Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 9780755608409, 9781780766638

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To Javad, Lili and Neda

List of Illustrations

  1 A group of merchants. (Courtesy of Mohammad Ali Jadid al-Islam, Tabriz.) 24   2 Muzaffar al-Din Shah out hunting. (Courtesy of Mohammad Ali Jadid al-Islam, Tabriz.) 30   3 Illustration from the satirical newspaper Hasharat al-arz. The lower caption says ironically, ‘Respect shown to pilgrims on the Haj by the Iranian Consul in Istanbul.’ (Courtesy of the Central Library of Tabriz, Newspaper Section.) 37   4 The Rushdiyya School in Tabriz. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.) 56   5 Satirical cartoon in Baladiyya showing a bakery and different types of customers waiting for bread and commenting on the delay. (Courtesy of the Central Library of Tabriz, Newspaper Section.) 62   6 The annual subscription to Thuraya of Mirza Ahmad the Munajim Bashi of Zill al-Sultan. (Courtesy of the Torfehnezhad Archive, Isfahan.) 92   7 Revolutionary supporters of constitutionalism. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.) 117   8 Some of the seals (signatures) of the inhabitants of Bunab appointing a representative to follow their interests. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.) 133   9 ‘Abbas Aqa, the assassin of Amin al Sultan, published in Mujahid. 140 10 Shaikh Salim amongst the members of the Anjuman-i Islamiyya. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.) 146 11 Muzaffari newspaper of Bushehr, Year 1 No. 1. 190

Acknowledgements

This book was from the beginning intended to be based as far as possible on primary material reflecting a variety of little-studied contemporary views of the Revolution of 1906. For this reason my research visits to Iran have been especially significant. Therefore, first and foremost, I am greatly indebted in my research for this book to the many scholars of my subject, and staff in the archives of Iran, for their invaluable interest and assistance during my visits there. Considerable help, comments and advice were given to me in Tehran by Dr Hossein Abadian, who offered stimulating debate, and also obtained for me copies of the newspaper Nida-yi Islam. Mr Reza Mokhtari gave most generously of his time in exploring the archives, and obtaining material. I am grateful to Mr Reza Salami for his most scholarly assistance in the reading of hand-written texts. Dr Mansoureh Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi gave me the opportunity of attending gatherings on my subject and kindly donated to me some of the latest publications in Persian. I much appreciate the hospitality of Dr Mohammad Ali Kazembeyki, our debates and exchange of ideas. With regard to archives and libraries, I am extremely grateful to Dr Sadeq Sajjadi at the Centre of the Great Islamic Encyclopaedia, who enabled me to have access to the newspaper collection and to study regularly in the library. He was particularly kind in providing me with copies of the newspaper Habl al-Matin. All the staff of the National Archives of Iran and the National Library were unfailingly helpful both in exploring the catalogue and in providing me with the material requested. I am most grateful to Mr Musa Haqqani and Mr Reza Farasti of the Mo‘asseseh-ye Motala‘at-e Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran for their assistance, as well as the staff there, who made such a thorough search of their collection for the items requested. I was delighted to have access to the magnificent collection of the Majlis Library in Tehran, the modernisation of which owes much to the admirable initiative of Dr Rasool Ja‘farian, the Director. Mr Kuroosh Moradi, who is the Head of the Newspaper Section, was outstandingly helpful in allowing me to study the impressive newspaper collection and in providing the material needed. I would like also to express appreciation of the efforts of Mr Ali Tatari of the Majlis Library for his assistance, and his endeavours in building up the new Constitutional Revolution section. I was fortunate to be able to visit the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has made impressive advances

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in archival management in recent decades. The Head of the Document Office, Mr Ali Asghar Rastineh, and staff were especially helpful in enabling me to study their highly significant collection of documents. The Bonyad-i Daerat al-Ma‘arefe Islami gave me the opportunity to use their valuable collection of books, and Mrs Afsaneh Monfared was particularly warm in her assistance. In Isfahan, Dr Morteza Nouraei was extremely helpful in introducing me to all the local archives. The staff of the Museum of the History of Education of Isfahan were most hospitable in showing me their illuminating collection and providing me with material. I would especially like to thank Mr Hasan Nejad, the Director, and Mr Parsapour and Mr Raja’i. Mr Ahmed Reza Torfehnezhad permitted me to explore his private archive, which has many unusual documents. I also found the staff of the National Archives of Isfahan most welcoming and interested in my research. Dr Siroos Baradaran-Shokoohy, in Tabriz, shared his considerable knowledge of the history of Tabriz and its primary material regarding my research, and arranged for me to visit all the relevant archives and libraries. I am deeply grateful to him. At the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz the Director, Sayyid Mohammad Mas‘ud Naqib, Mr Hasan Asvadi and the staff were most hospitable in helping me explore the collection. The Director of Iran Heritage, Mr Turab Mohammadi, very kindly introduced me to the museums there. The Museum of the Constitutional Revolution (Museh Mashruteh) has a fascinating collection regarding the events of the period. Mr Yunis Shirzad and the staff there took much trouble in enabling me to photograph some of the documents. I am absolutely grateful to the Central Library of Tabriz, to the Director, Mr Madani, for welcoming me there, and to Mr Mahmud Mahmudzadeh, the Head of the Newspaper Section, for the considerable time and trouble he took in enabling me to have copies from the fine collection of the contemporary newspapers. Mr Jadid al-Islam’s outstanding collection of photographs has provided me with illustrations for the book, for which I am grateful to him. I would also like to express gratitude to the British Institute of Persian Studies for their contribution to the funding for the research visits to Iran and to my research. Discussion with Dr Denis Hermann of the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) in Paris, on the ideas of Akhund Khurasani has stimulated greater understanding of his view. I much appreciate him providing me with a copy of his forthcoming article on Khurasani’s role in the mashruta. I would also like to thank Dr Mateo Farsaneh for sending me his paper on Khurasani delivered at the University of California in March 2012. The effort of Dr Siavush Ranjbar-Daemi in obtaining copies of newspapers is greatly appreciated. I also much appreciate the efforts of Mr Onur Sar in providing me with copies and translations of diplomatic dispatches from the Ottoman collection in the State Archives in Istanbul. Publication has been much assisted by a grant from the late Miss Isobel Thornley’s Bequest to the University of London and from the Lincoln Record Society. Finally and by no means least I would like to thank my family in Tehran for their kindness and hospitality. In particular I am very grateful to my husband for his help, support and encouragement.

Note on the transliteration

The transliteration system is that of the Cambridge History of Islam with its Persian additional and variant forms, and without diacritics. Where proper names of authors or institutions have an established spelling in the English language texts, that has been preferred to the transliterated version. Certain Persian words frequently used in the text have been rendered in normal font on the grounds of familiarity.

Abbreviations

FO Foreign Office Correspondence, National Archives, London MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Tehran, Iran MMajlis Debates of the Majlis MTM Mo’asseseh-e Motale‘at-e Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran (Institute for the Study of Contemporary Iranian History) Tehran, Iran SAM Sazman-i Asnad-i Milli-yi Iran (National Archives of Iran), Tehran, Iran SAM Tabriz Sazman-i Asnad-i Milli, Tabriz (National Archives, Tabriz Branch)

Note on style

The frequently used words ‘‘ulama’ and ‘shari‘a’ have been put in roman font. In accordance with its Persian name, the Iranian parliament is referred to as ‘the Majlis’.

INTRODUCTION Iran between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: the Constitutional Revolution of 1906

This book has two major themes: the first is the role of Islam and secularism in the Revolution of 1906; and the second is the way in which the politics of the Revolution played out in the society of the provinces and the way the debate on Islam and secularism developed there. With regard to the first, the literature in English has so far tended to concentrate on the secular viewpoint of the Revolution of 1906. To some extent it has also followed the model set by E. G. Browne in his seminal volume, The Persian Revolution 1905–1909.1 Notable studies of the Revolution since then have included Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i mashrutayi Iran,2 Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1905–1911,3 and Mangol Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution.4 The more recent Iran’s Constitutional Revolution, edited by H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin,5 included articles on ideas, artistic initiatives and transnationalism, and some reference to Islam, but did not address the subject as such. Therefore, I have considered a study of the role of Islam in the Revolution as a whole to be timely. This is all the more so because wide reading of the sources of the time demonstrates how far the population as a whole thought of it implicitly as a Shi‘i revolution, whilst also being conscious that it would introduce a new system of government that promised greater accountability, regularity and justice to replace the arbitrary rule of absolutism. It might be argued that, given that Iran at the time was a devoutly Shi‘i country, it was natural that the Revolution would be perceived in religious terms. Certainly, secularism was not widely understood, in fact its advocates were largely confined to small and often widely travelled intellectual and mercantile elite. The ‘ulama were very influential, not only because of their role in Islam, but also because the people were accustomed to deploying their influence to bargain with and protest against the state.6 As the twentieth century unfolded, many of those who addressed the issues of the time in Islamic language were to emerge as secularists under the subsequent Pahlavi regime.

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Others who grew up and lived in the Pahlavi period were to see secularism as the natural way of addressing politics and the role of religion. However, a substantial portion of the population, even as the country modernised under the influence of new political institutions, ideas and education, particularly scientific and technological, derived from the West, from which they readily learnt, retained their Shi‘i national identity. Aspects of the presence of this modernising Shi‘i trend at the time of the Revolution have already been identified and studied by Martin,7 Gheissari, ‘Constitutional Rights and the Development of Civil Law in Iran, 1907–1941’,8 Hermann, ‘Système parlementaire et consultation selon Thiqat al-Islam-i Tabrizi: légitimation religieuse et justification historique’,9 and Boozari, Shi‘i Jurisprudence and Constitution.10 The studies of the Revolution mentioned above have largely been focused on Tehran, with the result that very little has been written on the provinces. As Morteza Nouraei remarks in his study of Mashhad at this period, there has therefore been a tendency to hold general views about the whole country, without considering whether or not they applied in any particular area.11 Of course, Browne, Kasravi especially, and Afary, have given attention to Tabriz, which was in many ways the ideological and political powerhouse of the Revolution. For this latter reason, it has also been included in this study. Other provinces have been studied by Heidi Walcher on Isfahan with reference to Zill al-Sultan,12 and Mohammad Ali Kazembeyki on Mazandaran.13 In addition to Tabriz, this book looks at Shiraz, Isfahan from the Islamic perspective, and Bushehr, significant provincial centres which have not been examined in detail in English. Shiraz is important in giving an insight into the role of the tribes, especially the Qashqa’i, a major local power, in an urban centre during the Revolution. It was also the centre of the large, complex and strategically significant province of Fars. Given that this study focuses on Islam, the main reason for choosing Isfahan was to study the role of the influential Masjid-Shahi family of ‘ulama, and above all that of Aqa Nurallah, one of the most significant mujtahids of the Revolution, and one whose ideas influenced Khomeini. Throwing light on Bushehr provides an indication of the politics of the Persian Gulf shore, so different from that of the central plateau. It also enables a more detailed study of the policies of at least one of the Great Powers, namely the British. Unfortunately in one book it has not been possible to look at other cities in any depth. A useful study might well be made of Kermanshah, for example, given the complex political and ethnic dimensions provided by its position on the Ottoman border and in the neighbourhood of the Kurdish region. The relevant chapters on the cities chosen seek to highlight their evolution during the period from both the point of view of their individual provincial and local characteristics, as well as from a comparative perspective. Connections are also made between the struggles in the provinces and the unfolding events in Tehran itself. The book thus begins with a chapter setting out the political, ideological and social development of the country as a whole, which forms an overall background to events in the individual provinces. It then moves to a chapter

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exploring the issue of Islam, and secularism in particular. With the ratification of the constitution in December 1906, Iran was to embark on the great movement of systemic and institutional change which, along with the introduction of new ideas, was to be one of the most abiding legacies of the Revolution. Therefore, the period covered by this book has been divided into two, the first half covering the time up to December 1906, and the second to that which followed, leading ultimately to the establishment of a modern system of government in Iran. Because of the financial crisis, and the consequent developing disorder, these institutions had largely made little progress by 1908; nevertheless they constitute the introduction of a new form of government. The period of study chosen is 1896 to 1908. These years are seen here as representing a distinctive time that commenced with the accession of Muzaffar al-Din Shah, the most liberal of the Qajar monarchs. His reign began with the appointment of a reforming ministry under Amin al-Daula, which attempted to engage with rationalisation of the finances and improvements in education. The Shah also demonstrated a favourable interest in reform through his support of education. However, he had the weakness of velleity, and a fondness for expensive visits to Europe, which meant that he did not support the reform programme as he might have done. Nevertheless, the popular movement, led by Sayyid Abdullah Bihbihani and Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i from 1905 onwards, which brought about the establishment of the first Majlis, had its roots in response to government reform. It was also Muzaffar al-Din Shah who granted the constitution. During this period, which includes the First Majlis, Iran, despite its far flung and diverse provinces, still functioned as a relatively unified polity when compared with the years that followed. It ended in 1908 with the bombardment of the Majlis, though the subsequent years saw some progress under the Second Majlis.14 However, this was also a time of fragmentation, with a Bakhtiyari interest developing in the south,15 the presence of radical socialist movements in the north and north west, and growing interference by the British and Russians leading to the occupation of 1911, and the devastation of World War I. During the years 1896 to 1908 it is possible to see emerging divisions, particularly on the religious versus secular issue; but for a while there was a common view, fostered by the burgeoning press and the telegraph. This view supported a national (milli) movement for change with many goals for reform in common. Milli at this time was used to imply either religious or secular nationalism, according to the perspective of the individual. In the course of its discussion this book addresses a number of thematic issues. With regard to Islam, a powerful conception of modern Islamic government was emerging for some time before the Revolution, having its origins in the ideas of the reformist Pan-Islamist, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Asadabadi).16 His vision of Islamic reform and renewal, which he advocated tirelessly in Islamic lands between the Ottoman Empire and India, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, permeated societies in those lands through increased travel and trade and a burgeoning press in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

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The  influence of his ideas in Iran itself will be traced here. It appears in the demand for an Islamic national consultative assembly (majlis-i shura-yi milli-yi Islami) in 1906, and most specifically in the brief Islamist government of Isfahan between 1906 and 1908, which advocated many of the objectives of later Islamist movements. There is thus a continuity between Al-Afghani, the burgeoning Islamist vision, and the Nahzat, or movement, of Khomeini, a continuity that is also reflected in the politics of Egypt. Thus in 1906 the Iranian people already had two ways forward, which were to come to dominate the character of Iranian politics in the twentieth century and thereafter – namely, was Iran to be an Islamic or a secularist society? However, it would be a mistake to think that the Iranian people of the constitutional period perceived, as they do at present, that there was a choice between the one or the other. To many contemporaries in 1906, Islam and constitutionalism were compatible: they saw no disjunction between the law of the popular will and the divine law. Only a few of the secular educated elite, and some of the ‘ulama, realised the problems that might emerge. Thus this volume will explore the evolution of the debate between Islam and secularism and its implications in terms of popular perception and public opinion. Therefore it focuses on the emergence of Islamic nationalism, hitherto neglected, and considers the question of how far there was room for compromise over Islam and how far an effort was made to achieve it. Constitutionalism is based on the sovereignty of the will of the people as expressed by their elected representatives in Parliament, by contrast with absolutism, where the ruler is the sovereign, and his authority is legitimised by the divine will. According to the Shi‘i religion, however, only the government of the absent Imam can be the legitimate sovereign. However, a variety of views amongst the ‘ulama posited that the best alternative to the Imam should be supported, some holding that this was monarchy, others that it was constitutionalism.17 There were thus two main contending views on sovereignty at this time, which will be examined: the first was between an existing absolutist system and constitutional democracy; the second was between the secular constitutionalists, who believed religion should not be involved in politics, and the Islamic constitutionalists, who to a greater or less extent wanted accountability to the shari‘a. This heated debate continues to this day over the politics and identity of Iran. Constitutionalism also represented a rationalisation of government that ran counter to the practices of the absolutist system, and to some extent to the shari‘a, with its dependence on the independent judgement of the mujtahid. The reorganisation and restructuring carried out during the Revolution primarily took the form of institutional change as set out in the Constitution of 1906 and its Supplement of 1907,18 as well as in the Provincial and District Council Law of 1907.19 It constituted the separation of the legislative and executive powers, the responsibility of ministers, the accountability of the monarchy, the introduction of parliamentary law, and at this time incipient reform of the legal system. As will be shown these new modernising, systemising methods were to create their own

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problems in Iranian provincial society with values very different from those of the countries of Europe which they emulated, and for which they had been devised. The mashruta (constitutional) period was also profoundly concerned with the whole issue of rights, and the introduction of a modern systematic legal system. These were not only perceived in terms of the individual and the state, but also in terms of granting a just political system that would unite and strengthen the country against foreign interference and debilitating economic penetration. The end to arbitrary and unjust government and the fact that this goal could be achieved through constitutionalism, was a view held in 1906–1907 by the majority of those who engaged in politics both in Tehran and the provinces, and at most social levels Browne, Lockhart, Amanat, Arjomand and Afary20 have tended correctly to stress or indicate the advances the constitutional innovations represented in terms of individual rights (in particular in accordance with the law). Gheissari has drawn attention to the desire to protect civil rights in such matters as family law and property law, but also covering the rights of the nation to political freedom and just administration.21 Of the ‘ulama involved in the reform movement, many perceived that there would be a need for reinterpretation of the mutual rights of ruler and ruled.22 Constitutionalism brought the idea of a new just law, one that would be consistent, not arbitrary. It included the right of engaging in the making of government policy through the process of consultation; and that of having security, in particular of life, property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest; in sum, of living under the rule of law.23 In the provinces new civic rights, particularly in the control of local affairs, were brought in. The most contentious single issues were those of equality and freedom. The struggle over equal rights for members of the religious minorities, for which the radical Tabriz deputies fought with the conservative ‘ulama in 1907,24 was largely played out in Tehran. In the more conservative, deeply pious provinces, even Tabriz, it was no doubt discussed in private, but was too difficult to broach publicly. In fact, as Findley observes of the Ottoman Empire, only a massive assertion of the legislative power of the state and its use in a way incompatible with the shari‘a, could bring in egalitarianism.25 The idea of freedom of expression, however, was taken up by the press throughout the country, though it was easier to advocate in Tabriz than in other provinces, as will be discussed. The major struggle between Islam and secularism in the period took place over the questions of how far constitutional law should replace the shari‘a, with the consequent introduction of secular law courts, and how far such law was compatible with the shari‘a, a debate which has occupied Iran up to the contemporary period, and was particularly significant in 1979. Of the ‘ulama involved in the reform movement, many supported the concept of constitutional law as a valid legal-juristic system, and one on which the relationship between shah and people could be properly based. However, all of the senior ‘ulama in both Tehran and the provinces at this period believed that the new law must in some sense recognise the principles of the shari‘a and Islamic values. The struggle over the

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law was at its most bitter in Tehran and Tabriz, where, as will be demonstrated, it became an increasingly serious source of dispute. Islamic societies began to emerge in all four of the cities studied, which not only had Islamic and legal agendas, but also the organisation and regulation to assist in achieving them. The struggle over Islamic and modern secularising values was also reflected in the educational system, with the ‘ulama objecting strongly to the establishment of modern Western-style schools. However, they varied in the strength and nature of their objections, as will be shown. Scholars such as Ringer have tended to see the introduction of modern education into Iran as a lay secular achievement. However, as will be discussed, although the laity and some radical clerics played the major part in establishing new schools, moderate members of the ‘ulama gave their endorsement to the new style education in both Tehran and the provinces. Education was gradually perceived by both groups as integral to the progress, development and strengthening of the country.26 Iran between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism continues the theme of The Qajar Pact27 of focusing on groups below the state elite level in all the provinces discussed, especially the lesser merchants and guilds, and where the sources make it possible, the poor. However, this focus is not to the exclusion of the government elite. The merchants are considered in the context of the influence of the international economy, which is here cast in a more positive light because it introduced modernity. Gilbar28 and Torabi Farsani29 raise the question of how the merchants adapted to change. Little has been written in English on the guilds specifically at this period, though they form part of the populace in Afary’s discussion of the anjumans.30 Along with the anjumans, events could be influenced by organised crowds.31 The book also traces how, with the growth of the press, people at levels below the elite absorbed Western ideology, and how far they had other theories of necessary change. The introduction not only of the Majlis but also of provincial councils produced the beginnings of class struggle in the provinces. Since the economy was still pre-industrial this was not class struggle in the Marxian sense; nor did the protagonists as yet display any sense of class identification, or class consciousness. However, under the old order, the millat, the people had a perceived common interest vis à vis the state (daulat), and there was correspondingly a skein of ties as between the different social groups, ‘ulama, merchants and guilds, and in different ways, between all three and the poor. The new order in the provinces, with the relatively free elections and discussions in the councils, as well as the formation of the anjumans, enabled the different social groups or classes, especially those below the elites, to perceive their common interests, and to organise to represent them together. This awareness was heightened by the struggle over access to ever dwindling resources. The beginnings of this struggle have been traced in this study, but there is much scope for further research on it. A major issue was nationalism, identification with and loyalty to the state, which under the traditional system meant in effect loyalty to the shah. A sense of nationalism meaning in the simplest sense loyalty to the land of Iran was

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developing in the late nineteenth century. It arose from ideas introduced from Europe, and the possibility of a majlis-i shura-yi kubra-yi milli (a great consultative national assembly).32 Iran had a basis on which to build a sense of nationalism in its history and culture, in the fact that Persian was the predominant language,33 and also that its borders had largely been decided by the end of the nineteenth century, which clarified issues of territorial sovereignty. In addition, the pressure from the imperialist powers, both political and commercial, had led Iranians to define a common identity and interest. Both the Anglo-Iranian Convention of 1907 and the Ottoman take-over of Savujbilagh and Urumiya generated nationalist sentiment in the sense of a perceived need to protect Iran as a nation. The Urumiya crisis in particular, as Kashani-Sabet observes, was seen as a threat to Iran as the land of the Shi‘a,34 a very important substantiating feature of Iranian nationalism at this time. Also, as Abadian has pointed out, the executing of the Fundamental Law as a national promise to all the people and the end of absolutism, provided a common bond and an impetus to national unity.35 This common bond led, as Tavakoli-Targhi has indicated, to a strong sense of common purpose, whereby the people, speaking in the name of nation and homeland, challenged the legitimacy and moral authority of the state.36 However, the concept of a state constituting an institutionalised political system with sovereign power held by a parliament was still weak during this period. Though the idea of Iran as a nation developed in both Tehran and the provinces, there was still a tendency to confuse nation and community, particularly a specifically Islamic community. As Katouzian has observed, historically the state was not bound into the social structure, as in feudal Europe, and through most periods of their history Iranians exhibited recurring mistrust of it.37 By the same token, the questions of to what extent and why they clung to old identities and loyalties, particularly of locality, social structure and clan, were to have serious implications for the future, not least in the formation of political parties. In addition, as Kashani-Sabet has pointed out, the very diversity of Iran’s population presented problems for the implementation of an ideal of nationalism,38 and, therefore, for collaborative political organisation. A related issue is that alongside the establishment of new institutions, the public began to organise in societies (anjumans) which represented a whole range of aspirations, and a diversity of identity. Their role has to some extent been assessed by Afary, but her tendency to see them as a sign of modernity will be subject to question, particularly given their relationship to old-established social networks. Their appearance had implications for the growth of modern institutions, which their existence both encouraged and discouraged. That led on to problems for democracy itself, which is dependent on a community which gives equal rights to all, rather than to personal connection, and to loyalty to and trust of the state, with which the individual must necessarily identify. Finally, with regard to specifically local problems, the Provincial and District Council Law and the Municipal Law of 1907 in effect established local government in Iran, and were the beginning of its rationalisation. This raises a number

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of issues to be addressed. As with such institutions elsewhere, their establishment was at once a decentralising measure and an extension of central control.39 The new, under-funded institutions had to struggle with continuing central interference; in addition they faced the problem of coping with the power wielded locally by established elite groups, not least the tribes. However, new groups, especially lesser merchants and guilds, began to take a role in the government of the provinces. Poorer people used the new institutions as a means of redressing their grievances. Councils also faced the problem of being embroiled in the debate as to how far the new order was religious or secular, and on the one hand could face rival Islamic organisations, and on the other have the epithet ‘Islami’ applied to them. At the same time they were struggling to achieve rationalisation and bureaucratic professionalism without adequate funding. The councils began gradually to assume responsibility for local facilities such as education, and conditions of health and hygiene. This book is organised into eleven chapters, in addition to the Introduction and Conclusion. Chapter 1 provides a background, particularly for readers new to the subject, on the relations between religion and state in Iran, the nineteenth-century reform movement which drew upon modern ideas of government derived from Europe, the impact of Iran being drawn into the world economy and the role of merchants, whose part in the Revolution was to be significant. It also discusses the movement for educational reform and its link to the press, which were important for drawing wider society into what became the constitutional movement. Chapter 2 contrasts the Islamic and secularist perspectives of government, law, society and the individual. It considers the Islamic goals of modernisation and reform, and religion and secularism in the years leading up to the Revolution. Regarding the pre-Revolution press, it illustrates how similar in many ways the Islamic and secular perceptions of reform actually were in their objectives. These themes are among those addressed in the four following chapters on the provincial centres chosen for the book (which will be described below). The text returns to the issue of central government policy in Chapter 7 on Constitutional Development, Local Government and the Role of Islam. It addresses the granting of the constitution in December 1906, and the restructuring of the state which began as a result. It looks at the issues of sovereignty, law and rights, both from the religious and secular perspective. It then considers the Constitution of 1906, the Fundamental Law of 1907, and the Provincial and District Council Law of 1907, and their implications both nationally and for the provinces. Each of the four provinces is covered by two chapters, one related to the period before the Constitution of 1906, and one to the period after, and the impact of the Majlis legislation mentioned is addressed in each. Special attention is given to Tabriz, which was politically and intellectually in the forefront of the Revolution. Chapter 3 explains the importance of the geographical location and history of Tabriz, the role of its elites, including the crown prince as governor, and religious divisions. The chapter shows how

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the influence of the Caucasus was instrumental in early development of modern ideas, and in the establishment of a lively press even before the Revolution. This was accompanied by a determined movement to advance modern education, strongly resisted by conservative forces. Chapter 8, the second on Tabriz, develops the theme of radicalism, which was much less apparent elsewhere. It studies the Tabriz Council, or Anjuman, and the elections, and then moves to the Trans-Caucasian factor, and the appearance of secular militancy. Also considered are the radicalisation of the poor and the growing class struggle, which engaged town and countryside. Finally, the chapter discusses the Islamic response, from the moderate views of Thiqat al-Islam to the emergence of Islamic organisation and militancy. The two chapters on Shiraz, Chapters 4 and 9, show a completely different provincial story, as its politics were dominated by a relentless power struggle between the effective mayor of Shiraz, Qavam al-Mulk, the Il-Khani (chief) of the Qashqa’i tribe, and the governor of Fars. However, a reformist movement developed which engaged with the language of change, both religious and secular. Chapter 4 studies the long-lasting struggle against Shu‘a al-Saltana, governor and son of the Shah, which was a prelude to the movement against the customs reforms which launched the Revolution. All this took place against a background of considerable economic difficulty. Chapter 9 demonstrates how the endeavour to advance the cause of constitutionalism in Shiraz became increasingly embroiled in the elite power struggle, as Fars deteriorated into chaos. Concerned by a perceived decline in the influence of Islam, the ‘ulama formed their own Anjuman, which further divided opinion. The emergence of societies representing different interests served to undermine the local council that had been established. Isfahan, the former Safavid capital of Iran, also had an exceptionally powerful elite, one part of which surrounded the prince governor Zill al-Sultan; the other part was composed of highly influential clergy. The leaders of these were the Masjid-Shahi family, in particular the zealous mujtahid, Aqa Najafi, and more especially his younger brother, Aqa Nurallah, who was open to new ideas. The two chapters on Isfahan therefore concentrate on their role in the politics of the city. Chapter 5 discusses their conflict with Zill al-Sultan, and their response to the growing foreign presence in Isfahan, particularly foreign enterprise. It also demonstrates how Nurallah was responsive to Islamic modernist ideas then current in Muslim countries. Chapter 10 addresses the impact of Nurallah’s assuming leadership of the Anjuman of Isfahan, the only cleric to occupy such a powerful position in provincial government. The result was that he went beyond a simply Islamic perspective to develop ideas of the organisation of state and society and was an early example of Islamism, later to influence Khomeini. By virtue of its geographical location on the Persian Gulf shore, Bushehr was to follow a different path. Dominated by the British, and engaged in trade with the outside world, it formed part of the Persian Gulf trading system, and thus

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was more remote from the politics of the interior. Life in Bushehr was about commerce, enterprise and development as exemplified in the career of Mu‘in al-Tujjar, a wealthy merchant who was later to become a Vice-President of the the Majlis and a founder of the National Bank. His rise to wealth and influence forms one of the subjects of Chapter 6. Two other important developments were the establishment of one of the best-funded schools in Iran, the Muzaffari; the other was the founding of a local newspaper, also called Muzaffari. Chapter 11 shows how the Majlis never gained much credibility amongst the shrewd entrepreneurs of Bushehr, who disliked the disorder that followed its establishment because of its effect on trade. They were very slow to elect their representatives, but a local council made some progress in civic issues. A radical, Islamic view had begun to make its mark here too, by 1908. Primary sources include the National Archives, and the British Library. In the earlier part of 2007 I was in Iran and did comprehensive research in the National Archives of Iran, which has a large and varied collection of documents, though only occasionally was a group or sequence to be found for this period, which is a characteristic of much Iranian archival material before 1921. The Archive of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains the foreign correspondence for Iran, and with regard to internal policy, communications from the governors of provinces and the karguzar (agent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in each province). Published catalogues of documents are available. The Institute for the Study of Contemporary Iranian History has a variety of documents from the period, though more from the subsequent decades. Its journal, Tarikh-i Mu‘asir-i Iran, includes significant articles on particular primary material. The Majlis Library has a large collection of the newspapers of the period, a most useful website on which the debates of the Majlis are available, and a centre for the study of the Constitutional Revolution. There is also a wide selection of books on the period in the National Library in Tehran. The Centre for Local History in Isfahan has some documents relating to the period, notably on penal matters, but its collection is largely later in date. I returned to Iran in 2010 and visited Tabriz, where I carried out research in the Central Library of Tabriz, which has the most complete collection of the newspapers of Tabriz, and a fine selection of books on Tabriz itself. The Museum of the Constitutional Revolution has a variety of objects, amongst them photographs and individual documents on display. There is also a good collection of primary material in the National Archives of North West Iran. On an earlier visit I had been to the Centres for Local History in Shiraz and Bushehr, which are gradually accumulating material relating to their local history. As a result I brought back a large body of primary material, including copies of archival documents, and collections of contemporary local newspapers, including Muzaffari from Bushehr, Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Milli from Isfahan, and Ruznama-yi Anjuman from Tabriz, as well as Thuraya and Akhtar. The press is an important Persian language source for the period. I have the complete debates of the Iranian parliament for 1906–1908 (Luh-i Mashruh); and also the Provincial and District Council Law of 1907.40 The major effort

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made to find as many Persian language sources of the period, in addition to those published in document collections and journals, has helped me to achieve one of my principal goals, to present the period in question from the point of view of a variety of contemporaries. The number of local newspapers becoming available especially offers new opportunities for future studies of the provinces, notably for the possibilities of exploring the role of popular and class dimensions in local politics. The National Archive of Britain documents have provided some background information, and usually give the most accurate dates.

1 The political, economic and social background Iran: An Islamic Society Iran in the late nineteenth century was a profoundly Islamic society in which modernity in the form of new political ideas, economic change and political restructuring had as yet made much less progress than in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. It was difficult for the vast majority of Iranians to conceive of a world where Islam did not shape every aspect of their lives. Apart from religious observance, it permeated social and family relations; the regulation of communities, especially in towns; their legal relations, in which the shari‘a precepts had to be implicit even in the customary law; and the varying theories of the legitimacy of the government. In addition, popular grievances were often expressed through a religious channel, namely the ‘ulama, who were looked upon as mediators between the people and the government. Justification of protest in religious terms through religious leaders also gave it legitimacy. Thus, secularism as such was understood only by a very few, who included members of the bureaucracy, as yet small circles of the intelligentsia and a few of the ‘ulama. At this period, it was hardly ever discussed as a goal in itself. A modern system of government was understood mainly in terms of a more uniform and fair legal system, and political and financial accountability which would end the arbitrary practices of the absolutist system. Ideas on representation and consultation were developing as a means of attaining these objectives, but it was not realised that in constitutionalism they were usually secular. In their campaigns for change the reformers were careful not to make the full implications of secularism clear, both for fear of offending the ‘ulama, and also to enable their involvement in the movement. The Nineteenth-century Reform Movement During the nineteenth century a reform movement developed to address the problems of absolutism – especially arbitrary rule, lack of accountability, inefficiency and general oppression. It began early in the century under the crown

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prince ‘Abbas Mirza (1789–1833) and gained in momentum in the latter part, during the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848–1896) firstly with the reforms of Amir Kabir from 1848 to 1851. It found further expression in the measures of Sipah Salar in the early 1870s. This movement was accompanied by successive theoretical works on the need for modernisation of government on Western lines. These reformers were largely members of the higher bureaucracy. Though they admired the systems of representation and parliamentary government of the West, and the rights of the citizens in Western countries, it was not their immediate objective to introduce representative institutions and such rights to Iran in its comparatively backward state. Rather their main objective was to strengthen the state itself by modernisation, which included limiting the power of the shah, reforming the law, putting the finance system on a sound basis, and generally rationalising the bureaucracy. The objectives of the these reformers, which form a background trend to the Constitutional Revolution, entered a new and significant phase in Kitabcha-yi ghaibi written by Malkum Khan in 1858–1859.1 It advocated the establishment of the rule of law, the rationalisation of the branches of government, and the complete reorganisation of the bureaucracy In 1871 the reform movement acquired an advocate in a powerful position in the appointment of Mirza Husain Khan Mushir al-Daula, later Sipah Salar, as Sadr A‘zam (prime minister). As the representative of the Iranian government for eleven years in Istanbul at the time of the Tanzimat, Mirza Husain Khan had had the opportunity to observe the process of the strengthening and centralisation of the Ottoman state through the Tanzimat reforms. These included a cabinet on European lines, and a council to draft reform legislation.2 It also incorporated major reform of the provincial administration and the codification of the law, together with legal principles taken from Europe. Mirza Husain Khan endeavoured to introduce a similar programme in Iran. He reorganised the court system, establishing clear rules of judicial procedure, though in the name of implementing the underlying principles of the shari‘a. He also introduced regulations for the bureaucracy, and attempted to restructure the central organs of the state.3 However, Sipah Salar, weakened by resentment of his reforms by powerful vested interests and by the response to the Reuter Concession in 1872, which gave extensive rights over potential railway construction to a British subject, was dismissed from his position of prime minister. The advance of European economic and political penetration of Iran, especially the Tobacco Concession of 1890–1891, produced in the 1890s two further works by reformist thinkers, Kitab-i Ahmad by ‘Abd al-Rahim Talibuf, the Azarbaijani playwright and essayist, and Siyahatnama-yi Ibrahim Baig by Zain al-‘Abidin Maragha’i. The latter in particular was deeply critical of the government administration and of the country’s political and social problems. The wealth of ‘ulama and merchants was castigated as well as general lethargy in the face of progress, absence of common skills, and notably the failure of Iranians to collaborate.4 The same years saw a burgeoning of the press abroad, and a new phase in ideas on reform which addressed more cogently issues of the role of

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government, its powers and authority, the place of religion and its relationship with the state, and the rights of the individual vis à vis the state. Malkum Khan, now in exile in London and at odds with Nasir al-Din Shah, produced Qanun, not necessarily the most radical of the newspapers, but the clearest in explicit objectives for fundamental change. To an ever-widening readership of merchants and bureaucrats in particular, it advocated a united movement for complete restructuring of the system, especially in the establishment of a national consultative assembly, majlis-i shura-yi milli as a legislative body that also rendered the government accountable.5 Later he further suggested a majlis-i shura-yi kubra, which would implement the shari‘a and control oppression by keeping ministers accountable.6 Malkum Khan was anxious both to gain the support of the ‘ulama, given their influence, and to persuade them to take a leading role in the reform movement, which would help legitimise it. Qanun was highly influential on the constitutional movement; the presentation of the objectives in Islamic terms (as a strategy by an undoubted secularist) helped both to obfuscate the fundamental divisions between religion and secularism, and to win support for constitutionalism amongst the Muslim population of Iran. The objectives of Qanun, which included the enforcement of law, and regular taxation and expenditure,7 set the goals of the mainstream constitutional movement of 1906. At the same time the accession to the throne of Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896– 1907), more sympathetic to change than his father, brought to power briefly a reformist ministry under Mirza ‘Ali Khan Amin al-Daula, prime minister from 1897 to 1898. He emerged from the same reformist tradition as Mirza Malkum Khan and Sipah Salar, and was the leader of a new generation of Iranian bureaucrats who influenced Iranian political development through their knowledge of Europe.8 He had spent a considerable time in Europe and the Ottoman Empire at the time of the reform programme of Midhat Pasha (1822–1884), and hoped ultimately to have a limited constitutional monarchy, of which Germany provided something of a model. In common with other members of the higher bureaucracy he also hoped to reduce the influence of the ‘ulama in political affairs and more specifically in the judiciary. Amin al-Daula had attempted codification of the shari‘a in 1890,9 supported the founding of the Rushdiyya College in Tehran, reorganised the postal service, and displayed a genuine and constant devotion to reform of the state.10 Assisted by a council of like-minded people he embarked on the first serious reform programme for 20 years, starting with the country’s grave financial problems.11 The new minister of finance Abu’l Qasim Khan Nasir al-Mulk proposed a plan of reform influenced by his study of the financial organisation of European states. Its major item was the abolition of customs farming and the introduction of European officials into the management of the customs organisation. In place of a complex system of varied internal duties, such as road tax, a new uniform tax of 5 per cent ad valorem on all imports and exports, whatever the origin of the goods or nationality of the trader, was introduced. The reform provoked opposition among merchants accustomed to the greater flexibility of the former system, including the chance to offer gifts to

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officials to ensure freedom from taxation. This reform, which constituted part of a programme of centralisation, was to prove so successful in raising additional taxation that it was one of the major immediate causes of the Constitutional Revolution. However, the energetic ministry of Amin al-Daula was soon brought down by his enemies including merchants, members of the ‘ulama (annoyed among other reasons by his attempt to impose a tax on shari‘a documents), and Qajar family members who considered him a threat to their position, and his rival, ‘Ali Asghar Amin al-Sultan.12 The World Economy and its Effects During the nineteenth century Iran was also gradually being drawn into the world economy. In the late nineteenth century in particular, this process was to accelerate the rate of change far more rapidly than government endeavours at reform. Although Iran’s balance of trade throughout this period remains something of a mystery, as there are no really reliable figures, there was seemingly an imbalance of imports over exports. The country nevertheless prospered, though at first very slowly, from the 1860s. By then trade with India picked up, encouraged by the development in communications. Steam was introduced into the Persian Gulf in the early 1860s. The establishment of the telegraph line in the latter part of the decade, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, also helped to develop trade with Europe by steamer. In the 1870s a postal service was established between Tehran and other major centres, including Bushehr in 1877. The involvement of Iran in the world economy now began to accelerate rapidly. Trade, in the south, for example, went up in volume from £1.7 million in 1875 to £4.5 million in 1914. Transportation was further improved in 1888 with the opening up of the Karun River to steam shipping, as part of a plan to create a transportation system operating from the Persian Gulf to Tehran. However, as a result of the world economy, the export of cash crops, particularly tobacco and opium, rose rapidly, with 300 cases of the latter being exported in 1859, and 8,000 in 1886. In particular, there was growth in the carpet industry. Most notably, the increasing import of European, and especially British, textiles and other manufactured produce damaged Iranian handicraft production, and adversely affected the artisans. As a result, much of the rhetoric of change at the end of the century concerned the import of foreign textiles in particular and their use for clothing. Another problem contributing to the deficit in the balance of trade was that an outflow of specie (coin) gathered momentum in the 1880s and 1890s, resulting in inflation. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the Iranian currency, the kran, was based on silver at a time when world prices in silver were going down and Iran was being drawn with increasing rapidity into the world economy.13 At the same time, the mint masters, Amin al-Sultan, the Prime Minister, and a leading merchant, Amin al-Zarb, in recouping their outlay for acquisition of control of the mint, were responsible for the issue of defective silver coin, and even worse, for flooding the country with copper coins known

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as black money. As a result the copper shahi, which was widely used in transactions, fell considerably between 1893 and 1897, resulting in inflation and causing immense distress to the poorer social groups. The Iranian elite protected themselves by devices such as wheat rings, and the foreign banks by only accepting the copper coinage, the common currency, at a heavy discount. By the 1890s the connection between high inflation and popular unrest became increasingly clear. By the 1870s European capitalists, who had hitherto neglected Iran because of the communication and transportation problems, began to consider the country more seriously with a view to introducing new enterprises. Concessions also appealed to the Shah, as they would advance the development of the country, and enhance the state revenues, which were as yet not distinct from his own. The income from concessions was particularly welcome at a time when the value of the principal tax, the maliyat, or land tax, was constantly falling because of inflation, and in any case difficult to collect. The Shah’s other considerable source of revenue was the sale of offices, most significantly provincial governorships, to the highest bidder. This resulted in the incumbent’s attempting to cover his overheads with profit at the expense of the people, before he lost the post, often only a year later. The issue of concessions came to a head in 1890–1891, when the Shah, in an attempt to increase the profits of the tobacco industry and direct some part of them to the treasury, sold a monopoly of the collection, manufacture and export of tobacco to a British subject.14 This sweeping measure initiated widespread agitation, particularly amongst the Iranian merchants who controlled the tobacco trade. It was also perceived as foreign encroachment in Iran on a new and unprecedented scale, which alarmed the clergy. The result was the first mass protest in modern Iran, culminating in a fatva (edict) issued by Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the principal mujtahid of the Shi‘i shrine cities, the ‘Atabat (in what is now Iraq), forbidding the smoking of tobacco until the concession was dropped. The fatva was observed throughout Iran, and as a result the Shah had to withdraw the concession at a cost of £500,000 in compensation to the British company, which left him seriously indebted. The Shah himself suffered a severe loss of authority. Reform-minded Iranians also learnt from the mobilisation of popular opinion against this concession, and the impact it made. The debate on reform and economic development continued throughout the 1890s in the press, both internally and abroad. Despite the setback over the Reuter concession, by the later 1880s both Britain and Russia were starting to think less about the strategic value to themselves of Iran and more about its economic potential, especially in view of its resources.15 The result was a growth of capitalist pressure on the Iranian economy. Trade continued to advance rapidly, not least as a result of the opening up of the Karun River to steamships of all nations’ shipping in 1888. The concession applied only to the lower part of the river, and a barrier still remained at a dam at Ahwaz, which meant that only Iranian vessels were allowed to ply the upper Karun. The scheme was operated by the Lynch Brothers’ Euphrates and Tigris Steam

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Navigation Company. The result was considerable growth in the prosperity of the region, with the unexpected result that between 1890 and 1896 exports doubled but imports barely increased.16 The development continued from the late 1890s when a concession to build a road from Ahwaz to Isfahan was granted to the British. From the 1880s, and more especially the 1890s, there was growth in the number of foreign-owned trading concerns, companies such as Gray Paul and Hotz, and institutions, such as the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia established in 1889. This bank, which had the right to print bank-notes, was seen by the British as a means of offering lower interest rates than the traditional bankers (sarrafs), ending the fluctuations in exchange, and the scarcity of money, all of which impeded business.17 In addition the Russian Discount Bank, founded 1891 with strong support from the Russian government, granted loans at a highly favourable rate of interest. The advent of modern financial institutions facilitated commerce, and with improved communications, both exports and imports grew. In the north a concession covering the years 1888–1900 for the development and benefit of fisheries along the Caspian shore was given to a Russian merchant. The concession was later renewed several times and with different conditions between 1900 and 1925.18 The growth in foreign firms caused social disturbance for more than one reason. It meant that Iranian merchants, more precisely those of middle rank rather than the great traders such as Amin al-Zarb and Mu‘in al-Tujjar, found their share of the market was falling, and that they were at a disadvantage in terms of their trading system in dealing with the increasingly dominant Imperial Bank. The local bankers (sarrafs) were hit by the new institutions, especially the Imperial Bank, which brought the advantages of modern financial practice, a fact not lost on many traders. For example, since it was linked to a long-term capital market, it could offer greater security for deposits. Secondly, the number of Europeans grew, not massively but enough to make their presence more conspicuous. The 1890s especially marks a more aggressive approach on the part of Europeans towards their role in Iran, manifested in the conduct of the missionaries, backed by their counterparts at home. The British Church Missionary Society in Isfahan contrived to exasperate not only the local governor but also the British consul by insisting it had the right to proselytise in both Isfahan and Shiraz, thereby provoking the local clergy. Iranians at all levels felt a profound unease at the growth of foreign influence and interference in the affairs of the country, accentuated by the Shah (Muzaffar al-Din) taking out foreign loans of £2,000,000 in 1900 and £1,000,000 in 1902 to meet the above-mentioned burdens, and the gradually growing expenses of the state, in comparison with the comparatively simple apparatus of the early nineteenth century, when the pressures of modernity were much fewer. In Iran, as elsewhere in the less developed world, in general the growth of the world economy in the nineteenth century brought both advantages and disadvantages, but there has been a tendency both by Iranians at the time, including the merchants, and to some extent the historiography on the subject, to stress the

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disadvantages.19 One of the purposes of the merchant councils established in 1884 (see below) was to protect Iranian merchants against the perceived deleterious impact of the growing activities of foreign entrepreneurs in the country.20 The decades leading up to the Revolution of 1906 also saw the early stages of the way the international economy brought new organisation and structure to Iran, which, if it destroyed the old, created benefits as well as disadvantages in its wake. Much of what has been described above involved the strengthening and development of natural skills, initiative and innovation, and the emergence of new investment activities.21 As elsewhere, the introduction of steam and the quest for raw materials created new opportunities for trade and economic growth. The construction of ports, both in the Caspian and in the south meant increased utilisation of ships and, consequently, a lowered cost of freight charges. Alongside ports came docks, warehouses and new machinery which enabled the rapid handling of cargoes. All these facilities encouraged exploration for minerals for a world economy hungry for raw materials. At the same time the rivalry between foreign and Iranian merchants over the control of trade and resources would contribute substantially to the movement for reform and the reshaping of Iranian identity. The Merchants and the Reform Movement The opportunities created by the world economy were not lost on Iran’s entrepreneurs. The wealthiest merchants in particular, having accumulated capital through the growth in trade in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, turned to innovative projects such as transport development and the mining of raw materials. Gilbar has demonstrated how the major or wholesale merchants led the agitation against the Belgian-administered customs reforms, which formed a prelude to the Revolution.22 Some of the major merchants, who probably numbered a few hundred, owned leases to farm the customs at a number of the ports. Whilst the growth in the customs revenue which resulted from the reforms introduced from 1898 accorded them considerable loss of income, they were equally disquieted at the failure of the government to account for the money which they perceived in particular as being squandered on the Shah’s trips to Europe in 1900 and 1902. At the same time the policy of centralisation implied in the customs reforms separated the merchants from their regional ties, undermining their influence in favour of the state. The merchants, however, had certain advantages in dealing with impacts of the world economy and the increasing intrusion of foreign companies. In particular, they grew in wealth at a time when the revenues of the state, still based mainly on the land tax, did not substantially increase. As a result, the major merchants in particular were in a position to challenge the state through their financial means and influence, as they became increasingly discontented with arbitrary and inefficient government which denied them the rights of European merchants. Consequently, urban society, wealthier and better organised than the tribal society on which the Shah relied for his army, was able to mobilise

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to change the established order.23 The merchants were assisted by the fact that, despite impressions to the contrary, confiscations of property in Iran did not take place on a large scale, since they were prohibited both by the shari‘a and the ‘urf (customary) law.24 As a result, a number of merchants were able not only to amass considerable wealth, but also to pass it on to their heirs. In addition, the merchants had strong links with each other, which, despite commercial rivalry, worked to their mutual support. These ties were maintained by marriage, at least between those of the same religion; by the fact that, before the advent of modern banking, they conducted nearly all the money transactions in Iran; and by the way in which they dealt independently with their own affairs by consultation in meetings, or majlis. They used the networks based on these features of their social position and its privileges to thwart not only foreign merchants, but also the powerful governments that supported them.25 A local majlis of the leading merchants might meet to settle an individual case, and it might also meet to discuss affairs, often with a senior member of the local government administration in attendance.26 Further organisational cohesion was provided in some parts by a merchant guild of their own, headed by a Ra’is al-Tujjar (the head of the merchants). It negotiated with state officials on tax levies, claims and bankruptcy cases.27 In addition, the major merchants had links and dependents throughout the country, as is clear from the voluminous and multifaceted correspondence of the major merchant, Haj Muhammad Hasan Amin al-Zarb. Amin al-Zarb was the leading member of a group of merchants involved in setting up a Council of the Representatives of the Merchants of Iran (majlisi-vukala-yi tujjar-i Iran) in 1884 to place restrictions on foreign goods and implement a programme of economic development, and to encourage the export trade.28 Amin al-Zarb believed that merchants should have a voice in the affairs of the country since they above all advanced its prosperity. The assembly was to consider many suggestions later adopted by the Majlis, including the development of the country’s resources, the establishment of factories and the opening of mines. The merchants criticised above all the quality of administration in the country, pointing out that its officials lacked knowledge, experience and expertise.29 There was no investigation of official misconduct, or any attempt to grant the people their rights.30 Therefore it was proposed that the assembly should take judicial precedence over provincial governors in commercial affairs, giving merchants protection from their arbitrary actions, especially the seizure of property. The merchants also criticised the implementation of the shari‘a law, and the functioning of the religious courts, mainly because the clergy were in the habit of overruling each other’s decisions. As a result their legal judgements were difficult to enforce and provided little security. The new merchant majlis opened in August 1884. Its success was small, but nevertheless sufficient to antagonise powerful vested interests among the provincial governors and the ‘ulama, with the result that the majlis and its branches closed and within two years the project had died away.31 However, its objectives remained and were to form an important part of the agenda of the constitutional assembly.

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Amin al-Zarb, however, maintained his interest in development in line with the opportunities and demands of the world economy. He was prescient in his understanding of the significance of development of modern forms of transport and communication, and of the significance of science. In 1887 he won a concession for an iron smelting foundry, but, and this was typical, even he lacked the capital to make it workable. He was more successful with a short railway in Mazandaran from Amul to the Mahmudabad with its new harbour facilities, which he completed in 1890.32 Such initiatives in turn met the requirements of links to the world economy to cut freighting costs and advance the interests of trade, in other words transform Iran from a pre-mercantile to a market economy. After the campaign against the Tobacco Concession in 1890–1891, merchants became increasingly involved in discussions on institutional change and the re-ordering of Iran, and they had a highly significant role in the movement that brought about the Constitutional Revolution. The campaign in effect actually built upon the pressure created by the foreign entrepreneurial forces, which it seemingly opposed, to seriously undermine the Qajar regime.33 Most notably, merchants read and participated in the debate on reform in the press, which had emerged abroad in the decades before the Revolution. In particular, Akhtar, published by Iranians in Istanbul, and Habl al-Matin, published in Calcutta, were sustained in large part by merchant communities in Iran itself and abroad, as is clear from the many articles and announcements concerning trade and trading enterprises. New companies, which sought to enhance the role of Iranians in the economy, and counter foreign competition, were a particular subject of reports and debates. Akhtar included the latest information on bond issues, and market reports, as well as on world news, for the increasingly widely-travelled merchant community of Iran. Merchants such as Amin al-Zarb, and his son Haj Muhammad Husain, who inherited his title when he died in December 1898, did not show an interest in the theory of nationalism as such, but they were undoubtedly highly patriotic. They shared the vision of reformers such as Malkum Khan and Majd al-Mulk, of a strong modernised, revitalised Iran. They saw industrialisation as the way forward toward the progress and civilisation which western Europe then epitomised. In terms of the revitalisation of Iran economically, socially and politically, Haj Muhammad Hasan was a devoted follower of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who preached political and institutional reform in Islamic lands, combined with resistance to European interference, and propounded the doctrine of Pan-Islam.34 There is no indication that either of the Amin al-Zarbs had any interest in Afghani’s doctrine of Pan-Islam. Though Afghani stayed in 1887 and again in 1890–1891, discoursing on constitutional governments and other subjects, it is doubtful whether Amin al-Zarb understood the full purport of Afghani’s radical arguments, which implied that rulers who would not accommodate change in the political order should be removed. He remained loyal to Nasir al-Din Shah, with whom he was in essence in alliance, bound by the provision of funds and trading influence on the one hand, and patronage and protection on the other.35

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Figure 1 A group of merchants. (Courtesy of Mohammad Ali Jadid al-Islam, Tabriz.)

The Movement for Reform in Education and its Connection with the Press The movement for educational reform, which had as its principal purpose the modernisation and strengthening of the country, was allied to the developments in bureaucratic and economic reform and the press mentioned above. As in the Ottoman Empire, the movement for educational reform in Iran began with the needs of the state to restructure the army so as to protect the country against foreign control, and to develop a modern civil service to provide administrative support.36 The result was the establishment of a technical college, Dar al-Fanun, in 1851, with a curriculum which included military studies, engineering, mining, medicine, chemistry, pharmacy and mineralogy. This initiative was allied to development of the press, and the appearance of Ruznama-yi vaqayi‘-i ‘ittifaqiyya (The Newspaper of Current Events) in 1851, which was printed at the College. Therefore, from the beginning, there was a close connection between the educational reform movement and the role of the press as supporting it, encouraging it and developing public opinion to understand it. The purpose of the educational reform movement became the encouragement of economic and social progress that included the mobilisation of society as a whole, to the level of the West. Ultimately, with the spread of education, the population would be sufficiently informed for the introduction of political freedom,37 a view that was shared by the Young Ottomans.

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The movement made slow progress until the coming to power of Sipah Salar in 1870. His support for modernisation produced calls for the advancement of society as a whole through education; this view was reflected in the works of reformist writers such as Mirza Yusuf Khan Mustashar al-Daula, who pronounced education to be the precondition of progress. At the same time, the perception that the strength of European armies was due to educational and scientific qualifications continued as an abiding preoccupation of reformers.38 Modern schools began to open at this time (much later than in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire).39 In 1873, Sipah Salar established the first public secondary school in Tehran. Military high schools were set up in Isfahan in 1882–1883 and Tehran in 1884–1885.40 After the fall of Sipah Salar in 1873 the state involvement in educational reform once again declined and was not really to resume until the coming to power of Amin al-Daula in the 1897. The low and sporadic state revenues of minimal government, combined with resistance by many of the ‘ulama to what they perceived as the threat of foreign influence undermining Islam, discouraged the development of a state educational system. Nasir al-Din Shah felt reluctant to support the establishment of modern-style schools because of the disruption and potentially expensive disorders that it would entail. Therefore, education in Iran in the later nineteenth century did not benefit from a financial budget from the state itself. Its educational reform movement can thus be contrasted with that of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman new-style schooling provided the state with a mission. The state bureaucracy mobilised its entire political reserves and substantial resources to spread the message of the value of education.41 Iran’s position also contrasts with that of other countries in the wider world. In America, powerful social, and particularly economic, forces became engaged in education in order to develop the skills increasingly needed to carry out essential commercial tasks.42 As a distinct national pride developed along with awareness of national needs and the deployment of national resources, a number of new forces, social, economic and philanthropic, combined to change attitudes. Significantly, the educational movement was supported by wealthy private philanthropy.43 Although social and economic forces in Iran were not powerful at this period, they nevertheless existed, and merchants and some bureaucrats in particular gave philanthropic assistance to educational reform. The educational movement also showed a strong awareness of the need to develop national resources. The development of education in Japan had some features similar to that in other countries, including Iran, and others unique to Japan itself. Japanese reform started from a much stronger base in that the level of education among all social groups was higher even than in Europe.44 The policy of the later nineteenth-century Meiji government was that progress, particularly in the development of technical and scientific skills, was essential to modernisation,45 and therefore to Japan’s advancement in the world: sentiments similar to those in Iran. In 1872, a Fundamental Code of Education set out a programme for a fully modern and comprehensive system of education. In this respect Japan

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resembled the Ottoman Empire, and the sporadic government initiatives in Iran. However, Japan also saw an influential movement towards modernising education from below, which engaged people from different social groups in small initiatives. Merchants in particular wanted literate staff for book keeping and accounts, and saw their children’s future linked to education.46 By the twentieth century education was firmly connected to political development. That meant education in the sense of specialised skills, marked by a structural differentiation of tasks, developed to produce modern business, managerial and technical personnel. In other words Japan adopted the characteristics of modernity in its educational system.47 In Iran, the realisation of these objectives had to await the policies of Reza Shah. Whilst the British in India were comparatively slow to develop mass education, parliamentary pressure produced the Charter Act of 1813, and Wood’s Despatch of 1854 fastened on the neglect of mass education. These contributed much to the organisation and stabilisation of the Indian educational system.48 Two of its main objectives, however, were to provide the East India Company with able and reliable public servants, and to assist in the growth of commerce by creating in India a market for British goods.49 Thus nationalism, an important motive in Iran, was not an objective in India. In other words, the company had a capitalist agenda. In accordance with this value system, educational initiatives were also left to missionaries, who in turn stimulated Muslims and Hindus to begin founding schools themselves.50 One of the most notable was Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s movement to mobilise Muslims to support the establishment of a modern education system of their own.51 He believed that Muslims had fallen behind the West, and that as a community they suffered from decline. His aim was the introduction of a curriculum which included both the values of Islam and the modern knowledge of Europe. However, here also there was a specific agenda different from any in Iran, for the new schools were to be a prerequisite for participation in political power, from which Muslims had been displaced by the advent of British rule.52 The first groups to introduce modern education successfully into Iran were the missionaries and the religious minorities.53 The establishments of the former reflected the values of their European founders, and had political and commercial objectives, as well as educational and religious ones. The main attraction of the French missionary schools and the Alliance Française was that they taught the French language, which was popular with the elite.54 The Baha’i schools, on the other hand, played an important role in advancing reform and modernisation through education.55 Muzaffar al-Din Shah supported the establishment of Baha’i schools possibly in response to the growing pressure for educational reform.56 In Fars, a Baha’i school was established in Nayriz during 1905–1906, and one was founded in Shiraz by Mirza Aqa Khan Bashir al-Sultan, though its date is uncertain. The Baha’i and Jewish schools were the only modern examples there before the Constitutional Revolution, and did provide models for Muslims.57 In Isfahan likewise an early attempt was made by the Shah’s son, Ma‘sud Mirza Zill al-Sultan, to establish a modern-style

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school influenced by the Dar al-Fanun in Tehran, which he had inspected.58 After having seen the facilities there, especially in the teaching of the sciences, he obtained permission from the Shah to establish a similar school in Isfahan, using teachers recruited from the graduates of Dar al-Fanun. On his return to Isfahan, Zill al-Sultan ordered that one of the old royal palaces be renovated and provided with all necessary facilities for the proposed school.59 The responsibility for preparing and running the school was given to Mirza Taqi Khan Kashani, the hakimbashi-yi makhsus (special doctor) of Zill al-Sultan, who had founded the newspaper Farhang two years previously. When the building was ready, an opening ceremony was held on 15 Rajab 1298/23 June 1881 in the presence of the most prominent cleric of the town, Haj Shaikh Muhammad Baqir Najafi, and other ‘ulama. A group of commanders of the army and the senior officials attended as well. It employed teachers educated in Europe, and its subjects included military studies, music, Arabic, and French.60 Unfortunately this school, as ‘Askarani observes, was dependent ultimately on one person, namely Zill al-Sultan, and it closed with his fall from power in 1888. For a number of years, there was no modern school in Isfahan until Mirza Baqir Khan, Mushir al-Mulk-i Na’ini, established the Baqiriyya Shahshahan School in 1318/1900–1901. When the educational reform movement at last maintained a continuous momentum in the 1890s, it was largely the result of a movement by a variety of social groups, particularly in the cities, who were gravely concerned at the country’s growing weakness as compared to other nations. It was not supported by the state as such, but state officials, both civil and, significantly, military from the highest levels down, were involved in most educational initiatives. Further, Muzaffar al-Din Shah himself was much more sympathetic towards modern education than his father had been. It is important to note that, although there was an abiding resistance by traditionalist clerics, many of those involved in the movement were deeply pious Muslims and members of the ‘ulama, whose motives included a still little-articulated Islamic nationalism. Both Islamic and more secular educationalists had a common language of needing to unite millat and daulat (people and government) in the cause of strengthening and developing the country so that it would catch up with the West. Iran and Islam were recognised as having grown weak, and Islamic lands were seen as having fallen behind. The word milli began to be used for ‘national’, although at this stage the full potential implications and meaning of the term were not yet clear. The education and the development of Iranian industry became mutually intertwined with the progress of the country. In all this the press played a pivotal role in propagating and publicising the various ventures to develop Iran, and in creating a growing body of public opinion below that of the state elite. The earliest proponent of this stage in the educational movement was Mirza Hasan Rushdiyya, the son of a mullah. He first attempted to establish a primary school in Tabriz in 1888 following the example of those in Beirut, which had attracted his attention, but it was closed because of clerical opposition.61

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A significant feature of its curriculum was an easier way of learning the alphabet through material adapted to the level of children. Despite persistent attempts, Rushdiyya did not succeed in firmly establishing a school in Tabriz, as he was vehemently resisted by the Tabriz clergy.62 After he founded the school in 1888, he was accused of heresy and forced to close it. Despite a high level of student registration, further attempts to open it also proved futile.63 One of his failed attempts, in 1894, even had the support of the ‘ulama of Najaf, as well as the Crown Prince. Its curriculum included the teaching of students aged between 25 and 40 to read and write in 90 hours. It faced resistance from Haji Mirza Javad, the leading mujtahid of Tabriz, and there was fierce opposition from the tullab (theological students), who perceived their livelihood as being threatened by this innovative rival to the traditional primary religious schools, the maktab. As a result they attacked and destroyed it. However, the school reopened in 1896 with the support of Amin al-Daula, then steward to the government of Azarbaijan.64 Rushidyya finally gave up when Amin al-Daula moved to Tehran and became prime minister, leaving him vulnerable to renewed attack. Therefore in 1896 Rushdiyya himself moved to Tehran, where, with the support of Amin al-Daula, he created a new school. Amin al-Daula brought the Shah there, and he contributed a large sum.65 Meanwhile, the school in Tabriz, being still subject to clerical animosity, closed.66 Thus Tabriz, though open to new ideas from the Caucasus, initially proved a hostile environment for the innovative education movement. Although the ‘ulama had an interest in resisting an initiative that undermined their control of education, there was probably another reason of context behind the vehemence of their resistance and the initial failure of the education reform movement there. This was the overpowering presence and influence of Russia at a period of intensified Russian penetration of the north, which would have led to an overwhelming fear of education being used as a spearhead for Russian values and influence in the province. A similar reason no doubt lay behind the government’s reluctance to support educational reform in Tabriz. The situation may be contrasted with that in Rasht, where the Vatan School was founded by Mirza Habiballah Khan. An examination took place on 28 Dhi al-Hijja1 317/ 29 April 1900 in the presence of local notables, including ‘Ali Khan Qajar, Zahir al-Daula, and donations were made.67 It had the purpose of providing the young of Gilan with education and the other benefits of progress. The establishment of schools made particular progress in Tehran. There, Rushdiyya established a school in 1898, with science in its curriculum, under the protection of Amin al-Daula, Prime Minister 1897–1898.68 More significantly, Muzaffar al-Din Shah himself, following his interest in educational reform, encouraged at least one school, the Muzaffari in Bushehr, with financial support. Thus with the interest, albeit mainly of an individual and personal nature, now coming from the state, modern schools began to appear in other cities from the 1890s. Their success was due not only to royal and notable support, but also to that of the more enlightened ‘ulama.69 In addition, the whole modern educational

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movement began to organise and coordinate its activities in an unprecedented fashion. The Anjuman-i Ma‘arif or education society was founded by Amin al-Daula.70 It included a variety of individuals, such as the intellectual activist, Yahya Daulatabadi, Rushdiyya and members of the bureaucracy. The new Anjuman met at the beginning of 1898, and those who attended included Nayir al-Mulk, Minister of Education, Ihtisham al-Saltana, and Yahya Daulatabadi.71 At the same time the newspaper Tarbiyat was founded to promote the advancement of knowledge.72 After the fall of Amin al-Daula in 1898, Amin al-Sultan returned to office. Initially he had been suspicious of the education movement because so many of its members had close affiliations with his rival. However, he came to realise the immense significance of the advancement of education in Iran and the need for change. In September 1898 he came to the Anjuman-i Ma‘arif, which was meeting in Madrasa-yi ‘Ilmiyya. The students of three recently founded schools, the ‘Ilmiyya, the Sharaf and the Iftitahiyya were present.73 This gathering also included a number of notables, and overall the policy of encouraging the establishment of new schools had the support of Muzaffar al-Din Shah.74 In 1901 Amin al-Sultan encouraged the re-establishment of the Anjuman-i Ma‘arif, which had dissolved as a result of disagreements. He also announced the education system in Iran was much in need of reform. He suggested the movement be organised by the Minister of Education, Nayir al-Mulk, who should establish a council to discuss regularly the matters of education and reform.75 The education policy was supported by the Majlis-i Shaura-yi ‘Ali-yi Ma‘arif, the High Consultative Council of Education, also established in 1901, to support the education system.76 However, ‘Ain al-Daula, who succeeded Amin al-Sultan in 1903, was less supportive as he closed the Majlis-i Shaura-yi ‘Ali-yi Ma‘arif in that year.77 One remarkable feature of the movement was the emphasis on providing opportunities for education to all classes, the principle being that wealthier parents paid fees, whilst the children of the poor were educated for free. There was thus an enormous demand by poor students for admission, demonstrating the value accorded to education by the poorer as well as the wealthier social groups. A particular emphasis was placed on providing for orphans and students of poor families. The Sharaf School, already established in 1899, accepted the latter,78 and the Iftitahiyya School, founded in 1898, accepted both. The latter had regulations with stipulated that all children should be subject to the same rules regardless of background, including the obligation to wear a uniform. As an exception the children of the ‘ulama were allowed to wear their usual dress.79 This latter point is very significant, because it shows that, contrary to many accounts, the ‘ulama did not all resist the new movement. On the contrary, many saw the value of it for their own children. The most notable member of the ‘ulama active in the new movement was Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i, who founded the Islamic School in early 1900, with his son Mirza Muhammad Sadiq as principal, and Aqa Mirza Muhammad

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Figure 2 Muzaffar al-Din Shah out hunting. (Courtesy of Mohammad Ali Jadid al-Islam, Tabriz.)

Shari‘at-madar-i Kirmani as its supervisor. The latter had responsibility for organising the delivery of the curriculum. His qualifications included the publication of books on new methods of teaching grammar and syntax, similar to those written for the primary schools of Egypt. Qur’anic vocabulary was taught by a new alphabetic method, suitable to the students’ level, which helped them to read. To publicise its activities, the school sent the newspaper Thuraya a copy of its regulations, announcement of examinations and sample textbooks. The newspaper commended the good order of the school and remarked that the press had an effect in advancing such initiatives.80 No mention is made of any other foreign language, indicating the religious nature of the school. In 1901, Amin al-Sultan came to the school as part of his programme of encouraging the ‘national schools’, accompanied by Mirza Nasrullah Khan Mushir al-Daula, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Justice. The school had two types of students: scholarly, or advanced, and primary. Geography and mathematics were taught by Mirza ‘Asadallah Khan Qajar, a graduate of Dar al-Fanun; the health of the school was the responsibility of a medical officer. Amin al-Sultan allocated 80 tomans a month for help to cover the expenses of the school, 50 on behalf of the government and 30 from his own pocket.81 By 1903, the school, referred to by Habl al-Matin as having more advantages than the other ‘national’ (milli) schools, was entering its fourth year, and reportedly had 200 good students.82

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Education and the Press on the Eve of Revolution In their characteristics, the new schools broke with tradition in curriculum, teaching methods, assessment and organisation. In view of religious sensitivities, they also had to strike a balance between a modern curriculum and the perceived need to be sensitive to Islamic culture and belief. The degree and manner in which this latter was achieved varied in time and place, and according to the objectives of the founders. However, the purpose of most was ultimately to establish a secular education system to produce a new type of Iranian able to advance the country in the modern world. Texts were specifically written for the new curriculum with proper attention to the level of the young readers. One such example is Usul-i ‘ilm-i jughrafiya (The Basic Principles of Geography) by Muhasib al-Daula in 1318/1900.83 The development of education and the press advanced rapidly during the constitutional period; however, the achievements in establishing schools and newspapers since the late 1880s were not negligible. Thus on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution the state had an incipient educational policy in place, and there were about 21 modern schools in the country.84 In 1897 the first modern school for girls was established in Kerman.85 The greatest success of the movement was in Tehran where the protection of the state and the influence of more enlightened ‘ulama provided more promising opportunities for advancement.

