Iqbal, Jinnah, and Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality 9780915984817, 0915984814

Citation preview

/ IQBAL, JINNAH, AND PAKISTAN: / THE VISION AND THE REALITY

Edited by C.M. Naim

Contributors Manvooruddin Ahmed Barbara Metcalf Sheila McDonough Lawrence

Saleem M.M. Qureshi Fazlur Rahman Anwar H. Syed Ziring

Foreign and Comparative Studies / South Asian Series, No. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University

Copyright 1979 by MAXWELL SCHOOL OF CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, SYRACUSE, NEW YORK, U.S.A.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Iqbal, Jinnah, and Pakistan. (Foreign and comparative studies: South Asian Series; no. 5) Papers presented at a conference organized by the Muslim Studies Subcommittee of the Committee on Southern Asian Studies, University of Chicago, in April 1977. 1. Iqbal, Muhammad, Sir, 1877-1938— Political and social views— Congresses. 2. Jinnah, Mahomed All, 1876-1948— Political and social views — Congresses. 3. Pakistan— Politics and govern­ ment— Congresses. I. Naim, C. M. II. Ahmed, Manvooruddln. III. Chicago. University. Committee on Southern Aslan Studies. Muslim Studies Sub­ committee. IV. SeriesDS481.I65I69 954.9*042*0922 79-25477 ISBN 0-915984-81-4

a>t.

M2.1 'TCc'Z PREFACE When Pakistan came into existence in August 1947, the man who is said to have envisioned it had been dead nine years. Barely a year later death also took the man credited with giving the vision its concrete shape* But Pakistan continues to exist, though not with the geographical boundaries it originally claimed.

In the en­

suing years since 1947, controversies and speculations have continued to rage concerning the exact nature of the visionary ideal of Iqbal, the geo-political nation that Jinnah sought and obtained, and the inter-relationships between the two. The discussion is not merely ac­ ademic, for its conclusions directly effect the hopes and prospects of tne people who now constitute the na­ tion of Pakistan— and even of those who now call them­ selves Bangladeshi— and who must continuously strive to give their polity a just and stable form* In April 1977, the Muslim Studies Subcommittee of the Committee on Southern Asian Studies, University of Chicago, organized a small conference to observe the birth centenaries of Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), the poet-philosopner, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) , the Quaid-i-Azam of Pakistan.

The theme of the meeting

was "Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan: The Vision & the Real­ ity." Five papers were presented on that occasion which have now been edited for publication.

Professor Ahmad's

paper deals with the definitions of 'nationalism1 and • communalism' in the public statements of Iqbal and Jin­ nah, implying a harmony of thought which is popularly believed to have existed between the two. Professor Uureshi's paper, on the other hand, suggests a more sym­ biotic relationship, as he brings out their differences in 'personalities, perceptions, and politics.1

Profes­

sor McDonough has sought to introduce a necessary cor­ rective in the debate over Iqbal's concept of

iv 'nationalism,' by delineating the importance of the con­ cept of 'change' in Iqbal's thought and the rarely-recognized self-critical attitude that underlay his thinking. Professor Metcalf, in her brief paper, sketches for us the importance of placing any discussion of 'ideology' within its specific time and place, that changes in the nature of the political arena are as important as the changes in the vocabulary and rhetoric of the political debate. Professor Ziring's paper deals with the post1947 developments in Pakistan and provides a useful sum­ mary description of the 'Reality' to highlight the prob­ lems with the 'Vision.' To these five papers we have added a prefatory note by Professor Fazlur Rahman, who was a discussant at the conference, and an abridged version of an article by Professor Anwar H. Syed. Professor Syed is also con­ cerned with tne questions of 'nationalism* and 'communaiism* in the thought of Iqbal and Jinnah, and comes to some interesting— 'revisionist'?— conclusions concerning the issue that has confounded Pakistani policy for a long time:

must Pakistan be an Islamic state?

An

Afterword by the editor concludes the substantive part of the book.

To supplement the discussion in various

papers and make it easy for the reader to consult the original documents, we nave included appendices of the complete texts of (1) tne 193i> Presidential Address by Iqbal, (2) the 1940 'Pakistan' Resolution passed in an open session by the All India Muslim League, envision­ ing "Independent States," (3) the 1946 resolution pas­ sed by a convention of Muslim League legislators, envi­ sioning "Pakistan Zones" and a single "Independent State," (4) the 1947 speech by Jinnah in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The editor is grateful to the Foreign and Compara­ tive Studies Program of the Maxwell Scnool of Citizensnip and Public Affairs, Syracuse university, and its

V Director, Professor Susan S. Wadley, for accepting this collection for publication in their South Asian Series* Thanks are also due the Committee on Southern Asian Studies of the University of Chicago for their help in organizing the original conference and getting the papers ready for publication*

Finally, grateful appre­

ciation should be expressed to the authors who instintingly cooperated with the editor and made this book possible*

C* M. Naim

Chicago August 28, 1979

CONTENTS PREFACE IQBAL, THE VISIONARY; JINNAH, THE TECHNICIAN AND PAKISTAN, THE REALITY Fazlur Rahman 1*

IQBAL AND JINNAH: PERSONALITIES, PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICS Saleem M.M. Qureshi

2.

IQBAL AND JINNAH ON THE "TWO-NATIONS* THEORY Manvooruddin Ahmed

3.

IQBAL AND JINNAH ON ISSUES OF NATIONHOOD AND NATIONALISM Anwar H* Syed

4.

METAPHORS OF CHANGE IN THE EARLY IQBAL Sheila McDonough IQBAL: IDEOLOGY IN SEARCH OF AN AUDIENCE Barbara Metcalf

5.

6.

THE PHASES OF PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL HISTORY Lawrence Ziring

AFTERWORD C. M. Naim APPENDICES I II III IV

IQBAL'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS OF 1930 THE RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE, 1940 THE RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE MUSLIM LEAGUE LEGISLATORS, 1946 JINNAH*S SPEECH IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN, 1947

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

I

I ! i

i i

IQBAL, THE VISIONARY; JINNAH, THE TECHNICIAN; AND PAKISTAN, THE REALITY Fazlur Rahman Ever since the conversion of Muhammad Iqbal, some­ time durinq his study stay in Europe, from territorial nationalism to Islam, he considered certain values of ethical orientation as crucial both to the survival and development of mankind, values which, in his view, con­ stituted the essence of Islam. We have deliberately used the word "orientation" to dispel any notion that one can find ready-made specific moral imperatives in Iqbal; these are rather to be formulated for specific conditions, by those who would accept his orientation, under the impact of that orientation. It is the "grand design" of this orientation which will determine the ethical value of particular injunctions that are actionspecific, for without this orientation no injunction has any real life, let alone ethical meaninq (and, of course, he knew the Ten Commandments very wellJ). Iqbal came to formulate this orientation after a thorough acquaintance with not only the thought-classics of the Muslim East and the West but also with the actual state of affairs in the Muslim East and the West. So far as the realm of thought is concerned, he remained until the end of his life an admirer of the West and of the Muslim East, except for such currents of thought as he considered to be negative towards this spatio-tempo­ ral world in tne interest of some "higher" spirituality. But it was at the level of actualities that he passed harsh judgments on both the Muslim East and the West. The criterion for these judgments was his principle of 1ishq. This term, which literally means "absorbing love" and which he took over from Sufism, appears to mean, in his usage, a creative forward movement, where

2 forward movement rules out backward or stationary mo­ tion, while the term creative ensures that the movement is meaningful and purposeful and reaches higher planes of spiritual and moral being for men.

Now, while Iqbal

found the Muslim world as somnolent and stationary and hence devoid of *lshq, he found the west alive and mov­ ing, but this movement of the West was not only not mean­ ingful and purposeful for man, it was positively harmful and, indeed, destructive.

The West was inventive, but

not creative in the sense of Iqbal's 1ishq. If one compares Iqbal's critique of the contempor­ ary Muslim community and that of the contemporary West, the result is interesting. The rigidity and immobility of the former ought to draw a much more severe criticism from him than the latter which has at least some motion. And this is, indeed, the case in one sense.

For, while

addressing the Muslim, Iqbal invites him to perform something new, even if it be a sin! But Iqbal patently knows and recurrently acknowledges that the West is do­ ing something new, in fact, it is always up to something new.

Sheila McDonough has pointed out in her paper

in­

cluded elsewhere in this book, that in 1910, Iqbal wrote of the Muslims that the meaning of their contemporary existence was no more than something evidentiary (cf. the Qur'an, 2, 143), for they had become irrelevant to the current of history. A Muslim is one who directs history in a certain ethical direction, he cannot be a plaything of historical forces. But Iqbal was convinced that, in their role as "witnesses on mankind" at least, the existence of Muslims was necessary for the world. Later, he said: Although we [Muslims] are coiled up on ourselves like a bud. Should we perish, this whole garden [of the world] must perish In this verse, a certain inevitability of the Muslims'

3 continued existence for the world is asserted and Iqbal comes to repose some sort of hope in the Muslim commun­ ity. We shall explain the reason for this presently. As for the West, while Iqbal gave it credit for its vast expansion of intellectual life and technology, he accused it of doing grave violence to the ethical and spiritual being of man— to the extent, indeed, of vir­ tually destroying it. The facts upon which this judg­ ment was based were colonialism, capitalistic exploita­ tion and a breakdown -of moral life in Western socie­ ties.

