Iran and China: A New Approach to Their Bilateral Relations 9781498544573, 9781498544580

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Iran and China

Copyright © 2017. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Iran and China A New Approach to Their Bilateral Relations

Copyright © 2017. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Shirzad Azad

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB

Copyright © 2017. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2017 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available ISBN: 978-1-4985-4457-3 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-4985-4458-0 (electronic) TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

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Contents

Preface

vii

Introduction

ix

Chapter 1: The 1980s: Marking a Watershed in Sino–Iranian Ties

1

Chapter 2: Under Eminences Grises: Vowing Perpetual Partnership

17

Chapter 3: Same Talks, Contrasting Connotations: Civilizational Nuances

31

Chapter 4: Principlism Engages Pragmatism: Failures and Frictions

47

Chapter 5: A New Era: Toward Strategic Equilibrium

75

Conclusion

95

Bibliography

99

Index

103

About the Author

109

v

Copyright © 2017. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2017. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Preface

This book is written from the viewpoint that the old relationship between Iran and China is essentially a horse of a different color and has little to do with the way the two countries have managed their ties over the past several decades. It instead studies the interactions between the two countries in the post-1980 era, during which their relations have by and large been unceasing and incremental. Rather than providing a detailed account of myriad politicoeconomic connections involving the two sides, I paid particular attention to how Iran and China have treated each other since the early 1980s. The book, therefore, as much as possible, aims to keep away from descriptive narratives, particularly recapitulating what other works already have tackled. One other important matter is that the Iranian–Chinese relationship, like all other formal state-to-state relations, has never been linear: their bilateral ties over more than three and one-half decades often have been fraught with ups and downs. I endeavor to cover as concisely as possible all major issues that have mattered most in Tehran’s relationship with Beijing since 1980 without preoccupation with how the two parties could have sorted things out otherwise. Having said that, my argument with regard to a likely direction of the Sino–Iranian relationship in the foreseeable future is based on my understanding of how the political establishments in Beijing and Tehran function.

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Preface

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Finally, I am an Iranian citizen who is discontented with the current situation of Chinese studies in my home country. I hope that the present work contributes humbly to the relevant existing literature and fills a tiny fraction of the gap my fellow citizens at home and abroad definitely had better opportunities and resources to fill a long time ago. And although I appreciate the incisive feedback and invaluable suggestions of the anonymous reviewers (no matter that I disagreed with some of their opinions), all shortcomings and mistakes in this book are mine alone. Shirzad Azad Beijing March 6, 2016

Introduction

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RESEARCH THEME The contemporary scholarship on the Iranian–Chinese relationship tends generally to drift toward two contrasting lines of argument. Based on one assertion, Iran and China are principally perceived to be “perfect partners,” “close companions,” “matchless matches,” “cordial comrades,” “amiable allies,” and so forth. The Sino–Iranian ties often are contended to be deeprooted and built on very solid foundations so that neither ephemeral external elements nor even fundamental domestic developments in either country can seriously dent the fortified edifice of their somewhat multifaceted connections. In a broader context, moreover, Iran and China usually are asserted to be two key angles of an indispensable triangle in the Eurasian arch that shapes a nexus of continental powers whose combined resources and overall significance make multipolarity in the structure of an international system stark in its clarity. These two ancient countries continue as usual to obsess the stronger rival arch of power in the world for some highly critical interests at stake, ranging from socio-cultural uniqueness to political ideologies and from territorial integrity to strategic spheres of influence. Therefore, the very nexus of the Tehran–Beijing partnership is claimed to be so pivotal that any trivial matter in their bilateral relationship essentially pales into insignificance by comparison. At the other extreme, the Iranian–Chinese interactions are maintained to be merely a “limited partnership,” “mismatched relationship,” “marriage of convenience,” “fair-weather friendship,” “unlikely affiliation,” and so forth. By cherry-picking certain statistics or highlighting particular developments in Sino–Iranian relations during the past decades, this line of assertion by and large neither believes in any robust foundation that sustains the contours of ix

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Iran–China bonds in the present times nor favors such intimate association between the two sides in the first place. From such a perspective, thus, Iran approached China largely for its war requirements in one decade, whereas in another decade Beijing had to get closer to Tehran in order to guarantee a long-term supply of fossil fuels to satisfy its insatiable energy needs. Each side served mostly as a contingency country for the other party: Beijing was to be befriended only when Tehran had use for the East Asian power to rid itself of various political pressures and crippling economic sanctions levied by the West against the Persian Gulf country; China was equally desperate to ally with Iran whenever Beijing was at loggerheads with Western countries over a domestic issue or an international crisis. Which line of reasoning holds water? Basically, can we trust either side in the foregoing explanation to understand the true nature of Sino–Iranian relations? Logically, is it adequate to follow only one of those two lines of argument in order to assess what happened between Iran and China during the past several decades? On one side, if the Tehran–Beijing relationship were such a perfect partnership, why have we witnessed so much anti-China backlash from Iranians in recent years? If the Sino–Iranian connections were that formidable, why then did they refuse to stand up to the relevant systemic pressures on multiple occasions? If their bilateral relations were convincingly so vital and irreplaceable, why were Iran and China often nebulous and obscure about their commitments and obligations to each other? Is it avowedly normal to witness so much bureaucratic bafflegab hovering over the atmosphere of Sino–Iranian interactions from one decade to another? And if they were that close and cooperative in the past, would Iran and China be fully prepared again to realize recent talk of forging a “comprehensive strategic partnership” between the two countries? On the other side, could a limited and constrained relationship between Tehran and Beijing, regardless of its various twists and turns, be so perpetually stable and incremental for more than three and one-half decades? Was periodic pragmatism by only one side, or even both parties, an appropriate approach to keep the basis of all Iran–China bonds intact over those turbulent years? If Iran and China were only fair-weather friends, why would there have been frequent contacts and consultations between Tehran and Beijing when troubles of one sort or another befell one or both of them? Why does a mismatched association between the Iranians and Chinese deserve a lot of constant attention and total monitoring by multiple rival parties here and there? If Iran and China were only unlikely allies and mismatched fellows, why so much agitation and worrisome thoughts with regard to potential ramifications stemming from any enhancement in the size and scope of Sino–Iranian interactions? On top of that, why does a limited partnership of an ostensibly contingency nature between the two countries involve so many

Introduction

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stereotypes and and so much biased news coverage on every relevant development, whether vital or trivial, in the Sino–Iranian relationship? To find answers to such questions, the present research scrutinizes major developments and key issues in the Iran–China relations since 1980. This study basically argues that none of the foregoing lines of analysis can provide a proper understanding of what happened between Tehran and Beijing over more than thirty-five years. Moreover, it is highly unlikely this Sino–Iranian partnership will move toward either extreme position in the foreseeable future. By favoring a middle perspective, it is instead more persuasive to detect traces of both viewpoints in every critical period of the Iran–China connections over the past several decades. The relations between Iran and China are not essentially based on pivotal principles and clear-cut commitments, nor do their ties rest on tenuous thoughts and flimsy foundations devoid of any common interests in the short term or well-conceived objectives in the long run. To better grasp why the scholarship on the Iranian–Chinese relationship is often afflicted with one of the two myopic standpoints adumbrated earlier, this study first takes on some big hurdles and grave impediments facing any academic inquiry into the contours of bilateral interactions involving Tehran and Beijing.

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Research on Iran–China Ties: Problems and Pitfalls For better or for worse, Iran and China primarily are two security states persistently in the crosshairs of their enemies and rivals as well as their allies and friends. As a matter of fact, the international relations of Sino–Iranian connections over the past several decades have been in the limelight of both public and private sectors in other parts of the world. As experienced by this author for the umpteenth time, sometimes even Google may get agitated when interested people search certain aspects of the Iranian–Chinese relations so that the crouching search engine pounces on the hapless users, abruptly blocking their access for “detecting unusual traffic” unless they pliantly enter a pin code requested by the elephantine Google. Despite compliance, only a very tiny percentage of their pertinent search results will be retrieved. Because of such peculiar characteristics, the governments in both Iran and China are somehow entitled to their coyness and bureaucratic bafflegab when it comes to divulging state secrets or not being quite transparent about the mechanisms through which most domestic and, particularly, foreign policies are carved out and implemented in Tehran and Beijing. The same also applies to various outcomes and implications of those policies, regardless of whether they achieve their desired objectives eventually. Another discouraging limitation is this: the bulk of the modern Sino–Iranian connections, from brief diplomatic tete-a-tetes to substantial

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cultural programs, essentially are state-sponsored and devoid of active participation by the citizenry. Extensive and long-lasting people-to-people interactions, by and large, are lacking in spite of the fact that Iran and China are neighboring countries when we exclude the Persian-speaking states of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, which were and still are parts of the greater Iran, at least culturally. More companies from the private sector are now dispatching their staff to the other country, and more Iranians and Chinese are visiting each other every year. But such developments have yet to play a major role in the way the Sino–Iranian international relations function today. In addition, the relevant people active in the public media or bureaucratic and academic institutions, as in many other parts of the world, are influenced by various politico-economic considerations of both governments in Tehran and Beijing in one way or other. This is an important matter especially when we take into account the situation of relevant scholarship in Iran and China. Basically, the overall condition of Chinese studies in Iran is far from satisfactory. Iranian universities were very late in beginning their Chinese language programs, and many departments of political science and international relations in Iran still adamantly refuse to pay enough attention to the field of Chinese and Asian studies generally commensurate with the Persian Gulf country’s expanding interactions with the East. The country enjoys so many Middle East mavens and other specialists who work on North America or European countries, but regrettably it has overlooked other important area studies such as East Asia. And despite a significant share of Tehran’s overall political and economic interactions with Beijing regardless of their long-term ramifications for the Iranians, the Persian Gulf country astonishingly still lacks a single research center or think tank that concentrates exclusively and professionally on China. Although more scholars and pundits have started to produce books and papers on China in recent years, Iran still has a long way to go before it can make up even partially for its critical shortcomings in such a crucial academic area. As compared to Iran, China may get more credit when it comes to the production of relevant scholarship on Iranian studies. More people can speak Persian in China, while many Chinese universities have initiated academic courses on Iranian studies at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Iran has also been in the crosshairs of some influential Chinese think tanks and research institutes that focus mainly on politico-strategic as well as economic studies, though the language barrier often has prevented many of them from presenting the outcomes of such works, regardless of their quality, to a larger audience outside China. Still, in China the academic study of Sino–Iranian relations has certain other drawbacks. As a case in point, some of the most influential Chinese experts and policy wonks who often write or talk about Iran—and the Middle East in general—received their higher education in a Western country without personally experiencing the country or the region

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they now focus on. This group of people especially played their own cards and credentials, rendering a particular impact upon China’s overall approach to Iran under the presidency of Hu Jintao. Finally, the significance of Sino–Iranian ties or exciting developments in their relationship have galvanized many people from other parts of the world, the Western countries in particular, into researching and writing about this significant subject. Besides works done by the Chinese experts or Iranian specialists in those countries, a large number of graduate students here and there have also written MA theses or PhD dissertations about some aspects of the Iranian–Chinese relations over the past several decades. Because the language barrier has made it all but impossible for such intrigued experts and pundits to emerge simultaneously as expert on both Iran and China, nonetheless, a lot of pertinent papers and policy reports tend, by and large, to recycle a few other scrupulous and meticulous works or paraphrase their key arguments. This is a main reason why one can easily access a flurry of academic papers and policy reports written in English about important issues in the Sino–Iranian relationship over the past decades, but finding more than a few relevant books is almost a futile quest.

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Organization of the Book The present study is made up of five chapters. Chapter 1 probes Iran’s relations with China from the reestablishment of their diplomatic ties in 1980 to the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War, focusing primarily on the political and ideological grounds that made it possible for the two parties to rekindle their old connections, the indirect and direct military bargaining during the internecine conflict, and major areas of economic cooperation between the two countries throughout the war period. In chapter 2, the roles of both internal and external elements are sketched to give credence to various reasons behind a determination of the Sino–Iranian leaders to enhance their bilateral interactions in the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq War era. Chapter 3 examines both ups and downs in Iran’s relationship with China under the presidency of Khatami, highlighting a number of important cultural issues that could influence considerably the contours of the Tehran–Beijing nexus in one way or another. In chapter 4, the Iranian–Chinese relationship during the presidency of Ahmadinejad is appraised by surveying Tehran’s fresh looking-East approach and strategy, the unprecedented bilateral economic exchanges between Iran and China, the Chinese vague and lackadaisical position toward the Iranian nuclear controversy as well as the pertinent sanctions, and major factors behind the unhappiness of many Iranian citizens with their key East Asian partner. Lastly, chapter 5 explores the perspectives about and pros-

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pects of Iran’s often multifaceted, complex connections to China under the Rouhani government, contending that the two countries ultimately may each contribute to a separate pole of power regionally and internationally rather than move faithfully and steadfastly in line to realize their more recent vow of achieving a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Chapter 1

The 1980s: Marking a Watershed in Sino–Iranian Ties

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THE CHAOTIC IRAN VERSUS A STABILIZING CHINA On the cusp of 1980, both Iranian and Chinese societies were drifting toward contrasting directions and dissimilar pathways. In Iran, the political and economic foundations of the country for some time had been unraveling at a brisk pace as if the very fabric of the Iranian state was on the verge of foundering and disintegration. A number of centrifugal forces had revved up their dubious activities and suspicious movements by taking advantage of the political parturition, social confusion, economic disruption, and cultural commotion; all of these avowedly had engulfed the entire Persian Gulf country for some time. By comparison, the previously disturbing disarray and disorder in China was now largely coalescing more and more into political permanency, economic expediency, and cultural resiliency. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for all its faults and imperfections ultimately had managed to put things together over time; although friction and disagreement about many crucial issues and sensitive matters still existed within the society at large, nonetheless enervating altercations and attenuating dustups were gradually, even if grudgingly, subsiding in favor of profitable aspirations and money-making endeavors. 1 For comparison, look at the elites who took charge of affairs then in each respective system. In the Iranian case, the commanding heights of politics as well as economics and culture had already moved, or were swiftly falling, into the hands of new people, many who had yet to sense how things could work in practice in the real world. Some certainly needed more time to get relevant experience and to see whether, and to what extent, they could deliver on the early promises they had made to the public. The Iranian system, 1

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The 1980s: Marking a Watershed in Sino–Iranian Ties

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therefore, appeared to be rather rudderless: simply, many top elites did not share consensus on how to approach and manage various contentious politico-economic and even cultural matters. Still, what added insult to injury was the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980, making any serious policy deliberation on key political and economic issues almost inconsequential; the internecine conflict unavoidably was to hollow out the bulk of Iran’s human and financial resources throughout the 1980s. In sharp contrast to the Iranian story, many Chinese elites certainly had had enough time to get to know the basic nuts and bolts of important internal and external affairs. They had undergone a rather long period of trial and error, and it was the time for them to put into practice their hardly gleaned lessons. Unlike some of their counterparts in Iran, therefore, the well-placed Chinese elites now were obsessed with how to tone down their early revolutionary rhetoric and spruce up their previous pledges to the citizenry in order to seek their cooperation and commitment toward achieving the newly carved-out national policies and objectives. And as the East Asian country was coming in from the cold, at the heart of its national agenda lay the grand strategy of economic development under the practical banner of “reform and opening-up” (gaige kaifang). Unlike progress policies and growth strategies that had been put into practice during the Mao era, the new Chinese policy of “four modernizations” (industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology) was essentially outward-looking in nature: it required a radical overhaul in many economic—and, to some extent, political and cultural—approaches the CCP had long pursued with a frenzy. 2 On top of that, the changes in China indicated that top elites had already reached some consensus with regard to the urgency and inevitability of the new orientation, though not everyone would have completely kowtowed to all of the new policies, let alone to their probable ramifications for the Chinese people. 3

An Awakening Communist Colossus: Suspicious Yet Exotic Divergent viewpoints of Iranian and Chinese officials on varied external topics and international matters were equally if not more striking. Topping the list was a serious antipathy among the officials of the Islamic Republic toward the hegemony of the then two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Because Iran’s official motto was “neither the East nor the West,” the orbit of Iranian foreign policy was now unavoidably moving more and more around those regions and countries that had forged less and lesser connections to either of the two superpowers. Despite objecting to and calling into question the policies and ideologies connected with the two major power blocs, still the United States was dubbed the “Great Satan”; the honor of “Lesser Satan” dubiously was bestowed upon Britain and not the Soviet

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The 1980s: Marking a Watershed in Sino–Iranian Ties

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Union. As a corollary to such an official approach and all the ensuing policy posturing, Iran’s erstwhile relations with the United States as well as a large number of its close allies and friends were to go into a tailspin for decades, affecting negatively almost every single aspect of the Persian Gulf country’s previous contacts and connections to those nations, from diplomatic chitchat to cultural interaction and from patterns of import and export to norms of migration and investment. On the other hand, the Chinese were just coming to terms with their “Century of National Humiliation” (bainian guochi), 4 committing themselves not to stand in the past by following a new course of action and thereby opening a different chapter in the East Asian country’s modern history. With a national agenda now largely focused on jump-starting economic development and industrialization, the Chinese could certainly get nowhere by further hewing to a Maoist or Islamic Republic-style foreign policy and diplomatic approach. China’s open-door policy was avowedly after foreign capital and investment, forcing its key policy makers willy-nilly to approach as many countries as they could befriend throughout the world, particularly those promising nations teeming with state-of-the-art technology, finance, and natural resources. The top Chinese officials, therefore, had little choice but to modernize their international political views and discard those ideologically antagonistic and confrontational stances from the Mao era, gradually paving the way to integrate the new China into the international system that Beijing had abandoned, sometimes partly and sometimes wholly, for nearly three decades. Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) patently and discernibly was a communist country, it appeared to many new Iranian officials in Tehran like an unknown giant awakening from a long hibernation as a feeble figure with less threatening organs. Not only had the Chinese not invented communism, but essentially influential officials of the Islam Republic had little curiosity or discussion about the Chinese version of communism or even its erstwhile Maoism. By and large, at that crucial and chaotic period in Iran, China and its communist ideology were nonstarters either to be obsessed with culturally and ideologically or to be dragged into the mainstream debates politically and economically. Little, if any, historical evidence of Chinese intervention in present-day Iranian frontiers made it convenient to lump them in with the flag-waving, anti-hegemonic discourse about the Russians. 5 On top of that, some important commonalities in the international vocabulary of Iranian and Chinese officials made it possible for the two countries to reestablish and revive their old interactions, even if surreptitiously for a while.

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The 1980s: Marking a Watershed in Sino–Iranian Ties

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Rekindling Connections: Politico-Strategic and Ideological Elements Iranians and Chinese had maintained bilateral interactions on and off for more than a thousand years before the communist takeover of mainland China brought a total halt to their relations for more than two decades during which Cold War considerations largely dominated their relationship. Although Tehran and Beijing managed to reestablish diplomatic ties in August 1971, political and economic connections between the two countries did not improve that much throughout the 1970s. Despite the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, the two parties did not rush to resume diplomatic interactions, though China swiftly recognized the new Iranian government on February 14, 1979. The hiatus in Sino–Iranian relations, however, could not last long as each country had important reasons to move toward normalization in their bilateral relations in 1980 when Beijing dispatched its ambassador to Tehran. But given the anticommunist rhetoric of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian government and the big communist state of China needed to engage each other rather discreetly. 6 What, then, were the crucial stakes that compelled Iran and China to come to terms with impediments and work together, even if quietly and furtively for some time? Politically, Iran was drifting swiftly toward isolation and the closure of its doors to the outside world. The anticommunist, anti-Western, and particularly anti-American rhetoric of the Islamic Republic was a surefire recipe for further seclusion and distance from the international system and its affiliated forums and institutions. The Western antagonism and countermeasures against the Islamic Republic over the so-called hostage crisis made things much worse, leaving Iran with few powerful and influential partners and supporters. In such dire circumstances, befriending a major non-Western country such as China with veto power at the United Nations (UN) could be helpful. That is why China’s shrewd and well-calculated move not to attend the UN Security Council vote in July 1980 to condemn the seizure of American diplomats improved Beijing’s status in Tehran considerably. Despite its diplomatic dexterity, however, the Chinese in all likelihood had a reason to assist the new Iranian government to succeed: they probably were thanking heaven that the Islamic Republic had, out of the blue, assumed an anti-American stance. After all, many CCP officials under a new generation of reformist leaders were very desperate to better China’s image by pointing at the Islamic Republic to convince powerful capitalists and influential technicians in the West that the Chinese were not really as anti-American and generally anti-Western as they were thought to be. Strategically, superpower rivalry and an obsession with the United States and Soviet Union’s further infiltration into the Middle East—and the Persian

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Gulf region in particular—were such bugaboos for China that its leader, Hua Guofeng, was even prepared allegedly to apologize to the new Islamic Republic officials for his official visit to the Shah of Iran in 1978. 7 Such a move, which is hardly common among big powers, could only indicate China’s growing concerns about Iran and signify the importance the PRC had attached to its connections to the Persian Gulf country and the surrounding region. Moreover, the Russian invasion of neighboring Afghanistan in November 1979 had already exacerbated the Chinese queasiness over the Soviet’s potentially demonic designs in the region. On top of that, China’s recent embarkation on economic development and industrialization had made the resource-rich region of the Persian Gulf appear more attractive than ever to Beijing. But the onset of the Iran–Iraq War and the palpable support thrust behind Baghdad by the Soviet Union and particularly the United States simply made the Chinese more nervous about their long-term interests in the region. 8 As for ideological ground, China was anxious that the ascendancy of the Islamic Republic in Iran eventually could stoke the flames of Islamic fundamentalism in restive Xinjiang (Uyghuristan). The PRC, therefore, was in a hurry to convince Iran’s new religious and political authorities that China’s Muslim minority bore no significant problem and lived in “peace and harmony” with the rest of the Chinese population. With better connections to Tehran as leverage, Beijing certainly could control Iran’s plans for and “suspicious movements” on its western frontiers. China even arranged to send a group of influential Muslims as its first visiting delegate from Beijing to Tehran in early 1980. 9 They could transmit China’s well-meaning messages to new Iranian officials and seek their understanding for Beijing’s desire to forge better ties with Tehran. 10 Moreover, the Chinese were concerned about the spread of Islamic movements to other parts of the Middle East and Central Asia, which ultimately could worsen China’s problems with its Muslim population and pose serious risks to Beijing’s overall interests in those regions. The outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980, therefore, provided the PRC with a unique opportunity to partially damp down anxiety and subsequently make its own move with regard to both warring parties, particularly Iran.

The Longest Conventional Conflict of the Twentieth Century: China and the Iran–Iraq War One conspicuous characteristic of the Sino–Iranian relationship is that war plays an important role, though the two countries apparently never have engaged in a military battle against each other. In the ancient times, when the teeming hordes of Arabs invaded the Sassanid Empire of Persia, part of the

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The 1980s: Marking a Watershed in Sino–Iranian Ties

tragic implications of that fateful event later rendered many important developments and stories involving both Iranians and Chinese, though those issues are not the subject of this book. In contemporary history, when the Arabdominated regime of Iraqi Saddam moved its military forces on September 22, 1980, to conquer Tehran in a few days, part of the reverberations of that decision became a milestone in relations between Iran and China. Although China was officially neutral toward the two warring parties, 11 the Iran–Iraq War (September 22, 1980–August 20, 1988) essentially was heaven-sent for the Chinese, who subsequently took advantage of it for their politico-strategic and commercial interests. As the internecine conflict in the Persian Gulf coincided with the early years of reform in China, the war in essence was a crucial issue in Beijing’s international relations. China badly needed skillfully and peacefully to manage its complex relationship with the two superpowers, the United States in particular, but it did not want those great powers to use the war as a pretext to intervene in that highly important region. The Chinese, therefore, were willing to cooperate with the Americans and Russians while simultaneously blaming them for contributing to the “stalemate” in the military conflict between Iran and Iraq. 12 Moreover, the Chinese leaders in Beijing did not want Iran to be defeated in the war, but they didn’t want to ruffle feathers in other Arab capitals by publicly jumping on the bandwagon to assist Tehran. But this policy did not imply that China was in favor of Iran swiftly winning the battle either. The Chinese basically were inclined to see the military power of Iranians significantly reduced by the war lest Islamic fundamentalism rejuvenate too quickly and spread into other parts of the Middle East and Central Asia, because its spread ultimately could affect China. The Chinese neutrality in the Iran–Iraq War, nevertheless, was in the style of “zuo shan guan hu dou” (to sit on top of the mountain and watch the tigers fight). The political stance was taken innocuously, but it was not meant to be totally disinterested and impartial, like observing two fighting tigers from afar, with no intervention or without caring which side won. Like many other countries, China wanted the Iran–Iraq War to go on for a long time in order to achieve a number of its political and strategic objectives. The escalation and continuation of the bloody conflict made it possible for China to better tap into economic gains from the war, precious to the Chinese in that period of scarce foreign currency. But China had a big problem: it could not move straightforwardly and engage in the war business without causing major trouble, so it turned instead to its congenial comrades and communist confidants in North Korea. They were very willing to be a convenient conduit for China impulsively to ship arms to Iran in the early years of the Iran–Iraq War.

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The North Korean Liaison By the time the Iran–Iraq War started, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was virtually the closest East Asian country to the Islamic Republic. The Chinese were already testing the waters and calculating how to approach Iran and reestablish previously severed diplomatic ties with Tehran. Little doubt existed about the loyalty of the Japanese and South Koreans to the Americans as they were now coordinating their Iran policy not with Tehran but with Washington and a number of major Western European capitals. 13 Moreover, the alleged espionage activities of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and its dubious alignment with the United States during the “hostage crisis” badly tarnished the South Koreans’ image among the new Iranian officials. After all, North Korea’s role in partially revealing the “vile and depraved collusion of South Korea with the Americans” had only raised Pyongyang’s status in Tehran. 14 Given that the congenial relationship between the CCP and the DPRK was something like “lip and tongue,” no country could serve China’s desire to ship arms to Iran better than North Korea. At the beginning of the Iran–Iraq War, therefore, China did not engage in direct military deals with Iran; the PRC preferred instead to take advantage of the North Koreans as a conduit for arms sales. When those sales fizzled out for the first time in 1984, both the Iranian and Chinese governments vehemently denied they were happening. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, for instance, repudiated such association by stating, “It is a sheer rumor to say that China sells arms to Iran through North Korea.” 15 The role of the DPRK as go-between for shipping Chinese arms to Iran had, nevertheless, certain advantages then for the PRC. 16 China badly needed deniability in its arms sales to the Middle East region, as was also the case with the Soviet Union and particularly the United States (the notoriously gone wrong Iran–Contra affair). 17 Moreover, it was vitally important for the Chinese not to alienate their pro-Iraq allies and friends in the region, such as Egypt, though it was still okay for China to let Cairo deliver to Iraq the warplanes it had purchased from Beijing. Jordan played a similar role, assisting China to ship arms to Iraq, while North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan could facilitate China’s arms sales to Tehran. 18 The ace in the hole was that the PRC’s arms factories fortuitously were located close to the borders of DPRK, making the intermediary role of North Korea more much convenient to export combat aircraft and other weapons to Iran. 19 Considering Pyongyang’s conduit role, nevertheless, reliable data and impartial information, for the most part, are sparse and scattered with regard to the volume of military equipment supplied, the types of weapons, the approximate cost of the weapons, the means of paying for them, the exact ways of delivering the weapons, and—to top it off—the original manufactur-

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er(s) of the weapons. In one of the early arms deals involving North Korea in spring 1983, China reportedly secured some $1.3 billion for J-6 (F-6), T-59 tanks, 130 mm artillery, and light arms to be delivered to the Persian Gulf country over three years. It was later estimated that Iran had bought some 70 percent of its arms from the DPRK and PRC by the mid-1980s, 20 but it was not clear what percentage of that military equipment was North Koreanmade. For instance, the American government estimated that China and North Korea together provided roughly 40 percent of the weapons Iran purchased by 1982; 21 other sources put Pyongyang’s weapons sales to Tehran in 1982 alone from $500 million to $2 billion, or around 40 percent of Iran’s total purchases of arms for that year, which prompted witty pundits to bestow upon the DPRK the label of “comrade 40 percent.” 22

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Military Deals: Chinese Arms Sales to Both Warring Parties From the vista of sheer strategic calculations, China had to step into the bonanza of the arms market, which flourished briskly upon the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War. The United States’ arms embargo against Iran instantly had a dramatic impact on Tehran’s ability to purchase increasingly needed military supplies to fight Iraq, which was already armed cap-a-pie. Iran no longer had easy and direct access to American military supplies or other arms markets in the West, and Beijing did not want Tehran to turn to Moscow for weapons. Not only had China and the Soviet Union been vying for influence in the greater Middle East since their relationship had soured in the early 1960s, but the Soviets’ blatant invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had made China more nervous about how to contain the Russians’ power and influence in the region. It came as no surprise, therefore, when astute Chinese officials soon recognized that arms transfer to Iran had the potential to stoke antiSoviet insurgency in neighboring Afghanistan, galvanizing them into action by revving up their weapons sales to Tehran. 23 From a purely commercial point of view, selling arms was thought to be a great source of hard currency, motivating Chinese arms factories to sell their products abroad to raise foreign exchange to meet budgetary requirements. 24 As a matter of fact, a number of China’s military companies already were on the verge of going bankrupt, and the onset of the Iran–Iraq War was fortuitous in saving a great many of them. 25 Among such entities was PolyGroup, an arms company controlled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which later exported more than $1 billion worth of silkworms to Iran. Moreover, the war provided China with a unique opportunity to partially implement one of its “four modernizations” (national defense) by testing Chinese weapons against Iraq’s Soviet-made weapons and Iran’s U.S.-made military equipment bought during the Shah’s reign. 26 On top of that, the Iran–Iraq War

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eventually became a turning point in China’s military commercialization, because Beijing could find keen cash customers for its arms sales in the Middle East and other parts of the world. For obvious reasons, by the mid-1980s China opted to jettison North Korea and directly ship its arms to Iran. At about the same time, Beijing also raised both the quantity and quality of its weapons supply to Tehran. In March 1985, for example, China and Iran reportedly signed a $1 billion deal for Chinese arms and aircraft over two years. The agreement covered the sale of twelve F-6 fighter aircrafts, two hundred T-59 tanks, antitank guns, and rocket launchers. 27 In the course of 1986, the PRC’s arms sales to Iran encompassed, among other things, the Chinese version of MiG-21 planes, 180 tanks, and various types of missiles. 28 When the tanker war deepened in the Persian Gulf, the value of some Chinese weapons such as Silkworm antiship missiles became strikingly clear to Iran. Moreover, China showed a keen desire to cooperate with Iran on the construction of a Tehran-based structure required for designing, building, and testing ballistic missiles as well as extending their range throughout 1987 and 1988. 29 Meanwhile, news coverage of China’s military cooperation with and arms sales to Iran significantly ruffle feathers among a number of stakeholders, especially the United States. In December 1987, the American Congress bluntly described Beijing’s attempts to rebut its arms sales to Tehran as “flimflam,” asserting unequivocally that “about two-thirds of all military supplies imported by Iran now originate in China.” 30 The Chinese officials were still adamant in once again swiftly repudiating such American allegations, stressing, “China has never directly sold weapons to Iran but has rather taken strict measures recently to forestall the flow of Chinese weapons into Iran from international markets.” 31 By refusing to divulge the sources of its arms purchases, the Iranian government made matters worse so that the concerned parties failed to quickly and precisely estimate both origins and total values of all foreign arms supplied to Tehran. While admitting implicitly or explicitly that Iran acquired Chinese-made military equipment, for instance, the Iranian embassy in Beijing once made it public that the Persian Gulf country “might have captured Chinese weapons from Iraqi troops or purchased such weapons on the open market.” 32 Despite all of the talk about the Chinese arms sales to Iran, the PRC was an important weapons supplier to Iraq as well. 33 Based on some estimates, in the first half of the 1980s alone, China’s military sales to Iraq reached approximately $3 billion. 34 By a rough count, the Chinese sold some $12 billion in arms and military equipment to the Persian Gulf region throughout the Iran–Iraq War. From 1980 to 1987, some 74 percent of China’s total arms deals with and 69 percent of its total arms deliveries to the third world ended up in Iran and Iraq. 35 In addition, Beijing’s arms sales to the region in that period played a very crucial role in China’s international status as a key

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exporter of arms in the world. It contributed equally handsomely to China’s defense industry domestically in terms of underwriting military modernization projects as well as paying the bills for the required arms imports. As a consequence, the PRC eventually became the world’s third largest arms exporter during the 1980s, accounting for 8 percent of the total arms trade by 1989. 36

