Iraqi Refugees in the United States: Self-Sufficiency and Responsibilization in the Vicious Cycle of Integration 3031387929, 9783031387920

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Iraqi Refugees in the United States Self-Sufficiency and Responsibilization in the Vicious Cycle of Integration Volkan Deli

Iraqi Refugees in the United States

Volkan Deli

Iraqi Refugees in the United States Self-Sufficiency and Responsibilization in the Vicious Cycle of Integration

Volkan Deli Law TOBB University of Economics and Technology Ankara, Türkiye

ISBN 978-3-031-38792-0    ISBN 978-3-031-38793-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

̇ Deli for my beloved daughter Idil

Preface

This book focuses on experiences of Iraqi refugees resettled in the US state of Arizona. Looking at the much-discussed integration and assimilation issues in the refugee and migration literature, this book basically argues that refugee integration must be differentiated from immigrant integration in defining the refugee context and condition, and also recommends to pay much attention to refugees on the basis of the circumstances that compel them to leave their home country and to live through the conditions of the destination country in which they will eventually be settled, that is, of which they will be citizens. From this point of view, refugee integration can be seen as part and outcome of this entire long-standing process and will pave the way for us to understand the integration conditions of first-generation adult refugees from Iraq. In this regard, this book demonstrates that the theoretical structure of humanitarian governance fully serves to carry out such an analysis for refugee integration since it does not only refer to role of states but also it manifests how states interact with international organizations, resettlement agencies, non-­governmental organizations, nonprofits, volunteers, and non-state actors in process. In humanitarian governance, refugees, on the other hand, appear on the stage of history as very persistent and struggling subjects who have to deal with many challenging conditions and problems from the moment they have to leave their country, even though they seem to be passive subjects receiving humanitarian aid and assistance in the process. However, many variables such as the time they spend in asylum countries, the uncertain asylum processes where they face the risk of losing their rights, and the decisions to be taken by the resettlement countries deeply affect and vii

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shape refugees’ lives. Therefore, this book, which concentrates on refugees’ lives in their long journey, demonstrates that it is not adequate for refugees “to be saved” by the organs of humanitarian governance; they also need “to be selected” and resettled in a Western country to have a life in dignity. This book portrays the case of Iraqi refugees resettled in Arizona in this regard and aims to be the voice of Iraqi refugees. In the echo of this voice, this book explains that refugee integration should be handled as a separate title, using two new concepts it proposes to the literature: “Vicious Cycle of Refugee Integration” and “Blind Spot of Integration” and argues it within the framework of humanitarian governance. In this context, it offers a new theoretical and empirical framework as a model for discussing and analyzing refugee integration. This book is the product of a “sociological imagination,” in the words of the great sociologist C. Wright Mills. All adults know that dreams usually don’t come true if the circumstances don’t work out well. I am grateful to Prof. Çağatay Topal for his great support at every stage of my fieldwork to make this dream come true. I would like to give special thanks to Prof. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç and Prof. Mehmet Okyayuz for their illuminative and constructive comments throughout my research. The field research of this study was conducted in Arizona, the United States of America, with technical and financial assistance provided by the Middle East Technical University (METU) Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit. During the field research, I was a visiting scholar for the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies (MENAS) at the University of Arizona in the USA. I am particularly grateful to METU and MENAS/UoA for assistance provided to my research process. I would like to express my deepest love and gratitude to my wife, Simin Yalçıntaş Deli, who took care of our 2-year-old daughter and tried to make time for me to write this book. I cannot thank my parent, my mother and father, my sister enough for their love and support throughout my academic life. I would like to express my special thanks to my friend Prof. Özgün E. Topak with whom we discussed the basic idea of this book and who did not hesitate to help me whenever I asked for his opinion and views. I would like to thank the following people and organizations for their assistance with the collection of data: Iraqi refugees whom I interviewed, and Arizona Department of Economic Security, Catholic Community

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Charity Services, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest, Tucson Refugee Ministry, International Rescue Committee, Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship, La Frontera Center Inc., Noor Womens’ Association, Iskashitaa Refugee Network. Ankara, Türkiye

Volkan Deli

Contents

1 Introduction:  Field Research in Arizona  1 Methodology and Data Collection   7 Interviews with the Iraqi Refugees  10 Interviews with Government and Non-Profit Organizations  12 Research Ethics  13 References  15 2 Forced  Migration, Resettlement and Responsibilization in the Functioning of Humanitarian Governance 17 Neoliberalization of Humanitarian Governance  20 Refugees to Clients  23 Paternalism and Responsibilization  25 The U.S. Refugee Resettlement System: Government and Non-Profits  28 Cooperative Agreement: Refugee Reception and Placement Program and Matching Grant Program  34 Triad of Humanitarianism: Faith, Paternalism and Philanthropy  43 Voluntary Organizations  52 Professional and Specialized Services  59 Impact of 9/11 on the Functions of Humanitarian Governance  64 References  74

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3 A  Politics of Refugee Lives 79 Saved Lives: Why Iraqis Left Their Home Country?  82 Living in Uncertainty: Asylum Condition  90 The American Dream Versus the Refugee Experience 101 References 107 4 Self-Sufficiency  Policy and the Construction of New Americans in Arizona111 Self-sufficiency and Entry-Level Jobs 119 Responsibilization of Iraqi Refugees and Appearance of New Americans 125 References 140 5 Social  and Economic Integration of Iraqi Refugees in Arizona143 Arizona: Host-Related Factors 155 Social Participation and Intercultural Relations 162 Social Mobility and Social Capital 168 Security and Safety in Arizona 176 Accommodation and Social Organization Among Iraqi Refugees 181 References 184 6 The  Limits of Integration: From “Iraqi-­American” Identity to Citizenship187 Preserving the Mother Tongue 188 Cultural Identity and Cultural Distance 191 Acculturation Strategies 195 “Iraqi-Americans” Between Integration and Assimilation 199 Being an American Citizen 203 Remembering Home 207 References 211 7 Rethinking Refugee Integration213 References 226 Index229

Abbreviations

CC CENSUS DES DOS IASPF INGO IRC IRS LSS-SW MGP NAE NGO OIG ORR PRM RISP-NET RRP UN UNHCR UNSC US USA USCIS USRAP VOLAG

Catholic Charities Community Services US Census Bureau Arizona Department of Economic Security US Department of State The Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship International Non-Governmental Organizations International Rescue Committee International Revenue Services Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest Matching Grant Program New American Economy Non-Governmental Organization US Office of Inspector General US Office of Refugee Resettlement Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration Refugee Integrated Services Provider Network Refugee Reception and Placement Program United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Security Council The United States The United States of America US Citizenship and Immigration Services US Refugee Admissions Program Voluntary Agencies

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Field Research in Arizona

It is true that, at least in the eyes of the public in the liberal democracies, the criterion regarding the morally reprehensible nature of the new enemy is satisfied in Iraq more clearly than in any other case since the American war against Hitler’s Germany and its allies. But in the ‘new wars’, in which a state or alliance of states is directly opposed to a network of non-state actors, one is literally talking of ‘perennial’ war that cannot be won by military means. Nor, given the lack of anyone empowered to sign the terms of surrender, can we imagine how it would be securely established that the war had actually come to an end. (Claus Offe, Reflections on America)

My first views in this book started to form while I was working in a branch of a non-governmental organization for refugees in a small city in Türkiye. As a social worker, I was serving refugees from Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan by providing information about their rights and obligations during their stay in Türkiye, the country of asylum. In my area of responsibility there was a large population of refugees from Iraq, and all they wanted was resettlement in a third country like America, Canada, or a European country and many of Iraqi refugees had an American dream. Iraqi refugees came to Türkiye due to various reasons like geographical proximity, social and cultural affiliations, and reunification with relatives or friends. Türkiye is the first haven where they stayed until their asylum application was finalized by the state authorities and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). During their “temporary” © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Deli, Iraqi Refugees in the United States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7_1

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stay in Türkiye, like many in different countries of asylum, including Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Middle East countries, all they wanted was to be resettled in a safe Western country. The first question that came to my mind was where these people were going and how they were living in the country they were going to, and especially whether their American dreams would come true. These were the initial reasons for my research plan, and I went into the details of the process by reviewing the literature on Iraqi refugees in post-resettlement countries, but while there is invaluable work on refugees in the United States, studies specifically on Iraqi refugees resettled in the United States were few. Against this background, this book explores the experiences of Iraqi refugees resettled in Arizona in the United States to contribute to the relevant literature. As far as I have been able to determine while working with refugees, many Iraqi refugees have been resettled in Arizona. For this reason, the main reasons for my research were that most of the Iraqi refugees I could come in contact with were in Arizona and that Arizona was close to Mexico as a border state which made it a special case for such an analysis. Although my research, which started with these initial findings, took place within the borders of Arizona, it makes to understand the whole post-resettlement process in depth. In this sense, I obtained the results of the in-depth interviews and surveys which I both conducted for one month in 2015 and analyzed all these findings with a multi-layered theoretical analysis to present the views and experiences of Iraqis while revealing views and work of the nonprofit sector and government agencies working with refugees. On 16 June 2015, I attended the third World Refugee Day celebrations at Catalina High School in Arizona. It was a modest conference room. There were not many participants. State representatives, a group of refugees, refugee support organizations, and volunteers were reading the words of the American poet Emma Lazarus, named New Colossus, on the screen: Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free/ The wretched refuse of your teeming shore/ Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me/I lift my lamp beside the golden door! (Rumens, 2012)

At the first glance, everyone seemed proud to share this atmosphere with the words on the screen. It was an emotional moment for some, and it was possible for me to feel the nationalist emphasis as the organizers

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focused on the fact that the United States (USA) opened a golden door for many who were rejected by their home country. In fact, she wrote this poem to show her concern that “the plight of Russian-Jewish exiles fleeing the pogroms informed the direction she took in this commissioned poem” (Rumens, 2012). This poem aims to show the vision of the USA as a “home” for those who have been “rejected” by their own country by promising a land of freedom. It was a definite fact that a large part of the audience also shared the same fate with Russian-­ Jewish exiles two centuries later. They had to leave their homes because of the risk of persecution for their religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and political views. The US “saved” them and now they were in Arizona as a group of “saved” and “selected” people; they were literally behind the golden door. This special day was crowned with the glorification of the generosity of the United States. Because America was the land of the free, the refugees were now free in their new home. Representatives of various communities, many family and community leaders underlined the importance of refugees” freedom in America. Afterwards, the event ended with a symbolic citizenship ceremony. Ten refugee children aged between 7 and 15 were standing on the stage. The children were of different nationalities, ethnicities, and religions. They had come to Arizona with their families. They all took the symbolic oath of citizenship and then approached the facilitator to obtain their symbolic citizenship certificates. Some said “God bless America” or “Thank you America” after receiving their certificates. It was quite interesting for me to see how American ideology symbolically worked at the World Refugee Day event. Future Americans were learning to express their gratitude to America at a very young age. They were encouraged to realize that they were allowed through the Golden Gate. The refugee children, immigrants, and non-Americans had to carry all moral and spiritual values and were expected to show their belonging to America where “huddled masses” could “breathe free”. Indeed, my observation reveals that it is common for the United States, as a country of immigrants, refugees, and displaced people, to ideologically see itself as a land of freedom and opportunities. It awaits to be glorified as a liberating country. It reproduces this by generating a series of moral, spiritual, and especially symbolic forces. At the very least, this symbolic ceremony shows that becoming an American citizen is merely the acceptance of American citizenship, that there is no room for any other

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allegiances, neither to the homeland nor to any other country.1 The next generation of immigrants and refugees must take on this great job of promoting and elevating America. This book aims to provide a holistic analysis of the experiences of Iraqi refugees before and after they pass through the “golden door” to explore the social reality behind this symbolic representation. Beyond the rhetoric of freedom and opportunity, a detailed understanding of the American refugee reception and admission system requires a demonstrable answer to the question of what happens to “tempest-tossed” Iraqis given their experience of forced migration. According to the statistical information obtained from the reports prepared by the Refugee Processing Center (RPC) which is operated by the US Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), the US has received 3,504,829 refugees from five different regions since the year of 1975. In the data officially going back to the year of 2001, the US has admitted 148,532 Iraqi refugees as of 28 February 2023 (RPC, 2023a). The state of Arizona which is the focus of this book is of great importance as a state hosting a large number of Iraqi refugees and for its proximity to the Mexican border. During the past decade, Arizona admitted 3559 Iraqi refugees as of 2022 and, in 2015, when this research was conducted, the state became the fourth to admit 655 Iraqi refugees after Texas, California, and Michigan (RPC, 2023b). Given the unique circumstances of Iraqi refugees, the significant increase in the number of refugees resettled in the United States between 2007 and 2009 should be underlined. The number of Iraqi refugees, which ranked first until 2011, lagged Burma and Bhutan refugee communities as of 2011. Between 2011 and 2013, the number of Iraqi refugees in the United States rose to the top again, and this trend continued until 2015, when the field of this study was also carried out (Martin, 2010; Martin & Yankay, 2012, 2014). Considering the general population of refugees, “seventy-four percent of refugees admitted to the United States in 2015 were under 35 years of age” and their median age at arrival was “23 years old” (Mossaad, 2016, p. 5). Looking at the statistical data of Iraqi refugees between 2006 and 2015  in general, I underline that the United States has received more than 250,000 refugees from the Near 1  The oath declares that American citizens support the Constitution and renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which the applicant was before a subject or citizen.

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East/South Asia region, and within this region, Iraqi refugees ranked first with the number of 126,000. The average age of refugees, especially Iraqi refugees, is the working age, so young and single refugees were given priority (Mossaad, 2016; Martin, 2010; Martin & Yankay, 2012, 2014). Although it is difficult to obtain official information on the ethnic and religious identities of Iraqi refugees, Connor from Pew Research Center highlights the fact that: “Nearly 425,000 Christian refugees entered the US over that period, accounting for 46% of all refugee arrivals between 2002 and 2017.” Besides, it is reportedly noted that “Arabic is now the most spoken language among newly admitted refugees” (Connor, 2017). Recognizing the difficulty of generalizing from these data, the fieldwork of this book focuses on the experiences of Christian, Muslim, and Ezidi Iraqis from different ethnic and religious identities. In addition, Iraqi refugees are urban, educated, and professional people from major cities such as Baghdad and Nineveh and have higher English proficiency compared to other refugee communities living in refugee camps, such as Bhutanese and Burmese refugees. Resettlement into a third country, such as the US, Canada, or European countries, is one of the most important solutions aimed at providing permanent residency and citizenship for Iraqi refugees as it is for all refugees. The resettlement process and humanitarian action are therefore interlinked with each other at different institutional levels. In a sense, humanitarian governance is a form of interaction among institutions, organizations, policies, and techniques. Through such an interaction, the function of the US refugee reception and admission program can be appropriately analyzed to demonstrate how it interacts with global and local processes. Since the socio-economic basis of humanitarian governance is formed by the US grounded on neoliberal requirements, such interaction necessarily takes place among state officials, resettlement agencies, and voluntary organizations in forming “a politics of refugee lives” to construct “New Americans.” In such a process of politics, Iraqi refugees, as New Americans, have adapted to their new lives under the supervision and guidance of institutions of humanitarian governance. Supervision and orientation for refugees are designed to eliminate “refugees’ dependence on the system” within a certain timeframe. Known as the self-sufficiency policy this policy does engage in neither vulnerability nor the profession of refugees but facilitates their incorporation in the labor market. In this regard, the US refugee reception and admission program presumes “a consequentialist

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ethic” and “competence assumption” for newly arrived refugees and “responsibilizes” them for their new lives. When Iraqi refugees undergo such a process of taking responsibility while motivating themselves to develop their competencies, skills, and survival strategies, they also begin to face difficult stages of integration, acculturation, assimilation, and transnationalism. This book reveals how Iraqi refugees in Arizona have developed their own acculturation strategies to adopt their language, culture, and identity while portraying future generations. As subjects of the first generation from the 1990s to the 2000s, they appear as New Americans in the way the US system has politically and discursively formed. Sometime after their arrival in the USA, they become subject to a policy of self-sufficiency as a workforce for the labor market, thus transforming literally from subject of forced migration to subject of economic immigration. Therefore, they appear as a subject of “socioeconomic sacrifice” for future generations. They envision their children as Iraqi Americans who are firmly committed to their own identity, religion, and culture while raising their social class in America. It also means they accept the impossibility of returning home, even though American citizenship means the freedom to travel to other countries. In other words, they do not see themselves as “transnational” subjects in their new lives. Analyzing the roles and policies of the “nonprofit sector” and “government officials” against the constructed positions of refugees such as clients, poor, disadvantaged, patients, and so on is the key to understanding both the boundary between humanitarian governance and poverty governance, and the weight of the social and economic conditions unique to Arizona. To this end, in this book I place the integration process at the center of this analysis, revealing two functional concepts in the quest to articulate the experiences of Iraqi refugees: The “Vicious Cycle of Refugee Integration” and the “Blind Spot of Refugee Integration.” The purpose of these concepts is to reveal that the refugee experiences that started with forced migration are directly related to the formation of humanitarian governance that determines the parameters of refugee integration in a destination country. In particular, the first generation involuntarily enters a vicious cycle in their pursuit of economic prosperity and survival, in order to create a good integration process for the next generations. In addition, the limited support of the system for refugees suffering from traumatic events during forced migration creates a blind spot in refugee integration. This design of refugee integration is more than a coincidence, it reflects the nature of humanitarian governance. In other words,

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the organization of humanitarian governance necessitates a “contested” governance on a global scale, logically interconnected in different parts of the world and working through states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (Betts, 2009; Barnett, 2013). In summary, today, the countries witnessing the forced migration of Syrian and Afghan refugees underline that it has turned into a “refugee crisis.” Especially after the Syrian crisis that started in 2011, the so-called refugee crisis has increased the sphere of influence of humanitarian governance. Refugees reaching asylum countries from Asian and African countries, have paralyzed the resettlement mechanism of humanitarian governance. In this process, where states have difficulty in producing response and strategies on their own, the support of many non-­ governmental organizations, nonprofit sector, and voluntary organizations ensures the continuity of humanitarian governance (Betts, 2009; Barnett, 2013). Therefore, for refugees, the experiences they have gained in both transit/asylum countries and destination/resettlement countries they aim to reach cannot be separated from the discourse and practices of humanitarian governance. On the other hand, the policies that need to be developed for the continuity of humanitarian governance and its survival as a mechanism are the subject of a separate study. However, this book, which examines the situation of refugees in the post-resettlement period, focuses on the experiences of Iraqi refugees and the role of institutions and civil society in Arizona, discussing in detail how humanitarian governance affects integration and assimilation policies and shapes the lives of refugees.

Methodology and Data Collection The field research providing the empirical data was conducted in 2015 in Phoenix, Tucson, Glendale, and Scottsdale in the state of Arizona. The book is mainly based on qualitative and quantitative research techniques. For obtaining quantitative data, survey research was conducted and, as Neuman (2007, pp. 167–8) states, I asked questions about “behavior,” “attitudes/beliefs/opinions,” “characteristics,” “expectations,” “selfclassification,” and “knowledge” in a questionnaire including “conceptualized and operationalized variables as questions.” My questionnaire consisted of forty-three questions: The first part of the questionnaire aims to find out their legal status, gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity, marital status, education level, and language proficiency level. The second part

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aims to measure the conditions and factors related to the host-country and state. Therefore, the questions were formulated to learn about their work, income, region, and education in Iraq. The last part of the survey aimed to reveal their situation, legal status, English proficiency, occupation, and first impressions about the USA immediately after their resettlement. I prepared my questionnaire in English and Arabic languages to ensure that the research process is understandable for the respondents. With the help of the Iraqi American Association for Peace and Friendship (IASPF) in Phoenix, I completed my survey of thirty Iraqi refugees, even though I wanted to reach more refugees. As Neuman points out (2007, pp.  170–171), the questions were free of jargon, slang, emotional language, prestige bias, double-barreled questions, leading questions, false premises, and beliefs as real, and so on. The questionnaire was formulated to measure social, economic, and educational variables at three levels: Personal or family characteristics, considering conditions in Iraq, and the USA. My survey of Iraqi refugees aimed to increase the quality of the analytical part of the research to lay the groundwork for in-depth interviews. Based on the survey results, I had the opportunity to test some of the basics for my research. Indeed, Neuman points to this framework which emphasizes the role of “focusing and sampling.” The first takes us to reflect on “a general picture” and then “focus on a few specific issues and issues” and the second “to focus their attention on different types of people (old timers and newcomers, old and young, men and women, leaders and followers)” to develop samples (2007, p. 296). In this sense, based on the results of the survey, I focused on creating a set of interviews that would strengthen my snowballing strategy through the respondents’ explanations; that would enable me to reach the refugees to be interviewed, and most importantly; that would directly reflect the main factors such as gender, length of stay, occupation, and education level in my analysis. In this context, I conducted in-depth interviews separately and respectively with resettlement agencies, non-governmental organizations, and Iraqi refugees to explore different aspects of the functioning of the nonprofit sector and experiences of refugees in the post-resettlement process. On this basis, it is important to underline that there were three field interviews regarding the qualitative structure of this research: “Unstructured,” “nondirective,” and “in-­ depth interviews.” The field interview always entails “asking questions, listening, expressing interest and recording what was said” and is also “a joint production of a researcher and a member. Members are active participants whose insights, feelings, and cooperation

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are essential parts of a discussion process that reveals subjective meanings” (Neuman, 2007, p. 296). My in-depth interview questionnaire consists of three separate texts. The first questionnaire contains forty-five questions, and I interviewed twenty-eight Iraqi refugees, and the interviews lasted between thirty minutes and three hours. During the interviews, I was assisted by an interpreter from Arabic to English. I should emphasize that the questions were formulated to measure the premises of the process by which Iraqi refugees decide to leave their country forcibly and stay in a country where they seek refuge. I also concentrated on the resettlement process, conditions, rights, and obligations in Arizona, highlighting access to public assistance, the labor market, health, education, and social and economic conditions and indicators. Finally, I ended my questions by focusing on social mobility and integration processes in the United States. Alongside this last part of the questions, I also focused on their internal and external relationships with Iraqis and American citizens, their perception of safety and security, marriage, and other personal relationships and inclusive or discriminatory forms of relations. On the other hand, I should also mention that I had the opportunity to visit the homes of some of the refugees to see their home life and to observe their daily life. The second questionnaire contains twenty-one questions. I interviewed the directors or associate directors of seven Arizona resettlement agencies, as well as four volunteer and professional (nonprofit) representatives in Arizona. The interviews lasted from one hour to three hours. I employed the questionnaire to measure the characteristics, roles, knowledge, and practices of resettlement agencies, voluntary and professional (nonprofit and non-governmental) organizations. This book’s main objective is to reach a successful map of all refugee organizations serving refugees in Arizona. Therefore, I have aimed to analyze these agencies and organizations’ rationale and approach to the refugee reception and admission program, refugee policies, principles, and norms as well as their understanding of the adaptation and integration process in Arizona. The third questionnaire consists of fifteen questions. I asked these questions to two government officials from the Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES). The interview lasted one hour and forty minutes. At this point, I utilized Neuman’s formulation of question types; “descriptive, structural and contrast questions” (2007, p. 298) in creating my interview questions to understand the refugees’ experiences, conditions, subjective meanings, and socio-economic variables in this sense. The

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questionnaire is designed in this understanding to elicit the authorities’ views on the Refugee Reception and Admission Program to fathom their roles in humanitarian action and governance. I also should note that, in order to retain the naturalness in the use of language and transmission, I have not altered the sentence structures or grammatical usage in the passages I have taken from the interviews unless absolutely required.

Interviews with the Iraqi Refugees I completed my survey with thirty Iraqi refugees of seventeen men and thirteen women. Twenty-two refugees expressed their religious belief in Islam, seven in Christianity, and one in Ezidi. The refugees were at the age range of twenty-four and seventy-two. Twenty-one participants had a high school degree, six participants with a higher education degree, and three with a primary school degree. Looking at the education levels of women and men, eight female participants had a high school degree, three with a higher education degree, and two with primary school degree. As to the males, thirteen male participants had a high school degree, three with a higher education degree, and one with a primary school degree. As to the marital status, although the large number of refugees is married according to the result of the survey, it is highly crucial to underline that their children are single, and mostly at education and working age. Regarding their social and economic background in Iraq, either they had their own business, or they worked as unskilled workers in the labor market. Many of them lived in the urban areas, mostly from Baghdad. The situation of women refugees was different; only two women worked in Iraq and other women engaged in household chores, even though their education levels were the same as the men. Given the professional status of the Iraqi refugees and their English proficiency in Arizona, nine of them, seven men and two women, had a good level of English and they were in the position to be able to find a better job while thirteen refugees had a poor level of English and thus had little chance of finding a better job than entry-level jobs. The number of the unemployed refugees was sixteen since either their language was poor or they looked for a different job. Twelve refugees were unemployed since their language competence was stated to be poor. Six of them had an entry-level job with their average or good level of English. Four refugees with both a university or high school degree and a good level of English competence had a job with a humanitarian organization which was

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different from the entry-level jobs. In fact, having a good level of education and English competence is decisive in finding a better or more qualified job in the US. The last important result of the survey was both the length of their stay in the United States and whether they were citizens or not. Only four refugees had citizenship status and others did not have, which means that the majority were residing less than five years in the legal terms. In this sense, being a citizen cannot only be evaluated in terms of either integration or assimilation, but it is important in terms of having a better level of English and participation in social and economic networks and relationships. On this basis, the results of the survey I conducted do not provide detailed information about Iraqis who have resided in Arizona for more than five years. However, one of the most important reasons for this is that the majority of the Iraqi refugees examined here were resettled in the United States after 2007. Based on a general profile I have drawn on Iraqi refugees so far, I conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-eight Iraqi refugees to discuss all aspects of their forced migration and resettlement processes in the cities of Phoenix, Tucson, Glendale, and Scottsdale in the state of Arizona. As Seidman (2006, p. 9) puts forward, “at the root of in-depth interviewing is an interest in understanding the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience.” In this sense, my aim during the in-depth interviews was to focus on the first-hand experiences of Iraqi refugees and to include their lived experiences in the process from their home country to Arizona. I conducted my interviews at the IASPF office and at the refugees” homes, and in cases where the refugees” English was not sufficient, I completed the interviews with the support of an interpreter for Arabic-English translation. The profiles of the interviewed refugees were similar to that of the surveyed ones in terms of their age, education, religious belief, social, and economic status. The refugees resettled in Arizona came from the different transit countries: Thirteen refugees from Türkiye, four from Jordan, two from Egypt, one from Syria, and three from other Arab countries. The reason why the number of the refugees from Türkiye is higher than others is because my gatekeepers from Türkiye living in Arizona supported me and this also facilitated my analysis including a comparison between pre- and post-resettlement processes. The refugees I interviewed were a mixed group of Iraqis from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The majority were of the Islamic faith,

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there were also Christians and Ezidi refugees respectively. Most of the refugees stated that they lived in the United States between two and seven years, and four people stated that they were unemployed and two people said they were not able to work due to their age and health. Among the interviewees, only two were primary school graduates and the rest were either high school or university graduates. Only ten people stated that their English level was good, and the interviewee refugees consisted of individuals between the ages of twenty-four and seventy-three, and only nine women refugees out of twenty-eight were interviewed.

Interviews with Government and Non-Profit Organizations In addition to the analysis of thirty surveys and twenty-eight in-depth interviews carried out with Iraqi refugees resettled in the state, this book also presents a comprehensive analysis of in-depth interviews with authorities and nonprofit organizations serving refugees in Arizona. I conducted eleven in-depth interviews which consisted of one state institution, five resettlement agencies, five non-governmental organizations, and one volunteer for resettlement agencies in Phoenix and Tucson. I interviewed two state officials from the refugee coordination unit of Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES) in Phoenix; one director and one manager from the resettlement agency, Catholic Charities Community Services (CC), in Tucson and Phoenix; two directors from the resettlement agency, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest (LSS-SW) with Refugee Focus Program in Tucson and Phoenix; one executive director and one coordinator from the resettlement agency, International Rescue Committee (IRC), in Phoenix; and one program director and one founding manager from the non-governmental organization, Iraqi-American Society for Peace and Friendship (IASPF), in Phoenix; and one representative from the non-­ governmental organization, La Frontera Center Inc., in Tucson; one director and one coordinator from the non-governmental organization, Tucson Refugee Ministry, in Tucson; and one representative from the non-governmental organization from Noor Women’s Association, in Tucson; and one director from the nongovernmental organization, Iskashitaa Refugee Network, in Tucson; and one volunteer, a PhD student at Arizona University, worked for the resettlement agencies for years in Tucson.

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It is important to underline that the interviewee resettlement agencies and non-governmental organizations constitute the nonprofit sector of the United States, on the other side the representatives of the resettlement agencies and non-governmental organizations identify themselves as faith-­ based organizations. The historical roots of nonprofits trace back to the appearance of faith-based organizations in the United States. From this angle, the history of the resettlement agencies is also embedded in this religious tradition, but also the agencies develop their resettlement programs over time as part of the rationale to help needy people in the community. Before going into detail, the legal status of the resettlement agencies deserves to be underlined how they are categorized due to their faith-based structure. The United States Internal Revenue Services (IRS) categorized churches and religious organizations as 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations which have tax exemption (IRS, 2023). Catholic Charities Community Services, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with Refugee Focus Program, and International Rescue Committee are nonprofit organizations under the code of 501(c)(3). In addition to the large number of faith-based organizations in the nonprofit sector in Arizona, another distinguishing feature of resettlement agencies among others is the way they work with the federal government by implementing both the refugee reception and placement program (RRP) and the Matching Grant Program (MGP) in “a cooperative agreement.” In this context, the Refugee Act of 1980 constitutes the founding background of these programs and determines its primary goal to make refugees self-sufficient in a shortest timeline (Refugee Act of 1980).

Research Ethics Ethical and confidentiality principles are the primary requirements of the study, as is the case with any study with vulnerable groups in social sciences. In this regard, Neuman (2007, p. 51) underlines the possible negative effects of social work on participants and states that: “Social research can harm a research participant in several ways: Physical, psychological, and legal harm, as well as to a person’s career, reputation, or income.” This is especially important when working with refugees, as they have already suffered physical, psychological, and legal harm and unfortunately have a traumatic past and vulnerability. Therefore, it is not easy to do research on this delicate subject and interview them, especially in resettlement countries. This difficulty may stem from various reasons such as

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security concerns, fear of deportation, and lack of trust or rapport with people outside their own networks. In this understanding, researcher might be someone from state institutions, intelligence service, and unknown organization and might pose risks against their legal status; researcher might be perceived as an outsider to their community and might not be culturally suitable to have interview with an outsider; researcher may be perceived as a potential trouble maker for their citizenship process and affect their residence in the US. Considering all conditions surrounding refugees” experience, it is quite ordinary for them to be thinking about these risks and more in this way. To eliminate all risks during the research, I have completed the ethics approval procedures for my research from the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Middle East Technical University where I advocated my doctoral dissertation. Having a professional background in working with refugees, I have also designed all research processes by preparing all documents and questionnaires with consent letters and informed consent in the mother tongue of respondents. In this sense, my surveys left out the possible harms underlined by Neuman (2007), “psychological harm, stress and loss of self-confidence.” Each question is basically based on “informed consent”; that is, the respondents were never forced to answer any questions they did not want to answer. In order to put all these ethical issues in writing, an information letter and a letter of consent were prepared and shared with the respondent refugees before each interview. I have clarified the design and purpose of the research for each respondent in the information letter. I have also provided information about the details of the in-depth interviews such as the number of questions, the expected duration of the interview, the voluntary nature of answering the questions and participating in the research, the use of the voice recorded with the respondent’s permission, and the concealment or disclosure of the names and identities of the respondents upon the participant’s written request. As Neuman (2007, p.  54) describes “informed consent” as “a fundamental ethical principle of social research: never force anyone to participate and participation must always be voluntary,” I used the letter of consent as an informed consent form to see whether they agreed to participate in the research or not after receiving the letters and whether they allowed their personal information and identity to be disclosed or not. I had my questionnaires, information, and consent letters translated into Arabic to ensure that all participating refugees clearly understood and

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provided consent to be interviewed in this research. I handed over a copy of the information and consent letters to each participant and explained all the details before the interviews. In accordance with the ethical principles of the research, I used pseudonyms for the refugees in the analysis of the research findings. I applied all similar ethical rules in my interviews with representatives of state institutions, resettlement agencies, and non-governmental organizations. In the analysis of the research findings, I used their positions and institution names while sharing their views and thoughts.

References Barnett, M. N. (2005, December). Humanitarianism transformed. Perspectives on Politics, 3(4), 723–740. Betts, A. (2009). Forced migration and global politics. Wiley-Blackwell. Connor, P. (2017). U.S. resettles fewer refugees, even as global number of displaced people grows break with past responses to global refugee surges. Retrieved November 19, 2017, from http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/12/ u-­s-­resettles-­fewer-­refugees-­even-­as-­global-­number-­of-­displaced-­people-­grows/ IRS. (2023). Exemption requirements—501(c)(3) organizations. Retrieved March 24, 2023, from https://www.irs.gov/charities-­non-­profits/charitable-­ organizations/exemption-­requirements-­501c3-­organizations Martin, D. C. (2010). Refugees and asylees: 2009. Annual Flow Report. Retrieved August 25, 2016, from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2009.pdf Martin, D. C., & Yankay, J. E. (2012). Refugees and asylees: 2011. Annual Flow Report. Retrieved August 25, 2016, from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2011.pdf Martin, D. C., & Yankay, J. E. (2014). Refugees and asylees: 2013. Annual Flow Report. Retrieved August 25, 2016, from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ default/files/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2013.pdf Mossaad, N. (2016). Refugees and asylees: 2015. Annual Flow Report. Retrieved July 3, 2017, from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ Refugees_Asylees_2015.pdf Neuman, W.  L. (2007). Basics of social research, qualitative and quantitative approaches. Pearson/Allyn and Bacon. Refugee Act of 1980. (2015). United States Refugee Act of 1980. Retrieved August 27, 2015, from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-­94/ pdf/STATUTE-­94-­Pg102.pdf RPC. (2023a). Refugee Admission Report as of February 28, 2023. Retrieved March 24, 2023, from https://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-­and-­arrivals/

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RPC. (2023b). Refugee Arrivals by State and Nationality as of 2022. Retrieved March 24, 2023, from https://www.wrapsnet.org/archives/ Rumens, C. (2012, June 4). Poem of the week: The new colossus by Emma Lazarus. Guardian. Retrieved January 16, 2016, from http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/jun/04/poem-­week-­new-­colossus-­emma-­lazarus Seidman, I. (2006). Interviewing as qualitative research, a guide for researchers in education and the social sciences. Teachers College Press.

CHAPTER 2

Forced Migration, Resettlement and Responsibilization in the Functioning of Humanitarian Governance

The concept of global governance, explained by Alexander Betts in the context of its relationship with forced migration, and the concept of humanitarian governance, discussed by Michael N. Barnett in the context of global governance, constitute an important ground for explaining the nature of refugee reception and admission systems. While Betts (2009, pp. 101–104) emphasizes the “complexity” in the definition of the concept of global governance, he points to the role of “multilateral institutions” that emerged after the Second World War and the increasing power of international institutions to influence the policies of states. However, considering the complexity of this process, he mentions that global governance focuses on “institutions/organizations” rather than states, and that it influences the behavior or identities of state and non-­state actors by either “constraining” or “constituting.” Global governance, which has become more prominent since the 1990s, points to the role of international institutions and organizations in regulation processes that transcend nation-states, and which becomes more related to forced migration in this period not only defines “the formal institutions” with the power to influence states, but also lays the groundwork for understanding the global governance of forced migration. The essential point is to go beyond “the abstract and formal institutions that exist at the global level which are explicitly labeled forced migration” to analyze the complex nature of the global governance of forced migration. In doing so, as he suggests, the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Deli, Iraqi Refugees in the United States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7_2

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impact of “formal and informal institutions on the politics of forced migration” can be taken into consideration (2009, p. 126). The United States forms her place in the global governance of forced migration through the enforcement of the Refugee Act of 1980. Considering the long history of immigration to America, the Act has set clear standards to the implementation of the process with three important pillars: Firstly, the Act introduces an “annual quota of 50,000” with the aim of centralizing refugee admissions. Secondly, the Act includes the United Nations definition of refugee based on race, religion, nationality, or membership in a social group or political movement; and lastly, the act contains the admission of “asylees”—“refugees who are already in the US” (Lee, 2006, p. 23). Referring to Betts’s argument on the constraining and constituting of the relationship between state and non-state actors, the United States has a constraining role on refugee resettlement agencies while at the same time having a constituting effect on their humanitarian identities. Brown and Scribner (2014, p. 101) indicate, the Refugee Act of 1980 established “political asylum in US law” that reinforced the relation between “resettlement agencies” and “the federal government.” The United States Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) expands such relationships to a wider network based on the interaction between the state and the nonprofit sector as well as international organizations. At this point the complexity of the global governance of forced migration appears in three priorities of the program, which also transcends the policies of nation states: First, the program proceeds the case of “individually referred refugees, put forward by UNHCR, US embassies, or designated NGOs, who can be identified in any country” and such method for resettlement into the US has become more effective later than the 2000s. The second is to include “specific groups…identified by the Department of State” in consultation with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), UNHCR, NGOs, or other experts. The last priority is to refer to “family reunification cases” (Van Selm, 2014, p. 515). The USRAP has been restructured according to historical changes over time. By the end of the Cold War, the Department of Homeland Security’s US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) started to conduct interviews with refugees of fifty different nationalities each year and managed the refugee resettlement process (PRM, 2016). The driving force behind this change is American foreign policy and the development of the relevant refugee policies and legislation. As Barnett (2013) points out, this

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process, which has begun to be associated with humanitarian action after World War II, was shaped by the anti-fascist movement. It is possible to find some themes that can be considered together with humanitarian governance in the roots of this anti-fascism. In a broad sense, humanitarian governance emerges as an organized effort to reduce human suffering and is not intrinsically good, emancipatory, or dominant (Barnett, 2013; Barnett & Duvall, 2005). The relationship between humanitarian governance and the refugee reception and admission program of the United States is embedded in legal developments in the light of American foreign policy. It is also important to grasp how the institutional and organizational network, which is put forward within the scope of global governance, operates in a complicated nature of international dynamics. The US admitted approximately 3.5 million refugees after the year of 1975. With the endorsement of the Refugee Act of 1980, its foreign policy has played a critical role in shaping the refugee reception and admission system. The purpose of the Act in title 1, which recognizes the refugee admission and assistance rule as “the historic policy of the United States,” clearly underlines “admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States” and demands a clear distinction between who comes from what circumstances and if there is any humanitarian concern for the consideration of the US. In Title 2, “appropriate consultation” is accepted by the law, provided that “reception of refugees” stems from “humanitarian concerns” or “grave humanitarian concerns” or “national interests.” More specifically, the US prioritizes “foreign policy interests” before determining her refugee policies (The Refugee Act of 1980). The Act appoints the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) as the agency responsible for managing refugee reception within the Department of Health and Human Services. The office works with other federal agencies to manage refugee admission and assistance to refugees. At this point, the law mainly sets out in Title 4 that the Office is responsible for providing resources for “employment training and resettlement to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as soon as possible”; “providing refugees with the opportunity to acquire sufficient English language” and “insuring that cash assistance is made available to refugees in such a manner as not to discourage their economic self-sufficiency” (The Refugee Act of 1980). With the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the control of illegal immigration and the security of the Mexican border

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gained importance (Daniels, 2001; Lee, 2006), security, and undocumented migration developed into the priority issues after the September 11 attack. Lee (2006, p.  26) explains the impact of such process on immigrants: The identification of a new immigrant threat and the solutions that followed borrow from and extend earlier gatekeeping efforts. In the search for the perpetrators, entire Middle Eastern and Muslim immigrant communities were vulnerable to blanket racialization as ‘terrorists,’ ‘potential terrorists,’ or accomplices and sympathizers.

Terrorism and national security as determining factors also had a significant impact on legal developments in the country. With the enactment of the USA Patriot Act on 26 October 2001, the military order and the president’s authority “to suspend the rule of law” on terrorism-related issues have expanded (Kaldor, 2014) and deeply affected the refugee reception and admission process which was filtered and cleared through security considerations. Refugees admitted to the US within the scope of the resettlement quota granted to the Middle East countries have begun to be subject to long-­term security investigations.

Neoliberalization of Humanitarian Governance The emergence of terrorism and national security issues as a foreign policy element and the fact that it affects refugees, that is, the carriers of forced migration among migrants, requires the “South” to be handled separately as a source of terrorism and conflict. In the sociological analysis of forced migration, “development” is presented as an important variable in the analytical framework proposed by Stephen Castles. With this variable, not only the developments at the national level but also “the global processes of social transformation” are pointed out and such transformation, which can be considered in the context of the separation of the North and the South, in a sense, forms the basis of the processes of social transformation underlying forced migration associated with results of uneven development. In this regard, the North imposes a strict policy of containment on the South while the South is discursively condemned to “a source of conflict, terrorism and instability” (Castles, 2003). In this context the global governance of forced migration must be distinguished from the humanitarian governance of forced migration, without dissolving the relationship

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of two processes. The former shows us how the state and non-­state actors work together and interact in the face of forced migration, thereby allowing us to understand the operating institutional and formal system. The latter enables us to consider how this system works in the face of reasons and consequences of forced migration, through the eyes of those who experience forced migration and leads us to a more micro-level analysis. The analysis of the category of power put forward by Alexander Betts, which can be handled together with the analysis of Castles, is significant in this manner. Before that, Barnett and Duvall’s definition of power plays a critical role in demonstrating the relationship between global governance and humanitarian governance. Barnett (2005, p.  2, 12) points out that “governance” involves “the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power” and adds that there are four forms of power: Compulsory power exists in the direct control by one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another. Institutional power exists in actors’ indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others. Structural power operates as the constitutive relations of a direct and specific, hence, mutually constituting, kind. And productive power works through diffuse constitutive relations to produce the situated subjectivities of actors.

In addition to such a power typology, Betts argues that “North–South power relations are not reducible simply to an assessment of military or economic strength but are also influenced by factors such as institutions and ideas, which may present both an opportunity or a constraint for actors that are traditionally thought of as ‘weaker’ actors in military or economic terms” (2009, p.  120) while pointing out the multifaceted nature of power relations. Considering Barnett’s power typology and Betts’s North–South power relations in the context of the relationship between US and Iraq, the US’s reception and admission program deserves to be evaluated by including all of these dynamics. This book proceeds on the argument that the refugee reception and admission system is an appropriate example of the operation of such a power typology associated with North–South tensions and the analysis of the linkage between global governance and humanitarian governance reveals the parameters of the global governance of forced migration and its consequences.

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Looking closely at the explanation of this typology, power first works in “interactions” and “social constitution” as well as emerges as an “attribute” that can be used to shape “the actions of others,” or it works through “social relations” and “constitute” actors as social beings with their interests and capacities. It is also important to demonstrate what kind of actors those social relations produce (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 9). In the decisiveness of power, it would not be incorrect to put forward that humanitarian governance works with such a power typology as a form of governance, as Barnett (2013) indicates, global governance grows into “global governance of humanity,” in a manner of speaking “humanitarian governance” which refers to: Humanitarian governance, in this view, adopts this broad theme of global governance but trains it on the specific goal of saving lives, reducing the suffering, and enhancing the welfare of the world’s most vulnerable and neglected population. (2013, p. 380)

In relation to the constraining and constituting effect of global governance on both state and non-state actors, humanitarian governance with “formal and informal institutional context” takes the form of a neoliberal hegemony through structural power in different capacities of individuals and communities, which “constrains some actors from recognizing their own domination” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, pp. 15–20). Then the essential purpose of structural and productive power is to form the lives of people after “saving” them. Keeping aside the idea that it is a purely positive concept, we can thus consider it in relation to “humanitarian intervention,” “humanitarianism,” and “role and responsibilities of state and non-state actors.” Firstly, the term refers to “the specific goal of saving lives, reducing suffering, and enhancing the welfare of the world’s most vulnerable and neglected populations.” Secondly, the term is “concerned with more than ‘cooperation’—it touches on matters of moral progress… humanizing the world.” Lastly, the role of non-state actors is emphasized by the study of humanitarian governance to show the extent to which NGOs can be active in humanitarian actions (Barnett, 2013, p.  381). Looking at these three interrelated features, the form of governance we find in the operation of the global governance of forced migration, which transcends the responsibilities and duties of the states, is crucial in grasping such power relationships in practice.

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Fassin underscores that humanitarian intervention as a “policy of nation-states” and “governments” is implemented by the hand of “para-­ governmental agencies” (2007, p. 58). Where humanitarian governance and global governance encounter each other, the question of whether humanitarianism, beyond alleviating people’s suffering, eliminates the conditions that cause these sufferings, makes us understand how “power” turns into a functional factor in the operation of humanitarian governance. In other words, as Barnett (2013) also indicates, humanitarianism which responds to needs of people without adequately focusing on the relevance of human rights requires scrutiny of power. One of the most important arguments at this point is to draw attention to the relationship between Fassin’s concept of “a politics of life” and the purpose of humanitarian governance. Fassin explains how MSF (Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors without Borders) worked to carry out humanitarian activities in Iraq by indicating the dichotomy between “lives to be saved” and “lives to be at risk” as part of a politics of life. Humanitarian intervention takes on a different meaning: It takes as its object the saving of individuals, which presupposes not only risking others but also making a selection of which existences it is possible or legitimate to save… it takes as its object the defense of causes, which presupposes not only leaving other causes aside but also producing public representations of the human beings to be defended. (2007, p. 508, 510)

Considering the institutional operation of humanitarian governance in the organization of the global governance of forced migration until the resettlement process is completed, the dichotomy as “lives to be at risk” and “lives to be saved” exists at every stage and the state and non-state actors impose intermingled power relations. The consequences of forced migration triggered by the social transformation caused by conflict, terror and war pave the way for a resettlement process, and this dichotomy thus takes the form of “lives to be resettled” and “lives to be rejected for resettlement.”

Refugees to Clients There is a large literature that examines the relationship between the North and the South within the scope of the consequences of forced migration and evaluates this analysis in terms of existing capitalist

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relations. Castles’s argument on the sociology of forced migration provides us with both a micro-level and a meso-level in understanding of humanitarian governance through an analysis of the ways in which power is exercised. Especially regarding the implications of structural and productive power, this approach plays an important role in shaping social, economic, and political conditions. Barnett (2013, p. 381) plainly explicates humanitarian governance as “the global project to shape lives, habits, dispositions, and institutions in order to improve the well-being of people.” The transformation of refugees’ lives in the post-resettlement process is part of this global project. As “clients” refugees take place within the refugee reception and admission program based on the logic of neoliberalism. This neoliberalism, as David Harvey underlines, indicates “strong individual private property rights,” “effectively functioning free market” and “competition” and underlines the fact that individuals have to take responsibility for their own lives in the neoliberal administration: While personal and individual freedom in the marketplace is guaranteed, each individual is held responsible and accountable for his or her own actions and well-being. This principle extends into the realms of welfare, education, health care, and even pensions…Individual success or failure are interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings… (2005, p. 65)

The functioning of the nonprofit sector in the United States, the role of civil society and the policies pursued by the government while providing these services point to a process in which the individual is held responsible in many areas from access to health to education. Following Lipsky’s (Lipsky, 2010, p. 6, 11) analysis of “street-level bureaucracies,” which take an active role in the delivery of public services, should be considered as a tool of this neoliberal operation due to its nature as “active governmental organizations” assign their responsibilities to some specific actors through a set of procedures and agreements to provide public services to disadvantaged groups, and “street-level bureaucrats” appear in the realm of public services as a mediator between “citizens” and “secure estates.” In this structure, citizens benefiting from public benefits are expected to exhibit “suitable attitudes” in return for the service they receive. The essential element in this relationship, which corresponds to neoliberalism’s strong and central conception of the individual, is to understand the social construction of a client. As Lipsky (2010, p. 59, italics in original) explains, “the processing of people in clients” is “a social process” in

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which people with different migration experiences, social and individual backgrounds are transformed and “learn to treat themselves as if they were categorical entities.” In its connection with the operation of humanitarian governance, it is evident that the US’s refugee reception and admission system is identical with the logic of the implementation of street-level bureaucracies. Regarding the situation of refugees, the nonprofit sector, resettlement agencies, civil society organizations, and state officials define them as poor, needy, unemployed, unqualified, or unskilled individuals and they concomitantly include them in the social process so that refugees are constructed as “clients” and are expected to develop “suitable attitudes” matching with public and specialized services they receive, thus pushing them to take responsibility for their own lives.

Paternalism and Responsibilization Barnett (2012b, pp.  486–7) describes humanitarian governance as a machine of intervention operating without taking into consideration the consent of individuals and it assumes that it offers “the best” to refugees to provide “care” and “control” concomitantly and exist with “the presence of paternalism.” With all these features, it emerges as a politics of refugee life. Under the overwhelming influence of the consequences of forced migration, all policies and assistance programs developed for refugees proceed through the logic of the nexus: “to be selected” and “to be saved,” by analogy with Fassin’s conception of a politics of life. Refugees are saved, selected, and settled in different states within the scope of the refugee resettlement program by the United States. In the post-resettlement process, resettlement agencies, philanthropic communities, civil society organizations that we can generalize as the nonprofit sector particularly plays a critical role, in suspending refugee identity, and recognizing them as clients who can benefit from the public services for a certain period of time. The functioning of this whole network manifestly includes the practice of care and control and is built within a paternalistic structure. The important question is whether a paternalistic operation always leads to good outcomes, even if it has the purpose of humanitarian action. The assumption here is that “the rightness of an action is determined by whether it helps to bring about a better outcome than its alternatives” (Barnett & Weiss, 2008, p.  44). Barnett discusses the ethical aspect of paternalism by pointing to “a forward-looking consequentialist ethic” as “intervening for the benefit of others” may not always be “true motives”

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or “serving the interests of the powerful” (Barnett, 2012b, p. 494). The “humanitarian intervention,” which forms the basis of this argument, is constructed by a structural force, especially when we consider the way in which assistance or support services are provided to refugees, regardless of refugees’ consent. To handle this discussion at a concrete level, it is important to analyze how the nonprofit sector serves refugees in a paternalistic manner. Lawrence M. Mead (1998, p. 98) underlines several “supervisory policies directed toward the poor and disadvantaged” while discussing the operation of paternalism. One of the most important issues leading to this discussion in Mead’s approach is that he shows “directive and supervisory means,” which are centralized for the solution of “social problems.” The point to be made here is that the “suitable attitudes” expected from individuals who are seen as “clients” in return for the service they receive is also included in Mead’s description of paternalism as follows: “Programs based on these policies help the needy but also require that they meet certain behavioral requirements, which the programs enforce through close supervision” (Mead, 1997, p. 2). The way the nonprofit sector of the United States provides services to resettled refugees, the details of which will be explained here, in a way envisages that refugees who are resettled will have suitable behaviors and establish their new lives under the guidance of the supervisory role of the nonprofit sector. Indeed, this process is essentially paternalistic and operates without applying to the consent of the refugees. Such a paternalistic practice should be differentiated from what Mead (1998, pp. 109–10) defines as “competence assumption” which basically “lies behind liberal measures to suppress discrimination, train the poor for better jobs, or reduce the financial disincentives when welfare recipients take jobs.” This assumption may not hold true for paternalistic programs, namely that assistance is not a right but is offered in exchange for good behavior. Thus, paternalism offers “a combination of aid and structure that they seem to need.” It is a fact that the U.S. refugee reception and admission program is paternalistic and is also designed to prevent refugee poverty, so the supervisory role is actively involved. However, such a program does not operate on the assumption of competence, but that refugees are expected to enter the labor market quickly and work in proposed entry-level jobs. From this point of view, it is a system in which a combination of aid and structure is offered together to form the policy of self-sufficiency.