All these ills were basically rooted in Western

secularism. From this point of view, therefore, the movement of the West seemed to him much more ominous than the somnolence of the Muslim world. If the West was too much absorbed in orgiastic technological per­ formance and would not listen to the crying and wounded humanity, perhaps the Muslim could be awakened from his sleep?

And the Muslim had the right prescription (the

Qur'an and the example of Muhammad) for the right ori­ entation (Islam). Muslim.

The problem was how to awaken the

It could be done by motivating him through the

dynamism of the Qur'an, as we shall see presently, but also partly at least, by telling him how well some of his ancestors in history had performed— that he may be inspired. Hence, the "Mosque of Cordiva." We have often pointed out in our writings that his is not the romanticism of the West, as it has often been dubbed. True, during his "nationalist" phase he did define him­ self romantically as, for example, in the last verse of his poem, "The Himalaya": Race backward, 0 Cycle of Time!

2

But after his adoption of Islam as the ideological basis for reconstruction of the world social order and his discovery of Islam's nature as ethical dynamism and its formulation in terms of a creative forward movement &

4 la Western philosophy from Hegel, through Bergson to Whitehead, Iqbal not only never spoke again of cyclic time but denounced it as the surest enchainment of hu­ man progress. In the Javed Nama, the Spirit of India, he complains about the Indian: His gaze is fixed on the past, He is burning his heart with an extinguished fire!3 Indeed, in the "Mosque of Cordiva”

itself, he looked

to a new Islamic future and not to the past, when, after speaking of Western revolutions, the Protestant and the French, he said: The same restlessness exists today in the spirit of the Muslim; This is a divine secret which the tongue cannot utter. Let us see what is thrown up from the bottom of this ocean, What new turn the blue canopy of the heavens takes!^ Compare the "cycle of time" metaphor in the previous quotation with that of the "new turn of the canopy of the heavens" which has nothing of the past about it. Indeed, the gaze of Iqbal was now so fixed on a new fu­ ture that he was even prepared to abandon the "old Mus­ lim world" to the past: Men of vision will establish new settlements; I am not looking [back] at Kufa and Baghdad!5 Iqbal was convinced that Islam, which means the Qur'an and the performance of the Prophet Muhammad, was the cure for the ills of mankind, for Islam was the only genuine movement in history which ethically oriented the raw materials of history rather than compromised with them under the convenient cover of secularism. The very early generations of Islam helped implement this ideal further and, hence, when Iqbal pointed to certain events in past Islamic history, he did so not because he

5 wanted to go back to the past but because they yielded some sort of inspiration. His values were vertically "up," not horizontally in the past. To bring these values into play in the arena of the spatio-temporal world was the task of a Muslim— his "man of faith" (mard-i-mu'min) or "perfect man" (insan-i-kamil), who could comprise the Muslim Community if only it could recover solidarity and its true being. It was for the realization of this ideal that Iqbal dreamed of Muslim autonomy to be carried out in the Mus­ lim majority areas of tne Indian sub-continent.

And it

was for this reason that he explicitly rejected Indian territorialism as the basis for nationhood since nation­ hood, for him, was squarely based on ideology. Iqbal did not talk merely of "two nations" in India but of "nations"— apparently more than two— in his correspond­ ence with Jinnah.

Yet, since he did not explicitly

speak of a multiplicity of sovereign states in India (pernaps because he did not think it realistic under the then existing conditions in the sub-continent), it is a moot point to ask whether and how India could be­ come not only a multi-religious but a multi-national state. In the later years of Iqbal's life, this general Islamic orientation developed more specific content, at least in the economic field: a content which, as an ex­ pression of Islamic egalitarianism and parallel to political democracy, had explicitly surfaced already in his Payam-i-Mashrig and all through his middle period (i.e., the twenties of this century).6

This was econ­

omic egalitarianism or a socializing ideal, expressed in very strong terms in his Urdu poems "Lenin Before God" and "God's Command to Angels" in Bal-i-Jobril.

In

his correspondence with Jinnah in the middle thirties, he criticized Jinnah for not paying enough heed to the economic problem of the average Muslim, and for the

6 fact that the leadership of the Muslim League was think­ ing in aristocratic rather than denocratic terms. He advocated the re-adoption of the principle of Zakat, provided it was suitably interpreted in the light of modern conditions. In those years (around 1935-36), Jinnah was still pre-occupied with his fight for the rights of Muslims in a unitary India, a game which was purely political. He did not seriously believe in Pakistan as a separate en­ tity until 1938.

It is understandable, therefore, that

his thoughts did not move from the immediate political issues to long-range economic ones. tude seems to have been that his job tician

Even later his atti­ as a lawyer-poli-

was to obtain Pakistan front the British, while

the actual shape that Pakistan should take was the bus­ iness of the people of Pakistan. A brilliant lawyer and astute politician, his sense of the immediately practi­ cal and the achievable set him quite apart from the vi­ sionary Iqbal. Nor did Jinnah have in his camp others who might be called ideologues, properly speaking. There was thus no middle term linking the vision of Iqbal with the immediate practicality of Jinnah, a middle term that could translate Islam effectively into policy goals and imperatives of public life in the newly-born "labor­ atory of Islam" as Liaquat Ali Khan described Pakistan. Hence the bewildering variety of "experiments" that have been tried in this "laboratory," during its brief but checkered history. It is undeniable, however, that Jinnah did adopt the doctrine of economic justice, at least in general terms, as propounded by Iqbal.

The clearest proof of

this is the speech delivered by him on the occasion of the inauguration of the State Bank of Pakistan (the speech was actually drafted by Zahid Husain, the first governor of the State Bank), in which he heavily attacked the landlords' class and accused them of the socioeconomic

7 ruination of the peasantry,the large bulk of itants of Pakistan. Jinnah the materialization of this

the inhab­

died too soon for not goal but also for the

only actual

spelling out of the goal itself into concrete policies. The goal still remains obscure and unpredictable and, at present at least, under heavy clouds. The main reason for this situation and for the in­ ability of Pakistan to define her Islamic goals in con­ crete terms has been the terribly confused ideological situation over the past thirty or more years.

A few

years before the partitioning of India, a fundamentalist party had been founded in what is now Pakistan with its center at Lahore.

This organized fundamentalism was

the culmination of a strong trend of reaction against both the West and the Muslim Modernists who, since the mid-nineteenth century, had interpreted certain modern Western institutions (political democracy, women's

rights, modern education) in Islamic terms in ordar to reform Islamic society. The fundamentalist reaction, which became ever stronger since the turn of this cen­ tury along with political anti-Westernism, gained momen­ tum as the goal of freedom from British colonialism dretf nearer. In such situations all societies make bids for cultural reassertion against the intrusion of the dom­ inating and domineering imperial culture, and this development is not only natural but perfectly healthy. Such a phenomenon, since it reacts, is valuable as a protest against compromises if these go too far and puts its foot firmly down at certain points. The Pakistani Islamic fundamentalism (like most other Islamic funda­ mentalist phenomena), however, substituted its essen­ tially reactionary role for the positive Islamic recon­ struction program and was able to enlist the support of middle-middle and particularly lower-middle urban classes. The most surprising thing is that while it itself was a defensive mechanism, it managed to put the

8 Modernist on the defensive and confuse him. Take for example the opening clause of the Pakistan Constitu­ tion (s) that talks about the 'sovereignty of God Al­ mighty over the Universe.' Tnis clause, which kept the Pakistan Constituent Assembly tied up for six or seven years, represents a sheer confounding of the fundamental­ ists between the Qur'anic assertion that "to God belongs the kingdom of the neaven and the earth," and the idea of political sovereignty discussed in modern political theory. Such confusions have pervaded and bedeviled all public fields of Pakistani life— not the least being the fundamentalist contention that modern banking is unlaw­ ful in Islam because the Qur'an had banned an extremely cruel and exploitative system of usury called Riba. There can be no doubt that fundamentalism will be short­ lived because being essentially a reaction, it can offer little positive, but its brief career probably will not end without doing great damage to Pakistan in several ways, unless, of course, the actual exercise of power on the part of its representatives (should they be able to wield power for a considerable time) should result in a drastic cnange in some of their attitudes.

9

Notes 1. Muhammad Iqbal, Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, Farsi (Lahore: Ghulam All, 1973), p. 120. Rumuz-l-Bekhudl (1918).

Sh.

2. Muhammad Iqbal, Kulliyat-1-Iqbal, Urdu (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali, 1973), p. 23. Bang-1-Dlra (1924), "Himalaya" (before 1905). 3.

Kulliyat, Farsi, p. 732.

4. Kulliyat, Urdu, p. 392. l-Qartaba" (ca. 1932). 5.

Ibid.. p. 362.

Javed Namah (1932). Bal-i-Jibril (1935), "Masjid-

Ibid., ghazal no. 50, second set.

6 . See this expression as early as Payam-i-Mashriq (1922) in Kulliyat, Farsi, pp. 204, 215, and 216, and Zabur-i-?Ajam (1927?) in ibid., pp. 86-8 8 .

i i

Chapter 1 IQBAL AND JINNAH: PERSONALITIES, PERCEPTIONS AND POLITICS Saleem M.M. Qureshi Two personalities loom large on the Muslim politi­ cal horizon of twentieth century India— Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The vision of one and the leadership of the other led to an act of political cre­ ation— the State of Pakistan. Iqbal and Jinnah are thus the two great national heroes and revered personalities of Pakistan to the ex­ clusion of practically all others. The purposes of this paper are to attempt to: actual people,

(1) focus on these heroes as

(2) penetrate beyond the image, the myth,

(3) clarify their actual roles in the independence strug­ gle, and (4) understand how they are likely to go down in history. The objectives will be met by comparing and analyzing Iqbal and Jinnah from three perspectives: their personalities including their family backgrounds and the influences that shaped their personalities, their perceptions of themselves and the world around them, and finally the venue and the instrument that each used to achieve what became the common objective, an independ­ ent Pakistan. Personalities A number of features appear common to and Jinnah. The most obvious is that both

both Iqbal were Muslims

of recent origin, i.e., their families had been Muslim for just about three generations.