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The Taiwan Trace The Iran–Iraq War provided unexpected fertile ground for Taipei to play a cameo role in Tehran. The anticommunist rhetoric of the Islamic Republic and a lack of official diplomatic ties between Tehran and Beijing provided Taiwan a good chance to come back to the Persian Gulf country. In fact, Iran had signed a friendship treaty with the Chinese nationalists in the early 1940s, and the commencement of its diplomatic ties with Taiwan had preceded that with communist China by a decade and a half. Tehran established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), and in June 1958 the Iranian monarch became the first non-Asian leader to visit Taipei. In 1971, when Iran endorsed the “one-China policy” and switched its diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to communist China, political ties between Tehran and Taipei were broken instantly, but economic cooperation between the two parties never really tapered off. Taiwan still engaged in economic interaction with Iran throughout the 1970s. Nonetheless, Iran’s situation in the early 1980s evoked for many Taiwanese citizens their own political isolation and insecurity that had largely persisted since the early 1970s, when many countries rushed to establish or rekindle their political relations with Beijing primarily at the cost of Taipei. 37 As Beijing pushed for a rapprochement with Tehran in the early 1980s, Taiwan was not in a favorable position to rekindle its previous political and noneconomic relations with Iran. Still, Taipei found a unique opportunity to engage in military deals with Tehran following the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War. Like South Korea, Taiwan was producing American weapons under license, and some of its arms products could be useful to the Iranians, who were already in search of new military equipment or replacement parts for their artillery and ammunition, which had become hard to acquire due to the arms embargo imposed by the United States and other major Western European countries. It is yet unknown to what extent Taipei eventually sold arms to Tehran covertly, and whether its clandestine weapons supply to Iran involved any intermediary or private dealer. 38 The same can also be said about Taiwan’s probable arms deals with Iraq over the course of the Iran–Iraq War. After all, Taiwan was the only Northeast Asian state whose commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf waterway escaped the eight-year-long conflict

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unscathed, whereas ships belonging to its neighbors (including China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) all more or less were damaged or destroyed at some point during those years. 39 Despite all of the issues related to Taiwan’s probable involvement in furtive arms deals with Iran, Taipei and Tehran engaged in considerable nonmilitary economic interaction throughout the 1980s and afterward when Iran became a lucrative market for many Taiwanese companies. But Beijing always kept an eye on Tehran–Taipei relations lest Iran forge a special relationship with Taiwan, then use it as a bargaining chip against the PRC, particularly when the Persian Gulf country was after certain technological or financial requirements not easily accessible in other Asian or European markets because of sanctions diktats. 40 Besides the importance of Tehran–Taipei connections in the relationship between Iran and China as well as a welter of other stakeholders, the thorny “Taiwan issue” also remained a useful tool that played into the hands of Americans to exploit unilaterally whenever some part of their multifaceted and often complex political and economic interactions with Beijing required them to do so. 41 By taking advantage of the Taiwan matter, for instance, Washington could bludgeon Beijing into curtailing its expanding cooperation with Tehran in certain military and politicoeconomic areas or modifying its policy position toward some other trigger issues—the nuclear controversy, or the sundry sanctions that were levied over time against the Iranians. 42

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A Latecomer China: Dabbling in Pure Economic Exchanges When the Chinese started their rewarding economic activities in the Persian Gulf region, they had to compete with almost all of their rivals from East Asia as well as many sophisticated Western companies that obviously enjoyed all of the trappings of technology and capital. The Japanese had already built a legendary reputation in the region; the South Koreans had successfully established hundreds of construction companies staffed largely by hundred thousands of their own laborers who regularly were taken there from all over the ROK. The Taiwanese had also been successful in the areas of construction, energy imports, and manufactured exports to the region. Even North Korea had forged rather amicable ties with Baghdad and Tehran prior to and after the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War, respectively. On top of that, China had no official diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia then, and Iran was the only major country in the region where Beijing could capitalize economically in addition to other political interests and military benefits coming from better ties with Tehran. Of course, the Chinese already had a smattering of the Middle East’s gutter politics and its rather complex and

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incongruous religious system, but a rudimentary understanding in such affairs would not help them much in other areas. Not only were the Chinse neophytes to the field of modern business in the greater Middle East region, but also they were starting from scratch in other ways. And although they could purchase arms, for instance, from Israel and then sell them to Iran, either directly or through their communist comrades in North Korea, at a hefty price and make a lot of easy foreign currency, 43 they could not engage profitably in a similar type of international business by, for instance, buying Japanese furniture and automobiles and later shipping them to Tehran. At the time of Chinese foray into modern business in the Persian Gulf, moreover, it was unbefitting even ambitious managers from China to buckle down to learn relevant technical and managerial stuff from their East Asian counterparts, who had been active in the region for many years, if not decades. The Chinese, nevertheless, were very lucky to find themselves without many serious competitors, because most of the advanced, affluent companies from the West and the East had already left Iran to escape the sanctions imposed on the Persian Gulf country as well as the perils of the ongoing military conflict between Tehran and Baghdad. 44 When Iran started to negotiate economic deals with China in addition to arms deals, the Chinese were more than happy to agree, though they were still not sure if they could live up to all of the expectations of their Iranian counterparts. 45 A series of high-level delegates from Beijing and Tehran visited each other throughout the Iran–Iraq War period, aiming to work together on agriculture, fisheries, water irrigation, dam building, and other basic industries that were by and large not that capital intensive. 46 The two sides began talks about such areas of cooperation when the annual total bilateral trade between the Islamic Republic and the PRC was less than $200 million. 47 After all, China was not a technologically advanced or economically sophisticated country at that time, nor did Iran require much in the way of modern commodities or luxury goods largely because of its flatlining economy in war circumstances. It was the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War that provided fertile ground for the Chinese to make inroads into the lucrative Iranian markets.

Surreptitious Yet Significant and Sustainable Iran and China both had too much at stake to cozy up to each other quickly and publicly in the early 1980s. For all of its fierce anticommunism rhetoric and trenchant criticism of the communist manifesto, the Islamic Republic was not in an easy position to reach out rapidly to a major card-carrying communist state such as the PRC. Moreover, China was implicitly in the crosshairs of some officials of the newly established Islamic Republic in

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Tehran for its “undeservedly” international status epitomized by its “unjust veto power” at the UN available for use whenever national interests or peculiar circumstances required Beijing to do so. For their part, the Chinese were reluctant to rush into the Islamic Republic’s embrace until assured that building good ties with Tehran would not affect other growing interests at home and abroad. China was particularly afraid that recent political developments in the Islamic Republic could lead to the spread of Islamic movements in the greater Middle East, Central Asia, and more importantly in its backyard, Xinjiang (Uyghuristan). Moreover, the PRC, which had just commenced its new era of “reform and opening-up,” did not wish to get “stigmatized” by a swift and cordial approach to a new “revisionist and anti-status quo” regime in Tehran. Iran’s relationship with China turned out to be very important at a very crucial time, when the Persian Gulf country had to both fight a well-armed enemy and counter sanctions and restrictions imposed on Tehran by Baghdad’s big backers. 48 Chinese weapons could partly replenish Iran’s rapidly depleting armaments even when Tehran had to pay a larger price or obtain them through intermediaries or misleading channels. Besides that, Beijing’s occasional political support in favor of Tehran at a number of influential international institutions and forums, no matter how much was only talk, could only continue to raise its status in Tehran. China was benefiting equally from its growing ties with Iran, politically and particularly economically. In spite of its early agitation and anxiety, the PRC soon realized that it shared with the Islamic Republic some significant political and ideological perspectives that could sometime acknowledge or even boost China’s own views at regional and international bodies. 49 Economially, Iran’s bottomless purseful of hard currency in exchange for weapons could conveniently finance development and modernization projects in China, including the Chinese military industry and national defense. 50 For a whole host of reasons, therefore, the peculiar Sino–Iranian relationship over the course of Iran–Iraq War proved to be durable and long lasting. In fact, some obstructive and detrimental international pressures and restrictions put on Tehran at the beginning or during the Iran–Iraq War ramped up after the conclusion of the military conflict with Baghdad. Managing to be on good terms with countries such as China, therefore, could give Iran wiggle room to wriggle free of its regional and international constraints—even if only partially. The Persian Gulf country also needed successful Chinese experiences with regard to new domestic matters such as reconstruction and economic revival. But Iran had also become too dear for China to let it go at the end of that Mideast mayhem. Beijing had successfully obtained the label of “a friend in need” in Tehran, where new political developments and an imminent major power shift were to bring to power a new generation of officials with other policy priorities at home and abroad. 51 Such seismic

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changes inevitably had their own ramifications on almost all Iranian economic policies and military strategies, deepening the Chinese involvement in lucrative business in Iran for many decades to come.

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NOTES 1. China Publishing Company, Chinese Communist Modernization Problems (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1979). 2. See Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978–1994 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996). 3. There were also sharp differences in the views of new Iranian and Chinese officials with regard to many other domestic issues, ranging from penny to privatization and from nudity to nationalization. For instance, while for some influential authorities in Iran “the rich was thought to be filthy and materialism evil,” China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, had already started lecturing his brethren on how “getting rich is glorious,” or why “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice.” In the new Iran, emphasis was put on the ideological and nonmaterial, while for some CCP cadres in China money was now more important than Mao and Maoism; still other more pragmatist yet powerful elements of the Chinese ruling class were allowed, if not assisted, simultaneously to salute Mao with one hand and fill their pockets with the other, because it was “better for some to get rich first.” 4. The “Century of National Humiliation” (bainian guochi) is a shorthand reference to the bouts of interference and evil deeds against the Chinese by both Western countries and Japan roughly from the First Opium Wars (1839–1842) until 1949. 5. There happened to be one recent occasion when Iran and China could really risk going into war with each other even if indirectly or on a foreign soil. The case in point dates back to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, when the Iranian government under the monarchical dynasty of Pahlavi denounced China, along with North Korea, and had at one point even boldly considered the idea of dispatching its military forces naively to take part in the fight against the communists, including the omnipresent Chinese battalions on the other side of the Yalu River, but the Persian Gulf country’s long border with the then Soviet Union fortunately had dissuaded the relevant government officials to take the idea a further step forward. See Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wegyo Munseo [Diplomatic Archives] (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). 6. By May 1982, the first ambassador from the Islamic Republic to China had commenced his diplomatic post in Beijing, though the speaker of the Iranian parliament, as the highestranking official from Tehran, had already visited the East Asian country in February 1981. “Khamenei-Ulanfu Meeting,” Xinhua, February 14, 1981. 7. R. S. Thapar, “Chairman Hua’s Visit to Iran,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 2, no. 7 (1978): 246–51; and “Peking Leader Apologises for Official Visit to Shah,” Arab News, July 30, 1979. 8. See Adam Tarock, The Superpowers’ Involvement in the Iran–Iraq War (Commack, NY: Nova Science, 1998). 9. “Chinese Islamic Leader Leaves Iran for Home,” Xinhua, February 13, 1980. 10. “Ye Jianying Congratulates Bani-Sadr on Election,” Xinhua, January 30, 1980. 11. “China Sympathetic to Iran But Neutral on War,” Tehran Times, February 18, 1981. 12. John Calabrese, “China and Iraq: A Stake in Stability,” in China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence, edited by P. R. Kumaraswamy (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), 52–67. 13. Shirzad Azad, “Iran and the Two Koreas: A Peculiar Pattern of Foreign Policy,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 26, no. 2 (2012): 163–92. 14. See “No Scheming Can Subdue Iranian People,” Pyongyang Times, April 26, 1980, 4; “Iran Response to N. Korean Demands Cool,” Korea Times, October 26, 1980, 1; and “Alleged ROK–U.S. Collusion: N.K. Iran Slur ‘Unfounded,’” Korea Herald, October 16, 1980, 1.

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15. “China Sells Arms to Iran via North Korea,” Washington Post, April 3, 1984, Al; and “Iran, in Six-Year Search for Arms, Finds World of Wiring Suppliers,” New York Times, November 25, 1986, Al. 16. North Korea also played a similar conduit role for the Soviet Union; although its gobetween role for China was widely emphasized in policy and academic circles around the world, the Soviet case did not render much controversy. 17. Some partisan pundits, however, have strived to play up Israel’s role in arming Iran then by resorting to feel-good claims such as “Iran obtained 80% of its weapons imports from Israel at the onset of the war, and bought a total of $500 million in weapons from Israel between 1981 and 1983. Israeli technicians kept Iran’s Phantom F4’s flying after America cut off spare parts.” See “Why Iran Is Obsessed With Jews,” Asia Times, August 3, 2015. 18. “China, Despite Denials, Is Reported Arming Iran,” International Herald Tribune, October 29, 1987. 19. Shirley Kan, “China’s Arms Sales: Overview and Outlook for the 1990s,” in Joint Economic Committee, China’s Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 696–711. 20. “China Sells Arms to Iran via North Korea.” 21. “Iran’s Chinese Air Force,” Middle East Defense News 2, no. 4 (November 21, 1988): 1–2. 22. Husain Haqqani, “Comrade 40%: Pyongyang’s Arms for Iran,” Arabia–The Islamic World Review, no. 30, February 1984, 17. 23. “China Joins the Arms Merchants,” Asiaweek, October 26, 1984, 9; and “China Is Iran’s Chief Source of Weapons, U.S. Officials Say,” International Herald Tribune, August 27, 1986. 24. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991), 164; and John L. Scherer, China: Facts & Figures Annual, vol. 10, 1987 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1988), 226–30. 25. Jasper Becker, The Chinese (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 269; and “Peking Under U.S. Pressure, Re-examines Arms Sales,” China Post, September 9, 1988, 2. 26. “US-Owned Tanker Hit by Iran Missile in Gulf: Kuwaiti Officials Are Certain That Weapon Was A Silkworm,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 1987. 27. The Perth Corporation, Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook: 1987–1988 (Washington, DC: The Perth Corporation, 1987), 192. 28. “Red Chinese Refusal to Ban Arms Sales to Iran,” China Post, April 27, 1988, 2. 29. “Iran: Military Relation with China,” CRS Report, June 26, 1996; and “U.S. Retaliates Against Chinese for Sales to Iran,” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1987, A35. 30. “US Notes ‘Strong Indications’ China Is Sending More Missiles to Tehran,” Washington Post, December 25, 1987, A37. 31. “Sino–US Relations Over the Past Year,” Beijing Review 31, nos. 7 & 8 (February 15–28, 1988), 29. 32. “Iran May Have Received Chinese Arms, Aide Says,” Washington Post, April 14, 1987, A11; and “China Pledges to Sell Iran Nearly $600 Million in Arms,” Washington Times, June 8, 1987, 1. 33. “Chinese Tanks for Saddam Paid for By Saudis,” Tehran Times, February 26, 1983, 1; “U.S. Suspects China Will Widen Arms Sales to Iran,” New York Times, March 13, 1988, 11; and “U.S. Concerned Beijing May Sell Jets to Iran,” International Herald Tribune, March 14, 1988. 34. Calabrese, “China and Iraq: A Stake in Stability.” 35. Richard F. Grimmett, CRS Report for Congress: Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1980–1987 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 9, 1988), 52. 36. Grimmett, CRS Report for Congress, 68. 37. See Dennis V. Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). 38. Michael Brzoska, “Profiteering on the Iran–Iraq War,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1987: 42–45.

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39. Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran–Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988 (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 205–14. 40. “China and Iran: A Perfect Match,” Taipei Times, June 17, 2006; “Answering the Call on Iran Is A Wise Move for Taiwan,” Taiwan Today, July 4, 2012; and “Taiwan Tries to Cut Iranian Oil Imports at Behest of the US,” Taipei Times, February 9, 2012. 41. “Senator Dole’s Efforts in Delaying U.S. Arms Transfer,” China Post, September 17, 1988, 2. 42. John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 200, 216. 43. Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to China and Taiwan,” Survival 40, no. 1 (1998): 68–91. 44. Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 159. 45. James Clad, “Iran Woos Peking,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 13, 1985, 45; “Iranian Foreign Minister’s PRC Visit Continues,” Xinhua, September 14, 1983; “Wu Meets Iranian Leaders,” Xinhua, November 25, 1984; and “Iran’s Rafsanjani Meets PRC Leaders, Ends Tour,” Xinhua, June 28, 1985. 46. “PRC Economic, Trade Delegation Visits Iran,” Xinhua, December 30, 1982; “Iran, China Talks on Cooperation,” Tehran Times, February 28, 1985; and “Trade, Exchange Protocols Signed with Iran,” Xinhua, March 5, 1985. 47. “Agri-Delegation Off to China,” Tehran Times, July 18, 1982. 48. “Security Council Demands A Truce in Iran–Iraq War,” New York Times, July 21, 1987, 1. 49. “China Praises Iran’s Policy of Self-Sufficiency and Independence,” Tehran Times, June 29, 1985. 50. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1987 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 129; and Grimmett, CRS Report for Congress, 53–61. 51. “Iran Seeks Ties with Genuine Friends,” Tehran Times, March 4, 1985.

Chapter 2

Under Eminences Grises: Vowing Perpetual Partnership

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RECIPROCAL: THE ERA OF IRANIAN RECONSTRUCTION AND CHINESE RAPID GROWTH The Iran–Iraq War turned out to be one of the greatest tragedies of contemporary Iran, draining the bulk of the nation’s physical, mental, and financial resources over the course of eight years. The conflict took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iranian youth and wreaked havoc on the country’s infrastructure from schools and hospitals to dams and factories. In fact, the bloody campaign destroyed many achievements of the previous generation, hamstrung opportunities for the present generation, and unavoidably left its mark on the next generation. In addition, a slump in oil prices from more than $36 a barrel in 1980 to less $13 in 1986 further debilitated the Iranian economy, 1 though the mass exodus of talented people and financial assets from Iran both prior to or during the war had left the country paralyzed socially and and its economy crippled. 2 The conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War coupled with the ascendancy of a new group of political elites in the late 1980s, therefore, paved the ground for a new chapter in the politico-economic life of the Islamic Republic known as the “reconstruction era.” In contrast, the Chinese experienced many halcyon years of economic expansion almost in all fronts. Both domestic and international environs were rather conducive to China’s obsession with “rapid growth.” Even the political and ideological commotion of the late 1980s in Beijing did not really slow the swiftly moving economic machine at home and abroad. And unlike Iran’s growing isolation and susceptibility, China was on the march diplomatically, befriending one nation after another at the cost of Taiwan. 3 Ill fate had befallen Iran while its old pal, China, had been blessed, and little was to 17

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be done about either party. And while Iran was encountering bad luck after bad luck, more and more windows of opportunity were opening to China. Still, the stakes for the Chinese were pretty high, simply because their giant economic machine needed more cut-rate resources to bank on, part of which were to be gleaned from a “reconstructing Iran.” As soon as the disastrous Iran–Iraq War ended and the Iranian officials were making reconstruction plans, the Chinese government dispatched a number of high-level delegations to Tehran to express its willingness to play a role in rebuilding Iran. 4 Because the Iranians had cooperated with their Chinese counterparts during the war, they were now seriously considering how to engage China in new fields and apply the “Chinese success story” in reshaping their war-torn country. 5 On top of that, the two countries previously had signed many agreements and memorandums of understanding (MOU) on economic, technological, and scientific areas during those tense years, facilitating some required administrative and legal frameworks for bilateral cooperation in some new fields that were favorable to both countries. 6 One other important issue was the key characteristics of new leaders in the two countries who were now going to formulate and oversee this fresh dynamism in the Sino–Iranian relationship. But who were those new chief administrators in Iran and China, and what did they share in common?

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The Iranian Rafsanjani and Chinese Zemin: Peculiarity and Commonality? In 1989, the Iranian presidency was handed over to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was to be the “commander of construction” (Sardar Sazandegi) of the postwar reconstruction era. As the speaker of the Iranian parliament (Majles), Rafsanjani previously had played an indispensable role in Iran’s delicate interactions with East Asia, including arms deals with both China and North Korea. He had also made several visits to the region during the war, signing a number of important bilateral agreements, particularly with China, in both economic and noneconomic areas. 7 When he became president, however, his two-term administration upped the ante by following a policy of looking East, which was to further strengthen Iran’s overall interactions with a number of Asian countries, China in particular. Some of his policies and strategies with regard to East Asia continued to play an influential role in Iran’s approach toward the region long after Rafsanjani left the presidency in 1997. On top of that, Rafsanjani’s son was in charge of the Tehran subway project, which became a major area of economic cooperation between Iran and China in the 1990s and 2000s. 8 Somehow similar to Rafsanjani, Jiang Zemin was elected general secretary of the CCP in 1989, then president of the PRC in 1993. More significant,

Under Eminences Grises: Vowing Perpetual Partnership

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although as former mayor of Shanghai Jiang Zemin had no direct military background, he became chairman of the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in November 1989. With that appointment came a very powerful portfolio, which he held tightly for nearly fifteen years. On top of that, Jiang Zemin was the first CCP leader to assume simultaneously all of the top political positions in China: secretary general of the CCP (1989–2002), chairman of the CMC (1989–2004), and president of the PRC (1993–2002). 9 He also played an equally important role in China’s economic development spurt and industrial progress by safeguarding the “rapid growth” mantra. After all, he was the very leader who let the private sector enter the CCP so it could accelerate marketization and privatization of the Chinese economy, which was comparable to a similar process the Iranian government implemented under Rafsanjani. 10 Both Hashemi Rafsanjani and Jiang Zemin became far more powerful than they had been regarded previously in their respective countries. 11 During their rise not only did they play crucial roles before assuming the top executive position, but the two leaders continued to wield significant power and influence long after they had left the presidency. 12 Moreover, these two strong politicians left behind significant diplomatic records in the foreign affairs of their respective countries on par with their politico-economic legacies at home. They certainly were pragmatic leaders, but their pragmatism was incontrovertibly tinged with an ideological streak, which is why their reputations at home and abroad indicated that both of them were in a lovehate relationship with their enemies. This could be attributed in part to the fact that Rafsanjani’s Iranians and Jiang’s Chinese had to work in a rather different international environment fraught with both opportunities and challenges, including the end of the Cold War and the birth of a new international system.

The End of a Bipolar World: Shared Visions The fall of communism and thereby the collapse of the Soviet Union were harbingers of a new chapter in the Iranian diplomatic outlook both regionally and internationally. Epitomized by its “neither the East nor the West” slogan, the Islamic Republic had long opposed the bipolar system. Now it was time at least to commemorate all those statements and predictions with regard to the fragility and unsustainability of a bipolar world. Moreover, the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of new neighbors and stakeholders on Iran’s northern frontiers who long had had more much in common with Tehran than with Moscow. These new political entities, along with a number of Eastern European countries that had been freed from the Soviet Union, became a new diplomatic prize for Iran, though Tehran had

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long engaged them, at least economically, even when they were under the Soviet fetters. But the triumphant advent of neoliberalism and victorious rhetoric of Americans had their own impediments and perils for Iran as well. At the top of the list was the increasing encroachment of the United States upon the Persian Gulf region, which made Tehran nervous about its overall national security, even its territorial integrity. 13 China faced identical opportunities and challenges from the downfall of the Soviet Union. Not only had China gotten rid of its archrival, but also Beijing was now in a rather good position both politically and economically to develop better ties with Russia as well as Mongolia and Central Asian states that came into existence after the Soviet Union crumbled. 14 Despite such gains, eliminating communism from the world stage posed serious ideological headaches for the CCP in Beijing. The communist Chinese were forced to further ramp up their politico-ideological claims by capitalizing more and more on recent economic successes, because any major interruption or reversal in material achievements truly would be detrimental to the existence of the CCP. In addition, China encountered another growing hassle: it was designated a new enemy, or at least a new competitor, for the United States and the coalition closely associated with it as Washington, triumphantly, was preparing to further spread its tentacles across the Chinese borders by air, land, and sea year after year. 15 Facing a hodgepodge of familiar fluke and falter, therefore, Iran and China could not agree more on the urgency for exchanging their views about a new world order emerging in the post–Cold War era. After all, both Tehran and Beijing were strongly opposing the unipolar world the Americans and their close friends and allies advocated. On the contrary, both the Iranian and Chinese governments favored a multipolar international system characterized by the territorial integrity of all sovereign states, in which their domestic characteristics and way of governance were sacrosanct, not liable to any sort of foreign interference. Top Iranian and Chinese officials repeatedly stated that stance in the aftermath of the first post–Cold War international crisis (i.e., the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the follow-up military conflict in the Persian Gulf region in 1990–1991). 16 When push came to shove, though, China’s immediate politico-economic interests took priority, so the leaders in Beijing could not speak out about what they thought privately to be the right policy.

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A Pariah and an Outcast: Domestic Politics Runs into Systemic Pressures Neither the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War nor the end of the Cold War helped Iran to rid itself of the constraints and limitations it had lived under since the early 1980s. To the contrary, Iran faced more hassles and further intimidation under new allegations of “terrorism” and “human rights” violations. The Washington-led Western world designated Iran a serious menace to its interests in the greater Middle East, further demonizing and isolating Iran in order to safeguard its interests. 17 The United States revved up its antiIran rhetoric and designed a well-coordinated “dual containment” strategy affecting Iran and Iraq, on regional and international levels. It was designed primarily to deny access to various political and financial resources, which Iran deemed indispensable for its robust reconstruction and development programs in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War. 18 But what particularly helped Chinese officials understand the situation of their Iranian counterparts was the incident in Tiananmen Square and its repercussions on Beijing’s bilateral relationship with many countries in the world. 19 The “mysterious occurrence,” 20 which took place in June 1989, immediately had a negative effect on China’s interactions with the Western countries and their close allies. The top CCP officials were called the “butchers of Beijing,” and China swiftly was ostracized from forums and meetings internationally and regionally. Moreover, the PRC inevitably encountered short- to mid-term sanctions or limitations on its economic and military exchanges with those countries. Such circumstances created empathy between the Chinese and Iranian officials, many who became unwavering opposition to “the American hegemonism and its interference in their domestic affairs.” Still, China eventually overcame most of these external constraints after Beijing proved its willingness to cooperate with the United States and Europe throughout the Kuwaiti crisis of 1990–1991. Because Chinese cooperation in the UN Security Council was particularly instrumental in sorting out the legal framework for the United States and its coalition forces to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait, China was able to take advantage of the Mideast conflict to ease its international isolation. 21 The beginning of Bill Clinton’s administration in 1992 further paved the way for the PRC into the international system. Unlike China, Iran continued to face external hurdles and limitations for many years, if not decades. Marginalized by the West in the politico-economic arena, the Rafsanjani government’s crucial strategy centered once again on Asia, this time primarily for economic and political purposes.

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Looking East: A Nascent Contingency Yet a Standing Stopgap Iran specialists at home and abroad have long asked this compelling question: What does “looking East” mean for the Iranians? After all, is Iran not also part of the East? The problem is that East here is not primarily a geographical concept; it has more to do with political and nongeographical nuances. In fact, some Iranians do not like their country considered part of Asia; others think that Iran does not share much in common with the rest of the Middle East. Yet a third group of Iranians believe Iran has nothing to do with either Asia or the Middle East; it is as if the Iranian plateau is itself a distinctive continent separated from all other geographical names and political entities with which Iran is often affiliated. This third group’s position, by and large, prevails among many Iranians across the world who typically tend to pair up primarily based on such a mindset in their host countries. 22 Moreover, successive Iranian governments since Hashemi Rafsanjani have done very little, if anything, to elucidate the “looking-East” concept, leaving the bulk of the interested citizenry with the belief that the “looking-East” approach is all about economic engagement with the countries and regions located beyond Iran’s eastern frontiers, particularly those in the Northeast Asia region such as China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan. 23 Deep down, the looking-East policy under Rafsanjani was intended primarily to supply Iran with essential economic and technological needs largely curtailed by the West’s hostile policy and its sanctions levied continuously against Tehran since the early 1980s. 24 The looking-East orientation was not totally devoid of political or cultural elements, but such noneconomic facets were used to pave the way for economic and technological objectives. Short of such prerequisites, Iranian officials had no rationale for engaging the Japanese and South Korean governments, which were more than willing to toe the line with regard to American policies toward Tehran. They did not share much in common politically and ideologically with other East Asian countries either. Behind the spurious smiles, half-hearted handshakes, and feigned backslapping tributes in front of cameras from officials delivering high-sounding statements on international matters or signing new bilateral agreements in various economic and technical fields, there was not much substance. For all of the intellectual, political, and ideological impediments Iran faced, therefore, the looking-East policy would not soon lead to truly multifaceted, symbiotic connections between Iran and other countries in the East Asian region. Nevertheless, Tehran’s policy approach toward East Asia was a major step in a right direction. Iran was among the earliest countries to look East at a time when there was little consensus that a wider East Asian region could become prosperous and attract the rest of the world in the ensuing decades. Of course, Japan was a significant power then, but there was also

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not much persuasion and predilection for the rest of the region partly because political as well as ideological considerations were still influential factors in an overall diplomatic orientation of many nations. This is one reason why the Iranian pivot toward East Asia put the Persian Gulf country more than ever in the limelight of the world media, policy circles, and the relevant scholarship on security and politico-economic fields. Its impact on drawing the attention of East Asian countries, China in particular, toward Iran was already crystal clear.

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In Search of Energy: Approaching the Safest Option One inescapable implication of China’s rapid growth policy was its galloping energy consumption, particularly its increasing consumption of oil. Like Japan and the “Asian tigers,” the Chinese industrialization and economic development plans were based on energy-intensive industrial sections, necessitating whopping amounts of fossil fuels year after year. But unlike its Asian peers, China was an energy-rich country and an oil exporter for many decades, even in the midst of its rapid growth during the 1980s and early 1990s. Significantly, in the 1980s oil prices dropped sharply, tumbling from $36 per barrel in 1980 to around $13 dollar in 1986. Even as cheap oil prices contributed markedly to China’s rapid growth, they also enticed the Chinese to use more energy. They became addicted to consumption, though part of the energy they were squandering was coming from their domestic reserves. 25 But this situation could not go on forever: it turned China into a net oil importer from 1993 onward. In the first half of the 1990s, for instance, the average oil consumption in China increased more than 6 percent annually, forcing Beijing to court oil-rich countries such as Iran to assure its energy security in the long run. 26 Chinese history of oil importation from Iran, surprisingly, goes back to the time when Beijing was self-sufficient in oil. Although China was an oil exporter as recently as 1992, it started to import Iranian petroleum in 1974. During the 1970s, the supply of the Iranian oil to China was overshadowed by otherwise insignificant commercial interaction between Tehran and Beijing. When the two countries ratcheted up their two-way connections in the 1980s, the arms business between Iran and China overshadowed their oil deals. In fact, until China joined the club of absolute oil importers, trade in fossil fuels was not a major factor in the Sino–Iranian relationship. Moreover, China needed more time to come up with new plans on how to better engage oil exporters such as Iran for the sake of its long-term energy security. As a giant oil and gas producer with a treasure trove of fossil fuels, Iran could certainly satisfy a great deal of China’s energy requirements. 27

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The Iranian case was particularly delicate because Iran itself was destined to become the answer to Chinese energy security. Not only was the supply of Iranian crude to China supposed to be safer than almost all other options in the long term, but Iran’s geographical position could ensure an uninterrupted flow of petroleum to meet the growing Chinese energy demands. After all, China was to soon import half of its needed crude from the Persian Gulf region, where only Iran could be counted as a close partner and reliable supplier to Beijing in long run. 28 Because none of the countries in the region could play a bigger role than Iran in the overall stability and security of the Persian Gulf, the Chinese inevitably had to focus on Iran for energy security. But this matter became a source of misunderstanding by instant experts and policy wonks who were to overemphasize, for whatever reason, the oil issue in the Iran–China relations.