2 Islam, secularism and modernisation

A major theme of this book is the relationship of Islam and secularism in politics and society in the period in question, from the early 1890s until 1908. In the discussions in English of the constitutionalism at this time there has been a tendency to focus on the secular or non-Islamic perspective. In The Persian Constitutional Revolution 1905–1909 (1910), E. G. Browne established an enduring approach which perceives the Revolution from the liberal secular point of view; the term ‘constitutionalism’ in the subsequent debate, and indeed in this work when used on its own, has also been understood in this secular sense. Subsequent works such as Janet Afary’s The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911 (1996) took a similar approach, as did Iran’s Constitutional Revolution (2010), edited by Chehabi and Martin, which looks at the Revolution largely from the non-religious perspective. Bayat’s Iran’s First Revolution (1991) considered the role of Western liberals, Russian social democrats and in particular Shi‘i radicals, focusing more on both the heterodox clergy and the secular laity. There have otherwise been many detailed scholarly studies in the form of articles which have perceived the Revolution mostly from the secular liberal or socialist point of view. The discussion of the Revolution as a secular event has, however, been balanced by studies of arguments by the ‘ulama, especially in the form of treatises. For example, Hairi in Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (1977) drew attention to the pro-constitutionalist arguments of Mirza Muhammad Husain Na’ini in his Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah (1909). The latter argued that constitutionalism was the best form of government in the absence of the ideal, government by the Imam. He did not, however, display any real understanding of the secular implications of constitutionalism. In Islam and Modernism. The Iranian Revolution of 1906 (1989), I discussed the anti-constitutionalism arguments of Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, demonstrating that, although he did not use the term ‘secularism’, he understood the secular implications of constitutionalism as it

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was introduced into Iran, primarily through the implicit incompatibility between religious and constitutional law. Both these books refer to the arguments of the ‘ulama after the establishment of the Majlis and the promulgation of the constitution. Indeed a sustained discussion of constitutionalism by a member of the orthodox ‘ulama prior to these events has not yet emerged. Those who were averse to such reform saw it in terms of Western values undermining Islam, or a possible conduit for foreign interference, rather than a secular concept of itself. After 1906, a number of other ‘ulama did become aware that constitutionalism both offered advantages as compared to absolutism, but also represented issues for Islamic authority and culture. Treatises discussing these issues have been published in Persian in a collection edited by Gholam Hosein Zargari-Nezhad entitled Rasa’il-i mashrutiyyat (1374/1995).1 Studies have also been made in French by Denis Hermann on the significance of Arabic teaching during the constitutional movement (2010), and on Thiqat al-Islam Tabrizi’s religious legitimisation of consultation and parliament (2010).2 Some of the ‘ulama’s arguments on constitutionalism from the period of 1907 onwards will be addressed in the latter part of this book, alongside the views of the laity. The current chapter, however, seeks to examine the Islamic perspective on modernisation and reform, religion and secularism, in the years leading up to the Revolution. Modernisation is understood as the process whereby ideas derived from Europe through the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, led to the development of new political systems and laws based on rationalisation, new forms of organisation with a similar ethos, especially the nation state, and the advancement of science, industry and trade which accompanied these changes. The discussion which follows will fall into four parts: it will first address secularism and its implications; it will then consider the question of reform and of the emergence of the sense of a national community in the press from the point of view of Muslim opinion; as part of the question of how some Iranians responded to modernisation, it will discuss the question of Pan-Islamism as advocated both by the reformer, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II; finally, it will consider the role of the ‘ulama in the campaign for modernisation. Secularism and its Implications for Religion To explore the issues raised by secularism further it is first necessary to define the term. Secularism was coined by George Jacob Holyoake (1817–1906) as a theory whereby religion and the concept of the divine are separated from government and government institutions.3 Further, government actions and decisions should be based on reason alone. It emerged from the humanism of sixteenthcentury Europe, the advance of science in the seventeenth century, followed by the Enlightenment in the eighteenth, and led to the marginalisation of religious practice and belief in the political and public sphere. Secularism, therefore, superseded the pre-modern world view that the divine was at the very heart and origin

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of human existence. In the pre-modern world, to win legitimacy and command obedience, a state or polity had to persuade its subjects to accept that it derived its authority from a higher authority.4 This higher authority was expressed in a law, which conferred leadership on a particular group. The authority of the religious law permeated all aspects of society and influenced its various associations. It perceived society as a community governed and monitored by the religious law, with religious beliefs permeating all aspects of life. In Islam such a law is represented by the shari‘a, its representatives by the ‘ulama, the community by the ‘umma and the various associations by, for example, the bazaar and its links with the mosque. Secularism depends for its existence on the paramountcy of reason. While reason has played a role in the evolution of Islam, which is outside this discussion, it is not the same reason as secularism demands. This latter reason is the ethos that governs all institutions in the political and public realm, and which marginalises and separates religion. In the process it develops a system of differentiation based on rationalisation as the means by which society makes its decisions, and the concomitant elimination of the metaphysical and supernatural. Political power is no longer tamed by a divine order, but by reason. Further, the validity of knowledge is tested by reason and experience, and has no connection with claims to divine origin. The result is the breaking down of the communal view into a multiplicity of understandings. However, it should be noted that in Islam at the same time, a single parallel overarching religious system abides in the concept of the ‘umma. A new order thus arises of a community of individuals who are able to use their judgement to arrive at their own conclusions by the use of their independent reason. They are no longer answerable to a prevailing religion for their public and political views, and may therefore exercise their opinions in a context of freedom of thought and expression without reference to a sacred law. In the place of the religious law comes one that is secular and civil, exercised in a context where tolerance of difference is expected. The individual, however, now has to contend with a new political order. Instead of the old empires, polities and potentates responsible to a religious world order, comes the modern state. In this most powerful, because the most centralised, of all political organisations, the individual holds the position of citizen, equal to other citizens, regardless of creed, and no longer trapped in a social hierarchy. The state gives its citizens a new set of rights, based on reason, and a new set of duties and responsibilities to the state, points that were not always absorbed in the liberalist discourse of the early stages of modernisation in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. However, constitutionalism, the earliest theory of the modern state to reach Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East, emphasised government by free and open consultation, along with justice supported by the law. These concepts chimed with political values in the Islamic tradition, which also emphasises consultation (shura), justice (‘adalat) and responsibility to the law (albeit religious, that is, the shari‘a). The modern system of election was to Iranians and other

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Muslims a means by which people could participate in government and thereby achieve justice and legal accountability. However, understanding varied as to the nature of that legal accountability, namely as to how far the law in question was the shari‘a. Reformers such as Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) in Egypt, for example, envisaged a model legal system developed from the shari‘a,5 and many Iranians who engaged in the modernising debate held the same view. The shari‘a was thus seen in this view as an integral part of democracy and consensus. There was, however, one significant subject allied to the rise of secularism and modernisation on which Muslim opinion varied, and that was science. Since the ‘ulama in particular are portrayed at least in some of the Western literature as being on the whole adverse to the teaching of a modern curriculum, implicitly including modern science,6 it is necessary to look at this subject more closely. On the one hand, as I have been reiterating since the publication of my work Islam and Modernism in 1989, the ‘ulama hold a range of views on any one subject, including science. On the other, the history of religion and science in Islam has been different from that in Christianity, and there has been too much of a tendency for Western writers in particular to import issues from the latter into discussion of the former. Islam, more abstract than Christianity, never became theologically dependent on a fallacious scientific theory, namely the Ptolemaic system, which established belief in an earth-centred universe. Therefore, when a true understanding of the universe emerged, Islam had no iconic martyred scientists, such as Copernicus and Galileo, to place a distance between it and modern thought. Further, it did not have, like Christianity, a theocratic establishment who claimed to be God’s representatives on earth, and therefore to have the right to oppose progressive thought in His name.7 That is not to say that science was regarded entirely without mistrust. There was suspicion of it on the grounds that it did not originate from the fundamental precepts of Islam, especially in the Qur’an and jurisprudence, and was derived ultimately from ancient Greek ideas. It was perceived as possibly influencing the believer’s faith and leading him to infidelity.8 However, the emphasis of al-Ghazzali (1058–1111) on the value of logic assisted the spreading of logical reasoning as a valid means of organising knowledge. A custom developed of teaching theoretical and natural sciences apart, mostly in small elite groups, and it came to be seen as an autonomous sphere of knowledge separate from religious subjects, and therefore outside theological concerns.9 It was thus also not perceived as threatening the authority of the Qur’an. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) in particular, believed that science was natural to man and should be approached with an open mind.10 The long history of the immense contributions to science of Islamic societies is testimony to these views. Nevertheless, the religious authorities were not always open minded and to some extent scholars had to depend on the support of enlightened rulers to pursue their studies without harassment, and it remained as a subject the interest largely of an intellectual elite.11 The coming of Western influence to the Middle East and to Iran in the early nineteenth century witnessed a broader interest in science there as part of the

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proposed programme of modernisation. It was realised that the then superior wealth and power of the West owed much to scientific advancement, and if the Middle Eastern Islamic lands were to catch up, they would have to enlarge their scientific knowledge and ability, in particular through education. Some Muslims, such as al-Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) in Egypt, sought to ‘de-Europeanise’ science and therefore make it more acceptable to Muslims, by reminding them how science had been advanced during the peak of Islamic civilisation, and how scientific ideas had passed from Islam to Europe.12 These ideas were to be taken forward in Egypt by Muhammad Abduh, in his project of Islamic modernism. He developed a new theology in relation to science and civilisation and admired the natural sciences.13 His influence was felt throughout the Muslim world. At the same time, a Lebanese Shi‘i scholar, Husain al-Jisr (1845–1909) wrote in support of modern scientific theory and popularised it among more traditional Muslims.14 Nevertheless, there was some suspicion of modern science in Islamic societies in the modern period because it was the product of the West, whose people had religious beliefs and cultural values perceived as a potential threat to Islam. Therefore it might have a detrimental influence on Muslims.15 In conclusion, therefore, the assumption that the ‘ulama and other Muslims were largely opposed to science, and naturally would be, is erroneous. Although some did take a dogmatic orthodox view, especially in, for example, Tabriz, others supported the teaching of science in modern schools in Iran at least from the end of the nineteenth century. Further, even with the most hard-line clerics, their preoccupation was really less against science than against the advance of European influence and penetration of Iran. For that reason, their opposition to the teaching of foreign languages was much more vehement and widespread than their opposition to science. Islam, Secularism and Reform in the Press In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the debate on modernity was carried out to a significant extent in the press, which helped create a public sphere that engaged a variety of views. There was a common agreement that Iran as elsewhere in the Middle East had to be liberated from poverty, weakness and backwardness. This goal would be achieved by reform of government institutions on the lines of the precepts mentioned above, by developing industry, by fostering modern knowledge and by the formation of a modern army. Thus a common mind was formed with unity provided by opposition to the absolutist other. Other opportunities for debate, apart from the press, emerged in proliferating schools, libraries, associations and societies,16 and the growth in cities of a civic sense expressed in the establishment of new local government institutions. The creation of a common mind then paved the way for a common action,17 and with it, radical vision, political, economic and social. It may be said, however, that before the Revolution very few people in Iran outside a small number of mainly senior bureaucrats, and a few radical activists

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Figure 3 Illustration from the satirical newspaper Hasharat al-arz. The lower caption says ironically, ‘Respect shown to pilgrims on the Haj by the Iranian Consul in Istanbul.’ (Courtesy of the Central Library of Tabriz, Newspaper Section.)

in Tehran and Tabriz, really understood what secularism was. Both groups were influenced by the reading of foreign works on political thought translated into Persian, and in some cases by having actually visited Europe. Both groups also envisaged a strong modernised industrialised well-defended Iran able to take its place with pride in the family of nations. The bureaucrats, as will be discussed later, tended to have a view of secularism influenced essentially by their preoccupation with state power and its rationalisation and extension over other centres of power, whether lay or religious. The intellectual activists were more concerned with the rights of the individual vis à vis the state, with equality and justice, with legal reform that would protect the individual from the state, and with power derived from below, from the popular will. They sought in particular the accountability of the executive to the legislature that would control the state bureaucracy as well as the ruler. Such a vision was accompanied by the emergence of a nationalism developed in contrast to absolutism and its conservative religious base; but it could be religious as well as secular nationalism. It was not to become among the wider public a fully formulated theory of nationalism until after World War I. It was rather an understanding there was a common Iranian community based on individual reciprocity and obligation to the state and each other. These ideas related to the establishment of a more just common law and the need to protect and strengthen the country. Further, at this stage the more or less united common mind, or at least the mind that was not as yet aware of serious potential divisions on the subject, depended for its unity on the continuing existence of absolutism. Once the absolutist system collapsed, a whole range of differing opinions struggled for hegemony, and consensus gave way to dispute. These new ideas relate to a growing sense of a Muslim Iranian public opinion, fostered by the debate in the newspapers, especially those published abroad. With regard to the wider public, which this book addresses, they are best

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represented in the most popular paper in Iran at the time, the Persian language Habl al-Matin of Calcutta. This debate was also reflected in the regional press, as will be shown later, all of which contributed to the creation of a common Islamic opinion. The themes to some extent reflect al-Afghani’s concern for the decline of Islam, and at the same time are an advance on it in the remedies and actions they suggest. For example, an article in Habl al-Matin in 1904 examines the characteristics of Islamic civilisation, and identifies them as wealth, knowledge and culture, industry and trade, good order overall, and a regular social order and its customs.18 It goes on to discuss the sources of wealth over time, and the nature of its allocation, in particular whether it goes to the people and the country as a whole or the government and the notables. It remarks pointedly that in the days of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs, financial management was well-ordered. However, with the arrival of the rule of political sultanates, the regime became one of greed and the seizure of wealth by all possible means. The implication is, therefore, that subsequent and current regimes do not display the true characteristics of Islamic civilisation, not least in proper economic management. This topic was particularly significant to the merchant readership of Habl al-Matin whose commercial needs required more regular and accountable government and a rationalised legal system free of the contradictory judgements of mujtahids. The new-style nationalism was also related to the economy. Iranians of all views at this time, including those who designated themselves ‘the supporters of Islam and those who know the vatan (homeland)’ campaigned for resistance to foreign imports and the development of foreign goods. In particular some strove to demonstrate that the purchase of foreign goods was in itself infidelity,19 and fatvas to that effect were obtained from the ‘ulama of Najaf.20 Articles discussing secularism as such in Habl al-Matin are rare. However, it engaged with the subject at some length in 1901. The paper picked up the issue not from within Iran itself, but from discussions on religion abroad.21 It argued that, according to shari‘a precepts concerning the exigencies of the age, challenges arise from time to time and must be met by absolutely obligatory struggle on the part of Muslims. The nature of the struggle varied from one age to another, and might, for example, meant the raising of an army to capture the lands of infidels. Today, however, when the light of knowledge illuminated the whole world, the struggle was of another nature, and it was against a new enemy, namely ignorance. Therefore a new means of struggle had to be found, namely the advancement of knowledge, which would enable believers to distinguish right from wrong and true from false. (The writer does not specify the nature of this knowledge.) In Europe and America, went the argument, the basis of Christianity was not sufficiently strong to resist the challenge of the philosophers, and it did not provide enough in its doctrine to solve all the problems of the people. Therefore they examined the commands of the four gospels and subjected them to new interpretation, and abandoned some points and added others. This led to secularism

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(dahriyat), and the corruption of morals, to worldliness and materialism, arising from its influence. As a result religion was adapted to the purposes of the world, or else undermined, and along with it the morality, and the good in humanity which came from religious righteousness. The point of contention picked up by Habl al-Matin was the view that the light of science and of natural philosophy (which influenced Darwinism) had made clear that much of religious belief had no basis in fact. As a result the peoples of Europe were moving towards secularism. They were rejecting the view that personal interpretation of belief was contrary to the law, and now adhered to the opinion that people were free to believe what they wanted and could be open about their views – which in effect meant a complete change to the status of the religion and its law. The paper informed its readers that a third of European ‘notables’ were now secularists and that this wretched view was increasing, an alarming trend for ‘Asians’ (meaning including Muslims). In Asia there had thus far been no wave of scientific knowledge (and implicitly, no secularism), which meant that people had no freedom to discuss their own particular views on religion. Looking to the future, however, as Asians became educated, they were soon likely to absorb the European argument. Since Asians had many religions, as opposed to just one, secularism would have more impact than in Europe. The world order would be destroyed and the fundamentals of civilisation would collapse. Religious disputes, which history shows to be the worst in terms of bloodletting, would arise, and brother would kill brother. Action was therefore necessary to prevent this problem from arising in the first place, and to create a barrier against a flood of secularism that would become widespread amongst the public and destroy religion. Secularism was thus identified with moral corruption and irreligion. The result, continued the writer in a later article, was the quest for selfish personal interest, and the weak were oppressed by the powerful, which was likely to lead to the collapse of civilisation.22 Thus secularism was the enemy of religion and the spread of its influence had to be resisted. The principles of secularism were therefore outside the laws of religion, and had become a law of human intervention.23 The secularists failed to acknowledge that religion was based on a divine law with all that implied, including the beneficial effect of punishment in the next world as a deterrent to straying from the right path. Thus the writer recognised the challenge of secularism specifically to the shari‘a. However, there was also a rationalist, even utilitarian element in his approach to the shari‘a, for he argued that it had to be obeyed not only because it was God’s law, but also because it employed intimidation, namely fear of punishment in the next world, to oblige people to act lawfully. That such an objective might be achieved by another form of law was a possibility he did not recognise. By implication he was arguing that Islam had to be supported and strengthened. His approach was nevertheless modernist. The way to strengthen Islam was to follow the example of Christianity and ally itself with progress and

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organised propagation, as Islam’s current weakness and disgrace was due to its backwardness. He went on to say that the religion that conformed to the order of reason and the nature of the world and to the nature of all nations at all times was none other than the religion of Islam. Therefore, in essence, the writer argues against secularism as such in terms of its undermining faith, but at the same time supports progress, rational organisation and reason, and by implication science, without seeing these objectives as being in any way contradictory. The argument was advanced further in a subsequent edition by linking religion to both knowledge and logic.24 Ugliness, said the writer, derived from ignorance, and good came from ‘aql (intellect, wisdom). Islam, which was preferable to all other religions, enjoined its followers to base their beliefs on research and logic, and considered ideas contrary to logic to be unacceptable. It was therefore the religion of wisdom. Unfortunately, there was a lack of wider understanding of the nature of Islam, and many false impressions. Therefore it was necessary to open an office of propagation to counter these false impressions by publicity, eloquent lectures especially in Europe and America, and translation of appropriate texts in simple language. To this proactive new initiative the ‘ulama should also lend their support. These articles, which represent a fairly accurate understanding of secularism and the threat it posed to Muslims as a community united by the Islamic law, were unusual amongst the publications in the press of the time. They were probably written by someone who had visited Europe or America or who was familiar with those who had and understood what they had seen. It may well reflect the location of Habl al-Matin, in Calcutta, India, but it was undoubtedly intended for an interested readership in Iran itself, where secularism and its implications had yet to be experienced, and was therefore very little understood amongst both those who were to come to support it, and those who would oppose it. Pan-Islamism and Modernisation in the Press None of the then current problems of Muslim society, however, could be achieved without unity, and in this Muslims looked to Christians not only as rivals and potential imperial conquerors, but also as examples to be emulated. There was much discussion on this subject. In an article on the unity of Islam, Christians were perceived as models of unity and progress, and their priests as an effective example in inviting people to join the religion.25 Muslims had been asleep for 200 years, argued one contributor to Habl al-Matin, whilst the Christians had awoken.26 Muslims had strayed from love of their religion and the precepts of the shari‘a, whereas Christians had become lovers of progress and benefited thereby. Christians, the writer continued with a less than well-informed view of their history, had acted in unity and countered enmity, whilst Muslims had been busy with wars. Thus integral to this Muslim analysis of Christian success was the concept that united belief in

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the faith was at its heart, and that there was a connection to be made between faith and progress, meaning the development of the country. Christians spent a lot on the dissemination and development of the religion, in such a way that included not only life but property. Muslims, by contrast, had been merely passive believers. Thus the role of religion was connected to active organisation, mobilisation and prosperity, and through them to the strengthening of Islam and of Islamic countries. In that sense it was the beginning of modern Islamic activism. However, according to one view in an article entitled Qaumiyyat va ittihad-i Islam (Peoplehood and Unity in Islam), unity was not only a matter of religion and truth, it was also linked to brotherhood, and to words and language, and these concepts were a basis of other kinds of unity.27 Groups of Arabs, Iranians, Turks, Indians and Chinese were to be united in one Islamic circle by one aim, their heartfelt belief. However, they were also united by language. The Prophet, asserted the writer, had made sure that all believers, whether in East or West, were familiar with one language, Arabic. Since Islam places no emphasis on language as an element of faith, what is evident here is the emergence of a nationalist interpretation of Pan-Islam that draws on the arguments of the contemporary Arab nationalist movement, which had begun to pay attention to language. One programme for Islamic unity which was regularly discussed was that the Ottoman Sultan (Sunni) and Shah of Iran (Shi‘a) should unite in a policy with a strong basis to protect Islam. It was noted the good behaviour of the Ottoman officials in what is now Iraq had delighted the Shi‘a.28 Elsewhere another contributor argued that the two rulers were united for the sake of Islam like ‘one soul in two bodies’.29 Therefore for the people of Iran, especially the ‘ulama, it is obligatory to support these two kings. Another suggestion was that there should be an Islamic Congress Movement uniting Muslims worldwide, with its centre in India. If it was also established in Iran and the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of the sultan and the shah, such an organisation would ‘illuminate the whole world’ under the guardianship of these two rulers.30 The article mentions the Iranian mujtahid Abu Talib Zanjani, a well-known campaigner for Islamic unity, as an example of a member of the ‘ulama active in the cause. The Congress was also to be organised in that it had a centre in one of the holy places (given as Mecca, Medina, Najaf, or Kerbala, or even Baghdad). Muslims both inside and outside Iran were thus reaching out to their co-religionists in other parts of the world in a trans-national context. They were assisted by an increasing knowledge of far-flung countries through reports in the press. Thus Habl al-Matin noted in Dhi al-Hijja 1316/April 1899 that its correspondent in the Deccan had passed on news of ‘a town called Lagos’ in West Africa where a local amir had converted to Islam.31 His conversion was the result of effective preaching on Islam and it was expected that others would follow. Habl al-Matin itself, and its editor, Mu‘ayyid al-Islam, was praised for its years of service as a protector of religion and a well-wisher of Muslims by Haj Zain al-Abidin Aqa Taqiuf, styled one of the richest Muslims in Russia, and an outstanding patron of

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welfare and education. He particularly noted the success of the paper in drawing the ‘ulama into the movement for Islamic progress. Further, he offered to subsidise the dispatch of the newspaper to the great mujtahids of Iran by paying the subscription himself.32 Habl al-Matin itself was conscious of the role of the press in advancing the cause of Islamic unity. It considered the main duty of the ‘Islamic press’ was to bring about the progress of the religion and remove its defects (here following the arguments of al-Afghani).33 The best way to advance the cause of Muslims was through unity, as enjoined by the Prophet. Habl al-Matin argued for the convening of a congress in India (where it could meet with relative freedom) to advance the cause of Islamic unity. Its own particular self-designated role would then be to promote the cause of the congress in Iran, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. After the granting of the Constitution in December 1906, however, Pan-Islamist rhetoric became largely neglected, and the emphasis was placed instead on the Iranian nation (millat), its needs and its endeavours to reform. The ‘Ulama and Modernisation Before the powerful arguments put forward by the secular deputies in the Majlis, the ‘ulama did not address secularism as such. They did, however, become engaged with modernisation, both as a result of their own inclination, and as a result of encouragement from lay and even secularist reformers. Overall there was a movement towards modern-style organisation and mobilisation in which the ‘ulama were involved. Such organisation covered institutions such as councils and assemblies, as well as very detailed planning of propagation of the Islamic view. One example was a Hauza-yi Islami (Islamic Circle) set up in the house of the Tehran mujtahid Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i in 1902, which met weekly. Its aim was the reform of religious affairs. Members of the Hauza were expected to have some knowledge of different religions, as well as being pious and of sound judgement. It was particularly significant as it encouraged membership from the guilds and others with some education, and the public were allowed to attend. Its main topics of teaching and discussion would be the precepts of Islamic politics and the need to deal with the problem of ‘the deniers’ (extreme secularists). It would also discuss the language of the Torah and the gospels. It would engage in the writing and distribution of religious works.34 The model for this particular organisation was similar Christian societies and their use for propagation of such gatherings. This was not the only initiative of its kind, and indeed there had been an earlier one in Istanbul. It was highly organised, and aspired to consist of four sections each with fifteen individual missionaries who knew foreign languages and would travel abroad on their mission. Their work would be monitored and coordinated by the central council.35 In addition, reformers such as Mirza Malkum Khan, knowing the immense influence of the ‘ulama amongst the people, had a strategy to exhort the ‘ulama

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to engage in organising and leading the campaign for reform. One reason for their involvement, argued Habl al-Matin in 1900, was that they had the facilities for propagating unity in the pulpits, in gatherings and mosques, which enabled them to reach a wider audience among the people.36 They could then also take the opportunity to exhort the rich to establish companies and set up factories. They should encourage the government to increase the army and the store of munitions, and persuade the people to learn the new military science and technology. As a result, when the governments in the West put into action whatever they had in mind about the people of Iran and Islam, Iran would at least not be in a worse situation than the Transvaal, and it should even be able to defend itself. Another reason why the ‘ulama should exert themselves to lead a unified movement against the foreign threat was that the people trusted them. Therefore to ensure the independence of the country and the survival of the shari‘a they should make every effort to support the struggle. Indeed the reinforcement of the shari‘a, and its implementation by the ‘ulama, was seen as strengthening the national cohesion of the country and as providing a firm bond among its people. The example of their action at the time of the Tobacco Concession was a demonstration of the effect of their using their power and influence in the service of nation and government (millat va daulat) and righting wrong on the basis of the shari‘a.37 The leadership of the ‘ulama was linked by Habl al-Matin to an overall united national programme whereby the Iranian government had to involve the nation (millat) in the affairs of state (saltanat), which was the only way for the country to make progress.38 The newspaper went on to specify what was meant by ‘‘ulama leadership’ through explaining what it did not involve. Thus it did not mean that the ‘ulama would have the position of commander of the army (sipah salar), minister, foreign minister or home secretary. Their role would be to endorse policy that had first been explained to them and then implemented. The ‘ulama, as will be shown, responded to these calls to leadership and action in a variety of ways that did not always accord with the objectives of those who sought to involve them in the struggle, but many of them were at least determined to change the political system.

3 Tabriz the politics and economics of a north-western city

Tabriz, the natural centre and capital of the Turkic-speaking province of Azarbaijan, agriculturally the wealthiest province, has long been at the crossroads of trade routes, and throughout the nineteenth century was considered the second capital of Iran itself. Were it not for the residence of the central government in Tehran, Tabriz could have been called the country’s foremost city. Until around the end of the nineteenth century, when it was overtaken by Tehran, it was the largest and most densely populated city in Iran,1 and had been three times capital in the past, most recently under the Safavids between 1501 and 1548, which has given it a strong sense of its own significance and of civic pride. It was the residence of the crown prince (Vali‘ahd), who had his own well-developed civil and military bureaucracy. However, despite these characteristics, and the distance between Tehran and Tabriz, the connections between the two were always strong. Constant correspondence with the capital, as well as the Shah’s vigilance over the court of the crown prince, ensured that Tabriz remained firmly under central control. External Influences: A Border City After the advance of Russia through the Caucasus to the border of Iran in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Tabriz was affected by its position near Russia, as well as the Caucasus in particular, and the Ottoman Empire. Only 80 miles from the Aras River border, Tabriz was close to the Russian garrisons not far beyond it,2 and therefore subject to Russian pressure. This was maintained to a greater or lesser degree throughout the nineteenth century. In 1895 the Jada Sazi Company was established by a Russian company with Iranian associates to build two key roads, one from Enzeli to Qazvin, and the other from Tabriz to

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Tehran, for which the concession was given to the Russian Discount Loan Bank (Banque d’Escompte de Perse), founded in 1891 with strong support from the Russian Government.3 In 1902 a reconstituted version was formed with a capital of nine million roubles under its auspices. The Bank was thus able to provide loans at favourable rates of interest with a view to extending Russian influence in Iran.4 Whilst it was agreed that the roads would benefit the country, the purpose of Russia in building these roads, and their implications for the security of Iran, were viewed with concern.5 In addition, by the early twentieth century, the rate of acquisition of land by Russians accelerated. According to Wilhelm Litten, who lived in Iran during 1902–1918, the Russian Discount Loan Bank became an outright owner of large tracts of land.6 In any case, through its connections with Russia, and in addition the Ottoman Empire, Tabriz became a major commercial centre, with a large bazaar, by conducting trade with these lands, and beyond them with Europe, the Mediterranean and India. The result was that the influences of modernity streamed into Tabriz from Russia and Europe to a much greater extent than anywhere else in the country. One outcome of these external influences was the growth of a group of highly prosperous merchants who were well informed through their trade connections of the considerable differences regarding trade and economic affairs as between Europe and Iran.7 At the same time, they gained in influence through intermarriage with notables from the local state administration and with the clergy. Thus mutually reinforced, merchants and clergy in particular became increasingly independent of provincial state control.8 Capable and experienced, the merchants were well able to organise and finance an ideological movement of resistance to the absolutist regime.9 External Influences: New Ideas and the Press The second characteristic of outside influence was the flow of new ideas and ideologies into Tabriz, especially through Russia and the Caucasus, but also through the burgeoning Persian language press abroad. These ideas were to include not only constitutionalism, but also social democracy and bolshevism. In addition, along with ideas, Tabriz welcomed modern education and new technology. The first modern-style school in Iran was established in Tabriz in 1888 by Mirza Hasan Rushdiyya, and the Tabrizi community in Istanbul was active early on in the establishing of a Persian press through the founding there of the newspaper Akhtar.10 Tabriz was also an early example of the founding of modern-style municipal government and a chamber of commerce. Centralisation and the Elites The provincial administration, headed by the crown prince, was restructured in the middle of the nineteenth century with the creation of the office of Amir Nizam. Local elites and power centres were dismantled and suppressed, their

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influence incorporated into a new administrative system. The Amir Nizam was given military resources independent of the local, particularly tribal, leaders, which enabled him to crush revolt more effectively than in the past.11 Tribal leaders and other senior bureaucrats thus found their positions devalued, especially the office of baiglarbaigi (a cross between military commander and chief magistrate), previously held by a rich landowner. For this reason, the province was more susceptible to central control than, for example, Fars and Shiraz. The clergy of Tabriz were turbulent, and highly influential, partly from their religious duties, but also from their ownership of land, the high-level administrative posts they held, and their connections as mentioned above with other members of the city elite. Most of the leading clergy were large landowners,12 which gave them close links in terms of interest with other elite groups amongst notables of the administration, and the merchants. During the nineteenth century their influence extended increasingly into the hinterland of the city.13 Many clergy belonged to families which had been well-established since the Safavid period.14 One example of such a family was the Tabataba’i sayyids (descendants of the Prophet), who held and inherited the positions of qazi (judge) and shaikh al-islam (a title denoting the official representative of the ‘ulama conferred by the state). This particular family were the upholders of orthodox Shi‘ism, and had links with the leading merchants.15 Another leading cleric was Haji Mirza Javad, whose power base was his broad following amongst the people.16 On the one hand his word had great influence on them; on the other, he represented their views. One source of contention among the clergy was the rivalry between Shaikhis and mutisharri‘s, of whom the latter represented orthodox Shi‘ism (usuli). The Shaikhis were the followers of an early nineteenth-century mujtahid named Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa’i (1753–1826). He developed a new concept of religious leadership, which was influenced by philosophy and mysticism linked to direct guidance and inspiration from the Imams, as opposed to dependence on the reasoning and independent judgement of the mujtahids.17 Other mujtahids designated this to be innovation, and accused Ahsa’i of being an atheist. Tabriz divided into two parties, the Shaikhis, and the mutisharri‘s.18 The Shaikhi leader in the period in question was Mirza ‘Ali Aqa Thiqat al-Islam, who had a following in a few large mosques. Although the differences between the Shaikhis and mutisharri‘s were comparatively minor, and there were no major controversies at this stage in Tabriz, Thiqat al-Islam’s relations with the other mujtahids were reserved and he was effectively debarred from holding any significant position in the town.19 The majority of the clergy belonged to the mutisharri‘ group. Kasravi highlights the Shaikhi–mutisharri‘ controversy as having a significant role in the Revolution, but the evidence is that by this point it belonged largely to the past as a seriously divisive issue. It does not feature prominently in either his own book, or the contemporary British correspondence for the period in question, and it would seem the ‘ulama had stronger bonds in common through their various elite interests.

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The Agitation against the Tobacco Concession A major issue of the period was the protest over the Tobacco Concession granted in 1890–1891.20 Agitation began early in 1891 with the circulation of placards in both Tehran and Tabriz, the latter playing a leading part in organisation of opposition to the concession. After the issuing of a fatva banning the smoking of tobacco by Mirza Shirazi, the level of disturbance in Tabriz caused consternation to the authorities. The Shah himself sent a telegram to leading members of the ‘ulama in Tabriz, who had been complaining about the Tobacco Concession. He adopted a peremptory tone, having already in his view made his wishes clear in a previous telegram to calm the people: The answer had to be explicit and it was explicit to calm the people. If you keep control of the people, you do a good service – bravo to you! You are learned, also wise, also supporters of the government. Of course with these qualities you will not do anything that is contrary to the maintenance of good order and the stability of the government. The order and stability of an Islamic government, and especially a Shi‘i government, abides for everyone, even old women, even the likes of you. He went on to say: Azarbaijan and Tabriz have always been a centre of order in Iran, not an example of disturbance for elsewhere. It is better to deal with such matters confidentially and quietly, and thus get an answer.21 Meanwhile, a Tabrizi wrote to Mirza Shirazi himself to ascertain whether he really had written the fatva; what its purpose was and the duty of believers; and whether it was possible for the people to use tobacco grown locally. Mirza Shirazi replied that he had indeed issued the fatva; and the purpose was to have the concession cancelled, and to remove the hand (control) of foreigners from the tobacco business both internal and external. Further, until he personally announced that the fatva had been lifted, it remained in force. All avoidance of the use of tobacco was essential, even if the tobacco was in no way associated with foreign control.22 Economic and Financial Issues The common landowning interest of the elite gave them control of the grain market, and at times of dearth, the situation was much exacerbated by hoarding on the part of the big landowners of all kinds. The resultant rise in prices was by far the most common cause of disturbance in Tabriz during this period. However, prices also rose for other reasons, not least the decline in the value of the Iranian currency, the kran. The consequent fall in the value of the copper shahi, which

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was widely used in transactions, during 1893–1897 caused inflation. The resulting distress to the poorer social groups led to the taking of sanctuary, and closure of the bazaars in protest.23 Government officials had to negotiate with the protestors to try to normalise the situation.24 Further measures were to send grain or rice from one province to another,25 and to bring in bread and charcoal from outside Tabriz to force down the prices.26 On another occasion, persons with particular grievances as to their rights were invited to approach the baiglarbaigi any time between 2 o’clock and sunset.27 The control of the price of bread, with its implications for keeping order, and loss of prestige, the paramount concerns of Iranian rulers, was a cause of severe anxiety to the authorities in Tabriz and they had a variety of stratagems for dealing with it. For example, in August 1895 when there was a particularly serious crisis because of crop failure, there were disturbances partly instigated by women, and also the poor in general. The authorities asked Haji Mirza Javad mujtahid to help quell the disturbances and restore looted property. Prince ‘Abd al-Majid Mirza, ‘Ain al-Daula, then governor of Azarbaijan, also provided 5,000 tomans to cover the differences between the prices of wheat and bread. He took control of the situation and set up a majlis (council) of ‘ulama, a‘yan (notables) and merchants to make arrangements to deal with the problem.28 One official ordered the establishment of a bakery in the town solely for the use of the soldiers (which would ensure they did not mutiny). On another occasion, they were forbidden from purchasing bread elsewhere so that the pressure on the other bakeries would be alleviated.29 A further move was, inevitably, simply to pass the blame to someone else.30 In April 1897 there were bread riots, with attacks on the governor’s residence involving the death of several people due to crowd pressure.31 The governor general and the Crown Prince had to rely for defence on free-booters from the surrounding villages, especially Usqu, a place said to be inhabited by lutis. The regular soldiers were kept in their barracks for fear that they would join the rioters, since they were also suffering from scarcity and high prices.32 Further grave disturbances over the high price of bread and hoarding (including by some of the leading clergy) arose in August 1898. On 9 August a group of seminary students (tullab) accompanied by a crowd of women, as often leading the way as they were rarely arrested, attacked the bakeries.33 Both the Crown Prince and the governor departed for the country, leaving Tabriz in a state of near siege. By September the people’s wrath had turned on the leading ‘ulama on account of their great wealth and indifference to the prevailing poverty. The crowd attacked and wrecked the house of Nizam al-‘Ulama (chief councillor and advisor to Muzaffar al-Din Mirza whilst Crown Prince, and head of one of the most powerful families in Tabriz). By September the situation was so tense that the Imam Jum‘a and Haji Karim Aqa, both wealthy landowners, were preparing to leave Tabriz.34 In March 1899 the crisis brought down Amir Nizam,35 the governor of Azarbaijan, not least because of intrigues among the clergy, whose influence he had been struggling to diminish.36 He was replaced by Nizam

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al-Saltana, who managed to quell the trouble by taking vigorous measures to distribute cheap wheat.37 Tabriz: The Press, Education and the Rise of Radical Modernism As remarked in Chapter 1, the press was of immense significance in the introduction of modern ideas to Iran and the development both of public understanding and of a movement to support it. The establishment and development of a press went hand in hand with the founding of schools and the spreading of modern education. This section of the current chapter will deal with the local movement to disseminate change and reform in Tabriz through the press and education. One of the earliest newspapers founded in Tabriz was Nasiri, which was established in 1311/1894 under the auspices of the government administration. As mentioned earlier, Muzaffar al-Din Mirza (later Shah) had a personal interest in modern education and development, and Nasiri was linked to the Muzaffari School. This paper was to last for six years until 1900.38 In its first edition, the statement of editorial policy paper said that its coverage would not be about internal politics or government, but that it would discuss knowledge related to progress and trade; however, it would include news of Azarbaijan.39 Its main preoccupations were thus typical of the other newspapers of the period, though it reported in a certain amount of detail on the activities of the Crown Prince’s administration.40 In the years leading up to the Revolution, other newspapers were established by private individuals interested in reform, though most of them did not last as long as Nasiri. In 1316/1898–1899, a group of like-minded intellectuals, of whom the most prominent was Sayyid Hasan Taqizada, came together to exchange and develop progressive ideas.41 They had an interest in political ideas, modern civilisation, political freedom and freedom of thought, and were well read in the Iranian and Ottoman nineteenth-century literature of reform. In addition, Taqizada in particular had already engaged with radical activism in the Caucasus.42 The group members also included Muhammad ‘Ali Khan (afterwards known as Tarbiyat), Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Shabistari (later known as Abu al-Ziya’), editor of Iran-i Nau, Mashhadi ‘Ali Askar Urduabadi, known as ‘Millat’, and Mirza Sayyid Husain Khan (later known as ‘Adalat).43 The last-mentioned was the editor of Al-Hadid, first founded in 1897, during its initial period of publication. This period was, however, brief (three issues), as it was closed down after the editor took up employment in the passport office of the Russian Consulate.44 It reopened in 1905 under the name Hadid (which means ‘Iron’), and with a new editor, Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Shabistari. After the establishment of the constitution, the paper changed its name in September 1906 to ‘Adalat.45 Other newspapers followed with lesser and greater success. Ihtiyaj (Necessity) appeared in 1898, edited by ‘Ali Quli, known as Safaruf, and attacked Iran’s dependence on foreign imports with provocative irreverence. It was therefore closed after seven issues by Hasan ‘Ali Khan Garusi, governor of Azarbaijan,

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as a result of its highly critical and satirical tone.46 Its editor was arrested and beaten. Influenced by the renowned satirical paper, Mulla Nasr al-Din, published in Baku, to which he contributed under a pseudonym, he continued his career as a journalist as the editor of Azarbaijan, famous for its caricatures, and is considered the father of satirical publication in Iran. Two further papers were Adab and Kamal. The former was established in September 1898 by Mirza Sadiq Khan Amiri Adib al-Mamalik, and lasted for as long as two years. It specialised in the translation of articles from foreign newspapers, particularly on science. After the publication of the seventeenth issue, it was suspended for a time, but appeared again with the founding of the Lughmaniyya School, of which Adib al-Mamalik was director.47 However, after four issues, Adib al-Mamalik resigned from his position as director of the school, and after one more edition, the paper stopped, and the editor left for Mashhad. He was to have a long and distinguished career, not least as a poet. Kamal was established in November 1898 under the editorship of Mirza Husain Khan Tabibzada. Eight months earlier, he had founded the Kamal School in the modern style. The income from the newspaper was spent on the school, other costs being borne by Tabibzada himself. It continued until 1903, when, at the time of the revolt over the customs reform, it was looted by tullab along with other buildings with European or infidel affiliations, namely hotels and taverns.48 The newspapers of Tabriz themselves were very conscious of the significant role of the press in the movement to reform and regenerate Iran. Kamal opined that its role was to promote the progress of the nation, the propagation of knowledge and the discovery of science.49 It believed the press had an important role in educating the inhabitants of the country to be ‘wise, polite, knowledgeable and law abiding’.50 The first three of these objectives are not particularly modern but could be summarised as ‘civil’ in the sense of serving a common objective in according respect to one’s country and one’s countrymen. The last objective meant raising the awareness of a modern, Western-style law, and it was also linked to the concepts both of freedom from oppression and obeying the law. Newspapers, asserted Kamal, were the tongue of the people and the servants of the people in the dissemination of information that would help, implicitly by collaboration, the development of trade and thus the increase in the wealth of the country. The link between the press and the independence of the country was indeed a regular topic in the newspapers of the period. A comment from Tabriz to Habl al-Matin in October 1905 observed that a free press enabled the protection of the independence of the state and the education of the people.51 Such a press was needed in all the towns of Iran so that the people would become well-informed. Education and information were thus implicitly connected to the development of good citizens, who would be alert to problems and dangers, and strive for the benefit of their country. It would also bring about just and efficient government through accountability, by ensuring the absence of oppression and the loyalty and honesty of officials. As yet, the press was not seen as an instrument of nationalism as such, although it created the building blocks of a national conscience.

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With a long history of active reformers coming from Tabriz, going back to the days of ‘Abbas Mirza and Amir Kabir, and including Talebof and Akhundzada, Tabrizis were conscious of the need for progress, and in particular of the learning of science and technology as being essential to that progress. In addition, there was also awareness of the significance of military strength for the protection of the country from foreign interference. A letter from Tabriz to Akhtar in 1895 reports with approval the apparent increased interest of the government in military affairs.52 As elsewhere, notably in Isfahan, with the establishment of the Islamic Company and the activities of Sayyid Jamal-Din Va‘iz, a strong connection was made in Tabriz between the empowering of the nation though the development of its own industry and commerce, and the ending of the purchase of foreign goods. However, in Tabriz, in the newspaper Hadid, this vision acquired a more innovative and militant character. Emphasis was placed not just on knowledge, reform and progress, but also on action and activism. This was particularly marked in an address on the role of the ‘ulama in September 1905, as the campaign against the customs reforms was mounting. Hadid exhorted them in an article that quoted Sa‘di, saying that an ‘alim (a learned person) who was without action was like a bee without honey. In addition, it said the difference between a learned man and an ignorant man was like light compared to darkness. Knowledge raised man above animals; it was the origin of every discovery and government could not develop without it. Knowledge and action combined was the most productive way forward.53 Further, in July 1906, it said in this period the great ‘ulama had to take action to remedy deficiencies, and meet the needs of religion and of the world for Muslims. Islam should demonstrate the progress of the religion and of Muslims themselves. An example was provided by one leading clergyman who had campaigned for donations for a road to be built between Tabriz and Ardebil, and a set of machines for manufacturing thread to be brought from abroad.54 Till then, the ‘ulama had been overly preoccupied with study of shari‘a affairs, and had been less wellinformed on progress in trade. It was therefore necessary to point out that such matters needed the cooperation of the ‘ulama and others to assist in the raising of donations and investments. This emphasis on knowledge and action, albeit referring to a different kind of knowledge, brings to mind the political exhortations to the ‘ulama to mobilise and engage in politics by Khomeini, and therefore forms part of a trend in the political culture of Iran leading, though not continuously, from the late nineteenth to the later twentieth century. Despite the pious tone of some its arguments, Hadid may well have been influenced by Mirza Malkum Khan and his enjoinment to the ‘ulama to lead the people in the name of reform against government oppression, knowing, as he did, their influence over the people. Indeed, the paper emerged from a radical, reformist circle with a strong bias towards secular government, and its editor, Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Shabistari, was later to strongly criticise the views of the conservative mujtahid of Najaf, Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Yazdi.55

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There was a further feature of Hadid which was very unusual, and that was its name, which means ‘Iron’.56 The newspaper itself was proud of having such a distinctive name.57 Other newspapers had conceptual titles, often exalted or inspiring, such as Habl al-Matin (The Firm Cord), or Iqbal (Progress), or else they were named after a place, for example Kirman, or an aspect of the heavens, Khurshid (The Sun). Hadid explained its choice of title thus: The basic matter in the world of industry is iron. … The name refers to the best of all minerals and mines, and is essential to all industrial needs. Iron is linked to the mine of progress, which is the basis of hope. To the learned, it is more dear than silver and gold. The value of iron depends on knowledge.58 There was thus more than one connotation to the name Hadid. Clearly it had a strong link to industrial development, perceived as the salvation of Iran, as it would facilitate modernisation, it would make the country economically independent and wealthy, and therefore strong. There was also a connection between modern education and knowledge, and industry. Together these would lead to an awakening from the ignorance which enabled oppression to remain, and was a barrier to its removal. At the same time in Persian as in English ‘iron’ has the connotation of iron determination, strength of character and will, dedication and single-mindedness. In fact, what it also evokes, though more indirectly, is the uncompromising iron leader. So perhaps we may see beginning to emerge here, a characteristic of Iranian politics of the twentieth century – Iran’s century of iron. In November 1905 Hadid set out a questionnaire of ten queries to make its readers aware of certain significant issues. It asked, for example: ‘Which is the greatest government? Which is the most victorious army? Where is the most sacred place? Who is the wisest amongst the people? What is the most sublime speech?’ The questionnaire was intended to encourage readers to draw on a wider base of knowledge and to articulate their values and priorities on the subject of politics and leadership.59 The readers were encouraged to give their view, and produced such answers as, ‘The greatest government is totally aware of science and civilisation, establishes justice and commands equality. It propagates the new science and the reading of newspapers. The most victorious army is welltrained and patriotic.’60 ‘The wisest people are the ones who know the value of their time and use this time for the affairs of this world and the other, and deal with them according to the shari‘a.’61 The discussion continued through later editions. The replies demonstrate that the paper’s readers had a value system based on Islam, together with new ideas on national cooperation and modernity coming in from Europe. The Persian language press generally was preoccupied with industrial development. Akhtar, for example, discussed the way in which companies brought profit and prosperity to a country, especially through road building and mining. It also advocated unity and cooperation in developing the country’s industry.62

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A correspondent from Tabriz showed especial awareness of the environment and energy in a piece which pointed out the need to control deforestation, as was being done in developed countries. He also reported that the Crown Prince had engaged an engineer to deal with the matter of coal. There was a need to disseminate understanding of the country’s energy resources, particularly oil as it seemed to be the fuel of the future. Fellow countrymen should be aware of the treasures beneath the ground.63 There was another Tabriz newspaper which took a particular and trenchant interest in industry, and that was Ihtiyaj. As it explained in its second edition, it discussed industry, trade and general matters, and perceived journalism as giving service to daulat and millat.64 It also perceived itself as a newspaper of uncompromising integrity, that hoped ‘never to forsake the right principles, and to avoid flattery and ill-intention’. ‘If we tell the truth, subscribers should not criticise us,’ it said. It attacked dependence on foreign goods with oblique sarcasm: If we want to describe the conditions of the country, we have to be aware of how much Europe is the source of what we need. To some extent we have become lazy. Suppose our neighbours should stop providing us with machines for weaving long cloth or making paper. In that case our dead would have to be buried with no shroud, and our publishers would have to stop working. Our books would be written on the hides of sheep.65 Finally, the Tabriz press shared the preoccupation discussed earlier with the need for unity between Islamic countries, and some means of staving off the advances of Christianity under the banner of Christian powers, a preoccupation which had as much to do with nationalism as with religion. Adab expressed at length its concern over the advance of Christian nations in Muslim lands, and accused Christian missionaries of spying on and stirring up trouble among Muslims. It lauded Sultan ‘Abd al-Aziz of Morocco for keeping control of the disturbances Europeans caused, and imposing restrictions on them. It particularly commended him for supporting a group of ‘ulama who had set up an office for the propagation of Islam so as to refute Christian speakers. Adab also reported that he had made a substantial donation for the completion of the Hejaz railway.66 Kamal published a letter from the Anjuman-i Khairiyya-yi Islami which had been established in Batum by Aqa Mirza Ahmad Khan Sartip, the Iranian Consul there, under the auspices of the Iranian government.67 Its main objectives were to build a mosque and other facilities and care for the disadvantaged. However, it evidently also had Pan-Islamic agenda, as an opening ceremony was attended by the Ottoman Consul and the local Mufti and Ghazi in a show of Sunni–Shi‘i solidarity. The Muslims of the Caucasus themselves demonstrated an interest in Iran and its well-being. From their point of view, Ahmad Baig Aqa’uf, reportedly one of the renowned learned men of the Caucasus, wrote an article about Iran, published in the newspaper Hayat in Batum, in which he expounded on its deficiencies, and exhorted it to progress and renewal.68 He commented that it was

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time Iranians woke from their deep sleep. It was a pity to see that a country with a great past, such as Iran, was in its present condition, when the roads, mines and agriculture were so underdeveloped. So Muslims in the region were wellinformed and interacting, though not without a hint of old rivalries. Education and its Implications The subject of education has already been discussed in Chapter 1 with some reference to Tabriz, especially the role of Rushdiyya. Here the discussion will look in greater detail at how education in the city developed between c.1890 to 1906. It has already been mentioned that the government newspaper Nasiri established in 1894 was linked to the Muzaffari School. The first edition of Nasiri came out on 1 Shavval 1311/4 April 1894. It mentioned the Muzaffari School at the top. The editor was Muhammad Nadim Bashi, who was also the head of the school.69 Initially known as the Madrasa-yi Daulati-yi Tabriz, this was the oldest modern-style educational establishment in the city, having been originally founded as a state institution in 1293/1876 on the model of the Dar al-Fanun of Tehran.70 From not long after that time until 1893 it was referred to either as the Madrasa-yi Daulati or the Dar al-Fanun.71 The first head of the school was Mirza Javad Khan Sartip, a military officer, as were some of his successors.72 Its curriculum included both medicine and military studies.73 In 1882, it was mentioned as the Dar al-Fanun-i Tabriz in the newspaper Akhtar, which criticised it for being poorly managed.74 Apparently its defects were remedied and it continued until 1311/1894, when it closed briefly.75 It then reopened the same year, and at this point its name was changed to the Muzaffari School.76 It had evidently gained the support of Muzaffar al-Din Mirza, the crown prince, who then, and later as shah, had a policy of encouraging modern-style education. Nasiri mentions that at its reopening on 1 Dhi al-Hijja 1311/5 June 1894, the Crown Prince was thanked for establishing the school.77 It was known in the subsequent years as the Muzaffari School, and the Crown Prince took an interest in its progress.78 It is not clear when the school closed but Husain Omid believes it was in 1896. Also founded at this time was the Kamal primary school, linked to the Kamal newspaper. It was established in 1315/1897–1898 eight months earlier than the newspaper and it continued until 1321/1903.79 Its regulations were published by Kamal in February 1900,80 and made clear that it was to have four levels: firstly, basic 5–7 years, reading and writing and ‘the national language’ (Persian);81 secondly, up to 12 years, dictation and composition; thirdly, Persian, basic Arabic, mathematics, geography, Qur’an, and principles of the shari‘a; fourthly, the so called ‘first level’, continuation of the subjects just mentioned, plus physics, astronomy, French and Russian, biology, sanitation and other sciences. Students were to be prepared to study the higher sciences, including medicine, chemistry and agriculture elsewhere. Two years later, in 1900, the school was flourishing, and approved by the nation (‘umum-i millat) or at least the local public. Requests were being made to establish

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an adjacent infant school for girls, a proposal on which the ‘Islamic nation’ was being consulted, and asked to give their view to the Kamal newspaper, as a result of which the majority view would be accepted.82 In July 1900, the Kamal School requested ‘the Islamic nation of Iran’, and especially the ‘ulama, to come and view the school for themselves without previous notice, so they might be assured of Kamal’s good work.83 The Kamal newspaper reported in addition that ‘Umdat al-Tujjar Aqa ‘Abd al-Riza Tajir Tabrizi had established a maktab in Qum called the Fatimiyya School, which now had 65 students, and a further such school was proposed in Mashhad.84 At the end of 1901, the Kamal requested support for the school to have its own building endowed from the people.85 The Lughmaniyya School, of which Adib al-Mamalik was the vice-principal, was founded in 1899 by Lughman al-Mamalik, the physician of the Crown Prince, Muzaffar al-Din Mirza, who supported him.86 Lughman al-Mamalik took great pride in his patriotism and stressed that all the expenses were borne by him personally.87 It had foreign as well as Iranian teachers and emulated the French secondary school system.88 The curriculum consisted of science, Arabic, Persian, geometry, mathematics, geography, cartography and calligraphy.89 Taqizada taught physics there.90 However, there was also a strong religious component, no doubt an attempt to placate the conservative ‘ulama. On 3 March 1900 the school held a gathering for the examinations, which was attended by, amongst others, members of the ‘ulama, as well as merchants and local dignitaries. The pupils were aged between seven and thirty, a testimony to the dearth of opportunities for modern education in Tabriz. Habl al-Matin reported that the occasion was personally supervised by Lughman al-Mamalik, who had shown thereby great dedication in the service of education, and thus in the service of the nation.91 Finally, Taqizada mentions that he tried with three friends to found a modern school to be called Tarbiyat, founded around 1899–1900.92 It thus followed the Muzaffari, Rushdiyya, Kamal and Lughmaniyya schools. It was opposed by Haji Sayyid Muhammad Yazdi, who preached against such schools, and there was nearly an uprising.93 In 1903 it perished along with the other schools attacked by tullab at the time of the revolt against the customs reforms, and according to Taqizada, the reformers had to flee.94 Tabriz: From the Customs Reforms to Revolution, 1898–1906 In 1898 a new cause of discontent appeared in Tabriz in the form of opposition to the customs reforms. It began to emerge in 1900, and in 1901 there were riots in Tabriz, among other cities. In March 1903 the situation was exacerbated by a new customs tariff on trade with Russia, which was considered to favour Russian goods. The introduction of the new tariff brought serious agitation against the chief customs official, Priem, in 1903.95 The Crown Prince was considered to be implicated in the protests. In July, the ‘ulama of the ‘Atabat protested to the Shah over the employment of foreigners, and sent a letter to the leading mujtahid of Tabriz, Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa, declaring the new tariff impious and impure as it

Figure 4 The Rushdiyya School in Tabriz. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.)

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allowed duty on wines and spirits (as in his view they should have been banned altogether). That same month Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa was expelled from Tabriz, after a serious riot by tullab.96 The campaign against the customs reforms, and in particular the Belgian head of the national customs administration, Naus, was to rumble on through 1904–5, and eventually to be a main immediate cause of the Constitutional Revolution. Although radical modernising Tabrizis had begun to organise (see above), the movement of December 1905–January 1906 in Tehran, in any case seen as a protest against the customs regime, and the requesting of an ‘adalatkhana, did not otherwise receive much attention in Tabriz.97 The situation in Tehran changed radically in July 1906, when the leading ‘ulama of Tehran departed to Qum with a large following in an expression of loss of confidence in the government, reflecting great popular discontent. The result of the agitation was the granting of an elected assembly on 5 August 1906. Meanwhile, in July 1906 Tabrizi preoccupations were still mainly local, partly because the press was muzzled, and also because the Crown Prince had blocked telegrams.98 The Crown Prince (Muhammad ‘Ali Mirza) was unpopular and despised by the city’s elite. He was further said to favour Haji Mirza ‘Abdul Karim Imam Jum‘a, at the expense of Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa, the most influential mujtahid, who partly in consequence had declared himself in sympathy with the pro-constitutional mujtahids in Tehran. Meanwhile, a group of ‘ulama opposed to the Imam Jum‘a because of his association with the Crown Prince contacted the British Consulate with a view to requesting consent to their taking sanctuary there.99 However, the Crown Prince perceived a new opportunity in the crisis, this being to remove the Prime Minister, ‘Ain al-Daula, whom he disliked. He summoned the leading mujtahids of Tabriz, including Haji Mirza Hasan, the Imam Jum‘a, and Thiqat al-Islam, and encouraged them to send telegrams to the Shah in support of their fellow clergy in Qum.100 In the consequent telegram, the ‘ulama of Tabriz supported the requests of those in Qum, but gave their interpretation of the new arrangements a distinctly Islamic flavour. They emphasised the observance of the shari‘a and the need for a just and rightful government. They anticipated improvements in the judiciary and the financial system, meaning that they expected the people to be protected from the unjust acts of government officials. They also complained that the promises made to the ‘ulama in January had not been kept, and that their requests had been prevented from reaching the Shah. These requests were in turn supported by a telegram from Muhammad ‘Ali Mirza, who had now come to an understanding with some of the clergy.101 Having achieved his objective with the resignation of ‘Ain al-Daula on 29 July 1906, the Crown Prince subsequently turned against the constitutional movement, and forbade the publication of the Shah’s rescript in Azarbaijan. The ‘ulama, meanwhile, continued to support their fellows in Tehran, from whom they awaited guidance.102 By mid-September, the Imam Jum‘a, had also turned against the constitutional movement, fearing he would lose by a change of regime to popular government.103 As a result both Muhammad ‘Ali Mirza and the Imam

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Jum‘a were becoming increasingly unpopular, as the people became restive over the lack of progress on the promulgation of the constitution in Azarbaijan. On 17 September 1906 a British subject was stopped by a sayyid, who asked if the British Consulate would permit those wishing to demonstrate in favour of the constitution to take asylum there. The next morning, 30 people, most of them ‘ulama and sayyids, came to the consulate to take bast.104 The leader of the bastis was Sayyid Hashim, a pishnamaz (prayer leader). This was the first sign of a major bast in Tabriz because the Crown Prince was resisting the confirmation of the establishment of the national assembly. Sayyid Hashim explained to Wratislaw, the British Consul, that Tabrizis felt they had been slack thus far in the constitutional cause. It was incumbent upon Iran’s largest and richest province to show that it was abreast of the movement for reform. Wratislaw felt obliged to allow the visitors to stay, but on condition that they should not be disorderly. Among his other concerns was that disorder would lead to attacks on the Armenians, which it was perceived to be amongst his responsibilities as British Consul to prevent if possible. In fact, some of the Armenians were to supply campaign funds. At midday on 18 September the bazaars closed, and people arrived in increasing numbers, until there were an estimated fifteen to twenty thousand men105 in the consulate, adjacent mosque and neighbouring streets. On 19 September the Crown Prince sent the karguzar (agent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who dealt with foreigners) to ask what they wanted, without success. He was further subjected to complaints of the Crown Prince’s perceived connections with the Russians.106 The members of the popular movement were now using the British to obtain access to and put pressure on the Shah. The leading ‘ulama, urged by their following, telegrammed Tehran through the British Legation to indicate their support, and their leaders, including Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa and the Imam Jum‘a, regularly appeared at the gathering in the mosque near the Consulate, no doubt encouraged by popular support. Soldiers outside the town talked of joining the demonstration but were dissuaded by a grant of 7 kran per head, and by British warnings to Sayyid Hashim not to involve them. Wratislaw now became effectively the mediator between the Crown Prince and the constitutional movement. Asked if he would tell them to leave, he replied that he could not do so until a positive reply was received from Tehran regarding the electoral law. Meanwhile, the soldiers threatened to leave their camp and come to the Consulate, at which Wratislaw declared himself, ‘alarmed at the thought of five thousand half-starved villagers who recognised neither Sayyid Hashim nor me nor anything but empty bellies flooding into the Armenian quarter’ (which was the location of the Consulate, as well as being the residence of most Europeans).107 The consul then persuaded the Crown Prince to begin negotiating to reach a compromise, and proposals that he had drafted were put by the latter to the people on 23 September. The bazaars were to open, 20 people were to remain in the Consulate, no one was to be harassed for demonstrating

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and Wratislaw would assure the people in the name of the Crown Prince that he was not opposed to the constitution. When these suggestions were put to the bastis (who had by now formed a committee to speak for them),108 it was agreed that they should be officially informed that the constitution had been granted by the Prime Minister, and a telegram should be dispatched to that effect. Despite apparent agreement on the part of the Crown Prince, no action had been taken by 26 September. Violent speeches commenced in the mosques, and some of the horsemen of his bodyguard deserted him. The employees of the telegraph and electric light organisations (Tabriz was comparatively advanced in the latter) went on strike. Further pressure by Wratislaw produced the telegram and a letter to the committee on 27 September. The letter promised: no molestation of those who had taken bast; the confirmation of the establishment of the national assembly, which was to be made known in the provinces; illuminations for the granting of the assembly as an indication to associate it with the future prosperity of the nation; and the arrangements of elections. The town was illuminated and the provinces informed. As Kasravi has pointed out, the bast was highly significant from the point of view of the development of the understanding of modern institutions among the people (including his young self). They became politicised in an innovative way and familiar with terms entirely new to them; the ideas of devotion to nation and country and mutual cooperation also took hold, whilst sectarian rivalries diminished. A new vision produced new-style leadership and activism, it being hoped that the constitution would produce freedom from oppression and autocracy, a better, more dignified way of life, with a promise of progress and well-being.109 In addition, of course, there was an expectation of cheaper bread. In the following weeks, however, divisions appeared in the constitutional movement in Tabriz. Sayyid Hashim became increasingly unpopular, Wratislaw judging that his head had been turned by success.110 He endeavoured to intimidate any opposition to his wishes by the use of a band of armed sayyids, who went with him everywhere, even to committee meetings.111 On one occasion when criticisms were made of him, his followers responded with revolver shots. As a result there was a bast in protest at one of the mosques, and the mujtahid, Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa, asked the Crown Prince to have him removed from Tabriz. Sayyid Hashim was thus given funds and sent on a pilgrimage to Mashhad. The Imam Jum‘a, who had been so powerful before the granting of a majlis, was also obliged to leave Tabriz because of his anti-constitutionalist views.112 The Establishment of the Anjuman and the Organisation of Elections The constitution now accepted and elections approved, the constitutionalists set about establishing an anjuman (council), to act as a centre of organisation. A house was donated for its meeting and administration by Mirza Mahdi Khan, a leading merchant, who also paid for its maintenance. Twenty leaders of the movement were elected to sit in the Anjuman-i Tabriz and meetings were also

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attended by the clergy involved.113 People from different walks of life, especially trades, each elected a representative for themselves to work with the members of the Anjuman. These included representatives of the chintz merchants, saddle weavers, fruit vendors, tobacconists and sugar vendors. Many members of the Anjuman had strong religious tendencies, and for example understood the promulgation of laws to refer to the shari‘a. The Anjuman was finally established on 7 October 1906. According to Afary, it then endeavoured to organise its activities so that a daily public session dealt with grievances, a twice-weekly private session, discussed more general national political issues, and a committee to organise the elections of the Majlis deputies was established.114 A particular effort was made to carry the elections out in the correct manner.115 It has to be said that the Tabriz Anjuman was far in advance of anjumans elsewhere in terms of organisation and differentiation of tasks. Nevertheless, despite these good intentions, in a society as yet unaccustomed to rationalisation of state institutions, meetings did not follow a single established pattern. In addition, the uncertainty as to the exact nature and constitutional role of the Anjuman was demonstrated in the variety of names accorded to it by its devoted following, and the differences between their own perceptions of it. It was variously called the National Majlis (majlis-i milli), Provincial Anjuman of Azarbaijan (anjuman-i ayalati-yi Azarbaijan), the Tabriz Anjuman (anjuman-i Tabriz), and the Sacred Anjuman (anjuman-i muqaddas). This last demonstrates the significant differences in the perceptions of the people as between secular and religious, and by inference, the difference in their visions for the future of Iran. The Birth of Organised Militant Secular Radicalism The Anjuman soon encountered a major obstacle peculiar to Tabriz as the seat of the crown prince of Iran in that the Crown Prince viewed the new institution with mistrust, and complained that it interfered in matters which were really the concern of the local government.116 He knew there was a connection between the Tabrizi radicals and Russian subjects from the Caucasus, whom he believed to be influencing them. He furthermore complained to the Russian Consul about the latter. Meanwhile, when the constitutionalism movement started in 1906, Taqizada’s group of radical activists in Tabriz formed an organisation called the Secret Centre (Markaz-i Ghaibi), in which they were joined by other Iranians from the Caucasus, and they established their own armed group of mujahidin. Those involved included Karbala’i ‘Ali Misyu, Haji Rasul Sadaqiani, and Haji ‘Ali Davafurush. Other members were Mashhadi Baqir Baqqal, a grocer, and Haji ‘Ali Akbar Pulaupaz (a rice-cook).117 One member, ‘Ali Misyu, was charged with the special responsibility of contact with the mujahidin.118 At the beginning of December the simmering power struggle between the Crown Prince and the Anjuman came to a head, and the bazaars closed. In Ardebil the people demanded the dismissal of the governor and the establishment

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of a local council. Such demands were spreading.119 In Urumiya an anjuman had also been established and was taking control of local affairs.120 By 10 December Tabriz was reported to be seriously disturbed. The Crown Prince tried to have the Anjuman closed, but the people, including merchants, and clergy, liberal reformers and mujahidin, stood against him. According to Kasravi, the ostensible organiser was Haji Mirza Hasan, the mujtahid, but in reality, it was the mujahidin, organised by the Secret Centre, who incited the crowd to resist.121 The situation had calmed down on 15 December, when the bazaars opened.122 The reformists were also not idle with regard to education. Meetings were organised in every quarter and discussed the establishment of schools. The well-to-do were especially active and supportive.123 The link between the social conservatives, especially some of the leading ‘ulama, and the Crown Prince, had been broken by the establishment of new power structures in what the reformers entitled the Majlis-i Shura-yi Milli (as opposed to Islami). Thus the way was opened for the introduction not only of modern education, but also of secular modern education. The Elections of the Azarbaijani Deputies It took some time to complete the elections of the Azarbaijani deputies and to arrange their departure to Tehran. Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa, who had been elected as a representative of the ‘ulama, according to some reports to get rid of him, refused to depart, as did the other clerical representative, Thiqat al-Islam.124 Both of them were said to have courted election, but subsequently realised a prolonged absence in Tehran would lead to a serious reduction in their local influence in Tabriz.125 They therefore declined to move, which meant that the departure of all the deputies was postponed. Pressure was brought in particular on Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa by the Anjuman. However, it had to be given up as he was protected by 200 tullab. By 27 December 1906 the deputies still had not left.126 Elsewhere, villages were beginning to form anjumans of their own, and refusing to recognise the local landlords. Thus the picture was of a country beginning to fragment with centrifugal and centripetal changes, and some looking at the reform movement at the centre as a positive development towards strengthening the country, others seeing it as an opportunity to resist central and local established power, and still others remaining indifferent. Above all though, the granting of the constitution was creating a wider public opinion in Tabriz and to a certain extent in the towns elsewhere. It was giving a voice to classes hitherto excluded from expressing their views other than through the ‘ulama or other members of the elite. These classes included at least the guilds and those connected to them by work. As to other social groups, their participation was to vary according to place and to particular times and issues.

Figure 5 Satirical cartoon in Baladiyya showing a bakery and different types of customers waiting for bread and commenting on the delay. (Courtesy of the Central Library of Tabriz, Newspaper Section.)

4 Reform in Shiraz The people, Qavam al-Mulk, the state and the tribes

The revolt of the people of Shiraz against the governor, Shu‘a al-Saltana, in 1905 is one of the well-known events that precipitated the Constitutional Revolution, and is described in the literature on the subject. However, very little has been written in English on the political developments in Shiraz in the period between the movement against the Tobacco Concession in 1891–1892, and 1905, though new works have appeared in Persian.1 The one continuous source is the diary of the British newswriter in Shiraz.2 This latter work provides a picture of the political manoeuvres of the Shiraz elite, composed of the governor and his administration, the kalantar (mayor), a wealthy merchant and notable of Shiraz named Muhammad Riza Qavam al-Mulk, and the khans of the Qashqa’i tribe in the countryside. It also addresses the constant complaints of the people about the financial situation, including inflation, taxation and debasement of the coinage. This chapter will discuss the political and economic situation during the period in question, but with special reference to the development of the reform movement and the emergence of an Islamic as opposed to a secular vision of Iran as a nation. It will be noted that for the majority of the people of the city economic fluctuations, disease and poverty were the main concerns. Nevertheless, periodic articles in Habl al-Matin in particular demonstrate that there was a growing discussion of reform at this time. Shiraz in the 1890s By the 1890s state control in Shiraz was no more secure than it had been for much of the nineteenth century. The population fluctuated as between a British estimate of 25,000 in 1868,3 to 53,607 produced by a census in 1883,4 possibly as

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a result of the growth in trade, and a figure of 30,000 in 1913, perhaps reflecting a decline due to the conditions before World War I.5 The politics of the city were characterised by intermittent expressions of unrest occasioned either by government attempts to collect taxes, or by inflation affecting the price of bread. These events were followed by closure of the bazaars, as popular bargaining contrived to bring prices down. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, taxes were as grave a problem as ever. By 1893, Shiraz owed the central government 200,000 tomans, and the governor himself owed money both to the Imperial Bank and a local sarraf (traditional banker).6 Debasement of the coinage was a serious problem for tradesmen, sarrafs and government. Shiraz was the centre of the government of Fars, and overall authority there lay with the governor general, who was usually a senior Qajar prince, given the importance of controlling this strategic and frequently turbulent province with its high proportion of tribal inhabitants. The governor general was thus the most powerful official in south west Iran, having precedence over the Darya Baigi, the governor of the coastal ports, who resided in Bushehr. The governor of Fars was usually assisted by a local vizier, who might be appointed from Tehran, or might belong to a local notable family, and by a rudimentary bureaucracy. He was also supported by a military force which varied in size according to both necessity, and, in the constitutional period, the available finances. The taxes of Fars were nearly always in arrears by some years, and notoriously difficult to collect, which added to the problems of the provincial government. The governor had the advantage of the support of the central authority, whereas his principal rival, the mayor, Qavam al-Mulk, belonged to a long line of Qavam al-Mulks, each of whom inherited their position. Qavam’s position was based mainly on his ability to use his enormous wealth, influence and family experience to manipulate the population of the town.7 He was also chief of the Arab tribes of Fars which provided him with a ready force to quell popular disturbance if need be. The power of the Qavams was really of an unofficial nature, but they sometimes did, and sometimes did not, hold a position to which they were appointed by the government, the most usual one being baiglarbaigi of Shiraz, a title that in this case comes closest to ‘mayor’, or the person in charge of the well-being of the town as a whole. From the early 1890s, the mayor was Muhammad Riza Qavam al-Mulk, though he was obliged to leave Tehran for a time in 1893 as a result of popular discontent.8 At this stage the influential members of the so-called Qavami family also included Qavam’s two sons, Salar al-Sultan and Nasir al-Daula, who usually acted at the behest of Qavam himself, and who took charge of the family interests during his periodic absences. One further group belonging to the local elite was the influential Nuri family, who included Qavam-i Lashkar.9 The second major local power was the Qashqa’i tribe, many of whose members lived in Shiraz. By the early twentieth century, many of this powerful confederation were armed. The central government was both insecure and vigilant with regard to any possible uprising or extension of power by the Qashqa’i in both Fars

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as a whole, and particularly in Shiraz itself. At this stage there was some rivalry between the designated Ilkhani, Saulat al-Daula, and his brother Zargham al-Saltana, which was periodically manipulated by both the central and local government authorities. One of the functions of Qavam, from the point of view of the government, was to ensure that Qashqa’i power and influence in Shiraz was strictly limited. This policy was on the whole successful, as the Qashqa’i tribal power was only on rare occasions felt in Shiraz itself. Like the rest of Iran, Shiraz was experiencing rapid change by the end of the nineteenth century with the introduction of new-style economic and political systems, and organisation and technology. Growth in trade bringing novel commercial methods, particularly in the financial services, caused dislocation in a society accustomed to other and long-established practices. In particular prosperity gained by Shiraz from being on a main trade route from the Persian Gulf was gradually undermined by the opening of the Karun River in 1888, as transportation of goods to some extent by-passed the city. Indeed on the proclamation of the project in 1888, Shirazi merchants were disquieted over the likely effects of the new trade route on the economy of the city.10 Foreign banks and the establishment of foreign businesses put the bulk of trade into the hands of Europeans, who also appeared in the form of sometimes militant missionaries. Religious Groups in Shiraz In religious terms, Shiraz was more heterogeneous than other cities in Iran. About 15 per cent of the population were Jewish, and dominated the trade in gold. Other minority groups included Zoroastrians, and members of Sufi orders, including Nimatallahis and Zahabis. There was a community of Baha’is who had connections with the local intelligentsia and also with more liberal members of the ‘ulama.11 They constituted a merchant and artisan class linked by ties of patronage and enterprise with their kind amongst other religious groups. Some of the general Muslim population, with origins in the tribes, were not especially devout. However, many of the poorer classes and those with roots in the bazaar were very pious indeed, and hostile to both foreigners and the religious minorities, especially the Baha’is and Jews. The leader of this part of the community was a mujtahid named Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar Fal Asiri. In general, his energies were directed principally against foreigners, especially the Church Missionary Society, and their influence, which, like many ‘ulama, he saw as a threat to the beliefs and security of Islam. He played a significant role in the campaign against the Tobacco Concession in Shiraz in 1891, and was successful in leading a movement to bring down ‘Ali Muhammad Qavam al-Mulk in 1892.12 By contrast with the orthodox Shi‘i and Iran-centred Islam of Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar, the new transnational vision of Muslims united against imperialism was emerging in Shiraz, following the Pan-Islamic message of Al-Afghani. This message benefited from the growth of the press and the development of lithography in the late nineteenth century. Books published in India circulated

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in Shiraz, along with newspapers such as Akhtar and Habl al-Matin, both of which published articles about or by Shirazis. One of the leading proponents of the Pan-Islamic message was Abu al-Hasan Mirza Shaikh al-Ra’is, a member of the Qajar family, who had studied in Samarra and become a full mujtahid.13 Towards the end of 1895 he arrived in Shiraz, and built connections with clerical factions, and the Jews. His eloquent sermons at the Masjid-i Nau influenced the local intellectuals, particularly in their emphasis on ethics, and the edification and awakening of the people, as opposed to the more traditional branches of religious knowledge.14 The Press, Nascent Public Opinion and Reform All these factors, but especially the influence of the press, were to produce a climate of public opinion, at least among the intelligentsia, which was favourable to change. The first open sign of the emergence of interest in reform in Shiraz occurred early in 1896 and was related to the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank there, with a right to issue banknotes. The Shiraz merchants, especially the sarrafs, were most affected and attempted to establish a bank of their own. The wider population were alarmed that the economy of Iran was passing into the hands of foreigners. To deal with the situation, a Council named the Majlis-i Istintaq (the Council of Interrogation), composed of ‘ulama and notables and merchants, was established by the governor, Nazim al-Daula, and met weekly for three days to look into the people’s problems, and, in traditional terms, to redress their grievances.15 This new initiative towards reform demonstrated both Islamic and Westernising characteristics. Habl al-Matin described it as inspired by European practice to attend to the problems of the people.16 The new institution was based on a principle of consultation, common to both traditions; on the other hand the representative element, which included the election of Azar al-Saltana ‘for the people’ (probably meaning the merchants, and possibly also the guilds) and Mirza Muhammad Taqi Fasa’i for the ‘ulama, comes from essentially Western ideas on consultation and representation. The governor chose Sa‘id al-Saltana Amir Tuman (divisional commander) as head of the Council. The Council was also known as the ‘adalatkhana (House of Justice) of Fars.17 Of course, this ambiguous term was also to be used by the reform movement in Tehran in 1905–1906, which led eventually to the establishment of the Majlis. The reform initiative in Fars kept up its momentum. Its achievements included repairs, the cleaning of the town and rifah (welfare), a novel term for those days.18 It was joined by two other representatives for the people (millat, a term meaning community or people, which was gradually coming to mean nation), Haj Mirza Mahmud Mu‘in al-Tujjar and Aqa Sayyid Mahdi Tajir; and by Mas‘ud al-Daula for the local provincial administration (nizam).19 Sa‘id al-Saltana took up the cause of soldiers’ pay and the endeavours of the Council met with general approval. However, when Nasir al-Din Shah died in May 1896, Shiraz descended into a customary state of confusion and disorder. The government was obliged

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to recall Qavam as the only effective mediator between government and people, and he managed to disperse a crowd of protesters who had gathered in one of the mosques. The ‘adalatkhana was succeeded by another body, entitled the Majlis-i Muhtarram (the Honourable Assembly), still consisting of ‘ulama, notables and merchants. However, the objectives of this assembly were of a much more traditional nature, being the restoration of order and the removal of the governor, Rukn al-Daula.20 It also rapidly acquired support from the poorer classes in the hope that it would reduce their tax burden. Qavam dealt with further disorders caused by soldiers and closures of the bazaars by the time-honoured methods of punishing the soldiers, forcing the bazaars to open and arranging compensation.21 Education During this period, especially compared to Tabriz, the cause of education made little progress in Shiraz. On the one hand, reportedly, an initiative to establish a school for orphans and children of those with limited means, by Intizam al-Mamalik, the son of Qavam al-Mulk, was quashed by one of the leading ‘ulama on the grounds of being irreligious. The curriculum was to begin with Persian and led on to other branches of study.22 On the other, a rumoured attempt by young relatives of the mujtahid Aqa Mirza Ibrahim to attend a special class (subject unspecified) at a Jewish school, of which there were a number in Shiraz, came to nothing.23 The prince-governor, Shu‘a al-Saltana, did, however, send some pupils there. According to Sipihr, he also established a school and paid for the expenses of the students there himself.24 With regard to other opportunities of modern education, probably the sheer financial indigence of the city, together with its complex social mix, militated against change. Social Groups, Disputes and Grievances In the following years, though the discussions on reform no doubt continued and gained momentum, they did not outwardly produce much impression on the on-going struggles over taxes, inflation, the high price of bread, disease, tribal unrest and elite rivalry. The Il-Khan of the Qashqa’i refused to pay either his taxes or compensation for the plunder of foreign goods by his tribal following.25 The merchants took sanctuary over plunder of their property, and the general mismanagement of the government, which also suffered from weakness in the face of the populace, who beat its tax collectors.26 ‘Abd al-Husain Mirza, Farman Farma, briefly governor of Fars in 1897–1898, complained of the numerous problems he had to deal with, including cholera, and the scarcity of food, but considered he was still managing to control the province.27 A fracas took place between the followers of the Shaikh al-Ra’is and certain of the ‘ulama, as a result of which he was nearly expelled from Shiraz.28 The merchants and ‘ulama kept up their battle against the Imperial Bank of Persia by taking sanctuary, and joined the

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country-wide protest against the customs reforms and the new 5 per cent duty.29 Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar was generally active, firstly in building a new qanat, which took up other people’s water, and which he was subsequently ordered to close; in breaking up cases of wine belonging to the late deputy governor; and in shaving the head of a dancing boy.30 He also tore down new passport regulations placarded in the main mosque on account of their being ‘an innovation’.31 There were, however, opportunities to glimpse the outside world. In 1899 a Japanese emissary to Tehran passed through hoping to see if the Iranian government would make an alliance with Japan with a view to protecting China against foreign (Western) aggression.32 Riots occurred on several occasions, demonstrating the mounting financial problems. A crowd encamped in the telegraph office in December 1899 after the government in Tehran cancelled a deduction in taxes. The governor resigned, the bazaar closed and people gathered in one of the mosques. The government then retreated over taxes. Instead it threatened to pay less for its troops, who were destitute and therefore talking of mutiny.33 The leaders of the people, including the Shaikh al-Islam, the sons of the Imam Jum‘a and well-known merchants then formally complained of oppression by the government.34 At this point the rhetoric of reform reappeared, and at meetings which took place once a week, the people again asked for a Majlis-i Muhtarram. However, by March 1900 the people were back in the telegraph office complaining about pul-i siyah (the debased coinage) and the price of grain, and obtained exemption of payment of 18,000 tomans worth of grain. Security was weak in the districts of Shiraz with regular deaths and destruction of property; complaints against the authorities were futile.35 The Visit of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani and Pan-Islamism Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, the renowned preacher, came to Shiraz at that point, as part of his mission to support Iranian manufactured goods. He preached in the Masjid-i Vakil, of which Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar was the prayer leader, and was heard by an extraordinarily large crowd of people. He exhorted them to subscribe to a new enterprise, the Islamic Company (Shirkat-i Islamiyya), which supported the manufacture and marketing of local products. He also bade them refrain from purchasing foreign goods,36 a gesture which he linked to loyalty to and support of the homeland (vatan). Sayyid Jamal was to remain in Shiraz for about two months. The movement to support the Islamic Company gathered momentum, and in February 1900 a significant gathering took place in the premises of one of the major merchants. Those who attended included Qavam al-Mulk, Nasir al-Daula, his son and vizier of Fars, Intizam al-Mamalik, who had the military rank of Amir Tuman, Mu‘tamid-i Divan a lesser member of the Qavami clan, the vizier of trade, Mubashir-i Divan, Director of the Post Office of Fars, and Shaikh al-Ra’is. Other state officials attended, including 20 mustaufis (financial officials), as well as 20 important merchants, 25 ‘ulama, students (tullab) and 30 members of the guilds.

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The gathering, which lasted four hours, listened to a speech by Sayyid Jamal al-Din, once again publicising the Islamic Company, and encouraging the support of all levels of society. The emphasis on cooperation in an Islamic enterprise partly reflects the prevailing debate on Pan-Islam in the wider Muslim world, which was well represented in the press, particularly Habl al-Matin. It was also a means of uniting social groups, the great majority of whom still saw politics in traditional Islamic terms. It also encouraged a nascent sense of nationalism. Shaikh al-Ra’is was, of course, a Pan-Islamist, but being also a Baha’i, may have had a more political than religious understanding of the movement, essentially one for the defence of Islamic lands against foreigners, than the majority of its adherents. However, there were also likely to have been those amongst the state officials who had begun to take a more secular perspective, but probably without being able to identify and define the concept. The gathering also discussed other matters, thereby demonstrating how informed the participants were on international affairs. They talked about the war in the Transvaal, South Africa, and commended the people there for making a stand against the British (thereby providing an example for Iran). The question of arms was also raised, and the Mubashir-i Divan first complained of the numbers of arms imported from abroad, and then suggested that the government construct a national (milli) arms company in Isfahan. These arms he suggested (not altogether wisely) could be distributed among the population so that there was a ready-made army to protect religion and state (at this time, of course, still inextricably bound together in popular perception). It would provide a good profit for its owner and empower the country. What was needed above all, the gathering agreed, was reform (islah) itself of the entire system of government, including the treasury. A further issue raised at the occasion was the question of the improvement and modernisation of education, which would contribute much to the progress of the country. The Islamic Company thus advanced the debate on a number of related issues, including the development of the concept of the vatan and the term national (milli), the objective of reform of the system throughout, and the ideas of unity and cooperation in the strengthening of the country – and the religion – economically, militarily and in the development of knowledge. A further building-block of country-wide if not yet entirely national unity was the opposition to the customs reforms by the merchants. Habl al-Matin in particular played an important part in keeping merchants in one part of the country informed of the campaign by those in another part, and thus mobilising support. In June 1900 it printed a copy of a telegram sent in May by the merchants of Shiraz to those of Bushehr objecting not only to the imposition of the new tariff, but just as much to the foreign administration, designated a threat to state and religion. In retaliation they were organising a boycott of internal and external trade, including that of (foreign) banks and the government administration. The boycott was to include the hire of mules, the use of money orders, and the conveying of cargo through customs.37

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According to Yaghma’i, Sayyid Jamal al-Din became caught up in a dispute between the governor of Shiraz, Shu‘a al-Saltana, and Qavam al-Mulk, and as a result had to leave and return to Isfahan.38 Thus elite and probably other rivalries undermined the consensus he had briefly built. In 1902 Shaikh al-Ra’is suffered a similar fate when popular disturbances led to his being declared an infidel and ordered to leave Shiraz.39 The background to his exile is not clear, but in January 1902 he became involved in an elite dispute between the governor, Shu‘a al-Saltana, whom he advised on reform, and Mu‘in al-Shari‘a, the son of the Imam Jum‘a, when he tried to prevent a riot organised by the latter against the former.40 It was a turbulent period, as a severe drought had led to the rise in the price of bread. In addition, Qavam al-Mulk, who had been away from Shiraz, returned, leading to a power struggle between him and the governor. In March, the governor was recalled to Tehran, and Shaikh al-Ra’is was induced to promote the governor’s cause with the people, so that his recall would be cancelled.41 He led a large crowd of roughs and women, said to be the servants of the powerful Nuri clan and their wives, Jews (for reasons as yet unclear) and princes (presumably of the governor’s family) to ask for his reappointment and complain that Qavam had organised a riot. In essence an open power struggle took place between Shu‘a al-Saltana and Qavam, with one represented by a crowd in the telegraph office and the other similarly connected to a crowd in the main mosque, thus dividing Shiraz. The interests of the ‘ulama in Shaikh al-Ra’is for his unorthodox belief and of Qavam for his support of Shu‘a al-Saltana, now coincided. Shaikh al-Ra’is’s house was surrounded by ‘ulama and persons of the poor class, who threatened him with death, and he, like Shu‘a al-Saltana, was forced to leave Shiraz. This event demonstrates clearly how the cause of reform in Shiraz became embroiled with abiding elite rivalry and economic unrest. The Struggle against the Customs Reforms: Habl al-Matin and the Idea of an Assembly In 1903 the country-wide campaign against the customs reforms was one of the factors that brought down the Prime Minister, Amin al-Sultan, along with his rivalry with ‘Ain al-Daula. Both the merchants and ‘ulama of Shiraz joined this struggle. On the one hand, most wanted to complain to the Shah about Amin al-Sultan; others sought to inform the ‘ulama of the ‘Atabat that they supported him. This latter initiative was resisted by the chief mujtahid, Mirza Ibrahim.42 This mujtahid was held in very high regard in particular by the people of Fars, and was known for administrating justice with impartiality.43 He was in effect the scholar of Shiraz, and endeavoured as far as possible not to be drawn into either side of a dispute. In any case, the campaign against Amin al-Sultan succeeded, and he resigned at the end of October 1903, to the delight of the Shirazis, who considered that a disaster for people and government (daulat va millat) had been removed.