Both went to England,

both were called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn, and, after a stay of about three years, both returned to India, With the brief exception of Iqbal teaching Philosophy

12 at Government College, Lahore, and Jinnah working as a Presidency Magistrate in Bombay, both practiced law, both were elected to legislative assemblies, and both came to be convinced of the indispensability of a sepa­ rate Muslim sovereignty. Iqbal formulated, or reformu­ lated, the concept and inspired its natural supporters. Jinnah planned and executed the strategy that led to the realization of Iqbal's vision and Jinnah's own final conclusion about the destiny of Muslim India. Beyond these surface similarities dwell deep and profound differences in all three areas. The differ­ ences, however, did not impinge upon the conviction of either for the desirability of Pakistan. Iqbal's was a reflective, pensive and introspec­ tive personality, sensitive to its social, cultural, economic and political environment spatially and histor­ ically.

He saw the suffering, degradation and depriva­

tion of his fellow man, internalizing the anguish of the humanity he most identified with.

He expressed his con­

cerns both about the temporal as well as the spiritual life of his fellow man in a most stirring and inspiring message.

Iqbal used the medium of poetry (a natural

and, in his case, a most effective gift)— as well as prose, writing in three languages— Urdu, Persian and English to convey his message.

Even his earliest poetry

shows deep human concerns. Iqbal had already received advanced education, an M.A. in Philosophy, and had taught for a few years be­ fore he went to England at the age of 28. There, in addition to studying law, he worked for a B.A., mainly in Oriental Studies at Trinity College (Cambridge Uni­ versity) , and wrote a Ph.D. dissertation on Persian mysticism for Munich University. Higher education in literature and philosophy and Western research method­ ology exposed Iqbal to a wide range of ideas, and en­ dowed him with the abilities to compose his views and

13 communicate them effectively and inspiringly. Jinnah*s seems to have been a reserved, shy and in­ troverted but strong personality, achievement-oriented and determined to succeed. Failure, as Jinnah himself said, was a word unknown to him. His private secretary M. H. Saiyid described Jinnah as resolute, independent, capable of bearing hardships and confident of his own abilities, a man who would pursue a goal if he himself considered it worthwhile though others might find it farfetcned.^ The qualities which Jinnah himself admired and endeavored to live by were character, courage, in­ dustry and perseverance. However, some others like J. Alva, witn a more detached and analytical eye consid­ ered that Jinnah, "the stormy petrel of Gray's Inn," was an individualist, an egotist, vain, ambitious, dominat­ ing and difficult to work with: "If you want him with you, you must put him at the top."^ On the other side, Jinnah's cordiality, probity and integrity were acknowl­ edged even by his critics. Though arrogant, he was in­ corruptible? though not a philanthropist and not known for giving favors, Jinnah also never asked for favors. Before completing his high scnool education Jinnah left for England at the age of 16. The three years he spent there led to the successful completion of legal training and supposedly to some political apprenticeship. Iqbal's family background was rather numble, if not working class. Hard work, frugality and the gener­ osity of his older brother paid for Iqbal's education. Jinnah's was a merchant family, rich enough to send young Mohammad Ali to England and to count at least one Englishman as a friend of his father. For Iqbal, the religious atmosphere in the house and the Sufi piety of his father were an early influence which, coupled with his personal interest and quest for knowledge led him to the feet of masters in Arabic, Persian, Islamics and philosophy.

Jinnah's family background, on the other

14 hand, does not seem to have offered much by

way of

ideas beyond leading him into an early legal career. The business tradition of his family and the embarrass­ ments caused by lack of money on his return from England seem to have imbued Jinnah with a rather exaggerated im­ portance of independence, financial and otherwise. Jin­ nah earned great amounts and lived a life of luxury, though not of indulgence. Iqbal, on the other hand, made just enough to get by and lived rather simply. In terms of family background, interests, education, concerns and dispositions, it seems Iqbal and Jinnah were as dissimilar as they could be. Perceptions Iqbal perceived the world as basically divided be­ tween the West and the East. The Westwas symbolized by Britain.

In terms of the actual experience Iqbal had

as an Indian Muslim, it was seen as capitalistic, impe­ rialistic, materialistic, dominant, powerful but also exploitative, decadent, destructive of human happiness and unable to provide a philosophy and moral structure capable of ameliorating the condition of the poor masses or of providing an ideology and motivation for spiritual resurgence and an ethical-temporal activity. The East he saw as subdued and dominated, exploited and humili­ ated but capable of rising again.

Iqbal believed a

humanitarian religious philosophy and a high moral code to be imperative for the elimination of exploitation and repression on the part of the West and for the promotion of regeneration in the East. For Iqbal Islam alone could provide such a philosophy and such a moral code. In his numerous statements and speeches, as well as in his poetry, Iqbal returns again and again to this theme. No specific Muslim country is Iqbal's ideal:

it is

rather the ideal realm of Islam or the ideal of exist­ ence emanating from the spirit of Islam with which

15 Iqbal's thought is imbued.

In idolizing Islam, Iqbal

is often carried away and contrasts it with Christian­ ity— not the ideal world of Christianity but the actual one as Iqbal saw it exist in Europe, As a Muslim and as an Indian Iqbal finds in his living world the domination of an alien race, the hos­ tility of another religion, and the repression of the Muslim peasantry in a feudal structure. It is a world Iqbal cannot accept. It must be changed. The only agent for the change Iqbal would like to see is the pton revealed by God to Prophet Muhammad,

This plan can be

implemented only by the self-willed action of the Mus­ lim, the ceaseless spiritual activity Iqbal defines as ego. But the ego Iqbal is concerned with is not that of an individual for Iqbal sees no meaningful life in isolation; it is only within the community that such ceaseless activity, the ego, can find meaning: The the The the

individual exists in the cohesion of community, in isolation he is nothing. wave exists within the ocean, outside ocean it is nothing.3

In order for the community to provide a suitable envi­ ronment for the development of the ego, the community must control its destiny because the ego cannot survive in submission.

This conclusion leads Iqbal to the

formulation of his political philosophy, a philosophy which demands that the Muslim community must have politica independence within its own state if it is in majority--i.e., nationalism— or complete self-determination if in a numerical minority— i.e., Muslim nation­ alism, Iqbal strenuously rejects the idea of territorial nationality, for on the one side it subordinates the distinction of Muslim and non-Muslim and on the other it impinges on the universalistic character of Islam. In his early years he did compose poems which eulogize

16 a common Indian nationality and admonish both the Hindus and Muslims on their separate tendencies. However, by the time he returns from England he seems convinced of the desirability of a separate Muslim development. This concept is further developed, appealingly formulated and forcefully presented in his famous 1930 presidential ad­ dress to the All India Muslim League.

His views on Mus­

lims as a nation were not fully understood at the time since he rejects territorial nationalism yet demands a separate territorial homeland for Muslims.

Yet although

Iqbal is concerned with polity and society and propounds ideal solutions, he does not concern himself with de­ tails: he offers no specific scheme pertaining to the socioeconomic structure and the political system he would like established. Iqbal's concern with the plight, degradation and exploitation of the poor, his intense opposition to op­ pression of every kind attracts him toward socialism. In the Russian Revolution he sees the elimination of despotism, feudalism and capitalism and a beginning to­ wards the establishment of justice and equality. He is so much enthused by this new creed and its first imple­ mentation that he embraces it in the name of 'Bolshevism plus God is equal to Islam.' Iqbal's notion of social­ ism, however, seems rather simplistic for he fails to distinguish between a system of religious charity as prescribed by Islam and a scientific scheme of society founded on the concept of human rights. He also had little understanding of what social revolution meant and how would or could it be brought about. In the words of Jan Marek, Iqbal "thought of revolution as an obscure mystic force which emanates from hidden sources and, with a stroke, changes the world for the better." Kuropeanination, at least in principle, did not appeal to Iqbal— yet both of his sons followed their father's footsteps to Lincoln's Inn.

He opposed

4

17 European ways of life, Europeanization of Indians, even English instruction in Indian middle and high schools. However, his most profound work on Islam as well as his political testament were both written in English, as also were most of his statements and speeches and let­ ters. Iqbal's European exposure was spread over a pe­ riod of about three years, most of it in England, dur­ ing which he qualified for the Bar, and earned a B.A. as well as a Ph.D.