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An Overstated Factor: The “Oil Ascendancy” in Sino–Iranian Ties The supposition that “oil plays a dominant role” in the relationship between Iran and China gradually became a favorable theme when the Chinese later engaged in both upstream and downstream oil projects in Iran. 29 Chinese and Iranian scholars as well as pundits of other nationalities were among those who produced a number of works, arguing that oil had virtually eclipsed all other aspects of the Sino–Iranian interaction. Rather than presenting a selfappraisal about and a detached insight into the nature of the Iran–China relations, these specialists and observers, regardless of their citizenship or affiliation, seemed largely to follow the relevant arguments primarily advocated by three other groups. Proponents of the “peak oil” theory were the first group conveniently to take advantage of the Sino–Iranian energy ties for substantiating their thesis. 30 The second group typically hailed from the business sector; no matter whether they were energy tycoons and oil spectators or currency and stockbrokers, they had a lot to gain from accentuating China’s “oil obsession” in Iran. 31 Finally, partisan policymakers and prejudiced lobbyists exploited the “oil factor” to influence Chinese or Iranian officials to adopt a certain policy approach or refuse to contribute to another cause. In sharp contrast to various explanations put forward by the foregoing groups, the Chinese government adhered to foreign policies that, by and large, indicated that the Beijing–Tehran nexus was not consumed by “oil ascendancy.” China developed good relations with other oil producers in the world, especially those in the greater Middle East region, Africa, and Latin America. In the Persian Gulf region, the Chinese either initiated or improved diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia and other member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 32 Although these Arab states had never been more important than Iran for China strategically and politically, they still had

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significant oil resources that would allow them, some single-handedly, to replace the total supply of Iranian crude to China in the extremely unlikely scenario that Iran was unable to do so. 33 In addition, normalization of the Sino–Israeli relationship was another matter that negated the notion of oil prominence in bilateral ties between Iran and China. 34 If advancement in Sino–Saudi relations was to have an economic message for the Chinese–Iranian connections, particularly in the oil business, growing interaction between China and Israel certainly would have political repercussions for Beijing’s ties to Tehran. Since the 1980s, officials of the Islamic Republic had now and then put forward requests with regard to the Jewish state, expecting that China would cooperate with Iranian policies toward Israel. In fact, there was no end to Israel-related appeals and requests, implicit or explicit, by Tehran of Beijing even when China later became the top client for Iranian oil. On the contrary, such expectations largely fell on deaf ears in Beijing even when they required only lip service from the Chinese government or its top representatives at international institutions and regional forums. All in all, the Iranian government could not exploit oil as a weapon to browbeat Beijing into certain policy decisions, and the role of oil was not prominent enough fundamentally to shape the contours of the Sino–Iranian relationship in all politico-strategic, economic, and cultural domains over time. 35

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Inroads into New Economic Grounds: Mine and Metro The Iranian reconstruction agenda under Rafsanjani was not all it was cracked up to be. Internationally, Iran was largely marginalized from the world economy, blocking its easy access to investments and technological know-how to develop on par with its huge potential in natural and human resources. Even the creation of the free-trade zones in different parts of the country did not help much; these new economic districts were less than successful due to structural impediments Iran had long struggled with. On the domestic front, the sluggish economy did not improve much despite implementation of liberal policies such as privatization and the slashing of state subsidies and social welfare programs. The average per capita income, more than $11,000 in 1979, had nosedived to less than $3,000 in the final years of Rafsanjani’s presidency. Although some of the reconstruction schemes carried out under Rafsanjani were merely cosmetic, his government paid better attention to other economic sectors such as mining and the subway system, both of which involved some degree of Chinese participation. The country was endowed with many other precious mineral resources in addition to huge oil and gas reserves, and Iran had been capitalizing on them for decades. But war conditions during

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the 1980s as well as financial and technological shortcomings had kept Iran from fully tapping this treasured sector. Mine-rich China had invaluable experience in this area, prompting the Iranian government to begin negotiations with the Chinese in the late 1980s. 36 When the Rafsanjani government earmarked the mining sector as a crucial part of its economic development plans, bilateral talks with the Chinese gradually increased, leading to a number of mining agreements between the two countries, though part of the accords were to be put into practice after Rafsanjani left the presidency. 37 Rather than mining, it was the subway system that stood for Sino–Iranian economic cooperation under Rafsanjani. (Coincidentally, both fields required underground operations.) Whereas joint mining activities were both diverse and extended to different parts of Iran, work on a subway system concentrated initially only in the capital, Tehran. Because a great deal of Rafsanjani’s development plans and construction, rather than reconstruction, measures revolved around Tehran, the city had a fat budget to build a stunning subway system. 38 But in lieu of sophisticated and technologically advanced Western and Japanese companies, the Rafsanjani government made a deal with the Chinese to take on this ambitious project. 39 The metro venture was, therefore, another prize for the Chinese rookies to both earn a lot of cash and upgrade their own relevant industry at home, as they had already done with the PRC’s fledgling defense industry during the Iran–Iraq War.

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Uninterrupted Arms Deals: China Was Both Honored and Relegated Envied or coveted by distant powers, surrounded by unsympathetic or jealous neighbors, Iran always has been obsessed with its hard power and defensive capabilities. In fact, the history of the military in Iran is as old as Iran itself, as if they were somehow interchangeable. Successive Iranian dynasties and political systems often have been willing to go to the mat in order to equip themselves with the latest weapons and military technology. 40 The Islamic Republic was no exception. For most of the 1980s, the Iranian military mindset and combative capabilities concentrated primarily on winning, or at least not losing to an enemy that enjoyed the backing, either implicitly or explicitly, of nearly all of the major military powers in the world. Still, the war provided Iran with invaluable lessons, particularly those germane to arms and defensive capabilities, laying the ground for some new weapons programs and military strategies that involved China’s participation. 41 In addition to replacing its depleted stores of conventional military weapons, Iran focused on strategic armaments such as nuclear technology, missile systems, and chemical weapons. Iranian nuclear policy dated back to 1957, but one particular development in the early years of the Iran–Iraq War galva-

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nized officials in Tehran to revive the country’s dormant nuclear energy program. The surprise Israeli air strikes that dismantled the Iraqi Osirak Reactor in June 1981 warned many in Tehran that Iraq could soon have access to nuclear weapons with catastrophic consequences for Iran. The immediate requirements of the war with Iraq then were swiftly draining its resources, so a serious review of its shelved nuclear policy had to wait a couple of years more. 42 When the Iranian government restored the country’s nuclear energy program, China became its closest partner, an alliance that lasted almost until the end of Rafsanjani’s presidency. 43 But China did not maintain its dominant position in military cooperation with the Iranians where conventional weapons were involved. The Russians and, to some extent, North Koreans played a larger role than the Chinese with regard to collaboration with Iran on conventional arms. One reason was that the Iranian government preferred Russian weapons to Chinese and bilateral agreements with Russia over China. 44 One other influential factor was the Chinese reluctance to cooperate fully with the Iranians on the weapons for which the two sides had already signed agreements. 45 China was on the West’s radar screen with regard to its military cooperation with Iran, and Beijing simply did not wish to make things worse by further engaging in controversial arms business with Tehran. 46 That is why the Chinese still denied their military cooperation with Iran several years after the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War. 47

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NOTES 1. Rodney Wilson, “The Economic Relations of the Middle East: Toward Europe or Within the Region,” Middle East Journal 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 268–87. 2. Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran–Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 205–15. 3. Lucian W. Pye, “Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behavior,” in The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang, edited by Jonathan Unger (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 38–57. 4. “Qian Qichen, Iranian Counterpart Hold Talks,” Xinhua, December 15, 1988. 5. “President Khamenei Accorded Warm Welcome in China,” Tehran Times, May 10, 1989; “Iran, China to Improve Relations,” Arab News, March 8, 1989; and “Iran, China Sign Pact Covering Diversified Fields,” Tehran Times, May 13, 1989, 1. 6. “Sino–Iran Accord for Cultural, Scientific Exchanges,” Tehran Times, September 17, 1983. 7. “Iran’s Rafsanjani, Delegation Continue PRC Tour,” Xinhua, June 27, 1985. 8. “Chinese Company to Invest $100 Million in Iran’s Subway Project,” Tehran Times, February 26, 2001; and “Mashhad–Bafq Railroad Operational by March,” Iran Daily, October 23, 2004, 3. 9. Philip P. Pan, Out of Mao’s Shadow: The Struggle for the Soul of a New China (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2008), 199. 10. Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Paradoxical Post-Mao Transition: From Obeying the Leader to ‘Normal Politics,’” in The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang, edited by Jonathan Unger (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 58–97.

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11. Bruce Gilley, “Deng Xiaoping and His Successors (1976 to the Present),” in Politics in China: An Introduction, 2nd ed., edited by William A. Joseph (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 119–47; and William O. Beeman, The Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullahs: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 199. 12. In comparison to Jiang Zemin, who still held considerable sway over his successors from behind the scene after leaving the office, Rafsanjani never really left the political arena as he remained in charge of some powerful institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and especially the Expediency Council. 13. Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing With the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Crown Publishers, 2008), 234–37. 14. Richard Lotspeich, “Economic Integration of China and Russia in the Post-Soviet Era,” in James Bellacqua, ed., The Future of China–Russia Relations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 83–145. 15. Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue,” Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (August 1996): 758–86. 16. “China Calls for Restraints for Both Sides of Gulf War,” Xinhua, January 17, 1991; and “Tehran, Beijing for Peaceful Solution to P. Gulf Crisis,” Tehran Times, October 18, 1990, 2. 17. “Calling Iran ‘Outlaw State,’ Christopher Defends U.S. Trade Ban,” New York Times, May 2, 1995, 6. 18. “European Oil Giants Roiled as US Maps Iran Sanctions,” Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1996, 3. 19. After all, Iran was already at loggerheads with the Western countries, the Europeans in particular, over the political drama that followed the publication of The Satanic Verses by the Indian–British novelist Salman Rushdie in 1988. 20. It is yet to be widely acknowledged what exactly triggered the Tiananmen Square incident in the first place, who were the chief culprits, and how many people really lost their lives over the course of that crisis. Despite many of such pressing queries, however, that bewildering turmoil was very poisonous to the Chinese development agenda as Deng Xiaoping himself had famously stated that “China cannot afford chaos” (Zhongguo buneng ruan). 21. “Bush Lifts Sanctions against China in Expectation of End of Missile Sales,” Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1992. 22. Lucian Stone, ed., Iranian Identity and Cosmopolitanism: Spheres of Belonging (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014); and Manochehr Dorraj, From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990). 23. “Iran Turns East: A Chronology of Iranian Relations with the Eastern Bloc and China,” Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), July 10, 1989, 3. 24. “Clinton to Order A Trade Embargo against Iran,” New York Times, May 1, 1995, 1. 25. “Dōngběi yà yǔ zhōngguó shíyóu ānquán” [Northeast Asia and Chinese Oil Security], Huaxia, September 29, 2004. 26. “China Seeks Economic Ties with Iran,” Tehran Times, March 5, 1989, 1. 27. “Premier Li Peng Meets Iranian Petroleum Minister,” Xinhua, May 26, 1997; and “Lǐkèqiáng huìjiàn yīlǎng shíyóu bùzhǎng” [Li Keqiang Meets Iranian Oil Minister], Rénmín rìbào (People’s Daily), August 6, 2010. 28. “Growing Economic Cooperation with Iran Detailed,” Xinhua, November 11, 1995; and “China to Develop Iran’s Largest Refinery,” Mehr News Agency, September 10, 2016. 29. In the lexicon of oil industry, “upstream” refers to exploration and production activities, while “downstream” deals with processing of crude oil into various petroleum products. 30. For a riveting discussion on this topic, see Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008). 31. For instance, see: Kenneth D. Worth, Peak Oil and the Second Great Depression (2010–2030): A Survival Guide for Investors and Savers after Peak Oil (Denver: Outskirts Press, 2010). 32. The PRC established its diplomatic relationship with Saudi Arabia in July 1990. 33. On top of that, not all the oil that is supplied to China is consumed by the Chinese or used only to serve the interests of the Chinese people. A swarm of foreign businesses and international companies established in China badly depends on the crude supplied from faraway territories, while it is ultimately only China that is either credited or blamed for the

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whopping quantity of petroleum, including the Iranian oil, which is imported by the bucketful into the East Asian country year after another. 34. Israel and China officially established diplomatic relations in 1992. 35. “Zhōngguó yǔ yīlǎng guānxì huímóu” [China and Iran Relations Appraised], Běijīng zhōubào (Beijing Review), July 15, 2011. 36. “Mining, Geology Agreement Signed with Iran,” Xinhua, September 27, 1989; and “Iran Seeks Joint Project in Coal Industry,” China Daily, June 3, 1992. 37. “PRC, Iran to Jointly Invest in Copper Mines,” Xinhua, July 10, 1996; and “Iran, China Discuss Mineral Cooperation,” Tehran Times, October 12, 1998. 38. “Changchun Plant Wins Iran Subway Carriage Contract,” Xinhua, August 26, 1996. 39. “Minister Signs Railways Cooperation Agreement with Iran,” Xinhua, May 16, 1996; “Chinese Delegation Visits Tehran–Karaj Subway,” Tehran Times, February 9, 1999; and “China-made Subway Fulfills Iranian Dream,” Xinhua, June 15, 2004. 40. For instance, see Steven R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). 41. Robert E. Mullins, “The Dynamics of Chinese Missile Proliferation,” Pacific Review 8, no. 1 (1995): 137–57; “Yang Shangkun Meets Iranian Defense Minister,” Xinhua, October 16, 1990; and “Iran, China Set to Sign Arms Purchase Agreement,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 29, 1996. 42. Gary Samore, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), 12. 43. “Micro-nuclear Reactor Contract with Iran Signed,” Xinhua, June 11, 1990; “Spokesman Comments on Nuclear Assistance to Iran,” Xinhua, November 4, 1991; and “Chinese Nuclear Officials See No Reason to Change Plans to Sell Reactor to Iran,” Washington Post, May 18, 1995, A22. 44. The Iranian aversion toward the Chinese weapons was not really that strong when the arms business involved a third party. For instance, there was an alleged Iranian role about the purchase and shipment of Chinese weaponry to Sudan, partly or fully financed by Tehran, under Rafsanjani in the 1990s. Iran might have also had played a similar role with regard to the transfer of Chinese weapons to Syria. See “Iran Financing $300 Million in PRC Arms for Sudan,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 27, 1991; and “Sudan: Arms Deal Concluded with China, Financed by Iran,” Middle East News Agency (Cairo), March 31, 1996. 45. “Iran, China Set to Sign Arms Purchase Agreement,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 29, 1996; and “China, Iran Align to Develop Short-Range Missiles: Report,” Times of India, June 18, 1997, 14. 46. As proved by the Yinhe incident in 1993, even nonmilitary and purely commercial Chinese transportations with Iran were in the crosshairs of American watchdogs here and there. For more details about the occurrence, see “China Says U.S. Is Harassing Ship Suspected of Taking Arms to Iran,” New York Times, August 9, 1993; “No Chemical Arms Aboard China Ship,” New York Times, September 6, 1993; and “Saudis Board a Chinese Ship In Search for Chemical Arms,” New York Times, August 28, 1993. 47. “Spokesman Denies Missile Technology Sale to Iran,” Xinhua, February 13, 1992; and “China, U.S. Agree on Defense Contracts, Disagree on Iran,” Times of India, December 11, 1996, 12.

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Chapter 3

Same Talks, Contrasting Connotations: Civilizational Nuances

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THE REFORM RHETORIC: KHATAMI AND JIANG ZEMIN The commencement of Mohammad Khatami’s presidency in 1997 ushered in a new period in Iran widely known as the “reforms era.” The dominant discourse in society now shifted from economic matters to politico-cultural issues and from materially perceptible “reconstruction” to materially undetectable “reforms.” In fact, “reforms” could cover any political and cultural theme the society at large favored, including the formation of political parties and associations, civil society, civil participation by all groups, and press freedom, for example. Debates about reforms set many young people abuzz, instilling in them the impression that political rights outweigh economic progress and that any significant improvement in the country’s overall economic circumstances must follow achieving some degree of political liberty and maturation. Internationally, the Iranian foreign policy under Khatami adopted a more conciliatory tone, vowing to engage other nations based on common interests and mutual respect without interference in the way each country is governed. Nonetheless, the “reform discourse” under Khatami did not solve Iran’s chronic domestic and foreign problems. Not only was the concept of “reform” largely vague from the beginning, but no firm and explicit explanation followed with what would be reformed and how. In place of a well-thought economic plan, the society was engulfed in open-ended discussions on politics and culture, which ultimately increased the expectations of the citizenry, the youth in particular, without offering productive works that brought substantial results. Despite its gentle gestures and positive measures, diplomatically Khatami’s two-term administration could not make a serious dent in the 31

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country’s frosty relationship with the West. Even Iran’s genuine cooperation with and generous material assistances to the U.S.-led West in the Bosnian crisis as well as during the military conflicts in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) were only met with stinging remarks and derogatory labels. With regard to China, the beginning of Khatami’s presidency in Iran roughly coincided with Jiang Zemin taking China’s reins as he assumed the title of paramount leader in 1997 after Deng Xiaoping died. 1 And in sharp contrast to Khatami, who increasingly relied on Rafsanjani to keep power inside the Iranian political establishment, Jiang Zemin was now the supreme leader who had at his disposal all of the power and prestige required to push forward policies outlined in close consultation with the CCP’s powerful politburo. Like Khatami, Jiang Zemin was called a “reformist,” but his reforms were overwhelmingly concentrated on economic and financial matters with specific characteristics and tangible outcomes. 2 Khatami was a stylish cleric who had busied himself and his followers predominantly with politics and culture, whereas Jiang Zemin was a seasoned technocrat concentrating the Chinese interests primarily in the strategic and economic domains. They were two different politicians with quite different backgrounds, which is why their contemporaneous leadership in Iran and China did not really contribute much to the common political and cultural interests of the two countries contrary to what was often perceived to be the case then.

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Unrequited: Obsession to Define the Other For more than a century, scores of works have been written and lectures have been delivered on how Iran should define its identity vis-à-vis the West. In fact, this has been an all-consuming subject since the Iranian government first began sending students to Europe in the Qajar era (1794 to 1925) and more frequently during the rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925–1979). As more Western thought and ways of doing things spread through Iranian society from intellectuals who already had experienced Western countries firsthand, a clash of opinions grew. Although a West-leaning approach sometimes dominated the public discourse or the way government accomplished things, it remained a contentious issue. So far it is a vicious circle: an enthusiastic orientation toward the West often has been branded “Westoxication” (gharbzadegi) and “self-alienation” or “self-estrangement” (khodbakhtegi), its rival conviction tagged as reactionary and radical. It has been Iran’s great loss in failing to come into terms with the West in relation to Iran’s own society and ambitions. An equally great loss has been its failure to pay enough attention to some others (i.e., the East Asian societies such as China), which somehow have found a way to muddle through such a crise de conscience. 3

Same Talks, Contrasting Connotations: Civilizational Nuances

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The presidency of Khatami was again marked by a large society dealing with open-ended questions and arguments for which no one could offer persuasive answers. His leitmotiv of “dialogue among civilizations” essentially was an invitation to dialogue on controversial topics that had long obsessed the literati and even ordinary citizens with a bent for intellectual and nonmaterialistic discussions. Even the “dialogue among civilizations” theme was not that inclusive; it was designed largely to push the Iran (the Islamic world in general) versus the West debate. Unfortunately, the East was absent, and its representatives (Arabs and Indians or other dignitaries from an East Asian country) were treated mainly as ornaments at “international conferences” and “multinational meetings” held inside or outside Iran during Khatami’s presidency in order to ponder some specific aspect of his high-sounding “dialogue among civilizations” project. 4 Of course, discussions like that existed in China as well, but many Chinese had for some time concluded that they needed to empower themselves economically in order to better rival their Western counterparts in other realms. Aiming primarily “to rejuvenate China without forgetting its century of humiliation,” they believed economic gains and financial successes would be effective instruments to counter perceived political deficits and cultural shortcomings vis-à-vis the Western societies. Even those patriots, nonpartisan ideologists, and intellectuals who were too proud of their own identity to accept non-Chinese schools of thought and methods quietly kept working on their favorable themes without alluding to the CCP or its way of governing China. The Iranian and Chinese societies, therefore, were drifting in relatively different directions with significant reverberations particularly for the cultural interactions between the two ancient countries as heirs to two proud civilizations.

Disconnectedness: Culture as an Ornament One implication of the contemporary Iranian obsession with the West has been its detachment from genuinely engaging with the East in general and with Iran’s former territories and provinces in Central and Western Asia in particular. The Iranian affinity with and cultural connections to all of these regions is steeped in history. After all, the masterpiece of Iranian literature and cultural hallmark (Shahnameh, or The Epic of Kings) is replete with references to all of those regions that preoccupied the Iranians significantly in older days. But Iran’s obsession with those areas was not only politically and militarily; economic and cultural interactions were also an integral part of the Iranian preoccupation. A large number of trade houses and vital business routes were located there, many doyens of culture and policymaking rose from those regions, and the security and stability of those territories was

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a constant concern of every succeeding political establishment in Iran from one era to another. 5 Because Iran’s literati and scholars became preoccupied primarily with the West in contemporary history, Iran remained ignorant of the cultural legacy and historical accomplishments in the East. Politics and the business sector were equally affected negatively; even the Shah of Iran, who intended in the early 1970s to create a “second Japan,” did not bother to gain a good understanding of what was happening on the Japanese archipelago then. Instead, he visited one Western capital after another, wishing that his country would soon join the ranks of industrialized nations and economically transformed societies. The fall of the Pahlavi dynasty did not bring change for the better as the Iranian scholarship became even more detached from Eastern countries and crucial developments in them. Still a bigger problem with the Iranian–Eastern dialogue under Khatami was that his leitmotiv of culture and civilizational interchanges did little to rekindle Iran’s historical connections to the East. Of course, a slew of governmental exchanges involved cultural matters between Iran and Eastern countries, but most of them were transient initiatives taken on a whim; they had no long-term impacts on consolidating non-politico-economic ties among the parties involved. In some cases, cultural confabs were used to create or cement political and economic interests. 6 Even as the Khatami government launched civilizational initiatives at the UN (i.e., naming 2001 as the “year of dialogue among civilizations”), which had the strong support of countries such as China, it failed even to set up a Chinese studies program at a reputable educational institution or establish a think tank in Iran to focus primarily on Asian studies and Eastern civilizations. To add insult to injury, his government was often blamed for ignoring its Islamic obligations with regard to the ethnic minority of Chinese Muslims by giving preference to the political and economic interests of the Tehran–Beijing nexus.

Uyghuristan: Religious Responsibility Is a Bit of a Sticky Wicket The Uyghur people share more with the Iranians than with the Chinese. In fact, the Uyghurs have little, if anything, in common with the dominant Han Chinese people who now rule them, whereas they share nearly everything with the Iranians and other Central and Western Asia nations. Even the Uyghur Khaganate (the Uyghur Empire), which lasted for close to one hundred years (744–840 A.D.), heavily tapped into the Persian legacy to run its bureaucracy and state affairs to the extent that the Khaganate adopted the Iranian Manichaeism as its official religion in 762 A.D. The kingdoms and reigning tribes that succeeded the Khaganate preserved elements of their affinity with the Iranians to the present day, ranging from the writing alpha-

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bet to local customs and food. 7 A day trip to Urumqi’s Grand Bazaar (Dàbāzhā) conjures up the bazaar of Tabriz, and many foods listed on the menu of a Uyghur restaurant taste quite similar to cuisine in Iran and neighboring countries. After a Uyghur history marked by ups and downs, communist China was running roughshod over them. The vast territory of Uyghurs is now officially an autonomous region, but the indigenous population is autonomous largely in eating and sleeping habits. 8 The CCP has imposed Beijing time (Běijīng shíjiān) as the official clock of the Xinjiang region, which differs markedly from the real time the Uyghurs need to get accustomed to for their business and religious affairs. All influential administrative positions and economic opportunities are the prerogative of the Han Chinese, even as state-sponsored mass migration of ethnic Chinese to the region has threatened the very identity of the Uyghur people in recent years. If things move at the current pace and the Han Chinese increasingly use their power and wealth to hold back the Uyghurs, they will certainly disappear from the region in the future, a blow to the human conscience in other parts of the world, including Iran. 9 Over the past decades, therefore, unbiased observers and unprejudiced scholars working in the field of Uyghur and Chinese studies have poked fun at the Iranian government for neglecting the plight of the Muslim Uyghurs by kowtowing to Beijing’s demand not to interfere in what the CCP considers its “domestic affairs.” But the same could be said of a host of other countries such as Saudi Arabia as the birthplace of Islam and the custodian of the top Islamic shrine. 10 Moreover, the Western countries and their affiliates active in what some call “the human rights industry” are equally guilty; they, too, have ignored the daily torments of the Uyghurs, favoring political and economic benefits they get from breaking bread with Beijing. 11 The Chinese government obviously has not been ungrateful for that level of “understanding and collaboration,” paying back each party’s “cooperation” in a different way, from turning a blind eye to Arab countries’ various domestic problems to applying certain vocabulary favorable to Western political and academic institutions.

The Age of Distortion: Twisting or Misreporting the History of Sino–Iranian Relations As compared to the Uyghurs, the overall impact of Iranian civilization on the Chinese was far more extensive and deep rooted. More than a thousand years before Western nations started to learn about the Chinese in earnest, the Iranian empire of Sassanid had established more than ten embassies throughout China. Iranian influence was distinctive in Chinese literature, military strategies, trade practices, architecture, agricultural methods, public policy

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matters such as the issuance of coins and paper money, pottery, culinary, and so forth. A trip to a historical museum in Shanghai or other major cities in China can reveal a great deal about an intense Iranian legacy in ancient China that is not readily observable in present-day China. Deliberate distortion of archival records and historical relics, interstate conflicts, and especially foreign invasions all resulted in a partial disappearance of the classic Iranian presence in China. 12 As is the case with the contemporary Iranian people and politics, the old history of Iran, including its previous connections to and impacts on China, has been mistreated and sometimes distorted at the hands of those who had little, if any, sympathy for and affinity with either country. Some people even penned works on the close relationship between Greece and China in old times without giving proper references to Iran and its geographical role in laying the groundwork for those “close interactions” between the Greeks and Chinese. Without airplanes or even easily traveled sea routes between China and Greece, exchanges of any sort between these two nations had to be by road extending through the Iranian frontiers. As elucidated in more detail in Did Marco Polo Go to China?, one needs to take with a pinch of salt the scholarship detailing the close connection between the Chinese and Western nations in ancient times without properly acknowledging the Iranian contribution, though not all works are just a figment of the imagination. 13 As China’s increasing interaction with the Western world has developed in recent years, more people on both sides have strived to delve into the existing literature or historical archives to produce something new that could better substantiate their connections of yesteryear. Taking into account the geographical and cultural constraints, it is surprising to see more and more works produced every year about the Sino–Western relations in ancient times but very few works on the role of Iranians in facilitating such connections. That circumstance leaves the Chinese and Iranians at risk for learning about each other and their older connections through the perspectives of others. 14 A harbinger of such eventuality is the willingness of many Chinese political bodies and educational institutions in recent years to adopt a certain vernacular in addressing or covering the developments germane to what they have long called the Western Asian region.

Taxing Taxonomy: West Asia Becomes Middle East Despite the imposition of communism on the Chinese since the late 1940s, China remains a stronghold of Confucianism, a key characteristic of which is the power of a hierarchical mindset that trickles down to every single aspect of political, economic, and cultural life. Confucianism is critical to both the Chinese foreign policy practices and the country’s domestic affairs. It would

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not be preposterous, therefore, to claim that officials of the CCP lean more to their Confucian beliefs than to their communist creeds no matter how hard they strive to impute their loyalty to communism. Despite what principles the Maoist version of communism dictates, the CCP has in more recent decades looked at the outside world primarily through Confucian eyes, especially when its economic interests are at stake. For instance, when the Chinese were desperate to gain Japanese technology and hard currency, they often placed a high priority on Japan in their foreign policy strategies and diplomatic niceties. The CCP officials occasionally made charitable comments to arouse the sympathy of their Japanese counterparts or just to curry favor and to set up official connections with influential Japanese figures in political, economic, and technological fields. But as soon as they achieved a certain level of industrialization and surpassed Japan as the second largest economy in the world, they were no longer obsessed with Japan. So it is no coincidence that when influential Chinese write or talk about Beijing’s great power diplomacy these days, they hardly mention Japan; by and large, their only concern is that the United States might eventually use Tokyo to contain or even fight China at some point in the future. 15 In the same way, when the communist Chinese were engaged in the Middle East prior to the 1980s, they wholeheartedly considered the region part of the bigger Asian family, calling it “West Asia” or “Western Asia.” As time elapsed and the Chinese began to sense their overall interests in the region from other perspectives, they were now willing to apply the term “Middle East” in reference to whatever developments were taking place there, even if they still used the “Western Asian” terminology in the Chinese sources for the sake of other interests. 16 Of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China still uses the terms “West Asia” to refer to all countries located between its western frontiers and the Levant region, including the states situated in the Arabian Peninsula, but various outlets tightly affiliated with the Chinese establishment have widely applied the term “Middle East” in recent times. 17 The English versions of Xinhua and Global Times, for instance, only use “Middle East” and “Mideast” to cover all developments germane to the region in much the same way the Western media has long reported on the region. As far as the Sino–Iranian relationship concerns, the problem was not only the use of the term “Middle East” for “West Asia.” The Chinese gradually found the courage to use “hǎiwān” (Gulf) instead of the long-established terms “bōsī wān” (Persian Gulf) in reference to the huge body of water between Iran and the member Arab states of the GCC. The Chinese media preferred to lump all Persian Gulf-related developments under “Middle East,” but ultimately when they had to refer to the region, “Gulf” instead of “Persian Gulf” became their leitmotiv. Many Iranians were not that annoyed

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about the use of “Middle East” for “West Asia,” and some even preferred it this way; however, they could never accept foreign stakeholders’—Chinese or Western countries—abuse of the term “Persian Gulf” to please a number of their Arab partners. Double loyalties of that kind sooner or later inevitably influenced their bilateral connections to Iran. 18

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Double-Edged Swords: Affinity with One Party Costs the Other During the Khatami–Jiang years, the Chinese had to often strike a delicate balance between their growing interests in Iran and those related particularly to three other groups of major stakeholders that were in a positon to influence the Beijing–Tehran relationship. 19 First, the Americans (and to some extent major Western European states) could exert politico-economic as well as technological and psychological pressures on China’s interactions with the Iranians. 20 In the second half of Jiang Zemin’s presidency, his big-power diplomacy (daguo waijiao) tilted significantly in favor of the United States at the cost of Iran. 21 The Chinese virtually terminated their nuclear cooperation with Iran and greatly limited other conventional areas of military dealings with Tehran. 22 Still other less controversial, if not normal, parts of the Sino–Iranian relations were not free from American arm-twisting. For instance, Jiang postponed his planned state visit to Iran several times. Only at the end of his presidency, in April 2002, did he make an official visit to Tehran to pay back his Iranian counterparts’ visits to China in May 1989 and June 2000, 23 respectively, without making controversial statements unfavorable to the Americans at that sensitive time. 24 Second was China’s interest in the Israelis and their powerful Jewish lobby in the United States. From the time Israel and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, the Jews tried to influence various Beijing policies toward the greater Middle East region, in particular those related to Iran. The Israelis also wanted to increase economic as well as military cooperation with the Chinese, though the two parties already had benefited greatly from such bilateral engagement long before they normalized diplomatic ties. Because the Chinese were chasing the Israelis to get sensitive technologies and military innovations, they were attentive to what the Jews expected from them for generous cooperation with Beijing. The Chinese were also alert to potential power of the American Jewish lobby on their relationship not only with the Middle East, Iran, and especially Israel, but with the United States as well. Books such as The Jewish Lobby and American Foreign Policy heightened the sensitivity of Chinese politicians and scholars to the potential impacts of the lobby on China and possible consequences of disregarding its demands on Beijing. 25

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Finally, Arab countries, particularly those located in the Persian Gulf region, sometimes played a role in the Sino–Iranian nexus. These Westernbacked states were not long-term suppliers of energy for China’s growing fossil fuels needs; they were a relatively attractive market for Chinese products and an easy source of cash and capital investment in China. The Chinese, therefore, could not secure their overall interests in the Persian Gulf without paying attention to Iran-related demands and expectations of their Arab partners in the region. 26 When the Western countries increased pressure on Iran in the final years of Khatami’s presidency, the role of these wellheeled Arab states was to become even more important in China’s foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in general. 27 Epitomized by the newly designated function for Dubai in the region, the Chinese found themselves at their whim to protect their ever-expanding interests in the Iranian markets.

