Secretary-General’s efforts, it seemed doubtful that he would be able to locate a second Latin American state willing to participate in UNIFIL and the small size and capabilities of the Senegalese army lend doubt on that state being able to deploy a battalion of soldiers to Lebanon. The message declared Ireland still had a chance for being selected for UNIFIL although in the West European Group: The present position is that the SECGEN will continue to attempt to get suitable contingents from the E.E., L.A. [Latin America], and African Groups. If in the long term he fails to obtain contingents from these area, he will of course turn to other regional groups to supply contingents…it is quite possible that the U.N. will turn to the WEO [West European and Others] states to fill any gaps left in UNIFIL by the failure of any of the regional groups to volunteer a suitable contingent for the force. Thus notwithstanding the recent Canadian offer, there is still a good possibility that Ireland may yet be asked to supply a contingent to UNIFIL. Indeed,

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were it not for the recent Canadian offer, it is felt here that Ireland would be the first WEO to be asked to fill any gap in UNIFIL.10

Three days later, the PMUN’s positive belief was justified. A member of the UN Secretariat contacted Ambassador Molloy, also serving as Ireland’s Charge d’Affaires in the PMUN office, on 25 March and made an informal approach about Ireland providing a battalion size unit for UNIFIL. A 29 March internal memorandum mentioned that the Minister for Foreign Affairs Michael O’Kennedy attended the funeral of former Irish President Ó Dálaigh on 23 March along with many other members of the Government. At some point during the gathering, the Government attendees discussed the possibility of the UN Secretary-General approaching Ireland for a UNIFIL contingent. The positive responses proved opportune on the evening of the 23rd when the Minister received word of the UN informal approach. Jeremy Craig, the author of a 29 March internal memorandum outlining this process, wrote: He [Minister for Foreign Affairs O’Kennedy] indicated that in view of these discussions [at the gathering for the funeral] we could reply to the United Nations approach by saying that the Government would be favourably disposed and that it would give careful consideration to a formal request when such was received. Owing to telephone difficulties I was not able to contact Mr. Molloy in New York until the early morning of Sunday, 26th March. I gave him the message as indicated above and he said that he would convey it to the U.N. as soon as possible.11

Ireland responded to the UN approach on 27 March 1978. PMUN delivered the note and dispatched a message back to Dublin later the same day confirming the task and providing more details: Message conveyed to UN Secretariat early Sunday morning. UN are relieved and grateful for prompt action. When asked when we could expect to hear further from UN, I was told the SECGEN would have to report to SECCO members and receive approval to [formally] approach us. SECGEN is for the moment unwilling to make such an approach to SECCO until he has heard from Bolivia (itself a member of SECCO) and Iran. Until these replies are received, Secretariat fears that to ask for approval to approach Ireland now might prompt objections from certain SECCO members that the equitable geographic principle was not being upheld.12

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All continued to wait for the UN Secretary-General to receive responses from Bolivia and Iran. PMUN sent a formal letter, rather than an electronic message, to the Department of Foreign Affairs on 3 April. The Secretary-General departed New York for a three-stop trip to Europe. His destinations were The Hague, London, and Dublin. Ireland’s Permanent Representative, Eamon Kennedy, met with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim before the latter’s departure in an attempt to secure some of his thoughts about Ireland and UNIFIL so these could be sent to Dublin ahead of Waldheim’s arrival. Kennedy wrote to Minister for Foreign Affairs Michael O’Kennedy that the two men spoke about the prospects for UNIFIL to succeed. Dr. Waldheim seemed cautiously optimistic that it would help to maintain the ceasefire despite the complications associated with an Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon before the arrival of all UN contingents. The Secretary-General informed O’Kennedy that the situation in the area was much more fragile than either that in the Sinai or Golan where UN units enforced mutually accepted agreements.13 Waldheim stated that he finally received a negative reply from Bolivia in reference to providing a UNIFIL contingent. Therefore, the SecretaryGeneral reached out to Mexico which did respond favorably. UNIFIL now had contingent pledges from each geographical group except Eastern Europe although speculation at the UN leaned toward persuading Yugoslavia to participate. O’Kennedy asked Waldheim about the opportunity for an Irish contingent: He told me he would very much welcome an Irish contingent but since there are already three contributors from Western Europe, he would have to wait a while until other areas were approached. Incidentally, he mentioned that he was a bit worried about the French who seemed quite trigger-happy and inexperienced in the delicate art of UN peace-keeping in which Irish troops have so often distinguished themselves.14

PMUN sent a classified electronic message on the same day O’Kennedy prepared his formal memorandum on his conversation with SecretaryGeneral Waldheim. The purpose of the electronic message was to ensure the Irish Government received the details of the meeting between the two men prior to the Secretary-General’s arrival in Dublin on 10 April. The message contained many interesting points related to Ireland’s efforts to join UNIFIL and the projections of success for the mission. Prior to

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Waldheim’s departure, the Secretary-General attended a formal dinner in which he delivered a speech that was quite complimentary of Ireland’s role in the UN “and unusual for him, paralleled Ireland’s constructive role with Austria in international affairs and at the UN.”15 The Department of Foreign Affairs replied to PMUN on 6 April requesting clarifications in the information related to UNIFIL provided in recent messages from New York. The nature of the questions illustrates the ongoing concern in the Irish Government that Dublin might not receive a formal request for a UNIFIL contingent. First, Dublin pointed out that an earlier PMUN message noted that if another non-West European contingent could not be found, the UN would request an Irish contingent. If another non-West European contingent is secured, does this mean Ireland will now not be approached as long as the maximum size remains at 4,000 peacekeepers? Second, if the UN Security Council increases the size of UNIFIL, would this mean Ireland would be the first WEO country approached for the additional troops? Third, one PMUN message noted Iran had been approached in the context of an enlarged UNIFIL and another seemed to indicate the UN asked Iran as one of the initial contingent providers for the first 4,000 peacekeepers. Fourth, one PMUN message placed Sweden as an Advance Guard contingent and another seemed to state Sweden would dispatch a permanent contingent.16 PMUN responded to Dublin’s queries on the same day. The New York office essentially assembled the answers to each question into a single response package to ensure the Department of Foreign Affairs understood how the UN viewed Ireland’s desire to send a contingent to UNIFIL. The UN still sought a non-West European battalion to reach the maximum UNIFIL strength of 4,000: When they [the UN] have obtained this additional battalion of 600 men, the force will then have reached its authorized strength of 4,000. At this stage it is unlikely that we will be formally approached to provide this battalion and indeed it is correct to say that it is unlikely that we will be approached formally as long as the authorized strength remains at 4,000…Should the force be increased to 6,000 men, it is then quite likely we will be formally approached for a contingent. The only other WEO “waiting in the wings” is Canada and I am informed by the Secretary (George Sherry) that it is his understanding that we are still the first choice of the UN from the possible WEO contributors.17

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A 7 April message from PMUN to Dublin informed the Irish Government that Kuwait (a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1978) planned to call a gathering of the Security Council on 10 April to discuss issues associated with the peace process in Lebanon including the arrival of UNIFIL. Comments from PMUN reported that it seemed the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon hinged on the timely arrival of UNIFIL as well as whether its currently authorized size was sufficient to provide adequate security during the transition.18 The 10 April meeting, an “informal consultation” without an official permanent record of the proceedings, can be followed through the originally classified PMUN message summarizing the discussion. A request by the Soviet Union to establish the consultation as a formal and open meeting of the Security Council met opposition from Kuwait which called to keep it informal along with a meeting the next day as the body awaited word on the initial Israeli withdrawal. The members reviewed the current political and military situation in southern Lebanon and the status of UNIFIL contingents on the ground and scheduled to arrive. PMUN reported, “The question of the expansion of UNIFIL was not discussed.”19 UN Secretary-General Waldheim arrived in Dublin on the same day as the informal Security Council consultation. Speculation among the media that Waldheim might ask Ireland to join UNIFIL while in Dublin made the pages of the Irish Times which reported that a Government official stated Waldheim did not arrive with a request for Ireland. The newspaper did cover Taoiseach Jack Lynch’s speech at the dinner to welcome the UN Secretary-General and printed, “At a dinner in Dr. Waldheim’s honour last night, in Iveagh House [the location of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin], the Taoiseach referred to Ireland’s record in providing peace-keeping forces, and said that this was one way in which small countries with limited resources could make a ‘practical and significant contribution to the UN’.”20 One 12 August, the Irish Independent reported that Waldheim replied to a direct question on Irish peacekeepers for UNIFIL the previous day prior to his departure. The article stated, “…the formal request [would] probably be sent to the Irish Government in a fortnight [two weeks] or three weeks.”21 PMUN sent a message to Dublin on 18 April to alert the Department of Foreign Affairs that Mr. F. T. Liu phoned to report he had heard from Mr. Brian Urquhart (Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs). The Secretary-General planned to deliver a report on UNIFIL

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to the Security Council the next day. PMUN prepared Dublin that if the Security Council approved the report, “…it would propose the expansion of the force to include among others an Irish contingent…In the event of SECCO approval, the SEC GEN will liaise with this office regarding the modalities of the operation.”22 The UN dashed Irish hopes again on 20 April 1978. PMUN dispatched a very urgent message to Dublin declaring in the opening paragraph, “We have learned today that the SECGEN has decided NOT repeat NOT to request an increase in the size of the force at this present stage.”23 The rationale from the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs centered on dissatisfaction among the Arab Group of states that Israel was not in compliance with the provisions of its withdrawal stages. The Secretary-General opted to not raise the issue of UNIFIL enlargement rather than risk the Arab states organizing a “no” vote at this point in time.24 Noel Dorr of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs expressed his thoughts on the Secretary-General’s change in plans the next day in an internal memorandum to Minister for Foreign Affairs O’Kennedy. Dorr was quite direct in his dissatisfaction with the UN and wrote: This indicates that contrary to firm indications which the Mission received earlier from the UN Secretariat, the Secretary General himself has decided not to request an increase in the size of the Force at this stage (and accordingly not to request an Irish contingent for the moment)...Clearly from our point of view, it is unsatisfactory that we have been kept “hanging” in this way and that there have been changes in the UN’s approach. However, it would appear that there is little we can do in the matter since the Secretary General is trying to cope with a difficult, complex, and changing situation as between Israel and the Arab States…the moral we can draw from recent developments is that any definite commitment on our part should await a formal request from the UN.25

The Secretary-General released a press message on 28 April stating that he had received offers of contingents from Fiji, Ireland, and Iran and that he would like to see the UNIFIL manpower increased from 4,000 to 6,000 in order to assist the operation to conduct its UN mandate. PMUN forwarded this information to Dublin the same day. Waldheim informed the press that he was grateful to the three states for offering peacekeeping contingents and he planned to introduce the proposal to increase UNIFIL in the Security Council. If the Security Council agreed

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and the General Assembly approved the necessary funding, the Secretariat would then extend formal offers to the three states to provide contingents for UNIFIL.26 After six weeks of expectation followed by dashed hopes and then more expectation in anticipation of a 50% increase in UNIFIL’s size, the UN Secretary-General finally extended a formal offer for Ireland to deploy a contingent with UNIFIL. The approach arrived at PMUN on 3 May 1978. The letter stated, “The Secretary-General accepts with appreciation the offer of the Government of Ireland to provide a contingent for service with the Interim Force…[and] wishes to express his appreciation to the Government of Ireland for its support and cooperation in establishing this important United Nations peace-keeping operation in the Middle East.”27 The letter to PMUN also listed several key foundations for the Irish contingent including that it should be a self-sufficient battalion of 600 personnel and should arrive in Lebanon “at the earliest possible time.”28 PMUN wasted little time forwarding this information to Dublin. At this point, the first stage of the Irish peacekeeping policy process was completed—Ireland had received a formal request from the UN Secretary-General for participation in a peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping Policy Step Two: Approval by the Irish Government The Irish Government did not permit the grass to grow under its feet. The Department of Foreign Affairs prepared a memorandum for the Government the next day, 4 May 1978. The document provided an overview of the process behind the receipt of the UN request, the background to the conflict and peace process, and the mandate and purpose of UNIFIL in preparation for a Cabinet vote on the Secretary-General’s request as stated in the opening paragraph, “The Secretary-General of the United Nations has requested that Ireland make available a selfsufficient battalion of about 600 all ranks for service with the United Nations Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The Minister for Foreign Affairs recommends that the Government accede to this request and seek Dáil authority for the dispatch of a contingent.”29 The overview of UNIFIL and the peace process did not overlook the dangers involved in the operation. The Israelis, Government of Lebanon, the Palestinians, and others held different views on the UNIFIL mission and the peace process itself.

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Despite the potential hazards of the peacekeeping operation, the Department of Foreign Affairs reminded the other Cabinet members of the following: In the light of [our] background of commitment to U.N. peace-keeping activities, agreement to provide a contingent would be in conformity with our policy to date. Refusal to meet the request would call into question our commitment to U.N. peace-keeping, particularly in view of the fact that other Western European countries (France and Norway) have supplied contingents.30

The Cabinet met the next day to discuss and vote on the SecretaryGeneral’s formal request. The Cabinet Minutes from the meeting detailed the three key decisions that resulted from the gathering. First, the Irish Government approved the UN Secretary-General’s request and agreed to provide a battalion size contingent based on the mission of the UNIFIL mandate and subject to UN financial reimbursement as approved by the UN General Assembly. Second, the Government authorized the Minister for Defence to seek volunteers from the Defence Forces, equip them, and train the contingent for the deployment. Third, the Government authorized the Minister for Foreign Affairs to submit a resolution to the Dáil for that body’s consideration and vote on meeting the SecretaryGeneral’s formal request for Irish peacekeepers.31 Following this quick two-day decision, the process turned to the Dáil. Peacekeeping Policy Step Three: Approval by the Irish Dáil The Government introduced the bill for Dáil authorization to accept the UN formal request for Irish peacekeepers on 9 May 1978. Minister for Foreign Affairs Michael O’Kennedy introduced the bill in the legislature and answered questions from the members of the Dáil. Since 1960, the preparation of the bill for Dáil consideration had evolved into a standard process for simplicity. The Government representative introduced the bill, presented a statement on the value to Ireland when the state supported the UN and the world by contributing to peacekeeping missions, and covered any concerns already raised by members of the legislature such as funding, peacekeeper safety, and the effectiveness of the peace process. Minister O’Kennedy opened the formal proceedings with the standard relaying of the purpose for introducing the bill in the Dáil:

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The purpose of this motion is to enable the Government to give a positive response to the request received by the United Nations Secretary General to provide an Irish contingent for service with the UN Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL)...The Government have decided, subject to the approval of the Dáil, to make available a contingent for service with UNIFIL in response to this request. Under the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act. 1960, Dáil approval is required. The present motion asks the Dáil to give this approval.32

O’Kennedy moved to remind the members why supporting the Government’s recommendation was in the political interests of Ireland and supported the state’s policies of bolstering global peace. He also recalled for the benefit of the members how Ireland had diligently worked with Dáil support to return the state to UN peacekeeping since the 1974 departure from UNEF II in 1974 due to the home emergency: I need hardly refer in detail here to past Irish participation in UN peacekeeping forces. I will simply recall that Irish contingents served almost continuously with UN forces from 1960 to 1974 in the Congo, Cyprus and, from October 1973 until the contingent then serving was withdrawn in May 1974, with the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East in Sinai. Last July, as Deputies will no doubt recall, the Dáil gave its approval for the despatch once again of a full contingent to Cyprus. However, in the event, owing to a reduction in the strength of the UN Force in Cyprus the UN decided not to maintain the initial request which it had made for an Irish contingent.33