It seems improbable that with all

this work he also had-much time and opportunity to ob­ serve, probe and understand the European ways of life and hence to be able to criticize them and proscribe them for Indians. With his admiration for the German philosophers, his use of European research methods and learning from European academics, in short with his be­ ing in considerable debt to European scholarship, it seems contradictory that Iqbal should proscribe for his fellow Indians the very same thing he prescribed for himself and his sons. This contradiction or the rela­ tionship of hate-love towards the West is shared by many Indian Muslims and Iqbal voices it with consider­ able feeling— the realization by a proud Muslim that the West is ahead of the world of Islam in almost every respect, and his inner anguish at the backwardness of his own people, compelling him to admire the achieve­ ments of the West but also to hate since in comparison his own world appears inferior. Jinnah, unlike Iqbal, went to England at a very young age and though he also spent the same period of time there as Iqbal did, he only studied law. Jinnah returned from England an Englishman, wore only English clothes, spoke only English and with a British accent, kept horses and dogs in the style of English country squires, and visited Europe almost every year. At one time he even abandoned India altogether, took up resi­ dence in England and set up his legal practice before

18 the Privy Council.

If Jinnah had any preference for a

particular way of life it was obviously and decidedly the English way. It appears quite obvious that he con­ sidered this choice a personal and not a philosophical preference for he neither eulogized nor castigated the East or the West, Islam or Christianity.

In other mat­

ters pertaining to life style as well, Jinnah's atti­ tude was eclectic. He never preached nor philosophised about how people should live: ual to decide for himself.

it was for every individ­

Unlike Iqbal, Jinnah considered religion a purely personal matter.

He was neither concerned with the

world of Islam nor even with Indian Muslims exclusively until almost the twilight of his life, and whatever con­ cern he did show was entirely political, not even social and never religious— to the extent that he rebuked his admirers when they eulogized him as 'Maulana Mohammad Ali Jinnah Zindabad,' saying that he was only their political leader, not their religious leader. Jinnah's attitude towards the one religious issue which gripped Muslim India completely— the Khilafat issue— could only be described as one of indifference.

While Muslim India

was stirred to the core by this highly religious and emotional issue and countless Muslims willingly and en­ thusiastically faced arrest, imprisonment and depriva­ tion, Jinnah does not seem to have taken any mentionable stand on its behalf. As a matter of fact, the first and the most pronounced period of agitational politics of Indian Muslims also happens to be a period of relative political inactivity on the part of Jinnah, considering the role he played earlier as the president of the All India Muslim League and as the architect of the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Jinnah's detachment from the Khilafat agitation, though that was the most obvious path to political popularity at that time and many a political reputation was built on riding the crest of

19 this wave, is also indicative of his conviction which was based upon his conscience and upon moral consider­ ations. Jinnah perceived a proper world to rest upon the pillars of legal order, justice and fair play and developments in India seemed to be moving in that direc­ tion until Gandhi appeared on the scene.

It was Gandhi's

mystical approach and the injection of agitational poli­ tics that Jinnah sensed to be destructive of the orderly world he wanted to promote, and finding himself unable to stem the tide of Gandhi-sponsored agitational and emotional politics, Jinnah decided to withdraw rather than be a party against his convictions. He expressed his concerns in a letter toGandhi in 1920 in response to the latter*s invitation to join him: I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me "to take my share in the new life that has opened up before the country." If by "new life" you mean your methods and programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster • • . your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the pub­ lic life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even be­ tween fathers and sons. • . . All this means complete disorganization and chaos. What the consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate* . . .5 All these instances are revealing of Jinnah's concerns and from them we may conclude that Jinnah's main moti­ vations were political, not religious, Indian not Is­ lamic, favoring constitutional and orderly develop­ ment, not chaotic and agitational politics, though in the short run the latter might appear more glorious, popular and successful. Jinnah wrote precious little beyond his corre­ spondence. He did, however, deliver countless speeches and issued numerous statements and these are our only

20 clues to his concerns, thinking, feelings and attitudes. He never wrote long letters, never discussed any sub­ stantive matter in those letters, and never divulged his thoughts or plans* His speeches and statements, by and large, pertain to political matters and are either re­ actions to political developments or intended to arouse reactions in his political adversaries. Even when Jin­ nah finally gives up his All India dream of a free united India, he is concerned with political power for the Muslim Community, not with the community's religion or its religious philosophy. Unlike Iqbal, Jinnah never spoke or wrote about Islam beyond the generalities con­ tained in his messages issued on occasions of religious festivities. While Iqbal was deeply concerned with the religious solidarity of Muslims and hence condemned Qadianism as a divisive element on the issue of the finality of Mohammad's prophethood, Jinnah does not seem to have been perturbed by this issue. He must have reposed full confidence in Qadianis for he entrusted Pakistan's for­ eign affairs to a Qadiani. Both Iqbal and Jinnah saw the same human environ­ ment, including the misery and oppression of the poor, but while this turned Iqbal against despotism, capital­ ism and imperialism as the causes of this suffering and towards socialism as its cure, Jinnah does not give any indication of a similar anguish. Of the four major po­ litical proposals enunciated by Jinnah during his long political career, i.e., the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Fourteen Points of 1929, the Election Manifesto of 1936 and the Lahore Resolution of 1940, only the Election Manifesto has any reference to concrete benefits for the Muslim poor, and for obvious reasons. Even the La­ hore Resolution, the foundation stone of the new state being demanded in the name of the Muslim people— the masses— is singularly unconcerned with the plight of

21 zhe Muslim poor and, along with the Lucknow Pact and zhe Fourteen Points, is purely a political document dealing entirely with political power. Twice in his political career Jinnah felt compelled to embark upon palliative mobilization of nis constituency— in response to the perceived threat emanating from the Congress mass contact resolution of 1936, and in the 1940s in order to demonstrate tnat Muslim India did in fact endorse the new state demanded in its name— and on both occasions he appealed to the Muslimness of his community rather than promising actual economic benefits or other social up­ lift.

While Iqbal, as he himself said, would make his

state socialist if he were its ruler, Jinnah never made any similar pronouncement regarding Pakistan. By asso­ ciating with the upper crust of the Muslim society and maintaining the Muslim League as an elite organization, and, after tne establishment of Pakistan, by appointing to high government positions mainly landlords, indus­ trialists and other economic conservatives, Jinnah in­ sured that Pakistan would not drift toward socialism. Socialism did not form part of Jinnah's rhetoric, though he did occasionally express his concern at the plight of the poor. However, beyond pious hopes that the rich would look after tne poor Jinnah neither evolved any economic scheme for Pakistan benefiting

the poor nor

did he seek out individuals with such views to entrust to them the economic development of Pakistan. This leads us to the conclusion that in the scheme of Jin­ nah's concerns, the uplift of the poor, though a noble cause, had to take place under the control and supervi­ sion of the elites with the poor themselves playing a subordinate role. In Jinnah's perception there seems to be no place for Iqbal's eloquent call: Arise and awaken the poor of my world! Pull down the walls of the mansions of the rich!6

22 In terms of narrower and personal attitudes toward money and the material world, Iqbal seems to have shown a disdain for money and what money stands for— he would accept cases only up to the 10th of the month which would give him enough to live by— and lived rather sim­ ply and frugally.

Jinnah made a fortune in money and

lived a luxurious and high class life, owning the best of everything. However, Jinnah was very careful with his money, some would say miserly, for he seldom parted with his own money except in personal pursuits. Iqbal's perceptions and concerns may be called hu­ man, moral, spiritual and universal; he lived primarily in the realm of ideas and had a profound inner life. Jinnah seems to have altogether lacked an inner life, his concerns were mainly mundane and narrowly defined— political power for the Muslim elites under his own leadership, obtained in an orderly, legal manner with justice and fair play for all parties.

The two main

vocations Jinnah seems to have concentrated his entire energies upon were law and politics, while Iqbal also delved in law, mainly of necessity.

Needless to say,

Jinnah excelled in both, Iqbal not particularly in either. Politics In subordinate politics, a political career is neither a matter of choice nor a specified, specialized pursuit.

Generally political inputs are restricted and

most collective endeavors come under political regula­ tion. Consequently, the politics that is open to the indigenous population is usually agitational since ul­ timate decision-making and allocation of resources.are not related to popular endorsement. Only those who have independent means or are willing to put up with finan­ cial or vocational deprivation have the opportunity to play any political role. In the colonies, thus, politics

23 seems to have been the preserve of the elites and the agitationists. It was therefore not unusual that both Iqbal and Jinnah participated in the political life of India. Iqbal's active participation in politics was, as compared to Jinnah, of a short duration. It was mainly confined to the province of the Punjab and starts only in 1923 with Iqbal showing willingness to be a candi­ date for the Punjab Legislative Council. He success­ fully contested the actual election in 1926 and served one term. Thereafter, and to the end of his life, he was mainly involved with the affairs of the Punjab Pro­ vincial Muslim League and extremely concerned with the politics of the Muslims in India. It was during this period that he delivered the presidential address of the All India Muslim League (1930), participated as a Mus­ lim delegate in the Round Table Conference in London (1931), and wrote the famous political letters to Jin­ nah (1936-37). Jinnah's political career spans almost half a cen­ tury, from 1906 when he first participated in the All India Congress session to the time of his death as the governor general of Pakistan in 1948. From 1910 to the end of the British dominion he was an elected member of the Central Legislative Assembly with two brief inter­ vals, and during most of this period he occupied a very prominent position on the central stage of Indian poli­ tics. His association with the All India Muslim League started somewhat late but once it had begun it remained a lifelong commitment. It was as president of the Mus­ lim League that Jinnah led the movement which culmin­ ated in the creation of Pakistan. Initially both Iqbal and Jinnah advocated one In­ dian nationality— a very normal stand since at this point the 'we' seen in juxtaposition to the alien 'they'— but, while Iqbal changed his political

24 trajectory

almost as early as 1909, it took Jinnah

about three decades to reach the same destination. Both ultimately became convinced that the object worth striv­ ing for was the self-determination of Muslims in India as a separate and distinct nation, not one Indian naticn which Iqbal considered undesirable and Jinnah unpracti­ cal.