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The Dubai Factor From Khatami’s second term on, Iran was forced to handle a considerable part of its international trade through less-known third parties. This pattern was not strange to Iran, as the country had practiced it since the onset of the Iran–Iraq War. Compared to the 1980s, however, this time both Iran and its foreign partners were subject to more restrictions imposed by the West. In fact, the U.S.-led West used everything at its disposable to highlight the Iranian nuclear situation. 28 The follow-up economic sanctions and financial restrictions imposed against Iran by the West created additional barriers for Iranian international trade. Many Western banks and other businesses had enormous stakes in Iran, so their access to and huge interests in the “Iranian el dorado” could not be totally torpedoed, which is why a handpicked number of insignificant and unknown places around Iran, Dubai in particular, became hot spots almost overnight. Unlike the southern Iranian ports with a proud history in foreign trade going back thousands of years, Dubai and its adjacent Arabian coastal towns used to be home to desperate people, some of whom robbed commercial ships to eke out a living before the fortuitous discovery of oil in the region. 29 Despite their poor background, these former pirates and desert dwellers were soon propped up to engage in international business and multilateral arrangements, largely thanks to the ill-fated situation that had befallen the Iranians. Dubai was not only to become a vast entrepôt trade in the Persian Gulf region; it was also designed to serve as a mafia den for various illegal activities, including human trafficking, drug trafficking, slavery, sleaze, gambling, and money laundering. 30 The vital workforce of Dubai, from technicians and business managers to truck drivers and toilet cleaners, had to be

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supplied almost entirely from foreign countries. 31 Like many of their foreign counterparts, many Iranian merchants and businesses moved with celerity to establish offices in Dubai to deal with both Western and Eastern partners such as China. Iranians and foreign businesses set up Dubai branches not only to transfer commodities from overseas to the insatiable markets in Iran, but the lion’s share of Iranian nonenergy exports to world markets and their relevant financial and banking services had to be processed through these Dubai-based trade offices as well. The business was often very lucrative, so illegal transportation of commodities and illicit commercial practices gradually increased year after year, especially when new rounds of sanctions on Iran made access to foreign products and services more difficult for many Iranians. Because Iran has the longest coastal borders on the Persian Gulf, sophisticated traffickers sometimes enjoyed lax monitoring, transfering their foreign products into the country on different shorelines. 32 This is one of the main reasons why the amount of Chinese products, as well as manufactured commodities from other East Asian countries such as South Korea, in the Iranian marketplace far outstripped the relevant trade statistics released by the Iranian or Chinese authorities. 33

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“Going Out” Reaches Iran: Expanding China’s Energy Profile Some of Jiang Zemin’s Iran policies came to fruition under his successor, Hu Jintao, under whose leadership the Chinese business with Iran reached its peak. In the last three years of his presidency, Khatami dealt with Hu Jintao, who had previously visited Iran in early 2001 as China’s vice president. A number of lucrative deals Hu’s China signed with the Khatami government, particularly in the field of energy, were a sweet outcome of Jiang Zemin’s “going-out strategy” (zǒuchūqū zhànlüè). Both inside and outside China numerous debates have discussed the timing of initiating this policy, key objectives, and major implications. In fact, halfway through Khatami’s preoccupation with his “dialogue among civilizations,” Jiang Zemin began implementing a practical version of such international dialogue by pushing China’s established enterprises and fledgling startups into every nook and cranny of the world. Although Jiang had paid attention to that necessity since ascending to the presidency in 1992, he dedicated more time and resources to the overall framework of this strategy in his second term, more precisely in 1999. 34 In other words, if the “open-door policy” was to attract foreign capital and investment into the Chinese markets, the “going-out” strategy now would encourage Chinese companies to invest abroad to further secure China’s increasing interests and physical presence in foreign territories by directly

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41

engaging in exploration, production, marketing, trading, transportation, and so forth. With the CCP’s strong support, relevant laws and regulations quickly were enacted at home, and the Chinese enterprises were promised financial and technological help to implement the goals of the “going-out” strategy. In the host countries, it was primarily the work of China’s diplomats to gain a foothold for Chinese companies and their workforce, both professionals and manual laborers, by persuading foreign governments such as Iran to sort out the legal and bureaucratic barriers hindering the Chinese. 35 The direct involvement of Chinese corporations in the Iranian oil and gas projects during the presidency of Hu Jintao was, therefore, a high-yielding follow-on to the “going-out” strategy formulated earlier under Jiang Zemin. On the eve of becoming the second largest consumer of oil after the United States and the second biggest oil importer after Japan in 2004, China’s Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in October 2004 with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop the Yadavaran oil field. The two parties had already signed several deals covering both oil and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), 36 but the most important among them was the Yadavaran project, which is located in Iran’s southern province of Khuzestan. 37 The NIOC and SINOPEC agreed in 2007 to sign the final agreement, according to which the Chinese state-owned company secured a 51 percent stake in the Yadavaran project in exchange for buying ten million metric tons of LNG from Iran over twenty-five years. Not only was Yadavaran Iran’s largest undeveloped oil field then, but the $70–100 billion deal also marked the success of China’s “going-out” strategy in Iran as China’s first deep participation in the development of a major oil field in the Persian Gulf country. Because of its geographical location, Iran still played a crucial role on its northern frontiers by assisting the Chinese to live up to other objectives of their “going-out” strategy in the Caucasus.

The Bridgehead for Befriending Central Asia If for many Chinese Central Asia was an extension of the greater Middle East, Iran was a crucial link that straddles the two regions. Similar to the case of the Middle East, in Central Asia the bottom line for China, Iran, and other stakeholders is about three key issues: nationalism, natural resources (oil and gas as well as other precious commodities), and geopolitics rivalry. With regard to nationalism, historical affinities and cultural connections between Iran and the Central Asian states for thousands of years are clear. 38 But China has been very keen recently to present itself as a captivated acquaintance, partly to tamp down anxiety over the long-term impact of nationalist tendencies in the region, especially its Uyghur population. Because of close

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racial and religious commonalities between the Uyghurs and many people in Central Asia, the Chinese have tried to neutralize the perils of those distinctive bonds among the people by forging closer bilateral and multilateral ties with the political systems. 39 Given Iran’s implicit neutrality toward the “Uyghur question” and the overall situation of Muslims in the PRC, the Beijing–Tehran relationship has also been emulated as a role model for China’s developing interactions with its partners in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. In the same way, Central Asia became a target of the Chinese “going-out” strategy Jiang Zemin and his successors pushed. Again similar to the Persian Gulf, Central Asia is endowed with untapped resources, most of which are crucial to China’s insatiable need for raw materials. Even resource-rich Iran has imported needed commodities, such a natural gas from Turkmenistan. But the Iranian and Chinese officials have demonstrated more interest in exploiting the unique geographical location of Iran as a safe channel for transferring the Central Asian resources to China and some other Asian clients. This has been a key factor behind the more recent geopolitical and geostrategic rivalry in Central Asia, involving both major Eastern and Western powers. Unlike other assumptions, neither China nor Iran wants to engage in nineteenth-century-style one-upmanship with more aggressive stakeholders, preferring to safeguard their expanding multifaceted interests in the region through proactive participation in regional frameworks, in particular the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 40 Like the “going-out” strategy, the establishment of SCO was another accomplishment of Jiang Zemin in the final years of his leadership. As an outgrowth of the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) founded in 1996, the SCO embraced Uzbekistan to emerge officially in 2001 as a regional body with critical political, security, and economic objectives. Other states applied later to join the organization with observer, dialogue, or guest status. Roughly one month before the end of Khatami’s presidency, Iran was offered observer status at the SCO summit in Kazakhstan in July 2005. 41 As many crucial interests were at stake, the next Iranian government applied for a full membership at the SCO in March 2008, but an impediment blocked that goal. Based on an article clearly specified by the SCO charter, a country under UN sanctions could not be given full membership in the organization. 42 That technical hurdle, and to some extent the unwillingness of some members to back Iran at a crucial time, did not stop Ahmadinejad’s government from later taking advantage of its frequently high-profile presence at the SCO to partially fulfill Iran’s objectives in Central Asia.

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NOTES 1. Five years of Khatami’s presidency (1997–2005) coincided with the rule of Jiang Zemin in China. 2. Jiang Zemin allegedly was called a “chief engineer of deep reform” to distinguish him from Deng Xiaoping as the “chief architect” of “reform and opening-up” (gaige kaifang). 3. “Iran Should Look East, Not West,” Asia Times, July 17, 2009. 4. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Dialogue among Civilizations: The Round Table on the Eve of the United Nations Millennium Summit (Paris: UNESCO, 2001). 5. Richard W. Bulliet, “Iran between East and West,” Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007), 1–14; and George Erdosy, ed., The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia: Language, Material Culture and Ethnicity (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995). 6. Fred Dallmayr, Dialogue among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 71–83. 7. For more details on this topic, see Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 B.C. to A.D. 1757 (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992); James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and Peter B. Golden, Central Asia in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 8. “China’s Wild West: The Problem with Beijing’s Xinjiang Policy,” Foreign Affairs, January 26, 2014; “China Bans Ramadan Fast in Xinjiang Region,” Al Arabiya, July 2, 2014; “China’s War on Terror Becomes All-out Attack on Islam in Xinjiang,” Washington Post, September 19, 2014; “China’s Minority Report: When Racial Harmony Means Homogenization,” Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2016; and “China Needs to Overhaul Xinjiang Policy,” Business Standard, June 27, 2016. 9. In January 2013, I took a Shanghai–Urumqi train in order to experience firsthand the territory of the Uyghurs and its people. The trip was full of surprises and lessons from the time I boarded the train to the minute I left Urumqi International Airport. The fact that the most gorgeous girl on the train, apparently a Han Chinese, had been given a seat right in front of mine forewarned me to watch my moves and words carefully throughout the trip. Considering the matter to be a potential Chinese trap set for me, I left my place most of the time in order to socialize with Uyghur passengers in that or other cars and listen to their narratives of life and history in that region. I was fortunate that one of them was an English interpreter who could facilitate my communication with other people in the train. I reached my destination and took a taxi to the accommodation I had struggled to book in advance, only to find that as soon as the Chinese manager looked at the emblem on my Iranian passport, he refused to let me in. He cited the “lack of any vacancy and some problem with reservation.” Only when I threatened to call in the police did he back down. Then I discovered that more than two-third of all rooms and beds were empty. Similar behavior was to be expected from other Han Chinese residing in Urumqi, no matter whether they were taxi and bus drivers or the airport customs officers, who gave me a rough body check from head to toe upon departing. 10. Even Turkey recently was accused of abusing the Uyghurs by offering them the Turkish citizenship as pretext to recruit them to serve as a cannon fodder for the Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ Daesh) project. “173 Uighurs Kept Under Detention by Thailand Arrive in Turkey,” Daily Sabah, July 1, 2015; and “‘Passports for Uyghurs’ Story Shadows Turkey’s Relations with PRC,” Asia Times, July 13, 2015. 11. “China Bans Ramadan Fast in Muslim Northwest,” Associated Press, July 2, 2014; and “Rising Uighur Militancy Changes Security Landscape for China,” New York Times, September 9, 2016. 12. “Zhùmíng zuòjiā wángméng xīnshū 'yīlǎng yìnxiàng' chūbǎn fāxíng” [“Iran Impression” Book Published by Famous Writer Wang Meng], Xinhua, December 2, 2007. 13. Frances Wood, Did Marco Polo Go to China? (London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1995).

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14. “Zhōngguó yǔ yīlǎng chénglì wénhuà liánhé wěiyuánhuì” [China and Iran Set up Joint Committee on Culture], Xinhua, February 16, 2012. 15. Christopher Howe, “China, Japan and Economic Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region,” in China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects, edited by Christopher Howe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 98–126; and Benjamin Self, “China and Japan: A Façade of Friendship,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002–2003): 77–88. 16. Part of those critical interests can be attributed to the fact that China was considered the “middle kingdom” by its neighbors in the tributary imperial system of the past, whereas the country’s Chinese name, zhōngguó, now means “middle country.” Recognizing a “middle” point geographically requires the four geographical directions, north, south, east, and west. When the Western powers picked up the term “Middle East” for “West Asia,” it made the Chinese nervous about their historical position in the larger continent. This is one reason why some Chinese are adamant about using the terms “West Asia” and “Western Asia,” though these historical designations are appropriate names for what others call the “Middle East” or “Mideast.” 17. Still the categories in which official names of these countries are placed somehow differ in the Chinese and English versions of the foreign ministry’s website. In the Chinese version, they are put under “yàzhōu” (Asia); in the English version, under “Western Asia and North Africa.” Data taken from the official website of the foreign ministry are available at http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn. 18. “Iran Protests at China over Using False Name for Persian Gulf,” Fars News Agency, November 13, 2010; and “Row over Persian vs. Arabian Gulf at China Games Ruffles Tehran’s Feathers,” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2010. 19. “Dance of the Lion and the Dragon,” Asia Times, November 8, 2006. 20. “Strategy chiniha baray hozour dar Iran” [Chinese Strategy for Presence in Iran], Donya-e Eqtesad, August 13, 2016. 21. Jean-Pierre Cabesta, “China’s Relations with the Major Powers,” in Charting China’s Future: Domestic and International Challenges, edited by David Shambaugh (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011), 77–85. 22. In return, the Chinese were promised technological assistances in both military and nonmilitary fields. Long desperate for help with their military modernization projects, they were willing even to freeze certain parts of their cooperation with Iran. See Henry J. Kenny, “Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China,” in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 43–44. 23. “Iranian President Concludes Tour of Xinjiang, Leaves for Hong Kong,” Xinhua, June 25, 2000. 24. Jiang Zemin’s visit in 2002 was a Chinese leader’s first trip to Iran since Hua Guofeng’s visit in 1978. 25. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2007). 26. John Calabrese, “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security,” Middle East Journal 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 351–66; and “China Eager to Buy More Crude Oil from Iran,” Tehran Times, December 10, 2000. 27. “What the Persian Gulf States Want: Iran Kept at Bay,” Los Angeles Times, May 9, 2015. 28. Scott Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Richard K. Betts, “A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?” Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 135–50. 29. Raymond Barrett, Dubai Dreams: Inside the Kingdom of Bling (London and Boston: Nicholas Brealey, 2010). 30. Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (London and Philadelphia: Kogan Page, 2006), 90, 149; and International Monetary Fund, United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on AntiMoney Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2008).

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31. “Dubai in United Arab Emirates A Centre of Human Trafficking and Prostitution,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 21, 2016. 32. Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 79–82. 33. “Dubai Traders Call for Relief on Iran Exports,” The National, January 3, 2012. 34. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 174–75; Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice,” China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001): 835–64; and Edward Burman, China, the Stealth Empire (Stroud, Gloucestershire: History Press, 2008). 35. Aaron L. Friedberg, “‘Going Out’: China’s Pursuit of Natural Resources and Implications for the PRC’s Grand Strategy,” NBR Analysis 17, no. 3 (September 2006): 5–35. 36. “China National Petroleum Corporation Wins 1st Gas Drilling Contract in Iran,” Xinhua, August 20, 2000; “China’s Oil Giant Sinopec to Explore Oil in Iran,” Tehran Times, January 14, 2001; and “Iranian Economic Delegation in China to Talk on Energy,” Tehran Times, March 8, 2001. 37. “China and Iran near Agreement on Huge Oil Pact,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2004. 38. Golden, Central Asia in World History, 21–27; and “Tiě kuàng shí kǎoyàn zhōngguó yǔ yīlǎng guānxì” [Iron Ore Tests Sino–Iranian Ties], Sōuhú xīnwén (Sohu News), April 29, 2010. 39. Michael E. Clarke, Xinjiang and China’s Rise in Central Asia–A History (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2011). 40. George Walden, China: A Wolf in the World? (London: Gibson Square, 2008); and “Russia, China Looking to Form ‘NATO of the East’?” Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 2005. 41. Matthew Brummer, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Iran: A Powerful Union,” Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 185–98. 42. “SCO Summit Meeting Issues Joint Communique,” Xinhua, August 17, 2007; and “SCO: Solve Problems by Dialogue,” China Daily, August 29, 2008.

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Chapter 4

Principlism Engages Pragmatism: Failures and Frictions

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LOOKING EAST UNDER AHMADINEJAD The presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which lasted for two terms (August 2005–August 2013), marked the acme of Iran’s decades-long policy of looking East. Relations with the countries located in the Northeast Asian region (greater China, including the mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong; Japan; South Korea; and North Korea) demonstrated the quintessential characteristics of Iran’s eastward proclivities, albeit overall interactions with South Asia and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were also unequivocal elements of the Asianism Tehran pursued. The huge volume of economic, political, military, and even cultural exchanges between Iran and the East Asian nations under Ahmadinejad validated key elements of the looking-East approach. But the eight-year period allowed Iranians to monitor closely and appraise Ahmadinejad’s policies toward East Asian countries. More important, his uncompromising, occasionally obstreperous leadership drew many ardent critics. Bearing evidence of his failed policies, they questioned not only his performance in East Asia, but also the general direction of Iran’s external political and economic strategies under his leadership. 1 By and large, Ahmadinejad was neither a staunch architect of the lookingEast orientation nor did he favor giving significant preferential treatment to the East Asian nations compared to Iran’s conventional partners in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. The latter could not meet Iran’s growing economic and technological requirements, and other crucial issues moved Iran toward further interaction with East Asia. For instance, the Iranian economy already had commercial connections with nearly all East 47

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Asian states, and the antagonistic policies of the West over the nuclear controversy left Iran with little option but to turn to East Asian countries. Commercial interactions with them fulfilled Iran’s ever-expanding economic and technical needs. Strained relations with the West over the nuclear issue and the ensuing sanctions brought fresh dynamism to relations with the East Asian nations, this time for political and strategic purposes. 2 The nuclear issue and ensuing economic sanctions implemented by the West, nevertheless, negatively influenced the volume of material exchanges between Iran and its East Asian partners and somewhat dimmed prospects for long-term economic and political cooperation between the two sides. Despite the fact that Iran had been subject to sanctions since the early 1980s, they were greatly expanded in number and in scope after the Iraq War because of the nuclear issue. The outcome required East Asian governments to participate in some of the political and economic actions against Iran, occasionally bringing the East Asian nations’ trade ties with Tehran to the brink. Even as the Asian states could not support the political action, they hesitated to endorse the relevant economic measures against the Iranian government and were twice as reluctant to implement them. But they had to find a way to both mitigate the sanctions and alleviate the indignation of Iranian officials who had generously opened their country’s markets to a myriad of made-inEast Asia products. China, Japan, and South Korea either were or had leapfrogged to become three of Iran’s top exporting partners and principal purveyors of its imported goods and luxury items. Of course, North Korea long had been suspected of playing a role in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, but the West’s political drama with the Ahmadinejad government put a spotlight on the partnership between Tehran and Pyongyang. Even Taiwan and Hong Kong were not immune from Western countries’ distrust after connections to Iran they built to bypass sanctions were exposed. Moreover, the position of East Asian nationals as leaders of major international institutions meant that Ahmadinejad’s foreign affairs team had to deal with people from these countries when managing Iran’s troubles with the West, although these Asian officials were not necessarily representing the declared policies of their affiliated nations toward Tehran. Western policies toward Iran were echoed or implemented through East Asian nationals who occupied influential positions at international institutions, from the top manager of the United Nations to the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA’s inspectors, and key executives of the World Bank. On top of that, Ahmadinejad’s longestserving foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, had significant Asian credentials, including education in India and a short stint as Tehran’s ambassador to Tokyo in 1994. Iran’s unprecedented expanding interactions with East Asia under Ahmadinejad had significant ramifications for the entire nation, particularly in

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economic affairs. 3 His government was blamed more for its policy failures in dealing with the East Asian nations than credited with achievements under the banner of looking East. Whereas Iranians were predisposed to blame East Asian nations for taking advantage of their country’s misfortunes during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, his opponents blamed the government for what went wrong in the relationships with the East. Many prominent members of this latter group were later to play pivotal roles in the government of Hassan Rouhani, expressing candid views on how to better handle Iran’s relationship with East Asia and how to rectify past mistakes based on hard lessons gleaned from the Ahmadinejad era. 4 In spite of the fact that Iran’s expanding connections with East Asia under Ahmadinejad had numerous follow-ups favorable to the nation’s peace and prosperity, such connections have escaped discussion by Iranian academics at home and abroad. Iranian scholarship on the subject is still dormant compared to what the nation has produced regarding the Middle East or the West. Not only did Ahmadinejad fail to address such a fundamental weakness; his government expelled one of the nation’s top East Asian scholars from the University of Tehran ostensibly on disciplinary grounds, though the expert was later allowed to return and retire there. 5 It is no coincidence that in Iran’s interactions with the outside world through history, it was often obsessed with the West politically and to some extent militarily, spent a lot of capital and energy on its cultural affinity with the neighboring regions, and yet conducted the lion’s share of its economic interactions with the East.

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Ahmadinejad Versus Asians: Anything in Common? The eight-year presidency of Ahmadinejad is somehow remembered most for the Iran–Iraq War when the country experienced tremendous international pressures, regional resentment, and domestic hardships. The early years of his first government coincided with the heyday of insurgency in Iraq, when Ahmadinejad fortuitously turned out to be the “weapon of mass destruction” for which Iranians were now condemned to pay a hefty price. What had already gone wrong in Iraq for the West was to be made up for with Iran, under the pretext of the country’s alleged nuclear program. 6 Having lost the moral high ground in Iraq, the West revved up its rhetoric against Iran, mountains were made out of molehills, and world public opinion turned more unfavorable than ever toward the Iranians. 7 Sanctions were imposed on Tehran, friendly countries became nonaligned overnight, nonaligned partners became neutral swiftly, and some neutral ones jumped on the bandwagon to further discredit Iran. 8 This is the general picture of Iran’s international situation during the presidency of Ahmadinejad. But what type of person was he? And did he share anything in common with his East Asian counterparts?

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This issue is still a contentious one among Iranians: was Ahmadinejad an accidental president or a handpicked leader given a mandate to steer the course at that time? This impression was influenced by the suspicious circumstances that kept him in power after the controversial presidential elections in June 2009. Ahmadinejad indisputably believed in the core principles of the Islamic Republic, ardently advocated religious values, and genuinely defended family and traditional customs. But none of these characteristics prepared him for the daunting task as the Iranian president, which requires a basic understanding of and attachment to “the way world politics works.” 9 To make matters worse, he challenged the modus operandi of international relations and embarked on costly projects of dubious benefit to his nation. 10 In the end, Ahmadinejad was judged by an overwhelming majority of Iranians “not the right person for the right job,” although his personality and policies dovetailed neatly with some crucial interests of major powers and many of Iran’s partners, including those in East Asia. In a nutshell, the core of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy rested on three issues. First, he did not agree with the present structure of the international system and the division of power and labor within it. Ahmadinejad’s rearview politics, his resentment and animosity toward the West, affected his perception of the role certain Western countries played in shaping and consolidating the international system; personally, he had reservations about certain sociocultural attributes of the West. Second, he believed strongly that the international system was unfair and discriminatory toward Iran, and the Middle East or the Islamic world in general. To better challenge the way the international system was working, Ahmadinejad approached like-minded leaders in other parts of the world (e.g., Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, etc.), and tried to put together an informal alliance. 11 It was instrumental in achieving some political and economic objectives of Iran’s foreign policy and helping the country out of total international isolation. Third, Ahmadinejad criticized the power of the Jews in some crucial contemporary international developments, particularly those related to the Middle East. He campaigned to mobilize world public opinion against Israel and the “bad Jews” by giving prominence to topics such as the Holocaust. Despite this general approach, he neither added eloquent ingredients to the core doctrine of the Iranian foreign policy nor challenged any fundamental principle of the Islamic Republic toward other nations. Ahmadinejad’s views regarding various foreign policy and domestic issues were endorsed by some very powerful figures and key institutions such as the supreme leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); their often well-timed support was important for two reasons. First, he became more assertive and was lionized year after year with respect to his policies and strategies and the approaches his conservative and principlist government adopted to imple-

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ment them. Second, Ahmadinejad found himself immune to growing criticism from his opponents within the Iranian political establishment. For instance, the Iranian parliament could not impeach and ultimately unseat Ahmadinejad or any of his powerful ministers without at least some agreement of the supreme leader and other dominant political bodies. Contrary to Ahmadinejad’s devotion to principlism, the leaders of almost all East Asian states were pragmatic. Despite all the chatter about an imagined affinity between Iran and North Korea, two-third of the world didn’t care what the North Korean leadership was up to and most of the rest hardly heard a word uttered through by the communist state’s leader, Kim Jong-il, before he died in December 2011. Concerning foreign and economic policies toward Iran, the pragmatist East Asian countries had three main characteristics. First, Iranians were on target in believing that with Ahmadinejad, the East Asian nations wanted to walk in lockstep like the popular Persian proverb of sharik dozd va rafigh ghafele (literally, a partner of the robber and a companion of the caravan). This saying harkens back to Iran’s history as a major trading state on the erstwhile Silk Road. The bottom line was East Asians’ uninterrupted access to the lucrative markets of Iran while simultaneously enjoying the advantages of close cooperation with the West without paying any relevant costs. Second, saving face played an important role not only in East Asia’s relationship with Iran but with regard to the East Asian countries’ interactions with the Western world as well. They did not like some of the issues the West was focusing on about Iran and were unwilling to take punitive measures against Tehran, but they did not want to stick out like a sore thumb in the Western media for being spoilers with close ties to the Iranians. 12 Western countries may bomb a nation with nuclear weapons and call it a close ally afterward, but this is not how the Confucian systems of East Asia seem to function. Representatives of East Asian countries were often heard quietly asking their Iranian counterparts for forgiveness for being forced to take steps harmful to Iran. 13 Finally, some degree of prudence always guided the positions and policies that East Asian countries adopted vis-à-vis Iran. Japan and South Korea were walking on eggshells so as not to risk losing China’s favor; all of them were burdened with the worrisome thought that they might be duped by the West in Iran. When judging the behaviors of East Asian nations toward Iran during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iranians tended, by and large, to highlight the first element and pay little attention to the last two.

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Spoiling Sino–Iranian Ties: Sowing Seeds of Friction Perhaps the U-turn in the attitude of Hashemi Rafsanjani and other officials toward China epitomizes the overall thinking of a majority of Iranians about the Tehran–Beijing relationship under Ahmadinejad. As an eminence grise of the Islamic Republic and a major player behind the Sino–Iranian military deals during the Iran–Iraq War, Rafsanjani was once quoted saying in the early 1980s, “We consider China to be really independent and without domineering intentions. It pursues a policy of support for the oppressed, and is opposed to superpower domination.” 14 In a speech given to his supporters after ostensibly having been blocked from the presidential race in May 2013, the very same Rafsanjani stated bitterly, “We optimistically handed over our foreign banknotes to China and the Chinese changed them to the RMB after charging some fees, and they later told us that we give Chinese products for your hard currency but still not any sort of commodity, only those items we determine to ship you.” 15 Rafsanjani’s protégé and current president, Hassan Rouhani, was later far more frank. Delivering his government’s first sixmonth report to the public broadcast live on Iranian national TV, he stated: “We created many jobs in recent years but for the Chinese and Koreans.” 16 For some three and one-half decades, Iranian officials hardly ever revealed their attitudes and private opinions about the Chinese in such a straightforward manner to the general public. Could this have come out of the blue? In fact, the principlist government of Ahmadinejad approached China with the same sanguine perspective Rafsanjani possessed in the 1980s. Mesmerized by a beguiling portrait of Mao and a silhouette of socialism long abandoned by the communist party, Ahmadinejad and key officials of his government made lofty public statements about China and its foreign policy that many Chinese could hardly believe. 17 To his disadvantage, the presidency of Ahmadinejad coincided with the leadership of Hu Jintao (2002–2012), who was widely considered one of the most pragmatic and perplexing captains at the helm of CCP since 1949. 18 Hu’s domestic policy was to create a “harmonious society” (héxié shèhuì); his foreign policy, to harmonize China’s strategies and rhetoric with its ever-expanding interests and influence worldwide. 19 Hu no longer was obsessed with his predecessor’s calls for a multipolar world because many Chinese were now predicting a bipolar world, with China making up one pillar of it. 20 Under his leadership, a new generation of officials with Western experience and education gradually penetrated major policy-making executive posts in China. Their mindsets toward Iran often sharply differed from what the CCP portrayed in official meetings with the Iranians or through its tightly controlled party outlets and public media. For all of the baffling policy statements and bewildering behaviors related to Iran, therefore, Hu Jintao and his prime minster, Wen Jiabao, eventually

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were seen by Iranians as a devouring dragon in a peacenik panda’s clothing. Some among the new liberal generation were upfront in expressing their true views about Iran whenever they found an opportunity to talk or write. For this group, Ahmadinejad’s Iran was a close partner of yesteryear but a present danger, with which China had to avoid associating. 21 Often they reminded their leaders of recent discourse such as “China is a responsible global power,” cautioning them against endorsing Ahmadinejad’s policies or tying China’s “bright prospects” with Iran’s “sinking ship.” In some cases, their arguments were self-righteous, by raising puerile points—for example, about China being a permanent member of the UN Security Council while Iran still waited for full membership in the SCO. 22 Their main obsession throughout the Ahmadinejad presidency was the possibility of a military conflict between Iran and the West, and they didn’t want China to get involved in any way. 23 As for the average Iranians’ viewpoints regarding the Beijing–Tehran ties, Rafsanjani’s and Rouhani’s recent statements were only the tip of the iceberg. Whenever China voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution against Iran or threw its weight behind sanctions meted out by the West, public indignation against Beijing would grow stronger and spread wider. The public’s unheeded outrage was reaching boiling point as they suffered from the crippling sanctions China endorsed and lived in an environment inundated by Chinese products of all sorts, from paper to pottery and from sunburn cream to subway cars. The wrath of ordinary Iranians was an understandable reaction to the prospect of a decent life shattered by closed factories, laid-off workers, disappearance of national brands, omnipresent foreign products, and a recalcitrant president unresponsive to legitimate grievances against his governance. Openly showing their resentment about a worsening situation many considered to be next to a full-fledged national tragedy, some newspapers and cyber outlets resorted to vulgar and derogatory language in echoing the general outcry over the effect massive importation of Chinese, and to some extent Korean products, had upon the country’s economy in both the short term and the long run. 24 Meanwhile, discontented Iranians were not hurling barbs at the officials of the CCP alone. 25 China’s private businesses and nonpublic brokers were at times the main target of complaints raised against the East Asian country. A dozen different reports noted that Chinese companies had taken advantage of the situation, delivering containers chock-full of useless items such as water and sand in place of products Iranian merchants had ordered and already paid for. These unfortunate customers, some having been bankrupted, had to forgo legal action to get a proper compensation because they lacked necessary judicial procedures between the two countries, as well as financial and bureaucratic restrictions imposed in tandem with sanctions. 26 It was quite common under Ahmadinejad to hear Iranians from almost every walk of life

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criticize something about China. And Ahmadinejad and his stalwart colleagues seemed to give no answers why they were clearing the way for the arrival of even bigger numbers of Chinese to work at Iranian infrastructure projects, when the influx of Chinese goods was increasingly turning the country into a one-stop shop for foreign products and displacing more unprotected domestic laborers year after year. 27

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China and the Nuclear Controversy: Acting out of Expediency The nuclear issue became the main sticking point of the Iranian foreign policy during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. The nuclear stalemate further isolated Iran regionally and internationally, slowed the wheels of its diplomatic machine, and brought tremendous economic losses in both domestic productivity and foreign commerce, not to mention significant damages in human and cultural realms. 28 The nuclear matter was equally a major issue in the Sino–Iranian relationship under Ahmadinejad; outside observers suddenly emerged to evaluate the interaction between the two countries largely from the nuclear angle. 29 In fact, foreign stakeholders capitalized too much on how various implications of the nuclear controversy could influence the contours of the Iran–China connections in almost all areas. But the question is this: what was the “real position” of the Chinese government with regard to the Iranian nuclear program? From one perspective, China was playing a sort of double game, pitting one party against another in order to milk both of them. The longer Iran stayed on a collision course with the West, the more Tehran was at the whim of Beijing for political favors. The stakes were even higher economically; a closed and isolated Iran could better serve the interests of ravenous Chinese companies, enabling them to tap a huge market shunned by foreign competitors. 30 Considering the other side of the dispute, the Chinese did not want the Americans to emerge from the nuclear crisis swiftly and victoriously. They hoped the United States would bog down in a protracted military conflict in the Middle East and China could someday rule the roost free of any menacing American interference. 31 In order to make that dream a reality and achieve other crucial political and economic objectives, the Chinese needed only to straddle a fine line and play the nuclear card carefully vis-à-vis both Iran and the United States. 32 But from a different perspective, China was simply on a two-track policy with regard to the Iranian nuclear program and its follow-on battle with the U.S.-led West. China was a rational player; it wanted to adopt dual diplomacy to safeguard its expanding interests in both Iran and the United States without getting involved in their quarrel over the nuclear standoff. 33 In doing so, the Chinese could talk favorably to each party but refrain from making

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their stance clear to both of them. 34 As a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), the Iranians were spot-on in their argument behind the nuclear policy, which was as old as the history of Chinese nuclear itself. 35 But the Chinese had to keep their American partners happy as well. As excellent students of copying and rote learning, they had carefully learned the “responsible stakeholder” lesson they heard from their American guru, Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State. They were now obsessed with how safely to put his well-timed lesson into practice so that other important stakeholders would acknowledge them as a “gatekeeper” of nonproliferation and other international rules and regulations. 36 Deep down, the Chinese did not crave a nuclear Iran, because China was behaving like a jealous nouveaux riche who did not want to see a newcomer join its “exclusive nuclear club” any time soon. China simply did not feel compelled to make its official position clear to everyone, but when push came to shove, it favored a nonnuclear Iran. And contrary to what others said, the Chinese government did not have the nerve to either stand up to the Americans or throw its full support behind the Iranians in case the two faced off over the nuclear impasse. 37 Still, Beijing did not genuinely wish for a military conflict between Tehran and Washington; that could be catastrophic to China’s overall interests in the Persian Gulf. 38 Having said that, the Chinese did not hope for a quick quid pro quo settlement in the nuclear deadlock either, because the ongoing crisis between Iran and the West was serving their interests rather well.