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After the resignation of Amin al-Sultan, Habl al-Matin was congratulated by one Muhammad Riza writing an article from Shiraz, in generating a lively national debate over a ten-year period on the need for better government, and encouraged to continue its good work.44 He said that its part in the mobilisation of public opinion was indeed not insignificant, and launched into criticism of the depths of the roots of absolutism, regretting that affairs were not managed without consultation with the people. Amongst the points addressed was the lack of continuity of policy, caused by the frequent changes of governors (brought about by the royal policy of selling the governorships each year). The only way to solve the problem was to establish a consultative assembly (majlis-i mashvirat) in which people and government could collaborate. Such an assembly would enable progress, and enlighten and strengthen both people and government. It should be composed of elected representatives of any group and level (that is, not just the elite). However, ‘any group or level’ would not appear to mean universal suffrage, as further on the article mentions that the ‘representatives of bakers, grocers and landowners’ would take part in the national assembly (dar al- shurayi milli), with majority votes, so that no one could claim that their rights had been ignored. Ministers must be members of the assembly and responsible to it, and only the assembly (that is, not the shah) could remove the chosen government. Thus the problems of everyone, from the prime minister to the ordinary worker ( farrash), would be addressed. However, this particular suggestion, whilst being an advance in the national debate on restructuring, was not exactly of a secular nature. The proposed assembly was to ensure that the rights of the shari‘a were observed, so that (ideally) it would prevent the power-hungry from causing divisions between people and government. Further, it would prevent the government from enacting laws in the name of the shari‘a which were really nothing of the kind. On the other hand, a law passed by the majority of the assembly, in the presence of the leading ‘ulama, and then executed, would be one to which there could be no objection. Above all, the affairs of people and government would come under the law, and thus there would be no suspicion of the government as there was at present. Otherwise the present system of government by extortion, and force used against the powerless, would continue, and the country would go on declining. Law: Religious and Secular Clearly, this represents a very idealistic view of the workings of the proposed assembly, evident in its being seen as an end to all divisions and to self-interested government; and its claim that the rights of all were to be addressed. The identification of the law with the shari‘a may not have been meant to be interpreted literally. Many readers would have realised that the qanun of such a majlis was a modern state law that would provide rationalised government and administration in a way that the religious law was not designed to do. Therefore the use of the shari‘a in the argument would seem to have had more of a legitimising than

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a religious purpose. At the same time, the writer seems to have envisaged that the shari‘a would have a moral influence in preventing the kind of divisions that would destroy the new assembly; it would facilitate the much sought-after trust between people and government. The designated role of the ‘ulama was part of the similar pious vision of many Iranian reformers at the time; few people understood what secularism was and how it might clash with the shari‘a, particularly in a potential conflict of authority between religious and secular law. An article discussing the subject of law also written from Shiraz, though more secular in tone, appeared subsequently in Habl al-Matin a year later, in July 1904.45 This time the position on qanun as secular (that is, non-religious state law) was clearer and more emphatic. The article argued that there was no real law in the country and that the government was not limited (mahdud) by law in its actions of whatever kind. Without a proper law the people could have no tranquillity, there could be no progress, and reform would not be achieved. As an example of the lack of accountability of those in authority, the article cited an incident in which three followers of the late Haji Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar had come to the Muhammadi press and attacked its editor, Aqa Muhammad Hadi over a publication. The article commented that if the government did not create a law to limit the power of those such as this mullah, the people of the country could be neither prosperous, nor secure. The Struggle with Shu‘a al-Saltana and the Coming of the Revolution Beyond the fact that the news of the Japanese naval victory over the Russians in February 1904 heartened the people of Shiraz, as elsewhere in Iran, the picture is of the same political and economic character through to 1905. Governors came and went leaving Shu‘a al-Saltana set to return in April 1904, causing Qavam al-Mulk to prepare his supporters for possible vengeance for their role in his fall.46 Shiraz was reported to be divided into three groups, those who supported Shu‘a al-Saltana, those who supported Qavam, and a third waiting to see which of them prevailed before declaring their preference.47 Rival mujtahids likewise struggled for pre-eminence, with Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Fal Asiri striving to protect the eminent position he had inherited from his father, Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar, who had died in August 1901, from an Aqa Mirza Hasan not long come from Najaf.48 Support for this newcomer was interpreted as one of several signs of general unrest in Shiraz over the established order, not least because the price of provisions had reached an exorbitant level. A further change of generation occurred among the ‘ulama in August 1905, when the Imam Jum‘a died, and was succeeded by his son, Mu‘in al-Shari‘a, who thus became Sayyid Muhammad Imam Jum‘a.49 Meanwhile the governor, Shu‘a al-Saltana, could collect no taxes.50 As frequently happened in times of hardship, foreigners became a target of discontent, especially the foreign schools.51 In September began the movement of discontent against the state administration in Shiraz, and particularly against Shu‘a al-Saltana, that was to be the first

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precipitating event of the Constitutional Revolution. Matters came to a head in the autumn of 1905, when the smouldering discontent against the governor came out into the open. In the year that followed, at a time of continuous financial crisis, the situation in Shiraz and much of Fars was tumultuous. However, most of the features of the struggle were similar to those of unrest throughout the nineteenth century. These included economic problems, particularly inflation,52 problems over tax-gathering, elite rivalries, ‘ulama rivalries, and fear of the growing influence of foreign concerns. However, this time protests included women on a larger scale than any previously. The language of rebellion was traditional, protest against oppression and injustice and the demand for redress of grievances;53 it also included requests for rightful government, combined with attacks on the Jewish quarter,54 as regularly occurred at times of economic crisis. There was still little sign of the modern language of reform, or that the great majority of the population really understood what was happening in Tehran, right up until early 1907. The major innovative feature was the use by the people on a serious scale of the British Consulate as an instrument in their protest against the Iranian state. In fact this action may have influenced the great bast in Tehran in the summer of 1906. The first intimation the British had of serious unrest was in late September 1905, when four people belonging to different social groups – landed proprietors, clergy, merchants, various followers of Qavam al-Mulk, shop owners and mule owners – approached the consul in Shiraz about his likely attitude in event of the people seeking protection against the ‘tyranny’ of the authorities in Fars.55 The consul agreed to pass on petitions to Tehran, but discouraged any attempt to take refuge under a foreign flag. The agitation was stirred by the Salar al-Sultan, the son of Qavam al-Mulk, who had been exiled from Shiraz.56 Meanwhile, Shu‘a al-Saltana left Shiraz on 30 September. In early November an unusually large crowd, including over 500 women, appeared at the weekly rauza khvani of Mirza Ibrahim.57 They presented petitions against the ‘usurpation’ of their property by the Shu‘a al-Saltana. Riots erupted on 19 November, drawing even the moderate clergy into participation.58 The mujtahids were obliged to telegraph the Shah, and received the angry response that they should go to their mosques and pray, and send a representative to Tehran if they had anything to say.59 Despite continual reiteration of non-intervention by the British, their involvement in the popular movement was viewed with concern by Iranian government officials in Shiraz. In particular, it was suggested that they were likely to use the attacks on the Jews to increase their Indian guard,60 which would enhance their influence. Indeed, attacks on the Jews in Shiraz were growing throughout this time, to the point where they dared not come out of the town. Jewish women, especially, were subjected to indignities.61 On 22 November 1905, a crowd of 300 men and boys, mainly from the lower social groups, together with about 10 women, gathered at the gate of the British Consulate. Like other demonstrations involving women in nineteenth-century Iran, this one had evidently been carefully planned.62 The group of women

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initiated the negotiations with the British Consul by saying they had not come to send a telegram but to become British subjects, to which the Consul responded that they would need five years’ residence in Britain. The chorus, as he termed them, then said they wanted a house under the wing of the consulate to abide in until their grievances were resolved. Mr Grahame (the Consul) said that no such dwelling was available. The women protested that the Shah was not allowed to hear of their grievances. The Consul responded that he would do what he could, but that they must make their husbands resume work. The women replied, How can our unhappy husbands go back to work? They are afraid of the servants of the government [hukumat] harassing them. The government oppresses the people in a thousand ways. They need to be protected by a British guarantee of their safety. They also displayed little faith in the leading mujtahid, Mirza Ibraham, whom they claimed to have been bribed to sit at home. On the following day, 23 November, the women and roughs ran around the bazaars, causing shops that had begun to open to stay closed. They dragged people out of their houses and made them join the demonstration.63 The Grievances of the People By 1 December 1905, ‘Ain al-Daula had sent a telegram promising investigation and redress of grievances, but the unrest had now spread to the surrounding districts. In Jahrum, the deputy governor was seized in the bathhouse and paraded unclothed through the bazaar.64 That day a long telegram was sent by ‘ulama, some notables and merchants to ‘Ain al-Daula listing the grievances of the people under five headings: 1 The increase of the maliyat levied on the tribal districts. The rightful tax was 6,000 tomans, whereas 20,000 had been levied. 2 The number of state employees in the provinces (and thus the cost of the administration) had greatly increased, with consequent adverse financial implications for the local population. 3 Taxes additional to the customs dues had been levied on Fasa and Neriz. 4 Orders from Tehran on redressing grievances on the road tax had been disregarded. 5 The government had attempted to seize property, especially shops, in the bazaars. The telegram concluded with a general complaint at the absence of any kind of justice. The Fars government had no respect for life, property or honour.65 From this list the predominantly financial nature of the grievances, and the traditional means of expressing them are clear. In a later telegram sent to the main foreign

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legations, the Shirazis also pointed out that effective governors had been sent, but they were not given the time or an opportunity to implement their policies.66 On 4 December, however, the agitation took a significant new turn in that the leading ‘ulama of Shiraz telegrammed those of Tehran urging them to support their case with the authorities there,67 and the agitation thus acquired an interregional character of co-ordination and support. Telegrams were also sent to Kerbala. Sayyid Muhammad, one of the Shirazi mujtahids, telegrammed the British Consul saying no response had come from Tehran, and asking if the people of Fars could approach the Shah through the British Legation.68 This manoeuvre is significant as it resembles the way the Ottoman ambassador was used as an intermediary by the clergy-led movement in Tehran. A similar attempt was made to involve the Russian Legation. The karguzar of Fars reported in despair that the situation in the area was very dangerous because it played into the hands of the British.69 He pleaded for action in response to the people’s grievances, especially in view of their mounting disrespect for their own government, and thought their concerns regarding Shu‘a al-Saltana were not receiving sufficiently serious attention. Whatever the intentions of the British then, he was to be ultimately correct in that they would not go on tolerating escalating disorder. The Effects of Disorder and the Bast in the British Consulate The agitation continued to gather momentum into January 1906. Nightly meetings, occupation of the Shah Chiragh Shrine, and closure of the bazaar took place; so did a struggle of wills as between Shah and populace as to whether Shu‘a al-Saltana should be completely removed as governor of Fars.70 Blame for the disturbances was placed in particular on Sayyid Ahmad Dastaki, described to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as ‘a luti who wears a turban’, who should be thrown out of the province.71 He was later to emerge as a leader of Islamic radicalism. However, support was beginning to flag in some cases. An agreement between the merchants of Bushehr and those of Shiraz not to transport merchandise faltered as those of Bushehr grew tired of it. Many poor craftsmen were badly affected, and ribald songs about both Sardar Akram (the then acting governor) and Mirza Ibrahim mujtahid were sung in the streets.72 A strongly worded telegraph came from Tehran saying that if the riot did not calm down, Amir Bahadur-i Jang would be sent with a force from Tehran to suppress it and make sure the roughs got their just deserts.73 Although there were rumours of the revolutionary movement in Russia inflaming the situation, there is no evidence of it in either organisation or ideas. At the end of January, by which time the opposition movement in Tehran had dispersed following the granting of the request for an ‘adalatkhana, the disturbance in Shiraz was still in process, and its principal objective was still the removal of the governor, Shu‘a al-Saltana. His replacement was finally confirmed in February 1906.74 However, relative peace only returned to Shiraz when his women, children and attendants departed on 7 April.75 He was replaced by Vazir Makhsus.

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Problems remained over the government of Fars, the difficulties of which were hardly due to one individual governor, however grave his shortcomings. The discontent reached a climax on 9 June 1906 when between 300 to 400 people of all social groups (including the guilds, but not the ‘ulama) took refuge in the British Consulate in Shiraz76 (thus providing a precedent for the great bast in Tehran in July–August 1906). A number were leading members of the administration of Fars, suggesting there were personal as well as reformist motives. Although there were no open complaints against the Vazir Makhsus, the interim governor of Fars, the unrest partly derived from intrigues against him in different districts by petty governors appointed originally by Shu‘a al-Saltana; and he suffered in addition from lack of central government support. Otherwise complaints focused on taxes and the perceived injustices of Shu‘a al-Saltana, especially his claiming crown lands in Fars, and ownership of the main bazaar in Shiraz. The bastis persuaded George Grahame, the British Consul, to act as their intermediary between them and the Shah, and in the meantime they set up tents in a neighbouring garden, where they held a majlis which met twice daily. Eventually the bastis withdrew on 21 June at the request of the mujtahid, Mirza Ibrahim, who made a speech opining that perhaps the oppression (zulm) they were experiencing from their superiors was punishment for their own zulm to others. He also enjoined his flock to obey the ‘urf (administrative law) and the shari‘a, and retire to their homes.77 The whole scene was viewed with deep disgust in some quarters of Shiraz. One correspondent of Habl al-Matin wrote that it was enough to make true patriots cry tears of blood to see their fellow countrymen take refuge with foreigners in their own land. He asked what better opportunity there was for the advancement of foreign influence.78 This view is echoed by that of certain merchants in Bushehr (including the agent of Mu‘in al-Tujjar), unhappy over British influence there, who warned the Shiraz merchants of the possible ill-effects of taking refuge in the British Legation.79 The karguzar of Fars wrote that the solution to the problem was to reinstate Qavam al-Mulk, and keep Salar al-Sultan and Nasir al-Daula in Shiraz, as they were the only ones who knew how to keep order in Shiraz.80 The problems regarding the British and the Jews would have been much worse if Salar al-Sultan had not been here. He added that he thought the situation was being stirred by Mu‘tamid-i Divan (an aspiring rival of Qavam from the Qavami clan),81 and Saulat al-Daula (Ilkhani of the Qashqa’i tribe). It was thus not lost on the central government that the situation was being stirred by a tribal leader. He went on to say that ‘Ata al-Saltana (one of the local notables) was expressing his own view that either Qavam should return and restore order, or through force, two kurur (one million people) of Fars must perish. Objections on Religious Grounds On the other hand, some of the communications with the government carried a religious tone, for example, a telegram sent in April 1906 from the ‘ulama of Shiraz to ‘Ain al-Daula expressed the hope that the government would be

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free of the previous oppression, and follow the path of administering justice and implementing rights (ihqaq-i huquq).82 Another telegram sent at this time from ‘the ‘ulama, notables and subjects of Fars’ to the Crown Prince in Tabriz complained of the oppression of the servants of the shari‘a and disrespect for Islam. It explained that up to now they had believed that government should be by the notables and the wise, not by just one farangi-ma’ab (foreign imitator – possibly referring to ‘Ain al-Daula for his support for the customs administration). Since Iran was a jumhuri-yi Islami (here meaning an Islamic political community), when the ‘ulama in any town led an uprising, the government had to remove the governor for the well-being (maslahat) of the people.83 It cannot be certain who sent this telegram, but some of its language is novel. The Vazir Makhsus was dismissed from Shiraz on 13 June, and the new governor, ‘Ala al-Daula, arrived there on 3 July 1906.84 He introduced a new ‘court of justice’, which included notables, bureaucrats and representative merchants to examine petitions. This institution brought an element of modern organisation to a traditional Islamic responsibility. Such was the local nature of the sense of grievances in Shiraz that the initial stages of the constitutional movement in Tehran caused no echo there, and it was not until the end of July that reports of it began to circulate.85 This was partly because news was blocked by the British through their control of the telegraph. Their preoccupation was with disorder, not least because of continuing attacks on the Jews. However, the fact that the governor of Fars was not consulted first is an indication of their growing confidence in their authority in the south. In the meantime the leading clergy received a telegram from the ‘ulama of Tabriz calling them to resist oppression and defend the shari‘a. Indeed, at this point it seems to have been the ‘ulama who played the most conspicuous role in leading support of the movement, as in Tehran.86 By mid-August ‘Ala al-Daula was deeply pessimistic about the situation because of the continuing intrigues of Shu‘a al-Saltana through his long-standing interests and supporters in Fars, lack of support from the Shah, and the consequent spread of discontent.87 Shiraz and the New Majlis By October 1906, the discontented population of Fars had in the meantime begun to take note of the new Majlis as a possible means of remedying their grievances.88 On 10 October the leading merchants sent a telegram to the Majlis pointing out that, despite repeated remonstrations, their grievances against Shu‘a al-Saltana had not yet been addressed, and threatening that if Qavam al-Mulk continued his relations with the former governor, they would ‘bring down his house on the ears of his womankind’.89 The election of representatives to the Majlis proceeded slowly, as elsewhere, and whilst some viewed the institution with great enthusiasm, others doubted its efficacy.90 The merchants of Tehran tried to involve those of Shiraz in the raising of an internal loan of two-and-a-half million tomans to assist the government, but the Shirazis

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demurred unless satisfactory security be provided and the purpose of the loan be set out clearly.91 The situation again reached crisis point in November when ‘Ala al-Daula was recalled and by 19 November there were many thousands of people demonstrating to prevent his departure.92 However, the city was ostensibly quiet by mid-December. The campaign against the former governor and his partisans continued, and ‘the people of Fars’, represented by about 16 merchants, telegrammed the Majlis and the ‘ulama of Tehran complaining on the subject.93 Their perception that it was necessary to contact the ‘ulama as well reflects both the weakness of the new institution, and the traditional perspective and value system from which many Iranians viewed it. Although the Shiraz representatives were reportedly chosen in early December – Haj Muhazzab al-Daula for the clergy, Nizam al-Din Mirza for the notables, Haji ‘Abd al-Rahman and Haji Bashir al-Divan for the merchants94 – the elections had still not been completed by 20 January 1907, that is to say after the promulgating of the constitution.95 However, new-style organisation began to appear, and a local council of 30 members consisting of various social groups met regularly in the house of Muhazzab al-Daula, the chosen representative of the clergy. It invited various nomad tribes of Fars to send representatives to it.96

5 Isfahan the religious elite and Zill al-Sultan

This chapter discusses the issue of reform in Isfahan between 1892 and 1906 with special reference to the emergence of Islamism.1 Whereas much of the approach to reform in other parts of Iran may be considered to be have been imbued with the Shi‘i Islamic culture of the country, in Isfahan the path of change took a more specifically organised and ideological character, which may lead to it being designated as an early form of Islamism. That this happened is due in particular to the power of the Masjid-Shahi family, and especially to two of its members. These were the powerful and wealthy mujtahid Aqa Najafi (b.1262/1845–1846 and d. 1332/1914) and his much younger brother Haj Aqa Nurallah (b. 1287/1870– 1871 and d. 1306sh/1927). Both were primarily motivated by their disquiet at the increase of foreign influence in Iran, in a variety of forms. However, the rapid burgeoning of new ideas on resistance to the impact of Western imperialism had a greater influence on Nurallah, who was responsive to the ideological currents in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere in the Muslim world, whereas Aqa Najafi adopted more traditional and cruder methods of strengthening Islam against the advance of the West. Isfahan at the End of the Nineteenth Century Isfahan was a flourishing centre of architecture, the arts, learning, philosophy and commerce even before the Safavid Shah ‘Abbas (1586–1629) made it the capital of his dynasty at the end of the sixteenth century. Isfahan reached its apogee during his reign in the early seventeenth century. In 1722 the Safavid dynasty ended when the city fell to an Afghan invasion and was sacked. Though Nadir Shah (1736–1747) drove out the Afghans in 1729–1730, the country was

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unsettled and Isfahan continued in a state of decay, except for some years after Karim Khan Zand took it in 1758–1759. From the end of the eighteenth century, it, like other cities, began to benefit from the greater security provided by the Qajars, who, however, made Tehran their capital. By the mid-nineteenth century, the population of Isfahan was estimated at 60,000,2 and the state of the city was dilapidated. In 1872, the population was also put at 60,000.3 In 1877 Husain Khan Tahvildar estimated that the population was 50,000, basing his view on food consumption and the reports he gathered from the heads of the city’s quarters.4 He commented on the decline of the guilds generally, and noted in particular that the makers of printed cloth had been much affected by foreign imports.5 By the end of the nineteenth century raw cotton was exported from Isfahan to Russia.6 The number of foreigners in Isfahan grew substantially at this time as a result of the advance of the world economy. Modern banking in particular was established, both as a result of and an impetus to the growth of trade. However, the modern financial sector was in foreign hands. Curzon refers to Isfahan as the second largest trading emporium in Iran (after Tabriz), and estimates the population at 70–80,000, following a recent revival in commercial activity.7 He lists its main imports as Manchester clothing, copper sheets from the UK, and tin and zinc from Java, and its exports as being opium (widely grown in the Isfahan district, and a major export of Iran at this period), tobacco, and carpets. The Governorship of Zill al-Sultan During most of the period in question Isfahan was under the governorship of one of the most powerful men in Iran, the Shah’s eldest son Ma‘sud Mirza Zill al-Sultan (1850–1918).8 Appointed governor of Isfahan at a very young age, he was able and ruthless. By the early 1880s he was undertaking a number of projects to embellish the city, which included the encouragement of the founding of a school with a modernised curriculum, the establishment of a learned society, the building of a hospital, the fostering of trade and agriculture, and the restoration of the dilapidated areas.9 By 1888 Zill al-Sultan had created a virtual state within a state, supported by a well trained and funded military force.10 In addition to Isfahan, he held the governorships of Fars, Borujerd, Khonsar, Mahalat, Yazd, Khuzistan, Luristan, ‘Araq, Kurdistan and Gulpaigan, amongst others.11 The combination of his extensive control of the south, his well-drilled military force, and his links with the British, led the Shah in 1888 to remove all the governorships from him, except Isfahan, and to dismantle his military force. He never regained the position he lost, particularly vis à vis the powerful and wealthy old established ‘ulama families, with whom he now had to come to a greater degree of accommodation than he had in the past. Isfahan was in fact a deeply pious city and a centre of religious knowledge. At the end of the nineteenth century it had 146 mosques, which were not only centres of worship but also a focus of social life, learning and religious education.

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Therefore their influence on the intellectual life of Isfahan was considerable.12 In addition, the extensive religious endowments and other land holdings ensured the ‘ulama had a highly significant place in the city’s elite, which enabled them to enforce a strongly religious culture. In the early twentieth century, the British consul, Barnhan, in a journey to Sultanabad and its environs, commented that he found in all the smaller towns an absence of the zealous spirit among the ‘ulama which was such a feature of life in Isfahan.13 Aqa Najafi, the Masjid-Shahi Family and Zill al-Sultan Zill al-Sultan’s position in Isfahan was therefore much weakened from 1888 onwards, and the politics of Isfahan became dominated by one mujtahid, the above-mentioned Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Aqa Najafi, the son of Shaikh Muhammad Baqir.14Aqa Najafi owed his immense influence to his great wealth and family prestige, as well as to his position as the prayer leader in the principal mosque, the Masjid-i Shah. These advantages put most of the legal business in Isfahan into the hands of his family, known as Masjid-Shahi, but both Iranian and British observers commented that he was very astute in handling the ordinary people. He was said to have been exceptionally receptive to their wishes and opinions, understanding what they were trying to say even when they did not express it clearly. He was adept at developing a strategy with which to realise popular concerns and gain widespread support, all the while assessing whether it was gaining public acceptance.15 Once he was completely sure of the grounds of his strategy, he pursued it, winning the support of the majority of the population. For this reason, he always succeeded in his objectives, in contrast to the other ‘ulama, who lacked his perspicacity.16 He was also perceived as thinking about the community, as having a sincere social conscience, and of being a sincere and just man, impervious to bribes, if avaricious.17 Being the son of a leading mujtahid, Aqa Najafi learned Islamic politics early, and the role and responsibilities of a cleric with regard to the problems and issues of his time. In particular he witnessed how a leading mujtahid was expected to struggle against the absolutist system, a battle that was most marked against Zill al-Sultan, and the need to protect the oppressed against the power of an absolutist state.18 Aqa Najafi’s influence extended beyond Isfahan, into the villages around the Bakhtiyari country. For example, when Faridan was put under the government of a Bakhtiyari Khan, and Gallidari likewise separated from Isfahan, the inhabitants complained to Aqa Najafi, who wrote to Mushir al-Saltana, Vazir A‘zam, requesting that they remain part of the Isfahan administration.19 His connections extended also into Bakhtiyari itself, including the elite, as Zargham al-Saltana Bakhtiyari was a murid (religious adherent) of his.20 Neverthess, Aqa Najafi was very much a prominent member of the Isfahan elite, and although he was engaged in a constant struggle against the governor, Zill al-Sultan, the two also colluded. For example, when they both had a claim to a village, they could negotiate an agreement whereby they divided it.21 The two

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were also frequently reported as conniving in grain hoarding, and Aqa Najafi would export grain to Yazd, even when there was a shortage in Isfahan.22 It was noticeable that when Zill al-Sultan was absent from Isfahan, Aqa Najafi tended to be quiet,23 demonstrating that he needed the governor to set boundaries to the disturbances he created, so that they did not threaten the positions of both. Aqa Najafi was also not necessarily popular with his villagers, and in 1907 the villagers of Velidun (said to be worth 100,000 tomans and to produce crops worth 7000 tomans per year) appeared before the Anjuman (Council) of Isfahan asking for justice from the family of Aqa Najafi. They claimed, firstly, that his father had tricked them into signing away their rights under the guise of offering them protection against over-taxation; and secondly, that they had been cruelly treated. Aqa Najafi called on his old ally-adversary, Zill al-Sultan, who sent in a party of Cossacks to suppress the uprising.24 The Impact of Foreign Influence on Isfahan The huge growth in trade and foreign influence in the country was making itself felt in Isfahan by the later 1880s in a much larger and more evident foreign presence. In the years from 1890 to 1906 the political opinion and configuration of Isfahan were to be shaped by three major concerns already mentioned: the Tobacco Concession of 1891; the creation of the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889, which was followed by the establishment of a branch in Isfahan; and the customs reforms. In addition, the economy of Isfahan was affected by an attempt to form a local tobacco company in 1894, and the rise in the price of piece goods. As elsewhere, Isfahan also suffered in the 1890s from the inflation caused by the decline in the value of silver. The heightened activity of foreign concerns produced a negative reaction, which manifested itself among other ways in persecution of Babis, Jews and foreign Christians. In this popular response, Aqa Najafi took the lead.25 He conducted a crusade against Babism in 1889, obliging hundreds to take refuge in the stables of Zill al-Sultan, and promulgated eight measures against the Jews, including prohibition from riding into town, and eating in the presence of a Muslim during Ramadan.26 The Babis were again attacked in 1892, and their execution demanded.27 Missionaries were both an incitement and a target, since they proselytised amongst Muslims, as well as Christians and Jews. The Church Missionary Society, which both proselytised and injudiciously insisted on moving its Bible Society depot from Julfa into the main town of Isfahan, was a particular provocation to pious opinion.28 Yet being exceptionally well-organised in Isfahan, they also provided a model of how to assert and disseminate a faith in terms of organisation, publications, education and propaganda. Aqa Najafi declared European goods unclean, as part of a campaign to keep missionaries out of Isfahan.29 Needless to say, Aqa Najafi was most relentless in his pursuit of apostates, whom Aqa Najafi forced into hiding by threatening to have them tried for their lack

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of belief.30 He complained to Zill al-Sultan that Qajar princes were reading books from a foreign culture, and would end up wanting to be like foreigners.31 Drinking of wine and music were further subjects of discontent,32 and in 1895 he contrived to have the coffee houses closed, because they were centres of wine drinking and gambling.33 So, to sustain orthodoxy, he was vigilant in his opposition to all forms of deviancy. None of this, it may be observed, bore any trace of a discussion on Islam, reform or modernity. Overall, such attacks were part of a growing resistance to foreign influence, but they were also more frequent, better organised and more clearly formulated than in the past. Aqa Najafi and the Impact of Foreign Influence The major event of the decade, however, was the Tobacco Concession announced on 21 November 1891. It brought insurrection in Isfahan, although there had already been rumblings in September.34 Aqa Najafi called the people to the main square, but was himself summoned to the presence of Zill al-Sultan and threatened to the point where he could not go to the mosque; but the crowd went anyway. The governor sent a message to Aqa Najafi asking why he made such a fuss over tobacco and so little over wine, when the latter was much more unclean, to which the mujtahid replied: ‘This is our shari‘a duty, you keep to your ‘urf duty,’35 thereby taking advantage of the occasion to maintain the position of the ‘ulama with regard to legal jurisdiction. Following the abolition of the Concession in January 1892, Isfahan became quiet. The evident weakness of the state was encouraging to the reformers, and they were reported as being willing to support the ‘ulama, as a way of using them to undermine the existing system, and then to attain their own ends,36 in effect the policy of Malkum Khan. Emboldened by the success of the campaign, Aqa Najafi and other ‘ulama now turned on the Imperial Bank and wrote to complain of it to Tehran, as well as to ‘ulama throughout the country, inciting the overthrow of all other European institutions in Iran.37 Behind their campaign were the Isfahani merchants, increasingly overwhelmed by the sheer volume of capital and commercial organisation on a global scale of their European rivals.38 Their campaign against the Imperial Bank encouraged debtors to seek help, thus obviating the necessity of paying the bank its interest.39 ‘Ulama, State and Legal Jurisdiction The ‘ulama were also engaged in a struggle with the state over their respective spheres of legal jurisdiction, the state having for some time been endeavouring to extend its legal authority at the expense of the ‘ulama, though to little avail. Aqa Najafi now countered by attempting to enlarge his sphere of authority, specifically by getting all questions referred to his court, and by inciting Iranians to renege on their debts to Europeans.40 He also tried to undermine the legal rights of Europeans. In June 1892 a major case arose concerning a merchant who was

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a British subject, on which Aqa Najafi produced a most interesting opinion. Therein it is possible to discern the very early beginnings of Iranian religious nationalism, as well as the traditional view of religion and state being the twin pillars of Islamic rule:41 According to the law of the government of Islam, any order which is issued by the national42 religious law has to be carried out. Religion and government are twins and there is no difference. In any case where the religious judge has given decisions, the government has to carry them out and there is nothing beyond this. In reality, both [litigants] are subject to the government of Islam, and their case is to be decided by religious law … Even if Malthos Aqa is a British subject, according to English law also, the subject of any nation must obey the laws of the country in which he is. Here it is the government of Islam, and people must obey its law.43 Thus a territorial aspect comes into Islamic practice, which was not previously present, and we see the beginning of absorption of the concept that law relates to territorial jurisdiction. Religious responses to imperial influence began to reflect the wider development of territorial loyalties in the shaping of national identity, as traced by Kashani Sabet.44 Aqa Najafi and the Economic Problems of Isfahan In 1893 a major issue between Aqa Najafi and the governor of Isfahan was the desire of the British Consul, Preece, to move into the centre of the city. With popular support Aqa Najafi tried to persuade other ‘ulama to join him, but they were cautious for fear of the Shah. ‘The Shah is a fool,’ said Aqa Najafi, ‘and I am not afraid of him.’45 The main source of contention at this point, however, was a rise in the cost of piece goods due to the heavy depreciation in the value of silver currency, which had a deleterious effect on the sale of European merchandise.46 People went to Aqa Najafi and his brother, Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali, to complain of the prices, and brought pressure on the local dealers not to collect the goods from the European merchants, in protest. They complied despite the fact that it meant they would lose money. As a result the foreign merchants were forced, by an effective embargo on their goods, to bring down their prices by 6 per cent, though not without objection, and the local merchants were also resentful of Aqa Najafi.47 Zill al-Sultan judiciously kept out of the whole issue, in order to maintain good relations with both sides. Economic problems were again to the fore at the end of the year, when there was a scarcity of bread, causing much discontent in city and villages. There were rumours of Aqa Najafi and Zill al-Sultan cornering wheat. Placards appeared in the bazaar abusing Aqa Najafi, and calling him a ‘wheat merchant’.48 He was forced by a crowd, mostly of women, to go and remonstrate on their behalf with Zill al-Sultan and oblige him to bring down the price.49 Zill al-Sultan stated that

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it was not possible, but having no troops to quell the riot, had to give way to a request for consultation on the subject. An assembly (majlis) duly met, which consisted of 500 members representing different classes. After consultation, they agreed a price for wheat, a little above that originally requested, and for retailed bread.50 A Local Tobacco Company and its Implications The troubles of the tobacco trade continued after the demise of the Concession. The Ottoman Empire, the main market for Iranian tobacco, placed restraints on its import by granting a monopoly to the Société de Tombac, which greatly reduced the purchase of Iranian tobacco.51 The effects of the change were felt in Isfahan by 1893 to 1894, and various attempts were made to establish Iranian tobacco companies to market the product, including one by Aqa Najafi.52 The cultivators of tobacco petitioned Zill al-Sultan on the failure of their agent to sell their tobacco, and on the fact that they were being taxed when they had not made a sale.53 Zill al-Sultan tried to shift the burden to the merchants by forcing them to purchase the tobacco, so that he could obtain his taxes. The merchants explained that they had a backlog of tobacco, and would be ruined if they bought more, but suggested instead that a company be formed which would have sole rights to buy the tobacco from the cultivators. This company was duly established, its primary aim being to prevent damage to tobacco cultivation, and further loss to those engaged in the trade. Its proposal was that less tobacco should be grown, so that the Société de Tombac was squeezed out, and that the cultivators did not sell tobacco for export, but only for the internal market. Zill al-Sultan was persuaded to grant the company officially the sole right of export from Isfahan. A document was produced detailing the arrangements for the company, and signed by Zill al-Sultan and several ‘ulama, thus establishing a new degree of co-operation and organisation in Isfahan in the face of an outside threat. The Prime Minister, Amin al-Sultan, also supported the venture, and the ‘ulama preached that Iranians should stop doing business with foreigners. The company had 100,000 tomans in shares for which purchasers had to provide documents. Not unexpectedly, problems arose because the company could not persuade the Société de Tombac to buy its tobacco. The Ottoman company complained to the Shah that tobacco could not be exported from Isfahan as it was being hoarded. The Shah took rapid action, because the new company was contravening the contract he had entered into with the Ottoman company, which provided him with some money to pay off the British for the cancellation of their concession. Rebuked by the Shah, Zill al-Sultan denied that he had had anything to do with it, and the Shah’s wrath fell on Amin al-Sultan and the merchants. The peasants too were displeased, as they disliked being told to reduce their tobacco crop, and suspected that the whole thing was a monopoly initiated by Zill al-Sultan.54 Whilst the company drew together unlikely collaborators in the national interest, its struggle to survive demonstrates the skein of problems faced by local commercial ventures.

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The Emergence of a Reform Movement The formation of the company, however, produced new political language on the subject of its venture, and demonstrates how the merchants of Isfahan, though themselves pious, emphasised the religious basis of the company to secure it popular support. A leaflet distributed at the time stated that they had founded the company because people of Iran had to unite, and if they implemented the principles of their religion, there would be much progress. Government support was also important. Finally, the leaflet spoke of the daulat va millat (state and people) obliging the cultivators to grow less in the general interest.55 Here we have an early reference in Isfahan to the term daulat va millat that was to become current at the time of the Constitutional Revolution. It represents an intermediary phase between the older references to daulat va ru‘aya (state and subjects) and the term millat, meaning nation. The people were moving up from being subordinate to the state to being a partner with it, sharing in its authority, though they were not yet one of its integral elements. Aqa Najafi himself began deploying this new national (milli) language. After an incident in which two Muslims were killed in Julfa in 1896, he wrote to Zill al-Sultan requesting the strengthening of the country (taqviyyat-i millat), and that the matter be remedied since the well-being of the people and the state (salah-i millat va daulat) required it.56 In this way he demonstrated that he was beginning to adopt the language of reform. He declared himself to have been a long time active in the well-being of people and state, and that he was trying to calm the people down. Meanwhile, the local tobacco company survived and managed to do business, but the battle with the Ottoman company continued, with the latter trying to undercut the Iranians, whilst warning the Shah that they would not be able to pay him anything.57 In 1897 a meeting took place between Zill al-Sultan, the leading merchants of Isfahan, and the Ottoman company, where, after some discussion, all parties agreed to collaborate to their mutual benefit, and an agreement was signed to that effect.58 Aqa Najafi and the Imperial Bank Meanwhile, problems had also developed with regard to the British Imperial Bank, which had been established in 1889, and received a concession from the Iranian government to provide banking facilities and issue notes. A branch in Isfahan was established in the same year. The bank undermined the position of the traditional bankers (sarrafs) who were instrumental in fomenting agitation against it in alliance with bazaaris and ‘ulama, who saw it as a new and dangerous form of foreign influence in the country. In 1894 Aqa Najafi at first contemplated sending his tullab (students) to wreck it, but then opted to try to form a bank of his own.59 He gave all the assistance in

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his power to the chief debtor of the Imperial Bank and wrote constant letters to the manager about other debtors, in an attempt to resist the Bank’s claims. His own banking initiative was blocked by both the Shah and Zill al-Sultan at the instigation of the British, the Shah in particular having no desire to see further disorder such as that over the Tobacco Concession.60 However, Aqa Najafi persisted in his harassment of the bank, particularly when a dispute between the Chief Secretary (and bank debt collector) and one of the local sarrafs caused all the others to close. A meeting was held to discuss the matter in front of the deputy governor of the town, Rukn al-Mulk, which decided there was no case to answer. The Acting Manager, however, then felt obliged to respond to Aqa Najafi to state his case before him, thereby virtually admitting the right of the ‘ulama to interfere in the civil administration of the city.61 The British being now also anxious to get rid of the Secretary, he was obliged to leave. Thus Aqa Najafi and the merchants manipulated the disturbance to encroach on the rights of the government, and to embarrass the foreign power. The Problems of Debased Coinage By 1895 one of the main problems for the people of Isfahan as elsewhere was the debased coinage, or so-called black money, in which the Imperial Bank would only deal on the most unfavourable terms. This situation was the result of mismanagement of the mint, which produced both defective silver coinage and copper coins known as ‘black money’ (pul-i siyah). The value of the copper coins, widely used amongst the poor, fell sharply between 1893–1897 causing distress to ordinary people.62 Aga Najafi, blaming the Imperial Bank, wrote to the ‘ulama of Kerbala that Isfahan and its trade were in the hands of foreigners, and that banking was against the shari‘a, which was being flouted by Christians.63 He pursued Akhund Mulla Baqir Fashariki, known as the most pious of the ‘ulama of Isfahan, to fight the ‘degradation’ of Islam and join him in saying all European goods were unclean, and thus bring the prices down by deterring their purchase.64 ‘It will be useful,’ he is reported as saying, ‘as the poor will gain and the people will be obliged to us.’ The Reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah and Reform On the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah on 1 May 1896, Aqa Najafi kept to his house. Isfahan was quiet, largely due to the efforts of Zill al-Sultan. He summoned other members of the ‘ulama to a conference, and obtained their adherence to his brother Muzaffar al-Din Shah. During the following 24 hours, some of them rode through the town, quieting the people, breaking up meetings, and doing everything possible to prevent ferment and looting. Business resumed on 5 May, shops and other concerns having shut on 4 May out of respect for the Shah.65

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As elsewhere the Belgian-run customs reforms introduced from 1898 affected the politics of Isfahan, particularly the merchant community, and therefore the ‘ulama, who voiced their concerns. Once the Belgian-run customs reforms were introduced in 1898, Aqa Najafi campaigned vigorously against them, communicating by telegram with ‘ulama and merchants in other towns, threatening to leave the country, and in 1905 giving full support to the Tehran agitation against the Belgians.66 In 1903 Aqa Najafi surpassed himself in a particularly brutal attack on the Babis, which the combined objections of the governor and the British and Russian consulates were unable to control. However, the fact that two Babis murdered as a result were merchants produced unease in the wealthy mercantile quarter of Isfahan.67 As a result Aqa Najafi’s various enemies succeeded in having him removed to Tehran, despite the protests of his large local following and a telegram from the ‘ulama of Tehran, telling him to stay.68 He eventually left on 12 October 1903, accompanied by Aqa Nurallah, who had played a subsidiary role in the matter, and returned on 30 May 1904 after giving an undertaking for good behaviour (iltizam),69 a long absence which must have caused him considerable expense and inconvenience. The town had been quiet whilst he was away, and he found his influence much diminished and his position weakened.70 The effect was salutary, for he never again instigated such a vicious attack on the Babis, but involved himself in the new style of politics which emerged in 1905–1906 as a way of changing the means of government and containing Europeans. By the middle of 1905 Aqa Najafi had recovered much of his position after his disgrace in 1903. He benefited from the passing away of some of the leading ‘ulama of Isfahan who had acted as a restraint on him, and actively communicated with the movement against the customs administration in Tehran.71 Nevertheless, sometimes he was acting from public pressure rather than personal inclination. In October 1906, Aqa Najafi, who had been reading Habl al-Matin, discussed the Armenian question in the Caucasus with Dr Aganoor, the Acting British Consul and asked his view. Although the Armenians were reported as causing the most deaths in the conflict, Aganoor informed him that this was not the case. Aqa Najafi displayed less than keen interest in the question, but explained that he was having difficulty controlling an outbreak in Isfahan against the Armenians. He was nevertheless, he said, compelled by others to speak out and show himself as a defender of Islam.72 However, he embraced with enthusiasm the cause of the ‘ulama when they took refuge in Qum in July 1906.73 As illustrated above, Aqa Najafi benefited from the absolutist state structure in matters of position, contacts and wealth, and he was astute enough to realise it. So he never engaged as wholeheartedly with the constitutional movement, and the idea of mashruta, as his younger brother, Haj Aqa Nurallah. However, Aqa Najafi would never have to confront powerful militant secularism as such; that was to be the destiny of Haj Aqa Nurallah in the 1920s.

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Haj Aqa Nurallah: An Emerging Islamist Response to Foreign Influence Aqa Nurallah, born 25 years after Aqa Najafi, was attuned to the ideological movements of his time in a way that the latter was not.74 In particular, he appears to have been influenced by Sayyid Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani’s ideas on institutional reform as the means of strengthening Islam and resisting the encroachments of foreign powers.75 Although Nurallah bore some resemblance to Aqa Najafi, particularly in terms of family circumstances, in character he was very different. He was more widely read, and well-informed on foreign relations. In thinking, he looked for moderation and was far-sighted, in private critical of Aqa Najafi’s excesses.76 To his followers, he was the embodiment of the struggle both against absolutism and for the independence of the country and for a political order based on a religious order.77 He participated in the tobacco movement along with his brothers, but first appeared in a significant way in the politics of Isfahan in January 1894, when he joined his brothers in forming the Isfahan tobacco company with the support of Zill al-Sultan.78 It was established principally in rivalry to the Ottoman tobacco company operating in Isfahan, which was perceived as yet another foreign organisation inimical to Iranian commercial interests.79 In August 1895 Nurallah was sent by Aqa Najafi, with the approval of both other ‘ulama and Zill al-Sultan, to Karbala to start a crusade there against the Ottoman tobacco company.80 However, his first major role in the politics of the city came in the spring of 1899, with the establishment of the Shirkat-i Islami (Islamic Company).81 This was a rare collaborative venture on the part of different Isfahanis to promote the manufacture and use of local textiles, as opposed to foreign imports. Its founding members included the leading merchants, especially Muhammad Husain Tajir-i Kazeruni, Zill al-Sultan, who provided state support, and members of the ‘ulama, especially Aqa Nurallah and Aqa Najafi, who forbade the wearing of foreign clothing. Its principal propagandist was the free-thinking preacher, Aqa Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, who was sent to address the Shirazis on the subject.82 It was also supported by the editors of the newspapers Habl al-Matin and Thuraya, in which its activities were publicised. In December of the following year, 1900, Aqa Nurallah gave his views to the British Consul on the Russian loan and the Shah’s first trip to Europe: The mujtahid said that he had heard that the Shah was going to introduce great improvements in Iran on his return, and with that view he had spent large sums in Paris on the purchase of ‘meubles’. He added that he did not exactly know the meaning of this word but understood it to mean children’s toys of all sorts, and went on to say that appeared to be the way in which the Shah was about to introduce reforms. He then said the Shah had taken out a further Russian loan for the purpose, and that His Majesty was said to be bringing several Europeans as ‘Viziers’ in different departments. … [He said] reforms were necessary, but that they must be introduced through Islam.83

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Indeed, the political and social role of Islam was a developing theme in the life of Aqa Nurallah. In 1321/1903–1904, according to Musa Najafi, he and Rukn al-Mulk established the Anjuman-i Safakhana in the Armenian quarter of Isfahan, and published a journal, al-Islam, which organised debates between Christians and Muslims.84 The subjects of the debates were disseminated widely, to the extent that copies of the journal, as is shown by readers’ letters, reached London and other capitals of Europe, India, Egypt and the Ottoman territories, including the Hejaz. It was founded in response to missionary proselytising, and was perceived as a means of developing Muslims’ ideas on their encounters with Christian opinion. It was thus part of the wider movement to combat Christian proselytising mentioned earlier. One of those involved, Da‘i al-Islam, settled in India, where he learned Urdu and published al-Islam in Urdu as well as Persian.85 The granting of the constitution and promulgation of the electoral law were greeted with enthusiasm by Aqa Najafi and Aqa Nurallah. The latter had been absent from Isfahan at the time of the agitation in Decmber 1905, which produced the promise of an ‘adalatkhana, having gone to Mashhad in November, and not returned until May 1906.86 Aqa Najafi, however, was in constant communication with the Tehran ‘ulama during the agitation,87 and sent telegrams of support during the bast in Qum in July–August 1906.88 To Aqa Najafi this was a campaign against foreigners, a movement to reform the state in terms of reducing its control, and an opportunity to diminish the power of Zill al-Sultan, in which to some extent he succeeded.89 His influence was such that he was heavily involved in the process of electing representatives, though not without some popular objections, and the representative of the clergy was one of his students.90 However, as ‘Askarani observes, he acted prudently, avoiding direct support of the constitutionalists.91 He was reported in September and again in December 1906 as having some reservations about the proposed reforms the assembly would introduce.92 Aqa Nurallah, by contrast, greeted the establishment of the assembly with much enthusiasm, seeing its possibility for introducing a new order. On 25 October 1906 he made a speech in the Masjid-i Nau, in which he said: Thank God for our National Assembly. It will assure your welfare in this world and the next. Some people ask me if it will have the effect of cheapening the price of bread. It will confer so many benefits upon you that the mere cheapening of the price of food is as nothing by comparison. By the means of the Assembly, Islam will become a great power, and the laws of Islam, which have become old, will gain new life …The enemies of Islam, on the other hand, grow weak and the hopes of our foreign enemies will be cut short. They will no longer think of taking our country. … The Convocation of the National Assembly will be regarded as a mark of the special favour of the Twelfth Imam. … We shall use the law of Islam, the same holy law which foreigners have stolen from us for their own advantage.93

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Aqa Nurallah went on to point out the cost of the struggle for freedom in Russia (implying that the struggle in Iran had succeeded by peaceable means), and to contrast Iran with the Ottoman Empire where the law was influenced by the French code. He denied that the Shah would be removed from his throne, and indeed the evidence in his writings is that he supported constitutional monarchy. At the end of 1906, Aqa Nurallah wrote to Mirza Ibraham, the mujtahid in Shiraz, explaining his view of mashruta and saying that it emerged from Islam, and that it would bring the blessing of the shari‘a, and progress and patriotism, justice, and equality, the unity of government and people, and so the end of oppression.94 From this point it will be noted that Islam and patriotism were closely associated, and at this time generally most people did not perceive milliyyat or nationalism as secular. Nurallah continued that mashruta emerged from Islam, and that it would be a means of mobilising the whole people, in the place of a few useless soldiers, against foreign intrusion. The country would thus be much strengthened by the unity of people and government, instead of undermined by division. Government would be in the interests of Islam and the whole people, not just one person or a few, who were traitorous to both religion and state. Taxes would no longer be misspent (in other words there would be accountability) and the country’s decayed industry, trade and agriculture would flourish, and produce full employment. The house of ruin would become a place of prosperity. Finally, having noted that foreign powers placed much emphasis on unity as a source of strength, he stressed Islam as a unifying factor, asserting that Iran was blessed in that the people were of one religion, which had the Qur’an and the shari‘a. The Non-religious Alternative – Two Paths to Reform As elsewhere, the term secularism did not appear in the rhetoric of reform in Isfahan at this time. Nevertheless, there was a secular reform movement developing, and though the focus of this book is on the emergence of an Islamic constitutional movement, it would be appropriate to complete the picture by discussing it briefly. In Isfahan in particular it is necessary to distinguish between state-driven reform, to which for example Zill al-Sultan himself belonged, and liberal constitutional reform. Zill al-Sultan’s modernisation of his military force, along with the founding of a technical school, and the publication of the newspaper Farhang are evidence for his support for strengthening Iran by innovation. Of course, these measures also strengthened his own position.95 Also, however, officials in his government administration showed an interest in reform. For example Aqa Mirza Ahmad Munajim Bashi subscribed to the reformist newspaper Thuraya, based in Cairo in 1898–1899.96 Not unexpectedly, the clearest glimpse of secular reform appears from the remnants of Zill al-Sultan’s modernised military force. In an interview with the British consul, Mirza Ahmad Khan Mirtip said that amongst ‘thinking people’ there was a

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Figure 6 The annual subscription to Thuraya of Mirza Ahmad the Munajim Bashi of Zill al-Sultan. (Courtesy of the Torfehnezhad Archive, Isfahan.)

clear wish for the improvement of the country. These people, he added, would now support the mullahs whilst using them to upset the present state of affairs, and then try to attain their own ends.97 In addition, although Isfahan was a highly traditional centre of orthodox theology and scholasticism, it also had an important heterodox intellectual and religious tradition.98 The Shaikhis had a considerable following there, as did the Babis. These movements appealed to lesser merchants and ‘ulama, guild members, and state officials of the lower and middle ranks.99 Three of the most significant reformers of the constitutional period, Yahya Daulatabadi and Haj Mirza Nasrallah Malik al-Mutikallimin, both of whom were Babis, and Aqa Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va‘iz Isfahani, a free-thinker, came out of this milieu. Whereas the first two were to be active as reformers largely in Tehran, Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va‘iz also played an important role in Isfahan, especially in the establishment of the Shirkat-i Islami. His tireless preaching against the importation of foreign goods, and the failure to develop a home industry, mobilised support for the company.100 In particular he criticised the actual wearing of foreign-made clothes and cloth. This practice was by now extensive not only among the wealthier social groups but also among the peasantry, large numbers of whom wore loose trousers of cloth made of English material but dyed in Iran.101 He also travelled to other cities, including Shiraz and Tabriz, to speak on the same subject. Sayyid Jamal al-Din became increasingly critical of the status quo, notably in his book Ru’ya-yi sadiqa (The True Dream) written at the

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beginning of 1899 or soon after.102 In it he discussed the position of the powerful of his time on the Day of Judgement when they would answer for their black deeds against the people. He painted a vivid picture of these oppressors in their garb of governors, clergymen and judges. As a result, he was designated a Babi by Aqa Najafi, and debarred from Isfahan by Zill al-Sultan.103 By contrast with some other cities, Isfahan engaged with relative enthusiasm in the elections for the Majlis. Although there was difficulty in finding a representative for the merchants, and suggestions had to be requested from Tehran, the Isfahan deputies were on their way by the end of December 1906.104 By late January a number of them had arrived.105 As Walcher has commented, popular political activism of the constitutional period in Isfahan was never split as sharply as in Tabriz with its stark differences between radical and conservative forces,106 to which may be added secular and religious confrontation. On the other hand, Tabriz had no religious leader to offer with such a fully conceived and powerful image of a modernised Islamic state as Haj Aqa Nurallah. He sought an Islamic Iran with modern political institutions, economy and legal system, all legitimised by the shari‘a. Although, as Walcher also observes, the politics of Isfahan was dominated at this stage by the power struggle between Zill al-Sultan, and in particular the Masjid-Shahi family, there were other influential forces at work, especially amongst the local government administration and the radical heterodox members of the ‘ulama, notably those of the Babi faith.

6 Development and reform in the south Bushehr and the rise of Mu‘in al-Tujjar

In the historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, there has been a tendency to perceive the influence of the world economy on Iran in the late nineteenth century as being negative, yet another example of deleterious foreign penetration of the country.1 In particular, the undermining of the local handicraft industries and the transformation of land for the use of cash rather than agricultural products, which drove up the cost of food, are cited as examples. So is the relentless granting of concessions by both Nasir al-Din Shah and Muzaffar al-Din Shah, who have both been accused of using this means of raising money to sell the country on the pretext of developing it. However, the reality was more complex, for in Iran, as elsewhere, in general the growth of the world economy at this period brought both advantages and disadvantages to the less developed world. To redress the balance on the subject of Iran, I will draw attention to some of the advantages in the south of Iran. The focus of the chapter will be on Bushehr, with specific reference to the career of one major merchant, Mu‘in al-Tujjar, who was to rise through opportunities provided by the world economy to become Deputy President of the Majlis, and one of the founders of Iran’s National Bank. Advance of the World Economy and Bushehr The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the early stages of the way the international economy brought new organisation and structure to Iran, which, if it destroyed the old, created benefits as well as disadvantages in its wake. Much of what has been described in Chapter 1 involved the strengthening

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and development of natural skills, initiative and innovation, and the emergence of new investment activities.2 As elsewhere, the introduction of steam and the quest for raw materials created new opportunities for trade and economic growth. The construction of ports, both in the Caspian and in the south meant increased utilisation of ships and, consequently, a lowered cost of freight charges. Alongside ports came docks, warehouses and new machinery which enabled the rapid handling of cargoes. All these facilities encouraged exploration for minerals for a world economy hungry for raw materials. As a result, a pre-modern economy was gradually transformed, with eventually a growth in population from better health facilities; wealth from new enterprises in the towns resulted in urbanisation, and new habits of consumption, leading to an emerging dynamism. The opportunities thus created were not lost on Iran’s entrepreneurs, and the wealthiest merchants, having accumulated capital through the growth in trade in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, in particular turned to innovative projects such as transport development and mining of raw materials. One of the most flourishing merchant communities in Iran was that of Bushehr. It was the main port and centre for trade in the south of Iran, having begun to prosper under the general security provided by the British in the Persian Gulf. Trade increased after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and especially after the establishment of steam navigation and the rapid rise of the opium trade.3 The addition of a steamer service to Baghdad, and a trade route to Hamadan, lessened the time and cost of transport. In the last three decades of the nineteenth century especially, trade increased substantially from Britain itself, particularly in the importation of piece goods.4 In 1889 the British India Steam Navigation Company had six ships in service touching at ports along the Persian Gulf coast between Bombay and Basra, bringing substantial imports from India. Indeed, the immense wealth of the Malik al-Tujjar family of Bushehr was acquired by their connection with India, where they were equally at home as in Iran.5 Steamers also ran directly from England to Bushehr.6 Thus as a port, Bushehr benefited from changes in the means of transportation from land systems to waterborne systems. Correspondingly, new networks and interactions took place between the local and the global economies of the hinterland and other regions.7 By 1885 the volume of trade was double that of the previous decade and it continued to rise substantially, especially as a result of the decline in the costs of freighting. By 1910/11 there were 200 hundred steamships with a total tonnage of 319,000 entering Bushehr. The Development of the Karun River and its Implications The growth in trading activity, and the pressure of the international economy on Iran, led the British to consider ways of opening up the hinterland through cheaper and easier means of transportation. A particularly advantageous opportunity was offered by the Karun River, which indeed excited the attention of entrepreneurs from 1871.8 For a long time British efforts were frustrated by the

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prescient fear of Nasir al-Din Shah that such an enterprise would lead to British domination of the south, especially Khuzistan. However, by 1888 the pressure of trade, the obvious advantages, and the persistence of the British led the Shah to relent and issue a farman (royal order) that the Karun be opened as far as Ahwaz to the commercial steamers of all nations. The farman justified the new policy by announcing the government’s intention to extend wealth and commerce in Iran, and especially the development of agriculture in Khuzistan.9 However, traffic from the port of Mohammareh along the lower Karun could only go as far as Ahwaz, where there was a dam. River navigation from this point was reserved to the Iranian government and its subjects, the dam acting as both a political and physical barrier to outsiders. The upper Karun from Ahwaz to Shushtar remained the preserve of local boats, supplemented by caravans on land, which took goods on to Isfahan. Of the companies competing for a concession to navigate the Karun, the Lynch Brothers were successful, and brought in two steamers from their operations on the Tigris and Euphrates to run on the lower Karun. In 1889 the Lynch Brothers presented a steamer to the Shah, and it was run on the upper Karun under their management. However, the firm still had to negotiate with a whole range of local interests.10 In the same year, 1889, a group of government ministers and major merchants founded the Nasiri Company, based on an application for a concession made in 1888 by Malik al-Tujjar.11 Its founding members included Amin al-Sultan, the Prime Minister, Shaikh Miz‘al of Mohammareh, Malik al-Tujjar, and Mu‘in al-Tujjar, who was to be its moving spirit. The company was not only given shipping rights but also authority to oversee the statutes stipulated in the Karun regulations. This included the provision of wharf facilities and storage for Lynch, as well as the collection of dues and custom fees.12 By 1891, as part of this arrangement, the Nasiri Company was laying down a light steel tramway at Ahwaz to transport goods across the rapids there. The opening up of the Karun River brought prosperity to the south of Iran. The wages of the Arab labourers rose, making them less vulnerable to exploitation by the shaikhs, and enabling some to establish themselves as independent smallholders.13 The prosperity spread inland to Bakhtiyari, where there were many signs of improvement, including growth in cultivation and the erection of fine houses.14 It also had a detrimental effect in that the newly prospering tribes had the means to buy arms, which contributed to a pattern of an enriched society confronting an increasingly weak state.15 By World War I, after the coming of oil, steamships operated by three companies, one of which was German, provided services several times a fortnight. As a result trade flourished even further rising from £16,000 in 1891 to £272,000 in 1902. The journey of 500 miles from Bushehr to Isfahan, which formerly took up to a month, was halved, with freight costs correspondingly reduced. Iran’s international trading connections were rapidly developing. By 1896, for example, increasing quantities of date boxes were imported from Norway and Sweden for the flourishing date trade.16 The karguzar of Mohammareh

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reported to Tehran of the rapidly increasing influx of applications for entry from foreigners, and requested a larger supply of passport forms.17 Other consulates began to join the British in Bushehr, the French establishing one in 1889, and profiting in particular from the import of sugar. The Establishment of the Muzaffari School Bushehr, therefore, flourished and amongst other signs of its prosperity were the establishment of a new modern-style school, the Madrasa-yi Muzaffari18 (so called in honour of the Shah and his interest in education) as part of the reform movement of the 1890s, and of a local newspaper, Muzaffari.19 The school was founded early in 1901 by Darya Baigi, Amir Tuman, Governor of the Persian Gulf ports.20 He had to leave Bushehr for a while, but through the efforts of educated Bushehris from a variety of occupations, money was collected to support it through the Anjuman-i Sa‘adat-i Muzaffari, which was established for the purpose. It was very well-organised, in particular in recognising the need for collaboration both in raising funds for the school and in managing it. Those involved in running the school included state officials and merchants. Among them were the deputy head of customs for the Persian Gulf ports and a representative of the head of the Postal Service. Contributions towards funding came from an unusual variety of sources, including the governor of all the Persian Gulf ports, Mu‘in al-Tujjar, the leading merchant in Bushehr, the Belgian inspector of the customs of Kermanshah and Kurdistan, and several other customs officials. Later lists included the Christian merchants, Mr Gulzar and Mr Zaitun, Muhammad Javad Khan, the translator of the Imperial Bank, Mulla ‘Abdullah Rauza Khvan, Haji Mirza Hasan, an official of the French consulate, Aqa Fatih al-Saltana, former head of a regiment of Bushehr and ‘Ali Akbar Paik Bashi (a name meaning ‘the head of the messengers’).21 Financially the school was fortunate. The Shah granted some of the proceeds of the customs to pay for it.22 Ghulam Husain ibn ‘Abdul Rasul and others were also enterprising and produced a small book to publicise its achievements and expenditure. Amongst others they sent it to Mushir al-Daula, the Foreign Minister, requesting a donation, and were rewarded with a contribution of 100 tomans.23 The school curriculum included the Arabic language, and religious issues, amongst them shari‘a matters, history, geography and mathematics, composition, Persian and English.24 It thus retained some of the existing style of curriculum alongside its innovations. It was immediately successful, with its number of pupils growing from eighteen in 1318/1900–1901 to 140 in 1319/1901–1902.25 The Press, Reform and International Awareness The newspaper Muzaffari was likewise and more militantly dedicated to reform, critical of the government and its officials, and of British imperialistic ways. It was established in January 1902 under the directorship of Mirza ‘Abd al-Hamid

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Khan Matin al-Saltana, deputy and translator of the customs administration of southern Iran,26 that is to say a state official in the foreign-administered government sector. Matin al-Saltana was subsequently sent to Mashhad and Tehran. He was succeeded by Mirza ‘Ali Aqa Labib al-Mulk Shirazi. The early editions appeared in lithograph form for three years until Labib al-Mulk brought a printing press from India, and it was published in print from 18 Dhi al-Hijja 1323/13 February 1905. The fortunes of Mirza ‘Ali Shirazi (as Labib al-Mulk usually signed himself thereafter) fluctuated, as in 1903 he was bastinadoed by the Governor of Bushehr for writing objectionable articles, but by July 1904 he was in receipt of a robe of honour sent from Tehran.27 However, in 1905 he was again exiled and did not return until the autumn of 1906. Most of the newspaper’s readers were in the south, and its articles indicate their interest in reform, as well the commercial development of the country. They appear to have been merchants and lesser government officials. Written in the language of the people, the paper’s ideals included raising the standard of living by awakening the people, and attending to the interests of the poor and weak.28 Implicitly, it attacked mismanagement and corruption. Muzaffari also followed the campaign of Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i in Tehran for reform and ordering (intizam) of religious affairs through the formation of a group of like-minded persons entitled Hauza-yi Islam.29 Tabataba’i’s campaign and ideas, which were part of the movement to propagate Islam in an organised manner, gathered apace in regular letters and reports of his speeches in Muzaffari. Another regular topic of interest for the readers was the advance of Japan, particularly in the publication of books on education. It was said that in Japan 300,000 copies were printed of each educational work, and that newspapers totalled 1,100 in the country as a whole.30 Japan was thus an ideal example for Iran, not least in having a much better informed and educated public. Pan-Islamism and the unity of Muslims also drew the attention of the newspaper, one notable example being a speech on the subject by the Imam Jum‘a of Fars, who exhorted the Shah to collaborate with the Ottoman sultan.31 In this Bushehr and Shiraz were in line with the debate on a possible Pan-Islamic response to imperialism elsewhere both in Iran and in the Muslim world. Another newspaper which influenced opinion in Bushehr at this time was Habl al-Matin,32 the most widely read newspaper in Iran. It provided the reader with news of events in the wider world as well as publishing discussions on reform, and on such concepts as vatanparast (patriot), an emerging and evolving term.33 Habl al-Matin also carried occasional news items from Bushehr, as did Thuraya, and one feature that emerges is the strength of the culture of meetings (majlis) to consult on major issues, such as quarantine, or the establishment of a branch of the Shirkat-i Islami (the Islamic Company, which had branches throughout Iran).34 Another constant topic of concern was foreign encroachment, not only in Bushehr, but also in the Persian Gulf area, notably by the British in Muscat.35 An anonymous letter from Bushehr to Habl al-Matin speaks of the writer’s love of his country and concern for its well-being, its rights and independence in the

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face of the rapacity of foreigners.36 Some of the correspondents were women. For example, in April 1906 Zahra Bibi wrote to the editor of Habl al-Matin, with, as she informs us, the permission of her husband, to express her patriotic feelings on resistance to the encroachments of foreigners.37 The paper also addressed commercial and transport issues. In July 1902, for example, a meeting of merchants discussed the founding of a company to build a roadway from the gates of Bushehr at an estimated cost of 60,000 tomans, with part to be paid for by the governor and part by the merchants, towards its construction.38 By the spring of 1905 Muzaffari was supporting the campaign against the unpopular new customs regulations. It reported on a strike by the merchants of Bushehr, who met daily to discuss the problem. Eventually they invited a representative of the customs to negotiate with them.39 The Rise of Haj Aqa Muhammad Mu‘in al-Tujjar These many changes facilitated the rise to prominence of Haji Aqa Muhammad Mu‘in al-Tujjar, one of the most remarkable merchants of the period. Described by a contemporary as something of a visionary, he was also considered one of the shrewdest entrepreneurs in the country.40 He rose through his family connection with the most powerful entrepreneurial dynasty in southern Iran in the later nineteenth century, that of the Haj Muhammad Mahdi Malik al-Tujjar of Bushehr, whom he was ultimately to replace.41 Mu‘in al-Tujjar was the son of a merchant, Haj Muhammad Rahim Dihdashti,42 whose sister had married into Malik al-Tujjar family. As a wealthy middle-aged man, he became the close companion of the young Haj Muhammad Mahdi Malik al-Tujjar,43 and being deeply involved in his affairs, also acquired a vast network of connections in Iran and abroad. These included Mushir al-Daula, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the turn of the century.44 By 1898 Mu‘in al-Tujjar had connections with the Prime Minister, Amin al-Sultan.45 By 1890 the fortunes of Malik-al Tujjar were in decline and the subsequent years saw the rise of Mu‘in al-Tujjar to acquire widespread interests along the Persian Gulf coast of Iran, but especially in the Nasiri Shipping Company, which he founded after the opening up of the Karun River from 1888. Already in 1888 he was in negotiation with the governor of Khuzistan, Nizam al-Saltana, over a shipping company to be called Nasiri in the upper Karun.46 In 1893 he was in Dezful for the opening of the Dez River to trade with his ship, the Susa. As a result, goods could be sent via the Nasiri and Dez Rivers rather than by caravan.47 To Mu‘in al-Tujjar this was not only a personal success but also part of the campaign by Iranian merchants to squeeze foreign enterprise out of Iran. It included the obstruction and harassment of the employees of agents of British shipping companies by the local administration in Bushehr.48 By 1896 Mu‘in al-Tujjar had sufficient influence in Mohammareh to challenge the influence of the local governor, Shaikh Miz‘al (Mu‘iz al-Saltana).49 In an on-going struggle with the Darya Baigi (the governor of Bushehr), Mu‘in al-Tujjar had the support

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of Amin al-Sultan.50 Mu‘in al-Tujjar said that the governor was undermining him, and he commented that it was a pity that the people of Iran could not be more united.51 The Darya Baigi complained to Tehran in 1901 that he was subject to complaints from various people who had been paid large sums by Mu‘in al-Tujjar to discredit him.52 By 1902 Mu‘in al Tujjar had ventured into the extraction of minerals, for example gaining a concession to work an oxide mine in Hormuz.53 Furthermore, he branched out, as some of the leading merchants did, into local government administration, in Minab, where the local inhabitants began to complain of his tax demands.54 He held date groves in Lingah granted to him in fief by the Iranian Government, which brought him into dispute with the local shaikh,55 no doubt to the satisfaction of the Iranian authorities. His property in Bushehr led him in 1903 into a dispute with the British Residency stonemason, but his influence was such that, despite the involvement of the British, he was able to impose his view on a shari’a court held by a local mujtahid against documentary evidence produced by the stonemason, and ultimately persuade the Governor to issue a decree in his favour.56 By 1905, significantly, he was landlord of the Bushehr customs, a position he used to exert leverage, and he was rumoured to have had a deciding role in the appointment of the local governor.57 In that year, work began on his sulphur mine near Bostana, the concession for which he had won in the face of competition from a German company.58 It was therefore not surprising that the British resisted his attempt to store ochre at British Bassidore in 1905 in preference to Hormuz where he would have had to pay customs dues.59 By 1906, he had inspected his salt mine rented from the government in Hormuz, having brought from Europe an engineer to explore the technical possibilities of further advancement and development.60 His engineer also recommended a light railway from Mohammareh to Shushtar, leading to a good road to Isfahan, and concluded that a modest irrigation scheme at Shushtar would be viable.61 The British watched these developments with some malevolence, complaining of what they called ‘the ubiquitous vested interest which he has systematically created in these regions during the past few years, either under his own name or that of the Malik al-Tujjar’.62 However, his greatest interest of all saw him locked in mutual combat and collaboration with the British themselves, and that was over the development of the Karun River. Mu‘in al-Tujjar and the Karun River The Karun River was opened up by a concession granted to a British firm, Lynch Brothers, in 1888. Their enterprise involved the surmounting of a number of problems. One of these was the serious resistance of local powers, particular Shaikh Miz‘al at Mohammareh, to the growth of trade on the Karun, which arose from the justified fear that the central government would use it to expand their control.63 To his interest was added the concerns of Nizam al-Saltana, that the

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local government, and he himself as governor in particular, should gain advantage. Another difficulty was the acquisition of land for facilities such as storage and landing. Given that foreigners were not supposed to own land outright under the Treaty of Turkmanchai between Iran and Russia (1828), the company had to rent it from a local landowner, with the consent of the local authorities.64 Also a problem was the animosity of local competitors, in this case principally the Nasiri Company established by Mu‘in al-Tujjar. According to Torabi, Mu‘in’s concession had been granted as part of a government policy of placating Iranian merchants over foreign concessions.65 Nevertheless, as she observes, it was also the result of a considerable struggle with the government to oblige it to pay attention to their interests and resist foreign penetration. These and numerous other local factors formed a skein of established structures and interests, of absolutist government practice and local networks which were an impediment to European capitalist development. The advantage of Mu‘in al-Tujjar was that he could operate within both the declining and emerging systems. His disadvantage was that he did not have the capital of a European entrepreneur. Mu‘in al-Tujjar had already acquired land in the region, and a mutually beneficial agreement was reached with Lynch to rent a plot at Ahwaz. According to a by now customary arrangement he was to erect a building in line with their plans, which would revert to him after 30 years of usage. In addition, he was paid for the lease.66 Unfortunately, as was to happen again, this arrangement displeased the Iranian government which found itself in the position of making no profit thereby. As a result it complained that the lease was too short and the rent too low.67 A conflict of interest arose in which the British decided to settle with the Iranian government, cutting out Mu‘in al-Tujjar.68 Meanwhile the rivalry between Lynch and Mu‘in al-Tujjar over transportation on the river gained pace. Mu‘in al-Tujjar acquired a ship, the Shushan, but it had insufficient capacity for the volume of trade on the river. To add to this difficulty, in 1893 Lynch proposed to introduce an iron barge, which Mu‘in al-Tujjar managed to block, until they agreed it should be towed by the Shushan.69 Mu‘in al-Tujjar also raised queries on the ownership of the land next to the river in their building site at Ahwaz, an advantageous move in thwarting Lynch, since no one knew who owned the land here (or much of it elsewhere in Iran).70 The main weakness of Mu‘in’s position continued to be his lack of capital. In 1895 he telegrammed the prime minister (Amin al-Sultan) explaining the transport in merchandise on the Karun was increasing, but more carrying power was needed on the upper part of the river.71 He disputed rights to landing goods on wharfs other than his own, and said his facilities were inadequate.72 Despite these deficiencies he managed to maintain a monopoly on wharf facilities at Nasiri for several years, together with a monopoly on the carriage of cargo between Nasiri and Ahwaz. His right to his concession to the latter was acknowledged, but not his right to raise carriage dues, which produced disputes with foreign firms in 1902. Mu‘in, however, had the support of Amin al-Sultan, so the government evidently made some profit from his management.73

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In addition, he had a monopoly on storage space for goods at Shelalieh, and refused co-operation with other firms unless he was given a share.74 By 1903 he had bought up more land there with the intention of building a tramway thence to Shushtar, an enterprise in which he sought co-operation with local merchants. His interest arose from the prospect of a Khorramabad route being opened to trade.75 By 1906 and the coming of the Constitutional Revolution he was planning to block the head of the Gerger River, and prepare the portion of it above Shelalieh so it would be navigable to Shushtar, which the British judged not feasible in terms of capital.76 He also ordered a steamer to be built for the Karun in Glasgow, and by October 1906, it had started to work on the lower Karun. As Lynch already had a steamer there, the result was a weekly boat service between Nasiri and Mohammareh. The Coming of the Constitutional Revolution in Bushehr The first sign of an impending revolution came to Bushehr not from Tehran but from Shiraz in the middle of December 1905. A telegram from Shiraz was received by the local merchants reporting ‘a great disturbance’ arising from discontent at the manner of government in Shiraz, and the cessation of trade because of insecurity. The Bushehr merchants were invited to co-operate, and duly responded by suspending trade, on account, they explained, of the indifference of the Tehran authorities to the complaints of the merchants and the people of Fars. Thus the movement began with merchant-led discontent with the local government.77 This initiative was accompanied by the mujtahids of Shiraz urging the clergy in Bushehr to close the bazaars, but neither they nor the local merchants were prepared to take action at this stage for fear of damaging their own interests. Therefore the clergy urged the authorities in Tehran to resolve the problem.78 By the end of January 1906 goods were moving on from the Bushehr customs house. That in effect was the response in Bushehr to the Tehran movement against ‘Ain al-Daula’s government, which ended in the request for the establishment of the ‘adalatkhana. News of the latter did not become common knowledge in Bushehr until early March 1906, when Muzaffari published two rescripts addressed by the Shah to the ‘ulama of Tehran, in which he promised to ‘institute the desired reforms’.79 The revolt in Tehran thus made little impact in Bushehr. Discontent resurfaced in June 1906, unsurprisingly in the form of the arrest of the editor of Muzaffari, which had been complaining of the local administration; he was exiled to Tehran in mid-July.80 By this time news of the bast in the British Legation had reached Bushehr, though interestingly it was reported in some quarters that the bastis were tullab. On 31 July a telegram from Tehran to the governor informed him that ‘Ain al-Daula had been dismissed, and said the fact should be made public.81 This was welcomed by a great demonstration at Kermanshah, the town being lit up for the evening, but had a more muted reception in Bushehr.82

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Bushehr’s Response to the Granting of the Constitution The first local reaction was an attack on the Belgian administration of the customs, which overshadowed a meeting in the house of the governor (Darya Baigi) to discuss the Shah’s granting of a legislative assembly.83 The main focus, however, continued to be on grievances against the customs administration, which included not only the merchants’ demand for the removal of Heynssens, the Belgian head of the customs, but the grievances of the Tangistani boatmen, all led and voiced as usual by members of the clergy. On 18 August a crowd collected at the house of Sayyid Murtaza, a clerical representative of Tangistani grievances, where they were urged to embark on a general strike, an early example of this type of such organised protest in Bushehr. On 19 August the bazaars closed, and small boys with sticks wandered the town singing ribald couplets against the customs. Finally, the governor conceded the following demands, which represent the varied concerns of the crowd: • Release of one Shaikh Shahab and his brother imprisoned in November for a raid on the customs at Charbar; • Release of Rahman, a servant, imprisoned for theft; • Release of four Tangistani boats held for smuggling; • Release of another boat held on suspicion of arms smuggling; • Permission to land cargo from coasting boats at the consignees’ go-downs and not at the customs wharf; • Pilgrims to land without payment of quarantine fees; • Arms smuggling to be punished by confiscation only, not by fines as well. It will be observed that none of the above relates to the demands for reform in Tehran. By late August Bushehr was quiet again. Mu‘in al-Tujjar and the Constitutional Movement From this time on, mention of a legislative assembly began to appear in Tehran, one of the moving spirits in its emergence being Mu‘in al-Tujjar. He was already seemingly part of the group of merchants close to ‘Abdallah Behbehani and Muhammad Tabataba’i, and is listed by Nazim al-Islam Kirmani as being among the wealthy merchants who contributed to the bast in the British Legation in July–August 1906.84 In mid-August he was in Tehran and telegrammed one of his agents to say a rescript had been issued granting an assembly to include representatives of all classes. He further urged his agents to ask the notables of Bushehr to send telegrams of gratitude to the Shah via himself.85 His purpose in so doing was believed to be nomination as a member for Bushehr and the Persian Gulf ports in the proposed assembly, and he was reputed to be distributing bribes in Tehran partly for that reason.86 This move marks the beginning of the rise of Mu‘in al-Tujjar through the new structures of government which were now beginning to make their appearance in Iran.

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Initially, however, the response to his overture in Bushehr was not auspicious, as the community there took no notice of it. Further, a meeting of merchants and clergy convened at the governor’s house on 15 August proved less than unanimous on sending a telegram of thanks to the Shah over the new assembly, and more concerned with abiding grievances over the customs administration. By mid-September, further telegrams from Mu‘in, this time requesting the governor to repress popular agitation, still met with little success.87 Meanwhile, at Lingah, another Persian Gulf port, which had been relatively quiet, the deputy governor convened a meeting of merchants and leading officials, and read them the Shah’s telegram on the assembly. It was received with scepticism as a stratagem to pacify discontent.88 Elections to the Majlis and the Response in Bushehr and Other Ports in the South By October 1906 electoral proceedings were underway throughout Iran. In Bander Abbas a meeting held to nominate a member for the Majlis was marked by lack of interest, many being away because of the heat.89 A subsequent meeting was informed by the deputy governor that the people had unanimously nominated Mu‘in al-Tujjar. He then produced a piece of paper and demanded their signatures.90 A similar meeting in Bushehr itself put off the decision, there being disagreement as to whether to elect Mu‘in al-Tujjar or not.91 There do not appear to have been any other candidates. The disagreements continued until late November, when a meeting of the leading men of Bushehr heard the Shah’s rescript granting ‘the National Assembly at Tehran and its branches in provincial towns’. The governor also informed the meeting of a proposal to select three members from the Persian Gulf towns, who were to have an allowance of 1,000 tomans each. He told those assembled that a local committee of leading merchants, artisans and others would be formed, and meet once a week to debate local affairs. Though he said that he, the governor, was bound to enforce this decision, the meeting was inconclusive.92 By the end of December 1906, representatives to the Majlis and the local council had still not been elected, and there was reportedly inadequate confidence that the new institution would endure, especially given the state of the Shah’s health.93 Nevertheless, having failed to secure his election as a representative of the Persian Gulf ports, Mu‘in al-Tujjar was shortly afterwards elected to the Majlis on behalf of the merchants of Tehran.94 He was thus by now a well-established member of the new order, with concomitant influence and connections. Thus the acting Ottoman vice-consul in Bushehr, having received intimation that he might be replaced, telegrammed Mu‘in to use his influence in Tehran to have the proposed new appointment cancelled.95

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Mu‘in al-Tujjar and the International Economy In June 1897 a most unusual incident had occurred in that Mu‘in al-Tujjar took bast in the Residency grounds of his inveterate rivals, the British. The governor of Bushehr, Hisam al-Saltana, who according to the British could not find the money to extend his governorship, and according to himself was merely demanding tax due to the government, sent soldiers to the house of Mu‘in to demand the money. Mu‘in was unable to carry out his business, especially as agent for a large number of foreign merchants. He fled to the British Residency, claiming that British interests would suffer if he lost all he possessed, leaving the karguzar worried about the Iranian government losing face before the foreign merchant community.96 The British felt obliged to keep him for his personal safety, but they also recognised the truth of one point, namely that if his property was seized, nothing would be left for British firms with claims on him. The governor was furious at British interference but obliged by them to back down. Nothing encapsulates the relationship between Mu‘in al-Tujjar and the British so much as this strange incident. It also embodies the mutual dependence of the Great Power and its trading interests, and the local entrepreneurs, as well as the interdependence of foreign and local merchants as the world economy and the capitalist system advanced. However much the Iranian merchants might complain about foreign advantage and foreign interference, they benefited from the influence they exerted to ensure security. Foreign commercial interest and the international economy it represented was a powerful force in the destruction of the old system in Iran. Mu‘in al-Tujjar rose through the structures created by the capital of foreigners, and took advantage of the opportunity they created. Although he was in constant dispute with British firms, and in ceaseless rivalry, nevertheless he could not have played a part in the opening up of the Karun without them. He had relatively little capital, but still he made a considerable impression of his own in the economic modernisation of the country. Therefore, the argument that local entrepreneurs were disadvantaged by foreign competition and obstruction, supported as it was by imperial governments, though it is not without merit, is also far too simplistic. Iranian entrepreneurs were quite capable of using both local structures and networks, and the opportunities presented by the world economy, to advance their business. They were also to seize the opportunities offered by modern political and economic structures to advance their enterprises, both through the Constitutional Revolution, and their use of new-style commercial organisation from the 1920s onwards. Finally, it will have been noted that the goals of such entrepreneurs were neither religious nor secular, but commercial, and they deployed both views, and those who represented them, as suited their interests best. Merchants such as Mu‘in al-Tujjar also did a great deal to bring modernity and development to Iran.