They both arrived at the same conclusion:

Iqbal

deriving the reasons through his dialectics and Jinnah learning his lesson through political apprenticeship? this also explains the time differential— Iqbal very early and Jinnah very late. Iqbal’s concept of nationality, i.e., Muslim nation­ ality, is derived from his concept of what it means to be a Muslim.

His ideal community is a human unity anchored

in Islamic values. tory-free.

It is therefore universal and terri-

The western concept of nationality, on the

contrary, is territory-bound and excludes religious con­ siderations altogether. Iqbal rejected it and on the same basis also rejected a religiously mixed Indian na­ tionality. But even Indian Muslims had to live on some territory and the only place where they could endeavor to realize the ideal values of Islam or to approximate their individual and collective existence in accordance with the divine revelation would be that territory where they constituted a majority and consequently would be able to dominate its politics.

Iqbal, therefore, de­

manded that Muslims must have control of those regions of British India wnere they comprised the majority of the population. This argument constituted the basis of Iqbal's advocacy of the establishment of the right of self-determination for the Muslims of Northwest India. However, Iqbal did not indicate what would become of the sizeable non-Muslim population in the Muslim territory, whether they would be asked to leave or allowed to live as jizya paying zimmis.

In view of its lack of clarity

and absence of practical detail, Iqbal's 19 30

25 pronouncement was taken more as an ideological restate­ ment of the traditional Muslim view of politics by a poet-philosopher rather than as a concrete plan intended for actual implementation.

Consequently, it was not

then considered a call for the partition of India, though in fact it did later serve that very purpose and was used to provide a philosophical and ideological basis for the state of Pakistan.

From his own words

Iqbal seems neither so certain of the inevitability of partition nor so emphatic about its indispensability. In later years, and particularly during the twilight of his life, Iqbal became more emphatic and concrete in his proposals about the desirability of a Muslim state. The actual achievement of partition, however, was to be the destiny of Jinnah once he had been converted to the cause espoused by Iqbal. The evidence of Jinnah's politics vividly brings out the compulsions inherent in the politics of national liberation. In the initial phase it starts out as the activity primarily confined to elites acting as a pres­ sure group to obtain minor concessions from the colon­ ial rulers.

But as the mere form of autonomy is re­

placed by substance, even if restricted, mobilization of the supportive constituency for a share of real power inevitably leads to an increasingly clearer il­ lumination of the components of the national fabric. If these components are not harmonious but disparate and if there is a previous history of mutual antagonism, elite cohesion of the initial phase is incrementally replaced by elite competition inevitably leading to constituency competition, and the once seemingly solid national fabric is torn asunder by the incompatible demands of the disparate components.

Or, to put it the

other way, the disparateness of the components is in­ evitably emphasized as the discordant elites compete for political power and, to back up their respective

26 claims, mobilize their natural, i.e., the ascriptive constituencies. Jinnah's long political career spans the extremes of "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity" and "rank communalist," and he may have been both to those who found him an instrument of their policy at one stage and an imped­ iment at the other. A closer scrutiny of Jinnah's poli­ tics, however, reveals that he was essentially an "In­ dian Muslim," never only an Indian and never only a Mus­ lim, though some of his pronouncements were subjected to one-sided interpretations, such as this statement of 19 31: I am an Indian first and a Muslim afterwards. But at the same time I agree that no Indian can ever serve his country if he neglects the interests of the Muslims.7 Jinnah, early in his career, aligned himself with the Indian National Congress

then the only political party

with a potential for the realization of the nationalists' aspirations, hoping that he could help the Muslims bet­ ter from within the Congress, by using group pressure, than from without, by acting as an individual. He saw that Muslims were in the same boat as other Indians and concluded that India's political progress would inevit­ ably be advantageous to Muslims as well. He considered colonial rule the bane of India— of both Hindus and Mus­ lims— and its elimination required public solidarity, essentially that of Hindus and Muslims.

But this soli­

darity must be based on the separateness of the Muslims, not on their merger in an Indian conglomerate. As early as October 1916— three months before the conclusion of the Lucknow Pact— Jinnah, presiding over the 16th Bombay Provincial Conference which was attended perhaps by more Hindus than Muslims,explained: The Muhammedans want proper, adequate and effective representation. . • . But (they)

27 further require that representation. . . should be secured to them by means of separate electorates. The question of separate electorates has been before the country since 1909 and rightly or wrongly the Mussalman community is absolutely determined for the present to insist upon separate electorates. To most of us the question is no more open to further dis­ cussion or argument, as it has become a mandate of the community.3 In Jinnah's view Hindus and Muslims were 'two great sis­ ter communities.' They should cooperate with each other in the cause of the motherland and have an attitude of goodwill and brotherly feeling towards each other be­ cause that was the only way to India's real progress. However, "with regard to our own affairs," Jinnah said in 1916, "we can depend upon nobody but ourselves."

9

If Muslims were organized, the Hindus, even though dom­ inant in government on account of their majority, would not be able to act unilaterally and in opposition to Muslim wishes. During the twenties, in order to make Indian de­ mands more effective by promoting greater and more har­ monious cooperation between the Hindus and Muslims so as to secure more meaningful concessions from London, Jinnah persuaded Muslims to abandon separate elector­ ates provided Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. ac­ quired provincial status and Muslims were guaranteed one third of the seats in the central legislature. But* while the Hindus wanted the Muslims to give up separate electorates, they themselves were unwilling to concede the other concessions the Muslims demanded. It became a case of the maximization of political power, and as the Hindu elites endeavored to absorb the Muslim con­ stituency within their fold by emphasizing its Indianness, the Muslim elites felt compelled to emphasize the disparateness of the Muslims from the Hindus in or­ der to retain the Muslims as their own ascriptive constituency.

28 This competition for the loyalty of the Muslims coincided with the grant of a considerable measure of internal autonomy to be implemented after India-wide elections, held in 1937.

Jinnah had recently returned

to India from his self-imposed exile in England and in the brief period before the elections had endeavored to resuscitate the All India Muslim League which had be­ come moribund during his absence.

It was Jinnah's quest

for Muslim solidarity and his support for the All India Muslim League on one side, and the inability of the Hindu elites to accommodate the aspiring but cooperative Muslim elites on the other that ultimately sealed the fate of a united India and eventually intertwined Iqbal's dream and Jinnah's destiny.

Specifically, it was Iqbal's

concern for Muslim solidarity and unity for the purpose of advancing and protecting the exclusive Muslin inter­ ests— which he was convinced the Hindus would not do— and Jinnah's pique at the Congress spurning his repeated, including the latest, offer of cooperation for contest­ ing the elections on an agreed program and, later, the Congress attempting to destroy the Muslim League by lur­ ing the Leaguers away with promises of ministerial of­ fices, that for the first time created an identity of interests and objectives between these two great Muslim leaders. Jinnah toured India to organize Muslims in the Mus­ lim League for contesting the elections but found provincial and parochial loyalties, especially in the regions of their majorities, and provincial Muslim leaders unwilling to support the Muslim League.

But, as

Jinnah's secretary Saiyid recorded, "in the midst of all this darkness there shone a flickering light in Lahore? he was the only consolation of J i n n a h . I q b a l , who had been zealously promoting Muslim solidarity and sup­ porting the Muslim League for a decade and a half, now came forth with his concrete suggestions and proposals

29 which enabled Jinnah to give the Muslim League the kind of warmth and attractiveness that gradually became irresistable to the Muslim masses.

Iqbal advised Jinnah

to include in the statement to be issued by the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in June 1936, the following points Indirect election to the Central Assembly has made it absolutely essential that the Muslim representatives returned to the Provincial Assemblies should be bound by an All India Muslim policy and programme so that they should return to the Central Assembly only those Muslims who would be pledged to support the specific Muslim questions connected with the Central sub­ jects and arising out of their position as the second great nation of India.H In his presidential address to the Indian National Congress Jawaharlal Nehru had argued that the economic problems were paramount and that the Congress should undertake a Muslim Mass Contact program in order to se­ cure their loyalty to the Congress.