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Ambiguity Pays Off: Running Afoul of Sanctions Laws From 1979 onward, the U.S.-led West used sanctions effectively to keep the Iranians in check, hobble their economy, and eventually harness their comprehensive national power. Given the political and financial clout of the United States throughout the world, the Americans particularly played a leading role in both drafting and imposing unending sanctions against Iran for decades. After Ahmadinejad took over the Iranian presidency in 2005, the United States strengthened its sanctions policy, forcing other countries to participate. The sanctions were implemented under the pretext of the nuclear controversy, though repercussions from previous sanctions were still wreaking havoc on Iranians. 39 They affected the whole citizenry, but the disadvantaged bore the brunt of the economic pains. 40 In fact, during the eight-year long presidency of Ahmadinejad the sanctions against Iran covered many areas, from energy deals and financial transactions to aviation and transportation. 41 Of course, some sanctions affected the Iranian government, but sanctions in other areas had little to do with the state. For instance, Google and Yahoo, Skype and others prohibited Iranians

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from signing up. Even innocent students from Iran studying in foreign universities were refused a bank account simply because they were carrying an Iranian passport. 42 And although the Strait of Hormuz continued refueling the international economy uninterrupted, guaranteeing the prosperity of industrialized nations including those in the West, Iranian patients at home were denied access to urgently required drugs from Western pharmaceutical companies again under the pretext of sanctions. 43 But where the Sino–Iranian relationship was concerned, how did the new rounds of sanctions against Iran play into Chinese hands? American and many European companies clearly were among the first clients to leave the Iranian markets due to the sanctions. 44 The Japanese also were not in a position to resist pressure from the U.S. government for engaging the Iranians. 45 Investors from these countries were not allowed to participate in new projects in Iran either. 46 The withdrawal of all of these sophisticated and established corporations and investors in Iran, therefore, created many business opportunities for Chinese companies waiting to fast-track their market penetration in Iran with its nearly eighty million consumers. Although many Iranians had long been addicted to quality foreign products, they now had little choice but to put up with whatever the Chinese, and to some extent the Koreans, were offering them. 47 To top it off, the American government soon came up with other edicts that virtually consolidated China’s market hold in Iran by the Chinese and others. 48 The Obama administration in the United States issued a number of exemptions according to which handpicked countries, almost all U.S. allies but China, could still do business with Iran despite the sanctions. The American government basically argued that because these countries had scaled backed their oil importation from Iran, they could do business as usual. 49 Not only were these oil cuts often erratic, or only window dressing, but other countries had taken part in the sanctions without importing even a drop of Iranian oil. This strategy played a crucial role in both facilitating and reinforcing the Chinese penetration into Iran. Only after sanctions-related scandals had fizzled out did the Iranians realize how much the Chinese had taken advantage of them.

Recourse to a Wrong Rescuer: The “Turkmenchay-esque” Currency Deal As originators of the “scorched-earth” strategy and the “Parthian shots” tactics, the Iranians were not going to stand by idly and let the U.S.-led West push them out of international commerce and financial transactions through sanctions; they felt they had a legitimate right to damage the system if it was not going to serve them fairly. In fact, the Iranians were hell-bent on fighting

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back, taking advantage of every loophole in the international system to skirt the sanctions or at least alleviate their ramifications. That spirit eventually led to the creation of a colossal black market, which extended to all five continents. To dodge sanctions through a sub rosa system of financial and economic activities, therefore, Iran’s public and private sectors dispatched representatives to almost every part of the world. 50 Not every step taken to circumvent the sanctions was illegal. Many companies were lawfully registered in different parts of the world, either by the Iranians or in close cooperation with their business partners from those foreign territories. These companies could be instrumental in sorting out business requirements and financial transactions in addition to other important services each company had been set up to provide. Seasoned dealers and brokers in bustling international markets, ranging from high-tech to currency swap, were eager to engage Iranians and charging them handsomely. In many cases, Western citizens or those with dual nationalities played a crucial role by assisting Iranians to bypass sanctions, for which they were compensated handsomely. 51 Despite all of the attention to legal requirements and sanctions regulations, this apparently massive mafia probably corrupted more people in the West than in the East. 52 As the tip of the iceberg, the American executive and judicial systems often had to give a great deal of time and human resources to track down and then fine multinational companies or international banks for violating Iranian sanctions. 53 With a change in the Iranian government, a number of scandals related to the measures taken under Ahmadinejad to skirt sanctions were disclosed to the public in Iran. 54 One shocking case was a currency agreement between Iran and China, according to which the Iranian government was to lend the Chinese part of its currency reserves so they could escape potential blockage by Western banks due to sanctions imposed primarily by the United States. 55 Moreover, Iran was going to transfer to China $25 billion in currency reserves held in Europe so Iran could save those critical funds from imminent blockage levied by a new round of financial sanctions. 56 The two governments had begun discussions about this matter in 2007, years before they signed the deal around 2013. It was Tahmasb Mazaheri, the governor of the Central Bank of Iran from September 2007 to September 2008, who revealed more details about the case during an interview with a national daily in July 2015. 57 Tagging the currency pact a “dreadful deal akin to the Turkmenchay Treaty,” Mazaheri disclosed a bitter reality: the situation of Iranian reserves in China was worse than the funds in other countries blocked under sanction because the Chinese were not going to give them back easily. 58 Based on the agreement Mazaheri himself had not signed, part of the money, estimated between $18 and $47 billion, was to finance Iranian projects implemented by China; other tranches could be taken back only in the form of importing

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Chinese products. 59 Despite the nature of the contract and in spite of what Hashemi Rafsanjani had already revealed about it in May 2013, the whole problem was swept under a thick Persian carpet as different offices of the government, previous and current officials, all provided different justifications to hush up the scandal and clear the Ahmadinejad government of any wrongdoing. 60

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The Taiwan and Hong Kong Connections: Déjà Vu and Dollar Although Taiwan had engaged in economic exchanges with Tehran in previous decades, Ahmadinejad’s Iran proved a different story. Of course, the Ahmadinejad government was on good terms with the Chinese government, which the Taiwanese did not view favorably. Except for a small group of Iran-friendly nations, the rest of the world had turned its back on the Iranians. While the pro-Americans and staunch supporters of the West in Taiwan spoke ill of Iran, a good number of Taiwanese seemed to possess at least a soupçon of sympathy for Iran. 61 The Iranian situation conjured up for Taiwanese their own feelings of political isolation and economic vulnerability for a couple of decades. But they couldn’t approach Iran politically; only the economic arena, less controversial, was perceived to be safe. 62 Under Ahmadinejad, therefore, Iran’s commercial connections to Taiwan saw new developments. 63 In May 2009, a Taiwanese trade delegation from fifty-nine companies visited Iran, the largest-ever business mission to the Persian Gulf country. Taiwan also assisted Iranian merchants by easing visa restrictions that had been in place under a special act since 2003. 64 The Taiwan Trade Center in Tehran and Taiwan–Iran Business Association revved up their activities to quietly manage potential bureaucratic and legal hurdles facing ninety-five Taiwanese companies engaging in business with the Iranians. Iran officially was the third-largest export market for Taiwan in the Middle East, but taking into account Dubai’s role, it was virtually the largest market of the Taiwanese in the whole Mideast. 65 Still, Iran’s trade with Taiwan was erratic, changing significantly from one year to another. For instance, Taipei was importing only 1 percent of Iranian oil exports in 2011, or about 4 percent of its total petroleum purchases; Iran became the biggest customer for Taiwanese machine tools in the Persian Gulf and the third largest Middle-Eastern market after Turkey and Israel, respectively. 66 Meanwhile, one disputed issue concerned suspicious transactions involving Iran and Taiwan as well as Hong Kong, though the matter was also relevant to other East Asian countries. 67 Particularly from 2008 onward, a number of European and other Western journals published pieces about the involvement of Taiwanese and Hong Kong companies and private citizens in the illegal transfer of nuclear components and other sensitive technologies to

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Iran, which they claimed violated sanction laws against Tehran. 68 With regard to the violation of this or other Iran sanctions, moreover, the Americans had either arrested or fined individuals and companies affiliated with Taiwan and Hong Kong on a number of occasions. Whenever such news broke, the authorities in charge denied the incident, promising to investigate the matter as quickly as possible through close cooperation with nonregional stakeholders. 69 Whether such reports were plausible in the first place, and regardless of the willingness of these parties to engage in such “illegal” businesses, two issues were of particular importance. First, Taipei was pressed not to get closer to Tehran for political considerations touching upon multiple contenders, including the Chinese, Americans, and even Israelis. 70 The fear was that Tehran would take advantage of better ties to Taipei to pressure Beijing regarding the nuclear issue. Second, Taiwan and Hong Kong, though both were reluctant, were expected to implement sanctions against Tehran as stipulated, and not help Tehran circumvent those sanctions. In one case, it took Hong Kong nine months to come up with measures regarding the implementation of one sanction the United Nations enacted in 2010. 71

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Other Pressure Groups: The Arab and Israeli Lobbies Because the Chinese had developed multifaceted connections to other centers of power, they were not going to sacrifice all or even part of those interests for the sake of their relationship with Iran. As China was, and still is, at the whim of American technology and markets, it could not rush headlong into the embrace of Iranians without paying attention to demands put forward by the United States with regard to Iran. 72 Even when the executive body in Washington was in a rather palsy relationship with Beijing, the American Congress often showcased its uncompromising stance about a number of Iran-related grievances, which the Chinese could ignore only at their own peril. 73 Moreover, a number of powerful European countries had huge vested interests in Iran, compared to a small physical presence of American companies in the Iranian markets. As for as the nuclear controversy and its sanctions, various Iran-related warnings to China by Europeans could not go unheeded because major European stakeholders were not willing to quit the lucrative Iranian markets and leave everything to the Chinese. 74 Two other camps were equally against closer Sino–Iranian ties: the Arabs and Israelis. 75 Whereas the Arab nations, especially those in the Persian Gulf region, were both anxious about and jealous of the Iranian nuclear program, they felt the same way about Iran–China relations. After all, they cringed at appearing to be subservient to Western countries while Iran boasted at its independence in the Persian Gulf, including the nuclear program. 76 Frightened of potential

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abandonment by the West, the Arabs also were obsessed by how to develop new partnerships resembling the Sino–Iranian relationship. 77 All they could do was to approach the Chinese, even bribe them by offering uninterrupted oil supplies at cut-rate prices, tempting China into forging closer, sustainable multifaceted connections to Arab capitals. Sometimes they parroted part of the Western vocabulary, forewarning China of the inherent danger to its critical interests in the greater Middle East region caused by Beijing’s staunch support for Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. 78 Unlike the Arab lobby, whose activities against closer Sino–Iranian ties often were hidden, the Israeli lobby worked far more straightforwardly and in all directions. Part of its responsibilities had long been delegated to American Jews, but the Israelis themselves had for some time initiated major policies to push their interests in China in political, military, economic, and cultural circles. 79 They courted academic centers in different parts of China; a number of Jewish writers wrote about Chinese and Jewish commonalities, as if everyone had forgotten Maoist China’s reaction to Israel and its Mideast policies. Usually at the forefront, however, was Iran and how its nuclear program eventually could pose a grave threat to both Israel and China. 80 The Arab and Israeli lobbies certainly could influence the mindset of many Chinese with regard to regional and international matters, but it is not clear to what extent they could hinder Sino–Iranian relations.

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The Incestuous Hothouse of Diplomacy: Patronizing SCO Summits While governmental offices in Tehran released data and statistics to substantiate its relationship with Beijing, top Iranian officials and their Chinese counterparts held frequent meetings to further highlight the mutually beneficial, lasting nature of bilateral ties between the two countries. Ahmadinejad played a major role, interpreting the contours of Sino–Iranian affairs. Even when the Iranian public was mad at China when it took a particular position against Iran on a UN resolution or a sanction that followed, Ahmadinejad behave magnanimously toward the Chinese. 81 For example, after China threw its full support behind UN Security Council Resolution 1929 in June 2010 to impose additional financial and military sanctions on Iran, Ahmadinejad, who visited Shanghai only a few days later, still praised the ties between the two countries, pointing out that the Chinese needed to be forgiven because they had been bludgeoned by the “bloody Americans” into voting against Iran. 82 Perhaps nowhere was Ahmadinejad more charitable to China than at his regular attendance to the SCO summits. In spite of Iran’s observer status, he was determined to take full advantage of the organization’s annual meetings to both disseminate his views on regional and international issues and pro-

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mote Iran’s ties with major participants at each high-level gathering. Despite the usually obstreperous tone of his speeches, Ahmadinejad’s statements delivered at SCO meetings were by and large mild and conciliatory, particularly when talking about the objectives and approaches of the organization. And he hardly ever criticized China’s policies, either foreign or domestic, at SCO summits in China or elsewhere. In fact, Ahmadinejad was so upbeat about the organization and its clout that his government applied to the SCO in March 2008 for acceptance as a permanent member. But the SOC was not the large, impartial body it appeared to be. 83 Although the Iranian application for permanent membership was turned down, the whole matter revealed a great deal about the organization. In fact, the SCO was functioning as an offshoot of the Chinese and Russian foreign ministries; important decisions and operational strategies were made at the whim of Beijing and Moscow. As far as Iran was concerned, those two countries treat the SCO much like the UN Security Council, where they wielded their veto power at will, and as long as that malign mentality persisted, aspirant nations would make a big mistake in joining the SCO in the first place. Even the official name of this forum—Shanghai Cooperation Organization—illustrates the mindset. Otherwise “Shanghai” would long since have been replaced by an impartial, nonpartisan term so that other participants would not have the impression that they are members of a Chinese governmental organization functioning within a regional framework.

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China Emerges as Iran’s Top Trading Partner From the time the Iranian nuclear program became a leitmotiv of international politics in the aftermath of the Iraq War, China’s role in Iran’s international commerce expanded both unremittingly and exponentially. The more economic sanctions were levied against Iran, the stronger the Chinese clout in Iran as if the whole raison d’étre of the Iranian nuclear controversy was to enlarge and consolidate China’s presence in Iran. It was perplexingly that the West had put the Chinese whammy on the Iranians, even in the throes of a universal economic crisis, when business activities were nose-diving in nearly every part of the world and sharp drops in bilateral trade exchanges had become the norm. 84 Although Beijing’s diplomatic exercises in Tehran and the omnipresence of Chinese products in markets of Iran were apparent both inside and outside Iran, key economic statistics and data on the annual trade between the two parties better encapsulated the success of China’s penetration into Iran. Because China’s designs and technology were not modernized, it could not ship any significant amount of nonmilitary exports to Iran prior to 1988. Commercial dealings between Iran and China were shy of $600 million in

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1989, when the annual bilateral trade between Iran and South Korea had climbed to more than three times that, or approximately $2 billion, including $700 million in direct trade between Tehran and Seoul. 85 Trade between Tehran and Beijing reached more than $21 billion and $29 billion in 2009 and 2010, respectively. 86 The huge increase in those exchanges had taken place within a few years. Trade between the two countries had increased more than three and one-half times between 2000 and 2005: Iran–China trade was around $10 billion as Ahmadinejad became president in August 2005, and China had overtaken Japan and stood right behind Germany as Iran’s second and first largest trading partners, respectively. 87 China officially became Iran’s top business partner in 2010, though it probably had started to play that role a few years earlier thanks to unofficial channels importing Chinese products into the Iranian market. 88 The volume of exchange between Iran and China increased by leaps and bounds year after year: the annual net value rose to around $45 billion by early 2012 and $52 billion in 2014. 89 As Ahmadinejad prepared to leave the presidency after two consecutive terms, Iranian officials were bragging about a yearly total trade of about $50 billion with China, though it was hard to put faith in all figures and statistics released by different government offices. 90 The crux of the problem was the role of Dubai and other black markets in Sino–Iranian trade. Dubai had been listed repeatedly as a major import-export partner, but the tiny Arab entrepôt did not produce anything meaningful to justify that label. Moreover, economic policies Ahmadinejad’s government implemented inflated the size of unofficial hands in Iran’s external trade.

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The Triple Whammy: Ahmadinejad’s Additional Contribution to China In spite of his unruly nature and vociferous political statements, Ahmadinejad and his government put into place economic policies that had enormous ramifications on the lives of the majority of the Iranian citizens. They fundamentally changed many elements of the national economy as well as the normal life of the citizenry. Moreover, they could not be regarded naively as reverberations of the sanctions because they were carried out, by and large, arbitrarily, quietly, and swiftly. Skyrocketing prices of real estate, a whopping drop in the value of Iranian currency, and massive cuts in state subsidies, in particular, contributed to the active encroachment of Chinese goods upon Iranians’ daily lives. The value of properties in Iran surged so dramatically it put real estate in northern Tehran on par with apartments in the swanky areas of London and San Francisco. Rents and costs of erecting new buildings grew equally, all of it almost overnight. A crippling economic situation made it almost impos-

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sible for Iranian families to think of buying new properties at stupendously high prices. Instead, they invested their hard-accumulated savings in imported automobiles and furniture, a great deal of it made in China. 91 Soared property prices discouraged many young people from marrying and building a family, driving them toward a happy-go-lucky lifestyle and carefree spending on imported cars and other consumer products. Still, the real estate bubble and increased construction allowed opportunistic dealers and builders to take advantage of the situation, starting new projects using illegal laborers from Afghanistan as well as inexpensive materials and equipment from China. The national currency, the rial, depreciated dramatically, draining the financial muscle of many Iranians. The rial lost more than two-thirds of its worth; it took more than 30,000 rials, not 10,000 rials, to buy one American dollar. 92 Low salaries and high rates of unemployment, and galloping inflation meant that because quality imported products were not going to be sold any cheaper, Iranian consumers had to rely more on cut-rate products from China and other Asian countries. 93 In addition, domestic producers and manufacturers could no longer afford to import technology and raw materials unless the government threw its full support behind them. But this did not happen most of the time, forcing builders and industrialists to purchase Chinese goods to make ends meet. 94 The slash in state subsidies had the most directly negative impact on Iranian producers and distributors. For about thirty years, Iranians had been used to receiving subsidies from the government in the form of commodities, almost all of which were produced or manufactured in-country. 95 By offering its population of more than seventy million such subsidized items, mostly consumer goods, in relatively large quantities a number of times a year, the government was directly and indirectly supporting domestic production and those who were involved in the process. When the subsidies ended, many families were compelled to buy cheaper foreign products; many of the domestic producers had to downsize their production lines, to forgo quality or income to survive, or simply were forced to shut down their businesses. 96

The Debacle of Swapping Jewels with Gimcracks The history of overloading Iranian markets with consumers products imported from foreign countries harkens back to the first oil shock in the early 1970s. Since then, Iran has almost always had a place for foreign products. But compared to the foreign goods supplied previously mostly by Western and Japanese trade houses, the quantity and quality of Chinese products were detrimental to Iranian producers and working-class people. Even Iran’s industries and businesses encountered the presence of Chinese commodities,

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ranging from pottery and pistachio to carpet and caviar. 97 Because China could now figuratively counterfeit a replica of France’s Eiffel Tower or Egypt’s pyramids, producing and exporting Iran’s traditional foods and arts would not be any more challenging for Chinese companies. 98 Unlike other destinations for Chinese goods of relatively better quality, Iran had received some of the worst goods, costing many Iranians dearly. 99 A similar situation regards Iran’s nonoil exports to China. The government had tried to balance the country’s external trade, but many export markets had prohibited the importation of Iranian goods. Either directly or through a third source such as Dubai, China became the main destination for Iran’s nonoil exports and some precious minerals. 100 Taking advantage of the situation, the Chinese quickly became more selective in importing Iranian goods. While China was shipping some of its worst stuff to Iran, it soon developed a taste for Iranian commodities of the highest quality, of which Iranian citizens were more deserving. 101 Not only were Iranians deprived of such goods, but they now had to pay much higher prices to purchase similar stuff of lower quality. 102 And the Iranians still had to put up with importing Chinese workers to Iran. In a country of close to eighty million, where half of its youth were either unemployed or had poor jobs, it was hard to figure out why their government let in unskilled manual laborers from China. Because more than three million illegal Afghans already had taken many jobs and social benefits from the Iranians, 103 the arrival of Chinese workers could only add insult to injury, though the government and the media had done their utmost to keep the public ignorant about the number and whereabouts of the Chinese laborers in Iran. These matters combined to frustrated people with the government’s China policy, generating significant anti-Chinese sentiments among a growing number of Iranians, some of whom knew hardly anything about the Chinese and their society in the first place. 104

Coming Home to Roost: China Becomes a Target of the Pent-Up Wrath Although the “neither the East nor the West” slogan and other anti-communist rhetoric had long been ingrained in the political ideology of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian public had hardly been vocal against China before Ahmadinejad took office. Anti-Chinese sentiment stemmed largely from the omnipresence of Chinese products while the Chinese government had failed to support Iran in regard to its nuclear standoff with the West. Moreover, in sharp contrast to what officials of the Ahmadinejad government often claimed, the Sino–Iranian relationship was not really “complementary.” 105 Swapping energy resources with Chinese manufactured products may have

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worked with members of the GCC states, but that easy pattern of international trade definitely harmed Iranian society. And if some failed to realize the crux of the problem intellectually, they certainly would have to deal with it in real life sooner or later. In sharp contrast to the way Iranians expressed anti-American and antiIsraeli feelings, they expressed anti-China sentiments subtly. Of course, some people chanted anti-China slogans in public, such as during the antigovernment demonstrations following the controversial presidential elections in June 2009, but most of the time people tapped into various cultural outlets to get across their attitudes and thoughts about China, which had become a subject of satire, political lampoon, caricature, and mockery. They poked fun at China on TV and radio talk shows, made video clips about the ramifications of Chinese products in their country, and wrote in their blogs why the Iranian businessman needed to be twice as cautious while dealing with Chinese people. Highly popular poets wrote about “the Chinization of Iranian life,” while journalists talked volumes, picking up certain vocabulary or headlines to cover news germane to some aspect of Sino–Iranian economic or political exchanges. 106 Meanwhile dissidents outside Iran partly stoked the anti-China mood, warning their fellow citizens at home about a “treacherous and perilous” application of the “Chinese model” by the Iranian government. They even provided evidence with regard to a “dastardly egregious collusion” between the Iranian and Chinese governments. They gave social media outlets photos and clips about vehicles and equipment the Iranian government likely had imported from China to use for dispersing antigovernment demonstrations and gatherings, reminding their fellow Iranians about the close cooperation between Beijing and Tehran against their interests. 107 To further substantiate their claims about such “wicked intrigue,” they also took advantage of news stories from Western sources about rather close collaboration of Chinese and Iranian governments to censor the Internet and monitor their citizens. 108 Whether or not such assertions could be proven true, the crux of the matter was the plausibility of a “Chinese model” for Iran.

Not in Iranian Terms: The Illusion of a “Chinese Model” Today, the CCP ideology is a mélange of Confucianism, communism, and capitalism. Even the Confucian and communist attributes gradually are succumbing to unfettered cronyism with enormous reverberations for the entire Chinese system, the political establishment as well as the society. What often erroneously is referred to as the “Beijing consensus” or “the Chinese model of development,” by and large, echoes industrialization and economic growth policies that previously were implemented by Japan and later by the so-

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called “Asian tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Advocates of a “Chinese model,” therefore, need eventually to come up with unique characteristics of their fanciful framework. 109 But even if the major political and economic doctrines the CCP in Beijing adheres to supposedly were Chinese, at least two main impediments block their successful use in an Iranian context. 110 First, the Islamic Republic long has vowed that it is a unique system within the wider Islamic world, and that ultimately it wants to create a similar universal system on the world stage. It has not been looking for a model either in the West or in the East. Far from being obsessed with other foreign models of statehood, the Islamic Republic has often been preoccupied with rectifying its shortcomings and adjusting itself to changing cultural and economic requirements in Iran. Unlike the Chinese political system, the Islamic Republic holds regular elections and takes into account opinions put forward by representatives elected by the public, because its legitimacy depends greatly on the eager participation of its citizenry. Even when the current Iranian political system reached a consensus to drop political and ideological slogans in favor of economic progress and technological advancement, its practical policies and strategies were different than those put into practice by the CCP. Second, the polyglot Iranian society is far different than the largely homogenous constituency of the CCP in China. Because of racial and cultural differences, the centrifugal forces somehow have been most powerful within the Iranian state for some three thousand years. 111 Iranian individuality far outstrips that of many other societies; one needs time just to count the number of active political parties affiliated with the Iranians both inside and outside the country. 112 Moreover, the relatively conservative, spirit-bound Iranians are hardly impressed by a god-free, even morality-free Chinese society. 113 Even the “rich kids of Tehran,” who have benefited enormously from politico-economic circumstances under the Islamic Republic, seem to follow a rather different lifestyle than ones favored by highly affluent children of China’s gilded age, regardless of how they have been aided by CCP policy. 114 Therefore, little is left that can be used to give credence to the assertion starry-eyed campaigners promoted that the Islamic Republic is tapping into an illusory “Chinese model” to better manage Iranian affairs.

Etched in Stone: A Chapter of Misfortunes and Setbacks Under the presidency of Ahmadinejad, Iranians by and large experienced unfavorable circumstances at home and abroad. Mismanagement of various affairs, economic corruption, malfeasance, and embezzlement reached alltime highs; more people were disappointed by mouthwatering promises

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made by Ahmadinejad or powerful members of his cabinet during his years in office. 115 Even Iranians around the world partially bore the brunt because a universal campaign against Iran and the Iranians, ostensibly over the nuclear controversy, ruined opportunities and made other options risky. 116 Things could go awry at any moment as anti-Iran officials could “take the food from the mouths” of blameless Iranian people. 117 In such precarious situations, people in charge of Sino–Iranian connections could have acted more judiciously, but unfortunately they faltered for different reasons. Although pretending to the contrary, foreign policy in China proved to be unprincipled because many Chinese preferred to reap the benefits of ambiguity rather than risk the potential perils of clear-cut standpoints. Instead of giving a second thought to probable implications of their actions in the long run, in many cases the Chinese seized the moment as if things had been set to move in a similar direction with a certain pace. 118 After all, if well-placed Chinese did not care much about the woes of their unfortunate brethren at home, why would they consider the plight of other nations? 119 At least two important lessons could be gleaned from the way China managed its Iran policy during those years: First, the Chinese demonstrated their fundamental shortcomings in shaping a much cherished bloc of power and coalition of action compatible with China’s growing status and ambitions on a world stage. Second, the unhappy Iranian experience made other likeminded countries cautious about putting too much faith in China and capitalizing on some approaches that ultimately could best serve the CCP in Beijing. Iranians were equally blameworthy. As a mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad previously had had opportunities to encounter people from China. But he and his relevant team had little theoretical knowledge and practical comprehension of the way the Chinese system functions. 120 Ahmadinejad was so upbeat about China that he was ready to believe statements uttered by this or that Chinese official in various circumstances. He sometimes treated the Chinese, as well as officials from other nations, based on Islamic principles and Iranian manners without being cognizant of the unfamiliarity of many Chinese with that way of sorting out important matters. All in all, his government simply put too many eggs in the Chinese basket without careful attention to probable perils. Only seasoned observers knew that this unwarranted approach could never serve the Iranian interests in China over the long term. 121 NOTES 1. The early parts of this chapter are a revised version of a paper originally published as “Principlism Engages Pragmatism: Iran’s Relations with East Asia under Ahmadinejad,” Asian Politics & Policy 7, no. 4 (October 2015): 555–73. Thanks to the journal of Asian Politics & Policy (a Wiley periodical) for making it possible to incorporate half of the paper into this book.

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2. Nathan Gonzalez, Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America’s Strategic Choice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 90–101. 3. Mark Hitchcock, The Apocalypse of Ahmadinejad: The Revelation of Iran’s Nuclear Prophet (New York: Doubleday Religious Publishing Group, 2007), 91–98. 4. “Dar dolat Ahmadinejad baray chiniha eshteghal ijad shod” [Jobs Created for the Chinese by the Ahmadinejad Government], Shafaf, November 27, 2013; “Khyanat nafti chin be Iran miras modiran Ahmadinejad ast” [China’s Petroleum Betrayal of Iran Is the Legacy of Ahmadinejad’s Managers], Tadbir, May 28, 2014; and “Shiveh modiryati dolat ghabl bar vezaret naft zaminesaz suestefadeh chiniha” [Oil Ministry’s Management Style under Previous Government Paved the Ground for Chinese Exploitation], Islamic Consultative Assembly News Agency, June 17, 2014. 5. “Ekhraj asatid daneshgah cheghadr vagheiyat darad?” [How Real Is Expulsion of University Professors?], Jahan News, October 3, 2007; and “Bazneshashtegi zoodhengam ostadan momtaz daneshgah Tehran” [Early Retirement of Top Professors from Tehran University], Deutsche Welle, July 24, 2008. 6. Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); and Robert E. Ebel, Geopolitics of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Program: But Oil and Gas Still Matter (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010). 7. Ilan Berman, Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 8. “India Votes Against Iran at IAEA,” Times of India, November 28, 2009. 9. Expert views and public opinions patently differ on how Ahmadinejad’s previous credentials and value-laden personal beliefs could have a determining influence on his crucial role as the Iranian president at a critical period. 10. Joseph M. Skelly, ed., Political Islam from Muhammad to Ahmadinejad: Defenders, Detractors, and Definitions (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010); and Jahangir Amuzegar, “Ahmadinejad’s Legacy,” Middle East Policy 20, no. 4 (2013): 124–32. 11. “The Emerging Axis of Iran and Venezuela,” Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2009. 12. “Wúbāngguó huìjiàn yīlǎng zǒngtǒng ài hā mài dí-nèi jiǎ dé” [Wu Bangguo Meets Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad], Rénmín rìbào (People’s Daily), June 7, 2012; and “Wúbāngguó huìjiàn yīlǎng dì yī fù zǒngtǒng lā xī mǐ” [Wu Bangguo Meets Iranian First Vice President Rahimi], Rénmín rìbào, September 11, 2012. 13. For instance, influential members of legislative bodies were particularly dispatched to Tehran as agents of apology. East Asian ambassadors residing in the Iranian capital, Tehran, were also other means of expressing regrets as well as seeking understanding and sympathy from Iran over years. 14. Cited from Hiro, 164. 15. “Hashemi: Az mardom mikhaham mayoos nashavand” [Hashemi: I Urge the Public Not to Get Disappointed], Tabnak, May 23, 2013. 16. “Raisjomhoor dar gozaresh telvizeyoni: Dar salhay akhir shoghl ijad kardim amma baray chiniha va koreiha” [President at A TV Report: We Created Jobs in Recent Years But for the Chinese and Koreans], Kar va Kargar, November 28, 2013, 1. 17. “Iran’s President-elect Expresses Willingness to Develop Ties with China,” Xinhua, June 27, 2005; and “Ahmadinejad Hails Iran–China Ties,” Press TV, July 25, 2011. 18. For more details on this issue, see Thomas W. Robinson, “Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s,” in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, edited by Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 555–602; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); and Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 19. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 1–31.

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20. “The Group of Two That Could Change the World,” Financial Times, January 14, 2009. 21. Chris Patten, “In the End, China Will Vote against Iran at UN,” New Perspectives Quarterly 23, no. 2 (2006): 46–48. 22. Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC), Asia Yearbook 2008 (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2009), 270–76. 23. “Iran President to Visit China, Meet Hu Jintao,” China Daily, June 8, 2006; “Iranian President to Attend Pavilion Day in Shanghai,” China Daily, June 8, 2010; and “Chinese President Hu Jintao Meets Iranian Counterpart,” CCTV, June 8, 2012. 24. “Chashmbadamiha Tehran ra taskhir kardand” [The Almond-eyes Conquered Tehran], Mashregh, July 9, 2012; “Toofan varedat kalay chini, khyanat be eghtesad keshvar ast” [The Flood of Chinese Imports, A Treason to the National Economy], Tabnak, April 26, 2013; and “Dast Iran dar hanay chashbadamiha” [Iran Hoodwinked by the Almond-eyes], Rooz Online, September 3, 2012. 25. “45 Countries Listed for 72-hour Visa-free Stay in Beijing,” Xinhua, December 6, 2012. 26. “Kolah chini bar sar tojjar Irani” [Iranian Merchants Hurt by Chinese Chicanery], Tabnak, February 4, 2012; and “Majaray kolahbardari chiniha az tojjar Irani” [The Story of Chinese Tricks Played on Iranian Merchants], Tabnak, March 26, 2015. 27. “Vaghti Iran kargar chini ham vared mikonad!” [When Iran Imports Chinese Laborer Too!], Farda News, May 25, 2012; “Vakonesh be vorood kargar chini be Iran” [Reaction to the Arrival of Chinese Worker to Iran], Hamshahri Online, May 26, 2012; and “Vakonesh vazir kar be khabar varedat kargar chini be Iran” [Labor Minister’s Reaction to the News about the Arrival of Chinese Workforce to Iran], Qeshm Daily, July 13, 2012. 28. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012): 2–5. 29. “Hu, Ahmadinejad Discuss Iran Nuclear Issue,” China Daily, August 16, 2007; and “Wúbāngguó huìjiàn yīlǎng zǒngtǒng” [Wu Bangguo Meets Iranian President], Rénmín rìbào (People’s Daily), September 12, 2012. 30. “Editorial: China and Iran: A Perfect Match,” Taipei Times, June 17, 2006, 8; and “Zhapon khotoot tooled khod ra az chiniha dar bazar Iran pas migirad?” [Will Japan Take Back from Chinese Its Production Lines in Iran Market?], Azad News Agency (ANA), August 12, 2015. 31. “Rúhé kàndài měiguó chóng fǎn yàtài” [How to View American Return to Asia–Pacific], Rénmín rìbào (People’s Daily), February 27, 2012. 32. “Zhìcái yīlǎng: Yī chǎng méiyǒu yíngjiā de dòuzhēn” [Fighting a Battle without Winners], Rénmín rìbào (People’s Daily), February 2, 2012. 33. “China Says Dialogue Key to Solution of Iran’s Nuclear Issue,” Xinhua, November 27, 2003; “Beijing Urges Talks on Iran Nuclear Issue,” China Daily, January 18, 2006; “China Calls on Iran to Continue Cooperation with IAEA,” Xinhua, November 25, 2006; “China Expects Iran to Work with IAEA on Nuclear Issue,” Xinhua, December 3, 2009; “China Still Hopes for Dialogue on Iran Nuclear Issue,” Xinhua, March 16, 2010; and “China Sells Petrol to Iran While Talking at UN About Sanctions,” Guardian, April 14, 2010. 34. Ilan Berman, “Beijing’s Iranian Gamble,” Far Eastern Economic Review 172, no. 3 (April 2009): 52–55. 35. “New Documents Show Iran’s Nuclear Program Predates the Current Regime,” Newsweek, January 10, 2016. 36. Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 59–64, 82, and 101–3. 37. “China will not Hesitate WW-III to Protect Iran,” Modern Survival Blog, December 1, 2011; and “China Should Take Fight to US over Iran,” Global Times, January 14, 2012. 38. “Měiguó méitǐ chēng zhōngguó tóng yīlǎng ‘zhànlüè méngyǒu’ guānxì sōngdòng” [US Media Say China Is Not Committed to Its ‘Strategic Alliance’ Relationship with Iran], Xīnlàng (Sina), January 16, 2012. 39. “Iran Has No Right to Nuclear Technology,” Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2009.