7 Constitutional development, local government and the role of Islam

This chapter examines the series of highly significant laws which in effect established modern institutional government in Iran, arguably the greatest lasting achievement of the Constitutional Revolution. Much attention has been given in particular to the Electoral Law of 1906, the Constitution of 1906 and its Supplement of 1907.1 Attention has also been given to the advances they represent in terms of individual rights (in particular in accordance with the law), the creation of institutions, and the modernisation and rationalisation of state governance. They – especially the last – introduced such features as the legal basis of the will of the people and its sovereignty, the legitimisation of the political system in modern terms, the representation of the people in parliament through elections, the separation of powers, the responsibility of ministers, and above all the accountability of the monarch. This discussion will firstly focus on these laws with a mind to studying the effects of their implementation in the provinces in subsequent chapters. The little-studied Provincial and District Council Law of 1907 and the Municipality Law will also be introduced with the same intentions. The chapter will in addition consider these laws in the light of the still emerging debate of whether the state was to be Islamic or secular (milli-yi Islami or milli), and its consequent implications for nationalism. Constitutions, Local Politics and Change Under the pre-constitutional absolutist system of Iran, power resided with the shah. His power was absolutist but was not unlimited. The divine right by which he ruled also found expression in the shari‘a interpreted by the ‘ulama in their role of na’ib-i ‘amm, to which the shah was expected to conform.2 In addition he had two particular duties in Islamic terms – and in nineteenth-century Iran, whatever the kingly claims of the Qajar shahs to divinely conferred

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authority, Islamic terms were the real terms. These were protection of Twelver Shi‘ism and of Iran, the land of its establishment, and the maintenance of good order. The shah was responsible for governance, including tax collection and disbursement, scrutiny of the conduct of his senior officials, consultation with his ministers and members of the ‘ulama, efficient management of the cities, and enforcement of edits.3 He was the ultimate political authority; his word was law; he was not accountable in any detail for the finances; nor for the way he controlled the army; all his officials were responsible to him, and he might consult whomsoever he chose. The rights of his people were not stipulated by any regulations or charter, and though rights in specific matters were granted by the shari‘a, they pertained mainly to matters of religious practice, and personal and civil law, and very little to actual government. According to Islamic practice, and here more specifically Shi‘ism, the people had the right to expect justice,4 a notion which, by comparison with the understanding of rights arrived at in the West by this period, lacked specific definition. In this political system, such institutions as existed, and by the late nineteenth century they did include several ministries, were subject to the will of the monarch and had no independent authority. The Constitution of 1906 and its Supplement set out to create state institutions separate from the monarchy and having the authority to administer the country without royal intervention. They aimed to define and demark the authority of the new state institutions and of the monarchy itself, whilst conferring on the former a legitimacy based on the will of the people. They also theoretically subjected the restructured state to systematic regulations and practice, with the aim of creating a modern institutionalised state, legitimated by correct constitutional and representative procedures. However, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the sudden introduction of these new institutions posed considerable problems for a state and society in which they had not arisen over time. In particular with regard to the provinces, at a time of financial indigence the state was able to extend its control only gradually and to a very limited extent. Whilst its aim was ultimately to impose central power over provincial power, it also sought the rationalisation of provincial politics, which included the elimination of the power of the old elites, particularly those of the tribes. The Question of Religious or Secular Sovereignty The introduction of the new system of government brought in elements of incompatibility as between the existing absolutist system with regard to sovereignty, and constitutional democracy. The issue was further complicated by resultant inconsistencies between surviving features of the old system, and the ethos of the new. These included the whole question of the legitimacy of the sovereignty of the will of the people in parliament and its potential conflict with a ruler who owed his sovereignty to long-standing norms. In addition, there was the question that, whatever the juristic theory of royal legitimacy, the ruler was accepted as

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the de facto authority to be obeyed according to the practice of Islam, as long as he defended it. On this question the leading ‘ulama took a variety of views (as will be illustrated in subsequent chapters), but the task which confronted all of them was to integrate popular sovereignty, that prerequisite of constitutional government, into a specifically Shi‘a constitutional system. The main problem that confronted the supporters of Islamic constitutionalism was that in classical juristic Shi‘a doctrine all governments in the absence of the Imam were illegitimate; this was to oblige them to designate constitutionalism as illegitimate, but the best alternative to rule by the Imam, and therefore meriting obligatory support.5 Constitutionalism, it was hoped, would not only bring in justice, it would also strengthen the country so as to ensure its protection against foreigners. Having reached this conclusion and clarification, they could then proceed to identify the rights of the ruler and the ruled, and specifically to address such contentious issues as freedom and equality. One argument that was put forward, albeit rarely, was that, in the absence of the Imam, ‘the sovereignty of the political ruler belongs to the jumhur-i Muslimin’6 (the general public or community of Muslims). It may be noted that their concern was thus not individual liberty or sovereignty residing in a community of individuals; popular sovereignty was here a collective concept. This complex debate was to result in the emergence of an Iranian conception of democracy and national sovereignty that included Shi‘a Islam.7 In sum, as Gheissari has observed, constitutionalism was not seen by most people at the time as a secular goal, but as a part of Shi‘a culture and identity.8 The Question of Religious or Secular Law Contingent upon the question of sovereignty was that of the introduction of a new system of law and civil rights. The idea of a law that would change arbitrary government to introduce a modern systematic legal system, and bring in justice and a respect for individual rights, goes back to the reform movement that began in the mid-nineteenth century. This involved the protection of civil rights which included such matters as family law and property law, but also meant the rights of the nation to political freedom and just administration, all linked to a growing sense of Iranian nationalism9 (expressed in the words milli and millat). Of the ‘ulama involved in the reform movement, many supported the concept of constitutional law as a valid legal-juristic system, and one on which the relationship between shah and people could be properly based. They also perceived that there would be a need for reinterpretation of the mutual rights of ruler and ruled.10 Previously the peoples’, rights such as they were, had depended on the juristic endorsement of monarchical rule in practice, and the fact that the ruler was in turn answerable to the ‘ulama for ensuring that he governed according to Islamic principles. This gave the subject rights in terms of security, welfare and to some extent consultation. Whereas previously there was no acknowledged right of rebellion against an oppressive ruler who contravened the law, some of

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the ‘ulama in the constitutional period were to confer such a right on the people.11 Before the constitutional period, the established rights of customary practice were recognised by the ‘ulama as long as they were not contrary to the shari‘a.12 With the advent of constitutionalism a new law was established which gave formal recognition to certain rights. On this account, society would be expected to obey this law, and, by the same token, to disregard principles which did not belong in the newly emerging legal system. In other words law and rights, which had been treated in a manner that was arbitrary and inconsistent, would become consistently interpreted and administered. Constitutionalism thus brought new legally recognised rights for the people, including that of engaging in the making of government policy through the process of consultation; and that of having security, in particular of life, property, freedom from arbitrary arrest; in sum, of living under the rule of law.13 The Constitutional Movement in Tehran 1905–1906 The opposition movement in Tehran which led to the granting of the Constitution in August 1906 was composed of different groups with a variety of agendas, but led by the ‘ulama as their representatives, with their own particular concern being the growing foreign influence in Iran. The immediate source of complaint for the merchants, who largely financed it, was an end to the customs reforms which the government had initiated in 1897–1898, and the removal of the Belgian customs officials who administered them. According to the Ottoman Ambassador, Shemsettin Bey, some of the higher bureaucracy wanted to regain control of the customs, which they felt was no longer within the public administrative system, and therefore no longer benefited the people at large. They had been working hard to this effect both secretly and openly.14 However, for some time, a desire for change and reform had been growing among most social groups. The main broad general objectives were an end to the injustices of the absolutist system, and the curbing of the arbitrary power of the shah and the state, in particular by the introduction of the rule of law and of individual rights. In addition there was the desire for protection against foreign encroachment, especially financial. However, the merchants, guilds, reformist bureaucrats, religious and lay intelligentsia, ‘ulama, including tullab, and poorer people affected by rampant inflation and scarcity of necessities, as well as mistreatment, who formed the bulk of the movement, had different agendas. In particular, the powerfully placed bureaucrats, and the lay intelligentsia sought a rationalised secular state on the model of Britain and France. The outcome in January 1906 was the granting of an ‘adalatkhana, or ‘house of justice’, a term that was variously interpreted. The Ottoman Ambassador, who was in contact with the bureaucratic leaders of the movement, described it as ‘new juridical reforms’.15 The government failed to meet its promise to grant an ‘adalatkhana, with the result that the insurgency re-emerged in June 1906, leading to a great bast by 14,000 people in the British Legation in Tehran, and the departure of ‘ulama

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to Qum, to express their disapproval of the regime.16 The ‘ulama, with the exception of radicals such as Malik al-Mutakallimin and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, sought a reformed Islamic state. Their moderate leaders, Bihbihani and Tabataba’i, were prepared to compromise. Indeed, as Farzaneh has observed, the liberal ‘ulama of Tehran acted as facilitators and understood the majority of issues that the people considered significant.17 Even by the summer of 1906, it did not occur to the great majority of the people in the reform movement that the Majlis to be established was anything other than a Shi‘a Majlis, and that Iran was anything other than a Shi‘a state. What was to emerge was a power struggle which divided both the ‘ulama and the laity over what constitutionalism represented in secular and religious terms. The arguments were formulated in the most advanced terms in Tehran, and their implications on the whole were not fully understood in the provinces, even in Tabriz. The Royal Edict Granting an Elected Assembly of 5 August 1906 The Shah’s edict, issued to the Sadr-i A‘zam (prime minister), Mushir al-Daula, was couched in traditional language; in particular, as was common, it emphasised his divinely ordained authority over the progress and prosperity of the wellprotected lands of Iran. There is no indication that this authority was to be shared, though an elected assembly (majlis) was to be instituted to ‘carry out the requisite deliberations and investigations’ on important matters of state, and to ‘render necessary help and assistance to our cabinet of Ministers in such reforms as will promote the happiness and well-being of Iran’.18 In the preamble of the rescript informing the prime minister of His Majesty’s intention to establish an assembly, he refers to it as majlis-i milli, a national assembly, but not in the rescript itself. How far this was intentional it is difficult to say, but it gives evidence of the Shah’s reluctance to yield after months of resistance to demands and protests for shared authority. The edict also stipulates that regulations for elections to the assembly should be drawn up. In the events surrounding the issuing of the rescript, requests were made that indicated it should be Islamic in nature. For example, at the beginning of August 1906, the ‘ulama sent a telegram to the Shah from Qum requesting that the proposed Majlis should implement the shari‘a in the process of reforming the country.19 A few days later, in early August, a draft of a rescript was circulated in Tehran which referred to a constitution being drawn up for the ‘Majlis-i Shura-yi Islami’ and would include executing the laws of the shari‘a.20 In other words, at that time, there was both a clearly religious as well as a clearly secular interpretation of the nature of the Majlis. The Electoral Law of 9 September 1906 (nizamnama-yi intikhabat) In the latter part of August a gathering was convened in the old military school to draw up the electoral rules. According to Daulatabadi, there were three main groups involved: those whom he referred to as the ‘liberals’ or reformers, together

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with notables educated abroad; certain of the ‘ulama; and representatives of the court (absolutists).21 The first group, who constituted the leading secularists, submitted a draft based on the electoral rules in the Belgian constitution. The ‘ulama faction objected to it, and attempted to draw up their own version which gave more prominence to Islam. On 30 August the secular draft was accepted, the influence of the powerful bureaucrats and merchants being greater than that of the ‘ulama. The new Electoral Law proposed an assembly of 156 members, including 60 from the capital.22 The Law provided (Article 1) for electors from six classes: princes and the Qajar tribe, ‘ulama, notables, merchants, landed proprietors and peasants (into which Iran’s large tribal population were incorporated), and guilds. All had to be literate (Article 4), and had to have property worth 1,000 tomans or more amongst them (Article 2). Therefore those who participated in the election came from the upper and middle classes of society. As a result the majority of the people had no right to express their view by vote. In addition, the assembly was referred to as ‘the Majlis-i Shura-yi Milli’, which gave it deliberative,23 or from another perspective, a traditional Islamic function but omitted to refer to it as Islamic. It did not confer on it a legislative function, which meant another battle had to be fought to introduce the latter in the Constitution of December 1906. The elections took place on 29 September 1906, and the 60 deputies from Tehran convened on 7 October, whilst representatives from the provinces gradually made their way to the capital. Although the secular reformers dominated, they were aware of the need to keep the good will of the ‘ulama, given their influence over the people, and powerful opposition from the court. This was reflected in some of the rules; for example, although the deputies had immunity from arrest, this did not apply if they said anything contrary to the rules of Islam.24 At this time the constitutionalist ‘ulama of Najaf began their long campaign to support the Majlis. They pronounced its establishment as being beneficial, and declared that the nizamnama-yi qanun-i Islami (the Islamic book of rules of law, that is, the constitution), should be in accordance with the shari‘a.25 The Constitution of 30 December 1906 The Constitution of 1906 had to be hastily composed as Muzaffar al-Din Shah, who had some sympathy with regard to reform, was dying, and his designated successor, Muhammad ‘Ali Mirza, had none. A complicating factor was also introduced into its drafting by the engagement of the people of Tabriz in the subject via the telegraph, and the arrival in Tehran in the autumn of 1906 of the radical secularist Tabriz deputy, Sayyid Hasan Taqizada, and in early February 1907 of the others, including Mustashar al-Daula. On arrival, the latter’s first question was, ‘Have we been given constitutional government [mashruta] or not?’, to which the new prime minister, Mushir al-Daula, returned no answer.26 The Tabriz deputies were to play a major role in shifting the balance of power and authority away from the court and bureaucracy and towards the Majlis, and

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away from a religious perspective towards secularism. However, in the final months of 1906, they were not yet in a position to exert significant influence on the drafting of the constitution. The major preoccupation of all those involved in writing the document was curtailment of the power and authority of the shah, and the battle with the court on this matter took precedence over all else, including religious and secularist views. Specific points to which this related were the powers of the sovereign to dissolve parliament, the responsibilities of ministers, the creation and role of a senate, and financial accountability. To ascertain how this might be achieved, the decision was taken to model the new constitution on that of Belgium. Mukhbir al-Saltana, felt that, since in an Islamic country constitutional (mashruta) had no meaning, it was better to call the constitution mashru‘a, though not with the sense meant by the clergy.27 However, he had to give way to those with more radical secular views. An attempt was made at a compromise between the courtiers and reformers to push the document through before the Shah died. For example, the word mashruta (constitution), with all the conditions it implied in terms of limiting the royal power, was left out in favour of the term qanun-i asasi or ‘fundamental code of regulations’. It defined the liberties and functions of the assembly, its limitations and its relations with the various Departments of State.28 Although this term did not satisfy the Tabriz deputies, to some extent it met the aspirations of the original movement for an ‘adalatkhana, a House of Justice, which would end arbitrary rule, and lead to the longed-for realisation of a desire for stability and order. It would protect the national interest by curbing the arbitrary rule and injustice which weakened it.29 It was not concerned so much with the rights of the individual, except against oppression, but with a communal right to boundaries to absolute power.30 The Constitution of 1906 transferred some of the powers of the shah to the elected assembly, and an element of compromise was reached on some, though not all, major points.31 It was a legislative assembly with the right to introduce and make laws (Article 15), but its initiative was curtailed by the fact that legislation was seen as being presented mainly by ministers (Articles 36 and 37). The one issue on which all but the court agreed was finance, the single most significant issue of the constitutional period. Article 18 stated that the regulation of all financial matters and regulation of the budget, and all changes to fiscal arrangements, had to have the approval of the Majlis. Article 25 forbade the contracting of foreign loans without the permission of the Majlis , and indeed, one of the first measures of the Majlis was to refuse to sanction a proposed joint loan of £400,000 from Britain and Russia.32 Thus a long-standing objective of the reformist bureaucracy was finally realised. However, the constitution failed to address the issue of the constitutional rights of the people and of popular sovereignty.33 Overall, the compromises in the constitution of 1906 satisfied the ‘ulama, and, as the main thrust of the reformers was to reduce the influence of the shah and court, they refrained from addressing the question of secular law and the shari‘a.

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Debates on the Constitution and its Limits Late Winter and Spring 1907 The main causes of dispute in the later winter and spring of 1907 between Shah and Majlis were the questions of ministerial responsibility and of the existence and rights of the Senate, in which the advantage in the Constitution had been given to the shah, in the sense that ministers were implicitly recognised as the shah’s appointees. Members of the Majlis tried to make ministers and the prime minister more responsible to the assembly itself.34 The question of the right of the shah to dissolve the Majlis, a subject of some anxiety,35 had been resolved by the decision to limit each term of the Majlis for two years in Article 5,36 a measure which in effect limited the power of the shah in terms of control over the assembly. But it was also at this time that the conflict between religion and secularism came to the fore. In accordance, in particular, with the long-standing views of the reformers of the Qajar bureaucracy on the role of the ‘ulama in politics, reference to the role of religion was kept at a minimum, and no mention was made of the clergy themselves. The Majlis was said to have been established to strengthen the foundations of government and implement the principles of the shari‘a.37 However, no precise regulations were drawn up or measures indicated to implement the latter objective, and the interests of religion were not otherwise mentioned. As Tavakoli-Targhi has remarked, power of supervision over the law in effect passed from the ‘ulama to the representatives of the people.38 The Constitution of 1906 nevertheless left much still to be done, especially with regard to ministerial responsibility, full separation of powers, the law and the judiciary, individual and minority rights, and the provincial administration. The question also arose in February 1907 of mashruta, a word hitherto avoided, and one which clearly implied conditional or limited monarchy. The Shah was reluctant to accept the term, and now began to find common cause with the conservative ‘ulama, who were demanding that the Majlis be mashru‘a (in accordance with the shari‘a) instead. Following intense popular pressure, the Shah finally agreed to mashruta in a rescript issued on 11 February 1907 in return for recognition that the monarchy would be vested in perpetuity in himself and his descendants.39 He further agreed to the introduction of provincial councils. The conservative ‘ulama resistance, however, continued until 23 February, and a cleric named Sayyid Akbar Shah preached against the assembly saying that the laws of the Prophet were sufficient for Muslims, who should protest against the introduction of the laws of infidels.40 In the meantime a committee was formed in mid-February 1907 to remedy the perceived deficiencies of the Constitution by drafting a new or ‘supplementary’ version. This committee included none of the reformist bureaucrats who had drafted the first Constitution, and had instead altogether more radical secular members. They were the Tabriz deputies Sayyid Hasan Taqizada, and Sadiq Mustashar al-Daula, Javad Khan Sa‘d al-Daula, now the dominant figure in the more militant section of the Majlis members, and Haj Muhammad Husain Amin al-Zarb, the prominent Tehran merchant. They decided to adopt more or less in

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Figure 7 Revolutionary supporters of constitutionalism. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.)

full the Belgian Constitution, translated by Sa‘d al-Daula, with some elements of the French, Bulgarian and Ottoman constitutions.41 This news was not well received by the conservative ‘ulama, who were expressing disquiet by April. The most contentious issue was Article 8 of the proposed new version of the constitution, termed the Supplementary Fundamental Law, which stated that all the people of Iran were equal before the law of the state (qanun-i daulati), irrespective of their creed.42 When the Supplement was put to the Majlis on 16 May all the ‘ulama except Tabataba’i objected on the grounds that non-Muslims could not have the same rights as Muslims according to the shari‘a. The mujtahid Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri proposed an amendment saying that a council of mujtahids should examine laws before they were passed to ensure that they were in accordance with the shari‘a. If they were not, they could not be passed. A struggle then ensued between the radical secularists, led by Taqizada, and the conservative ‘ulama, led by Fazlallah. Supported by the Shah, Shaikh Fazlallah took bast (sanctuary) in the shrine of Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim, near Tehran, and sent telegrams to the provinces, and the ‘ulama of Najaf, saying that the Majlis was acting contrary to the principles of Islam.43 The controversy spread to Najaf, where Akhund Khurasani and Shaikh ‘Abdullah Mazandarani supported the Majlis. Later Khurasani was to write that ‘Constitutionalist rule and justice and equality in all hisbah matters are much closer to the shari‘a than tyranny’.44 This, however, is not the same as

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equality of all regardless of religion according to the law. The most conservative senior mujtahid of Najaf, Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Yazdi, declined to endorse the Majlis, explaining only that the reason concerned the need to safeguard Muslims through the shari‘a.45 In fact, he was not as opposed to the Majlis as Shaikh Fazlallah, and though he disagreed with absolute freedom of the press, he said people had the right to read it as long as it did not attack religion. He also said that the legislative power arose from the shah, the Majlis and the Senate, and related to the ‘urf laws, in particular on matters concerned with political rights, government duties and taxes.46 Shaikh Fazlallah came out of bast in September 1907 having achieved little in the way of winning support either in the Majlis or the provinces. He was to stage a demonstration again in December 1907, when he and his followers set up tents in Maidan-i Tupkhana, at the time of the Shah’s attempted coup against the Majlis. Once again the Majlis was victorious and Fazlallah failed to garner sufficient support either in Tehran or the provinces.47 The Supplementary Fundamental Law of 7 October 1907 The resulting Supplementary Fundamental Law, finally passed on 7 October 1907, moved well beyond its predecessor in several respects. It incorporated individual constitutional rights such as equality before the law, fair trial, freedom of expression and of assembly. It also established that the government was bound to provide education, fairness in taxation, and legality.48 It diminished the rights of the shah, it much enhanced the powers of the Majlis and the prime minister, and it established a secular judiciary as part of a systematic division of powers (Article 27)49. The shah’s powers were defined by Articles 35 to 57, Article 57 stating that his prerogatives were only mentioned in the present constitutional law. Ministerial responsibility to parliament was explicitly stated in Article 44, and enlarged upon in Articles 60 to 67. New rights were granted to the people by Articles 8 to 25, in particular that of equality before the law (Article 8). The budget was fully determined by the Majlis (Article 96). Sovereignty was stated to be a trust confided (as a Divine gift) by the people to the shah (Article 35). In other words, sovereignty lay with the people. The constitution introduced much greater rationalisation into the government administrative system. It brought about full financial accountability, and removed the appointments within ministries from control of the shah (Article 48). Education was to be regulated by the Ministry of Science and Culture (Article 19). Supervision of expenditure was established by an auditing committee (Articles 102–3). Articles 71 to 89 governed the establishment of the tribunals of justice, which in turn were to usher in judicial reform.50 Regulations were to be introduced for the provincial administration, which was to be extended by the establishment of councils (Article 29). This last point initially and ostensibly worked to the advantage of the provinces, but was later to become an instrument of the extension of state control.

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The conservative ‘ulama, who had apparently lost in their struggle to control the secular nature of the constitution, made one very significant gain: they obtained in Article 2 the right to supervise the enactments of the Majlis to ensure that none was contrary to the shari‘a. Thus, as Afary has observed, unprecedented powers were conferred on the clergy to interfere with legislation thereby undermining the authority of both the Majlis and the judiciary.51 Provincial and District Council Law (qanun-i anjumanha-yi ayalati va vilayati) Whilst the struggle over the Supplementary Fundamental Law was in process, the Majlis at least succeeded in approving the Provincial and District Council Law on 14 April 1907. After some delay in ratification, it began to be implemented in the provinces in the summer of 1907.52 District elections took place at different times, and the main preoccupation of the Majlis itself was that they should take place without disturbances. The chief task of the councils was then to try to maintain some sort of control over the provinces. They were supposed to replace the old administration in many matters, and they had to co-operate with it, particularly the provincial governors. There were, however, to be struggles over spheres of authority. The main features of the Provincial and District Council Law were that a provincial council should be composed of members elected by the capital of the province and its environs, and its districts (Article 3). It was explained in Article 1 that the term ‘provincial’ (ayalat) referred in this instance to a part of the country in which a central government was located,53 and ‘districts’ (vilayat) referred to places which were the seats of lesser governors. Members of the provincial council were to be elected by majority vote (Article 4), with 12 seats being allocated to the provincial capital and the remainder being elected by the districts. The number would depend on the number of districts in the province, and each district would send one member. One member should represent a tribe where there were any in the province (Article 5). Specific conditions were set out for the right to vote and the right to be elected in the provinces (Articles 6–10) and districts (Articles 48–9); procedures for the elections in the provinces were also set out (Articles 11–47), and for the districts (Articles 50–2). With regard to the relationship of the councils to the provincial government administration, Article 67 specified that the latter must answer all requests related to the province put forward by the former. However, the provincial council could contact different government offices without necessarily going through the governor, except those offices directly under the governor, in which case they should write to the governor. (Article 68). The governor or his deputy had the right to attend meetings of the provincial council, unless it was investigating government accounts (Article 69). The duties of the councils were specified in Articles 87 onwards. They were focused on the particular affairs of the province, and its prosperity. They did not

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include passing laws (Article 88), but did include investigation of complaints against the governors of both provinces and districts, who were thus made accountable (Article 89). Pending reform of the judicial system, for the period until the law courts (‘adliyya) were established, the council could investigate a complaint regarding an ‘urf court, and if necessary refer the matter to the central government (Article 90). With regard to taxes, the councils had some rights. They could give an opinion on taxes within limits specified by the law (which was currently vague). They could suggest adjustments arising from calamities, which should be referred through the governor to the Ministry of Finance to be approved and implemented (Article 91). Any additional taxes needed by the council had to be approved by the Majlis (Article 94). Articles 105–14 set out details regarding the budget, allocation, collection, audit and expenditure for the provinces and districts. Their budgets were dependent partly on an allocation from the centre and partly on local revenues. According to Article 106, the role of the councils was to supervise the collection of revenue by the administration. Once the provincial budget was prepared by the local administration, the council had to audit and ratify it, after which it was sent to the Ministry of Finance (Article 112). The councils had no fixed budget of their own, and were evidently dependent for their funding on allocation from the local governor. The Law thus demonstrates a certain reluctance to relinquish the control of the local governors. According to Article 98, the government authorities had to obtain the view of the council before any major change because of their local knowledge, but they were not obliged to act on their advice. Article 103 permitted council discussions on matters of administration of their local affairs, but excluded them from addressing ‘political affairs’. These were defined as what related to the fundamental laws of the country and the policy of the central government. The noticeable complexities in the foregoing allocation of responsibilities and duties represent a reality of far-reaching change in a country that was not well-prepared for it. Thus flexibility incorporated to assist the process of change was also to give rise to confusion over areas of authority as between the new and the old. The Municipality Law 1907 The Baladiyya or Municipality Law was passed on 2 June 1907.54 The first priority of the Law was to reduce local chaos if possible. However, it was mainly created to encourage civic participation by the urban population, and to lessen, in particular, the role of the tribes in the towns.55 It was therefore at once a modern institution-building reform, and a continuation of a long-term central government policy of tribal control. One of its main responsibilities was to control the price of everyday necessities, which would thus be taken out of the hands of the powerful. It aimed to foster a sense of citizenship and of responsibility for urban matters, especially education – including schools, libraries, reading rooms and museums.56 The 1907 Law was incomplete in implementation, as might be expected, given the state of the economy, and came closest to success in Tabriz.57

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The Provincial Law and the Municipality Law in effect established local government in Iran, and were the beginning of its rationalisation. As with such institutions elsewhere, their establishment was at once a decentralising measure and an extension of central control. On the one hand, local authorities were to receive funding for their purposes, and a say in the allocation of resources. On the other hand they were part of a dialogue of centre–local relations, and a forum for local views on central policies. In the short term the under-funded new institutions were partly subsumed by the politics of the old elite, but they did provide a forum for new social groups to begin to have an established role in local politics. They received a limited welcome and recognition of authority in these areas, and were liable to a whole range of interpretations as to how they might serve individual and local needs. The result was that to some extent they began to reshape local politics, and to become a new arena for old rivalries. People supported the creation of local and provincial councils both as part of a contribution to the new order, and to pursue their own political and economic objectives more effectively. Ultimately, however, the old local authorities were to be replaced by these institutions which were accountable to the central government, and owed their power and authority to the latter. Finally, they were not perceived by those in provinces as either Islamic or secular, though occasionally the epithet ‘islami’ was to be applied to one or other of them.

8 Tabriz Islam, radicalisation and class struggle

The period of the First Majlis began as it was to continue with a bitter struggle between the radicalism of the Tabrizis and the inherent absolutism of Muhammad ‘Ali Shah. The enmity between the Tabrizis and Shah was already well established when he came to the throne. Hints of an impending conflict of authority between the Anjuman of Tabriz and the new Shah began immediately on the news of the death of Muzaffar al-Din Shah.1 Essentially the Shah was in particular hostile to both the Azarbaijani deputies and the Anjuman, as he was aware that they wanted full constitutional government, which would limit his powers much further than the existing constitution. There was soon a clash over a new road toll (Russian), and especially over a bridge that had been rebuilt by an Iranian forty years before, and which was not treated as the property of the town. The new Shah had nevertheless sold the bridge to the Russian road company, and the Anjuman therefore complained to Tehran.2 By early February 1907 the conflict was so serious that the Anjuman sealed the government accounts, seized the keys of the arsenal, and took over the government telegraph office. The governor telegrammed the Shah to say that he was powerless.3 An attempt was made to draw the British into guaranteeing any terms offered by the Shah, but they declined to be involved. Eventually the situation was resolved by pressure on the Shah in Tehran itself, and he was obliged to issue a decree ‘confirming the principles of constitutionalism’.4 However, he resisted Tabrizi pressure to dismiss his loyal conservative councillors, Sa‘d al-Mulk and Mufakhir al-Mulk. All sides in Tabriz were united against the Shah, whatever their differences. Only fear of Russian intervention prevented them taking stronger action.

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The situation deteriorated further in March 1907, when the Anjuman seized a consignment of rifles (presumably from the Tabriz arsenal) belonging to the Shah which were on their way to Tehran.5 The seizure was justified by the fact that ‘public money’ had been used to buy them, and therefore they were for public use, sentiments which raised a range of issues about the separation of the Shah’s private purse from state revenue, and the control of armaments. Eventually, however, the rifles were handed back to the Shah. The Azarbaijani Deputies to the Majlis in Tehran Tabriz had been well in advance of other places in choosing its deputies (as named below), and on 8 January 1907 a group of them left for Tehran.6 Clergy Mirza Fazl ‘Ali Aqa Imam Jum‘a Khu’i Princes (Qajars) Hidayatallah Mirza Notables Mustashar al-Daula Sharaf al-Daula Merchants Mirza Abd al-Rahim Talibuf 7 Haji Muhammad Hariri Haji Mirza Aqa (Farshi) Guilds Haji Mirza Ibrahim Sayyid Hasan Taqizada (already in Tehran)8 Mir Hashim (already in Tehran)9 Cultivators Ahsan al-Daula Of these, Taqizada, Mustashar al-Daula, Mirza Fazl ‘Ali Aqa and Ahsan al-Daula were to play a prominent part in the debates of the Majlis. Mir Hashim remained as a deputy for only a short period. He made pronounced comments on the sufferings of ordinary people and the way their wishes were overridden by ministers who were close to the Shah, and who misled him. He was concerned over the introduction of a regular system to protect the rights of Muslims, a subject on which he spoke in a militant tone.10 He also considered that the situation of

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Muslims was becoming worse than that of the Christians and Jews. Altogether, his tone was much more Islamic in nature and stood out in the Majlis, dominated as it was by the secularist Azarbaijani deputies, and the higher bureaucrats of similar, though not so militant views. There had been very little competition to be elected as it was difficult to find candidates of standing who were willing to leave their concerns in Tabriz. Wratislaw commented that although the ideas of the deputies were mostly moderate, there was very little understanding that ‘democracy cannot grow like a mushroom’.11 At this time there was no obvious division in their political views, which reflected the fact that the Anjuman was politically in broad agreement at the time that it chose them.12 With regard to other Azarbaijani deputies, Imam Jum‘a Khu’i and Haji Muhammad Aqa Hariri left on 27 February 1907.13 The Customs Administration Although the outward appearance of relations between the customs administration and the Anjuman was conciliatory,14 there were attacks on it and its Belgian director, who was dismissed.15 The news of the dismissal of the leading customs administrators, Naus and Priem, who had served the central government so well in terms of raising revenue under Muzaffar al-Din Shah, was received with much approval.16 Some weeks later, however, the pressure on the customs administration in Tabriz was reduced following instructions from Tehran, which saved the jobs of the other Belgian customs officials.17 The new-style central government was discovering, as the old one had, the financial benefits of an efficient customs administration. The National Bank Meetings were organised by the leading merchants to support the movement to establish a national bank.18 They put out a plea for donations, and had considerable support, at least in spirit. In the Anjuman, the representatives of the guilds agreed that the establishment of the bank was more essential than any other matter to the progress of the country. As elsewhere, arrangements were agreed for collection of contributions not only in cash but also in personal valuables. Sacrifices, it was said, were required, including among others, it was suggested, having hookahs with brass rather than silver tops. At the same time the ‘ulama should preach the advantages of using local over foreign goods.19 The bank was also seen as a project of social and economic unity which would assist in vital aspects of the development of the country, such as road building and the establishment of factories. It was linked to independence – a wealthy country was a country that owned itself. In reality, the project of the national bank did not meet with much success in Tabriz. Most Tabrizis either considered that it provided inadequate security for investment, or simply did not have the funds to invest.20

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Schools and Education The movement to develop education resumed under the constitutional regime. A society named the Anjuman-i Ma‘arif (also known as the Society of Schools in Tabriz), announced that it would meet twice a week, and invited the attendance of heads of schools, including the maktabs (traditional schools).21 A primary school named Dabistan-i Naubar was founded in the Naubar Quarter by a Mirza Husain under the supervision of Aqa Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, Aqa Mirza Javad Pishnamaz and others, in February 1907 as a result of public subscription mainly from merchants.22 Its curriculum was moderately innovative and included Persian, Arabic, geography and mathematics. Some students had free tuition and some paid fees. Not long afterwards a primary school with a curriculum in the new style was established in the Charandab Quarter through the efforts of Mirza ‘Ali Akbar Khan, the editor of Anjuman, with public support.23 The fees were calculated according to the means of the family. When after some months it ran short of money, the Anjuman agreed to find ways to help fund it.24 The modern-style Rushdiyya School held examinations in September, which were welcomed by Anjuman as a model of modern-style education associated with the progress of the country.25 Its curriculum included Persian, Arabic, mathematics, geography and, significantly, French, and it had a new-style system of examinations. The Tabriz Anjuman January to June 1907 The Anjuman’s ideal was to play its part in enabling the country to reach the standard of Europe in terms of the development of the law, education and progress. The means of achieving these ends were perceived to be the unity of government and nation, and the regulation of all affairs. It was conscious of how backward Iran was, but also aware of the possibilities of progress for countries of the East shown by Japan. One member mentioned how some villagers, though uneducated, were buying newspapers and bringing them back to the village to find someone who could read them.26 The Anjuman was well-ordered; it usually met daily at a specified time, and its proceedings were reported in some detail in the Anjuman newspaper. Attendance was expected to be regular and punctual though there were inevitably absences, and complaints of lack of punctuality.27 In the earlier part of 1907, at least, the Anjuman was vigorous in addressing the problem of redress of grievances. In March 1907 the soldiers of one of the regiments took refuge in the Anjuman, complaining of non-payment of wages, despite their invaluable work as sentinels and as a garrison.28 Their load was seemingly heavier for the fact that some soldiers from wealthier backgrounds bought themselves out of service. The Anjuman assured the soldiers that they would make sure the wages were paid. In another matter, in January 1907, the peasants of the village of Ilkhichi complained against a Mir Taqi Hariri to the Anjuman for causing them

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problems including damage.29 Documentary evidence was brought to support the case against him to demonstrate that he had subjected the villagers to unwarranted interference, and he undertook not to do so. The matter was then referred, according to the procedure then current, to the local government to implement. It was a particular concern of some members of the Anjuman that petitioners of more humble origin be treated with proper respect.30 The Anjuman also acted with considerable vigour in dealing with its subordinate provincial districts, as happened with disturbances in the village of Shabistar, for example, which complained of oppression.31 The Anjuman vigorously supported the struggle against despotism in other provinces, for which it was criticised in Tehran. The government of Hamadan, for example, had complained vehemently about the Tabriz Anjuman interfering in the affairs of its district, accusing it of fomenting anarchy.32 According to the Hamadanis, the Tabriz Anjuman was confusing itself with the Majlis-i Milli in Tehran. One problem was that other areas were behind Tabriz in sending their deputies, with the result that the Tabriz Anjuman was seen elsewhere as a popular representative in default of any other.33 The Anjuman seemed secure and popular in Tabriz itself, but was prone to heated debate, which sometimes turned to violent quarrels.34 The governor in the early part of 1907, Nizam al-Mulk, avoided confrontation. His position was weakened by the fact that he did not speak Azari. The developing radical view made itself heard in the Anjuman, being largely represented by some of the guild members and the radical preachers. Radicals amongst other members of the public also attended on a basis that is not consistently clear. For example, in February 1907 Karim Mujahid addressed the meeting on behalf of the people, saying that they had become constitutionalist to ward off oppression in the affairs of ‘Muslims and nation’.35 There were a number of competing factions in the Anjuman, though they would instantly unite if they came under pressure from the Shah. Indeed, the dethronement of the Shah was a common topic of discussion in Tabriz, even at this early stage in his reign, and there were some who actively advocated it.36 It is not recorded what type of government was suggested in his place, but elsewhere the idea of an elected monarchy was to develop. In March 1907, a sign of the increasing internal dissentions was the attempted murder of a prominent member, the leading merchant, Mirza Milani.37 This event was also an early indication of a class struggle in the Anjuman (see below) and in the city itself. At the same time a religious–lay division was emerging.38 This was exemplified in Mir Hashim resuming his membership of the Anjuman, though he remained adept at acting in both religious and secular organisations. Nizam al-Daula, the former governor of Urumiya, was elected president, assisted by Majd al-Saltana, so the established bureaucracy was also represented.

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The Trans-Caucasian Factor From early on in the constitutional period, offers of assistance if required against the forces of absolutism came to Tabriz from the Caucasus.39 In particular the Organisation of Social Democrats was secretly in contact with Tabriz revolutionaries, and by October 1906 they had sent several members to Iran to help organise the movement there.40 Some of these views were couched in religious terms with some Russian ‘Muslims’ urging the Tabrizis to use violent action against the government if provoked. The Caucasian Muslims in Tabriz formed their own association, under the leadership of a cleric named Mirza Ghafar, who preached incendiary sermons.41 The appearance of red flags42 at many disturbances was attributed to the Caucasian influence. By the end of June 1907 there were believed to be about 30 to 40 Caucasian mujahidin in Tabriz, who had many followers. The Caucasian revolutionaries were almost certainly instrumental in the emergence of an armed movement, but it should not be thought that they were its sole instigators. Mujahidin was a term meaning those who struggled for radical change; it was used to refer to combatants of both religious and secular views. As part of the same movement, a newspaper, Mujahid, was established in September 1907, and in the same month a congress of mujahidin was held in Mashhad. As Afary observes, the ideology of the mujahidin was a hybrid of Western socialism, liberalism and nationalism, and indigenous ideas. For example they were critical of the conservative ‘ulama, but believed in Shi‘a traditions. They were ardent supporters of the Majlis, but wanted more radical reforms than most, supporting redistribution of land, an eight-hour day for workers and universal suffrage. They included violence as a means to attain their goals, and considered it legitimised as sacred through reference to the Islamic principle that, ‘God recognises the active more than the resigned’.43 The Rise of Militancy In the winter of 1906–1907, people of all kinds began to perform military exercises and target practice outside the town. They were encouraged by radical preachers, in particular Shaikh Salim, Mirza Husain (both of peasant origin) and Mirza Javad, and indeed it is noteworthy that a fair number of lesser ‘ulama supported constitutionalism. Their message was that the volunteers should be ready to struggle for law, equality and co-operation, and to repair the weakness of Iran, all supported by quotations from the Qur’an and the Hadith.44 Unlike the Bushehri volunteers, who practised with sticks, they had rifles and cartridges, even though the latter especially were expensive.45 According to Kasravi, recalling his youth, the volunteers were of all ages and backgrounds, including ‘ulama, chintz dealers, rock sugar sellers, coppersmiths, and merchants themselves.46 Anjuman provides a detailed description of such a group, who were evidently the cohort supported by the merchant Haji Muhammad Baqir.47 They performed military exercises in the courtyard of his house arrayed in a uniform

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of his choice, which included a coat, white trousers with a green stripe, made from Iranian material, and white lambskin hats, all stylishly designed. As they marched, they chanted, ‘Long live the Anjuman’, in unison in Azari. A speech by one of the mujahidin spoke of the need for self-sacrifice for the country, promotion of the shari‘a, and ‘the acquisition of the knowledge of jihad, which is one of the duties of Islam’. Every quarter had its own armed group and barracks, and military practice included the music of drum and bugle.48 By May 1907, they were parading regularly, and many Tabrizis had some sort of gun.49 The Tabriz Anjuman had from the beginning regarded the emergence of armed groups with considerable disquiet. One member, Mirza Mahmud Tajirbashi, opined that it was of course a shari‘a duty to support jihad when required, but to hold armed gatherings outside the town was unlawful and could lead to sedition. It was therefore necessary that the ‘ulama preach against it.50 Needless to say, the Majlis in Tehran was not happy with this emergent militancy,51 which was a threat not only to order but also to central authority. The Radicalisation of the Poor and Class Struggle: Spring 1907 There was a certain amount of hostility to the Anjuman on the part of the senior ‘ulama, principally the leading mujtahid, Haji Mirza Hasan, as they believed it might undermine their significance and remove the sources of their income. A further discontented group were the landowners, as the Anjuman, whose sympathy lay with their supporters among the bazaaris and the lower classes, reduced the price of meat and grain. Indeed, the ordinary people of Tabriz were the most anti-clerical section of the population,52 in the sense that they challenged the leading ‘ulama, especially those with a landed interest. They were also vociferous in criticising the competence of the authorities. In March 1907 the representatives of the guilds gathered together with a large group of shopkeepers and mujahidin. Complaints were made to the Anjuman about lack of proper investigation of affairs, especially concerning bread, lack of security on the roads and lack of accountability. They also criticised Anjuman for a failure to publish useful discussions.53 The resultant agitation in the Anjuman was calmed by the preachers Mir Hashim and Shaikh Salim. It may be noted here that these two preachers, often described as radical, were less so than many of their followers, whom in a sense they represented. In April 1907 a break appeared in the unity of the constitutionalist movement in Tabriz with the emergence of class divisions. The poorer sections of society were represented by Shaikh Salim, who was supported by a number of mujahidin.54 The opposition was represented by Haji Mirza Hasan, who in effect voiced the view of the landowners and some of the major merchants, and who threatened to withdraw from the Anjuman unless Mir Hashim and another cleric were expelled.55 The landowners were concerned at the emergence of the mujahidin movement (which now numbered about 3,000), which they saw as

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a campaign by their inferiors to undermine their position.56 Influential among some members of this movement were the revolutionary Caucasian social democrats, who submitted a plan to divide and redistribute state and major private land holdings to the Anjuman.57 This major issue included rents and other dues. An uprising took place in a large village near Tabriz, named Qarahchaman, over the rights claimed by the landlord, Haji Muhammad ‘Ali, regarding his share of the crop. He complained to Haji Mirza Hasan, who complained to the governor, Nizam al-Mulk. The latter ordered the uprising to be suppressed, as happened with some violence.58 The tullab from Qarahchaman complained to the Anjuman, with the result that Haji Muhammad ‘Ali fled his village for the house of Mirza Hasan, who was thus revealed as opposed to constitutionalism, or at least its popular version.59 Since various classes were represented in the Anjuman, many of its members sympathised with the mujtahid, such as the President, Nizam al-Daula, and Bashir al-Saltana, a former chamberlain of Muzaffar al-Din Shah, both of whom were wealthy landowners. In fact, Bashir al-Saltana attended without having been elected. Mirza Hasan tried to have Shaikh Salim ejected, with the support of the conservatives.60 The people gathered in the mosques of the quarters and the bazaars closed. One of the mujahidin, named Aqa Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali, who evidently had a limited respect for senior ‘ulama, addressed the people on constitutionalism, saying, ‘What is the meaning of constitutionalism? Is it not that our religion remains in our hands? Is it not that the people are free of tyranny and oppression?’ The upshot was that Mirza Hasan was overwhelmed by the number and force of his adversaries, and obliged to retire to one of his villages. Shaikh Salim, aided by Mir Hashim, now held the field as the effective leader of Tabriz, with the support of the lower classes and the mujahidin.61 Leading members of the Anjuman, such as Malik al-Tujjar and Nizam al-Daula, withdrew from the town. The opinion of the guild members, who were caught between landlords and radicals, was that an attempt was being made to undermine constitutionalism as a whole.62 The Majlis was now drawn in. The people sent a telegram to the Azarbaijani deputies saying that Mirza Hasan among others, had been scheming to undermine the just laws of constitutionalism, and had been exiled as a result. This telegram was signed, ‘All the people of Tabriz, the ‘ulama and members of the Anjuman’. That evening a telegram came from Tabataba’i and Bihbihani, the two mujtahids in Tehran, asking the Tabrizis to apologise for their action, and ordering them to bring Mirza Hasan back.63 This response would have been partly a gesture of support for a fellow senior member of the ‘ulama, and partly an enjoinment to the Tabrizis to overcome their divisions, co-operate and compromise. As Kasravi remarked, the town was now out of control not only of the government, but of the leading ‘ulama as well, and from this time support among the wealthier ‘ulama began to slip away.64 Of the ‘ulama he said that, while some secretly became enemies of constitutionalism, others continued to support it, but were later to feel disillusioned. Others still (junior and younger) threw off their turbans and

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cloaks, and took up other occupations.65 Nevertheless, at this stage, as Wratislaw commented, the people of Tabriz showed a marked disinclination to shed each other’s blood.66 The Landed and Religious Elite and the Radicals Alarmed at the rise in the number of those carrying arms, and the growing radicalism, the landed and religious elite of Tabriz, including Thiqat al-Islam, Nizam al-Daula and Bashir al-Saltana, and various wealthy merchants, left Tabriz.67 When Haji Mirza Muhsin Aqa and Aqa Mirza Sadiq Mujtahid, two senior ‘ulama, were reported as intending to go to the ‘Atabat, the Tabrizis, after much effort, persuaded them to return to the town.68 Mirza Muhsin Aqa and Aqa Mirza Sadiq were reported as threatening to leave the town again unless five conditions were met: 1 Bring back those ‘ulama who have left the town; 2 No discussion of matters other than shari‘a affairs from the pulpit (a reference to the politicised sermons of Shaikh Salim and Mir Hashim); 3 That the newspapers should not print discussion of any subject that was contrary to the shari‘a; 4 That shari‘a affairs should not be dealt with in the Anjuman; 5 Do not make us attend the Anjuman.69 That propitiating them was a cause of such concern is a demonstration of the strength of their influence both socially and politically, and the Anjuman agreed to discuss the conditions they had made. Meanwhile a telegraph arrived from the Majlis instructing them to settle their differences in such a delicate situation and bring the ‘ulama back. The representatives of the guilds and other members of the Anjuman discussed the matter, and sent a group to see Thiqat al-Islam, and persuade him to return to Tabriz. As a result a report came shortly afterwards to the Anjuman by telephone that he was on his way, and he duly arrived somewhat reluctantly on 27 April 1907.70 Haji Mirza Hasan departed for Tehran, where in June he joined Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri in sanctuary in the Shah ‘Abd al-Azim shrine in protest at the Supplementary Fundamental Law.71 Thiqat al-Islam and Islamic Constitutionalism The one senior cleric who stayed unquestionably loyal to constitutionalism – in fact Islamic constitutionalism – was Thiqat al-Islam. A Shaikhi mujtahid who had been educated in the ‘Atabat, he was involved early on in the movement for reform, and supported the creation of the modern-style schools, and reportedly participated in the meetings of secret reformist societies.72 Certainly he held strong views against the absolutist system, and wrote a number of treatises on the religious legitimacy, on the basis of the Islamic injunction to consultation, of the

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Majlis.73 He saw constitutionalism as a barrier against oppression; indeed it was the only alternative to the iniquities of absolutism. The institution of a parliament was the means whereby consultation was facilitated and decisions taken.74 However, it had to be in accordance with the shari‘a. He had a particular definition of constitutionalism in Iran, as opposed to abroad, saying that reforming the current system, with all its flaws, and then adding the word mashru‘a did not make it mashruta (constitutionalism) in his sense. Firstly the government had to be bound by the shari‘a and execute it. Any new laws had to be suitable to Iran. In this way it would not be necessary to describe the Iranian system as mashruta-yi mashru‘a, as the mashruta in Iran was ipso facto in accordance with the shari‘a.75 In addition, like the other pro-constitutionalist ‘ulama, Thiqat al-Islam saw constitutionalism and the Majlis as a defence against foreign interference and invasion. On this point he deployed a reasoned historical argument demonstrating how the weakness of absolutism under the Qajars had permitted relentless foreign penetration of Iran.76 However, he also argued that Muslims should adopt certain aspects of Western modernity, especially education, the development of the sciences, and government through more democratic institutions. He believed that such institutions were in conformity with the beliefs of the Prophet. Overall, he was a moderate who was gradually to grow alarmed at the radicalism of some members of the Anjuman. The Districts of Azarbaijan and the Tabriz Anjuman Tabriz also radicalised the districts of Azarbaijan, where the revolution had much support. To many the Anjuman was seen as liberating them from the fines and fees of officials and mujtahids.77 Meanwhile, radical preachers also left Tabriz to spread the message in provincial towns such as Urumiya, Khoy and Salmas. The fame of the Tabriz Anjuman as a redresser of grievances spread far and wide.78 One Anjuman preacher and renowned orator, Mirza Javad, who went to Urumiya, found favour with both Muslims and Christians, the latter of whom reportedly were allowed into a mosque to listen to him. His vision was one of patriotism and unity, with the advanced benefits of European civilisation achieved without European help. He was supported by the ordinary people, but frowned on by the khans there and by some of the ‘ulama. He went on to organise anjumans throughout the districts of Azarbaijan, speaking on behalf of the rights of peasant communities.79 By May 1907 the renown of the Tabriz Anjuman had also continued to spread beyond the province, and it received appeals from elsewhere, one for example from the village of Ibrahimabad near Qazvin.80 With the spread of interest in constitutionalism, many small towns and villages formed their own councils. Khalkhal, for example, set up a council in early 1907 on the initiative of local ‘ulama and merchants.81 The right of small towns and villages to have councils was denied by the Majlis itself, not least because such organisations showed a tendency to undermine landlord rights.82 This preoccupation in part related to order and in part reflected the fact that Majlis deputies on

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the whole came from the wealthier classes. In early 1907, the Majlis, disquieted by some of the more radical policies of the Tabriz Anjuman, which it had come to regard as a rival, accused it of being too lenient over the formation of village councils in Azarbaijan. The Anjuman responded that it had in effect curtailed the formation of village councils – indeed the landowning interests in the Anjuman had strongly resisted the growth of peasant rights. There was a divergence of opinion in the Anjuman itself, reflected in its debates, on the question of local organisations, and Sayyid Javad Natiq asserted that according to Muslim tradition, people were allowed to form organisations to manage their interests and concerns, such as the establishment of schools and improvements in cultivation.83 By the beginning of 1908, local communities felt that they were under-represented at the national level. The people of Bunab and its surrounding villages organised to select a representative to speak on their behalf in January 1908.84 They drafted two documents, one for the town and one for its surrounding villages, which stated that according to the text of the Constitution the subdistricts and small towns were not permitted to establish councils. Therefore their only option was to appoint their own representative to take care of their affairs inside and outside Bunab relating to local and provincial issues. As wholehearted supporters of constitutionalism, they had decided to introduce Aqa Saif al-Islam, a member of the ‘ulama whose forebears had always served the local community, as their choice for this purpose. The documents were endorsed by the seals for the townspeople, and the local villages, with the name of each signatory carefully written below. The ‘Ulama, Judicial Administration and the ‘Adliyya (Court of Justice) The ‘ulama began to demonstrate growing concern that their position of influence in society and control of legal matters were being steadily eroded. It must be said that political matters had long been referred to, obliquely or otherwise, from the pulpit. However, the radical preachers continued to speak on constitutionalism and other matters of the day openly and forcibly, without particular regard for the views of more senior clerics. Nor was there much indication that the wishes of the ‘ulama were respected by the radical press. Though the Anjuman was making provision for a court of justice (‘adliyya), to be administered by the local government officials, with the participation of Anjuman members,85 the law was still essentially the ‘urf or customary law, applied in accordance with the principles of the shari‘a, that is, following longestablished practice. There was not as yet a formal secular law, though there were indications as to the way the wind was blowing. Discussions in the Anjuman about the ‘adliyya had centred largely on administrative arrangements, and which of the local authorities, the government administration or the Anjuman, should have the management of it. Some rationalisation of legal issues was in particular necessary because of the large numbers of people who were coming to the Anjuman demanding redress of grievances. It was agreed to establish a court

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Figure 8 Some of the seals (signatures) of the inhabitants of Bunab appointing a representative to follow their interests. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.)

of justice. It was pointed out that since the verdict had to be executed by the local government, it would be more logical if the hall of justice were to be situated in its offices. The authority of the Anjuman to see that rights were acknowledged and justice carried out, should be represented by a group of members who attended in a supervisory capacity. This arrangement was finally agreed, and put in process.86 Four people were duly chosen in July 1907.87

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The Disturbances of May–June 1907: The Supplementary Fundamental Law In early May agitation began over the delays in Tehran, ultimately due to the reluctance of the Shah, over the ratification of the Supplementary Fundamental Law.88 Thwarted in their attempts to have the law ratified, the Azarbaijanis were reported to have begun to threaten secession, though Kasravi considered that these rumours were exaggerated and made up in Tehran.89 The Tehran deputies, who were more moderate than some of their fellows in Tabriz, sent telegrams urging patience. Nevertheless, schoolboys wearing white paraded through the town indicating their willingness to sacrifice their lives for the Supplementary Fundamental Law.90 As shown by Baradaran-Shokoohy, women were active in the demonstrations, and even came to meetings in the local mosques with their babies.91 The bazaars closed for fear of disorder, and at the growing radicalism, especially that of the Caucasian mujahidin.92 By the end of May Tabriz was in a state of near siege, and being patrolled by groups of men armed with rifles obtained from the arsenal, who also guarded the gates. By June the 12 quarters of Tabriz were divided between: three who followed Mir Hashim, seven who followed Shaikh Salim, and two which were neutral.93 Despite the divisions which they generated, these two preachers were also concerned with encouraging unity,94 and thus in a sense represented the middle rather than lowest classes of society. This point is borne out by the fact that the Anjuman, which had by now contrived to expel the more senior government officials and some of the major merchants, agreed unanimously that the two preachers should attend its meetings with the specific purpose of gathering popular power in one place, namely the Anjuman. Accusations of collusion with the Shah were levelled at some of the local government administration, especially the brother of the Shah’s farrash bashi. He was also brother-in-law to Rahim Khan, a bandit with connections to the Shah, whose son was pillaging the border area, to suppress support there for the Anjuman, and was believed to be in collusion with the Shah.95 The Anjuman had an exchange of fierce telegrams with the Azarbaijani deputies in Tehran. The Anjuman informed the latter that the bazaars would not open until the Law was ratified, and a large crowd composed of all social levels encamped in the telegraph office. ‘Mashruta’, they argued in a telegram sent in mid-May, ‘is like a tent of which the Fundamental Law is the pole. Without the pole the tent will collapse.’96 They further complained that the delay of the Law was not advisable.97 Tehran replied enjoining patience and explaining the Supplementary Fundamental Law had not yet passed through the Majlis, to which the response was a sarcastic expression of gratitude for an explanation of the process of drafting and ratifying the Law.98 If it takes time, said Tabriz, the bazaars would stay closed and the people would be in the telegraph office for as long as was necessary. The Tabrizis went on to ask what was to be understood by the fact that regulations for the provincial councils

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had been finalised some time ago, but still not been signed by the Shah. ‘All the people of Azarbaijan’, that is, the Tabrizis, would remain where they were until the laws had been signed. In the reply from Tehran, the deputies indicated that there was a new difficulty, namely the scrutiny of the law by the ‘ulama. This had brought up the questions of the rights of the ‘ulama, and what rights people had regarding the religion and the shari‘a in this matter. These questions were too sensitive to be widely discussed at this time, as the co-operation of the ‘ulama was needed in other, more urgent matters. The telegram ended by distinguishing between sensitive, essential, fundamental matters to be dealt with, and subsidiary matters, of which the law in general was one, which would have to wait. In fact this referred indirectly to the objections being raised by Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri over the potential conflict between constitutionalism and the shari‘a. On the subject of the shari‘a, Shaikh Salim, the radical preacher, wrote to Mirza Fazl ‘Ali Aqa, the Majlis deputy, telling him that there was concern in Najaf over the possibility that the Supplementary Fundamental Law was not in conformity with the religious law. He feared that opposition might be raised by the absolutists on this count, and warned that all articles of the Law should be in conformity with the shari‘a. He made special mention of the matter of equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, saying the excuse that it was in conformity with the ‘urf law would create problems with all the other articles. He ended up by advising that it was not possible to impose European ways on Iran.99 The crowd in the telegraph office, which included secularist Tabrizis, expressed surprise that the matter was being delayed over the question of the shari‘a. Did the nation want a religious law, they asked? They had requested a fundamental law based on constitutional monarchy, which, they asserted, was the same in all countries with constitutions. The unchangeable religious law had been bestowed on them 1,300 years earlier, and there were no more prophets coming, which was why they had not asked for a law related to the shari‘a.100 These sentiments were reflected elsewhere, but with greater vehemence. According to one report, a group of mujahidin, clearly believing that the shari‘a should be separated from the constitutional laws, argued that: The prophet in his time was a knowledgeable person, who introduced the shari‘a 1,300 years ago … and departed. Now in the countries of Europe there are many people experienced in politics, to whom Jesus could not even be a student. As is indicated in the newspapers, these ‘ulama of today who preach favourably of constitutionalism and liberty are a hundred per cent more politically aware than the Prophet and Jesus. It is not necessary to repeat the matter again. … We are not going to listen to the nonsense that the prophet and others have commanded this and that.101 While the debate in the telegraph office was going on, the preachers, including Mir Hashim and Shaikh Salim, endeavoured to keep the crowd quiet. Thiqat

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al-Islam appeared and informed the people that the shari‘a was eternal and unalterable and could not be changed by any other law. Meanwhile the central government began taking measures to calm Tabriz, particularly the so-called roughs or rebels (ashrar), which appears to mean those of the poorer classes. A self-styled national group in the telegraph office under the direction of the Azarbaijani deputies in the Majlis set out to assist the restoration of order. They marched into town to the tune of drums and trumpets carrying red flags with the legend, ‘With the help of God, victory is at hand’. Groups of mujahidin patrolled the streets of each quarter to keep them in order, and the local government and the Anjuman secured the deployment of a state regiment to Tabriz. Thus, eventually, the Tabrizis were forced to accept that ratification of the new law was in process but would take time, and to give up and go home. Nevertheless, their famous stand for the Supplementary Fundamental Law strengthened the hand of the various reformers in the Majlis both against the Shah and the conservative ‘ulama. Elite Concern over the Disturbances However, trouble continued in Tabriz itself. Members of the elite had moved to their country properties to escape the situation, which continued to be disturbed because of the bread shortage. The bazaars were still closed but ordered to open because of the distress caused over lack of provisions. A further problem was the scarcity of money. By early June 1907 Thiqat al-Islam was the only mujtahid remaining in Tabriz.102 The bread shortage became so severe that Haji Qasim Ardabili, the richest merchant in Tabriz and the owner of many villages, was killed for reportedly cornering the market in wheat, by a mob including women complaining about bad bread.103 As a result other wealthy merchants fled the town. The Anjuman began to lose prestige because of radicals perceived as anarchists moving towards violent change, and the starving radicalised poor resorting to pillage.104 Divisions amongst the Mujahidin and Disorders To make matters worse, the by now large numbers of the mujahidin divided into different factions, with many opposed to Mir Hashim, who had come to dominate the Anjuman, and had numerous followers.105 Kasravi speaks of two groups of mujahidin, those who were resident in Tabriz and those who were originally Iranians but had spent some time working in the Caucasus.106 The term fida’iyan tended to be applied more to those who were from or had been in the Caucasus, but not consistently so.107 According to Kasravi, the Caucasians, as they were also referred to, were influenced by the Russian social democrats. He believed, probably correctly, that the struggles among the secularist fida’iyan were little understood by the rest of the population.108 However, their disputes and radicalism came to be seen as a problem as far as keeping order and carrying

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out business was concerned.109 With regard to the term ‘mujahidin’, it gradually covered radicals with an ever-widening range of agendas. Old quarter disputes and rivalries had a bearing on the situation. Lutis from different quarters joined the mujahidin attracted by guns which they could use to pursue their existing feuds, which added to the problem of order.110 Some of the mujahidin came from the poorest classes, and having concerns about the problems of obtaining a livelihood, saw these titles as an opportunity to acquire sustenance by one means or another. They harassed not only the wealthy of the town using blackmail, but also the Armenians. Not unexpectedly they were regarded by the more prosperous sections of society as ‘the greatest evil on earth’. Other mujahidin seem to have been destitute persons who had come in to Tabriz from the provinces.111 In June 1907, the Azarbaijani deputies in Tehran summoned members of the Anjuman to the telegraph office in Tabriz and complained of the rumours of anarchy there, and demanded they take action.112 The wealthier landowners made an effort to send grain into the town to calm the situation, and the mujahidin repaired their divisions and organised themselves sufficiently to guard the bakeries and ensure an adequate distribution of bread.113 The Tabriz authorities endeavoured to reassert their control and force 30 Caucasians out of town. On 27 June the public crier was sent round ordering people to disarm, but to little effect, despite the governor’s promise to send soldiers.114 The Debate over Mashruta-yi Mashru‘a (Constitutionalism According to the Shari‘a) Differences among the leading mujtahids in Tehran and the ‘Atabat began to emerge in April 1907 and were an undercurrent in the struggle over the Supplementary Fundamental Law in May and June. The leading pro-constitutionalist mujtahids of the ‘Atabat were Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kazim Khurasani, Shaikh ‘Abdullah Mazandarani, and Haji Mirza Husain ibn Khalil (of whom the first two were the more significant). They continually supported the Majlis. In April, Khurasani sent a telegram directly to the Majlis, which was also read out in the Anjuman, stating his view. Khurasani believed the Majlis strengthened religion and government, protected the foundations of Islam, and was the key to justice and a barrier to oppression.115 To Khurasani, as to Mirza Muhammad Husain Na’ini, the only rightful government was that of Imam, but in his absence constitutionalism was the most preferred alternative, as it was the most likely to fulfil the Islamic duty of amr-i bih ma‘ruf va nahy az munkar (the command to enjoin good and prohibit what is wrong). It was therefore in his view obligatory for Muslims to struggle for the establishment and support of constitutional government. To Khurasani, constitutionalism had the double advantage of respect for the shari‘a and popular consultation based on the participation of the community of Muslims ( jumhur-i Muslimin).116 By the same token Khurasani seems to have accorded comparatively less significance to the role of the mujtahids than Muhammad Husain Na’ini, and allowed the ‘reason of

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the community’ (‘aql-i jami‘a) superiority over any individual reasoning. He believed in the Majlis as the best means of protecting Islam, and considered its validation lay in the implementation of necessary reforms, especially in the system of education, the army and the finances.117 He supported freedom in the sense of being liberated from despotism, but not in the sense of a possible cause of chaos. Government by the representatives of the people was his preferred choice, but they should write the laws under the supervision of the mujtahids, whose duty it was to ensure justice at the time of the absence of the Imam.118 Another telegram of April 1907, signed by all three of the constitutionalist mujtahids of the ‘Atabat, supported the Majlis on the grounds that it was the basis for the removal of tyranny, and the means of promoting the shari‘a and its principles. Support for the Majlis was therefore obligatory, and opposition not permissible.119 Finally, in July 1907 a detailed summary of his own view of constitutionalism was provided by Shaikh ‘Abdullah Mazandarani in response to the question of whether it was obligatory, or forbidden and unacceptable, to support the Majlis.120 He argued that, since kings were the shepherds of their people, it was their duty to ensure the protection of the country, and the lives and property of their subjects, for which they needed the support of the people. They could then look after their subjects through the army, the amirs and the governors. However, there had been dereliction of duty on the part of the officials, who had oppressed the people, and nobody had been able to inform the ruler. This aspect of the argument seems to indicate that Mazandarani was unwilling to provoke or undermine the Shah, who was known not to favour the constitution. His tone is more conciliatory in this respect than that of Khurasani. Mazandarani continued that the aim of establishing the Majlis was to secure limits of the government (hudud) and the rights (huquq) of the people. In effect, this meant that both parties should keep to the right path, namely the shari‘a, and enjoin good and prevent harm (amr bih ma‘ruf va nahy az munkar). If the Majlis achieved such a result, and it protected country and people, it was to be supported. However, certain announcements by vicious people, purporting to support constitutionalism, had advocated freedom (hurriyya) in the sense of freedom from the decrees of the Almighty, rather than freedom from oppression. In addition, they had attacked the shari‘a, the Shah and the ‘ulama. ‘It is obvious, perhaps certain’, said Mazandarani, ‘that the Majlis is exempt from such accusations.’ Unfortunately, however, publicity given to this kind of argument had given the Majlis a bad name in the minds of the people, and turned the Shahanshah-i Islam and some of the ‘ulama against it. This formal opinion demonstrates the profound preoccupation of the constitutionalist ‘ulama of Najaf with the need to protect and strengthen Islam, and their limited understanding of the liberal constitutionalism being sought by reformers in Tehran and Tabriz. It also shows doubt about the constitutional venture on the part of Mazandarani, which was in accord with a developing section of public opinion. The latter included a certain degree of sympathy with the concerns of Shaikh Fazlallah, although not with his methods. Khurasani, on the other hand, as discussed, was developing his own view of constitutionalism in Iran as

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integral to Iran, because that was where it had emerged and evolved. He put more faith in popular opinion as expressed through consultation in the Majlis. The Struggle between the Local Authorities in Tabriz: Autumn 1907 In the following months Tabriz itself was largely quiet, but there was unrest in Urumiya and amongst the Kurds, who also harassed Khoy and Salmas. The struggles, particularly around Savujbilagh, continued. At the end of August the Ottomans attacked Urumiya. September brought a new governor in Farman Farma, with some reservations about his appointment on the part of the more radical section of the Anjuman. In a letter to Nahzat al-Daula, a relative of Farman Farma, Shaikh Salim threatened that if he came to Azarbaijan and showed a negative attitude to the people and the mashruta, not only would Nahzat al-Daula’s ‘property and soul’ be destroyed, so would that of Farman Farma.121 Nahzat al-Daula responded reassuringly that he would not be so oppressive and irreligious as to ill-treat believers, and Farman Farma would do his best to improve matters for the people. In fact, Farman Farma endeavoured to establish co-operation with the Anjuman on the basis of working towards the execution of the decrees on constitutionalism, and to bring down the price of wheat and bread. He also pointed out that the Anjuman should ensure an adequate budget for the army because of the problems of security. There was a considerable struggle over resources; objections were made to more being expended on the war when the price of food in Tabriz was so high.122 On the grounds that not all affairs could be discussed publicly, Farman Farma came to an arrangement with the Anjuman that four representatives of their choice should see him as necessary to discuss the rectification of any problems. He insisted on taking over the policing of the town and asked that the local government servants be paid by the Anjuman. However, he felt his authority was weakened by the assassination of Amin al-Sultan, which otherwise occasioned joy in Tabriz.123 The socialist newspaper Mujahid published a picture of his assassin, ‘Abbas Aqa, surrounded by a poetic text saying, ‘You are greater than Khizr. I call you the Messiah, but you are more exalted.’ It added, ‘You are not dead – you are alive, and that is all.’124 Indeed, after the assassination the confrontation between absolutists and constitutionalists grew more bitter. In Tabriz, as in other towns, the opposition to absolutism was increasingly represented by radical societies.125 The local authorities blamed each other both over the expenditure of funds, and the failure to bring in more. In yet another debate on the army in the Anjuman of Tabriz in early October 1907, for example, Shaikh Salim criticised Farman Farma for not raising adequate funds; Aqa Mirza Aqa said it was the central government’s duty to do so; and Mu‘in al-Ru‘aya pointed out that the problem was the lack of clear regulations regarding administrative expenses.126 The Anjuman, however, did co-operate on occasion with the mayor, the baiglarbaigi, as for example on town sanitation. Regulations were drawn up on matters such as the slaughtering of livestock so as to avoid the spread of germs, removal

Figure 9 ‘Abbas Aqa, the assassin of Amin al Sultan, published in Mujahid.

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of gun-sellers’ shops from the bazaar to a designated area, the maintaining of a recommended price for groceries and other such matters.127 The Passing of the Supplementary Fundamental Law The discussions in Tehran on the Supplementary Fundamental Law, which included a struggle in the Majlis between the secularists, led by Taqizada, and the ‘ulama over judicial authority, continued into October.128 During this prolonged dispute the merchants of Tabriz complained of the delay via the Anjuman to the Majlis, because of the disturbances it was causing, and asking that it be resolved as soon as possible.129 Finally the Law was signed on 7 October 1907 and the bazaars were illuminated in celebration. With regard to the provinces, it stated that provincial and departmental councils were to be established in accordance with regulations which had already been sent (Article 90).130 Elections to the councils (that is, new elections) were to take place immediately (Article 91). Article 86 stipulated that a court of appeal was to be set up in each provincial capital. This court was to cause some confusion with the provincial council itself, which was also seen as an ‘adliyya. The Growth in Anjumans (Societies) The growing divisions in the city were to some extent exemplified in the formation of new anjumans (in this sense meaning societies). Some of the leading ‘ulama formed one in March 1907, the principle of which was that they be ‘guided by the shari‘a’,131 which would seem to be an early indication of an intention to resist the encroachment of the secular law. The tendency to form societies, however, accelerated in the latter part of 1907, with general discontent at the economic and political situation. This discontent was mobilised by revolutionary committees seeking to have the upper hand in the Anjuman.132 Broadly speaking, three kinds of quasi-organisation were fighting for influence in the Anjuman. The first, called the Majlis-i Khairiyya, which opened on 2 October 1907, and consisted of some of the wealthiest men in the town, included Basir al-Saltana and Nizam al-Daula. It had a programme of protecting authority, helping the local government carry out its duties, and preventing the Anjuman from interfering in the business of government. The second, the Anjuman-i Sadat, was composed of sayyids and had a following of about 3,000 persons. It was both influenced by the mujtahids and influenced them, and so to some extent represented an ‘ulama interest. It declined to recognise the Anjuman as an elected body with specific responsibilities that related to legal matters, as it would thus impinge on the interests of the ‘ulama. It was therefore not positive about constitutionalism.133 The third kind of organisation was that of the so-called mujahidin, described above. Towards the end of 1907, there was an increasing reaction against the mujahidin, because of the disorders they caused. The governor sided with the anti-mujahidin view, and had notices posted round the town abolishing the fida’iyan (sic) of any sort,

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and threatening anyone found in possession of a rifle with penal servitude.134 This decree had little effect. The Anjuman, meanwhile, co-operated with the governor, and telegrammed Urumiya, a source of fida’iyan, saying their services were no longer required in Tabriz. By December 1907, Urumiya was in fact under the control of fida’iyan, and out of the control of both the central government and the Tabriz Anjuman. None of the three kinds of organisation described above had one overall leader. The Provincial and District Council Elections In April 1907, the prayer leaders and people had gathered in the Anjuman and some demanded a reconfiguration of its membership through new elections. After some debate, however, it was decided that there was no need for new elections, but that those who had been removed, could be replaced.135 This left a situation in which, while the number of guild representatives remained constant, those of the merchants were reduced, so it was said new merchant representatives should be elected. The ‘ulama should send their previous representatives, and choose others if they could not attend.136 Members of the guilds also attended on occasion without having been elected, as did certain prayer leaders and the mujahidin. The result had been a radicalisation of the Anjuman. In early July, Anjuman began publishing the Regulations for the Provincial and District Council Elections.137 A full discussion of the elections took place on 18 July, in which it was noted that a supervisory committee should be appointed, according to the conditions of the regulations, so as to avoid malpractice. The Anjuman elected six persons to act as supervisors of the elections.138 In mid-August the supervisory committee arranged for potential voters to be given a voting form, and the name of each one was entered in a register.139 It was hoped that the voting would be completed by 22 August. However, as that date approached, doubts were thrown on the election procedure, it being stated – absolutely correctly – that if there were irregularities in the procedure, then the election would be invalid. The problem was not the supervisory committee, but the prospective voters, whose claims to have the requisite qualifications to vote would have to be accepted on the basis of ad hoc verbal confirmation. However, as Aqa Mirza Aqa pointed out in the Anjuman, how could it be possible to find someone who knew all the inhabitants of Tabriz individually, and could reliably vouch for them?140 The problem of course was that hardly anyone at this time had a reliable form of identification. It was decided that this problem should be addressed by the selection of known people to assist the supervisors, and the elections went ahead as planned on this basis. They took place using a voting box on 21 August 1907.141 As it turned out, proceedings were suspended by order of the new governor Farman Farma, who had been too busy with other matters to be present at the completion of the process, as required by the regulations. He desired to ensure himself that proceedings were carried out correctly, so the box of votes was therefore sealed for the time being.

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In early September, a heated meeting attended by representatives of all levels demanded to know what had happened to the elections.142 It would appear, however, that the previous procedure had been disregarded, at the wish of the governor, as in mid-September, a new arrangement was set up whereby a deputy appointed by the governor to act on his behalf began supervision of new elections.143 Once again the regulations were addressed, but this time with an emphasis on the role of the governor, who according to the regulations, was supposed to be responsible for them. There were objections to this arising from the fact that the Anjuman, though supposedly composed of specific members, was, as previously mentioned, made up of as many people as wished to attend, most of them from the lower classes.144 These latter were unhappy at the prospect of being excluded from attendance. Some of those involved belonged to the revolutionary committees, who were trying to influence the outcome according to their own objectives. The result was in effect that certain Tabrizis, probably the betteroff, were becoming even more disillusioned with constitutionalism.145 Therefore the governor’s move to control the elections was not without support. At the end of October 1907, those responsible for supervising the elections announced that by 14 November the voting forms would be handed out, and the elections take place on that day.146 Although the elections appear to have been largely complete by the end of November 1907, according to Kasravi they were not finalised until 6 December, with 11 persons being elected.147 Those elected were mostly merchants, bureaucrats and ‘ulama.148 The rationalisation of membership, the assertion of central state control in the form of the Provincial and District Council Law, and the influence of the governor deprived the Anjuman of much of its innovative vigour, by reducing the influence of the lower classes. Therefore the elections organised by Farman Farma represented to some extent a victory for wealthier, more conservative Tabrizis in the class struggle. The Shah’s Attempted Coup of December 1907 When the news of the Shah’s attempted coup of December 1907 reached Tabriz, the Anjuman sent messages of exhortation to resistance to the other provinces. It also, it informed the British Consulate that, As, according to the laws of the constitution, and after taking an oath on the Qur’an, the Shah had broken his promise to their representatives and the assembly, so, from that day 13 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325 [18 December 1907], the whole nation had dethroned Muhammad ‘Ali Shah from the sultanate (monarchy), and whomever the sacred assembly of the nation elected to the sultanate in his place would be recognised as shah and obeyed.149 At the same time the ‘ulama of Najaf sent a telegram to Tabataba’i and Bihbihani, designating Shaikh Fazlallah as seditious and forbidding his participation in all affairs.150 In Tabriz Sayyid Muhammad Shabistari, the editor of Mujahid, wrote

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an article disrespectful to Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Yazdi, the anti-constitutionalist mujtahid of Najaf, and was beaten on the orders of the Anjuman, with consequent criticism of its members, especially Basir al-Saltana.151 With disorder in the town, the Anjuman also took measures to stabilise Tabriz and maintain security. The heads of the different quarters (kadkhudas) and some of the ‘ulama were called in to discuss the matter. However, a problem arose over who had responsibility for security, to take the necessary measures to keep order – the local government administration, the baiglarbaigi or the kadkhudas152 – which illustrates the difficulties over both designated duties, and ultimately funding. On the other hand, the Anjuman made sure that the state military in Azarbaijan were not used to suppress the constitutionalist point of view. The commanding officer was taken hostage in Tabriz and obliged to vouch for the obedience of his men.153 Disturbances were caused by Mir Hashim, who had been constantly intriguing against the Anjuman, and the constitutionalists, whom he called ‘irreligious’.154 He was also moving to ally himself with the Shah. He dominated the significant Davachi quarter of Tabriz, where he built up a following among its wellknown roughs or lutis. They called themselves ‘the moderate constitutionalists’, and refused to recognise the Anjuman. There was also rivalry between the lutis of Davachi (a mutisharri‘ quarter) and those of Amir Khiz (a Shaikhi quarter), which styled itself ‘revolutionary’ and supported the Anjuman. Mir Hashim, being a mutisharri‘, led the lutis of Davachi, and his long-established principal rival, the later famous Sattar Khan, a Shaikhi, and so-called liberal, led those of Amir Khiz. On 17 January 1908 some of known revolutionaries ( fida’iyan) were attacked by the followers of Mir Hashim, leading to closure of the bazaars. Outright struggle between the two forces began, and trumpets called out the revolutionaries. The Anjuman and the forces supporting it, including Caucasian revolutionaries, surrounded Davachi. This led among other occurrences to the Russian Consulate, which was being drawn into the disturbances, posting Cossacks in some of the shops belonging to Russian subjects. The actions of the Russians caused much disquiet, and indeed this was a significant event. Hitherto, following the Anglo-Russian rapprochement and Agreement of 1907, which implemented a policy of non-intervention developed by the Russian foreign minister, Alexander Izvolsky, the Russians had largely stayed out of the events of the Constitutional Revolution. The arrival of Cossacks in Tabriz was to be a portent of change to come. With regard to the struggle between the Anjuman and Mir Hashim, the former demanded that the latter and his main supporters and 12 roughs leave town.155 Mir Hashim agreed on condition that 15 Caucasian revolutionaries and some others be expelled from the province. Grave fighting began, with about 10,000 shots being fired, but by 28 January 1908 the local authorities had posted soldiers in the disturbed quarters to keep order. The bazaars opened shortly afterwards. In the following two months, Tabriz was relatively quiet, with the Anjuman in

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control, now having sorted out some of the law enforcement problems, and a new body of policemen patrolling in the bazaar.156 The Anjuman-i Islamiyya In 1908, towards the end of the period in question, the anti-constitutionalist Anjuman-i Islamiyya was formed by Mir Hashim, who was still in dispute with the Tabriz Anjuman. By May 1908, it had a detailed constitution, which set out the purpose of the society (in Article 1) as being to propagate the shari‘a, ensure the consolidation of the constitution (mashrutiyyat), and obey the Majlis, and strengthen the sacred (muqaddas) Provincial Council.157 It would also protect the sacred foundations of Islam. Further articles, probably drawn from a Western model, gave clear and precise stipulations on the number of members (at least 40), the officers (including a president and vice-president), conditions of membership (including being an Iranian subject), and procedures, such as rules of attendance and conduct, and custody of the society stamp. The society also proposed to engage in the cause of progress, including generation of wealth, improvement of the standard of living, facilitation of the means of transport and security of the roads; the promotion of Iranian goods and the establishment of companies and factories; and the development of learning and education. Similarly, its debates were to be characterised by freedom of thought. Its wider supporters included landowners, quarter leaders (kadkhudas) and the lutis of the Davachi quarter.158 From 1908–1909 and during the siege of Tabriz it published a newspaper named A Mulla ‘amu, which was funded by the brothers Haj Muhammad Taqi, Haj Muhammad Ibrahim and Haj Baqir, sarrafs of Davachi, who were known to be supporters of absolutism.159 It was innovative in the way in which it aimed for a wide readership amongst the ordinary people of Tabriz, its subject matter being simple to follow, related to common concerns, and written in everyday colloquial language, with frequent use of a dialogue format.160 In the battle for Tabriz in 1908–1909 between the anti-constitutionalists and the Tabriz Anjuman, the society’s principal spokesman was Mir Hashim. The society attacked the constitutionalists, by designating them as Babis, who were using the constitution to undermine Islam.161 On this count it summoned Muslims to jihad in the defence of Islam. Its meetings, by then comprising mostly ‘ulama, were guarded by armed men under the command of Mir Hashim, who was reportedly in contact with the Shah. Therefore the idealistic principles of its constitution, like much else, fell by the wayside in the grim struggle for control of Iran between Muhammad ‘Ali Shah and the constitutionalists. The Events Leading to the Fall of the Tabriz Anjuman: July 1908 Discontent with the Anjuman continued to simmer beneath the surface. It was criticised for becoming dominated by the notables, and by a section of local opinion that was becoming increasingly favourable to absolutism.162 Agitation

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Figure 10 Shaikh Salim amongst the members of the Anjuman-i Islamiyya. (Courtesy of the National Archives of North West Iran, Tabriz.)

started again in early June with news of the disturbances in Tehran. Angry groups of mujahidin appeared complaining of the deceit of the supporters of absolutism, and of the removal of the rights of the nation. In this deteriorating situation, Haji Mirza Hasan returned to Tabriz on 1 June 1908.163 The Shah began manoeuvres against the Majlis, which included limiting telecommunications, especially those that might cause disturbances in any of the towns. A telegram from the Azarbaijani Deputies warned the Tabriz Anjuman that the Majlis was in danger of being occupied. On or about 17 June 1908, the Anjuman telegraphed the Shah to say that, as he had broken his oath, he had been deposed. It also sent telegrams to the same effect to other cities.164 On 19 June there was an attempt on the life of Mir Hashim.165 This brought about fighting between his partisans and those of the Anjuman, with the mujtahid Haji Mirza Hasan supporting the former. By 23 June the Anjuman was powerless while their opponents began looting several houses.166 On 28 June some of the constitutionalists took refuge in the Russian Consulate, and the Consul General tried to restore order.167 On 1 July, cavalry sent by the Shah and led by Rahim Khan reached Tabriz and began looting shops, especially those belonging to the supporters of the Anjuman, now styling themselves ‘nationalists’.168 All anjumans, except the Anjuman-i Islamiyya led by the mujtahid Haji Mirza Hasan, were dispersed. On 24 August 5,000 armed revolutionaries arrived and the battle over Tabriz commenced.169

9 Shiraz the elite struggle, Islam and popular politics

A New Administration: Qavam Returns to Shiraz, February 1907 In February 1907, Prince Mu’ayyid al-Daula was appointed governor of Fars, with Qavam al-Mulk as his vizier of Fars, a piece of news initially received with apparent indifference.1 Qavam had paid the central government 100,000 tomans for permission to return to Fars,2 an enormous sum, which he now would have to find the means to recuperate. He duly arrived on 1 March, when half the population turned out to greet him. Since an unusually long quiet period in Shiraz was now about to come to an end, it may be surmised that the other half of the population was planning a different kind of welcome. Part of the problem may well have been that he would expect his huge payment to be recuperated by more effective tax collection in Shiraz, and Fars as a whole.3 Shiraz and the New Institutions: The Election of the Majlis Representatives Once the constitution had been promulgated, Shiraz society began to organise a campaign to play a part in the new institutional arrangements, the ‘ulama and merchants being especially active in the cause of constitutionalism. As will emerge, this term was subject to a range of interpretations. Of the ‘ulama Mirza Ibrahim mujtahid, Aqa Sayyid ‘Ali Fal Asiri and Aqa Shaikh ‘Ali Aqa preached encouragement to the people to participate in elections.4 The first organisational steps were necessarily informal and in line with established practice. A local council of some 30 persons, entitled Majlis-i Milli-yi Shiraz (the National Council of Shiraz), began to meet regularly in the house of the cleric, Haji Muhazzab al-Daula.5 Its chief initial move was to invite the tribes of Fars to send representatives. Meanwhile, Shiraz was quiet, its life uninterrupted by any mourning for the late Shah.6

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The movement had gathered momentum, with leading ‘ulama again exhorting the people to participate in the elections to the Majlis. They were supported by the patriotic, national, Islamic newspaper, Muzaffari of Bushehr (edited by Mirza ‘Ali Shirazi). Muzaffari indeed saw itself as having a serious role in a campaign that included a variety of ways of conveying the message of reform to the people. The rauza khvans exhorted the people to support the elections and also the National Bank when they went into people’s houses to conduct religious ceremonies.7 The departure of the Majlis deputies nevertheless took place slowly, despite the support of Qavam and his son, Salar al-Sultan, and Mirza Ibraham.8 The local Shiraz council addressed a range of issues at its meetings, and full accounts of them are given for 26 and 29 Muharram 1325/11 and 14 March 1907, and 25 Jamadi II/5 August 1907, are given in the newspaper Nida-yi Islam.9 These accounts reveal the problems at this early stage of the development of local government in Shiraz and elsewhere. These related to the precise nature of the council, its duties, functions and area of responsibility, legal responsibilities, its relations with other local authorities, its funding, and its priorities. Much of the council’s business was concerned with complaints and petitions, but there was disagreement as to whether these were in fact its business. This provoked discussion of what kind of body it was – a national council (majlis-i milli) or a court of justice (‘adliyya), and what the duties of a national council were. One member thought it should hear petitions to the benefit of the people. Another considered that these should be referred to the local administration, that is, the governor and his officials. A third thought the council should deal with the petitions until the proposal to establish an ‘adliyya was implemented, and remarked that if the local administration did not investigate grievances, then it was the duty of the local council to do so. Nasir al-Daula, who attended on behalf of his father, Qavam, said that they would co-operate with the council, but only until the new ‘law’ (qanun) arrived from Tehran. The connection between the new arrangements and the shari‘a was also unclear. On the one hand it was considered that certain claims should go to a shari‘a court to be proved, and then be referred to the local administration for action. On the other hand it was felt that the local administration required authorisation from the council to deal with these cases. Nida-yi Islam considered that there should be an ‘adliyya which made everyone from the shah downwards equally accountable in accordance with constitutional government – a longstanding ideal – and ensured a fair legal system ‘according to Islamic law’ administered through courts of justice and executed by government officials.10 With regard to finance, the council had no proper budget, nor indeed designated funds, and appears to have been subsidised at least in part by its members. This problem was manifested in the need for an administrative officer to execute its decisions. However, when it was suggested that such a duty be undertaken by a member, there were unsurprisingly no volunteers, given that there was no proposed remuneration. It was then suggested that the local government administration might provide someone to carry out the task, but this idea was dismissed

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as likely to perpetuate bad habits of the past (in the traditional administration). A proposal to charge petitioners and claimants was also rejected. A final decision that funds for a special administrator be obtained from the local government was not likely to meet with approval from the latter and does not seem to have materialised. By contrast with Bushehr, the governor did not attend, but on occasion could be invited to do so. As with Bushehr, there were complaints (in the August meeting) that the Provincial Council Law was not properly implemented and the wishes of a few people only prevailed. Shiraz, the National Bank and Trading Initiatives The Shiraz merchants showed an interest in the new National Bank, but subject to negotiations of their own reflecting local interest. The local council also discussed the National Bank, and it was remarked that certain seditious persons were against the proposal altogether (which was unsurprising as the existing system under the British Imperial Bank worked very well for some Iranian merchants). However, other provinces were contributing to the bank (meaning Shiraz should not be seen to be backward in this national initiative). The chairman of the council pointed out that there had been much enthusiasm in that 5,000 tomans had been subscribed by some, and there was a need to encourage others. Indeed, support for the bank gathered momentum. Aqa Mu‘in al-Islam became supervisor of subscriptions aided by Aqa Shaikh Yusuf. With his encouragement, the students (tullab) sold some of their books in order to subscribe, a point which the bank’s supporters used to advise the merchants of their duty to contribute. As the mujtahid Sayyid ‘Ali Fal Asiri expressed it, to have a national bank would be advantageous to both people and state, and support for it should be taken both as a shari‘a and as a patriotic duty.11 As elsewhere, the National Bank was seen as a cornerstone of the country’s independence, which would help prevent Iran suffering the fate of people in India and Africa. Assertive action was needed, and Sayyid ‘Ali criticised the fatalistic view that everything happened because God willed it. On this point he quoted Sa‘di: There is a well, and there is a way, and there are eyes to see, and there is the sun. (So that a person can see where he is going.)12 In particular he advocated co-operation between all levels of society and all parts of the country to remove the current deficient system through the means of consultation. Thus the Islamic principle of shura was seen as integral to the whole process of reform and to its institutions, notably the Majlis and the National Bank. The people of Shiraz thus showed considerable enthusiasm for the bank, and it was reported in March in Bushehr that the Shirazi merchants had remitted 500,000 tomans for it to Tehran,13 though the sum may well be exaggerated.