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At this juncture, “responsibilization” is the stage at which the supervisory policies developed for refugees, the poor and other needy individuals crystallize in relation to paternalistic programs. Responsibilization works with supervisory policies for the poor and refugees to make them selfsufficient. In the most succinct terms, Nikolas Rose (2000, pp. 324–325) explains such a process in the context of its relationship to control: Individuals are encouraged to “control” their own lives through the various options, chances, and alternatives offered through institutions and actors in the system and links the “dispersed” and “non-hierarchical” nature of control to how individuals are “obliged to be prudent, responsible for their own destinies.” Given the functioning of humanitarian governance in the United States, the themes I have underlined such as control, structural power, and the politics of refugee lives become more prominent. Control and power mechanisms to which refugees are subject appear at every stage of the forced migration. For example, a refugee leaving Iraq to seek asylum in a transit country first determines her life under the authority of the control and power of the state, international organizations, and local institutions in the transit (asylum) country. If she is accepted to a resettlement country from a transit country, she has to shape her new life in line with the supervision of different control and power mechanisms offering assistance in the post-resettlement process. In this sense a politics of refugee life is formed by the power of supervisory policies for a rapid self-sufficiency. In this sense, it is an important finding that the control that Rose draws is dispersed and operates without being hierarchical. The fact that control is not hierarchical does not mean that humanitarian governance is non-­ hierarchical. The way in which institutions of humanitarian governance are organized is decisive and, as Barnett (2013, p. 388) often points out, these are “well-established hierarchies.” In a way, this is necessary for the full functioning of the broad network of control that affects refugees and citizens receiving assistance, who are expected to quickly become self-sufficient. The U.S. refugee reception and admission program handles the process of responsibilization through the involvement of resettlement agencies, civil society organizations, professionals, experts, volunteers, and faithbased initiatives. It is precisely at this point that it becomes possible to understand the liberal nature of human governance in the way Rose explains: “The collective logics of community come into alliance with the ethos of individual autonomy characteristic of advanced forms of

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liberalism: choice, personal responsibility…etc.” (2000, p. 329). The process that refugees experience within the United States’ refugee reception and admission system can be fully understood through the choice and personal responsibility highlighted by Rose. As refugees make their choices among the alternatives offered to them, they also experience that they have to construct a process in which they take responsibility for their own lives. Therefore, we should point out that the first experience of all refugees, including Iraqi refugees, is the process of responsibilization implemented by humanitarian governance. This liberal operation of the system proceeds through “the power of experts” and “the authority of truth” (Rose, 1993, p. 297). The purpose here can be summarized as follows: The aim is, once more, responsibilization: to reconstruct self-reliance in those who are excluded. But responsibilization here takes a characteristic form. Within this new politics of conduct, the problems of problematic persons are reformulated as moral and ethical problems, that is to say, problems in the ways in which such persons understand and conduct themselves and their existence. (Rose, 2000, p. 334)

The U.S. Refugee Resettlement System: Government and Non-Profits The function and role of resettlement agencies reveals the refugee reception and admission system of the United States operates in the neoliberal context of humanitarian governance in line with self-sufficiency policy and responsibilization of refugees upon their arrival. The refugee reception and admission system bears two main characteristics of humanitarian governance; on the one hand humanitarianism emerges of the efforts “to reduce suffering of the oppressed” (Barnett, 2013) on the other hand humanitarian intervention may be delegated to “para-governmental organizations” in the logic of humanitarian governance (Fassin, 2007). At this point, the United States Department of State provides funds to resettlement agencies for the implementation of humanitarian policies such as helping refugees start their new lives in Arizona and placing them in entrylevel jobs. No doubt, the authorities aim to make refugees responsible for their own lives for an efficient management of refugee resettlement programs at the local level and monitor how such an implementation operates in the field. In Arizona, the official of Arizona Department of Economic

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Security I interviewed explain how the system is officially linked to the function of the resettlement agencies: Initially they get resettled through the reception and placement program called RPP. That program also is operated under contract we call to cooperate by the US Department of State with nine US non-governmental agencies that they have networks across the US so those resettlement agencies that you met with in Tucson are affiliated with one of the nine national organizations that works under cooperative agreement with the US Department of State during that period they are providing them with some very essential basic services including housing and food, clothing, orientation, they help kids register for school, they help them have Social Security card, they help them apply for public benefit programs to which they are titled, they help them to get there screenings health screenings here a number of basic services that all of that information is available at different sites…

The officials from the Arizona Department of Economic Security manifest the fact that the resettlement agencies play a critical role in welcoming and assisting refugees to meet their initial needs and to get them access to the basic rights and social services in Arizona. It is a clear situation the officials underline that the refugee reception and admission system stand on the shoulders of resettlement agencies and non-governmental organizations as well as community sources. Indeed, both the government officials and resettlement agencies act with humanitarian concerns to help refugees for their new life, but this fact does not eliminate the operational logic of humanitarian governance as part of the neoliberal organization of the system, which also draws the limits of humanitarianism. The interviewee, U/32m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson touches upon this aspect in the following words: I guess that the governments do not want to support everything in social services by the 1980s and especially, the state has started to abdicate its assistance in the framework of neo-liberal policies with the appearance of church-based organization supporting people in need. It was put in such abdication of the state that the state has begun to share the burden of social services with such organizations by providing a grant.

Based on this argument, the Department of State does not undertake a direct responsibility for the implementation of the refugee resettlement program at the local level rather establishes a sort of business relation with

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nine resettlement agencies for the implementation of assistance programs for refugees. In this regard, the United States maintains the so-called “humanitarian intervention” in the operation of “humanitarian governance” by cooperating with non-governmental organizations. This exists at the local and global level as part of the similar rationale referring to Barnett’s (2013) argument about efforts to create “more humanized environment with the active participation of non-governmental organizations.” Nevertheless, a critical grasp of humanitarian governance manifests that it is not only related to the effort to alleviate the suffering of people but also is linked to the formation of “a global project to shape lives, habits, dispositions and institutions in order to improve the well-being of people” (2013). As a local echo of these global processes, American authorities formulate the components of the refugee reception and admission program to shape refugees’ lives and habits and target a smooth fabrication of future American citizens and/or Americans who are expected to act in harmony with American values. For this purpose, the system disciplines refugees by initially incorporating them into the labor market to encourage self-­ sufficient individuals as “good new cases” for the system in the shortest period. David Haines (2010, p. 142) underscores this point by emphasizing by the category of “good new case,” meaning that “whether because of youth, English competence, education or economic skills, helps show that refugees are not only the dispossessed but deserving of a new life.” The system is mainly designed to contribute to the environment in which “good cases” may survive and expect refugees to be good new cases in improving their skills and competencies. On the contrary, Haines (2010, p. 142) underscores that “any difficult new case, whether because of age, health, education, or socioeconomic background, is a potential threat to the success of the resettlement program.” Being a good case implies both the quality of integration in the United States without taking into account background, reasons for flight, social and cultural differences and keeping away from being “a potential threat” to the resettlement program. One thing is clear that refugees remain obligated to advance their skills and competencies while working in the United States. Resettlement agencies, nonprofit organizations, and volunteers serve them only to realize this ultimate purpose. This last situation also allows us to understand the limits of humanitarian action, which takes the form of power and governance. As indicated previously, the exercise of power by humanitarian actors is associated with the existence of various actors, strategies,

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capacities, and resources. Even if the visibility of power is subtle in humanitarian governance as Barnett indicates (2013), the US reception and placement system is part of global governance as the Department of State and refugee resettlement agencies impose power in different capacities. In analyzing how the resettlement system generates good cases in the US, the function of “institutional power” deserves to be accentuated with reference to the role and responsibilities of resettlement agencies. As Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 15) explain: The conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constraints, the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even unknowingly.

At this juncture, in my analysis, while A refers to the Department of State that is a formal institution, B corresponds to resettlement agencies that are formal or informal institutions. Moreover, their relationship is of the fact that A works with B agencies in procedures, rules, and projections. More concretely, institutional power regulates “cooperative agreement”1 between the Department of State and resettlement agencies. It is important to underline here that the volume of power in this relation is not necessarily repressive. The relationship unfolds itself through a set of “institutional arrangements” like “decisional rules, formalize lines of responsibility.” Therefore, it is not possible to speak of the direct effect of A on B in practicing power, but such a relation embodies “socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 16). Moreover, institutional arrangements are at the core of this relationship since states also intend to take the responsibility to produce effective outcomes in the resettlement system. In another saying states are 1  “The Department of State has cooperative agreements with nine domestic resettlement agencies to resettle refugees. While some of the agencies have religious affiliations, they are not allowed to proselytize. The standard cooperative agreement between the Department of State and each of the domestic resettlement agencies specifies the services that the agency must provide to each refugee. Altogether, the nine domestic resettlement agencies place refugees in about 190 communities throughout the United States. Each agency headquarters maintains contact with its local affiliated agencies to monitor the resources (e.g., interpreters who speak various languages, the size and special features of available housing, the availability of schools with special services, medical care, English classes, employment services, etc.) that each affiliate’s community can offer” (Department of State, 2017).

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open to institutionally diffused relations and the role of resettlement agencies, non-governmental organizations, and charity organizations represents the “socially extended” character of the refugee resettlement process. Such process can also be acknowledged through the following words of the state official of the Refugee Coordination of the Arizona Department of Economic Security: The US Department of State has a particular role that was not initially included in the law but the Department of Health and Human Services, the refugee resettlement officer oversees the domestic programs, states may opt for the program. We can participate, we don’t have to, states don’t have to participate in the US refugee program. If we do, we have to develop a state plan. We do first we are responsible for coordinating public and private resources in refugee resettlement, the law says we have the responsibility and the authority, okay, so in the law the state coordinators have the authority to coordinate resources for refugee resettlement.

The state official clearly explains that their power is not direct, but in a sense, their institutional existence refers to the authority so that they mobilize all sources to increase the efficiency of the resettlement program. When they participate in the domestic programs for refugee resettlement, they also determine their institutional position between the Department of State and resettlement agencies. The Arizona Department of Economic Security and resettlement agencies bring the plight of refugees to the attention of the American community. At this juncture, the role and responsibilities of resettlement agencies begin and take the form of productive power. As Barnett and Duvall (2005, p.  20) put forward, productive power is “the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope.” Putting aside the efficiency of productive power the refugee resettlement agencies impose, I point out the fact that productive power makes one understand “the boundaries of all social identity” emerging out of “binaries or hierarchical relationships” as indicated by Barnett and Duval. At this point, the resettlement agencies play a critical role in producing the discursive production of refugee resettlement matter. Considering this last point, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which is operating in Arizona as well, state that:

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The United States is a country of immigrants with a long, proud history of welcoming and supporting the most vulnerable people to rebuild their lives in America. Let us know live up to that tradition and meet all our neighbors with kindness and compassion. (IRC, 2016)

The emphasis here is primarily on the fact that America has an identity as a country of immigrants. The call for Americans to help refugees is expressed by attributing to a tradition of compassion and kindness. The Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest (LSS-SW) with refugee focus program from Arizona states that Since 1975, LSS-SW has served some of the world’s most persecuted people living right here in Tucson and Phoenix. Violence and armed conflict chase millions of people from their homes, their families, and their countries, forcing them to seek safety in other countries around the world. Learn more about refugees coming to Arizona here. Honoring a proud identity as a nation of immigrants, the United States has welcomed refugees and asylees throughout its history. Every year, the President and the State Department identify global regions in which people have an exceptional need for protection outside of their home countries. These refugees and asylees are then invited to resettle in the ‘land of opportunity,’ in a nation that cherishes the value of uplifting the oppressed. (LSS-SW, 2023)

Similarly, these calls for help are to mobilize the public and remarks on the New American identity. The Catholic Charities Community Services (CC) from Phoenix in Arizona explains that Catholic Charities Community Services has been welcoming and resettling refugees in Arizona from all parts of the world since 1975. As a national leader in refugee resettlement, our team of staff and volunteers work together to provide a welcoming and supportive network to help refugees who are new to our country quickly gain independence and become productive members of their new community. (CC, 2023)

The purpose of this tradition is to help those in need in a spirit of solidarity, while building a process that will accelerate their integration into society, in other words, make them productive members of American society. In this sense, the nonprofit sector that serves the common good or public good plays a complementary role in line with the purpose stipulated by the state.

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Because they are more constructive in the community, nonprofits, especially faith-­based agencies, often accentuate their history of “welcoming those who are in need” and the resettlement agencies as part of the nonprofit sector construct their own discursive practices around “help, support, new Americans, new lives…etc.” No doubt, as Adler and Bernstein (2005) indicate, “power’s productive capacity” is to “fix meanings which are necessary for global governance” through formal and informal institutions. It is not incorrect to put forward that the resettlement agencies fix meanings to mobilize local communities to support the process by which “new Americans” can easily become “productive members of their new communities.” Back to the categories of institutional power and productive power at this point, the form of discursive construction of new Americans grows out of the faith-based tradition of the American society and such a tradition itself is not independent of power categories regarding the organization of the refugee resettlement program whose roots are in the neoliberal form of American foreign policy. Therefore, the resettlement agencies as (international) non-governmental organizations act in the scope of humanitarian governance as representatives of the American power, which expands at institutional and structural levels as Adler and Bernstein (2005, p. 299) point out: American power begins with social science discourse and knowledge generated in an American epistemic context, and continues with its application in practice, mainly through economics and business administration and their embeddedness in international organizations, and tacit acceptance by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors. Thus, US power depends on the diffusion of a global governance episteme, which, to be effective, must take the appearance of being scientific, technical, and universal.

Cooperative Agreement: Refugee Reception and Placement Program and Matching Grant Program The importance of the presence of the non-governmental sector in the United States, which plays an active role in the delivery of public services to the poor and vulnerable groups, is obvious. Considering the critical responsibility of the resettlement agencies in such a sector, it is necessary to underscore a few important points with reference to Salamon (2012,

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p. 6, 11) that there is a strong presence of the nonprofit sector in the US, which “consists of a broad range of private organizations that are generally exempt from federal, as well as state and local, taxation on the ground that they serve some public purpose” and that the revenue sources of the nonprofit sector come from “fees, governments, and philanthropy (individuals, foundations, and corporations). Fees account for 52%, government for 38%, and philanthropy for 10%.” The financial support of the government is very decisive in the relationship of resettlement agencies with refugee reception programs with the federal state although there are revenue sources for nonprofits. The power relationship between the state and resettlement agencies is shaped by a cooperative agreement. It is an agreement that sets both institutional and structural boundaries. The Department of State works with the resettlement agencies in the cooperative agreement which the program coordinator of the Catholic Charities Community Services defines: Cooperative agreement is the outline of reception and replacement service. Resettlement agency must provide for refugees. You have to do it. Know your way, design, and request by the cooperative agreement we call that core service.

Unlike other agencies in the nonprofit sector, resettlement agencies are committed to provide several specific services to refugees, which are obligatory and which include that “refugees are met by someone from the local resettlement affiliate or a family member or friend. They are taken to their initial housing, which has essential furnishings, appropriate food, and other basic necessities” in a culturally appropriate way (Department of State, 2023). The resettlement agencies spend the money to meet the needs of refugees under the provision of the program according to the cooperative agreement. The program supervisor from Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus program in Tucson explains that: Only ten agencies within the US are really able to contract with the federal government to be able to receive refugees; each one of us, a national agency, has a legal federal contract that PRM approved to be able to legally resettle refugees.

Within this legal framework, the resettlement agencies implement two main programs for refugees arriving in America: “The reception and

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placement program” and “matching grant program.” In addition, it is also worth noting that the refugee resettlement program contains “refugee cash assistance (RCA),” “refugee medical assistance (RMA),” “refugee health promotion,” “English language training,” “unaccompanied refugee minors (URM),” “case management and employment services,” “refugee school impact program,” and “AmeriCorps VISTA project” (DES, 2017). The common rationality behind this program and the system is that it assumes to serve the best interests of refugees. In this respect, it is a question mark to what extent refugees can benefit from these services. This is also a feature of the intrusive aspect of humanitarian governance, as presented by Barnett (2012b, 2013) because there is no humanitarian intervention in the determination or delivery of services, driven by the will or consent of refugees. Refugees are “victims” of forced migration, saved by humanitarian intervention, and the system shapes their new lives in America as a form of a politics of refugee lives. They are expected to integrate into their lives with the assistance of experts and volunteers they encounter in receiving the designed public services. While this operation in the field is practically regulatory, it also requires the resettlement agencies to remain culturally and politically neutral while delivering designated services, as the fieldwork of this book demonstrates. Looking at the legal basis of the implemented refugee support programs, it is possible to see the cornerstones of this regulatory structure. The Refugee Act of 1980 and the Immigration and Nationality Act are the essential legal texts that determine the conditions and considerations of all support services offered to refugees while giving prominence to the policy of self-sufficiency. In this regard, Act 412-Authorization for programs for domestic resettlement of and assistance to refugees regulates that: (a) Conditions and Considerations: (i)(A) make available sufficient resources for employment training and placement in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as quickly as possible, (ii) provide refugees with the opportunity to acquire sufficient English language training to enable them to become effectively resettled as quickly as possible, (iii) insure that cash assistance is made available to refugees in such a manner as not to discourage their economic self-sufficiency, in accordance with subsection (e)(2), and (iv) insure that women have the same opportunities as men to participate in training and instruction. (B) It is the intent of Congress that in providing refugee assistance under this section- (i) employable refugees should be placed on jobs as soon as possible after

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their arrival in the United States; (ii) social service funds should be focused on employment-related services, English-as-a-second-language training (in non-work hours where possible), and case-management services; and (iii) local voluntary agency activities should be conducted in close cooperation and advance consultation with State and local governments. (ORR, 2022) The backbone of the legal regulation is the “self-sufficiency” policy, which also forms the practice of responsibilization of refugees. In this sense, all training, including English language training, exists for the implementation of the self-sufficiency policy and necessitates an effective and fast resettlement process through the hand of resettlement agencies and voluntary organizations. While the emphasis of the law on women refugees is important, how it works in practice for women and men refugees, especially when considered together with the issues listed in Article B of the law, is also among the problematic areas analyzed by this book. In a sense, all conditions and considerations laid down in the law are compatible with the requirements of the neoliberal organization of humanitarian governance since self-sufficiency as part of this process prioritizes the needs of the system rather than that of newly arrived refugees. The responsibility of the resettlement agencies within the border of cooperative agreement is to implement the policy of self-sufficiency motioned through refugee support programs funded by the government. My interviews with the representatives of the resettlement agencies reveal this fact by pointing out how the resettlement agencies disregard the root causes of human suffering while aiming to reduce it. To clarify the function of resettlement agencies, the following explanation by the director of the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus program in Phoenix can be accentuated: Refugee Focus is a division of Lutheran Social Services. We have offices in Tucson and Phoenix. The program is mostly funded by the federal government. Federal funds, some of which come through the State office of refugee resettlement… and we do a lot of private funds and support for resettlement through churches and individuals here in Tucson and Phoenix. Our organization has several programs for the homeless, elderly, and disabled populations… One of those programs is refugee focus for refugees. We started to resettle refugees here in 1980. It was mostly refugees from South-east Asia. Now, the program has evolved over the years in very diverse sides of resettlement. We have 35 full-time staff…

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From this point of view, the program basically serves vulnerable persons or groups with funds received from the government to conduct refugee assistance programs as well as to attract the public’s attention to help refugees. Regarding their long-lasting presence in serving refugees, their function is an essential part of the refugee reception and admission system in the United States. Agencies take all necessary steps from the beginning to prepare a welcoming environment for the newly arrived refugees and the director highlights this specific function below: We prepare the cases before they arrive of course. You know we get bio-­ sheets from the US Department of State. We prepare the apartments, maybe sometimes with assistance through church groups or whatever.

As part of the coordinated mechanism of the refugee reception and admission system, the resettlement agencies take all steps settled by the government as indicated in the following words: “The standard cooperative agreement between the Department of State and each of the domestic resettlement agencies specifies the services that the agency must provide to each refugee” (Department of State, 2017). The nature of the main function of the resettlement agencies in a regulative humanitarian action is to perform refugee assistance programs, namely “the reception and placement program” and “matching grant program.” The limits of the programs drawn by the cooperative agreement serve the neoliberal needs of the system as well. As nonprofit organizations, the resettlement agencies do not move beyond the main objectives of these programs even if they target more since the agencies are also expected to act like a business corporation and their budget is strictly limited with determined objectives. In my analysis of humanitarianism that organizes actions to alleviate the suffering of refugees, the agencies as humanitarian organizations are placed in their own places as “bureaucratized” structures, “specialized knowledge,” “standardized responses” and “means-ends calculations,” and so on. In fact, this is the “institutionalization” of the humanitarian field that was initiated in the 1990s and that has become “more recognized as a field, with more donors, deliverers, and regulators of a growing sphere of action” (Barnett, 2005, p. 725). Following the logic of the institutionalization of the humanitarian field, it is possible to speak of resettlement agencies as bureaucratic and well-­ structured organizations that work with specialized knowledge and means-­ goal calculations. It offers a unique example of regulatory humanitarianism

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in this sense, especially in the case of the USA.  The Director from the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus in Tucson explains how the responsibility of the agencies begins and has its contractual limits in the following manner: Our responsibility is to administer all the contractual agreements to resettle refugees. We have several different contracts from the federal state and the resettlement and placement contract actually lasts for 90 days so we have that responsibility for somebody for 90 days… We have a third contract which is a matching grant which is really focused on employment… 70 % of our clients get into a matching grant program which is an early employment program, that is 180 days, and that is really a strong push to be able to get somebody a job.

The institutional rationale of the resettlement agencies is based on the cooperative agreement and the consent of refugees does not represent a constitutive component of such institutionalization. Therefore, the director’s emphasis on the rapid incorporation of refugees into the labor market sets the limit for the assistance programs at 90 and 180 days, respectively. Along with the necessity for rapid inclusion of refugees in the labor market, “rationalization” in humanitarian assistance deserves to be highlighted at this juncture. Barnett explains such rationalization in the way that “a major feature of the field’s (humanitarianism) rationalization is the attempt to standardize relief activities” (2005, p. 729, parenthesis added). For this purpose, the resettlement agencies, which are expected to be accountable,2 are expected to provide the services determined in the field by taking this burden off the state. This process necessitates a neoliberal rationalization as Barnett (2005, p. 730) underlines in the following way: “One of neo-liberalism’s goals was to reduce the state’s role in the delivery of public services and, instead, to rely on commercial and voluntary organizations, which were viewed as more efficient.” Having a well-structured, bureaucratic, and rationalized agenda to incorporate all refugees into the labor market, the resettlement agencies function as street-level organizations since they offer all services in the 2  For example, when we look at an audit report prepared by the US Department of State, the Office of Inspector General promulgates to review the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service’s Reception and Placement Program in general if they comply with the federal laws and regulations concerning the terms and conditions of the agreements and the Office of Inspector General opens a separate chapter called accountability (OIG, 2005).

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logic of humanitarianism for clients and employ “street-level bureaucrats” and “street-level bureaucracies” in this operation. To recall swiftly what it means for my analysis, the former point to “public service workers” that bring public services to citizen or socially-economically vulnerable groups so that the latter demonstrates the structure consisted of those bureaucrats serving to people in different expertise areas. Moreover, as we know, street-level organizations play an important role in mediating the relationship between the state and citizens (Lipsky, 2010). Although my analysis deals with the refugee programs of resettlement agencies, I should point out that such agencies work in a wider network in terms of providing public services to persons in need. This also allows us to consider them within the operation of street-level organizations. The program coordinator for Catholic Charities Community Services in Phoenix explains how this process spreads over a wide network as follows: Catholic Charities refugee programs is part of a larger social service agency, so, the refugee program is actually one of about 23 different programs or agencies that we are not a stand-alone organization that just specifies in refugee settlement which is good and bad to them. We have been resettling refugees in 1975 before the refugee act is even established and so we have a long-standing history of resettling refugees in Phoenix on we typically take on about 500–550 refugee a year and we also have the terms of unique programs we had unaccompanied minor program were the only agency in state that has the refugee unaccompanied minor programs that were also resettling minors that are coming without biological parents…

The same is true for other resettlement agencies in Arizona. Refugee resettlement is one of the programs they run. An overview of the function of their role allows us to analyze the situation of refugees as beneficiaries for their long-term resettlement in the US. They will be included in a well-­ structured form of service for refugees, regardless of their economic or educational status. There is no room for extra demands and expectations. In the design of this system, refugees as right-holders are entitled to receive public services provided by nonprofits. The obstacles that may arise in this process are indicated by Lipsky (2010, pp.  25–26), to it briefly, “inadequacy of resources,” increasing “demand for services,” “goal expectations for the agencies,” and “non-­ voluntariness of clients.” In many aspects, the resettlement agencies also suffer from these obstacles while offering their services to refugees.

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However, regarding the scope of the cooperative agreement and their position against the state, the agencies justify their responsibility to meet refugees’ basic needs. The program coordinator from Catholic Charities Community Services in Phoenix highlights some important difficulties in this regard: The refugee act hasn’t been updated since 1980. The same policy in effect for 30 years that supposed to apply to all refugees, and one of the things that can be a challenge is that you know economic background isn’t effective for resettlement so you could have a refugee that say never used refrigerator and then you can ever be refugee who is with master’s degree, and it is the same services.

The Refugee Act of 1980, which has been in force for thirty years now, has not been amended according to recent needs and gaps that refugees encounter. It creates an egalitarian basis in terms of providing the same conditions for all arriving refugees. At the same time, considering the current conditions and the needs of refugees, the amendment of the act is seen as a need, albeit implicitly, by the refugee agencies. However, this remains a secondary issue. The main purpose of the resettlement reception and admission program must be clear to refugees. At this point, the humanitarian nature of the program, which is also essential, is highlighted in line with such a main purpose. To make this point clear, the program coordinator adds that: Making sure that they understand the goal of the refugee program, and this is a very difficult goal to explain to people because the US resettlement program as it stands right now is treated as a purely humanitarian program. The goal of the program is to provide protection to those who have no other option, so it’s not designed as something that’s going to give you a pathway to a better education or better economic situation and I’ll get into that if necessary. This is okay.

The ultimate “goal” that explains why refugees are resettled in America emerges as a requirement of the humanitarian program. Within this approach, it is the message given to refugees that the American Dream is not presented as a world of accessible opportunities, but a process has begun in which the steps required to become loyal and productive American citizens must be taken. The essential point here is the necessity for refugees to abandon unrealistic expectations and to obtain information

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that the services provided by the state through resettlement agencies are limited and temporary. This humanitarian process, whose borders are obvious and framed by temporary services, does not prevent structural problems, but is a manifestation of the neoliberal mechanism of regulating the field of refugee resettlement. The director from the Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest, which has been running the refugee focus program in Phoenix for many years, explains this situation as follows: The main challenge is certainly employment because it is always changing, it goes up and down. There has been slow but gradual steady improvement in the economy here over the past eight years. I mean you know eight years ago; it was hard, very very difficult to get jobs. Now it is easier. But it is always a challenge. Most of the jobs are unfortunately entry-level jobs and it is not because some of the refugees come with a lot of skills, language abilities so forth, they have no record of working here so they have to get started in mostly entry-level jobs. Iraqis in particular have a lot of work experience, a lot of skills, a lot speak English very well but a lot of them have started in entry-level jobs. I know that is frustrating. I really understand that. We try to get other people in the community involved to get a better quality of jobs, but that is difficult.

At this juncture, the most important structural problem in the refugee reception and placement system is the nature of employment. Especially considering the social and economic conditions of Iraqi refugees in their own countries, it is a huge handicap for them to start at the bottom of social and economic mobility in America. Therefore, this structural problem, that is, starting a new life by working in entry-level jobs, carries the risk of turning into a process in which the traumas suffered by refugees become deprioritized and invisible. In this way, the system shapes the services it will offer without recognizing the existence of such a risk at the policy level. With reference to Lipsky’s argument on “decentralized service provision” through “contracting with non-profit organizations” (2010), the resettlement agencies provide services identified in “a purely humanitarian program” in which there are persistent areas for improvement at the policy level and risks that need to be eliminated. The state’s policy of decentralization of public services is an attempt to oblige refugees to be self-­ sufficient. Thus, employment substantially constitutes the backbone of the post-resettlement process, thereby forming the initial phase of integration process in the broadest sense.

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Triad of Humanitarianism: Faith, Paternalism and Philanthropy Adhering to the level of major determinants, two important aspects of George W.  Bush’s Iraq policy should be mentioned to understand the relationship between faith and politics. The first of these is to criticize the policies that include Bush’s military intervention in Iraq and to call for them to be stopped by the United Methodist Church’s General Board of Church: “Your war would violate the teachings of Jesus Christ. It would violate the tenets, prayers, and entreaties of your own United Methodist Church bishops… It will bring death and destruction to Baghdad, a huge city filled with innocent civilians. It will take the lives of too many of our own sons and daughters” (Tipton, 2008, p. 4). The other is Bush’s use of a political discourse woven around “compassionate conservatism” to ensure the security of American society and solve its problems, under the influence of 9/11, despite all these moral calls (Tipton, 2008). In this period when there were two different attitudes of religious arguments, President Bush, in a statement in 2001, underlined the responsibility of the government for public safety and health and defined the American society as a society consisting of compassion, helping those who need help (Bush, 2001a). The president tenderly pointed to the responsibility of the American nation to show compassion for others in need and to pay their debt to the community in the way they reach a goal for American society. Especially after 9/11, the government’s effort has sought to build blocks of American society based on religious discourses. Moreover, the president announced two executive orders to strengthen “faith-based programs” that provide “social services.” One of them has been established in the Department of Health and Human Services (Bush, 2001b) as pointed out by Tipton as the government framed policies to promote faith-based initiatives for the delivery of public services to people. At this juncture, the president clarified this in the following statement: “Yet when we see social needs in America, my administration will look first to faith-based programs and community groups, which have proven their power to save and change lives. We will not fund the religious activities of any group, but when people of faith provide social services, we will not discriminate against them” (Bush, 2001b). Tipton (2008, p. 25) points out the president’s effort to mobilize faith-based initiatives to provide social services for the needy as “social entrepreneurship” that unifies “faith-based programs and non-religious community programs into an ideal of social agency.”

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Majority of resettlement agencies fall within the scope of “social entrepreneurship” which was specifically promoted and strengthened by the Bush administration. Based on my interview findings, the prominent result is that an overwhelming number of resettlement agencies and non-­ governmental organizations define themselves as “faith-based organizations” in Arizona. On the one hand, all of them operates in the neoliberal mode of the delivery of public services; on the other hand, the resettlement agencies are particularly obliged to distance themselves from their religious activities in terms of proselytization as the Department of State also manifests that “while some of the agencies have religious affiliations, they are not allowed to proselytize” (Department of State, 2017). One of my interviewees, U/32m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for years touched upon this point in the following way: Resettlement agencies are faith-based organizations; but they are not religous ones; so to speak, nothing to do with religion. In the US, social services are provided by both the government and other organizations in a fragmented manner.

The interviewee denotes a significant point that the resettlement agencies identify themselves with a religious identity, but do not act to fulfill humanitarian goals in a religious way. In fact, they run a social entrepreneurship and manage the process of providing packaged services that affect or will affect every stage of the refugees’ lives. However, this process does not remove the fact that they are faith-based organizations. It is a fact that the element that constitutes the main identity of the institution is religion rather than their humanitarian practices. In a similar vein, Nawyn (2006, p. 1515) emphasizes that “faith-based NGOs to be heavily involved in the religion-in-civic-life context. Their focus will be on social service provision, not religious activities, and, thus, religion will not be a central component of their work.” While determining the place of resettlement agencies in the system based on faith, it is crucial to underline the role of other non-governmental organizations or voluntary organizations. When Nawny (2006) makes this distinction according to the way organizations are organized, “local non-profit resettlement NGOs or mutual assistance associations (MAAs), voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) and support agencies” function to deliver social services and assistance in the United States, but when it comes to refugee resettlement, voluntary agencies (VOLAGs)

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take the form of resettlement agencies owing to cooperative agreement with the state. To better demonstrate how the resettlement agencies reveal their religious identity in their humanitarian rationale, the Catholic Charities Community Services which is one of my interviewee organizations can be a good sample to see their vision and mission in this process: We are one of the major social service agencies of the Diocese of Phoenix. Our mission of service is founded in Scripture: Jesus called upon his disciples to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, care for the sick, welcome the stranger… Catholic Charities Community Services operates within the principles of its faith tradition and our values are based on Catholic Social Teaching. While we do not provide services that are contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church, we respect the religious beliefs and values of all clients, staff, and volunteers. (CC, 2017)

The direct relationship between the public services offered and religious beliefs and values ​​is the founding element here. The organization as an institution organized around “Catholic Social Teaching” works to help and support those in need. Therefore, faith tradition and values form ​​ its humanitarian identity. Another resettlement agency I interviewed is the Lutheran Social Services, which also serves refugees in Arizona and which denotes what a faith-based action means: We serve all people with an attitude of compassion and caring, recognizing and honoring our Christian heritage of God’s love in Christ for all. (LSS-SW, 2017)

Here, compassion, which Bush underlined at the political level, constitutes the essence of humanitarian action. The Lutheran services, just like the Catholic Charities, build their social entrepreneurship on compassion and caring, and proceed with an understanding that benefits the American society and sees it as a requirement of common religious values. The basic element that underpins the humanitarianism of faith-based organizations is faith. The reason why it is decisive in the debate on humanitarianism is that the boundaries between religion and secularism, as stated by Barnett (2012a), disappear in a humanitarian action. Therefore, while there is a discourse developed over faith in the expression of every

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resettlement agency, an emphasis on rights does not come to the fore. In other words, humanitarianism appears as a kind of transcendental form, as Barnet states and a sublime responsibility to help people and relieve their suffering emerges while an understanding of eliminating the underlying causes that cause people to suffer becomes invisible. Whether there is a political motive in humanitarianism or not remains an important question since the politics of humanitarianism and many activities, as Barnett indicates, “aspires to restructure underlying social relations” (Barnett, 2012a). A historical development of humanitarianism and politics manifests that it does not seem possible to exclude politics from both humanitarianism and religion since religious movements frequently questions “social justice” and it is clear to put forward that “all humanitarianism is faith based” (Barnett, 2012a, p.  177) as faith-based organizations discursively determine the boundary between religion and politics in their humanitarian efforts. Considering the resettlement agencies’ relation to religion and politics, their humanitarianism does not demonstrate any argument for either point out or to “eliminate underlying roots of the suffering.” In another saying, the resettlement agencies do not intend to advocate refugee rights or human rights in a larger sense but move in humanitarian areas to promote social justice in line with their faith tradition. Such a humanitarian approach is also appreciated and supported by the state. The analysis of power relations here is important for understanding the relationship between religion and politics. It is not incorrect to assert that the route followed in delivering some public services to the needy follows a unilateral route. In this sense, the concept of paternalism highlights the discourse of the Bush administration based on compassion and care, and the source of the discourse developed by faith-based organizations on compassion and care. Starting with the broadest sense of how paternalism works in power relations, as Barnett (2012b, p. 502) points out, “international paternalists did not pretend that they were democrats, only that they were more likely to represent the interests of the people than was the home-grown potentate.” Then the critical question here comes into view if “consent of people” is provided or not since “paternalism occurs when one actor interferes in the choices of another without her consent and on the grounds that it is in her best interest” (2012b, p. 503). This system in which consent is excluded as underlined before, constitutes the rational basis as a consequentialist ethic. On this ethical value, refugees are expected to comply with the functioning of the refugee reception and admission system,

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which consists of a number of experts and a series of procedures to be followed, and to build their lives by using the services offered to them as a stepping stone. Rather than addressing the paternalistic aspect of the refugee reception and admission process in purely negative terms, concentrating on its relationship with humanitarian governance plays a key role in understanding the functioning of the system. Following Barnett’s (2012b, p. 517) main points on that, the “institutionalization of global liberalism” has led to the “acceptable practices of paternalism in humanitarian governance.” That is to say, the existence of paternalism relates to “the spread and deepening of liberal principle of autonomy, choice and consent.” The activity of resettlement agencies is paternalistic, unless autonomy, choice, and consent are considered apart from the policy of self-sufficiency. The functioning of this paternalism through the qualities of counseling and orientation given to refugees arriving in Arizona makes such a paternalism clear and enables us to see how the above-mentioned power relations are reflected in the policies and forms of service delivery in practice. At this point, first, the main argument of paternalism is to function in the best interest of others and is associated with the assumption that the services offered are obligatory. During the interviews, the executive director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix states that: Especially if they already have a family member here, you know we gotta give them as much as we can in the shortest time possible so that we can meet our commitment to them. Now that doesn’t mean that we see people for a short time, and we see people for years in some cases you know it’s all dependent on the family because keeping in mind that none of the services, that we provide, are mandatory so for someone who lands in Phoenix and we had this happen on the family got off the plane, a friend from Utah heard they were coming, drove up to the airport, our family our caseworkers are there to start doing their work with them, they got that is so much and I am going to Utah with my friend, they often go in and it really is that fluid once they get to the United States in its very much to their benefit to stay with the local resettlement agency for a period of time. We’re able to help them with the first month’s rent and oftentimes will pay two months’ rent because we work with departments that don’t charge us deposit and you know just to get the health screenings and social security cards and you know just to really get grounded. It’s really in their best interest to stay where they are placed. I will say out of migration rate which means how many times do they get off the plane and go somewhere else is only about 10% in Arizona.

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As the director mentioned, it is in the best interest of refugees to stay in their state of resettlement because they can benefit from the assistance program that will last up to 180 days in that state. This aid program must necessarily be offered to refugees. The aim of this aid program is to include refugees in the job market and to make them self-sufficient as soon as possible. Rather than the rigidly applied paternalism here, the refugees themselves are free to settle in another state, with their relatives or friends at their choice and with their consent. However, considering that this only covers a group of 10%, most of them actually “prefer” a process with predetermined resettlement conditions. In the similar sense, the director from the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus in Phoenix explains this from a different angle: Sometimes we get a call from somebody in Minnesota saying I wanna come to Arizona. Will you help me? I am a refugee and I’ll always say the same thing: how long have you been there? I just arrived two weeks ago. Do you have a resettlement agency that’s helping you? Yes. My advice to them is to stay in Minneapolis. Get your health needs taken care of. Get grounded and get a job, get some money in your pocket after six months and a year, go anywhere you want.

Indeed, at this point, the biggest obstacle for refugees to move from one state to another by their own choice is their lack of financial resources. As can be seen in the passage above, in order for a newly resettled refugee to go to another state, the process envisaged by the system requires the refugee to be self-sufficient at a certain level. Refugees’ processes of being self-sufficient are affected by a number of social, cultural, and economic external factors. Some refugees may need help or be dependent on assistance programs longer than expected. Within the American system, the amount and quality of support provided by authorities may differ from one state to another, and the initial support programs offered to refugees force them to stay in the state in which they were placed. It is stated by the agencies that Iraqi refugees are not in a trend to move to states other than Arizona. Thus, it is not possible to generalize the existence of a secondary migration for the case of Iraqi refugees. However, it is essential for the refugees to accept whatever is offered to them and to integrate them into the system before the authorities. Confining refugees to the cycle of choice, consent and autonomy may lead us to a one-sided analysis to fathom the nature of paternalism.

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However, paternalism in relation to the American social policy system fulfills a very important task for the control of refugees. Lawrence Mead (1998, p.  98) explains this as “supervisory policies directed toward the poor or disadvantaged” so as to control the poor in helping them. Such a control mechanism ensures that the poor or the disadvantaged behave and commit to work or study in return for received support or aid provided by the government. In a sense, so to speak, “the poor need support, but they also require structure—a combination of help and hassle” (1998, p. 108). Refugees and migrants who belong to a vulnerable group seek assistance and help upon their arrival in Arizona and the social policy system treats them in the same paternalistic manner. The paternalistic model of social policy works in relation to the competence assumption. Even in poor or vulnerable situations, clients can work towards self-sufficiency and demonstrate their competence in return for the support of the system. Mead (1998, p. 109) underscores that “established benefit and opportunity programs take it for granted that poor clients are as able as other people to take care of themselves” and “the poor and the non-whites” develop a kind of “self-interest” to respond to the system. In Arizona, considering the loss of social and economic mobility for refugee groups, the poor point to the case of Iraqi refugees and almost all the refugees receive assistance from the refugee reception and placement program, and they are also expected to take care of themselves in the way other Americans do. Regarding the neoliberal rationale of the social policy system in the United States, Soss et al. (2011, p. 27) accentuates the “transformation of government” to “more effectively manage the poor.” As an important indicator, the high unemployment and poverty rate in Arizona can be considered when compared to other states. Although it is underlined that this rate has decreased in recent years, persons in poverty are still 12.8% and unemployment rate is 4.1% (Census, 2022; BLS, 2022) and these rates are not low in comparison with other states. Consequently, the state needs to deal with poverty and unemployment and requires the management of the poor including both refugees and migrants due to its geographic proximity to Mexico as well. For the ideal administration of the poor in this sense, “the state’s governing capacity” applies to “privatization and collaboration to enlist civil society institutions” (Soss et al., 2011, p. 27). At this point, paternalism concurs neoliberalism in poverty governance in practicing the “market rules” to organize the function of paternalism as indicated in the following paragraph:

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The neo-liberal state is called upon to make the poor available to employers on terms set by the declining market for low-skilled labor. The state must teach the poor to conceive of themselves as market actors, and, to accomplish this goal, it must actively position its targets as actors in market relations… (2011, p. 28)

The competence assumption with the positive aim of ensuring the self-­ sufficiency of refugees is not sufficient to acknowledge the nature of the post-resettlement process since the governance style of the system is crystallized as “poverty governance” in the words of Soss et  al. (2011). Therefore, the humanitarian governance of the resettlement process takes the form of poverty governance and makes it functional in serving refugees within the boundaries formed by the state. Such a functionality of the system, whether she is a refugee or an immigrant or a person in need is as stated by Soss et al. (2011, p. 28) “transformation of the poor into subjects who chose to act in ways that comply with market imperatives and political authorities.” When the function of resettlement agencies is considered, the assumption of competence is nothing more than a requirement, because the nature of the system is not equipped to meet all the needs of refugees. The system consists only of certain main programs and the budgets of these programs are determined within the framework of poverty governance. During our interview, the official from the refugee coordination unit of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES) provides us with a better understanding of the nature of this implementation: Yes, refugees do need specific support. I think they need longer support. I think the more targeted kinds of support are not always just longer and more targeted. First, they need to have access to the community program because there’s not enough money in the refugee specific program. If they could assess better to mainstream programs I think there are a lot of good mainstream programs…We have expertise in regular settlement but we have such little money that it’s hard to do so much we either need to make sure that the mainstream programs are equally capable of meeting refugees unique needs linguistically, culturally but also in response to their experiences is rapidly due to trauma and other experiences or we do need to make sure that the refugee program has more resources, longer…

In this context, two issues can be highlighted. The first is the obligation to provide services within the budgetary limits despite the awareness of

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refugees with more special needs, and the second is that the programs developed within a certain standards and periods are offered through a certain expertise. In a sense, this form of service delivery emerges as a business relationship with defined boundaries and purpose. One of my interviewees, a volunteer U/32m for resettlement agencies in Arizona, shares his observations by referring this process as a type of “business”: That is, such organizations (resettlement agencies) are supposed to provide such services in return of grants provided by the state. This is, in a way, business. Social service has taken the form of business in the US. Lutheran or Catholic cannot do so much profit in this way; but the organizations such as Maximus targets profit by claiming that they are better than the state in providing social services. However, there is no area related to religion in this sense.

The demarcation between resettlement agencies and other voluntary organizations is that the relationship of the former with the state is decisive in its humanitarian action and manages humanitarian programs with a paternalistic logic, without resorting to the consent of the refugees. On the other hand, while the faith tradition establishes the ethical values of humanitarian action, ​​ethical values ​​also become open to discussion in the relations of resettlement agencies with the state. Therefore, offering only certain programs in this business relationship and not taking any humanitarian action beyond them does not lead such a discussion but such a relationship, what is at stake is the distinction between humanitarian action and human rights and development marked by Craig Calhoun (2008). This distinction, in the last instance, brings with non-­governmental organizations a sort of standards and “professionalism,” thereby changing the balance between ethics and power. At this point, Calhoun’s (2008, p.  95) argument on humanitarian action with reference to Max Weber gains a rich meaning that humanitarian action is not divorced from the influence of “states” and “markets” by underlying the following dispute: Recruitment to work in humanitarian assistance is significantly based on seeing humanitarian action as ‘value rational,’ an end in itself and intrinsically self-justifying. But at the same time, humanitarian action has become the province of large-scale organizations, donors with demands for evidence of efficacy and efficiency, and a profession with its own standards of good performance. Against the ‘value rational’ sources that have given much impetus

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to humanitarianism there is a growing instrumental orientation. Reconciling moral self-justification and instrumental assessment is difficult.

Leaving aside the missions of voluntary groups or charity organizations in Arizona, the faith tradition for resettlement agencies constitutes their value rationality, while their function in poverty governance embodies their instrumental orientation and rationality. In this sense, self-­justification for resettlement agencies as faith-based organizations in humanitarian relief grows out of faith rather than the effort of, to put it in the words of Calhoun (2008, p. 96), “improving the human condition” and the agencies act within the boundaries of the humanitarian realm composed of government, market, and humanitarianism.

Voluntary Organizations It is obvious that the function that the resettlement agencies undertake in the field has an instrumental function, although it is value rational with their faith tradition. However, the main objective of the agencies is not to improve refugee rights in their instrumental action, but to provide access to the labor market, which will improve the conditions of refugees in the long term. Whether the obstacles and systemic gaps brought about by such a process led to any alternative mechanism or not is a matter of discussion as they stem from a set of structural reasons, from budget constraints to expert resources. However, the tasks and functions undertaken by charity organizations and NGOs have an important place in the “humanitarian sector” of the United States. In highlighting the characteristic of the humanitarian sector, Barnett (2013, p. 388) refers to “a network” function because “organizations come together to accomplish particular and well-defined outcomes.” A developed network of charity and voluntary organizations as well as non-­ governmental organizations exists to help refugees resettled in Arizona. In addition to the diversity of actors and norms in humanitarian governance, such a network functions in such a way to fill the gap for advocacy of refugee rights and to alleviate their suffering. Back to the argument on social entrepreneurship, the presence of the network of voluntary organizations seems to be a strong part of the effort to work for the well-being of American society. At this juncture, the features of network functions deserve to be explicated with reference to six characteristics defined by Ramalingam et  al. (2008) namely “community-building,” “filtering,” “amplifying,”

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“learning and facilitating,” “investing and providing,” and “convening.” Besides, Payton and Moody (2008) underline the logic of philanthropy grounded upon “voluntary giving” and “voluntary association.” In Arizona, this network mainly comprises voluntary and non-­ governmental organizations for refugees namely Noor Women’s Association, Tucson Refugee Ministry, Iskashitaa Refugee Network, and The Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship Association. To keep in mind refugees and refugee communities are also part of the humanitarian sector as active agencies to provide refugees’ participation and mobilization in the post-resettlement area. All of these actors aim to build community, facilitate refugees’ lives, establish a system of expertise and call for donors and fund-raising activities. In this understanding, “philanthropy” is one of the critical attributes for these organizations and does not allow them to be easily identified as charities. Payton and Moody (2008, pp.  34–5) introduces five roles for philanthropy: “Service role,” “advocacy role,” “cultural role,” “civic role,” and “vanguard role.” Service roles “provides services and meeting needs” in the absence of these services and many voluntary organizations and non-governmental organizations primarily undertake service roles to fill the gap after the services are over by the resettlement agencies in Arizona. To put it more concretely, the representative of the Noor Women’s Association, which provides information and support to single refugee women with minor children in Tucson, explains their service role as different than that of the resettlement agency in the following words: Resettlement agency is something that works with the government. You go through the government funding. We do not get any government funding. Basically, we are approached by these agencies that get the government funding when the government funding stops. That’s we come in when the refugees still have not gotten jobs or are not able to find jobs; that’s we come in, so we are basically in extension.

Considering the duties of this association in relation to philanthropy, when the services of the resettlement agencies end, the association provides assistance especially to single refugee women and single refugee women with children. In this sense, the association fulfills both the service role and the cultural role, at the same time, it provides services specifically for refugee women, meeting their special needs. The refugee reception and admission system does not develop programs specifically in this area,

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thereby causing a gap in implementation. Therefore, the role of the association in this field becomes additionally important and its relationship with the resettlement agencies expands in this context. The association carries out activities aimed at both capacity building and improving its network in order to reach refugee women at larger levels and the representative explains such an improving relationship with the resettlement agencies in such a way: “Resettlement agencies know us for the last twenty years; they have a reputation…. Individuals donate to us. We go to individual people, not agencies,” and adds how the association comes in the picture in their relationship with the resettlement agencies: Because these agencies that work with the government were, I really do not know, how they work because we have never dealt. We only worked with them after the government funding stopped for three or six months. Then those people who have still not gotten jobs after vocational training and lose jobs and get sick that’s why we really come in to have them.

On the border between humanitarianism and human rights, as Barnett (2013, p.  383) states, many organizations help people by “giving them the bare necessities” and stay behind the advocacy for human rights. At this very point, although being a voluntary organization offers a more flexible area in terms of rights advocacy, it is seen that some voluntary organizations aim to provide humanitarian aid to refugees only as philanthropic organizations. The representative of Noor Women’s Association explicates this in the following manner: So, we strictly work with the resettlement agencies and since we are a volunteer organization, our thrust of helping people are single mothers, widows or divorcees who do not have a person who has incomes for their family because a lot of donations go to those people and it takes longer to get jobs, vocational training with language issues.

Regarding the objective of both organizations, the resettlement agencies and the voluntary organizations, the common objective is obviously to solve public problems faced by refugees, in other words, to work for the solution of public problems as part of the same joint effort and the organizations run practical and solution-oriented approaches to fill the gap. The association’s work is to develop solutions to the case of single refugee women or refugee women with minor children who might be in a more

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difficult position to integrate themselves into the labor market and to be self-sufficient in a short time. In this regard, as underlined by Payton and Moody (2008, p. 10), “philanthropy is an essential tool in our collective attempts to solve public problems” and the association’s voluntary effort complements the services provided by the resettlement agencies and such a complementary role serves not to underestimate the ultimate purpose of the system, but to fill the gap needed for the well-being of American society, which is the purpose of the system. Another volunteer organization, Tucson Refugee Ministry, provides funds and support for refugees in Tucson. This organization, which mainly depends on Christian values ​​and is organized through churches, is involved in the process after the resettlement agencies and helps refugees. In my interviews with the executive director of the organization and the development coordinator of the organization, this organization, which states that it cooperates with its completely volunteer network, carries out community-­based activities effectively. The ministry’s mode of working with refugees relates to the definition of “conveners” that Ramalingam et.al. explain and refer to “bringing together individuals and groups from different nationalities, disciplines and practices” (2008, p. 3) and establishing a productive network to maintain the dissemination of information and knowledge among the stakeholders. At this point, the ministry representative points out the importance of having a more systematic structure to support refugees in Tucson: There is an organization called RISP-NET, Refugee Integrated Services Provider Network. We meet together each month and usually we have a topic, and somebody shares with us what they do and have to do with refugees.

Having a network like RISP-NET running in Tucson is significant for convening because it makes intergroup dialogue dynamic and sustainable. Conceptually speaking, this is a good example of “amplification” because it is highly effective for the purpose of “disseminating a message or idea and can also be part of two-way process of communication and feedback” (Ramalingam et al., 2008, p. 2). The function of this network is to concomitantly build community and help refugees in Tucson and is purely a form of philanthropic action regarding the history of philanthropic tradition in America. According to Payton and Moody, this tradition is essentially based on two strands: “A core value of compassion” and “a core

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value of community.” The former refers to “acts of mercy to relieve suffering… as charity… or humanitarian assistance” and the latter indicates “acts intended to enhance the quality of life in our social worlds…” (2008, p. 134). Considering the importance of these two important elements in American history, the volunteer work of the Tucson Refugee Ministry is indeed in accordance with the basic components of philanthropy. This situation is based on the definition of philanthropy rather than the narrow sense of a charity activity built on religious values. In relation to the objective of the ministry, philanthropy both “implements moral imagination and to shape and advance the moral agenda of” the society and “voluntarily intervenes in other people’s lives for their benefit… to advance the public good” (2008, p. 96). In this regard, the representative of the Tucson Refugee Ministry reveals these core values by explaining the nature of their voluntary intervention and community activities: Our main purpose is to connect Christians with newly resettled refugees who are coming to live in Tucson. So that’s what we do is to talk to churches, get education and presentations and training and invite them to connect with newly arrived refugees and we ask them to make a commitment of three months of working together. And then Church groups, resettlement agencies and Tucson refugee ministry help one family for three months.

Mobilizing community members for the public good through Christians and churches gives a basis for the organization’s philanthropic approach. The ministry runs to collect donations and contributions from all communities and use them for refugees as part of their moral responsibility. At every stage of this humanitarian assistance, the ministry does explicitly represent its religious identity to help refugees as well as acts in a political way, which ultimately aims to build the public good as part of the American philanthropic tradition. From this standpoint, it is obvious to point out that religion as a dominant factor manifests itself in this voluntary humanitarian movement. Robert D. Putnam (2000, pp. 67–8) also underscores this fact peculiar to America that “nearly half of all associational memberships in America are church related, half of all personal philanthropy is religious in character, and half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context. So how involved we are in religion today matters a lot for America’s social capital.”