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40. Sasan Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008), 206–9, 217–21; and Lukas Ebner, ed., Sanctions on Iran and Their Impact (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2013). 41. “European Countries Declined to Provide Fuel to Iranian Planes for Three Years,” Zawya, November 26, 2014. 42. “Born in Iran? No Bank Account for You,” Sunday Times, November 16, 2014; and “CIBC Closes Concordia Student’s Bank Account Because He’s Iranian,” CBC News, December 9, 2014. 43. Robert K. Figg and Danielle A. Wilson, eds., U.S. Led Sanctions on Iran (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2011); and Mitch H. Rocha and Ricky L. Puckett, eds., The Sanctions Squeeze on Iran and Syria (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2012). 44. “Europe’s Share in Iran Imports Halved Since 2005,” Trend News Agency, May 7, 2014; “Raz movafaghiyat chiniha dar bazar khodroo Iran” [Secret of Chinese Success in Iran’s Car Market], Fararu, May 4, 2016; and “Oroupayiha miayand chiniha miravand” [Europeans Come Chinese Go], Farheekhtegan, July 23, 2016, 5. 45. “Iran Warns Japanese to Act on Oil Deal Soon,” International Herald Tribune, October 2, 2006; and “Japan Loses Out on Massive Iranian Oilfield Amid Fears of US Sanctions,” Financial Times, October 7, 2006. 46. “US Bypasses UN with Iran Sanctions,” Financial Times, October 25, 2007; “US Applies Sanctions to Third Iran Bank,” Financial Times, March 13, 2008; “Iran: EU Oil Sanctions ‘Unfair’ and ‘Doomed to Fail,’” BBC, January 23, 2012. 47. “Měiguó yóushuì zhōngguó jiǎnshǎo jìnkǒu yīlǎng shíyóu zāo jù” [China Rejects American Persuasion to Cut Back Iranian Oil Imports], Sōuhú xīnwén (Sohu News), January 12, 2012; and “Wēnjiābǎo shuō zhōngguó yǔ yīlǎng zhèngdàng màoyì yīngdāng shòudào bǎohù” [Wen Jiabao Says Sino–Iranian Normal Trade Should Be Protected], Xinhua, January 19, 2012. 48. “China Blocks New Iran Sanctions Talks,” Associated Press, October 16, 2008; “Iran Sanctions: Which Way Will China Go?” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2010; and “China Backs Talk to Penalize Iran,” New York Times, April 13, 2010. 49. “U.S. Grants Iran Sanctions Exceptions to China,” Reuters, June 29, 2012; “US Clears China, Singapore from Iran Oil Sanctions,” Associated Press, June 29, 2012; and “US Extends Waivers on Iran Oil Sanctions for Big Asian Economies, South Africa,” Associated Press, December 8, 2012. 50. “Black Market Shows Iran Can Adapt to Sanctions,” New York Times, October 4, 2009; “Iran: Sanctions’ Effectiveness Widely Questioned,” Inter Press Service, June 9, 2010; and “‘State-of-the-Art’ Subterfuge: How Iran Kept Flying under Sanctions,” Reuters, January 31, 2016. 51. “Raes bank markazi elam kard: 15 darsad hazineh tejarat khareji dar jib kaseban tahrim” [Governor of the Central Bank Announced: 15 Percent of Foreign Trade Costs in the Pocket of Sanctions Brokers], Iran, September 14, 2016, 5. 52. Avi Jorisch, Iran’s Dirty Banking: How the Islamic Republic Skirts International Financial Sanctions (Washington, DC: Red Cell, 2010). 53. “Chinese Firms Bypass Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, October 18, 2010; “Analysis: StanChart Hit May Not Dog Other Banks as Much as Feared,” Reuters, September 4, 2012; “Deutsche Bank to Pay $258 Million and Fire 6,” New York Times, November 5, 2015, B6; “Iranians Held in U.S. for Sanctions Violations Released—Lawyers,” Reuters, January 17, 2016; “Chinese National to Be Sentenced for Illegal Exports to Iran,” ABC News, January 27, 2016; and “Chinese National Arrested Here Trying to Smuggle Military Parts to Iran,” Buffalo News, August 3, 2016. 54. “How Babak Zanjani Went From Iran’s Top Sanctions Buster to Dead Billionaire Walking,” Newsweek, March 14, 2016. 55. “U.A.E. Cuts Off Ties to Iran Banks,” Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2010; and “$8.8 Billion Iran Money Blocked in India,” Press TV, May 16, 2015. 56. “Rabete gharardad shoom ba chiniha va amar motanaghez az darayihay bloukeshode” [Link between Dreadful Deal with Chinese and Contradictory Statistics on Blocked Properties], Tabnak, July 26, 2015.

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57. “Goftogoo ba Tahmasb Mazaherin dar mored arzhay bloukeshode” [Dialogue with Tahmasb Mazaheri on Blocked Funds], Shargh Daily, July 25, 2015, 1. 58. Turkmenchay is a euphemistic term that essentially refers to the Treaty of Turkmenchay, which Iran (called Persia then) signed with the Russians at the end of the Russo–Persian War (1826–1828) on February 10, 1828. It forced Iran to hand over to the Russians control of several important Iranian territories in the southern Caucasus. Many Iranians since have used the term to express vexation at any forceful and unjust treaty or contract imposed upon them by a foreign government. 59. “Tahmasb Mazaherin: Gharadadhay ‘shebh Turkmenchay’ ba chin badtar az blokeshodan amval bood” [Tahmasb Mazaherin: ‘Turkmenchai-style’ Contracts with China Were Worse Than Blocked Properties], Asriran, August 9, 2015. 60. “Aya gharadad arzi Iran va chin Turkmenchay bood?” [Was Currency Deal between Iran and China Turkmenchay?], Jahannews, July 20, 2015. 61. “Answering the Call on Iran Is A Wise Move for Taiwan,” Taiwan Today, July 4, 2012. 62. “Taiwan Tries to Cut Iranian Oil Imports at Behest of the US,” Taipei Times, February 9, 2012, 1. 63. “Taiwan Foreign Ministry Denies Rejecting Iran Trade Office Request,” China Post, May 26, 2010; “Bureau Clarifies Report on Company Selling Nuclear Components to Iran,” Central News Agency (Taiwan), December 18, 2009; and “Taiwan Not to Curb Pursuit Trade Ties with Iran,” Central News Agency, July 27, 2010. 64. “Taiwan Eases Visa Regulations for Iran, Iraq Businessmen,” Central News Agency, July 19, 2009. 65. Data cited according to the website of Taiwan–Iran Business Association are accessible at http://www.tibairan.org.tw. 66. Information is taken from the Taiwan Association of Machinery Industry (TAMI) available at http://www.tami.org.tw. 67. “Xīfāng chǎozuò yīlǎng jiējìn Táiwān” [The Western Speculation about Iran’s Rapprochement with Taiwan], Shìjiè xīnwén bào (World News Journal), March 14, 2008; and “Iran Seeks Nuclear Parts through Taiwan,” Daily Telegraph, December 10, 2009. 68. “HK Shell Firms Helping Iranian Shipper May Escape Penalty,” South China Morning Post, April 5, 2011; and “Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland Middlemen Help Iran Obtain Banned Components,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2012. 69. “Táiwān dāngjú fǒurèn tái shāng shòu yīlǎng héwǔ yíqì wéifǎn guiding” [Taiwanese Authorities Deny Selling Iran Nuclear Equipment in Violation of Legal Provisions], Huánghé xīnwén wǎng (Yellow News Network), March 9, 2010. 70. “Israel Would Object to Closer Taiwan–Iran Ties,” China Post, July 26, 2010. 71. “HK Enacts Iran Sanctions Law after 9 Months,” South China Morning Post, March 30, 2011. 72. Addressing a national conference on the matter in late May 2016, the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, candidly confessed, “The situation that our country is under others’ control in core technologies of key fields has not changed fundamentally, and the country’s S&T foundation remains weak.” “President Xi Says China Faces Major Science, Technology ‘Bottleneck,’” People’s Daily, June 1, 2016. 73. “Deepening China–Iran Ties Weaken Bid to Isolate Iran,” Washington Post, November 18, 2007; “U.S. Enlists Oil to Sway Beijing’s Stance on Tehran,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009; “China Rejects Linking Trade and Iranian Nukes Ahead of Geithner Visit to Lobby for Sanctions,” Washington Post, January 9, 2012; and “Iran and China Suspend $3.3 Billion LNG Project, Mehr Says,” Bloomberg, September 2, 2012. 74. “Iranian Bank Assets Frozen by EU Sanctions,” Telegraph, June 16, 2008; “Thousands Flee Iran as Noose Tightens,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009; “David Miliband to Press China to Support Iran Sanctions,” Telegraph, March 12, 2010; and “Total Moves to Tighten Screw on Tehran,” Financial Times, June 27, 2010. 75. “The Cold Arab–Israeli Alliance against Iran,” World Affairs Journal, April 19, 2016. 76. “Gulf Arabs Fear Iran with Cash as Much as Iran with the Bomb,” Financial Times, May 12, 2015.

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77. “China and GCC,” Saudi Gazette, March 17, 2014; and “GCC Scripts Closer Strategic Equation with China,” Gulf News, June 11, 2014. 78. “Běijīng: Zhōngguó yǔ yīlǎng de shāngmào guānxì bù sǔnhài tāguó lìyì” [Beijing: China’s Trade Ties with Iran Not Harmful to the Interests of another Country], Radio France Internationale, November 11, 2011. 79. “Yǐsèliè wàizhǎng fǎng huá cù běijīng zhīchí zhìcái yīlǎng” [Israeli Foreign Minister’s Visit Is to Press Beijing to Back Iran Sanctions], Radio France Internationale, March 16, 2012. 80. “Israel Makes Case to China for Iran Sanctions,” New York Times, June 8, 2010; “Iran Is Surrounded by US Troops in 10 Countries,” Arutz Sheva, June 27, 2010; “Israel, China Launched Futile Cyber Attack on Iran: Official,” Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), October 8, 2012; and “Seized Chinese Weapons Raise Concerns on Iran,” New York Times, March 2, 2013. 81. “Ahmadinejad Says China–Iran Ties Unhurt by Sanctions,” Today’s Zaman, June 11, 2010. 82. “At Shanghai Expo, Ahmadinejad Polite, Despite China’s Support for Iran Sanctions,” Christian Science Monitor, June 11, 2010. 83. “Iran and SCO: Strange Relations and A Strange Break-up,” Vestnik Kavkaza, June 16, 2010. 84. “Sino–Iranian Relations in Global Economic Crisis,” Middle East Online, May 25, 2009; and “China and Iran Plan Oil Barter,” Financial Times, July 24, 2011. 85. “Iran to Diversify Exports to China,” Associated Press, July 18, 1989. 86. “Iran and China Are Discussing An Oil Barter to Circumvent U.S. Sanctions,” Business Insider, July 25, 2011. 87. “How Japan Lost Iran to China,” Global Politician, September 11, 2007; and “China Takes over from West as Iran’s Main Economic Partner,” Agence France Presse (AFP), March 15, 2010. 88. “China Becomes Iran’s Top Trade Ally,” Press TV, November 9, 2007; and “China Takes Over from West as Iran’s Main Economic Partner,” AFP, March 15, 2010. 89. “Iran–China Trade Soars to Top $45 Bn: Report,” AFP, January 25, 2012. 90. “Iran’s Crude Oil Sales to China,” Mehr News Agency, April 12, 2005; “Iran, China Sign Deals Worth $17 Billion,” Press TV, May 18, 2009; and “Diplomat Calls China Iran’s Major Trade Partner in Asia,” Fars News Agency, July 7, 2009. 91. “Iran Homes Plan Fails to Raise Roof,” Financial Times, November 19, 2009; “Anger Rises over Iran’s Nouveaux Riches,” Financial Times, February 14, 2011; “Inside Iran: What Life Is Really Like in Tehran,” Independent, May 1, 2011; “Payan dooran talaei chiniha dar bazar khodrooy Iran” [End of Chinese Golden Era in Iran’s Auto Market], Mehr News Agency, August 2, 2015; and “Hajm ravabt tejari Iran va chin afzayesh miyabad” [Volume of Iran–China Trade Relations to Increase], Asr-e Eghtesad, August 17, 2016, 2. 92. “Iran Plans to Take Three Zeros Off Currency,” Reuters, April 2, 2011. 93. “Iranians Go for Gold amid Inflation and Currency Fears,” Reuters, July 6, 2011. 94. “China–Iran Trade Surge Vexes U.S.: Technology Shipments Frustrate Bid to Curb Tehran’s Nuclear Program,” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2007. 95. “Black-Market Gas Shelters Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2010; “Iran to Pare Food, Gas Subsidies,” Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2010; “Gas Prices Soar in Iran as Subsidy Is Reduced,” New York Times, December 19, 2010; “Booksellers of Tehran Falling on Hard Times,” Reuters, February 24, 2011; and “Iran’s Rich Eat Ice Cream Covered in Gold as Poor Struggle to Survive,” Washington Post, August 6, 2011. 96. “Iran Becomes Biggest Wheat Importer,” Financial Times, April 16, 2009. 97. “Varedat kaleske chini baray koodakan Irani” [Importing Chinese Strollers for Iranian Babies], Young Journalists Club, August 2, 2016; “Sang mazarhay chini rooy ghabrhay Irani” [Chinese Tombstones on Iranian Graves], Tabnak, August 15, 2016; and “Bazar lavazem tahrir Iran dar chang chiniha” [Iran’s Stationery Market in the Chinese Clutches], Rahe Mardom, August 31, 2016, 1. 98. “Chiniha honar safavi ra be naboodi keshandand” [Chinese Wreaked Havoc on Safavid Art], Tabnak, February 3, 2016; “Ettekay Iran be varedat az chin record zad” [New Record for

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Iran’s Reliance on Imports from China], Farda News, April 6, 2016; and “Dumping kalayah chini dar Iran” [Dumping Chinese Goods in Iran], Farda News, July 10, 2016. 99. “India and China Skirt Iran Sanctions with ‘Junk for Oil,’” Bloomberg, March 30, 2012; and “Chiniha khodroy chini savar nemishavand” [Chinese Do Not Drive Chinese Car], Aftab, February 21, 2015, 1. 100. “Iran Faces U.S. Challenge in ‘Pistachio War,’” Reuters, October 9, 2008; “Iran Sees 40% Rise in Exports to China,” Tehran Times, January 18, 2010; “China Shares 26% of Iran’s Nonoil Exports,” Trend News Agency, January 2, 2015; and “Chin va hend motaghazi kharid zobale Iran” [China and India Seeking to Buy Garbage from Iran], Asr Iran, July 23, 2016. 101. “China Secures Iran $13 Billion Rail Deal,” Saudi Gazette, February 9, 2011; “Iran and China to Expand Trade Relations,” Radio Zamaneh, January 4, 2012; “Iran—4th Largest Importer of Chinese Cars,” Trend News Agency, April 15, 2013; and “Khodroohay chini dar bazar Iran hich keifiyati nadarand: Mardom gool zaher bazak kardeh khodroohay chini ra nakhorand” [Chinese Cars in Iranian Market Have No Quality: People Should Not Get Deceived by Embellished Appearance of Chinese Cars], Aftab Yazd, August 1, 2016, 6. 102. “Che kalahayi az chin vared mikonim?” [What Commodities Do We Import from China?], Aftab Yazd, August 4, 2016, 13; “Kharid zafran Irani az chamsh badamiha” [Purchasing Iranian Saffron from Almond-eyes], Farda News, June 22, 2016; and “Varedat ajil chini?” [Importing Chinese Nuts?], Young Journalists Club, July 27, 2016. 103. “More Than Three Million Afghan Refugees Live in Iran,” Cihan News Agency, June 18, 2016. 104. “Behind the Protests, Social Upheaval in Iran,” New York Times, June 23, 2009. 105. As a case in point, Ahmadinejad’s last foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, once stated that the Iranians and Chinese “mutually complement each other. They have industry and we have energy resources.” Cited from “Iran’s New Alliance with China Could Cost U.S. Leverage,” Washington Post, November 17, 2004, A21. 106. “Ahmadinejad 700 milyard dolar sarf eshteghal chiniya kard!” [Ahmadinejad Spent $700 Billion on Job Creation for Chinese!], Abrar Eghtesadi, April 26, 2015, 1, 2. 107. “Tasviri az varedat tajhizat zerehi vizhe sarkoub eterazhay shahri” [Pictures of Armed Equipment Imported to Counter Urban Demonstrations], Rahe Sabz, January 1, 2011. 108. “Iran: Chinese-made Armored Anti-riot Trucks, Equipped with Plows, May Arrive in Tehran,” Los Angeles Times, January 1, 2010; “Huawei: Why A Chinese Company Finally Decided to Pull Back from Iran,” CNBC, December 20, 2011; and “Iran Plans Its Own Sanitized Internet with Chinese Help,” Voice of America, July 31, 2013. 109. Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010); and Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 110. “Post-Sanctions Iran: China-Inspired Dream, Soviet-Style Collapse, or Something Else?,” Gulf State Analytics, September 8, 2016. 111. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Dover, 1956), 173–74. 112. Michael Axworthy, Iran: Empire of the Mind (London: Hurst, 2007); Richard Foltz, Religions of Iran: From Prehistory to the Present (London: Oneworld Publications, 2013); “New Evidence: Modern Civilization Began in Iran,” Xinhua, August 10, 2007; and “Iranians Have Democratic Values,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2012. 113. Considering cultural differences in some other areas, for instance, it is all but impossible to find a single Iranian who can stomach a single dish in China of insects, spiders, worms, and private parts of larger animals such as donkey. 114. Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014). 115. “Iran Bought Luxury Cars with Medical Funds,” Washington Times, March 20, 2014; “Iranians Were Real Victims of Western Sanctions,” International Business Times, May 9, 2014; “US Sanctions Collective Punishment on Iranian People: Analyst,” Press TV, December 29, 2014; “Iran’s Two-decade Collapse in Prosperity,” Bloomberg, July 10, 2015; and “Rais-

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jomhouri: Be bahane dourzadan tahrim poul mellat ra gharat kardand” [President: Plundered Nation’s Money by Excusing Sanctions Circumvention], Shargh Daily, February 14, 2016, 19. 116. “Iranian–Canadians ‘Squeezed’ by Sanctions Hopeful about Policy Change,” Globe and Mail, January 27, 2016. 117. “Sen. Mark Kirk: ‘It’s Okay to Take Food from the Mouths of’ Innocent Iranians,” Think Progress, October 12, 2011; “Sanctioning Society: From Iraq to Iran,” Al Jazeera, October 3, 2012; and “Adelson and Saban Try to Out-Hawk Each Other,” Forward, November 9, 2014. 118. Arthur Smith describes succinctly such mentality: “There can be no doubt in the mind of any one who knows the Chinese that they display an indifference to the sufferings of others which is probably not to be matched in any other civilised country . . . the commerce of the Chinese is a gigantic example of the national insincerity . . . a Chinese is anxious to take advantage of the man with whom he makes a bargain, and he is not less anxious to take advantage—if he can—of the god with whom he makes a bargain–in other words, the god to whom he prays.” Cited from Arthur H. Smith, Chinese Characteristics (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1894), 213, 280, and 302. 119. As a case in point, a British newspaper reported in June 2006 that “many of the Chinese workers assembling iPods were young women who worked fifteen hours a day and lived in corporate dormitories, earning less than fifty dollars a month.” Cited from John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009), 29. 120. “FM Salehi: Iran Reliable Partner for China,” Press TV, May 26, 2011. 121. Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing’s World-View,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): 37–52.

Chapter 5

A New Era: Toward Strategic Equilibrium

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SPRUCING UP INTERNATIONAL PROFILES: IRAN AND CHINA SET TO GO TRENDY It is difficult to get a full picture of Iranian foreign policy under the Rouhani government without sensing what happened in Iran’s relations with East Asia and the rest of the world during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. By and large, Iranians of every bent were disgruntled with the way his government was handling its external affairs. With regard to East Asia, the general impression was that the president was giving too many economic concessions to his Asian counterparts without receiving equivalent political corroboration from their side, especially in dealing with the Western sanctions levied against Iran over the nuclear issue. 1 Iranian indignation was exacerbated by Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and his importing spree that filled the marketplaces mainly with East Asian products, bankrupting local factories, making workers redundant, and causing inflation as in no other nation. Rectifying Iranian foreign policy and prevailing over major predicaments that Ahmadinejad’s approach had brought about, therefore, were among key promises of the several candidates campaigning in the presidential elections of June 2013. Hassan Rouhani emerged as the winner. Rouhani vowed his foreign policy essentially would be omnidirectional, pursuing a positive-sum relationship with Iran’s foreign partners around the world. Although his government often has claimed to give priority to enhanced cooperation with Iran’s neighbors in the Middle East and Central Asia, such a pledge was not the backbone of Iran’s new grand strategy toward the outside world. Iranians traditionally take relations with the neigh75

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boring nations for granted, whether their relationship with them is amicable or antagonistic. 2 It is generally the nature and scope of Iran’s interactions with foremost centers of power in faraway territories that the Iranian people use to mark their government’s foreign policy performance. But this yardstick doesn’t indicate that Iran should always be on good terms with those power centers; public perception of zero-sum relationships would still disconnect them from the government even in the midst of maintaining close partnerships with more powerful powers. For the past several decades, therefore, Iranian foreign policy has been appraised largely based on its comparative gains or losses from managing Iran’s relations with major Western and Eastern powers, and the government of Rouhani won’t be an exception. For better or for worse, top advisers in his government favor a gradual rapprochement with the West rather than close attachment to the East, an approach that supposedly was implemented successfully without calamitous conservative backlash at home. Meanwhile, the relationship with the East was an important element of the government’s economic and foreign policies. Iran still had to supply energy to the East Asian states and give back part of the revenue in the form of imported commodities. Better interactions with the West could settle some of Iran’s political and strategic challenges, but the key to fixing the country’s crippled economy was in proper management of ongoing connections to the East, where the bulk of Iranian exports are now flowing. After all, Iran generally is far better positioned than many other countries in the Middle East to benefit from its geographic, human, and natural resources in its relationships not only with East Asia but with other parts of the world as well. Moreover, Iran has the largest number of Middle Easterners studying or working in the East Asian states, and its long-established connection to these countries is steeped in history. In order to take advantage of all of these assets, the Rouhani government needed to shrewdly direct Iranian foreign policy toward establishing a symbiotic relationship with the East Asian countries, China in particular, as it was aiming to bury the hatchet with the West. Meanwhile, the commencement of the Rouhani presidency roughly coincided with the rise of a new generation of politicians in China led by Xi Jinping, who became the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP in November 2012 and subsequently took over the Chinese presidency in March 2013. These Chinese princelings began to broach new directions in China’s domestic and foreign policies. 3 To better promote China’s new agenda, Xi Jinping was prepared even to use his wife to advantage, so citizens at home and interested people abroad would become fascinated by some of the promises he and his premier, Li Keqiang, made. On the domestic front, their approach was about achieving the “Chinese Dream” (zhōngguó mèng); they hoped this slogan eventually could energize the public to be more attentive and work harder at a time when China was becoming a competitive society

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facing challenges, including a drop in the rate of economic growth and commercial turnover. 4 Internationally, China was moving from “keeping a low profile” (taoguang yanghui) toward “striving for achievements” (fenfa youwei). In a nutshell, the Chinese foreign policy had long been expected to play a more visible role commensurate with its political, military, and economic capabilities. Xi and his powerful colleagues fulfilled some of that expectation by embarking on projects and initiatives in different parts of the world. Despite being tagged “the graveyard of great powers” and escaping deep involvement with the Chinese partly for that reason, the Middle East was a particularly fertile area for China to both raise its international profile and spruce up its “hands-off style of diplomacy.” 5 And no country better suited the Chinese to do just that than Iran under the Rouhani government. 6 The commencement of a new round of international negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program by Rouhani’s foreign policy team, therefore, was a fortuitous development that could significantly boost Beijing’s foreign policy role by its involvement in the talks between Tehran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, and Germany). 7

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The Iranian Nuclear Deal and China: Bargaining with Its Own Party After three and one-half decades of anti-Americanism, the Islamic Republic negotiated with the Americans, eventually agreeing to a very cheap deal over the nuclear program. Iran’s protracted negotiations, which lasted about eighteen months, ultimately led to a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 8 The JCPOA, whose acronym the Iranian Foreign Ministry translated into a catchy Persian term, barjam, would mostly satisfy those who were to benefit from the agreement. Many Iranians were indignant about the JCPOA; some even dubbed it a “nuclear Turkmenchay” imposed upon their country by the great powers involved in the nuclear negotiations. Disgruntled Iranians were concerned about its long-term security implications for Iran; some were peeved at the terms dictated by the JCPOA, such as the shipment of enriched uranium to Russia and heavy water to the United States. 9 The JCPOA was not a quid pro quo agreement. A case in point was the question why some American congressmen demanded their administration disclose the secret side deals that Iran apparently had signed with the IAEA over the nuclear settlement. 10 Despite controversies such as that, the American congress quietly passed the JCPOA without convening a conventional voting session, although it had long voiced hostility toward any deal with Tehran. Moreover, the Jewish lobby in the United States and the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, were used carefully to give the impres-

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sion that Iran got a fair deal. 11 To cap it all, the Iranian parliament also swiftly threw its support behind the deal and the Rouhani government awarded medals of honor to the team that had negotiated for the JCPOA. Meanwhile, China emerged victorious. Nearly every country participating in the nuclear negotiations appreciated China’s “constructive role” in reaching the agreement and subsequently implementing its relevant conditions and terms. The Americans heaped praise on China for its “significant involvement” and “instrumental role” in ironing out the nuclear deal with Iran. U.S. officials, including the president and the secretary of state, thanked their Chinese counterparts on multiple occasions for being “helpful” and “encouraging.” 12 Iranian officials also recognized the positive Chinese participation, giving some both inside and outside Iran the impression that the Chinese had favored a quick resolution of the nuclear standoff. 13 Of course, the Chinese media and relevant public institutions in Beijing swiftly broadcast such congratulatory messages. 14 But was China’s role that prominent? The nuclear talks, first and foremost, were arranged to provide an opportunity for the American and Iranian governments to negotiate their longstanding disputes, including the uranium enrichment controversy. Excepting Russia, even the three Western European countries involved in the negotiation process were almost irrelevant to the outcome, though France could still lobby in favor of Israel, and Britain brought up some worrisome issues put forward by its Arab partners in the Middle East. 15 As far as Iran’s position and counterarguments vis-à-vis the 5+1 were concerned, China was an ornamental presence at the negotiating table. Even the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, refrained a number of times from attending meetings in which the rest of the foreign ministers participated. It seemed that China was not negotiating with Iran as its formal status within the 5+1 group indicated it should. Instead, the Chinese apparently were negotiating with their own counterparts in the group, the Americans in particular, over vested interests in a postnuclear Iran. 16 No matter that informal, behind-the-scene talks between the Chinese negotiating team and its sextet of partners were conducted in the officially designated venues for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, or separate representatives were assigned by Beijing to take on such matters, China was justifiably anxious about its position in Iran once the nuclear crisis was patched up and sanctions were lifted. 17

Looking East Loses Luster In addition to applauding China’s minimal, rather insignificant role during nuclear negotiations, many in the international media and policy circles ran reports and news stories about an imminent Chinese surge in Iran in the aftermath of the deal. They discussed why Western companies could now

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have a really tough time returning to Iran and successfully rivaling their Chinese and other Asian counterparts in the lucrative Iranian market. 18 Moreover, once a formal agreement was reached between Tehran and the 5+1 caucus within the framework of JCPOA, these same pundits declared China a major winner in the nuclear deal with Tehran. 19 China had now become the Persian Gulf country’s “new best friend” with far-reaching implications for Tehran’s multifaceted relations with Beijing. 20 But were such viewpoints plausible, and to what extent could their basic argument hold water? To better realize the new direction of Iranian foreign policy, a closer look at the profiles of people who occupied several key official and unofficial positions in the government of Rouhani gives some hints. Rouhani brought in a number of Western-educated people, some who held American green cards, including his presidential chief of staff, Mohammad Nahavandian. He often received influential foreign dignitaries and represented Rouhani in international meetings and forums. 21 These people were very connected to one or more Western countries where some of their family members had been living for a long time. Rouhani himself was believed to have received graduate education in a British university. The ideological and international affiliations of his foreign policy advisers already were known to many at home and abroad. Even if they did not speak out to promote their true ideological beliefs and political attitudes because of domestic considerations and personal interests, their actions would speak much louder. Their positions were clear to those interested, who noted the brands of their personal laptops and business suits, the choice of vacation destinations for their family members or top staff, and so forth. The Rouhani government, therefore, wanted gradually to mend fences and rekindle ties with Western countries, at least the important European ones, rather than succumbing further to the East. After sitting with the Americans for a year and a half of intense negotiations, the idea of restoring diplomatic ties between Tehran and Washington was no longer considered farfetched. It was only a matter of time to find proper channels and appropriate approaches in order to sort out foreign policy objectives, based on economic and cultural considerations, to facilitate the fulfilment of those crucial goals. As a matter of fact, such discussions were an integral part of Iran’s grand plan after the nuclear deal was settled. 22

Euphoria over a New Iran: Neither Another Germany, Nor a Second China Although Iran was rid of some international sanctions based on the JCPOA framework, a number of others, particularly those by the Americans, will

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remain in place many years to come. 23 The hysteria over Iran and its regional and international policies will certainly go on in influential circles and powerful centers of Western countries, though Iranophobia seemingly has been replaced with favorable news stories and reports about the country. 24 Even when the Iranian government fixed some of the country’s economic shortcomings and chronic social problems, many Iranian citizens would continue to pay a dear price for mismanagement of the failed states in the region, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. 25 Thanks to the generosity of the Iranian government, even Pakistani beggars recently have found that they can eke out a living by asking in English for money in the swanky streets of northern Tehran. 26 Iranians are still paying for the invasion of Afghanistan by the Russians in 1979 and of Iraq by the Americans in 2003. And there is no assurance that the current international system won’t move the goalposts for Iran, or that another regional crisis will not affect Iranians, even when their own government reconsidered the country’s policies and focused heavily on prosperity for its citizens. Observers have been busy in recent years offering prescriptions for the grand politico-economic approach the Iranian government should adopt in the post-sanctions era. 27 They highlight Iran’s huge natural and social resources, which can help the country raise its status within a relatively short period. 28 Some are almost certain that Iran can repeat Germany’s story, or China’s, with a swift, smooth pace of industrialization and economic development. 29 Although Iran has the potential to achieve even beyond Germany and China in industry and science, its current circumstances make that unlikely in the foreseeable future. 30 Taking into account crucial domestic requirements as the sine qua non for embarking on a rapid takeoff, various limitations will prevent that. Brain drain is the result of Iran having lost many of its talented, skilled people during the past decades. Of the educated youth who remain, many lack enough experience and skill in their field to streamline a national rejuvenation program. 31 Moreover, the personal interests and private lives of movie personalities and sports players suddenly have become a major obsession of the national newspapers and social media outlets, pushing more citizens toward superficiality and luxury with dire consequences for the country. 32 To cap it off, Iran’s pattern of international trade is an obstacle to a German or Chinese-style approach to a rapid start, and the Rouhani government has done very little, if anything, to reverse the course.