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Another initiative of concern to the people of Shiraz was that they had heard that Mu‘in al-Tujjar had obtained a concession for a planned central railway line leading from Nasiri port to Ram Hormuz through Bakhiyari to Isfahan and onwards to Tehran and the Caspian Sea. On 30 January 1907, they telegrammed the Majlis to say that they would support the National Bank, but on condition it subscribed to a railway from Bushehr to Isfahan via Shiraz.14 An article addressed to the council in a new local newspaper, Nida-yi Islam, edited by Sayyid Ziya Tabataba’i, a young theological student, commented that the signing of the constitution and the establishment of the Sacred Majlis, a place of consultation, was supposed to usher in an era of justice and equality.15 All this should be accompanied by a suitable economic policy, but instead it was manifested in a railway that would lead to the destruction of Fars (that is, it circumvented Shiraz and would consequently have a detrimental effect on the local economy). The article commented that a matter of such significance needed more time to decide, and called for the postponement of any discussion of this significant issue until the Shiraz deputies had arrived in Tehran. New Schools Shiraz, as will be remembered, had not benefited from the movement to advance modern education in Iran. The removal of the implicit support for conservatives by the absolutist system seems to have lifted some of the disincentive to embark on the establishment of new schools, albeit still of a religious nature. The Madrasa-yi Islamiyya was set up by a Mr Veneziani, an Italian Jew converted to Islam and also known as Mirza Riza Khan, under the patronage of the mujtahid, Haji Mirza Ibrahim. By the end of April 1907 this school had been obliged to close as Veneziani was in debt and its teachers and students scattered.16 However, Haji Mirza Ibrahim was forced not long afterwards, to issue an order, circulated in the bazaars, forbidding the teaching of English and French in schools. Pressure was said to have come from other members of the clergy fearing for their livelihood. The matter of schools, however, was raised with the Imam Jum‘a, who decided to establish the Madrasa-yi Imamiyya in place of the Islamiyya. It was seemingly more traditional, and started with 12 teachers and 100 students. It was supported by Imam Jum‘a himself.17 Another school, the Masu‘diyya, founded by Aqa Haji ‘Ali, appears to have made some progress. In July 1907 the children were examined individually (and presumably orally) in the presence of the local notables, who commended their progress, and made donations according to their means. On the same occasion members of the Anjuman-i Islami attended, and Taj al-Shu‘ara recited a poem.18 Other schools receive only brief mentions. A reportedly modern school was opened by Haji Mirza Hasan Sarraf.19 Haji ‘Ali Mujtahid also opened a school, and the Nuri family proposed to found a Madrasa-yi Harbiyya.20 All were said to aim to include either English or French in their curriculum.

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The Emergence of New Societies At this point new societies began to emerge in Shiraz. A significant new development was the establishment in early 1907 of an Anjuman-i Islami, or Islamic Society, which met in the house of the mujtahid, Haji ‘Ali Aqa, and was supported by Mirza Qasim Khan, who was the brother of Mu‘tamid-i Divan. According to the Majlis Deputy, Aqa Shaikh Yusuf, the founders were mostly his teachers, and he accorded to it a prominent role in the advancement of constitutionalism in Shiraz.21 Nida-yi Islam noted its foundation with approval, and explained that the initiative came from ‘ulama and notables. The paper said that its purpose was to protect the authority of the Majlis.22 It had a large membership from all levels of society, but mainly of tullab, who swore an oath to support freedom with their lives and property. There was excitement among the people that no gathering so great had been known so far. The gathering swore by its life and soul to support just rulership (saltanat-i ‘adil) and the Majlis, in accordance with the Muslim faith, and to resist oppression.23 The Anjuman requested the establishment of a temporary council to deal with disputes, consisting of ‘ulama on behalf of the people, and representatives of the government administration, to investigate complaints, pending definite instructions from Tehran on local government institutions. Its objectives thus represented a mixture of the old and the new. Given the existence of the local council led by Muhazzab al-Daula, this society was in effect the first sign of a perception in Shiraz that the newly established Majlis might not be sufficiently diligent in support of Islam; which is not to say that there was any understanding of secularism as such. However, the politics of Shiraz were not so simple, as the society was infiltrated by the opponents of Qavam, particularly Mu‘tamid-i Divan and his brother Mirza Qasim Khan.24 Qavam realised that one of the purposes of the Anjuman was to limit his power and authority by making it more accountable. The Anjuman-i Islami was firmly in accord with the movement to establish unity between government and nation and to strengthen the foundations of constitutionalism, seen as a concept entirely compatible with Islam, and the best means of securing reforms that would protect the independence of the country. For this reason, it encouraged contributions to the National Bank. Indeed, such was the variety of its following that at one meeting, a ‘woman with the demeanour of a man’ appeared, and handed a letter to the chairman of the Anjuman, Mu‘in al-Islam, saying, ‘We hope all the men of the country will fully support the National Bank, given its significance.’25 A further and by now well-established concern was the weak position of Islam. In mid-April 1907 the Anjuman-i Islami and its many followers assembled in the Masjid-i Nau to listen to a speech by Shaikh Muhammad Baqir Mujtahid Isfahani on the subject of the decline of Islam. He said the strengthening of constitutionalism and national unity were the only means of insuring the independence of the country. Therefore it was obligatory (vajib) for all Muslims to support the Majlis, and anyone who undermined this legitimate goal would be

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considered to be at war with the Imam of the Age (implying he could rightfully be killed).26 Some members of the Anjuman demonstrated zeal in other matters. One of them, Abu Talib Mujtahid, obliged the authorities of the local quarters to close all the alcohol retailers, despite the fact that they derived considerable revenues from the sale of alcohol.27 Other Anjumans formed in Shiraz at this period up to May 1907 included the Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya, consisting of about 200 ‘ulama, tullab and notables who met at the Hashimiyya School; the Anjuman-i Danish, founded by a group of poets; and the Anjuman-i Asnafiyya – the Guilds Society – which met once a week.28 Another society was the Anjuman-i Namusiyya (Chastity Society) discussed below. In October the Anjuman-i Muhammadi was established, its avowed purpose being to renew the sense of brotherhood that existed in the early days of Islam.29 It professed to be impartial in dealing with other societies and in politics and aimed to encourage unity, and consisted of merchants, notables, landowners and cultivators of good reputation, and was thus something of an elite organisation. However, one of its purposes was to develop a programme of reform and the removal of sedition to the benefit of all the people, referred to as jumhur.30 The Shiraz Deputies to the Majlis in Tehran A further concern at this point was the delayed departure of the elected representatives of Shiraz for Tehran, which was becoming a matter of concern to civic pride, as the other deputies from the provinces were arriving there. However, after a concerted effort, which contrasts with the indifference on the subject in Bushehr, at least some of the deputies had been chosen by mid-March. The final list was to be as follows. Guilds Haj Mirza Muhammad Sirishta-dar31 Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Clergy Shaikh Yusuf Aqa Shaikh Ja‘far32 Merchants Thiqat al-Islam Haji Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Landlords Fakhr al-Sadat33 Notables Qavam Divan34

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In a meeting of the Shiraz council on 18 March 1907 the deputies attended and were told that the chief mujtahid, Mirza Ibrahim, had received a letter complaining of their non-arrival in Tehran.35 They explained that they had not been given the means for their journey, which presumably meant funding as well as personal necessities. The council promised to organise the removal of any obstacles, an objective seemingly achieved by 21 April, when they were reportedly allocated a stipend, varying according to their class, of 1,000–1,800 tomans.36 One further name was to be added to the list in March 1908, when the local headmen of the Qashqa’i tribe asked the Majlis if it would receive Mirza Farajallah Khan Mir Panj37 as their representative, and whom they had dispatched to Tehran sometime previously. Not a Qashqa’i himself, he had lived in Europe where he had become influenced by liberal ideas.38 The deputies arrived in Tehran and five of them were duly introduced to the Majlis on 21 May 1907.39 The Fragmentation of Public Organisation By mid-April 1907 there were reportedly three different factions in Shiraz: those who gathered round the Shiraz council, the more radical Anjuman-i Islami members and the conservatives represented by Qavam and his sons.40 The first two met on different days at the Masjid-i Nau, but were at loggerheads. The higher clergy had already begun to distance themselves from the increasingly radical Anjuman-i Islami, which was also strongly anti-Qavam. The arrival of Prince Mu’ayyid al-Daula as Governor General of Fars on 14 April led to the anticipation of the formation of a further faction, providing the view of the government administration. In addition Shiraz opinion was becoming increasingly radicalised by external influences. Principal amongst these were inflammatory leaflets sent in large numbers from Tabriz. Many were purportedly addressed by the women of Tabriz to those of Shiraz.41 These may well have been members of the women’s anjumans, discussed by Afary, which addressed current political and social issues.42 At the same time meetings were held nightly in the larger mosques, no doubt attended by younger Shirazis, where there was much talk of ‘shedding blood in the cause of freedom’. By the end of April 1907, the situation was being further riven with divisions.43 Firstly, a more violent element was emerging in that many of the members of the Anjuman-i Islami were termed lutis; it also meant a class element was developing in the overall struggle, in that the poorest classes now saw the Majlis as realising ideals of their own relating to social justice. Secondly, radicalism took the form of Islamic fundamentalism focusing on women. Pressure was brought on the leading mujtahid, Mirza Ibrahim, who was in fact a moderate, to issue a hukm (order) preventing women from going to the bazaar, which he refused to do.44 The extremist group then put out a proclamation of their own, and attacked women in the bazaars, destroying their shoes. About this time an Anjuman-i Namusiyya (chastity) was formed.45 It sought to prevent women from visiting certain local places, such as the graves of Hafiz and Sa‘di,

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on Fridays and certain other days of the month. The emergence of this type of fundamentalism was probably related to the growing weakness of the country, and the increasing fear of foreign penetration, one manifestation of which was persistent Christian missionary proselytising in Shiraz.46 Thus the divergence between the religious and non-religious (but not yet secularist) perspective widened and became more complex. Growing Disorder Outside Shiraz order was also breaking down and there were robberies on both the Bushehr and Isfahan roads, paralysing trade.47 This trouble was exacerbated by weak, under-funded government. Mu’ayyid al-Daula was ill, which left the unpopular Qavam in charge of the administration of Fars. The problem was worsened by a power struggle for the position of Ilkhani (chief) of the Qashqa’i. The established Ilkhani, Saulat al-Daula, was removed and replaced by his brother, Zargham al-Saltana.48 Saulat al-Daula was invited to explain his case in Shiraz but refused to appear without a safe conduct. This action was influenced by the fact that the Qashqa’is had yet again defaulted in their taxes. At the beginning of May 1907 the crisis broke in Shiraz. An incident involving a sayyid, a bear-leader, and the servant of a government official proved a pretext for the Shiraz council and the followers of some of the ‘ulama to unite against Qavam.49 Initially, about 300 followers of the two groups combined took bast in the telegraph office, and the bazaars closed. Reportedly about 800 clerics, presumably mostly tullab, took refuge in the Masjid-i Nau in support of Qavam. However, the majority of the population were against him. On 4 May, Qavam gave in and resigned as vizier of Fars. The following day Saulat al-Daula arrived in Shiraz, having offered to help the council. He also promised 800 tomans in taxes and the help of 400 mounted Qashqa’i, a cohort of whom joined him the next day, bringing about one of the perennial nightmares of the central government, a Qashqa’i force in Shiraz. He thus made his point, and on 3 June was reinstated as Ilkhani of the Qashqa’i. Shortly afterwards, having paid no further taxes, he left Shiraz, promising to come back to assist the local council at a later date if necessary.50 Subsequently a government expedition to subdue the Qashqa’i succeeded in reconciling Saulat al-Daula and his brother, Zargham al-Saltana, the former being once more accepted as Ilkhani.51 Meanwhile the British consul was instructed on no account to intervene, and refused to do so when invited.52 Agitation, however, increased to the point where several thousand joined those in the telegraph office and the Masjid-i Nau, whilst the level of violence escalated and the number of armed men grew.53 Enormous pressure was brought on the bazaar to stay closed,54 and the smaller businesses in particular suffered greatly from the loss of income. Fearful of the rise of popular power, another elite clan, the Nuri family, made common cause with Qavam. Qavam also had the support of the Imam Jum‘a, and called in Arab and Baharlu tribal support.55 Given the

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illness of Mu’ayyid al-Daula, a new governor was appointed in the person of Nizam al-Saltana, who had a much more effective record. The Qavamis began quietly leaving Shiraz by mid-June, persuaded by the promise of remission by the government of Qavam’s considerable debts, incurred by the huge downpayment he had made to acquire the office of vizier of Fars.56 Mu’ayyid al-Daula, having been appointed governor of Isfahan, left, and Nizam al-Saltana arrived on 28 June.57 The Provincial and District Council Law Shiraz complained about the delay in the promulgation of the local council regulations. In particular they demanded to know what portion of the taxes were to be allotted to the local authorities, and commented that if the Majlis acted according to the law, as it claimed to do, then it should let the council know what the law was.58 The Majlis itself was confused by the local bodies in Shiraz, the council and the Anjuman-i Islami. One deputy, Aqa Mirza Abu’l Hasan Khan, commented that there appeared to be a ‘majlis’ established in Shiraz which gave itself a different name in each telegram – sometimes it was the Anjumna-i Islami, sometimes the Anjuman-i Milli, and sometimes just the local Anjuman. Muzaffari expressed the hope that matters would improve when the ‘Majlis-i Muqaddas-i Milli’ took action, particularly so when it sent the regulations for the provincial elections, as various duties would be set out.59 The regulations were received on 27 June 1907 by Haji Muhazzab al-Daula, still the leading spirit in the local government reforms.60 The regulations met with consternation in the Shiraz council. Members felt that their incipient powers were being curtailed, as they were debarred from any real authority over the administration of the government of Fars and the baiglarbaigi of Shiraz. To make matters worse, Nizam al-Saltana ordered that the council should hold their meetings on stated days at the government palace.61 Therefore a process of negotiation on the whole subject began. Nine members of the council, including Muhazzab al-Daula, resigned. Nizam al-Saltana was obliged to drop the proposal for meetings in the governor’s house, and to consider a request for the suppression of the Anjuman-i Islami and the expulsion from Shiraz of the partisans of Qavam and the supporters of absolutism.62 Otherwise the 18 members of the council, in effect now the provincial council, met as before twice weekly in the house of Muhazzab al-Daula (who had withdrawn his resignation), and ignored the detailed procedure set out in the provincial council regulations. Nevertheless, the council subsequently changed its name to the Anjuman-i Ayalati, the title to which it is referred in March 1908.63 Local practice, interests and events continued to decide the administration of the province of Fars, and Shiraz as a whole paid little attention to the new regulations. The governor’s authority, which by now depended on minimal funding, was reduced by circumstances rather than by accountability to the provincial council.

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The Struggle over Constitutionalism and the Shari‘a in Tehran There is no indication of any support in Shiraz for Shaikh Fazlallah’s programme of constitutionalism according to the shari‘a, because of his perceived connection with the shah. Probably even most of the ‘ulama did not understand his arguments, or the danger from secularism which they identified. Probably also they had faith in the broad religious vision of the ‘sacred’ Majlis that was not just the new way but the only way to bring about just government and the rule of law. In any case they supported Tabataba’i and Bihbihani against him, and the clerics amongst them were also concerned that they should not become weakened by divisions. In July 1907 Mirza Ibrahim telegrammed Tabataba’i to warn Fazlallah that he must collaborate in supporting the Majlis, otherwise ‘the simple people’ would perceive the ‘ulama as being weakened by divisions (and therefore implicitly losing respect).64 Tabataba’i telegrammed Mirza Ibrahim personally in response to give his view of Shaikh Fazlallah’s position. He stated that: One of the articles of the Supplementary Fundamental Law is that at all time some of the ‘ulama must supervise legislation to ensure that the laws of the Majlis are in conformity with the shari‘a. The Shaikh is arguing that this group must form a committee outside the Majlis [meaning chosen without its involvement]. The deputies are saying that it would be more beneficial if the Majlis is involved [that is, has a role in the selection of the members of the committee].65 Tabataba’i ended by saying that Fazlallah was encouraging riots in the provinces on this matter, and he implied that he was in alliance with the Shah (which was true). He asked Mirza Ibrahim to deliver him a severe warning. Mirza Ibrahim then sent a telegram to Fazlallah, who was in sanctuary in Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim. He stated that he did not usually interfere in ‘outside affairs’ (amur-i khariji, meaning non-provincial affairs), but felt bound to do so because Fazlallah was neglecting his ‘shari‘a duty’. He was openly acting against the ‘jumhur’ (the majority of the people). He told Fazlallah, whose behaviour was ‘not normally what we would expect of you’, that: Today is the day that we must support the fundamental basis of justice [meaning the Majlis]. If there is a deficiency in it, then people of responsibility should consult and solve it through kindness and calmness. Also the advantages it offers for the removal of tyranny and absolutism should not be forgotten. If we do not take this opportunity to bring about change, then the situation will revert to the same absolutism of the past.66 Finally, as requested by Tabataba’i, Mirza Ibrahim warned Fazlallah that he must look at both sides of the issue and change his policy. Any further delay would have a bad effect.

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The Supplementary Fundamental Law was otherwise passed virtually unnoticed in Shiraz. The Return to Shiraz of Mu‘tamid-i Divan At this point a new force entered the scene in the form of Mu‘tamid-i Divan, an exceptionally turbulent member of the Qavami clan, who, having been banished some time before as a troublemaker, was allowed back to Shiraz on 13 July 1907.67 Part of his strategy to gain influence there was to use the Anjuman-i Islami as a power base. His aim appears to have been to enhance his position not only as against other factions and powers in Shiraz, but also against his fellow clan members, Qavam and his sons. He organised a meeting at his house at the end of July to bring together the various persons who had previous links with Qavam, including the Imam Jum‘a, as well as Anjuman members. He also began to reassert his influence among the Arab tribes, a principal power base of the Qavami clan. Responsibility for one of these tribes, resident around Abadeh, was given to Mu‘tamid-i Divan by the governor of Fars, doubtless taking the opportunity to play off one Qavami faction against another. The said tribe, however, went into bast in the local telegraph office over the appointment.68 An additional problem was that Mu‘timid-i Divan had been asked to collect their taxes. Emboldened by the influence of Mu‘tamid-i Divan, the Anjuman-i Islami began to play a more assertive role in the politics of Shiraz. There were rumours of persistent tensions between the society and the governor, who complained to the British of the increasing efforts of the Anjuman-i Islami to assert their authority in Shiraz itself and over the local administration.69 One outcome of the growing influence of the Anjuman-i Islami and its following of tullab and members of the lower social groups was increasing persecution of the Jews, who rapidly began leaving Shiraz, mostly for Palestine.70 Nida-yi Islam, in a series of articles entitled ‘Dialogue between a Bushehri and a Shirazi in Kucha-yi Haft Pich (Seven Twists Alley)’,71 which provided a partly satirical commentary on the politics of Shiraz, presented the role of the Anjuman-i Islami as follows: Question (by the Bushehri): Again the sounds of unrest. What is the news? Answer (by the Shirazi):  Haji Aqa72 and Mu‘in al-Islam have had a dispute

about the wages of the riflemen who guard the Chenar Road.

Q: Who is Mu‘in al-Islam? Is he the baiglarbaigi? A: No. Q:  Is he the thief catcher and guardian of the road? A: No. Q:  Is he a member of the government? A: No. Q:  Is he a pillar of the town or a merchant? A: No.

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Q:  Is he an elected deputy? A: No. Q: So who is he? What does he do? A:  He is an Aqa Sayyid Ahmad called Dastaki. Q: So why don’t you say he is a member of the ‘ulama? A:  He isn’t, he’s illiterate. Q:  You make him out to be a nobody – he must have some

sort of significance if he can argue with Haji Aqa. A:  His significance is that he says he is a member of the Anjuman-i Islami. Q: What has a member of the Anjuman-i Islami got to do with the wages of the riflemen? A: Why do you ask? Hasn’t the country become constitutionalist? Q: What has the country’s becoming constitutional got to do with this subject? The affairs of a constitutional country must be dealt with according to regulations. Everyone should know his duties. Nobody should interfere in the work of someone else. This subject has got nothing to do with the Anjuman-i Islami. Each person now has a specified position. A: Where have you been? Mu‘in al-Islam appoints the governor, and appoints and removes the chieftains of the Arab tribes. How come you are asking me what he has to do with riflemen? … Having stirred up the Anjuman-i Islami, Mu‘tamid- i Divan was busy collecting evidence from districts such as Lar of the oppression and malpractice of Qavam and his sons,73 thereby creating further difficulties for the governor. Nizam al-Saltana was by now, somewhat inevitably, the subject of complaints to the Ministry of Justice that he did not listen to those seeking redress of grievances.74 He himself told Grahame that he saw no possibility of order being restored in southern Iran without the intervention of the British. However, at this point, they themselves did not have any such plans. The Growing Rivalry between the Shiraz Council, the Anjuman-i Islami, Qavam al-Mulk and Mu‘tamid-i Divan In the latter months of 1907 Shiraz increasingly descended into disorder. The editor of Muzaffari of Bushehr, himself a Shirazi, commented that whereas Shiraz began the popular movement against despotism in the campaign against Shu‘a al-Saltana, alas it had made no progress on the path to constitutionalism, as the movement had become manipulated by malicious persons, discord had set in, and the town had become out of control. It had now fallen behind other provinces.75 From this time onwards Muzaffari’s accounts of events in Shiraz became less like news reports and commentaries, and more like polemic against those who used the situation to serve their own ends. A notable feature of this situation from August 1907 was the escalating conflict between the Shiraz council and the newly invigorated Anjuman-i Islami,

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both of which also opposed the Qavamis. A heated debate on the affairs of Shiraz took place in the Majlis on 12 August 1907.76 Complaints sent by telegram by the merchants of Shiraz (who supported the local council) were voiced in the Majlis against the Anjuman-i Islami, for disturbing trade, particularly with its influence over ‘the simple-minded’. This telegram was followed by others giving different views. The main issue, as far as the Majlis was concerned, was how order could be restored. A discussion took place on who had the responsibility of dealing with it. One view held that it should be dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior, and that Nizam al-Saltana, as a capable governor, should sort out the matter. However, it was recognised that the Qavamis were crucial to the problem, but there were differing opinions as to whether they should be kept away from Shiraz or made to resolve its difficulties. In fact, since the heart of the matter was financial, there was no means of resolution. The rivalry of the local powers in Shiraz was further manifested in a demonstration instigated by the Anjuman-i Islami over a request by the council for contributions to help maintain security on the roads.77 The council itself was divided, and one member, Haji Quli, made a speech saying he would only pay when there was security. A fracas took place as between the council and the Anjuman-i Islami, and its supporters, especially Mu‘in al-Islam and Mu‘tamid-i Divan. A stand-off emerged with the party supporting the council encamped in the Masjid-i Nau and those adhering to the Anjuman-i Islami assembled in the telegraph office.78 Muzaffari blamed self-interested persons (by whom it meant Mu‘tamid-i Divan) for usurping the power of the governor and spreading sedition in the name of constitutionalism. It also essentially accused such persons of subverting the good intentions of the Anjuman-i Islami79 (which the newspaper had so far supported). At the same time the governor faced the problem that his attempts to administer the town were continually thwarted by either the Shiraz council or the Anjuman-i Islami,80 in addition to which he found his communications to Tehran received inadequate attention.81 The Anjuman-i Islami was for a while suspended and some of its members were summoned to Tehran. These included Nasir al-Mulk, vizier of Fars and Bashir al-Daula, the head of the telegraph office, so Mu‘tamid-i Divan thus appears to have had the support of a group of local bureaucrats against Qavam, as Mirza Farajallah Khan Mir Panj also acted on his side.82 Nizam al-Saltana, however, was reported as wishing for the return of Qavam as he was comparatively effective in collecting the maliyat (the land tax).83 The assassination of Amin al-Sultan on 31 August 1907 made little impression on the Shirazi public, though his passing was considered to weaken Qavam, with whom he had an affiliation.84 News of the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention on 31 August 1907 took longer to filter through, and seems mainly to have worried the better-educated Shirazis. British officials were obliged to emphasise the respect of Britain for the independence of Iran, and its continuing policy of non-intervention in Iranian affairs.85

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The Emergence of Militant ‘Socialist’ Radicalism In the summer of 1907, a new element entered Shirazi politics, which was described by the British as socialistic in tone and respecting no authority.86 In it may be detected the small beginnings of the influence of secularism. One of its signs was the growth in the number of radical ‘gelatine’ leaflets (shabnama). One of them set out its creed as follows: This paper is published twice a week without fear or favour. It gives warning in connection with the [intended] assassination of reactionaries – under whatever guise they may be passing. We are the people whom the French call ‘Anarchists’ … the slayers of the unpatriotic and the reactionary. We have arrived at Tehran. The leaflet then claimed responsibility for the assassination of Amin al-Sultan, going on to say: Several of our number have proceeded to each city for further service to our cause. Out of these, certain individuals have arrived in Shiraz during the last month, and with all speed and some expenditure have been busy with the preparation of dynamite. Thank God it is now ready. … By virtue of the bravery and manliness with which we are imbued, in every case we first give warning ourselves. If you do not cease your impatriotism [sic] and reactionary conduct, we intend to act as duty bound. This project, it added, was intended to ‘remove the innocent with the guilty’.87 This curious mixture of Russian anarchism and Shahnama javanmardi hardly boded well for constitutional democracy, and may well have been the product of the arrival of violent radicalism in Shiraz as it spread from the Caucasus to Tabriz and elsewhere. The Emergence of Class Differences Class differences were becoming clearer, with the poorer tradesmen in particular being concerned that the primarily elite power struggles were adversely affecting their businesses. A leaflet addressed to the largely clerical Anjuman-i Islami demonstrated such concerns: You said, ‘We want to tear up the root of tyranny and plant the tree of lawful constitutionalism. For forty days you sat in the telegraph office and kept the shopkeepers away from their occupations and assembled them round yourselves on the grounds that Qavam and his sons and their party are tyrants and the opponents of the constitution, and they must be expelled from Shiraz. Shopkeepers who endured tyranny for years supported you … .

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Now we hear that you are reconciled with the Qavamis and intend to make terms with them. For goodness sake, think about what the unfortunate shopkeepers have suffered at their hands. You Mirza Muhammad son of Shaikh ‘Abd al-Jabbar, why do you not think? You seem to believe that no one can harm you. But what about Husain ‘Ali Baig, the coppersmith, who will be arrested tomorrow, – what is he to do? Another of you says, ‘I am Haji ‘Ali Aqa Chief Darvish. If anyone exercises tyranny over another, on Friday evenings I will make him burn with my curses and throw his remains into the waters.’ But what will Taqi the hatmaker do tomorrow? A third of you says, ‘I am Haji Mu‘in al-Islam. I am related to Aqa Sayyid Muhammad. He is [connected to] Qavam, and through him I will be forgiven.’ But what about Husain the catsmeat man? What will become of him?88 The small shopkeepers whose view was represented in this leaflet shortly afterwards endeavoured to form a faction of their own to try to protect their interests,89 in the realisation that they were being increasingly manipulated to their disadvantage in elite power struggles. The guilds of Shiraz also sent a petition to the Majlis through the Shiraz Deputy, Aqa Sayyid Ja‘far, complaining that their families dared not go out and it was impossible to do business in such a disturbed situation. Why, they asked, did the Majlis not act to protect people who only wanted security?90 The Growing Tribal Presence in the Shiraz Conflicts The various factions in Shiraz now began to look for tribal support to advance their particular cause, whilst all the time justifying their actions as being in the interests of constitutionalism. Some of the clerical members of the Shiraz council, together with Mu‘tamid-i Divan, and other enemies of Qavam, for the present united, and invited a tribal leader, who was also a cleric and based in Shushtar, named Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husain Lari, into Shiraz along with his followers.91 Sayyid Lari reached Shiraz on 13 October 1907, accompanied by 70 followers, and lodged with Muhazzab al-Daula. He was introduced as a mujtahid, and though there appear to have been doubts about this, he was welcomed by Mirza Ibrahim and other leading members of the ‘ulama, as well as most of the population. However, he was not welcomed by most of the merchants, who saw him as being not so much an ally of the council as a tool of Mu‘tamid-i Divan.92 Sayyid Lari gave out that his mission was to break the power of the Qavami family, remove all aspects of absolutism from Shiraz, and support constitutionalism.

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The arrival of Sayyid Lari in Shiraz was viewed with misgivings by Muzaffari, which opined that it would only exacerbate the problems of Shiraz.93 Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husain Lari and the Islamic Dimension Indeed Sayyid Lari published two treatises in 1325/1907–1908 entitled Qanun-i mashruta-yi mashru‘a and Risala-yi qanun dar ittihad-i daulat va millat.94 Sayyid Lari believed in mashruta-yi mashru‘a in the sense of constitutional government based on the absolute oneness (tauhid) of the Divine will and the denial of any sort of shirk (association).95 He totally rejected the legitimacy of any rule that was against the principles of the shari‘a, and stated that the only rightful opinion was that of the Prophets and the ‘ulama. All paths that strayed from these, for example Sufism and Shaikhism, were deviations. The political order had to be based on the sound principles set out above. Sayyid Lari was at pains to ensure that the national law (qanun-i milli) must prevent disunity amongst Muslims, who must unite in jihad against foreign enemies, and provided the example of the Sultan Abdul Hamid.96 Indeed, there were 13 items in the national law (his version of mashruta-yi mashru‘a). These included a disquisition on quarantine, and the travel restrictions and costs that it imposed on pilgrims, which he believed should be lifted.97 In his second treatise, the Risala-yi Qanun, Sayyid Lari brought his ideas on the oneness of Islamic government and society to fruition in his view that government should be based on a consultative council of which the first person should be a just faqih (jurist), with all the appropriate qualities.98 All others, led by the ‘ulama, should do their obligatory duties in general affairs (umur-i hisbiyya) under his guidance. Despite the vicissitudes of the years following the establishment of the first Majlis, Sayyid Lari never deviated from this view to co-operate with those who were against constitutionalism. The Majlis Debates and the Shiraz Power Struggle Contradictory telegrams on the problems in Shiraz were sent to the Majlis, one being read out on 19 October 1907. It claimed that the situation was highly disturbed and the local council powerless, and complained that the government had not taken effective action. Now Sayyid Lari had come with armed men and was terrorising the town. Sayyid Muhammad Ja‘far (the Shiraz deputy for the clergy) commented that just as an attempt was being made to reform and develop the country, the seditious of the earth (alluding to, amongst others, Mu‘tamid-i Divan) prevented it. The Shiraz deputies were told to contact Nizam al-Saltana (whose view was that nothing could be done while Qavam was away) and find out what was happening; they should also try to ascertain what Sayyid Lari thought he was doing in Shiraz.99 Mu‘tamid-i Divan now turned to the Qashqa’is, 100 of whom soon appeared by order of Saulat al-Daula to offer their support. Mu‘tamid-i Divan was believed to be trying to use them against the Arab tribes, who were still under the control

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of the Qavamis.100 It may also be that, as Vusuqi suggests, Saulat al-Daula had some sympathy for constitutionalism,101 though he is acknowledged to have had personal concerns, like all the tribes involved. In collaboration with the Shiraz council, an istishadnama (a form of petition) listing all the crimes of Qavam, was sent to the Majlis in Tehran with the signatures of all the different groups supporting the council (merchants, guilds, and some Qashqa’i and Laris). It was endorsed by a statement by Sayyid ‘Abd al Husain Lari, which indicted the Qavamis for the killing and plundering of those ‘who protected Islam and supported the mashrutiyyat’ (the two being seen as the same).102 At this time also, the Anjuman-i Islami wrote to the well-known radical Tabriz deputy to the Majlis, Mustashar al-Daula. In a letter dated 20 Shavval 1325/26 November 1907, they asked for his support for the on-going struggle between the supporters of the constitutionalism and Qavam al-Mulk.103 The letter claimed that, For forty days the members of the anjuman, who are learned men and notables of the country, together with some of the guilds and some of the villages and tribes, have taken refuge in the Shah Chiragh, and are telegramming leading members of the state and people. These telegrams are being blocked by Qavamis. They said that if the situation continued, the fundamentals of constitutionalism would be destroyed, especially as the Qavamis went unpunished for using roughs and one of the Arab tribal chiefs to stir up trouble in the town. Significantly, they complained that Qavamis were ignorant of mashruta and its meaning; they should either be sent back to Tehran, or made to implement the Supplementary Fundamental Law, in which case they would not be able to interfere in the offices of security, justice and finance. It may be noted that this telegram was different in tone from the Islamic language used by such members as Mu‘in al-Islam, and reflects the fact that some of its members belonged to the local bureaucracy. This in turn shows how complicated loyalties in Shiraz were, the one consistent theme being opposition to or support of the Qavamis. Tribal Struggles and the Return of the Sons of Qavam The tribal presence in Shiraz grew, with new Laris and Qashqa’i arriving daily. The large anti-Qavam group were now once more in the Masjid-i Nau. The partisans of Qavam retaliated by bringing to Shiraz 100 followers of the Arab tribes, which were under their control.104 This group were encamped in the telegraph office. The numbers on both sides were reportedly augmented by lutis and tufangchis (armed men) from Dih Buzurg, a poorer quarter of the town.105 Violence therefore escalated. Nizam al-Saltana meanwhile had lost interest in the affairs of Fars, and in early November he resigned and subsequently returned to Tehran.106 Robberies in the town increased, bread was scarce and expensive,

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and charcoal was difficult to obtain. The conditions elsewhere in Fars were as bad as Shiraz, with an increase in attacks reported on both the Bushehr and Isfahan roads. On 8 November the sons of Qavam, Salar al-Sultan and Nasir al-Daula, returned to Shiraz and ‘Ala al-Daula was made governor general of Fars.107 The Qavamis were now regarded by the authorities as the only persons capable of stopping the escalating chaos in Fars, and so were gradually regaining the ascendancy. The Ilkhani of the Qashqa’i withdrew his men from Shiraz, on being urged to do so by Mirza Ibrahaim. Mu‘tamid-i Divan, fearing for his life, tried to ascertain if he might take refuge in the British Consulate since he was a distant relative of the former British news agent in Shiraz.108 The attempted coup of December 1907 in Tehran occasioned some concern in Shiraz, and wild reports circulated,109 not least because of the involvement of Fazlallah Nuri. The Shirazis sent messages of support for the Majlis, though the Qavamis took longer than others to demonstrate their loyalty. However, a telegram sent from Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri to Mirza Ibrahim saying that not only Mu‘tamid-i Divan and his following, but also all persons who supported constitutional government, were infidels and deserved death,110 did not trouble the Shirazis, embroiled as they were in their own conflicts. The Majlis was unhappy that the taxes of Fars had still not been paid, and Qavam was duly blamed.111 The disturbances rumbled on into January 1908 in conditions of lawlessness, when the combined efforts of the Imam Jum‘a, acting on behalf of the sons of Qavam, and the Shaikh al-Islam acting for Mu‘tamid al-Divan, who had taken refuge in the Shah Chiragh for fear of his life,112 and probably behind the scenes the government in Tehran, succeeded in reconciling the warring parties. By this time the presence of the Shiraz council was barely visible, as the city was dominated by the internal dissensions of the powerful Qavami clan. However, a pause followed a long period of disruption and disturbance when Sahib Ikhtiyar (Vazir Makhsus) was made governor of Shiraz, and he duly arrived on 8 February 1908.113 By this time the various tribal groups who had been called in during the conflict, except for a few Laris, had departed. The Shiraz Council and the Anjumans The Shiraz council largely faded from the political scene during the worst of the disturbances. During October–November 1907 it did not meet officially for over a month. Its seal was in the hands of one of its members, who had disappeared, and was evidently on the side of the Anjuman-i Islami and Mu‘tamid-i Divan. As a result telegrams were being sent to other parts of the country and to Majlis newspaper with the seal of the name of the council without their authority. The majority of the council members were therefore obliged to disown the telegrams publicly. In this response the council did reveal that it was trying to observe procedures. It stated that any communication had to be signed by 12 people. Otherwise the council was reported busy with reforms.114

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By January 1908, the Anjuman-i Islami was in the ascendant, and at the heart of the disturbances. This Anjuman was becoming more assertive of its Islamic identity and more hostile to foreigners. When money was collected generally for the victims of recent flood damage, the Anjuman-i Islami, to whom the fund was initially handed, refused to accept it, saying that ‘the Muslim community of Shiraz did not require help from Europeans’.115 Not surprisingly there was a furore among potential recipients, and the money was accepted, and an elaborately worded receipt (presumably providing justification in Islamic terms) offered in return. However, anti-European sentiment was also growing in Shiraz, and now affected the Parsees116 (Zoroastrians), as well as the Jews, especially after the arrival of the Sayyid Lari in Shiraz.117 New anjumans were also being formed, in particular one of domestic servants (Anjuman-i Ta‘ssub – the Zealous Anjuman), the Anjuman-i Ansar, headed by Haji ‘Ali Aqa,118 and other anjumans including one of Qajar princes,119 one of the descendants of the Prophet (Anjuman-i Sadat), and the Anjuman-i ‘Askari (the Military Society) of unspecified objectives.120 The Assassination of Qavam al-Mulk and its Significance By mid-February 1908 rumours were growing of the return of Qavam al-Mulk (regarded as the only person who could effectively raise taxes in Shiraz and Fars), a prospect which was roundly opposed by the Anjuman-i Islami.121 Qavam had to collect a large amount of revenue to recover the enormous sum he had paid to be vizier of Fars in February 1907, though some of it had been remitted. Sahib Ikhtiyar tried to resolve the problem, which he considered ‘a stupid mistake’ into which Qavam had been inveigled by Nizam al-Saltana, by suggesting to Qavam that he resign control of the taxes; instead he should provide the governor with every assistance in collecting them.122 As a result Qavam telegrammed Nizam al-Saltana, asking to be released from the commitment he had entered into with regard to the taxes on the grounds that it did not meet the approval of the new governor.123 At the same time Sahib Ikhtiyar attempted to negotiate with the council, now termed Anjuman-i Ayalati, and the Anjuman-i Islami, so as to bind them to co-operate over tax collection.124 At this time news of the attack on the Shah’s life reached Shiraz, and was greeted with mixed views. Some thought it was a pity it had failed, whilst others, especially the merchants, were relieved, as they felt that the loss of the Shah would lead to an increase in the disturbances throughout the country. That assassination attempt, however, was a sign of things to come, as on 7 March 1908, Qavam al-Mulk was killed by a gun shot in his own garden. The assassin then tried to kill himself. Still alive, he was imprisoned in a cellar, where he died shortly afterwards.125 His name was Ni‘matallah, and he had recently been in the service of Mu‘tamid-i Divan as a coachman. The latter, now the principal suspect for instigating the assassination, was seized and confined in the governor’s palace, largely for his own protection.126 At the funeral of Qavam on

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9 March Salar al-Sultan was hit by a bullet and Sayyid Muhammad Baqir, one of the most eminent mujtahids of Shiraz, was mortally wounded and died that night. On the spur of the moment, Mu‘in al-Islam was identified as the gunman, and killed by the partisans of Qavam. Grahame, the British consul, now seriously concerned for order, reported that the governor had only 400 useless infantry to rely on, and was thus dependent on the Qavamis and the tribal chiefs. He demanded that troops be sent urgently from Isfahan. Shiraz went into ferment. The sons of Qavam, in fear of their lives, decided to leave Iran immediately, and asked for British assistance. The governor wondered how he could control Fars without them, and refused to let them go.127 What Grahame described as ‘the reign of terror’ continued, with threatening letters being sent to persons of note, including the leading mujtahid, Mirza Ibrahim, and many merchants.128 At the funeral of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir there were demonstrations against the Qavamis, in which schoolboys paraded through the streets with Qur’ans on their heads, followed by a crowd of 2,000. On 19 March came news of the appointment of Zill al-Sultan,129 known to be one of the most effective of governors in keeping order. The news was received with mixed feelings, but many Shirazis were by now tired of their own disputes. It was never ascertained at the time and it cannot be known for sure now who was behind the shooting of Qavam al-Mulk, especially as he had so many enemies, both personal and political, from all social levels. Of course, the assassination could have been the sole work of Ni‘matallah, who belonged to the poorer social class, many of whom saw Qavam as a corrupt oppressor. It is possible that Mu‘tamid-i Divan was involved, but he would have known the danger of being arrested for the crime as he was such a likely suspect. Alternatively, the assassination could be linked to that of Amin al-Sultan, and the attempt on Muhammad ‘Ali Shah, as well as the presence in Shiraz of elements influenced by the Russian anarchists, as indicated by the circulation of extremist leaflets. In his article on the assassination, Vusuqi concluded that the assassination indicated a trend in a new level of violence, as in fact seems to have been the case, which had an influence on British policy.130 As this chapter has demonstrated, the growing disorder, the insecurity of the roads, the robberies in the city, and the fact that trade had come to a standstill constitute a long-term trend of which the assassination was part. As is discussed in Chapter 11, the British began to change their policy in the spring of 1908, and it was the trend against security for trade which influenced them. The murder of Mu‘in al-Islam caused consternation in Najaf, and in May 1908 a telegram was sent by the three constitutional mujtahids, Akhund Khurasani, ‘Abdallah Mazandarani and Haj Mirza Husain ibn Khalil to ‘all the Anjuman-i Shari‘at-i Islami’,131 which appears to have been their understanding of a variety of societies in various cities. The murder was referred to as ‘a disgraceful event’, which demonstrated ‘the extremity of oppression by the supporters of autocracy [absolutism and probably a reference to the Qavamis] in the murder of the ‘ulama and those of the Prophet’s family’. The telegram ended with the

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warning that if the Shah failed to maintain order, and thus to carry out his responsibilities ‘all is over with Islam’. The telegram demonstrates not so much the support of the three mujtahids for constitutionalism, as their concern for the fate of Islam, which, as had always been the case, was linked in their mind with the question of good order. The Governorship of Zill al-Sultan As Shiraz awaited the arrival of Zill al-Sultan, it was quiet, but some people feared to be seen out-of-doors, notably the Imam Jum‘a and Mirza Ibrahim.132 The head men of the Arab tribes swore an oath that if Zill al-Sultan oppressed any of them they would support each other. Meanwhile, they ravaged Fars, where trade was now at a standstill. In early May Mu‘tamid-i Divan was released from detention in the governor’s palace, and placed in ‘honourable confinement’ in the house of Ja‘far Quli Khan Mir Panj, and finally released in early June, when he was appointed vizier of the Arab tribes, under a son of Zill al-Sultan, as their chief.133 On 30 June 1908 he was shot dead by an Arab chieftain named Asghar Khan.134 Thus passed a consummate schemer in the politics of Shiraz. He had links with both the Qavami clan and their enemies; with the Anjuman-i Ayalati and the Anjuman-i Islami; with all social levels, from merchants and ‘ulama to roughs and the poorer social groups. He professed support for different political views, and, though he was not responsible for the turbulence which bedevilled the engagement of Shiraz in the Constitutional Revolution, he added much to it. In the end he pursued his own bid for power using the dark arts of urban politics, which had previously been deployed much more successfully by a Qavami forebear in the mid-nineteenth century, ‘Ali Akbar Qavam al-Mulk.135 On 8 May 1908 Zill al-Sultan arrived in Shiraz, accompanied by two regiments, and on 23 May the sons of Qavam left.136 The son of Salar Sultan, Intizam al-Mamalik, the only remaining child in this Qavami line, was kept in Iran (in effect as a hostage) until his father returned. The departure of the sons of Qavam occasioned a stormy discussion in the Anjuman-i Ayalati, members of which considered them responsible for the city’s problems.137 Following his arrival, Zill al-Sultan received the Anjuman-i Ayalati, again now playing a more prominent part in the politics of Shiraz, and the Anjuman-i Islami, which, though not enjoying government status, seems to have been accorded equal approval. Zill al-Sultan also expressed approval of an Anjuman-i Ansar to its president, Haji ‘Ali Aqa, but opined that the remaining societies were formed mainly for the purpose of rioting and disturbances. Suhrab Khan, President of the Anjuman-i Ta‘ssub, the servants’ society, was arrested.138 The first major issue to confront Zill al-Sultan was an investigation of the recent disturbances.139 Two committees were established to deal with it. One met at the Anjuman-i Ayalati, and consisted of two members of each of the six principal societies of Shiraz (despite Zill al-Sultan’s view). Its purpose was to examine the deaths of the two members of the ‘ulama as a result of the attempt

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on Salar al-Sultan. However, it proved to be more concerned with debate than judicial inquiry, and its principal resolution was that provincial government should not accept the intervention of any society in any particular matter. This conclusion would appear to have been directed mainly at the Anjuman-i Islami. The second committee discussed the problems of loss by robbery during the disturbances. The investigations of the Anjuman-i Ayalati into the murders concluded with the execution of two of the leading roughs who were associated with the Qavami family: Shukrallah Baig, a personal servant of theirs, and Ra’is Hadi, for the death of Shaykh Muhammad Baqir. A third rough, Aqa Baig Lur, was executed for that of Mu‘in al-Islam.140 Zill al-Sultan began a rationalisation of the government of Fars, with much activity in asserting control of the local governors, and filling the posts of a number who had fled.141 In an endeavour to pay some attention to the Provincial and District Government Regulations, he organised a system whereby anyone with a complaint should refer it first to his office; from there it would go to the Anjuman-i Ayalati, and thence to the baiglarbaigi for execution. However, Shiraz’s period of relative peace and better government was brought to an end by the events leading to the bombardment of the Majlis on the orders of Muhammad ‘Ali Shah on 23 June 1908. Telegrams were sent at that time from both Shiraz and Isfahan saying they were waiting for the permission of the deputies to choose a new king, given the present one had been dethroned.142 On that occasion, Zill al-Sultan’s house was plundered and destroyed. On receipt of the news he decided to go to Europe and left Shiraz on 7 July 1908.143 At the time of his departure Shiraz was quiet, but Fars still in disorder. The Shirazis greeted the news of the coup with a variety of views.144 The Imam Jum‘a, not unexpectedly, supported the Shah. A notice was posted that all friends of the constitution should gather at Qum; it received no response. The British verdict was that ‘It is abundantly clear that nothing really touches the Shirazis except their local feuds.’ This is not entirely fair as there were small pockets of reformers, both religious and secular, with both liberal and socialist views, but the documents that fully tell their story have yet to come to light in a complete study.

10 Isfahan Haj Aqa Nurallah and the Emergence of Islamism in Isfahan 1907–1908

Aqa Nurallah and Mashruta As has been observed, Aqa Nurallah saw nothing secular about constitutionalism, and believed that mashruta emerged from Islam. As a result it would provide unity between people and state, and thus strengthen the country and the movement towards reform. He emphasised the Qu’ran and the shari‘a, not just as a basis for religion and law, but as a bond uniting the Iranian nation. As a result Islam provided a vision for uniting people and state, and mobilizing Iranians in a struggle against foreign domination. Islam would also ensure that government policy addressed the needs of all the people, not just a corrupt few, and that accountability would lead to a productive economy and expenditure. Consequently, industry and trade would flourish, and Iran would prosper. At the heart of Aqa Nurallah’s vision was the Majlis, which as an Islamic assembly, would implement the policies that would empower both the country and the religion, and so foreign intrusion would be repulsed. This in effect sums up the essence of Aqa Nurallah’s ideas, which were developed more fully in the treatise Muqim va musafir, published in 1909, and to be discussed further below. It will be noted that he shared many of the ideas put forward by secularist reformers, including the concept of mobilising the people as a whole. However, the essential nature of the revitalised state was to be Islamic, and it may be noted that he stressed Islam, rather than Shi‘ism. In that he is to be distinguished from Aqa Najafi, who, as Musa Najafi has observed, remained quintessentially Shi‘i in his vision, as is illustrated by his signature as ‘a servant of the Ja‘fari faith’ in a telegram to the Ottoman Sultan.1 Occasionally, however, he spoke in Pan-Islamic language.2

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Zill al-Sultan and the ‘Ulama and the Local Council The establishment of the Majlis was celebrated with illuminations in Isfahan in early January.3 The creation of the Majlis opened up the question of who or what would now have the authority to govern Isfahan. Both Zill al-Sultan and many of the ‘ulama regarded the new institution with scepticism and dislike. However, it had the support of Aqa Nurallah, who led a movement which obliged Zill al-Sultan to agree to the establishment of a city council of 12 members for Isfahan, to meet once a week at the Chehel Sotun Palace, with Nurallah as its president. It also began drawing up a code of regulations for the government of Isfahan. Not unexpectedly, this initiated a struggle for control of Isfahan between Aqa Nurallah (and his large following) and Zill al-Sultan and the more conservative ‘ulama. This represented realignment between Zill al-Sultan and the clerical elite, such as had happened in the past in times of crisis. The opposition of the latter delayed the elections, resulting in repeated telegrams from Tehran demanding that their arrangements be hastened. Zill al-Sultan convened a meeting of ‘ulama and merchants in the Bagh-i Nau Palace, and represented himself as a longstanding supporter of constitutionalism. At the meeting he reportedly produced a diary kept on a recent visit to France, from which he read out passages which indicated that he was an opponent of autocracy, and of a republic, but strongly supported a constitutional monarchy, such as that of Britain (which country he was also privately turning to for assurance of support). He reinforced this impression a few days later in a dramatic speech to a meeting of 6,000 people declaring that anyone who opposed the Majlis was a traitor.4 By such manoeuvres he managed for the time being to maintain a stake in the new order. However, behind the scenes he asked Barnham, the British Consul, to write to the Representative in Tehran, Spring Rice, to obtain from the Shah such recognition of his authority as would enable him to bring the new arrangements to an end.5 Meanwhile, the movement led by Aqa Nurallah drew up a code of regulations for the government of Isfahan, and proceeded to establish the council. There were as yet no rules for the conduct of elections, or description of the duties of members or clarification of the authority of the council, and no regulations had come from Tehran. Therefore temporary regulations were prepared until the official ones arrived from the Majlis. The regulations specified that the council must observe the shari‘a, and not interfere in government affairs such as taxation and military matters.6 Soon the council was meeting twice weekly, with increasing numbers and activity, as a result of which Zill al-Sultan complained to the British that his authority was being undermined, and that he needed their assistance.7 In fact the Anjuman of Isfahan was to be significant not just for its having an Islamic ethos, and the purpose of establishing Islamic government, but also in terms of organisation, it being the first time that such an organised and consciously Islamic body, which was elected and had its own rules and regulations, actually participated in the government of Iran, albeit at a local level.

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In early January the Shah died, but his passing was received with indifference in Isfahan, where people were preoccupied with local rather than national concerns.8 Elections to the Majlis Elections in Isfahan to the Majlis took place with relative speed compared to some provinces. Murtaza Quli Khan Na’ini, a member of the household of Zill al-Sultan, had been chosen for the landlords and Mirza Hadi for the guilds by the end of January.9 The Redress of Grievances The new council had essentially been established by the Isfahan elite of ‘ulama and merchants in collaboration with Zill al-Sultan, but it soon attracted the interest of other citizens of less substantial means. The news that there was a council (entitled ‘the Anjuman-i Muqaddas’ or ‘sacred council’) sitting in Isfahan with the announced purpose of redressing grievances, spread far and wide, and brought many claimants into the city.10 These included the people of Velidun, a large village near Isfahan with a substantial revenue from its crops, demanding justice from the Masjid-Shahi family. According to the villagers, they had some time before sought the protection of Aqa Najafi against the demands of the tax collector. Over time he persuaded them to make him nominal owner of their land, with the effect that he benefited from its proceeds by payments claimed from them. Now, they had a chance to appeal for justice, and regain their financial rights. When Aqa Najafi heard of their action, following previous action in such disputes, he demanded a company of Cossacks from Zill al-Sultan. The latter agreed and sent a force which killed some villagers and caused the women to flee into the hills. However, he also took the opportunity to exacerbate the situation behind the scenes. Hundreds of villagers poured into Isfahan demanding justice, and embarrassing both Aqa Najafi and Zill al-Sultan. The Anjuman,11 meanwhile, found itself so overwhelmed by demands for redress of grievances that it posted notices round the city advising petitioners that they would be penalised if they took up time needlessly. The Emergence of Newspapers The founding of the Anjuman coincided with the establishment on 21 Zhi al-Qa‘da 1324/6 January 1907 of a new publication under the auspices of Nurallah, Ruznama-yi Anjuman-i Muqaddas-i Milli-yi Isfahan, which was owned and edited by Aqa Sarraj al-Din, a well-known cleric.12 The newspaper declared itself an avowed supporter of the constitution, and in its second issue reproduced the Shah’s farman announcing the promulgation of the constitution and the first five articles.13 It may be noted that the Shah’s farman granting the constitution provides both explanation and legitimacy for Nurallah’s interpretation

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of it as authorising the establishment of an Islamic institution, for it speaks of ‘giving effect to the enactment of the sacred law of the Prophet’. Many of those who supported the movement for the constitution automatically thought of it as an Islamic document, or simply did not understand its secular implications and functions.14 In other words there was a body of opinion favouring reformed Islamic government, following al-Afghani’s message, in the country at the time, though its size and level of influence is still not clear. Its adherents saw mashruta as based on the law and example of the Prophet, not a modern innovation, and as representing past principles that were lost, in which they were similar to other followers of al-Afghani. Mashruta, therefore, meant the return to and renewal of the shari‘a, and, just like the shari‘a, was consistent with the needs of society. For this reason, in the absence of the Imam, it was the best form of government for society. Nurallah had studied in the ‘Atabat, and reportedly had connections with Khurasani, with whom he was in communication.15 His policies thus had the support of the ‘ulama of Najaf, and though Nurallah was more militant, active and forward-thinking in terms of the organisation of society, there were no substantial differences between him and Khurasani and Na’ini. Another newspaper to appear was Al-Jinab, the editor and proprietor of which was Mir Sayyid ‘Ali Jinab, a member of a well-known merchant family, active in the constitutional movement.16 He had considerable learning, but his previous employment in the Russian consulate led some to regard him as an ‘infidel’.17 The ‘ulama being so influential in Isfahan, Al-Jinab sought their favour, and in its first issue, above its policy statement, it advised its readers it was published under the auspices of ‘His Excellency Thiqat al-Islam’ (Aqa Nurallah).18 The newspaper was the first to be established in Isfahan after the granting of the constitution, and ran for 14 issues in five months from 20 Shavval 1324/7 December 1906 to 16 Rabi‘ I 1325/29 April 1907.19 Its policy was set out from the first edition, and stated that it was a weekly newspaper, which addressed national issues, which included support for national products, unity of the people and popular support for the revolution, freedom and equality. Its main concern, however, was Isfahan, its politics, society and economy. It advocated proper regulation of affairs, for example, stating with regard to elections, that each group should ensure that their own elections be correctly arranged.20 Al-Jinab held strong views on rights, which it related to Islam, saying the national assembly should be responsible for regulating the equality of the rights of Muslims. Al-Jinab also supported freedom (hurriyat or azadi), which, it stated, was to be discussed in the Majlis; it added that it had stood against those who objected to the word.21 It argued that if rights were recognised, the people of Iran could flourish like those of Japan, which, having laws, had developed a long way. It likened existence without freedom to servitude such as had existed from the time of the Pharaoh. However, it noted Islamic law had challenged this system and argued that a Muslim could not be the slave of another.22 Al-Jinab further took up the issue of freedom of the press, and argued that the principle ensured that journalists would be able to serve the people and government, investigate

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current affairs and comment on the advantages and disadvantages of different policies. In that way ill-judged polices of national concern could be rectified.23 In fact, investigation by disinterested journalists could bring out the truth, particularly when those working for the government were unwilling to divulge it, with the result that affairs were not put in order, nor accountability introduced. The Attitude to Foreign Interests and the Religious Minorities Anjuman-i muqaddas was also supported by the leading merchants and soon launched into a violent attack on the Imperial Bank, claiming a national bank would both better serve the country and give much higher interest.24 The significant role of the leading merchants, particularly Muhammad Husain Kaziruni, and of the bazaar, in the new reform movement is also brought out by the fact that an early act of the Anjuman was to place limitations in early 1907 on the trading rights of the Jews in textiles.25 They were summoned to the Council and forced to agree a ruling that in future no Jews should hawk goods within a radius of eight miles from Isfahan. Their rights of debt collection were limited, and the overall effect on the livelihood of a substantial number of the Jews of Isfahan was potentially ruinous. Returning briefly to the point that Aqa Nurallah’s declaration that mashruta would bring ‘equality’, it is evident that this was not equality before the law regardless of religion, as accepted by Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i, but equality amongst Muslims (in his words king and beggar), with Christians and Jews still occupying an inferior position in accordance with the shari‘a.26 In addition, a petition from Muslim quarters adjoining Julfa (the Armenian quarter) and supported by Aqa Najafi, complained about the existence of an Iranian women’s school in Julfa, and the employment of Persian female attendants (presumably for nursing) in the women’s hospital in Isfahan. A protest was organised, but in this case a telegram from Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i in Tehran obliged him to call it off.27 The Position of Zill al-Sultan Zill al-Sultan’s position was becoming increasingly untenable in January 1907. Initially, his rival for power, the Anjuman, found its authority curtailed by Zill al-Sultan himself. The Anjuman therefore determined to be rid of him. He also had the problem that Muhammad ‘Ali Shah regarded his ambitions with deep mistrust. Following the new Shah’s accession to the throne, Zill al-Sultan thus found himself coming under pressure from these two sides. Eventually, feeling he was losing control of the situation in Isfahan, he left surreptitiously for Tehran on 2 February 1907. He hoped to win the favour and support of the new Shah, and obtain the granting of a new term of office as governor of Isfahan.28 Immediately on his departure demonstrations led by Aqa Nurallah began against him, demanding that he should not be allowed to return. Aqa Najafi and Aqa Nurallah evidently aimed to assume some of the power and authority of the governor, even though it could be to their detriment given the way they could

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co-operate with Zill al-Sultan over financial matters. In February and March 1907 Nurallah and Aqa Najafi and their supporters continued to be preoccupied with the struggle to oust Zill al-Sultan. A bast took place in March in the British consulate as a demonstration against his possible return, and the bazaars closed.29 The bast was funded by some of the merchants, who as usual paid the expenses of the less well-to-do traders in order to keep the bazaars closed. One of these was Haji Muhammad Husain Kaziruni, whose clerk, Adib al-Tujjar, was a member for Isfahan in the Majlis.30 However, the bast was not just a struggle for elite control, it was also sustained by popular grievances, including grain hoarding, the selling of river water in summer, and duties on market produce. At the end of March, Zill al-Sultan resigned, and was replaced by Husain Quli Khan Nizam al-Saltana. Aqa Najafi reportedly had regrets over Zill al-Sultan’s departure because of the many interests they had in common, but feeling his age, was increasingly allowing Aqa Nurallah to occupy a more prominent role. The bast ended and the consulate was evacuated at the end of March, with news of Zill al-Sultan’s resignation arriving on 29 March.31 The Growth in the Power and Influence of Aqa Nurallah Indeed, Aqa Nurallah was rapidly gaining in power in Isfahan because of his influence over the Anjuman. The following months were to see the height of his power, as well as his sustained opposition to foreign penetration, and his undiminished and consistent support for the Majlis and constitutionalism. In March 1907 he took part in a struggle to establish the National Bank, which he considered essential for the progress of the country and the protection of its religion from foreign interference.32 He attacked in April those among the merchants and guilds who traded with foreigners, asking for how long they were going to send their gold and silver to foreigners and to deal in foreign-made clothes.33 Nizam al-Saltana, who became governor at the end of April, had considerable difficulties in controlling the city in the face of the Masjid-Shahis, and the intrigues of Zill al-Sultan, and complained in a letter to Amin al-Sultan that the arsenal in Isfahan was inadequate.34 He had promised the Shah to do his best, providing Zill al-Sultan did not try to undermine his authority. However, he felt his position to be so insupportable that he tried to resign twice. At that time a meeting was reportedly held in a village belonging to the Masjid-Shahis, outside Isfahan. There Aqa Nurallah is said to have informed his following that recent events had enabled them to measure their strength, and that they could, if they needed to, dethrone the Shah. If they did, they could have a republic, if not for the whole country, then for Isfahan, where they would not accept any governor who did not act in the service of the people.35 This reveals that Nurallah was aware of discussions on the subject of a republic, also current in Tabriz. However, it should be noted that he appears to have been talking hypothetically. With reference to Isfahan itself, the term seems to mean both freedom from oppression and independence from central control. Aqa Najafi,

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also present, reportedly expressed disapproval of such language, pointing out that if it reached the ears of the government, they would be blamed for any new disturbances. Indeed, not long afterwards, one Mu‘in al-‘Ulama was sent by the Majlis in Tehran to inquire into the composition of the local Anjuman (dominated by Nurallah) and the manner of election of its members.36 The various provinces were also in touch with each other requesting support for their local struggles. In May, Aqa Najafi received a telegram from Shiraz asking him to support the movement there against Qavam by arranging for the closure of the bazaar of Isfahan37 (which did not take place). At this time the struggle between the Majlis and the Shah emerged, and the latter began his campaign over the Supplementary Fundamental Law. A telegram arrived for Aqa Najafi from the mujtahids of Tabriz, requesting he organise a demonstration requiring the Shah to sign the Supplementary Fundamental Law.38 This resulted in Aqa Najafi making a speech in support of the Law, and urging the people not to pay their taxes until the Shah signed it. This event in turn produced a stormy meeting between Aqa Najafi and Nizam al-Saltana. By the end of May, the concerns of the Majlis over the manner of the formation of the Isfahan Anjuman had sufficient impact to demand response. Aqa Najafi and Nurallah sent a circular to the ‘ulama of every quarter of Isfahan, saying that dissatisfaction had been expressed about the membership of the Anjuman, and they should send in the names of persons they considered eligible for election.39 Of course, for their opponents, this method of choice was no more satisfactory than the previous arrangements. In June, Nizam al-Saltana was released from Isfahan and sent to Shiraz.40 He was eventually replaced by Nayyir al-Daula, a less experienced governor, in July.41 He appointed a small executive council of bureaucrats and merchants, to assist him in the place of a sub-governor, which appears to have been an attempt to improve and strengthen the bureaucracy. Indeed, Aqa Najafi and Nurallah tried to have his appointment cancelled as he was known to be hostile to the ‘ulama. The governor’s move was followed by a telegram to him from Tehran, ordering him to reform the Anjuman in accordance with the new Provincial and District Council Regulations, in effect signalling the reassertion of central administrative control. The telegram also stipulated that there should only be two members for the ‘ulama on the council instead of the five claimed by Aqa Najafi and Aqa Nurallah. Elections of a kind appear to have taken place, two of the most influential merchants of Isfahan, Haji Mirza Husain Kaziruni and Malik al-Tujjar, being chosen for the merchants. Fazlallah Nuri, Mashruta-yi Mashru‘a and the Supplementary Fundamental Law 1907 At the time of Fazlallah Nuri’s movement for mashruta-yi mashru‘a in the summer of 1907, Isfahan was unable to understand the situation in Tehran. Both Fazlallah and the Majlis sent representatives to Isfahan in July to explain their view, and

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Bihbihani telegrammed Nurallah requesting him to try to keep Isfahan quiet. The seemingly inconsistent behaviour of Fazlallah, who had initially supported the Majlis, caused consternation in Isfahan, especially given his status as a mujtahid. Opinion was divided as to what to do, when Fazlallah’s representative arrived. Since he openly accused the Majlis members of being infidels, it took considerable endeavours by Nurallah to calm the situation in favour of the Majlis.42 Nurallah also supported the Majlis at the time of the Shah’s attempted attack on it in December, when there were big demonstrations in Isfahan.43 Aqa Nurallah announced a march on Tehran, and had his supporters drilling in preparation. At the victory of the constitutionalists, the bazaars were illuminated in celebration. Anjuman-i muqaddas, reflecting Nurallah’s view, expressed joy at the royal signing of the Supplementary Fundamental Law on 8 October 1907, saying that the standard of unity had been raised against the absolutists, and the disturbances they had caused had been suppressed, thus protecting the foundations of Islam and the shari‘a.44 The Apogee of Aqa Nurallah’s Power However, the apogee of Aqa Nurallah’s power came in August 1907, when he recruited a volunteer force from the neighbouring villages, and engaged 2,000– 3,000 of them in drills outside the town at the time when Shaikh Fazlallah attacked the Majlis. They were armed with swords, allocated rations, and marched in columns to the sound of drums and cymbals. Each wore a medal saying Farrash-i milli, Fidayi-i majlis.45 It was a primitive force in terms of arms and training, but it demonstrated Aqa Nurallah’s perception that the reformed Islamic state had to be strong. In August Zill al-Sultan made an attempt to return to Isfahan, ostensibly to inspect his property, for which he had obtained the agreement of the Majlis. A telegram from Isfahan advised the Majlis that his return was likely to cause disturbances and insecurity, and asked why the people of Isfahan were not entitled to respect under the constitutionalist regime.46 The Majlis discussed who would be responsible for the consequences of his visit, which would seem to be likely to cause agitation and death. Fear was also expressed that his visit might have seditious intentions. One member objected that there was no law to prevent someone going where he wished to go, to which another responded that this was taking the matter further than the French Republic. In the end, the majority view, reinforced by a telegram from Nurallah, warning that roughs would assert themselves, people would be injured and disappear with consequent disorder, led the Majlis to withdraw their approval of the visit. To emphasise the point, Nurallah’s supporters had transferred their parades to the main square of Isfahan.47 Their numbers had been augmented by arrivals from the villages escaping from rent and debts, and seeking his protection. There was also much disquiet over the high price of bread, and some of the populace of Isfahan tried to play off the prince and the two mujtahids against each other to bring it down.

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The Decline in the Influence of Aqa Nurallah From the autumn of 1907 Nurallah’s influence was in fact on the wane. There was thus growing discontent with the Anjuman, and though members met bi-weekly, and passed and registered decrees, none were carried out.48 This was, of course, at least partly due to lack of funds for administrative purposes. Though up to 30,000 fida’is were now busy with drill technicalities, recruitment was declining.49 The assassination of Amin al-Sultan caused anxiety to Aqa Najafi, as he was informed that a member of an anarchist society was now planning his own demise.50 Nevertheless, Tehran began slowly, and not particularly successfully, to re-exert its control over the city in October 1907. A town council (Anjuman-i Baladiyya)51 was established and Vathiq al-Mulk Ansari, son of Mushir al-Mulk, a former secretary of Zill al-Sultan, was elected head of it. It had its own newspaper, Anjuman-i Baladiyya. However, since the new town council was at variance with both the provincial governor and the provincial Anjuman, the newspaper endeavoured to criticise both sides cautiously. The town council tried to improve public amenities by having the bazaars cleaned and also had some prices brought down.52 As part of this new ethos, the Malik al-Tujjar had a proclamation issued in the bazaar that the Jews were not to be mistreated. When a Mirza Riza Khan was appointed by the court of justice (‘adliyya) to investigate a Bakhtiyari attack on villagers near Isfahan, Nurallah and Aqa Najafi complained about his having been selected without the approval of the Anjuman,53 but without any discernible success. The Baladiyya also attempted various other urban improvements, and although it was hampered by the Anjuman (now the Anjuman-i Ayalati), it nevertheless undermined that body. In a climate of economic crisis and reduced trade, constant disputes arose over taxation had made all forms of government unpopular.54 Aqa Najafi was also growing disillusioned with the new order, and effected a reconciliation with Zill al-Sultan, seeing him when he visited Isfahan in April 1908, and turning against the now numerous societies in the city.55 However, Zill al-Sultan’s chances of returning to Isfahan ended with the bombardment of the Majlis in June 1908, and alongside it the house of Zill al-Sultan, whom Muhammad ‘Ali Shah regarded as a rival for the throne. Zill al-Sultan left the country as a result. By contrast, at the time of the bombardment of the Majlis, Aqa Nurallah was very active and in constant contact with the ‘ulama in Tehran. He rallied support, and telegrams were sent to other towns saying Muhammad ‘Ali Shah was no longer to be recognised as the sovereign of Iran or as a Muslim unless he kept his oath to the constitution.56 The Bakhtiyaris and Isfahan By the beginning of 1909, the then governor, Iqbal al-Daula, was taking a reactionary line, and consequently found himself in confrontation with the Anjuman. Therefore, at the request of the Anjuman, Aqa Najafi used his influence among

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the Bakhtiyari, to invite them to support the constitutionalists against the absolutist regime. He contacted the Bakhtiyari khans through one of them, Zargham al-Saltana. The Anjuman itself invited the Bakhtiyari through contact with another khan, Samsam al-Saltana, to enter Isfahan in the name of constitutionalism. After the Bakhtiyari leaders arrived in Isfahan, a meeting including Samsam al-Saltana, was held at house the house of Aqa Najafi on 6 January 1909.57 The Bakhtiyari gradually assumed control of Isfahan before marching to Tehran and taking over government there in July 1909. Nurallah was dismissed as President of the Anjuman-i Vilayati, and devoted himself to giving a course of lectures on law and doctrine.58 Haj Aqa Nurallah’s Islamist Vision as Expressed in the Treatise Muqim va Musafir At about this time Aqa Nurallah focused on setting out his vision in its complete form, and it appeared in the treatise Muqim va Musafir, written between January and July 1909, in a simple modern style, and published the same year.59 It took the form of a debate between the supporters of two different movements and visions at the time of the Constitutional Revolution. One of the interlocutors, Haji Muqim Tajir Kashi, had doubts about the constitutional order as he considered it to be insecure. There were also uncertainties in his mind as to whether mashruta conformed to the shari‘a. By contrast Aqa Mirza Mahdi Musafir (Mahdi being the original personal name of Aqa Nurallah) vigorously defended the constitutional order and argued the case for its being integrally bound to the shari‘a.60 In effect, Musafir represented Nurallah’s own view, and Muqim the opinion of those who doubted its validity, and thus to some extent reflected the arguments of Fazlallah Nuri. The debate between the two took place in the house of Mirza Hidayatallah, who appeared to represent a more neutral opinion, which was gradually won round to the view of Musafir. The treatise engaged firstly with the question of absolutism, and pointed out the disadvantages of government or control by one person, whether he be a sultan or a mujtahid, or a farrash (servant) or kadkhuda (village headman), because whatever he decided had to be carried out, legal or not.61 In using this terminology, Nurallah demonstrated that to him absolutism (and by the same token, constitutionalism) was a complete political and social system which permeated every level of society. Thus the whole of society was brutalised and corrupted by it, and it had only endured because it had been adequate in defending Muslims against outsiders.62 Nurallah then considered whether absolutism or constitutionalism was the best form of government. In a discussion on the nature of absolute monarchy (saltanat-i mutlaqa), he pointed out that the sovereign had to be obeyed whether his laws were in conformity with the shari‘a or not; by contrast, in constitutional government, the commands of the sultan had to be in conformity with the ‘book of God and the sunna of the Prophet’. A law passed against these had to be disregarded. Therefore, argued Nurallah, the Majlis had

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to be obeyed, but only as long as its laws were in accordance with the shari‘a. In other words he argued for mashruta-yi mashru‘a, seemingly for the same objective as Fazlallah Nuri. However, Nurallah was in no sense a supporter of Shaikh Fazlallah, whom he perceived, even in 1907, as being linked to Muhammad ‘Ali Shah, and the forces of absolutism. The difference between the two was that Nurallah perceived mashruta as being implicitly in conformity with the shari‘a, for which reason he did not use the expression mashruta-yi mashru‘a, whilst Fazlallah perceived it as being implicitly contrary to the shari‘a.63 As far as Nurallah was concerned (and other contemporary mujtahids64) constitutionalism was Islamic. He argued that constitutional government was not, as some said, foreign and imported from abroad, it was the same as the ba‘yat of the early days of Islam, and that it had been lost to Islam by unjust rulers.65 The current rulers, however, were weak and ineffectual and must therefore be replaced by a better system of government, in fact by Islamic government itself in the form of constitutionalism. Thinking along the lines of Al-Afghani, he stated that constitutionalism would bring the unity and justice which had been integral to Islam and its progress from the first. Nurallah never really understood Fazlallah’s most powerful point, that there would inevitably be a conflict between the Divine law and the man-made law of an elected assembly. He followed a style of argument pursued by a number of contemporary ‘ulama, notably ‘Abdallah Bihbihani, Mirza Muhammad Husain Na’ini and Mirza Abu’l Qasim Tabataba’i66 in attempting to divide what was essentially the shari‘a from the ‘urf law supposed to be in conformity with it. Thus he said that the Majlis passed two kinds of law: the first was basically the shari‘a, and could not be changed, as it represented a confirmation of rights; the second was really the alterable ‘urf law of government administrative affairs,67 which under the provisions of (Fazlallah’s) Article 2 of the constitution for a supervisory council of mujtahids, would be in conformity with the shari‘a in spirit. Like other proponents of this style of theory, Nurallah did not address the issue of where the one began and the other ended, or whether they were really compatible. In Muqim va Musafir, Musafir was challenged to explain further why some of the ‘ulama did not accept that constitutionalism was mashru‘a. He replied that it was because they did not comprehend that mashruta was in essence the shari‘a. He then went on to make a point that was novel and very radical. He argued that this did not mean that mashruta was absolutely always in conformity with the shari‘a, as it was simply not feasible.68 His view was that through mashruta, oppression was made less than through any other system. His pragmatism in this foreshadows that of Khomeini on the subject of conformity of legislation to the shari‘a in 1988.69 Nurallah was similarly radical on the question of obedience to the ruler. He argued that the shah must redress grievances, including those of infidels; he must be just and listen to the complaints of the oppressed, he must protect the country, and the milliyat, qaumiyyat and saltanat of the Shi‘a.70 If he carried out these

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responsibilities, he would be obeyed; on the other hand, if he failed to carry out his responsibilities and to govern according to the shari‘a, then he would not be obeyed.71 Thus in Shi‘i terms Nurallah argued obliquely for revolution where the shah was unjust. However, as to the freedom such revolution might bring, it was not to be liberty in the European sense of constitutionalism, but the right to be free except in the way that was required by the Qur’an and the Sunna.72 In some ways the most striking feature of Muqim and Musafir is its understanding of modern political organisation, and its vision of a modern state having that feature. Nurallah’s comprehension of modern institutions was not advanced, but his long involvement in the politics of Isfahan and his leadership of the Anjuman in Isfahan gave him an experience of practical politics and economic struggle which was lacking in Na’ini, a better-known and more juristically expert Islamic political theorist.73 One of the results was that he was more radical and activist in his views, whereas Na’ini had a more quietist approach. With regard to taxation, for example, he argued that being taken from the poor people, it should be spent to their benefit through the development and protection of the country’s trade, industry and communications.74 Further, the government should be accountable to the Majlis and the people for its expenditure of taxes, which should not just be spent at personal whim; they should be levied in a just and regular fashion, not randomly seized.75 He pointed out that the acceptance of a type of government such as mashruta would permit participation in international treaties, which would provide protection against foreign aggression.76 He questioned the idea that it was implicitly pious to forsake the world, and therefore somehow not Muslim to engage with wealth creation. He pointed out that the Prophet toiled for the wealth and prestige of Muslims, and therefore for their strength. Above all it was impossible to protect Islam as long as Muslims were poor, and therefore an effort had to be made to develop trade, industry and agriculture, and enterprise generally, and open up the country’s mineral resources.77 The country needed high employment and a full treasury. But perhaps his most remarkable argument for this period was his view (also held by the ‘ulama of Najaf), that as a modern state Iran must introduce modern military training. It was imperative, especially as Muslims elsewhere had fallen under foreign rule, for the Iranian Islamic state to have military might and the latest weaponry.78 His arguments reflect similar views among secular reforms of his period, but they also foreshadow the vision of a strong Islamic state in Khomeini’s Kashf al-asrar.79 Nurallah’s organisation of the levies who marched past him in Isfahan, as mentioned above, was evidently an attempt, within the constraints of limited resources, to develop the idea of military might. Thus the vision of Nurallah of an Islamic state reveals Islamism emerging at a stage between the ideas of Al-Afghani, and the view propounded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, which began to emerge in the 1930s, partly in response to influences from Europe. Nurallah sought a new, strong, revitalised political order, with a new-style executive, more efficient administration, modernisation of trade and industry, greater well-being for the people, its borders guarded by

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a strong army, its people inspired by a spirit of unity, based on Islam but fundamentally Iranian. Its government was not to be under the ‘ulama, or a faqih, it was to be an elected government of both clerics and pious laymen, in principle according to the shari‘a, and representing a political order perceived to have been established in the early days of Islam. Nurallah himself never aspired to power on the national stage, and remained in Isfahan where his family’s wealth and contacts in the bazaar gave him great influence, in particular among the lower social groups. In that sense he was a traditionalist, like Aqa Najafi, and represented an abiding feature in Iranian politics. He was also a product of the social structures of Isfahan, which gave such a wealthy, powerful and privileged position to the ‘ulama.