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Religion, which has an impact on philanthropic humanitarian action, is important in the reproduction of moral values. However, volunteer humanitarian organizations or initiatives encounter people from different social, ethnic, and religious groups. Therefore, the scope of these voluntary activities should be considered more broadly in the way Putnam (2000, p. 82) demonstrates: Faith-based organizations serve civic life both directly, by providing social support to their members and social services to the wider community, and indirectly, by nurturing civic skills, inculcating more values, encouraging altruism, and fostering civic skills recruitment among church people.

The philanthropic nature of voluntary organizations is essentially political in reaching out to a wider network of community. As regards the activities of voluntary organizations operating in Arizona, it is possible to talk about the weight of faith-based organizations. However, there are also non-governmental organizations that take on different roles in serving refugees, and all the efforts of these organizations continue to reach the public good. In Arizona, the Iskashitaa Refugee Network acts as a network of refugees and plays “a vanguard role” of philanthropy. The organization actively innovates “new forms of action” in the humanitarian sector. The founder of the organization explains those activities in the following way: Iskashitaa Refugee Network was formed in 2002 and 2003. We have purposes to empower, help and integrate refugees into the larger Tucson community by providing practical English, life skills, introduction to the community in the way that local food programming, what I mean by local food programming is our first and largest project program is harvesting… We introduce fresh vegetables. There is a great appreciation for the large quantities of refugees that work with Iskashitaa and have access to large quantities of fresh food and vegetables from people’s backyards and from local farmers…

Carrying out activities in food projects, the organization contributes to refugees’ integration process through “assisting refugees with self-­ sufficiency, community connections, education, entrepreneurship, applied English, and civic engagement through our shared language of food” (Iskashitaa, 2022). The founder of the organization clarifies how their activities make a difference in the field as different than the resettlement agencies:

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Our funding streams are different. They (resettlement agencies) got the federal state funding. We do not. We do not follow the regulations. The agencies follow pretty closely and give intense services for three to six months and drop severely although refugees may not be self-sufficient at the end of six months.

The founder identifies one of the main challenges refugees encounter at the end of refugee support programs and shares her concerns about the process in which self-sufficiency of refugees needs to be improved for a better integration into the American community. The founder also highlights the organization’s relationship with the agencies for this purpose as shown below: We work with the resettlement agencies, Refugee Focus as well as IRC… We work with volunteers. We work to build up that network for the resettlement agencies and others working with refugees. We run a young group, hundred members to get information on family members for the refugee integrated services provider network and participate in meetings.

As a network of volunteers, the organization also develops the existing structure of the refugee support community which aims to help refugees on different subjects (Ramalingam et al., 2008). Being conscious of the refugees’ social and cultural background, including their food culture, as well as their abilities and farming skills, the organization’s expertise in the food system both gathers and provides information to refugees. The voluntary activities of nonprofit organizations in Tucson displays an active network functionalism in the way other voluntary organizations do, but its distinguishing feature is to be able to have more creative and innovative ways for community members. In this regard, the organization takes on a different task to build up an environment where refugees can easily integrate into the American community. Given the diversity of the refugee community, it also brings in that of voluntary activities for the purpose of serving the public good in “voluntary philanthropic action,” which Payton and Moody (2008, pp.  59–60) profoundly, to “relieve suffering and to improve the quality of life.”

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Professional and Specialized Services In Arizona, the common purpose of philanthropic structures is underlined to provide the public good although the distinction between funds and services is clear. As a feature of the diversity of humanitarian governance, the expertise and hierarchical structure of resettlement agencies funded by the state is more clearly defined, whereas in voluntary organizations such hierarchy and budget schemes are totally different. Since voluntary organizations do not have any public revenue, all their ways of earning revenue work through philanthropic and charity activities as well as collecting donations. In addition, the activities of professional organizations that provide services in a specific field with paid experts are part of the nonprofit sector in Arizona. While talking about the characteristics of nonprofit America, Salamon (2012, pp.  15–16) mentions four important features, namely “voluntarism, professionalism, civic activism, and commercialism.” Among them, “professionalism” is one of the most important features that enables us to understand how the organization of La Frontera Arizona operates in Arizona. Professionalism pertains to “specialized, subject-matter knowledge gained through formal training and delivered by paid experts” and increased “professional standards in government-funded programs.” In Arizona, the La Frontera Arizona is in charge of the professional provision of a certain type of services to refugees rather than more voluntary or philanthropic work. Services offered to refugees range from inpatient/ outpatient treatment to employment services and to specific prevention/ diversion activities for children and adults (La Frontera, 2017). The supervisor for all staff of the organization explains the background of the organization during our interview in the following way: It is a behavioral health agency. So, we have clients who have serious mental illness, substance use, major mental illness from children to elderly. I work in prevention so thirteen years ago we received a grant to offer a prevention program, parenting program specifically for refugees. Thirteen years ago, it was for Russian reunification families and Spanish speaking families for the first year and the second year we added families from former Yugoslavia. So, we had a program specifically for refugees and immigrants where our staff came from the target populations. For example, I was hired to work with Spanish speaking children and another facilitator was hired to work with Spanish speaking parents. We worked with them individually and together. It was a family education program. It was mostly to prevent substance use

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and violence. That program lasted three years. We’ve got the funding. New populations arrive in Tucson. We would add them. So, we have Somalia, Meskhetian Turks, Iraqi, Burundi, so whatever populations have been arriving, we’ve been hiring staff for those populations.

The organization has spent thirteen years of its forty-five-year operational life solving the adaptation problems of refugee children and adults and operates in humanitarian governance, as a nonprofit organization, in accordance with the strategy relying on a medical model, treating the beneficiaries essentially as “patients” in need of some form of “treatment,” whether “physical, or educational, or psychological” (Salamon, 2012, p. 17). As the supervisor stated, the main purpose here is to reach people with behavioral disorders and eliminate their problems with professional methods. Here, refugees are treated as “patients” and “persons in need of treatment.” On the other hand, as stated here, there is a point underlined by Salamon (2012) that in this type of professionalism the reference group is not the donors or beneficiaries, but the professionals or the profession itself. The supervisor of the organization explains their profession as “a behavioral health agency” to prevent violence and substance use among children and adults and the organization also carries out its activities in schools and contributes to the health development of the community. In doing so, the supervisor explicates their strategy of reaching out to refugees in Tucson as different than the resettlement agencies and voluntary nonprofit organizations in the following manner: We don’t do anything like the resettlement agencies. We are a non-­ governmental and non-profit organization. Once a family has been here for three months, they can be referred to our program. Our facilitator will go, meet them, and invite them to natural groups, into existing groups, sometimes one on one specifically for Iraqi families. We don’t get funding to work, to do any resettlement activity. Our funding comes from the Department of Health Services not the federal state.

Receiving funds from the Department of Health Services, the organization develops its mode of working with a set of accepted standards called “CARF accredited programs” (La Frontera, 2017). It is important to note that the organization receives funds from the State under a designated project as long as the organization is able to provide a standard service for

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refugee children and adults in Arizona. As regards with the support of Arizona Department of Health Services and CARF program, following Salamon’s (2012) argument, “professional style” is “therapeutic, segmented, and secular” and “professionalism creates organizational structures that are hierarchic and segmented” and “requires the more ample and reliable resources of government and fees for support” and the La Frontera serves refugees in this sort of professionalism and fills an important gap when it comes to the special needs of refugees in Arizona as stated by the supervisor below: We teach them other things that nobody else does, like how to parent your children here because discipline here is very different from discipline in any other countries; how to work with the schools. When the refugees come here, they take their children to the school and then they tell the teachers you are the expert, you take care of my children, teach them… Here the system is different, the school wants families to be involved. So, we work with them and teach them those kinds of things… how to keep the kids from getting Americanized too quickly.

The ultimate objective here, when considered together with the general purpose of the nonprofit sector, is to establish the public good quickly. As Barnett (2013) points out, humanitarian governance functions as a global project and shapes people’s lives, institutions, and habits to establish people’s well-being. One of the essential objectives here is that the children are trained and taught to enter the Americanization process as soon as possible. At this juncture, the work of the Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship (IASPF), which is a nonprofit organization working with refugees in Phoenix, is important in relation to the activities to promote integration and adaptation process of refugees. The organization’s activities are multifaceted given its community-based activities to empower refugees in their new lives. The organization’s presence not only reflects the diversity of humanitarian action but also provides professional support to refugees in Arizona. Given the organization’s work for its own community, it can also be added that the organization actively takes place in the human services field. Gronbjerg (2001, p. 287) elucidates “human services field” by stating that “nonprofit entities dominate the central, traditional social service fields of family and individual counseling, residential care, and vocational rehabilitation” and the organization undertakes such tasks in

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working with refugees since it is physically a small facility but socially and culturally a large entity in the city of Phoenix. The organization establishes a solidarity environment for Iraqi refugees in Arizona, but its organizational structure, with reference to Salamon (2012), is “hierarchic and segmented” and is quite “programmatic, universalistic, and secular.” The program director of the IASPF explains how it has received funding and what kind of programs it has run since its establishment in 1993 in the following manner: We are a non-profit organization that is based on a three-year grant from the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Our program is based on three different activities: a youth program, a women program, and a job specialist.

The organization, which has the characteristics of a professional structure, continues its activities by receiving funds from an important institution, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, in America. In this regard, the youth, women, and employment programs run by the organization aim to provide solutions to the vulnerable cases of refugees. In this sense, we should underline that it is part of a humanitarian action that points out the problems in the field and tries to fill the gap. The program director expounds its role and objectives in reference to the educational and informational program as well as the youth program designed to serve young refugees over the age of eighteen in line with the requirements of the United States school system and continues in the following way: Youth program focuses on educating youth upon their arrival here. Basically, providing activities for them that would allow them to be more active within the community and build relationships with other youth from the community. A lot of them stand on the wrong path because a lot of youth come to US and they get emergent idea of freedom and we have a lot of youth that come here over eighteen which, in the U.S. school system, if you are over eighteen, you can’t register the public high school so there is a special high school sphere all take GED.3 GED is another program where we have to have English, writing skills and reading skills to be able to get a high school diploma. So, we have a lot of youth that come from seventeen and eighteen that can go back to school. And they have to pay a year to register into a college, which is…, they get residence to be able to get financial assistance 3  General Educational Development is a test for adults who do not have a high school diploma in the United States.

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for their college expenses. We have some activities such as education and workshops so far.

The youth program provides orientation to young Iraqi refugees arriving in Arizona so that they can get a high school diploma without wasting time. In this respect, it carries out a program that aims both to convey the correct information to the community and to disseminate this correct information by the community. Considering the general resettlement process in the USA, it aims to include especially young groups in the system quickly. While working in a professional structure, the director also explains how they take steps in education process once volunteer teachers come into picture in the following words: We work with volunteers, our English teachers. So, our English teacher, level one, is a volunteer. We welcome volunteers. We see a lot of volunteers.

The demand for volunteers is high because of the community-based activities of the organization. Similarly, the women’s program, another program carried out by the organization, fills an important gap as it supports women to become self-sufficient quickly. On the other side, the director also addresses specific challenges and difficulties that refugee women face in this process below: We have a woman program that allows them to become more self-sufficient to provide for the family also because we have a lot of single women and single female that come here with their kids and upon the arrival, who they get it is shocking or it is surprising, it is not what they thought of America was gonna be. It is, you know, resettlement agencies pay for the first three months and after that under their own. So, the rents are really expensive here, so female, single female comes in, she has, I mean, no job that is gonna be difficult for her to get the family. So, we provide different workshops, we provide financial workshops, everything. We also have a job specialist program. The person, or already the staff, looks for jobs for the refugees if they are interested, so it is based on appointments, and they walk in. They come if they know their store, they will help them apply or if we have connections with different departments, we can find jobs.

Although it includes professional work, the element that differentiates the humanitarian action of the organization is that it points out the shortcomings of the system and carries out activities related to the special needs

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and vulnerable situations of refugees. In this sense, identifying and developing programs related to many issues such as culture shock, the temporary nature of public services, and the difficulties of being a woman or a single woman is part of the humanitarian action that tries to fill the gap in practice. This humanitarian action, which is in line with the objectives of nonprofit organizations that aim to transform the behavior, values, ​​and knowledge of people underlined by Gronbjerg (2001, p.  291), is an instrumental rationality of humanitarian governance.

Impact of 9/11 on the Functions of Humanitarian Governance The diversity of humanitarian governance in the United States manifests the huge work of resettlement agencies, voluntary organizations, professional agencies, and community-based agencies and reveals that the dominance of faith-based organizations in the American nonprofit sector is an undeniable fact. The common denominator for the nonprofit is to establish the public good and to integrate refugees in the American community as self-sufficient individuals as quickly as possible. Considering the activities and work of the nonprofit serving Iraqi refugees in different capacities, the tragic events of 11 September 2011 remark a turning point for Americans as well as the function of humanitarian governance for the refugee resettlement process. Without having a good understanding of how the incident affects all agents this book focuses on, speaking of the experiences of refugees in the post-resettlement area carries the risk of incomplete analysis. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) facilitated the process of surfacing all between the US government and Saddam’s regime. In the political environment before 9/11, the Bush administration had already signaled political plans to replace the existing foreign policy of the so-­ called “containment plus strategy” with a new foreign policy centered around “the new global war on terror” at the discursive level (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007). The US government declared that Islamist terrorism and Saddam’s regime pose a vital threat to American values and interests in the Middle East and decided to refocus on the US foreign policy and regional equivalences to prevent threats from growing. As a result, the Bush administration revised its policy by forming the political discourses of “terrorism” and “national security” (Lee, 2006). At first sight, such a political

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approach to prioritize national security for the sake of Americans wielded an enormous influence on migrants and refugees, and security clearance against those from the Middle East quickly became policy. The Bush administration consolidated new regulations to restrict the entry of immigrants and refugees, giving the president a set of entitlements “to suspend the rule of law” and to investigate or detain non-­ citizens (Kaldor, 2014). In case there is a reasonable indication that a foreigner poses a threat to society, the INS will be able to act without waiting for the judge’s decision (Firestone, 2001). Such policies quickly transformed the matter of immigrants and refugees into a security matter with the regulations to eliminate “potential threats” growing out of foreigners from the Middle East. Barkdull et al. (2012) also demonstrates the role of the PATRIOT Act, which expands the definition of “terrorist” to individuals or groups with arms or material support involved in a terrorist activity or terrorism. This regulation also affected the protection of refugees and migrants and based on the policy of war on terrorism, the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants published a report in 2001 and stated that: In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and the US-led military offensive against Afghanistan that began October 7, US refugee program has come to a halt, leaving thousands of refugees overseas in dangerous limbo, straining the limited resources of agencies that resettle them, and exacerbating the decline in annual US refugee admissions for yet another year.

In the post-9/11 area, the first impact of these developments was seen over the US’s refugee admission statistics: The Department of State, Office of Admissions—Refugee Processing Center reveals the fact that refugees were not admitted in high numbers until 2008 and 2009 and there was a huge difference in admission statistics in comparison with the statistics of the pre-9/11 period (RPC, 2023a, 2023b). These legal developments and regulations have had a heavy impact on social and political life and various studies highlight the increasing level of confusion, anxiety, sadness, discrimination, and anger in many forms. Barkdull et. al.’s research, for instance, underline how immigrants and refugees experience the post-9/11 period by pointing to the fact that “incidents of verbal harassment including racial slurs were common, and many have been called ‘terrorists’ when it comes to Muslims in particular

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and that violence, xenophobia and Islamophobia increased in this process (2011, pp.  144–146). The report of the American Immigration Law Foundation in 2004 indicates the severity of the situation that the US government implemented a set of law enforcement actions by “interviewing roughly 100,000 people of Muslim, Arab or South Asian origin, including citizens, permanent residency, individuals legally present in the country…” Moreover, the report emphasizes the approach of the Department of Justice to the function of “immigration rules” which is to be considered as “a primary weapon” in the fight against terrorism and “more than 1200 people, mostly Arabs and Muslims, were rounded up and detained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the days and week after 9/11” (American Immigration Council, 2004). The role and responsibilities of refugees and humanitarian organizations were very critical in this historical period as Critelli points out the US government began to evaluate and implement its refugee admission program and humanitarian aid out of “security concern in the war against terrorism” (2008, p.  154). Both the restrictive effect of the neoliberal policies that started and continued since the 1980s on welfare reforms and the strict policies developed on refugee and immigrant rights reached an important stage under the influence of 9/11 (Critelli, 2008). On this ground, the US government put security concerns at the center while decreasing the social and economic support to migrants and refugees in its humanitarian governance. All actors, including refugee resettlement agencies, voluntary organizations, professional and community-based associations, began to lose their strength and ground in humanitarian activities. The Bush government employed a dual political discourse during this period: On the one hand, as slightly emphasized before, social entrepreneurship is formally emphasized by the hand of faith-based organizations and civil society for the good of American society, on the other hand, the government’s security policies will spotlight non-citizens, immigrants, refugees, and externals by using immigration policies. To better demonstrate how resettlement agencies and voluntary organizations experienced such a process, I will give a place to the words of the executive director of International Rescue Committee, which is one of the most important agencies in Arizona: …in the year post-9/11 we resettled 22,000 refugees. The year prior to 9/11 we resettled 75,000, so just from a government’s perspective refugees were the first population at the shutdown as it could be controlled. 9/11

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was a wake-up call for America and I think that the media has done a wonderful job of keeping us afraid and realistically I mean everybody has to fear ISIS because they are everywhere, so I mean it certainly changed things.

The issue is no longer the decrease in the number of refugees coming to the country, but the emergence of an important responsibility and duty of these humanitarian organizations so that Muslim refugees are not seen as a threat to the society and are not associated with terrorism. In other words, one could think that their work would be aimed at preventing the increase of the risk of Islamophobia. However, this process, beyond the statistics, resulted in the temporary suspension of the refugee acceptance programs carried out by these humanitarian organizations. During my interview with the director from the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus in Phoenix, this situation is summarized as follows: But refugee staff were just so impacted by this even more than I was and other staff; that was the first reaction then of course the refugee program after 9/11 was closed, shut down temporarily; no arrivals until we figured out what was going on. So, the short-term result of 9/11 was completely closing another program; no refugees.

By the same token, the director from Catholic Charities Services in Phoenix stated that: I started here in 2003. I know that after not to 9/11 on refugee numbers plummeted and then are just now starting to get back. I know that there are obvious additional security checks in place.

The statements of the representatives of refugee resettlement organizations reveal that 9/11 changed many things in the way that refugees were resettled in the host community. The first result is the restriction of refugee admissions and the second is to embed security perception in the host community that affected people in different aspects. The consequences are different for refugee communities and refugee resettlement agencies including refugee communities and refugee staff. From the workplace to the host community, these organizations faced a number of problems in the post 9/11 area. The executive director from the International Rescue Committee (IRC) explains this last point in the following statement:

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This is what happened to me on the day 9/11; maybe this gives a good idea what happened to me shortly thereafter, the day of 9/11. I worked with staff similar to my staff here who were from all over the world. On the day of 9/11, I had multiple staff that had lived in other parts of the world, who said we’re going to war where to sign up they wanted to go fight for the country. I also had one negative call from some persons who probably were angry long before 9/11 about refugee resettlement, who, you know, said some very bad things about the CVs of the people. I had a fleet of people who called, who said can help the children of Afghanistan how to help the people of Iraq had a way you know how to get involved to help you and the work you do with refugees so even though 9/11 obviously was a horrible event it didn’t really affect the supporters that were already supporting us in fact I think it made them stronger the general public we had our homework we had work to do we had to get…

Humanitarian organizations that did not lose their sense of responsibility handled many negative consequences in this period while developing a strong attitude and solidarity with their staff and refugees on the one hand. Although it is an important sign that these agencies, which were working in a large ethnic and religious diversity, received support from the volunteers who were supporting them, the threat perception created in the public and the Bush administration’s “war on terrorism” discourses became navigating unfavorably. One of the most negative consequences of this is what happened to one of my interviewee organizations: JM/50/m, who is one of the founders of the Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship in Phoenix, shares his experience after 9/11: The first place of this organization was attacked by Americans right after 9/11 since there was huge anger and they were probably my neighbors.

Dealing with the ramifications of the “war on terror” discourse is a huge task for resettlement agencies in Arizona. At the same time, as a requirement for the public good, a clear understanding of who are refugees and whether they are terrorists is needed to be communicated to the public. This is a must to overcome public’s prejudice against refugees, especially Muslim refugees. In the case of Arizona, reducing perceptions of security and terrorism has not been an easy task for the agencies, but my research findings show that many succeeded in both developing a positive impact on the public and mobilizing voluntary efforts to speak about refugees in a more humanitarian sense. The program coordinator of the

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International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix underlines this during our interview: So, we would get questions about you know literally how do you know the terrorist is not coming to the refugee program, not part of our job as educators and in advocacy to help people understand what the process actually is that somebody who is going to the refugee program has to go through State Department checks in a series of the interview. FBI checks, embassy checks that sometimes take years literally and so if you are objective is to become a terrorist into to do a terrorist act you cannot go through a program more than likely that is gonna check into every single part of your background and make sure who you are and that you are not, have been not involved in a terrorist act.

The sense of security paved the way for the organizations’ efforts to raise awareness about how the refugee admission system works in the United States and admits refugees in the country. In the post-9/11 era, the resettlement agencies dealt with people’s questions and concerns about the ethnic and religious background of refugees and these questions did not seem to be resolved through the agencies’ efforts because of the evoked sense of security in the public. The director of the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus program in Phoenix explains this in the following statements: People then understood, you know, for instance okay, they learned more about refugees because of 9/11. Well, it’s like because everyone asking about public meetings, you know we had to go back and start meeting with churches to get their support for resettling refugees; questions would be well refugees are coming from Afghanistan, coming from Iran, coming from Somalia, these are all the countries that you know that are terrorists and what we can get in more terrorist country. Then my response was that people who were refugees are escaping that same violence that same terrorism that were fighting they were victims just like you and I, and believe me they there you know they’re fighting the same terrorism like we are there they’re running from that they’re trying to find security so don’t let the names of countries shock you, it is kind of the political extremism that’s present all over.

Throughout their efforts to raise awareness and allay their fears and panics, resettlement agencies used the language of victims and victims of

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violence to describe the situation of refugees, and portraying refugees as victims in the eyes of the public is seen as the best way to deal with the perception of terrorism and terrorists. In this process, the resettlement agencies found themselves in an educator position and intentionally continued this role to establish the public interest. The best example of this is expressed by the program coordinator of the Catholic Charities Community Services in Tucson: We educated the host community, the receiving community. But, as I told you earlier, before they come to the US, they are conducted through a background check, criminal background check and refugee is the most scrutinized immigrant. If you are involved in terrorist activism, you are banned from being admitted to the US. So, after the post 9/11, we educated the community, refugee they are good people, they are not terrorists, they are here because they need protection.

In a similar vein, the director for the Catholic Charities Community Services in Phoenix also gives a huge importance to education or educational activities for awareness-raising activities as well as to community outreach in the following manner: When people, when you actually sit down with someone and you talk to them about it, most people get it they know that they’re coming here because of an urgent humanitarian rescue and they kind of get it our support overall but you do have to work with the ethnic community as well and you have to make sure that we’re all doing a part of education consists critical if you don’t have a community support, you can’t do it, you can get that important, you can’t do resettlement without the community support… but again this is what makes education more important than ever with this climate and an understanding and faith communities have been of, faithcommunities have been very generous very generous whether they are Christian or Muslim they all care, my parishes support Muslim families too.

Education is stated to be a key factor for both refugee and host community. Moreover, the agency uses how Iraqi refugees had supported the American armed forces in Iraq to make the public opinion about refugees positively. This is also an effort to address public safety concerns through community work and awareness-raising activities. Along with all this, the importance of the refugees’ contribution to the American society and their contribution to social and economic life, if we are to say in particular

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to Arizona, is also highlighted in the words of the director for the Catholic Charities Community Services in Phoenix: This has partly to do with the economy as well, right the economy in America was bad therefore also now we have to make sure you are also telling the story of what they bring not only what they flee but what did they bring and why they should be here and why should they stay because they’re integrated because they become supporters of our community because they pay taxes because they buy houses because they grow food in all those stories have to be told as well but I think 9/11 did really remind us to tell the story of who they were and what have they fled.

No doubt, on the other side of the 9/11 event is the revitalization of the American spirit. This means that, after the six-month suspension of the refugee reception and placement system, the symbolic value of America opening its doors again to the poor fleeing violence has emerged. The director of the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus program in Phoenix tells me in the following way: In a few years we’re back to work so long-term in some way, I think it may make people become more aware of refugees. We’ve always had the refugee program and it has always had really strong political support because it’s a very symbolic program like the Statue of Liberty gives me your tired, your poor. Even though our door used to be open like this, now it is only open for small numbers of people but that is still open for people who flee from political and social persecution.

Despite the importance of this symbolic value and the resumption of the refugee reception and placement program, “terrorism” as the threat or common enemy pointed out by the Bush administration created a significant concern for migrants and refugees from Middle East countries and people of the Islamic faith. As a result of the security concerns, Muslims have emerged as the other living together with the American society. Beyond the case of migrants and refugees, 9/11 consequently raised concerns about local perception of Islam and Muslims. In this process, many have begun to explore and learn about these topics. The program director for the Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship Association in Phoenix summarizes as follows:

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I can’t speak on behalf of everyone, but personally I think it did change after 9/11 more on individuals who were aware of Islam and who were aware of us. I think the news was everywhere. Websites and social media allowed people to recognize Islam and read about that and learn more about that. I think they got knowledge rather than prejudices. It depends on how the individual took it. Some were reading and learning that it was positive even if you work with a scarf at a job. I mean I personally had a lot of questions before that why you were here. I gave a lot of stories. After 9/11, I knew the sound was different. Some people did not get it, they did not come back. Some people, they have more knowledge about. It depends if it is positive or negative, but more positive because you are allowed to read and get more knowledge about Islam.

The role of resettlement agencies and other nonprofit organizations in general has been constructive to relive the negative consequences of 9/11. The top-down process of US politics had already announced that foreign policy dynamics had changed before 9/11 due to the threatening presence of Saddam’s government. Alternatives, namely the “containment plus strategy” were already sought to change the US–Middle East paradigm. However, this paradigm shift towards the Saddam regime was not sustainable and, as underlined before, the “new global war on terror” was implemented by President Bush (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007). This top-down process is important to understand how the Bush administration linked Saddam’s regime to this new paradigm shift in what has been called the “new global war on terror” in the post-9/11 environment. The Bush administration pushed the theme of terror into the daily life of the American people, pointing to the region of immigrants and refugees. Despite the direct impact of the Bush administration on the Iraqi refugees, the interview results demonstrate that the discourse on terror did not totally affect the American society’s perspective, especially in the case of Arizona by the hand of the American nonprofit sector. On the other side, the function of the new global war on terror deserves to be analyzed in terms of humanitarian governance in relation to the consequences of 9/11 since the Bush administration’s emphasis on the role of resettlement agencies in the pre- and post-9/11 period underwent a consistent progress considering its neoliberal implementation. The Bush administration pointed at the important role of faith-based and community groups to strengthen solidarity among the American people in the process prior to 9/11 (Bush, 2001b).

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In the context of the top-down process of the global war on terror after 9/11, the Bush administration re-emphasized the importance of the role of faith-based and community groups in the post-9/11 political era. Bush’s speech on “key elements of his faith-based initiatives” is important to understand how the humanitarian space was reorganized after 9/11 in his following words: “We have that obligation, to recognize the world changed for America on September the 11th, 2001… Our government and your leadership must have a realistic assessment of the dangers we have faced, and we will face” (Bush, 2002). On the one hand, he prioritizes the security and safety concerns of Americans and on the other hand he also how faith-based and volunteer organizations contribute to the country in his following words: Faith-based charities work daily miracles because they have idealistic volunteers. They’re guided by moral principles. They know the problems of their own communities… They deserve the support of the rest of us. They deserve the support of foundations. They deserve the support of corporate America… Faith-based groups will never replace the government when it comes to helping those in need. Yet the government must recognize the power and unique contribution of faith-based groups in every part of our country. (Bush, 2002)

In addition to the securitization of the refugee reception and placement program, what is at stake is the demolition of the US traditional liberal or democratic values under the increasing weight of neoliberal governmentality. As Wendy Brown (2005, p. 47) clearly points out, “neoliberal rationality has not caused but rather facilitated the dismantling of democracy during the current national security crisis” since the neoliberal logic of the process required a cost-effective construction of practices and that “the post-9/11 period has brought the ramifications of neoliberal rationality into sharp focus, largely through practices and policies that progressives assail as hypocrisies, lies, or contradictions…” Roughly speaking, 9/11 is not a simple process of securitization of foreign policy and national security but is instrumentalized as a component of neoliberal governmentality and it has brought the dynamics of humanitarian governance in the logic of the cost-effective policies in the refugee reception and admission system although the government often emphasized democratic values, solidarity, and compassion.

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Obviously the social and political consequences of 9/11 deeply altered the course of the neoliberal functioning of humanitarian governance. The United States has explored a cost-effective construction of the American community by reducing the responsibilities of the state and the construction of community as faith-based organizations or volunteers is a cost-­ effective form of alleviation of human suffering. With reference to Brown (2005) “progressives assail as hypocrisies, lies, or contradictions” regarding the results of 9/11 and calling this process as a sort of “hypocrisy” is possible to see a dual politics in the area of civil society: The government encouraged a kind of social entrepreneurship through the inclusion of faith-based organizations and volunteers for the establishment of the public good and the government also harmed the democratic rights of immigrants and refugees while categorizing them de-skilled subjects of the labor market during the neoliberal restoration of the system.

References Adler, E., & Bernstein, S. (2005). Knowledge in power: The epistemic construction of global governance. In M. Barnett & R. Duvall (Eds.), Power in Global Governance (pp. 294–319). Cambridge University Press. American Immigration Council. (2004). Targets of suspicion: The impact of post-9/11 policies on Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United States. Immigration Policy In Focus, 3(2). Retrieved May 7, 2017, from https://www. americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Targets%20 of%20Suspicion.pdf Barkdull, C., Khaja, K., Queiro-Tajalli, I., Swart, A., Cunningham, D., & Dennis, S. (2011). Experiences of Muslims in four Western countries post—9/11. Affilia, 26(2), 139–153. Barkdull, C., Weber, B., Swart, A., & Philips, A. (2012). The changing context of refugee resettlement policy and programs in the United States. Journal of International Social Issues, 1(1), 107–119. Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in global governance. In M. Barnett & R.  Duvall (Eds.), Power in global governance (pp.  1–33). Cambridge University Press. Barnett, M., & Weiss, T. G. (2008). Humanitarianism: A brief history of the present. In M. Barnett & T. G. Weiss (Eds.), Humanitarianism in question, politics, power, ethics. Ithaca and London. Barnett, M. N. (2005, December). Humanitarianism transformed. Perspectives on Politics, 3(4), 723–740.

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Barnett, M. N. (2012a). Where is the religion? Humanitarianism, faith, and world affairs. In T. S. Shah, A. Stepan, & M. D. Toft (Eds.), Rethinking religion and world affairs. Oxford Scholarship Online. Barnett, M. N. (2012b, November). International paternalism and humanitarian governance. Global Constitutionalism, 1(3), 485–521. Barnett, M.  N. (2013). Humanitarian governance. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 379–398. Betts, A. (2009). Forced migration and global politics. Wiley-Blackwell. BLS. (2022). Local area unemployment statistics. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from https://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm Brown, A., & Scribner, T. (2014). Unfulfilled promises, future possibilities: The refugee resettlement system in the United States. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2(2), 101–120. Brown, W. (2005). Critical essays on knowledge and politics. Princeton University Press. Bush, G.  W. (2001a, January 20). Inaugural address. Social Security Online. Retrieved March 19, 2017, from https://www.ssa.gov/history/ gwbushstmts.html Bush, G. W. (2001b). Remarks by the president in announcement of the faith-based initiative. Retrieved March 19, 2017, from https://georgewbush-­whitehouse. archives.gov/news/releases/20010129-­5.html Bush, G. W. (2002, December 12). President bush implements key elements of his faith-based initiative. Retrieved January 15, 2017, from https://georgewbush-­ whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021212-­3.html Calhoun, C. (2008). The imperative to reduce suffering: Charity, progress, and emergencies in the field of humanitarian action. In Humanitarianism in question, politics, power, ethics, eds. M.  Barnett and T.  G. Weiss, Cornell University Press. Castles, S. (2003). The international politics of forced migration. Socialist Register, 39, 172–192. CC. (2023). Catholic Charities Refugee Services. Retrieved March 26, 2023, from https://www.catholiccharitiesaz.org/refugee-­assistance CC. (2017). Catholic Charities Community Services Vision and Mission. Retrieved May 6, 2017, from https://www.catholiccharitiesaz.org/about-­us/ vision-­and-­mission Census. (2022). QuickFacts, Arizona. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/AZ/INC110221 Critelli, F. M. (2008). The impact of September 11th on immigrants in the United States. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 6(2), 141–167. Daniels, R. (2001). American immigration, a student companion. Oxford University Press.

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Department of State. (2017). The reception and placement program. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from https://2009-­2017.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm Department of State. (2023). U.S. refugee admissions program: Reception and Placement. Retrieved March 26, 2023, from https://www.state.gov/refugee-­ admissions/reception-­and-­placement/ DES. (2017). Arizona Refugee Resettlement Program. Retrieved July 10, 2017, from https://des.az.gov/services/aging-­and-­adult/arizona-­refugee-­resettlement-­ program Fassin, D. (2007, September). Humanitarianism as a politics of life. Public Culture, 19(3), 499–520. Firestone, D. (2001, November 28). A nation challenged: The immigrants; U.S. makes it easier to detain foreigners. New York Times. Retrieved August 12, 2017, from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/us/a-­nation-­ challenged-­the-­immigrants-­us-­makes-­it-­easier-­to-­detain-­foreigners.html Gronbjerg, K. A. (2001, June). The U.S. nonprofit human service sector: A creeping revolution. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30(2), 276–297. Haines, D. (2010). Safe haven? A history of refugees in America. Kumarian Press. Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. IRC. (2016). How to help refugees in Phoenix. Retrieved June 14, 2022, from https://www.rescue.org/press-release/now-time-embrace-our-on-humanity Iskashitaa. (2022). About us. Iskashitaa Refugee Network. Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://www.iskashitaa.org/about-­us. Kaldor, M. (2014). Human security. In M.  Kaldor & I.  Rangelov (Eds.), The handbook of global security policy (pp. 85–103). Wiley Blackwell. La Frontera. (2017). What we do. Retrieved June 26, 2017, from http://lafronteraaz.org/what-­we-­do/carf-­accredited-­programs/ Lee, E. (2006). A nation of immigrants and a gatekeeping nation: American immigration law and policy. In A companion to American immigration, ed (pp. 5–36). Blackwell. Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy, dilemmas of the individual in public services. Russell Sage Foundation. LSS-SW. (2017). About us. Retrieved April 25, 2017, from http://www.lss-­sw. org/about/about-­us/ LSS-SW. (2023). Refugee & Immigration Services. Retrieved March 26, 2023, from https://www.lss-­sw.org/refugeeservices Mead, L. M. (1997). The rise of paternalism. In L. M. Mead (Ed.), The new paternalism, supervisory approaches to poverty (pp. 1–39). Brookings Institution Press. Mead, L. M. (1998). Telling the poor what to do. Public Interest, 132, 97–112. Retrieved May 20, 2017, from https://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/telling-­the-­poor-­what-­to-­do Nawyn, S.  J. (2006). Faith, ethnicity, and culture in refugee resettlement. American Behavioral Scientist, 49(11), 1509–1527.

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OIG. (2005). Report of audit review of Lutheran immigration and refugee service’s reception and placement program. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from https://www. stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/aud_cg-­05-­28_1.pdf ORR. (2022). The Refugee Act. Office of Refugee Resettlement. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/policy-­guidance/refugee-­act Payton, R. L., & Moody, M. P. (2008). Understanding philanthropy, its meaning and mission. Indiana University Press. PRM. (2016, September 15). Report on proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year 2007. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Retrieved April 30, 2017, from https://2009-­2017.state.gov/documents/organization/262168.pdf Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone, the collapse and revival of American community. Simon & Schuster. Ramalingam, B., & E. Mendizabal, & E. S. van Mierop. (2008). Strengthening humanitarian networks: Applying the network functions approach, background note. Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved June 25, 2017, from https:// www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-­a ssets/publications-­o pinion-­ files/831.pdf Refugee Act of 1980. (2015). United States Refugee Act of 1980. Retrieved August 27, 2015, from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-­94/ pdf/STATUTE-­94-­Pg102.pdf Ritchie, N., & Rogers, P. (2007). The political road to war with Iraq, Bush, 9/11 and the drive to overthrow Saddam. Routledge. Rose, N. (1993). Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism. Economy and Society, 22(3), 283–299. Rose, N. (2000). Government and control. British Journal of Criminology, 40(2), 321–339. RPC. (2023a). Refugee Admission Report as of February 28, 2023. Retrieved March 24, 2023, from https://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-­and-­arrivals/ RPC. (2023b). Refugee arrivals by state and nationality as of 2022. Retrieved March 3, 2023, from https://www.wrapsnet.org/archives/ Salamon, L. M. (2012). The resilient sector: The future of nonprofit America. In L. M. Salomon (Ed.), The state of nonprofit America (2nd ed.). Brookings Institution Press. Soss, J., Fording, R. C., & Schram, S. F. (2011). Disciplining the poor, neoliberal paternalism and the persistent power of race. The University of Chicago Press. Tipton, S. M. (2008). Public pulpits, methodists and mainline churches in the moral argument of public life. The University of Chicago Press. Van Selm, J. (2014). Refugee resettlement. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.), In the Oxford handbook of refugee & forced migration studies (pp. 512–525). Oxford University Press.

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Interviews U/32m, volunteer for resettlement agencies in Tucson, 2015. JM/50/m, one of the founders of Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship in Phoenix, 2015. Public officials from Arizona Department of Economic Security in Phoenix, 2015. Director, Catholic Charities Community Services in Tucson, 2015a. Program Coordinator, Catholic Charities Community Services in Phoenix, 2015a. Program Supervisor, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus program in Tucson, 2015. Director, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus program in Phoenix, 2015b. Program Coordinator of the International Rescue Committee in Phoenix, 2015b. Executive Director of the International Rescue Committee in Phoenix, 2015. Representative of Noor Women’s Association in Tucson, 2015. Representative of Tucson Refugee Ministry in Tucson, 2015. Founder of Iskashitaa Refugee Network in Tucson, 2015. Supervisor for La Frontera Arizona in Phoenix, 2015. Program Director for Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship in Phoenix, 2015.

CHAPTER 3

A Politics of Refugee Lives

The humanitarian governance of forced migration preserves diversity in the implementation of the refugee resettlement and reception phase, and exhibits a paternalistic, philanthropic, and faith-based nature, acting without recourse to refugees’ consent to make refugees self-sufficient. Resettlement agencies, voluntary organizations, community-based associations, and professional service providers constitute a wide network in Arizona and undertake the post-resettlement process as constitutive agents so that all practices and implementation contribute to the formation of a politics of refugee lives, affect, change, shape and transform refugees’ lifestyles, habits, social and cultural interactions as well as, in the broadest meaning, their integration into the American community. At this point, the other side of the coin inevitably draws our attention to the refugee experience or refugee condition to voice their stories and experiences in this process. Therefore, the experiences of Iraqi refugees deserve a comprehensive analysis, closely linked to the concept of humanitarian governance. Such an analysis is key to understanding the humanitarian governance of refugees under the influence of forced displacement. Understanding the nature of forced migration lays down at the core of refugee experience as a beginning point. Stephen Castle (2003) explains forced migration in North–South division and underlines the role of “the powerful Northern states” and “the intergovernmental agencies” for the prevention of forced migration, but, on the other hand, links it to economic migration contextually. As slightly touched upon previously, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Deli, Iraqi Refugees in the United States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7_3

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humanitarianism or humanitarian efforts surface with social, political, and economic linkages to forced migration for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of people in various contexts of humanitarian governance. However, this understanding gains a new dimension in the fragile relationship between development and humanitarianism and Castle (2003, p. 19) underlines this new dimension as a task of “the transformation of whole societies in order to prevent conflict and to achieve social and economic change” since the dialectical relationship between humanitarian action and military intervention substantially alters the social and economic structures of society and requires the transformation of the whole society for the Northern countries, the ultimate goal of which is going to change society as a whole through value systems and political structures for the sustainability of development (Castles, 2003; Duffield, 2001). In this logic, forced migration also takes us to a point where “the social and cultural diversity of populations” in the Northern countries needs to be understood in relation to the process of how “social transformation” takes place and of “the proliferation of transnational communities” emerges out (Castles, 2003). The relevance of humanitarian governance for development, economic growth, global capitalism, and so on is obvious when the implementation of self-sufficiency policy is closely examined. In the social and economic organization of humanitarian governance, the hegemonic capacity of the Northern countries over “rough states” helps demonstrate how forced migration appears as a form of the “asylum–migration nexus” in the North–South distinction. Moreover, this hegemonic relationship triggers the reproduction of forced migration while managing the process of social transformation at national and international levels. In this process, the United States, as a hegemonic power, forms the humanitarian governance of forced migration to maintain its own development in the asylum–migration nexus. Therefore, refugees and migrants come into the picture as active agents of humanitarian governance; they take place in the social transformation of both asylum country and destination country as refugees and workers respectively. Under the consequences of forced migration, the admission and reception of refugees and immigrants to the destination country also embraces their labor recruitment process. Within this process of social transformation, the paternalistic nature of humanitarian governance surfaces in all phases of refugee experiences. Refugees undertake uncertainties during their stay in asylum countries while waiting for their resettlement into a third country. Right after the

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admission of refugees to safe countries, they begin experiencing a different level of uncertainties concerning their lives. Uncertainty as a form of humanitarianism builds up their experiences under the consequences of forced migration and their experiences mirror the social transformation of the countries which both force them to leave and admits them to live. At the heart of this process, Didier Fassin’s argument on the politics of life as a functional concept enables us to see how they experience uncertainties during their journey to the United States. At first sight, it is obvious that the system exists to assume the “best interest” of refugees in a “paternalistic” approach (Barnett, 2012) in the post-resettlement area and Iraqi refugees are subject to a sort of a politics of life by the American authorities. As touched upon earlier, Fassin (2007) provides us with an insight of a politics of life bringing the case of Iraq to the fore with reference to humanitarian intervention. Based on his definition of the humanitarian politics of life, “victims” are the subject of the whole process in which humanitarian action takes place between the powerful and the weak and “the sacred life of the Western armies of intervention, in which each life lost is counted and honored.” Here, the politics of life does not “give equal value to all lives” because of the threat to “the civilian population” by military intervention. Therefore, humanitarian organizations aim to establish a politics of life to provide solidarity and equality for humanity, but it is not easy to consider “the triple problematic of the humanitarian politics of life” since “First, it distinguishes lives that may be risked (humanitarian agents) from lives that can only be sacrificed (the populations among whom they intervene): this is illustrated by the Iraqi case. Second, within the movement itself it separates lives into those with higher value (expatriate humanitarian workers) and those that are accorded only limited protection (national staff): this is what the abductions starkly reveal. Third, it establishes a distinction between lives that can be narrated in the first person (those who intervene) and lives that are recounted only in the third person (the voiceless in the name of whom intervention is done): testimony, operating as an autobiographical account for the former and the construction of a cause for the latter, reveals this split.” (Fassin, 2007, p. 519) On this basis, Fassin underlines that humanitarianism is associated with a critical point which comes out as a problem of “inequality” as part of “a hierarchical manner the values of human lives” (2007, p. 519). Following Fassin’s argument on humanitarian intervention as a politics of life, the

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same logic of humanitarian intervention reproduces a complex form of a politics of refugee lives in the post-resettlement area since humanitarian organizations undertake the responsibility to “give equal value to all lives” in Arizona, on the other hand they know they work “victims” of war and they also know the fact that the United States “selected” and “saved” their lives by admitting them to the country. The most important thing is that all in all, the paternalistic implementation of humanitarian action is decisive to expand the definition of a politics of life to that of a politics of refugee lives considering the Iraqi refugees’ experiences in Arizona. Considering the refugee experience within the framework drawn by Fassin, it represents a relationship based on the lives saved because of the humanitarian intervention, the relationship between refugees and humanitarian action workers, and the testimony of those who intervene. However, in this understanding, refugees are no longer “victims” in the post-­ resettlement context which both removes the condition of being a victim and expands the condition of equality. Thus, refugees experience this process as witnesses of their own lives, and this politics of refugee lives allows us to explain it fully.

Saved Lives: Why Iraqis Left Their Home Country? Iraq has undergone a massive social transformation under the influence of military interventions and armed conflicts in different historical processes. Chatelard (2009a, pp. 4, 13–23) illustrates the social transformation in a context related to the fact that “traces of forced migration can be traced back to the 1920s” and adds that half a million Iraqis left their country permanently between 1990 and the end of 2002 due to various reasons such as the economic embargo, the decline in living standards, the increasing of arbitrariness, coercion and physical pressure, the prevention of the return of those who had sought refuge in Iran, and the assassination attempts on Shi’te political groups (the Da’wa party). The experience of many Iraqi refugees who forcibly migrated to the United States from Iraq starting in the 1990s plays a key role in our understanding of the conditions in Iraq as well as in revealing the nature of the forced departure of these refugees. One of my interviewees, JM/50/m who had witnessed Iraq in the 1990s and left his country right after the first Gulf War shares his experiences in the following manner:

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It was 1991. I was a party to an uprising against the regime of Saddam Hussein. After the regime crushed the uprising, we did not have a choice. If we stay, we will be prosecuted, maybe we will be put in jail by the dictator regime if we stay in Iraq. So, I decided to leave the country. I heard, after the first Gulf War, the United States army, and the coalition army on the border of Iraq with Saudi Arabia. So I walked to cross the desert to the border and it took seven days to get there. I found thousands of people in the same situations. All of us young, I was 23 years old when I crossed the desert. There were thousands of young guys who left their home because we didn’t want to be punished by the regime.

From JM’s statement, opponents of the regime faced many difficulties regarding freedom of demonstration and expression. In other words, the regime undermined their fundamental human rights. As a result, he left his country due to physical safety and security problems and fear of imprisonment. Another interviewee I/69/m explains his experiences as follows: I was in Iraq. For many years, I escaped from Saddam’s brutality. I did not want to join the military in Iraq, and I always hid at my sister’s home. I never got out of the house. I had the opportunity and managed to come to Turkey.

I/69/m points to the regime’s brutality which forced him to do a compulsory military service and his rejection of being a part of the regime’s crimes. He several times tried to escape and left Iraq before the beginning of 2000s. His emphasis on the regime’s mistreatment against people was often underlined by the interviewees. A/50/m who arrived in Arizona right after the first Gulf War also spoke of sectarian violence and financial difficulties in the following statement: You know, Saddam Hussein was a president. We had more problems. Everybody. Specifically, I am a Shia, Muslim. Unfortunately, the economy went from bad to worse, and then no job. If you talk about anything, you will go to jail. This is why I left my family to go to Jordan.

The intertwining of security and economic problems in the early 1990s resulted from the repressive nature of the regimes and the embargo imposed as part of American foreign policy. At this point, the increasing social and political tension between Shiite groups, Kurdish regions, and political opponents has led to the social transformation of Iraq as an incentive for forced migration. The Iraqi state was in economic decline and the

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political climate of the state did not have positive indicators for Iraqis. People started to leave Iraq because there were many reasons for their mobility. By the early 1990s, it was clear to the Iraqi people that their country would not be able to maintain its level of prosperity and would only get worse. Since the regime’s political pressure on dissidents and some other ethnic and religious groups signaled the severity of human rights violations, social, economic, and political reasons were intertwined in this process. As a matter of fact, the underlying reasons for social transformation stated by the interviewees stem from the transformation of the Iraqi state over time. Kaldor (2007) distinguishes a new war from an old war by pointing to the process of state disintegration rather than the process of establishing a state. It can be stated that the Iraqi state was in the process of disintegration between the 1990s and the end of 2002, due to the fact that the regime and the state were intertwined as Kaldor also implies. More importantly, these years witnessed the facilitation of the social transformation of Iraqi society under the influence of the social and ideological dynamics of globalization. Besides, this process of social transformation is a harbinger of a new war that will break out in the 2000s, and then new wars will change the lives of Iraqis deeply. In this framework, with reference to Castles (2006), this social transformation forms the basis of forced migration from Iraq to other countries. Amnesty International’s report (AI, 1997) on Iraq reveals that “about 580,000 Iraqis who came in several waves in 1975, the 1980s and in 1991” fled abroad to seek asylum in the Middle East and Western countries. Under these conditions, Iraqis’ sense of belonging to their country was damaged and many left their homes. By 2003, the US had led to the abolition of the regime and the emergence of disguised social and political tension was devastating for Iraqis. Citing from Dawod and Bozarslan, Chatelard (2009b, p. 4) underlines: The global social organization of Iraqi migration has been shaped as much by the nature of the coercion subsequent Iraqi regimes have exerted upon the society—by fragmenting the population along corporate lines based on kinship, religion, ethnicity but also ideological orientations and class, and by exerting control upon the mobilities of individuals.

Unfortunately, Iraq has remained mired in a vicious conflict where ethnic, religious, and ideological factions have taken their positions to fight for their “identity.” The ongoing social and political atrocities continued

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with the emergence of a new war, as Kaldor puts it. It has turned into a bloody conflict with no winner. As Kaldor points out, “you can’t win a new war. If you go to war, all you do is make the war worse—that’s what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq” (2007, p. 18). Moreover, this new war continued as a mechanism that has reproduced forced migration. In 2015, when I was doing my field research, Iraqi refugees in Arizona were talking about the dire consequences of the ongoing conflict and the thousands of people still seeking to leave Iraq. Refugees who fled Iraq and resettled in the United States after 2003 mostly pointed to the consequences of escalating ethnic and sectarian conflicts. One of the interviewees, NS/32/m, who left Iraq in 2011, explains his and his family members’ experience as follows: I fled to Turkey because we have relatives in Turkey. These people were here before we came and they tell us that if they need help applying as refugees, you can come to Turkey. You can apply to Turkey, and you go to a third country because our country is completely destroyed, you cannot live over there. Because I am from Sunni religion, and I cannot really live over there. We got threats from different people, and we don’t know them.

As one of the thousands of families who left their country, it is clearly seen from the expression that kinship relations are determinant in their decision to seek asylum in Türkiye. This is one of the general conclusions for Iraqis that strong extended family and kinship relationships are one of the main sources of information among refugees. Therefore, one of the main factors determining the asylum decision is that the information obtained through these kinship relations plays a decisive role for Iraqis in the decision to seek asylum. Second, there is a situation in Iraq arising from not knowing where and how the risks and the uncertainty of violence will come. This violence, of unknown origin and targeting everyone, forcing families and communities to leave their regions, targets civilians and emerges as a result of ethnic and sectarian divisions and conflicts. While this theoretically points to the dynamics of the new war process underlined by Kaldor, it is a period of huge threat that hinders and affects the continuation of daily life in Iraq. Ferris (2008, p. 1) also points to the gravity of the situation in Iraq by analyzing the case of displacement and security in the following manner:

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Since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes because of fear—fear of sectarian violence, fear of coalition forces, fear of bandits and kidnappers. Many leave because they have been targeted by sectarian militias or because of explicit threats to their lives. Some leave because they cannot get medical care inside Iraq, because their children cannot go to schools, or because their businesses are no longer sustainable.

The existence of violence that has emerged and is not clear has created an atmosphere of fear. From the perspective of the Geneva Convention and international law, this constitutes concrete conditions for a wellfounded fear that compels people to leave their country. Two important themes that stand out in these concrete conditions are the inability to ensure safety and security in public space. D/51/m, one of the interviewees who left Iraq in 2009, has been living in Arizona with his family for about seven years, longing for his homeland, and tells how and from whom the threat he faced came from because he is an Ezidi: ISIS, I received a lot of threats that they will kill us. I received a lot of letters saying that they put letters, they wanted to kidnap my kids. My kids didn’t go to school because of ISIS and threats. We went to Turkey to apply for UN program for refugees.

To put it bluntly, they have survived daily violence and trauma and their only alternative was to flee their country. However, like the majority of the interviewees, this family was worried about their extended family members, stating that they actually spent every day thinking about their relatives in Iraq. Iraq’s social transformation can be explained by broken families, uncertainty, and risks. In particular, the violence that spread to the whole society, especially the Ezidis and Christians, has caused irreparable damage. Violence and uncertainty have targeted the identities that make up Iraq’s diversity. ISIS terrorized social and economic life and the feeling of insecurity, which has been stagnant since 2003, has spread rapidly to all areas of life. This process is described by O/32/m in the following words: I left my country because there is no safety and when I get up and go to work, maybe I can come back, maybe I cannot come back to home because of the situation. There is no work, there is no money, Baghdad is not secure,

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and we cannot live in Iraq. Because of these reasons, I left the country because there is violence between religions, and I left my home. The reason is that I left Iraq and I came to Turkey.