Garret FitzGerald, the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the previous Fine Gael Government and leader of the party after 1977, supported the Fianna Fail Government’s efforts to contribute a contingent to UNIFIL. FitzGerald strove to return Irish peacekeepers to Cyprus in 1976 and endorsed the Fianna Fail efforts to accomplish the same in 1977. He added more detail to the multi-partisan support for the Government’s work to join UNIFIL to ensure all understood his backing for the process and how Fianna Fail’s request represented an extension of Fine Gael’s work after 1974: When it became necessary in May 1974 to withdraw the Irish UN force, it was a matter of great regret to the Government of the day. This interruption in the service we offered to the international community through

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the efforts of our forces in peacekeeping was regrettable. At that time it was necessary because the strength of our Defence Forces was not sufficient for domestic requirements. Since then the build up of the Army and the training of recruits has reached the point where it is possible for us to contemplate a re-involvement in this exercise. I am very glad we have reached that point and that we are able once again to play our part. Our people took considerable pride in the role of our forces in various UN peacekeeping operations and are always glad to see our soldiers playing this role, a role they play so superbly.34

As the leader of the Fine Gael party, FitzGerald did raise valid concerns for addressing prior to a Dáil vote on the bill. First, FitzGerald tempered his remarks by informing the Dáil of his personal knowledge of the respect Ireland holds among the disputants in Lebanon: When visiting the Middle East in 1975 [as Ireland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs], I found that among both the Israeli and Arab authorities there was a desire for our troops to return. Both sides expressed great confidence in their impartiality. It was nice to see there was something on which they were able to agree—the one thing they were unanimous about was that they both liked to see our forces holding the reins between the conflicting armies.35

FitzGerald then raised two questions for O’Kennedy. First, and related to the UNIFIL mandate and the peace process, do the Israelis plan to withdraw their forces completely from Lebanon with UNIFIL overseeing the process in accordance with their mandate or do the Israelis intend to shift southward but remain approximately six miles north of the international border it shares with Lebanon? Second, FitzGerald asked O’Kennedy to explain the UNIFIL mandate under which the Irish forces would operate. “I read out the words used in the original mandate, but since then the Secretary-General has reported on what the functions of the force should be, and some of the Minister’s words later on probably reflect this…”.36 Patrick Kerrigan of the Labour Party addressed O’Kennedy upon completion of the remarks by FitzGerald. The Labour Party formed the coalition with Fine Gael that governed Ireland between 1973 and 1977. This unity with Fine Gael can be witnessed in Kerrigan’s remarks after FitzGerald:

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I support this motion which arises directly from the resolution adopted by the Security Council. As Deputy FitzGerald said, it is ambiguous in so far as nobody knows what mandate our troops will have in that area. There is no doubt that this is one of the most sensitive and most complex areas in the world. I would join with Deputy FitzGerald in asking the Minister to enlighten us if possible as regards the exact functions of the troops in that area. It says here that it was decided in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon to ensure the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from states members of the United Nations. It is necessary to have some assurance on what the functions of the troops are. Also, while everybody welcomes our renewed participation in United Nations peacekeeping forces—we accept the responsibility of membership of the United Nations—we should be under no illusion. It is not on a picnic or holiday our troops are going. They are going into a very serious and delicate situation. We should therefore ensure that in such an explosive area as the Lebanon we shall try to prevent at least any grave risks to our troops in situations to which they may not be able to respond unless they know exactly what their functions are.37

Oliver J. Flanagan spoke after Kerrigan. Flanagan served as the Fine Gael-Labour coalition Minister for Defense from 1976 to 1977. From 1977 to 1987, he held the honorary title of Athair na Dála (Father of the Dáil) meaning he held the longest current uninterrupted period of service within the Dáil. Flanagan also offered his support to the Government on the bill and praised the state and the Defence Forces for Ireland’s service with the UN. He regretted that Irish peacekeepers had to be withdrawn from UNEF II in 1974 but looked forward to Ireland’s return to UN service with a contingent-sized unit. He did introduce one concern for the Government—will Ireland’s peacekeepers receive the remuneration in pay and benefits they deserve for such service and will Ireland itself be properly reimbursed for state expenses related to deploying a battalion in UNIFIL? I should like to ask the Minister a question about the recoupment of the expenses involved in the participation of our forces abroad. The United Nations are a reasonably healthy financial institution. Because of that, I have little doubt the pay and allowances for our people will be of the

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highest possible standard. When this resolution has been passed by Dáil Éireann, the men who will be going abroad as well as having to face the dangers of the existing strife on the Lebanon-Israeli border, and perhaps elsewhere in the Middle East, will also have to endure separation from their wives and families. Therefore, one expects that there will be generous pay and allowances for members of the Defence Forces serving with the United Nations.38

O’Kennedy spoke again after a break in the proceedings and addressed the concerns of those Deputies who spoke following the presentation of the bill to deploy Irish peacekeepers to UNIFIL. At that point in time not all of the questions could be answered with surety due to speculation and options for some of them. O’Kennedy presented what he understood of the peace process and promised to inform the leaders of each party of changes as they occurred. O’Kennedy noted: The important point is that the strength of the force is to be increased from 4,000 to 6,000 because it was recognised when the Secretary General had visited the area that another 2,000 troops would be needed to implement the terms of the mandate, the first point of which is the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. As yet there is not any explicit Israeli commitment to withdraw, but consequent on the increase in the level of the force, which is in the course of approval here and elsewhere, the Secretary General will be entering into negotiations. He is having discussions at the moment in an endeavour to effect an Israeli withdrawal before the full force operates. I cannot say at this stage whether this will be done before our troops are in situ. It is possible, though not definite, that this will be the case. The second point which Deputy FitzGerald raised is what is to happen at that stage. As I mentioned in my speech, this mandate can be effectively discharged only with the co-operation of all parties. The force will be under the command of the Secretary General under the authority vested in him by the Security Council. The Secretary General has been to the area himself and has been in contact with the parties to the dispute in an endeavour to ensure that there will be maximum co-operation in enabling the mandate to be discharged. Deputy FitzGerald has rightly asked a question which has not yet been finally resolved: what will be the position of the UN force if guerillas resume armed conflict and try to enter an area? This mandate runs out in September. That is the first thing to recognise. It is based on the assumption that there will be maximum co-operation. Should it happen that it would not be possible for the force to fulfil the mandate, the ultimate would be that the mandate would not be renewed. In advance of that,

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we are satisfied that the Secretary General, in whom command is vested, is pursuing every possible avenue to ensure an Israeli withdrawal and to guarantee that they will not be subject to attack. I should like to have dealt for a little longer with these two delicate and sensitive issues raised by Deputy FitzGerald. I can assure Deputy Flanagan that the financing arrangements are fixed under the resolution of the Security Council. This is a mandatory financing activity as distinct from the position in Cyprus which was voluntary. There will be no need for the Government to make a case to have matters assessed or examined. They apply automatically under the mandate.39

Postscript After four years, Ireland returned to UN peacekeeping with a contingent size unit. The Irish peacekeepers began arriving later in May 1978 and battalions rotated from Ireland until 2001 when Dublin withdrew its contingent after the departure of Israeli troops from South Lebanon. This phase of Ireland’s UNIFIL deployment demonstrated the positive and negative political issues that can develop from a peacekeeping operation. Ireland’s fair handedness in UNIFIL earned a positive image for Dublin among some states and reinforced that image with others. Yet, taking a stand when Israel violated agreements resulted in sour relations between the two that devolved into situations where pro-Israeli militias murdered captured Irish peacekeepers. Rory Miller wrote about Ireland’s deployment in UNIFIL and noted, “It provided Ireland a level of prestige and political goodwill across the globe that would otherwise have been beyond the attainment of a small, neutral nation.”40 Miller pointed out that this period of increasing good will occurred at a time when the Irish were selling increasing amounts of beef to the Muslim states in the Middle East. On the other hand, it also “precipitated an immediate crisis in Irish–Israeli relations, and over the subsequent two decades Irish animosity towards Israeli actions in Lebanon would have a significant impact on the evolution of Irish–Israeli bilateral political and diplomatic relations and, no less importantly, Ireland’s attitude towards the Palestine question.”41 An Irish reinforced company returned to UNIFIL again in October 2006 following renewal of hostilities in Lebanon and formed a joint battalion with peacekeepers from Finland. The size of the Irish contingent

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has fluctuated based on the needs of the UN and availability of personnel in Ireland. An Irish unit is still deployed with UNIFIL as of 2023. Concerns expressed by the Government and within the Dáil in 1978 were justified. Between 1978 and 2023, UNIFIL has proven to be the most dangerous peacekeeping operation for the Irish Defence Forces which has lost 47 personnel to accidents and hostilities in that window of time. As of 2023, 340 Irish personnel serve in an integrated Irish-Polish Battalion. Ireland did not return to the application of its peacekeeping political process for the next ten years. As the Cold War quickly waned in the late 1980s, lessened global tensions and increased American and Soviet cooperation resulted in a series of new UN peacekeeping missions to support renewed peace processes in areas that were under Cold War influence. Between 1988 and 1989, Ireland received four formal requests for personnel to deploy with UN peacekeeping operations. Three of these destined for Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and Central America are covered in Chapter 9 and the fourth in Namibia is examined in Chapter 10.

Notes 1. Rory Miller, “The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland’s Evolving Relationship with the Muslim Middle East,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 15, 2004, page 136. See also Marie-Violaine Louvet, “Shedding Light on the Arab World: The ‘Irish-Arab News ’ 1975–1985,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 23, 2012, pp. 191–203. 2. For more information on the Lebanese Civil War see: Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War, Palgrave MacMillan, 1993 and Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967– 1976, Harvard University Press, 2000. 3. G. Goor, Desk Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs Internal Memorandum, 19 March 1978. 4. Ibid. 5. Department of Foreign Affairs to Irish Embassy in Vienna, Electronic Message, Subject: UN Peacekeeping Force in Southern Lebanon, 20 March 1978. 6. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: Contacts with UN Re Possible Irish Contingent for UNIFIL, C89, 20 March 1978. 7. Ibid.

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8. Department of Foreign Affairs to Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C51, 22 March 1978. 9. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C90, 22 March 1978. 10. Ibid. 11. Jeremy Craig, Department of Foreign Affairs, Internal Memorandum, 29 March 1978. 12. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C96, 25 March 1978. 13. Eamonn Kennedy, Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum, Subject: The Prospects for UNIFIL, PR 14 78 UN, 3 April 1978. 14. Ibid. 15. “Unusual” in that Waldheim was Austrian. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum, Subject: SECGEN’S Visit, C110, 3 April 1978. 16. Department of Foreign Affairs to Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C63, 6 April 1978. 17. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL - Your C63, C124, 6 April 1978. 18. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, 7 April 1978. 19. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C131, 10 April 1978. 20. Denis Coghlan, “Troops for UN if Requested - Lynch,” The Irish Times, No. 17,565, 11 April 1978, page 1. 21. Raymond Smith, “Irish Troops for Lebanon,” Irish Independent, 12 April 1978, page 1. 22. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C145, 18 April 1978. 23. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C155, 20 April 1978. 24. Ibid. 25. Noel Dorr, Department of Foreign Affairs Internal Memorandum to Minister Michael O’Kennedy, Subject: Proposed Irish Contingent for Lebanon (UNIFIL), 305/329/13, 21 April 1978.

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26. Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Electronic Message, Subject: UNIFIL, C178, 28 April 1978. 27. United Nations Secretary-General Memorandum to the Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 3 May 1978. 28. Ibid. 29. Department of Foreign Affairs memorandum to the Irish Government, Subject: Request from the United Nations Secretary-General for an Irish Contingent to Serve with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 305/329/13, 3 May 1978. 30. Ibid. 31. Department of the Taoiseach, Subject: Cabinet Minutes, S20566, 5 May 1978. 32. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Foreign Affairs Michael O’Kennedy, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Motion,” Volume 306, No.4, 9 May 1978. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 33. Ibid. 34. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Garret FitzGerald, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Motion,” Volume 306, No.4, 9 May 1978. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Patrick Kerrigan, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Motion,” Volume 306, No.4, 9 May 1978. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 38. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Oliver J. Flanagan, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Motion,” Volume 306, No.4, 9 May 1978. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 39. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Foreign Affairs Michael O’Kennedy, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: Motion,” Volume 306, No.4, 9 May 1978. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 40. Rory Miller, “From At Tiri to Qana: the Impact of Peacekeeping in Lebanon on Israeli–Irish Bilateral Relations, 1978–2000,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, July 2010, page 387. 41. Ibid. These observations about the positive and negative impacts of Ireland’s UNIFIL deployment are examples generally outside the scope of this book which examines decision making for deployment. However, they are worthy of mention since future decision making can include examinations of positive and negative lessons from earlier operations, especially UNIFL. More on this topic can also be seen in the UNIFIL chapter within Katsumi Ishizuka, Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960–2000: A Study of Irish Motivation, London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 2004.

CHAPTER 9

Afghanistan-Pakistan 1988, Iran-Iraq 1988, and Central America 1989

Our acceptance would contribute to raising Ireland’s profile at the UN and would be fully consistent with our support for the SG’s [Secretary-General’s] efforts to secure a resolution of the Iran/Iraq war which has been a major focus of activity at the UN over the last eight years. —Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs

Introduction Following a period of increased tensions between the Superpowers in the early 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During this window of time, Ireland served a second term on the United Nations (UN) Security Council (this time for the two years of 1981–1982). With the arrival of Gorbachev to the top post of the Soviet Union, the Cold War began to slowly wane in intensity. By 1988, reforms initiated by Gorbachev were taking hold in the country despite conservative opposition. In early 1988, Gorbachev confronted the hardliners in the Politburo who opposed his reforms. The 19th All Union Conference of the Communist Party met in June 1988. This body and the formation of the Congress of People’s Deputies in early 1989 introduced new levels of democracy into Soviet

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politics. East European states unraveled themselves from Soviet domination in 1989 and by 1990 Gorbachev transformed his position to that of President of the Soviet Union and thus separated state leadership from the Communist Party itself. During this fast paced political transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1988–1989, the world also witnessed the easing of international tensions and reduction of superpower obstruction to peace processes in various conflicts. With increased American and Soviet cooperation in events across the globe emerged greater cooperation in the UN Security Council. The UN took advantage of this atmosphere of general cooperation to become more actively involved in overseeing or at least monitoring the peace processes in Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, Central America, Namibia, and Angola. Each process included plans to introduce a UN observer force to oversee adherence…and each included requests for Irish peacekeepers. In this brief window of 1988–1989 at the end of the Cold War, Ireland found itself playing important roles as parties to conflicts across the globe recognized the impartiality and experience of Irish peacekeepers. Irish international interests became more fixed on the waning Cold War during the late 1980s…as did the national interests and foreign policy of most states across the globe. This chapter examines how Ireland applied its peacekeeping decision making process to requests for its assistance with the UN to help mitigate and solve late Cold War conflicts in Afghanistan, between Iraq and Iran, and in Central America. Namibia proved to be a more complicated question for Ireland and is covered in Chapter 10.