Iqbal saw a snare

and wrote to Jinnan: I suppose you have read Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's address • • • and that you fully realise the policy underlying it in so far as Indian Muslims are concerned. • . .While we are ready to cooperate with other Pro­ gressive Parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete or­ ganization of Indian Muslims. • . • You should immediately hold an All India Mus­ lim Convention in Delhi . . . (and) to this Convention you must restate as clearly and as strongly as possible the political ob­ jective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country. It is ab­ solutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater conse­ quence to most Indian Muslims.12

30 Iqbal was pleased to hear from Jinnah that the latter would bear in mind the proposed suggestions and wrote back to Jinnah that while "the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much responsefrom the Muslims," the problem of bread had become acute for the Muslim, "and the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve this question.1,13 Iqbal found a solution to this problem in the Law of Islam, the Shari'at: But the endorsement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States. • . • Anyhow I have given you my own thoughts in the hope that you will give them serious consideration. • • •Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties. Since the Law of Islam could only be applied in a Muslim state which could be established only in the Muslim majority areas Iqbal suggested to Jinnah "that the Mus­ lims of North-West India and Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority provinces. This is the best course to adopt in the interests of both Muslim majority «15 provinces." Iqbal died in 1938 long before his dream was real* ized. Even his plan had not yet been adopted by the League. In November 1937 Jinnah appealed to the Con­ gress to settle with the Muslims since the League and the Congress had the same aim. However, the Congress reply was a statement by Nehru asserting that the Con­ gress enjoyed the confidence of the Muslims more than the League did. Believing in what Nehru had said, the Congress, though willing to secure the adherence of the League to India's independence, was unwilling to accord the League the status of the 'sole authoritative organ­ ization of Muslim India1 in spite of the fact that the Lucknow Pact of 1916 had been based on these very

31 assumptions. Accordingly, negotiations between Jinnah and the Congress presidents— Rajendra Prasad in 1935, Jawaharlal Nehru in 1936 and Subhas Chandra Bose in 1937— as well as Mahatma Gandhi himself in 1944— re­ peatedly fell through because of the Congress insist­ ence that it could not deal with the Muslim League on this basis.16 Additionally, in the euphoria of Con­ gress victories in 1937, Nehru, the Congress president further affronted the Muslims by declaring that there were only two parties in India, namely, the British Government and the Congress, thus questioning not only the position but the very existence of the League. This was the last straw on the camel's back. Finally giving up his three decades' efforts at cooperation, Jinnah declared during his speech on the Finance Bill in the Central Legislature in March 19 39: . . . that the Congress Party is (sic) not only hostile to the Muslim League bat they are inimical. Therefore, I say to them that cooperation between you and us is not possible . • . [and that the Congress and the British] combined will never succeed in destroying our souls . . . you may over­ power us; you may oppress us; and you can do your worst. But we have come to the conclusion and we have now made a grim re­ solve that we shall go down, if we have to go down, fighting.17 In accordance with Iqbal's wish for Jinnah to call an All India Muslim Convention and to indicate the course of action the Muslims would eventually have to take, Jinnah, in his presidential address to the All India Muslim League on March 22, 1940, declared: The problem in India is not of an intercommunal but manifestly of an international character and it must be treated as such . . . . If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this sub-contin­ ent, the only course open to us all is to

32 allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national States.1® The 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity* had now become a 'rank communalist.' In a private conversation with his secretary Saiyid, Jinnah once said "Iqbal is no more amongst us but had he been alive he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do.'*19 Concept of the State Iqbal's primary concern was with the inner life of man, with the moral aspects of life rather than with in­ stitutions and structures. As a poet and a philosopher it was the moral side of life that Iqbal remained en­ grossed in, eulogizing the ideal and grieving over the sad state of actual life.

During his own life time the

need for him to be concerned with the concrete reality of the state he had advocated did not arise, and even the possibility of self-rule for Muslims, though ap­ proaching closer, was yet uncertain. In fact, he him­ self did not see the Muslim League adopt his proposal as its official demand. Thus Iqbal's intellectual energies were primarily focused on the consolidation of the na­ tion— the Muslim nation— so that eventually this nation could claim its own state. In Iqbal's view forms of government and structures of institutions were of little consequence as he said that: . . * the ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of individual men.2® He found democracy distasteful since "colossal oppres­ sion masquerades in the robes of democracy," and at best he considered it a mechanistic device in which only num21

bers are counted, not the worth of the individuals. A Iqbal considered a religious foundation as the first

33 principle for any society and proclaimed that "be it a monarchy or a democratic show, if faith is removed from politics what is left is mere tyranny*"22 For Iqbal, religion could not be separated from politics since re­ ligion alone could endow men with the moral fiber neces­ sary for good governance. Iqbal, however, did not favor theocracy, a government run by the *ulama. As a matter of principle Iqbal was against the 'ulama assum­ ing state roles or the establishment of a council of 'ulama because that would separate the functionaries of religion from laymen and for Iqbal there cannot be a juxtaposition of the spiritual and the temporal.

Iqbal's

ideal polity would be a society firmly anchored on a re­ ligious foundation and ruled by what may perhaps be des­ cribed as an aristocracy of Islamic intellect. Jinnah, the founding father, was called upon not only to govern the new state but also to define the ac­ tual basis of its nationhood. Would Pakistan be a state exclusively for Muslims or would non-Muslims be only tolerated, treated as alien-residents or given full and equal citizenship with the Muslims? Jinnah, who had never quite accepted separate electorates and sectarian Muslim politics though he had actually felt compelled to champion both and had won Pakistan as a result of this championship, came around full circle now that he had created a state dominated by Muslims.

Though there

had been an apparent shift in Jinnah's advocacy of na­ tionhood, from one nation to that of two nations, this shift had been a matter of redefinition of boundaries, not of the nature or the basis of the nationality as it had been with Iqbal. Though the majority of Jinnah's political participants were to be Muslim, their poli­ tics under his leadership were going to remain secular and multi-communal, as Jinnah himself pronounced on his election as the first president of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947.

34 If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter what community he belongs, no matter what relations he nad with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations there will be no end to the progress you will make.23 We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and soon— will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain freedom and inde­ pendence and but for this we would have been free peoples long ago. . . .You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the bus­ iness of the State. Throughout his advocacy of Pakistan Jinnah had in­ sisted that the form of government his cherished state would have would be democracy. Indeed, democracy, as he had repeatedly said, was nothing new for Muslims since "we learnt it 1400 years ago." Jinnah, however, had never clarified what he actually meant by democracy though it was generally assumed that he referred to the Westminster model.

Of the Westminster model Jinnah, in

fact, had been a distant spectator. What he had actu­ ally experienced and participated in for almost 30 years as a member of the legislative branch was the British Government of India wherein the effective decision-making power was exercised by the Viceroys directly through the bureaucratic structures. The form of government that Jinnah established and legitimized by his deliberate actions turned out to be

35 an approximation of the British Government of India rather than of the Westminster model. By choosing to become the governor-general rather than prime minister, Jinnah very clearly and unambiguously indicated where the centre of gravity of the executive authority was go­ ing to be. By permitting himself to be elected the pres­ ident of the Constituent Assembly, the first Parliament of Pakistan, while simultaneously holding the office of the governor-general, Jinnah established the principle of the concentration of the legislative and executive power, not in one body but in one individual. In addi­ tion to these two positions Jinnah also held on to the presidency of the All India Muslim League which had been his uninterrupted for the last ten years.

Thus

Jinnah, by the sheer fact of his action, legitimized the precedent of the personalization of total authority. By personally choosing not only the first prime minister of Pakistan but his entire cabinet and by reserving for himself the ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Frontier Regions, Jinnah made it quite clear that he did not in­ tend to be only a ceremonial head of state but to actu­ ally rule Pakistan*

Through his dealings with the min­

isters and provincial qovernors over the head of the prime minister, and with the secretaries over the heads of their ministers Jinnah, whether deliberately or in­ advertently yet unmistakably, demonstrated that the real power holder was only the governor-general and the rest were mere trappings. As the Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and Jinnah alone was the source of legitimacy of the government as he had been of the Pakistan movement and while he lived no government decision was or could ever be taken without reference to the Quaid-i-Azam. Not only did the conventions of the parliamentary govern­ ment not apply to Jinnah, the Constituent Assembly further expanded the powers of the governor-general.

36 This concentration and personalization of authority need not be attributed to lust for power or glory, for as the Quaid-i-Azam of Muslim India, Jinnah had both. As head of the Pakistan movement for almost a decade, Jinnah had established a pattern of leadership and in­ teraction amounting to a Unitarian model. The need for Muslims to speak with one voice and the confrontational nature of the politics of the All India Muslim League, whether in dealing with the British, the Congress or other Muslim organizations, had necessitated the subor­ dination of many views to the one authoritative view, only and always expressed by Jinnah himself. Conse­ quently, though the running of Pakistan was a brand new venture, the actors, their political attitudes and be­ havior had been too well established to be changed over­ night, and Jinnah conducted the affairs of the govern­ ment of Pakistan as he had been accustomed to conducting those of the Muslim League. While Jinnah's political behavior as the ruler of Pakistan may not be questionable in terms of motives, it seems open to reevaluation on the grounds of the conse­ quences that befell Pakistan in later years.

By his

concentrating so great a power in his hands and by his combining so many offices in his person, he had estab­ lished a precedent which lesser men would find very tempting to emulate and emulate it they actually did. In terms of developing policies and determining priorities, building structures and institutionalizing functions Jinnah actually did little for he had neither the time nor the opportunity and perhaps not even the inclination. Pakistan had come into existence with a host of problems and, as the ruler of Pakistan, Jinnah had to find solutions for them.

The immediate tasks

were so stupendous that even the most experienced and well-entrenched governments would have staggered. The Government of Pakistan was not only new, it hardly

37 existed on paper, and, for all practical purposes, Jin­ nah was the government* Had he lived long and had Pak­ istan stabilized, it is conceivable that Jinnah might have paid attention to the need for translating his concept of the Islamic egualitarian democracy into the development of Pakistan's institutions. But Jinnah lived for only thirteen months as the governor-general of Pakistan and these were consumed in the bare necessi­ ties of anchoring the concept of Pakistan onto its ter­ ritorial moorings in northwest and northeast India.

It

is tragic that Iqbal was not alive at this time to coun­ sel Jinnah, to provide him with a long range view, a de­ tached, moral perspective; to nudge and guide him as he had done in the formulation of the Pakistan ideal. Conclusion Looking at the personalities of Iqbal and Jinnah, the two great leaders of Muslim India, one is struck by their complementary roles:

Iqbal the architect, the

prompter, the theoretician and Jinnah the builder, the actor, the realist.