In this environment of uncertainty and insecurity, although the experiences of Iraqi refugees are to some extent common, the weight of the gender category in the refugee experience is indisputably very important, along with ethnic and religious factors. Nadje Sadig Al-Ali’s prosperous book Iraqi Women illustrates the changing social status of Iraqi women over time and shows how their social status has changed due to the economic embargo in the years after the first Gulf War, by national and regional politics and by the “social conservatism” implemented by the regime in the 1990s as well as points to the declining direction of their mobility in public life by adding that: Girls, especially, suffer in a climate where patriarchal values were strengthened and where the state abandoned its previous policies of social inclusion vis-à-vis women. In the midst of the inversion of moral values and cultural codes, economic hardships and political repression, more and more women and men turned to religion for comfort…not only has there been a growing trend towards religiosity by women, but women have also been subjected to increasing social pressures that expect and demand the expression of religious adherence. For women this often culminates in the question of whether to wear the hijab or not—the hijab being the most visible and obvious sign of religious adherence and supposedly good moral conduct. (Al-Ali, 2007, p. 203)

Between the 1990s and 2000s, Iraqi women lost their status in social, economic, and civil life, and they became a group that felt deeply the pressure of the regime. In 2003, with the US military intervention in Iraq, women began to be exposed to uncontrolled violence by different groups. Al-Ali (2007, p. 240) explains this situation as follows: In 2004, reports from several cities around Iraq stated that Islamist extremists were targeting universities by threatening and even attacking female students who were wearing Western-style fashions, setting off bombs on campuses and demanding that classes be segregated by sex. Thousands of female students decided to postpone their studies after bombs exploded in a number of universities.

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After 2003, women and children were caught in a decentralized atmosphere of violence. This violence, which permeated all areas of life, is directly related to the disintegration process of the state. Sassoon (2009, p. 14) also underlines this as follows: “Once the state had collapsed and its institutions, which were run mainly by a secular urban cadre, had disintegrated, ethnicity and tribalism took over.” Under these conditions, the most important indicator that defines this process is gender-based violence against women and girls. Reporting violence against women in this period, MADRE (2007, pp. 7–8) expresses this fact statistically as follows: “More than 400 Iraqi women were abducted and raped in the first four months of the US occupation” and similarly explains the violence that other groups were subjected to as follows: Violence against women is a primary weapon in the arsenal of fundamentalists of various religions, who seek to impose their political agenda on society. Often, the first salvo in a war for theocracy is a systematic attack on women and minorities who represent or demand an alternative or competing vision for society. In Iraq, women, Christians, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual, and intersex (LGBTTI) Iraqis have been among the Islamists’ first targets of violence. For example, the Mujahadin Shura Group vows to kill any woman seen in public without a headscarf. Mujahadin Shura listed among its reasons for opposing the January 2005 Iraqi elections the need to prevent Iraq from becoming homosexual.

Under these historical conditions, which summarize the situation of Iraqi refugee women and the discrimination suffered by other groups, the experiences of Iraqi women refugees require a separate evaluation. The violence environment in Iraq and gender-based violence suffered by women are traced in the interview results of Iraqi women refugees in Arizona. One of the interviewees, B/31/f, tells how she experienced the process in Iraq as a woman: Because the situation in Iraq is very bad. Someone told me in a threatful manner that I should wear the hijab. So, I was afraid, and I left the country because I do not like to wear the hijab. I finished my bachelor’s degree and left the country and went to Jordan and stayed there for six years.

Most of the women stated that they were forced to wear the hijabs and that they left Iraq because of the interference in their lifestyles and threats to their lives, but this was not the only reason to leave the country but also

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it was not possible to build a future in Iraq as a woman. The atmosphere of psychological violence and fear created by decentralized violence in Iraq has forced both women and single women with children to leave the country. By the same token, Z/47/f tells her experience after the military intervention: “In Iraq, no safety, war. My husband died in the war. I was alone and I left my country and went to Syria and stayed there for 7 years.” The negative impact of violence over women, children, and families enables us to analyze forced migration as a stratified process rather than an immediate outcome. This environment of decentralized violence led to many consequences for women who lost their spouses and relatives in violence and conflict, and many were in the position of seeking asylum for the safety of their children first and then for their future. Explaining the reasons for leaving Iraq after her husband’s death, the interviewee M/48/f explains it as follows: I lost my husband in the war. I have a minor son. I was always caring about him. We were threatened as well after my husband passed away. To protect my son, I went to Dubai and stayed there for eight months.

Another woman interviewee, FD/57/f describing the reasons why she and her family members left Iraq, also draws attention to the devastating impact of religious groups over their profession and work: I had a hard time before leaving Iraq, especially in 2008. I was a lawyer. I worked with an American company as a legal adviser. So, they, some people from Iraq considered me like an enemy because I worked for Americans, even my work is civil work. That is, I left my country. I went to Jordan and spent two years there.

In the atmosphere of “fear” and “hatred” created by the new war that Kaldor (2006, pp. 7–9) underlines, Iraqi women became targets because of their identities and were subjected to pressure from various groups. At the same time, as MADRE (2007) underlines, it was not possible for them to exist as equal individuals in the public sphere. From this point of view, instead of the claimed democracy or freedom, there was a great chaos prevailed in Iraq. Moreover, from the perspective of the asylum–migration nexus pointed out by Castles, this military intervention triggered poverty and anti-development consequences in Iraq, adding other compelling reasons such as unemployment, poverty, political pressure to the security, and

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protection needs. As a result, Iraqis had ample reasons to seek asylum and Iraqi women also had other reasons such as fleeing gender-based violence against their woman identity.

Living in Uncertainty: Asylum Condition The process that begins after Iraqis have made the decision to leave their country is the stage where the humanitarian governance process discussed in this book essentially becomes operational. At this point, Iraqis are moving to the country where they will seek asylum in search of security and safety. As can be seen in some of the above interviews, there are Iraqi refugees seeking asylum from different countries, some in Türkiye, some in Lebanon, some in Egypt, and so on. In this sense, non-governmental organizations, and international non-governmental organizations, especially the asylum procedures of states, UNHCR and other UN agencies, take part and act as the main mechanisms of humanitarian governance. Asylum countries, also defined as transit countries, are countries where refugees have to reside until they are resettled in a third country. During this compulsory residency period, refugees await assessment and completion of resettlement consideration for one of the countries that admit the refugees, usually America, Canada, and European countries. Known as the asylum process or international protection procedure, it is full of uncertainties and contradictions in different countries. As Norman (2019, p. 51) indicates, “the case of Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey” enables us to fathom how host states implement “a policy of indifference” which is based on “minimal government intervention” and “relying on international organizations to provide primary services.” Such an approach does not bring a standard implementation of asylum procedures and humanitarian assistance to refugees but leads to “uncertainties” under which they remain in limbo during their stay. On the other hand, similarly, refugees who want to complete these processes in European countries are exposed to uncertainty in asylum procedures. This issue was underlined by Brekke (2004), who examined the situation of refugees in Sweden. This book includes interviews conducted with Iraqi refugees who had completed their asylum process in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries neighboring Iraq. At this point, the experiences of refugees in the countries of asylum vary according to the social, cultural, economic, and legal conditions of the country they take refuge in. In

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other words, we can say that a group of people who were “saved” during the politics of life before they were placed in Arizona and those who were “selected” later reached Arizona. It should be noted that at the first stage, the refugees started this process by applying to the state from which they sought asylum and to UNHCR during their stay in their country of asylum. In the interviews conducted within the scope of this book, the interviewees stated that they resided in asylum countries for more than two years on average and waited for their applications to be concluded. It is a fact that during these two years, refugees needed financial and in-kind support in many fields, including humanitarian aid. UNHCR report on Humanitarian Needs of Persons Displaced within Iraq and Across the Country’s Borders: An international response analyzes this issue very closely and provides detailed information on the situation in the countries of Syria and Jordan and underlines that: Iraqis are facing the problem of dwindling resources and are finding it progressively more difficult to sustain themselves. Many have overstayed their visas and have become illegal residents, at risk of detention and deportation. Refugee households have limited access to medical treatment. Children are either unable to attend school or facilities are so overcrowded that they cannot accommodate new pupils. Some host countries allow Iraqis to enroll in private schools, but most families do not have the means to do so. Ensuring access to education is critical for displaced children, as it offers structure, stability and hope for the future, during a time of crisis, and provides protection against exploitation and abuse. (2007, p. 9)

Evaluating refugees’ stay in asylum countries within the scope of humanitarian governance provides how we should understand the “safe haven,” which includes the expectations of refugees and where they expect to be resettled, as a destination. In other words, asylum countries or transit countries are not safe havens in the eyes of refugees. The factors that constitute the material condition of this perception are the existence of various uncertainties about the opportunities and conditions provided by the states of asylum countries to the refugees. However, asylum countries, as part of the international protection regime, constitute components of global governance. In this context, examining the situation of these countries through two characteristics of human governance is possible. First, Barnett (2013) already implies that there is an organized effort to alleviate human suffering in this global governance and humanitarian

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organizations in partnership with the state and other stakeholders undertake responsibilities to achieve their objective to deliver humanitarian aid. In this regard, the responsibility of UN agencies and international organizations can be evaluated from different angles. For instance, Sassoon (2009, p. 116) points out the risks and security problems to which UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organizations might be exposed in Iraq for their humanitarian assistance, and many prefer continuing these activities in mainly Jordan to provide assistance to Iraqis. Nevertheless, this situation itself indicates the strength of the organized humanitarian governance in different regions and countries to alleviate human suffering. Secondly, it is not possible to state that the content and functioning of human governance is internally “good, emancipatory or dominant” (Barnett, 2013). In other words, we can examine the experiences of Iraqi refugees in the countries of asylum, mostly within the borders determined by the state and in the context of power relations in which both international organizations and non-governmental organizations are active. From this point of view, it can be explained by determining what is in the “best interest” of refugees, which is the basic logic of humanitarian governance. However, this is often experienced with difficulties in accessing rights and adequate humanitarian assistance in an area full of uncertainties for refugees within the confines of the international protection regime. The provision of an international protection regime points to a long wait or protracted situation for Iraqi asylum seekers and in many respects uncertainty. As stated earlier, they expect humanitarian aid, support, and resettlement during their protracted conditions. States, UN agencies, and international non-governmental organizations appear to be responsible actors in deciding the volume of this humanitarian aid. The burden of the Iraqi refugees’ long waiting and constant need for humanitarian assistance was not shared satisfactorily by many countries of asylum. Therefore, refugees were doomed to uncertainty in many areas, from access to basic needs, to the labor market, to health services. From the perspective of the asylum–migration nexus, the material conditions of such a long waiting and uncertainty can only be considered in the context of refugees’ deprivation of social and economic rights. This process, which is identified with the temporary nature of waiting in the asylum country, is also experienced by refugees as a temporary process. In humanitarian governance in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Türkiye, and other Middle East countries, refugees approach the UNHCR, the state and the

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American authorities to initiate their asylum or asylee application, and all these procedures may take longer than expected. The fact that Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon are not parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention (Sassoon, 2009) can be determined as an important criterion for the functioning of humanitarian governance. For example, the fact that Türkiye is a party to the Convention is also an important variable in this process, because this is the area of the influence of international organizations such as the UNHCR in the organization and delivery of international protection and humanitarian aid determines its efficiency, or power. On the condition that the state does not regulate the procedures for the determination of legal status of refugees and types of assistance to them, the UNHCR may develop the strategies and procedures for refugee registration, status determination, and resettlement in collaboration with state authorities. All these conditions form the basis of the long-term experiences of refugees in asylum or transit countries like Jordan, Syria, and Türkiye. On this basis, one of the interviewees, A/50/m explains his stay in Jordan in the process as follows: I stayed in Jordan for a year and half. It was very difficult for me to stay in Jordan. I applied to the UN, I had to prove I was against Saddam’s regime. They accepted me as a refugee.

Although the waiting period mentioned by the interviewee is relatively short, the element that he defines as proof is linked to the status determination process, which includes whether he fulfills the eligibility conditions to be granted refugee status in line with the 1951 Geneva Convention. It is also not possible to be evaluated for resettlement processes unless refugee status is granted. Therefore, it is important in this sense that he states that he is “accepted as a refugee.” Another interviewee, FD/57/f, had to flee from Iraq with her family due to security reasons and she had worked for an American company running in Iraq and thus she went through a special procedure for the obtainment of the US visa in asylee procedures. She explains her main challenges as follows: I spent two years in Jordan. Since we applied to get permission to live in Jordan, we were waiting to get a final letter to say yes, you are eligible for two years. Jordan, it is Islam, it is a Muslim country. It is the same, familiar culture. But the problem is that they didn’t allow me to work as a lawyer. I tried but I couldn’t. Staying without work is super hard. And I put my

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daughter, of course, in a private school because education in the public schools was not good. Then I had a son, he was studying in the university of Jordan. He got a degree in civil engineering in Iraq, and he got a master’s degree in Jordan. Of course, I had to spend money for their education. They considered them like internship students. I worked a lot in Iraq. I had money to cover all these fees. But not for more time. Finally, I got to live, we have been here since 2008.

While the main task undertaken by UNHCR and other international organizations has been to contribute to the creation of the safe environment for refugees, in line with one of the ethical goals of humanitarian governance, even expressed in abstraction, to relieve the suffering of people and deliver humanitarian aid to them, the UNHCR has a highly professional and expert approach in this sense. However, although this process strives to alleviate the suffering of refugees, which requires humanitarian aid, expertise and supervision at every stage, the process of resettlement to a third country where the uncertainty disappears for refugees is determined by quotas. In this sense, relatively few refugees can complete their resettlement processes and be resettled in a third country. During our interviews, they were remembering their refugee days before the resettlement by referring to their expectations after all the difficulties and challenges they faced in their home country. It may not be appropriate to state that their expectations are high and difficult to meet by the states or the actors of the international protection regime when we focus upon their main problems in a country of asylum. They flee their countries with their beliefs, cultures, political views, vocational knowledge and skills, and hopes. Many of them give priority to their religious affiliation with countries like Jordan, Türkiye, and Egypt. Beyond the socio-cultural intimacy, the majority of the Iraqi refugees underline that they are not allowed to perform their occupation, to work and provide their subsistence under humanitarian conditions. The lack of material sources to meet their needs sufficiently is the basis for their uncertainties. They have to manage their conditions by using their limited sources that may come from their home countries. They also have to live as dependent as possible on the support and assistance provided by the organizations because it is not possible to speak of the certainty of resettlement to a third country. In conditions where even the basic needs of refugees are not met, there is no more predictable reality than the high expectations of refugees

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regarding this process. However, it is a necessity for refugees who have security problems to act according to their networks in the countries of asylum. For example, the reasons for the Iraqi refugees going to Egypt are indicated by Sassoon (2009, pp. 88–89) as follows: “Being cheaper than Jordan and Syria”; “safety and distance from the locus of violence and sectarianism”; and “consideration of Egypt as a transit point given the high number of non-Iraqi refugees who have been resettled from Egypt to third countries.” At this point, one of the most important factors to be underlined is that refugees do not have job opportunities, in other words, they do not have access to the job market in a formal way. This situation, which is also valid for Egypt, is resolved in favor of refugees being able to work informally at least. Access to decent work is the key challenge for Iraqi asylum-seekers and refugees in a neighboring country of asylum. Therefore, many refugees experience poverty and loss of social and economic status during long waiting periods. For this reason, they do not think that Jordan or Egypt is a country to live in under the current conditions. In a succinct manner, MH/47/m explains this as follows: In 2006, I started to live in Egypt. There is no job. It was hard to find any job there. Egypt has a big population, a lot of people who don’t have a job. So, I used to live, my brothers and my father used to send money to support me for myself and my family. It was good days you know, living without a job (laughing), just eating, drinking, going there and there to see the kids going to the school, living in a peaceful environment, secure places, it was good. But, there was no future. That’s why I have applied to the United Nations to be resettled in another country.

However, the emphasis on “a peaceful and safe place” is still remarkable; Iraqi refugees live their lives without proper access to rights and services in a flawed humanitarian environment. The humanitarian network has little to do with the dysfunctionalities of international protection procedures. In this humanitarian governance, Iraqis are led to appreciate the value of being in a safe place without bread and shelter. They did this because they had no other choice. Compared to Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and other Middle East countries, the experiences of the refugees who went through this process in Türkiye are also very similar. However, at this point, the differences in culture and language bring about important distinctions for Iraqis in Türkiye. Like Egypt, Türkiye is a party to the Geneva Convention and has established its

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own national legislation and institutions within the scope of the international protection system. Türkiye has begun to receive refugees from Iraq since the first Gulf War of 1991. UNHCR managed the refugee status determination and resettlement processes during 1990 and 2015 and still deals with the resettlement of refugees into third countries and has emerged as a professional organization providing knowledge and expertise in this field. As mentioned before, although the reasons for coming to Türkiye are similar, the fact that Türkiye is a safe country and a country proximate to Iraq, as well as the fact that Türkiye is more advantageous in the resettlement process as a transit country are among the determining reasons. Iraqi refugees live in urban areas and experience difficulties of both language barrier as one of the main problems and diversity in terms of religion, language, and culture. Considering the situation of Christians and Ezidis, it is a prominent fact that their experiences is quite different from that of Muslims who share a common religious identity. The interview with D/51/m, an Ezidi refugee who fled to Türkiye with his family members and lived in a small province, reveals this as follows: With the beginning of the year of 2007, we stayed like two years in Türkiye before coming to the United States. You know, for every person who lives in his country and goes to another country as a stranger, it is difficult not easy to live in another country. And there are good people and bad people wherever you go outside of your country. You don’t feel comfortable because you’re a stranger. We always think about what will happen to us. The governor was good in that province. We didn’t have any problem with them. The most difficult thing that we faced is that when you say that we are Ezidis, of Ezidis religion, nobody accepts you. We face difficulties when people know we are Ezidis. Another difficulty, because we don’t know Turkish, they tried to use us like if you wanna buy something for one dollar, they say three, four dollars because they know you are foreigner. Even when we tried to rent a house for a good price but when the owner knew that we are Ezidis, he said no, he is not renting. I had to rent a house nobody wanted to rent, but I rented, I need a house as I have my kids with me. Nobody can live in that house. It was in the basement full of insects and scorpions. I had to live because I have kids.

Based on the perception of being a foreigner, besides the difficulties of being outside of their own country, there are also difficulties created by being in a country where the language and culture are different. On the

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other hand, the foreign perception of the host community is also decisive here. In this environment where socialization is very limited, refugees are at high risk of being discriminated against because of their beliefs and identities. It should be noted that the local perception, especially in small cities in Türkiye, is one of the biggest factors in the formation of these discriminatory practices. Another interviewee, RZ/73/m, who was a priest in Iraq and told me about his days in Türkiye in the following words: In the year 2012, I came to Türkiye. Türkiye is a beautiful place, everything is cheap. Telling honestly, Turkish people, some are racist, and some are looking for a religion and sect, discrimination. We are Christians and they were looking at us very disgracefully. They didn’t allow us to make any prayer, all the churches were closed in the city. I needed to pray in my house. We had a religious occasion and people came to my house to pray and I was told by the locals that I shouldn’t do that again… For safety and security, it was so good, health, healthcare was good; benefits and some help were good. I want to share something about this discrimination. I went to a doctor, who asked my name, I told him my name, and there was a translator with me. He asked me if I was Christian. I told I was Christian. The doctor told me to become a Muslim (bu nasıl cümle, the interviewee adds in Turkish) I said we were all brothers.

Tears filled his eyes as he talked about the days he spent in Iraq and Türkiye in the interview. In their “safe haven” in the United States, these people were homesick in a huge longing for their homeland. Without generalizing, he often tried to explain why Turkish people behaved in a racist manner with concrete examples. However, it was clear from his saying that language and culture were the biggest barriers to communication and socialization between refugees and local people in Türkiye and this situation itself plays a negative role that strengthens the perception of being a stranger for both parties. This is exactly as Bauman and May (2001, p. 35) express: “The strangers deny the very validity of the accepted positions… After all, they come into our field of vision and social spaces— uninvited… They are, as it were, neither close nor distant and we do know exactly what to expect of them and ourselves.” Iraqi refugees encounter the host community at every stage of social life, and this encounter is often damaged by prejudice and discriminatory practices, especially when it comes to different religious and ethnic groups. This uncertainty in socialization, being close or distant, opens the door to

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different experiences when it comes to Turkmens and Muslims. The interviewee, DR/36/m, an Iraqi Turkmen in belief of Islam, longed for Türkiye due to his close identification with Turkish culture and lifestyle and expresses his experience as follows: I stayed for two years in Türkiye. I had my best days in Türkiye; that’s everything is nice there. Only they did not give work to refugees there. Working was forbidden there. There was only this situation that was not good there. Otherwise, living and people were nice. There were a lot of people who helped us a lot by saying that you were refugees, you left your country and here we would help you. In Türkiye, the problems I faced were little, that’s it was difficult to find a house to rent. The owners didn’t give their houses to refugees. But, living there was very nice. I didn’t see anything wrong there. I had money with me, I had sold everything in Iraq. I was meeting my family’s needs with this money.

Similar to this Iraqi refugee, who said that he had no problems other than finding a job and renting a house in Türkiye, SH/40/f points to a similar situation: “Only the hard thing was that we couldn’t work, and our paperwork was on hold by the agency, we couldn’t find a job anywhere because we were stuck in one place, that’s the only thing.” As in other asylum countries, access to the labor market is full of hardships in Türkiye and this difficulty also arises from the fact that the work permit procedures must be followed by employers. Therefore, refugees are mostly working informally. However, most refugees use positive expressions regarding humanitarian aid and assistance. H/48/m shares his experience in this regard: I chose Türkiye because, first of all, it is a Muslim country and otherwise, the sound is good, people’s habits are respectful and good. I will never forget my days in Türkiye because of the friendship and good attitude between me and the people there. They helped us and they supported us. They came to my house, they paid for me all the furniture and all the equipment I needed in my house. Also, my daughter gave birth there. One of my neighbors, she slept with my daughter in the hospital. In Türkiye, the kind of work was too hard, twelve hours, and salary and payment were very low. I am an electrical engineer and sometimes some people call me for electric work.

Most of the Iraqi refugees suffered from financial difficulties and poverty during their stay in Türkiye. The results of the interviews also demonstrate that the Iraqi refugees were highly dependent on the assistance from

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the state and international organizations. The refugees who define Türkiye as a cheap country, unlike the majority, come from the middle class or from a class with better economic conditions in Iraq. While the time spent in Türkiye also affects the economic situation of refugees very negatively, on the other hand, long periods spent for some refugees can be seen as an important criterion in explaining their belonging to Türkiye. For example, it is difficult for a refugee whose resettlement process was completed in a very short time to experience the weight of various difficulties and conditions. Therefore, S/38/m, who is an owner of a Middle East restaurant in Arizona, tells his experience with reference to his short stay in Türkiye: I stayed seven months in Turkey. I loved this country. They helped us a lot. When I was there, I didn’t speak any Turkish. But after two, three months, I was able to speak Turkish very well. Turkey is very good. They helped us, gave us ekmek (bread), food. I came from Iraq to Turkey. I was a refugee. We didn’t have a job, that’s why they helped us. I like to go back to visit Turkey.

In case a refugee spends a reasonable time of waiting in a country of origin, it is possible to state that they just have a reference to how people helped them because of their refugee condition and not more. It is clear from my research findings that their perception of being a refugee in a country of asylum is usually identified with the lack of work, citizenship, and future with an emphasis on safety and security. As clearly understood from the words of the Iraqi refugees, they cannot establish their social life in a country of origin; no matter, it is Jordan, Egypt, or Türkiye. Under the implementation of humanitarian governance, the actors of humanitarianism can push the system to a certain point. After that, the refugees face social, cultural, and economic deprivation in their daily lives. The network of UN agencies, international non-governmental organizations, and other organizations in the design of humanitarian governance presents a “politics of life.” That is to say, the humanitarian governance creates “an object” in this process as Fassin points to “the saving of individuals” without putting “others” at risk and finding a “legitimation” to make a decision on who will be saved (2007, p. 508). At this point, I will enlarge this point by putting forward that humanitarian governance leads to a kind of objectification of the uncertainities in a country of origin so that the network of humanitarian organizations cannot overcome the paradox of asylum-seekers and refugees who will be saved and will be left at risk. Unfortunately, the majority of these people will live

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in uncertainty, without being able to make decisions about their own lives unquestionably. In fact, it is also possible to see this process as a part of global governance that teaches people to wait, obey, abdicate, and re-shape their lives and expectations. Nevertheless, the objective limit of their lives is therefore the uncertainty. Whenever they go out in a country of origin, they will see that there is no possibility of having a decent job, no possibility of affording their children’s education forever, no possibility of having lifesustainable assistance in the long-term, and no possibility of having a future. At this point, before concluding my arguments for this part of the study, I will refer to the concept of “temporal regularity” to see how the objectification of uncertainties takes place in the refugees’ experiences. Eviatar Zerubavel explains the term “temporal regularity” while talking about how people put their daily lives in order by managing and using their time effectively. He emphasized that “temporal regularity” “allows us to have certain expectations regarding the temporal structure of our environment, it certainly helps us considerably to develop some sense of orderliness.” He also adds that “temporal irregularity, on the other hand, contributes considerably to the development of uncertainty” (1981, p. 15). In another saying, people need a sense of “orderliness” to be able to make a plan for their lives and more specifically, they need to move in a certain period of time in planning their daily lives to accord themselves to their environment as well. In this perception of temporal regularity, people come with some “expectations” and “time slots” to indicate “the normalcy of our social environment” (1981, pp. 16–23). Experiences in the country of asylum are built on the balance of refugees competing with time, delaying their expectations, and therefore waiting and surviving. One of the power areas of humanitarian governance in the country of asylum manages this uncertainty and refugees’ expectations. How this process will take place and how it will progress depends on the individual situation of the refugees. Therefore, who will be selected and resettled in the United States or in another country is determined by the state, UN agencies, international organizations, but ultimately by the states that will admit refugees to their country for citizenship. In this sense, the granting of citizenship represents the beginning of the normalization of the social environment, while to some extent eliminating the uncertainty. At this point, it should be underlined that there is no system based on the consent of the refugees, that the authorities make the right decision for the best interests of the refugees and determine the politics of their lives. For refugees seeking order, their experiences, and perceptions in the country of asylum can be summed up in three words: Uncertainty, temporality, and survival.

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The American Dream Versus the Refugee Experience Immanuel Wallerstein (2003, pp. 1–2) displays a possible definition of the American dream in his glorious book, The Decline of American Power, in the following way: The American dream does exist and is internalized in most of our psyches. It is a good dream, so good that many others across the world with the same dream for themselves. What is this dream? The American dream is the dream of human possibility, of a society in which all persons may be encouraged to do their best, to achieve their most, and to have the reward of a comfortable life. It is the dream that there will be no artificial obstacles in the way of such individual fulfillment. It is the dream that the sum of such individual achievements is a great social good—a society of freedom, equality, and mutual solidarity. It is the dream that we are a beacon to a world that suffers from not being able to realize such a dream.

Wallerstein emphasizes that all these components are parts of a dream, not reality. However, there is such a dream in souls because many people believe in the existence of the dream, even though there is no such dream. Of course, it is impossible to say how many people have made their American dreams come true by living a comfortable life full of equality, solidarity, and freedom. But still, millions of people come to the United States of America with expectations and hopes, whether by force or voluntarily. So, America is a “beacon to the world” for imagined lives. In fact, the American dream of refugees mostly consists of ideals such as a comfortable life, enjoying equality and freedom. However, these ideals begin before their expectations and are shaped by humanitarian governance. Therefore, as underlined by Garnier et  al. (2016, p.  2), while examining the resettlement process as “a form of humanitarian governance,” it needs to be evaluated beyond “its apparent benevolence and analytical and ethical aspects.” In their new lives following the resettlement process, the refugees’ experiences of whether this dream comes true or not becomes evident. As Wallerstein points out, many refugees internalize this dream and begin to form their expectations before they reach America. These expectations can be studied from the exchange of information among refugees to the impact of historical relations between Iraq and the United States. One of the interviewees, IM/62/m, who has been in Arizona for almost five years, explains his experience in this sense as follows:

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Since my childhood, I will say, I was in Kirkuk at that time. I was very young in my fifteenth. Then there was a bazaar where American sent bags of clothes as aid. That is, Americans were helping our country. I was taking American shirts like cowboy shirts from there. I always had an enthusiasm inside of me to go to America. I hear about Vegas, San Francisco, California. After being a refugee, I learnt many other things about America. After coming here, in a sense, I was happy since I have gotten rid of suffering. America has kept its doors open for us. In return, I have tried to become a good citizen here. I didn’t make any mistakes with my neighbors, environment.

He had repeatedly stressed during our interview that being a good citizen was very important, and he seemed excited and meticulous in his choice of words as he would soon be taking the citizenship test. However, he was grateful and happy that America was a safe place and opened its doors to him. For him, the American Dream is associated with removing the uncertainties in Türkiye and getting rid of the insecure conditions in Iraq. In this sense, the dream of becoming an American citizen means that this dream comes true to a certain extent for all refugees. Iraqi refugees who have become American citizens, on the other hand, evaluate this process from different aspects. The interviewee, Z/47/f, who has been in Arizona for a long time and who is an American citizen, explains how her American Dream has changed over time: I’ve been here for seven years. Before I came here, I saw America on TV. It was nice and green, but what I see here is different from TVs. You have to find a job and help yourself here. I still love Arizona. Better to live here than in Iraq. The government rented me a flat for nine months and gave me 200 $ for six months. Now, I am staying in public housing.

She has the same point of view as IM/62/m. She is grateful to America for being in a safe place, but she knows it’s hard for her to get what she sees on TV.  Being a single woman in the US doesn’t change much for refugees in terms of the sort and duration of humanitarian assistance. After getting assistance from the resettlement agencies for a while, they have to deal with all the hardships and difficulties on their own. It should be underlined that one of the most important factors determining the formation of all these expectations or the American dream in general is gender. To put it more clearly, being a woman or being a single woman is an important factor in experiencing this process. More concretely, M/48/f, shares her experiences about her American dream in the following words:

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I have been here for seven years. Before coming here, I thought that everything would be nice and I would have a good house, but here I found everything is complex and conditions are not good; no assistance or cash assistance was given me, they didn’t give me cash assistance. The only thing I like here is that my son is studying here. I know, America’s assistance in comparison with Europe or Australia is not enough. It should be more consistent. The government supported me for four months and then cut off.

The interview results reveal that evaluations based on the inadequacy of aid and support programs emerge as the most important factor that divides the American dream of refugees. The importance of assistance programs is decisive, especially when considering other barriers to women’s access to the labor market, such as social, cultural, and language barriers. The expectation of long-term financial aid and shelter support programs expected from American authorities forms the basis of refugees’ perception of life in America. However, this expectation contradicts the self-­ sufficiency policy implemented by the United States. All these conditions are unsatisfactory, especially for single women with children. Especially the difficulties in learning English, taking care of their children while working are among the factors that make their life quite difficult in Arizona. Therefore, they have a constant tendency to compare their lives in the United States with their lives in asylum countries. KJ/36/f, who has been living in Arizona for three years but cannot speak English, expresses her conditions: I was expecting to come here to live in a house or be given a house, a monthly income, and a feeling of being happy and safe, but it was the opposite, more problems. After thinking we would get rid of all the issues we faced before, when we arrived here, we faced more problems. It is better to live in Türkiye.

It is an undisputed point emphasized by all interviewees that after all the traumatic experiences they had in Iraq, they have reached a safe and secure place in their lives in Arizona. However, this situation also emerges as a reality that does not fully meet their expectations about America. Uncertainties in the asylum country are replaced by a new process of adapting to new conditions and surviving. However, the fact that they compare the conditions in the asylum country with the conditions in Arizona indicates that they still envisage the conditions within the refugee

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identity. Therefore, they do not think of themselves as the subject of a new life-building process in Arizona. The mechanisms of humanitarian governance to develop a regular program of assistance to refugees with special needs are open to debate. However, as long as the post-resettlement process is not consequently seen as the country where they will spend the rest of their lives and become citizens, they will continue with the understanding that their lives can be dependent on assistance and aid in the United States. Considering that refugees do not have a chance to make a choice regarding the country they will be resettled, humanitarian governance mechanisms decide to place refugees in any country that accepts refugees, not where they preferred to be resettled. Therefore, humanitarian governance provides security first and neglects the rest of the process in which refugees survive. Indeed, this remains an important gap in the operation of humanitarian governance since refugees with specific needs such as persons with disabilities, medical conditions, single parent and so on have difficulty adjusting to living with the neoliberal conditions of social and economic life in America. This is also, as Barnett (2012) underlines, the indication of paternalism since “one actor interferes in the choices of another without her consent.” As a result, refugees are resettled in Arizona or somewhere else without their consent; some destroy their expectations after receiving information from their relatives and friends in America and some others maintain their American dream by upscaling their expectations. The consequences of the paternalistic function of humanitarian governance are also the same as with the resettled refugee families in Arizona. In other words, refugees living with their family members in Arizona do not intend to put aside their expectations in favor of their new lives. For instance, the interviewee, Y/37/f who cannot talk English despite the four years behind and explains her dissatisfaction with the conditions in Arizona: We have been here for four years. Türkiye is more beautiful than here. I was shocked upon our arrival here. I thought that we would be going out. We would have friends and some fun. But it is not. In Türkiye, I had friends, and we were going out. Türkiye is better than here.

Refugees who stated that their social relations in the asylum country were better compared to the social life in America are mostly female refugees. Especially married women’s lives in America are mostly spent at home, dealing with childcare and domestic affairs. Compared to men’s

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daily life, it is difficult for women to find a job and socialize due to social and cultural reasons, which causes them to find life in America boring. Therefore, the expectation of enjoyment and pleasure, which can be considered as part of the American dream, is not realized. Looking at the period between three and five years spent in this process, it should be noted that, as an indicator of the weakness in the level of socialization, their English level is poor, and they cannot learn English at a level to express themselves. It is seen that refugees who learn that they will be resettled in the USA during the post-resettlement process mostly turn to the option of having sponsors, which they use to be resettled in the state where their relatives and friends are resettled. Kinship and friendship relations create solidarity in this process, and refugees want to make their lives easier in America through this channel. Some of the interviewees underscore that they asked their friends and relatives about the conditions in Arizona before their resettlement process is completed. O/32/m, who has been in Arizona for almost three years, says that: We have all our relatives in the US, so I was not thinking of going to Australia or Canada. My guess was I’ll buy a car, get a job when I come to the USA before I come to Arizona, it was my guess because we have relatives here, they tell us what’s going on. After learning that I will be recommended to America, I asked my sponsor, one of my relatives in Arizona, what my rights were in America, and they said that they will provide you with your health insurance and you can also get food stamps and other rights too. I chose this city because my sponsor is here.

Although three years have passed, O/32/m, who does not speak English, says that he has benefited from the information provided by his relatives and that he prefers to live in Arizona with the support of his relatives. It is possible for refugees to submit their sponsor information to the authorities that will decide on the resettlement process, but refugees do not have the opportunity to choose the countries where they will be resettled. However, this sponsor information is taken into account by the authorities when it comes to the state where they will be placed. However, this situation does not constitute an exception to the paternalistic functioning of humanitarian governance, on the contrary, it can be considered as a situation that reduces the pressure on humanitarian governance mechanisms.

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The boundaries of the solidarity established through the sponsor relationship cannot be considered beyond kinship relations. The basis of solidarity here is to get information and assistance about the process of resettlement in America and afterwards. One of the interviewees, SH/40/f, who is with her family members in Arizona, speaks of the assistance provided by her nephew in Arizona: My relative, my nephew, is already a US citizen here and he knows Arizona well. That’s why I requested to come here. The reason I chose to live in a house away from others, also because we have a complex apartment the agency put us in is not that safe. There are some kinds of groups that, like you know, teenage groups make problems around, so we decided to live in a safer place, house. As for other assistance, we got in a lot of trouble because the government benefits after a month were cut for us because we rented a house. So that’s different, we didn’t choose the agency benefit, so it is kind harder to apply for me. I didn’t use the apartment they gave me; the agency gave me 4500 dollars I didn’t use for the rent. I bought the furniture. The agency provided just cash assistance for me. They paid us for the rent for only one month. And then I got food stamps and medical care.

While it is true that close relatives are the primary mechanism by which refugees who do not find the support offered by resettlement agencies suitable for them receive support, it is difficult to say that their information about the support programs provided by the resettlement agencies and state authorities is complete and accurate. At this stage, they prefer the information provided by their networks to professional information. However, this situation affects their decisions and causes them to give up on programs from which they can benefit more. For instance, IM/62/m shares his four years’ experience in Arizona as follows: I have been in Arizona for five years. My sponsors were my siblings here. I didn’t want any assistance from the resettlement agencies. But later, I didn’t want to depend on my siblings, and I found a job and worked. It was difficult for me. I was shocked because America in my dreams was different. In my dreams, life was very beautiful, freedom…etc. Here, freedom is available, but you have to comply with the laws. People like me live with a narrow perspective. They don’t know about the outside, that’s New  York, Washington, California, and Florida since going to these states is very expensive in fact. You cannot have a car to go to those states. You have to take a flight to go to New York, it takes six or seven hours, and it costs a lot

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of money. We are in America but there is a long distance, so I have stayed with this narrow window. And other migrants and refugees are living with this narrow window because of their financial situation.

The main factor that summarizes this whole process and makes them wake up from the American dream is the culture shock and the disappointment experienced at every stage that does not meet the expectations of the refugees. However, there is the human possibility that Wallerstein underlines, and there is a good chance of seizing opportunities in America. However, the possibility of taking advantage of these opportunities and establishing a better future seems to be a dream passed on to the next generations. The purpose of the whole system is, in fact, to enable refugees to become good immigrants and good American citizens, as stated by Haines (2010). This process begins with the alignment and limitation of expectations, making room for a policy of self-sufficiency.

References AI, (1997). The Middle East Fear, flight and forcible exile, Index: MDE/01/01/97, Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ mde01/001/1997/en/ [Accessed on 12.07.2017] Al-Ali, N. S. (2007). Iraqi women, untold stories from 1948 to the present. Zed Books. Barnett, M.  N. (2012, November). International paternalism and humanitarian governance. Global Constitutionalism, 1(3), 485–521. Barnett, M.  N. (2013). Humanitarian governance. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 379–398. Bauman, Z., & May, T. (2001). Thinking sociologically (2nd ed.). Blackwell Publishing. Brekke, J. P. (2004). While we are waiting, uncertainty and empowerment among asylum-seekers in Sweden, Report 10. Institute for Social Research. Retrieved February 16, 2017, from https://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Forskning/ NTG/While%20we%20are%20waiting.pdf Castles, S. (2003). Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation. Sociology, 37(1), 13–34. Castles, S. (2006). Global perspectives on forced migration. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 15(1), 7–28. Chatelard, G. (2009a). Migration from Iraq between the Gulf and the Iraq wars (1990–2003): Historical and socio-spatial dimensions. Working Paper No. 68, University of Oxford. Retrieved July 11, 2017, from https://www.compas. ox.ac.uk/2009/wp-­2009-­068-­chatelard_iraq_migration_1990-­2003/

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Chatelard, G. (2009b). What visibility conceals. Re-embedding Refugee Migration from Iraq. Retrieved July 11, 2017, from https://halshs.archives-­ouvertes.fr/ halshs-­00370980 Duffield, M. (2001). Global governance and the new wars. The merging of development and security. Zed Books. Fassin, D. (2007, September). Humanitarianism as a politics of life. Public Culture, 19(3), 499–520. Ferris, E.  G. (2008, August). The looming crisis: Displacement and security in Iraq. Policy Paper, Number 5. Foreign Policy at Brookings. Retrieved July 12, 2017, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-­looming-­ crisis-­displacement-­and-­security-­in-­iraq/ Garnier, A., Sandvk, K.  B., & Jubilut, L.  L. (2016). Refugee resettlement as humanitarian governance: The need for a critical research agenda. FluechtlingsforschungsBlog. Retrieved January 2, 2016, from http://fluechtlingsforschung.net/refugee-­resettlement-­as-­humanitarian-­governance/ Haines, D. (2010). Safe Haven? A history of refugees in America, Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press. Kaldor, M. (2006). New & old wars (2nd ed.). Polity Press. Kaldor, M. (2007). New wars and human security: An interview with Mary Kaldor. Retrieved July 11, 2017, from https://www.dissentmagazine.org/wp-­ content/files_mf/1391450911d11Kaldor.pdf MADRE. (2007). Promising democracy, imposing theocracy, gender-based violence and the US war on Iraq. An international Women’s Human Rights Organization. Retrieved August 20, 2017, from https://www.madre. org/press-­p ublications/human-­r ights-­r eport/promising-­d emocracyimposing-­theocracy-­gender-­based-­violence Norman, K. P. (2019). Inclusion, exclusion or indifference? Redefining migrant and refugee host state engagement options in Mediterranean ‘transit’ countries. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(1), 42–60. Sassoon, J. (2009). The Iraqi refugees, the new crisis in the middle east. I.B. Tauris. UNHCR. (2007). Humanitarian needs of persons displaced within Iraq and across the country’s borders: An international response. Retrieved February 25, 2017, from http://www.unhcr.org/4627757e2.pdf Wallerstein, I. (2003). The decline of American power, the U.S. in a chaotic world. The New Press. Zerubavel, E. (1981). Hidden Rhythms, schedules and calendars in social life. University of California Press.

Interviews A/50/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. B/31/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015.

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D/51/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. DR/36/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. FD/57/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. H/48/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. I/69/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. IM/62/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. JM/50/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. KJ/36/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. M/48/f, Iraqi woman refugee, 2015. MH/47/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. NS/32/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. O/32/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. RZ/73/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. S/38/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. SH/40/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. Y/37/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. Z/47/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015.

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CHAPTER 4

Self-Sufficiency Policy and the Construction of New Americans in Arizona

The point Iraqi refugees have learned late is that the American dream does not exist. This fact also shows that refugees or immigrants cannot establish a long-term sustainable life if they are dependent on assistance or aid programs run by the Federal Government or the Department of Economic Security. As Haines (2010, p. 143) points out, “no governmental program concerned with refugee adaptation after arrival” and “refugee story of building a new life was not their business.” This is a systematic approach that has developed throughout American history, where the multiple influxes of human societies from the Soviets, Hungary, Vietnam, Cuba, and Southeast Asia took place, and the system has readjusted itself to the requirements of self-sufficiency. The 1980s secured this as a state policy with the enforcement of the Refugee Act of 1980. Given the background of these legal developments, American government has not made any clarification on the concept of self-sufficiency but referred it in the way that Haines (2010, p. 154) indicates as “the absence of receipt of cash assistance by a household,” or “it goes to the heart of public concern about whether refugees are costing anybody any money.” In this sense, the first one is the State Department’s reception and placement program (RRP). The main rationale of the RRP was to transform program goals and targets based on the revision of the national legislation. The 1975 RRP agreement was to resettle refugees into the United States by providing reception and placement assistance and did not appertain to employment or self-sufficiency objectives. The 1979 RRP was also to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Deli, Iraqi Refugees in the United States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7_4

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involve the same objectives, but it did not focus on achieving self-­ sufficiency beyond initial assistance programs. By the 1984 RRP, “the basic program goal was to provide core services to assist refugees to self-­ sufficiency through employment as soon as feasible” (GAO, 1986, pp. 20–21). The bedrock of the RRP agreements was formed on the goal of self-sufficiency. Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982 regulates: “Firstly, employable refugees should be placed in jobs as soon as possible and secondly, social service funds should focus on employment related services” (GAO, 1986, p. 21). Along with the implementation of the RRP, self-sufficiency is regulated as “a 90-day goal” on the grounds of the agreement between resettlement agencies and the State government. In other words, the system commits to assist the refugees in their first 90 days in terms of food, shelter, and cash assistance and promotes their self-sufficiency through employment. As being aware of challenges in practice, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) (1986) reportedly points out “voluntary agencies” face difficulties in achieving such a task of self-sufficiency due to differences in refugees’ personal, social, and economic backgrounds. In addition, considering that a large part of the refugees has a traumatic past, I can put forward that the nature of these programs prioritizes the aim of making them “economically self-sufficient” and subordinates their self-sufficiency in terms of social, cultural, or skills. Since the early 1980s, the United States has streamlined its refugee admission program, citing refugees’ self-sufficiency as the goal. In Arizona, the public official from Arizona Department of Economic Security official explains during our interview how important it is to achieve self-sufficiency: States have to respond to actually pretty simple; some states say more about what you have to basically do is to assure how you gonna provide some mandatory services; how you gonna deliver social services related to case management plan; and how English language training ties to self-sufficiency because self-sufficiency is the driving force in the US refugee program, really critical. Congress really wanted to make sure that refugees are not seen as a burden that they were going to achieve self-sufficiency.

As already mentioned, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) implements a 90-days refugee reception and placement program (RRP) and the voluntary agencies matching grant after program (MGP) is defined as an “alternative to public cash assistance” for

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ORR-eligible populations and also depend upon some benchmarks that are mainly concerned other assistance programs from which the refugees benefit and aims to make refugees and asylees “economically self-sufficient within 120 to 180 days of program eligibility” (ORR, 2022). The director from Catholic Charities Community Services in Tucson in Arizona expounds both the reception placement program and matching grant program in the following way: The first program is the reception and placement program, which is a 90 days program. This three-month program is started when refugees arrive. When they arrive, they pick them up from the airport that the program starts for only three months. Main rationale is, I call this program, initial resettlement program. All refugees admitted by the federal government to come to the United States are in the rule of reception and placement program. This program is managed by the department of the state. The reception and placement program is managed by the office of PRM. PRM is an office of the department of the state, US refugee admission program. PRM provides the funding, money for the reception and replacement program. We provide community orientation. We provide applying orientation. We assist them to apply for food stamps. They have a health screening to be sure that they are healthy. They receive assistance to apply for a social security card. We register them for English learning class and children are registered to schools. We provide transportation and financially support them for three months.

Taken together with the Iraqi refugees’ narratives of the American dreams, this early process marks the beginning of American realities and the refugees get over their initial confusion in this process and later move on to the next steps. My research findings reveal that they feel fear, happiness, anxiety, longing, and so on and experience various thoughts and emotions. In these first 90 days in Arizona, many find a way of taking charge of their own lives so as to survive beyond their high expectations. The matching grant program, which starts after this first aid program and lasts a maximum of 180 days, is the program itself that will enable refugees to become self-sufficient through the employment process. In other words, as underlined above, as a kind of social policy, as a form of street-level public service delivery, refugees are expected to accept the job offered to them at the end of the program. The director from Catholic Charities Community Services in Tucson precisely defines its goal as an “early employment program,” pinpointing the exact scope of the matching grant:

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The second program is a matching grant which is more complicated than RRP and is also funded by the federal government. Matching grant program is an early employment program funded by the department of human health services. Matching grant program is a selective program, early employment program. If you are educated because you have a master’s degree in science, and then you don’t want to be a housekeeper, you are not in the rule of matching grants, because it is an early employment program. We prefer to rule you in matching grants because we want you to start working as soon as possible.

The US refugee admission system does not grant gratis assistance to Iraqi refugees in Arizona. In return, they must cede their labor to the labor market under the orientation of the resettlement agencies. In case they decline the job offer, they are encouraged to find a job as soon as possible; otherwise, it is a simple reality that the system does not programmatically care about their survival strategy. In this sense, the only alternative way for refugees is to use their own sources to provide their subsistence in Arizona as the refugee reception and placement system does not provide additional programs or resources to help them have credentials with their licenses or professions. On this basis, self-sufficiency through employment does not spell employment opportunities with high social mobility but rather it amounts to entry-­level wage jobs. At this point, I put forward that it is more relevant to probe self-­ sufficiency by dint of analysis of entry-level jobs that are offered to Iraqi refugees. Since self-sufficiency through employment does not reveal the objective conditions of how Iraqi refugees experience their early days in Arizona, but having an entry-level job utters the objective conditions that Iraqi refugees have to admit. This point is exactly verbalized by the resettlement agencies multiple times during the interviews. The director of the Catholic Charities Communities Services in Tucson underlines how Iraqi refugees are encouraged to have entry-level jobs due to their urgent need to take care of their families in highlighting the progressive facet of labor mobility in the subsequent manner: Why you are working now, you can look for a new that highly job on the move of your feet; because most of refugees believe that if you are physician and you were compelled to come here, they can start easily: No, you have to go to school, you have to do transcript events, it takes many many years; so meanwhile, you have to take care of yourself and your family, so you can accept any job as long as this job is suitable for you. If they do not work, it

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is not wrong with me or matching grant. He will receive only cash assistance for a year. Depending on the case size, from eight months to a year.

Along these lines, I will stress upon that the correlation between assistance programs and self-sufficiency does not produce a sustainable socio-­ economic environment for Iraqi refugees. It is not consistent with the refugee condition to argue that the US refugee admission program is designed to promote the well-being of Iraqi refugees in case they are not involved in a labor market. Unfortunately, the resettlement agencies get a handle on the problems faced by Iraqi refugees and forge their assistance networks for refugees. Therefore, the temporary programs led by the resettlement agencies do not comprise the process in which Iraqi refugees establish their new life in Arizona. Given this pure fact, the resettlement agencies are not in the position to produce policies or services except the scope of the cooperative agreement even if there are refugees with special needs related to traumatic experiences. During our interview with the executive director for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix, this point is clearly underlined to portray how the resettlement agencies can implement the assistance programs and force their limits with alternative volunteer actions: All organizations that can call themselves refugee resettlement agencies, all say all 99% of us have funding through the State Department, okay so the State Department gives you funding basically for the first 60 to 90 days for refugees. That’s where paying for rent in the very beginning but, after that which and in this case we’ve been able to maneuver two months but if you’re coming to California, you are probably getting one month because of the cost of living there. In Arizona we can afford to pay two months and still give them all of their housing supplies by month three, if we are able to put them on our matching grant program which is the alternative system may be we gonna working to pay up to four months sometimes five months of rent but if they’re not on matching grant and they don’t get a job in the third month, their cash assistance that they get through the government will not pay the rent, so in some cases we have to have donations and some emergency money and so we are getting help people you know that have run into crisis whenever we can but we don’t have huge amounts of money to do that.

Considering the negative impact of the refugees’ experience of forced migration, many suffer from psychological and physical vulnerabilities and

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suffer losses in Iraq. In case refugees cannot have entry-level jobs, they might be eligible for limited cash assistance by the government, but this sort of assistance is also temporary and limited, therefore it does not harm the function of self-sufficiency policy in this sense. The executive director for International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix points to TANF assistance program provided by the Federal Government while saying that: Refugees are eligible for the mainstream public cash assistance which is under TANF,1 the temporary assistance to needy families, so if you are a single or two parent household with children, you could qualify for TANF, but the money is very very little like $300.

The federal government implements assistance programs to deal with the vulnerable refugee cases but emphasizes the temporariness of all programs in pointing to how the system puts effort to eliminate refugees’ dependence on assistance. For this purpose, the system requires an analysis of vulnerability in the long run, hereby standing on a limit of month or year with certain eligibility requirements while holding the condition of working in the United States. As discussed in the chapters in which I discussed the paternalistic nature of the resettlement system, both the services offered by the resettlement agencies and the assistance programs offered by the government are designed to maintain the balance between self-sufficiency and competence assumption. In this balance, the temporary and limited assistance programs are used as a strategy by the state to set the boundaries of the selfsufficiency policy. Therefore, the RRP, matching grant and TANF referred here are not programs that encourage refugees not to work or discourage refugees from accessing the job market. Iraqi refugees are informed about their rights and obligations by the resettlement agencies upon their arrival in Arizona and the interview results indicate that the agencies aim to be as clear as possible to avoid unduly expectations. In Phoenix, the program coordinator of the Catholic Charities plainly explicates the situation in the following manner: You also have to explain to families that, you know, we are gonna be careful with the resettlement funds, because we need to make sure they have basic 1  TANF refers to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families that provides cash for families in need (DSHS 2017).

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housing throughout the 90 days. We need to make sure that there might be a cushion because there is no long-term thinking for refugees here. You know that all the assistance for refugees is designed to be temporary, the expectation is that people become independent through work since a very different system than maybe some of the other countries where there is a longer-term support. My priority is always housing because I don’t know how long it’s going to take this person to get a job and I want to make sure that they have a roof over their head and need the basic needs met first, and you kind of have to go food, shelter, clothing. Sometimes they say where is my money, give it to me and we have to say well, you know this is the agency’s money that the agency receives to cover your basic needs once you are food shelter and clothing is covered by yourself independently. I am happy to do this, but we have to make sure that basic needs are met.