11 Bushehr commercial pragmatism and the growth of Islamic activism

Each of the regions under discussion in this book has its own distinct characteristics as compared to the others. The progress of the revolution in Bushehr, however, was particularly unusual in that it did not arouse a great deal of interest or many expectations in the great majority of its citizens. Bushehr, as previously indicated, was a trading community, dominated by merchants with pragmatic and practical commercial concerns. It existed in an atmosphere of comparative calm and order protected by the governor, the Darya Baigi, and by the British. The town also was economically and socially part of the Persian Gulf littoral of Iran, where numbers of the population were Arabs. In any case the Bushehri world view related more closely to that of the peoples of the Persian Gulf than to the remote central government in Tehran. In having such a strong local political view, Bushehr resembled Mashhad, also remote from the capital, with a political, social and economic sub-system of its own.1 Bushehr had a small band of dedicated reformers, mainly of the pious Muslim persuasion, and no ardent secularists such as to make their views heard. Though the reformers counted the editor of Muzaffari among their number, they did not make much impression on Bushehri politics as a whole. The election of the deputy from Bushehr to the Majlis did not take place until March 1908 after much pressure from the Majlis, and a record has yet to emerge of his participation in that institution. As a topic, Bushehr made a rare appearance in the debates of the Majlis in July 1907, when the Bushehris complained to it about the irregular levies of the road tax.2 The truth was that the Bushehris were apathetic on the subject of the Majlis. This attitude was partly due to a preference for spending time on their business concerns; it was also due to the fact that they did not take it seriously as an institution, and took a dim view of its likely prospects

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of success. They even tended towards mild amusement, producing Majlis jokes, such as the following (which followed the assassination of Amin al-Sultan): The Majlis has now taken the place of the Shah; hence the Shah has no money; but the Majlis pays the Prime Minister; hence the Shah murders the Prime Minister in order to take his place and draw his pay.3 As time passed, the Bushehris were also increasingly concerned at the Majlis’s failure to maintain order, which had a dire effect on their commercial interests. In fact, regarding their pragmatism, Percy Cox, the British Resident (Representative) in the Persian Gulf, drew attention to the sharp contrast in the attitude of the Bushehris to that of the Tabrizis on the subject of the constitutional movement.4 He also remarked that this contrast was in part due to the greater development in every respect of the north,5 which was socially and economically more advanced as an area, and open to the ideological influences of the West through its connection with the Caucasus and Russia beyond. The three major powers in Bushehr were the Darya Baigi, the governor of the Persian Gulf ports; the British Resident, who was responsible for all British interests in the Persian Gulf ports and was also the Consul General for Southern Iran; and the Customs Administration, led by Belgian officials, who were primarily answerable to the Ministry of Finance in Iran for the government’s most significant revenue, the customs dues. They were to a lesser extent also under the authority of the Darya Baigi. Of these three local powers, the Darya Baigi was the most significant in Iranian terms. The Iranian government took a close interest in the affairs of the Persian Gulf shore, to which it referred as a had (border). As such it was in defensive and strategic terms a very sensitive area, and their principal concern there was, of course, the British. The Iranian Government therefore provided the Darya Baigi with facilities, military and otherwise, that it did not confer, for example, on Shiraz, where the tendency seems to have been to let the local powers balance each other, and bring in troops whenever the situation was getting out of control. The Iranians realised that the stated British policy of non-intervention in Iran was related to discouragement of Russian intervention and expansion in the north. Thus the factor which was likely to lead to British intervention and possible extension of control was any disorder that threatened their strategic and commercial interests. Therefore, a major preoccupation of the Iranian government in the region was to prevent disorder. As a result, the main Persian Gulf ports, and Bushehr in particular, were usually kept quiet. As a flourishing port in the early twentieth century, Bushehr had a variety of consulates in addition to the British Residency, including Russian, French and German. The dominance of the British and the overall foreign presence provided experience of modern administrative practice, which meant that the government administrative culture of Bushehr and the organisation of its trading houses were in advance of other cities, except Tehran and Tabriz. The presence of the

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Directorate of the Customs Administration of Persian Gulf ports in the town further influenced the particular Bushehri work culture. It was also the cause of the most prominent local bone of contention: that the merchants resented the levies imposed on them, and particularly the fact that proceeds went straight to the impoverished coffers of Tehran, rather than being spent locally. They also resented the constant interference by the Customs Administration in their business affairs, and the directives they were obliged to observe. On-going disputes between all levels of society involved in trade, from the harbour porters to the major merchants, were the main feature of the urban politics of Bushehr. Provincial Government From the promulgation of the constitution on 1 January 1907, the Bushehris showed markedly more interest in the possibilities offered by new responsibilities for local government than for the Majlis itself. By contrast with Shiraz, this enthusiasm was quickly harnessed by the local governor, who both encouraged it and was careful to control it. Thus in early January 1907, a ‘local representative council’ met at Charburg (Government House), with the approval of the Darya Baigi. Its members were, as elsewhere, merchants and members of the ‘ulama, but contrary to government wishes, and unlike the councils in Tabriz and Shiraz, it did not include the guilds. It also suffered from the start from general apathy on the part of Bushehr’s trading community. The Armenian community, for example, were invited to choose a representative for it, but declined. The council’s brief was understood to be to hear petitions, and either suggest a solution or refer them on, for example to a shari‘a court. In this respect three cases soon came before it, of which two were referred on to a shari‘a court.6 In the absence of regulations, which did not appear in detail until June 1907, the council was not entirely clear as to its functions, and as in Shiraz was inclined to confuse a provincial council with a court of justice (‘adliyya). In the meantime, at the beginning of February 1907, this issue was addressed by the government, which informed all the provinces that from 21 March 1907 all existing arrangements of provincial government were to be replaced by a new system.7 This confusion over function led to a difference in view among the ‘ulama, some of who declined the governor’s invitation to participate in the new council on the grounds that it threatened to take business away from the shari‘a courts (which were in fact the subject of criticism in some quarters of Bushehr).8 Nevertheless, the selection of ‘ulama representatives proceeded, albeit slowly. Sadr al-Islam and the Imam Jum‘a, the respective clerical leaders of the Usuli and Akhbari sects in Bushehr, were popular candidates, but not eligible because of their age.9 ‘Alam al-Huda (the son of the Tehran constitutional mujtahid, ‘Abdallah Bihbihani) was eligible, but not popular.10 Once established, the new council was soon dealing with claims, and showed a better understanding of the nature of its responsibilities than its counterpart in Shiraz by proposing arrangements for sweeping and lighting the streets. It expected to meet the cost by a tax on the boatmen.

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Early in 1907 the provincial council, still meeting with the governor present, moved to the house of one of the most influential merchants in Bushehr, Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul. He was also the agent of the National Bank in Bushehr, and a representative of the merchants on the council. This move (and the evident preponderance of Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul) met with some opposition with placards posted round the town saying its proceedings were irregular, and ‘the people’ would not recognise it.11 The council therefore moved to the house of Sadr al-Islam for the time being. It was not long before a cabal formed against Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul, led by his rival merchant, Haji Sayyid Muhammad Riza, supported by the editor of Muzaffari, who was considered responsible for the circulation of placards against the former.12 Haji ‘Abd-al Rasul threatened to resign, and he and the mujtahid Sadr al-Islam considered going into bast. At a meeting of the council on 4 March 1907, the governor threatened to fine the kalantar if any more placards appeared. Eventually, the governor made peace between the warring factions (see further below).13 Provincial Council Elections On 15 March 1907 the governor of Bushehr issued a notice calling on landed proprietors and cultivators to choose their representatives for the local council. By this time six more members had been nominated by processes not clear, bringing the number up to 12 thus far. The council was also supposed to be responsible for electing the Majlis deputy for Bushehr,14 but was faced with the problem of lack of volunteers arising from lack of interest. Bickering continued, however, bringing the dispensation of justice to a standstill, much to the discontent of other Bushehris. The governor, who appears to have largely managed the proceedings, was forced to postpone meetings15 for a while, in order to sort out the problems. There was also an on-going difference of opinion as to the council’s functions with regard to the administration of justice, with the central government considering that this was not one of its responsibilities, though local expectation appears to have been that it was no use unless it dealt with grievances. By mid-April elections to the council were completed in a seemingly regular manner, and it now assembled with the following members.16 Clergy Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ali Sayyid Murtiza, brother of Sadr al-Islam Sayyid Muhammad Shafi‘ Sayyid Murtiza17 Advisers to Clergy The Imam Jum‘a and Sadr al-Islam

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Merchants Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul Sayyid Muhammad Riza Haji Mirza Ghulam Husain Kaziruni Haji Muhammad Hasan Burazjani Haj Muhammad Shafi‘ Landed Proprietors Haji Mahmud Haji Muhammad Ja‘far Haji Muhammad ‘Ali Dashti Guilds Mirza ‘Ali Kaziruni Haji Muhammad Taqi ‘Abd-al Riza Hakim (a doctor) It will be noted that there was a preponderance of merchants on the council, and the under-representation of the guilds accounts in part for local complaints about it, though at least their representatives were now allowed to be present. Meanwhile, the Majlis was demanding to know why the Bushehris had still not sent any representative to Tehran, and as a result Sayyid ‘Abd al-Riza Hakim was chosen to go. However, there were disagreements over his remuneration, and the fact that he was considered close to Mu‘in al-Tujjar,18 whose influence in Bushehr itself other Bushehris had successfully managed to curtail. A Local Militia: ‘the National Volunteers’ Meanwhile, as elsewhere, a perceived need emerged for a local volunteer force to defend Bushehr in case of attack. Forty guildsmen were to be drilled under the instructions of Nakhuda Ibrahim, the captain of the government ship, the Persepolis, using sticks instead of guns. They were to be entitled the National Volunteers.19 The British were told that this was for local purposes, and Cox remarked that it was not clear if there were any other purposes. The governor duly received the volunteers and gave them the title of ‘Mujahidin fi sabil allah’ (Those Who Fight in the Path of God). The movement was not universally popular in Bushehr, as anonymous leaflets (shabnama) appeared condemning the volunteers.20 It was also not popular in Tehran, whence the government sent a telegram of disapproval. 21 In April 1908, members of the Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya (Society for Unity) enrolled themselves for drills carried out by Shuja‘ al-Mamalik.22 Shortly afterwards they were joined by members of the Anjuman-i Safa, kitted out in grey uniforms made of shirting, and provided by Mirza Husain, the Munshi (secretary) of the German consulate.

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Otherwise, January 1907 brought the good news that a ban on the publication of the local newspaper, Muzaffari, had been lifted as a result of pressure from Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i in Tehran, and it was allowed to resume publication.23 Meanwhile, news of the death of Muzaffar al-Din Shah was received with rather more interest in Bushehr than Shiraz, perhaps because of his generous interest in the Muzaffari School, and all flags flew at half-mast. January also saw a change of governor, as the Darya Baigi left, having lost his post because of differences with the customs administration.24 He was replaced by Sa‘id al-Saltana, who appeared shortly afterwards. The National Bank The Bushehris may not have had much enthusiasm for the Majlis, but they did have an interest in supporting the National Bank, which, in Bushehr as elsewhere was seen as a means of advancing the prosperity, and therefore the independence, of the country. A supervising committee was elected, which was dominated by Haji Muhammad Riza Tajir Kaziruni. Prospective contributions to the National Bank were reported as totalling 25,000 tomans pledged by the Bushehris by early February 1907, though they had yet to be collected. At the end of February, Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul agreed to arrange collection of money pledged from the other Persian Gulf ports.25 Mu‘in al-Tujjar Mu‘in al-Tujjar, having as indicated lost his influence in Bushehr itself, was asserting it elsewhere. Now deputy president of the Majlis, he was also one of those who resisted most strongly the idea of a moderate-sized government loan from Britain and Russia. Following an argument with Mukhbir al-Saltana about the shortage of time needed to raise money, given the financial crisis, he became one of the founder members of the National Bank along with other leading merchants and notables. Also a representative designated to receive contributions, he urged those who had promised financial support to come forward and donate.26 He was to pursue its interests diligently, although it did not come to successful fruition in this period. Now part of the central government, he began advancing the interests of Tehran against the Bushehr customs administration by asking for a complete list of arms and ammunition, as well as other contraband items it had seized, for submission to the Majlis.27 Haji Abd al-Rasul and Sayyid Muhammad Riza demonstrated local loyalty by declining to provide it. Mu‘in nevertheless pursued his strategy of having persons loyal to his interests elected in the new institutions. In December 1907 he suggested the name of a Mirza Aqa Javad, who lived in Tehran and had nothing to do with Bushehr affairs, as a representative to the Majlis for the guilds of Bushehr, though without success. He had already had one of his munshis (secretaries) chosen for Mohammareh, and was evidently attempting to build up a faction

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supposedly representing Persian Gulf matters, but also attending to his own interests in the Majlis.28 Mu‘in continued to be very active in his interests in other Persian Gulf ports and areas. For example, he held the concession for the mining rights of a substantial red oxide mine in Hormuz. His partners in developing it were a British firm named Strick and Co.29 A German syndicate, viewed with suspicion by the British, not least for its nationality, was trying to obtain control of the business, so Mu‘in was in the position to drive a hard bargain with them over future collaboration. Not only was his price high, he was also demanding that they take more red oxide than they needed. The British were thus in a quandary, a point not lost on Mu‘in. On the one hand he was in a very powerful position in Tehran. On the other they did not, as they put it, want another Morocco (where the Germans had interfered in the crisis of 1905–1906). As a result Mu‘in got his way. Other Iranian opinion took a poor view of the claims of all parties: the newspaper Nida-yi Vatan of Tehran published an article on the subject on 16 December 1907, which opined that it was mortifying to see: the three parties – Arabs, Germans and British – fighting over the recognised property of Iran, while the owner of that property pays absolutely no attention to the fact.30 However, the negotiations over the Hormuz oxide proceeded at a slow pace, and the matter was still unresolved in July 1908.31 The Sa‘adat (Muzaffari) School The Sa‘adat School appears to have progressed successfully despite the adverse economic situation. On 26 April 1907 celebrations were held at the school to mark the Shah’s birthday. Two hundred and ten students assembled at Government House, along with local dignitaries, and satisfactory contributions were raised form the governor and his staff, various merchants, and others such as the First Secretary of the Imperial Bank.32 By November 1907, student numbers had risen to 230–40, and donations continued to come in, with support in particular from the Darya Baigi.33 The students also played a part in the ceremony to mark the opening of the provincial council in November 1907, one of them giving a special oration. Afterwards Muzaffari published the text as an article on how the council was the protector of the laws, of equality, and the means of the abiding justice, as well as the guardian of rights. It was also the preventer of sedition and of unlawful innovation (bid‘at),34 a mixture of ideals which demonstrates both the modern and traditional character of their curriculum. In February 1908, an attempt was made to resolve a problem that was peculiar to Bushehr. The khans of the surrounding area, the Dashti and the Dashtistan, wished to send their children to the Sa‘adat School.35 However, they were afraid that if a problem arose between them and the government of Bushehr,

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the latter might harass their children studying at the school. They contacted the head teacher of the school, Shaikh Muhammad Husain, about this matter, and asked for reassurance. As a result, the school raised the issue with the governor. He in turn referred it to the Minister of Education in Tehran, San‘i al-Daula, who arranged for a royal farman (command) to be issued on 3 Shavval 1325/9 November 1907 totally forbidding any mistreatment of the children. The Muzaffari Newspaper The editor of the Muzaffari newspaper, Mirza ‘Ali Shirazi, was a courageous combatant in the cause of the Majlis and constitutionalism, which he personally saw as advancing the interests of the country, strengthening it against foreigners, and modernising and reforming it. Beyond that he was not secularist, but seems to have implicitly believed that since Iran was an Islamic country, the institution was a sacred Islamic majlis. He wrote a long article in March 1907 in which he gave his perception of the reform movement, and no doubt reflected the view of some quarters in Bushehr.36 It was, however, received with more interest in Shiraz, where it was read out to the large membership of the Anjuman-i Islami. Entitled ‘The Refutation of Those Who Oppose Just Rule [saltanat-i ‘adila] and National Consultation [Majlis]’, in essence it advanced the longstanding view that independence, legal reform, and just government were independently linked, but reflected Mirza ‘Ali’s particular Islamic view of the issue, also evident in other articles in his newspaper. According to the article, respect for government was based on law, and the sultan of a country without law had no honour: in other words only a ruler who upheld the law was deserving of respect, and by implication was legitimate. He then announced that, ‘we the fida’iyan of the holy homeland [vatan] aim to ensure that there is no foreign domination of our country. We do not want Edward or Nicholai, we want Muhammad ‘Ali Shah’. He then drew upon an argument which is essentially Islamic by saying that the wise people, men of the government, ‘ulama and (orthodox) philosophers had to guide people in their duty so as to unite people and government. He emphasised the Islamic principle of consultation, and gave ultimate authority to the Majlis, whose decisions the government had to implement. However, Mirza ‘Ali’s regular disagreements with the authorities also arose to some extent from his combative style. His circulation of placards denouncing Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul led to his being summoned before the principal mujtahid, Sadr al-Islam, accused of printing lies, and struck for giving evasive answers to questions. The governor went further and imprisoned him for his pains, and suspended his paper.37 Mirza ‘Ali wrote to the Majlis complaining against his jail sentence, and the Ministry of the Interior ordered his release and the reopening of his newspaper.38 However, it took two attempts because of the opposition of Sadr al-Islam, who tore up one telegram from the Majlis. Finally, the governor ordered the release of Mirza ‘Ali (whilst making apologies to Sadr al-Islam).39 The chief feature of this incident, apart from the mistreatment of Mirza ‘Ali, was

Figure 11 Muzaffari newspaper of Bushehr, Year 1 No. 1.

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that it does not appear to have involved serious ideological or class differences, but was rather the product of a struggle between different cabals for influence in Bushehr. Muzaffari began to appear again at the beginning of June. The editor took a slightly more positive attitude to the authorities in Bushehr by noting that the town was quiet by contrast to just about everywhere else in Iran.40 He also offered an apology of sorts for taking little interest in the politics of Bushehr (by contrast with his native Shiraz), and excused himself by saying (with some justification) that no representatives for Bushehr had been sent to Tehran, and no properly constituted local council had been set up. He realised that the neglect of local affairs on the part of Muzaffari had contributed to the undermining of the notables (a‘yan) by troublemakers. He had therefore participated in the establishment of a new society, Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya (Unity), which it was hoped would lead to greater co-operation.41 The Provincial Council The newly constituted provincial assembly began its debates in late April. One member proposed that Iranians be warned against taking service with foreigners. This proposal was voted out by both other members and the governor, who was still attending.42 At a meeting on 5 May 1907 attended by five ‘ulama and five merchants, and himself, the governor announced that he had been instructed not to attend in future as he must not interfere. This news, however, received no comment, and he continued to attend from a perceived need to control the disputes. By May, Bushehr politics was becoming more polarised. Two groups emerged: one was led by Sadr al-Islam, and another by the radical cleric Sayyid Murtiza Ahrumi, the latter of whom was ordered to leave the council by the governor.43 Anonymous placards appeared in the coffee houses abusing both sides, and making sarcastic remarks about the ‘ulama. Sayyid Ahrumi, who claimed to be one of the consistent supporters of liberty in Bushehr, attempted to prevent the guilds’ representatives attending, which resulted in a meeting at the house of Sadr al-Islam on 9 May. It was attended in force by the boatmen and their captains (nakhudas), who, being threatened with taxes to fund amenities by the local administration, vowed to support the new council. They also vowed to go on strike unless they were allowed to attend it.44 Their threat evidently carried weight, in addition to concerns that the people were attending the council without being properly elected, so new elections to the local council were ordered. However, on the appointed day only a few people appeared. Therefore no elections were held.45 Subsequently the merchants re-elected three members, Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul, Sayyid Muhammad Riza and Haji Muhammad Shafi‘, and these were accepted by the government. Local apathy was further demonstrated by failure to take an interest in a proposed commercial conference organised by the governor, and for a while the council barely existed.46

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The Abolition of Tuyul (Land Holding by Traditional Right) At the beginning of June 1907, the governor of Bushehr received a telegram from Tehran saying the Majlis had abolished all tuyul (a traditional type of land holding).47 Feeling that he would be unable to enforce this order, he resigned from the subsidiary governorships of the largely tribal areas of Dashti and Dashtistan. The British commented on the problems relating to this kind of well-intentioned measure, saying that, especially in the remoter areas, it weakened the prestige of the central government, and therefore the only remaining centralising force in the country. The Struggle over Mashruta-yi Mashru‘a in Tehran: Summer 1907 The events which took Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri into sanctuary in Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim in protest against the Supplementary Fundamental Law began to have repercussions in Bushehr from mid-July 1907. In early July 1907 the Majlis telegrammed the ‘ulama of Bushehr (as elsewhere) concerning Shaikh Fazlallah, his opposition to and his ‘self-interested’ motives in opposing, the constitutional movement, which other ‘ulama had hoped he would join.48 On 25 July 1907 Muzaffari published an article saying the leading conservative mujtahid of the ‘Atabat, Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Yazdi, mistakenly deceived by the malicious, had accused the constitutionalists of infidelity, and had called the good men of Islam accursed.49 In fact, as Ahmadi has shown from scrutiny of a draft document of the Supplementary Fundamental Law with comments in the margin by Sayyid Kazim Yazdi, he was not against constitutionalism providing it was subject to certain conditions. For example, he accepted that the teaching of knowledge and technology should be carried out freely, except where it was contrary to the shari‘a.50 With regard to freedom of the press, he considered that it and other texts should be free in expression except for content that might be defamatory to Islam. On the legislative power, he considered that, in accordance with the Supplementary Fundamental Law, it should be based on the power arising from the monarch, the senate and the Majlis with regard to the enactment of ‘urf law. Judicial power, which is to say the determining of rights, should belong to the shari’a courts in religious matters, and to the ‘urf courts in non-shari‘a matters. On the question of the compatibility of shari‘a and constitutional law, he said that as long as an action was not forbidden and its forsaking was not obligatory, following it was permissible, especially in the case of protecting the rights of the people.51 In other words, though Sayyid Muhammad Kazim was not an ardent supporter of constitutionalism like his fellow mujtahids in the ‘Atabat, Khurasani and Mazandarani, he was not rigidly opposed to it like Fazlallah Nuri. In fact, in October 1907 he reportedly denied that he was opposed to the Majlis and recommended it in accordance with the view of other ‘ulama.52 The editor of Muzaffari was summoned before the governor for his remarkable valour in July, and asked to provide the names of his correspondents in the ‘Atabat

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who had sent him the information published. On his refusing, he was beaten, his house put under guard, and his press closed down pending orders from Tehran.53 Muzaffari was closed for two months, and on reopening announced that the most important news in the Persian Gulf for the past two months had been the closure of Muzaffari.54 Local Amenities The subject of local amenities was addressed from the beginning by the Bushehr council, but notably intermittently. The need for sweeping and lighting was considered in February 1907, and a meeting was held in late June 1907 to discuss the supply of drinking water.55 Nothing further was heard of these issues, and indeed little reported until January 1908, when the governor asked the Anjuman-i Tijarat (Mercantile Society) to attend to the cleaning of the streets and the taxing of the donkey drivers.56 The request is indicative of the local government’s problems in trying to carry out its duties and improve the town in the absence of adequate funding. The local governor later made an attempt to oblige the council to take charge of the lighting of the town.57 New Provincial and District Council Elections In June 1907, Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul received the Provincial and District Council Regulations from Tehran, and announced there would be new elections to the Bushehr council and that he would run for president again.58 A meeting was held at Government House to arrange new elections of the representatives to the council.59 They were to take place under a supervisory committee. Meanwhile, a class element was becoming more prominent in the politics of Bushehr. Anonymous leaflets were being circulated criticising local notables and merchants, and saying they were trying to postpone setting up a proper local council.60 On 5 July, the guilds met to elect their representative on the supervisory committee. The drapers, grocers and petty traders (khurda-furush) in particular chose Mirza ‘Ali Kaziruni unanimously, which drew a protest from the prominent merchant, Sayyid Muhammad Riza, who said one person could not represent more than one guild.61 In late July, the governor announced the names of those to supervise the local council elections as being Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul Hafiz al-Sihha, Sayyid Muhammad Riza Kaziruni, Haji Muhammad Shafi‘, Haji Muhammad ‘Ali Dashti, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Riza and Mirza ‘Ali Kaziruni.62 All six appear on the original list of council members above. At the same time, Sa‘id al-Saltana announced his resignation, and that he would be succeeded by the Darya Baigi, the previous governor. He left Bushehr on 28 July 1907. Unlike Darya Baigi he had little experience of Bushehr, and appears not to have been able to manage the disputes of the local factions, so order in the town had deteriorated in recent weeks. However, Bushehr was a haven of security as compared with Shiraz.

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In late July 1907 an informal meeting of the merchants of Bushehr agreed to work to co-operate amicably towards the firm establishment of the provincial council. This was the same Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya, to which the editor of Muzaffari already belonged. It now set about making a serious attempt to organise the elections for the council in a systematic fashion, which demonstrates the influence of Western bureaucratic practice in the town. Voting papers for completion of personal details were distributed to all applicants who fulfilled the conditions laid down by the Provincial Council regulations, and to be returned for scrutiny by 21 August. However, a serious dispute arose in mid-August which brought out latent hostility on the part of the ‘ulama to the council, arising from fear of loss of political influence and also that it would threaten their judicial monopoly, and thus their status and income. Sadr al-Islam wrote a letter to the supervisors of the elections warning them that they were acting unlawfully in holding elections before the new governor arrived.63 He made it clear that the ‘ulama would not permit the council to sit when elected. The supervising committee therefore put up placards in the coffee shops addressed to fellow Muslims. These notices announced that they had done their best to establish the council in co-operation with the ‘ulama, but had failed, and feared there would be serious disturbances if they pursued the matter any further. Although the supervising committee had no secularising intentions, this was the first open confrontation between ‘ulama and laity in Bushehr, and foreshadowed the struggle in Tehran over judicial reform in 1910 which led up to the assassination of Bihbihani.64 Voting cards were issued in September, but counting was delayed as a result of a further dispute between Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul and the other supervisors of the election. As one of only occasional signs of an undercurrent of radicalism in Bushehr, a certain section of public opinion was demanding that the guilds should be elected by all the inhabitants (that is, universal suffrage) and not just by the guilds members. This suggestion was rejected by the central government on the grounds that it would be ‘harmful’ in the present situation. This point is not explained but overall the reason was that it would probably further weaken declining central control. However, despite this sign of enthusiasm, an additional problem was that very few voting forms were filled up.65 A further complication arose when the Majlis telegrammed to say the provincial council should have six members (presumably meaning from Bushehr), not 12. According to an addition to the electoral law, the remaining members were supposed to come from the Persian Gulf ports. The Bushehris seemed to have ignored this by tacit agreement, and the other ports had aspirations for councils of their own. The elections finally took place between 10 and 14 November 1907. The six members were: Aqa Mirza ‘Ali Kaziruni as representative of the guilds; Sayyid Muhammad Riza Tajir Kaziruni for the notables; Aqa Shaikh Nasir Khan for the landowners; Haji ‘Abd al-Riza Haji Muhammad for the seamen, people of the sea and storehouse owners (a special category as Bushehr was a port); ‘Abd al-Rasul Ra’is al Tujjar for the merchants; and Aqa Shaikh ‘Ali Mujtahid Dashti for the

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‘ulama.66 It may firstly be noted that most of these had supported the council from the beginning. It may further be said that there was not much competition, at least partly due to lack of enthusiasm, and some members only accepted their new responsibility with reluctance. The new (and former) governor, the Darya Baigi, had arrived in Bushehr on 23 August 1907, with an appointed mission to submit revenue from the Persian Gulf ports, and to make the necessary arrangements for deputies to go to Tehran.67 The Darya Baigi had much more experience of the politics of Bushehr than his predecessor, which he was to deploy to advantage over the months to come. News of the assassination of Amin al-Sultan on 31 August 1907 was received in Bushehr without incident.68 The Election of a Majlis Deputy for Bushehr Bushehr was unusually slow for a large town to elect its deputy to the Majlis. An attempt in February by Mu‘in al-Tujjar to have his son elected was firmly rejected, as he was under age.69 By May 1907, Tehran was growing increasingly restive at the non-appearance of a deputy from Bushehr, despite repeated reminders, and Muzaffari also criticised the town in this respect. Their protestations appear to have had no effect, as the matter received little attention until the meeting of the local council on 8 January 1908, when a more sustained initiative followed. A long discussion on 31 January led ultimately to the public announcement in mid-February of the formation of a supervisory committee for the election of a deputy to the Majlis representing Bushehr and its province. The arrangements for voting were set out in detail, including the collection of a form demonstrating the requisite qualifications to be completed and returned at a specified time and place.70 The elections finally took place in stages in February and March 1908, after further remonstrations from Tehran. The following persons were elected by early March 1908: for the guilds, Mirza ‘Ali Tajir Kaziruni (who had consistently represented their interests); for the merchants, Aqa Sayyid ‘Abd al-Riza Hafiz al-Sihha (also known as Hakim), who also was to represent the ‘ulama; and for the notables, Shaikh ‘Abd al-Karim. The landowners and seamen had not yet elected their representatives, but were expected to finalise soon.71 As yet no mention has come to light of anyone finally being chosen to go as the deputy for Bushehr to Tehran. It may be noted that the Bushehr election process took place over a year after that of Tabriz. However, it must be said that the full complement of deputies to the First Majlis had not arrived by the time it was closed.72 The Provincial Council: Formal Establishment and Debates, November 1907 to June 1908 To organise the opening of the council, the Darya Baigi set up a meeting, at which members were to swear on the Qur’an to give service to the country.73 A suitable and convenient place was found in the centre of town. On 21 November

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1907 the council finally opened, in a splendid ceremony that was attended by all the dignitaries of Bushehr, including the governor and state officials in full formal dress, and as well as the flag flying, a blast of cannon fire and illuminations. The people crowded round the building on the roofs and in the alleyways, and a poem was recited to celebrate the event. The occasion was also marked by a speech of appreciation by Sadr al-‘Islam (who had arrived to much fanfare, after the governor).74 The council had its inaugural meeting on 24 November 1907,75 with an opening speech by the Darya Baigi. He advised the members that their duties were significant so there was no need to focus on petty matters (probably an enjoinment to refrain from personal squabbles), and that they must act in accordance with the regulations. At the next meeting on 26 November (attended by four persons) the provincial council regulations were read out, and it was noted that the council had the right to supervise all the affairs of the local government.76 It was therefore decided that the council should receive a list of government revenues from both the government office and the local customs administration. The council should also supervise the management of the grain stores and the arsenal, and ensure that the soldiers had their wages, adequate provisions, proper uniforms and garrisons in good repair. It was noted that the governor himself had recently added to the government grant for new uniforms. He arrived during the discussion and indicated he should sit apart from the elected members. He agreed to the provide accounts for the local government administration, but said it would have to await the return of the mustaufi (in effect the local government accountant) from Bander Abbas. The council then discussed the problem of who paid for its own expenses, which according to British sources, amounted to 144 tomans for rent and 150 tomans for service. An offer to divide the cost between the two leading merchants, Haj ‘Abd al-Rasul, and Muhammad Riza Sahib Tajir Kaziruni (presumably the Sayyid Muhammad Riza mentioned in the first list of participants in local council matters set out above) was accepted.77 Subsequently, problems arose over payment of the deputies for their time. Shaikh ‘Ali, the representative of the ‘ulama resigned, saying he had insufficient funds to maintain himself, and had not received the remuneration promised at his election. The governor gave him 100 krans and asked him to withdraw his resignation. A Shaikh Nasir Khan Chakuta’i, who had evidently been more recently elected to represent the cultivators, also resigned.78 By the end of November, the council was attending at every meeting to one of its functions of hearing complaints, and discussed whether it had the responsibility to deal with the many minor matters. It agreed it had to look at them and then to decide what to refer to the shari‘a courts and what to address to the local administration.79 At the next meeting, the main topic of concern was the scarcity of grain, which was partly due to a drought in India, and consequent demand from there. The price of bread was going up in Bushehr, causing anxiety. This led to the banning by the central government in January of the export of grain.80 By the end of December 1907 Muzaffari noted with approval that the council was gaining prestige, and whereas Bushehr had been behind other provinces in

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establishing a council, it was now viewed with growing respect.81 By January 1908, still with four members present, the council had acquired the practice of taking minutes, which were read out at the beginning of the session.82 The council also heard a variety of complaints, which it resolved with greater or (more likely) lesser success, given the financial implications. Some were referred to the local government administration, and some to the shari‘a courts. In February 1908, for example, it addressed the grievances of the muleteers, who complained about illegal and extortionate levies on the roads.83 A dispute between the harbour porters and the head porter of the customs was dealt with by the reassurance of the deputy governor in April 1908, and three people came in from Shamil ‘Abbasi, in the countryside, to complain of oppression by their kalantar and the local government.84 By May 1908 the council, impeded by lack of money, lost its most influential and leading founder members, Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul and Haji Sayyid Muhammad Riza.85 Replacements were elected shortly afterwards. In addition, and despite an order from the Majlis to the contrary, the council, with the governor present, celebrated the Shah’s birthday by holding a reception at which the Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya provided the guard of honour.86 It is difficult to say whether or not this was because the Shah still represented some possibility for security and stability in the country. The council also tried to assert its authority over the burgeoning number of local societies. It notified several of them that they had no official standing and should therefore desist from communicating directly with the central government. The societies ignored this demand, and the governor tried to calm the dispute by suggesting they communicate with him.87 The Attempted Coup of December 1907 in Tehran With news of the attempted coup of December 1907 against the Majlis by the Shah, in alliance with Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, came a telegram from Muhammad Tabataba’i, ‘Abdallah Bihbihani and the Imam Jum‘a of Tehran declaring that they and the deputies had withstood the attack against the nation’s interests and asking all patriotic Iranians to do the same.88 A meeting of the council was called immediately, with good attendance, and a telegram of unanimous support was sent to Tehran. A further telegram from Tabriz announced that the Shah had violated his oath to the nation, and was no longer fit to occupy the throne of Islam. The Majlis, it said, should act accordingly. Messages also went from Bushehr to Shiraz accusing the Shirazis of giving advantages to the reactionaries by allowing the town to continue in a state of uproar. Otherwise Bushehr remained calm. Some of the leading merchants, however, were beginning to express great dissatisfaction with constitutionalism, from which so much had been hoped. Not only did their businesses suffer from disorder, but they also resented a form of government which encouraged others to lampoon them. In any case, no partisan of Shaikh Fazlallah’s arguments for Islam protected by reform within the absolutist system emerged in Bushehr.

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The Formation of New Anjumans in Bushehr As elsewhere, the people of Bushehr began noticeably to organise into societies around the beginning of 1908. About 30 local merchants of medium standing formed an Anjuman-i Tijarat, or mercantile council, with the aim of advancing the country’s trade, in January 1908.89 It dealt with small trading issues, such as the period merchandise could remain in the customs house without rent becoming due.90 In March 1908 differences emerged between the lesser merchants of this society and the leading merchants who dominated the council. Some of these latter informed the Ministry of Commerce that they had no connection with the Anjuman, which, they wished to make plain, they considered to be ‘composed of common people’.91 In a radical new development, it was reported that non-local members of a secret society in Tehran had arrived in Bushehr and were encouraging some of the guilds to form a society of unknown intentions. Placards appeared saying a secret society intended to remove tyranny.92 An Anjuman-i Safa, formed in December 1907, complained that the expenses incurred on the government gunboat Persepolis, and customs revenues on ships were excessive. It sent several letters to the council urging the need for a statement of revenue and expenditure from the customs and the government departments. It also sought to remove the necessity of employing foreigners in Iran, and asked permission from the council to set up a tannery.93 Its last request was encouraged, and by May 1908 it had floated a company to open a tannery with a capital of 5,000 tomans.94 The Anjuman-i Safa also took up the cause of the soldiers in Bushehr, who as usual had not received their salaries and were being otherwise mistreated.95 It complained to the council that Haidar, one of the soldiers, had written a letter to it some time ago on the subject, and asked the council to investigate. Meanwhile, he was so frightened by his predicament that he had disappeared, and was afraid to hand in his petition. ‘He is a member of the people of Iran, and of the Anjuman-i Safa’, said the Anjuman, ‘and we want to find out about him.’ The incident demonstrates the considerable courage it required for an ordinary person to raise his concerns in Bushehr even in the new constitutional era. The discontented soldiers continued their protest by taking bast as a group in the council building itself. They finally received their pay, and left the local council building at the end of March.96 The Anjuman-i Safa also showed an interest in law and order by asking the governor to form a regular police force, or else permit them to apply to the council on the subject.97 Meanwhile, the already-established Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya was preparing to set up factories for the manufacture of tiles and soap.98 A new society of ‘ulama called the Anjuman-i Shaukat al-Islam (the Society for the Glory of Islam) was established in February 1908, and agreed to meet four days a week.99 Its principal purpose seems to have been to control the attestation of documents to the advantage of members.100 It was probably also a collaborative response to the growing involvement of the state in legal matters. It soon began asserting its influence on local government, by demanding that Islamic principles be applied in the market

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place (hisbah). It ordered the kalantar to examine the weights used in the bazaar, and report persons using false weights.101 The Islamic View in Bushehr Whilst many if not most of the Bushehris who supported the Majlis simply saw it as an Islamic institution, in accordance with the religion of Iran, there was a more theoretical and ardent view represented by Sayyid Murtiza Ahrumi. In July 1907 he wrote a treatise entitled Ihya’ al-Milla (The Revival of the Nation), which was published over several editions of Muzaffari at that time.102 He argued that, whereas previous governments had been in the hands of one person, namely the monarch, and were therefore absolutist, the Majlis, by contrast, was in the capable hands of the people. These were defined as those who were pious, scholarly and intellectual, and possessed of futuvvat (manliness, generosity), as well as honesty and sagacity, and appear to have been personified in Ahrumi’s view by the ‘ulama, sayyids and tullab, who had become martyrs in the cause of the Majlis.103 He hoped the intention of the courageous leaders of the sacred Majlis would be to stand up to the apostasy of the times (meaning the secularists), a necessary endeavour, given that in Ahrumi’s view many were forsaking the religion of Islam. In due course the Majlis would overcome the apostates and its victory would herald the arrival of the Imam of the Age, and government would pass into his hands.104 To substantiate his point, Ahrumi reported a saying ‘in some books’ that a people would appear from the East (meaning east of Arabia), who would prepare the means for the khilafat and saltanat for the Imam of the Age, and asserted that these people from the East could only be ‘from the provinces of Iran’.105 He was at pains to demonstrate how calling this Majlis dar al-shura (place of consultation) might appear an innovation, but was in fact advocated in the Qur’an in the principle of shura,106 and was therefore a principle of Islam. The Council and the Question of the Accountability of Other Local Government Bodies In early 1908 problems came to the fore over accountability of the government and the management of the customs in Bushehr. These were in part the product of the Provincial Council Regulations, which enjoined the provincial and district councils to seek accountability on the part of the local government administration, without being clear as to how this should be done; or being precise as to the nature of the authority and responsibility in financial and taxation matters of each of the local bodies involved. The essential problem related to central control, and the areas of authority of the Majlis and the Ministries of the Interior and of Finance, which were not clearly delineated. The governor and local administration, and the customs, were said to be responsible to these two ministries. The status of the council with regard to the central authorities was unclear.

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By contrast with Mashhad,107 where friction between the local council and the government administration made some impact on the authority of the governor, in Bushehr the council had little success in curtailing the powers of either the governor or the customs administration. A difference of views emerged in early 1908 when the head of the customs complained of interference by the council in its affairs to the Minister of the Interior, who informed the governor that the local councils should on no account interfere with the customs.108 The view of the council was that it came under the Majlis, not the Ministry of the Interior, and it accordingly sent a telegram to that body to clarify the point.109 The argument continued into early March, when the central government, mindful of its need for revenues, came down decidedly in favour of central control over the customs. A telegram from the Prime Minister advised the council that it had no right to interfere with the customs unless instructed to do so by the Majlis.110 The council nevertheless pursued the matter, particularly as the Bushehris as a whole were so concerned that they were threatening to riot.111 This issue of the customs, of course, raised questions both of foreign involvement in the administration, and implicitly of local or central entitlement to control the budget. Another complication also began to emerge when the people of Bander Abbas, on being informed that they should send representatives to the Bushehr council, responded that Bander Abbas, being a place of consequence, should have a council of its own.112 In effect, that would have represented further fragmentation at this stage of control of the centre over the provinces. Disillusionment with the Majlis and the Implications of Growing Disorder As has been indicated, the Bushehris as a whole never regarded the constitutional movement with much enthusiasm. By the end of February 1908, there was a growing feeling that in view of the chronically disturbed state of the country, there was no hope of stability from constitutional government. The attitude by many to both Majlis and shari‘a concerns was one of deep indifference. All most Bushehris desired was security on the roads, and an ability on the part of local officials to keep order, so that they could carry on their trade.113 More ominously, the British were becoming increasingly restive about the state of the country. In March 1908 Percy Cox wrote a letter of great significance to Charles Marling, the British Representative in Tehran, about the uncertain future of central government control in Iran. In it he in effect proposed the first major change in British policy since the end of the second Herat War in 1857, and a movement away from their longstanding policy of non-intervention. Pointing out that the situation was so bad that at one period they could not send anything through to Shiraz for a month, Cox went on to say that he intended to make plain his concerns about, ‘the guarding of communications and taking extra measures for the protection of our interests in the Gulf and in our sphere’. He added that he would have to:

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bring home to our people the absolutely parlous situation, greatly to the prejudice of our interests and prestige among the peoples of the Gulf, which has resulted from two years of flux and chaos in Teheran and 3 or 4 years of vile misgovernment in Shiraz and Fars. At Teheran, where the Majlis has naturally loomed large and its wrestle with the reactionary party occupies the centre of the stage, it is impossible for you to realise what is going on in the wings, down here. He continued: All we can see is the purely destructive and demoralising effect of the movement on the trade and administration of the South. Apart from the communications, what we need if the present anarchical condition of things is going to endure is decentralisation and more of H.M.’s warships, and the discretion to use these. He went on to say that where incidents arose in any of the Persian Gulf ports at present, they could be easily settled if either the governor had the means to take the necessary action, or if the British themselves had the right to send a ship of their own accord. The solution, he intimated, was for the British to have a vessel ready, and the Resident have unrestricted powers to send it.114 In a further letter in June, Cox lamented at what he perceived as a lack of positive results from the constitutional movement. In particular he complained at the way the authority of the local governor had been undermined partly by lack of funds, and partly by impediments placed on any attempts to exert his authority effectively. If he did so, some individual with a private grudge or an axe to grind or one of the numerous societies which have sprung up forthwith despatches a telegram to the Parliament or inspires a scurrilous article in the press. … Derya Begi in Bushire … who on the whole has proved the most effective and conciliatory Governor we have had, has repeatedly of late expressed his exasperation at the humiliating position to which he has been reduced, and the impossibility of exercising effective authority.115 The Impact in Bushehr of the Struggle for Power in Tehran in June 1908 On 10 June 1908 the governor received a circular telegram from the Shah explaining that he wished to be a constitutional monarch, but disturbances were being caused by troublemakers with revolutionary ideas. He therefore gave the governor all powers necessary to deal with those who broke the peace.116 At the same time a telegram from Shiraz conveyed strong criticism of the Shah, and suggested that the constitution be used to elect a new monarch. The result was agitation in Bushehr organised, among others, by Mirza ‘Ali Kaziruni (the

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longstanding representative of the interests of the guilds) and the radical cleric, Sayyid Murtiza Ahrumi. The council premises were occupied and the bazaaris prevailed upon to close their shops. On 18 June the Darya Baigi went to see the agitators and advised them that their action would not help Tehran, and that instead it would be more useful to collect and send money there.117 In the meantime, the editor of Muzaffari published an article on a recent bomb incident in India, and recommended it to his readers as the way forward for Iranians, much to the ire of the British. A telegram from the Shah to the ‘ulama advised them that there were evilly disposed persons in the Majlis who had to be eliminated. On 23 June 1908 the Shah ordered the bombardment of the Majlis. Detailed news of the coup seems to have reached Bushehr by 25 June, at which point the governor summoned members of the local council, and told them he had orders to dissolve it.118 The news was received without demur by all members except Mirza ‘Ali Kaziruni, who objected, but was overruled. The bazaar, which had been closed since 14 June, opened on 25 June. Thereafter the town was quiet. The news of the bombardment and arrests in Tehran were on the whole received without much concern, though with the hope that taxes would not be unduly raised. The various societies quietly dissolved at the request of the governor, but a few young enthusiasts continued to express support of the Majlis. The editor of Muzaffari left for Bombay on 29 June.119

Conclusion

This study has sought to demonstrate the role of the wider public and their opinion at the time of the Revolution of 1906. Their participation in the Revolution and their objectives varied from province to province, as did the major concerns of debate. During the period of the First Majlis, religion and secularism were a major issue of contention outside the capital only in Tabriz. Its geographical location near to Russia, and open to the revolutionary movements there, meant that the presence of Iranians who had been working in the Caucasus, and of Caucasian revolutionaries themselves, led to an activist secular presence. In Tabriz, however, as elsewhere, it was still difficult to express openly secular arguments, though much is implicit in the socialist-inclined press and some of the debates in the Anjuman. Elsewhere, secularism hardly appeared, but for different reasons. In Isfahan, the dominance of powerful and zealous clergy was too daunting, especially in the face of the insecurity caused by the determined initiatives of both commercial and religious-minded Europeans. Nevertheless, modernism, as opposed to secularism, was present in the emerging Islamist movement. In Shiraz, there were hints of a secular perspective, particularly among the bureaucrats of the government administration in the 1890s, but the politics of the city were subsumed by the elite power struggle. In Bushehr, the intimidating factor was public indifference to ideological debate, especially if it might lead to disorderly controversies that disturbed trade. The general trend of lack of engagement with the issue of religion and secularism is clearest in the provincial response to the problems raised by Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri in the middle and end of 1907. On both occasions, not even the leading provincial ‘ulama seemed to have understood the roots of his arguments, and the implications of the secular perspective advanced by Taqizada and the Tabriz deputies for Islam with regard to constitutional and Islamic law. He in fact identified the powerful secular trend which was to become dominant 20 years later in the reign of Reza Shah, to the detriment of the ‘ulama. Perhaps Fazlallah chose the wrong approach to advance his cause by linking secularism to the Majlis, and by implicitly criticising and undermining that institution as opening the way to secularism, and the destruction of Islam. In 1907, most of the ‘ulama of the provinces, or at least of those who held political views, were

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strongly in favour of the Majlis, which they saw as an Islamic institution which would strengthen the country against foreign incursion, and secure the foundations of Islam by providing fair and well-regulated government instead of the arbitrariness of absolutism. Indeed, several Islamic visions for Iran existed at this time. In Tabriz the moderate Shaikhi mujtahid, Thiqat al-Islam, was a supporter of constitutionalist ideas, and of modern-style education. To him the institution of a parliament was the means whereby consultation was facilitated and decisions taken, albeit providing they were not contrary to the shari‘a. The line of moderation and compromise was constantly advocated by Tabataba’i and Bihbihani from Tehran, and in the provinces mujtahids such as Mirza Ibrahim in Shiraz followed their lead. However, the leading figure of the reformist view was Akhund Khurasani, with his supporting societies throughout the country. He provided strong arguments that constitutionalism was the only acceptable government in the absence of the Imam, and the best barrier to the iniquities of both absolutism and foreign penetration. In Isfahan Aqa Nurallah, thinking more in organisational and institutional terms, developed more advanced ideas of the Islamic state. Other views were less compromising on the subject of the shari‘a and more ambitious on the role of the ‘ulama, whilst also being retrogressive on points such as quarantine. Ahrami in Bushehr fostered a millennialist vision incorporating traditional virtues ( futuvvat). He gave a role of leadership to the ‘ulama, sayyids and tullab, and took issue with ‘apostasy’ by which he appears to have meant secularism. Iran was a deeply religious country, and these views, whilst being devout, also represented a way forward that was moderate and based on compromise. It was replicated in some views of leading members of the government, such as Sani‘ al-Daula, Mushir al-Mulk, erroneously labelled conservative by some. It was also replicated in sections of the press and by a public opinion that was for a while united behind the Majlis in its quest for better government. Indeed, the Muzaffari period as a whole was one where many in the country struggled for compromise. The First Majlis was in many ways part of the ethos of this period, since it was established by Muzaffari al-Din Shah, and continued only reluctantly by his son, until he finally lost patience with compromise in the summer of 1908. It has been argued that Taqizada, in his turn, had some regrets over failure to compromise with the Shah, though specifically in 1909.1 Perhaps the financial crisis and the consequent gathering chaos meant that the Majlis was always doomed, but there is a sense that the opportunity to build consensus that would have provided greater continuity, instead of the swings and vicissitudes of the twentieth century, was lost. With regard to justice, in an article on the newly elected council in Bushehr, the newspaper Muzaffari argued that it was the protector of the laws of equality and the means of implementing abiding justice, as well as the guardian of rights. None of these terms, however, were clarified. To Mirza Ibrahim, in his address to Fazlallah on the extremism of his views, the Majlis was the fundamental basis of justice. Here the meaning is clearer in that he believed it would bring in a more

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just form of government. The ‘adliyyas established in the provinces, with little clarification as to their functions, were nevertheless seen as halls of justice which would address people’s grievances through a more rationalised administration than in the past. The debate about who should control them was also related to justice, it being perceived that even if they were administered by the existing local authorities, the councils should have some role in them, as was arranged in Tabriz. A whole range of views on rights made their appearance in the provinces at this time. From the beginning there was some confusion regarding the exact nature of the Majlis – was it a national assembly or council (majlis-i milli) or a court of justice (‘adliyya), and what were its duties? Mazandarani argued that the aim of establishing the Majlis was to secure the rights and limits of the government (hudud) and the rights (huquq) of the people. In effect, this meant that both parties should keep to the right path, namely the shari‘a, with the Majlis protecting the rights of people and government. The issue of the rights of the ‘ulama was also raised at the time of the passing of the Supplementary Fundamental Law. The Tabrizi deputies informed their fellow townsmen that the scrutiny of the law by the ‘ulama had their rights thus addressed. They also said that the issue was too sensitive to be further discussed at this time, as the co-operation of the ‘ulama was needed in other, more urgent matters, a point which had implications for the future. In the countryside rights were perceived in the ancient sense of the rights of the peasants and the landlords with respect to each other. The establishment of the Majlis provided an entirely new opportunity for the peasants to assert and improve their rights. This applied in Isfahan, for example, to the villagers under Aqa Najafi, and what they described as their natural rights. In Bushehr Muzaffari called for a land survey to fix details of ownership through government registration, and accountability of the tax revenues. However, the issue of rights was addressed most radically in Tabriz and Azarbaijan. The social democrats, in particular, had militant ideas on landlords’ rights, which they effectively wished to abolish. In his tours of the villages, Mirza Javad spoke up strongly on the rights of the peasants. With such views, the Tabriz Anjuman became renowned in its provinces as a redresser of grievances and protector of rights. The result was something of a backlash in Tabriz, with landlords asserting that they also had legal rights which should be protected. The most prolonged and powerful debate over the whole issue of law, rights and jurisdiction concerned the difference between parliamentary and also customary (‘urf ) law and the shari‘a. Shaikh Fazlallah understood that under parliamentary law, sovereignty lay with the will of the people, and that the Majlis could therefore override the ‘ulama and the shari‘a. Despite his endeavours he was not able to convince the leading ‘ulama of the provinces of his arguments, and appears to have had virtually no influence on the laity. Aqa Nurallah, in a discussion of the matter, understood that the Majlis, as the sovereign authority, had to be obeyed, but stipulated that its laws had to be in conformity with the shari‘a. What he

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failed to understand was that the nature of constitutional government based on representation meant that there was no way of making sure that its man-made laws were in conformity with those of Islam. Like other ‘ulama he also attempted to resolve the problem by dividing the shari‘a from the ‘urf law and saying that this would be the sphere of legislation of the Majlis. In fact such a simple division did not in practice exist. When the local councils were established there was considerable confusion in all four provinces as to their responsibilities with regard to the law. This lasted for the period of the First Majlis, when there was as yet no formal secular law. In Tabriz, although the Anjuman provided for a hall of justice (‘adliyya), the law was still essentially the ‘urf or customary law, applied in accordance with the principles of the shari‘a, that is, following long-established practice. In Isfahan, after the establishment of the municipal council, the administration of nonshari‘a matters was gradually taken under its control. Some attempt at rationalisation was made in Bushehr, where the council’s brief was to hear petitions, and either suggest a solution or refer them on, for example to a shari‘a court. Shiraz, by contrast, was confused as to whether the local council was an ‘adliyya (court of justice), or that hearing petitions was its duty until one was established. The connection between the new administrative arrangements and the shari‘a was also unclear. On the one hand it was considered that claims should be referred to a shari‘a court to be proved, and then be referred to the local government administration for action. On the other hand it was felt that the local administration required authorisation from the assembly first to deal with these cases. Whilst the secularists, and especially those of Tabriz, as has been discussed in the literature on this subject, saw freedom in terms of the rights granted by the liberal constitutions of Europe, especially freedom of expression and of the press, the Islamic arguments for freedom were guarded and qualified. Aqa Nurallah, for example, said that freedom did not mean liberty in the European sense of constitutionalism, but only the right to be free as was required by the Qur’an and the Sunna. Exactly what that meant, he did not explain. On the whole, to the ‘ulama, freedom meant freedom from oppression, and from the iniquities of the absolutist system. Thus Khurasani supported freedom in the sense of being liberated from despotism, but not in the sense of a possible decline into chaos. Mazandarani warned against those who advocated freedom (azadi) in the sense of freedom from the decrees of the Almighty, rather than freedom from oppression. Such a view was probably in the minds of the tullab of Shiraz, who swore an oath to support freedom with their lives and property. Similar viewpoints may be found on the subject of equality. Thus Aqa Nurallah’s declaration that mashruta would bring ‘equality’ evidently did not mean equality before the law regardless of religion, as accepted by Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i, but equality amongst Muslims (in his words ‘king and beggar’), with Christians and Jews still occupying an inferior position in accordance with the shari‘a. Likewise, the radical preachers of Tabriz called for a struggle for law, equality and co-operation, and to repair the weakness of

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Iran, all supported by quotations from the Qur’an and the Hadith. Shaikh Salim argued against the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, saying the excuse that it was in conformity with the ‘urf law was not compatible with the shari‘a. In his view it was not possible to impose European ways on Iran. In the ways that the provinces under study responded during the Revolution to events and trends of national significance there were at once similarities and differences. Certainly they were in constant touch by telegram and in the press at times of crisis in the confrontation with absolutism and there are many examples of people in one province standing up in support for those who were beleaguered in another. This was particularly so of Tabriz, Shiraz and Isfahan. The events in Shiraz in 1905 to 1906 were watched with intense interest elsewhere. Not only did the Shirazis receive widespread support, but also their endeavours to remove Shu‘a al-Saltana, in terms of vocabulary and organisation, including availing themselves of the grounds of the British consulate, were to prove an example for the subsequent reform movement in Tehran. Later, in 1907, the Tabrizis constantly sent telegrams to the other provinces regarding the passing of the Supplementary Fundamental Law, which brought forth inquiries to the government as to when it would be finalised. As has been discussed, the constitutional period was important from the point of view of building an Iranian sense of nationalism. It has been argued by Tavakoli-Targhi and Kashani Sabet that the sense of nationalism at this time (and at other times) was frail, tenuous and pessimistic. For this period Tavakoli-Targhi has based his view on a particular line of debate in some parts of the press, which represented Iran as a sick patient in need of urgent medical attention to recover its former strength. My own view, having read many of the local papers and studied the debates in the local councils, and amongst the wider public (though not necessarily those of Sunni, and for example, Kurdish, ethnic backgrounds), is that this was not the case. There was considerable enthusiasm for the Majlis at least until the end of 1907, as it was seen as the only means of strengthening the vatan and was a milli (national) institution. As has already been discussed, nationalism was not yet the coherent ideology it was to become in the years after World War I, but it was certainly evolving. Further, the constitutionalist period was characterised by a sense of optimism and self-empowerment, and very little by martyrdom and victimhood, which were to become such pronounced features of Iranian identity in the subsequent century. If nationalism was growing, then there is a question as to how far the provinces were drawn into the national debate; and, correspondingly, how far did having their own elected institutions serve to cultivate provincial and local identities within a state system as opposed to clan associations and loyalties to the culture of district of birth. It has to be said that in the period of the First Majlis, the answers vary. Despite the problems that beset the Tabriz Anjuman at this time, and the fact that it lost some of its wider representation after the regular elections, it retained an important position in the managing of the city, and in the struggles of the following years. This was due to the dedication of Tabrizis

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to the idea of the Anjuman as an institution which provided an organised and gradually rationalised management of their city, and beyond it of the province of Azarbaijan. Thus, it did not enhance Tabrizi identity, so much as modernise it. With regard to Shiraz, the local Anjuman had less success at this period, as the council not only virtually collapsed under the continuous power struggles, which factionalised it, it also acquired an Islamic rival that further accentuated city divisions. In Bushehr, the trading community had a limited interest in under-funded, time-consuming local government, which to some extent left the council open to the influence of a radical Islamic faction supported by the guilds. The community as a whole did unite on one point, and that was to use the council as an instrument of both local and wider nationalism, to gain control of the customs administration, a move which the central government would not allow. Despite this tendency, the governors of Bushehr (and of the other Persian Gulf ports), were at some pains under central direction to make sure the institution continued to function, and was properly constituted. The motive for this interest was most likely that this particular institution was seen as a means of extending government control in a province which had no particular desire for closer relations with the centre. The British, who also came into the picture, largely ignored it, unless it interfered directly with their interests. However, with these forces at work, during the period in question, the council struggled to engender civic identity and pride in the inhabitants of Bushehr. The Anjuman of Isfahan presented quite a different picture, because it acquired a distinctly Islamic identity under the powerful leadership of Aqa Nurallah. Its distinctive Islamic ethos and express purpose of establishing Islamic government made it unique in terms of organisation for its time. It was also directly linked to Aqa Nurallah’s volunteer force. Unsurprisingly the Majlis was anxious to reduce its influence, resulting in a swift establishment of the Anjuman-i Baladiyya. The identity of this body was marked by its attempts at urban improvements as well as its non-religious nature, and it gradually undermined its rival. The new local government institutions had to struggle with central interference, and also with the power wielded locally by established elite groups, not least the tribes. Central interference came mainly in the form of the provincial governors, especially as the areas of responsibility between governors and councils were not clearly delineated. In addition, the issue was confused by the twofold purpose of the central government in establishing the councils, namely to advance central control, and to encourage local civic responsibility. Thus in Bushehr the establishment and management of the local council were often subjected to guidance by the governor, which was not always welcome. Shirazis, on the other hand, frequently dispatched governors, so only the last of the period, Zill al-Sultan, provided a measure of by now welcome control over the running of the city. Farman Farma in Tabriz worked towards co-operation with the council to execute the decrees on constitutionalism, manage the budget and control prices.

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With regard to local pressures, in Shiraz, the local council faced the political manoeuvrings of the Ilkhani of the Qashqa’i and of the Qavami rivals, Qavam al-Mulk and his sons, and Mu‘tamid-i Divan. It also had to contend with an Anjuman of Qajar Princes. In Bushehr the Anjuman-i Shaukat al-Islam represented the interests of some of the leading ‘ulama, who aimed to preserve their vested interest in the attestation of documents. In addition, the merchants Haji ‘Abd al-Rasul, and his rival Haji Sayyid Muhammad Riza, used the council to advance and protect their respective interests. The leadership of the council in Isfahan by Aqa Nurallah in itself served to protect the interests of his family. The pattern of Tabriz local politics was different, in that it represented ideological struggles other than Islamic and non-religious (rather than clearly secularist). The most obvious was the considerable force of radical, modernist opinion, from militant socialist to liberal. Class struggle emerged most clearly in the politics of Tabriz, though there was also evidence of it in the other provinces. Whilst the Tabriz Anjuman had to deal with the ramifications of the battles in the countryside between landlord and peasant, it sought to address the interests of the lower social groups at the expense of the higher in its control of the price of necessities. In Shiraz the indication of a class identity was comparatively minor, it consisting of the establishment of the Anjuman-i Ta‘ssub by domestic servants. In Bushehr the Anjuman-i Safa took up the interests of the workers in the tannery and of the unpaid soldiers. Overall, however, a variety of new groups, especially of lesser merchants, and guilds began to take a role in the government of the provinces. Poorer people used the new institutions as a means of redressing their grievances. Despite the serious financial problems, but also encouraged by the central government, the councils took some steps towards the rationalisation of local government and bureaucratic professionalism, though they were not able to achieve much during this period. In Tabriz the Anjuman’s ideal was to raise the standard of government practice in Iran to that of Europe through well-regulated assemblies and national unity. Its struggle for well-regulated management had high points and low points, but considering some of the obstacles its achievement was not negligible. It was well-ordered, it usually met daily at a specified time, and its proceedings were reported in some detail in the Anjuman newspaper. In Shiraz, by contrast, there was lack of clarity as to what procedures should be, and what the precise purpose of the council actually was. It was never really clear as to its duties, functions and area of responsibility, its relations with other local authorities, its funding, or its priorities. In both Tabriz and more particularly Bushehr there were heated disagreements with the local Belgian-managed customs administration, which really meant a struggle over authority for the management of the provinces and their revenue by the three bodies. Bushehr argued for greater accountability to the council of both government and customs. Its argument was in part the product of the Provincial Council Regulations, which encouraged the provincial government to seek accountability on the part of the local government administration without being clear as to how this should be done, or being precise as to the nature of the

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authority and responsibility in financial and taxation matters of each of the local bodies involved. A further problem was that throughout the country the areas of authority of the Ministries of the Interior and of Finance were not clearly delineated. The governor and local administration, and the customs, were said to be responsible to these two ministries. On the other hand, in Bushehr the council understood that it was not responsible to these ministries, but to the Majlis. This was a further matter of dispute which hindered administrative efficiency. The councils at this time made only a tentative beginning in assuming responsibility for local facilities. In particular they were expected to take the initiative in fostering education, and improving conditions of health and hygiene. The issues of health, establishing hospitals, libraries and museums, and repairing schools and mosques came to the fore in Isfahan with the establishment of the Municipal Council, though it did not achieve much in this period. Notably, the Tabriz council showed awareness of hygiene, with its regulations on moving slaughtering to an area outside the town, because of the spreading of germs, and the Bushehr council discussed sweeping and lighting. During this period, the councils were not able to achieve much in advancing education, because of funding. As a result, initiatives in the establishing of new institutions of education remained largely in private hands. With regard to the specific characteristics of the provinces, in terms of engagement with reform and constitutionalism, Tabriz had long been in advance of the other provinces of Iran. This was largely due to its location near the Russian border where it was open to the new radical ideas coming in from the Caucasus. During the constitutional period it remained by far the most significant province in Iran. The Tabriz Anjuman, in particular, provided a rare forum for the political engagement of a range of social groups. Its significance was enhanced by the exceptional involvement of the small towns of Azarbaijan, where the people were more politically aware, in the constitutional movement. The struggle between landlords and peasantry shows a strong popular sense of the new rights which the constitution introduced. The press engaged with a wider readership socially, and ideologically offered comparatively advanced arguments with a range of views. At the same time, the Anjuman showed a stronger sense of rationalisation of administration and the development of civic responsibilities and duties. This in turn was to lead to a very strong sense of civic pride in terms of the introduction of institutions and their buildings and the continuing development of education and learning. Finally, the arguments regarding the religious and secular interpretations of constitutionalism were far more intellectually advanced and their supporters more organised than in other provinces. There is an irony that in the years leading up to the Revolution, Shiraz as a provincial centre was in some ways in the forefront of the development of new ideas on national identity and institutional reform, including the concept of judicial reform to grant the people better rights, new legal rights, urban facilities and welfare, and a new-style assembly or council to administer a programme of such changes. It also extended these ideas to discussion of the nation and the

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homeland, and the introduction of a non-religious legal system. Unfortunately, this movement which was supported seemingly by the local state bureaucracy and some of the merchants and guilds, was to be marginalised by the old problem of Shiraz politics , the struggle between the governor of Fars and his administration, Qavam al-Mulk and his tribal, commercial and luti powerbase, including his personal family rivals, and the Ilkhani of the Qashqa’i tribe. To this were added greater disorders than elsewhere because of the reconfiguration of the economic development in the south which adversely affected Shiraz. In addition, the rise of a particularly hard-line, and in some ways regressive, Islamic movement contributed to the divisions and disorders. The course of the Revolution in Isfahan was shaped by the exceptional influence of its old established clerical elite, whose power had been enhanced by Nasir al-Din Shah’s undermining of the power of his son, Zill al-Sultan, the governor. The result was, as the problems facing the newspaper, al-Jinab, show, that it was difficult for organised secular opinion, especially that which advocated the freedom of the press and legal reform, to establish itself in Isfahan. Therefore, the ‘ulama, in the form of the Masjid-Shahi family, came to dominate the city. This was to provide a unique opportunity for Aqa Nurallah, in particular, who was widely read and engaged in the wider Islamic movement towards reform deriving from the ideas of Al-Afghani. With his dominance of the local Anjuman, he assumed a unique position of power and influence. As a result he set out a formulated vision of an Islamic state and society with modern organisation which can be seen as a prototype of later Islamism, and was to be an influence on Khomeini. However, by 1909, the introduction of a local council supported by the state and the arrival of a local power in the form of the Bakhtiyaris, was able to regain some of the lost lay influence. The attitude of Bushehris to the Majlis, which was largely one of indifference, represents the affinity of the town with other ports along the Persian Gulf, and with the world beyond, given its growing involvement in the world economy. It was also becoming recognised as part of an area of commercial and strategic significance, not least by the Germans. As a result, the influential merchants of Bushehr regarded the Majlis from the point of view of commerce and trade. From the beginning they were sceptical that it would provide the necessary security to benefit the economy and their interests. However, the presence of the British, the customs administration and a comparatively large trading community seems to have imparted ideas on how to organise the establishment of new institutions. This community also helped support the establishment of the Muzaffari School, along with the Shah himself. There was little concern with secularism as such. On the one hand, Muzaffari offered ideas on reform, within an Islamic framework. On the other hand, there were elements of radicalism among the young and also the guilds, which gave rise to an Islamic society that was to play a significant role later to uphold the Majlis, and to end British influence. Its leading spirit, Sayyid Ahrami, did take issue with the secularism in Tehran, and was loyal to the concept of an Islamic Majlis.

Glossary

‘adalat justice ‘adalatkhana  house of justice, court of justice ahkam  precepts, orders amir tuman  military rank roughly equivalent to divisional commander amr-i bih ma‘ruf va nahy az munkar  the command to enjoin good and prohibit what is wrong anjuman  council, society, association, gathering (variously) ‘aql-i jami‘a  the reason of the community ‘Ashura  the 10 Muharram 61ah /680ad, the day on which Imam Husain was martyred asnaf  guilds (plural of sinf ) ‘Atabat  the thresholds (refers to the holy cities in Iraq; Najaf, Karbala, Samarra and Kazimain) ayalat province Babi  a follower of Mirza Ali Mohammad, who founded a new religion considered heretical by Twelver Shi‘ites; hence a byword for ‘heretic’ baiglarbaigi  office akin to that of mayor, but having difference functions at different times and in different places baladiyya  municipal government, town council bast  sanctuary against government conduct perceived as oppressive bastis  those in sanctuary bay‘at  oath of allegiance bid‘at  unlawful innovation dahriyat secularism daulat  government, state din religion farangi-ma‘ab  imitator of foreigners and their ways; ally of foreigners farhang culture farman  royal command farrash  a servant, varies in functions and responsibilities fatva  a religious edict issued by a mujtahid fida’i  one devoted to a religious cause

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fida’iyan  plural of fida’i (those devoted to a cause, usually meaning religious cause) fiqh jurisprudence futuvvat  manliness, generosity had  limit, boundary Hadith  traditions concerning the Prophet, his companions and successors, which form the basis of Islamic law haram forbidden haqq right hukm  order, decree hukumat government huquq  plural of haqq, rights hurriyya  liberty, freedom ihqaq-i huquq  the confirmation or implementation of rights ilkhani  paramount tribal chieftain Imams  for Shi‘ites, the legitimate successors of the Prophet Muhammad imam jum‘a  one appointed by the shah to lead prayers in the main mosque in each town inqilab revolution islah reform istibdad despotism istishad-nama  form of petition jihad  holy war jumhur  a term meaning mainly community of the people; it later came to mean a republic, and sometimes did even at this early stage jumhurriyat  normally republicanism; here the people in common kadkhuda  headman of a village or urban quarter kalantar  chief of the traditional municipal administration karguzar  agent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who dealt with foreigners khalifa caliph khan  title of tribal chiefs and landowners khums  canonical tax representing one-fifth of a person’s income kufr  infidelity luti  urban rough who lives on the edge of legality but is also capable of occasional acts of nobility and self-abnegation or sacrifice madrasa  traditional Islamic institution of learning majlis parliament maliyat  tax, especially the land tax mamalik-i mahrusa-yi Iran  the guarded domains of Iran mardum people marja‘-i taqlid  leading mullah who is emulated by other believers mashru‘a  according to the shari‘a mashruta constitutional mashrutiyat constitutionalism

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mashvarat consultation maslahat  well-being of the people millat  people, community, nation milli national mir panj  army rank roughly equivalent to major mujahid see mujahidin mujahidin  plural of mujahid, here those who fought for the constitutional cause, including by armed struggle, usually used with religious connotations mujtahid  senior cleric entitled to exercise ijtihad, the right to exercise independent judgement mullah (mulla)  a Muslim cleric, usually used for lower-level ‘ulama munshi secretary muqaddas sacred murid  religious adherent to a mujtahid mustaufi  financial official, accountant nayib deputy nizam  military, security forces, administration, political order nizamnama  constitution, book of rules, code of laws, regulations pishkar  agent, steward pishnamaz  mullah who leads the prayers in a mosque pul-i siyah  debased coinage qanat  covered water channel qanun  law, usually non-religious law qaumiyyat peoplehood qazi  one who has the office and function of applying Islamic law qiran  a currency unit, equal to a rial raushanfikr  intellectual, member of the intelligentsia (plural: raushanfikran) rauzakhvan  a reciter of lamentations commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husain rial  a currency unit rifah welfare rish sifid elder ru‘aya  subjects, peasants sadr-i a‘zam  prime minister saltanat  power, worldly rule, authority, sovereignty, monarchy saltanat-i mutlaqa  absolute monarchy sarhang  army rank roughly equivalent to colonel sarraf  moneylender, traditional banker sayyid  one claiming descent from the Prophet shabnama  a tract, usually anonymous, distributed at night shahid martyr Shaikhi  member of a Twelver Shi‘i sect prominent in Tabriz shari‘a  Islamic law shirk  association of others with God

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siyasi political takfir excommunication tauhid  unity, oneness of God tufangchi  rifleman tujjar  plural of tajir, merchants generally, but also particularly wholesale merchants tullab  plural of talaba, theological students tuyul  landholding by traditional right tuyuldar  fief holder tuman  a currency unit, equalling 10 rials ‘ulama  plural of ‘alim, Muslim clerics umur-i hisbiyya  general affairs (the affairs of the marketplace) umur-i mubah  permissible affairs ‘urf  customary law ustad  teacher, master usul  principles, roots, essentials va‘iz preacher vajib obligatory vakil  representative, agent, deputy vaqf  religious endowment vatan homeland vatanparast patriot vikalat  agency, representation, deputyship vilayat  deputyship, guardianship; district zakat  alms, canonical tax zulm oppression

Notes

Introduction 1 E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905–9, London, 1910, Cass 1966 edition. 2 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i mashruta-yi Iran, Amir Kabir, Tehran, 2536sh. 3 Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996. 4 Mangol Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991. 5 H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (eds), Iran’s Constitutional Revolution. Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections, I.B.Tauris, London 2010. 6 Vanessa Martin, Islam and Modernism. The Iranian Revolution of 1906, I.B.Tauris, London, 1989. 7 Ibid., chapter 3. ‘Aqa Najafi, Haj Aqa Nurullah and the Emergence of Islamism in Isfahan 1889–1908’, Iranian Studies, 41, No. 2, 2008, pp. 155–72. 8 Ali Gheissari, ‘Constitutional Rights and the Development of Civil Law in Iran, 1907–1941’, in , H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (eds), Iran’s Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections, I.B.Tauris, London, 2010, pp. 69–79. 9 Denis Hermann, ‘Système parlementaire et consultation selon Thiqat al-Islam-i Tabrizi: légitimation religieuse et justification historique’, in Denis Hermann and Sabrina Mervin, Courants et dynamiques chiites à l’époque moderne (XVIIIe–XXe siècles), Orient-Institut Beirut, and Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, Beirut 2010, pp. 155–70. 10 Amir Hassan Boozari, Shi‘i Jurisprudence and Constitution, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011. 11 Morteza Nouraei, Mashhad between 1890 and 1914: a Socio-Historical Study, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Manchester, 2000. 12 Heidi A. Walcher, In the Shadow of the King. Isfahan under the Qajars, I.B.Tauris, London, 2008. 13 Mohammad Ali Kazembeyki, Society, Politics and Economics in Mazandaran, Iran, 1848–1914, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003. 14 Mansoureh Ettehadieh, The Origins and Development of Political Parties in Persia, Edinburgh, 1980. 15 Arash Khazeni, Tribes and Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2009. 16 Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani’; a Political Biography, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972.

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17 On the most advanced arguments on this subject, those of Mirza Muhammad Husain Na’ini, see Abdul Hadi Hairi, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, Brill, Leiden, 1977. For a discussion on the Shi‘i juristic approach as a whole see Boozari, Jurisprudence. 18 Browne, Revolution, pp. 362–84. 19 Muzakirat-i Majlis – Proceedings of the Majlis (MMajlis). 20 Browne, Revolution; L. Lockhart, ‘The Constitutional Laws of Persia. An Outline of their Origin and Development’, Middle East Journal, 13, 1959, pp. 372–88; Abbas Amanat, ‘The Constitutional Revolution. i. Intellectual Background’, Encyclopaedia Iranica, VI, Costa Mesa, 1993, pp. 163–76; Amir Arjomand, ‘The Constitutional Revolution. iii. The Constitution’, Encyclopaedia Iranica, VI, pp. 187–92; and Janet Afary, ‘Civil Liberties and the Making of Iran’s First Constitution’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 25, No. 2, 2005, pp. 341–59. 21 Gheissari, ‘Rights’, pp. 70–2. 22 Boozari, Jurisprudence, pp. 50–1. 23 Ibid., pp. 118, 121. 24 Martin, Islam, pp. 113–38. 25 Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom. A Social History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, p. 31. 26 Monica M. Ringer, Education, Religion and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar Iran, Mazda, Costa Mesa, 2001. 27 Vanessa Martin, The Qajar Pact. Bargaining, Protest and the State in 19th-Century Persia, I.B.Tauris, London, 2005. 28 Gad G. Gilbar, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Tujjar Councils of Representatives in Iran, 1884–85’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 51, 2008, pp. 639–74. 29 Soheila Torabi Farsani, ‘Merchants, their Class Identification Process and Constitutionalism’, in H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (eds), Iran’s Constitutional Revolution, I.B.Tauris, London, 2010, pp. 117–30. 30 Afary, Revolution, 1995. 31 See Ervand Abrahamian, ‘The Crowd in the Persian Revolution’, Iranian Studies, 2, 1969, pp. 128–50. 32 Hamid Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973. 33 What Katouzian terms ‘Iranianism’, The Persians: Ancient, Medieval and Modern Iran, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2010, p. 13. 34 Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions Shaping the Iranian Nation 1804–1946, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp. 124, 127–9. 35 Hossein Abadian, Buhran-i mashrutiyyat dar Iran, Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at va Pazhuhishi-yi Siyasi, Tehran, 1383, p. 607. 36 Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 122. 37 Katouzian, Homa, The Persians, pp. 4–5. 38 Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, p. 104. 39 For examples of this kind of reform elsewhere, see Philip Mawhood, Local Government in the Third World, Africa Institute of South Africa, 1993, pp. 9–21. 40 See Provincial Council Law of Rabi‘ I 1307/April–May 1908 (the law does not have a precise date), Session 68, 29 Safar 1325/14 April 1907, MMajlis. 1  The Political, Economic and Social Background 1 Malkum Khan, ‘Kitabcha-yi ghaibi’, in Majmu‘a-yi athar-i Mirza Malkum (ed.), Muhammad Muhit Tabataba’i, Kitabkhana-yi Danish, Tehran, 1327, pp. 1–117.

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2 Shaul Bakhash, Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858–1896, Ithaca, London, 1978, pp. 43–4. 3 Ibid., pp. 83, 86. 4 Zeynol‘abedin Maragheh’i. The Travel Diary of Ebrahim Beg, transl. James D. Clark, Mazda, Costa Mesa, 2006; see, for example, pp. 200, 206, 226. 5 Qanun No. 6, 1 Dhi al-Hujja 1307/19 July 1890, p. 2, published in Mirza Malkum Khan Ruznama-yi Qanun (ed.), Homa Nateq, Sipihr, Tehran, 2535sh. On Qanun see also Hamid Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 236–67. 6 Qanun, No. 9, n.d., p. 2. 7 Qanun, No. 2, 1 Sha‘ban 1307/23 March 1890. He also poured scorn on the existing majlis-i shura-yi daulati in this edition. Masha’allah Ajoudani gives a detailed discussion of the development of Malkum Khan’s ideas in Mashruta-yi Irani va pishzaminiha-yi nazariya-yi, Vilayat-i Faqih, Intisharat-i fasl-i kitab, London, 1367, pp. 275–356. 8 Anya Pistor Hatam, Iran und der Reformbewegung im Osmanischen Reich, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 1992, p. 113; Mirza Muhammad Nazim al-Islam Kirmani, Tarikh-i bidari-yi Iranian (ed.), A. A. Sa‘idi Sirjani, Intisharat-i Bunyad-i Farhang-i Iran, Tehran, 1357, I, pp. 154–7; Yahya Daulatabadi, Tarikh-i mu‘asir ya hayat-i Yahya, Ibn Sina, Tehran, 1336, I, pp. 178–9. 9 Algar, Malkum Khan, p. 191. 10 Browne, Revolution, p. 417. Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, p. 157. 11 Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, p. 157; ‘Ali Khan Amin al-Daula, Khatirat-i Siyasi (ed.), Hafez Farmanfarma’iyan, Amir Kabir, Tehran, 2535sh., pp. 246, 254; Martin, Islam, pp. 45, 51. 12 Martin, Islam, p. 46. 13 See P. W. Avery and J. B Simmons, ‘Persia on a cross of Silver 1880–1890’ in Elie Kedourie and Silvia Haim (eds), Towards a Modern Iran, Cass, London, 1980, pp. 1–37; V. F. Nowshirvani, ‘The Beginnings of Commercialised Agriculture in Iran’, The Islamic Middle East (ed.), A.L. Udovitch, Darwin Press, Princeton 1981, pp. 547–91. 14 On the tobacco protest, see Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran, Cass, London, 1966. 15 Shahbaz Shahnavaz, Britain and the Opening up of South West Persia 1880–1914, Routledge Curzon, London, 2005, pp. 12–13. 16 Walcher, Shadow of the King, p. 77. 17 Shahnavaz, Britain, pp. 26–7. 18 Wilhelm Litten, Persien – Von der „pénétration pacifique“ zum Protektorat. Urkunden und Tatsachen zur Geschichte der europaeischen „pénétration pacifique“in Persien, 1860–1919, Berlin and Leipzigk, 1920, translated into Persian as Iran az nufuz-i musalamat amiz ta taht al-himayagi 1860–1919 by Mariam Mir Ahmadi, Mu‘in, Tehran, 1367, pp. 116–17. 19 Scholars such as Foran and Afary have emphasised the detrimental effects of the impact of the world economy by drawing attention to the undoubtedly negative effect it had on lesser merchants, artisans and peasants. See John Foran, ‘The Concept of Dependent Development as a Key to the Political Economy of Qajar Iran 1800–1925, Iranian Studies, 1989, 22, pp. 5–56; Janet Afary, Revolution, pp. 18–19. Gilbar, however, has inclined to a more positive view. See Gad G. Gilbar, ‘Persian Agriculture in the Late Qajar Period, 1860–1906. Some Economic and Social Aspects’, Asian and African Studies, 1978, 12, pp. 312–65. 20 On the councils see Feridun Adamiyat and Homa Nateq, Afkar-i ijtima‘i va siyasi va iqtisadi dar athar-i muntashir nashuda-yi dauran-i Qajar, Agah, Tehran, 1356,

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pp. 299–302. The Tobacco Movement of 1890–1 was an expression of the same concern. In the 1890s Iranian merchants complained bitterly over foreign commercial encroachment, and sought to establish companies of their own. See Martin, Qajar Pact, pp. 86–7, for example, on the resistance to the Ottoman tobacco company. 21 A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 1820–1990, London, 1992, pp. 1–11. 22 Gad G. Gilbar, ‘The Big Merchants and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906’, Asian and African Studies, 2, No. 3, 1977, pp. 275–303. 23 Martin, Qajar Pact, p. 188. 24 Gad G. Gilbar, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Tujjar Councils of Representatives in Iran, 1884–85’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 51, 2008, pp. 655–56. 25 For an example see the Shabankara case in Morteza Nouraei and Vanessa Martin, ‘The Role of the Karguzar in the Foreign Relations of State and Society of Iran from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1921. Part III: The Karguzar and Disputes over Foreign Trade’, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Series 3, 16, 2, July 2006, p. 155. 26 See for example A. Pidram and I. Afshar (eds), Kerman dar asnad-i Amin al-Zarb, Tehran, 1384, p. 114. 27 Soheila Torabi, ‘Merchants’, p. 118. 28 Adamiyyat and Natiq, Afkar, pp. 299–302. 29 Shireen Mahdavi-Khazeni, For God, Mammon and Country. A Nineteenth Century Persian Merchant, Westview, Boulder, 1999, p. 90. 30 Ibid., p. 91. 31 Ibid., pp. 92–4. 32 Feridun Adamiyat, Andisha-yi Taraqqi va hukumat-i qanun, Khvarazmi, Tehran, 2536sh., p. 326. 33 Gilbar, ‘Councils’, p. 668. 34 On Al-Afghani, see Keddie, Nikki R., Sayyid Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani”; a Political Biography, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972. 35 For a similar traditional relationship between merchants and Persian Gulf rulers, see Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf. Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, CUP, Cambridge, 1990. 36 Reza Aresteh, Education and Social Awakening in Iran, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1962, pp. 20–1. 37 David Mensashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1992, p. 27. 38 Ibid., p. 33. 39 Ibid., p. 60. 40 Students were also sent for military education in Vienna; see No. 40, 19 March 1904, Iranian Legation in Vienna to Mushir al-Daula, Minister of Foreign Affairs, MFA 1322q–16–14, pp. 8–9, regarding the satisfactory progress of Muhsin Khan and ‘Isa Khan. 41 Benjamin Fortna, Imperial Classroom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 4–5. 42 John L. Rury, Education and Social Change: Contours in the History of American Schooling, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 37. 43 Ellwood P. Cubberley, The History of Education: Educational Practice and Progress Considered as a Phase of the Development and Spread of Western Civilization, Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 881–81. 44 Ardath W. Burks, The Modernizers, Overseas Students, Foreign Employees and Meiji Japan, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1985, p. 22.