Here is the philosopher urging and

encouraging, proposing and suggesting strategies to the politician, the politician, with his finger on the pulse of the nation, hesitating, tempering and gradially incorporating the ideas of the philosopher in his plan of action.

Iqbal, the ideologue, had infused a sense

of separate destiny in the Muslims of India and Jinnah, the catalyst, actually led them to that destination.

38

Notes 1. M. H. Saiyid, Mohammad All Jinnah, A Political Biography (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 1970). 2. J. Alva, Leaders of India (Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1943), p. 58. Alva perhaps Intended to mean Lincoln's Inn. 3. Muhammad Iqbal, Kulliyat-1-Iqbal, Urdu (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali, 1973), p. 190. Bang-l-Dlra, "Sham1-o-Sha*ir. 11 4. Jan Marek, "Perceptions of International Politics," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Iqbal: Poet-Phllosopher of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 172. 5. S. Sharlfuddin Pirzada, ed., Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Corre­ spondence (Karachi: Guild Publishing House, 1944), p. 81. 6. Khuda." 7.

Iqbal, oj>. clt.» p. 401.

Bal-i-Jibrll, "Farman-i-

Saiyid, 0£. cit., p. 156.

8 . Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1970), p. 43. 9.

Ibid., p. 57.

1 0 . Saiyid , op. cit., p. 177. 1 1 . Ahmad, op. clt., p. 204. 12 .

Ibid., pp. 205-206.

13.

Ibid., p. 207.

14.

Ibid., pp. 207-208.

15.

Ibid., p. 210.

Letter dated June 9, 1936.

Letter dated March 20, 1937.

Letter dated May 28, 1937. Letter dated May 28, 1937.

Letter dated June 21, 1937.

16. In view of all this it is ironic that after the elections of 1945 and after the failure of the Cabinet Mission, the Congress did actually negotiate with the Muslim League on the following basis: The Congress does not challenge and accept(s) that the Muslim League now is the authentic representa­ tive of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic principles they alone have today an unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India. (Quoted in Saiyid, 0£. cit., pp. 294-295.) 17. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jin­ nah, Vol. I (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968, 7th ed.), pp. 89-90. 18.

Ibid.. p. 168.

19.

Saiyid, op. cit.,, p. 231.

39 20. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Sh* Muhammad Ashraf, 1968, reprint), p. 151. 21.

Iqbal, Kulliyat* p. 611,

22.

Ibid.. p. 332.

Zarb-i-Kalim. "Jamhurlyat."

Bal-i-Jibrll. ghazal no. 17, second set,

23. Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.) , p » 8 .

Chapter 2 IQBAL AND JINNAH ON THE "TWO-NAT IONS" THEORY Manzooruddin Ahmed On August 14, 1947, the Indian sub-continent was divided into the two sovereign independent states of India and Pakistan, an event that was, in fact, a rec­ ognition of the "Two-Nations" theory. The idea of a separate Muslim state was expounded by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal in his famous presidential address at the Allaha­ bad Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League in December, 1930.1

A decade later, on March 23, 1940, at

the Lahore Annual Session, the All-India Muslim League unanimously adopted the famous resolution, popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, demanding the creation of ‘Independent States' in the North-western and North­ eastern Zones of India which constituted predominantly 2 Muslim majority areas. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jin­ nah, advocating the Muslim demand for Pakistan, ob­ served in the course of his presidential address: The problem in India is not of an intercommunal character, but manifestly of an international one, and it be treated as such. I I . If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into "autonomous national states."3 Henceforth, the Quaid's life mission was to explain to the people, to the British Government, and to the Con­ gress leaders the concept of Two-Nations. In asserting that the Hindus and the Muslims in India constituted two distinct nationalities, the Quaid had to demolish

42 the popular myth of a United Indian Nation, and also had to establish the positive elements of a separate Muslim nationality* Therefore, it is proposed to examine in this paper the emergence of Indian nationalism in general and analyze in particular the factors and forces which had thwarted the growth of a United Indian national move­ ment.

Against this background, we shall see how Iqbal

and Jinnah expounded the "Two-Nations" theory in defense of the Muslim right of self-determination, to carve out a separate Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent. Nationality, Nationalism and National State In the terminology of western political science, nationality is ascribed to a group of people living in a geographically defined territory bound together by com­ mon bonds of race, language, culture, history, religion, and economy.

In this sense, nationality is essentially

a physical reality. However, in its inchoate condition, nationality remains formless and imprecise. But once the consciousness of nationality is activated among a people for political self-realization, it is transformed into nationalism. The ultimate goal of nationalism is to transform nationality into a nation-state. In Europe, during the Middle Ages, medieval universalism gave way to nationalism as a new principle of territorial integration. The Renaissance, coupled with the Reformation and, subsequently, the Industrial Revo­ lution, gave birth to the modern territorial, sovereign, secular, national, and democratic state. When these European nations, pursuing economic nationalism, entered into the phase of imperialism and colonialism, they were able to subjugate the entire Afro-Asian world, and they built for themselves huge colonial empires, based on a ruthless exploitation of the subject peoples and their resources. European imperialism and colonialism posed a chal­ lenge to the colonial people. Their response was

43 nationalism, their western educated political elites having learnt the lessons of nationalism, democracy and secularism from the study of the history and political philosopny of their masters, Easton, in his The Twi­ light of European Colonialism, has succinctly observed: Arnold Toynbee in one of his more suggestive passages in his magnum opus draws attention to the fact that "barbarians,” forced to sub­ mit to more powerful civilizations, tend to adopt by mimesis certain elements from the culture of their masters which they then proceed to develop for themselves, frequently turning their new-found abilities against the dominant power itself. There can be no more apt illustration of this thesis than the manner in which countries under the former or present domination of European powers have adopted for themselves the ruling passion of Western countries— nationalism.4 Therefore, it may not be wrong to say that nationalism was and remains an artificial product in most of the world outside Europe, its place of origin.'* Baron, in Modern Nationalism and Religion, strongly confirms this view when he observes: Unfortunately the prevailing brand of AfroAsian nationalism is but part of the process of Westernization of these new countries. It has been imported from the West at a time when it was degenerating there.6 This is most relevant to an understanding of the nature of Indian nationalism, particularly its ultimate failure to preserve the myth of the political unity of the In­ dian sub-continent. The nature of nationalism may vary depending upon what aspect of it is being consciously emphasized. One may talk about a dichotomy between cultural and politi­ cal nationalism, the former springing from the deeprooted attachment of most men to the language, litera­ ture, and mores of their forefathers, the latter focus­ sing on statehood and its territorial foundations, thus

44 being identical with patriotism.

In countries like In-

dia, the USSR and Canada with their continental expanses, the two may even be at variance with each other. There is another variety of nationalism called religious na­ tionalism. However, a religious basis of nationalism is not generally recognized due to its divisive impact upon the people, perhaps the only exception being Jewish na­ tionalism.

Thus in the Indian sub-continent, the

religio-political organizations such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League were contemptuously des­ cribed as communal rather than national associations. This brings us to the question as to what constitutes the proper basis of nationalism. The western authorities on nationalism clearly dis­ tinguish between objective and subjective criteria of nationality.

Contemporary legal philosophers and polit­

ical scientists frequently confuse the terms nation and state. They prefer a uni-national state, and in the case of a multi-national state, they are prone to con­ demn the national minority to assimilation and fusion with the ruling majority. More liberal political theo­ rists would be inclined to concede the right of cultural autonomy to national groups which do not have a state of their own but have not yet lost their territory and their language. However, the view is gaining ground that a nation may be defined as a historical-cultural group which is conscious of itself as a nation. Of late, there has been a growing tendency among theoretical sociologists and political scientists to attach greatest importance to the subjective and spiritual factors in o the development of the national type. Fichte, Renan, Fouille, and Springer have all defined the concept of nation with reference to subjective criteria.

9

It is

interesting to point out that both Iqbal and Jinnah, in expounding the "Two-Nations" theory, were greatly influ­ enced by this school of thought; under its impact, both

I

45 defined the Muslim Nation on the basis of subjective ratner tnan objective criteria. Nationalism in the Indian Sub-continent The concepts of nationality/ nationalism, and na­ tional state as discussed above had been non-existent in the Indian sub-continent before the advent of British rule. The native languages of India do not contain equivalents of these terms. The peoples of India were familiar only with the concepts of kingship and empire# which were the normal forms of political organization prior to British rule. However, this does not mean that the political organization of monarchy was the only f o m which bound the people as subjects with the ruler. There were other bonds as well which integrated them into dis­ tinct communities, tne two most important being (1) re­ ligion and (2) regionalism. India has rightly been described as a continent of religions in that since times immemorial her people have been grouped together into distinct religious groups— Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, and later in history, through conversion, Muslim, Sikh, and Christian. Both Islam and Christianity appeared in the Indian sub-continent along with alien rulers and enjoyed privileges due to offi­ cial patronage. Conversion of the Indian people to Is­ lam also provided over many centuries the nexus of a new social group which was strongly attached with the ruling elites- Both Islam and Christianity, rooted in Semitic doctrines, were also fundamentally different from the native Hinduism, which is characteristically Aryan both in form and substance. The interaction between Islam and Hinduism in the course of history did not permit assimilation of the two communities; it did, however, produce synthesis in the form of new religious move­ ments like Sikhism and Bhakti. The all-pervasive influ­ ence of religion generated in the course of history a strong consciousness of communalism, not of nationalism.