As understood from this paragraph, the temporary support programs provided by the resettlement organizations are designed with a limited budget and to meet the basic needs first. Moreover, it is the supervision provided by the agencies, which constitutes the framework of all these services and is one of the repeating results. On the one hand, this supervision is part of poverty governance, because it meets basic needs and informs people about their work. As Mead (1998, p. 98) and Soss et al. (2011) indicate the importance of “supervisory policies” or “supervisory governance” to ensure both the poor’s own good and the public good. By the same token, supervisory governance is also considered as an effective instrument in explaining the refugees’ obligations and rights in the relation of service delivery and “supervisory policies and governance” ascribes primary priorities to the agencies so that the agencies can stress upon their responses to refugees’ basic needs in institutional priorities to instill the idea that the refugees must be achieving themselves more than the basic needs. The classification of Iraqi refugees as poor is a remarkable indication of the interview results since most of them explain their conditions in terms of financial vulnerability. On the other hand, their way of surviving in Arizona is deeply linked to their recognition of having entry-level jobs, which means the lowest level of social and economic mobility. The program coordinator of Catholic Charities Community Services in Phoenix underlines how their supervisory governance affects refugees as follows: So, it can be difficult for them, I think you do understand where they’re coming from. I mean it’s a big shock to be low income in the world’s richest

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country. It is a big shock to come to the US and be low income. Maybe they were never low income, so you have to be very patient with them and be understanding. You cannot just be like all they are picky. You know you kind of have to, in my experience, be honest and sit down and have a conversation and say okay this is what you want, what do you want, what resettlement looks like what kind of house you want okay we will discuss this much…

This small summary of the supervisory role reveals the way to lower refugees’ expectations by telling them the details of what resettlement looks like. In this way, the agencies may have conversations with refugees to be able to explain what the US system expects of them in return for public services. The director of Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus in Phoenix frankly touches upon this point in the following manner: Especially, in the beginning, the biggest problem with Iraqis has been the very difficult population to resettle and it wasn’t that they were difficult, but they had expectations that were much greater than the reality; they thought they will be given homes and cars and everything and it is just not true, very high expectations… Your expectations are more, what you are given here is opportunities, you are given a chance, people are not gonna give you a lot of money that they are gonna give you only enough time to start; it is up to you what you make or not; it is gonna be your skill, your ambition your hard work, that’s true for everybody in the United States. The US is not really generous, you have to work, you have to be a participant otherwise doors are gonna close.

Obviously, the message given to Iraqis is clear that they must recognize their responsibility for their own self-sufficiency. Meads broaches that paternalistic programs do not ascribe a given character to competence; aid is usually provided in return for good behavior. Suffice it to say that aid and structure are given in a combination as the poor needs (1998, p. 110). The agency of humanitarian governance forms the structure of the post-­ resettlement era and employs supervision as a tool to manage expectations and introduce American realities. In other words, poverty governance through public services as a form of humanitarian governance requires an efficient management of expectations although it does not resolve refugees’ own problems in the long term. In this picture, the upsurge of the number of refugees who are not self-sufficient manifests both the failure of the refugee reception and placement system and the necessity of policies

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to govern the poor. Regarding the latter, the system must transform refugees into new subjects to be able to govern them within the operation of humanitarian governance in Arizona as Barbara Cruikshank (1999) points to how the system will govern the poor by creating new subjects from the poor, who will govern themselves in determined ways. In sum, poverty governance reproduces the policy of self-sufficiency in the “structure and supervision” of the neoliberal paternalism. The system pushes refugees to adjust themselves to the way the US refugee system expects. However, the process of self-sufficiency through employment fails to expand its objective more than making refugees into economically self-sufficient subjects. Yet refugees bring their language, religion, culture, and forms of socialization, but the policy of self-sufficiency through entry-­ level jobs necessitates the responsibilization of refugees in a possible shortest time. As a result, little of what they bring as added value differentiate the US during the transformation of refugees into new Americanized subjects.

Self-sufficiency and Entry-Level Jobs Scholars like Mahler (1995), Haines (2010), Ong (2003), Portes and Rumbaut (2014), and Sassoon (2009) examine the social, economic, and legal aspects of lives of immigrants and refugees in the United States of America while focusing prominently on the presumed priority of entrepreneurship through immigrants or refugees. Haines (2010, p. 154) poses a critical argument that “self-sufficiency” is “the absence of receipt of cash assistance by a household. It is a minimalist kind of governmental definition.” In other words, the system ensures refugees are not a burden on Americans and do not affect their prosperity. Its main aim is to “reduce dependency” of refugees on the system while placing refugees in entry-­ level jobs. Measuring the impact of the refugee reception and placement program, Haines (2010, pp.  157–163) refers to length of residence, employment, and use of services and assistance like English language training, cash assistance, and so on. While the aim is to guarantee “the immediate employment,” the dilemma is to increase household income to avert them from falling into poor conditions and poverty. All initial assistance programs from 90 to 180 days hinge on the basic assumption that refugees will begin to build up self-sufficiency mechanisms in line with the program objectives. The United States Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, reports in

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1994 that “according to Federal regulations and the MGP (matching grant program) guidelines, affiliates should place employable refugees in ‘appropriate’ jobs as soon as possible, and refugee must accept entry-level jobs” (OIG, 1994, p. 3). As seen in the expression of “appropriateness” and “must,” the system does not have the capacity to tolerate a condition such as refugees not working. In other words, even if attention is paid to the situation and subjective conditions of refugees, there is no option that they do not work and that they continue their lives only by receiving assistance. Michael Piore’s (1979, pp. 37–40) analysis of the dual-labor market on immigrants’ labor in America does not specify the condition of refugees but draws a theoretical standpoint of “a primary and a secondary industry” in which “migrants are found in the secondary sector,” which is characterized by “unsecure jobs,” “the bottom of the job hierarchy,” and “the low status, menial jobs”. Although it is not misleading to say that refugees fulfill their jobs in the second sector within this broad theoretical framework, it is also possible to consider refugees under the category of immigrants when their status in the job market is taken into account, that is entry-level jobs are covered by the secondary sector. By the same token, Steven J.  Gold (2007, p.  587) in his analysis of Russian migrants in the US with reference to the fact that many new arrivals accept entry-level jobs because of their age, poor health, and limited English proficiency. Similarly, Stephanie J. Nawyn (2010, p. 157) emphasizes that more skilled jobs always require being economically self-­sufficient to be able to meet further education expenses to get certification in the US. Therefore, the refugees are commonly offered an entry-level job that “require little skills or English language proficiency.” Likewise, Ong refers to the situation of the Cambodian immigrants that are living in “the worst neighborhoods in Oakland and San Francisco” as “isolated from the wider society” with the “low-paid entry-level jobs in hotels, middle-­class households, and the factories of the Silicon Valley” (2003, p. 123). In this context, Iraqi refugees also experience the same conditions, and it is not necessary to have any professional skills and speak English in order to be placed in entry-level jobs. U/32/m, who worked as a volunteer for resettlement agencies for years, discloses the fact that entry-level positions are less paid jobs and do not require any skills or education and expands on his point with the following statements:

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Resettlement agency tries to find work for them at the beginning. I observed that some of them did not want to work due to their education background, that is, a PhD holder does not want to wash dishes; in general, women work as cleaners for hotels or for nursing centers, while men also do the same work. Some employers, especially hotels and car wash companies, recruit refugees. But, in general, they do a back seat work which is not required of English knowledge, so, there is no need for them to communicate with clients.

In Piore’s words, Iraqi refugees are also part of the community “at the bottom of the job hierarchy” as they have to accept entry-level jobs. While talking about the specific condition of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, the program coordinator of the Catholic Charities Community Services in Phoenix delineates explains this as follows: Since they are here, they need basic needs. When they come here, protection is to secure them. You are safe in America. Now, in America, you need basic things to start a new life, which we do. Our role is to provide basic needs, house, food and training. The goal is self-sufficiency. Once you are working, if you want to be a doctor, engineer, you have to work and save money to go to school and become who you want to be. The US is capitalism, it is not socialism. The government takes care of you, no! Take care of yourself. They can get entry-level jobs. Entry level jobs which mean restaurants, hotels, retailing stores, nursing hall, construction, when they are integrated, they can speak English, if they are more comfortable, then move up to the second class, they can get skilled jobs, they can get management jobs, they can make a career.

This important paragraph first sums up the refugee reception and placement system: Refugees must adjust to living in American capitalism, taking care of themselves, earning money and then realizing their dreams. However, upward mobility for refugees in the labor market may not be an easy achievement considering their post-resettlement conditions. Many are unable to work and study at the same time after a hard time in Iraq and asylum countries as well as coping with their conditions in the US, as they are tired and homesick. Starting a new life at the bottom of social and economic hierarchy brings about disadvantages and additional vulnerabilities to refugees. The only remaining condition for refugees is to maintain their motivation, willingness, and determination to adapt themselves to new conditions and environment and to seek opportunities to move up in

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this hierarchy. In a sense, this is the process of making all the educational and professional experiences they have brought from the past acceptable to the system in this new condition. Because there is no equivalent of their education, work, and experiences in terms of the system. From the Arizona Department of Economic Security, the official summarizes how the system functions while orienting refugees to the marketplace: I think there are good strategic approaches. There are organizations that are trying to make a lot of money by taking refugees’ credentials and translating them. But to be honest, it works to some extent but the thing is most refugees are going to have to start by taking entry-level employment because they don’t have any work history. What I would say is what a lot of refugees don’t understand to is a lot of refugees who come from situations where yes their experience with their labor market, with their skills, with their education, with their credentials, is not competitive the way that is in the US, so one of the problems is for a lot of refugees is understanding that even if you have those credentials, the re-credentialing itself is gonna get you in because it’s competitive, you are gonna be competing with people who were trained in the US, people who were certified, people who understand the labor market here, and so helping, it is a path that help refugees understand, yes that’s an opportunity, it’s not a guarantee though, but it is an opportunity in the meantime, you probably you still have to try to support yourself, that is the reality of US system. US system doesn’t allow you to just pursue your occupation you have to work you have to accept the first available acceptable job of offer employment under the law if you refuse you gonna lose your assistance and then you can do whatever you want…

One of the key elements here is that the unique conditions of the job market in the United States are very competitive for refugees. Therefore, the neoliberal conditions that form the core of this competitive market and the building of individual success also apply to refugees. In this picture, the effort that refugees have to make in order to become competitive has to be many times over. Otherwise, as the official puts it: “If they choose not to work for that it is just going to, they are gonna go into a black hole.” In this system, the nonprofit sector as a whole of the humanitarian network wants to save refugees from going into this black hole. However, the boundary between the effort of the humanitarian network and the functioning of the system is quite clear and insurmountable. The entry of refugees into this labor market, their work and earning a living form the basis of their lives in Arizona. So, on this basis, the difference

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between a refugee and a migrant is ignored in terms of the system, if we exclude subjective conditions. Working is the primary condition for not falling into a black hole in Arizona. Encouraging this process from the very beginning brings with assistance to refugees in business life. In this sense, refugees are seen as subjects who should be rewarded by the authorities as long as they are good workers. For example, Peggy Halpern’s (2008) report submitted to the US Department of Health and Human Services reveals some instances that a state coordinator assists the refugees or immigrants’ job upgrading by contacting the companies as long as they are good workers. At this point, as an striking example of the importance of work or employment, it should be noted that the system applies this without compromising the rules it has established. The director of the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus program in Tucson explains the government’s policy of employment for self-sufficiency: You have a 60-year-old Iraqi woman who showed up here by herself, who does not know English. Getting her to the point where she can work a job and take care of herself is a huge cultural challenge, a physical challenge, a mental challenge. However, in the eyes of the government she is a payable person who does not qualify for the next 5 to 10 years for benefits… They (refugees) expect us to take care of them, but we cannot. We are told that this person has to get a job.

The international and national nonprofit sector and governments reveal stories of “lives saved” through “humanitarian action” and, recalling Barnett’s argument, as carriers of “consequentialist reasoning” they seek to provide the best philanthropy for their beneficiaries and try to strike a balance with their benevolence to avoid further harm and unintended consequences. More specifically, such an ethic refers to both “the intended outcome” and “the actual results” to measure its effectiveness (Barnett, 2005, 2012). Based on the logic of consequentialist reasoning, the best interest of individuals is to become self-sufficient in line with the general logic of the neoliberal order of the state institutions. Larner (2000, p. 13) succinctly expounds this: Neo-liberal strategies of rule, found in diverse realms including workplaces, educational institutions and health and welfare agencies, encourage people to see themselves as individualized and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well-being.

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Given the competitive market underlined by the government official above, the function of humanitarian governance is, in this logic, not only to make refugees self-sufficient and responsible for their lives in the public interest and not to burden the system, but also to build the vision and process of becoming good citizens of the future. Regardless of their age, nationality, or personal characteristics, as a reflection of the paternalistic nature of neoliberal policies, humanitarian governance seeks to subject all those who can afford it to the process of responsibilization. Being dependent on the system has no place in either the intended results or the actual results. Inquiring issues of dependency, Rose2 demonstrates that “the excluded individual” is at the center of the US welfare system which puts effort to “micro-manage the behavior of welfare recipients in order to re-­molarize them.” In doing so, the system aims to “get all those physically able to work off benefits entirely.” Through a set of strategies including “empowerment” “professional reconstruction” re-molarizes people while aiming to abolish the “patronizing” function of dependency. For this purpose, the system adheres to “autonomy” for individuals to make them recognize their own responsibility and constructs “ethical and cultural subjectivity” (Rose, 2000, pp.  334–335). Although Rose’s main contribution to the concept of responsibilization of the excluded is significant, it is also argued as a “moral and ethical problem” and in this sense, a remolarization is mentioned. If we consider the case of refugees in relation to responsibilization independently of ethical and moral aspects. Within this framework created by Larner and Rose, I should primarily state that refugees can also be considered in excluded groups. Secondly, it should be underlined that refugees are also exposed to a re-molarization process which takes place on the basis of American values and ​​ competitive market principles. Finally, I must say that the process of responsibilization is the engine of the system for Iraqi refugees to develop an ethical and cultural subjectivity among Americans. In this regard, as a binding process for refugees in Arizona, responsibilization is a different process for American citizens and institutional structures. Refugees come from a different social structure, culture, work culture, and many other different types of relationships and encounter 2  Nikolas Rose emphasizes the characteristics of advanced liberal rule rather than that of the neoliberal governance: “Advanced liberal rule depends upon expertise in a different way and articulates experts differently into the apparatus of rule. It does not seek to govern through “society’,’ but through the regulated choices of individual citizens. And it seeks to detach the substantive authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political rule, relocating experts within a market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability, and consumer demand” (1993, p. 285).

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Americans in Arizona at work, in school, in public institutions, in civic society organizations, and at many levels in the public sphere. In this new stage, they are also involved in the process of getting to Americanized, which is built on responsibilization by the system. In other words, responsibilization is a process that develops in the light of the rules and principles stipulated by the system. At this point, the experiences of Iraqi refugees gain importance in terms of understanding the process.

Responsibilization of Iraqi Refugees and Appearance of New Americans The White House Task Force on New Americans (2015) strategic action plan on immigrants and refugee integration3 is an important loop to generate a discussion on how much immigrants and refugees are important to the economic growth and social diversity of the US despite the existence of challenges in the integration processes. The plan indicates those challenges such as “limited funds for refugee integration and welcoming communities activities,” “naturalization process,” “linguistic integration,” and “limited awareness about refugees through mainstream networks and communities” and aims to overcome all issues to benefit from the labor capacity of immigrants and refugees as “the cheap labor force.” In the aging population4 in the US, the plan clearly demonstrates immigrants and refugees can ensure the sustainability of economic growth for the United States. On this wise, the system calls it as “the New American Workforce” saying that: Like native-born Americans, new Americans aspire to obtain economic security for themselves and their families. Economic security provides new Americans self-sufficiency and the ability to give back to their communities’ economy and growth. New Americans may also face significant risks of exploitation, particularly in low-wage occupations. These workers are most often employed in industries such as construction, agriculture, healthcare, 3  The plan was presented by White House Domestic Policy Council and US Citizenship and Immigration Services through the contribution of other relevant departments in order to show gaps, challenges and opportunities in immigrants and refugee integration into the US in the year of 2015. 4  Ortman Velkoff and Hogan indicate that “Between 2012 and 2050, the United States will experience considerable growth in its older population. In 2050, the population aged 65 and over is projected to be 83.7 million, almost double its estimated population of 43.1 million in 2012. The baby boomers are largely responsible for this increase in the older population, as they began turning 65 in 2011. By 2050, the surviving baby boomers will be over the age of 85” (2014, p. 1).

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hotel and motel, garment manufacturing, and restaurants where labor violations are most prevalent. (The White House Task Force on New Americans, 2015, p. 31)

New Americans are the founding subjects needed for America’s social and economic growth in future. Iraqi refugees have also taken their place in this process as New Americans and experienced all the obstacles mentioned in this process, for example, naturalization, language competency, vocational skills and being entrepreneur, personal vulnerabilities, and so forth. However, the most important output of the responsibilization process I mentioned is the Iraqi refugees as New Americans. To examine the entire process in which New Americans are formed, it is important to point out what kind of experience Iraqi refugees have gained from the beginning of the process, what status they hold in Arizona and what legal status they have obtained from the system as New Americans. At this stage, the process that starts with refugees accepting an entry-level job shows a permanent residence permit granted to them with which they gained a legal status with a residence until they obtain citizenship. The director of the Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus program in Phoenix makes it clear in the following words: You have to be here five years to become eligible for the US citizenship after the first year they become permanent residents or get the green card we call it, after five years and they make an application for citizenship, they go in for an interview, they will be expected to speak English and they will be asked questions on different kinds of history and civics kind of just to make sure that they understand…

Therefore, the horizon from the responsibilization of the Iraqi refugees to the construction of New Americans spreads over time. Iraqi refugees undergo the process of being reconstructed and re-moralized as New Americans through certain responsibilities. Regarding the main challenges Iraqi refugees experience upon their arrival, the representative of the Tucson Refugee Ministry delicately evaluates the situation in the following words: It is difficult obviously. It is hard to place somebody in a job who potentially speaks no English, who is not educated and who has never worked in a.., I don’t wanna say business atmosphere, but in a Western business atmosphere before, it is difficult, I think it is very frustrating for a lot of refugees as well, because they want to work but the opportunities are extremely limited. So,

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luckily in Tucson there are quite a few businesses who are open to hiring refugees and as the agencies get to work out there, you know, there are businesses who become more and more open to hiring refugees and working with the agencies. It works best with the agency who has the direct relationship with the business. I can say I will be a cannibal for this person, this refugee client. I will make sure that they have all the information. I will make sure that they understand and show up to work on time. I will help them with transportation issues because if their piece of the puzzle was not there, it would be very very difficult for any refugee to really be able to keep a job. I mean it is hard but there are opportunities, there are people who volunteer to work with refugees to teach them how to act in a business environment.

Beyond a shadow of a doubt, one of the important issues underlined by the representatives of this voluntary organization is that Iraqi refugees draw attention to the integration problems that they live or may experience in a Western business culture. Here, there is a well-done determination of one of the most important problems faced by refugees. However, the proposed resolution for this problem does not go beyond the explanations made with the concepts of supervision and orientation. To make this point more concretely, the interviewee, EF/48/m with her family of six persons in Phoenix speaks English during our conversation and explains the Western business atmosphere in his experience: Here, you must organize your life here. Our life in Iraq was not organized. But, now here, we should organize it like Americans because Americans organize everything, they work, wife, husband, son, work, everyone knows what he got, everyone knows how to pay, I mean we should respect the time here, we should respect work, we respect the money. In our country, we didn’t respect money. We didn’t care. But here, you should work like a machine, I mean if you do not go to work, if you don’t call your manager, you will lose your work, that means everything is organized, they pay you for four hours so you can’t move like what we had in our country where I can call my friend. But here, no. They pay you for four hours. That means we should organize our life how life is here.

The interviewer’s determinations that everything is organized, that time equals money, that every hour is a reward for work, that there is a system that works like a machine, and that there is a person who works like a machine are important indicators of the function of the neoliberal system. In fact, this whole system and order emerges not only as a

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manifestation of American capitalism, but also as the ethical and cultural responsibility of being a good American. During my interview with U/32/m, who was a volunteer for the refugee organizations in Arizona, he shares his observation about Iraq refugees in particular in the following sense: I heard about Iraqis during my volunteer activities. Iraqis are different from others. Iraqis come from different ethnic groups. Their education level was high, but their diplomas was not recognized by the US; doctors started to wash dishes to make their life and they complain a lot; especially, Sunni groups were not silent; they demanded assistance from the state by claiming that they were forced to migrate as a result of war the US triggered so that the state has to support or help them. However, such an attitude was not acceptable for the US state that does not approve state-based expectations in parallel to its own state tradition.

In this sense, the nature of the American system comes to the fore; essentially, the two concepts “economic imperialism” and “cultural hegemony” underlined by Ritzer and Stillman (2003, pp. 31–37) are important to see the limits of American hegemony. In this sense, what constitutes the operation of the process in America is a “standardization and homogenization” of consumption and production processes. Therefore, being competitive, adjusting to the competitive market, empowering social and economic conditions need to be formulated under the conditions Ritzer et al. As noted earlier, working in a Westernized business atmosphere is the only environment in which Iraqi refugees must necessarily integrate in order to achieve a higher social and economic position in the United States in their upcoming years. The recognition of this system in America by refugees and the necessity of living accordingly differ for refugees who have been citizens of the United States for a long time and have now internalized this culture. Therefore, refugees are supposed to approve both such a work culture and the state’s tradition of not supporting long-term assistance. For instance, JM/50/m, who is one of the founders of IASPF in Arizona and who came to US in the early 1990s, shares his observations on some refugees’ request on more assistance from the government in a critical way: In America, they helped you for a couple months and they told you to find a job and work instead of waiting for public assistance. Public assistance is not enough, maybe, refugees get cash assistance, it is not enough to pay the

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rent. They give them food, it is enough… Public assistance is not enough, and I believe it is fair, when refugees come here, especially refugees, they are able to work, they can start work and find a job after two months upon their arrival. And like a family, two or three, one of them can work and one then wife can be at home to take care of the kids or kids go to the school, then wife can also go to work. So public assistance is not enough for them. I am not supporting such an approach since they are always gonna be on the same level with public assistance.

JM/50/m reveals how he has internalized American culture through his social and economic achievements over years in the US and recommends refugees accept entry-level jobs and get used to working in the Western business culture and principles to be able to establish their own lives. In fact, Iraqi refugees explore the meaning of work in the system and acknowledge that accepting an entry-level job is a prerequisite which comes into existence in the form of cost of living. The interviewee, DR/36/m who has been living in Arizona with his wife and three children and who is not able to speak enough English, but his Turkish is quite well explains: Working is a prerequisite here. Assistance is ok but you have to pay your rent, clothes or gas for your car. You need a car here. Without having a car, you cannot move from one place to another. The car is cheap here, you can buy a car for $ 1000 or $ 1500 but gas is expensive. Everything costs here. If someone walks or goes somewhere on foot here, he is homeless or a beggar.

This prerequisite is also shaped by the necessities of life in Arizona. Since there is no developed public transportation, i.e. a high-speed train or tram network, all items of living are calculated one by one due to requirements of the hot climate and geography. What is remarkable is that this is also shown as a way of distinguishing themselves from the homeless and beggars. To able to cover all these living costs and more, refugees face the spillover of entry-level jobs in the labor market and earn only the minimum wage5 for their work. As a result, they encounter social and economic challenges and problems in their livelihood and the majority express their dissatisfaction with their entry-level jobs.

5  During the interviews, the fact that refugees gain 8.50 dollars per hour for entry-level jobs is emphasized.

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The complaints of the refugees who accepted the job about the work process are not only an indicator of the dissatisfaction of the refugees. In fact, this is the most important sign that access to the job market, which the American system sees as a necessity and regulates as a condition for refugees, does not serve their integration in the US. H/48/m, who has been in Arizona for more than three years with his wife and three children and who does not speak English, explains his experience with the assistance of interpreter in the following words: The organization found me a job, but the workplace was very far, and it was too hard to work for me. Kind of work the organization found for me, I prefer going back to my country instead of working with this kind of work. This kind of work is like dying slowly. They put me in a carpenter factory and the roof is open, as you know, Arizona is too hot. You work full time, all the week by carrying wood for the machine. They treat you like homeless people, I mean, who don’t have any attitude, they don’t have any culture. You feel that you are working with some homeless people.

The conditions refugees face includes not only getting used to the Western business culture, but also the difficulty of the job, human relations at work, and all of the refugees’ thoughts on where they find themselves after a hard life. At this point, there is a very crucial difference between the experience of a refugee and the experience of an immigrant who migrated voluntarily. The fact that a refugee, who feels so helpless as to think of returning to his/her country, thinks about himself/herself in terms of his/her homeless perception and identity should also be seen as one of the stages in which the system fails. At this point, it would not be misleading to put forward that the system remains indifferent to the work processes in which refugees are included, although the value that the system attributes to work is clear as a condition. In a similar vein, the interviewee, MH/47/m, who has been in Arizona for three years with his wife and two children and whose English is not good, shares his experiences: The agencies found a job for me. But it is too hard and not good. They don’t pay enough. I cannot carry heavy stuff because I had surgery and a problem with my stomach. And they shout at me, and I cannot carry heavy stuff. If I told them about my health problems, they would not give me any job. But later, I quit the job and I told my friends to find a different job.

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Many state that the work they do is very difficult and demanding and that they require physical strength. On the other hand, many refugees state that the discrimination they are exposed to during the problems they experience in business life is not due to ethnic or religious reasons, however, it is a common belief that the value of the work they do is not appreciated. However, at this point, it should be noted that, especially in the experiences of women refugees belonging to the Islamic faith, they experience discrimination and problems of not being able to find a job because of their clothing due to their beliefs. For instance, SH/40/f who has been in Arizona with her two children for almost four years and whose English is weak expresses her experiences as follows: It is difficult for me to find a job because all they offer is housekeeping and things like that. We have to take it because we cannot speak English. I also have hijab and Islamic dressing also affects my working too because not everyone accepts that. I applied for many places, but I didn’t get a job. I believe it’s because of my Islamic dressing.

First, the importance of knowing English and its positive impact on finding a job is best known to refugees. However, discrimination in the workplace due to ethnic or religious reasons, or exposure to the risk of Islamophobia, which remains a question for the situation of Muslim refugees, was not mentioned much during the interviews. In line with my observations, there is a risk of discrimination that women refugees face because of their clothing, but this was also not touched upon very often. One reason for this may be that the rate of women seeking or working for a job is quite low compared to male refugees. On the other hand, it is not possible to make an evaluation by excluding the risk of Islamophobia, which emerged in the post-9/11 period. However, there is still a risk of discrimination on the basis of visible elements such as the wearing of a hijab or head covering, and that there is no discrimination based on ethnic or other reasons, considering the multinational and multicultural nature of the United States. In this context, the observations of institutions and individuals working with Iraqı refugees are also important. The program director of the organization of the Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship in Phoenix explains as follows: When it comes to religion, I did hear. But personally you know I haven’t witnessed anything. I mean employers, any job, the law, any workplaces, do not discriminate against any employee. I haven’t heard unless maybe you have interviewed the clients who told you.

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The representative of Tucson Refugee Ministry in Tucson also refers to the existence of discrimination due to the lack of information about refugee’s identities and situation, but does not specify how discrimination exactly comes into picture: There is some discrimination against refugees in general because some employers hire refugees and then they realize how much they have to teach them and then they don’t wanna hire anymore after that… Negatively, a lot of them do not know much about the religion, or even do not know Muslims personally. So, they get all information on media, it is not always accurate.

While their statements are not examples of concrete practices of discrimination, particularly based on ethnicity and religion, it is valuable to understand that the diverse nature of the labor market does not lead to increased discrimination based on the beliefs and ethnicities of refugees. As to the refugees’ way of overcoming all challenges and difficulties in work life, many pursue developing alternative ways to find a different job using their network of relatives and friends as well as other information channels. The interviewee NS/32/m, who has been in Arizona for almost four years and who is able to speak English, express his conditions in the following manner: There are friends, relatives that help you find a job. Or, if you are too perfect in English, there is a website to find a job too. So, there are too many ways to find jobs. My first job, my friend helped out and found me a security job, at the same time, I continued my education, so my friend helped me a lot. The organization offered for me, but I didn’t spend a long time with the job. It took a week and I quit. I worked for a casino; I was like a servicer. I was like helping people, bringing dishes from the kitchen to the tables. This job was not for a hundred percent. It was not a forever job. I was always looking for something better. Now, I have been working with a security job for almost one year, but I wished to change my job, but you cannot change your work each month in the US, you have to spend at least one year for your job history. You have to spend to get experience, it is not good to work two months and jump to another job, it is not good.

As mentioned earlier, Iraqi refugees need work to survive in the US. In this sense, their first attempt to ensure their economic security. However, they try to strike a balance between their economic security and their personal, cultural, and religious values. In my interviews with some Iraqi

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refugees, it was raised that certain jobs, such as working as a servicer, maids, cleaners in hotel rooms, casinos, or other entertainment venues, are not culturally or religiously appropriate. On the other hand, Iraqi refugees over the age of forty imply that they are angry or upset at job offers, especially for those with higher levels of education, because it represents a form of downward mobility or loss of status. The program director of the Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship also underlines similar challenges Iraqi refugees face in the process of finding an appropriate job: The challenges are finding jobs, because we have, recently, we have clients that finished professional fields, degrees in Iraq when they come here. It is really very hard for them to find a job because, I mean, the US does not recognize your profession. That’s one of the challenges clients are facing. And, finding a job such as accepting to work in hotels as a housekeeper, that’s really difficult, forces the majority of individuals to work and specially females as well. We lack the English language. The majority of the employers ask for clients that could speak English to allow them work. Personally, I think there are also cultural barriers as well, language and education barriers.

The factors that affect the process of finding or changing jobs are not only the language barrier, but also gender, religious, and cultural factors and the social capital that Iraqi refugees have. It is certainly important to hear the observations of the IASPF at this point, because the organization is a frequent destination for Iraqi refugees to receive information and supervision in Phoenix and Arizona. The consequences of the difficulties in this process appear as unemployment in many cases. As long as the difficulties in terms of education and language are not overcome, alternative ways of finding a job are also closed. Therefore, learning English emerges as a necessity. Barriers against acquiring English proficiency also need to be evaluated carefully to analyze the function of the system. The representative of the Noor Women’s Association in Tucson in Arizona summarizes the importance of English knowledge in relation to better job opportunities in the following manner: Refugees who do not have the language English, they suffer. So in the past, in my experience, if a refugee knows English or tries to learn English, and they can drive they have a better opportunity of getting a job.

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The ability to know and speak English is an indispensable condition for establishing a life in America. Considering the length of stay of the interviewees, the number of refugees who can speak English fluently is very few even after two or three years. The process and dynamics of learning English differs primarily for women and men refugees. In general, Iraqi refugees, who remain in their own social networks, have difficulty developing English language skills since they do not have the opportunity to socialize with Americans in their daily lives. Secondly, although they are involved in business life, they do not experience a process that positively affects their language skills, as they encounter different immigrant groups in their business life consisting of entry-level jobs. On the other hand, they carry the pressure of learning and speaking English, which is the most important key to improving their social and economic situation in America. The interviewee, QK/64/m, who has been in Arizona for six years with his wife and adult children and who is working for the resettlement agencies as an interpreter with a good level of English, explains the importance of English skills to find a job: This is one of the important problems the refugees are worried about. When I meet people, we discuss a lot of things. The main thing, the main concern for them, is the job. This depends on how they are and whether they know and speak English or not. People who speak English get jobs easier than others, but the organizations try to find a job or help the refugees find a job, and usually it is an entry-level job except for people who have relatives here, they find a job different from the organization.

In the similar pathway, another interviewee, HA/24/f, who has been in Arizona for four years with her husband and who is good at speaking English states that: You know it is very important, like, it is good that we have enough English level so we can work, and we can do our business. Maybe because people like them cannot speak English, it is hard for them to find work and jobs. We have friends that don’t know any English so they cannot work on anything, and they just stay at home. I am working for perfume sales.

Haines (2010, p. 147) also emphasizes the importance of English proficiency for “successful adaptation to the US” and “absorption into and commitment to mainstream American social, cultural and political life.” Similar research points to the same findings concerning the positive impact

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of English proficiency over immigrant integration. Bleakley and Chin (2010, p. 165) stress upon that immigrants with English proficiency facilitate their economic integration more easily and can close the “wage gap” which is generally between Americans and immigrants. Refugees realize that speaking English is the key to achieving higher positions and integrating into American society. During interviews, many people show this fact by emphasizing the effort to learn English, although they find language learning assistance inadequate. More concretely, DR/36/m, who has been staying more than three years in Arizona says: My wife worked as a cashier in Arizona but later she was kicked off because her English was not sufficient and now, she goes to college. We receive $ 320 for our books, $ 600 for our local travel for four months. But it is not enough. I went to the language course for six months, but later I dropped. But I will continue again. Speaking English is very necessary here. In Türkiye, I did not suffer from the language. But here, I suffered a lot as I did not know English. I cannot continue my daily life here without speaking English.

Determined by age, gender, education, and other personal factors, it is imperative for many refugees to continue their lives in jobs that do not require English. In a sense, this means that refugees can only continue their lives with limited English proficiency.6 Most adult refugees do not tend to have English proficiency or continue their education for a job in Arizona due to difficulties in working and studying at the same time in pursuit of survival. For refugees, learning English after work or in the evening is an alternative, but not a realistic alternative. Concerning the gravity of this last point, U/32/m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson, underlines his observations in the following way:

 Capps and Newland et al. analyze English proficiency rates among the refugee population in the US and underline that “like other immigrants, refugees’ English proficiency increases with time in the United States. Nonetheless, in 2009—11.58 percent of refugees who had been in the United States for 20 years and more were Limited English Proficient (LEP). Limited English skills may slow the integration of some groups of refugees in particular (e.g. Cubans and Vietnamese) and lead to lower incomes and higher dependence on public benefits” (2015, p.  2). To support this argument, we can also turn to Zong and Batalova”s analysis that 25.1 million foreign and US-born immigrants are considered with Limited English Proficient (LEP) among the total population of immigrants, approximately 61.6 million, in 2013 (2015). 6

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Language education depends on refugees themselves. They are not forced by the system to learn English. The priority is given to employ them. Unless they know English, they can be employed. But also, they can learn English in libraries. In every neighborhood, there are some local libraries providing different services: computer classes or English classes refugees can benefit from… Refugees can also benefit from community college after achieving a certain level of English knowledge. Such colleges provide some amount of assistance as well. The basic problem is that you have family, and you have to continue college in the evenings.

On the one hand, learning English is not very easy for refugees, and on the other hand, the aim of getting a better job creates an insurmountable paradox for refugees. New American identity is not the solution to the language learning and economic mobility paradox. The New American identity is a wounded identity. The scars of this identity include the trauma of forced migration, the hard life in America, unemployment, and homesickness. As an umbrella identity, New Americans represents the weak and inhuman face of humanitarian governance, as well as the empowering and resisting refugee subject. On the way to the accomplishment of this identity, Iraqi refugees, if they belong to certain occupational groups such as medicine, engineering, and so on, must also complete the accreditation process in order to be able to practice their professions in the US. Again, this is a process that refugees must realize and complete with their own financial resources and means. During the interview, the program director for the IASPF shares her observations on the matter of the re-credentialing in the following fashion: You can’t have higher jobs unless you pass some requirements, which are language and even experience. Those individuals, they have professional degrees, they usually do have English skills. Some of them accept to work as security. Some of them don’t accept that, so what they do is they go back to school. They try to get equivalent degrees such as medical assistant and then to work, later, with a professional, in a professional field. Some of them, I know, are without work. Doctors and engineers, I hear, don’t work because they don’t wanna work as housekeeping, they don’t wanna work as security. Some of them go back to Iraq, but the number is not huge… I mean, if you have a medical degree from your country, it is hard to have the same degree here. It takes years. If you are a physician, you have to take exams step one, step two and then based on the scores, you get residency to specialize your

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work to do in the US. It is a lot of studying before the exams even if you have the same degree.

Iraqi refugees with higher education and qualified skills are more aware of the loss of their social and economic status when they see the jobs offered to them. While this causes psychological problems and stress in many cases, they also realize that they have no alternative but to overcome difficulties they face. At that point, the interviewee, EF/48/m, who was a computer engineer and journalist in Iraq and who have been resettled in the US with his wife and four children, raises his problems in accessing the labor market in the following words: They found me a very bad job. I am a computer engineer. I am a journalist. I have OSHA, a British certificate of safety at a factory. They do not accept this certificate because it is not from the US. Any kind of certificate, according to the law here, no one accepts without getting it from the US. That means I must find other work. It is ok. Our work has been cleaning for me for forty-eight years. It is kind of, I respect because I know, in Japan, people who clean there get more than eight dollars an hour. I don’t need that, but I cannot do this kind of work. My son is now working as a cleaner, he was a college student in my country, but he is doing this kind of work because he must work. But for me, I cannot work because I am forty-eight years old. But they find me only cleaning work and very far from my place. I worked more difficult than this job, eight to ten hours, at night shift… I just worked for ten days, and I quitted my job. They told me you are too slow. I worked with some company here, a night shift which started from six thirty in the evening to five in the morning. People usually order online items, so we prepared online items for people. So, they think, within ten hours, you should have more than two thousand items. So, if less than that, they will be upset. They said you are too slow; they’ll give you a warning with a sign, and the second or third time they’ll quit you…

It is one of the shared observations that, in conditions of loss of social and economic status, most refugees in similar situations become depressed. While there are those people who become asocial and confined to their homes as a result of this depression and psychological pressure, there are others who tirelessly seek alternatives to pursue their education and profession. As a single woman who has been in Arizona more than three years, B/31/f, shares her thoughts about this process and why she refused the entry-level job as follows:

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My master’s degree in Jordan is from an American university. So, I think it is accepted here. But I feel like my language is not good and I don’t have experience. When I apply, no one accepts me. I applied but no one called me for an interview because I don’t have experience.

Indeed, the research findings reveal that they suffer from unemployment while seeking better job opportunities in the US, but this job search makes highly educated people dependent on family members who may also be abroad. Adult single woman refugees with children often make a living if they live with adult family members; otherwise, if they are single, they usually receive financial assistance from close family members abroad. But for both, this process corresponds to the emergence of financial dependence. In the process of equivalence of professions and skills, refugees can legally initiate and complete these processes as long as they can cover their own costs. However, the resettlement agencies try to include the transferable skills and professions of refugees by carrying out some certificate programs. However, this may not be the case in fields such as medicine, engineering, law, and so on. The director of the Catholic Charities Community Services in Tucson explains all the details of this process as follows: We develop our strategy based on what experience they had. For example, he cooked in Iraq and then he can cook in the US. So those are transferable skills. In a resume, we are going to mention those skills in the client’s eyes so that they give him a chance to find a job in a hotel or restaurant. If you have a nursing background, here we can provide training and we can pay for your certification. We pay for nursing training; so you can get a certificate and you can get a job. Meantime, we have those who come as a lawyer and doctor. Those degrees in the US are not easily transferable. For example, I have a law degree. When I came here, I had to take classes because my degree is French law. I have to pay for my back classes. If you are a refugee, if you are a physician who came here, you have to go back to school to take more classes. At the same time, you have to work, that’s the challenge. It is difficult. You will see that if you go to New York, and most of Chicago, you will see that only cap drivers, they are engineers, they are lawyers, they are physicians from Pakistan, from India and from lost countries. Because when they come here, they have to take care of their family, they have to learn English and they have to take classes to revalidate their diploma; it takes time. Many, many cases like this.

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Gender again plays a decisive role in the progress of all these processes. In other words, women, single and educated women, prefer to live financially dependent on their families and relatives for a while in order to progress towards their goals despite all the costs of the process. Therefore, if the difficulties of this process for women are handled separately, a much more difficult picture emerges. The interviewee, M/48/f, explains her motivation to start a business on her vocational skills and knowledge as follows: At my first time here, a hotel cleaning job was offered to me. It was a far distance. I have to take care of my son as a single woman, and I didn’t accept the job. I have a car, but I have to find a job to provide my subsistence. I have applied for many jobs, but there is no response yet. I wish I could work for a beauty salon, but it is not possible. I have a long experience in a beauty salon, but I have to get a certificate here to work for a beauty salon, but I cannot since I cannot get a license here, too difficult for me to get that certificate…

Considering that people have the right to earn living by doing the job they want, it seems that this right is not easy to realize for many refugees in America. However, for many refugees, the cleaning job is presented as a starting point, and it can turn into a demotivating process. Therefore, to say that entry-level jobs can form the financial basis for creating a career plan leaves out many factors. It should be underlined that the refugees are not in the United States to earn money and that there will be no capital that they can transfer to their home country, that is, the refugees leave their country under force majeure conditions. From this point of view, the relationship between the immigrant and the refugee, which has been rendered ambiguous in terms of the system, is compatible with the paternalistic structure of humanitarian governance. It is a question mark whether this paternalistic operation has produced positive results. From this point of view, it is not an easy and inexpensive process for Iraqi refugees to become more educated by activating their social status in the USA, gaining English proficiency, and taking responsibility for their integration. In summary, this is a process in which refugees experience serious losses in their social and economic status. Therefore, at every stage of the process, the agencies of humanitarian governance employ a series of interventions to determine the best interest of refugees without receiving their consent, and shape refugees’ lives within the framework of certain

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principles and rules through supervision and orientation services ranging from global to local processes. The interviewee, the director of the Lutheran Social Services with refugee focus program in Tucson, summarizes refugees’ actual experiences in the following sense: I would say to most people, this is a hard reality again to accept that most people accept the job way below their status and their experience level. We always try to tell people your first job is not your last job. Your first job is really that first year is to get here, start making some money, start paying your bills, get in your life here and then on your spare time is to try to become more educated, to have your English stronger, to come up with a plan, to get your applications out there, where then you can progress by higher-level, most people want to come in and start at that level, but I know very very few clients who are able to come in and start at a level they had before. Balancing work, family life, education, there is no alternative. Honestly, most clients end up living their lives, it is a tough life, and they sacrifice that to their children who can have better opportunities.

One of the most important elements pointed out by this neatly summarizing paragraph is sacrifice. Other elements that make up the New American identity should be sought in the meaning of this sacrification. Firstly, refugees who have lost their hopes to pursue their own goals and desires and to build a life in America should devote all their motivation to the welfare of future generations. Secondly, New American identity emerges as an output of the responsibilization process. As refugees want to take more responsibility for their own lives, they realize that they need to make more sacrification in the functioning of humanitarian governance. At the end, the New American identity balances and organizes life.

References Barnett, M. N. (2005, December). Humanitarianism transformed. Perspectives on Politics, 3(4), 723–740. Barnett, M. N. (2012a). Where is the religion? Humanitarianism, faith, and world affairs. In T. S. Shah, A. Stepan, & M. D. Toft (Eds.), Rethinking religion and world affairs. Oxford Scholarship Online. Bleakley, H., & Chin, A. (2010). Age at arrival, english proficiency, and social assimilation among US immigrants. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1), 165–192. Capps, R., Newland, K., Fratzke, S., Groves, S., Fix, M., McHugh, M., & Auclair, G. (2015). The integration outcomes of U.S. refugees, successes

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and challenges. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved March 24, 2016, from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-­outcomes-­usrefugees-­successes-­and-­challenges Cruikshank, B. (1999). The will to empower: Democratic citizens and other subjects. Cornell University Press. DSHS. (2017). TANF and Support Services. Retrieved July 31, 2017, from https://www.dshs.wa.gov/esa/community-­s er vices-­o ffices/tanf-­a nd-­ support-­services GAO. (1986, April). Refugee program initial reception and placement of new arrivals should be improved. Retrieved May 26, 2017, from http://www.gao. gov/assets/150/144159.pdf Gold, S. J. (2007). Russia. In M. C. Waters, R. Ueda, & H. B. Marrow (Eds.), The new Americans a guide to immigration since 1965 (pp.  579–593). Harvard University Press. Haines, D. (2010). Safe haven? A history of refugees in America. Kumarian Press. Halpern, P. (2008, November). Refugee economic self-sufficiency: An exploratory study of approaches used in office of refugee resettlement programs. Retrieved March 7, 2017, from https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/refugee-­economic-­self-­ sufficiency-­exploratory-­study-­approaches-­used-­office-­refugee-­resettlement Larner, W. (2000). Neo-liberalism policy, ideology, governmentality. Studies in Political Economy, 63(1), 5–25. Mahler, S. J. (1995). American dreaming: Immigrant life on the margins. Princeton University Press. Mead, L. M. (1998). Telling the poor what to do. Public Interest, 132, 97–112. Retrieved May 20, 2017, from https://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/telling-­the-­poor-­what-­to-­do Nawyn, S.  J. (2010). Institutional structures of opportunity in refugee resettlement: Gender, race/ethnicity, and refugee NGOs. The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, 37(1), Article 9. OIG. (1994, August). The refugee matching grant program: Balancing flexibility and accountability. Retrieved April 24, 2017, from https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/ reports/oei-­09-­92-­00060.pdf Ong, A. (2003). Buddha is hiding, refugees, citizenship, the New America. University of California Press. ORR. (2022). Voluntary agencies matching grant program. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/refugees/matching-­grants Ortman, J. M., Velkoff, V. A., & Hogan, H. (2014). An aging nation: The older population in the United States. Retrieved August 4, 2017, from https://www. census.gov/library/publications/2014/demo/p25-­1140.html Piore, M.  J. (1979). Birds of passage: Migrant labor in industrial societies. Cambridge University Press. Portes, A., & Ruben, G. R. (2014). Immigrant America A Portrait, Fourth Edition, University of California Press.

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Ritzer, G., & Stillman, T. (2003). Assessing McDonaldization, Americanization and globalization. In U.  Beck, N.  Sznaider, & R.  Winter (Eds.), Global America? The cultural consequences of globalization. Liverpool University Press. Rose, N. (1993). Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism. Economy and Society, 22(3), 283–299. Rose, N. (2000). Government and control. British Journal of Criminology, 40(2), 321–339. Sassoon, J. (2009). The Iraqi refugees, the new crisis in the middle east. I.B. Tauris: London and New York. Soss, J., Fording, R. C., & Schram, S. F. (2011). Disciplining the poor, neoliberal paternalism and the persistent power of race. The University of Chicago Press. The White House Task Force on New Americans. (2015, April). Strengthening communities by welcoming all residents, a federal strategic action plan on immigrant & refugee integration. Retrieved June 20, 2017, from https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/tfna_progress_ report_final_12_15_15.pdf

Interviews U/32m, volunteer for resettlement agencies in Tucson 2015. B/31/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. DR/36/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. EF/48/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. H/48/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. HA/24/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. JM/50/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. M/48/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. MH/47/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. NS/32/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. SH/40/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. QK/64/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. Public official from Arizona Department of Economic Security in Phoenix, 2015. Director, Catholic Charities Community Services in Tucson, 2015. Director, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus program in Phoenix, 2015. Director, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus program in Tucson, 2015. Executive director of the International Rescue Committee in Phoenix, 2015. Representative of Noor Women’s Association in Tucson, 2015. Representative of Tucson Refugee Ministry in Tucson, 2015. Program director for Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship in Phoenix, 2015.

CHAPTER 5

Social and Economic Integration of Iraqi Refugees in Arizona

An adequate analysis of refugee integration cannot be presented without considering the social and economic integration of Iraqi refugees under the influence of all the stages that refugees experience from the day they leave their home country. In other words, the experiences of refugees only in the country where they are resettled do not provide a quality framework that sheds light on their integration process. Thus, it is part of a mutual analysis of how humanitarian governance, institutions, and policies manage and shape all this process and how and under what conditions refugees develop answers and strategies and try to exist or survive. In this context, the social and economic integration discussed in this chapter is considered as part, but the most important part, of the experience of refugees. Starting from the first studies on the integration of immigrants in America, learning the language of the country in which immigrants live has taken its place as an important element. Park and Burgess’s (1921, p. 765, italics added) analysis of integration and assimilation of immigrants in the US indicates that “the immigrants should not only speak the language of the country but should know something of the history of people among whom they have chosen to dwell.” The key point that stands out here is the freedom of the immigrant to choose the country in which s/he wishes to settle. Since refugees do not have this freedom, it is necessary to consider such a process itself in a paternalistic framework. This situation itself makes it necessary to treat refugee integration as a separate process. Within this framework, the motivations and expectations of immigrants © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Deli, Iraqi Refugees in the United States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7_5

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and refugees, and above all, the events they have experienced differ fundamentally. Both refugees and immigrants experience the process of acculturation, social integration, and assimilation in the USA regardless of their individual ethnic and religious backgrounds, and the literature often looks at a range of processes and deals with the social integration of immigrants and refugees in the host community together. However, one of the main arguments of this book is the thesis of considering the refugee experience and refugee integration on a different plane. It is certain to point out that the social integration of immigrants and refugees in the US must be defined to set a point of orientation for further discussion. In this context, Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) argue that “incorporation of individuals into a system,” that is, the inclusion and acceptance of “immigrants in the institutions, relationships and positions of a host community,” is defined as social integration. In agreement with Bosswick and Heckmann, the integration of Iraqi refugees should only be examined through indicators that indicate their level of involvement in the system and institutions. Social and economic integration of refugees can be measured through indicators showing refugees’ access to the job market, quality work, health services, education and skills development courses, and all other available support mechanisms. On this basis, this book looks at different aspects of the post-resettlement process through social, cultural, legal, and economic indicators. In this respect, Cholewinski (2005, p. 705) refers to the availability of eleven factors in discussing immigrant integration in the scope of the Hague Program: “Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society…” Ager and Strang (2008, p. 170) develop a conceptual framework for the explanation of integration at four main levels: “Markers and means,” “social connection,” “facilitators,” and “foundation.” They link “employment,” “housing,” “education,” and “health” to “markers and means”; connect “social bridges,” “social bonds,” and “social links” to social connection; attach “language and cultural knowledge” and “safety and stability” to “facilitators”; and lastly relate “rights and citizenship” to “foundation.” In addition, Castles et al. (2002) pinpoints the conditions of refugee integration in the UK with reference to a set of sociological processes like adaptation, adjustment, and assimilation rather than displaying the analysis of indicators. In fact, they do not underrate integration indicators that

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Bosswick and Heckmann, and Cholewinski, Ager, and Strang analyze; on the contrary, they, in a sense, investigate the capacity of indicators to draw attention to their functionality to grasp the process of integration and take up integration as two-way process in which refugees are expected to get access to rights and services and to maintain their cultural and social identities. Esser’s approach to immigrants’ integration process points out that “acculturation or socialization” is related to the way in which immigrants gain social and economic status and establish social relations in the form of friendships, romantic relationships, and marriages in attaching themselves to “a social system” (Esser, 2000 cited by Bosswick & Heckmann, 2006). Following Castles et al., the social integration of Iraqi refugees into the US takes place in a two-way process: Iraqi refugees’ access to the labor market and other services as well as public relief constitute the backbone of integration. The United States’s self-sufficiency policy organizes institutions and practices to reinforce refugee reception and admission programs and implements refugees’ responsibilization. Employment or involvement in business life is very important as the process that initiates social interaction. This social interaction or social contact takes place with Americans, Mexicans, and other groups. In a way, employment and the working environment are the most important stages that start a socialization process, but also, at the same time, they also determine the limits and boundaries of this socialization or social interaction. The interviewee U/32/m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson, stresses upon the importance of the relation between working/labor and socialization in the following words: Being employed means orientation as a part of adaptation into the US. That is, if refugees were employed, they would be working with Americans; so, their English would improve so that they could socialize, learn American culture, and solve their own problems.

Having a job and learning English are important intermediaries that facilitate integration and socialization. On the other hand, the type of work done, the size of the city, and the level of urbanization are among the most important factors. In this regard, the interviewee U/32/m adds that: They are placed in metropolitan areas, not in rural areas. During my observation, Arizona was always on the top ten list when it came to the settlement

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of refugees since entry level jobs are a lot in Arizona; so to speak, tourism sector, hospitals, services for older persons are large. No need for a qualified education for this sort of job, they can work for nursing homes at the end of a two-month certification program. Many come to Arizona, and they are placed in metropolitan areas.