United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 1988 Background In April 1978, a Socialist-based coalition known as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrew the autocratic centrist Government of Afghanistan led by Mohammed Daoud Khan who had seized power in Afghanistan five years earlier. Many executions of former Government leaders (including Daoud), their family members, and supporters of the regime followed the coup in what is often referred to as the Saur Revolution. Daoud had sought the backing of the Soviet Union in his claims to reincorporate Pashtun territory in Pakistan back to Afghanistan. At the same time, Daoud resisted the increasing Soviet

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involvement in overall Afghan foreign policy. Moscow viewed the coup as a new opportunity to develop Afghanistan within the Soviet orbit and backed the new Socialist Government. The new Afghan Government garnered little popular support among the Afghan population other than anti-Daoud factions and the coalition itself began shredding as the PDPA attempted to form a more stable Government expressing Marxist-Leninist principles and leaning on the Soviet Union. By October 1978, the opposition developed into open revolt against the Government. Armed opposition to the Government and the latter’s reprisals increased until 24 December 1979 when the Soviet Union’s concern resulted in a military intervention to protect the client regime in Kabul. The Soviet Union occupied the Afghan urban areas and conducted military operations against anti-Afghan Government opposition collectively referred to as the Mujahideen. Western backing maintained and strengthened the Mujahideen as the Soviet Union suffered casualties and lost equipment in an apparent never ending struggle to pacify the country. Soviet losses and the pending end of the Cold War helped to bring the Soviet Union into negotiations to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. The Geneva Accords related to Afghanistan proved to be a series of delicate negotiations to form a new Afghan coalition Government that would be stable enough to allow a Soviet military withdrawal from the country. The UN established the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) to serve as the organization’s hand in the peace process. The resulting agreements included the signatures of the UN, Afghanistan, and Pakistan with the United States and the Soviet Union overseeing the process as Guarantor states. The Soviets concluded the withdrawal of its military forces from Afghanistan in February 1989. UNGOMAP’s mandate to observe the compliance of the signatories to the peace process of the Geneva Accords was derived from the agreements themselves and included a delicate mission to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet military forces. The Soviet Union not only served as a Guarantor signatory state but also a permanent veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council which could hinder or even prevent the global body from performing a withdrawal observation mission. Maintaining a strictly neutral position in the conflict and Geneva Accords would be a critical role for UNGOMAP in the withdrawal process.

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Irish Peacekeeping Decision Making Process The UN Secretary-General authorized the organization’s observation assistance on 25 April 1988 with a memorandum from the UN Security Council President to the former requesting the body’s assistance in the Geneva Accords implementation process. UNGOMAP’s mandate, derived from the Accords, included a mission to monitor the noninterference and non-intervention by the parties in each other’s affairs; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and the voluntary return of refugees to Afghanistan. Rather than ask UN member states to provide all of the personnel for UNGOMAP, the Secretariat leaned on a temporary deployment of peacekeepers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) on the borders of Israel and its neighbors. Other peacekeepers would be temporarily transferred from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) between Israel and Syria. Numbers that could not be met with temporarily transferred observers would be requested from member states. An advance team visited the area in April 1988 and the Secretary-General turned to transferring 50 military observers to the area. In 1988, UNTSO included unarmed Irish peacekeepers in its ranks and the UN envisioned approaching Dublin for permission to temporarily transfer these individuals to provide support for UNGOMAP. This request activated Ireland’s peacekeeping decision making process. Although the agreements were signed on 14 April, the SecretaryGeneral initiated informal inquiries for temporary peacekeeper transfers the previous week. On 8 April, the UN Secretariat forwarded an informal inquiry to Ireland through the country’s UN representative. In Dublin on 11 April, the Department of Foreign Affairs officially referred the inquiry to the Government for consideration the following day. The memorandum forwarding the inquiry contained a number of interesting points for consideration by the Government. The stated purpose of the document reads: The United Nations Secretariat has asked for our views on an informal basis on the provision of five officers from the Defence Forces for service with the United Nations Observer force which it is proposed to establish following the signature of the Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement expected later this week. The proposed force would have a strength of approximately

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50 and would be known as UNIMAG (United Nations Implementation Assistance Group).1

First, the UN had yet to settle on an official name for the mission, presenting UNIMAG at the time of the inquiry before the signature of the agreements. Second, with a total force envisioned at 50 personnel, the UN considered Ireland for 10% of the total personnel. The UN requested that “one or two” of the Irish personnel would be selected by Dublin from those personnel currently serving with UNTSO and the rest dispatched from Ireland itself. Although originally envisioned as a mission comprising transferred peacekeepers, the UN’s inquiry for Ireland noted that most of the Irish observers should come from Ireland itself rather than transferred from a current assignment in a peacekeeping mission. The original inquiry informed Dublin that the Secretary-General envisioned a signature of the agreements on 14 April and wanted the small peacekeeping observation force in place before 15 April, the mandated commencement of the Soviet withdrawal. The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs included a personal appeal to his Cabinet colleagues for consideration on the matter. It is already clear however that the proposed agreement negotiated under UN auspices is of significant political significance and one with important implications for the standing of the United Nations in the international community. It is a reflection of the high regard in which the Irish contribution to UN peacekeeping is viewed that Ireland has again been asked to participate in the establishment of a new UN force.2

The Minister also noted that he recognized Ireland must have greater clarification of the mission and the agreements it supported before making a decision on sending Irish soldiers to the UN operation: Before coming to a final decision we will of course need to have more precise details of the mandate envisaged for the force, and of the agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as those between the United States and the Soviet Union governing the provision of assistance to the main protagonists.3

The UN Secretary-General provided a response to the Irish Government and officially requested an unarmed Irish contingent on 27 April 1988. The Department of Foreign Affairs officially forwarded the

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proposal to the Government on 28 April 1988 for its consideration the following day. A special note added to the forwarding document highlighted the request of the UN to have all of the peacekeepers on the ground by 2 May 1988 when the agreements became effective. The Government voted and agreed to: …augment its contribution to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) by approximately four members of the Permanent Defence Force on foot on the provisional agreement of the members of the Security Council to the setting up of military inspection teams in Afghanistan and Pakistan…4

By specifically wording the Government resolution as above, the Cabinet removed a requirement to send the UN request to the Dáil for approval. As worded, the contingent consisted of “approximately” four unarmed personnel destined for a peacekeeping mission for which Irish participation had already been approved. The Irish soldiers would be unarmed and on temporary assignment from UNTSO. The fifth Irish soldier would be transferred from the UNTSO detachment in Jerusalem. Based on the actions officially adding five unarmed soldiers to an already approved UN operation, the Irish legislature did not need to be consulted for its approval. The first public announcement of Irish observers deploying to support UNGOMAP occurred on 29 April 1988 when The Irish Times printed an article on the five soldiers. The article reported that Ireland had received an official UN request for Irish personnel and the Irish Government granted approval to the request.5

United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group (UNIIMOG) 1988 Background Tensions between Iran and Iraq erupted into warfare on 22 September 1980 when the Iraqi military launched air strikes on Iranian air fields prior to an invasion across the border. Although the Iraqi army achieved early successes on the battlefield, the Iranian air force recovered quickly and nearly intact to retaliate against Iraq. Continued early fighting resulted in Iraq gaining more ground but losing many vehicles to Iranian air attacks.

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Across the border, Iranian aircraft struck many Iraqi strategic facilities including oil refineries, oil extraction facilities, oil terminals, and factories critical to the war effort and Iraqi exports. Air losses on both sides continued as many of the Iranian aircraft fell to Iraqi air defenses and Iraqi aircraft fell to the Iranian F-14 fighters and Phoenix anti-air missiles inherited by the Revolutionary Government from that of the former Shah of Iran. Intense fighting and heavy losses on both sides characterized the conflict until a stalemate developed in December 1980 and shifted into a type of defensive trench warfare for most of 1981. Each side developed new tactics to break the stalemate in its favor. The Iraqis introduced long range Scud missile attacks into Iran. The latter conducted a successful and highly coordinated raid against a base in western Iraq where Baghdad had moved many of its surviving fighter aircraft. Yet, Iraqi Scud missiles could produce only limited damage and the Iranians were not capable of continuing large scale air raids. The stalemate began to crack in 1982 as the Iranians gained ground against the Iraqi military prompting many Middle Eastern and Western states to provide money and equipment to Baghdad. Iran rebuffed an Iraqi offer for peace negotiations and instead launched an invasion into the latter state. Iraq responded with attacks against Iranian cities to demoralize the population; Iran turned to tactics such as attacking oil tankers in the Gulf prompting Western naval patrols to protect tankers. Tensions were high in the Gulf regions.6 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 479 on 28 September 1980 calling for a cessation of hostilities and the settlement of the dispute by a peaceful avenue. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim appointed former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme to serve as his Special Representative in discussions with the belligerents. In 1984, the UN opened its first resident offices in both capitals to provide a continued presence of the organization. In June, the new Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, persuaded Iran and Iraq to accept the presence of six UN unarmed observers and two civilian staff to assist in investigations of attacks on civilians. The six observers were assigned to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) between Israel and its neighbors. The temporary transfer of the observers eliminated the often difficult process of mandating a separate organization and allowed the organization to have observers on the ground quickly following approval of the belligerents. This also permitted the transfer of unarmed observers

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on a temporary basis and negated a need to formally request countries to provide new personnel. The temporary organization assumed the name the United Nations Inspection Teams (UNIT) and deployed four personnel into each belligerent capital. Irish Peacekeeping Decision Making Process The UN informally inquired on 15 June 1984 about the temporary transfer of two Irish UNTSO observers to UNIT and formally requested the action on 20 June following a positive Irish response to the 15 June inquiry. In July 1984, the Irish embassy in Tehran noted the presence of an Irish observer with the UNIT office in Iran. Commandant (Major) David Griffin of Ireland transferred from his UNTSO posting at Tiberias with two other UNTSO officers (one from Sweden and one from Austria) and a UN HQ staff member to form the UNIT detachment located in Tehran.7 Two Irish observers served with other UNTSO peacekeepers in UNIT as of August 1984. Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs prepared an internal memorandum on UNIT and Ireland’s contribution of personnel. Being a temporary transfer of UNTSO personnel, the assignment did not qualify under Ireland’s peacekeeping decision making system as an action that required full and formal Government approval nor legislative affirmation. The Department’s memorandum noted: The UN Secretariat decided that the teams should be made up of UNTSO personnel, detached from normal UNTSO duties for an initial period of 6 months but still technically under the command of the UNTSO Commander-in-Chief. However the teams would report directly to the Secretary-General. The UNTSO Commander was asked to release the required number of personnel (6) including an Irish Lt. Colonel and a Major. Lt. Colonel Gerry McMahon and Comdt. [Major] David Griffin volunteered to join the inspection team.8

McMahon assumed command of the UNIT office in Baghdad and Griffin served as second-in-command at the office in Tehran. Despite the presence of UNIT and UN calls for serious negotiations for a lasting ceasefire, hostilities continued. Only four months later in January 1985, the UN made the decision to reduce the size of UNIT due to the lack of progress in a peace process between Iran and Iraq. The

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nearly fifty percent reduction cuts each UNIT section to two officers and one political adviser. As of January there were still two Irish observers assigned to UNIT in accordance with the plans from August 1984. One was on Christmas leave at the time of the decision and the other was due for rotation from UNIT in February 1985. Ireland made the decision not to replace them with other Irish UNTSO observers.9 However, it should be understood that this action was not an Irish repudiation of UNIT. A memorandum from the Irish embassy to the Department of Foreign Affairs forwarding an Iranian newspaper article discussed the presence of Irish Lieutenant Colonel Michael O’Shea who arrived in Tehran in March 1986 to assume leadership of the UNIT office at that location. The memorandum also noted the UN planned to reduce UNIT offices to one member and in this case the only UNIT officer representing the UN in Iran would be Irish. Indirectly, he assumed an important UN role boosting Irish political prestige at this point according to the Irish embassy. The Irish embassy document declared: It would seem that the main reason for the UN to maintain a military presence here is that they will have someone on the ground in both capitals in the unlikely event that some form of mediation talks might get under way.10

Warfare continued between Iraq and Iran into 1987. In January of that year, Secretary-General de Cuellar called for renewed negotiations and the Security Council passed Resolution 598 which incorporated provisions from a 1986 Resolution including a ceasefire and a withdrawal of armed forces to the 1980 international border. Iraq agreed to the resolution but Iran did not until 17 July 1988. Resolution 598 included a provision for the establishment of a means to verify and monitor the compliance of the agreement by Iran and Iraq. A small team of UNTSO observers traveled to each country to assess the needs of a UN verification and monitoring mission. The Secretary-General presented the mission’s official mandate on 7 August 1988 and the belligerents signed a ceasefire the next day. With the establishment of the mandate, the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group (UNIIMOG) became the organization’s newest peacekeeping or peace observation mission. UNIIMOG was not a surprise to Ireland since the provisions for the operation were in the 1986 Security Council resolution as well as Resolution 598 of 1987. In July 1988, the UN established what was referred

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to as a “technical mission” to visit Iraq and Iran to assess the needs for UNIIMOG. The mission comprised two UN civilians and five UNTSO officers with one of the latter an Irish peacekeeper. The UN requested permission for the temporary assignment of the Irish officer which was approved by the Government in Dublin.11 Being a temporary assignment of an unarmed observer from UNTSO, the Dáil was not required to review and vote on the move. The Secretary-General did not wait until the last minute to solicit contingents. As the certainty, or at least near certainty, of the ceasefire and opening of the UN mission approached, the Secretary-General informally approached states for contingents. The Secretary-General made an informal inquiry to the Irish Permanent Mission at the UN on 20 July 1988 regarding Ireland’s position if asked to provide a contingent for UNIIMOG. The Permanent Mission relayed the informal request to Dublin and included comments from Ireland’s Ambassador to the UN who was in Geneva at the time. The office ensured the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs understood the Secretary-General made an informal approach rather than a formal request: The Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General has conveyed a request through the [Irish] Permanent Representative for the participation of Irish officers in the proposed military observer force in Iran/Iraq. In accordance with usual procedure the approach at this stage is informal in nature and will be formalised only if we are in a position to give an informal positive response.12

The UN informal approach covered three areas. First, it requested permission to utilize an Irish soldier currently assigned to UNTSO to serve on the Technical Team to make a pre-deployment assessment in Iran and Iraq. The UN noted that both Iran and Iraq found Ireland “acceptable” for contributing observers to the operation. Second, the UN requested advance permission to transfer four additional Irish officers from UNTSO to UNIIMOG if deemed necessary for the establishment of the mission. Third, the global body sought Irish approval that it would provide more observers if needed once UNIIMOG commenced operations. The legal basis for UNIIMOG lay in Security Council Resolution 598 of 1987 with a mandated mission to “verify, confirm, and supervise the ceasefire and subsequently the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries.”13

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Ireland’s Permanent Representative at the UN provided an endorsement and justification for an Irish acceptance of the informal inquiry. The document prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs stated: The Permanent Representative considers the approach to be a significant recognition of Ireland’s role over the years in UN peacekeeping and peace monitoring operations and a tribute to the quality and performance of Irish military personnel who have participated in them. Our acceptance would contribute to raising Ireland’s profile at the UN and would be fully consistent with our support for the SG’s efforts to secure a resolution of the Iran/Iraq war which has been a major focus of activity at the UN over the last eight years.14

The Permanent Mission recommended approval by the Irish Government pending two points of clarification. First, UN assurance that the financial arrangements for UNIIMOG would mirror that of UNTSO and provide reimbursement for Irish soldiers based on the conditions set for that operation. Second, all Irish soldiers assigned to UNTSO must volunteer for temporary service with the UNIIMOG Technical mission and/ or its main body rather than be assigned without their consent.15 On 21 July, the Department of Foreign Affairs dispatched the Government’s response to the UN’s informal request via an electronic message to Dublin’s Permanent Mission. The Government agreed to the first provision (the assignment of an Irish UNTSO officer to a temporary technical mission bound for Iran and Iraq). Reference the other two points, the Department of Foreign Affairs noted: We are conveying our assent to this part of the package separately at this stage in view of the urgency [the UN wanted to dispatch the technical team two days later on 23 July]. The rest of the package will be put to the Government tomorrow [22 July]. I would not anticipate any problem in getting Government agreement but clearly, the more information available, on numbers, timing, reimbursement, before Government consideration, the more satisfactory it will be.16

The Government accepted the provisions behind the informal UN request on 22 July 1988. The resulting Government memorandum provided approval for the following:

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(1) The inclusion of up to four officers currently serving with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and of the Irish officer currently the Chief Communications Officer with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in the proposed “technical mission” to Iran/Iraq. (2) The redeployment, if necessary, of additional Irish UNTSO personnel in the early days of the observer mission to facilitate the establishment of the operation, and (3) The provision of additional Irish observers for the main observer mission when it is established.17 The ball was now back in the court of the UN after the latter’s receipt of Ireland’s response to the informal inquiry on the transfer/assignment of Irish observers with UNIIMOG. On 10 August 1988, the Secretary to the Taoiseach prepared an internal memorandum based on a Department of Foreign Affairs note detailing an official UN request for Irish observers. The memorandum informed the Government: 1. There was a possibility that one of the senior posts in this new force to be called UNIIMOG (United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group) would be offered to Ireland. The appointment, if it materialises, would be offered at Brigadier General level … 2. To date the UN have asked for fifteen officers at the Captain/ Commandant level. A request for an officer at the Colonel level was received yesterday. 3. The countries likely to participate in the force are Ireland, Yugoslavia, India (?), and Argentina.18 Ireland agreed to the formal UN request on 10 August 1988. UN personnel requests did not end with the August formal request. The next month, the UN Secretary-General presented a request for Ireland to consider providing additional observers for not only UNIIMOG but also the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (an operation covered in the next chapter of this book). The Irish Government agreed to provide the 15 officers officially requested the previous month. On a separate note, Ireland was also planning a deployment with UNTAG at this point in time and had agreed to dispatch 35 Garda (civilian police). The September UN approach did not specifically say it

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wanted Ireland to provide more personnel for either operation at this stage but noted they “may ask” for 30 additional Irish military police [sic] for UNIIMOG as well as a logistics company of 140 personnel and 20 military observers for Namibia.19 The Irish Department of Defense objected to accepting a UN request for further military personnel in UNIIMOG and UNTAG. The Minister for Defense declared: …having regard to the military recommendations, and in view of the financial implications [those for which Ireland would not receive immediate reimbursement from the UN as well to alleviate military personnel shortages at home], as well as the continuous representations about troops being required to undertake inordinately long hours of duty, additional military personnel cannot be made available to the U.N. unless additional funding is made available for defence. Such funding would be required to permit recruitment to meet manpower requirements and the extra financial costs.20

The response of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Taoiseach, as recorded by the Secretary of Government, noted: While understanding the concerns of the Minister for Defense, DFA [Department of Foreign Affairs] would hope it would be possible to respond positively to the UN request in view of our traditional attitude to UN peace-keeping. The Taoiseach, as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, may wish to discuss this at Government today.21

Following an informal nod of approval by the Government for the UNIIMOG military police, Ireland’s Permanent Mission at the UN received an official formal request. The UN did not delay in turning the informal into a formal request. Ireland’s Permanent Mission informed the UN of the 16 September Government approval on 19 September and the UN then formally requested the military policy detachment the same day. The Irish delegation reported to the Department of Foreign Affairs: We have conveyed to USG [Under Secretary-General] [Marrack] Goulding the informal Government decision of 16/9/88 (HQ’s C168) in regard to the request for the unarmed MP platoon. Goulding was appreciative and asked whether we could now consider his informal approach of 30/8/88 as a formal request…and on the assumption that we can agree to the request,

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the Secretariat would be grateful if the platoon could be made available for duty in approximately two weeks from now…Goulding confirmed that financing will be on the basis of UNIFIL reimbursements.22

On 22 September 1988, Ireland received details of the mission assigned to its MP platoon upon Irish approval. The Irish unit’s assignment included oversight of three checkpoints between Iran and Iraq. The Irish Army’s response, relayed through the Department of Defence to the Government, reported the number of soldiers be increased from the 30 requested by the UN to a total of 37 for this particular mission. The Army justification noted: For operational reasons, the Army takes the view that a detachment of 37 military police is required. The Army and Department of Defence are in favour of supplying the detachment, provided a number of consequential promotions can be made. These have so far been opposed by the Department of Finance. The annual cost of these promotions is estimated at 13,000 [Irish pounds], compared with estimated net receipts of 105,000 [Irish pounds] per year from the UN for the detachment. 23

The Government noted, “Pending resolution of this impasse between the Departments of Defence and Finance, we are unable to reply to the UN Secretariat.”24 The Government approval of a UN request for the additional military police for UNIIMOG was held hostage to an internal feud over defense appropriations for the cost of personnel promotions. The UN offered to increase the reimbursement rate for the MP detachment on a per capita basis higher than the initial 15 observers. The Government replied: In view of the Government decisions in this matter, the agreement of the Department of Defence, the favourable financial terms for the participation of this unit in UNIIMOG and our positive response to the informal approach from the U.N., it would not seem appropriate to refuse this request on the basis of the refusal of the Department of Finance to sanction consequential promotions costing an additional annual 13,000 [Irish pounds] when this figure will be more than offset by the annual estimated 105,000 [Irish pounds] net receipts from the U.N. for this unit.25

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A vote in the Dáil was not required once the Government approved the UN request due to UNIIMOG deploying as an unarmed observer mission.

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) 1989 Background By the 1980s, conflicts within El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua resulted in the destabilization of the Central American states and the region itself. The destabilization impacted the economies of the states, threatened any chances of democracy in the region, and attracted American and Soviet attention as each superpower lined up on opposite sides of the disputes. Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela led an effort to establish an agreement that would end the conflict in each state and halt the transnational efforts of guerrilla forces to operate in one country and take refuge in another. The complexity of the issues and opposition of the United States to the Sandanista-led government in Nicaragua helped to stall this peace process (known as the Contadora Group) from its first formal meeting in 1983. The Cold War played a major role in the process with the United States declaring the Sandinistas as a Communist-backed group and in turn armed a counter guerrilla campaign against the latter with a group known as the Contras. Although the Contadora Group process failed by 1986, it did lay a foundation for a new round of discussions known as Esquipulas but also referred to as the procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America as well as the Central American Peace Accords. The first gathering of states under the new process occurred in May 1986. Through the following year the states developed an economic cooperation plan and turned to a means to secure peaceful relations between them. 1986 also proved pivotal in clearing the process from the fog of the Cold War. A June 1986 International Court of Justice decision ruled against the United States and declared the Sandinista-run government of Nicaragua as being legitimate, prompting greater support among other Central American states for its role in the peace process. The progress resulted in the signing of a treaty, Esquipulas II, on 7 August 1987.

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Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 and, thus, that state’s de facto ruler. As time progressed, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States thawed and prompted greater cooperation between the two Superpowers in solving various conflicts across the Third World including supporting the peace process in Central America. In 1989, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua requested assistance from the UN to help implement the 1987 Esquipulas II Agreement. In turn, the UN established a series of peace observation organizations to oversee the implementation of the agreement and verify compliance of each state. These missions included the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN), the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL), and the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA). ONUCA represents the largest and best known of these UN missions. As with other UN military-based peace observation operations, the body sought a diversity of troop-contributing countries that the various belligerents considered neutral, or at least non-aligned, in the conflict. Thus, Ireland found itself again a prime candidate for UN consideration. The UN Security Council established ONUCA on 7 November 1989 and the Secretary-General provided the mission mandate on 11 November 1989. Much of ONUCA’s work would be conducted by mobile patrols on land, sea, and air to monitor the border areas of the signatories to ensure the cessation of aid going across the borders to guerrilla movements and states from staging raids from another country into a third state. Irish Peacekeeping Decision Making Process Three weeks before the Security Council officially established ONUCA, the Secretary-General informally approached Ireland and other states providing military personnel for the operation. The UN Section of Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs prepared a memorandum outlining the informal approach by the UN. The 20 October 1989 memorandum declared:

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Ireland has been informally asked by the UN Secretary-General if we are willing to provide 30 military officers for the proposed new UN Observer Mission in Central America. A formal request would follow later if our positive reaction were assured…The military observers of ONUCA, as is normal practice with UN observer missions, would not be armed. Because they are not armed, Dáil approval to participate will not be necessary.26

The document also covered the initial views of the major Cabinet offices connected with Irish peacekeeping. The Department of Defence and the Office of the Tanaiste (Deputy Head of Government) supported a positive reply but with fewer soldiers than requested by the SecretaryGeneral. Their opinion noted: …the number of observers requested poses some difficulty because of our current commitments. We are not in a position, at this time, to provide the full 30 observers [all commissioned officers at the rank of Captain and above] requested. The termination dates for the officers on duty in Afghanistan/Pakistan (5) and Namibia (20) have not been confirmed. On this basis, the Tanaiste and Minister for Defence is prepared to agree to participation in the mission of 18 officers of the Permanent Defence Force…Our current UN commitments involve 143 officers, 312 NCOs, and 407 privates, a total of 862 all ranks.27

These figures represented a large percentage of the active Irish army and an even larger percentage of its senior officers. When one considers the size of the contingents on UN duty for a six month rotation, the unit and personnel undergoing six months of training and preparation to replace them, and the unit and personnel undergoing reconstitution, leave, and reorganization after returning from a UN deployment, onethird of the total Irish army was committed to either preparing, serving, or post deployment leave and reorganization related to a single six month rotation window with the UN. This fact was demonstrated on a board to the author while visiting the Irish peacekeeping school at the Curragh military camp west of Dublin. The Department of Defence was not against the participation in ONUCA but viewed the Irish army as already overstretched in its commitment to overseas deployments, especially in the grades of senior army officers. Rather than make an initial commitment of 30 senior officers, the Department viewed its assets as supporting up to 18 officers with up to 12 more in the near future.

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The Department of Finance recommended approval to the informal request. The extra costs above the salaries of the deployed personnel applicable to Ireland would be minimal. The Department of Foreign Affairs recommended a positive reply to the UN Secretary-General. In particular, supporting UN peacekeeping operations provided a measure of international recognition and honor for Ireland. The Minister for Foreign Affairs supports Irish participation in ONUCA and recommends that we meet the request of the Secretary-General as far as possible. It is a valuable new confirmation of the important role we are able to play in providing personnel for such missions, which is entirely in the spirit of our support for UN peacekeeping. In addition, the Central American countries will be meeting with the Twelve [the 12 countries of the European Community which became the original members of the European Union in 1993] in Ireland next month under our [rotating] presidency. The Central Americans’ preoccupations at that meeting will turn significantly on the progress of the peace process in the region, of which ONCUA will be an essential part.28

Three days later, on 23 October 1989, the Department of Foreign Affairs released a memorandum and Speaking Points for the Minister on the approval of the informal request. In the resulting document, the Department notes that since ONUCA is a small unarmed UN observer mission, the Government is not technically required to approve the request as a body. However, the memoire reminds all members of the Government “…it has been the practice for the Minister for Foreign Affairs to seek Government approval to do so informally [sic].”29 The Minister for Foreign Affairs did concede on the personnel numbers issue to the decision based on the recommendation of the Minister for Defence. The memorandum reads: I [the Minister for Foreign Affairs] support Irish participation in ONUCA and recommend that we agree to send 18 officers at this stage and to review the possibility of sending the additional 12 requested, as circumstances permit. It is a valuable new commitment of the important role we are able to play in providing personnel for such missions, which is entirely in the spirit of our support for UN peacekeeping.30

While the Irish Government viewed ONUCA as a means to promote the state’s role in UN peacekeeping, it was also concerned about the

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opinion of the United States on the operation. The Government Secretary prepared a 23 October memorandum and wrote: I have not been able to establish this morning what the US attitude to the proposed observer mission is. We have no information on it in the Department nor does the US Embassy have any guidance on this question.31

The Government formally approved the Secretary-General’s request on 27 October 1989 but for 18 officers as discussed the previous week with “…12 additional officers to be provided at a later date as circumstances permit.”32 Irish peacekeepers served in ONUCA from December 1989 to January 1992. Upon the closure of ONUCA, some Irish peacekeepers transferred to the United Nations Observation Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) along with other ONUCA peacekeepers. ONUSAL observed a peace agreement between the Government of El Salvador and rebels backed by Cuba. Ireland maintained two peacekeepers with ONUSAL until May 1994.

Postscript UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, and ONUCA represent three of the four UN observer missions with which Ireland deployed peacekeepers in 1988 and 1989…the twilight of the Cold War. Warming relations between the Superpowers during this period is reflected in so many conflicts achieving workable peace agreements under UN guidance or oversight. Each peace process included a UN observation mission to oversee adherence by the belligerents. For Ireland, each peace process arrived with an informal request for Irish peacekeepers and then followed by a formal request. Each request then received Government approval after a brief review process. However, none of the three proceeded to the Dáil for legislative approval. In accordance with the 1960 amendments to the Defence Act, each met the requirements for avoiding the third step in the peacekeeping decision making process. All three UN missions called for small numbers of unarmed observers. The last time Ireland experienced this alteration of the decision making process was 1965 when the state agreed to provide unarmed observers to the United Nations India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) for six months (see the Postscript in Chapter 5).

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The fourth UN observer mission to which Ireland provided peacekeepers in 1988–1989 is an interesting exception to the operations in this chapter. It not only necessitated Dáil approval but also required an amendment to two pieces of police legislation dating to 1924 and 1925 to meet the UN request. This mission, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, is the subject of the next chapter in this book.

Notes 1. Internal Irish Government Memorandum Referring an Issue to the Cabinet Agenda, “Informal Request for Provision of Personnel for Service with the United Nations Observer Force in Afghanistan”, 3202N, 11 April 1988. 2. Ibid. 3. Internal Memorandum Forwarding Slip, “Afghanistan: Observers”, 16/ 39, 12 April 1988. 4. Internal Irish Government Memorandum, “Provision of Personnel from the Permanent Defence Force for Service with the United Nations Military Inspection Teams in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 306/148/31, 28 April 1988. 5. Joe Carroll, “Irish Observers Sought by the UN”, The Irish Times, 29 April 1988, page 8. 6. For more information on the Iran-Iraq War, see Willamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014 and Pierre Razoux and Nicholas Elliott, The Iran-Iraq War, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015. 7. Letter from the Irish Embassy in Iran to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, 17 July 1984. 8. Department of Foreign Affairs Background Note, “UN Inspection Teams Iran/Iraq,” 10 August 1984. Gerry McMahon (later Lieutenant General and Chief of Staff of the Irish Army) was a personal friend of the author. As an Irish peacekeeper he served in the UNOC, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNTSO, and UNIT. 9. Irish Permanent Mission coded message to the UN to the Department of Foreign Affairs, “Iran/Iraq Observer Teams,” C1, 3 January 1985. 10. Irish Embassy in Iran letter to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 1986. 11. Internal Irish Government Memorandum, “Request for Irish Participation in Proposed UN Observer Mission in Iran/Iraq,” 3419, 22 July 1988.

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12. Irish Permanent Mission Information sheet, “Request by the UN Secretary-General for Irish Participation in Proposed UN Observation Mission in Iran/Iraq Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 598,” 175A, 20 July 1988. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Department of Foreign Affairs coded message to Permanent Mission at the UN, “Proposed Iran-Iraq Observer Mission,” C146, 21 July 1988. 17. Government Secretary Memorandum to the Private Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, S.16137P, 22 July 1988. 18. Frank Murray, Secretary to the Taoiseach memorandum, S.16136P, 10 August 1988. 19. Dermot Nally, Secretary to the Government, Internal Irish Government Memorandum, “Question of Additional Military Personnel for the U.N.,” 16 September 1988. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. As noted, the Taoiseach (Charles Haughey) served also as the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at this time. This movie is likely due to Minister for Foreign Affairs Brian Lenihan’s health. Leniham suffered from a serious liver condition at this time and would undergo a liver transplant eight months after this meeting of the Government. 22. Irish Permanent Mission coded message to the UN to the Department of Foreign Affairs, “UNIIMOG—Request for a 30-man Unarmed Platoon of MPs,” C369, 19 September, 1988. 23. Secretary to the Government memorandum to the Tanaiste, “UN Request for a Detachment of Military Police,” S.16136P, 3 October 1988. 24. Ibid. 25. Internal Irish Government Memorandum, “U.N. Request for Irish Military Force for UNIIMOG,” 237A, no date. 26. Ireland’s UN Section, Aide Memoire, “United Nations Observer Group in Central America,” 20 October 1989. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ireland’s UN Section, Speaking Points for the Minister, “Government Approval for Irish Participation in ONUCA,” 23 October 1989. 30. Ibid. 31. T. F. Brady, Internal Memorandum, Irish Government, 23 October 1989. 32. Frank Murray, Government Secretary, to the Private Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Private Note, S/16137P, 27 October 1989.