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45 Ibid., pp. 257, 259. 46 Ibid., p. 256; Ronald S. Anderson, Education in Japan, United States Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 18. 47 Burks, Modernizers, p. 256. 48 P. L. Rawat, The History of Indian Education, Lucknow, 1965, pp. 178–9, 234–55. 49 A. S. Thakur, The Development of the Educational System in India, Shipra, Delhi, 2008, pp. 51–2. 50 Rawat, History, p. 182. 51 Hafeez Malik, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1980, p. 72. 52 Ibid., p. 219. 53 Monica M. Ringer, Education, Religion and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar Iran, Mazda, Costa Mesa, 2001, p. 109. 54 Ibid., p. 138. 55 Soli Shahvar, The Forgotten Schools. The Baha’is and Modern Education in Iran 1899–1934, I.B.Tauris, London, 2009, pp. xxii, xxiii. 56 Ibid., p. 63. 57 Ibid., p. 159. 58 Mohammad Reza ‘Askarani, ‘Ta’sis-i madaris-i jadid dar Isfahan’, Sair-i tahavvul-i amuzish va parvarish ba nigahi vizha bih ustan-i Isfahan (ed.), ‘Alireza E‘tibariyan, Muza-yi amuzish va parvarish-i ustan-i Isfahan, Autumn, 1380, p. 6. 59 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 60 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 61 Ahmad Kasravi, History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, transl. Evan Siegel, Mazda Press, Costa Mesa, 2006, p. 26; Ehsan Naraghi, Enseignement et changements sociaux en Iran du VIIe au XXe siecle, Editions de la maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris, 1992, p. 102. 62 Menashri, Education, pp. 60–1. 63 Ringer, Education, pp. 156–7. 64 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 27. 65 Ibid., p. 28. 66 Ringer, Education, p. 158. 67 Thuraya, Year 2, No. 26, 4 Safar 1318/2 June 1900, pp. 1–2. 68 Naraghi, Enseignement, p. 103; Ringer, Education, p. 161. 69 Naraghi, Enseignement, p. 103. 70 Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, p. 157. 71 Daulatabadi, Tarikh, I, pp. 186–9. 72 Ibid., p. 199. 73 Ibid., pp. 217–19. 74 ‘Abd al-Husain Khan Sipihr, Mirat al- vaqayi‘-i Muzaffari va yaddashtha-yi Malik al-Muvarrikhin (ed.), ‘Abd al-Husain Nava’i, Zarin, Tehran, 1368, Part 1, pp. 276–7, 279. 75 Daulatabadi, Tarikh, I, pp. 298–9. 76 Ringer, Education, pp. 200–1. 77 Ibid., pp. 204–5. 78 Habl al-Matin, Year 6, No. 11, 10 Ramazan 1316/ 22 January 1899, p. 129. 79 Sipihr, Mirat al-Vaqayi‘, Part 1, pp. 279–81; Ringer, Education, p. 165. 80 Thuraya, Year 2, No. 41, 3 Rajab 1318/27 October 1900, pp. 9–10. 81 As reported in Habl al-Matin, Year 8, No. 45, 18 Jamadi I 1319/2 September 1901, pp. 8–9. 82 See Habl al-Matin, Year 10, No. 19, 24 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1320/23 February 1903, pp. 11–12.

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83 Mirza Aqa Khan Muhandis Amir Panja Muhasib al-Daula, Usul-i ‘ilmi-yi jughrafiya (The Basic Principles of Geography) Tehran, Rabi‘ I 1318/June–July 1900, copy in the Museum of the History of Education, Isfahan. 84 Naraghi, Enseignement, p. 103. 85 Saeed Paivandi, Religion et éducation en Iran, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2006, p. 37. 2  Islam, Secularism and Modernisation 1 Gholam Hosein Zargari-Nezhad (ed.), Rasa’il-i mashrutiyyat, Intisharat-i Kavir, Tehran, 1374. 2 Denis Hermann, ‘La défense de l’enseignement de l’arabe au cours du mouvement constitutionnel iranien (1906–1911)’, in Denis Hermann and Fabio Speziale (eds), Muslim Cultures in the Indo Iranian World, Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 2010, pp. 301–21; and ‘Thiqat al-Islam-i Tabrizi’, pp. 155–70. 3 George Jacob Holyoake, The Origin and Nature of Secularism, Watts, London, 1896; Azzam Tamimi, ‘The Origins of Arab Secularism’, in John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, Hurst and Co., London, 2000, p. 14. 4 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, The Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2007, pp. 2–4, 126–7. 5 Tamimi, ‘Arab Secularism’, p. 20. 6 See, for example, Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, Ithaca, London, 1992, pp. 61–2. 7 Tamimi, ‘Arab Secularism’, p. 16. 8 Pervez Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1991, pp. 100–1. 9 Howard R. Turner, Science in Medieval Islam, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1995, pp. 32–3; Ahmad Dallal, Islam, Science and the Challenge of History, Yale University Press, 2010, pp. 146–7. 10 Dallal, Islam, p. 147. On Al-Ghazzali, see also Prof. A.Y. al-Hassan (ed.), The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture, 4, Science and Technology in Islam, UNESCO Publications, Paris, 2001, part I, pp. 121–2. 11 Hoodbhoy, Science, p. 109. 12 Tamimi, ‘Arab Secularism’, p. 18. 13 Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘Islamic Modernism’, in Muhammd Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen (eds), Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009, p. 244. 14 Ibid., p. 245. 15 Osman Bakar, The History and Philosophy of Islamic Science, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 1999, p. 220. 16 Armando Salvatore, ‘The Reform Project in the Emerging Public Spheres’, in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen (eds), Islam and Modernity. Key Issues and Debates, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009, p. 193. 17 Taylor, Secular Age, pp. 192–3. 18 Habl al-Matin, Year 11, No. 30, 15 Safar 1322/1 May 1904, pp. 13–14. 19 Habl al-Matin, Year 7, No. 11, 12 Ramadan 1317/14 January 1900, pp. 126–7. 20 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 33, 25 Safar 1324/20 April 1906, p. 20. 21 Habl al-Matin, Year 8, No. 38, 28 Rabi‘ I 1319/15 July 1901, pp. 5–7. 22 Habl al-Matin, Year 8, No. 39, 5 Rabi‘ II 1319/22 July 1901, p. 17. 23 Habl al-Matin, Year 8, No. 40, 12 Rabi‘ II 1319/29 July 1901, pp. 14–15.

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24 Habl al-Matin, Year 8, No. 41, 19 Rabi‘ II 1319/5 August 1901, p. 5. 25 Habl al-Matin, Year 5, No. 24, 24 Dhi al-Hijja 1315/16 May 1898, p. 280. 26 Habl al-Matin, Year 7, No. 18, 24 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1317/20 March 1900, p. 7. 27 Habl al-Matin, Year 5, No. 24, 24 Dhi al-Hijja 1315/16 May 1898, p. 280. 28 Habl al-Matin, Year 10, No.10, 7 Ramadan 1320/8 December 1902, p. 21. 29 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 8, 16 Sha’ban 1323/16 October 1905, p. 16. 30 Habl al-Matin, Year 5, No. 36, 26 Rabi‘ I 1316/14 August 1898, p. 429. 31 Habl al-Matin, Year 6, No. 24, 13 Dhi al-Hijja 1316/24 April 1899, p. 280. This information had been taken from The Lagos Standard by Misbah al-Sharq and picked up in the Deccan in India. 32 Habl al-Matin, Year 7, No. 21, 15 Dhi al-Hijja 1317/16 April 1900, p. 19. 33 Habl al-Matin, Year 5, No. 31, 22 Safar 1316/12 July 1898, p. 369. 34 Habl al-Matin, Year 10, No. 10, 7 Ramadan 1320/8 December 1902, p. 9. 35 Habl al-Matin, Year 5, No. 28, 29 Muharram 1316/19 June 1898, p. 327. 36 Habl al-Matin, Year 8, No. 4, 4 Rajab 1318/28 October 1900, p. 5. 37 Habl al-Matin, Year 6, No. 11, 10 Ramazan 1316/22 January 1899, p. 128. 38 Ibid., p. 129. 3  Tabriz: The Politics and Economics of a North-Western City 1 The population was 200,000 according to one contemporary estimate. No. 15, 2 April 1896, FO 248/633. See also George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Longman, Green and Co., London, 1892, I, p. 521. He estimates the population as then being 170,000 to 200,000. 2 No. 1 political enclosure in No. 18, 2 June 1897, FO 248/654. 3 The agreement was made on 13 Rajab 1313/30 December 1895. See SAM 1AB4J517, No. 240022876. The Russians had been pressing for a such a road since 1889, see Russian Representative to Amin al-Sultan, 9 Dhi al-Hujja 1310/24 June 1893 in Ibrahim Safa’i (ed.), Asnad-i Siyasi-i dauran-i Qajariyya, Intisharat-i Babak, Tehran, 2335sh., p. 181. 4 The establishment of this bank in 1891 considerably encouraged Russian trade by liberal financing. Advances on Russian goods were charged at only 8 per cent as against the more usual 12 per cent. No. 30, 17 November 1902, FO 248/766. Concern among Iranians over the activities of the Russian Bank was sufficient to induce the Imam Jum‘a of Tabriz to speak to Wrastislaw, the British consul there, about the indebtedness of the Crown Prince (Muhammad ‘Ali Mirza) to the Russian Bank, and ask him to encourage the Crown Prince to use the British Bank of Persia, See No. 10, 9 March 1905, FO 248/851. 5 Habl al-Matin, Year 11, No. 3, 28 Jamadi II 1321/21 September 1903, pp. 4–5. 6 W. Litten, Persien, pp. 93–8. See also Vanessa Martin and Morteza Nouraei, ‘Foreign Land Holdings in Iran 1828–1911’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, 21, Part 2, April 2011, pp. 131–45. 7 Muhammad ‘Azizi, Anjuman-i ayalati-yi Azarbaijan dar daura-yi mashrutiyyat, Akhtar, Tabriz, 1385, p. 62. 8 Christoph Werner, An Iranian Town in Transition. A Social and Economic History of the Elites of Tabriz, 1747–1848, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2000, p. 10. 9 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 154. 10 Ibid., p. 154. 11 Werner, Iranian Town, pp. 202, 288. 12 For an example of a powerful landowning cleric, see group complaint against the mujtahid Haji Mirza Javad, 25 Sha‘ban 1303/29 May 1886, SAM, 1ZA2J527, No. 296009868, saying he was using force to pressurise people in order to gain control

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of their land. Reportedly, his strategy was to cause someone else to challenge the owner’s claim, and then to harass the owner, particularly by using his following of lutis (roughs). For this reason, asserted the petitioners, they could not rest over the security of their property and land. They demanded that the government end his thievery, and swore to bar him from involvement in the work of the city, and their own affairs. Further, they had an agreement to unite against him and support each other in case of harassment. 13 Werner, Iranian Town, p. 286. 14 Ibid., p. 208. 15 Ibid., p. 210. 16 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 155. 17 Mangol Bayat, Revolution, pp. 12–13; Martin, Islam, p. 21. 18 See Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 159–60. The names of the mutisharri‘s are given in No. 188, 18 September 1897 FO/654 as Mirza Ahmad Aqa, Mirza Aqa Imam Jum‘a, Haji Mirza Hasan Aqa, Mirza Sadiq, and Mirza Karim Aqa; and of the Shaikhis as Haji Mirza Musa Thiqat al-Islam (the father of Mirza ‘Ali Thiqat al-Islam), Aqa Mirza Isma‘il Hujjat al-Islam, Hadi Abu’l Hasan, Ghazi, Mu‘in al-Islam, Mirza ‘Ali Aqa, Haji Mirza Riza Aqa, Haji Mirza Taqi Aqa, and Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Qarabaghi. 19 On Thiqat al-Islam, see Denis Hermann, ‘Thiqat al-Islam’. Hermann observes that the Shaikhis in Tabriz were largely able to hold their own as a result of substantial religious endowments, p. 157. 20 On Tabriz, see especially Keddie, Religion, p. 75. Agitation in Tabriz came into the open in July 1891. 21 Nasir al-Din Shah himself to the Tabriz ‘ulama, 7 Safar 130(9)/12 September 1891, SAM, 1ZA4J816, No. 296010873. 22 SAM, Tabriz, No. 110000217, date not clear. It is signed Muhammad Hasan al-Husaini. The document was donated to the archive by Sayyid Jamal Turabi Tabataba’i. 23 Martin, Islam and Modernism, pp. 43–4. See No. 15, 2 April 1896, FO 248/633 for an example of the serious depreciation of the only coin in daily use among the poorer classes, which included a bread shortage. See Akhtar, Year 22, No. 38, 15 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1313/28 April 1896, p. 591 for the effects on prices of necessities and the failure of officials to deal with the situation. A suggestion was made to form a meat company, but the economic backing for such projects was still woefully lacking. 24 See SAM 1ZA3J816, No. 296010465, 25 Rabi‘ I 1315/24 August 1897. 25 See SAM 1ZA4TH224, No. 296008734, from Amin al-Daula to an unknown recipient, 14 Sha‘ban 1314/18 January 1897, for an example of rice being sent from Gilan to Tabriz in January 1897 to quell the disgruntled populace of Tabriz. 26 No. 18, 15 April 1896, FO 248/633. 27 Announcement by the authorities of Tabriz to the people, SAM 1ZA2J428, No. 296009828, 15 Rabi‘ I 1307/9 November 1889. 28 Nasiri, Year 2, No. 15, 21 Safar 1313/13 August 1895, pp. 118–19. 29 Sa‘d al-Mulk (probably) to unnamed official, 2 Dhi al-Hujja 1313/15 May 1896. SAM 1ZA4J128, No. 296010536. 30 For example, in SAM 1ZA5J703, No. 296011165, no date, no names. 31 No. 12, 15 April 1897, FO 248/654. 32 Despite regular messages over the years to the shah assuring him that all was in order, and that his subjects were peacefully praying for him, even the government communications at times admit to irregularities: Tonight, as I mentioned, all the quarters are in order except that the farrash bashi (head servant) of the ghallabaigi (head of the granary), who has a house in Pa’in

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Cheragh. He goes there taking two or three bottles of ‘araq (alcohol) and a boy, and that is all he does till morning. The guardhouse (qaravulkhana) is also in disorder, while the kalantar (mayor) is himself there. SAM 1ZA3J819, No, 296010468, Mu‘tamin al-Divan to unknown superior official, on the night of 16 Rabi‘ II 1316/3 September 1898. 33 No. 14, 15 August 1898, FO 248/675. 34 No. 21, 19 September 1898, FO 248/675. 35 Amir Nizam was the former all-powerful governor of Azarbaijan in 1889–91 who had resigned at the time of the Tobacco Concession crisis, being held responsible for failing to control the resistance in Tabriz, and been reappointed in 1897, see No. 12, 15 April 1897, FO 248/654. 36 No. 6, 29 March 1899, FO 248/698. 37 No. 10, 27 July 1899, FO 248/698. 38 Abd al-Hussain Nahidi Azar, Tarikhcha-yi ruznamiha-yi Tabriz dar sadr-i mashrutiyyat, Intishrart-i Talash, Tabriz, n.d., p. 18. 39 Nasiri, Year 1, No. 1, 1 Shavval 1311/4 April 1894, p. 1. 40 Ibid., p. 1. 41 Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh, Zindigi-yi tufan – khatirat-i Sayyid Hasan Taqizada, (ed.) Iraj Afshar, Intisharat-i Mohammad ‘Ali ‘Ilmi, Tehran 1368, p. 27. 42 Afary, Revolution, pp. 40–1. 43 Taqizadeh, Zindigi, p. 27. 44 Nahidi Azar, Tarikhcha, pp. 20–1; Edward G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1914, pp. 75–6 (in Cornell University Library Digital Collections). 45 Browne, Press, pp. 75–6. 46 Nahidi Azar, Tarikhcha, pp. 22, 24, 25; Browne, Press, pp. 15, 36. 47 Nahidi Azar, Tarikhcha, pp. 26–28; Browne, Press, pp. 37–38. Taqizada, in Zindigi, pp. 29–30, explains that Lughman al-Mamalik, the personal physician of Muhammad ‘Ali Mirza, established the school with his permission. 48 Nahidi Azar, Tarikhcha, pp. 28–30. See also No. 7, 25 June 1903, FO 248/792. Habl al-Matin mentions in September 1905 that Tabriz had no school in which the children of the vatan could study in the new style, and opined on how this was detrimental to the development of knowledge. Year 13, No. 5, 25 Rajab 1322/ 25 September 1905, p. 12. 49 Kamal, Year 1, No. 1, 10 Rajab 1317/14 November 1899, p. 2. 50 Ibid., pp. 4–6. 51 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 8, 16 Sha‘ban 1323/16 October 1905, pp. 12–13. 52 Akhtar, Year 22, No. 7, 13 Safar 1313/5 August 1895, p. 108. 53 Hadid, Year, Year 1, No. 12, 18 Rajab 1323/18 September 1905, pp. 2–3. 54 Hadid, Year 2, No. 5, 29 Jamadi I 1324/21 July 1906, pp. 1–2. 55 Browne, Press, pp. 75, 131–2. 56 According to Browne, it could also mean ‘The Keen One’, see Press, p. 75. 57 See Hadid, Year 1, No. 24, 21 Shavval 1323/19 December 1905, p. 1. 58 Hadid, Year 1, No. 24, 21 Shavval 1323/19 December 1905, pp. 1–2. 59 Hadid, Year 1, No. 19, 8 Ramazan 1323/6 November 1905, p. 6. 60 Hadid, Year 1, No. 27, 12 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1323/8 January 1906, p. 5. 61 Hadid, Year 1, No. 26, 5 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1323/1 January 1906, p. 4. 62 Akhtar Year 22, No. 18, 22 Jamadi I 1313/11 November 1895, pp. 278–80. 63 Akhtar, Year 22, No. 20, 7 Rajab 1313/24 December 1895, p. 313. 64 Ihtiyaj, Year 1, No. 2, 23 Muharram 1316/13 June 1898, p. 1; Nahid Azar, Tarikhcha, pp. 22–5.

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65 Ibid. 66 Adab, Year 1, No. 35 (date not clear) Jumadi I 1319/August–September 1901, pp. 273–4. 67 Kamal, Year 1, No. 29, 21 Shavval 1318/11 February 1901, pp. 1–4. 68 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 7, 9 Sha’ban 1323/9 October 1905, pp. 14–15. The newspaper remarked on the article that, ‘You can see how bad our situation is from the fact that our neighbours’ hearts burn for us.’ 69 Husain Omid, Tarikh-i farhang-i Azarbaijan, Farhang, Tabriz, 1332, p. 43. 70 Ibid., p. 29. 71 Ibid., p. 35. 72 Ibid., pp. 30, 45. 73 Ibid., pp. 30, 33. 74 Ibid., p. 34, citing an article in Akhtar, No. 36, 9 Ramazan 1299/25 July 1882. 75 Ibid., p. 37. 76 Ibid., p. 37. 77 Ibid., p. 38, quoting Nasiri, Year 1, No. 5, 1 Dhi al-Hijja 1311/5 June 1894. Husain Omid says that, according to some reports, the change in name was made by Amir Nizam Garusi, who was governor (in this case known as pishkar or steward) of Azarbaijan from 1300/1882–83 to 1313/1895–96, Tarikh, p. 37. Omid adds that a speech made at the opening ceremony was attributed to Garusi. The contemporary sources, however, make no mention of Garusi, who, indeed, was not in Tabriz. He was governor in fact from 1882 to September 1891, see Abbas Amanat, ‘Amir(e) Nezam Garrusi’, in Encyclopaedia Iranica, I (ed.), Ehsan Yarshater, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985, p. 968. At the end of 1891 he was appointed governor of Kurdistan, to which office responsibilities for other areas were later added (see Amanat, ‘Amir (e) Nezam’, p. 969). He did not return until 1897 (see No. 12, 15 April 1897, FO 248/654, which gives the most accurate date). He was dismissed in March 1899. 78 Omid, Tarikh, pp. 43–5. 79 Omid, Tarikh, p. 51. 80 Kamal, Year 1, No. 4, 11 Shavval 1317/12 February 1900, p. 5. 81 This point is interesting in terms of nation building, given that the language in Tabriz is Azari Turkish. 82 Kamal, Year 1, No. 16, 1 Rabi‘ II 1318/29 July 1900, p. 2. 83 Kamal, Year 1, No. 15, 11 Rabi‘ II 1318/7 July 1900, pp. 5–6 84 Kamal, Year 1, No. 15, 11 Rabi‘ II 1318/7 July 1900, p. 6. It appears also to have had a mixed curriculum. 85 Kamal, Year 1, No. 28, 11 Shavval 1318/1 February 1901, pp. 5–6. 86 Taqizadeh, Zindigi, pp. 29–30. 87 Habl al-Matin¸Year 7, No. 25, 14 Muharram 1318/14 May 1900, p. 15. 88 Ringer, Education, p. 175. Thuraya, Year 2, No. 6, 22 Rajab 1317/26 November 1899, p. 19, and No. 7, 29 Rajab 1317/3 December 1899, p. 15, reported on the arrangements of the school in some detail. The marking system provided for both encouragement and admonishment, exams took place every six months, and the rules on absenteeism were strict. 89 Habl al-Matin¸Year 7, No. 25, 14 Muharram 1318/14 May 1900, p. 15. 90 Taqizadeh, Zindigi, p. 30. 91 Habl al-Matin, Year 7, No. 25, 14 Muharram 1318/14 May 1900, p. 15. 92 Taqizadeh, Zindigi, pp. 27–8. He gives the date of its founding as 1319/1901, but according to Omid it was established in 1317/1899–1900, Omid, Tarikh, pp. 52–6. The latter may well be correct, given that Taqizada wrote his memoirs so long after these events.

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93 Omid, Tarikh, pp. 52, 55. He cites Thuraya, Year 1, No. 36, 22 Safar 1317/2 June 1899. 94 Taqizadeh, Zindigi, p. 28; see also No. 7, 25 June 1903, FO 248/792. 95 Martin, Islam and Modernism, p. 47. 96 See No. 7, 25 June 1903, and No. 10, 18 July 1903, FO 248/792 for the unrest over the customs reforms in Tabriz. See also Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 38. 97 Neither Kasravi nor the British Consular correspondence mentions it from the point for view of Tabrizi opinion. This may be partly because the press was strictly controlled by the crown prince, which was certainly the case in July 1906, see Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 182. 98 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 139. 99 No. 38, 14 July 1906, FO 248/878. 100 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 139. 101 No. 40, 26 July 1906, FO 248/878. See also Hadid, Year 2, No. 7, 14 Jamadi II 1324/5 August 1906, pp. 3–4. The signatories are not given, but the Shah’s reply was addressed to Haji Mirza Hasan Mujtahid, the Imam Jum‘a, and Aqa Thiqat al-Islam, amongst others, indicating how they had united despite Shaikhi–mutisharri‘ differences. 102 No. 41, 2 August 1906, FO 248/878. 103 No. 48, 15 September 1906, FO 248/878. 104 No. 49, 29 September 1906, FO 248/878. On Sayyid Hashim see also Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 183, 190, 199, 200. 105 No. 49, 29 September 1906, FO 248/878. Kasravi believed that women in Tabriz did not participate in these events in the way they did in Tehran, see Kasravi (Siegel) Revolution, p. 187. However, the evidence of Nasiri, Year 2, No. 15, 21 Safar 1313/13 August 1895, pp. 113–14 and the British sources do not support this view – see the events of 1895 and 1898 mentioned in this chapter. 106 No. 49, 29 September 1906, FO 248/878. 107 Curzon, Persia, I, p. 522 108 This committee provided seemingly unlimited funds, presumably mainly from the wealthier merchants, and there were regular distributions of bread and money to poorer participants. No. 49, 29 September 1906, FO 248/878. 109 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 186, 188. 110 No. 54, 19 October 1906, FO 248/878. 111 Indeed, by no means all of the bastis had liberal views or respect for legal rights. In late November Wratislaw, who by then was growing weary of bastis remaining in the consulate, reported that some of them ‘regard themselves as censors of morals and amongst other things had had a man beaten for wearing a stiff collar’. No. 58, 22 November 1906, FO 248/878. 112 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 200. However, he lingered at a property near Tabriz. The constitutionalists tried to persuade the Crown Prince to get him to move on, but the latter claimed it was impossible as he was under Russian protection. No. 114 tel., 27 November 1906, FO 248/878. 113 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 193. 114 Afary, Revolution, p. 79. 115 Muhammad ‘Azizi, Anjuman-i ayalati-yi Azarbaijan dar daura-yi mashrutiyyat, Akhtar, Tabriz, 1385, p. 71. 116 No. 57, 18 November 1906, FO 248/878. 117 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 195. 118 Sohrab Yazdani, Mujahidan-i mashruta, Nashri-nai, Tehran, 1388, p. 56. 119 No. 121 tel., 5 December 1906, FO 248/878. 120 Wratislaw to Spring Rice, 22 November 1906, FO 248/878.

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121 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 204. He comments that the event changed the perception of the character of the Iranian constitutional movement in the Caucasus. 122 No. 61, 15 December 1906, FO 248/878. 123 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 195. 124 Wratislaw to Spring Rice, 10 December 1906, FO 248/878; No. 61, 15 December 1906, FO 248/878. 125 However, according to his own version, written in 1907, Thiqat al-Islam said he had not courted election. See Hermann, ‘Thiqat al-Islam’, p. 158. 126 No. 61, 15 December 1906, FO 248/878. 4  Reform in Shiraz 1 See Mirza Habiballah Afnan, The Genesis of the Babi and Baha’i Faiths in Shiraz and Fars, transl. Ahang Rabbani, Brill, Leiden, 2008; Mohammad Ali Ranjbar, ‘Junbish-i mashruta khahi dar Fars: barrisi-yi asnad-i muntashir nashuda’, Faslnama-yi mutala‘at-i tarikhi zamima-yi majala-yi Danishkada-yi Adabiyyat va ‘Ulum-i Insani, Danishgah-i Firdausi-y iMashhad, Nos. 13–14, Autumn/Winter 1385, pp. 1–28; Mohammad Ali Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az mashrutiyyat to jang-i jahani-yi avval, Sazman-i Asnad va Kitabkhana-yi Milli-yi Jumhuri-yi Islami-yi Iran, Tehran, 1389. 2 The Persian version has been edited by Sa‘idi Sirjani (ed.), Vaqayiʻ-i ittifaqiyya: majmuʻa-i guzarishha-yi khafifih-nivisan-i Ingilis dar vilayat-i junubi-yi Iran, az sal-i 1291 ta 1322, Novin, Tehran, 1362. 3 Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Iran 1800–1914, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1971, p. 28. 4 See discussion in C. E. Davies, A History of the Province of Fars during the Later Nineteenth Century, D.Phil. Oxford, 1984, p. 507. 5 Issawi, Economic History, p. 33. 6 No. 449, 1 February 1893, FO 248/576. 7 See Martin, Qajar Pact, pp. 51–3, 61–2. 8 Ibid., p. 53. 9 From Shiraz, 22 May 1907, FO 248/911. 10 Shahnavaz, Britain, pp. 50–1. 11 Juan Cole,‘The Provincial Politics of Heresy and Reform in Qajar Iran: Shaykh al-Ra’is in Shiraz, 1895–1902’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 22, No. 122, 2002, p. 119. 12 For these events see Martin, Qajar Pact, pp. 59–62. Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar died in August 1901, see monthly summary, 21 August 1901, FO 248/750. To some extent his particularly conservative brand of animosity to the West and its influence died with him. 13 Cole, ‘Provincial Politics’, pp. 119–20. 14 Ibid.; Afnan, Genesis, p. 125. 15 Habl al-Matin, Year 4, No. 10, 21 Sha‘ban 1313/6 February 1896; Martin, Qajar Pact, pp. 63–4. 16 Habl al-Matin, Year 4, No. 10, 21 Sha‘ban 1313/6 February 1896. 17 Habl al-Matin, Year 4, No. 13, 12 Ramazan 1313/26 February 1896. 18 Habl al-Matin, Year 4, No. 23, 30 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1313/13 May 1896. 19 This term could refer either to the military or the state bureaucracy as the two were not clearly separated at this stage. 20 From Shiraz, No. 130, 5 August 1896, FO 248/639. 21 From Shiraz, No. 131, 15 August 1896, FO 248/639. 22 Thuraya, Year 1, No. 22, 13 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1316/25 March 1899, pp. 7–8.

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23 From Shiraz, 18 February 1905, 248/849. See also No. 7, 23 January 1907, FO 248/911. 24 It would presumably have been a small venture. ‘Abd al-Husain Khan Sipihr, Mirat al-Vaqayi‘-i Muzaffari va yaddashtha-yi Malik al-Muvarrikhin (ed.), ‘Abd al-Husain Nava’i, Zarin, Tehran, 1368, Part 2, p. 243. 25 From Shiraz, 7 February 1897, FO 248/662. 26 From Shiraz, 20 February 1897, FO 248/662. 27 No. 296011247, 1ZACH114, SAM. 28 From Shiraz, 11 September 1897, FO 248/662. 29 From Shiraz, 19 May 1897, FO 248/662; from Shiraz, 23 May 1898, FO 248/682. 30 From Shiraz, 17 March 1897, FO 248/662, and 7 March 1899, FO 248/707. 31 From Shiraz, 3 March 1901, FO 248/750. In August 1901 he died. From Shiraz, 21 August 1901, FO 248/750. 32 From Shiraz, 16 August 1899, FO 248/707. 33 From Shiraz, 29 November 1899, 6 December 1899, and 23 December 1899, FO 248/707. 34 From Shiraz, 17 December 1899, FO 248/707. 35 Habl al-Matin, Year 7, No. 17, 17 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1317/19 March 1900, pp. 19–20. 36 Ibid. See also Eqbal Yaghma’i, Shahid rah-i azadi Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va’iz-i Isfahani, Tus, Tehran, 2537sh., pp. 6–7. 37 Habl al-Matin, Year 7, No. 30, 18 Safar 1318/18 June 1900, p. 15. 38 Yaghma’i, Shahid, pp. 11–12. 39 Cole, ‘Provincial Politics’, p. 122. 40 From Shiraz, 15 January 1902, FO 248/773. 41 From Shiraz, 12 March 1902, FO 248/773. During the struggle for an assembly in June 1906, Shaikh al-Ra’is took bast in the Ottoman Embassy, where he was sheltered because of his Ottoman Pan-Islamic connections. The Ambassador reported that, ‘We hosted him for fifteen days. Then, after having gained an assurance from the Iranian government regarding his actual and future living conditions, we sent him back to his house.’ Shemsettin Bey to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 Shavval 1324/13 December 1906, No. P1040585-Y.PRK.EȘA.49/83. 42 From Shiraz, 8 July 1903, FO 248/800. 43 Ranjbar, Fars, p. 2. 44 Habl al-Matin, Year 11, No. 6, 20 Rajab 1321/12 October 1903, pp. 6–8. This article is written by ‘Muhammad Riza’. 45 Habl al-Matin, Year 11, No. 39, 27 Rabi‘ II, 1322/11 July 1904, p. 20. 46 From Shiraz, 10 March 1904, 13 April 1904, 24 April 1904, 27 April 1904, FO 248/817. 47 Ranjbar, Fars, p. 1. 48 From Shiraz, 8 June 1904, FO 248/818. 49 His name is given as Sayyid Muhammad in Ranjbar, Fars, p. 12. 50 From Shiraz, 2 January 1905, FO 248/849. 51 From Shiraz, 20 January 1905, FO 248/849. 52 In November 1905 the prices of all necessities in Shiraz were said to have risen recently by 20 per cent. From Shiraz, 18 November 1905, FO 248/850. 53 See, for example, from Shiraz, 18 November 1905, FO 248/850. 54 See from Shiraz, 18 November 1905, FO 248/850. 55 From Shiraz, 4 October 1905, FO 248/850; Bushehr Diary, 15 October 1905, FO 248/844. 56 From Shiraz, 18 November 1905, FO 248/850. 57 From Shiraz, 25 October 1905, FO 248/850. 58 From Shiraz, 25 November 1905, FO 248/850.

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59 From Shiraz, 18 November 1905, FO 248/850. 60 Ranjbar, ‘Junbish’, p. 15. The writer of the dispatch referred to implied that the government needed to provide reinforcements to control the situation. 61 From Shiraz, 18 February 1906, FO 248/849. 62 Martin, Qajar Pact, p. 107. The description in the British source begins, ‘The chorus of women then opened the piece.’ See from Shiraz, 25 November 1905, FO 248/850. 63 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 17, 20 Shavval 1323/18 December 1905, p. 8. 64 From Shiraz, No. 121, 1 December 1905, FO 248/850. 65 From Shiraz, No. 122, 2 December 1905 FO 248/850. 66 Shirazis to the main legations, 29 Shavval 1323/27 December 1905, MFA No. 1323– 14–7–30, cited in Ranjbar, Fars, pp. 10–11. 67 From Shiraz, No. 126, 6 December 1905, FO 248/850. 68 From Shiraz, No. 126, 6 December 1905, FO 248/850. 69 Ranjbar, ‘Junbish’, p. 17. 70 From Shiraz, No. 129, 23 December 1905, FO 248/850. 71 Ranjbar, Fars, pp. 15–16. 72 From Shiraz, 17 January 1906, FO 248/881. 73 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 17, 20 Shavval 1323/18 December 1905, p. 8. 74 From Shiraz, 21 February 1906, FO 248/881. 75 From Shiraz, 7 April 1906, FO 248/881. 76 From Shiraz, No. 40, 9 June 1906, and also Mu‘tamid-i Divan telegram to Shu‘a al-Saltana, enclosure in No. 43, 16 June 1906, FO 248/881. 77 News from Shiraz, 23 June 1906, FO 248/881. 78 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 42, 6 Jamadi I 1324/28 June 1906, p. 21. 79 Persian Gulf Diary, 24 June 1906, FO 248/875. 80 Ranjbar, ‘Junbish’, pp. 24–5. 81 According to Vusuqi, the full name of Mu‘tamid-i Divan was Mirza Hasan Khan Kuvari known as Mu‘tamid-i Divan, and he was first a secretary and then steward of Qavam al-Mulk. See Muhammad Baqir Vusuqi, ‘Parvanda-yi yik tirrur, gusha’i az havadith-i Fars dar junbish-i mashrutiyyat’ Tarikh-i mu‘asir-i Iran, 8, Autumn 1374/1995, p. 86. The British sources imply that he was member of the Qavami clan, see Persian Gulf Diary, 24 March 1907, FO 248/901. See also from Shiraz, 17 July 1907, FO 248/912. Certainly from the way he acted during 1906–8, both points would appear to be correct. 82 Jahangir Qa’im Maqami, Nahzat-i azadikhahi-yi mardum-i Fars dar inqilab-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran, Chapkhaneh-yi Khosheh, Tehran, 1359, pp. 286–7. 83 Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, pp. 395–7. 84 From Shiraz, 4 July 1906, FO 248/881. 85 From Shiraz, 25 July 1906, and No. 55, 28 July 1906, FO 248/881. 86 From Shiraz, 1 August 1906, FO 248/881. 87 From Shiraz, No. 61, 11 August 1906, FO 248/881. 88 From Shiraz, No. 78, 6 October 1906, FO 248/881. 89 From Shiraz, 10 October 1906, FO 248/882. 90 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 October 1906, FO 248/876. 91 From Shiraz, 28 November 1906, FO 248/882. 92 From Shiraz, No. 122 tel. 13 November 1906, FO 248/882. 93 From Shiraz, 22 December 1906, FO 248/882. 94 News from Shiraz, 5 December 1906, FO 248/882. 95 News from Shiraz, 5 December 1906, FO 248/882; and Persian Gulf Diary, to 20 January 1907, FO 248/901. 96 Persian Gulf Diary, to 20 January 1907, FO 248/901.

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5  Isfahan: The Religious Elite and Zill al-Sultan 1 Part of the material for this chapter and Chapter 10 was first published in Iranian Studies, 41, No. 2, April 2008, pp. 153–72. 2 Charles Issawi, The Economic History, p. 28; John Ussher, A Journey from London to Persepolis, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1865, p. 590, puts it at 80,000 which is almost certainly too high. 3 Augustus Henry Mounsey, Journey through the Caucasus and the Interior of Persia, Smith Elder, London, 1872, p. 97. Joseph Arthur de Gobineau made a similar estimate, see Trois ans en Asie, Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1923 edition, p. 229. He noted that there were few Europeans in Isfahan at this time, the mid-nineteenth century. 4 Mirza Husain Khan Tahvildar, Jughrafiyya-yi Isfahan (ed.), Manuchehr Sotudeh, Intisharat-i Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at va Tahqiqat-i Ijtima‘i, Tehran, 1342, p. 65. 5 Ibid., p. 94. 6 Issawi, Economic History, p. 139. 7 Curzon, Persia, pp. 41–4. Houtum Schindler put it at 82,000 in 1893, see. A. K. S. Lambton, ‘Isfahan’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, IV, Leiden, 1978, p. 104. 8 Though he was the Shah’s eldest son, Zill al-Sultan was debarred from the succession to the throne as his mother was not a Qajar. 9 Akhtar, No. 10, 23 Rabi‘ I 1298/23 February 1881, No. 13, 14 Rabi‘ II 1298/16 March 1881, No. 18, 20 Jumadi I 1298/20 April 1881, No. 21, 11 Jumadi II 1298/11 May 1881, No.34, 14 Ramazan 1298/10 August 1881. 10 For a full biography of Zill al-Sultan, see Heidi A. Walcher, Shadow of the King. Isfahan under the Qajars, I.B.Tauris, London, 2008. 11 Ibid., note. 128, p. 372. 12 Ibid., p. 42. 13 No. 116, 28 December 1907, FO 248/905. He wrote that: ‘In Narak for example, there was a community of Babis and Sufis living in perfect harmony with the rest of the population, the only distinction being that they had a separate public bath.’ 14 On Aqa Najafi see Sayyid Muhammd Baqir Kitabi, Rajal-i Isfahan dar ‘ilm va ‘irfan va adab va hunar, Intisharat-i Gulha, Isfahan, 1375, pp. 171–9; Ne‘matollah Mir ‘Azimi, Isfahan zadgah jamal va kamal, Isfahan, 1379, pp. 404–8; Musa Najafi, Hukm-i nafiz-i Aqa Najafi, n.p., 1371; Musa Najafi, Andisha-yi siyasi va tarikhi nahzat-i Haj Aqa Nurullah Isfahani, Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at-i Tarikh-i Mu‘asir, Tehran, 1378 (biography of his brother); Sayyid Muslih al-Din Mahdavi, Tarikh-i ijtima‘i-yi Isfahan dar qarn-i akhar, Qum, 1367, I, pp. 403, 415, 439, 440, 464–8, II, pp. 27–34. 15 Mahdavi, Tarikh, 1367, II, p. 415. 16 Ibid., p. 415. 17 Kitabi, Rajal-i Isfahan, p. 175; No. 62, 17.10.1892, FO 248/548. See Aqa Najafi to Zill al-Sultan, n.d., for an example of his intercession on behalf of the common people. MTM, Q100750. 18 Musa Najafi, Hukm-i nafiz, p. 17. 19 Aqa Najafi to Mushir al-Saltana, 13 Jamadi II 1326/13 July 1908, SAM, No. 03070032, location IAA1N603. The people of Urujan likewise complained to Aqa Najafi as well as Zill al-Sultan over their treatment by their governor, Reza Quli Khan. No. 16, 10 March 1892, FO 248/548. Subsequently the wives of two Bakhtiyari Khans took bast (sanctuary) with Aqa Najafi, who wrote to the Prime Minister on their behalf. No. 57, 6 August 1892, FO 248/548. 20 Musa Najafi, Andisha, p. 23. 21 MTM, Q100818, Aqa Najafi to Zill al-Sultan, n.d. 22 See for example, No. 64, 13 October 1893, FO 248/572, where placards were posted in the bazaar of Isfahan. See also No. 38, 24 August 1898, FO 248/676.

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23 No. 46, 27 June 1892, FO 248/548. 24 No. 12, 22 January 1907, FO 248/905. 25 See for example, MTM, Q100896, Aqa Najafi to Zill al-Sultan, n.d. 26 No. 149, 30 July 1889, and No. 161, 28 August 1889, FO 60/501. In 1893 he sent for the elders of the Jews and required them to justify their belief according to the Torah, and answer his questions. They replied that they were not learned men, and suggested he refer the questions to their leading rabbis in Baghdad and Jerusalem. Aqa Najafi was not placated. He gave them 27 questions, and said if they did not provide satisfactory answers they must either convert to Islam or be killed. He was also again active at this time in persecuting the Babis. No. 63, 13 October 1893, FO 248/527. 27 No. 14, 10 March 1892, FO 248/548. 28 No. 57, 30 September 1893, FO 248/572. 29 No. 49, 15 February 1894, FO 60/557. 30 No. 88, 11 April 1894, FO 60/557. 31 MTM, Q 100970, Aqa Najafi to Zill al-Sultan, n.d. 32 MTM, Q 100754, Aqa Najafi to Zill al-Sultan, n.d. 33 MTM, Q 100935, Aqa Najafi to Zill al-Sultan, n.d. 34 Muhammad Hasan Khan, ‘Itimad al-Saltana, Ruznama- khatirat-i ‘Itimad al-Saltana (ed.), Iraj Afshar, Amir Kabir, Tehran, 1377, p. 769. See also Keddie, Religion, pp. 94–5; Martin, Qajar Pact, p. 84. 35 Ibrahim Safa’i (ed.),, Asnad-i siyasi-yi dauran-i Qajariyya, Babak, Tehran, 2535sh, p. 41. He meant government administration or common law duty. 36 Mirza Ahmad Khan Mirtip in conversation with the British Consul, No. 4, 29 February 1892, FO 248/548. 37 No. 7, 13 February 1892, FO 248/548. 38 Walcher, Shadow of the King, p. 167. 39 No. 3, 21 January 1894, FO 248/596. 40 No. 16, 10 March 1892, and No. 28, 9 April 1892, FO 248/548. 41 See Martin, Islam, p. 28. 42 The term used is milli, which at that time was just coming to convey the idea of national, as in majlis-i shura-yi milli, the national consultative assembly, though few people understood the full meaning of nationalism as such. 43 Enclosure in No. 47, 2 July 1892, FO 248/548. 44 Kashani Sabet, Frontier Fictions, especially p. 10. 45 No. 1, 3 January 1893, FO 248/572. 46 No. 3, 7 January 1893, FO 248/572. 47 No. 5, 14 January 1893, and No. 10, 24 January 1893, FO 248/572. 48 No. 64, 13 October 1893, FO 248/572. 49 Decipher No. 16, 26 October 1893, FO 248/572. 50 Decipher No. 20, 2 November 1893, FO 248/572. 51 Issawi, Economic History, p. 251. 52 No. 6, 26 January 1894, FO 248/596. 53 MFA, 1311 B23 F8 No. 10, 1311. For further details of the company see 1311/1893–4, B23 F8 Nos. 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21. The documents are all dated 1311, except for No. 18, which is dated 1312/1894–5, though it clearly belongs to the same period. The moving spirits were the Malik al-Tujjar of Isfahan, and Aqa Najafi, amongst others. It is also mentioned in No. 38, 8 February 1894, FO 60/557. Unsurprisingly, it was not viewed favourably by the British. 54 No. 5, 15 March 1895, FO 248/616. 55 MFA, 1311/1893–4 B. 23 F8 No. 15/3. 56 MTM, Q 100861, n.d.; and Q 100580, n.d. No. 8, 12 February 1896, FO 248/634.

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57 No. 5, 15 March 1895, FO 248/616; MFA, 1314/1896–7 B28 F2 No. 123, dated 7 Rabi‘ I 1313/28 August 1895. 58 MFA, 1315/1897–8 B31 F6, dated Rajab 1315/November–December 1897. 59 Enclosure in No. 41, 11 February 1894, FO 60/557. 60 Enclosure in No. 41, 11 February 1894, FO 50/557. 61 No. 170, 14 February 1894, and No. 178, 30 February 1894, FO 60/559. 62 Martin, Islam, pp. 43–4. 63 No. 10, 19 February 1896, FO 248/634. 64 No. 8, 12 February 1896, FO 248/634. 65 No. 22, 15 June 1896, FO 248/634. 66 No. 10, 18 June 1900, FO 248/725, and No. 77, 30 December 1905, FO 248/845. 67 No. 20, 6 June and No. 26, 13 June 1903, FO 248/788. For an account of this event see also Sipihr, Mirat al-Vaqayi‘, Part II, p. 27. 68 No. 44, 14 August. 1903 FO/248 788. 69 No. 74, 3 December 1903, FO 248/788, No. 23, 13 June 1904 and No. 53, 2 December 1904, FO 248/820. 70 It was further undermined by the British obliging him to accept the inestimable gift of a pen box, No. 49, 26 October 1904, FO 248/820. 71 No. 21, 20 April 1905, FO 248/845; No. 77, 30 December 1905, FO 248/845. 72 No 58, 9 October 1906, FO 248/877. 73 No. 32, 15 July 1906, FO 248/877. 74 Note that he was also known as Thiqat al-Islam. See Haj Aqa Nurallah Najafi Isfahani, Risala-yi mukalimat-i muqim va musafir (ed.), Musa Faqih Haqani, Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at-i Tarikh-i Mu‘asir, Tehran, 1384, p. 7. 75 For Afghani, see Nikki R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal al-Din “Al-Afghani” A Political Biography, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972. 76 No. 44, 14 August 1903, FO 248/788. 77 Sayyid Asadallah Rasa, Qiyam-i Ayatallah Haj Aqa Nurallah Najafi Isfahani, Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at-i Tarikh-i Mu‘asir, Tehran, 1384, p. 20. 78 No. 2, 21 January 1894, FO 248/596. 79 For further details see Martin, Qajar Pact, pp. 86–7. 80 No. 22 and No. 23, 30 August 1895, FO 248/616. 81 See also Mohammed Reza, ‘Askarani, Naqsh-i mardum-i Isfahan dar nahzat-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran, Nashr-i Nivishta, Isfahan, 1384, pp. 35–42; and No. 14, 9 March 1899, FO 248/699. 82 Soheila Torabi Farsani, Tujjar, mashrutiyyat, va daulat-i mudirn, Nashr-i Tarikh-Iran, Tehran, 1384, pp. 80–3. 83 No. 17, 6 December 1900, FO 248/723. 84 Najafi, Andisha, p. 17; see also Davud Amini, ‘Barasi-yi naqsh-i Haj Aqa Nurallah Najafi Isfahani dar inqilab-i mashrutiyyat va rahbari-yi mashruta-khahan-i Isfahan’, Ganjina-yi asnad, faslnama-yi tahqiqat-i tarikhi, No. 62, Year 16, Part 2, Summer 1385, pp. 30–1. 85 Najafi, Andisha, pp. 17–18. 86 No. 58, 4 November 1905 FO 248/845 and No. 23, 14 June 1906, FO 248/877. 87 No. 10, 24 February 1906, FO 248/877. 88 No. 38, 18 August 1906, FO 248/877. 89 Robert Michael Burrell, Aspects of the Reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah of Persia 1896–1907, Ph.D., SOAS, London University, 1979, p. 245. 90 No. 49, 27 September 1906, FO 248/877; No. 78, 5 December 1906, FO 248/877. 91 ‘Askarani, Naqsh-i mardum, p. 120. 92 No. 40, 10 September 1906, FO 248/877; No. 81, 28 December 1906, FO 248/877.

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93 No. 63, 31 October 1906, FO 248/877. The same argument about constitutionalism being rooted in the laws of Islam was used by secular reformers to win round religious opinion. See, for example, Malkum Khan, in Bakhash, Monarchy, p. 327. 94 See Najafi, Andisha, pp. 173–6 for the text. Note that it is not clear what he meant by equality. 95 Walcher, Shadow of the King, pp. 85–6. 96 See receipt, for subscription No. 33, dated 1317/1899, Torfehnejhad Private Archive, Isfahan. 97 No. 4, 29 January 1892, FO 248/548. 98 Walcher, Shadow of the King, p. 43. 99 Ibid., p. 43. 100 Eqbal Yaghma’i, Shahid rah-yi azadi Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va‘iz Isfahani, Tus, Tehran, 2537sh, p. 5. 101 Shahnavaz, Britain, p. 80. 102 See Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va‘iz Isfahani, Ru’ya-yi sadiqa – libas al-taqva (ed.), Sadeq Sajjadi, Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, Tehran, 1363, pp. 5–8. Sajjadi says Ru’ya-yi sadiqa was published after Ramazan 1316, see p. 8. 103 Yaghma’i, Shahid, pp. 12–13. 104 See Session 18, 6 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1324/22 December 1906, and Session 22, 13 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1324/29 December 1906, MMajlis. 105 See Session 24, 18 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1324/3 January 1907, and Session 36, 12 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/27 January 1907, MMajlis. 106 Walcher, Shadow of the King, p. 291. 6  Development and Reform in the South 1 See, for example, Shahnavaz, Britain, pp. 10, 185–7. 2 A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 1820–1990, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 1–11. 3 Issawi, Economic History, p. 83. 4 Shahnavaz, Britain, p. 78. 5 See No. 79, 30 September 1892, FO 248/544. 6 Issawi, Economic History, pp. 166–7. 7 On the development of ports and their role as cultural and economic mediators, see David Cesarani, Port Jews. Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres 1550–1950, Frank Cass, London, 2002, especially pp. 2–8. 8 Issawi, Economic History, pp. 170–4. 9 Walcher, Shadow of the King, pp. 73–4. 10 Ibid., p. 75. 11 Ibid., pp. 75–6. 12 Ibid., p. 388 quoting Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Calcutta 1915, I, part II A, pp. 1728–9. 13 Issawi, Economic History, p. 172. 14 No. 114, 16 October 1903, FO 248/787. 15 No. 31, 28 March 1898, FO 248/672, with reference to the Tangistanis. The same was also true of the Bakhtiyari. 16 No. 62, Mohammareh Diary, 28 August to 3 September 1896, FO 248/631. 17 No. 63, Mohammareh Diary, 4 to 10 September 1896, FO 248/631. 18 See Sayyid Ja‘far Hamidi, Bushihr dar mutbu‘at-i ‘asr-i Qajar, Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at-i Tarikh-i Mu‘asir, Tehran, 1378, pp. 106–9. 19 Ibid., pp. 103–6.

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20 Ibid., p. 133. 21 Ibid., pp. 106–9, 113–16. 22 Ibid., p. 107. 23 Mushir al-Daula to Ghulam Husain ibn ‘Abdul Rasul and others, 1322–12–9, No. 175, 25 Dhi al-Hijja 1322/ 2 March 1905, MFA. 1322-B12-F9, No. 175, and B12-F9-No. 176, MFA. The latter document is dated 25 Dhi al-Hijja 1322/2 March 1905. 24 Hamidi, Bushihr, pp. 118–19. 25 Ibid., p. 133. 26 Ibid., p. 103. See Muzaffari, Year 1, No. 1, 1 Shavval 1319/11 January 1902. It was preceded by a paper called Miftahuzzafar published in Calcutta, which was reported as subject to a ban by the Iranian government, along with Habl al-Matin between 2 and 21 December 1899. No. 26, 2 December 1899, and No. 139, 30 December 1899, FO 248/695. 27 Bushehr Diary, No. 110, 29 July 1904, FO 248/818. 28 Hamidi, Bushihr, p. 103. 29 Muzaffari, Year 1, No. 21, 15 Sha‘ban 1320/17 November 1902, pp. 334–5. 30 Muzaffari, Year 4, No. 2, 29 Dhi al-Hijja 1322/2 March 1905, p. 11. 31 Muzaffari, Year 4, No 20, 1 Ramazan 1323/30 October 1905, p. 14. 32 See No. 139, 30 December 1899, FO 248/695. 33 See Habl al-Matin, Year 10, No. 12, 21 Ramazan 1320/22 December 1902, p. 5, for an example, a letter from a ‘Vatanparast-i Irani’. 34 On quarantine see Thuraya, Year 2, No. 2, 23 Jamadi II 1317/29 October 1899, p. 7, and on the Shirakat-i Islami see Thuraya, Year 2, No. 29, 2 Rabi‘ I 1318/30 June 1900, p. 11. 35 Thuraya, Year 2, No. 34, 29 Rabi‘ II 1318/26 August 1900, p. 10. 36 Habl al-Matin, Year 11, No. 11, 25 Sha‘ban 1321/16 November 1903, pp. 15–16. In addition to such letters, there were also regular reports of events in Bushehr. 37 Habl al-Matin, Year 13, No. 31, 11 Safar 1324/6 April 1906, pp. 4–5. 38 Hamidi, Bushihr, pp. 120–1. 39 Muzaffari, Year 4, No. 8, 20 Rabi‘ I 1323/25 May 1905, p. 16. 40 Ahwaz Diary, No. 31, 29 January 1906, FO 248/875. See also Martin, Islam, p. 54. 41 See Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, Sadid al-Saltana, Safarnama-yi Sadid al-Saltana (ed.), Ahmad Iqtidari, Intisharat Bihnashr, Tehran, 1362, pp. 21–4; Reza Dashti, Tarikh-i iqtisadi-ijtma‘i-yi Bushihr dar daura-yi Qajariyya ba takiyya bar naqsh-i tujjar va tijarat, Mu’assisa-yi Farhangi va Intisharati-yi Pazina,Tehran 1380, pp. 175–8. 42 Sadid al-Saltana, Safarnama, p. 21. 43 The British referred to them as ‘arcades amis’ (presumably meaning boon companions) and described their relations as mysterious, see Kennedy to Ross, 6 November 1890, FO 248/502. Sadid al-Saltana comments in 1896 that he was around 50, Sadid al-Saltana, Safirnama, p. 21. 44 Mirza Muhsin Khan Mushir al-Daula to Midhat al-Vuzara, 19 Jamadi I 1318/5 May 1901, 1318–13–8, No. 41, MFA. 45 Sadid al-Saltana, Safarnama, p. 301. 46 Husain Quli Khan Nizam al-Saltana Mafi, Khatirat va asnad, M. Mafi, M. Ettehadieh, S. Sa‘dvandiyan, and H. Ram Pisha (eds), Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, Tehran 1362, I, pp. 154–5. 47 Mohammareh Diary, 2 June 1893, FO 248/567. 48 No. 29, 18 Apr. 1896, FO 248/630; No. 75, 31 October 1896, FO 248/631. 49 No. 40, 12 May 1896, FO 248/630. 50 Amin al-Sultan to Mushir al-Daula, tel. from Marienbad, 19 September 1900, 1318B13-F8, No. 57, MFA.

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51 1318-B13-F8, Nos. 5–6, 8 Ramazan 1318/ 30 December 1900, and No. 20, n.d., MFA. 52 1318-B13-F8, Nos. 2 and 3, 7 Dhi al-Hijja 1318/ 28 March 1901, MFA. 53 No. 17, 27 January 1906, FO 248/875. 54 Bushehr Diary, to 21 June 1902, FO 248/761. 55 No. 171, 15 December 1902, FO 248/761. 56 No. 29, 21 March 1903, FO 248/786. 57 No. 81, 23 June 1905, FO 248/843. 58 Bushehr Diary, to 12 February 1905, FO 248/842. 59 No. 81, 23 June 1905, FO 248/843 and No. 89, FO 248/843, 8 July 1905. 60 Persian Gulf Diary, to 12 November 1905, FO 248/844. See also Muzaffari, Year 4, No. 23, 20 Shavval 1323/18 December 1905, p. 16. 61 Ahwaz Diary, No. 30, 16 January 1906, and No. 17, 27 January 1906, FO 248/875. 62 No. 81, 23 June 1905, FO 248/843. 63 No 71, 11 July 1891, FO 248/524. 64 For more details see Nouraei and Martin, ‘Karguzar and Foreign Relations’, pp. 151–63. 65 Torabi Farsani, Tujjar, p. 76. 66 Talbot to Lascelles, 22 January 1892, FO 248/543. 67 Talbot to Lascelles 19 March 1892, FO 248/543. 68 No. 68, 10 August 1893, FO 248/567. 69 Enclosure 3 August 1893 in No. 67, 10 August 1893, FO 248/567; Mohammareh Diary, 16 to 22 March 1894, FO 248/590. 70 No. 33, 14 April 1894, FO 248/590. 71 Mu‘in al-Tujjar to Sadr ‘Azam in No. 4, 8 March 1895, FO 248/609. 72 No. 44, 27 June 1895, FO 248/610. 73 No. 24 Mohammareh, 22 March 1902, FO 248/760. 74 No. 17, 1 February 1904, FO 248/817. 75 No. 50, 11 April 1904, FO 248/817; No. 102, 29 July 1905, enclosing Ahwaz Diary, No. 20 of 19 July 1905, FO 248/843. 76 Ahwaz Diary, No. 31, 29 January 1906, FO 248/875. 77 Persian Gulf Diary, 24 December and 7 January 1905, FO 248/875. 78 Persian Gulf Diary, 14 January 1906, FO 248/875. 79 Persian Gulf Diary, 18 March 1906, FO 248/875. 80 Persian Gulf Diary, 24 June and 22 July 1906, FO 248/875. He was to return on 19 August, Persian Gulf Diary, 26 August 1906, FO 248/876. 81 Persian Gulf Diary, 5 August and 19 August 1906, FO 248/876. 82 Persian Gulf Diary, 12 August 1906, FO 248/876. 83 No. 95, 26 August 1906, and Persian Gulf Diary, 19 and 26 August 1906, FO/248/876. 84 Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, pp. 574, 591. 85 Persian Gulf Diary, 12 August 1906, FO 248/876. 86 Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, pp. 597, 626. Nazim al-Islam expressed regret at the continuation of such methods. 87 Persian Gulf Diary, 23 September 1906, FO 248/876. 88 Persian Gulf Diary, 9 September 1906, FO 248/876. 89 Persian Gulf Diary, 7 October 1906, FO 248/876. 90 Persian Gulf Diary, 14 October 1906, FO 248/876. 91 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 October 1906, FO 248/876. 92 Persian Gulf Diary, 2 December 1906, FO 248/876. 93 Persian Gulf Diary 23 December1906, FO 248/876. 94 Persian Gulf Diary, 2 December 1906, FO 248/876. 95 Persian Gulf Diary, 2 December 1906, FO 248/876.

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96 The incident is recounted in reports from the karguzar and the governor of Bushehr dated 9 and 14 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1314/11 and 16 April 1897, and 19 Dhi al-Hijja 1314/21 May 1897, 1314-B29-F9-No. 86, 1314-B29-F9-No. 20 and 1314-B29-F9-No. 16, MFA; and No. 65, 26 June 1897, FO 248/650. 7  Constitutional Development, Local Government and the Role of Islam 1 See Browne, Revolution; Lockhart, ‘The Constitutional Laws’, pp. 372–88; Amanat, ‘Intellectual Background’, pp. 163–76; Arjomand, ‘The Constitution’, pp. 187–92; and Afary, ‘Civil Liberties’, pp. 341–59; Vanessa Martin, ‘State, Power and Long Term Trends in the Iranian Constitution of 1906 and its Supplement of 1907’, Middle Eastern Studies, London, 47, No. 3, 2011, pp. 461–78. 2 On the ‘ulama as na’ib-i ‘amm at this period see Martin, Islam, chapter 1. 3 See Abbas Amanat, The Pivot of the Universe, I.B.Tauris, London and New York 1997, pp. 58–9, 70–3 for more details on the duties of rulers in the Qajar period; see Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, transl. H. Darke, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978, on the abiding principles of rulership in Islam. 4 Abbas Amanat, ‘From ijtihad to wilayat-i faqih: The Evolution of the Shi‘ite Legal Authority to Political Power’, in Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel (eds), Shari‘a Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007, p. 121. 5 On the most advanced arguments on this subject, those of Mirza Muhammad Husain Na’ini, see Abdul Hadi Hairi, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1977. For a discussion on the Shi‘i juristic approach as a whole see Amir Hassan Boozari, Shi‘i Jurisprudence and Constitution, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011. 6 Boozari, Jurisprudence, pp. 62–3, quoting Akhund Khurasani. 7 Gheissari, ‘Rights’, p 73. 8 Ibid., p. 73. 9 Ibid., pp. 70–2. 10 Boozari, Jurisprudence, pp. 50–1. 11 Ibid., pp. 53–8. 12 Ibid., p. 61. See also Vanessa Martin, ‘Murder in Bushehr in 1844: the Case of Bibi Asilu’, IRAN, 46, 2008, pp. 285–92. 13 Boozari, Jurisprudence, pp. 118, 121. 14 Shemsettin Bey to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 Shavval 1324/13 December 1906, No. P1040585-Y.PRK.EȘA.49/83. For an account of the movement see Martin, Islam, pp. 61–4, 69–76, 87–100. 15 Ibid. 16 According to the Ottoman Ambassador, they considered that it was no longer legally permissible (ja’iz) for them to remain in Tehran. Shemsettin Bey to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 Shavval 1324/13 December 1906, No. P1040585-Y. PRK.EȘA.49/83. 17 Mateo Farzaneh, Prospects of Constitutionalism in Iran and the Role of the Shi‘ite Clerics, paper delivered at the University of California Santa Barbara, 2 March 2012. I am grateful to Dr Farzaneh for sending me a copy of this paper. 18 Translation taken in part from Browne, Revolution, pp. 353–4; see also Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, pp. 551–2. 19 Nazim al-Islam, Bidari, I, pp. 546–7. 20 Ibid., p. 558. 21 Daulatabadi, Tarikh, II, pp. 86–8.

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22 See Browne, Revolution, p. 124, and pp. 355–61. 23 Amanat, ‘Intellectual Background’, p. 170. 24 Martin, Islam, p. 102. 25 Ibid., p. 103. 26 Mahdi Quli Hidayat Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat va Khatarat, Zavvar, Tehran, 1375, p. 145. The date Mukhbir al-Saltana gives for this point, Shavval 1324/December– January 1906, cannot be correct as Mustashar al-Daula had not yet arrived in Tehran by 24 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/8 February 1907. See Iraj Afshar (ed.), Khatirat va asnad-i Mustashar-i Daula Sadiq majmu‘a-yi avval, Firdausi, Tehran, 1361, pp. 25–6. 27 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, p. 147. 28 Amanat, ‘Intellectual Background’, p. 170. 29 Gheissari, ‘Rights’, p. 71. 30 Ibid., p. 72. 31 For the full text see Browne, Revolution, pp. 362–71. 32 Ibid., p. 134. 33 Boozari, Jurisprudence, p. 48. 34 Afary, ‘Civil Liberties’, p. 349, quoting Muzakirat-i Majlis, 7 Zhu’l Qa‘da 1324. 35 Fereydoun Adamiyyat, Idi’uluzhi-yi nahzat-i mashrutiyyat-i Iran, Payam, Tehran, 2535sh., pp. 389. 36 Browne, Revolution, p. 363. 37 Ibid., p. 362. 38 Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 138. 39 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Khatirat, pp. 147–8. He advised the Shah against mashru‘a on the grounds that it would ‘give rights to the akhunds’. In the exchange he benefited from the support of ‘Azad al-Mulk, the head of the Qajar tribe. No. 38, 27 February 1907, FO 371/301, No. 7801. 40 Martin, Islam, p. 115. 41 Lockhart, ‘Constitutional Laws’, p. 382; Afary, ‘Civil Liberties’, p. 341. 42 Martin, Islam, p. 117. The term ‘Fundamental Law’ comes from the then concern with justice and the rule of law, and was intended to be anti-absolutist, though not anti-monarchist, and protective of the rights of the nation. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 27. 43 On his struggle against the Supplementary Fundamental Law, see Martin, Islam, chapter 5. 44 Boozari, Jurisprudence, p. 112. Boozari interprets his view according to Mirza Muhammad Na’ini as being that the generally inclusive and consultative nature of constitutionalism means that every citizen has the right to control government through decision making. Therefore they have the right to be treated equally according to the law. Ibid., p. 121. 45 Martin, Islam, p. 123. 46 See ‘Ata Ahmadi, ‘Mu‘arifi-yi yik sanad-i tarikhi: (didgah-i sahib-i “‘Urvat al-vuthqa” raji‘ bih mutammim-i qanun-i asasi-yi mashruta)’, Ganjina-yi asnad, Faslnama-yi tahqiqat-i tarikhi, No. 62, Year 16, Part 2, Summer 1385, pp. 55–67. 47 See Martin, Islam, pp. 143–9. 48 Boozari, Jurisprudence, p. 48. 49 The full text is given in Browne, Revolution, pp. 372–84. 50 Ibid., pp. 381–2. 51 Afary, ‘Civil Liberties’, pp. 353–6. 52 Session 68, 29 Safar 1325/14 April 1907, MMajlis, Muzakarat-i Majlis Luh-i mashruh, muzakirat-i majalis-i shura-yi milli va Islami, Tehran. It was mentioned as due to go to the Shah for approval in Session 79, 20 Rabi‘ I 1325/3 May 1907;

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it was referred to as sent out to the provincial governors in Session 103, 1 Jamadi I 1325/12 June 1907; and it was confirmed as printed and sent to the provinces by Ahsan al-Daula in Session 122, 5 Jamadi II 1325/16 July 1907. In fact it arrived at different times and by different means. It had been received in Shiraz by 4 July 1907, and part of it was published in Nida-yi Islam in No. 22, 23 Jamadi I 1325/4 July 1907, pp. 1–3. 53 Iran was divided for this purpose into four provinces, Azarbaijan, Fars, Khorasan and Kerman. For example, Tabriz was the capital of Azarbaijan, and Shiraz of Fars. Bushehr came under Fars. 54 Reza Mokhtari Esfahani, ‘Municipalities and Constitutionalism in Iran’, transl. Kouross Esmaeli, in Chehabi, H. E. and Vanessa Martin (eds), Iran’s Constitutional Revolution. Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections, I.B.Tauris, London, 2010, p. 105. 55 Ibid., pp. 99, 102. 56 Ibid., pp. 102–3. 57 Ibid., pp. 104–5. 8  Tabriz: Islam, Radicalisation and Class Struggle

1 No. 3, 11 January 1907, FO 248/913. 2 No. 4, 11 January 1907, FO 248/913. 3 No. 10 tel., 11 February 1907, FO 248/913. 4 No. 8, 16 February 1907, FO 248/913. 5 No. 17, 30 March, 1 April, and No. 29 tel. 19 April 1907, FO 248/913. 6 No. 5, 11 January 1907, FO 248/913. Mustashar al-Daula says he and six others travelled to Tehran together. Iraj Afshar (ed.), Khatirat va asnad-i Mustashar al-Daula Sadiq, majmu‘a-yi avval, yaddashtha-yi tarikhi va siyasi, Firdausi, Intisharat-i Iran va Islam, Tehran, 1361, p. 25. Details of the numbers of votes for each deputy in the preliminary elections are given in the newspaper Umid, Year 1, No. 4, 7 Shavval 1324/ 24 November 1906, p. 4. 7 According to Kasravi, he had been elected because of his previous endeavours and his writings, but he turned the opportunity down. He is purported to have said that, ‘An Iran that has so far been the prisoner of the two horned bull of absolutism now faces the thousand horned rabble, if its administration is not capable’. Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 218. 8 He was in Egypt when he was elected in his absence, and he went straight to Tehran so he was already there when the others arrived, Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 218. 9 No. 7. 31 January 1907, FO 248/913. 10 Session 33, 7 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/22 January 1907, MMajlis. 11 No. 5, 11 January 1907, FO 248/913. 12 Mansoureh Ettehadieh (Nezam-Mafi), Majlis va intikhabat az mashruta ta payan-i Qajariyya, Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, Tehran, 1375, p. 106. She also remarks that the elections were not conducted according to the regulations. 13 Naqi Azar Moqadam (ed.), Vaqayi‘-i mashrutiyyat bih ravayat-i namaha-yi Sayyid Riza bih Haj Mirza Aqa-yi Farshi, Yaran, Tabriz, 1386, p. 33. 14 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 38, 18 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/2 February 1907, pp. 3–4. In this chapter the title Anjuman (in italics) refers throughout to the newspaper of that name published in Tabriz, and the name Anjuman refers to the Tabriz council. 15 No. 7, 31 January 1907, FO 248/913. 16 No. 8, 16 February 1907, FO 248/913. 17 No. 16, 23 March 1907, FO 248/913. 18 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 212.

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19 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 59, 11 Safar 1325/26 March 1907, p. 2. 20 No. 19, 15 April 1907, FO 248/913. 21 Umid, Year 1, No, 6, 21 Shavval 1324/8 December 1906, p. 4. 22 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 41, 25 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/9 February 1907, p. 4. See also Umid, Year 1, No. 8, 5 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1324/ 21 December 1906, p. 4. 23 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 67, 6 Rabi‘ I 1325/19 April 1907, p. 4. 24 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 123, 14 Rajab 1325/23 August 1907, p. 3. 25 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 136, 10 Sha‘ban 1325/18 September 1907, p. 2. 26 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 38, 18 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/2 February 1907, p. 4. On this point the villagers of Azarbaijan were in advance of those in the south. However, they may be compared with those of Palestine in the early 1920s, who did the same. See ‘Disturbances in May 1921. Report of the Commission of Inquiry’, HMSO, 1921, p. 12, The National Archives, Britain. 27 See, for example, Anjuman, Year 1, No. 73, 20 Rabi‘ I 1325/3 May 1907, p. 1. 28 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 59, 11 Safar 1325/26 March 1907, p. 1. 29 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 39, 20 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/4 February 1907, pp. 1–2. 30 Ibid., p.2. 31 Ibid. 32 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 40, 23 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/7 February 1907, p. 1. 33 For example, in April 1907 the Anjuman telegraphed the Majlis about the difficulties of the people of Kerman, Session 60, 15 Safar 1325/10 April 1907, MMajlis. 34 No. 7, 31 January 1907, FO 248/913. 35 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 42, 27 Dhi al-Hijja 1324/11 February 1907, p. 1. 36 No. 8, 16 February 1907, FO 248/913. 37 No. 14, 6 March 1907, FO 248/913. 38 No. 16, 23 March 1907, FO 248/913. 39 No. 8, 16 February 1907, FO 248/913. 40 Afary, Revolution, p. 82. 41 No. 19, 14 April 1907, FO 248/913. 42 The political nature of these flags is not clear, but it should not be assumed they were socialist. 43 Afary, Revolution, pp. 84, 86. 44 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 268–70; Afary, Revolution, p. 80. Although Afary associates these clerics with the social democrats, there is no indication their vision was other than religious, though they appear to have been influenced by ideas on social justice. 45 No. 7, 31 January, and summary of 26 May 1907, FO 248/913. 46 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 269. 47 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 75, 23 Rabi‘ I 1325/6 May 1907, pp. 1–2. 48 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 269–70. 49 No. 7, 31 January, 19 May, and 25 May 1907, FO 248/913. 50 Sohrab Yazdani, Mujahidan-i mashruta, Nashr-i Nai, Tehran, 1388, pp. 54–5. 51 Session 83, 27 Rabi‘ I 1325/20 June 1907, MMajlis. 52 No. 19, 15 April 1907, FO 248/913. 53 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 61, 16 Safar 1325/31 March 1907, p. 3. Not only were the roads affected by the lawlessness and problems with the local tribes, but also the provincial towns and villages. See for the example of Khalkhal, Sayyed Mohammad Ma‘sud Naqib, Khalkhal va mashahir, Mahd-i Azadi, Tabriz, 1377, p. 42. 54 Wratislaw to Marling, 20 April 1907, FO 248/913. 55 Wratislaw to Spring Rice, 9 April 1907, and 11 April 1907, FO 248/913. 56 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 273. 57 Sohrab Yazdani, Mujahidan , pp. 65–6.

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Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 273. Ibid., p. 274. No. 19, 15 April 1907, FO 248/913. Tabriz summary, 21 April 1907, FO 248/913. Tabriz summary, 21 April 1907, FO 248/913; Anjuman, Year 1, No. 71, 15 Rabi‘ I 1325/28 April 1907, pp. 2–3 gives a detailed description of the disturbances. 62 Azar Moqadam (ed.), Mashrutiyyat, p. 106. 63 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 71, 15 Rabi‘ I 1325/28 April 1907, p. 3. See also Kasravi, (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 245–6. 64 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 281–2. 65 Ibid. p. 282. 66 Tabriz summary, 21 April 1907, FO 248/913. 67 Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, p. 281. 68 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 71, 15 Rabi‘ I 1325/28 April 1907, pp. 3–4; Tabriz summary, 28 April 1907, FO 248/913. 69 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 72, 18 Rabi‘ I 1325/1 May 1907, p. 1. 70 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 72, pp. 1, 3, and No. 73, 20 Rabi‘ I 1325/3 May 1907, p. 1. 71 See Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashruta-yi Iran, Amir Kabir, Tehran, 2535sh., p. 375. 72 Hermann, ‘Thiqat al-Islam’, p. 156. 73 Ibid., p. 159. 74 Ibid., p. 163. 75 Rasool Jafarian, ‘Imkan ya imtina‘-i tarkib mashruta ba mashru‘a’, in Jarayanha-yi fikri-yi mashrutiyyat, Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at va Pazhuhishha-yi Siyasi, Tehran, 1386, pp. 138–9. 76 Hermann, ‘Thiqat al-Islam’, pp. 166–7. 77 Tabriz summary, 21 April 1907, FO 248/913. 78 Tabriz summary, 21 April and 5 May 1907, FO 248/913. 79 Tabriz summary, 5 May 1907, FO 248/813: Afary, Revolution, p. 80. 80 Tabriz summary, 5 May 1907, FO 248/813. 81 Naqib, Khalkhal, pp. 43–4. 82 Afary, Revolution, p. 169. 83 Ibid., p. 170. 84 Document No. 006000069, in two parts dated respectively 26 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325/31 December 1907 and 29 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325/3 January1908, Tabriz, SAM. 85 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 75, 23 Rabi‘ I 1325/6 May 1907, p. 1. 86 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 103, 11 Jamadi I 1325/22 June 1907, p. 2. 87 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 108, 26 Jamadi I 1325/7 July 1907, p. 4. 88 No. 32 tel., 7 May and No. 34 tel. 10 May 1907, FO 248/913. 89 No. 37 tel., 15 May 1907, FO 248/913. Kasravi, Mashruta, 2535sh., p. 390. 90 Tabriz summary, 6 May 1907, FO 248/913. 91 Siroos Baradaran-Shokoohy has made a study of the role of women in the revolution in Tabriz, see his article, ‘Nishaniha’i az bidari va naqsh-i zan dar nahzat-i mashruta az khilal-i ruznama-yi Anjuman’, Nashriyya-yi Danishkada-yi Adabiyyat va ‘ ulum-i insani, Danishgah-i Tabriz, Year 36, No. 148–9, Autumn and Winter, 1372, especially p. 15. 92 Tabriz summary, 26 May 1907, FO 248/913. 93 Tabriz summary, 23 June 1907, FO 248/913. 94 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 106, 20 Jamadi I 1325/1 July 1907, p. 2. 95 Stevens to Spring Rice, 23 May 1907, FO 248/913. Tabriz summary, 26 May 1907, FO 248/913. 96 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 81, 3 Rabi‘ II 1325/16 May 1907, p. 2. 97 Ibid., p. 3. 98 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 82, 5 Rabi‘ II 1325/18 May 1907, pp. 2–3.

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99 Reza Hamraz, ‘Panj nama az Shaikh Salim’, in Reza Hamraz (ed.), Sairi dar tarikh-i inqilab-i mashrutiyyat, ta’thir-i qiyam-i mardum-i Tabriz va Azarbaijan dar piruzihayi inqilab-i mashrutiyyat, Yaran, Tabriz, 1387, p. 166. 100 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 84, 7 Rabi‘ II 1325/20 May 1907, p. 1. 101 Musa Haqani, ‘Tihran va Tabriz: du kanun pur iltihab-i mashrutiyyat’, Tarikh-i mu‘asir-i Iran, Year 3, No. 10, Summer 1378, p. 198, quoting a letter from Ghulam Husain from Tabriz to Sayyid Muhammad Mujtahid Yazdi (a member of the ‘ulama of Tehran), dated 1325, mentioning an announcement by the ‘mujahidin of Azarbaijan’ against those who supported mashruta-yi mashru‘a. 102 Tabriz summary, 9 June 1907, FO 248/913. 103 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 95, 26 Rabi‘ II 1325/ 8 June 1907, p. 4, and No. 96, 28 Rabi‘ II, 1325/10 June 1907, p. 1; Tabriz summary, 9 June 1907, FO 248/913. 104 Stevens to Spring Rice, 23 May 1907, FO 248/913. The deputies in the Majlis tended to underestimate the role of the bread crisis in the disturbances, and to blame Caucasian anarchists unduly. However, the latter were not as influential as has been supposed. 105 No. 58 tel., 21 June 1907, and Tabriz summary, 23 June 1907, FO 248/913. 106 Kasravi, Mashruta, 2535sh, p. 391. 107 Tabriz summary, 27 October 1907, FO 248/913. 108 Kasravi, Mashruta, 2535sh, p. 391 109 See, for example, Tabriz summary, 9 and 23 June 1907, FO 248/913. 110 Kasravi, Mashruta, 2535sh., pp. 393–4. 111 Tabriz summary, 21 October 1907, FO 248/913. 112 Kasravi, Mashruta, p. 393. 113 Tabriz summary, 9 June and 23 June 1907, FO 248/913. 114 Tabriz summary, 30 June 1907, FO 248/913. 115 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 63, 22 Safar 1325/6 April 1907, pp. 2–3. 116 Hermann, ‘Thiqat al-Islam’, p. 162; Martin, Islam and Modernism, pp. 183–5. 117 Denis Hermann, ‘Le rôle d’Ākhūnd Khurāsānī au cours du mouvement constitutionnaliste’, Middle Eastern Studies, forthcoming, 2013. Hermann mentions that Khurasani did not produce any treatise on constitutionalism as such, but that he was a profound influence on Shaikh Muhammad Isma’il Garavi Mahallati, whose treatise Al-liali al-marbuta fi wujub al-mashruta most likely reflects his views. The text of this treatise is given in Gholam Hosein Zargari-Nezhad (ed.), Rasa’il-i mashrutiyyat, Kavir, Tehran, 1374, pp. 489–94. On Muhammad Husain Naini, see Hairi, Shi‘ism. 118 Gholam Hosein Zargari Nejhad, ‘Mashruta az nigah-i Akhund Khurasani’, Jarayanha-yi fikri-yi mashrutiyyat, Mu’assisa-yi Mutala‘at va Pazhuhishha-yi Siyasi, Tehran, 1386, pp. 149–53. 119 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 63, 22 Safar 1325/6 April 1907, p. 2. 120 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 111, 11 Jamadi II 1325/22 July 1907, pp. 3–4. 121 1ZA5Ch344, No. 296012801, no date, SAM. 122 Azar Moqadam, Mashrutiyyat, pp. 316–17. 123 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 126, 19 Rajab 1325/28 August 1907, pp. 1–2. No. 100 tel., 10 September, Tabriz summary, 14 September and 6 October 1907, FO 248/13; Kasravi, Mashruta 2535sh, p. 466; Azar Moqadam, Mashrutiyyat, p. 307. His assassin, ‘Abbas Aqa, a young man aged about 22, was one of the mujahidin, and came from a merchant family in Azarbaijan, see Afary, Revolution, p. 112. 124 Mujahid, Year 1, No. 3, 22 Sha‘ban 1325/30 September 1907, p. 1. Both the Messiah and Khizr appear frequently in Persian poetic texts, and represent religious figures of great eminence. 125 Ettehadieh, Intikhabat, p. 97. 126 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 147, 28 Sha‘ban 1325/6 October 1907, p. 1.