The process in which this social interaction and adaptation begins is not only a process in which refugees are in contact with people from different backgrounds, but also a process in which refugees obtain information about institutions and organizations, and receive supervision, orientation, and professional knowledge. Considering the development of modern societies based on “individual life,” “work,” and “work ethics” in Bauman’s (2005, p. 17) understanding, the place of work is both “the main factor of one’s social placement as well as of self-assessment” and “the main orientation point in reference to which all other life pursuits could be planned and ordered” and “the work career marked the itinerary of life and retrospectively provided the prime record of one’s life achievement and one’s failure.” In the United States, having a job, having work experience, and having an entry-level job represent a whole in the post-resettlement process. Refugees’ records of their occupations, skills, and experiences in Iraq remain a reference point for their lives in America. But if these reference points are still valid, they do play a role in making the lives of refugees easier in the US. When they bring a transferable experience, it’s clear they want to do similar work and shape their lives around their skills and occupations. In general, it determines the whole of life, as Bauman (2005, p. 17) puts it: “The type of work colored the totality of life; it determined not just the rights and duties directly relevant to the work process, but the expected standard of living, the pattern of the family, social life and leisure, norms of propriety and daily routine.” In light of all these findings, I propose to discuss the situation of Iraqi refugees in Arizona around the concept of a vicious cycle of refugee social integration. To make it clear, Iraqi refugees should enter an entry-level job immediately after receiving the short-term assistance provided by the post-resettlement programs. This entry-level job does not lead to effective social integration as it does not require language proficiency, i.e., knowledge of English. Unless there is effective social integration, most Iraqi refugees continue their lives within their own social or communication networks. Again, this situation does not allow refugees to have English

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proficiency. This circle is a vicious circle of refugee integration, and to break this cycle, refugees need to carry out their language learning and working processes together, if they are able to manage. Since it is not correct to reduce socialization or integration to learning English language, acquiring skills or licenses, and working or having better jobs, breaking this cycle should also necessitate the Iraqi refugees’ adaptation into working culture, lifestyles, rules and principles of institutions, agencies, and communities in the United States. Broadly speaking, a vicious cycle of refugee integration underpins the integration experience of Iraqi refugees. Even if some of the refugees reject the entry-level jobs offered to them for reasons such as social, cultural, and educational level, it is not sustainable for the system to make refugees live dependent1 on aid in the long run. Therefore, work is a must in the US. This instruction or imperative on work constitutes the objective condition of the vicious cycle I have specified. It should be noted that American social policy does not reveal a strategy to prevent this vicious circle from occurring. Here, first, it is necessary to separate the immigrant and refugee categories and to develop special strategies for the benefit of refugees. However, the American authorities refrain from designing this process as a legally classified process for refugees in legal terms. Refugees are people who have to work and even work hard to become new Americans in their safe havens. Even the American authorities offer the identification of the problems at different levels: For example, the White House Task Force on New Americans confirms “integration as a two-way process” and determines common challenges by emphasizing “limited capacity and funding for refugee integration activities, limited awareness about refugees and limited access to successful integration models.” On the other hand, the task force gives a priority to the role of “the welcoming communities movement” in different forms of initiatives and programs supported by the federal government. In this logic, there are some “federal strategic goals” that aim at strengthening “welcoming communities” (White House Task Force on New Americans, 2015, pp. 11–23). However, as can be seen here, the state wants to solve this as a community-based movement through agencies and voluntaries and does

1  Ong emphasizes that Southeast Asian refugees remain dependent on public assistance although they received specialized training on employment and English proficiency from the ORR according to the results in the 1980s (2003).

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not prefer to do it by developing concrete proposals to the identified problems or by developing legal regulations. On the other hand, the most important stage that the system has determined in the integration process is the point where refugees become citizens. The naturalization process creates the space where Iraqi refugees can now fully participate in the sociopolitical life of the US. More specifically, the naturalization process is considered as a process to “ensure that new citizens have the foundation to participate in civic institutions—skills such as the ability to read, write, and speak English, a demonstrated understanding of US history and government” (White House Task Force on New Americans, 2015, p. 24). Moreover, it means “permanency in a community” and “certainty of their future” in the US (2015, p. 34). The US policy does not concentrate on the negative outcomes of the vicious cycle of refugee integration, but stresses on the importance of the appearance of new citizens, that’s New Americans, who succeed in realizing herself or himself under the neoliberal organization of the system, and it is reasonable here to acknowledge “new citizens” as “American citizens” and “future Americans” as well, whereby enabling us to grasp the transformation of identities of Iraqi refugees from Iraqi-Americans to future Americans or American citizens. At this point, the subject of the future, envisaged by the system as a policy of integration, is future Americans. However, those who will have ideas or projections about future Americans are today’s Iraqi refugees, that is, the “wounded” subject defined as New Americans and the generation that comes right after the New Americans is Iraqi-Americans respectively. It is worth noting that the system accepts Iraqi refugees as New Americans, as it imposes a strict policy of self-sufficiency. The opportunities that the next generation will have after the Iraqi refugees create the Americans of the future we have pointed out. Examining the process through immigrants who came to America in the 1960s, Miltion M.  Gordon analyzes the conditions of immigrants in a similar process and draws attention to the impact of the “cultural patterns” on immigrants as follows: As the immigrants and their children have become Americans, their contributions, as laborers, farmers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, artists, etc., have been made by way of cultural patterns that have taken their major impress from the mould of the overwhelmingly English character of the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture or subculture in America, whose dominion dates from

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colonial times and whose cultural domination in the United States has never been seriously threatened. (1964, p. 72)

Gordon defines American culture as “the middle-class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins” and classifies types of assimilation, mainly “cultural or behavioral assimilation,” “structural assimilation,” “marital assimilation,” and “identificational assimilation.” Cultural or behavioral assimilation is actually “acculturation” as the first form of assimilation through the arrival of a minority group and takes place in the absence of other assimilation types. Structural assimilation refers to “the disappearance of the ethnic group as a separate entity and the evaporation of its distinctive values” and “identificational assimilation takes place in the form of all groups merging their previous sense of peoplehood into a new and larger ethnic identity which, in some fashion, honors its multiple origins at the same time that it constitutes an entity distinct from them all” (1964, pp. 72, 77, 81, 125). When taken within the scope of Gordon’s pioneering theory in this field, measuring changes in behavior and culture is important in terms of assessing the assimilation of immigrant groups. When we consider the situation of Iraqi refugees within this conceptual pattern, it is seen how cultural influence influences refugees from business life to social life. Refugees experience the acculturation process under the dominant influence of American culture. In this process, they are expected to work like Americans, take responsibility and integrate into society as good and hardworking citizens of American society. Public services and other support programs, which are the catalysts of this process, are offered to refugees for this purpose. Robert E. Park’s approach to assimilation takes place in two orbits: “To make like” and “to take up and incorporate” and stresses upon “a process” in which individuals are “incorporated into larger groups.” In this approach, the US provides a suitable environment in which “aliens” can easily “assimilate themselves to the customs and manners of American life” due to “the ease and rapid attributes of the social and economic structure of the US” (1914, pp. 606–608). In a society like the United States of America, the assimilation process is not based on a set of similarities; rather, it is essentially embedded in the coexistence of people with differences, to literally form a new compound of cultural differences. Kivisto (2004, p.  157) points out this with reference to Park in the following manner: “Park developed an explanation of how cultural pluralism (or

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multiculturalism) can coexist with assimilation and suggested that the capacity of the United States to absorb immigrants should be understood in this light.” In this sense, accommodation can be seen as a first step for this analysis as it is “a process” by which social relations are organized to reduce conflict areas and put persons and groups with different interests in a social order. Therefore, it is “adjustment” and “an organization of social relations” (Park & Burgess, 1921, p. 735). In this sense, accommodation may be rapid since it is a process to “a new situation” and it may change everything in a “sudden and revolutionary” way to generate “the mutation of attitudes in conversion” (Park & Burgess, 1921, pp.  736–737). Assimilation is different from accommodation, which is also “a process” to bring on “interpenetration and fusion” so that persons or people obtain “the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups” and share their “experience and history” and ultimately incorporate their commonalities into a “common cultural life.” More than different in the process of accommodation, assimilation is the symbol of “growth” meaning that it takes time, processes gradually and moderately and ultimately appear as a final product of the social contact. The significant point they underline is the necessity of “a common language” since it mostly appears as “barrier to assimilation.” It is an indicator of the interrelation between “communication and assimilation” since all different groups have their own “language, universe of discourse and cultural symbols” and their unity is a “unity of experience and of orientation” (Park & Burgess, 1921, pp. 735–737). Assimilation is based on three important aspects: The first one is “the biological aspects of assimilation,” the second one is “the conflict and fusion of cultures,” and the third one is “Americanization as a problem in assimilation.” In this sense, firstly, assimilation is not “amalgamation” which is a “biological process” that is “the fusion of races by intermarriage” since assimilation is “limited to the fusion of cultures.” Secondly, “social contact” appears as a component of acculturation that is “sufficient for the transmission from one cultural group to another of the material elements of civilization,” and “linguistic changes” need to be stressed upon since it is the strongest “medium of cultural transmission” and “the basis of unity” among people. Besides, “the intimacy of social contact” is a very effective factor to ensure the “rapidity and completeness of assimilation” for example “slavery and household slavery” can be the best examples of this type of social contact (Park & Burgess, 1921, pp. 737:739).

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Lastly, Americanization is related to “participation of the immigrant in American life” and immigrants need “an opportunity for participation” and “the language” before social reality: He needs to know how to use our institutions for his own benefit and protection. But participation, to be real, must be spontaneous and intelligent, and that means, in the long run, that the immigrant’s life in America must be related to the life he already knows. Not by the suppression of old memories, but by their incorporation in his new life is assimilation achieved. (Park & Burgess, 1921, p. 739)

This last point is critical to understanding the historical basis of Americanization, especially when it comes to the plight of immigrants in the United States. Park and Burgess explain that Americanization is created by participation, not an intellectual process that conveys “patriotism, loyalty, and common sense” to people. Participation is key to Americanization, and for an appropriate quality of participation, “communication” must be established in the form of “any organized social activity.” The use of language becomes very critical when it comes to communication and participation. The fact that they often emphasize the importance of the difference created by language shows how individuals and groups define a particular situation in their own mindsets. In other words, they attribute the formation of “common participation in common activities” to a “common definition of situation.” For this reason, understanding the differences in language emerges as a founding factor (1921, pp. 762–765). However, this is not a one-sided communication and participation process, they underline that “Native Americans should know the history and social life of the countries where the immigrants come from” (1921, p. 765). In general, this process needs to be built by public institutions, science, and education to create the healthy conditions for Americanization (1921, p. 766). In the integration and assimilation study developed by Park and Burgess, another voluminous approach, details of the lives of immigrants and foreigners in America are seen. In this study, which offers a great conceptual richness, it is expected that Iraqi refugees will realize all their social and business relations within the patterns predicted by the system during the integration process into American life. Therefore, this process is an effort to determine the behavior, attitudes and place of refugees in social relations, and ultimately requires the accommodation of refugees in order

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to establish a common cultural life. Thus, refugees’ social contact ensures cultural interaction as an important part of acculturation, while the emphasis on language learning is particularly relevant, as we will discuss later. The Americanization argument is one of the processes that Iraqi refugees go through in a similar way, as Park and Burgess point out. The citizenship stage I have underlined above and participation in American life, that is, being involved in any social event and taking part in certain partnerships, are the determining factors of Americanization, which also plays an important role, especially for the next generations of Iraqi refugees. In analyzing American ethnic and sectarian groups, W. Lloyd Warner makes a similar point by referring to the differences in “religious, national, or cultural origin” of “social minorities” who lived “in the cities and large towns of the United States” in the 1950s and adds that social minorities lose “their group identity” since their tendency is to “merge into the general population” through “acculturation and assimilation processes” (1952, p. 118). The strengths of Warner’s analysis are that immigrants live in areas with high rates of urbanization and eventually lose their group identity over time. While such analyses are, to a certain degree, still valid, Warner argues that immigrants completely abandon their own cultural norms and values and ​​ assimilate, referring to the melting pot model of acculturation. It is crucial to note that this last point is highly controversial for this book since identifying a point at which Iraqi refugees begin to lose all their religious, cultural, social norms and values requires ​​ analyses spanning different times, but an analysis that can be verified over first or second generations may not be sufficient. In my observations, it would be more accurate to say that such an analysis can be corroborated with post-­ generational data, given the limited affiliation and knowledge of Iraq, particularly the children of those who settled in the US in the 1990s. Integration, on the other hand, discussed by John Berry allows us to discuss adaptation and acculturation in plural societies productively. “Adaptation” refers to a set of “changes that take place in individuals or groups in response to environmental demands” which can come into existence as the short- and long-term changes (1997, p. 13) and is designed to measure “cultural changes” when immigrants begin living among different cultures and norms, thereby leading to transformation of social and psychological condition of immigrants. He also displays the existence of “cultural groups” in “plural societies” with reference to their “relative power.” The entry of cultural groups into the acculturation process differs from each other due to various factors like “voluntariness, mobility and

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permanence” which has a huge impact over the eventual outcome of acculturation (1997, pp. 6–8). According to Berry, plural societies imply “larger society” with “the civic arrangement in a plural society within which all ethno-cultural groups (dominant and non-dominant, indigenous and immigrant) attempt to carry out their lives” (2011, pp. 2–3). At this level, he emphasizes the role of two models: The first one is the “melting pot model” of intercultural relations and acculturation in plural societies. There is “one dominant (or mainstream) society, on the margins of which are various non-dominant (or minority) groups.” The second one is “the multicultural model.” There is “the larger society (rather than minorities)” that “accommodates the interests and needs of the numerous cultural groups” which are “ethno-cultural groups” that are “fully incorporated into this national framework” (Berry, 2013, p. 1123). Considering the situation of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, it is possible to evaluate the adaptation processes through cultural change. But while Arizona represents a pluralistic society, Iraqi refugees are also a cultural group. At this point, both the existence of intercultural relations and the dominant influence of the Americans as the dominant group, or rather of the American culture, should be taken into account. The effect of dominant culture is a highly effective variable in Berry’s quadruple model, assimilation, integration, separation/segregation, and marginalization analysis. If a brief evaluation is made within the scope of this variable, the limiting effect of the dominant group on the non-dominant group will affect the acculturation strategies of the non-dominant group. When the situation of Iraqi refugees is evaluated in this context, integration is associated with the refugees’ effort to maintain “some degree of cultural integrity, while at the same time seeking to participate as an integral part of the larger social network” (1997, p. 10). Nevertheless, the decisiveness of the dominant group causes Iraqi refugees to experience processes such as assimilation or segregation. Although a detailed discussion of the theories focusing on the social, cultural, and psychological aspects of integration will be given in the following sections, it is essential to consider economic integration separately as a model in the refugee integration process. At this juncture, Goldlust and Richmond’s (1974) multivariate model of immigrant adaptation and Kuhlman’s economic integration of refugees (1991) are two important models to demonstrate a comprehensive analysis of economic facets of refugee integration.

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The multivariate model of the “pre-migration characteristics and conditions” emphasized in the first model include objective and subjective conditions such as “education and technical training,” “previous urbanization,” “demographic characteristics,” “courtesy,” and “motivation.” There are also underlying factors for “situational determinants in receiving society”: “Demography,” “urbanization,” “industrialization,” “government policies,” “pluralism,” and “stratification” (Goldlust & Richmond, 1974, pp. 197–199). One of the important aspects of this model is that it examines the integration processes of the immigrants into the host community through their loyalty to their new country, and underlines that this is an “identification” and “internalization” process. On the other hand, one of the most important aspects of this model is “situational determinants,” which emerge as the determinants of this integration process, which in fact, besides social, cultural, and psychological factors, are rather factors such as “industrialization, professional and business services” (Goldlust & Richmond, 1974, pp. 199–203). The importance of the identification process of Iraqi refugees and their children is very evident. While expressing their commitment to the United States as a country that primarily saves them, it differs from adults in that children internalize this process. However, situational factors constitute the material conditions that should be examined when dealing with the situation of adults. Through these structural conditions, the situation of refugees is similar to that of immigrants as expressed by Goldlust and Richmond (1974, p. 199), “immigrant values” as part of both “a component of the socialization process” and “the level of satisfaction of immigrants” refers to “relative comparisons with the pre-migration situation of immigrants.” In this comparison, Iraqi refugees are in the position to challenge their values under the conditions provided by the US since they are resettled in industrialized areas with professional and business services, which may facilitate their socialization. Secondly, Kuhlman’s (1991) arguments on economic integration of refugees based on the multifaceted analysis of “demographic characteristics of refugees,” “socio-economic background of refugees,” “ethno-­ cultural affiliation of refugees,” “cause of flight,” “type of movement,” and “attitude to displacement” allows us to capture the whole process of integration beyond its social, cultural, and psychological aspects. In addition, “policies” or “national policies,” “policies followed by regional or

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local authorities,” and “policies of aid agencies” are also part of this analysis. The integration process is such a complex process that can be understood by examining all these processes. Within this multidimensional perspective, in which this book engages in all the processes, all these processes that form the basis of the economic integration of refugees, that is, starting with forced migration, consist of basic elements such as the duration of residence in the country of asylum and the urbanization, industrialization, and other social and economic parameters of the resettlement country.

Arizona: Host-Related Factors The demographic, social, economic, cultural, and political characteristics of the United States differ from one state to another. The ethnic and religious diversity of states may not allow researchers to approach the issues of cohesion, acculturation, and integration without considering the socio-­ cultural indicators of the social sphere. ORR data reveals that Arizona admits more Iraqis than any other state in the US.  Likewise, Texas, California, Michigan, and Illinois are areas where Iraqis live. Goldlust and Richmond’s emphasis on “situational determinants in the receiving society” (1974) and later Kuhlman’s on “host-related factors” (1991) is critical in a holistic analysis of the situation of Iraqi refugees in Arizona. Situational determinants and host-related factors in the receiving society lead us to see “macro-economic status, natural resource base, ethno-­ cultural structure, social stratification, socio-political orientation, and patronage” (Kuhlman, 1991). Talking about Arizona’s macroeconomic situation, it is critically important to find out how refugees have changed Arizona’s economic situation. New Americans contribute greatly to economic and business life in paying taxes and establishing new businesses, according to reports on the contributions of New Americans in Arizona published by New American Economy, which of the data reveals that immigrants take a significant place as producers and consumers. New Americans played a more active role in the overall increase in economic indicators in Arizona in 2014 and

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20152 than US-born residents. The IRC also indicates that the reports include refugees under the category of immigrants in the United States although the contribution of refugees to the economy is not mentioned in the report. To put the refugees’ circumstances in the Arizona context, it is necessary to understand Arizona’s particular circumstances as regards how Iraqi refugees are accommodated in Arizona’s social, economic, and demographic conditions. Resettlement agencies, nonprofit organizations, and Iraqi refugees evaluated macroeconomic conditions, natural resources, grassroots, ethno-cultural structure, social stratification, socio-political orientation, and patronage from different angles considering the macroeconomic conditions and natural resources. At this point, the interview with the representatives of Arizona Department of Economic Security explain the conditions in Arizona by pointing out why the refugees leave the state in the post-­resettlement period: Refugees leave the state of Arizona, yes, they do in the last few years in higher numbers than ever before, a lot of that, I think a few reasons: one is in 2009 the US economy crashed, there’s Arizona and Nevada were the hardest hit states because we were the fastest growing states in the country at the time and development was huge. When the economy crashed, development went way down so we were really hardly hard in Arizona. We have just been crawling back before 2009, the economy in Arizona was really good, refugees could have two, three jobs. I mean they were doing quite well and the cost of living in Arizona is still quite low actually but then the cost of living was great, so housing was wonderful, jobs were pretty plenti2  One of the reports published by a partnership of the International Rescue Committee in Phoenix, New American Economy, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce, Phoenix Mayor Gre Stanton, AT&T shows that “In 2014, immigrants paid $1 billion in federal taxes and $534.7 million in state and local taxes. They also held $4.9 billion in spending power; Immigrants living in Phoenix in 2014 helped create or preserve 14,052 local manufacturing jobs; 52.3% of foreign-born residents contributed to the rental property market, compared with just 45.8% of US-born residents; Foreign-born residents are more likely than US-born residents to start new businesses; In 2015, half of the Fortune 500 companies in Phoenix were founded by immigrants or their children” (NAE, 2017). Another report based on the data for the years of between 2010 and 2014 published by New American Economy in 2016 displays that “Arizona, which shares a 372-mile border with Mexico, is now home to more than 920,000 foreign-born residents; 113,760 people in Arizona were employed by immigrant owned companies in 2007; Immigrants were 31% more likely to work than native-born Arizonans; In Arizona, 70.5% of the foreign-born population is working aged, compared to only 46.8% of the native-born population” (NAE, 2016).

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ful, but in 2009 it was really hard. There was a lot of meat industry across the country and refugees were going to those places, there’s a lot of recruitment.

In fact, the officials’ emphasis on the global financial crisis of 2008 is an important breaking point for macroeconomic equilibrium, particularly in the industrial and sectoral areas. As a result, many refugees left the state due to financial problems since the state was not a land of opportunities for refugees in terms of economy, business, and employment. Looking at the income–poverty statistics between the years of 2011 and 2015 for Arizona, median household income is $50.255 and the rate of persons in poverty is 17.4% (Census, 2016). In comparison with the general statistics of the US, there is a slight difference in the number of household incomes while the poverty goes down to 13.5% for the year of 2015 (Census, 2015). Based on these conditions, refugee acculturation, integration, and assimilation processes are surrounded by the high rates of poverty in the US, particularly in Arizona. Most Iraqi refugees earn their living in entry-level jobs at minimum wage, thus starting a new life with a low socio-economic status. In this process, the most determining factor affecting the living strategies of refugees is the cost of living. In this sense, the representative of the Noor Women’s Association in Tucson refers to the past years of the state when talking about the socio-economic situation of refugees in Arizona: As compared to other states in the US, Arizona is more lucrative from the point of view of, I will call it a cheap state and an affordable state, but, in the last three or four years, the economy of Arizona was not good. So even though the standard of living you can get food, an apartment, good costs, and jobs, so that way is not lucrative. Before, five years ago, it was a little better, people were hiring more, and businesses were doing better. Because a lot of businesses do not hire refugees unless they are familiar with that. So, in the past, four years had gotten difficult, as far as the standard of living, it was very good state to come here and not only with the standard of living economically but the real atmosphere which was much easier; people who come in from hard countries like Somalia and Iraq get easier to be adapted but job opportunity isn’t great.

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The state is still considered as an affordable state. However, this does not change the fact that living costs are high and it is not easy for refugees to find a job, which meets their expectations, it is also difficult for them to be accepted and to adapt to their new environment. In a similar vein, U/32m, who was a volunteer for resettlement agencies for a long time in Tucson: Arizona is said to be a cheap state; but I do not agree with this. Arizona is on the middle level. Food is cheaper since we are on the border of Mexico from where many foods come, and we are also close to California from where some products come as well. However, salaries are too low as well. Educated and older ones leave here. Let’s say Arizona is at the middle level; not poor but not rich either. Refugees belong to the working class, and they will remain so for a long time; it would be difficult for them to move to middle class or upper class for especially the first generation of refugees at least. As a friend of mine said, you came here you are fucked for the first time, but your kids would be lucky... Republicans govern Arizona states and want to restrict social services as much as they can. They suppose that all must be responsible for themselves.

Young refugees looking for a better job leave the state for several important reasons. Besides the cost of living, the state also has some special conditions due to its proximity to Mexico, which is an important point that Kuhlman (1991) underlines in terms of the “ethno-cultural structure of the residential area.” Proximity to Mexico3 indicates the high number of Mexican immigrants coming to Arizona to work and live and may also be affecting the growing numbers of both undocumented immigrants and

3  New American Economy’s report (NAE, 2016, p. 1) reveals that “Arizona—which shares a 372-mile border with Mexico—has recently emerged as a major destination for New Americans. In 1990, 7.6 percent of Arizona residents were foreign-born. By 2010, that figure had risen to 13.4 percent.”

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unemployment,4 thus affecting the socio-economic conditions of the Arizona labor market. In terms of the population characteristics of the state, as of 1 July 2016, Arizona has a population of 6,931,071. Whites make up 83.3%, Blacks or African Americans 4.9%. Asians constitute 3.4% and others make up the rest. The percentage of Hispanics or Latino origins is 30.9% and Whites only 55.5%. The percentage of foreign-born persons between 2011 and 2015 is 13.5% (Census, 2016). This data during the years of fieldwork and analysis of the book shows the density of the Hispanics population in Arizona. As for the demographic structure of Iraqi refugees in the general population, it is important for American citizens living in Arizona to know who a refugee is and who is not. Immigrant and refugee diversity, confused with undocumented migration, risks a generalization that all migrants including Iraqi refugees are seen as undocumented. This distinction is also important for properly addressing the undocumented migration issue. From here, the executive director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix shares her observations: I think that agencies, not just ours but have done a pretty good job of getting the word out of who are refugees. I also think the media has done hammering job on who are undocumented and so the undocumented in Arizona in the eyes of the population are generally Mexican, and so now you have a bunch of Somalis at the store and even joke you, public will say all those are 4  New American Economy’s report (NAE, 2016, p. 24) explains that “Arizona is home to more than 284,000 undocumented immigrants. These individuals are far more likely than the native-born population—or even the broader foreign-born one—to be in the prime of their working years or ranging in age from 25–64. They also contribute to a range of industries that could not thrive without a pool of workers willing to take on highly labor-intensive roles. In 2014, for instance, undocumented immigrants made up 18.5 percent of all employees in Arizona’s administrative, support, and waste management services industry, a sector that includes grounds maintenance workers, janitors and building cleaners, and security guards. They also made up more than one in four workers employed in the agriculture sector, as well as 8.3 percent of workers in the wholesale trade industry. Large numbers of undocumented immigrants in Arizona have also managed to overcome licensing and financing obstacles to start small businesses. In 2014, an estimated 10.9 percent of the state’s working-­ age undocumented immigrants were self-employed—meaning Arizona was one of about two dozen states where unauthorized immigrants boasted higher rates of entrepreneurship than either legal permanent residents or immigrant citizens of the same age group. Almost 25,000 undocumented immigrants in Arizona were self-employed in 2014, many providing jobs and economic opportunities to others in their community. Undocumented entrepreneurs in the state also earned an estimated $464.2 million in business income that year.”

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refugees, but if they see Spanish speakers unfortunately, they could’ve been born and raised in Arizona and they think of them as undocumented so I think the stigma is more around being Hispanic…

Although Iraqi refugees have proof of registration, residency, and employment, in their resettlement states, Arizona’s proximity to Mexico, where it is mixed with undocumented immigrants, has consequences. Arizona’s diversity deserves attention to distinguish refugees from the non-refugee population in several respects. This is also part of an awareness-­ raising campaign, through the media, nonprofits, hospitable communities, and other private actors, to share information about refugees and strengthen communication with the American public. In this sense, it was equally important for the executive director to draw attention to some important breaking points to make refugees more visible to the public. 9/11 and ISIS are two of the situations that negatively affected the public opinion against refugees. But welcoming communities, nonprofits, and resettlement agencies across the US have taken on extra duties to recreate and maintain Arizona’s refugee-friendly climate. As the IASPF’s program director explained in this sense, Iraqi refugees also contributed to this process by showing their reactions, albeit rarely: On the political issues that happened in Iraq with ISIS, we hosted a protest, everybody came together, Christians, Muslims, Sunni, Shia. They came together, Lebanese, Iranians, Afghans. They all came together. They demonstrated to protest. They come together…For example, recently there was a protest that was going on by the mosque, everybody came together, Muslims, Christians, Jews. There are cases where they come together.

In this context, the opportunity to raise public awareness has arisen, since the point where refugees are visible is mostly the post-September 11 period. Beyond that, it is obvious that within Arizona’s diverse population, there is no strategy other than the limited effort of resettlement agencies and the nonprofit sector. It is important what these limited efforts of the nonprofit sector are. To briefly touch upon this point, for example, the representative of Noor Women’s Association explained with the following words: I would define Arizona as a refugee friendly state. Because in the past twenty years, there are a number of refugees we helped and at one time we had

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people come and mention to us that being a refugee friendly state between Tucson and Phoenix, they have the second quiet of refugees. So, I would with my experiences call it friendly; but, as far as funding by the state, that is not great because the state keeps cutting the funding.

Being a refugee-friendly state, or, as it is popularly called, a welcoming state, in this context, is insufficient to reach an overarching conclusion about American citizens’ knowledge and perception of refugees. Because there are no indications that refugees can be distinguished from other immigrants or that citizens can obtain information about the special situation of refugees. Being a hospitable community is often associated with “friendship, hospitality, help and support” in the eyes of the majority of humanitarian organizations in Arizona. At this point, the function of welcoming communities should be to defend the rights of refugees, to support their social and economic integration, or to raise public awareness about the special situation of refugees and to address this as a non-security problem. Because the refugee also experienced a series of victimization, escaped from the threat, torture, conflict, and was also controlled and selected by all institutions of humanitarian governance before arriving in the US. On this basis, the distinction between refugees and migrants needs to be broadened at the policy level as it is decisive in many areas, from refugees’ access to the labor market to their access to institutions and organizations. The way the host community, as a dominant group, limits its relationship with refugees is critical at this point. As Berry points out, the acculturation strategy of Iraqi refugees may also be manifested in the determination of the dominant group. In this sense, looking at Arizona as a whole and presenting it as a “welcoming” state has some disadvantages as well as its importance. These profoundly affect their access to the job market, their access to institutions, and their plans to belong to the larger society. As one of the best summaries of how this process works, we can refer to the words of the interviewee U/32/m: Americans, who directly communicate with refugees in a way, approach that they are sweet, they come from foreign countries, and they have their own foods; so, some of the locals are in a festive mood of celebration. That is, the locals do not know who refugees are and where they come from. Indeed, the refugee organizations lead people to this sort of area; they are in the mood to celebrate refugees who suffered much; we saved them, and we feel

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alright now…It is difficult to make a general comment about the situation of Americans. They do not know who those people are and where they come from, depending on the person.

Here, the factor determining the limits of the host community is, in a sense, their indifference to the specific gravity of the refugee issue rather than refugees themselves. The diversity within Arizona’s population is strong enough to absorb the particularities of refugees and render them invisible without a concern. At this point, it would not be incorrect to state that Iraqi refugees are also trying to survive in the difficulties created by this diversity.

Social Participation and Intercultural Relations In integration studies, there are analyses that consider integration as one-­ way or two-way processes. In the two-way definition of integration given by Castles et al. (2002, p. 115) as “normative use of the concept,” it is “a one-way process of adaptation by newcomers to fit in with a dominant culture and way of life,” which comes into sight as “a watered down form of assimilation.” On the other hand, it is “a two-way process of adaptation” and gives place to the process of “change in values, norms and behavior for both newcomers and members of the existing society.” Unlike the integration studies in Europe, it is necessary to develop a theoretical and analytical basis beyond the one-way or two-way integration duality in the approach to integration processes within a third or alternative manner. In this way, the Arizona case can be taken into account in the context of processes such as socialization and identification in relation to the subjective and objective conditions. Under all these circumstances, it is necessary to underline the subjective and objective conditions that distinguish Iraqi refugees from other refugee groups. At first glance, it must be underlined that Iraqi refugees are a more educated and urbanized population compared to other refugee groups, namely Somali or Burmese refugees. For this reason, the participation of Iraqi refugees in employment, vocational courses and language courses, and so on is an important sign that many want to integrate into the host society. In the light of Berry’s “participation” argument, in the case of Iraqi refugees, social participation appears to be a factor that to some extent hinders separation from the wider society. In this regard, the

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director of the Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus in Phoenix explains his observations in the following words: The Iraqi population as compared to others tend to integrate very quickly and the reason for that is that they come from very sophisticated society, very urban in most cases, and most have a lot of skills, education, and work experience, so those kinds of things will allow them to integrate much quicker. Of course, within the Iraqis, you have a full range of people who are professionals, lawyers, doctors, engineers whatever two people who were rural, agriculture, just laborers. So, the more educated you are, the more exposed you are to urban society, to school opportunities, education opportunities, to employment, the quicker you’re gonna integrate here. So by and large, the Iraqi population is pretty sophisticated and does integrate very quickly and they disappear in our community, to in our communities through positive way very quickly kids get in school, they learn English fast, parents or adults go to work, go to school, get additional training, they are making money, they’re paying their bills and they go to the mosque, they become part of the organizations, they make friends and they just disappear and become a part of American society. (Emphasis added)

The director’s emphasis, though particularly important, cannot be considered as subjective and objective conditions that remove the vicious circle of integration. Qualified, urban, and educated Iraqi refugees are subject to entry-level employment conditions that form the starting point for their economic integration. In other words, the element that the director talks about and that I should emphasize is the process of “disappearing.” It would not be possible to see disappeared refugees as integrated refugees. When it comes to Iraqi refugees fleeing war conditions, with special needs, or suffering long periods of poverty in the country of asylum, disappearance can also mean separation or marginalization rather than integration. Integration, which includes the integration process of Iraqi refugees with special needs and vulnerabilities, should be equipped with strategies according to these special needs and vulnerabilities. I conceptualize this process without these strategies and policies do not exist as a blind spot of refugee integration. The link between the blind spot of integration and the strategy of acculturation is very strong. However, the fact that Iraqi refugees are urban and educated is not a sufficient ground for discussion, household condition, role and status of women, conditions of rural regions and other decisive factors like vulnerabilities and specific needs and other factors

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need to be evaluated in this process. Therefore, a non-deterministic perspective on education and urbanization is required. The executive director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Phoenix explains this in the subsequent manner: I think in some cases it was a little bit easier for Iraqis, not because they are Iraqi, because they were primarily urban refugees and I think, for me, like you could’ve asked the same question 15 years ago about the Bosnians and I would’ve said the same thing. That was little bit easier for the Bosnians because so many of them had more similar lifestyles to what they are integrating into. And I think the most difficult thing for the Iraqis was that recertification that did not happen, because many of them are highly educated, but of course then what you do, right you say all the Iraqis are urban and highly educated and then you have this whole population here, you forgot about there are farmers that are from rural areas that the state may not have a high education what’s the rate of women in world communities that have had the same education opportunities as men and so any population that come in mass like the Iraqis, an organization like us can’t do that can’t say it’s can be easier for them because they are the urban even though that’s what the first thing out of my mouth, because generally speaking it has been but that’s not true for every household so we still have to think about what about the rural family and what about you see people who have been on the farms with large families but I have some families like that where the wife may not have ever had education looking in the same situation as I have any other rural family so for me a lot of it when I’m in my years of doing refugee settlement has really been more about what’s your life experience before you come here for Iraqis a lot of come from urban areas a lot had been exposed to a lot of world ways you know…

The main point expressed by the director is that unless the equivalence/credentiality process for the occupation and education of Iraqi refugees is duly implemented and their access to the labor market is regulated within this scope, the objective conditions of integration will be damaged. For this reason, it should be emphasized once again how important economic integration is. On the other hand, I should point out that while this policy weakens economic integration, it also paves the way for the functioning of the “melting pot” process (Berry et  al., 1989, p. 187). So, given the effectiveness of faith-based institutions in Arizona at this point, it should be noted that there is an emerging “an established dominant group” in the community and they work with Iraqi refugees as

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“a non-dominant group.” On this basis, “intercultural relations” gains importance (Berry et al., 1989; Berry, 2013, p. 1123). The predominant character of the socio-­cultural structure of the society suggests such intercultural relations in the melting pot model at first, while the multicultural model deserves attention, later analyzing how all “ethno-cultural groups” manage to live together. Milton M. Gordon examines assimilation in the context of America, the concept of “a theory of group life” reveals that there is “group life” as a “social setting” in which social relations are established between individuals of different races, religions, and nationalities and highlights that Americans take their social position according to their groups, which can be “primary and secondary groups, family groups, network of associations, groups of racial, religious and national origin, and social classes” (1964, p. 234). Without exaggerating the weight of this important argument in intercultural relations between refugees and American citizens, it is important to underline that refugees’ integration at the group level both positively and negatively affects intercultural relations. Considering their extended families, Iraqi refugees may have more interaction and social contact between “primary groups” such as “families, cliques and associations” in Gordon’s words. There is no doubt that family ties and relationships play an important role in their daily lives. However, the same cannot be said about whether they tried to come together as associations and organizations; although primary group relationships differ from one state to another, the level of community relationships and relationships among themselves influences both their relationship with American citizens/ American society and their integration into the host community. The staff supervisor of La Frontera Arizona states how Iraqi refugees organize and act together: “Iraqis are not organized in Tucson there is no trust among them. They cannot come together In Tucson. But they are organized in Phoenix, it is different. Concerning Iraqi Christians and Muslims, they keep separate. But they are not visible. We see other groups mostly. But Iraqis we cannot see.” The first point here is that there are ethnic and religious factors in forming the level of interaction among Iraqi refugees, but also, as they are under the influence of war and conflict, the sense of security is also determinant in their communication and interaction among themselves. In the similar vein, the representative of Tucson Refugee Ministry also underlines that:

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It is the Iraqis that want to disappear from other Iraqis; they move out of Iraqi communities to go to American communities, they do not want to be in the same community, they always say it is because they talk with, everyone is talking behind back… Some refugee groups form clubs to organize the support. But not Iraqis depending on various factors, religion, education…etc.

The “disappearance” referred to here is Iraqi refugees turning to American communities instead of their relationships with their own communities. Although this is not a generalizable result, it is a process that varies from a city to another. Gordon’s emphasis on “structural separation” becomes meaningful in the “secondary relations” that Iraqi refugees develop with the Americans. However, the integration process here raises the question of how Iraqi refugees maintain their “cultural identity” in a dominant society. In this regard, first, “structural assimilation of immigrants” does not seem possible for the first-generation adults, with some exceptions, and this may be a “generalization” especially for “peasant, working-class and lower-middle class immigrants” because these immigrants “prefer the security of a communal life” through “their fellow-immigrants from the homeland” (1964, p. 242). This is largely true for Iraqi refugees. Regarding the disappearance of Iraqi refugees, particularly the situation of the first generation of adult refugees interviewed in this book, Iraqi refugees build their “communal life” through the primary groups they trust while their tendency both to make this communal life an association and join an organization is not strong. Second, Gordon’s emphasis on the role of “immigrant adjustment agencies” should be “the adjustment of the immigrant to American culture and institutions” through the channel of “secondary group and institutional contact.” This is required to ensure “acculturation or cultural assimilation” by “training, education, ways of raising children in basically middle-class American culture” because immigrants are “potential future citizens” in American society. Beyond ethnicities and religions, acculturation must be based on the “element of American culture” that “gradually incorporates” into refugee lives and “interprets that culture to the newcomer in ways which he can understand” (1964, pp. 243–244). This refers precisely to the tasks undertaken by the resettlement agencies under the cooperative contract with the state in today’s conditions. In this picture, where Iraqi refugees are positioned as New Americans and citizens of the

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future, the requirements and values of the US system ​​are conveyed to refugees. Taken at the macro-level, the roles and importance of Christian values​​ and faith-based organizations that the Bush administration refers to at the political level, highlighted earlier, include fostering the development of American cultural identity and preventing other ethnic and religious divisions. The dominant character of American cultural identity as a social entrepreneurship has been reinforced through institutions, agencies, and other non-governmental or voluntary organizations. Under the melting pot model, this approach aims to accelerate the integration process and transform ethnic or religious affiliations in the context of intercultural relations. In this sense, the Director from the Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus in Tucson in Arizona explains how Christian Iraqis find more supportive communities quicker than Muslim Iraqis in this process: I would agree that Iraqi Christians adapt and develop support here much quicker than Muslim Iraqis. They are not much connected with the Iraqi community. They are connecting with Americans because they are reaching out in the open to those relationships and they are seeking them out, their English gets stronger because they are talking to Americans, they feel very happy with the way of being accepted. For the most part, unfortunately, maybe fortunately I don’t know, a lot of Christian Americans are thrilled to me about Iraqi Christians, and they are very welcoming and supportive and aren’t as intimate as with Muslim Iraqis. So that population I think adjusts much quicker because of these dynamics... probably they have too many volunteers… You know, we have Iraqis, they have a hard time, I would say, of adjusting because they are just coming from harsh conditions. They also didn’t have education, they had high education. Iraqis coming from Türkiye have done very well, they are used to urban living…

While it is true that ethnic or religious affinity or similarity with the host society accelerates this process, it also facilitates the adaptation to the cultural identity of the host society. In this sense, it should be underlined that Christian Iraqi refugees experience this intercultural process more comfortably in the United States. Therefore, the influence of the dominant form of culture is more decisive and restrictive for Muslim Iraqi refugees in this sense and affects their intercultural strategies and acculturation process.

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In this multi-faceted integration process of refugees, there are many factors that affect the intercultural relations of refugees. As Gordon explains: “Integration” is a comprehensive process that “involves an easy and fluid mixing of people of different racial, religious and national backgrounds in social groups, families (i.e., marriages), private organizations, and close friendships” (1964, p. 246). But the “disappearance” of refugees in public in the post-resettlement period in the eyes of institutions and organizations encourages us to find out how and why the refugees disappear. In pursuit of analyzing this process, the blind spot of integration tells us about participation, social contact, and intercultural relation beyond whether integration is a single or dual process, but it is also the process of inclusion in employment that determines the economic integration of refugees. As a result, the blind spot of the integration process does not respond to the peculiarity and special needs of refugees, which feeds the vicious cycle of refugee integration.

Social Mobility and Social Capital The importance of the change in the individual and social status of Iraqi refugees in terms of acculturation strategies will be discussed as a complement to the subjective and objective conditions that are effective in integration, which we discussed in the previous section. Speaking of integration or economic adaptation, Kuhlman often paints a detailed picture of the process from pre-migration factors to post-resettlement processes and provides three important areas of adaptation: “Non-economic dimensions of integration,” “impact on refugees,” and “impact on host community.” The non-economic dimensions of cohesion need to be clarified in terms of “impact on refugees” to show how the social integration of Iraqi refugees in Arizona has taken place. In this context, the non-economic dimensions of adaptation should be considered together in the light of acculturation and assimilation theories. He explains these non-economic dimensions of adaptation by dividing the issue into two parts: “Subjective aspects” and “objective aspects.” The first relates to “attitudes towards refugees,” “identification,” “internalization,” and “satisfaction.” The second is fulfilled by “legal rights,” “spatial integration,” “cultural change,” “social relations,” and “security” (1991, p. 17). The change in the social and economic conditions of Iraqi refugees includes, in Kuhlman’s theoretical framework, the comparison of the refugees’ social and economic conditions before the forced migration and

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similar conditions in the post-resettlement period. However, since the pre-forced migration process is a fragmented one, the effect of the time spent in the asylum country, which is one of the intermediate categories pointed out by Kuhlman, on poverty and refugees should also be considered. The social and economic status of Iraqi refugees and the social class they belong to are deeply affected by all these processes. This process has often led to losses in their social capital, networks, and mobility. In examining America’s social structure, W.  Lloyd Warner (1952, p.  77) describes that “social position” is not something fixed, because individuals can “move up or down” “by their own efforts” or “through the efforts of others” such as their families. Thus, “vertical mobility” in the United States is “accomplished by most people through the proper use of certain recognized sources of social power, the principal ones being occupation, entrepreneurship, education, talent, sexual attractiveness and marriage…” Otherwise, individuals may experience “downward mobility,” that is, they may not have a qualified social position that provides vertical mobility from the lower class to the upper class. From this point of view, he explains “social mobility” as “an incentive system, driving the man who climbs occupationally and his whole family, who share the rewards” (1952, p. 79). Aside from conditions of the majority of Iraqi refugees in Iraq, the most fundamental factor determining their social position starts with their acceptance of entry-level occupations. Here the “effort” of refugees and families is a crucial variable and the “vertical mobility” of refugees also depends on the level of the social power that refugees will use. Processes such as having social power, participation in education, being an entrepreneur, fulfilling the equivalence processes related to their professions and education are very important for refugees. Therefore, the inability of refugees to use this social power with entry-level jobs exposes them to downward mobility. The most important consequence of this situation is regression as a class position. In this sense, social mobility may not be a viable process for Iraqi refugees and their families. Milton (1964, pp. 46–47, 56) also examines Canadian and US contexts by associating “upward social mobility” with a kind of “moving up in the class system,” adding that “upward social mobility, then, involves the need for learning and adopting values and behavior in accordance with the standards of the class into which the upwardly mobile person is moving.” It is also important to recognize that upward mobility, in this sense, is something politically and socially inculcated by the “American value system,”

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which always emphasizes “bettering oneself,” “the rags to riches,” and “the triumph of individual merit.” At this point, while he explains the upward social mobility of refugees as a climbing within the class system, it is an obvious fact that this climb took place within the American value system. The whole integration process of Iraqi refugees consists of learning these values and ​​ developing appropriate behaviors for a successful entrepreneurship. In this context, social mobility necessitates Iraqi refugees to take part in the system and to have the motivation to climb up in the class system. In this whole process, refugees’ assessment of their own situation is also decisive, which also includes the change in their subjective conditions. Therefore, it is an important question of how satisfactory they are in their struggle to exist within the system. According to Goldlust and Richmond’s multivariate model, one of the subjective elements is “satisfaction” which refers to “relative comparisons with the immigrant’s situation before migration” (1974). For Iraqi refugees, this process requires assessing both their lives in Iraq and their situation in the country of asylum, but the main thing here is for them to indicate conditions in their home country, which constitutes their social position, class, and capital. Kuhlman also explains all variables in relation to their level of “satisfaction,” which refers to indicators concerning loss of social capital, social status, and social mobility. In analyzing satisfaction levels in comparison with conditions in Arizona, Iraqi refugees’ age, gender, education, and other individual factors are variables that apply to understanding the socialization process. Iraqi refugees’ level of education is considered higher compared to other refugees, as indicated before. The majority of Iraqi refugees have a high school diploma despite their limited knowledge of English. On the other hand, regarding the variable of gender in social position, it negatively affects the ability of married women who have never worked in Iraq to be included in the host community and to communicate in daily life. The age range of the people I interviewed is between 18 and 70, which refers to the median age of the working-age population in Arizona. Thus, the decline in the social mobility of this population should be considered first of all taking into account their economic conditions, and then analyzed at the level of social relations. Comparing conditions in Iraq with changes in their social and economic situation in Arizona, Iraq refugees see the economy as the first factor to deteriorate and its impact on their daily lives as a reference point. In

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this sense, the interviewee, MH/47/m, explains his and his family’s conditions as follows: In Iraq, there was a time that we were living very very well; good life, good cars, good money, good salaries, everything cheap and life was wonderful. But, Iraq, because of the wars, was having a bad economic situation. We reached a point where you cannot buy a pack of eggs. You have to buy one or two. The embargo, the war, the economic situation, it was too bad. I am talking about 2003. We were having a good time. If you want me to compare myself now, when I used to live in the 70s and 80s, I was living there much better than here. I was a big merchant in Iraq. We had a big house. We had a car. Later, we had a bad economy, we were hardly making a living. There is a good time in Iraq, but there is a time we are much better than Iraq here. For the social life, Iraq is much better than the US. We used to live a big social life there, communication, relatives, brothers, sisters, cousins, go there, do there, visit there, trip there, we missed this. Here, we cannot find this social life here at all. I think my social and economic situation is not going to be the same. Now, I am working, two of my kids are working, we are making some money to make our life good. Within the next five years, maybe if my son and my kids get a good job on their degree, then they would get good salaries, maybe things will change.

First, he underlines that the Iraqi economy under Saddam’s regime was good until the end of the 1990s. Later, when the regime began to disintegrate, their economic situation began to deteriorate. He was an engineer in Iraq but works as an interpreter in the nonprofit sector in Arizona and cannot perform his profession due to re-credentialing procedures in the US.  He stated that he earned well for doing his profession in Iraq but experienced a social and economic decline in Arizona. Their main motivation in Arizona is their belief that their children will have a great future if they get a good education. Therefore, he sees getting a good education as a necessary and important factor for advancing or moving up in the American class hierarchy. Under these conditions, as he states, the determination of all this economic life weakened his social relations as well. In my interview with FD/57/f, she explains that she used to work as a lawyer in Iraq and had a social network of people with the same education, and now works as a teacher and volunteer with a humanitarian organization in Arizona, recalling her situation as follows:

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It was better in Iraq. I had my house, so I didn’t have to pay for rent. I had my car, and I didn’t have to pay any payment. My salary was more than it is now. I am also good now. My salary covers all my needs. I have a right to think how I can improve my financial situation, but not really too much. After four or five years, my conditions may be better in Arizona. But it would never be close to my conditions in Iraq. When I was in Iraq, I had my best friends that were close to my career. But here, of course not. I don’t have friends who like working like my career. I found most of them graduated from high school. I worked here as a leader not a friend. I am guiding them. I cannot talk to them about my problems, but they need me to talk about their problems.

At the important point here, it is seen that Iraqi refugees who have a profession actively work to contribute to their society and gain a social power over the community to facilitate their integration in the host community. This is particularly common in associations that work closely with Iraqi refugees. There is a tendency for refugees who have lost their economic status or experienced downward mobility professionally to use their skills and knowledge to benefit their communities. One of the most important factors here is also gender and the interviewee puts her effort as a woman who wants to set herself an example for other refugee women and realize their potential. The research findings indicate that especially married women with children lead a much more isolated life in Arizona. The participation of these women, who undertake the housework and childcare, in social life is quite limited and their socialization is mostly to spend time with their close friends and relatives. It is also important to note that this does not mean that the roles of women and children are fixed and not subject to possible change. The interviewee, Y/37/f, highlights her willingness to learn English as quick as possible to overcome her difficulties in Arizona in the following words: Before the war, my husband was working for a church. Our conditions were better than our current conditions in Arizona. There were also difficult things in Iraq, and it is easier now. When I start school here, it would be better, I will talk and write in English. My husband also needs to learn English for citizenship. I spend my time in the house taking care of my children. I don’t have friends here. I have little communication with Iraqis on special days at a church.

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Beyond religious and ethnic differences, the additional burdens of being a woman, especially confined to the house, are a common finding. The desire of women refugees to socialize and participate in public life cannot be ignored. Unlike their life in Iraq, Iraqi refugees either act within a very limited social network or gradually lose their social relations in a Western cultural and social environment. In addition to suffering a downward mobility in their professions in the United States, they also suffer significant losses in terms of wealth or economic assets. In this sense, Iraqi refugees develop strong tendencies to attribute value to their feeling of safety and security in Arizona and to appreciate the value of the importance of extended family relations in a huge longing. In this regard, the interviewee D/51/m expresses his experiences in the following words: I was in Iraq. My social and economic situation was much better than here. First of all, I had my own house. There was no rent to pay. I had my cars. I had my land. My family and relatives were working. Much better. It is not possible to get the same conditions in five or ten years in Arizona. When the kids get a good job, then maybe we will be living better than this. I have all the free time because I am staying at home. I talk with my children. I go to the backyard. Most of the time, I sleep, and I lie down because my health is not good. I was in the emergency room two weeks ago. I don’t really have any friends here. When I have problems or issues, I call my caseworker only. I feel safe here. It is a time like we used to have in the 1980s in Iraq. You can keep your door open. Nobody comes in. Everything is good here.

In addition to the fact that Iraqi refugees enjoy their security and safety in the United States after a long experience in conflict and social ambivalences, caseworker, who is part of the institutional structure, plays an important role for a refugee as the institution is responsible for tracking and monitoring a refugee’s case for five years. For this reason, many approach the agencies to consult about their issues. It is a general outcome that they predict that their economic situation will not be the same in Iraq in at least the next five years. They often inherit their dream of having a “richer” life for their children in a belief that having a good level of education will change their lives and lead to upward mobility in terms of economy and social relations. For many, the 1980s Iraq is still vivid in their memories as a comfortable living space despite the political pressure on them. A Christian Iraqi, Ezidi or Turkmen, regardless of ethnicity or religion, accept the rule of a

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brutal dictatorship, but they also often stress that their situation is better than their current situation in Arizona. This is an indication of how much worsening their social and economic situation in Arizona has become. It is almost an indicator of having a certain social class and status even under dictatorship. During our interview, DR/36/m explains it with these words: If Iraq would be Iraq in previous times, it would be thousands of times better than Arizona. If Iraq was under the administration of Saddam, it would be thousands of times better for us. At that time of Saddam, nobody made difficulties for me in my country, my province. I had my work, my company. Yes, Saddam was a brutal man, but my province is thousands of times better than anywhere. After Iraq collapsed, now Arizona is better for us. My province collapsed. I have relatives there. I communicate with them through the internet or phone. I do not know what would happen here in Arizona. I hope it will be good for us in future. I would return to Iraq if the conditions were good. Türkiye is better than here. I know their language. But living here is more difficult for me.