CHAPTER 10

Namibia 1989

I am confident that our Garda [Civilian Police] can, if called upon to do so, enhance the already outstanding peacekeeping record of our Defence Forces, and play a distinguished and honourable role in the historic task of helping to bring independence and self-determination to Namibia and peace and security to a troubled region. —Minister for Justice Gerry Collins

Introduction In many ways, this chapter brings the discussion of Irish peacekeeping policy to a full circle and completes the period of 1955 when Ireland entered the UN to 1989 at the twilight of the Cold War. Between the 30 years ranging from Ireland’s first peacekeeping deployment in 1958 and 1988, a Garda (civilian police) detachment had not been requested for overseas service with the United Nations (UN). By 1989, one year later, Ireland had deployed members of both the Defence Forces and the Garda to overseas missions. This chapter examines the debates and process to change Dáil legislation to permit the overseas deployment of the Garda in support of UN operations.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_10

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United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) Background After World War I, the League of Nations transferred the former German colony of South West Africa to South Africa essentially as a “spoil of war.” This status held until after World War II when the League’s replacement, the UN, established a Trusteeship program and declared South West Africa and ten other territories under that system. South Africa still maintained oversight but the goal of Trusteeship was to help develop a territory economically and politically and prepare it for self-governance or independence. South Africa chafed under the Trusteeship system and worked against developing and preparing South West Africa as envisioned by the UN. The UN revoked South Africa’s charter for South West Africa under the Trusteeship system in 1966 but the state refused to acknowledge or permit the UN from assuming its own oversight of the territory. Local opposition to South African domination grew until the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) evolved to become large and strong enough to offer significant political and military resistance to South Africa from bases in Angola and Zambia as well as within Namibia…the new name adopted in 1968 for South West Africa. Beginning in 1966, South Africa conducted a war against the armed elements of the Namibian resistance. The UN objected to South Africa’s hold on Namibia and the Security Council passed many resolutions on the issue only to have them ignored by South Africa and other states. In 1978, the Security Council passed Resolution 435 which outlined the peace process for bringing Namibia to successful elections. Resolution 435 included a timeline for the process as well as guaranteed UN oversight through an organization titled the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Information and details on UNTAG were lacking in the resolution itself but set the foundation for further refinement and development over the next eleven years. Resolution 435 states the Security Council: Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by

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the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations; 1

South African resistance to Namibian independence continued as the Cold War drew the territory along with Angola into its realm. As the Cold War warmed in the late 1980s following detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, progress in the peace process increased. The two Superpowers saw fewer benefits in engaging each other in Angola which spilled over into Namibia as well as other states. Cuba, Angola, and South Africa engaged in Tripartite talks that resulted in an agreement related to Cuban military withdrawal from Angola and South African withdrawal from Namibia. The United States and the Soviet Union served as types of “guarantor” states over this peace process. South African President P. W. Botha welcomed UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to South Africa for deeper discussions on Namibia in September 1988. The Tripartite signed a formal agreement in December 1988. The peace process that essentially muddled its way from 1966 to a successful conclusion on multiple parts in 1988 resulted in two peacekeeping operations. The first, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to provide observers for the Cuban withdrawal from Angola and UNTAG to monitor South Africa’s departure from Namibia. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 629 on 16 January to provide details for the peace process and oversight in Namibia. UNTAG developed to be a large and complex operation to match the mission it assumed under the Resolution. Many debates about the size of the operation and the associated costs resulted in reductions of the military force on the ground and shifting those cut to a status as “stand by” troops, based in their home countries and earmarked for deployment if needed. Outside of the military force, police formed the largest civilian component of UNTAG which also included an administrative section, an independent jurist’s office, an office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, an electoral division, and the office of the Special Representative for Namibia. UNTAG’s maximum strength totaled approximately 4,500 military personnel, 1,500 police, and 3,000 local and UN civilian personnel.2 Ireland found itself involved very early in the Namibian independence and peace process. The UN established the post of UN Commissioner for Namibia in 1973 and appointed an Irishman, Sean MacBride (Irish Minister for External Affairs 1948–1951 and later the Chairman of the

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United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization known more commonly as UNESCO), as the first Commissioner. As the global organization refined its concept for UNTAG after the adoption of Resolution 435 in 1978, it recognized the importance of including an Irish contingent in the operation. Irish decision making for participation in UNTAG materialized three times between 1978 and 1989 based on progress, or at least perceived progress, in the peace process connected to both Namibia and its northern neighbor, Angola. These periods were winter 1979 following the 1978 UN Security Council adoption of Resolution 435, summer 1982 as an agreement between the belligerents appeared likely, and the fall of 1988/winter of 1989 as the UN finally secured a successful agreement of the belligerents to the original 1978 Security Resolution and its successors. Although the Irish Government initiated its peacekeeping decision making process in all three periods, this chapter will concentrate on 1988/1989 for two important reasons. First, the process during 1988/1989 resulted in an actual deployment of Irish personnel under the UN banner. Second, the proposed composition of the Irish contribution changed from initial UN planning in 1979 to the actual deployment in 1989 requiring the participation of the Irish legislature in the decision making process for the first time since the May 1978 deployment to UNIFIL (see previous chapter). The waning Cold War and a waxing interest in both the United States and Soviet Union to end the political and military hostilities in Namibia and Angola helped push their proteges in the region to an agreement of mutual interest. South Africa would withdraw from Namibia; Cuba would withdraw its forces from Angola. The removal of foreign military troops would then permit the UN to oversee an election process to bring independence to Namibia. However, the UN realized a security system would need to be in place to observe the withdrawal of military forces from both countries. UNTAG’s mandate included an observation mission to verify the departure of South African military forces as well guide the territory through “free and fair” elections and ensure security of the inhabitants. Between 1979 and 1989, the UN and Ireland discussed the possibility of Dublin providing up to three types of forces for UNTAG—Civilian police, military observers, and a military logistics company.

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UN Request for a Civilian Police Contingent Civilian police (Garda) were on the table from the beginning and approved by the Irish Government on 14 July 1982. However, the Irish Attorney General reminded the Government that the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act of 1960 covered the military forces and not the civilian police. This meant, like the military forces in 1960, the Garda were not subject to overseas deployment as governed by the Garda Síochána Act, 1924, and the Police Forces Consolidation Act, 1925. An amendment to these acts would be required to permit members of the Garda to serve as members of the Irish police force in UN operations similar to the situation of the military bound for the Congo in 1960. Some former Garda members already served with the UN security services but in these cases they had resigned or retired from the Garda and assumed positions with the UN as Irish citizens working for the organization. Garda destined for Namibia would be still assigned to the Irish police forces and deployed in this capacity to support an Irish contribution to a UN operation. With the UN request being informal at a time when no one was certain the belligerents would fully agree to the peace process, the Government recommended a pause on obtaining Dáil approval and amendments to the Siochana Act of 1924 and the Police Consolidation Act of 1925.3 Following the receipt of the formal UN request and Irish Cabinet approval for dispatching members of the Garda to Namibia, the Government turned to the issue of required legislative approval to amend the Garda Acts of 1924 and 1925 and approve Garda deployments outside the state in support of UN missions. The Garda are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice so Minister for Justice Gerry Collins officially presented the amendment bill to the members of the Dáil for debate and consideration. Being the first time the Minister for Justice approached the Dáil or consideration related to deploying the Garda in a UN peacekeeping operation, the event is worthy of a closer examination similar to the approach to the Dáil for overseas deployment of the Defence Forces. The outcome of the Dáil vote added the final piece to Ireland’s peacekeeping policy during the Cold War period. Minister Collins approached the Dáil with the standard formalities describing the bill before the legislature and explaining why the Government sought the support of the body:

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The purpose of this Bill is to amend the Garda Síochána Act, 1924, and the Police Forces Amalgamation [Consolidation] Act, 1925 to enable members of the Garda Síochána to serve outside the State with peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. There is a particular reason for this Bill being introduced now and for its passage through the House being a matter of some urgency. Following the successful conclusion of negotiations between all the parties concerned in the dispute over Namibia, South West Africa, Ireland has been called on to supply in the next few weeks a national contingent of members of the Garda to serve there with the United Nations forces. The UN force in Namibia will be known as the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and it will assist in the peaceful transfer of power in that country to its own population…4

At this point, Collins compared the approach to the Dáil reference the Garda as a similar requirement to the event in 1960 when the Taoiseach sought approval of the body to amend the Defence Bill and permit the military to serve overseas with UN peacekeeping missions: In 1960, the then Taoiseach, the late Seán Lemass, moved the Second Stage of the Defence Bill enabling Army contingents to be sent on UN missions abroad. In his speech on that occasion, he acknowledged that our adherence to the UN Charter imposed substantial obligations on this country. He also referred to Article 29 of our Constitution, Bunreacht na h Éireann, which solemnly affirms Ireland’s “devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations, founded on international justice and morality”. As Seán Lemass saw it, it was not only our moral duty but also in our national interest to support the United Nations to act in any situation in any part of the world that might endanger peace and to be prepared, where necessary, to contribute from our resources to the fulfilment of the UN’s responsibilities in such an event. I would submit that the three decades which have elapsed since the Dáil first agreed to national participation in UN peacekeeping missions have not changed the validity of our commitment to such activity. They have, if anything, endorsed it. It is for this reason that I have no hesitation in commending this Bill to the House. Our commitment to Namibian independence and our peacekeeping record with the UN in many parts of the world suggest that we should agree to help the United Nations in resolving one of its longest outstanding issues and one of its largest ever undertakings. I am confident that our Garda can, if called upon to do so, enhance the already outstanding peacekeeping record of our Defence Forces, and play a distinguished and honourable role in the historic task of helping to bring

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independence and self-determination to Namibia and peace and security to a troubled region.5

Mr. Sean Barrett, a member of the opposition Fine Gael Party and a future Minister for Defence, rose first to respond and address the proposed amendment. The response included pointing out that the Fianna Fail minority Government had reduced the number of Garda in recent years placing Ireland into a situation of increased crime. Under this scenario, the Government wanted to reduce Garda numbers even more by sending many of them overseas. He also pointed out to the Dáil that consideration of the amendment included the approval or disapproval for the Government to send members of the Garda to other operations in the future and not just Namibia in 1989: There is a difficulty in that the numbers of Garda have dramatically reduced during the past two years. We now have a police force of about 10,600, compared to about 11,400 two years ago. That represents a drop of about 800 in membership of the Garda Síochána. Nobody in his right mind would suggest that this reduction has been justified by a reduction in the level of crime. The contrary is the case. The level of crime has increased dramatically during the past 12 months and the type of crime we are dealing with makes our situation very serious. Border security problems must be faced on a daily basis and we must also deal with arms shipments for use by the IRA. All these things have placed a tremendous burden on the Garda Síochána. While I and my party would certainly support any effort to secure a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia, we must be conscious of our responsibilities at home. We can do both, if the will is there. This Bill deals not solely with Namibia but empowers the Government to dispatch members of the Garda Síochána to any part of the world on UN duty in the future. It is wise to give the Government this general power? We are talking about a specific instance here but the Government will be empowered by this Bill to meet future requests by the UN.6

Mr. Barrett continued to use the pending legislation to fuel his opposition to Fianna Fail policies related to crime and police recruitment. Following an intervention that the discussion was growing much broader than the amendment itself, Ms. Anne Marie Colley, a member of the Progressive Democrats (which would form a Coalition Government with Fianna Fail five months later in July 1989), spoke on behalf of her party’s position. She elegantly placed the bill into historical context and

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defended a Garda deployment in terms of the training and exposure to new methods of policing they would experience overseas with police personnel from many other countries. At the same time as a Progressive Democrat, she acknowledged Mr. Barrett’s concerns for decreasing Garda numbers and increasing crime: This is a Bill which should be supported in principle. Our history in terms of UN peacekeeping duties is extremely honourable. As the Minister pointed out, Seán Lemass in introducing the first Bill to allow members of the Defence Forces to take up UN peace-keeping duties some 25 to 30 years ago set a precedent which has been followed throughout the years. Many members of our Defence Forces have served with great honour with a number of peace-keeping forces around the world under the banner of the UN. In fact some members of the Defence Forces have lost their lives which is a source of great sadness for us. We are also resigned to the fact that some sacrifices are necessary and we appreciate the enormous sacrifice that has been made by those personnel and their families on our behalf and in the name of peace and the defence of freedom. Our own history makes us aware that an impartial police force is something to be valued. Over the years our own police force, the Garda Síochána, have displayed remarkable impartiality despite the great difficulties they have encountered. Therefore, we are very well placed to provide the kind of personnel the United Nations need and who will represent this country in a fine manner in Namibia and other areas in the future, presumably. The history of Namibia is a very difficult one but I am happy to see that an end may be in sight to their difficulties. If Ireland can help in that process we should do all in our power to make it possible. As I said, the Garda Síochána have over the years worked in support of the civil power and have worked with every Government who have come into power. Given the number of countries that have faced difficulties with their defence forces and police forces we can look upon ourselves as being unusual in that we have not experienced any such problems despite the violent beginning of this State. It is therefore unfair that the Garda Síochána to date have been shackled by the heavy hand of the Department of Justice, that no move has been made in recent years to remove this shackle and to allow them to grow into a modern police force. At this time we are being asked to approve the sending of 35 members of the Garda Síochána of various rank to Namibia to take up duty with the United Nations force. As I said, in general I believe that that is a good thing, not just because it will give members of the Garda Síochána an opportunity to participate in such a force but also because it will help to expose members of the Garda Síochána to other policing methods and approaches. This is something that should take place constantly. A feature

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of modern police forces is that personnel are exchanged on a very regular basis in a planned way so as to expose them to new methods of policing. That would be an added advantage of taking part in this police force. I have grave reservations about reducing the numbers currently serving in the Garda Síochána. I would re-echo what Deputy Barrett has said and raise a number of queries. We have a much depleted force and there is no evidence to suggest that the Government have any intention of increasing the numbers or restructuring the force so that those currently serving in the force would be able to provide the kind of service that this country so badly needs.7

Mr. Mervyn Taylor addressed the Dáil with the position of the Labour Party. At the time of this debate, Fianna Fail governed with the Labour Party as a minority Government. The Labour Party are supporting this measure in recognition of the contribution that Ireland has made, and must continue to make, on the international peacekeeping scene. Our Defence Forces have a proud record serving with United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon and other countries and I have no doubt that that tradition will be continued by our Garda who will be serving abroad after the Bill has been passed by the Oireachtas. We are a small and neutral country but we have an important role to play on the international scene. We do not have any tie with any of the major political blocs and our neutrality is important to us. It is important that we should take great care in exercising that neutrality particularly when our soldiers and Garda are involved with international peacekeeping forces. I am referring to the Garda who will be going to Namibia and to the soldiers serving in Lebanon. It is true to say that most of the time our Ministers observe our sense of neutrality to protect Irish people who serve abroad but, occasionally, there are lapses and one-sided statements are made by them.8

Mr. Patrick McCartan spoke on behalf of the Workers’ Party during the debate. I should like to indicate my party’s support of and welcome for this Bill, particularly the honour reflected on this country and the Garda Síochána on being invited to Namibia. It is a particularly pleasing feature that while 35 members of the Garda Force will be sent to Namibia initially, over 400 others indicated a willingness to participate. That is an incredible credit to the force as a whole.9