Promises Restricting Imports: A Game of Whack-A-Mole Hassan Rouhani commenced his presidency scoffing at the Ahmadinejad government’s import policy; he was particularly critical of Ahmadinejad for

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creating jobs for Chinese and Koreans. His first deputy, Eshaq Jahangiri, was soon to use similar words, attacking the previous government’s massive importation of foreign products from China and other Asian states. In the ensuing years, ministries and public institutions issued decrees, promising the public that they would buy and consume only those commodities made by domestic producers. 33 That made many Iranians believe that the Rouhani government was commited to job creation for unemployed graduates by addressing the scope of imported products. To the contrary, the Rouhani government had clay feet. Rival parties and opponents of his government gradually sharpened their criticism. 34 Substantiating their claims with statistics, the critics accused the Rouhani government of having no economic policy other than “job creation for Chinese,” as if all the criticisms against Ahmadinejad had boomeranged back on Rouhani and his team. 35 Ahmadinejah had used the sanctions as an excuse to justify his economic policies, but in the wake of concluding the nuclear deal and phasing out the sanctions, the Rouhani government could no longer justify its policies on that basis. 36 Worse, foreign companies from West and East had been planning both before and after the nuclear deal to freely ship more manufactured goods to Iran. The same nations that previously refused to sell them even urgently needed medicines at high cost now made a beeline to sell other unnecessary items to the Iranians at bargain prices. From German and Japanese to Irish and Koreans, everyone was talking about selling something to the Iranians, but none of them have serious long-term plans to create more jobs in Iran or buy more nonenergy products produced in Iran. 37 These foreign corporations had developed a taste for the lucrative markets of Iran, and it is unlikely that their return to the country will bring fundamental development to Iranian international commerce. 38 Pumping more oil or exporting other mineral resources would only exacerbate the country’s long-established pattern of external trade without aiding national production and sufficient job creation. 39 By sticking to Iran’s long-unsuccessful economic policy, how could the Rouhani government move to engage simultaneously both Western and Eastern countries?

From “Neither the East, Nor the West” to Embracing Both For decades, Iran had been treated as a pariah, shunned by both East and West. Even when those countries were benefiting economically from Iran, they were reluctant to deal with the Iranians politically and culturally. The JCPOA inspired many in both Western and Eastern countries to find their new El Dorado in an Iran that was supposed to emerge as the “biggest economic gold mines in decades.” 40 Scrambling to tap this massive mine,

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major countries dispatched one high-profile politico-economic delegate after another to Tehran. 41 This “Iran invasion” came at a crucial time: Western European countries were encountering higher unemployment rates and their Eastern rivals were struggling with a drop in exports. 42 In such circumstances, the Iranian government warmly welcomed every arriving delegate, declaring a “new chapter” in the relationship with each visiting party. 43 That “new chapter” applied more to Iran’s relations with the West. That is why Rouhani’s critics mobilized at a blistering pace to question even his government’s economic bargaining with Western countries. They expected such commercial and economic connections to Western metropolitan cities to serve as conduits to an all-round relationship with the West. Rouhani’s first official state visit to Europe, which took him to Italy and France, therefore, gave critics at home an opportunity to accuse his government of spending gratuitously almost all of the dollars released according to the JCPOA settlement on a shopping binge in Rome and Paris. 44 Venting their wrath at the French car company, Peugeot, for leaving the Iranians in the lurch due to sanctions that had been levied a couple of years earlier, they now tagged the Rouhani government’s new deal with the French corporation “auto Turkmenchay.” This buzzword has become a leitmotiv of many people in present-day Iran, applying it to every unfavorable political or economic agreement involving a foreign government or international business partner from the private sector. In the East, “new chapter” was not at all contentious politically. Countries such as Japan and South Korea had treated Iran like their Western allies; now Iran wanted leaders of these countries to visit Tehran to forge better ties with the Persian Gulf country. 45 Whether or not these political gestures by Eastern nations were genuine, they could dampen the displeasure of Iranian officials at their economic encroachment on Iran’s domestic markets. To the surprise of many Iranians, this time the Eastern countries, especially China, were enthusiastic about bilateral relations with Iran quite a change from an earlier reluctance. 46

The Siren Song of Silk Snare: China’s “One Belt, One Road” Strategy There is no clear explanation about the historical Silk Road and its characteristics in ancient times. In fact, armchair historians do not agree on when the Silk Road started or ended. Silk was an important item traded on the Silk Road, but the well-known commercial and cultural route was far more inclusive, giving life to many business activities and intellectual vocations among different races and ethnic groups. The caravan route extended from eastern China to western parts of ancient Iran and for most part it was controlled by

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both powers. 47 It is unlikely a single caravan or trader journeyed the entire Silk Road; different parts had different merchants and dealers hailing from different ethnics and tribes. Many nations today interpret the old Silk Road to make themselves inheritors of the ancient heritage and thereby enjoy its recent benefits. China under Xi Jinping has taken a leading role in turning the Silk Road legacy into a mega-commercial project largely for its own interests. And although a number of countries have shared their perspectives on how to revive trade along the Silk Road, the Chinese unilaterally began to use their own terminology and soon tried to sell it to other stakeholders. They also mapped out different strategies, talking about a maritime Silk Road, a rail Silk Road, an air Silk Road, and so on. Those plans make the recent “one belt, one road” strategy look irrelevant, because it is neither a single belt nor a single road, in spite of the fact that the Chinese say it is. 48 The Chinese have appropriated tens of billions of dollars to the elephantine project, aiming to connect the Asian, African, and European continents together to serve their interests. 49 As a key nod to the “one belt, one road” strategy, Iran has been receptive to various proposals the Chinese put forward in recent years. Iran’s strategic location can make it possible for the Chinese simultaneously to engage in commercial interactions with Iran, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the GCC countries, Iraq, and Europe through Turkey. 50 Despite that, indications are that the Iranian government has acted largely as the leading cheerleader for China’s single-handed Silk Road-related activity in recent years. 51 Iran simply has become a toll-free highway in China’s “one belt, one road” design; it ships the country’s precious natural resources through the Chinese maritime Silk Road and brings back revenue by importing China’s manufactured products through its rail Silk Road. 52

Up for “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”: Perils and Promises On January 23, 2016, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to pay an official state visit to Iran in about fourteen years. Jiang Zemin had been the last Chinese president to visit Iran, in 2002; his successor, Hu Jintao, opted out of an Iran visit during his two-term presidency, though he had visited as vice president. Xi’s Iran visit was greeted with much fanfare by Chinese and Iranian media. According to the press, he was accompanied by six ministers among a six-hundred-member delegation to converse with his counterpart, Rouhani, about the prospect of a $600 billion trade between the two countries. 53 Even the Australian media converted the $600 billion to the Aussie dollar for their audience as if that trade deal between Tehran and Beijing would materialized soon. To the surprise of many, the two leaders raised the

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$600 billion figure amid uncertainty: trade between Iran and China had plummeted in 2015 as compared to 2014, oil prices were continuously dropping, and the Chinese economy appeared bleak as the growth rate was dwindling and export markets were contracting. 54 Meanwhile, during the Xi visit to Tehran the Sino–Iranian officials discussed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” between China and Iran. 55 No party provided details on what that would entail. Although Xi’s proposal with regard to an “industrial Middle East” fell on deaf ears in the Western media, the notion of “comprehensive strategic partnership” was played up in places. 56 In fact, some saw such a bold concept as a possible red herring to neutralize opponents in the conservative camp and pro-Western elements among Rouhani’s reformist allies who were critical of China’s encroachment on the Iranian markets at the cost of job loss for the youth and displacement of domestic brands. Xi’s decision to call on the Iranian supreme leader during his Iran visit could also be interpreted somewhat the same way. 57 Still, the “comprehensive strategic partnership” could be an important formula introduced in the midst of a crucial period in Iran’s relations with the outside world. Key matters could compel the Chinese and Iranian governments to talk publicly about higher objectives in their bilateral relationship. The Chinese wanted to fend off an inclination in Iran to turn its back on the East Asian country and embrace the West at the cost of China’s interests in Iran and the greater Middle East. For its part, the Iranian government probably was taking advantage of a Chinese willingness for bilateral ties to send a clear signal to Western countries not to take Iran for granted now that it had changed course and mended fences with them. 58 If that was the case, what did the concept of “strategic” imply in the Sino–Iranian relationship?

Eviscerating Strategic from “Strategicness” The term “strategic” probably is among the most distorted, dumbed-down concepts in academia. Economics and its relevant majors have practically taken over this word and what it means in present-day life. In a nutshell, strategic in economic disciplines means selling more and thereby making more profit by keeping an edge on your rivals. But that is not its meaning in the classical military and political sense. As a derivative of strategy, strategic was about the art of generalship or commandership, about higher military objectives and crucial political stakes that demanded tremendous human sacrifice and the highest alertness. Strategy, by and large, was the prerogative of military elites and not marketing interns; strategic was ultimately to preserve the national security of a country rather than the personal interest of a coterie. The term “strategic” today is applied casually in a lot of bilateral relationships between China and other countries. China inevitably has become a

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bean in every broth, and any approach to forge a beneficial connection to this Asian country needs to be justified, first and foremost, by the high-sounding excuse of “strategic partnership.” 59 Even Western countries sharply different from China resorted to using the phrase “strategic partnership” in recent years to soften wrath of their citizens brought by closer exchanges with China. For example, successive governments in Australia and Canada used the “strategic partnership” rationalization to turn the attention of their citizens from Sydney and Vancouver becoming another Sichuan and Hong Kong, while the American and British governments used the excuse more than ever to dumb down standards in higher education to allow in more affluent students from China. 60 So the concept of “strategic” seems largely to be about the interests of elites in major politico-economic and cultural areas rather than their country or their misinformed citizenry. Although the issue of “strategic partnership” between Iran and China seems to encounter fewer questions than before, the two countries now talk about a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with little explanation, if any, about what it ultimately does involve. 61 If a simple strategic partnership between Tehran and Beijing implies a close cooperation that gives Iran and China a decisive advantage over their rivals and adversaries—militarily, politically, or economically, if not all three—an accentuated “comprehensive strategic partnership” logically would indicate that the two countries commit themselves to enhanced collaboration in all of those crucial areas regardless of unwelcome ramifications for either of them. At least three strategic scenarios with regard to Sino–Iranian relations are in the foreseeable future, so any serious attachment to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” can materialize only in one of those scenarios, while one of the other two would thoroughly negate such a notion no matter whether Tehran and Beijing wanted to behave otherwise.

Strategic Scenario I: A Nexus of Continental Powers The Chinese have talked about a higher strategic importance of Iran to their interests since the 1970s. Even when they refrained from discussing the matter publicly, they kept writing about it in intelligence reports and confidential documents. When the Chinese leaders were assured of their rise as an independent power, the importance of forming a coalition of like-minded partners became starkly clear to them. From the beginning Iran qualified as a major strategic partner, if not an ally, for China; only a possible military confrontation between Tehran and the West could involve China and endanger its vital interests. As soon as the possibility of settling peacefully the disputes between Iran and key Western nations was near, the Chinese geared

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up to buttress the foundations of their strategic affiliation with Iran, especially military cooperation between the two countries. 62 Besides Iran, China had tapped Russia as another significant choice for strategic partnership. The two great powers have managed a robust cooperation in recent years. Despite voting nearly in tandem in the UN Security Council over the past years, the two neighbors have strived hard to conceal their disagreements in favor of other priorities dear to both Beijing and Moscow. Such a relationship has also existed between Russia and Iran. In fact, Russia has been more successful than China in penetrating to the heart of Iranian politics and thereby positioning itself as a major strategic partner. 63 Moreover, the Russians generally have gained more in Iran financially, paid very little politically, and surprisingly received very little criticism for their shortcomings toward or misdemeanors against Iranian interests. 64 The troika of Iran, China, and Russia, therefore, has found more appropriate opportunities recently to give prominence to the common visions and shared interests of its members. 65 During Xi Jinping’s visit to Tehran, Iran and China voiced their opposition to American and European sanctions levied against Russia over the Crimean and Ukrainian crises; at the same time, both Beijing and Moscow threw their strong support behind Iran’s full membership in the SCO. 66 Moreover, Iran and China have vowed to increase their bilateral trade to hundreds of billions in coming years, and Tehran simultaneously has engaged in purchasing another round of expensive conventional and strategic weapons from Russia, though Iran is under less international pressure to buy from Russia. 67 The vast landmass and vital geographical borders under control or influence of these three continental powers make their strategic partnership far more critical and consequential than a mere “axis of expediency.” 68

Strategic Scenario II: An Adversarial System of Affiliation It may not be a preposterous idea to envision a day when Iran and China are locked in a bitter dispute over conflicting interests in Central Asia, Afghanistan or Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and the greater Middle East region. After all, the two countries were not far from military confrontation during the Korean War when the Iranian government under the Pahlavi monarchy was pondering direct engagement in the hostilities at the cost of the warring communists, including the Chinese PLA that had crossed the Yalu River to fight alongside the DPRK’s infantries. 69 That decision was under consideration when Iran had no immediate vital interests at stake. A similar argument can be made against claims China makes regularly that it has a clean record in Iran and the wider Mideast region. Only a few decades ago Maoist China was actively supporting guerrillas and separatist

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movements in Iran and other parts of the region. The Chinese and Iranian governments, therefore, should not take for granted the favorable climate of their current relationship. In his first state visit to the Middle East, Xi Jinping put Iran last on his journey to the region after visiting Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 70 Regardless of history or Iran’s place in world politics today, geographical proximity and Confucian mores required Xi to land in Iran first, though Iranian media and diplomats were ignorant of the Chinese leader’s discourteous behavior. It was a signal to China’s partners in the Arab world and significantly called into question China’s reliability as a “comprehensive strategic partner” with Iran. 71 Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, behaved no better toward Iran; he never paid back Ahmadinejad’s visits to China. Under his leadership, popular Chinese media often recycled abusive pieces aired initially in Western countries against Iran and Iranians, particularly during the heyday of the Iran–West squabble over the nuclear controversy. The Chinese government also imposed visa and banking restrictions on Iranian merchants and tourists. Chinese officials have put almost all of their eggs in the basket of their Iranian counterparts in past decades without caring much about other types of guanxi and people-to-people connections. 72 So China is left with very little soft power in Iran after it took advantage of Iran economically during those years when many other nations had deserted. The Chinese lost a big opportunity to lay a foundation for a deeper and stronger connection to the public and now their relationship with Iranian citizens is fragile compared to that of other nations. 73 A bigger problem for China is that it cannot put too much faith in its current friends in Iranian politics in the long run because some may one day distance Iran from China, and even Russia, in favor of different alliances. 74 But the Iranian government is not blameless. Rather than moving toward a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China, sometimes Iran just used the Tehran–Beijing bond as a bargaining chip in its topsy-turvy relations with Western countries. Iranian politico-economic policies toward China often were set by people with little understanding either of contemporary China or its history and culture. In part that is a result of Iran’s neglecting to set up Chinese studies programs and research centers or to train enough Sinologists. Moreover, the government in recent years has fanned anti-China sentiments by disproportionate importation of low-quality Chinese products largely at the cost of domestic production, displacement of national brands, job loss, and safety standards. 75

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Strategic Scenario III: Mutual Ambiguity Despite pretending to the contrary, neither Iran nor China has not taken momentous measures to form a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” and it is unlikely either is willing to do so at the cost of the other. By adhering to strategic ambiguity, therefore, they can’t engage in a close strategic partnership, but neither will they become strategic rivals. In fact, strategic ambiguity can better safeguard each country’s interests regionally and internationally. Although Iran and China are virtually the strongest powers in their respective regions, their combined capabilities, even including the Russia, would not be enough to balance, let alone displace, a combined force of a perceived rival coalition. 76 More important, through strategic ambiguity, which seems to best serve their own interests, Iran and China can keep the present balance in their respective regions, if not the wider world. Iran no longer needs to appear close to China, militarily, politically, or even economically, and any partnership with China in those areas unless symbiotic would have ramifications for Iran domestically and in the region. It certainly wouldn’t help Iran balance or roll back China’s growing influence in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Persian Gulf region, and even Iraq. Moreover, the Iranian and Chinese states have little in common, so close collaboration between the two countries would not be genuine. Last, strategic ambiguity would keep Iran from any clash involving China and its main competitor, the United States. 77 China has been cautious in its policy approaches to prove that a good relationship with Iran would not harm its growing interests in the GCC and other important parts of the Middle East. 78 Many Arab countries recently have moved toward strategic partnership with China, so Beijing can best serve its expectations by hedging through strategic ambiguity. China, like many Western countries, supports a balance of power between Iran and its Arab rivals in the Mideast. 79 China’s strategic ambiguity can help maintain equilibrium in the Middle East, although that does not satisfy many in Iran. 80 Internationally, China would be better off with fewer close ties of a truly strategic nature, because such relationships can only call into question its constant promises of a peaceful rise devoid of consequential regional and international ambitions. NOTES 1. “Five Basic Facts about the Sanctions on Iran—At A Glance,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2015; and “Iran Ends Free Oil Shipping Deal with India,” Business Insider (India), April 14, 2016. 2. Such a peculiar proclivity can by and large be attributed to the fact that all of the neighboring countries, from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the north to Bahrain and Oman in

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the south and from Turkey and Iraq in the west to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east, were Iran’s former satrapies and territories at some point in history. 3. Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014); and Christopher Lingle, The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century: False Starts on the Path to the Global Millennium (Hong Kong: Asia 2000 Limited, 1997), 53–67. 4. Daniel Lynch, China’s Futures: PRC Elites Debate Economics, Politics, and Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015); “Beijing’s Rat Tribe: The Chinese Dream Goes Underground,” Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2015; and “The End of China’s Rise: Still Powerful but Less Potent,” Foreign Affairs, January 11, 2016. 5. “Beijing’s Middle Eastern Dilemma,” Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2013; “China Needs to Deal with Its Own Backyard Rather than Taking on Middle Eastern Complexities,” South China Morning Post, December 19, 2013; and “Beijing Eyes Broader Role in Middle East,” South China Morning Post, January 10, 2014. 6. “China Congratulates Hassan Rouhani on Iranian Presidency,” Xinhua, June 17, 2013; and “Iran President-elect Rouhani to Value Better Iran–China Ties,” Press TV, June 26, 2013. 7. “Wáng jìn: Yīlǎng shì zhōngguó zài zhōngdōng de xīn jīyù ma?” [Wang Jin: Is Iran A New Opportunity for China in the Middle East?], Guānchá zhě (Observer), February 23, 2016. 8. “Iran Reaches Nuclear Deal with World Powers after Long Negotiations,” New York Times, July 14, 2015. 9. “Iran to Sell 40 Tonnes of Heavy Water to US: Official,” AFP, January 12, 2016; “Amano: Uranium Iran be Russia montaghel shod” [Amano: Iranian Uranium Was Transferred to Russia], Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), February 14, 2016; “U.S. to Buy Material Used in Iran Nuclear Program,” Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2016; and “US to Buy Iranian Heavy Water as Part of Nuclear Deal,” Voice of America, April 22, 2016. 10. “Republicans Call on Obama to Reveal ‘Side Deals’ in Iran Nuke Agreement,” Fox News, July 22, 2015. 11. “Was the Iranian Threat Fabricated by Israel and the U.S.?,” Haaretz, May 31, 2014; “Analysis: Secret Israeli–Saudi Ties Likely to Continue Despite Abdullah’s Death,” Jerusalem Post, January 1, 2015; “Netanyahu on Iran Deal: Let’s Look Forward,” New York Post, October 4, 2015; and “How AIPAC Lost the Iran Fight,” Times of Israel, November 9, 2015. 12. “Xíjìnpíng huìjiàn yīlǎng wàizhǎng” [Xi Jinping Meets Iranian Foreign Minister], Xinhua, May 24, 2011; “China’s Foreign Minister Pushes Iran on Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, February 16, 2015; “Iran–P5+1 Deal Helps Boost China–US Ties: Chinese FM,” Press TV, April 4, 2015; “Xi Jinping, Obama Discuss Iran Nuclear Deal,” CCTV, July 21, 2015; and “Obama Thanks China’s Xi for Role in Iran Nuclear Talks—W. House,” Reuters, July 21, 2015. 13. “Tashakkor zarif az naghsh mosbat chin dar 5+1” [Zarif Thanks Chinese Positive Role in 5+1], Tasnim News Agency, December 28, 2014; “Rouhani Sees China’s Catalytic Role in Iran Nuclear Talks,” Tasnim News Agency, February 16, 2015; “China Can Expedite Reaching Final N-deal: Rouhani,” Mehr News Agency, February 16, 2015; and “Zarif Calls for China’s Role in JCPOA Implementation,” Mehr News Agency, September 15, 2015. 14. “Chinese President Advocates Iranian Nuclear Dialogues,” Xinhua, June 8, 2012; “Middle East Respects China’s Mediation,” Global Times, January 1, 2014; “Chinese Envoy Urges Compromise in Fresh Iranian Nuclear Talks,” CCTV, June 18, 2014; “Backgrounder: China’s Stance on Iran Nuclear Talks,” Xinhua, December 30, 2014; “China Calls for ‘Sprint Finish’ to Iran Nuclear Talks Marathon,” Xinhua, February 16, 2015; “China ‘Constructive’ on Iran Nuclear Deal: Foreign Minister,” China Daily, July 15, 2015; and “China Welcomes Implementation of Comprehensive Iran Nuclear Agreement,” Xinhua, October 18, 2015. 15. “Senator: It’s US VS Iran in Nuclear Talks Showdown,” AFP, February 11, 2015. 16. Iranian media reported about a suspiciously negative Chinese role during formal nuclear talks held over roughly eighteen months. Beijing’s disruptive role probably had something to do with the impending question of how to end sanctions levied against Tehran, the blocked funds, the size and scope of the Western presence in Iranian markets after the nuclear settlement, a likely leakage of Iranian nuclear secrets to some members of the 5+1 by China, and so forth.

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17. “Iran Pays a High Price for Cheap Chinese Products,” Deutsche Welle, January 24, 2013; “Iran Bargain Brings Global Benefits, But Some Out in Cold,” Global Times, February 25, 2014; “Why China Loses Out If Sanctions on Iran Are Lifted,” AFP, May 9, 2014; “West will not Undercut Chinese Firms in Iran: Iran Official,” Xinhua, April 10, 2015; and “Iran Could be A Big Deal for Asian Manufacturers,” Bloomberg, July 20, 2015. 18. “China Carmakers Will Challenge West in Iran When Sanctions Lift,” Bloomberg, May 3, 2015. 19. “Oil-Thirsty China a Winner in Iran Deal,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2015; “China Emerges A Major Winner from Iran Nuclear Deal,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2015; “The Sino–Iranian Tango: Why the Nuclear Deal is Good for China,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015; and “Why China Likes the Iran Deal,” CNN, July 31, 2015. 20. “China Deepens Its Footprint in Iran after Lifting of Sanctions,” New York Times, January 24, 2016; and “China: Iran’s New Best Friend,” Newsweek, February 1, 2016. 21. “The Iranian Politicians Rumored To Have U.S. Green Cards,” Radio Free Europe, February 06, 2015. 22. “Why Iran Could Be Your Next Ski Destination,” CNN, January 27, 2016; “Pistachio Market Faces Return of ‘King of Nuts’ from Iran,” Financial Times, January 28, 2016; “Iran Is Back in Business,” Financial Times, January 29, 2016; and “After Iran Deal, Imported Persian Rugs Reach L.A.,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 2016. 23. “The U.S. Is Hampering Iran’s Return to the World,” Newsweek, April 20, 2016. 24. “John Simpson: Iran Is the Most Charming Country on Earth,” Telegraph, September 8, 2014; “The Master Plan to Manage Iran: Keep Containing It,” National Interest, December 2, 2014; “Don’t Let Iran Off the Hook,” Sentinel & Enterprise, January 21, 2015; “Iran’s Emerging Empire,” Washington Post, January 22, 2015; “Is It Time to Make Iran Our Friend and Saudi Arabia Our Enemy?” Guardian, January 28, 2015; “How the Nuclear Deal Will Fund Iran’s Imperialism,” Washington Post, August 3, 2015; “Saudi Arabia, Not Iran, Is Our Greatest Threat,” Times, August 4, 2015; “Eight Ways Iran Might Surprise You,” Guardian, August 10, 2015; “UK’s Hammond: Iran Too Powerful to Leave in Isolation,” New York Times, August 24, 2015; and “The Struggle for Iran’s Soul,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2015. 25. “Legacy of Iran–Iraq War Lives On,” BBC News, October 5, 2015; “Safir Iran dar Lobnan: Iran be khanevadeh har shahid flestini 7 hezar dolar komad mikonad” [Iran Ambassador to Lebanon: Iran Donates $7,000 to Family of Every Palestinian Martyr], Asr Iran, February 25, 2016; and “Iran: Every Family of Palestinian Martyr will Receive $7,000, and Whose Home Demolished will Receive $30,000,” AhlulBayt News Agency, February 25, 2016. 26. I was personally stopped by these beggars a number of times, but later I pretended I could not speak English to free myself of their nuisance. 27. “Business in Iran Awaiting the Gold Rush,” Economist, November 1, 2014; “Why An Iran Deal Is Like A $400 Billion Tax Cut,” National Interest, November 20, 2014; “Iran’s $300 Billion Shakedown,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2015; and “From Pariah to Powerhouse: The Iran Nuclear Deal and the New Land of Opportunity,” Forbes, August 24, 2015. 28. Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012), 58. 29. “Will Iran Nuclear Deal Unleash the ‘Germany of the Middle East’?” CNN, November 26, 2013; “With Iran Deal, Obama Seeks ‘Nixon in China’ Moment,” Al Jazeera, March 12, 2015; “Is Iran Deal Like China Opening?” CNN, July 19, 2015; and “Iran mitavanad alman Asia bashad” [Iran Can Become the Germany of Asia], Tabnak, January 27, 2016. 30. “Iran’s Long-postponed Rise Is All But Inevitable,” Bloomberg, April 7, 2015; and “‘New Era’ in Iran Science with End of Sanctions: Report,” AFP, September 4, 2015. 31. “Iran Faces A Long Road to Recovery,” Bloomberg, February 1, 2016. 32. “Faghat moallemhay khoshtip estekhdam mishavand?” [Only Handsome Teachers Are Hired?], Tabnak, February 4, 2016; “Iran to Issue Visa on Arrival for Citizens of All But 9 Countries: Spokesman,” Tasnim News Agency, February 15, 2016; and “Iran to Cap Government Pay,” Bloomberg, July 27, 2016. 33. “Jahangiri Urges Consumers to Use Domestic Goods,” Mehr News Agency, April 25, 2015; “Tahrim kalahay khareji dar doolat klid khord” [Boycotting Foreign Products Got Going

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in Government], Jahan News, April 30, 2015; and “Varedat 218 ghalam kala mamnoueh mishavad” [218 Types of Commodity will be Banned from Importing], Tabnak, June 28, 2015. 34. “Amar asafbar masraf kalay chini dar Iran” [Rueful Statistics on Consuming Chinese Goods in Iran], Jahan News, October 19, 2014; “Vadeh zedchini Rouhani mohagghagh nashod” [Rouhani’s Anti-Chinese Pledge Failed to Materialize], Tabnak, October 7, 2015; and “Sakht bozorgtarin palayeshgah Iran be chiniha rasid!” [Construction of Iran’s Largest Refinery Went to Chinese!], Tabnak, September 10, 2016. 35. “Ijad shoghl baray chiniha, tanha syasat eghtesadi dolat yazdahom” [Job Creation for Chinese, The Only Economic Policy of the 11th Government], 72SQ, January 23, 2016; and “Dolat hich barnamei baray hemayat az toolid nadarad” [Government Has No Plan for Supporting Production], Jahan News, February 19, 2016. 36. “Eghtesad Iran dar dolat Rouhani chinitar shod: Ijad eshteghalzaei 29 milyard dolari Iran baray chashmbadamiha” [Iranian Economy Becomes More Chinese under Rouhani: $29 Billion Job Creation by Iran for Almond-eyes], Ecofars, December 29, 2015; and “Dolat Rouhani, rekord varedat dar 100 sal akhir ra shekast” [Imports by Rouhani Government Unprecedented in Past 100 Years], Jahan News, February 9, 2016. 37. “Planemakers Poised for Iranian Buying Spree If Nuclear Deal Reached,” Reuters, July 10, 2015; “Iran Offers ‘Huge Opportunity’ for Irish Exporters,” Irish Examiner, February 10, 2016; “Kharejiha dar mozakereh ba Iran fagghat be donbal froosh mahsoulateshan hastand” [Foreigners Only After Selling Their Products While Negotiating with Iran], Kayhan, February 29, 2016, 1; and “Nail Polish and Mascara: Beauty Brands Eye Up Iran,” Reuters, April 17, 2016. 38. “Europeans Rush to Profit from Iran Deal,” Gatestone Institute, August 13, 2015; “Carmakers Eye Golden Iranian Opportunity in Wake of Nuclear Deal,” Financial Times, July 15, 2015; “Daimler Expects to Fight Chinese Rivals for Iran Truck Market,” Bloomberg, February 22, 2016; “Selling Luxury in Iran,” New York Times, April 5, 2016; “Italy’s Renzi Signs Potentially Huge Business Deals in Iran,” Reuters, April 13, 2016; and “Zanganeh dar astaneh neshasht OPEC elam kard: Barnemeh panj saleh Iran baray toolid roozaneh 4.8 million boshkeh naft” [Announced by Zanganeh on the Eve of OPEC Session: Iran’s Five-Year Plan to Produce Oil 4.8 Million bpd], Mehr News Agency, June 2, 2016. 39. “Varedat 13 hezar dastgah az mahsoulat khodroy France tay yek mah: Dobare montazh bejay toolid dakheli!” [13,000 Vehicles from A French Car Manufacturer Imported in One Month: Assembly Again for Domestic Production], Asre Iranian, January 23, 2016, 1 and 5. 40. “Iran’s Trade with Europe, US Picks Up,” Press TV, February 26, 2015; “Iran Is About to Become the Biggest Free-for-all since the Soviet Collapse,” Quartz, June 25, 2015; and “Post-sanctions Iran ‘Could Be the Best Emerging Market for Years to Come,’” Guardian, July 6, 2015. 41. “Chinese Commerce Minister Arrives in Iran for Talks,” Press TV, February 22, 2014; “110-member Chinese Trade Delegation to Visit Iran Next Week,” Tehran Times, February 22, 2014; “Britain in Danger of Losing the Race to Iran before It’s Begun,” Telegraph, July 31, 2015; and “Iran’s Oil Sale to Japan Hits Record High,” Mehr News Agency, September 13, 2016. 42. “The Iran Invasion,” Bloomberg, January 28, 2016; and “Luxury Groups Should Focus Their FOMO on Iran,” Reuters, April 25, 2016. 43. “Rouhani: Rabeteh ma ba gharb nafi rabeteh ba chin nist” [Our Relationship with West Not to Negate Relationship with China], Japan News, September 29, 2015; “Rouhani: Fasl novin hamkari Iran va chin aghaz shode ast” [Rouhani: New Chapter in Iran–China Cooperation Has Started], Mehr News Agency, January 23, 2016; and “Rohani Hails ‘New Chapter’ in Iran–France Relations,” France 24, January 29, 2016. 44. “Iranian President in France for Deals Bonanza,” AFP, January 28, 2016; “Iran’s Dealmaking with Europe: The Seven Biggest Contracts,” Guardian, January 29, 2016; and “Omde dolarhay azadshode sarf varedat shod” [Most of Unblocked Dollars Spent on Imports], Tasnim News Agency, February 5, 2016. 45. “President Xi Visits Iran, Hailing Historic and Future Opportunities,” CCTV, January 22, 2016; “Chiniha amadeh rababet tejari rahattar ba Iran” [Chinese Ready for Easier Trade Relations with Iran], Asre Iranian, January 23, 2016, 2; “Chashm badami vafadar dar Tehran”