Integration in Arizona is a quite complicated phenomenon for Iraqi refugees. Talking, working, and living are difficult in Arizona. The main element that makes up their perspective about Arizona are the memories of the good old days. Of course, the main reason behind all this is that it is very difficult for them to provide social and economic upward mobility in Arizona. The great losses in the past and the great effort for the future determine their perspectives deeply. This is sometimes seen as commemorating Turkey and missing Iraq despite Saddam’s occasional persecution. Despite all the painful weight of the past and the experiences, Iraqi refugees have built on rational decisions. This represents the time needed to accommodate a new environment and make reasonable decisions. Refugees, who build their lives by finding alternative ways, prefer to build a life on their past experiences and knowledge. At this point, there are refugees struggling regardless of age, ethnicity, and religion. The interviewee, QK/64/m shares his experiences in the following manner: Really, for me, I don’t feel a lot of difference because of my work there (Iraq), I had many relations, let’s say social, because I was working in a humanitarian organization, so I had a relation with UN agencies, with NGOs, with government and with people. I was busy and, social life in our area, we knew each other, parents and relatives, our village let’s say. Here, at the beginning, I was really bored. Many times, I asked my son, I said my

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son, tomorrow you book me, I’m gonna return to Iraq. Because there was not a lot of community here, those people I know may have two or three families and other families were new here. But, as far as others come, we communicate, and our communities are through the Church. What I did personally, I kept myself busy studying. I will tell you something, I improved my English language here. I was going by two buses, going two hours to the adult learning center.

Refugees who derive their social status and power from their professional knowledge, skills, or jobs in Iraq accommodate to their new environment by working in similar jobs or benefiting other refugees to make their lives in America somehow meaningful and productive. This accelerates the integration process of other refugees and their identification with American identity as Nelson et al. (2015, p. 5) emphasize “the malleability of identity and personhood” with reference to “displaced individuals must be willing to alter sometime deeply rooted values in order to accommodate these new contexts.” This is the construction of a process as long as refugees keep their motivation to “feel productive.” and this relationship, which is meaningful for the refugees, can also contribute to the implementation of the self-sufficiency policy. This process also leads to an effect that changes the traditional family structure and gender roles. Nelson et al. underline (2015, p. 6, 13) “the traditionally gendered Iraqi family is accommodating new stressors, such as forced displacement, by reassigning such roles to its members based on the potential for productivity.” Therefore, it is possible to deal with this process around various factors. Because losses in economic and social status cause individuals in the family to assume different roles. Working-aged women and children in particular are taking on new roles to support the family and regain mobility. On the other hand, this causes loss of social and economic status and downward mobility in terms of “productivity loss,” “shifting self-worth,” and “redistribution of roles” and also changes the male role in the traditional family as representing social power and economic status. Iraqi refugees are a very diverse group. Under the conditions created by forced migration, they have developed different personalities and identities depending on the acculturation process. However, the change in roles within the family is evident given the decline in their social mobility. Therefore, “productivity roles” and “role inversions” are the most important characteristics of the process. At this point, Kuhlman’s concept of

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“satisfaction” is explanatory because forced migration changes social positions. Refugees experience downward mobility due various premises such as entry-level jobs and losing financial assets. Therefore, refugees’ level of satisfaction is weak under the influence of conditions in Arizona although there are those who lose their productive power on the one hand and those who maintain their productivity roles on the other. Their satisfaction also does not indicate a good level of refugee adaptation, and many undergo a “shock” because the system does not meet their expectations, thereby falling them into “disappointment” rather than “satisfaction.”

Security and Safety in Arizona Considering the economic integration of refugees into acculturation strategies, it is important to draw that Kuhlman’s emphasis on satisfaction, identification, and internalization is deeply related to the analysis of how they experience acculturation in connection with the assimilation process. From a different but complementary angle, Gordon’s assimilation variables manifest that migrants may begin to change their “cultural patterns to those of host community” and experience a sort of “cultural or behavioral assimilation” in the context of “acculturation” in addition to other subprocesses or conditions migrants experience at different levels (1964, p. 71). In a different orbit, Park (1914, pp. 609–615) speaks of the variable of race in discussing assimilation in secondary groups in the United States and underlines the fact that “admission to the primary group…, in the family and in the tribe, makes assimilation” when his analysis of “slavery adopted into the family as servant.” Related to this, he gives us the importance of “like-mindedness,” “social solidarity,” and “loyalty” in explaining assimilation and puts forward that “individuals with widely different mental capacities enter as coordinate parts, that gives the corporate character to social groups and ensures their solidarity” and this corporate does not mean “a formal like-mindedness.” In Park and Burgess’s approach, “accommodation” has also an important place in inquiring the situation of communities, groups, social organizations in terms of Americanization, and homesickness. In this sense, their emphasis on “social organization” helps fathom how community groups like Iraqi refugees or other immigrants form their own community activities in their common “accommodation” strategies (1921). To be able to discuss their social organization level in Arizona, one of the most important factors is “security” in terms of “economic security” and

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“cultural security.” As Kuhlman (1991, p. 16) also points out, the impact of refugee influx over the host country is seen as both economic burden and antagonism in society and Berry also indicates “cultural security/ threat” is an important issue under the circumstances of “multiculturalism” and “ethnocentrism” in positive and negative terms (2013, p. 1129). Therefore, the issue of security and safety in a refugee context carries different meanings and areas to be discussed. At first sight, Iraqi refugees are a cultural group aware of what their own conditions mean to them in terms of security; in other words, they have a developed understanding and sense of security and safety. This does not influence their perception of reality that they have to accommodate themselves to new conditions and environment in Arizona. As Park and Burgess (1921, p.  736) underline, “the person or the group is general, though not always, highly conscious of the occasion… in the adjustment of the person to the formal requirements of life in a new social world.” Iraqi refugees also recognize their opportunity consciously. They are physically secure in Arizona while defining their sense of safety differently and express security and safety as their first condition that they prioritize based on their previous experiences. At this point, this first condition is a good starting point to discuss their acculturation process in Arizona since the sense of security and safety in a refugee case is the main hub to develop the debate on social organization of cultural groups. The interviewee DR/36/m explains this in the following manner: I have physical security here, but I do not feel safe living here. I feel homesick here. In Türkiye, I did not feel homesick, but here I feel too much. I wish I could go to my home country. I feel close to Iraqis because I cannot speak English. Also, Americans cannot help you and Americans do not have a sense of friendship and they have a structured lifestyle.

Given the perception of security, it is significantly important to understand that they prioritize their physical security since they suffered the lack of security during their life in Iraq. Although they accept the importance of physical security, they lose their sense of safety in Arizona unless they accommodate themselves to new conditions by learning language and getting Americanized. As a result, this leads them to approach their primary groups that greatly hinders their integration process since the primary

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groups are no longer in a relationship with the host community, but their own communities in Arizona. Based on the factors such as age, gender, education, social class, and so on, their perception of safety changes, but their views on physical security remain the same. Safety comes into existence as part of daily routine and interaction with people, institutions, and organizations, and when expressing their security as a point of orientation since Iraq did not provide them with physical security, they mostly refer to experiences in the countries they took refuge in. Related to this last point, the interviewee IM/62/m underlines her daily experience in the following sense: I am safe in Arizona. For example, I had a fear of having a car accident while crossing the street in Türkiye. But here, all cars stop and allow you to cross. People are honest and they don’t lie to you. They respect you.

Obviously, as a contribution to the debates on immigrant integration in mainstream theories, acculturation and assimilation depend heavily on a sense of security and safety in the context of a refugee. However, it is also important to draw the line between security and safety by prioritizing physical security caused by conflict and war in countries sending refugees. In addition, security is more about refugees’ daily practices and interactions and is deeply rooted in acculturation and accommodation. On this basis, Chase accentuates the importance of security feeling with reference to Giddens’ definition of “ontological security” in the following way: “Feeling secure in who we are stems from a sense of order, stability and routine that combine to give life meaning. Conversely chaos, turmoil and disruption threaten security, create a state of anxiety, and erode any trust in the predictability of life” (2013, p. 859). Given the context of forced migration, a sense of order is replaced with that of chaos and disruption; eventually leads to the emergence of ambivalences and instabilities that humanitarian governance aims to re-regulate. They bring experiences, thoughts, feelings, and assumptions shaped under the impact of all the chaos, turmoil, and instabilities and give them meaning in comparison with their lives in asylum countries and Iraq. During my interview with A/50/m, the following statements clarify the situation: Arizona is good. Here, I respect anybody. You know, I am Muslim. Right now, no one asked me to change my religion or something or invite me to

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come to another… no, no. Jordan is also worse than any country. They ask you, hey you are Sunni or Shia. But here, no one asks you.

A sense of safety can also be defined in relation to the discriminatory practices of host communities in the country of asylum or resettlement. Regarding religious affiliation of refugees, it is obvious that the United States has more capacity and tolerance to absorb Christian refugees rather than Muslims and Ezidis. This ultimately determines the refugee’s accommodation and acculturation pathway, as refugees, unlike immigrants in the United States, are at risk of secondary traumatization due to safety-­ related issues. As stated earlier, refugees are conscious of their subjective and objective conditions and are able to easily link a sense of physical security to social and economic indicators of states in the US.  This is again part of their strategy to accommodate the new environment and system’s requirements. The interviewee, EF/48/m, expresses how much he accommodates himself to conditions of Arizona in the following sense: If you think, the US is better, but Arizona is the least important state here about the economic situation. I have information about other states. I have a friend in Colorado, and I have a friend in Michigan. They are better than us. Here is a new state. I think it is one hundred years old, this is the state. So, everything is new here and I think the budget is not the same as other states. So, I cannot blame them because they are working according to their budget. Yes, I plan to move to another state like Colorado. They give you more cash assistance, but I am not sure. The positive side of Arizona, it is calm. You can find Iraqi people. This is the third state in numbers of Iraqis. You have an Arabic shop. You have something like this. We care about the kind of food. Here, we are sure that this food is Halal. We care about these things so it is good we can find Iraqi shops.

As can be seen, there are several factors that influence the refugees’ perception of staying in Arizona and directly determine their acculturation and integration in the host community due to their preference to maintain social contact with their own community and primary group. It is also about their sense of safety and mostly makes up their social organization in Arizona. In a sense, their accommodation to a new environment relies on knowledge obtained from relatives and friends rather than institutions and organizations. This is also an indication of their weak integration into

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the function of institutions since integration also requires refugees’ adaptation to the system. As long as refugees act in their own network, they gain a sense of safety, but also, they defer their integration into the host community. Their main purpose is to obtain information about living costs of other states to make subsistence, for instance, in California or Michigan. Although they are aware of the diversity of social life and entertainment opportunities in different states, they can prefer to reside in Arizona. The interviewee, A/50/m, explains in the following manner: I have traveled to Michigan. Iraqi people in Michigan are more than Arizona. The first group of Iraqis came to Detroit. There are many many Arabic stories in Detroit. They move to other states because they need jobs, they have friends and relatives. I like Arizona because the weather in Iraq is the same in Arizona. I like there are many cheap stories, food is cheaper than any state, this is good for any family like me who has a big family.

The economic integration of refugees remains a strong foundation for understanding how refugees shape acculturation strategies. The cost of living is decisive for Iraqi refugees. Here, many subjective conditions are subject to objective conditions of the states as they prepare themselves for accommodation and acculturation in Arizona. All these factors constitute the social organization of refugee lives in the post-resettlement period. Castles (2003, p. 22) underlines this as follows: One side of this is connecting forced migration with social relations, ideas, institutions, and structures at various levels (global, regional, national and local). The other is the study of processes of loss of identity and community disintegration and then the processes of redefining identity and of rebuilding community.

To contribute to this leading point, in a context of refugees, the first condition is to provide a sense of physical security for “the process of redefining and of rebuilding community.” Secondly, a sense of safety is the basis for the development of personhood and the rebuilding of community and it is a common point that discriminatory attitudes and policies harm the process of building identities. Lastly, the economic integration of refugees determines their incentives to stay or move in states based on their personal preferences. All factors determine their

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level of social organization and form their accommodation, acculturation, and integration in Arizona.

Accommodation and Social Organization Among Iraqi Refugees Accommodation, as stated before, is a process which contains both the organization of social relations and the reduction of conflict areas for persons and groups, and it is a new situation with the potential to change everything in a sudden and revolutionary way (Park & Burgess, 1921). Iraqi refugees experience accommodation in the post-resettlement area rather than the asylum country and reach a stable and new environment. On the other hand, they begin to develop new strategies in the way they have entry-level jobs and communicate with their fellow-refugees’ support as part of structural assimilation of immigrants (Gordon, 1964). Social contact among Iraqi refugees deserves to be examined in this sense since their accommodation is deeply affected by this communication. On the other side, they build up their identity and community relations in the new environment. The interviewee, D/51/m, who is an Ezidi, expresses his experiences in the following way: We celebrate the same events and occasions here. There are a lot of Ezidis here. But we could not celebrate together. They came alone by themselves. There were a lot before then, some of them like 25 years ago. Sometimes they call us when there is a celebration concerning our religion and we go to a hall and one time we went to a hall, we got together. If you see a person from your country, from your area or district, you would be happy.

Ethnic and religious affiliations, although not a generalized dimension, play a constructive role among Iraqi communities. Religious ceremonies and religious places are the unifying elements that bring together smaller ethnic and religious groups, especially Ezidis, in terms of social organization. However, the level of social contact among Iraqis is a multi-layered issue: The first factor in this regard is the impact of ethnic and religious affiliations, the second is the determining factor in the communication of naturalized Iraqi refugees with newly arrived Iraqi refugees, and finally the speed of the Americanization, in other words, of the accommodation process. On the other hand, all these factors have been affected by the processes in which ethnic and religious identities

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clashed and became hostile in terms of the conditions that created the forced migration and its consequences. The interviewee, MH/51/m explains this in the following sense: No. I don’t have any affiliation with Iraqis or their organizations. I hear here time to time people want to form something like organization, but it has never been successful because it is very sad to tell that Iraqis specially, they don’t like to get together because of the problems back in Iraq, Shia, Sunni, Kurd, all of them are in trouble, everybody, they don’t like to get involved together. Everybody has his own friends. I wish they could learn to live together. There will be a time. Iraq is divided in Kurd, Shia and Sunni. It has gone. We reached a point in our community that no one asks Shia, Sunni, Kurd; we are all brothers, we help each other. I have friends for twenty-five years; I don’t know if they are Shia or Sunni and I never asked them, and they never asked me. We are friends. Now, we are concerned, Shia, Sunni... It will take time.

Although the desire to live together is expressed by refugees, it is common not to be asked questions about each other’s identities and this is implicitly accepted as privacy. Such a sense of sensitivity or privacy is in fact an indicator of understanding the extent of violence that refugees are subjected to. Therefore, the perception of refugees to enjoy their diversity in a multi-cultural environment is inconsistent with the basic premise of the United States. In other words, Iraqi refugees still abstain from establishing social organizations in a diverse form due to their experiences in Iraq. In a similar vein, NS/32/m explains about refugees’ organizations as follows: “I don’t know. Maybe there is an organization, but I didn’t contact anybody. We visit each other every time. We are trying to go outside with each other. We are together. There is no problem with that.” The social contact mentioned here does not imply a broad network but rather indicates a communication network consisting of family and close relatives. This is the expression of a process in which Iraqi refugees are individualized. However, it is not possible to say that Iraqi refugees did not take any initiative and did not think about it in this process. The interviewee, A/50/m, who has been in the US for 12 years and who publishes a newspaper concerning the situation of Iraqis in Arizona, explains his initiatives in the following way: I wanted to establish an organization for the education houses. All the people who play, who sign and who are writers. At least, we invited the people

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to go by the book to respect themselves. But we couldn’t because we don’t have enough money. This organization will be good for us and good for America.

In the so-called mutual process of integration, the conditions provided by the host society, which is one of the conditions of economic integration, are also of great importance. As the refugee journalist points out, the budget for the establishment of a social organization such as an association or foundation remains one of the most important problems and the conditions for integration cannot be mutually resolved unless it is overcome. While social organizations can actually express solidarity for refugees beyond social contact, it is obvious that refugees become more individualized and lonelier. In this sense, the interviewee, DR/36/m states underlines similarities between Iraqis and Americans in the following way: Nobody cares about you here. There is no social relation here. Even Iraqis do not contact their relatives here like Americans. There is no one or institution here to share my problems. I could not even find a house to rent without a sponsor. But they look for a sponsor who earns much more than 2000 $. There is an association for Iraqis here. But I think it is not possible for them to help us much.

As Gordon’s structural assimilation analysis points out, the difficulty of assimilating the first-generation immigrants stems from the fact that many immigrants “prefer the security of a communal life.” However, Gordon makes a generalization about peasant, working-class, and lower-­middle-­ class mostly preferring this communal life in comparison with “immigrants of higher-class origins” who may act differently (1964, p. 242). Considering especially the first-generation adults, structural assimilation is not possible for refugees as they pursue the security of a communal life which is determined based on unique conditions of being a refugee as different from the case of immigrants. There are three important conditions that distinguish refugees from migrants: First, the refugees’ need for security and safety is determined by a traumatic background and ethnic, religious, and political reasons, that condition the desired communal life, while at the same time involving efforts to mitigate the negative effects of the fragmenting events on the communities. Second, the economic integration of refugees, which is rooted in the aim of making a living with entry-level jobs, plays a very oppressive and disabling role for refugees as the security of communal life

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only facilitates this process with alternative job opportunities. In a sense, priority is given to ensuring economic integration as part of living in the secure environment of one’s own community life. Finally, the impact of these two factors cannot be fully realized in the refugees’ need for social organization. This process mostly stimulates greater social contact with the primary groups and relationships with limited resettlement agencies and volunteers. As a result, Iraqi refugees are not motivated to go beyond their own communities or to build other forms of social organization among themselves. In parallel to Gordon’s class analysis, as members of the lower class in the resettlement country, they prefer to behave in a certain way in their communal life.

References Ager, A., & Strang, A. (2008). Understanding integration: A conceptual framework. Journal of Refugee, 21(2), 166–191. Bauman, Z. (2005). Work, consumerism and the new poor (2nd ed.). Open University Press. Berry, J.  W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 46(1), 5–68. Berry, J. W. (2011). Integration and multiculturalism: Ways towards social solidarity. Peer Reviewed Online Journal, 20, 2.1–2.21. Berry, J.  W. (2013). Intercultural relations in plural societies: Research derived from multiculturalism policy. Acta de Investigación Psicológica, 3(2), 1122–1135. Berry, J. W., Kim, U., Power, S., Young, M., & Bujaki, M. (1989). Acculturation attitudes in plural societies. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 38(2), 185–206. Bosswick, W., & Heckmann, F. (2006). Integration of migrants: Contribution of local and regional authorities. European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS) at the University of Bamberg, Germany. Castles, S. (2003). Towards a Sociology of forced migration and social transformation. Sociology, 37(1), 13–34. Castles, S., Korac, M., Vasta, E., & Vertovec, S. (2002). Integration: Mapping the field. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from http://forcedmigrationguide.pbworks. com/w/page/7447907/Integration%3A%20Mapping%20the%20Field Census. (2015). ACS demographic and housing estimates: 2011–2015 American community survey 5-year estimates. Retrieved August 16, 2015, from https:// www.census.gov/programs-­surveys/acs/technical-­documentation/table-­and-­ geography-­changes/2015/5-­year.html

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Census. (2016). Quick facts. Arizona. Retrieved February 14, 2017, from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/AZ/PST045216 Chase, E. (2013). Security and subjective wellbeing: The experiences of unaccompanied young people seeking asylum in the UK. Sociology of Health & Illness, 35(6), 858–872. Cholewinski, R. (2005). Migrants as minorities: Integration and inclusion in the enlarged European Union. JCMS, 43(4), 695–716. Goldlust, J., & Richmond, A. H. (1974, Summer). A multivariate model of immigrant adaptation. International Migration Review, 8(2), 193–225. Special Issue: Policy and Research on Migration: Canadian and World Perspectives. Gordon, M. M. (1964). Assimilation in American life, the role of race, religion and national origins. Oxford University Press. Kivisto, P. (2004). What is the Canonical Theory of Assimilation? Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 40(2), 149–163. Kuhlman, T. (1991). The economic integration of refugees in developing countries: A research model. Journal of Refugee Studies, 4(1), 1–20. NAE. (2016, August). The contributions of new Americans in Arizona. Retrieved July 23, 2017, from http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-­content/ uploads/2017/02/nae-­az-­report.pdf NAE. (2017). New Americans in Phoenix a snapshot of the demographic and economic contributions of immigrants in the city. Retrieved July 23, 2017, from http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-­c ontent/uploads/2017/06/ Phoenix_brief.pdf Nelson, M., Hess, J.  M., Isakson, B., & Goodkind, J. (2015). ‘Seeing the life’: Redefining Self-worth and family roles among Iraqi refugee families resettled in the United States. Retrieved July 23, 2017, from https://www. researchgate.net/publication/276411693_Seeing_the_Life_Redefining_ Self-­Worth_and_Family_Roles_Among_Iraqi_Refugee_Families_Resettled_in_ the_United_States Ong, A. (2003). Buddha is hiding, refugees, citizenship, the new America. University of California Press. Park, R. E. (1914). Racial assimilation in secondary groups with particular reference to the Negro. American Journal of Sociology, 19(5), 606–623. Park, R. E., & Burgess, E. W. (1921). Assimilation. In R. E. Park & E. W. Burgess (Eds.), Introduction of the science of sociology (pp. 734–783). The University of Chicago Press. Warner, W. L. (1952). Structure of American Life. Edinburgh University Press. White House Task Force on New Americans. (2015, April). Strengthening communities by welcoming all residents. A Federal Strategic Action Plan on Immigrant & Refugee Integration. Retrieved June 20, 2017, from https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/tfna_progress_ report_final_12_15_15.pdf

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Interviews U/32m, volunteer for resettlement agencies in Tucson, 2015. A/50/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. D/51/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. DR/36/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. EF/48/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. FD/57/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. IM/62/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. MH/47/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. MH/51/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. NS/32/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. QK/64/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. Y/37/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. Director, Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest with refugee focus program in Phoenix, July 2015. Executive director of the International Rescue Committee in Phoenix, July 2015. Representative of Noor Women’s Association in Tucson, June 2015. Supervisor for La Frontera Arizona in Phoenix, July 2015.

CHAPTER 6

The Limits of Integration: From “Iraqi-­American” Identity to Citizenship

Individuals experiencing “behavioral shifts” and “acculturative stress” undergo an adaptation process at the psychological and individual levels in terms of psychological and socio-cultural factors. In this analysis, Berry certainly sheds light on the acculturative framework in reference to the roles of dominant and non-dominant groups. All challenges leading to problems in “acculturating individuals” can be seen with the phenomenon of “acculturative stress” under the existing cultural and ideological system of dominant groups (2003, pp. 20–22). Despite the existence of common denominators in this process, Iraqi refugees experience the acculturation process quite differently from each other. Each refugee or refugee community has their own “stressors” in their acculturation process, but this also demonstrates that some other refugees may grasp these stressors as “opportunities,” as Berry (1991) underlines. His point of view on the relationship between the “acculturation experience,” “stressors,” and “acculturative stress” should be understood through a set of “moderating relationships” between acculturation and stressors (1991, p. 30). Moderating factors are the social structure of the larger society, type of acculturation groups, modes of acculturation, demographic, and social and psychological characteristics of groups (Berry, 1991). On this basis immigrants reform their acculturative strategies taking into account all stressors and opportunities while keeping their identities as a cultural © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Deli, Iraqi Refugees in the United States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7_6

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group in Arizona which represents a multiculturality of American society. As Berry clarifies: The maintenance and development of one’s ethnic distinctiveness in society, deciding whether or not one’s cultural identity and customs are of value and to be retained. The other issue involves the desirability of inter-ethnic contact. (1991, p. 26)

In this sense, the components of cultural identity and traditions need to be discussed more broadly with reference to the maintenance of the mother tongue, cultural identity, cultural distance, integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization. All these modest factors actually shape how Iraqis preserve their cultural identity during the integration process. For this reason, it is necessary to underline the factors that refugees can stand for in the integration process.

Preserving the Mother Tongue Age, education level, knowledge of English, and length of stay in the USA are decisive factors in coping with cultural stressors to produce alternative ways to deal with daily problems. As a cultural group, it is a prerequisite for Iraqi refugees to use their mother tongue or to be protected by the next generations so that they can continue their traditions and customs. In this respect, when the mother tongue is considered as a cultural stressor by the refugees, Arabic is an element that is taken into consideration over future generations. The interviewee NS/32/m, who has a high school diploma from his hometown, who speaks English and who works for a security company, has been living with his wife and one kid for nearly four years in Arizona and states his views about his mother tongue as follows: There are some schools that teach in Arabic too. It is an American school, but they give Arabic classes. I like to get both. You are in the United States, they speak English. You have to learn this language. We teach him Arabic at home. In school, they learn English a hundred percent. Sometimes, you can teach your children Arabic in house, you help them learn the alphabet and you can help them read and write in Arabic.

As a first-generation refugee who believes that learning English is a necessity in the US, I find out that Arabic is a living language at home,

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while prioritizing education in English and Arabic for their children. Speaking their own language in their private space is a natural part of their lives, given difficulties in learning English for the first-generation adult Iraqi refugees. However, considering the children’s interactions with the secondary group in schools and public areas, it is clear that the dominant influence of American culture and English language should be considered as a cultural stressor. The interviewee MH/51/m, who was an engineer in Iraq and speaks English well, has been living in Arizona for over five years and shares his thoughts in the following sense: I prefer they should go to American schools rather than Arabic schools because they live in this country, they need to learn the system and education and everything in this country. Although I want them to keep their mother language, it is very important for them. Because, here in the United States, first, it is important to keep language as your mother tongue; secondly, here in America, always bilingual is preferable. Those who are bilingual have more jobs… By keeping on talking Arabic and seeing Arabic movies, reading books, they keep on doing this they keep their language. My sons are good at Arabic, they read and write. My daughter is also good at Arabic, she is the only one who has difficulties with Arabic because she came to the US when she was eight years old. She learnt the American system too fast. I wish she could write in Arabic... We will try to do our best to keep the language. There are a lot of circumstances and in the future, we don’t expect what will happen. I am sure that when my kids get their kids, they will not know Arabic, they will go to American schools, and they will speak only English. We will do our best to make them speak Arabic.

The impact of the dominant group over the children of Iraqi refugees is incomparably greater. It would not be misleading to say that the children experience an assimilation process that makes them forget to write in their mother tongue. Although the relationship of families with children is decisive, evaluating this process as the integration of the children into the American system is one of the priority issues. On the other hand, many people are aware of the importance of this process for children’s education, working life, and a good future in the USA.  Considering the language learning experiences of the first-­generation refugees and the loss of both professional and economic status, and the challenges of upward occupational mobility, the learning of English by Iraqi refugee children is a very important factor for them to establish their future comfortably. However, even in this context, knowing and speaking Arabic is still

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considered one of the most important issues. The interviewee, D/51/m who cannot speak English and state that: My kids go to school. They are all good in the schools. They are doing fine. Kids start speaking English between them. I prefer that they keep their mother tongue. But they speak English, sometimes to me and their mom, they say English, so we also need to know English.

In a similar way, DR/36/m also mentions that “my three children go to the school here. They have small difficulties because of their names. They learn English in the schools. We are from Kirkuk, and we speak three languages namely Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic in our home. But they have to speak English in schools. Here, if there was a school teaching in Turkish or Arabic Kurdish, I would send them to the schools. My little daughter speaks English and Turkish now.” The attitude of refugees when describing their children’s relationship with their mother tongue is not one-dimensional. However, refugees often envisage a future where their mother tongue is indispensable for their children in future. It is clear that this affects the acculturation process of Iraqi refugees as a cultural stressor factor: First of all, children are faced with the necessity of learning English in order to be included in the American acculturation process, on the other hand, the families indirectly interfere with the acculturation of children under the influence of traditions and customs. Although it has been a long time since they came to the United States, the views of Iraqi refugees (now citizens) living in Arizona since the 1990s are more enlightening and decisive about the importance of their mother tongue. the interviewee, JM/50/m, who has been in Arizona over the last twenty-five years, who speaks English well and whose children have been grown up in the United States, share his experiences in the following way: We try hard. They know some Arabic. They communicate with us in Arabic. I want them to keep our own language. There is a private school. We do have Arabic classes here every week. It is a good opportunity for them to speak two languages, and to be bilingual. Maybe they can find a job easily… They have to learn our own language because they communicate with their relatives. Arabic language, maybe they can find a job here next to English, they can find another opportunity with a job. So, we try hard to keep both languages. They learn English at school, in the home we try to teach them.

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Although it has been a long time, the idea that knowing Arabic will create the opportunity to find a job and the efforts made in this regard are obvious. This understanding of “opportunity” also shows that the issue is in a sense a major cultural stressor. However, while it does not play a critical role in the structural assimilation policy, it can be seen as an important policy that the American system offers children a “special” opportunity to learn Arabic. The fact that Arabic is the most important bond that will enable future generations to stay in touch with their relatives and acquaintances in their own country, in other words, the glue that will ensure that the bond with the primary group is not broken, is an indispensable reality for the first-generation adult refugees. Equally, it means protecting a culture and ties with Iraq beyond preserving the language. The interviewee, A/50/m, who has been in Arizona for twelve years, similarly explains his views: We speak Arabic at home. Arabic is our education and our tradition. Maybe one day, when we go back to Iraq, I need my family to speak Arabic. Right now, I am a citizen. I am proud because I am a citizen. I have to speak Arabic because Iraq is my native country.

The children’s rapid acquisition of English is proof that they have a different experience in the post-settlement period. On the other hand, this issue is clearly a cultural stressor for families. However, this is not an issue for them to take a stand on or develop an alternative stance on. The difference between their own acculturation processes and children’s acculturation processes is due to the inclusion of children in the education system and their rapid acculturation and integration into the American system.

Cultural Identity and Cultural Distance Berry argues acculturation strategies by showing how cultural groups develop their strategies through the channels of “prejudice,” “security,” “contact,” and “similarity” in his analysis of multiculturalism in Canada. In this sense, “acculturative stress phenomena” are associated with “low contact” and “negative attitudes.” According to him, such “low contact” or adverse conditions can also be stimulated by the larger society and further consequences can be formed as “social, economic, political and residential discrimination” (1991, p. 31). Within this theoretical approach, it is important to see how Iraqi refugees formulate their intercultural

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relations with other cultural groups and American citizens. It is also worth noting that their main inclination is to ensure their cultural security, as they keep their “confidence” in their “individual identity” within Arizona’s social structure. In this regard, “cultural maintenance” implies all efforts to maintain their cultural identity while “contact and participation” indicate intercultural relations with other groups (Berry, 1997,p. 9). It is important to understand how Iraqi refugees seek to preserve their cultural identity and how they interact with other groups when it comes to their prejudices, similarities, and dissimilarities. In this context, Iraqi refugees recognize their home or private space as a cultural space where they reproduce their identity, just as they maintain their language. When it comes to refugee children in Arizona, the role of parents is to protect them by setting the limits of the cultural influence of the dominant groups. Whether it succeeds remains to be explored but it is a way of limiting intercultural relationships with others. The interviewee, EF/48/m, explains this cultural maintenance in the following manner: Just for my baby, I think it is important for her to study Arabic. She will start her life here, from zero. Life is different and culture is different than before. I must teach step by step how life is here, from the beginning. Yes, she does not understand but step by step she will, because she will go to school, and she will find another life different from ours. So, I must be careful here. You know it is a free country.

Iraqi refugees have a fear and a desire to distance themselves in the strategy of cultural maintenance. In Berry’s words, the prejudice of Iraqi refugees is that American culture and lifestyle are in many ways unacceptable to them. On the other hand, this last point cannot be generalized, but the refugees’ religion, ethnic origin, education, age, and degree of adherence to their own customs and traditions determine the refugees’ perspective on cultural maintenance. The freedom emphasized in the interview above actually includes a perception of freedom where their own customs and traditions can disappear. On the other hand, freedom is very important for refugees who have lived in dictatorship conditions for many years. It is not clear whether prejudice against American culture has been tested by the experiences of refugees. As a prejudice, this is an element that increases refugees’ cultural distance from American culture. The interviewee, YS/62/f, explains her views about American culture in this sense: “My children should be Muslim; accordingly, their mother and father will

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be their priority. American culture, no. When they turn sixteen-years old, boys go, and girls disappear, and they look for their own lives.” In fact, as long as American culture is perceived as a threat, it becomes a factor that increases refugees’ commitment to their own identity and family relationships. A second prejudice is the dominant belief that children are vulnerable to this threat and therefore need to be protected. At this point, refugee families have a will to determine the acculturation process of children from habits, behaviors, and attitudes. The interviewee, DR/36/m, also highlights this as follows: I am teaching my culture and habits to my children. Sometimes, I fear that my children may just like some Americans who drink and eat and go to clubs. I do not want this kind of thing. But there are some Americans who go to work and return to their home, they are good.

The role of refugees’ ethnic and religious affiliations is decisive in the formation of cultural distance. Therefore, the perception of prejudice or acculturation developed by a Muslim refugee and a Christian refugee can be addressed through religion and tradition. In addition, factors such as education, age, and gender also influence this perception. The following words of YS/62/f within the scope of the decisiveness of religion are quite guiding: “My children will not forget our language and our culture. My grandkids will also learn Arabic since we are Muslims. It is very important for us. Arabic is the language of Qur’an.” Acculturation is experienced by refugees as one of the contradictory processes. This process, in which many factors from language to religion are handled together, is concomitantly a way of coping with possible problems that may concern the children and families of refugees. Unless an alternative acculturation process is built, this process turns into a tendency to preserve its own culture rather than integrating with the culture of the host society. Given the mutual relation between language and religion, the interviewee, MH/51/m, provides a clear-cut explanation of what refugees look for: I think everybody likes their origin. No one says I am not Arabic; I am American. Only a few who don’t understand what tradition and culture are. Everybody wants to maintain their own culture, to maintain tradition. If you don’t maintain the language, you will not keep your culture and your tradition. Language is a culture; it is a tradition. that’s why you have to maintain your language and your origin.

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At this point, the decisive role of origin is important. When talking about “group acculturation,” Berry focuses on “the society of origin” and “the society of settlement” that the former shapes cultural distance as its social, economic, demographic, and political factors are decisive and indicate “the dissimilarity between the cultures in contact” while the latter represents whether there is room for multiculturalism or cultural diversity (Berry, 1997, p. 23). Therefore, the main factor that distinguishes Iraqi Muslims from Iraqi Christians or Ezidis is the strong ties refugees establish with their own country and origins and the level of cultural distance leads to “poorer adaptation” in the integration process (Berry, 1997). As the determining role of the society of origin in this relationship, the prejudices created by dynamics of the society of settlement as the domain of the dominant group in this process are also decisive. This is particularly useful for understanding the relationship between discriminatory practices and cultural distance. Considering the discriminatory practices of the host community towards refugees which naturally reduces social contact between refugees and host community members, this situation contradicts the so-called two-way integration process. The interviewee, JM/50/m, explains his experience in this sense as follows: Discrimination depends on education and persons. There are some complaints, especially from my daughter who wears a headscarf. Someone, one of the students, had fun. What is this? showing in the news, one of them, you are from an Islamic country saying you are murder, you are a killer, depends on…Discrimination is especially with the woman who graduated from the universities because of headscarf. We have girls with their bachelor’s degrees from here, but they cannot find a job. So maybe they go to Walmart to work. It is a discrimination. I have a business as an American. I don’t know about Islam and a girl comes to me with a headscarf and she wants a job. My knowledge or my information about Islam is just from the media and heard about ISIS, these girls come to me, and they want a job. Of course, I am gonna be suspicious. So maybe I don’t have a job for them. There are many many girls who graduated from here, but they cannot find a job.

There is no process without the likelihood of discriminatory practices after resettlement. In this process, the attitudes and behaviors developed by the host society can be decisive in the acculturation processes of refugees. It can be said that the discriminatory practices that Muslim women refugees are exposed to due to wearing headscarves make their integration difficult. While this is not a generalizable conclusion, it is an important

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question whether the host community members are also aware of the social and cultural diversity in Arizona. In parallel to this, Berry’s emphasis on “the development of national policies” as “balancing act” for integration at individual and group levels is critical as “public education and social legislation can promote an appreciation of the benefits of pluralism, and of the societal and personal costs of prejudice and discrimination to everyone” (1997, pp. 27–28). Whether authorities and members of the dominant group are politically aware of the social and economic diversity of the society of resettlement remains an important question. From this point of view, Iraqi refugees point to the existence of a kind of a host community’s indifference towards themselves. The interviewee, DR/36/m expresses his views on this matter in the following way: I faced a lot of difficulties here. But I have never faced a discrimination. Americans cannot figure out us because there are a lot of Mexicans here. They think that we are Mexicans, our skin color is close to Mexicans.

While the difference in the way refugees experience this process is quite clear, the refugees’ experience of discriminatory practices or the host society’s approach to them are different. However, from the perspective of resettlement agencies, it is often emphasized that Arizona is a welcoming state for refugees. But the state’s proximity to Mexico distorts this promised welcome and endangers the visibility of refugees. This situation leads to subjective experiences that can be defined as discriminatory practices, negative attitudes, and indifference by the host community.

Acculturation Strategies Cultural maintenance, social contact, and participation, acculturation strategies are the constitutive components of all plural societies. Berry classifies four main processes, namely “assimilation,” “separation,” “integration,” and “marginalization” to analyze the relationship and balance between “strategies of ethno-cultural groups” and “strategies of larger society” (2003, pp. 23–24) and, in doing so, pays attention to the function of the dominant and the non-dominant groups (1997). As can be seen, identifying the first-generation Iraqi refugees with one of these categories is not appropriate, as acculturation strategies emerge at different levels in the post-resettlement period. Iraqi refugees seek a balance between cultural continuity and contact/participation with others within the framework of their religion,

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language, and traditions. Therefore, the basic problems of “cultural maintenance” and “relationship with larger society” can be understood in pursuit of such a balance. It is quite difficult to identify acculturation strategies as a single-minded strategy such as integration or assimilation, and so on. More precisely, such an approach does not offer a sound integration analysis. Referring once again to Berry, “pre-acculturation moderate factors” can be highlighted as “age, gender, education, expectations, cultural distance, personality” (1997, p. 15). For this reason, it is necessary to evaluate a single woman differently from an old woman, from a large family, or from someone who lives alone. Despite the fact that each of these groups all desire to preserve their culture and interact with the larger society, their expectations, motivations, and efforts are not the same. In this regard, it is necessary to take these individual factors into account in order to the overall integration policy to be inclusive, not that this renders refugee integration impossible. The interviewee, MH/51/m, emphasizes the importance of personal characteristics and subjective conditions in the subsequent manner: You know, because of my age, I came when I was forty-six. My age always brings me towards Iraqis, not towards Americans. If I would come here at ten years old or fourteen years old, then I would be more American than Iraqis. So, in our age, we people are sure that we are close to Iraqis. When I meant by Iraqi means Iraqi tradition or culture. It is not that I don’t like Americans.

However, when a similar question is asked to a young refugee, it is possible to detect the change in acculturation strategy. For example, the interviewee MY/19/f clarifies that “I am closer to Americans rather than Iraqis. I am young and I am living here. I am close to Americans.” Age as a moderating factor is more related to young refugees’ expectations and personality and they develop their acculturative strategies by investing in social contact with Americans and participation in the larger society of the United States. The relevance of the conditions of being in the citizenship process and acquiring citizenship with acculturation processes is also important when evaluated in terms of moderating factors. The most important determining factor here is the length of stay in America. The length or shortness of this period is a sign of the development of the acculturation strategy of refugees and such a sign helps analyze how they find challenges in establishing social contact with American citizens. During the interview with

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EF/48/m who is not citizen yet and who has been residing in Arizona for approximately two years, the challenging aspects of social contact are emphasized in the following manner: I heard from other people about some discriminatory behaviors by some locals. But I didn’t face any. I feel close to Iraqis because Americans are like a machine. To be honest, in the morning they go to work and sometimes they don’t say ‘hello’. Because I don’t know what their habits are. It is their life. They care about a sex worker more than their mother. Maybe he can care for this sex worker, and he doesn’t know where his mother is because life is different. But my people and my country are close to me because culture is different.

The key issue here is to have a sense of absolute rejection of the dominant group’s culture. When it comes to American culture, skepticism that refugees have leads to various levels of rejection and does not lay the foundation for acculturation and integration. Most of the time, impressions and experiences from daily life form the basis of this doubt and rejection. Refugees, who are included in daily life starting from the lowest working level with entry-level jobs, experience the difficulties of being included in life from the lowest hierarchy of social relations. Therefore, the conditions that create Iraqi refugees’ prejudice and rejection against American culture and lifestyle are also determined by economic premises. Most refugees can relate to the last point. Either because there is no social interaction or communication between the two communities, or because they have little to no contact with the Americans they encounter through their entry-level positions. In a similar vein, although she spent three years in Arizona, the interviewee KJ/36/f, who is a single parent, cannot speak English and shares her experiences about acculturation process as follows: I feel close to Iraqis because we speak the same language, it is better and easier for us to communicate. Americans, there is an organization, Catholic Charities, they respect us. I don’t have any American friends here.

A large proportion of Iraqi refugees cannot establish social contact with Americans outside of certain organizations. The relationship they have built with organizations is certainly invaluable. However, it is an important debate whether this creates a separation in terms of acculturation strategies and whether it leads to marginalization. Before addressing this discussion, it is important to consider the situation of Iraqi refugees who

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are American citizens given their longer stay in the US. It would not be incorrect to put forward those Iraqi refugees, who are citizens, are less rejecting American culture while being attached to their own culture and traditions. Therefore, it should be determined that time spent on citizenship has a positive effect when considering moderating factors. The interviewee, A/50/m, who is an American citizen and who has been in Arizona more than twenty years, explains his acculturation process in the following words: I feel close to Iraqis, as you know, this is tradition. We are from Iraq, usually we sit together, we speak together, at night together. We want to talk about our country, what happened in Baghdad. I cannot talk with American people about my country. They don’t know anything about Iraq. But I have good American neighbors. We visit neighbors. When I was in Pittsburgh, I had friends there. Fortunately, last week, somebody came from Pittsburgh to visit Arizona, and he called me. I prepared some meals and cooked for him. His name is D. who is a pastor at a church. He was interested in me and my family when I was there. I liked him. I consider him, look like my brother. They take care of my family. I have a good friend.

In a similar vein, IM/62/m, who has been in Arizona for approximately five years, who is an elderly and single man, and who can understand and speak little English says that: I feel for Americans. I have an American neighbor. Her name is J. She took me to the hospital when I was sick. If I asked an Iraqi guy for help, he would say he is busy. I have two sisters here; they would say the same thing. Americans are helpful.

It is the need to establish friendly relations and a sense of solidarity as a restorative and constructive component of the acculturation process. The construction of acculturation as a mutual process is only possible with the development of such relations. It is an indisputable fact that the social contact established with the Americans in a durable manner has been effective in overcoming cultural and tradition-based prejudices and reducing denials against other’s culture over time. For this reason, an acculturation analysis based on the early experiences of refugees may not yield healthy results. However, realizing which variables this process goes through is prominent in terms of understanding the post-placement process.

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“Iraqi-Americans” Between Integration and Assimilation It is an important question whether it is possible to talk about the preferences and wishes of refugees in the integration process. This also has to do with the consent process I discussed in humanitarian management. Berry states that at the point where he defines integration as a strategy, people show a will to protect their own unique culture, that the dominant community develops an inclusivity suitable for cultural diversity, therefore it is an area of ​​free choice. In this context, Berry (2003, p.  24) underlines: “The dominant group must be prepared to adapt its national institutions (e.g., education, health, labor) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together in the plural society.” The system in Arizona is part of the United States’ policy of self-sufficiency. Refugees begin to integrate into this system through entry-level jobs, and at this point, they are not asked about their consent. On this basis, it is not possible to talk about free choice in the integration of refugees into the system. Moreover, there is no set of rules and functions that facilitate the integration of refugees at the institutional level, which Berry underlines. At this point, refugees have no choice but to define themselves under a hyper-identity, which is Iraqi-American. The political discourse produced by the system as New Americans includes a future envisioned by the system through refugees. However, where the Iraqi American identity stands must be questioned, especially given the situation of the first-generation adult refugees. As highlighted earlier, in the function of humanitarian governance, responsibilization of Iraqi refugees works through a process of self-­ sacrifice. Considering the cultural dynamics, this process, in which these refugees sacrifice their lives for the next generations, involves rather a separation and does not turn into a full integration and assimilation. However, for refugees, the situation and identities of their children cause an identity crisis as their own culture regresses in the face of the dominant culture. The Iraqi-American identity is seen as functional in terms of determining the place where this identity crisis is experienced. The interviewee MH/51/m expresses his experience in the following words: They will be both, they will be Iraqi-Americans. I think they love Iraq, and they love America. America may be more than Iraq because they live here. Half of their life is here. We don’t know what will happen in the future in

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Iraq, maybe they cannot go to Iraq for ten years more and then we are more loyal and love America more than Iraq. But, because of the origin, they still love their country, they have dual citizenship, two citizenships, and you have to be of both interests.

Beyond being a matter of identity, it is a sign of loyalty and devotion to one’s homeland. However, the remoteness of their home country and the uncertainty of returning increase the children’s attachment and love for the United States. Here, the integration of children into the system accelerates; the assumption of many refugees is nothing more than the belief that their children will find a mutual balance between the two identities. The beliefs and concerns of families in this process are quite clear: The interviewee, EF/48/m clearly explains both his responsibility and his belief in the following manner: I just told you. I care about them, and I contact them as my friends, not as a father. So, I trust them. I decided to come here because I know what they have. You have something that affects here more and the future, it is more how to say, you know no one knows about the future. But I trust them, I am a good father for them so they will choose the right things. They will be Iraqi-Americans. There is a big difference between Iraqi Americans and Americans. I saw some people here American Iraqi, he doesn’t feel about you. He doesn’t care about you. And I see Iraqi-Americans here and they are more close to you. American-Iraqi means an Iraqi guy who came here thirty-five years ago, who got the citizenship, and he is living here, yes he is Iraqi talking but his habits are like American. When he is shopping, he doesn’t care if this is Halal or not. He took their habits. Their culture is American. But Iraqi-American, they are Iraqi, and they respect American law, they respect to pay on time, but they can help and they can support you, others don’t have time.

From the perspective of this Iraqi refugee, it demonstrates how the hierarchy between identities works and how habits and attitudes change over time in the acculturation process. This statement that being Iraqi comes before being American is also taken as a reference point in terms of language and culture. Thus, the Iraqi-American identity emerges as an ideal type. The distance to American identity is determined by the assumed characteristics and reality of this ideal type. In fact, this idealization comes out because of such a deep understanding that it is stated that such an

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identity would carry the culture and tradition of the country of origin to future generations in the United States as seen in the words of RZ/73/m: My children will be Iraqi-Americans. Iraqi-Americans will stay loyal to the tradition and culture of Iraq in every detail. They will have a different culture, additionally to Iraqi culture, they will know what freedom is, what discrimination is, and how to respect people.

Loyalty to their own culture and affirmation of the chain of values, especially defining loyalty as the unifying element of Iraqi refugees, is also important for groups, as Park underlines, because “its basis in a modus vivendi, a working relation and mutual understanding, of the members of the group” (1914, p. 609). Gordon similarly points out the dominance of American culture when talking about immigrants’ children: Exposed to the overwhelming acculturative powers of the public school and the mass communications media, the immigrants’ children will proffer their unhesitating allegiance to those aspects of the American cultural system which are visible to them in their particular portion of the socio-economic structure... The tendency will be for native-born children to become alienated from their immigrant parents and the culture they represent, as they respond affirmatively to the higher status American cultural values. (1964, pp. 244–245)

The situation of children of Iraqi refugees can also be taken and analyzed in this and similar processes. This topic, which is beyond the scope of this book, only reveals the experiences of the first-generation Iraqi adult refugees in the Americanization process. Accordingly, the “melting pot” function of the American cultural system predicts the Americanization process. Therefore, in line with this purpose, the system aims to “transmit patriotism, loyalty, and common sense” to American society (Park & Burgess, 1921). Therefore, irrespective of being immigrants or Iraqi refugees, the system targets an Americanization through assimilation and foresees the necessity of loyalty to “a common cultural life” (1921). Therefore, in a long-term prediction, it is important what Iraqi refugees envisage based on their experiences. In this sense, MH/51/m describes the process for future generations as follows: I have worries for the second and third generations, not my kids. Those will have a problem with the language. But they will keep a lot of culture and

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traditions. It is not about religion. It is about Arabic tradition like for now, my kids don’t eat dinner until I come home. Even if they stay until six or seven o’clock, they will not take the dinner until I come home and then we get all together on the table and we start eating. It is a kind of tradition for my family. This kind of thing should be maintained. But for language, I worry about that.

The observation that language has disappeared, but some traditions will exist is quite meaningful. Elements that can be associated with many traditions such as food and folklore live in the multicultural atmosphere in the US.  However, this should also be considered as a natural part and necessity of the assimilation or Americanization process. While the system determines the process, families find the transmission of tradition to the next generations important. In this sense, another important interview reveals in the words of D/51/m in the following way: I can see that my kids are forgetting Iraq and now they have become Americans. The American community uses the brain, mind, how to live, how to work for life… If you would ask me, I would not accept that my children would get married to Americans. If the law forces me, I cannot do anything. I will give you an example. Now if you live with your mom and dad, and you go to another place, it would not be easier for you to find your mom and dad. You have to be close to your father and mother. Also, our religion, you have to understand that, if a person goes out of our religion, you are not accepted by Ezidis social community. You will be tolerated but nobody will accept him. So, nobody should go outside of religion. For example, what happened for the last time with ISIS when they captured Ezidis on the mountain. They called the women, they told them if you wanna Muslim, you can marry us; otherwise we will kill you. The women told us to kill us. They refused to change their religion.

From this point of view, it should be noted that religion, as an important variable, constitutes one of the most important concerns of the assimilation process. This element maintains its importance for Muslims and Christians as well. However, Iraqis’ future projections acknowledge the dominance and transformative power of American culture. As to the question regarding intermarriage relations, the interviewee, MH/51/m is an educated Iraqi person and has been working in a multicultural working place but expresses the importance of the religion in the following manners:

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I don’t know the answer for this. I am still wondering, one day I ask myself if I were in this situation, what I would do. It depends on the situation at that time. If my son loved the girl according to the original religion aspect, we should go to the religion. She has to be like our religion. She has to be converted. Otherwise, I will not accept. These are the teachings.

In this regard, there is a superiority of religion over ethnicity and other moderating factors when it comes to other forms of intercultural relations like marriage. To reinforce this aspect of the matter, another interviewee who is an Iraqi-Turkmen, DR/36/m, explains his opinions in the following words: My children will be Americans. America has helped me a lot and it has saved us from death. We cannot deny it. But there are some certain things. My children are getting used to harmonizing with their environment. But I cannot do that… I can allow my children to get married to a Muslim American. But, if he or she is not Muslim, I would not allow them to get married, but it is up to my children. I want a Muslim one.

Religious ties and intermarital relations, which develop closer relations with the American society and are more flexible for Christian refugees, appear as a point of resistance for refugees from different religions and ethnic backgrounds. How such areas of social contact and relationship will evolve over time remains an important research question. However, succinctly speaking, the Iraqi-American ideal type is an identity that knows these traditions and customs, carries them to future generations, and develops the American identity and loyalty to America. The political subject of the first-generation Iraqi refugees, recognized by authorities as New Americans, in the United States, is Iraqi-Americans in the eyes of refugees.

Being an American Citizen Considering the long uncertain lives of refugees and the impossibility of their return to their home countries, the acquisition of citizenship brings opportunities where these uncertainties are eliminated, participation in political life, unrestricted freedom of travel, and transnational relations are developed. However, whether there is a directly proportional relationship between the acquisition of citizenship and integration is an important

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debate. The United States grants permanent residence to refugees in the first phase of the post-resettlement process, so that refugees have the right to reside and work. After their first year, they can apply for a green card. In the final stage, they “can apply for citizenship after having been resident in the United States for five years” (PRM, 2017). Obtaining American citizenship is not a quick and easy process. Ong (2003, p. 79) states that this process is multi-layered, especially considering the historical conditions: As nationality has been shaped by a series of inclusions and exclusions on the basis of xenophobia, racism, religious bigotry, and male privilege. At its founding, the country excluded African slaves, Native Americans, and anyone not born in the colonies from citizenship—despite the fact that the United States is a leading example of a ‘nation of immigrants,’ in which the naturalization of residents has always been central to the theory and practice of citizenship. Today, the country has millions of legal resident aliens (visa holders and green-card holders), many of whom will eventually seek naturalization.