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Debate on the bill continued the next day, 16 February 1989, within the Seanad. Mr. Peter Kelleher of the Fine Gael opposition party (an appointed member of the Seanad’s Labour Panel) presented lengthy comments related to the bill. His opening remarks praised the opportunity for the Garda to represent Ireland in UNTAG: I welcome this Bill because it highlights the importance of this country as a peacekeeping force in the United Nations. Ireland has an excellent record in the UN. Our Defence Forces have done tremendous work as a peacekeeping force in many countries all over the world. However, this is the first time that serving members of the Garda Síochána will be able to participate in this type of exercise and the Garda Síochána Bill, 1989, is drafted to enable this to happen. Prior to this, members who wanted to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping force had to resign from the Garda first and then apply as ordinary citizens. This Bill allows serving members to apply and that is to be welcomed. It is envisaged that 35 members of the Garda will be selected to become part of a 500-strong contingent to travel to Namibia.10

Although praising the initiative, Kelleher also criticized the lack of information provided by the Government and in particular raised concerns for the Garda members themselves in the areas of length of duty hours each week, quality of housing and food, adequate uniforms for the environment, annual home and local leave, and visits by family members, UN reimbursements to the state and personal monetary allowances for each deployed Garda member. It is very laudable for anyone from any organisation to become part of a peacekeeping force for the United Nations but we have an obligation to make sure that this is not done at a financial cost to that person. There are lots of questions to be answered. After meetings between the Garda associations and the Assistant Commissioner these questions are still unanswered. The Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors are very concerned for their members because of the lack of information. For example, it has not been stated how many hours per week they will have to work. Will it be the standard 40 hours per week? If they have to work more than 40 hours, will there be overtime paid? Will there be Saturday and Sunday allowances? In the event of personnel being in Namibia this time next year, how will annual leave be decided? Will they be allowed time off in that country? When the Defence Force go abroad in a peacekeeping mission they are allowed to bring out their wives at certain times. Will this be allowed for

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the Garda Síochána? At the moment there appears to be complete lack of information. We are talking about a country which is approximately ten to 12 times the size of Ireland, with huge variations in temperatures, going from very cold in the mountainous regions to extreme heat in the plains. This will give rise to the question of different types of uniforms to be worn. Transport or the lack of it will be another issue because of the size of the territory to be covered. This is the kind of information that should have been available to members of the force before they made their applications…11

Mr. Joe O’Toole, an Independent member of the Seanad National University of Ireland Panel, offered his support for the Government position and placed it into the terms of trust. States like Ireland which have experienced colonialism or political domination by other countries are trusted by those whom peacekeeping is deployed to assist. Therefore, its Ireland’s duty to assist those states that trust her: First I compliment the Government on involving themselves in this initiative. It is a proud moment in international history. We see ourselves taking a pivotal role in the emerging statehood of a new nation which has suffered more than its share for a long period. It is significant as well to consider the countries with which we share those duties—Austria, Barbados, Fiji, Ghana, etc. The question was asked by Senator Kelleher why did we not have police forces from countries like the UK or France, etc. I can recall earlier debates in the UN, years ago, when they were putting together peacekeeping forces. The main reason which we should be proud of, is that countries like ourselves are trusted more by the Superpowers to carry out this kind of activity than those playing major influential diplomatic roles in international affairs. It is simply a matter that countries like Namibia, Cyprus before that, Lebanon, the Congo and other places, will trust the forces of States like Ireland, Fiji and Ghana who had the same type of history in a previous century, or in previous generations, who understand what it is about and who therefore can bring something to them. I would not be at all happy with what I would refer to as the Superpower states sending out their police forces. I am much happier with the make-up of the countries that are providing personnel.12

Seanad Labour Panel member Mr. Don Lydon of Fianna Fail defended his party’s proposal for the Garda deployment by not only citing multinational training but also the experience the Garda would receive in working

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with other police forces as Western Europe approached the formation of the European Union set for 1993: First, I would like to congratulate the Minister [for Justice]. This Bill is typical of the progressive legislation he has introduced since he took up office. It is an exciting Bill. It is innovative and it is an idea which has done a lot to enhance the standing of the Garda Síochána. Our Army have distinguished themselves abroad and I am sure the Garda Síochána will do likewise. Certainly, the experience of travelling abroad and working abroad will do no harm as we prepare for 1993, when we become a united Europe.13

While these excerpts from the Dáil and Seanad debates do not present the discussion in its entirety, they do offer a glimpse into the three types of responses presented by members following the reading of the bill by the Minister for Justice. Many members tended to present their views on acceptance of the bill due to pride that the UN requested the Garda to assist in bringing independence to Namibia. Other comments centered on the value to the Garda in terms of experience and training deployed with UNTAG’s international police forces. Third, a group of opposition party members did not necessarily directly oppose the Garda deployment but utilized the opportunity to criticize the Government’s record related to rising crime and decreasing numbers of Garda in the state. When called upon to vote, both houses approved the bill providing the Garda with the ability to deploy outside the state. This is a significant addition to Ireland’s peacekeeping policy. The Garda and not just the military forces could be deployed out of the state in support of UN peacekeeping operations. UN Request for a Military Logistics Company Beginning in 1979, the UN discussed the possibility of Ireland providing a military logistics company of approximately 140 personnel to UNTAG. This discussion fluctuated over the years as the number of military personnel altered and debate ensued whether the UN should utilize a military contingent, a civilian contractor, or a military-led civilian contractor for supply. On 9 September 1988, Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the UN office dispatched a note to Dublin stating the UN still sought a military logistics unit but did not specifically state from which country. The office also informed Dublin that the UN Secretariat

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stated the unit might need to be armed. Dispatching armed peacekeepers invokes the procedures to involve the Irish legislature. The office at the UN wrote: The Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act of 1960 Section 2 requires a resolution to be passed by the Dáil before an armed contingent of more than 12 numbers of the Permanent Defence Forces can serve in a particular International United Nations Force outside the state.14

As time progressed the UN need for an Irish logistics unit diminished, removing the possible question for Government and Dáil approval from the table. A 13 November 1988 internal Government memo mentioned that it was possible the UN might still request a 140 person logistics unit for Namibia as well as 20 military observers. The Government did not initially agree positively to this possibility with the Department of Defense declaring funding a roadblock for approval while the Department of Foreign Affairs hoped the situation could be resolved to permit Irish military personnel to participate in UNTAG.15 UN Request for Military Observers An informal UN request for 20 Irish military observers earmarked for UNTAG arrived in Dublin on 23 September 1988. Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the UN dispatched a classified electronic message on that day to inform Dublin of the approach and to note the UN foresaw a slippage in the implementation date for UNTAG to early in 1989.16 The November 1988 disagreement between the Minister for Defense and Minister for Foreign Affairs over whether to grant Government approval for Irish observers in Iran and Iraq rested on a question about funding. The same debate applied to UNTAG as well as the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group (UNIIMOG). The Irish Government granted approval for a dispatch of 20 military observers with UNTAG on 10 February 1989. Three days later a new issue arose when the UNTAG Force Commander, acting on an authorization of the UN Secretary-General, announced the military observers would be armed with personal weapons. Now the Government needed to secure consideration from the Dáil for the dispatch of the military observers to Namibia. The deployment of armed personnel to a UN operation required approval of the Dáil.

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Following the Government’s approval for the UN request of 20 military observers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs received permission to submit the bill to the Dáil requesting its placement in the Order of Papers for discussion. The Minister explained the purpose so that each member of the Dáil would be clear why the Government approached them for approval of only 20 military observers. The transmittal document reminded the body of the provision in Section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) (no. 2) Act 1960 requiring a Dáil resolution to permit more than 12 armed members of the Permanent Defence Forces to serve outside Ireland in a UN force. Members were also informed that under “normal” UN peacekeeping, military observers are unarmed and would not require Dáil approval. However, the UN Secretary-General made an exception to this policy and granted the UNTAG Force Commander the discretion to authorize military observers to carry defensive weapons if a situation warrants. Based upon the Force Commander’s authorization, Ireland planned to arm its military observers with side arms. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who also held the portfolio of Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) in the minority Government, requested an immediate debate of the bill due to a pending overseas departure. To facilitate the urgent need for speedy debate and ensure approval of a bill submitted by a minority Government, Minister Brian Lenihan sent an internal memorandum with the facts of the issue to Mr. Vincent Brady who served as the Minister for State in the Department of Defense and more importantly in this case as the Fianna Fail Chief Party Whip. Using a more common parliamentary title, Mr. Brady served as the Party Whip in the legislature. The task of a Party Whip is to help ensure party members vote in a manner along the preferred line of the political party. This is especially important for Fianna Fail at this period since it operated as a minority Government, meaning that although the Party held the Irish Government, it did not hold a majority in the Dáil making it easier for the legislature to not approve Government submitted legislation. To help ensure passage of the bill in the Dáil, Lenihan requested his Party Whip to muster Fianna Fail votes and to work with other Party Whips to ensure the same in their parties. Lenihan’s strategy involved reminding Dáil members that debate on the Garda covered the general concepts behind dispatching personnel to UNTAG so the legislature just needed to examine the matter of providing side arms to the Irish military observers as a formality:

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As the Dáil has already had an opportunity to debate the question of Irish participation in UNTAG very recently on the occasion of the Garda Siochana Bill 1989 which enables Garda to serve abroad with a UN Force an as this resolution is non-continuous, essentially arising from a technical requirement of the Defence Act, it may be that it can be approved by agreement with the Whips. I am also fully aware of the pressure on the Dáil time over the next two weeks. I would be grateful for your views on how to secure Dáil approval for this resolution before the 16th March.17

Minister for Defence Michael Noonan prepared a written statement to the Dáil for the introduction of the resolution into the legislature. Although the remarks were not delivered in the Dáil due to the success of the party whips in securing advance legislative agreement to the resolution, the comments he would have made are helpful for understanding the Government’s views and strategy. Nonan reminded the members that in accordance with Section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1960, the Dáil is not required to approve the deployment of Irish peacekeepers with a UN force if they are unarmed and twelve or less in number. For a deployment of military observers with UNTAG, Minister Noonan noted: In this case the U.N. have requested us to provide a detachment of 20 military observers, who may, at the discretion of the Force Commander, be required to carry personal arms. The approval of the Dáil Éireann is therefore necessary.18

The Minister for Defence, in the desire to reduce the amount of debate and increase the pace of approval, reminded the members that they were informed during the debate to permit overseas deployment of the Garda the Government had also approved the dispatch of military observers. Government agreement to accede to this request was based on the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Security Council detailing his recommendations for the implementation of the U.N. plan for Namibia. The report envisaged that the military observers would be unarmed, in accordance with normal peacekeeping practice. However, following representations made to him by a number of States, the Secretary General decided to make an exception in this case to the standard peacekeeping practice and gave the Force Commander of UNTAG discretion to authorise the military observers deployed with UNTAG to carry

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weapons of a defensive character, as when necessary. Although the question of arming military observers is to be at the discretion of the Force Commander, the military observers have been requested to bring side arms with them. The contingent of 20 officers will, therefore, be armed. As the House will be familiar with the question of Namibia from the recent debate on the Garda Siochana Bill, I do not propose to go into the background of the problem in detail but I think it might be helpful to recall briefly its main features.19

Minister Noonan continued by reviewing the post-World War I history of Namibia, the mission of the observers as developed by the UN, and the honor for Ireland to participate in UNTAG and other UN peacekeeping missions. The Dáil approved the resolution without the formalities of its introduction and reading in the legislature. At this point, Ireland was set to deploy 35 Garda and 20 military observers to UNTAG.

Postscript Ireland’s personnel began departing for UNTAG in March 1989 and returned to Ireland by April 1990. There were not any casualties among the Garda and military personnel deployed with UNTAG. South Africa officially granted independence to Namibia on 21 March 1990. Four months after the deployment of the Irish personnel, the Fianna Fail minority Government formed a new coalition Government with the Progressive Democrats Party after the June 1989 elections. Minister for Justice Gerry Collins assumed the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in this new Government.

Notes 1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, 29 September 1978. 2. For more information on the Namibian peace and independence process, see Cleophas Johannes Tsokodayl, Namibia’s Independence Struggle: The Role of the United Nations, XLibris Corporation, 2011; Henning Melber, Understanding Namibia: The Trials of Independence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; and Richad Dale, The Namibian War of Independence, 1966–1989, Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 2014. 3. Private Secretary to Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs Memorandum, S/161370, 14 July 1982 and Political Division, Department of

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

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Foreign Affairs, “Namibia: Provision of a Garda Contingent to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG),” 3541N, 14 July 1988. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for Justice Gerry Collins. Volume 387, No.2 (February 1989), page 15. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Gerry Collins assumed the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 1989 when new elections resulted in a Fianna Fail coalition with the Progressive Democrats. Ibid. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Sean Barrett. Volume 387, No.2, (February 1989), page 15. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Anne Marie Colley. Volume 387, No.2, (February 1989), page 15. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Mervyn Taylor. Volume 387, No.2, (February 1989), page 15. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy Patrick McCartan. Volume 387, No.2, (February 1989), page 15. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Seanad Éireann. Remarks of Senator Peter Kelleher. Volume 122, No.2, (February 1989), page 16. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Ibid. Seanad Éireann. Remarks of Senator Joe O’Toole. Volume 122, No.2, (February 1989), page 15. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Seanad Éireann. Remarks of Senator Don Lydon. Volume 122, No.2, (February 1989), page 15. www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie Department of Foreign Affairs Internal Memorandum, 146B, 7 September 1988. This debate within the Government was discussed in more detail as related to the proposed Irish military observers for Iran and Iraq covered in the previous chapter. Electronic message from Irish PMUN to Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, No Title, C3375, 23 September 1988. Brian Lenihan, Tanaiste, to Vincent Brady, Minister for State, Memorandum, 3 March 1989. Michael Noonan, Minister for Defense, Draft, “Speech by the Minister for Defense,” Mr. Michael Noonan TD, on moving the Resolution in Dáil Éireann to permit members of the Permanent Defence Forces to participate in UNTAG 9 March 1989. Ibid.

CHAPTER 11

Conclusions at the End of the Cold War

Ireland has a proud tradition of participation in UN and UN-supported peacekeeping missions, both civilian and military. Ireland is proud of being the only nation to have a continuous presence on UN and UN-mandated peace support operations since 1958, with Irish peacekeepers highly respected internationally. —Irish Department of Foreign Affairs website in 2023

Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War While it might be considered “putting the cart before the horse,” it seems appropriate here to outline the foundation of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy during the Cold War and then provide a summary of its evolutionary development from the text of this study. At the conclusion of the Cold War, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy during the Cold War can be described as the following process: 1. Ireland receives an official request from the UN Secretariat (Secretary-General or someone speaking on his behalf) for Dublin’s participation in a UN peacekeeping operation. This request is normally directed to Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the UN for transmittal to Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs. The UN © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3_11

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makes an informal approach to Ireland to ascertain its theoretical thoughts on providing a contribution before officially requesting Irish participation in order to prevent any embarrassment for either side by having to make and/or accept a public refusal. 2. Upon receipt of the UN request, the Government (cabinet) of Ireland reviews the request to determine if it meets Irish foreign policy goals/objectives and whether Ireland is able to accept based on finances, manpower, and/or other special considerations such as the nature of the conflict, Irish interests, and public sentiment. Departments coordinate among each other to determine any concerns and whether they can be resolved. The request is then normally scheduled for an upcoming Cabinet meeting where the Ministers discuss it openly among themselves and with the Taoiseach. It is possible for the Taoiseach to act without a formal Government meeting or unanimous Government agreement depending upon the size of the Irish contribution, nature of the conflict, and whether the Irish personnel will be armed or unarmed. The Government may accept either a request for Irish participation in a UN operation mandated by the Security Council or the General Assembly when the latter is operating under the Uniting for Peace Resolution process. 3. If the Government agrees to the UN request for Irish peacekeepers, the legislature reviews and votes whether to approve the Government decision. There are three codified exceptions. Quoting from the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960: 1. Subject to subsection (2) of this section, a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force may be despatched for service outside the State as part of a particular International United Nations Force if, but only if, a resolution has been passed by Dáil Éireann approving of the despatch of a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force for service outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force. 2. A contingent of the Permanent Defence Force may be despatched for service outside the State with a particular International United Nations Force without a resolution approving of such despatch having been passed by Dáil Éireann, if, but only if— a. that International United Nations Force is unarmed, or

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b. the contingent consists of not more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force, and the number of members of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State with that International United Nations Force will not, by reason of such despatch, be increased to a number exceeding twelve, or c. the contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force.1 4. There is not a requirement for legislative approval if the Government decides that Ireland needs to perform any of the following changes in an Irish contribution to a UN peacekeeping operation: a. Rotate Irish personnel from one unarmed UN operation to another unarmed UN operation for new assignment or temporary duty. b. Withdraw an Irish contingent from a UN peacekeeping operation. c. Reduce Irish personnel within a UN peacekeeping operation. 5. Ireland May Accept UN Deployment Requests for Both Irish Military (All Specialities) and Civilian Police Personnel.