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[Loyal Almond-eye in Tehran], Shabestan News Agency, January 23, 2016; “‘Very Bright Future’ for Sino–Iran Relations: Ambassador,” Tehran Times, January 23, 2016; “In Hopes of Strengthening Ties, Abe May Travel to Iran Later This Year,” Japan Times, October 10, 2015; and “Park Mulling Visiting Iran: Official,” Yonhap News Agency, January 27, 2016. 46. “Tahrimha miravand, chiniha nemiravand” [Sanctions Will Go, Chinese Will Stay], Ghanoon Daily, April 8, 2015, 8; “Xi Says China–Iran Cooperation Faces New Opportunities,” Xinhua, September 29, 2015; “Khorouj gheir momken chiniha az bazar khodroo Iran” [Impossible Departure of Chinese from Iran’s Auto Market], ISCA News, January 14, 2016; and “Barnamyeh 5 saleh chin baray bazgasht be bazar Iran” [China’s 5-Year Plan to Return to Iranian Market], Etemad, August 30, 2016, 4. 47. The main route probably started from China’s Chang’an and finished in present-day Tarsus, a city in south-central modern Turkey and 20km inland from the Mediterranean. 48. “‘Yīdài yīlù’ shì zhōng yī hézuò zuì hǎo píngtái” [‘One Belt One Road’ Best Platform for Sino–Iranian Cooperation], Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), January 23, 2016; “One Belt, One Road, One Heritage: Cultural Diplomacy and the Silk Road,” Diplomat, March 29, 2016; “New Silk Roads Tell the Story of Asia,” Global Times, August 15, 2016; and “Chinese Ambassador Hails Growing China–Iran Ties,” Global Times, September 14, 2016. 49. “Allure and Alarm as China Paves Way for New Silk Road,” New York Times, December 26, 2015, A1; “China–Iran Container Train,” Railway Gazette, February 5, 2016; “First Chinese Train Arrives in Tehran to Revive Silk Road,” Fox News, February 15, 2016; “China’s Dream of a New Silk Road Runs into Hurdles at Its First Stop: Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2016; and “‘Yīdài yīlù’ chàngyì jiāng shēnhuà zhōng yī yǒuhǎo jiāoliú—fǎng zhōngguó zhù yīlǎng dàshǐ páng sēn” [‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative Will Deepen Friendly Exchanges with Iran—Interview with Chinese Ambassador to Iran Pang Sen], Xinhua, August 24, 2016. 50. “Iran Important Outpost for Belt and Road,” Global Times, January 21, 2016; and “Iran dovvomin payegah chiniha dar jaddeh abrisham mishavad” [Iran to Become Second Chinese Station on the Silk Road], IRIB News Agency, June 5, 2016. 51. “Iran Backs Pipeline to China under ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative, Tehran Envoy Says,” South China Morning Post, April 23, 2015; “Iran Supports China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Official,” Xinhua, September 4, 2016; and “Iran Welcomes Reviving Silk Road,” Tehran Times, September 4, 2016, 2. 52. “China’s Oil Imports from Iran Rise Nearly 50 pct Jan-June,” Reuters, July 21, 2014; “‘Floating Formula’ in Iran’s New Oil Deals,” Press TV, April 25, 2015; “Naft arzantar az shir va ab” [Oil Cheaper than Milk and Water], Tabnak, January 23, 2016; “Iran to Become Strong Competitor to Russia on EU Oil Market—Official,” Sputnik, February 9, 2016; “Iran Needs $200b to Develop Oil Industry: Zanganeh,” Tehran Times, February 10, 2016; “Iran Offers Mining Riches Post-sanctions, But Investors Cautious,” Reuters, February 14, 2016; “China’s Iran Specialist Zhuhai Zhenrong Tips Senior Crude Trader as Head,” Reuters, August 2, 2016; and “Iran, China Sign New Oil Contract,” Mehr News Agency, August 31, 2016. 53. “Hajm tejarat Iran va chin 15 barabar mishavad” [Volume of Iran and China Trade Will Increase by 15 Times], Mehr News Agency, January 23, 2016; “Iran, China Agree $600 billion Trade Deal after Sanctions,” Reuters, January 23, 2016; and “Iran va chin 17 sanad hamkari emza kardand” [Iran and China Signed 17 Documents on Cooperation], Mehr News Agency, January 23, 2016. 54. “Yīlǎng jiěchú zhìcái hòu ‘yīdài yīlù’ de zhōngguó jīyù” [Lifting Iran Sanctions an Opportunity for China’s ‘One Belt One Road’], Dayoo, February 4, 2016. 55. “China, Iran Lift Bilateral Ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” China Daily, January 23, 2016; and “China, Iran Upgrade Ties to Carry Forward Millennia-old Friendship,” Xinhua, January 24, 2016. 56. “Xi Pledges Industrial Boost for Middle East,” China Daily, January 23, 2016. 57. “Iran’s Leader Says Never Trusted the West, Seeks Closer Ties with China,” Reuters, January 23, 2016; and “Chinese President Meets Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei,” Xinhua, January 24, 2016. 58. “Ettehad dobareh shir va ezhdaha aleih oghab” [Lion and Dragon Reunite against Eagle], Javan Online, February 15, 2015; “Amrika doshman moshtarek Iran va chin ast”

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[America Is the Common Enemy of Iran and China], Jahan News, October 15, 2015; “Emzay tafahomnameh nezami Iran va chin” [Iran and China Sign Military MOU], Arman Daily, October 17, 2015, 1; and “Iran va china: Shorakay strategic?” [Iran and China: Strategic Partners?], Tabnak, November 5, 2015. 59. “China, Serbia Lift Ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” Xinhua, June 18, 2016; and “China, Poland Lift Ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” Xinhua, June 21, 2016. 60. Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford Delong, The End of Influence; What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 24–25; “Schools Flush Out Cheating Chinese Students,” Global Times, November 12, 2013; “U.S. Schools Expelled 8,000 Chinese Students,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2015; and “When A Private Tutor Isn’t Enough: The Industry Helping Chinese Students Cheat Their Way Into and Through US Universities,” South China Morning Post, May 27, 2016. 61. “China and Iran Embark on ‘New Silk Road’ Path,” China Daily, January 22, 2016; and “Xi’s Visit Brings ‘One Belt and One Road’ Cooperation to New Level,” China Daily, January 22, 2016. 62. “Flotilla Makes First Visit to Iranian Port,” China Daily, September 22, 2014; “China, Iran to Stage Joint Navy Drills in Persian Gulf,” Global Times, September 23, 2014; “China Says Wants Closer Military Ties with Iran,” Reuters, October 24, 2014; “Iran and China Deepen A ‘Blue Water’ Friendship,” Washington Post, October 28, 2014; “Zhōngguó xúnqiú shēnhuà yǔ yīlǎng jūnshì guānxì” [China Seeks to Deepen Military Connections to Iran], Deutsche Welle, October 15, 2015; “Hozour chiniha dar Iran gosterdetar mishavad” [Chinese Presence in Iran Will Expand], Jahan News, November 4, 2015; and “Safir chin khabar dad: Taamol nezami Iran va chin dar ayandeh nazdik” [Chinese Ambassador Made Known: Military Interaction of Iran and China in Near Future], Asrar, September 14, 2016, 3. 63. It might be no coincidence, therefore, why Iranian officials sometimes have even talked of Iran’s “eastern orientation, first of all towards Russia . . . [as] the country’s strategic choice.” “The Tricky Triangle of Iran, Russia and Israel,” Guardian, April 25, 2016. Also see “A Russian–Iranian Axis,” New York Times, September 17, 2016, A17. 64. “Moragheb amrika bashim; amma nofouz rusha ra niz jeddi begirim!” [We Need to Keep A Watchful Eye on America; But Let Take Serious Russian Influence Too!], Tabnak, October 26, 2015; “Putin: Russian–Iranian Co-op Has Already Become Strategic,” Tehran Times, August 5, 2016; and “Bazi seriali rusha” [Russians’ Serial Game], Aftab Yazd, September 8, 2016, 2. 65. “Silk Road: ‘Iran Seeks Closer Cooperation with Russia, China and India,’” Fars News Agency, September 13, 2016; and “What Is Eurasianism?,” LobeLog, September 18, 2016. 66. “China, Iran Oppose Unjust Sanctions against Other Countries,” Xinhua, January 23, 2016; and “China Backs Iran’s SCO Membership in Joint Statement,” Sputnik, January 23, 2016. 67. “Velayati: Russia jaygah mohemi dar syasat khareji Iran darad” [Velayati: Russia Has Important Place in Iranian Foreign Policy], Fars News Agency, February 3, 2016; “Iran, Russia to Enforce $40bn Deals,” Press TV, February 4, 2016; “Moscow to the Arabs: Iran Is Our Top Ally,” Huffington Post, February 20, 2016; and “Iran Holds Talks with Russia over Missile Defense Upgrade,” Reuters, February 22, 2016. 68. Walter R. Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (May/June 2014): 69–79; and “America baray mahar Iran, Russia va chin dar Afghanistan khahad mand” [America will Stay in Afghanistan to Contain Iran, Russia, and China], Javan, September 14, 2016, 9. 69. Shirzad Azad, Koreans in the Persian Gulf: Policies and International Relations (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015), 16–17. 70. “Xíjìnpíng kāishǐ duì yīlǎng jìnxíng guóshì fǎngwèn” [Xi Jinping Arrives in Iran for State Visit], Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), January 23, 2016. 71. “China’s Middle East Tour: Beijing’s Post-Sanctions Ambitions,” Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2016; and “President Xi Jinping of China Is All Business in Middle East Visit,” New York Times, January 31, 2016, A8.

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72. Currently, less than 50,000 tourists from China visit Iran annually, while the number of Chinese tourists who visited South Korea and Dubai in 2015 reached around 6.11 million and 450,000, respectively. See “S Korea to Issue 10-year Visa to Highly-educated Chinese Tourists,” China Daily, January 28, 2016; “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative to Spur Trade Flows: Dubai’s Retail Giant,” Xinhua, June 2, 2016; and “Chera Iran maghsad gardeshgari chiniha nashod?” [Why Did Not Iran Become A Tourist Destination for Chinese?], Farda News, May 24, 2016. 73. “Az hamkari ba chiniha chizi nasibman nemishavad” [We Get Nothing from Cooperation with Chinese], Aftab Yazd Daily, January 23, 2016, 1 and 6. 74. “Iran’s Shanghai Dream: The Perks and Pitfalls of Joining China’s Security Club,” Foreign Affairs, July 25, 2016; “China Is Diving into the Gulf, But for How Long?” Fair Observer, August 15, 2016; and “China and Iran Won’t Join Putin’s ‘Dictators’ Club,’” Business World (Manila), September 4, 2016. 75. “Empratouri mooshhay chini dar Tehran” [Empire of Chinese Mice in Tehran], Khabar Online, November 20, 2014; “‘Bonjolhay chini’ bazar ra be dast gereftand” [‘Chinese Gimcracks’ Captured Bazaar], Tabnak, January 31, 2015; “700 milyard dolar Iran sarf eshteghal javanan chini” [Iran Spent $700 Billion on Job Creation for Chinese Youths], Arman Daily, April 26, 2015, 1; “Chinese Invasion,” Iranian, June 2, 2015; “Naghsh chin dar afzayesh saratan dar keshvar” [Chinese Role in Increasing Cancer in the Country], Iraian Labour News Agency (ILNA), July 31, 2015; “Jens chini nakharid” [Don’t Buy Chinese Product], Asr Iran, December 2, 2015; and “Zarbeh ajnas chini be eghtesad moghavemati” [Chinese Goods Wreak Havoc on Resistance Economy], Tarabar News, January 2, 2016. 76. “Iran’s New Alliance With China Could Cost U.S. Leverage,” Washington Post, November 17, 2004, A21; “The Moscow–Beijing–Tehran Axis,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2015; “China, Russia, Iran Closing Gap with Smaller, Older U.S. Military,” Washington Free Beacon, October 20, 2015; “Get Ready, China and Iran: American Naval Super Mines Are Coming,” National Interest, October 19, 2015; “China/Russia/Iran Alliance Confronts U.S.,” Desert Sun, October 29, 2015; and “China and Iran Are About to Gain Control Over Your Internet,” Catholic Online, August 29, 2016. 77. “China’s Top Paper Says West Stoking Extremism in Middle East,” Reuters, December 3, 2014; “It Is Reality We Do Not Trust West,” Mehr News Agency, June 6, 2015; “China Calls US ‘Source of Turmoil in the World,’” Daily Caller, September 18, 2016; and “How China Challenges the West,” Washington Times, September 18, 2016. 78. “China Forges Ties with Oil-rich Arabs,” Washington Times, February 14, 2012; “Chinese President Meets GCC Delegation,” Xinhua, January 17, 2014; “Chinese President Meets Saudi Arabia Crown Prince,” Xinhua, March 14, 2014; “KSA Seeks Strategic Chinese Partnership,” Arab News, March 15, 2014; “Landmark China–Arab Ministerial Meeting to Reap Harvest: Chinese FM, AL Chief,” Xinhua, June 5, 2014; “China, Arab States to Enhance Exchanges to Mark ‘Friendship Years,’” Xinhua, June 5, 2014; “GCC–China Economic Relations Grow Rapidly,” Arab Times, June 9, 2014; “Chinese, Saudi Leaders Hold Talks over Phone on Ties, International Issues,” Xinhua, April 18, 2015; and “Beijing Hand in Hand with Arab World to Push Silk Road Initiative,” Xinhua, May 29, 2015. 79. “China–Arab Relations Leap Forward with Large Potential: Chinese FM,” Xinhua, May 12, 2016; “China Looks to Raise Strategic Cooperation with Arab States,” CCTV, May 14, 2016; “China’s Rising Interest in the Arab World Could Bring Opportunities,” Gulf News, May 19, 2016; and “China Is Likely to Replace EU as 1st Trade Partner to GCC in 3 yrs—Expert,” Kuwait News Agency, May 22, 2016. 80. “CNBC: Zhōngguó zǒu jìn yīlǎng huò jiāng rěnǎo shātè” [CNBC: China’s Closer Ties with Iran Would Antagonize Saudi Arabia], Xīnlàng (Sina), January 25, 2016.

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Conclusion

The commencement of the “reform and opening-up” era in China in the late 1970s coincided with the beginning of conservatism and isolation in Iran for a couple of decades, during which Iran’s vexing situation, foreign and domestic, neatly dovetailed with China’s fortuitous march toward development and prosperity. Internally, Iran by and large remained an exporter of energy resources to a handpicked coterie of emerging and insatiable markets such as China. Iran’s crippled economy, often exacerbated by sanctions levied by the West, was a lucrative market for China’s manufactured products, though Iran remained a loyal customer for China’s modernizing weapons and conventional armaments decade after decade. In fact, Iran became an engine of Chinese growth to a certain extent; its oil and gas partially fueled the Chinese development machine, and its energy revenue, generally returned in the form of massive imports, also contributed to China’s industrial progress and technological refinement. Externally, Iran’s foreign policy kept the country in the limelight of international politics for a long time, diverting attention from China and its swift transformation. The U.S.-led West focused heavily on Iran, shifting excessive human and technological resources from East Asia to the Middle East to constantly monitor and contain the Iranians. As a consequence, the Chinese were able to keep a low profile and concentrate largely on their industrialization and development programs. By the time Iran and the West came to terms in the mid-2010s, China had quietly grown into a major world power. Current research has studied the dynamics of the Tehran–Beijing relationship since 1980 in five distinctive periods. In the first period, Iran and China reestablished their diplomatic ties rather surreptitiously due to the Islamic Republic’s anticommunism and anti-great power rhetoric. Another important factor behind the relatively quiet, discreet move was the outbreak of the 95

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Iran–Iraq War, which over time greatly contributed to Beijing’s growing profile in Tehran. Fortuitous for the Chinese, they soon sold a great deal of badly needed arms to Iran, first through their North Korean conduit and later directly, so they could dictate the terms of their relationship with Iran for decades. Although China emerged as a major armaments supplier to Iraq as well, its weapons sales to Iran were far more critical, making other aspects of the Tehran–Beijing relationship pale to comparison. Modern China under the CCP essentially was a latecomer to the region compared to its Eastern and Western rivals, but its well-timed arms deals helped Beijing position itself as a key partner in Tehran and other Middle East capitals. The second period started with the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War, which paved the way for the Chinese to surface naturally as a participant in Iranian reconstruction programs under the Rafsanjani government. With little improvement in Iran’s strained relations with the West, Tehran’s new looking-East strategy was intended partially to make up for economic and technological shortcomings by further warming up to Asian countries such as China. But the looking-East policy was neither carefully calculated nor skillfully implemented, and many of the reconstruction plans in Iran could not successfully achieve their desired objectives. Despite such impediments, Iran and China under Hashemi Rafsanjani and Jiang Zemin, respectively, could chip away at their differences when the demise of the Soviet Union provided them a unique opportunity to share some of their relatively common political views for a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War. Moreover, Tehran and Beijing vowed to continue their arms business. The Chinese concluded that they inevitably needed to consolidate their long-term presence in Iran by increasing Iranian petroleum purchases and investing particularly in Iran’s energy sector. In the third period, Iran served as a key beachhead for China’s “going out” strategy, which was designed primarily to push Chinese companies to invest directly in critical foreign countries that had excess energy resources. Iran’s geographical location facilitated implementation of other Chinese policies in Central Asia as well as the Persian Gulf region, where Dubai was waiting to play an instrumental role in transferring Chinese products to Iranian markets through both formal and informal channels. The Sino–Iranian relationship was less successful in noneconomic areas. Iran was operating under its looking-East policy, but the talk in Tehran was mostly about the Iranian divisions with the West rather than deep integration into the East. The Chinese were also preoccupied with lessening their political differences with the West, which is why they were willing to end some military cooperation with Tehran to better protect their stake in other places, especially the United States. The fourth period marked the acme of Iranian–Chinese interaction, especially in trade and financial connections, because China emerged as Iran’s

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Conclusion

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biggest trading partner, even as Iran increasingly counted on China for a larger volume of oil and non-oil exports. But new troubles in Sino–Iranian ties were equally significant, and unprecedented. The fly in the ointment was this: the controversy over the Iranian nuclear program and the pertinent sanctions, for which the Chinese were not willing to pay a price at the cost of their larger stakes in the West. The Iranian government under Ahmadinejad still opened the country’s lucrative markets to the Chinese products, despite Beijing’s multiple treacherous moves against Iran and its reluctance to support Tehran in possible military confrontation between Iran and the United States over the nuclear quandary. As a corollary to that, anti-Chinese sentiment reached an all-time high in Iran; the public would no longer put up with a foreign partner that was primarily after its own selfish economic interests. Finally, in the fifth period the commencement of Rouhani’s presidency ushered in a new era in the foreign policy of Iran, which inescapably influenced the Sino–Iranian relationship. Now that Iran sorted out the long kerfuffle over its nuclear program by agreeing to the terms of the JCPOA document, Tehran expected new ties with Western as well as Eastern countries. Such a critical development was certain to bring fresh challenges and opportunities to China’s relations with Iran. The Chinese could no longer take for granted their connections to Iran now that they had to compete with other nations in order to safeguard their interests in Iran. On the bright side, the lifting of sanctions and restrictions meant business was thriving in Iran and the Chinese could as usual count on their unique advantages to advance their interests. That is why they were now very willing to talk about the prospect of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with the Iranians. But is the new Iran prepared to engage in such tight, rather perilous collaboration with China? The Weltanschauung of the Iranian people as well as the Persian Gulf country’s huge vested interests in both the greater Middle East region and Central Asia all indicate that it is better for Iran in the long run not to enter into close alliance with China. In the same way, it is also not in Iran’s longterm interest to ally closely with any rival system that seeks to contain and subdue China. In either scenario, Iran would encounter more insurmountable difficulties and risks than opportunities and advantages. Any intimate association with China would only antagonize the West at a time when Iran desperately needs a more conducive international milieu in which to focus on economic development and domestic prosperity. But joining a West-led international alliance, even if its aim is not to contain and conquer China, is not an option. It would cost Iran its independence and national identity, for which it has paid a whopping price over the past decades. All in all, Iran and China need to exhaust all economic opportunities each party has to offer. It will be in the interest of both countries to remain on good terms without establishing an alliance. Such a move would only squan-

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der excessive resources from each country without serving their overall interests in the long run. Instead, more than ever they should do everything possible to establish themselves as the indispensable leader of their own alliance, no matter how small, so that each can contribute to the peace and stability of a larger international equilibrium in which Iran and China separately are recognized as independent powers. This feature historically has been a differentiating mark of each country, and any other strategy would backfire.

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Index

adversarial system, 86–87 Afghanistan, 4, 31, 62, 79, 86, 88, 88n2 Africa, 24, 83 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 42, 47–48, 52, 75, 96 ambassador, 4, 14n6, 48, 68n13 ambiguity, 55, 67, 88 America. See United States anticommunism, 12, 95. See also communism antipathy, 2 Arab, 5–6, 24, 33, 37, 39, 78, 88; lobby of, 59–60 Arabian Peninsula, 37 area studies, xii arms, 6–7, 8–9, 10–12, 18, 23, 26–27, 95–96 arms embargo, 8, 10 Asian studies, xii, 34 Asian tigers, 23, 65 Assembly of Experts, 28n12 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 47 Australia, 83, 84 Azerbaijan, 88n2 backlash, x, 76 bafflegab, x, xi Baghdad, 11–12, 13 Bahrain, 88n2 bainian guochi. See Century of National Humiliation

balance of power, 88 ballistic missile, 9. See also missile barjam. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action beachhead, 96 Beijing consensus, 65 black market, 56, 62 Bōsīwān, 37 Bosnian crisis, 31 brain drain, 17, 80 Brazil, 50 Britain, 2, 77, 78 bugaboo, 4 Cairo, 7 Canada, 84 capitalism, 65 caravan, 51, 82 Caucasus, 41, 71n58, 83. See also Central Asia CCP. See Chinese Communist Party Central Asia, 5, 6, 12, 20, 41–42, 47, 75 Central Bank of Iran, 57 Central Military Commission, 18 centrifugal force, 1, 66 Century of National Humiliation, 3, 14n4, 33 Chavez, Hugo, 50 Chinese Communist Party, 1, 2, 4, 7, 14n3, 19, 20; Central Military Commission, 18; general secretary, 18, 76; ideology,

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104

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65–66; Middle East, 95; politburo, 32; top leadership, 21, 33, 35, 36–37, 40, 52, 53 Chinese Dream, 76 Chinese model, 65–66 Chinese studies, xii, 34, 35, 87 Chinization, 65 civilization, 33, 34, 35, 40 Clinton, Bill, 21 Cold War, 4, 19, 20–21, 96 collusion, 7, 65 commanding heights, 1 commotion, 1, 17 communism, 3, 19, 20, 36, 65 comprehensive strategic partnership, 83–85, 87–88, 97. See also strategic partnership Confucianism, 36, 65 confusion, 1 conservatism, 95 continental power, ix, 85–86 contingency, ix, x, 22 corruption, 66 Crimea, 86 cronyism, 65 currency agreement, 57 Deng, Xiaoping, 14n3, 28n20, 32, 43n2 Did Marco Polo Go to China?, 36 diplomacy, 37, 38, 54, 60, 77 disintegration, 1, 19 disruption, 1 dollar, 23, 58, 63, 74n119, 82, 83 donkey, 73n113 downstream, 24, 28n29 dragon, 52 drug trafficking, 39 dual containment, 21 Dubai, 39–40, 58, 62, 64, 94n72, 96 Egypt, 7, 63, 87 Eiffel Tower, 63 El Dorado, 39, 81 elite, 1–2, 17, 84 embassy, 9 embezzlement, 66 eminence grise , 52. See also Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar; Jiang, Zemin

Index energy, 11, 23–24, 39, 40, 49, 55, 76. See also gas; oil; petroleum entrepôt, 39, 62 Eurasia, ix Europe, 7, 10–11, 21, 32, 58, 83, 86 expediency, 1, 54, 86 Expediency Council, 28n12 expert, xii–xiii, 24, 49 fair-weather friendship, ix, x fenfa youwei, 77 foreign policy, 38; of China, 36, 37, 39, 52, 67; of Iran, 2–3, 31, 50, 54, 75–77, 79, 97 four modernizations, 2, 8 France, 63, 77, 78, 82 gaige kaifang. See reform and opening-up gambling, 39 game of whack-a-mole, 80 gas, 23, 25, 40–42, 95. See also energy; oil; petroleum GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council geopolitics, 41 Germany, 61, 77, 79–80 gilded age, 66 Global Times, 37 going out strategy, 40–41, 42, 96 Google, xi, 55 graduate, xii–xiii, 79, 80 grand strategy, 2, 75 graveyard, 77 great power, 6, 37, 77, 86, 95 Great Satan, 2 Greece, 36 guanxi, 87 guerrilla, 86 Gulf Cooperation Council, 24, 37, 64, 83, 88 Han Chinese, 34–35, 43n9 hands-off diplomacy, 77 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, 18–19, 21–22, 26, 28n12, 29n44, 32, 52 heavy water, 77 hegemony, 2, 3, 21 hibernation, 3 higher education, xii, 85 Holocaust, 50

Index

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Hong Kong, 47, 48, 58, 58–59, 65, 84 hostage crisis, 4, 7 Hu, Jintao, xii, 40, 52, 83, 87 Hua, Guofeng, 4 human rights, 21, 35 human trafficking, 39 ideology, 3, 64, 65 illusion, 65 India, 33, 48 industrial Middle East, 84 inflation, 63, 75 inquiry, xi insurgency, 8, 49 International Atomic Energy Agency, 48, 77 international relations, xi–xii, 6, 50 international system, 3, 4, 19, 21, 50, 56, 79 Internet, 65 invasion, 4, 8, 20, 35, 79, 81 iPod, 74n119 Iranian plateau, 22 Iranian studies, xii Iran–Iraq War, 1, 4–5, 17, 26, 39, 49, 52; China, 5–6, 8–9, 12, 13, 26, 95; conclusion of, 21, 27, 96; North Korea, 7, 11; reconstruction, 18; Taiwan, 10 Iranophobia, 79 Iraq, 5–6, 20, 49, 79, 83, 88, 88n2 Iraq War, 48, 61 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 50 Islamic State, 43n10 isolation, 4, 10, 17, 21, 50, 58, 95 Israel, 15n17, 50, 58, 59, 65, 77, 78; China, 25, 38; Iraq, 26; lobby of, 59–60 Italy, 82 Jahangiri, Eshaq, 80 Japan, 7, 10, 12, 22, 37, 47, 81; China, 14n4; Persian Gulf, 11; second Japan, 34 Japanese archipelago, 34 JCPOA. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jew, 25, 38, 50, 60, 77 Jiang, Zemin, 18–19, 28n12, 32, 38, 40, 42, 83

105

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 77, 78, 79, 81–82, 97 Jordan, 7 Kazakhstan, 42 Khatami, Mohammad, 31–32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42 Kim, Jong-il, 51 Korean Peninsula, 22 Korean War, 14n5, 86 Kuwait, 20, 21 Kyrgyzstan, 42 language barrier, xii–xiii Latin America, 24 Lebanon, 79 Lesser Satan, 2 Levant, 37 Li, Keqiang, 76 lip and tongue, 7 Liquefied Natural Gas, 41, 42. See also energy; gas; oil; petroleum London, 62 looking-East, 22, 47, 96 Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 50 MA thesis, xiii mafia, 39, 57 malfeasance, 66 Manichaeism, 34 Mao, 2, 3, 14n3, 52 Maoism, 3, 14n3, 36, 60, 86 marriage of convenience, ix maven, xii Mazaheri, Tahmasb, 57 metro, 26 metropolitan, 82 middle kingdom, 44n16 migration, 2, 35 military power, 6, 26 mine, 25, 64, 81 missile, 9, 26, 48 money laundering, 39 Mongolia, 20 Moscow, 8, 19, 61, 86 motto, 2 museum, 35 Muslim, 5, 34, 35, 41. See also Uyghuristan

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106

Index

Nahavandian, Mohammad, 79 national agenda, 2, 3 National Iranian Oil Company, 41 nationalism, 41 neither the East nor the West, 2, 19, 64, 81 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 77 neutrality, 6, 41 nonproliferation treaty, 54 North America, xii North Korea, 6–7, 9, 10, 11–12, 18, 48, 51 nuclear club, 55 nuclear deal, 77–78, 78, 79, 81. See also Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear energy, 26 nuclear negotiations, 77–78, 78, 89n16 nuclear program, 49, 54, 59–60, 61, 77, 97. See also Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; nuclear deal; nuclear negotiations

pin code, xi pledge, 2, 75 policy deliberation, 1 policy report, xiii policy wonk, xii, 24 political parturition, 1 political science, xii polyglot, 66 positive-sum relationship, 75. See also symbiotic relationship pragmatism, x, 19, 67n1 president, 18, 50, 52, 53, 61, 65, 75; vice president, 40, 83 prime minister, 76, 77 princeling, 76 principlism, 50–51, 52 privatization, 14n3, 19, 25 pundit, xii, xiii, 7, 24, 78 Pyongyang, 7, 48

Obama administration, 56 oil, 24–25, 25, 40–41, 58, 59, 81, 95; consumption of, 23–24, 28n33, 56; discovery of, 39; oil shock, 63; price, 17, 83 oil shock, 63 Oman, 88n2 one belt, one road. See Silk Road open-door policy, 3, 40 orientation, 2, 22, 32; looking-East, 22, 47, 93n63 Osirak Reactor, 26 overhaul, 2

Qajar, 32

Pahlavi dynasty, 4, 32, 34 Pakistan, 7, 79, 86, 88, 88n2 panda, 52 paramount leader, 14n3, 32 Paris, 82 parliament, 14n6, 18, 50, 77 Parthian shots, 56 peak oil, 24 People’s Liberation Army, 8, 86 Persia, 5, 71n58 Persian carpet, 57 petroleum, 23–24, 28n29, 28n33, 41, 58, 96. See also energy; gas; oil Peugeot, 82 PhD dissertation, xiii

real estate, 62 reconstruction era, 17, 18 reform and opening-up, 2, 12, 95 reform era, 6, 31–32 reformist, 4, 84 Republic of China. See Taiwan research, xii–xiii, 87, 95 research center, xii, 87 responsible stakeholder, 54 rhetoric, 4, 10, 12, 20, 21, 31, 49; China, 2, 52; Iran, 64, 95 rial, 63 rich kids of Tehran, 66 rivalry, 4, 8, 41, 42 RMB, 52 Rome, 82 Rouhani, Hassan, 48, 52, 53, 75–77, 79, 80–81, 97 Russia, 3, 6, 20, 27, 71n58; Afghanistan, 4, 8, 79; JCPOA, 77, 78; Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 42, 61; troika of, 86, 87, 88 Russo–Persian War, 71n58 Saddam, 5 San Francisco, 62

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Index sanctions, 11, 22, 39–40, 49, 55–57, 81, 95; on arms, 13, 21; Chinese role of, 53, 57, 60, 89n16; Crimean crisis, 86; for looking-East, 12, 47–48; for nuclear controversy, 59, 61, 62, 75, 78, 79–80, 96; Peugeot exit, 82; Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 42; Taiwan and Hong Kong, 58–59; Tiananmen incident, 21 Sassanid Empire, 5 satrapy, 88n2 Saudi Arabia, 11, 24, 35, 87 scandal, 56, 57 scholarship, ix, xi, xii, 36, 49. See also Chinese studies; Iranian studies SCO. See Shanghai Cooperation Organization scorched-earth strategy, 56 search engine, xi Security Council, 4, 21, 52–53, 60, 61, 86. See also United Nations separatist, 86 sextet. See the 5+1 group Shah of Iran, 4, 8, 34. See also Pahlavi dynasty Shahnameh, 33 Shanghai, 18, 35, 43n9, 60 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 42, 52, 60–61, 86 Sichuan, 84 Silk Road, 51, 82–83 Singapore, 65 Sinologist, 87 SINOPEC, 41 Skype, 55 slavery, 39 Smith, Arthur, 74n118 socialism, 52 soft power, 87 South Korea, 7, 10, 22, 47, 61, 65, 82 Soviet Union, 2, 4, 7, 14n5, 19; China, 8, 20, 96; North Korea, 15n16 specialist, xii, xiii, 22, 24 stereotype, x Strait of Hormuz, 55 strategic ambiguity, 88 strategic partnership, 84–85, 86, 88 strategicness, 84–85 subsidy, 25, 62, 63

107

Sudan, 29n44 superpower, 2, 4, 6, 52. See also Soviet Union; United States Sydney, 84 symbiotic relationship, 22, 76, 88 Syria, 7, 79 Tabriz, 34 Taipei, 10–11, 58–59 Taiwan, 10–11, 11, 17, 47, 48, 58–59, 65 Taiwan Trade Center, 58 Taiwan–Iran Business Association, 58 Tajikistan, xi, 42 taoguang yanghui, 77 Taxonomy, 36 Terminology, 37, 83 terrorism, 21 tete-a-tete, xi the 5+1 group, 77, 78, 89n16 The Jewish Lobby and American Foreign Policy, 38 think tank, xii, 34 Tiananmen Square, 21, 28n20 Tokyo, 37, 48 traffic, xi Treaty of Turkmenchay, 71n58. See also Turkmenchay trial and error, 2 triple whammy, 62 troika, 86 Turkey, 43n10, 58, 83, 88n2, 92n47 Turkmenchay, 56, 57, 71n58, 77, 82 Turkmenistan, 42, 88n2 Ukraine, 86 UN Security Council, 4, 21, 52–53, 60, 61, 86 undergraduate, xii United Nations, 4, 48, 59 United States, 2, 4, 6, 9, 77, 96; arms embargo, 8, 10; China, 20, 21, 37, 38, 54, 59, 88; dual containment, 21; hostage crisis, 7; Iran–Contra, 7; JCPOA, 77; military confrontation, 96; oil consumption, 41; Persian Gulf, 20; sanctions, 55, 56, 57 University of Tehran, 49 upstream, 24, 28n29 uranium, 77, 78

108

Index

Urumqi, 34, 43n9 Uyghur Khaganate, 34 Uyghuristan, 5, 12, 34–35 Uzbekistan, 42 Vancouver, 84 Venezuela, 50 veto power, 4, 12, 61

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Wang, Yi, 78 Washington, 7, 11, 20, 21, 55, 59, 79 Weltanschauung, 97 Wen, Jiabao, 52 Western Asia, 33, 34, 36, 37, 44n16–44n17 Westoxication, 32

World Bank, 48 Xi, Jinping, 71n72, 76, 83, 86, 87 Xinhua, 37 Xinjiang, 5, 12, 35. See also Uyghuristan Yadavaran, 41 Yahoo, 55 Yalu River, 14n5, 86 Yemen, 79 Yinhe incident, 29n46 zero-sum relationship, 75 Zoellick, Robert, 54

About the Author

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Shirzad Azad is the author of several academic studies, including Koreans in the Persian Gulf: Policies and International Relations. He studied and taught in East Asia from 2005 to 2016.

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