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127 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 146, 27 Sha‘ban 1325/5 October 1907, pp. 3–4. 128 See Martin, Islam, pp. 139–42. 129 No. 1ZA1A407, 296000304, 25 Rajab 1325/3 September 1907, SAM. 130 On the Provincial and District Council section of the Law, see Browne, Revolution, pp. 382–3. See Chapter 7 for its regulations in detail. 131 No. 14, 6 March, 1907, FO 248/913. 132 Tabriz summary 27 October 1907, FO 248/913. 133 Tabriz summary, 27 October 1907, FO 248/913. 134 Wratislaw to Marling, 6 November 1907, FO 248/913. The term fida’iyan tended at this point to be used to mean armed supporters of the revolution from either the Caucasus or from Azarbaijan outside the Tabriz area. 135 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 71, 15 Rabi‘ I 1325/28 April 1907, p. 3. 136 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 72, 18 Rabi‘ I 1325/1 May 1907, p. 2. 137 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 107, 24 Jamadi I 1325/5 July 1907, p. 4. 138 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 112, 13 Jamadi II 1325/24 July 1907, pp. 1–2, 4. 139 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 119, 7 Rajab 1325/16 August 1907, p. 3. 140 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 123, 14 Rajab 1325/ 23 August 1907, pp 1–2. 141 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 125, 17 Rajab 1325/26 August 1907, pp. 2–3. 142 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 131, 1 Sha‘ban 1325/9 September 1907, p. 4. 143 Anjuman, Year 1, No. 138, 14 Sha‘ban 1325/22 September 1907, p. 1. 144 Tabriz summary, 14 October and 21 October 1907, FO 248/913. 145 Tabriz summary, 21 October and 27 October 1907, FO 248/913. 146 Azar Moqadam, Mashrutiyyat, p. 393. 147 Kasravi, Mashruta 2535sh, p. 494. 148 Ibid., p. 494. 149 No. 20 tel., 20 December 1907, FO 248/913. 150 Sayyid Ahmad Tafrishi Husaini, Ruznama-yi akhbar-i mashrutiyyat va inqilab-i Iran (ed.), Iraj Afshar, Amir Kabir, Tehran, 1386, p. 53. 151 Azar Moqadam, Mashrutiyyat, p. 507. 152 See discussions in Anjuman, Year 2, No. 25, 24 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325/29 December 1907, pp. 2–3. 153 Afary, Revolution, p. 134. 154 No. 44, 28 January 1908, FO 248/944; Tabriz summary, 31 January 1908, FO 248/944; Kasravi, Mashruta 2435sh, pp. 492–3. According to Kasravi, he received money from Muhammad ‘Ali Shah through one of the sarrafs, which he used to build up his luti following. 155 Tabriz summary, 31 January 1908, FO 248/944. 156 Tabriz summary, 29 February 1908, and 31 March 1908, FO 248/944. 157 Nizamnama-yi Anjuman-i Islamiyya (Constitution of the Anjuman-i Islamiyya), 1 Rabi‘ II 1326/3 May 1908, Matba‘a-yi Umid-i Taraqqi, Tabriz. I am grateful to the Muza-yi Mashrutiyyat (Constitutional Museum) in Tabriz for enabling me to study this text. 158 Siroos Baradaran-Shokoohy, ‘Nigarish-i intiqadi bar karkard-i mashruta-khvahan-i Tabriz dar yazdah mah muhasira az khilal-i ruznama-yi “A Mulla ‘amu” urgan-i Anjuman-i Islamiyya-yi Tabriz’, Nashriyya-yi Danishkada-yi Adabiyyat va ‘Ulum-i Insani, Dahishgah-i Tabriz, Year 40, No. 165, Winter 1376, p. 78. 159 Ibid., p. 79. 160 Ibid., p. 81; see pp. 83–8 for a sample. 161 Ibid., p. 80. See also Bayat, First Revolution, p. 236. 162 See letter from Shaikh Salim to Taqizada of 16 Safar 1326/20 March 1908, cited in Reza Hamraz, ‘Panj nama’, p. 168. 163 Kasravi, Mashruta 2535sh., p. 559.

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164 Browne, Revolution, pp. 204–5; Kasravi, Mashruta 2535sh., pp. 516–17. 165 No. 63 tel., 9 June and No. 65 tel., 19 June 1908, FO 248/944. 166 No. 67 tel. 23 June and No. 76 tel., 30 June 1908, FO 248/944. 167 No. 73, tel., 28 June and 30 June 1908, FO 248/944. 168 No. 79 tel. and No. 80 tel., 1 July 1908, FO 248/944. 169 No. 120 tel., 24 August 1908, FO 248/944. 9  Shiraz: The Elite Struggle, Islam and Popular Politics 1 From Shiraz, 16 February 1907, FO 248/911. 2 From Shiraz, 9 March 1907, FO 248/911. The amount passed through the Imperial Bank. 3 This was certainly essentially the view of Sahib Ikhtiyar, who became governor in February 1908. See No. 15, 12 February 1908, FO 248/942. 4 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 1, 1 Muharram 1325/14 February 1907, pp. 8–9. 5 From Shiraz, 9 January 1907, FO 248/911. It comprised six notables (and members of the provincial bureaucracy), Bashir al-Daula, Qavam Divan, Intizar Lashgar, and two others (unnamed); six clergy, Haji Muhazzab al-Daula, Sayyid ‘Ali Kaziruni, Sayyid Ja‘far Kaziruni, Shaikh al-Islam Kuchik, Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Talaba, and one other; six merchant representatives, Haji ‘Abd al-Rahman (head of the Fars Trading Company), Mu’ayyid al-Shari‘a, the nephew of the Imam Jum‘a, Haji Muhammad Hasan Namazi, Haji Muhammad Salih Dihdashti, Haji Ahmad Khan Lari, and Haji Sayyid Muhammad Hasan; six cultivator representatives, Haji ‘Abd al-Rahim, Haji Mirza ‘Abdallah, and the son of Haji Muhammad Isma‘il, and three others; and finally five or six members of the guilds. 6 From Shiraz, 16 January 1907, FO 248/911. 7 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 4, 3 Safar 1325/18 March 1907, p. 6. Muzaffari was proud that its efforts were mentioned by the much more widely distributed Habl al-Matin, ibid., pp. 6–7. 8 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 2, 23 Muharram 1325/ 8 March 1907, p. 1. 9 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 4, 30 Muharram 1325/15 March 1907, pp. 1–3; and No. 26, 29 Jamadi II 1325/9 August 1907, p. 1. 10 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 3, 27 Muharram 1325/12 March 1907, pp. 1–2. 11 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 1, 1 Muharram 1325/14 February 1907, pp. 10–12. 12 Sa‘di, Kuliyat-i Sa‘di, (ed.) Muhammad ‘Ali Furughi, Intisharat-i Eqbal, Tehran, 1342, ‘Ghazaliyat-i ‘irfani’, p. 106. 13 Persian Gulf Diary, 10 March 1907, FO 248/901. The sum may be somewhat exaggerated. 14 From Shiraz, 6 February 1907, FO 248/911. 15 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 1, 20 Muharram 1325/5 March 1907, p. 4. 16 No. 22, 27 April 1907, FO 248/911. See also Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 12, 29 Rabi‘ I 1325/12 May 1907, p. 12. There were also two more schools, mentioned by Muzaffari, called the Mas‘udiyya and the Husainiyya, of which no further details were given in this article. 17 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 12, 29 Rabi‘ I/12 May 1907, pp. 12–13. 18 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 25, 12 Jamadi I 1325/23 July 1907, pp. 7–8. 19 From Shiraz, 6 February 1907, FO 248/911. 20 From Shiraz, 6 February 1907, FO 248/911. 21 From Shiraz, 9 March 1907, No. 17, Enclosure 1, 13 March 1907, FO 248/901; Persian Gulf Diary, 24 March 1907, FO 248/911; Session 173, 12 Ramazan 1325/19 October 1907, MMajlis; Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 4, 3 Safar 1325/ 18 March 1907, p. 7, gives the name of the host as Haj Mirza ‘Ali Akbar, and reports that it members of

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the society came from all levels including ‘ulama and notables. The society appears to have been founded by 4 March 1907 as it sent a telegram to Tehran on that date, see enclosure in No. 17, 13 March 1907, FO 248/911. 22 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 2, 23 Muharram 1325/8 March 1907, p. 3. 23 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 4, 3 Safar 1325/18 March 1907, p. 7. 24 Persian Gulf Diary, 24 March 1907, FO 248/901. See also from Shiraz, 17 July 1907, FO 248/912. 25 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 6, 7 Safar 1325/22 March 1907, p. 2, under the heading of ‘Patriotism’. 26 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 13, 5 Rabi‘ I 1325/18 April 1907, p. 8. 27 Report (presumably from Karguzari of Fars to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 2 Rabi‘ I 1325/15 April 1907, MFA No. 1325–13–1–4, cited in Ranjbar, Fars, pp. 45–6. 28 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 12, 29 Rabi‘ I/12 May 1907, p. 7. 29 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 33, 10 Ramazan 1325/17 October 1907, pp. 1–2. 30 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 35, 29 Shavval 1325/5 December 1907, p. 8. 31 Haj Mirza Muhammad Sirishta-dar is mentioned as elected from Shiraz, 4 April 1907, FO 248/911. He left for Tehran on 20 April; see from Shiraz, 23 April 1907, FO 248/911. 32 Aqa Shaikh Ja‘far was also known as Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Ja‘far, see for example, Session 173, 12 Ramazan 1325/19 October 1907, MMajlis. 33 Departure of Shaikh Yusuf, Shaikh Ja‘far, Thiqat al-Islam, Sayyid Muhammad Hasan and Fakhr al-Sadat (also known as Fakhr al-Din), mentioned as being on 20 April in Shiraz news, 23 April 1907, FO 248/911. 34 Qavam Divan mentioned as leaving for Tehran on 24 April, Shiraz news, 1 May 1907, FO 248/911. 35 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 5, 4 Safar 1325/19 March 1907, p. 2. 36 Persian Gulf Diary, 21 April 1907, FO 248/902. The expenses of the journey to Tehran of the representatives of the notables and the guilds were paid by Qavam al-Mulk, and of the merchants, by Malik al-Tujjar. The ‘ulama, who had been given their expenses, had not yet left. Session 62, 18 Safar 1325/13 April 1907, MMajlis. 37 The army rank of mir panj is roughly equivalent to that of major. 38 From Shiraz, 4 March 1908, FO 248/942. He had been dispatched to Tehran by the Qashqa’i kalantars some time previously. It is not clear why the Qashqa’i kalantars chose him, but it raises interesting questions about the nature and level of their interest in reform. 39 Session 88, 8 Rabi‘ II 1325/ 21 May 1907, MMajlis. Qavam Divan was introduced on 30 May 1907, Session 94, 17 Rabi ‘ II 1325/30 May 1907, MMajlis. 40 From Shiraz, 16 April 1907, FO 248/911. 41 From Shiraz, 27 March 1907, FO 248/911. 42 Afary, Revolution, pp. 177–208; see in particular p. 184. For the role of women in the revolution, see also Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth Century Iran, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 50–77. 43 From Shiraz, 1 May 1907, FO 248/911. 44 From Shiraz, 1 May 1907, FO 248/911. 45 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 12, 29 Rabi‘ I 1325/12 May 1907, p. 7. 46 No. 25, 30 May 1907, FO 248/912. 47 No. 39 tel., 15 May 1907, FO 248/911. 48 From Shiraz, 1 May and 8 May 1907, FO 248/911. 49 From Shiraz, 8 May 1907, FO 248/911. The dispatch refers to the ‘clergy’ but may mean the Anjuman-i Islami, which appears to have been divided on the subject of Qavam. This probability is supported by a report in Muzaffari, which refers to the

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Anjuman-i Islami being infiltrated by seditious persons stirring up trouble. See Year 6, No. 12, 29 Rabi‘ I 1325/12 May 1907, p. 6. The editor, Mirza ‘Ali Shirazi, was vehemently anti-Qavam. See also Muhammad Baqir Vusuqi, ‘Parvanda-yi yik tirrur, gusha’i az havadith-i Fars dar junbish-i mashrutiyyat’ Tarikh-i mu‘asir-i Iran, 8, Autumn 1374/1995, pp. 74–5. 50 From Shiraz, 5 June 1907, FO 248/912. 51 From Shiraz, 24 July 1907, FO 248/912. 52 From Shiraz, 15 May 1907, FO 248/911. 53 From Shiraz, 22 May 1907, FO 248/911. 54 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 14, 15 Rabi‘ II 1325/ 28 May 1907, p. 9. 55 From Shiraz, 29 May and 5 June 1907, FO 248/912. 56 From Shiraz, 12 June 1907, FO 248/912; Persian Gulf Dairy, 16 June 1907, FO 248/902. 57 From Shiraz, 19 June 1907, and No. 54 tel., 28 June 1907, FO 248/912. 58 Session 59, 13 Safar 1325/28 March 1907, MMajlis. 59 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 13, 7 Rabi‘ I 1325/20 May 1907, p. 5. 60 From Shiraz, 19 June 1907, and 3 July 1907, FO 248/912. 61 From Shiraz, 3 July 1907, FO 248/912. 62 From Shiraz, 10 July and 17 July 1907, FO 248/912. 63 From Shiraz, 4 March 1908, FO 248/942. 64 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 25, 22 Jamadi II 1325/2 August 1907, pp. 3–4. 65 Ibid., p. 4. In fact, Shaikh Fazlallah realised that if the Majlis had control of the selection of the committee of ‘ulama, it would use it to advance the cause of the secular as against the religious law. See Martin, Islam, pp. 139–49. 66 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 25, 22 Jamadi II 1325/2 August 1907, p. 4. 67 From Shiraz, 24 July FO 248/912, and Persian Gulf Diary, 4 August 1907, FO 248/902. 68 Persian Gulf Diary, 4 August 1907, FO 248/902. 69 From Shiraz, 7 August 1907, and No. 43, 7 August 1907, FO 248/912. 70 From Shiraz, 16 October 1907, FO 248/912. 71 Nida-yi Islam, Year 1, No. 26, 29 Jamadi II 1325/9 August 1907, p. 6. 72 Probably Haji Quli Aqa, one of the rish sifids (elders) of the Darvaza-yi Kazirun. The local council of Shiraz asked him for payment as a contribution to the road guards on the Bushehr Road, which he declined to make. Mu‘in al-Islam, struck him in an argument on the subject, and was in turn beaten by Haji Aqa’s followers. A movement built up in support of Haji Aqa, which was said to be using the incident against Mu‘in al-Islam and Mu‘tamid-i Divan, and other radicals of the Anjuman-i Islami. From Shiraz, 14 August 1907, FO 248/912. 73 Persian Gulf Diary, 11 August 1907, FO 248/902. 74 No. 298000964, 1TA5B403, 1325/1907–8, SAM. 75 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 18, 22 Jamadi II 1325/2 August 1907, p. 2. 76 Session 131, 29 Jamadi II 1325/9 August 1907, and Session 132, 3 Rajab 1325/12 August 1907, MMajlis. 77 Shiraz news, 14 August 1907, and 21 August 1907, FO 248/912. 78 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 22, 21 Sha‘ban 1325/29 September 1907, p. 8. 79 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 23, 28 Sha‘ban 1325/6 October 1907, pp. 10–11. 80 From Shiraz, 28 August 1907, FO 248/912. 81 Persian Gulf Diary, 8 September 1907, FO 248/912. 82 From Shiraz, 4 March 1908, FO 248/942. In this he was said to have been encouraged by Mirza Husain Khan, son of Nizam al-Saltana. The aim of this small group was seemingly to enhance the power of the local administration against Qavam and his sons, and probably also to reform it.

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83 From Shiraz, 28 August 1907, FO 248/912. 84 From Shiraz, 4 September 1907, FO 248/912. 85 From Shiraz, 9 October 1907, FO 248/912. 86 Cox to Spring Rice, 7 August 1907, FO 248/912. 87 From Shiraz, 18 September 1907, FO 248/912. 88 From Shiraz, 18 September 1907, FO 248/912. 89 No. 57, 16 November 1907, FO 248/912. 90 Session 186, 7 Shavval 1325/13 November 1907, MMajlis. 91 From Shiraz, 16 October 1907, FO 248/912; Persian Gulf Diary, 3 November and 13 November 1907, FO 248/903. 92 From Shiraz, 16 October 1907, FO 248/912. According to Muzaffari, its agent in Shiraz, who was opposed to Mu‘tamid-i Divan, was seriously injured by roughs allied to him. Attacks were made on women as well as men. Year 6, No. 26, 17 Ramazan 1325/24 October 1907, p. 16. 93 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 30, 20 Shavval 1325/26 November 1907, p. 14. 94 They are published with the editor’s comments in Zargari-Nezhad (ed.), Rasa’il, pp. 363–414. Zargari-Nezhad points out that it was written before the bombardment of the Majlis in 1908, p. 365. 95 Ibid., p. 376. In this his views appear to resemble, in a Shi‘a form, the stricter versions of the Salafiyya movement, and indeed Wahhabism, but it is difficult to say how far they may be the product of outside influence, and how far they represent his own thinking. 96 Ibid., p. 370. 97 Ibid., pp. 369–70. It is evident that Lari did not fully understand the implications and purpose of quarantine. 98 Ibid., p. 408. See also, Jafarian, ‘Tarkib mashruta’, pp. 144–5; Denis Hermann, ‘Le rôle d’Ākhūnd Khurāsānī au cours du mouvement constitutionnaliste’, forthcoming, 2013. The idea of rule by a just mujtahid goes back to the Safavid period, see Jean Chardin, Voyages du chevalier Chardin en Perse et autres lieux de l’Orient, Le Normant, Paris, 1811, VI, p. 48. It is also an implicit possibility in Khomeini’s doctrine of vilayat-i faqih, the government of the jurist. 99 Session 173, 12 Ramazan 1325/19 October 1907, MMajlis. 100 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 November 1907, FO 248/903. 101 Vusuqi, ‘Parvanda’, p. 71. 102 Ibid., pp. 77–8. 103 Iraj Afshar (ed.), Mustashar II, pp. 212–15. 104 From Shiraz, 6 November 1907, FO 248/912. 105 From Shiraz, 27 November 1907, FO 248/912. 106 From Shiraz, No. 86 tel., 10 November 1907, FO/248/912; Nida-yi Islami, Year 1, No. 35, 29 Shavval 1325/5 December 1908, p. 8. 107 From Shiraz, 13 November 1907, FO 248/912. 108 No. 86 tel., 10 November 1907 FO 248/912; Persian Gulf Diary, 24 November 1907, FO 248/903, and 5 January 1908, FO 248/932. Interestingly, sanctuary was granted some time later to Mirza Haji Aqa, a noted calligrapher, formerly employed by Nasir al-Daula, who had sided during the disturbances with Mu‘tamid-i Divan, and consequently believed he was in danger of his life, from Shiraz, 5 February 1908, FO 248/942. 109 From Shiraz, 25 December 1907, FO 248/912. 110 Persian Gulf Diary, 19 January 1908, FO 248/932. 111 Session 205, 20 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325/25 December 1907, MMajlis. 112 From Shiraz, 8 January 1908, FO 248/942. Persian Gulf Diary, 5 January 1908, FO 248/932.

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113 From Shiraz, 12 February 1908, FO 248/942. 114 Nida-yi Islami, Year 1, No. 35, 29 Shavval 1325/5 December 1908, p. 8, and No. 36, Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325/December 1907 (precise date not given), pp. 3–4. Apparently a few members met occasionally. 115 From Shiraz, 29 January 1908, FO 248/942. An early example of determination by Iranians not to seek outside help with such calamities, later manifested also after the 1979 Revolution. 116 From Shiraz, No. 12 tel., 6 February 1908, FO 248/942. 117 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 November 1907, FO 248/903. 118 From Shiraz, 13 May 1908, FO 248/942. 119 From Shiraz, 4 March 1908, FO 248/942. 120 From Shiraz, 12 February 1908, FO 248/942. 121 From Shiraz, 12 February 1908, FO 248/942. 122 No. 15, 12 February 1908, FO 248/942. 123 From Shiraz, 4 March 1908, FO 248/942. 124 From Shiraz, 4 March 1908, FO 248/942. 125 No. 23 tel., 7 March 1908, and from Shiraz, 11 March 1908, FO 248/942. A piece of paper was found on him saying ‘qatil-i Nasir al-Daula’ (assassin of Nasir al-Daula). 126 On the assassination see No. 24 tel., 9 March 1908, No. 25 tel., 10 March 1908, and from Shiraz, 11 March 1908, FO 248/942. 127 No. 27 tel., 16 March 1908, FO 248/942. 128 From Shiraz, 18 March 1908, FO 248/942. The notices continued to appear threatening Mirza Ibrahim, who was in fact a moderate, Haji ‘Abd al-Rahman, head of the Fars Trading Company and a member of the Anjuman-i Ayalati, and Ahmad Khan Lari. See from Shiraz, 1 April 1908, FO 248/942. 129 From Shiraz, 25 March 1909, FO 248/942. 130 Vusuqi, ‘Parvanda’ pp. 83–4. 131 From Shiraz, 6 May 1908, FO 248/942. 132 From Shiraz, 22 April 1908, FO 248/942. 133 From Shiraz, 6 May 1908, from Shiraz 13 May 1908, FO 248/942. 134 From Shiraz, 1 July 1908, FO 248/942. 135 See Martin, Qajar Pact, p. 52 136 No. 37, 13 May 1908, from Shiraz, 13 May 1907, No. 47 tel., 25 May 1908, FO 248/942. 137 From Shiraz, 27 May 1908, FO 248/942. 138 From Shiraz, 13 May 1908, FO 248/942. 139 From Shiraz, 20 May 1908, FO 248/942. 140 From Shiraz, 27 May 1908, FO 248/942. 141 From Shiraz, 3 June 1908, FO 248/942. 142 Tafrishi Husaini, Ruznama, p. 80. 143 From Shiraz, No. 69 tel., 26 June 1908, and No. 78 tel. 7July, 1908, FO 248/942. 144 From Shiraz, 1 July 1908, FO 248/942. 10  Isfahan: Haj Aqa Nurallah and the Sacred National Council 1 Najafi, Hukm-i nafiz, pp. 122–3, quoting Jihad-i akbar No. 42, 23 Safar 1326/27 March 1908, p. 6. 2 Ibid., pp. 121–2. In this he may be compared to Khomeini. See Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London, 2000), pp. 164, 169. For Aqa Najafi urging the unity of Muslims see Jihad-i akbar, No. 39, Zhi al-Qa‘da 1325/December 1907, pp. 1–2. 3 No. 5, 5 January 1907, FO 248/905.

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4 No. 81, 28 December 1906, FO 248/877; No. 5 January 1907, FO 248/905. Apart from establishing Islamic government in Isfahan, its main undoubted purpose was to unseat Zill al-Sultan. 5 No. 1, 3 January 1907, FO 248/905. 6 ‘Askarani, Naqsh-i mardum, p. 124. 7 No. 1, 3 January 1907, FO 248/905. 8 No. 14, 30 January 1907, FO 248/905. 9 No. 15, 30 January 1907, FO 248/905. 10 No. 12, 22 January 1907, FO 248/905. 11 The local council will from now on be called the Anjuman, as it was then consistently known in Isfahan. 12 ‘Askarani, Naqsh-i mardum, pp. 71–2; No. 13, 29 January 1907, FO 248/905. 13 Anjuman-i muqaddas-i milli-yi Isfahan, Year 1 No. 2, 28 Zhi al-Qa‘da 1324/13 January 1907, pp. 1–2. 14 For further discussion of this point see Martin, Islam, pp. 98–9. 15 Najafi, Andisha, pp. 8, 22. According to Musa Najafi, the interpretation of mashruta in Isfahan based on the fundamental precepts of religion was referred to by secularists such as Kasravi, as ‘mashruta-yi akhundi’, ‘clerical constitutionalism’. 16 Mohammad ‘Ali Chelonegar (ed.), Ruznamaha-yi Isfahan dar ‘asr-i mashruta, Sazman-i Farhangi, Tafrihi-yi Shahrdari-yi Isfahan, 1385, Introduction, p. 14. 17 No. 1, 3 January 1907, FO 248/905. 18 Al-Jinab, No. 1, 20 Shavval 1324/7 December 1906, p. 1. 19 Chelonegar, Ruznamaha-yi Isfahan, pp. 14–15, 18. 20 Al-Jinab, No. 2, 3 Zhi al-Qa‘da 1324/19 December 1906, p. 8. 21 Al-Jinab, No. 3, 12 Zhi al-Qa‘da 1324/28 December 1906, pp. 1–2. 22 Ibid. 23 Al-Jinab, No. 6, n.d., p. 7. 24 No. 13, 29 January 1907/FO 248/905. 25 Anjuman-i muqaddas, Year 1, No. 6, 26 Zhi al-Hijja 1324/10 February 1907, p. 4; see also No. 18, 9 Feb 1907, FO 248/905. 26 Mirza Muhammad Husain Na’ini in Tanbih al-ummah wa tanzih al-millah, also published in 1909, had a similar understanding of equality to that of Nurallah, see Hairi, Shi‘ism, p. 234. 27 No. 24, 26 February 1907, FO 248/905. 28 No. 8 tel. and 2 Feb, 1907, and No. 9 tel., 12 February 1907, FO 248/905; No. 41, 13 April 1907, FO 248/905. 29 For the struggle to remove Zill al-Sultan, see No. 41, 13 April 1907, FO 248/905; Najafi, Hukm-i Nafiz, pp. 142–9. 30 No. 31, 9 March, and No. 32, 13 March 1907, FO 248/905. 31 No. 35, 20 March and No. 38, 29 March 1907, FO 248/905. 32 Anjuman-i muqaddas, Year 1 No. 15, end Safar 1325/14 April 1907, pp. 4–5. 33 Anjuman-i muqaddas, Year 1 No. 17, 14 Rabi‘ I 1325/28 April 1907, pp. 2–3. 34 No. 51, 6 May 1907, FO 248/905; Nizam al-Saltana, Khatirat, III, p. 758. 35 No. 42, 16 April 1907, FO 248/905. 36 No. 47, 27 April 1907, FO 248/905. 37 No. 56, 18 May 1907, FO 248/905. 38 No. 56, 18 May 1907, FO 248/907. 39 No. 58, 26 May 1907, FO 248/905. 40 No. 51 tel., 14 June 1907, FO 248/905. 41 No. 81, 23 July 1907, FO 248/905. 42 ‘Askarani, Naqsh-i Mardum, pp. 154–5; No. 81, 23 July 1907, FO 248/905.

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43 For a detailed account see ‘Askarani, Naqsh-i Mardum, pp. 153–6; No. 117, 28 December 1907, FO 248/905; Anjuman-i muqaddas, Year 2, No. 2, 22 Zhi al-Qa‘da 1325/27 December 1907, p. 1. No. 117, 28 December 1907, FO 248/905. 44 Anjuman-i muqaddas, Year 1 No. 42, 12 Ramazan 1325/19 October 1907, p. 1. 45 No. 83, 7 August 1907, FO 248/905. 46 Session 137, 12 Rajab 1325/21 August 1907, MMajlis. 47 No. 90, 24 August 1907, FO 248/905. 48 No. 93, 11 September 1907, FO 248/905. 49 Isfahan Diary, 19 September 1907, FO 248/905. 50 No. 102, 29 September, FO 248/905. 51 As a result of the passing of the Baladiyya Law (town council law) on 2 June 1907. 52 No. 106, 11 November 1907, FO 248/905; ‘Askarani, Naqsh-i Mardum, pp. 82–3. It also had the intention of improving health, establishing hospitals, libraries and museums, and repairing schools and mosques. 53 Session 166, 29 Sha‘ban 1325/7 October 1907, MMajlis. One member of the Majlis merely asked who he was, and it was reported that the matter had been referred to the Ministry of the Interior but no answer had been received. 54 For an example see SAM, 27 Shavval 1325, No. 240005243, location 1AA1H612. The attempted change in the taxation system in Isfahan from kind to cash was felt to work to the disadvantage of the Isfahanis, especially in a dire economic situation. 55 No. 2, 11 January 1908, No. 22, 15 April 1908, and No. 34, 30 May 1908, FO 248/937. 56 No. 56, 12 June 1908, No. 59 tel., 17 June 1908, No. 39, 17 June 1908, F0 248/937; Anjuman-i muqaddas, Year 2, No. 27, 20 Jamadi I 1326/20 June 1908, pp. 5–6. 57 No. 3 tel. 4 Jan 1909, News No. 2, 9 January 1909, FO 248/965. See also Arash Khazeni, Tribes and Empire, p. 166. 58 No. 30, 31 July 1909, FO 248/966. 59 Haj Aqa Nurallah Najafi Isfahani, Risala-yi mukalimat-i muqim va musafir (ed.), M. F. Haqani, Tehran, 1384, p. 7; see also Zargari Nezhad, Rasa’il, p. 417. This book gives an introduction and the treatise text, pp. 417–21, 422–68. The Risala came out in 1909 the same year as Na’ini’s Tanbih. The latter book has some similar arguments, but is superior in knowledge of fiqh. 60 Rasa, Qiyam, p. 28. 61 Nurallah, Risala, pp. 57–8. 62 See Na’ini who also considered absolutism to be tyrannical, but hitherto the only alternative in the absence of the Imam, Hairi, Shi‘ism, pp. 165–70 63 For his arguments, see Martin, Islam, pp. 123–30. 64 See for example the 1909 telegram of Khurasani and Mazandarani in Zargari Nezhad, Rasa’il, pp. 485–6. 65 Nurallah, Risala, pp. 58–60, 111–12. 66 Martin, Islam, pp. 139–140, 180: Hairi, Shi‘ism, pp. 210–17. 67 Nurallah, Risala, pp. 61–2. 68 Ibid., p. 105. 69 It was in fact the problems of time-consuming arguments over what was and what was not in conformity with the shari‘a that obliged Khomeini to bring in the concept of vilayat-i mutlaqa-yi faqih which affirmed the predominance of state interests over religious issues, see Martin, Islamic State, p. 170. 70 Nurallah, Risala, p. 89. 71 Ibid., pp. 58–9. 72 Ibid., p. 77. 73 Rasa, Qiyam, p. 25.

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74 Nurallah, Risala, p. 69. 75 Ibid., pp. 69–70. 76 Ibid., pp. 91–2. 77 Ibid., pp. 115–16 and p. 84. 78 Ibid., pp. 117–18. 79 Vanessa Martin, ‘Religion and State in Khumaini’s Kashf al-asrar’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 56, Part 1, 1993, p. 41. 11  Bushehr: Commercial Pragmatism and the Growth of Islamic Activism 1 See Nouraei, Mashhad, p. 204. 2 Session 122, 5 Jamadi II 1325/16 July 1907, MMajlis. 3 Persian Gulf Diary, 8 September 1907, FO 248/902. 4 Cox to Marling, 23 March 1908, FO 248/933. 5 Cox to Marling, No. 73/1727, 6 June 1908, FO 248/934. 6 Persian Gulf Diary, 13 January 1907, FO 248/901. 7 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 February 1907, FO 248/901. Reportedly, a telegram was sent on 2 Muharram 1325/15 February 1907, from the Majlis to Sayyid Murtiza Ahrumi, a well-known radical cleric, who had been agitating on the subject of the local council elections, saying elections must be according to the regulations, on which instructions would follow from the Ministry of the Interior, see Mohammad ‘Ali Ranjbar, ‘Naqsh-i Sayyid Murtiza Ahrumi va Akhund Khurasani dar qiyam-i mardum-i Bushihr (1327q.); baz khani-yi asnad’, in Faslnama-yi pazhuhishha-yi tarikhi (‘ilmipazhuhishi), Danishkada-yi Adabiyyat va ‘Ulum-i Insani, Danishgah-i Isfahan, Year 45, Daura-yi Jadid, No. 4, Winter 1388, p. 91. Sayyid Ahrumi was to lead an uprising against the absolutist government in Tehran and the influence of the British over the customs in 1908–9. 8 Persian Gulf Diary, 21 January 1907, FO 248/901, and 28 April 1907, FO 248/902. 9 This would seem to mean that they were over 70. There was as yet no specification regarding age for members of local councils, but those elected to the Majlis had to be under 70. See Browne, Revolution, Electoral Law of September 9, 1906, Article 4, vi, p. 356. 10 Persian Gulf Diary, 5 February 1907, FO 248/901 and Cox to Spring Rice, 28 July 1907, FO 248/912. ‘Alam al-Huda was not considered of much account in Bushehr, and was short of funds because he did not earn much from his shari‘a duties. ‘Alam al-Huda also had close connections with the Anjuman-i Islami of Shiraz. See Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 18, 22 Jamadi I 1325/ 3 July 1907, p.16. He was also a supporter of the editor of Muzaffari. 11 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 February and 9 March 1907, FO 248/901. 12 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 March 1907, FO 248/901. 13 Persian Gulf Diary, 17 March 1907, FO 248/901. 14 Persian Gulf Diary, 24 March and 7 April 1907, FO 248/901. 15 Persian Gulf Diary, 7 April 1907, FO 248/901. 16 Persian Gulf Diary, 21 April 1907, FO 248/902. 17 He was designated as the ‘brother of a deceased ‘Alam al-Huda’. This is evidently a different ‘Alam al-Huda from the one who was a son of Bihbihani. 18 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 April 1907, FO 248/902. 19 Persian Gulf Diary, 7 April 1907, FO 248/901. Sadly, the Persepolis was no longer seaworthy, and had recently been offered for sale. Persian Gulf Diary, 5 May 1907, FO 248/901. 20 Persian Gulf Diary, 14 April 1907, FO 248/901. 21 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 April 1907, FO 248/901.



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22 Persian Gulf Diary, 26 April 1908, FO 248/934. 23 Persian Gulf Diary, 13 January 1907, FO 248/901. 24 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 February 1907, FO 248/901. Muzaffar al-Din Shah was undoubtedly more popular in Bushehr than elsewhere. In July 1907, the anniversary of his birth was selected as an occasion to celebrate the constitutional reforms, and the town was gaily decorated. Persian Gulf Diary, 28 July 1907, FO 248/902. 25 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 1, 1 Muharram 1325/14 February 1907, p. 13; Persian Gulf Diary, 24 February 1907, FO 248/901. 26 Session 5, 12 Shavval 1324/29 November 1906, MMajlis. Kasravi (Siegel), Revolution, pp. 206–7. 27 Persian Gulf Diary, 12 May 1907, FO 248/902. 28 Persian Gulf Diary, 15 December 1907, FO 248/903. 29 Cox to Spring Rice, 8 April 1907, FO 248/901. Mu‘in al-Tujjar also had differences with the local merchants, for example, over property with Haji Muhammad Shafi‘. In this case he elicited the help of a personal telegram in his support from Amin al-Sultan. See Persian Gulf Diary, 14 July 1907, FO 248/902. 30 Persian Gulf Diary, 19 January 1908, FO 248/932. 31 No. 183/515 tel., 21 July 1908, FO 248/934. 32 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 15, 28 Rabi‘ I 1325/11 May 1907, pp. 10–11. 33 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 30, 20 Shavval 1325/26 November 1907, p. 16. 34 Ibid., pp. 2, 6. 35 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 39, 1 Muharram 1326/14 February 1908, pp. 6–7. 36 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 3, 26 Muharram 1325/11 March 1907, pp. 1–3. 37 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 March 1907, FO 248/901. 38 No. 297037427, 1PA4M479, 21 Rabi‘ I 1325/4 May 1907, No. 2260, SAM. 39 Persian Gulf Diary, 10 March 1907, FO 248/901; No. 297037427, 1PA4M479, 21 Rabi‘ I 1325/4 May 1907, No. 2260, SAM. 40 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 18, 22 Jamadi I 1325/3 July 1907, p. 16. 41 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 19, 29 Jamadi I 1325/10 July 1907, p. 16. 42 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 April 1907, FO 248/902. 43 Bushehr Diary, 19 May 1907, FO 248/902. 44 Persian Gulf Diary, 12 May and 6 October 1907, FO 248/902. 45 Persian Gulf Diary, 26 May 1907, FO 248/902. 46 Persian Gulf Diary, 9 June 1907, FO 248/902. 47 Persian Gulf Diary, 2 June 1907, FO 248/902. 48 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 20, 7 Jamadi II 1325/18 July 1907, p. 6. 49 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 21, 14 Jamadi II 1325/25 July 1907, p. 2. 50 ‘Ata Ahmadi, ‘Mu‘arifi-yi yik sanad-i tarikhi: didgah-i sahib-i “‘Urwat al-wuthqa” raji‘ bih mutammim-i qanun-i asasi-yi mashruta’, Ganjina-yi asnad, Faslnama-yi tahqiqat-i tarikhi, Year 16, Part 2, No. 62, Summer 1385, pp. 55–6. 51 Ibid., p. 57. 52 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 25, 10 Ramazan 1325/17 October 1907, p. 13. 53 Persian Gulf Diary, 4 August 1907, FO 248/902. 54 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 22, 21 Sha‘ban 1325/29 September 1907, p. 12. 55 Persian Gulf Diary, 17 February 1907 FO 248/ 901, and 23 June 1907, FO 248/902. 56 Persian Gulf Diary, 26 January 1908, FO 248/932. 57 Persian Gulf Diary, 31 May 1908, FO 248/934. 58 Persian Gulf Diary, 23 June 1907, FO 248/902. 59 Persian Gulf Diary, 30 June 1907, FO 248/902. 60 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 16, 5 Jamadi I 1325/16 June 1907, p. 11–12. 61 Persian Gulf Diary, 7 July 1907, FO 248/902. 62 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 July 1907, FO 248/902.

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63 Persian Gulf Diary, 18 August 1907, FO 248/902. 64 Martin, Islam, pp. 191–2. 65 Persian Gulf Diary, 8 September, 15 and 22 September 1907, FO 248/903. 66 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 29, 10 Shavval 1325/ 16 November 1907, pp. 2–3. 67 Persian Gulf Diary, 25 August 1907, FO 248/902; Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 22, 21 Sha‘ban 1325/29 September 1907, p. 12. 68 Persian Gulf Diary, 8 September 1907, FO 248/903. 69 Persian Gulf Diary, 17 February 1907, FO 248/901. 70 Persian Gulf Diary, 12 January 1908, FO 248/932; Muzaffari, No. 41, 21 Muharram 1326/24 February 1908, pp. 8–9. 71 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 42, 28 Muharram 1326/2 March 1908, p. 5, and No. 43, 6 Safar 1326/9 March 1908, p. 9. 72 Ettehadieh, Intikhabat, p. 106 73 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 30, 20 Shavval 1325/26 November 1907, pp. 2–3. 74 Ibid., p. 4. Persian Gulf Diary, 24 November 1908, FO 248/903. 75 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 31, 27 Shavval 1325/3 December 1907, p. 8. 76 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 31, 27 Shavval 1325/3 December 1907, pp. 8–9. 77 Persian Gulf Diary, 15 December 1907, FO 248/903. 78 Persian Gulf Diary, 26 January 1908, FO 248/932. 79 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 32, 5 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325/10 December 1907, p. 10. 80 Ibid., p. 10, and No. 36, 7 Dhi al-Hijja 1325/11 January 1908, p. 1. 81 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 34, 22 Dhi al-Qa‘da 1325/27 December 1907, pp. 1–2. 82 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 36, 7 Dhi al-Hijja 1325/11 January 1908, p. 4. 83 Persian Gulf Diary, 2 February 1908, FO 248/932. 84 Muzaffari, Year 7, No. 3, 11 Rabi‘ I 1326/ 13 April 1905, p. 8. 85 Persian Gulf Diary, 10 May 1908, FO 248/934. 86 Persian Gulf Diary, 17 May 1908, FO 248/934. 87 Persian Gulf Diary, 24 May 1908, FO 248/934. 88 Persian Gulf Diary, 22 December 1907, FO 248/903. 89 Persian Gulf Diary, 12 January 1908, FO 248/932. 90 Persian Gulf Diary, 1 March 1908, FO 248/933. 91 Persian Gulf Diary, 29 March 1908, FO 248/933. 92 Persian Gulf Diary, 26 January 1908, FO 248/932. Leaflets were circulated on 4 February warning that if the work of the council was impeded by tyrants, the Secret Society, which claimed to number 27 persons, would intervene with unpleasant results. Persian Gulf Diary, 9 February 1908, FO 248/932. 93 Persian Gulf Diary, 29 December 1907, FO 248/903, 12 January and 26 January 1908, FO 248/932. There were rumours of it being associated with a radical secret society but these are not borne out by the issues it addressed, or the manner of its approach to the authorities. 94 Persian Gulf Diary, 3 May 1908, FO 248/934. 95 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 38, 23 Dhi al-Hijja 1325/27 January 1908, p. 10. The officers, when questioned, said the soldiers’ salaries had not arrived from Tehran, to which the council therefore sent a telegram, Persian Gulf Diary, 2 February 1908, FO 248/932. 96 Persian Gulf Diary, 29 March 1908, FO 248/933. 97 Persian Gulf Diary, 9 February 1908, FO 248/932. 98 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 39, 1 Muharram 1326/4 February 1908, p. 16. 99 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 42, 28 Muharram 1326/2 March 1908, p. 5. 100 Persian Gulf Diary, 2 February 1908, FO 248/932. 101 Persian Gulf Diary, 1 March, 1908, FO 248/933. 102 Zargari-Nezhad, Gholam Hosein (ed.), Rasa’il-i mashrutiyyat, Intisharat-i Kavir, Tehran, 1374, pp. 273–92.

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103 Ibid., p. 280. 104 Ibid., p. 281. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid., p. 287. 107 Nouraei, Mashhad, p. 249. 108 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 36, 7 Dhi al-Hijja 1325/11 January 1908, p. 5. 109 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 37, 14 Dhi al-Hijja 1325/18 January 1908, p. 7. 110 Muzaffari, Year 6, No. 43, Year 6, 6 Safar 1326/10 March 1908, pp. 10–11. 111 Muzaffari, Year 7, No. 2, 4 Rabi‘ I 1326/6 April 1908, p. 2. 112 Persian Gulf Diary, 26 January 1908, FO 248/932. Similar rivalries emerged elsewhere, for example in Mazandaran, where the council of Barfurush was restricted by the aspirations of opposition from Sari, Kazembeyki, Mohammad Ali, Society, Politics and Economics in Mazandaran, Iran, 1848–1914, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, pp. 167–8. 113 Cox to Marling, 23 March 1908, FO 248/933. 114 Ibid. 115 No. 73/1727, 6 June 1908, FO 248/934. 116 Persian Gulf Diary, 14 June 1908, FO 248/934. 117 Persian Gulf Diary, 21 June 1908, FO 248/934. 118 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 June 1908, FO 248/934. 119 Persian Gulf Diary, 28 June and 5 July 1908, and No. 163/466 tel., 1 July 1908, FO 248/934. Conclusion 1 Katouzian, Homa, ‘Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, Three Lives in a Lifetime’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 32, No. 1, April 2012, pp. 195–213.

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INDEX

Abadeh, 157 ‘Abbas Mirza, 16, 51 ‘Abd al-Aziz, Sultan of Morocco, 53 ‘Abd al-Karim, Shaikh, 195 ‘Abd al-Rahim Talibuf, Haji Mulla, 16, 123 ‘Abd al-Rahman, Haji, 78, 243, 247 ‘Abd al-Rasul, Haji, (Ra’is al-Tujjar of Bushehr), 185–7, 189, 191, 193–4, 196–7, 209 ‘Abd al-Riza (Hakim), Sayyid, 186, 193, 195 Abduh, Muhammad, 35, 36 Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 33, 162 absolutism, absolute, 1, 4, 7, 15, 33, 36–8, 45, 71, 81, 88, 89, 101, 109–10, 112, 114–15, 118, 122, 127, 130–1, 135, 139, 142, 145–6, 150, 155–6, 161–2, 166, 176, 178–9, 188, 197, 199, 201, 204, 206–7, 214, 237–8, 249–50 Abu Talib Mujtahid, 152 Abu’l Hasan Khan, Aqa Mirza, 155, Adab newspaper of Tabriz, 50 ‘adalat, 34 ‘Adalat newspaper of Tabriz, 49 ‘adalatkhana, 57, 66, 67, 75, 90, 102, 112, 115, 212 Adib al-Mamalik, Mirza Sadiq Khan, 50, 55 ‘adliyya, 120, 132, 141, 148, 177, 184 agriculture, 205–6 Ahmad Khan Sartip, Aqa Mirza, 53 Ahmad, Aqa Mirza, Munajim Bashi, 91, 92

Ahrumi, Sayyid Murtiza, 191, 199, 202, 250 Ahsa’i, Shaikh Ahmad, 46 Ahsan al-Daula, 123, 238 Ahwaz, 19, 20, 96, 101 ‘Ain al-Daula, 29, 48, 57, 70, 74, 76, 77, 102 Akhbaris, 184 Akhtar, 10, 23, 45, 51, 52, 54, 66 Al-Afghani, Sayyid Jamal al-Din, 3, 4, 23, 33, 38, 42, 65, 89, 172, 179–80, 211 ‘Ala al-Daula, 77, 78, 164 ‘Alam al-Huda, son of ‘Abdullah Bihbihani, 184, 250 Alcohol and wine, 57, 68, 83, 152, 224 Al-Hadid newspaper of Tabriz, 49 Al-Islam, 90 Al-Jinab newspaper of Isfahan, 172, 211 ‘Ali Akbar Khan, Mirza, editor of Anjuman, 125 ‘Ali Akbar Paik Bashi, 97 ‘Ali Akbar Pulaupaz, Haji, 60 ‘Ali Jinab, Mir Sayyid, 172 ‘Ali Kaziruni, Mirza, 186, 193–4, 201–2, 243, ‘Ali Quli, known as Safaruf, 46 ‘Ali, Aqa Shaikh Mujtahid Dashti, 194 Alliance Française, 26 America, 25, 38, 40 Amin al-Daula, 3, 17, 18, 25, 28, 29 Amin al-Sultan, Mirza ‘Ali Asghar, 18, 29, 30, 70, 71, 85, 96, 99, 100–1, 139, 159–60, 166, 174, 177, 183, 195, 251 Amin al-Zarb, Haj Muhammad Hasan, 18, 20, 22, 23

I ndex Amin al-Zarb, Haj Muhammad Husain, 23, 116 Amir Bahadur Jang, 75, Amir Kabir, 16, 51 Amir Nizam, Hasan ‘Ali Khan Garrusi, 45, 46, 48, 225 anarchism, anarchists, 136, 160, 166, 177, 241 Anglo-Russian Convention 1907, 159 anjuman, anjumans, 6, 7, 9, 60–2, 119, 131, 141, 146, 153, 164–7, 198, 209, 212 Anjuman of Isfahan, 170–1, 173–8, 208, 211 Anjuman newspaper of Tabriz, 10, 125, 127, 142, 209 Anjuman of Tabriz, 9, 59–62, 122–47, 203, 205, 207–10 Anjuman-i Ansar of Shiraz, 165, 167 Anjuman-i ‘Askari of Shiraz, 165 Anjuman-i Asnafiyya of Shiraz, 152 Anjuman-i Ayalati of Shiraz, 165, 167–8 Anjuman-i Baladiyya of Isfahan, 9, 82, 177, 208, Anjuman-i Baladiyya newspaper of Isfahan, 177 Anjuman-i Danish of Shiraz, 152, 157–9, 160, 163–4 Anjuman-i Islami of Shiraz, 150–3, 155, 157–60, 163–8, 189 Anjuman-i Islamiyya of Tabriz, 145 Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya of Bushehr, 186, 191, 198 Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya of Shiraz, 152 Anjuman-i Khairiyya-yi Islamiyya of Batum, 53 Anjuman-i Ma‘arif of Tehran, 29 Anjuman-i Ma‘arif of Tabriz, 125 Anjuman-i Muhammadi of Shiraz, 152 Anjuman-i muqaddas newspaper of Isfahan, 10, 171, 173, 176 Anjuman-i Namusiyya of Shiraz, 152–4 Anjuman-i Sa‘adat of Bushehr, 97 Anjuman-i Sa‘adat of Shiraz, 165 Anjuman-i Sadat of Tabriz, 141 Anjuman-i Safa of Bushehr, 186, 198, 209 Anjuman-i Shaukat al-Islam of Bushehr, 198, 209, Anjuman-i Ta‘ssub of Shiraz, 165, 167, 209 Anjuman-i Tijarat of Bushehr, 193–4, 197–8 Arab tribes of Fars, 64, 157–8, 162–3, 167

265

‘Araq, 80 Ardebil, 51, 60 Armenians, 58, 88, 137 arms, 69, 103, 130, 176, 187 ‘Ata al-Saltana, 76 ‘Atabat, 19, 55, 70, 130, 137–8, 172, 192, 212 a‘yan, 123, 152 Azarbaijan, 16, 28, 44, 47–50, 57, 58, 60, 131–2, 134, 139, 144, 205, 208, 210, 224–5, 238–9, 241–2 Azarbaijani Deputies, 61, 122–4, 129, 134–7, 146 Azarbaijan, 50 Babis, 82, 88, 92, 93, 134, 145, 212, 227, 230–1 Baghdad, 41, 95, 231 Baha’is, 26, 65, 69, 220, 227 Bakhtiyari tribe, 3, 81, 96, 177–8, 211, 230, 233 Bander Abbas, 104, 196, 200 Baqiriyya Shahshahan School, Isfahan, 27 Bashir al-Daula, 159, 243 Bashir al-Divan, Haji, 78 Bashir al-Saltana, 141, 144 Bashir al-Sultan, Mirza Aqa Khan, 26 Basra, 95 bast, 58, 59, 73, 75, 76, 90, 102–3, 105, 112, 117–18, 154, 157, 174, 185, 198, 212 bazaar, 34, 45, 48, 58, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68, 74–6, 84, 86, 102–3, 128–9, 134, 136, 141, 144–5, 150, 153–4, 173–7, 181, 199, 202, 230 Beirut, 27 Bihbihani, Sayyid ‘Abdullah, 3, 113, 129, 143, 156, 176, 179, 184, 194, 197, 204 boatmen, people of the sea, 103, 184, 191, Bolshevism, 45 Bombay, 95, 202 Borujerd, 80 bread shortage, 48, 59, 62, 64, 67, 70, 84, 85, 90, 136–7, 139, 163, 176, 196, 223, 226, 241 British, Britain, 3, 9, 10, 16, 18–20, 26, 46, 57, 58, 63, 69, 73, 74–7, 80, 81, 84–9, 91, 95–103, 105, 112, 115, 122, 143, 149, 154, 157–60, 164, 166, 168, 170, 174, 182–3, 186–8, 192, 196, 200–2, 207–8, 211, 222, 226, 229, 231–2, 234, 250 Bulgarian constitution, 117

266

I ran

between

I slamic N ationalism

Bunab, 132–3 Bushehr, 2, 9, 10, 18, 28, 64, 69, 75, 76, 94–105, 127, 148–50, 152, 154, 157–8, 164, 182–206, 208–11, 234, 236, 238, 250–1 Bushehr council, 184–6, 188, 191, 193–200, 202, 206, 208–10, 252, Calcutta, 23, 38, 40, 234 Caucasus, Caucasian, 9, 28, 44, 45, 53, 60, 88, 127, 129, 134, 136–7, 144, 160, 183, 203, 210, 227, 241–2 centralisation and decentralisation, 14, 18, 21, 45, 201 China, Chinese, 68 Christianity, Christians, 35, 38, 39–42, 53, 82, 87, 90, 97, 124, 131, 154, 173, 206 Church Missionary Society, 20, 65, 82 civil rights, 5, 111 class struggle, 6, 9, 122, 126, 128–30, 143, 209 coinage, 19, 63, 64, 68, 87, 214 commerce, 10, 20, 26, 45, 51, 79, 96, 198, 211 Constitution of 1906, 4, 8, 109–10, 114–16 constitutionalism, 4, 5, 9, 15, 17, 32–4, 45, 60, 111–13, 117, 122, 127, 129–32, 135, 137–9, 141, 143, 147, 151, 156, 158–64, 167, 169–70, 174, 178–80, 189, 192, 197, 204, 206, 210, 213, 233, 237, 241, 248 consultation, 5, 15, 22, 33, 34, 66, 71, 85, 110–12, 130–1, 137, 139, 149–50, 189, 199, 204, 214 Cossacks, 82, 144, 171 Cox, Percy, 183, 186, 200–1 cultivators, 85, 86, 123, 152, 185, 196 customs, customs administration, 9, 17, 21, 38, 50, 51, 55, 57, 68–70, 74, 77, 82, 88, 97–100, 102–4, 112, 124, 183–4, 187, 196–200, 208–11, 226, 250 Dabistan-i Naubar, 125 Dar al-Fanun of Tabriz, 54 Dar al-Fanun of Tehran, 24, 27, 30, 54 Darya Baigi, Amir Tuman, 64, 97, 99–100, 103, 182–4, 187–8, 193, 195–6, 202, Dashti, Dashtistan, 188, 192 Dastaki, Aqa Sayyid Ahmad, see Mu‘in al-Islam, daulat, 6, 27, 43, 53, 54, 70, 86, 92, 113, 117, 162, 212, 218

and

S ecularism

Daulatabadi, Yahya, 29 Davafurush, Haji ‘Ali, 60 democracy, 4, 7, 35, 45, 110–11, 124, 160 Dez River, 99 Dezful, 99 education, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 24–9, 31, 36, 42, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 61, 67, 69, 80, 82, 97, 98, 118, 120, 125, 131, 138, 145, 150, 189, 204, 210, 219 Egypt, 4, 15, 25, 30, 35, 36, 42, 90, 180, 238 elections, 6, 9, 10, 34, 59–61, 66, 77, 78, 93, 104, 109, 113–14, 119, 141–3, 147–8, 155, 170–2, 175, 182, 184–5, 191, 193–6, 207, 227–8, 238, 250 Electoral Law 1906, 58, 90, 109, 113–14, 194 elites, 1, 4, 8, 9, 19, 26, 27, 35, 45–7, 57, 61, 63, 64, 67, 70, 71, 73, 79–93, 110, 121, 130, 136, 147, 152, 154, 160–1, 163, 170–1, 174, 203, 208, 211 Enzeli, 44 equality, 5, 37, 52, 91, 111, 117–18, 127, 135, 150, 172–3, 188, 204, 206–7, 233, 248 Euphrates, 19, 96 executive power, 4, 37, 175, 180 exports, 17, 18, 20, 80 Fakhr al-Sadat, 152, 244 Fal Asiri, Aqa Sayyid Muhammad, 72 Fal Asiri, Sayyid ‘Ali, 147, 149 Fal Asiri, Sayyid ‘Ali Akbar, 65 Farajallah Khan, Mir Panj, 153, 159 Farhang newspaper of Isfahan, 27, 91 Farman Farma, ‘Abd al-Husain Mirza, 67, 139, 142–3, 208 Fasa, 74 Fashariki, Akhund Mulla Baqir, 87 Fatimiyya School, Qum, 55 Fazl ‘Ali Aqa, Mirza, 123, 135 Fazlallah, Shaikh, (see under Nuri), finances, financial reform, 3, 15–17, 20, 21, 25, 28, 38, 45, 47, 57, 63–5, 67, 68, 73, 74, 80, 97, 110, 112, 115, 118, 120, 124, 138, 148, 159, 163, 171, 174, 183, 187, 197, 199, 204, 209–10, 214, 222 France, French, 26, 54, 55, 91, 97, 112, 125, 150, 160, 170, 176, 183 freedom, 5, 18, 24, 34, 39, 42, 49, 50, 59, 91, 111–12, 118, 138, 145, 151, 172, 174, 180, 192, 206, 211, 213

I ndex Germany, German, 17, 96, 100, 183, 186, 188, 211 grain, 47, 48, 66, 68, 82, 128, 137, 174, 196 guilds, 6, 8, 61, 66, 68, 76, 80, 112, 114, 123–4, 128, 130, 142, 152, 161, 163, 171, 174, 184, 186–7, 191, 193–5, 198, 202, 208–9, 211–12, 243–4 Gulpaigan, 80 Habl al-Matin newspaper of Calcutta, 23, 30, 38–43, 50, 52, 55, 63, 66, 69–72, 76, 88, 89, 98, 99 Hadi, Mirza, 171 Hadid newspaper for Tabriz, 49, 51, 52 Haidar, soldier, 198 Haji Mirza Husain ibn Haji Mirza Khalil, 137, 175, Hamadan, 95, 126, Hariri, Haji Mirza Aqa, 123–4 Hasan Aqa, Haji Mirza, 55, 57–9, 61, 223 Hasan Sarraf, Haji Mirza, 150 Hashim, Mir (Mirza), 58, 59, 123, 126, 128–30, 134–6, 144–6, 152, 226 Hauza-yi Islami, Tehran, 42 Hayat, 53 health, 8, 30, 95, 104, 210, 249 Hejaz, 53, 90 Hidayatallah Mirza, 123, 178 Hisam al-Saltana, 105 Hormuz, 100, 188 hudud, 138, 205 huquq, 77, 138, 205, 213 Husain Khan, Mirza Sayyid, 49 Husain, Mirza, 125 Husain, Mirza, Munshi, 186 hygiene, 8, 210 Ibrahim, Aqa Mirza, 67 Ibrahim, Haji Mirza, 123 Ibrahim, Mirza, mujtahid of Shiraz, 70, 73, 75, 76, 147, 150, 153, 156, 161, 164, 166–7, 204, 247 Iftitahiyya School, 29 Ihiya’ al-Milla, 199 Ihtisham al-Saltana, 29 Ihtiyaj newspaper of Tabriz, 40, 53 ‘Ilmiyya School, 29 Imam Jum‘a of Bushehr, 184–5 Imam Jum‘a of Shiraz, 68, 70, 72, 150, 154, 157, 164, 167–8,

267

Imam Jum‘a of Tabriz, Haji Mirza ‘Abdul Karim, 48, 57, 58–9 Imperial Bank of Persia, 20, 64, 66, 67, 82, 83, 86, 87, 97, 149, 173, 188, 243 imports, 17, 18, 20, 38, 49, 80, 89, 95 India, 3, 18, 26, 40–2, 45, 65, 73, 90, 95, 98, 149, 196, 202 individual rights, 5, 109, 111–12 industry, 18, 19, 27, 33, 36, 38, 51–3, 91, 92, 169, 180 Intizam al-Mamalik, 167 Iqbal al-Daula, 177 Iran-i Nau, 49 Isfahan, 2, 4, 10, 20, 25–7, 51, 68, 69, 79–93, 96, 100, 113, 150–1, 154–5, 164, 166, 168–81, 203–11, 230–1, 248–9 Isfahani, Sayyid Jamal al-Din, 68–70, 89, 92, 113 Islam, throughout, Islamism, 4, 9, 79, 89, 178, 180, 203, 211 Istanbul, 16, 23, 37, 42, 45, Ja‘far Quli Khan Mir Panj, 167, 214 Jada Sazi Company, 44 Jahrum, 74 Japan, Japanese, 25, 26, 68, 72, 98, 125, 172, Javad, Haj Mirza, mujtahid of Tabriz, 28, 46, 48 Javad, Mirza, 127, 131–2, 205 Jerusalem, 231 Jews, 65, 66, 70, 73, 76, 77, 82, 124, 157, 165, 173, 177, 206, 231 Jinab newspaper of Isfahan, 172, 211 Julfa, 82, 86, 173 jumhur-i muslimin, 77, 111, 137, 152, 156, 213 justice, 1, 34, 35, 37, 52, 66, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 82, 91, 110–12, 115, 117–18, 132–3, 137–8, 148, 150, 153, 156, 158, 163, 171, 177, 179, 184–5, 188, 204–6, 237, 239 Kamal newspaper of Tabriz, 50, 53–5 Kamal School, Tabriz, 54, 55 Karabala’i ‘Ali Misyu (Monsieur), 60 karguzar, 10, 58, 75, 76, 96, 105, 213 Karim Mujahid, 126 Karun River, 18, 19, 65, 95, 96, 99, 100–2, 105 Kashani, Mirza Taqi Khan Kashani, 27 Kaziruni, Haj Muhammad Husain Tajir, 173–5

268

I ran

between

I slamic N ationalism

Kaziruni, Mirza ‘Ali, 186, 193–5, 201–2 Kerbala, 41, 75, 87 Kerman, 31, 238–9 Kermanshah, 2, 97, 102 Khalkhal, 131, 239 Khoy, 131, 139 Khomeini, Ayatullah Sayyid Ruhollah, 2, 4, 9, 51, 179–80, 211, 246–7, 249 Khu’i, Imam Jum‘a, 123–4 Khurasani, Akhund Mulla, 117, 137–8, 166, 172, 192, 204, 206 Khurshid, 52 Khuzistan, 80, 96, 99 Kirman, 52 Kitabcha-yi ghaibi, 16 Kitab-i Ahmad, 16 knowledge, 17, 22, 26, 29, 34, 36, 38–42, 49–52, 66, 69, 80, 128, 135, 192, 224, 249 Kurdistan, Kurds, 2, 80, 97, 139, 207, 225 Labib al-Mulk Shirazi, see Mirza ‘Ali Shirazi, 98 Lagos, 41 landowners, 46–8, 71, 128–9, 137, 145, 152, 194–5 Lari, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husain, 161–3 law, 4–8, 15–17, 22, 33–5, 37, 39, 40, 50, 71, 72, 76, 84, 90, 91, 109–12, 115–21, 125, 127, 130, 132, 135–7, 141, 145, 148, 155–7, 162, 169, 172–3, 176, 178–9, 189, 192, 198, 203, 205–7 legal rights, 83, 205, 210, 226 legislative power, 4, 5, 17, 103, 114–15, 118, 192 legitimacy, 7, 15, 34, 110, 130, 162, 171 libraries, 36, 120, 210, 249 Lingah, 100, 104 local amenities, 193 Lughmaniyya School, Tabriz, 50, 55, Lur, Aqa Baig, 168 Luristan, 80 lutis, 48, 137, 144–5, 153, 163, 223 Lynch Brothers Company, 19, 96, 100–2 Madrasa-yi Daulati-yi Tabriz, 54 Madrasa-yi Harbiyya, 150 Madrasa-yi ‘Ilmiyya, 29 Madrasa-yi Imamiyya, 150 Madrasa-yi Islamiyya, 150 Majd al-Mulk, 23

and

S ecularism

Majlis, 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 22, 33, 42, 60, 61, 66, 77, 78, 93, 94, 104, 107, 113–20, 122–4, 126–32, 134–9, 141, 145–53, 155–6, 159, 161, 163–4, 168–72, 174–80, 182–9, 192, 194–5, 197, 199–208, 210, 211, 213, 239, 241, 245–6, 249–50 Majlis-i Istintaq, Shiraz, 66 Majlis-i Muhtarram, Shiraz, 67, 68 majlis-i shura, 17, 61, 71 maktabs, 125 Malik al-Mutakallimin, Haj Mirza Nasrallah, 92, 113 Malik al-Tujjar of Isfahan, 175, 177, 231 Malik al-Tujjar of Bushehr, Haj Muhammad Mahdi, 95, 96, 99, 100 Malkum Khan, 16, 17, 23, 42, 51, 83, 218, 233 Maraga’i, Zain al-‘Abidin, 16 Mashhad, 2, 50, 55, 59, 90, 98, 127, 182, 200 Mashhadi Baqir Baqqal, 60 mashruta-yi mashru‘a, 131, 137, 162, 175, 179, 192, 241 Masjid Shahi family, 2, 9, 79, 81, 171, 174, 211 Matin al-Saltana, ‘Abd al- Hamid Khan, 98 Mazandaran, Mazandarani, 2, 23 Mediterranean, 45 merchant councils (majlis), 21, 22 merchants, throughout, Midhat Pasha, 17 military reform, 24, 25, 27, 43, 44, 46, 51, 54, 64, 68, 80, 91, 113, 127–8, 144, 165, 180, 183, 212, 214, 219 millat, 6, 27, 42, 43, 53, 54, 66, 70, 86, 111, 162, 214 minerals, mines, 21, 22, 24, 100, 188 Mirza Ghafar, 127 Mirza Haji Aqa, calligrapher, 246 missionaries, 20, 26, 42, 53, 65, 82 Miz‘al, Shaikh of Mohammareh, 96, 99–100 modernity, modernisation, 6, 7, 15, 20, 26, 36, 45, 52, 83, 105, 131 Mohammareh, 96, 99–100, 102, 187 monarchy, 4, 17, 91, 110, 116, 126, 135, 143, 170, 178, 214 Morocco, 53, 188, Mu’ayyid al-Daula, 147, 153–5 Mu‘in al-Islam, Aqa Sayyid Ahmad Dastaki, 75, 149, 151, 157–9, 161, 163, 166, 168, 223, 245

I ndex Mu‘in al-Ru‘aya, 139 Mu‘in al-Tujjar, Haji Aqa Muhammad, 10, 20, 66, 76, 94, 96, 97, 99–102, 103–5, 150, 186–7, 195, 251 Mu‘iz al-Saltana, see Miz‘al, Shaikh of Mohammareh, Mubashar i-Divan, 68, 69 Mufakhir al-Mulk, 122 Muhammad ‘Ali, Haji, 129 Muhammmad ‘Ali Dashti, Haji, 186, 193 Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, Aqa Mirza, 125, 129, 152 Muhammad ‘Ali Khan (Tarbiyat), 49 Muhammad ‘Ali Shah (earlier Mirza), 57–61, 114, 122, 143, 145, 166, 168, 173, 177, 179, 189, 222, 224, 242 Muhammad Baqir Mujtahid Isfahani, 151 Muhammad Baqir Najafi, Haj Shaikh, 27 Muhammad Baqir, Haji, 127 Muhammad Baqir, Sayyid, 166, 168 Muhammad Hasan, Haji Shaikh, 152, 243 Muhammad Husain, Shaikh, 189 Muhammad Ja‘far, Shaikh, 162, 244 Muhammad Javad Khan, 97 Muhammad Nadim Bashi, 54, Muhammad Riza, Haji Sayyid, 71, 185–6, 191, 193, 196–7, 209 Muhammad Shafi‘, Haji, 185–6, 191, 193, 251 Muhammad Sirishta-Dar, Haj Mirza, 152, 244 Muhammad Taqi, Haj, of Davachi, 145 Muhammad Hadi, Aqa, 72 Muhammid Riza Kaziruni, Haji Sayyid, 187, 193–4, 196 Muhazzab al-Daula, Haj, 78, 147, 151, 155, 161, 243 Muhsin Aqa Mujtahid, Mirza, 130 Mujahid newspaper of Tabriz, 127, 139–40, 143 mujahidin, 60, 61, 127–9, 134–7, 141–2 Mukhbir al-Saltana, Mahdi Quli Hidayat, 115, 187, 237 Mulla ‘Abdullah Rauza Khvan, 97, Mulla Nasr al-Din newspaper of Tabriz, 50 municipal government, 7, 45, 206, 210, 212 Municipality Law 1907, 7, 109, 120–1, Muqim va musafir, 169, 178–86, Murtiza Quli Khan of Na’in, 171

269

museums, 120, 210, 249 Mushir al-Daula, Mirza Hasan Khan, 16 Mushir al-Mulk Na’ini, Mirza Baqir Khan, 27, 204 music, 27, 83, 128 Mustashar al-Daula, Mirza Sadiq, 114, 116, 123, 163, 237–8 Mu‘tamid-i Divan, Mirza Hasan Khan Kuvari, 68, 76, 151, 157–9, 161–2, 164–7, 209, 229, 246 mutisharri‘a ‘ulama of Tabriz, 46, 144, 223, 226 Muzaffar al-Din Shah, 3, 10, 17, 20, 26, 27–30, 48, 49, 55, 87, 94, 114, 122, 124, 129 Muzaffari newspaper of Bushehr, 97–9, 102, 148, 155, 158–9, 162, 182, 185, 187–96, 199, 202 Muzaffari School, Tabriz, 54 Muzaffari School, Bushehr, 49, 54, 97, 187–9, 211 Nahzat al-Daula, 139 Na’ini, Mirza Muhammad Husain, 32, 137, 179, 217, 236, 248 Najafi, Aqa Shaikh Muhammad Taqi, 9, 79, 81–90, 93, 169, 171, 173–5, 177–8, 181, 205, 230, 231 Nakhuda Ibrahim, 186 Nasir al-Daula, 64, 68, 76, 148, 164, 246–7 Nasir al-Din Shah, 16, 17, 23, 25, 66, 87, 94, 96, 211 Nasir al-Mulk, Abu’l Qasim Khan, 17, 159 Nasir Khan, Shaikh, 194 Nasiri newspaper of Tabriz, 49, 50 Nasiri Company, 96, 99, 101–2 nationalism, 3, 4, 6, 7, 23, 26, 27, 37, 38, 50, 53, 69, 84, 91, 109, 111, 127, 207–8, 231 Naus, Joseph, Belgian head of customs, 57, 124 Nayriz, 26 Nayyir al-Daula, 175 Nazim al-Daula, 66 Nida-yi Islam newspaper of Shiraz, 148, 150–1, 157, 238 Ni‘matallah, assassin of Qavam al-Mulk, 165 Nizam al-Daula, 126, 129–30, 141 Nizam al-Din Mirza, 78 Nizam al-Mulk, 126, 129

270

I ran

between

I slamic N ationalism

Nizam al-Saltana, 48, 99–100, 155, 158–9, 162–3, 165, 174–5 Nizam al-‘Ulama, 48 Norway, 96 Nurallah, Haj Aqa, Thiqat al-Islam,2, 9, 79, 88–91, 93, 169–81, 204–6, 208–9, 211, 248 Nuri clan, Shiraz, 64, 70, 150, 154 Nuri, Shaikh Fazlallah, 32, 117–18, 130, 135, 138, 143, 156, 164, 175–6, 178–9, 192, 197, 203–5, 245 Oil, 53, 96 Ottoman Empire, Ottomans, 2, 3, 5, 7, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26, 33, 41, 42, 44, 45, 49, 53, 75, 79, 85, 90, 91, 98, 104, 112, 117, 169 Ottoman tobacco company, 85, 86, 89 Pahlavi, Pahlavi dynasty, 1, 2 Pan-Islam, 23, 33, 40, 41, 68, 69, 98 parliamentary law, 4, 16, 205 patriotism, 55, 91, 131 Persian Gulf and ports, 2, 9, 18, 65, 95, 97–9, 103–4, 182–4, 187–8, 193–5, 201, 208, 211 police, 198, press, 3, 5, 6, 8–10, 16, 19, 23–31, 33, 36–42, 45, 49–54, 57, 65–7, 69, 72, 97–9, 118, 132, 172, 192–3, 201, 203–4, 206–7, 210–11 Provincial and District Council Law, 4, 7, 8, 10, 109, 119–20, 143, 155, Qajars, Qajar dynasty, 3, 6, 18, 23, 28, 30, 64, 66, 80, 83, 109, 114, 116, 123, 131, 165, 209 Qanun, 17 Qarahchaman, 129 Qashqa’i tribe, 2, 9, 63, 64–7, 76, 153–4, 162–4, 209, 211, 244 Qasim Khan, Mirza, 151 Qavam al-Mulk, ‘Ali Muhammad, 65 Qavam al-Mulk, Muhammad Riza, 63–8, 70–3, 76, 77, 147–66, 175, 209, 211, 229, 244–5 Qavam Divan, 152, 243–4 Qazvin, 44, 131 quarantine, 98, 103, 162, 204, 234, 246 Qum, 55, 57, 88, 90, 113, 168 radicalism, 9, 60, 61, 75, 122–46, 153, 160, 194, 211

and

S ecularism

Rahim Khan, 134, 146 railways, 16, 23, 53, 100, 150 Ra’is Hadi, 168 Rasht, 28 rationalism, reason, 33, 34, 36, 40, 46 rationalisation, 3, 4, 7, 8, 16, 33, 34, 37, 60, 109–10, 118, 121, 132, 143, 168, 206, 209–10 religious minorities, 5, 26, 65, 173 responsibility of ministers, 4, 109 Reuter concession 1872, 16, 79 Reza Shah Pahlavi, 26, 203 roads, 44, 45, 54, 128, 145, 154, 159, 164, 166, 197, 200, 239 Rukn al-Daula, 67 Rukn al-Mulk, 87, 90 Rushdiyya, Mirza Hasan, 27–9, 45, 54 Rushdiyya College, Tehran, 17, 55, 56, 125 Russian Discount Bank, 20 Russians, Russia, 3, 19, 20, 32, 41, 44, 45, 49, 54, 55, 58, 60, 72, 80, 88, 89, 91, 101, 115, 122, 127, 136, 144, 146, 159–60, 166, 172, 183, 187, 203, 210, 222, 226 Ruznama-yi vaqayi‘-i ‘ittifaqiyya, 24 Sa‘adat School of Bushehr (see Muzaffari School) Sa‘d al-Daula, Mirza Javad Khan, 116–17 Sa‘d al-Mulk, 122 Sadaqiani, Haji Rasul, 60 Sadiq, Aqa Mirza, Mujtahid, 130 Sadr al-Islam, 184–5, 189, 191, 194 Safavids, Safavid dynasty, 9, 44, 46, 79, 246 Sahib Ikhtiyar (see Vazir Makhsus), Sa‘id al-Saltana, Amir Tuman, 66, 187, 193 Saif al-Islam, Aqa, of Bunab, 132 Salar al-Sultan, 64, 73, 76, 148, 164, 166, 168 Salim, Shaikh, of Tabriz, 127–30, 134–5, 139, 146, 207, Salmas, 131, 139 Samsam al-Saltana Bakhtiyari, 178 Sani‘ al-Daula, 204 Sardar Akram, 75 Sari, 112 sarrafs, 64, 214 Sarraj al-Din, Aqa, 171 Saulat al-Daula, 65, 76, 154, 162–3

I ndex Savujbilagh, 7, 139 schools, 6, 10, 25–31, 36, 49, 55, 61, 72, 120, 125, 130, 132, 150, 210 science, 23, 27, 28, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 43, 50–2, 54, 55, 81,118, 131 Secret Centre, (Markaz-i Ghaibi), 60, 61 secularism, secular, 1–10, 15, 17, 27, 31–43, 51, 52, 54, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 68–72, 88, 91, 93, 105, 109–21, 124, 126–7, 132, 135–6, 141, 151, 154, 156, 160, 168–9, 172, 180, 182, 189, 194, 199, 203–4, 206, 208–12, 233, 245, 248 senate, 115–16, 118, 192 separation of powers, 109, 116 Shabistari, Aqa Sayyid Muhammad, 46, 51, 143, shabnama, 160, 186, 214, Shaikh al-Ra’is, Abu al-Hasan Mirza, 66–70, 228 Shaikh Muhammad ‘Ali Masjid-Shahi, 84 Shaikhis, 46, 92, 162, 223 Sharaf al-Daula, 123, Sharaf School, 29 shari‘a, 4, 5, 15, 18, 22, 30, 34, 35, 38–40, 43, 51, 52, 54, 57, 60, 70–2, 76, 77, 83, 86, 87, 91, 93, 97, 106, 109–10, 112–19, 128, 130–2, 135–8, 141, 145, 148–9, 156, 162, 166, 169–70, 172–3, 176, 178–84, 192, 196–7, 200, 205–7, 213–14, 249–50 Shari‘at Madar Kirmani, Aqa Mirza Muhammad, 30 Shemsettin Bey, Ottoman Ambassador, 112, 228, 236 Shiraz, 2, 9, 10, 20, 26, 46, 63–78, 89, 91, 92, 98, 102, 147–68, 175, 183–4, 187, 189, 191, 193, 197, 200, 201, 203–4, 206–11 Shiraz council, 147–51, 153–6, 158–9, 161–5 Shirza, Mirza ‘Ali, 98, 102, 148, 158, 182, 185, 189, 191–2, 194, 202, 205 Shirazi, Mirza Hasan, 19, 47 Shirkat-i Islamiyya (Islamic company), 68, 89, 92, 98 Shu‘a al-Saltana, 63, 67, 70, 72, 73, 75–7, 158 Shuja‘ al-Mamalik, 186 Shukrallah Baig, 168 shura, 34, 149, 199 Shushtar, 96, 100, 102, 161

271

silver, 18, 52, 82, 84, 87, 124, 174 Sipah Salar, Mirza Husain Khan Mushir al-Daula, 16, 17, 25 Siyahatnama-yi Ibrahim Baig, 16 social democrats, 32, 129, 136, 205, 239 Social Democrats, Organisation of, 127 soldiers, 48, 58, 66, 67, 91, 105, 125, 137, 144, 196, 198, 209, 252 sovereignty, 4, 7, 8, 109–11, 115, 118, 205, 214 steamships, 19, 95, 96 Suez Canal, 18, 95 Sufis, Sufism, 65, 162, 230 Suhrab Khan, 167 Supplementary Fundamental Law 1907, 117–19, 130, 134–7, 141, 156–7, 163, 175–6, 192, 205, 207 Sweden, 96 Tabataba’i, Mirza Abu’l Qasim, 179 Tabataba’i, Mirza Muhammad Sadiq, 26 Tabataba’i, Sayyid Muhammad, 3, 29, 42, 98, 103, 113, 117, 129, 143, 156, 173, 187, 197, 204, 206 Tabataba’i, Sayyid Ziya, 150 Tabibzada, Mirza Husain Khan, 50 Tabriz, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 24, 27, 28, 30, 36, 37, 44–62, 67, 77, 80, 92, 93, 113–17, 120, 122–46, 153, 160, 163, 174–5, 183–4, 195, 197, 203–10, 214, 223–6, 238, 240–1 Tabriz Anjuman (see Anjuman of Tabriz), al-Tahtawi, Rifa’a, 36 Taj al-Shu‘ara, poet, 150 Tajirbashi, Mirza Mahmud, 128 Talibuf, ‘Abd al-Rahim, 16 Taqizada, Sayyid Hasan, 49, 55, 60, 114, 116–17, 123, 141, 204, 225 Tarbiyat newspaper of Tabriz, 29 Tarbiyat School, Tabriz, 55 taxation, 17, 18, 63, 82, 118, 170, 177, 180, 199, 210, 249 Tehran, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 17, 18, 25, 27, 28, 31, 37, 42, 44, 45, 47, 54, 58, 61, 64, 66, 68, 70, 73–8, 80, 83, 88, 90, 92, 93, 97, 98, 100, 102–4, 112–18, 122–30, 134–8, 141, 146, 148–53, 156, 159–60, 163–4, 170, 173, 175–8, 182–4, 186–95, 197–8, 200–2, 204, 207, 211 Thiqat al-Islam (of Shiraz), 152 Thiqat al-Islam of Isfahan, see Nurallah, Haj Aqa,

272

I ran

between

I slamic N ationalism

Thiqat al-Islam Tabrizi, Mirza ‘Ali Aqa, 2, 9, 33, 46, 57, 61, 130–1, 136, 204, Thuraya, 10, 30, 89, 91, 92, 98 Tigris, 19, 96 tobacco, 18, 19, 23, 43, 47, 63, 65, 80, 82, 83, 85–7, 89 Tobacco Concession 1890–91, 16, 23, 43, 47, 65, 82, 83, 87, 224 Trans-Caucasian, 9, 127 Transvaal, 43, 69 tribes, 2, 8, 64, 65, 78, 96, 110, 120, 147, 157–8, 162–3, 167, 208 tullab, 28, 48, 50, 55, 57, 61, 68, 86, 102, 112, 129, 149, 151–2, 154, 157, 199, 204, 206, 215 Turkmanchai, Treaty of, 101 tuyyul, 192, 215 ‘ulama, throughout, ‘Umdat al-Tujjar, ‘Abd al-Riza Tabrizi, 55 universal suffrage, 71, 127, 194 Urduabadi, Mashhadi ‘Ali Askar, 49 ‘urf law, 22, 76, 83, 102, 118, 120, 132, 135, 145, 179, 192, 205 Urumiya, 7, 61, 126, 131, 139, 142, 205–7, 215 Usqu, 48

and

S ecularism

vatan, 38, 68, 69 Vatan School, Rasht, 28, 189, 207 Vathiq al-Mulk Ansari, 177 Vazir Makhsus, 75–7, 164 Veneziani, Mr (Mirza Riza Khan), 150 villages, 48, 61, 81, 84, 129, 131–2, 136, 163, 176, 205, 239 volunteers for drills, 127, 186 will of the people, 4, 109–10, 205 women, 47, 48, 70, 73–5, 84, 99, 134, 136, 151, 153, 171, 173, 226, 229, 240, 244, 246 world economy, 8, 18–21, 23, 80, 94, 95, 105, 211, 218 Yazdi, Sayyid Muhammad Kazim, 51, 55, 118, 144, 192, 241 Yusuf, Aqa Shaikh, 149, 151 Zahir al-Daula, ‘Ali Khan Qajar, 28 Zahra, Bibi, 99 Zanjani, Abu Talib, 41 Zargham al-Saltana, 65, 154 Zill al-Sultan, Ma‘sud Mirza, 2, 9, 27, 80–3, 85–7, 89–93, 166–8, 170–1, 173–4, 176–7, 208, 211, 230–1, 248 Zoroastrians, 65, 165