Evolution of Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War 1946–1955 Admission to the United Nations The Irish Government realized as early as its first attempt to join the United Nations (UN) in 1946 that membership meant adherence to the organization’s charter and the latter included provisions related to collective defense of states under attack and support for military forces operating under a mandate of the body. The year 1948 witnessed the first two UN peace observation missions and Ireland was aware that it could be called upon to provide military personnel for service in future peace observation operations after receiving membership in the global body. However, Ireland faced potential problems with the first being its lack of membership in the UN and a Soviet veto preventing admission. At

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the same time, the state needed to settle any questions related to how its policy of neutrality applied to the UN charter. Third, the Irish military operated under an ongoing series of temporary defense acts that transferred the constitutionally mandated oversight of the military by the legislature to that of the Government. While it would have been unlikely this would have caused any concerns related to Irish participation in peacekeeping operations…the possibility existed, even if remotely. These potential issues were resolved in 1954 with the passage of the Defence Act 1954; in 1955 with admission to the UN; and November 1960 with the release of the Department of External Affairs memorandum stating the concept of Irish neutrality is consistent with the UN charter.2 1955–1958 The First UN Peace Observation Missions Little time passed after UN admission before Ireland needed to question the development of a state peacekeeping policy. The global body fielded the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) into the Sinai in 1956. Unofficial conversations related to whether the UN would approach Ireland for a contingent contribution emerged in November 1956. The Irish Department of Defence released a memorandum on 9 November raising questions for the Government related to the definition and permission for Irish military personnel to serve outside the state; issues related to the command of Irish forces outside the state; active vs. reserve service member availability related to overseas deployment; and legal issues related to military punishments and courts-martial outside the state. When questioned by a member of the Seanad, Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave of the Fine Gael Party responded that Ireland was not ready yet to participate in UN peacekeeping. A new Fianna Fail Government assumed the reins of Government in 1957. The new Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, stood upon a position that Ireland needed to prepare itself for consideration of any upcoming UN requests for Irish peacekeepers then rather than later. Under the Fianna Fail Government, the Departments of External Affairs and Defence developed draft amendments to the Defence Act 1954. The preparations proved useful in 1958 when the UN requested Ireland to contribute unarmed military personnel for the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). An important question emerged within the Government discussions on this request. Should the Dáil play a role in Ireland’s decision making process? With both the Fianna Fail and

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Fine Gale parties in general supporting Ireland’s potential role in a UN peace observation mission, a review by the legislature seemed to be noncontentious in nature. At the same time, the ensuing discussions resulted in the addition of elements that became key foundations in Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy. As already introduced due to UN policy, the global body approaches Ireland’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (PMUN) reference participation. PMUN, in turn, forwards the request to the Irish Government which examines the issue and makes a decision to address the Dáil. During the discussions within the legislature related to UNOGIL, the following points for Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy developed. Irish personnel should be true volunteers and following the initial Dáil approval for the deployment of the first group of Irish observers, the Government did not refer additional requests for Irish observers in UNOGIL to the legislature for approval. This would be modified in 1960. Following the termination of UNOGIL, the Government approved the transfer of two unarmed Irish peacekeepers from Lebanon to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The Government did not request Dáil review/approval and the latter did not demand such action setting the precedent that the Government could transfer individual Irish volunteers from one unarmed observation mission to another without legislative approval. 1960 Congo The 1960 UN request for an armed battalion of Irish peacekeepers for deployment with the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) raised new issues for Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy. UNOGIL and UNTSO deployments represented small numbers of unarmed observers supporting a peace process. ONUC required a large contingent of armed personnel who were entering a new state that had devolved into political chaos immediately upon independence. Previous UN deployments involved the establishment of a peace process with the deployment of observers or peacekeepers to support it. A peace process did not exist in the Congo forcing the UN to practically reverse the procedure—deploy armed peacekeepers to provide an image of stability while the global body worked to develop a peace process.

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Following Government agreement for the deployment of an Irish battalion with ONUC, the decision making process passed to the legislature. With the Defence Act 1954 authorizing the utilization of the Irish army only inside the Irish state itself, the Dáil and the Seanad needed to amend the 1954 Act in order to permit an overseas deployment with ONUC. Debate in both houses resulted in passage of the Defence (Amendment) Act 1960. The document officially amended the Defence Act 1954 for a six month period by permitting the overseas deployment of Irish military personnel to serve in “international forces” mandated by the UN Security Council or General Assembly. The latter option permitted the possibility of the Irish deploying under the Uniting for Peace Resolution if the Security Council became deadlocked due to the veto rule. The 1960 Act also noted service outside the state applied to those Irish military personnel who were appointed or enlisted on the date of its passage or afterward. These personnel, if in a military reserve capacity, would be considered on active military service if deployed with an Irish contingent overseas (In contrast, reserve personnel training within the Irish state would still be considered military reservists). The 1960 Act, again a temporary amendment to the 1954 Act, would remain in place for six months or when replaced by a second Act that provided more permanent resolution to the question.3 The legislature worked on a second amendment that would be more comprehensive and permanent in nature while also authorizing the deployment of a second Irish battalion to ONUC. First, the second Act included the provisions of the first Act as discussed above. However, personnel who were appointed or enlisted before the date of the passage of the bill could affirm in writing their permission for overseas deployment with an international force. Debate during the passage of the first Act and its replacement second Act provided members of the Government and legislature (meaning all political parties holding seats) to delve deeper into the process for approval or disapproval of a UN request for Irish peacekeepers. This document directly states when the Government may approve and dispatch Irish personnel without a legislative resolution. The three conditions are: 1. that International United Nations Force is unarmed, or 2. the contingent consists of not more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force, and the number of members of the

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Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State with that International United Nations Force will not, by reason of such despatch, be increased to a number exceeding twelve, or 3. the contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force.4 The Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960, thus added these key provisions to Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy: Ireland may respond to both UN Security Council and UN General Assembly mandates for international forces and their resulting UN request for Irish personnel; the Irish military can deploy outside Irish territory with a UN international force; Governmental affirmation of a UN request can result in a deployment without Irish legislative approval if the international force is unarmed or consists of 12 or fewer individuals or “is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force.”5 1964 Cyprus The 1964 Irish decision to dispatch a battalion with the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) served more as a policy reinforcer than an object for modification of existing policy. Government members were divided on whether to deploy Irish peacekeepers with UNFICYP due to the nature of the conflict and the possibility of a permanent division of the island into two separate societies or states. The situation struck many in Ireland as being similar to the British division of Ireland. Taoiseach Sean Lemass brought the Government, in particular Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken, in line with his opinion to participate with the UN. Fianna Fail members of the Dáil followed the Government lead. Deputy James Dillon of the opposition Fine Gael Party addressed the Dáil, primarily those in his and other non-Government parties, and reminded the body:

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Now, bearing in mind that that heavy burden of responsibility is on us here in Dáil Éireann, when we make the determination as to whether the Irish Army is to participate in this United Nations operation, our view is that since we accepted the responsibility of membership of the United Nations, when Deputy Cosgrave first appeared there on behalf of Ireland, to take our place, we have an obligation to sustain the United Nations, particularly in a peace-keeping mission of this character, and to do so with our eyes open. It is for that reason that I have mentioned all the implications and that I propose to mention certain others that should be borne in mind by Dáil Éireann in determining this matter finally. The first thing is this: it is not the function of Dáil Éireann in this context to determine the policy that must be pursued by the United Nations. That is the function of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our Minister’s duty is to take his full part in the determination of that policy and make our views and influence felt there. In the resolution we are asked to pass today, we are supporting the United Nations effort to maintain peace while solutions to the political problems are found.6

At the same time, it was interesting to discover in the records that some members of the Dáil were not sure if they would have a role in the decision related to deploying Irish peacekeepers to Cyprus. This demonstrates the new nature of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy and the fact that not everyone understood the various options. Minister for External Affairs Aiken reminded the Dáil members that in accordance with Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960, Cyprus presented a case where the Government must seek legislative approval due to the deployment involving an armed battalion.7 1973 Sinai From 1958 to 1964, Fianna Fail led Governments developed the policies to permit the deployment of Irish peacekeepers. A Fine Gael led Government made the decision in response to a UN request for Irish personnel for the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in the Sinai. The 1973 UN operation represented the first time a Government other than one led by Fianna Fail acted upon an official UN request for Irish peacekeepers. Would Fine Gael follow the Government process laid down so far by Fianna Fail or modify policies to suit its own needs? The former prevailed and the Fine Gael Government followed the existing policies. Thus, the first non-Fianna Fail led test of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping

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policy demonstrated a measure of permanence and applicability to any Government holding the Cabinet seats. An important postscript did add a unique point to Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy. In early 1974, domestic needs related to terrorism necessitated the withdrawal of Irish peacekeepers from the Sinai. The Government viewed their return to Ireland as a means to help reassure the Irish population of a measure of internal security following a series of terrorist bombings. The Government informed the UN that it was returning the Irish contingent from the Sinai and it did not seek approval of the legislature. The Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960, did not discuss the need for legislative approval to unilaterally end an Irish peacekeeping deployment and the Dáil did not state the legislature should review such withdrawals of an Irish peacekeeping contingent. It should be noted that members of the Government and Dáil expressed remorse that the withdrawal needed to occur but generally accepted it as a security necessity at the time. Security and public reassurance at home came first. 1976–1977 Cyprus The easing of security concerns in Ireland beginning in late 1974 and the desire to return an Irish contingent to UN peacekeeping prompted the Government to seek an opportunity for the latter. The 1976–1977 process to coordinate a return of Irish peacekeepers to Cyprus did not necessarily alter Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy but did demonstrate two points. First, it can be seen as reinforcing the procedures for ensuring informal coordination between the UN and Ireland before formal requests and acceptances are made between the two. Second, it was the first test of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy during a period when the Government changed from a Fine Gael to a Fianna Fail dominated leadership in the middle of the process. Coordination and precise understanding between the UN and Ireland led to an embarrassing situation between the two. The UN turned down an unofficial Fine Gael offer of peacekeepers and in turn presented its own counter proposal for a greater number of Irish military personnel which was declined by Ireland. The new Fianna Fail led Government later accepted the UN request only to have the latter decline the offer due to decreasing needs for peacekeepers in Cyprus. The UN declination of what Fianna Fail was certain had been an official request to Ireland resulted in heated exchanges between Dublin and the UN Secretariat. In the end,

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Ireland reluctantly accepted a face saving offer to officially place an Irish battalion on “stand by” for any emergency in Cyprus but retained on Irish soil. The lesson for Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy can be seen as a need to ensure both Dublin and the UN have a clear understanding behind the intent of each in terms of what can be accepted and what can be delivered for a peacekeeping operation. 1978 Lebanon Ireland returned a battalion-sized contingent to UN peacekeeping in 1978…four years after withdrawing from UNEF II in 1974. A review of the primary documentation shows that Ireland followed the UN peacekeeping policy it developed between 1958 and 1973 when reviewing and accepting the UN request for Irish peacekeepers with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Between 1978 and 2023, Ireland deployed, withdrew, and deployed again contingents for UNIFIL based on the UN troop level requirements in the operation. 1988–1989 Afghanistan–Pakistan, Iran–Iraq, Central America, and Namibia As the Cold War waned in the late 1980s, the demand for UN peacekeeping increased as the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated more closely to help settle Third World conflicts that had been supported in various means by the two Superpowers. The years 1988– 1989 witnessed four new UN peacekeeping missions for which Ireland received official UN requests for personnel. Ireland’s UN peacekeeping decision making for the United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) involved the approval of five Irish personnel. One, already assigned to UNTSO, transferred to UNGOMAP from the Middle East. Four other Irish military personnel were officially assigned to UNTSO while in Ireland and then temporarily directly transferred to UNGOMAP. For Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy, this process can be seen as transferring an Irish UNTSO asset to UNGOMAP and adding four more unarmed individuals to UNTSO, a previously approved UN observation mission. Under these conditions, the Government approved the UN request and did not need to seek legislative approval due to the personnel in the mission being unarmed.

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Prior to the 1988 establishment of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Observation Group (UNIIMOG), Ireland maintained one to two officers in the area as part of the United Nations Inspection Team (UNIT). These unarmed personnel were temporarily transferred from UNTSO. By September 1988, the UN requested Dublin provide a total of 15 military observers (some transferred from UNTSO and some deployed directly from Ireland) and 30 military police to man checkpoints. All of these personnel deployed unarmed and therefore did not require legislative approval. The third observation mission, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), deployed in 1989 to oversee the peace process among states within the region. The Irish Government initially approved 18 military personnel for the operation with 12 additional personnel when circumstances permitted. ONUCA deployed unarmed and the Irish Government did not need to approach the legislature for approval. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia represented the fourth UN observation mission fielded in the window of 1988–1989 with Irish personnel. In contrast to the other three observation missions, UNTAG presented a requirement to amend long standing Irish legislation governing civilian police related to overseas deployment. UN discussions about the deployment of Irish civilian police (the Garda) dated to 1982. However, Garda personnel were prohibited from overseas service while members of the Irish police force under the provisions of the Garda Siochana Act, 1924, and the Police Forces Consolidation Act, 1925. In many ways, handling this issue brought Ireland full circle in its UN peacekeeping policy. Issues related to the deployment of military personnel were solved in 1960 but there had not been serious discussion of deploying the Garda until 1982. Minister for Justice Gerry Collins presented a bill before the Dáil in February 1989. Although debate tended to derail into party politics over crime, the legislature presented its approval and subsequent amendment to the two police acts permitting the Garda to deploy with UN peacekeeping operations in a manner similar to Irish military personnel. Having examined the question of UNTAG in February, the Government and Dáil quickly settled any questions in March related to military observers deploying armed.