Social, cultural, and economic inclusion and exclusion practices that refugees are exposed to are not separate from the citizenship process. In addition, refugees’ perspectives on American citizenship are related to the deprivation process of citizenship they experienced as a result of forced migration as well as their experiences in the post-resettlement period. The interviewee, M/48/f, who is an American citizen, explains the process experienced with citizenship acquisition as follows: I have been here for 7 years. I am a citizen of the US, but it doesn’t mean anything, but just means for my son’s future. He is studying here. Also, when you decide to go to any country, when they look at your passport, then they will provide a VISA. It is easy for me to travel to other countries.

Here again, it is necessary to draw attention to the right of freedom of travel, where the distinction between immigrants and refugees arises. In the forced migration process, refugees’ right to travel has disappeared within the framework of humanitarian governance rules. They cannot use these rights until the resettlement process is completed. Since they are refugees and their return to their home country is not recognized by international law, they do not have the right to travel freely until they acquire citizenship. In this sense, traveling is an important criterion for many. By the same token, the interviewee, Z/47/f, who is a single woman and who

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is an American citizen, states that “I have been in the US for seven years. I am a citizen. I swear to God that it means nothing. I just have a certificate. I did everything myself.” The reason why they stated that citizenship does not mean anything stems from what they experienced in the process until they obtained citizenship. This manifests how difficult the integration process is in terms of social and economic conditions in Arizona. The length of stay, gender, age, education, economic status, and occupation of refugees shape their perspectives on American citizenship. On the other hand, refugees who have not yet acquired citizenship have different ways of experiencing this process. The interviewee, MH/51/m, who has been waiting for naturalization, explains his experience in the following sense: I have my citizenship interview next month. You know, because of the situation in Iraq, now nobody can say that I can live in Iraq, everybody wants to leave Iraq. For me, if I have a citizenship here, at least I have another country to live in, I can live peacefully in this country which provides jobs, good life, security, much better than Iraq. For me, having citizenship means I have another home to live in. My other home is destroyed, I have another safe and peaceful home for my family. Besides, it means getting citizenship from one of the greatest countries. We are Iraqi, with Iraqi passports, we cannot enter any country, nobody allows us. Now, we can go everywhere, and we are welcomed because we have an American passport. At least, you can feel that now you are a human. When we are Iraqis having passports, nobody accepts us to go to their country, we feel that we are not human. This is a fact.

Citizenship is a document for many refugees to have a safe life permanently. Obtaining citizenship is the stage where temporality and uncertainty disappear. In this sense, it means to be a member of a strong and safe house that will replace the lost country. What is decisive here is the self-confidence given by the sense of citizenship rather than acquiring citizenship. Because most people, after a long painful period, accept the existence of a state and a system that sees and respects them as human beings. Additively, it is significant to argue that the obtainment of citizenship also refers to both the elimination of discrimination or bad treatment and the sentiment of safety and security in Arizona. The interviewee, EF/48/m share his views on this as follows:

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I came to this organization (IAFS) to meet Iraqis. We have some Iraqi friends here and we are visiting each other. I can say I feel safe 80 percent here. Because, last time I was shopping at Costco here. I was with my son. One man who was drunk came and asked us to take our stuff. He needed some food; he asked us, and he was drunk. No one from the people there talked with him and he took my bread, I was shocked. What should I do? I can’t fight with him but if he fights with me, I can’t defend myself according to what they know here. I cannot fight with him, you know. First of all, I don’t have citizenship. If I am American, I will be equal. Yes, we are equal here, but I don’t know what would happen, it is something strange. So, my son was upset because he wanted to fight with him. This kind of thing makes me really upset. And, one of my friends here, his son was outside, six people came and beat him for cigarettes or something like this. He was bleeding. We hear such stories, and it gives us the situation is not one hundred percent safe. We should be careful. No one from my family is outside at night, I mean they do not go outside after seven o’clock because we should organize our lives, we should be careful with all the steps.

Because of a lack of awareness of the rights that citizenship does or does not confer Iraqi refugees’ sensitivity to security, or their sense of insecurity, is attributed to their lack of citizenship. Being a citizen is therefore seen as a condition for equality with Americans. However, they consider that the rights of American citizens can be achieved when this condition is met. While safety and security are among the priorities, many refugees point to the importance of citizenship for the future of their children’s future. The interviewee, MA/48/f, underscores the importance of naturalization as follows: “It means a lot for me. It is big. Safety. I would not return to Iraq even if the conditions were good because my children are studying here.” Although the distinction between the rights provided by the residence permit, the green card, and the citizenship certificate is not fully known by the first-generation adult refugees, they are still aware of the importance of obtaining citizenship for their children, and constantly emphasize the importance of living in a safe and secure environment. In this regard, D/51/m expresses his views in the following sense: We came here in 2012. I have a green card. But I do not know what the difference between green card and citizenship is. Everybody says that citizenship is better. The most important thing is that I got rid of the problems in Iraq, and I will get citizenship. I think my kids will get citizenship in this country. Kids, one day, grow up with citizenship. They study here, they live

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their life here, they get their jobs like engineers, like pilots. Nobody asks you that you are Muslim, you are Sunni, you are Christian, and you are Ezidi. You live your life. For me, I take the citizenship, it is ok. If I cannot take the citizenship, it is also ok. The important thing is that my kids get citizenship and live in this country. I am old now.

The importance of obtaining citizenship for the safety and future of their children is an indisputable fact for refugees. In addition, the economic upward mobility that comes with citizenship is one of the processes experienced. In this context, the interviewee NS/32/m describes his experiences as follows: “For some higher positions, you need citizenship, they ask you for citizenship. But for the rights, everything is the same, nothing changes. The meaning of citizenship means for something too good. I didn’t spend my time on anything. It is a good thing. When I become a citizen, I will be very happy. When I become a citizen, I have the right to go and fly anywhere. I can go to my country as well.” The acquisition of citizenship is an invaluable goal for non-citizen refugees. It is a status in which they and their children see their future in institutionalized permanent and equal conditions. This process positively affects their integration, encouraging them to participate in social life by learning English, to accept work and to participate in social, cultural, and economic life in the USA. While they see that their social and economic problems are not completely resolved with the acquisition of citizenship, they accept that they provide their freedom and security to travel abroad. Citizenship is the final stage that brings them to a new home where they can live in peace while increasing their sense of belonging to the USA.

Remembering Home One of the most important issues addressed in the light of the citizenship debates is linked to transnationalism and this debate should also be evaluated within the framework of freedom of travel, which refugees associate with the acquisition of citizenship. While Basch et al. (1994, p. 23) consider the processes of global capitalism and transnationalism together, they define transnationalism as follows: “a process by which migrants, through their daily life activities and social, economic, and political relations, create social fields that cross national boundaries.” The critical question here is whether Iraqi refugees have the ability to move across borders in the

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context of all those relations and to have opportunities and rights to be able to become transmigrants. From this point of view, Al-Ali et al. (2001, p. 626) provides a typology of capabilities in analyzing the situation of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe and underline that “desire” and “capacity” are decisive when it comes to the participation of refugees in relief and reconstruction activities in their home countries; if a refugee is in poor economic condition or unemployed or dependent on public assistance, their participation will be lower or zero in this sense. In addition, “economic,” “political,” and “social” capacities determine their desire to be active in the economic, political, and social fields of their own countries. Al-Ali explains the factors limiting the economic and social transnational activities and capacities of refugees as follows: Employment, savings, secure legal status, freedom of movement within the host country, gender equality, and social integration (2001). The implementation of having entry-level jobs and self-sufficiency, which is the basis of the economic integration of refugees underlined earlier, demonstrates that refugees must primarily lead their own lives. Therefore, they establish their new lives with limited opportunities for economic activities in comparison with transmigrants. Also, as refugees, their freedom of movement or going to visit their home country is subject to special conditions as they are at risk of persecution and have to leave their country. In connection with this, refugees are a group with very high security concerns. Considering refugees’ desire to do something for their country and their relatives in Iraq, the interviewee, EF/48/m, remembers Iraq in the following sense: I ask my friends every time, how is Baghdad? They said worse than before, it gets worse and worse. I follow the Iraqi news and media every day. I want to see every time how it is going in Iraq because my family, my neighbors and my friends are still there. Every time they call me at night, hey your brother dead, your friend dead. I cannot see anything. But I don’t much follow American news. To be honest, I love Iraq. Still, my brothers and my relatives are there. I spent my whole life there. However, I don’t like to go there. You don’t know what time exactly you will die. No better conditions in Iraq, because right now, the war between Sunni, Shia and Wahabi will stay forever. Yea, no change, no change. We don’t have a good government, good minister. Sunni or Sia, all they just think how they steal the money from Iraq. That’s why I don’t want to go back to Iraq. I have asked my

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children also, they said ‘we don’t like Iraq, we are American’. They don’t want to go back to Iraq.

Despite more than two decades in Arizona, he lives every day with Iraq and his relatives and friends in Iraq. It is, of course, important to underline that Iraqi-Americans do not know much about Iraq, as they say, and that this weak transnational link between the old homeland and the new homeland is fading into oblivion. The main factor here is the inability to return to Iraq. In other words, when Iraq is considered in the context of transnational activities, it cannot be conceived as a livable city like a homeland. Even though there are refugees who have become citizens on short-term visits to Iraq, Iraq is not seen as a homeland to invest in and establish a lasting bond. For example, the interviewee, JM/50/m, after twenty-five years in Arizona, does not hesitate to say that If I am retired, I will go back to Iraq because of my very extended family. I miss them. I am not gonna live there permanently. My children were born here, they are citizens of this country. They will not go to Iraq. Last year, we were in Iraq, we visited. They like big families. They stayed at the house most of the time, they didn’t have friends.

Their length of stay in the United States is an important factor in understanding how they can develop their capacity to invest in their home country. As can be seen, Iraqis who have stayed in Arizona for a long time have the ability and desire to maintain contact with their relatives and acquaintances in Iraq, so they live here and there. However, Iraqi-­ Americans seem reluctant to maintain these transnational relationships because of the image of Iraq disappearing as a homeland. Although the religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq had their economic, political, and social opportunities in Iraq, they do not show a desire to attach themselves and their children to Iraq. On the other hand, they have no hope for the consolidation of Iraq, they only care about their relatives and friends, nothing more. The interviewee, D/51/m, describes their experiences in Iraq as follows: There are a lot of reasons that I have these things in my mind. My brother and his sons were killed by ISIS in front of me and I cannot imagine that I can go back and live in Iraq. I do not follow up the news regularly. My kids watch and tell me what is going on in Iraq. I have many relatives in Iraq. We

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keep our communication with them. We are trying to reunite with these family members.

On the other hand, minority groups of different ethnicities and religious beliefs, such as the Ezidis, maintain their relations with Iraq through technological tools, telephones, and television channels. However, the defining element of this relationship is fear and threat. For these reasons, the homeland is now perceived as a place where extended family and relatives should be saved. Therefore, it should be noted here that the boundaries of transnational relations are determined on the basis of security conditions. In the similar vein, the interviewee, RZ/73/m, who was a pastor in Iraq, expresses his despair about Iraq in the following words: Iraq is not gonna be the same as it was before. This is impossible for me to return, but of course, if Iraq was good and everything was fine, I would visit my village and my church. Saddam was a dictator. But one of the best things he had was that security was too good, safe.

Their subjective status, ethnic and religious backgrounds are important factors to make a reasonable point about their transnational capacity. Many believe that Iraq remains a dangerous region that does not allow them to have hope for their homeland, and many simply keep kinship ties alive. In this sense, their relationship is a transnationalism in the sense that Basch et al. (1994, p. 29) put it: “The fluidity with which ideas, objects, capital, and people now move across borders and boundaries.” Iraqi refugees, especially those who have gained citizenship, try to maintain their ties with their country with their thoughts, lifestyles, and touristic visits. On the other hand, its ties with America continue to be strong. The interviewee, MH/51/m, indicates this bound in this way: I would like to go back to Iraq if everything is nice and normal there. But I will still come back here. Now, I am a citizen. I am a part of this country. I have to serve this country as I was serving other countries. People treat you like a citizen here. You feel yourself American even if you are not a citizen. The law controls everything,

Based on the analysis by Al-Ali et al. (2001, p. 627), Iraqi refugees have capacity, particularly in terms of “gender equality,” “successful social integration,” and “freedom of movement” in the host country while their

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desire to achieve “financial stability in the host country” is highest at the economic level, and to “invest in or send remittances” to Iraq is negligible. However, they have a strong desire to preserve and strengthen their relations with family members and relatives who remain in Iraq, to ​​maintain relations with Iraqi refugees in the host country, and to maintain “a positive attitude” towards Iraq. As can be seen from an analysis at the political level, while Iraqi refugees have a significant capacity to achieve “secure legal status” in Arizona, they can only desire it for their homeland of Iraq, and they desire a stable system or political order for their home country. Concluding this section, Kivisto and Faist (2010, p. 150) distinguish assimilation from transnationalism by stating that “assimilation refers to a mode of immigrant incorporation into a receiving society, transnationalism does not.” Transnationalism then allows us to see a “mode of connection” or “mode of connectedness” between two worlds where people live in different forms of social life. The experience of Iraqi refugees is a mode of connection and connectedness. This principle is valid from the country of asylum to the country of citizenship. Transnationalism, however, requires such a connection mode to remain alive. It is very difficult for Iraqi refugees to keep their connections alive in this sense, as discussed in detail. Therefore, it is still a living argument for this book that Iraqi refugees are obliged to develop integration and assimilation strategies due to the consequences of forced migration and for their post-resettlement period: Once their cross-border activities are over, their transnational activities continue through the fluidity of traditional, cultural, and religious practices in conjunction with strategies of integration and assimilation.

References Al-Ali, N. S., Black, R., & Koser, K. (2001). Refugees and transnationalism: The experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4), 615–634. Retrieved February 7, 2016. Basch, L., Schiller, N. G., & Blanc, C. S. (1994). Nations unbound, transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments and deterritorialized nation-states. Routledge. Berry, J. W. (1991). Understanding and managing multiculturalism: Some possible implications of research in Canada. Psychology and Developing Societies, 3(1), 17–49.

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Berry, J.  W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 46(1), 5–68. Berry, J.  W. (2003). Conceptual approaches to acculturation. In K.  M. Chun, P. B. Organista, & G. Marin (Eds.), Acculturation, advances in theory, measurement and applied research (pp. 17–39). American Psychological Association. Gordon, M. M. (1964). Assimilation in American life, the role of race, religion and national origins. Oxford University Press. Kivisto, P., & Faist, T. (2010). Beyond a border: The causes and consequences of contemporary immigration. Pine Forge Press. Ong, A. (2003). Buddha is hiding, refugees, citizenship, the new America. University of California Press. Park, R. E. (1914). Racial assimilation in secondary groups with particular reference to the Negro. American Journal of Sociology, 19(5), 606–623. Park, R. E., & Burgess, E. W. (1921). Assimilation. In R. E. Park & E. W. Burgess (Eds.), Introduction of the science of sociology (pp. 734–783). The University of Chicago Press. PRM. (2017). U.S. refugee admissions program FAQs. Retrieved September 19, 2017, from https://2009-­2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2016/ 264449.htm

Interviews A/50/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. D/51/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. DR/36/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. EF/48/m Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. IM/62/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. JM/50/m Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. KJ/36/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. M/48/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. MA/48/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. MH/51/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. MY/19/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. NS/32/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. RZ/73/m, Iraqi man refugee, Arizona 2015. YS/62/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015. Z/47/f, Iraqi woman refugee, Arizona 2015.

CHAPTER 7

Rethinking Refugee Integration

The relationship between the United States of America and Iraq is undoubtedly the history of hegemony strategies determined at the international level. One of the most important factors shaping this history is American foreign policy. The analysis of these power relations is the first step in understanding Iraq’s social transformation that resulted from forced migration. Castles, Delgado Wise, and Covarrubias have tended to examine such a historical process through the development–migration nexus, especially when considered within the scope of migration literature. America’s hegemonic role in the Middle East in the 1990s and its conflict with Saddam’s regime brought with it the “structural dynamics” and “strategic practices” that led to the social transformation of Iraq. In this respect, the “Iraq Liberation Law of 1998” can be regarded as an important sign of this period. The foreign policy strategies behind these developments, which exist to the needs of global capitalism, should be emphasized. As Delgado Wise and Covarrubia (2010, 2011) point out, the restructuring process of global capitalism can be evaluated together with the North–South division. The foreign policy of the Bush administration, especially after the events of 11 September, developed on the basis of neoliberal premises, and the administration had two main arguments: The first is to point out the existence of a global enemy, and the second is to turn it into a political discourse and to create a political power and to legitimize it globally. On this basis, the administration criticized and targeted Saddam and his regime, arguing that Saddam’s regime had weapons of mass © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 V. Deli, Iraqi Refugees in the United States, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38793-7_7

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destruction as a living threat to the United States in the environment created by the 11 September effect. Based on these motives, after the military intervention of the USA, a social transformation process started for Iraq in the early 2000s. To point out how this book handles social transformation at this point, in Castles’ succinct terms, it refers to “the complexity, interconnectedness, variability, contextuality and multilevel mediations of global change” (2010, p. 1566). Therefore, the global change process, which is decisive for Iraq, can be examined through the impact of both American foreign policy and of Iraq’s domestic policy and relations. The political and military developments of the 1990s and the results of the first Gulf War heralded the said social transformation for Iraq. It is apparent that one of the characteristic features of this process is the New Wars described by Kaldor (2006, 2013) because it accelerates ethnic and religious segregation and helps understand how non-state actors take part in conflict and tension. Kaldor also expresses the weight of holding political power on behalf of a certain segment of the population or a defined identity. Therefore, the New Wars have continued Iraq’s social transformation while settling in there like a machine that produces the conditions for forced migration. The question of how exactly the New Wars should be understood when considered within the distinction between North and South is important. Castles (2003, p. 18) underlines the following fact in this sense: “the North does more to cause forced migration than to stop it, through enforcing an international political order that causes underdevelopment and conflict.” From this point of view, the USA, while implementing policies aimed at the continuity of the “international political order” pointed out by Castles, has not produced a policy aimed at preventing the underlying roots of forced migration. In this international political plane, global governance institutions and organizations play an active role in managing the consequences of social transformation. In other words, international organizations and institutions rather than states and public authorities respond to humanitarian crises revolving around social transformation and Barnett calls this process as the global governance of humanity, which finds its best expression in the concept of humanitarian governance (Betts, 2009; Barnett & Duvall, 2005). In general, it is “a global project to alleviate the suffering of the oppressed, and to form and shape lives, habits and dispositions of people” (Barnett, 2013). Since humanitarian governance is a process that deeply affects people’s lives and changes their lifestyles, habits, and daily lives in

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addition to saving their lives, it is a governance process that shapes the experiences of refugees in the process starting from their own country and extending to the country where they are resettled. Within this framework, the US manages humanitarian governance as a process of saving, selecting, and admitting refugees largely through the operation of the nonprofit sector. First, the US implements a humanitarian aid and refugee admission policy with the admission quotas of immigrants and refugees to be admitted into the country and cooperates with a large nonprofit sector, especially UN agencies and international non-­ governmental organizations, in the process of assisting, resettling, and admitting refugees. Besides, in the adaptation process of the refugees admitted to the country, the US continues to manage this process with the nonprofit sector at the country-level based on the implementation of the Refugee Act of 1980. At this point, humanitarian governance operates on two main dynamics: The first requires intense inter-institutional cooperation at the global level, while the second continues within the framework of policies determined at the local or country level to implement refugee reception and placement programs. Here, humanitarian governance is the operational link between global and local dynamics. The understanding of humanitarian governance of the United States is embedded into the analysis of power relations and “cooperative agreement” between the federal government and resettlement agencies, which are part of the nonprofit sector. Resettlement agencies exercise “an institutional power” in their own humanitarian action towards refugees resettled in Arizona and turn this power into a sort of “productive power” during their services such as refugee assistance, orientation, and supervision. Both power mechanisms enable them to reproduce the logic of humanitarian governance, which aims to alleviate suffering while forming people’s lives and dispositions. In a similar vein, they promote “kindness” and “compassion” as values ​​of American society to welcome and offer refugee communities and help them accommodate and adjust to their new life in Arizona. Here, their main operational logic is to make refugees “productive members of society” through self-sufficiency policy. For the realization of this sole purpose, a large part of the nonprofit sector, which is faith-based organizations, carries out professional and expert activities. Therefore, humanitarian governance, which comes up with a faith-based character at the country level, keeps the implementation of public services and humanitarian programs in the way formed by the government and serves the state discourse in this implementation.

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On this basis, humanitarian governance operates as a machine of intervention. The “network” of the nonprofit sector similarly functions as a response machine that determines what is “best” for refugees resettled in the United States. The common point in both processes is that these intervention mechanisms run through policies and strategies determined without the consent of refugees. On the other hand, in line with the neoliberal nature of humanitarian governance, the US does not want refugees to become a burden on the American system and society in the determination of the Refugee Act of 1980. So, the act regulates all services and programs with the purpose of “self-sufficiency” within the scope of the cooperative agreement. The resettlement agencies manage and offer all services and programs in a rational and bureaucratic structure together with the Department of State to make refugees economically self-­sufficient in a possible shortest time. In another saying, refugees are expected to become self-sufficient individuals as the agencies treat them like “clients” after their initial resettlement period. In this process, which develops in accordance with a similar logic of street-level bureaucracies involved in the delivery of public services to “the poor, the disadvantaged and the excluded” in the US, refugees take part in receiving public services as clients while committing themselves to mutual cooperation with the service provider. Refugees as clients are mainly expected to develop appropriate behaviors in return for the service they receive. In a sense, this is eventually part of institutional integration with which refugees comply as self-sufficient individuals for the common good of American society. Apparently, it is the “paternalist” structure of the system, which is also persistent for the nature of humanitarian governance. This usually means designating and offering services to be provided without the consent or excluding the consent of the individuals who receive services. The standard services and public assistance offered by resettlement agencies and professional organizations of the nonprofit sector under the cooperative agreement are designed as budget and time-limited programs, which means all refugees should be treated equally and provided on the same ground. In the provision of assistance and services, the humanitarian governance process operates as a form of poverty governance as well. Mead (1997, p. 2) expresses this as follows: “Social policies aimed at the poor” is to “attempt to reduce poverty” through “close supervision” in the context of the US. Given the social and economic situation of refugees in Arizona, it is a reliable fact that the majority of refugees fall under the

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social and economic scope of poverty governance, which includes the system’s efforts to improve refugees’ social and economic conditions and to provide them with systematic supervision and orientation towards them. As Mead points out, public services are to increase “individual efficiency” and enable the poor to develop their own knowledge and skills, in other words “aid is not given as an entitlement, but in return for good behavior” (1998, p. 110). The US humanitarian governance establishes such a structure in which refugees are supervised to improve their competences to become self-sufficient individuals in line with the logic of function of “poverty governance” (Soss et al., 2011). One of the most important results is that the nonprofit sector in their philanthropic and voluntary initiatives contributes to the operation of humanitarian governance and poverty governance in addition to the mandatory services to refugees offered by resettlement agencies in a cooperative agreement. The philanthropic organizations voluntarily promoted by American society during US history is “social entrepreneurship” in referring to Tipton’s concept here. One of the most important conclusions demonstrates that philanthropic and voluntary organizations are significantly effective in the eyes of society; “voluntary giving” and “voluntary association,” highlighted by Payton and Moody, are two important variables contributing to the function of humanitarian governance. These philanthropic and voluntary efforts focus on gaps and issues against which resettlement agencies are not in the position to take action and aim to solve social problems through the means of collective voluntary initiatives by calling for help for refugees, who are seen as vulnerable in poor conditions. The event that radically changed the functioning of the nonprofit sector and society’s perception about refugees was September 11. As a result, American society has developed a strict “security concern” when it comes to the case of “aliens” in the US. This concern, which is formed through the discourse of “war on terrorism” in the political sense, has emerged as a breaking point in terms of humanitarian governance. It put psychosocial pressure especially on Muslim immigrants and refugees. The 9/11 has caused drastic changes in America’s foreign policy, and given the functioning of humanitarian governance, it has led to the United States’ refugee admission policy to be suspended for a while. All of these adverse conditions forced the entire nonprofit sector, especially the resettlement agencies, to work to deliver accurate information about refugees to American society. Although it was not easy to turn this threat and security perception into a positive one, it has yielded possible outcomes to

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re-establish humanitarian space on refugees’ behalf. In this process, resettlement agencies, volunteers, and civil society organizations conducted awareness-raising activities for American society and provided information to the public about refugees’ backgrounds and vulnerabilities as well as their importance and contribution to America, the role refugees will play for the welfare and well-being of American society, and the faith-based values ​​of American society which help protect and offer them compassion. In terms of humanitarian governance, all actors are purely social, not simply reducible to the institutional matter and interactions of specific actors or their communication among themselves (Barnett, 2005). During this time of crisis in Arizona, the nonprofit sector also mobilized all social channels to address the security concerns and prejudices of American society against refugees beyond its institutional capacities. Following the reconstruction of humanitarian action in the post-­ resettlement period after the 9/11 events, in the case of Iraqi refugees in Arizona, a politics of life can be traced in the words of Fassin. This book puts forward that humanitarian governance certainly produces a politics of refugee lives and that this inevitably relates to the entire integration process of refugees in Arizona. At this point, the integration process is a phenomenon that should be addressed from the very beginning of the refugees’ forced migration processes. Therefore, although the time that refugees spend in the country of asylum where they seek asylum is seen as a transitional period, it takes at least two years from the lives of refugees and the main feature of this process is uncertainty. The most important opportunity for refugees who cannot return to their countries due to life-­ threatening risks is to wait to be “selected” for resettlement. This process, in which they are expected to be selected for resettlement as individuals who have managed to flee or “escape” their home country, awaits in uncertainty in a country of asylum. The politics of refugee lives begins at this point, and as I have underlined, this process is in the hands of humanitarian governance institutions. In the case of Arizona in the US, the implementation of the self-­ sufficiency policy and refugee admission and reception programs outlined in the Refugee Act 1980 primarily forms and reproduces a politics of refugee lives, which compels refugees to become economically self-sufficient. At this stage, humanitarian governance reaches its limits on refugees and no longer prioritizes to alleviate their suffering but pursues shaping their lives and dispositions where they arrive. Such limits point to a stage where those who arrived in the US as a result of forced migration have to work

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and live in the way immigrants undergo. With reference to Piore (1979), refugees, like immigrants, are also included as a group that meets a secondary industry’s workforce needs. In other words, refugees are expected to both work like unskilled immigrant workers and become economically self-­sufficient individuals by having entry-level jobs. In line with Barnett’s term of “consequentialist ethics” and Rose’s concept of “responsibilization,” the US refugee reception and admission program determines the ethical scope of humanitarian action which indicates “the rightness of an action helping to bring about a better outcome” among other options in humanitarian governance (Barnett, 2012) and performs “responsibilization” of refugees in Arizona to be able to construct them as self-sufficient individuals. In the eyes of the system, New Americans, regardless of the meaning of “White Americans,” implies subjects of responsibilization in the post-resettlement era where the system discursively combines all ethnic, religious, national, and racial differences under the umbrella of New Americans. Iraqi refugees as New Americans suffer from a variety of problems such as “English incompetence,” “having entry-level jobs,” ill-payment,” “adaptation problems in Westernized working life,” “inadequacy of public assistance until they recover themselves,” “problem of re-credentialing,” and “social and cultural barriers” in the process of responsibilization in Arizona although the system succeeds in constructing them as responsible individuals who have to pursue earning their own lives without being a burden on the system. On this basis, this book proposes to treat refugee integration as a separate process that differs significantly from immigrant integration in Arizona and cannot be considered independently of globally organized humanitarian governance. In this context, the way in which refugees are included in entry-­level jobs and working life is taken into stock as the most important part of integration. In other words, how refugee labor and refugee integration develop as two inseparable components in post-resettlement areas requires a perspective that deserves to be analyzed together in terms of acculturation and integration. In this frame, as an ongoing process through the experiences of refugees in their countries of asylum, in the first stage of accommodation and adaptation to the United States, Iraqi refugees receive services and assistance from resettlement agencies and are placed in entry-level jobs. As they learn the requirements of the system and adapt to an institutional and organizational environment different from that of asylum countries, they begin to gain key insights into how they should shape their lives in Arizona.

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In this new work environment, where vocational mobility is not possible without English proficiency, refugees have to work in entry-level jobs that represent the lowest segment of vocational mobility. These jobs typically do not require English proficiency such as cleaning, shipping, nursing, or security. The adaptation process, which starts at the center of such a labor process, is an area where communication and interaction with American citizens is quite limited. Referring to what Bauman (2005) said when talking about work, “the place of work” is literally “an orientation point” for the rest of their lives in Arizona. Therefore, one of the most important results is that Iraqi refugees need to build their lives and develop themselves starting from the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy, and this naturally carries some risks in terms of refugee integration. To embody such risks, the concept I propose to this literature is the “vicious cycle of refugee integration.” The White House Task Force on New Americans (2015) manifests “integration as a two-way process” and emphasizes challenges such as “limited capacity and funding for refugee integration activities, limited awareness about refugees and limited access to successful integration models.” Moreover, the naturalization necessitates to “ensure that new citizens have the foundation to participate in civic institutions—skills such as the ability to read, write, and speak English, and a demonstrated understanding of US history and government.” Indeed, this definition points out the fact that acculturation and integration have their shortcomings in a broader sense, which is an issue that needs to be discussed in terms of refugee integration itself. Based on the field research findings, this book addresses a fundamental gap which widens between the material (economic) basis of integration and the social and cultural construction of integration. On the one hand, refugees have to learn languages, work, and become self-sufficient as quickly as possible they can. On the other hand, they have to participate in social and civic life, experience acculturation, and transform themselves through intercultural interaction in their new environment. It is not an easy process for Iraqi refugees from a different culture and society to be involved in a new social and cultural environment and reproduce themselves by working in labor-intensive entry-level jobs. Therefore, this gap leads to a vicious circle in refugee integration in which New Americans, who represent the first-­generation adult Iraqi refugees in my case, often begin to develop their acculturation strategy by first returning to their primary groups and then remaining in limited contact with secondary

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groups. In a sense, this transforms into a process of reconnecting to one’s own cultural identity, traditional and religious values. In the final analysis, it turns to an acculturation strategy that poses obstacles to integration into the larger and pluralistic American society. At this point, it should not be forgotten that the main determinant behind this whole process is the efforts of Iraqi refugees to survive and continue their lives, that is, to be self-sufficient in the larger society. Although the vicious cycle of integration expresses a contradiction, it is clear that there is a risk that this process will be seen and accepted as a natural process for institutions and organizations working with refugees, unless the system has alternative and comprehensive supportive integration policies towards refugees. In particular, my research findings indicate resettlement agencies positively evaluate the integration of Iraqi refugees, assuming that Iraqi refugees disappear very quickly as an educated, urban, and motivated group in comparison with other refugee groups. The disappearance of Iraqi refugees before agencies and organizations is not a measure of integration. The first generation is a generation that has to work in entry-level jobs to survive. In a minimum wage life, there is the impossibility of social and cultural reproduction, which requires learning English and socially integrating into the wider society. This vicious cycle is one in which only economic self-sufficiency is reproduced. When it comes to the special needs of refugees, disappearance requires a separate risk assessment in terms of integration. Otherwise, refugees’ traumas, vulnerabilities, and special needs may be at risk of being ignored. Unlike an immigrant, the conflict and threat environment that a refugee is exposed to leaves lasting effects on her identity. In this sense, the fact that resettlement agencies and resettlement programs evaluate the integration process without assessing the extent of special needs is what I call “the blind spot of refugee integration” and where detailed policies for refugee integration need to be developed. The blind spot of refugee integration technically necessitates a policy analysis of individual factors that actually represent commonality for Iraqi refugees. The common variables are age, gender, social and economic status, personhood, education, disability, and so on and determine the course of the acculturation strategies of Iraqi refugees as a group. This does not mean that New Americans do not cope with cultural stressors, challenges, and identity-related issues but their disappearance in a larger society is not indicative of their social and economic integration in the host community. For instance, educated Iraqi refugees who were subjected to prolonged violence in Iraq may not be in the

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position to easily adapt into a new environment and to work in an entry-­ level job leading to secondary trauma and loss of social and economic status and they may not have the mental well-being to perform what is expected by the system. In the face of all these processes, it can be expected that the system will follow policies beyond the argument of disappearance. Integration, as Berry underlines, requires cultural integrity and daily interaction with other groups in a mutual relationship. Unfortunately, Iraqi refugees lack the ability to join the host community based on the above-mentioned challenges. In Kuhlman’s (1991) words, refugees do not have a “standard of living” that satisfies them economically and culturally at first. In an analysis with Berry’s (1991, 1997, 2003) concepts, “separation” from larger society, rather than integration, is emerging as an important acculturation strategy for non-Americans and produces obstacles against integration unless they individually overcome and transform their prejudices and sense of insecurity. While not a permanent strategy, Iraqi refugees use separation to avoid interaction with others in various situations. While assimilation occurs with the strengthening of relations with other groups, namely the dominant culture, the first-generation adult Iraqi refugees also tend to preserve their own cultural identity and develop a cultural distance from the dominant group. As a result, this greatly affects the Americanization process and leads to a failed sign of refugee integration. In the final analysis, at this stage where the vicious circle of refugee integration and the blind spot of refugee integration loses its functional value and assimilation emerges as an irresistible process, it also determines the New Americans’ envision of future generations. Based on their own experiences, they believe and observe that the next generation of Iraqi refugees will be an integrated part of American society, but not American culture. New Americans do not make a clear statement about the commitment of future generations to their original cultures and identities as well. Nevertheless, the American melting pot has an important weight in all of these different views and observations. As Park and Burgess put it years ago: “in assimilation the process is typically unconscious; the person is incorporated into the common life of the group before he is aware and with little conception of the course of events which brought this incorporation about” (1921, p. 736). As Park and Burgess point out, the impact of this unconsciousness is invaluable. Children of refugees and future generations will experience this in the US, where they have the sense of

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belonging. In this sense, it is possible to talk about an integration process independent of experiences of former refugee generations. However, the first generation transfers their experiences and traumas with their own culture to future generations as well, and this transmission may have an observable impact on the commitment of future generations to the US.  The first-generation experiences of Iraqi-Americans in preserving their cultural identity can also be decisive for increasing social and economic mobility and for the smooth functioning of the assimilation process. Therefore, although assimilation seems to be an immutable rule for future generations, it is not completely disconnected from the integration processes of first-generation refugees. Within the scope of this study, which evaluates the social and economic integration of refugees under the operational power of humanitarian governance, it conducts a research on the first-generation adult Iraqi refugees, whom the American system recognizes as New Americans. This group carries out acculturation strategies on the axis of separation–assimilation– integration axis and undergoes the vicious cycle of refugee integration and the blind spot of refugee integration. However, these processes that I have introduced into the literature become less obvious for the children of the first generation and future generations, and they evolve in a direction where the effect of the assimilation–integration bond increases. In sum, the self-sufficiency policy, which forms the basis of this whole process, allows us to think primarily of economic integration when it comes to refugees. New American Economy Report (NAE, 2016) draws a comprehensive picture of the state of Arizona by underlying the case of New Americans: Arizona has a growing foreign population due to its proximity to Mexico and being a state that admits refugees from different regions all over the world. The contribution of the immigrant population to the economy is quite high at the level of 40%. As for the workforce, 30% more people work than native Arizonans. All these indicators and more in the report highlight the enormous role that migrant and refugee labor plays in social and economic development in Arizona, while drawing attention to the high number of undocumented immigrants. Therefore, the inclusion of Iraqi refugees in the labor market of Arizona as a cheap labor force pushes their economic integration to a decisive position against the non-economic dimensions of integration. In the context of all these discussions, I draw attention to the following implications for the development of the refugee integration system in America:

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First of all, in a state bordering Mexico like Arizona, the high diversity of immigrants and the existence of the problem of undocumented immigrants require the system to be more vigilant and informed about discrimination and loss of rights that Iraqi refugees may be exposed to. At the same time, this requires programmed support for both resettlement agencies’ activities and volunteer work to combat the risk of Islamophobia and raise awareness about refugees in the aftermath of 9/11. Refugee reception and placement programs within the general functioning of humanitarian governance do not adequately respond to individual factors of refugees as different from immigrants. The system needs to prioritize their special needs such as age, gender, vulnerability, trauma, psychological well-being, and social factors. In this respect, the system and resettlement agencies should develop refugee-­oriented policies so that their disappearance in public does not turn into a blind spot of refugee integration. The fact that Iraqi refugees have different ethnic and religious identities manifests the importance of group dynamics in integration policies. For this reason, it is crucial to develop social and cultural standards that the system should carry out to improve intercultural dynamics between different groups, especially for the relations to be established with American citizens and American society. This can prevent Iraqi refugees from being confined to their own cultural identities and can allow the formation of ethno-cultural groups to socialize and develop stronger relationships with the larger society. Resettlement agencies and resettlement programs should also prioritize mainstream assistance and support programs in a rights-based approach that will facilitate the integration of refugees in addition to government-­ led programs and this might also ensure women’s participation in labor market, social and cultural life and eliminate prejudices against Muslim refugees in particular. Downward mobility of Iraqi refugees seems to be a persistent problem in the US and all refugees are programmatically placed in entry-level jobs based on legitimate reasons. Recredentialing procedures remain a robust issue for many refugees as the current function of resettlement programs does not propose an alternative resolution to those who want to perform their own licenses and professions in Arizona. Refugees, as a different group from immigrants, are a group that must be supported financially to complete the licensing or credentialing procedures for their own professions to work without a loss of self-respect in alignment with objectives of humanitarian governance. In this sense, the downward mobility of

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refugees, in which men and women experience differently, needs to be reformed by the system and implemented with measures to uphold their social and economic mobility. For instance, the loss of social capital and status of single women refugees or single women refugees with children is different from that of male refugees or refuges with extended families since, as Griffiths et al. (2005, p. 34) point out, social capital actually refers to “social networks and their role in enabling individuals and groups to access other forms of symbolic and material resources.” From this point of view, the integration process of vulnerable refugees is quite difficult if it is not supported by the system. In a similar vein, the system does not have specialized services for the development of the acculturation processes of refugees although there are services to be offered to refugees. English language learning is of fundamental importance but most of the refugees perceive themselves as lacking English competence despite years of living in Arizona. This affects the relations with the dominant established group, American society, on the other hand, it causes a long-term cultural distance and negatively affects intercultural relations in Arizona. Since the primary purpose of the majority of refugees is to work and earn money, they have difficulty in allocating the necessary time to learn English or cannot integrate into a cultural environment where they can learn English. At this point, the refugee reception and placement program should be designed to contribute to their acculturation process by facilitating their language learning process and by carrying out programs that encourage language learning. Finally, I can summarize the method of analysis for understanding and improving refugee integration within the framework of humanitarian governance, ranging from the global to the local, under three headings: The social and economic conditions of refugees in their home countries, their reasons for leaving and seeking asylum; The procedures, social and economic relations and conditions, and duration in the country of asylum; and The institutions, organizations, policies, legislation, and regulations that refugees encounter in resettlement countries. In the context of these three interrelated processes, refugee integration can be considered as part of a holistic analysis and as this book demonstrates, refugee integration, unlike immigrant integration, deserves to be developed with a multifaceted approach.

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References Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in global governance. In M. Barnett & R.  Duvall (Eds.), Power in global governance (pp.  1–33). Cambridge University Press. Barnett, M. N. (2005, December). Humanitarianism transformed. Perspectives on Politics, 3(4), 723–740. Barnett, M.  N. (2012, November). International paternalism and humanitarian governance. Global Constitutionalism, 1(3), 485–521. Barnett, M.  N. (2013). Humanitarian governance. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 379–398. Bauman, Z. (2005). Work, consumerism and the new poor (2nd ed.). Open University Press. Berry, J. W. (1991). Understanding and managing multiculturalism: Some possible implications of research in Canada. Psychology and Developing Societies, 3(1), 17–49. Berry, J.  W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 46(1), 5–68. Berry, J.  W. (2003). Conceptual approaches to acculturation. In K.  M. Chun, P. B. Organista, & G. Marin (Eds.), Acculturation, advances in theory, measurement and applied research (pp. 17–39). American Psychological Association. Betts, A. (2009). Forced migration and global politics. Wiley-Blackwell. Castles, S. (2003). Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation. Sociology, 37(1), 13–34. Castles, S. (2010). Understanding global migration: A social transformation perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(10), 1565–1586. Delgado Wise, R., & Covarrubias, H. M. (2010). Understanding the relationship between migration and development: Toward a new theoretical approach. In N. G. Schiller & T. Faist (Eds.), Migration, development, and transnationalization: A critical stance (pp. 142–176). Books. Delgado Wise, R., & Covarrubias, H. M. (2011). The dialectic between uneven development and forced migration: Toward a political economy framework. In T.  Faist, M.  Fauser, & P.  Kivisto (Eds.), The migration-development nexus: Towards a transnational perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. Griffiths, D., Sigona, N., & Zetter, R. (2005). Refugee community organisations and dispersal, networks, resources and social capital. The Policy Press. Kaldor, M. (2006). New & old wars (2nd ed.). Polity Press. Kaldor, M. (2013). In defence of new wars. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(1), 4, 1–4,16. Kuhlman, T. (1991). The economic integration of refugees in developing countries: A research model. Journal of Refugee Studies, 4(1), 1–20.

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Mead, L. M. (1997). The rise of paternalism. In L. M. Mead (Ed.), The new paternalism, supervisory approaches to poverty (pp. 1–39). Brookings Institution Press. Mead, L. M. (1998). Telling the poor what to do. Public Interest, 132, 97–112. Retrieved May 20, 2017, from https://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/telling-­the-­poor-­what-­to-­do NAE. (2016, August). The contributions of new Americans in Arizona. Retrieved July 23, 2017, from http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-­content/ uploads/2017/02/nae-­az-­report.pdf Park, R. E., & Burgess, E. W. (1921). Assimilation. In R. E. Park & E. W. Burgess (Eds.), Introduction of the science of sociology (pp. 734–783). The University of Chicago Press. Piore, M.  J. (1979). Birds of passage: Migrant labor in industrial societies. Cambridge University Press. Soss, J., Fording, R. C., & Schram, S. F. (2011). Disciplining the poor, neoliberal paternalism and the persistent power of race. The University of Chicago Press. White House Task Force on New Americans. (2015, April). Strengthening communities by welcoming all residents, a federal strategic action plan on immigrant & refugee integration. Retrieved June 20, 2017, from https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/tfna_progress_ report_final_12_15_15.pdf

Index1

A Accommodation, 150, 151, 176, 178–181 Acculturation, 6, 144, 145, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155, 157, 161, 163, 166–168, 175–181, 187, 190, 191, 193–198, 200, 219–223, 225 Acculturative strategies, 187, 196 Acculturative stress, 187, 191 Adaptation, 9, 60, 61, 111, 134, 144–147, 152, 153, 162, 167, 168, 176, 180, 187, 215, 219, 220 American citizenship, 3, 6, 204, 205 American culture, 129, 145, 149, 153, 166, 189, 192, 193, 197, 198, 201, 202 American dream, 1, 2, 41, 101–105, 107, 111, 113 Americanization, 61, 150–152, 176, 181, 201, 202, 222

American society, 33, 34, 43, 45, 52, 55, 66, 70–72, 135, 149, 163, 165, 166, 188, 201, 203, 215–218, 221, 222, 225 Arizona, 79–107, 111–140, 143–184, 187–211, 213–225 Arizona Department of Economic Security, 9, 12, 28, 29, 32, 50, 112, 122 Assimilation, 6, 143, 144, 149–151, 153, 157, 162, 165, 168, 176, 178, 181, 183, 188, 189, 191, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 211, 222, 223 Asylum country, 80, 90, 91, 98, 103, 104, 121, 169 B Blind spot of refugee integration, 6, 163, 221 Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 4, 112

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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C Catholic Charities Community Services, 12, 13, 33, 35, 40, 41, 45, 70, 71, 113, 114, 117, 121, 138 Citizenship, 3, 11, 14, 99, 100, 102, 126, 144, 152, 172, 196, 198, 200, 203–207, 210, 211 Client, 24, 121, 140 Competence assumption, 6, 26, 49, 50, 116 Consent, 14, 15, 25, 26, 36, 39, 46–48, 51, 100, 104, 139, 199, 216 Cooperative agreement, 13, 29, 31, 31n1, 34, 35, 37–39, 41, 45, 115, 215, 216 Cultural diversity, 80, 199 Cultural group, 150, 152, 153, 177, 187–188, 191, 192 Cultural identity, 166, 167, 188, 192, 221 D Department of State (Dos), 4, 18, 28, 29, 31, 31n1, 32, 35, 38, 39n2, 44, 65, 216 Discrimination, 194 Discriminatory practices, 97, 179, 194, 195 Dominant (or mainstream) society, 153 E Economic self-sufficiency, 19, 36 Education level, 8, 128, 188 English proficiency, 8, 10, 120, 133, 135, 135n6, 139, 146–147, 147n1, 220 Entry-level jobs, 10, 11, 26, 28, 42, 114, 116, 117, 119–121, 126,

129, 129n5, 134, 137, 139, 146, 147, 157, 176, 181, 183, 197, 199, 208, 219–222, 224 Ethnicity, 3, 7, 84, 88, 132, 166, 210 Expectations, 7, 40, 41, 91, 94, 100–105, 107, 113, 116–118, 128, 143, 158, 176, 196 F Faith-based programs, 43 Forced migration, 6, 7, 11, 17, 18, 20–23, 25, 27, 36, 79–83, 85, 89, 115, 136, 155, 168, 169, 175, 176, 178, 180, 182, 204, 211, 214, 218 G Gender, 8, 87, 88, 90, 102, 133, 135, 139, 170, 172, 175, 178, 193, 196, 205, 208, 210, 221, 224 Global governance, 17–19, 21–23, 31, 34, 91, 100, 214 H Host community, 67, 70, 97, 144, 154, 161, 162, 165, 168, 170, 172, 176, 178–180, 194, 195, 221, 222 Humanitarian governance, 5–7, 17–74, 79, 80, 90–95, 99–101, 104, 105, 118, 119, 124, 136, 139, 140, 143, 161, 178, 199, 204, 214–219, 223–225 Humanitarianism, 22, 23, 28, 29, 38–40, 43–52, 54, 80, 81, 99 I Immigrant, 20, 50, 65, 70, 107, 119, 125, 130, 134, 135, 135n6, 139,

 INDEX 

143, 144, 147–149, 151, 152, 154–156, 156n2, 158–160, 166, 170, 176, 183, 187, 204, 211, 215, 217, 221 Integration, 79–107, 111–140, 143–184, 187–211, 213–225 Intercultural relations, 153, 165, 167, 168, 191–192, 203, 225 International Rescue Committee (IRC), 12, 13, 32, 47, 66, 67, 69, 115, 116, 156n2, 159, 164 Iraqi-Americans, 6, 148, 199–201, 203, 209, 223 Iraqi American Society for Peace and Friendship (IASSPF), 53, 61 Iraqi refugees, 1, 2, 4–12, 28, 42, 48, 49, 62–64, 70, 79, 81, 82, 85, 87, 90, 92, 94–99, 102, 111, 113–117, 120, 121, 124–129, 131–134, 136, 137, 139, 143–184, 187–192, 195, 197–201, 203, 207, 210, 211, 218–224 Iraqi women refugees, 88 L Language proficiency, 8, 120, 133, 146, 220 Legal status, 8, 13, 14, 93, 126, 208, 211 Lutheran Social Services, 12, 13, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42, 45, 48, 67, 69, 71, 118, 123, 126, 140, 163, 167 M Marginalization, 153, 163, 188, 195, 197 Marital status, 7, 10 Melting pot model, 152, 153, 165, 167

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Mother tongue, 188–190 Multiculturalism, 149, 177, 191 N Nationality, 7, 18, 124, 204 New Americans, 5, 6, 119, 125, 126, 136, 140, 147, 148, 155, 166, 199, 203, 219–223 New war, 84, 85, 89 9/11, 20, 43, 64–69, 71–74, 160, 213, 214, 217, 218, 224 Non-dominant (or minority) groups, 153 Non-governmental agencies, 29 Nonprofit sector, 7, 13, 18, 24–26, 35, 59, 61, 64, 72, 122, 123, 160, 171, 215–218 Noor Women’s Association, 12, 53, 54, 133, 157 P Participation, 14, 30, 53, 144, 151, 152, 162, 168, 169, 172, 192, 195, 196, 203, 208, 224 Paternalism, 25, 26, 46–49, 104, 119 Philanthropy, 35, 53, 55–57, 123, 217 Phoenix, 8, 12, 33, 37, 40–42, 47, 48, 61, 62, 67–71, 115–118, 121, 126, 127, 131, 133, 156n2, 159, 161, 163–165 Plural societies, 152, 153, 199 A politics of life, 23 A politics of refugee lives, 5, 25, 36, 79, 82, 218 Poverty governance, 6, 49, 50, 52, 117–119, 216, 217 Power, 17, 21–24, 27, 28, 30–32, 34, 35, 43, 46, 47, 51, 73, 92, 93, 100, 169, 172, 175, 176, 201, 202, 213–215, 223

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Primary and a secondary industry, 120 Professionalism, 51, 59–61 Public services, 24, 25, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42–46, 64, 113, 118, 149, 215–217 R Reception and admission program, 5, 24, 26, 27, 30, 41 Reception and placement program (RRP), 29, 35, 38, 111–113, 119 Re-credentiality, 171 Refugee Act of 1980, 13, 18, 19, 36, 41, 111, 215, 218 Refugee integration, 6, 125, 143, 144, 147, 148, 153, 168, 219–225 Refugee resettlement agencies, 18, 31, 32, 66, 67, 115 Refugees, 17–74, 79–107, 111–140, 143–184, 187–211, 213–225 Religion, 3, 6, 7, 18, 44–46, 51, 56, 57, 84, 85, 87, 88, 96, 97, 119, 131, 132, 165, 166, 173, 174, 178, 181, 192, 193, 195, 202, 203 Resettlement, 1, 5, 19, 30, 32, 33, 37, 39, 48, 52–54, 63, 73, 120, 166, 224 Resettlement agencies, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 25, 27–32, 34–40, 42, 44–48, 50–60, 63, 64, 66–70, 72, 79, 102, 106, 112, 114–116, 120, 121, 134, 135, 138, 145, 156, 158, 160, 166, 184, 195, 215–219, 221, 224 Responsibilization, 25–28, 37, 119, 124–140, 145, 199, 219 S Safety, 2, 177, 180, 205–207 Security, 19, 20, 99, 104, 168, 176

Self-sufficiency, 6, 19, 26–28, 36, 37, 47, 50, 80, 103, 107, 111, 112, 114–116, 118, 119, 121, 123, 125, 145, 148, 175, 199, 208, 215, 216, 218, 221, 223 Self-sufficiency policy, 28, 37, 80, 103, 116, 145, 175, 215, 218, 223 Separation, 20, 153, 162, 163, 188, 195, 197, 199, 219, 222 September 11, see 9/11 Social capital, 56, 133, 168–176, 225 Social contact, 145, 150, 152, 165, 168, 179, 181–184, 194–198, 203 Social entrepreneurship, 43–45, 52, 66, 74, 167, 217 Socialization, 97, 105, 119, 145, 147, 154, 162, 170, 172 Social mobility, 9, 169, 170 Social organization, 84, 176, 177, 179–184 Social status, 87, 139, 168, 170, 175, 225 Social transformation, 20, 23, 80–84, 86, 213, 214 Society of origin, 194 Society of settlement, 194 Street-level bureaucracies, 24, 25, 40, 216 Street-level bureaucrats, 24, 40 Supervisory policies, 26, 27, 49, 117 Supervisory role, 26, 118 T Transnational activities, 208, 209, 211 Transnationalism, 6, 207, 210, 211 Tucson, 7, 11, 12, 29, 33, 35, 37, 39, 53, 55–58, 60, 70, 113, 114, 123, 127, 132, 133, 135, 138, 140, 145, 157, 158, 161, 165, 167

 INDEX 

Tucson Refugee Ministry, 12, 53, 55, 56, 126, 132, 165 U Undocumented migration, 20, 159 Upward mobility, 121, 133, 169, 173, 174, 207 Upward social mobility, 169, 170

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V Vicious cycle of refugee integration, 146–148, 168, 220, 223 Violence against women, 88 Voluntary agencies, 44, 112 Voluntary organizations, 5, 37, 39, 44, 51–54, 57–59, 64, 66, 79, 127, 167, 217 Volunteers, 2, 29, 33, 36, 45, 63, 68, 73, 74, 167, 184