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Ireland’s Peacekeeping Policy After 1989 1990–1991 brings an end to this examination of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy for two practical reasons. First, while many state the Cold War ended when the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, it is often easier and more accurate to place the end of the Cold War into a broader scope without taking the discussion down a rabbit hole and debating the precise length or minute spot of time. In November 1989, Irish peacekeepers were in multiple UN observation missions helping to end long-standing conflicts. In the same month, the Berlin Wall came down. Eastern European states broke free of Soviet domination and Germany achieved unification in October 1990. The Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. Irish peacekeeping policy can be seen as a product of the Cold War international system. Ireland joined the UN in 1955 and developed its peacekeeping policy to support the UN during the next forty-five years. As late in the Cold War as 1989, the Irish Government and legislature needed to determine the correct path to permit the Garda to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in a similar fashion as its military personnel in 1958 and solidified in legislative action in 1960. Second, the changes in the international system witnessed in 1990 and 1991 set the stage for a new era in Irish peacekeeping policy. Ireland did participate in new, small UN observation missions during the transitional window of time but new questions for Dublin emerged after the final demise of the Cold War and the arrival of a new period that might have seemed inconceivable during the Cold War. Can Ireland participate in non-UN peacekeeping operations? Can Ireland join the NATO alliance? Can Irish peacekeepers deploy with NATO missions? How does the formation of the European Union impact Irish foreign and military policy? Can Ireland contribute military forces to a European Union standby force? Can Irish peacekeepers deploy with European Union missions? Does the Irish concept of neutrality during the Cold War hold up in the Post-Cold War world? Should the Irish legislature and public play more dynamic roles in Irish peacekeeping policy? All of these questions have an impact on the Irish peacekeeping decision making policy in the Post-Cold War international system and deserve their own volume.8

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Notes 1. The official e-copy of the Defense (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960, can be found in the Irish Statute Book at https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/ 1960/act/44/enacted/en/html. 2. The official e-copy of the Defense Act, 1954, can be found in the Irish Statute Book at https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1954/act/18/ enacted/en/html. 3. The official e-copy of the Defense (Amendment) Act, 1960, can be found in the Irish Statute Book at https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1960/act/ 22/enacted/en/html. 4. The official e-copy of the Defense (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960, can be found in the Irish Statute Book at https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/ 1960/act/44/enacted/en/html. 5. Ibid. 6. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Deputy James Dillon, Volume 208, No. 7, 7 April 1964, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 7. Dáil Éireann. Remarks of Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken, Volume 208, No. 7, 7 April 1964, www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie. 8. It is the goal of this author to complete a second book examining the Post-Cold War questions and modifications of Irish peacekeeping policy.

Bibliography

Archival Sources National Archives of Ireland (Dublin): Papers associated with the Office of the Taoiseach, Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Defence, Department of Finance. National Library of Ireland (Dublin): Irish national and local newspapers. National Archives of Cyprus (Nicosia): UNFICYP and Cypriot Government sources. National Archives of the United Kingdom (London): Office of the Cabinet, Commonwealth, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs sources. US Department of State, Office of the Historian: Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Collection. United Nations Archival Collection (online): Security Council, Secretariat, Office of the Secretary-General, and Office of Special Political Affairs sources. Houses of the Oireachtas (Dublin): Government documents and transcripts of Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann debates. Frank Aiken Papers (University College, Dublin): Frank Aiken papers. Garret FitzGerald Papers (University College, Dublin): Garret FitzGerald papers.

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Index

A Afghanistan, 170, 174–178, 189, 192, 222 Aiken, Frank, 3, 15, 47, 56, 62, 83, 86–88, 91, 93–99, 108, 216, 219, 220 Anglo-Irish Treaty, 31, 32 Angola, 174, 196–198 Aubyn, Festus, 2, 16 Austria, 30, 37, 112, 154–157, 160, 180, 205 B Ball, George, 88, 89 Barbados, 205 Barrett, Sean, 201–203 Bartley, Gerald, 99 Belgium, 60 Benin, 132 Bennett, Jose Rolz, 92 Blake, Robert, 87 Blaney, Neil, 123 Blowick, Joseph, 68 Boland, Kevin, 51, 52, 57, 76

Bolivia, 157–159 Booth, Lionel, 52 Botha, P.W., 197 Brady, Vincent, 208, 211 Brazil, 44, 77 British Commonwealth, 15, 90 Bunche, Ralph, 86, 91, 92 Byrnes, James, 21 C Canada, 44, 86, 157, 160 China, People’s Republic, 62, 118, 132 China, Republic of (Taiwan), 60 Chubb, Basil, 15, 19 Clann na Talmhan (political party), 68, 80 Clonan, Tom, 33, 39 Colley, Anne Marie, 201 Collins, Gerry, 195, 199, 200, 210, 211, 223 Colombia, 44, 187 Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), 89

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. M. Mays, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32777-3

235

236

INDEX

Congo, 28, 35, 54, 57, 60–62, 64–75, 77–79, 81, 86, 90, 91, 99, 104, 105, 108, 123, 143, 165, 199, 205, 217 Constitution (Irish) 1922, 31–33, 38 Constitution (Irish) 1937, 23, 33, 35, 38 Corish, Brendan, 67, 76, 91, 93, 99–101 Cosgrave, Liam, 45, 46, 52, 55, 56, 94, 100, 108, 109, 115, 129–131, 138, 216, 220 Costa Rica, 188 Craig, Jeremy, 154, 156, 158, 171 De Cuellar, Javier Perez, 179, 181, 197 Czechoslovakia, 154

D Defence Act 1954, 34, 35, 39, 45, 47, 48, 52, 59, 63–65, 69, 70, 216, 218 Defence Act (Temporary) 1960, 116, 121, 191 Defence (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1960, 35 Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923, 32, 33, 38 Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill 1948, 33 Denmark, 118 Department of Defense, 63, 133, 135, 185, 207, 208 Department of External Affairs, 27, 28, 36, 41, 47, 50, 56, 73, 79–81, 89, 104, 216 Department of Finance, 186 Department of Foreign Affairs, 14, 55, 125–127, 131, 133–136, 149, 150, 154, 156, 163, 170, 172, 173, 176, 177, 180–185,

188, 190, 192, 193, 207, 210, 211, 213 Dillon, James, 67, 75, 76, 81, 93, 98, 99, 219 Dockrell, Maurice, 26, 36 Donegan, Patrick, 123, 127, 130–133, 135, 149 Dorr, Noel, 3, 17, 37, 73, 81, 162, 171

E Egypt, 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 70, 100, 102, 107–110, 113, 116–118, 120, 121, 123 El Salvador, 187, 188, 191 European Economic Community (EEC), 109, 152

F Fianna Fail, 14–16, 24, 35, 47, 50–52, 56, 57, 62, 70, 83, 107–109, 122–124, 127, 138–141, 151, 165, 201, 203, 205, 208, 210, 211, 216, 219–221 Fiji, 17, 162, 205 Fine Gael, 14–16, 25, 26, 41, 50, 55, 67, 75, 76, 78, 93, 99, 100, 102, 107–109, 116, 122, 124, 127, 129, 130, 138, 139, 142, 151, 165–167, 201, 204, 216, 219–221 Finland, 30, 37, 112, 130, 135, 169 FitzGerald, Garret, 108, 109, 111, 121–123, 127, 130–135, 140, 142, 149, 150, 165–169 Flanagan, Charles, 3, 17 Flanagan, Oliver J., 167, 172 France, 9, 49, 60, 72, 89, 118, 126, 155, 157, 164, 205

INDEX

237

G Garda, 79, 184, 195, 199–206, 208–210, 223, 224 Garda Siochana Act, 1924, 199, 223 Ghana, 2, 17, 61, 79, 205 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 173, 174, 188 Greece, 84, 85, 87, 89, 93, 95–98, 132 Griffin, David, 180 Guatemala, 187, 188

Ishizuka, Katsumi, 3, 17, 172 Israel, 42, 43, 53, 70, 100–102, 107–112, 116, 117, 123, 133, 153, 154, 162, 169, 176, 179 Italy, 30, 118

H Hammarskjold, Dag, 70, 123 Heaslip, Richard, 50, 54 Honduras, 188

K Kasa-Vubu, Joseph, 60 Kashmir, 100, 101 Katanga, 36, 60, 72, 78 Keating, Paul, 114, 116–120, 125 Kelleher, Peter, 204, 205, 211 Kennedy, Eamon, 138, 159, 171 Kennedy, John F., viii, 1 Kerrigan, Patrick, 166, 167, 172 Khan, Daoud, 174 Kittani, Ismat, 113 Korean War, 41, 55, 63 Kuwait, 55, 161 Kyprianou, 88

I India, 44, 45, 77, 100, 101, 184 Indonesia, 77 International Court of Justice, 8, 29, 187 Iran, 157–160, 162, 174, 178–184, 186, 192, 193, 207, 211 Iraq, 56, 174, 178–184, 186, 192, 193, 207, 211 Ireland, Republic of Assembly of Ireland (Dail Eireann), 12 Defence Forces Act, 1923, 22 Deputy of the Dail (Teachta Dala), 12 Deputy Prime Minister (Tanaiste), 12 Iveagh House, 161 Permanent Representative to the UN, 3 President (Uachtarán na hÉireann), 12, 13, 15 Prime Minister (Taoiseach), 12, 119 Senate of Ireland (Seanad Éireann), 12, 13

J Jadotville, 78, 81 Japan, 30

L Labour Party, 25, 67, 76, 91, 99, 101, 107, 109, 166, 203 League of Nations, 23, 25, 27, 29, 37, 54, 196 Lebanon, 49–52, 54–56, 59, 66, 86, 108, 109, 152–155, 157, 159, 161, 163, 166–169, 203, 205, 217 Lemass, Sean, 62, 64, 74, 80, 83, 101, 104, 105, 108, 200, 202, 219 Lenihan, Brian, 193, 208, 211 Liu, F.T., 117, 118, 134, 135, 146, 155, 161

238

INDEX

Lumumba, Patrice, 60 Lydon, Don, 205, 211 Lynch, Jack, 138, 140, 150, 161 M MacEoin, Sean, 76, 78 MacQueen, Norman, 3, 17, 62, 79, 103, 105, 106 Makarios III, Archbishop, 84 McCartan, Patrick, 203, 211 McCarthy, Justin, 53, 66 McGilligan, Patrick, 25, 36 McHugh, Roger Joseph, 46 McMahon, Gerry, 155, 180, 192 McQuillan, John, 51, 57, 69, 80 Mexico, 159, 187 Miller, Rory, 125, 152, 169, 170, 172 Molloy, John, 153, 154, 158 Muray, Leo, 88 Murphy, Ray, ix, 4, 17, 23, 35 N Namibia, 35, 79, 170, 174, 184, 185, 189, 192, 196–207, 209, 210, 223 Nepal, 157 Netherlands, 77 Neutrality (Irish), 9, 21–23, 27, 34, 36, 37, 73, 116, 120, 216, 224 New Guinea, 77 Nicaragua, 187, 188 Niemba, 73, 75, 81 Nigeria, 2, 77 Noonan, Michael, 209–211 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 23, 85–87, 89, 90, 119, 224 Northern Ireland, 23, 87, 89, 112, 125, 148, 149 Norton, William, 25, 36 Norway, 44, 155, 157, 164

O O’Brien, Conor Cruise, 36, 54, 81, 122, 123 O’Higgins, Thomas, 39 Oireachtas, 12, 13, 32, 33, 67, 74, 203 O’Kennedy, Michael, 122, 123, 127, 141, 150, 158, 159, 162, 164–166, 168, 171, 172 O’Riordan, F., 113, 114, 126 O’Shea, Michael, 181 O’Sullivan, T., 88, 91 O’Toole, Joe, 205, 211 Outer Mongolia, 30

P Pakistan, 44, 45, 100, 101, 106, 170, 174–178, 189, 192 Palestine, 9, 53, 54, 57, 59, 152, 169 Palme, Olof, 179 Panama, 187 Pearson, Lester, 45 Police Forces Consolidation Act, 1925, 199, 223 Progressive Democrats, 201, 211

R Republic of Ireland Act of 1948, 15 Romania, 157 Rusk, Dean, 85, 95 Russell, George, 68, 69, 80 Russia. See Soviet Union

S Sadat, Anwar, 110 Sandys, Duncan, 85 Seanad Éireann, 12, 13, 19, 56, 80, 211 Senegal, 77, 157 Sherwin, Frank, 68, 80

INDEX

Skelly, Joseph Morrison, 3, 17, 62, 79 Snelling, Arthur, 89 Sobolev, Arkady, 30 South Africa, 196–198, 210 Soviet Union (Russia), 22, 23, 29, 30, 34, 43, 60, 70, 97, 110, 118, 154, 161, 173–175, 177, 188, 197, 198, 222, 224 Spain, 30 Suez Crisis, 42, 45, 49, 55 Sweden, 36, 37, 71, 77, 89, 95, 112, 155–157, 160, 180 Syria, 49, 107–109, 133, 152, 176 T Tanaiste, 56, 189, 193, 208, 211 Taoiseach, 12–15, 19, 24, 26, 35, 47, 48, 55, 56, 62, 64–72, 74–76, 83, 91, 92, 94–101, 108, 109, 115, 124, 127, 129–131, 134, 136, 140, 143, 145, 161, 184, 185, 200, 214, 216 Taylor, Mervyn, 203, 211 Teachta Dála, 12 Thant, U, 85, 91, 92, 94–97, 104 Treaty of Guarantee, 84, 90 Turkey, 84, 85, 87, 89, 93, 95–98, 118, 132 U Uachtarán na hÉireann, 12, 13, 15 United Kingdom (Great Britain), 9, 23, 31, 60, 72, 118, 155, 157 United Nations (UN) Charter, 6, 7, 9, 10, 18, 21, 22, 26–28, 30, 34, 41, 49, 55, 60, 65, 66, 80, 196, 200, 215, 216 Fifth Committee, 10 General Assembly, 3, 9, 10, 43, 55, 78, 99, 109, 132, 164, 214, 219

239

Office for Special Political Affairs, 11 Secretariat, 11, 61, 87, 113, 117, 119, 136, 141, 145, 156, 158, 162, 176, 180, 186, 206, 213, 221 Secretary General, 51, 110–112, 121, 123, 141, 165, 209 Secretary-General, 50, 197, 208 Security Council, 7, 8, 10, 17, 29, 30, 43, 49, 53, 60, 65, 70, 78, 85, 92, 100, 109, 110, 122, 141, 153, 156, 157, 160, 161, 173–176, 179, 188, 196–198, 209, 218, 219 United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), 197 United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF), 133, 156, 157, 176 United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), 100, 102, 107, 109, 112–124, 126, 127, 133, 134, 148, 149, 157, 165, 167, 220, 222 United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), 5, 10, 35, 43, 45, 54, 216 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), 175, 176, 178, 191, 222 United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), 100–102, 191 United Nations Inspection Teams (UNIT), 180, 181, 192, 223 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 78, 151, 153, 155–170, 172, 176, 184, 186, 192, 198, 222

240

INDEX

United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group (UNIIMOG), 178, 181–187, 191, 207, 223 United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 35, 49–54, 56, 57, 66, 77, 101, 216, 217 United Nations Observation Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 188, 191 United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), 187–191, 223 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 9, 27, 58, 60, 61, 83, 115, 217 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 84, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 110, 113, 115, 118–121, 124, 126, 129, 132, 134, 135, 138–141, 143–147, 149, 219 United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), 78 United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), 77 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 35, 42, 43, 45, 53, 54, 57, 77, 101, 110, 115, 129, 176–184, 217, 222, 223 United States, 9, 14, 21, 29, 30, 42, 43, 56, 70, 85, 96, 97, 110, 117,

118, 146, 153, 175, 177, 187, 188, 191, 197, 198, 222 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 10, 18, 214, 218 Urquhart, Brian, 113, 114, 116–121, 136, 138–140, 143–147, 153, 154, 161

V de Valera, Eamon, 15, 24, 36, 47, 56, 70, 108 Venezuela, 157, 187

W Waldheim, Kurt, 111–113, 119, 120, 159–162, 171, 179 West Irian, 77 Workers Party, 203 World War I, 21, 196, 210 World War II, 15, 16, 21, 23, 25, 34–36, 54, 89, 107, 196

Y Yom Kippur War, 108, 109, 125 Yugoslavia, 159, 184

Z Zambia, 78, 196