46 Until South Asia became an integral part of the British Empire, there had been in existence only religious com­ munities, not nationalities in the sense defined earlier. The other important force which had greatly shaped and conditioned the lives of the peoples of South Asia was regionalism.

It has frequently been asserted by the

advocates of a United Indian nationalism that India had always been a country with definite geographic unity. This view, however, has been controverted by others who regard India as a continent, with distinctive regional characteristics.

If we base our view on the physio­

graphic reality of the Indian sub-continent, we may dis­ cover at least four distinctive regions: (1) the Indus River Valley in the Northwest; (2) the Gangetic Plains in the North; (3) the Brahmaputra River valley in the Northeast; and (4) the Deccan Plateau bounded on the north by the Vindhychal and Satpura hills, and the Nar­ bada, Tapti, and Mahanadi rivers*

These broad geographi­

cal regions have created in the course of past centur­ ies certain fundamental regional uniformities which dis­ tinguish one region from the other, though numerous sub­ cultures also flourish within each broader regional unit. For example, the Indus river valley in the Northwest provides a broader regional character within which flourish the sub-cultural units of the Sindhis, the Pun­ jabis, the Kashmiris, the Pathans, and the Baluchis, while in the Northeast region of the Brahmaputra River valley there live a culturally cohesive people, the Ben­ galis. To sum up, we find that before the advent of the British, the Indian people were divided into either re­ ligious, regional or sub-cultural communities.

Conse­

quently, the twin forces of communalism and regionalism were the most active in the process of community building.

47 With the coining of the Muslims, communalism became a more potent factor since it created an aggressive com­ munity of a ruling minority. Muslim communalism based on uncompromising monotheism, with its millenial con­ cept of the Divine Law, became the mainstay of the Mus­ lim Rule in India. In contrast, Hindu communalism was grounded in the psychological complexes of a subject people. The conflict pattern inherent in the HinduMuslim interaction eventually led the all-pervasive force of communalism to cut through the regional bound­ aries and the sub-cultural ties. There could not emerge any pattern of conformity between the two circles, i.e., regional and communal; instead, the regional commnities along with their sub-cultures were closely divided into distinctive Hindu or Muslim groups throughout the length and breadth of South Asia. The demographic distribution of the Hindus and the Muslims was such, however, that in the Northwest, the Muslim population constituted a rela­ tive majority as it did in the Northeast, the Hindus be­ ing in majority in the remaining regions. The imposition of the British colonial rule in the sub-continent was a most significant development in many ways. Firstly, the Indian sub-continent came into contact with the western world and its administrative and political ideas and institutions, laws, and culture. Secondly, the British rule replaced the Mughul empire; consequently, the Muslim community, no longer identified with a ruling dynasty, was reduced to the status of a helpless minority. For the majority community of the Hindus, it was merely a change of masters from whom they could learn a lot* Thirdly, the British colonial policy was one of non-intervention with the local communities with respect to their religion, customs and cultures. Consequently, the cultural profiles, communal life, and regional characteristics remained more or less unchanged. Fourthly, the British rule introduced reforms and

48 initiated a process of modernization in the economic ed­ ucational, administrative and legal spheres. The most significant development therein was the growth of indus­ try and the emergence, for the first time, of educated, urban-based, middle classes of Hindus and Muslims. The responses of the Indian people as represented by their respective educated classes were not uniform. One may perceive three distinct patterns:

(i) the Indian

nationalist response; (ii) the Hindu elite response; and (iii) the Muslim elite response. The members of the upper strata of the Hindu com­ munity adopted early a policy of association with the British government and greatly benefited from the Brit­ ish policy of reforms. Consequently, there soon appeared a new class of western educated Hindus. Some members of this class formed the vanguard of Indian nationalism. Their political goal was to unify all communal groups, regional communities, classes and castes on the basis that India was their common homeland. They were the exponents of the territorial - political type of Indian nationality. On the other hand, some more traditional Hindus re­ sponded differently.

They sought to rejuvenate Hindu

communalism so that it might provide substance and mean­ ing to Indian nationalism. Toward this end, they inter­ wove cultural, political and religious nationalism to­ gether with an emphasis on the ancient traditions of Hindu culture, a return to the Vedas for regenerating Hinduism, and the idea of Aryavarta or Bharatvarsh as the Motherland.

This revivalist Hindu nationalism al­

lowed little scope for other cultural and religious minorities to survive as distinctive communal groups. The response of the Muslims to the British colonial rule was in the beginning a npgativt* Psychologi­ cally they were most unwilling to accept the reality of the British power; hence they withdrew into the narrow

49 shell of their own community.

Thereafter, the Muslim

community remained backward in all spheres of life. Later, confronted with their new Christian masters and a militant Hindu majority, Muslim leaders adopted two dif­ ferent and mutually opposing courses of action.

The re­

formists like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his associates pleaded for a policy of close cooperation with the Brit­ ish government and at the same time advised the Muslims to stay aloof from the activities of the Indian national­ ists who had already organized themselves into the AllIndia National Congress. On the other hand, a section of traditional Muslim clergymen strongly advocated a pol­ icy of cooperation with the Indian nationalists to wage a struggle for national independence; at the same time, in the sphere of religion, they advocated a return to the purity of the Quranic Islam. The emergent Muslim educa­ ted classes, however, followed Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's advice, and ignored the revivalist traditional clergy­ men. The new classes were acutely conscious of their status as a numerical minority and looked upon Indian nationalism as a movement dominated by the Hindu major­ ity..

They were also cognizant of the intellectual con­

nections between the movements of Hindu reforms— such as the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj— and the so-called Indian nationalism. It is true that so long as the lead­ ership of the All-India National Congress remained with the early generation of moderates like Dadabhoy Naoro ji and Gokhale enlightened Muslims like Badruddin Tyabjee and Muhammad Alii Jinnah genuinely believed in the po­ litical goals of the Congress, and they continued their association with it. But no sooner than the All-India National Congress came under the grip of Hindu extrem­ ists as Tilak, Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal and Auro12 bindo Ghoash, the Muslim leaders got scared and left it. To sum up, we observe that both Hindu and Muslim leaders borrowed the concepts of nationality, nationalism

50 and national state from the Western political culture and that Indian political nationalism was no more than a myth cultivated by some leaders for achieving political unity of all groups— communal and regional. But politi­ cal nationalism failed to contain the revived thrust of communalism. In the course of the political struggle for independence, rampant communalism first overwhelmed the undercurrents of regionalism, then divided the up­ surge of nationalism into separate channels— Hindu na­ tionalism and Muslim nationalism. Iqbal’s Theory of a Muslim Community Like many other western educated Muslims, Iqbal also started his intellectual career as an ardent Indian na­ tionalist. His early poems, Himalaya, Naya Shiwala, and many others are expressive of his patriotism. He also sincerely believed in the concept of Hindu-Muslim unity. For him religion was not a barrier between the two com­ munities. He ardently aspired for the independence of India. Iqbal's dedication to the gospel of Indian na­ tionalism was due, perhaps, primarily to the fact that the liberals and moderates were still in the vanguard of that movement. However, this phase of Iqbal's political thought was rather a signpost than the destination. His trip to Europe for higher studies in philosophy provided him deeper insights into the philosophical thought of Europe. This period of exposure to Western culture and thought turned him into a severe critic of the West, while ex­ panding his interest in Oriental thought and philosophy, particularly Muslim philosophy. While he could clearly perceive the inner contradictions of Western civiliza­ tion, he was equally perturbed by the existing stagna­ tion of Muslim thought. His critical knowledge of the German philosopher, Nietzsche, and his study of Rumi en­ abled him to come forth with his prescription for the malaise of the Muslims. He expounded his theory of

51 Khudi (the Self) and Millat (the Community of Faith) . In doing so he totally rejected the Western ideas of nationality, nationalism and nation-state. Iqbal re­ futed the idea of a fatherland as the basis of modern political nationalism, for instance in these verses in his famous The Mysteries of Selflessness: Our essense is not bound to any place The vigor of our wine is not contained In any bowl; Chinese and Indian Alike the shard that constitutes our jar Turkish and Syrian alike the clay Forming our body; neither is our heart of India, or Syria, or Rum, Nor any Fatherland do we profess Except Islam.13 In this poem Iqbal categorically rejected the territor­ ial foundations of modern nationalism and instead asserted that Islam was the only genuine principle for communal integration of mankind. He rejected the idea of the country since it divided humanity into warring nations and replaced the worldwide fellowship of Islam: Now brotherhood has been so cut to shreds That in the stead of community The country has been given pride of place In men's allegiance and constructive work The country is the darling of their hearts, And wide humanity is whittled down Into dismembered tribes. • . • Vanished is mankind; there abide The disunited nations. Politics Dethroned religion.14 After rejecting modern theories of nationalism, Iqbal constructed his own theory of Islamic nationalism. For him the Islamic community (Millat) founded in the faith of the Oneness of God could be the only legitimate prin­ ciple of integration among the Muslims. In expounding his idea of Millat, Iqbal said: . . . . When the burning brands Of times great revolution ring out our mead Then Spring returns. The mighty power of Rome, Conqueror and ruler of the world entire.

52 Sank into small account; the golden glass of the Sassanians was drowned in blood; Broken tne brilliant genius of Greece; Egypt too failed in the great test of time. Her bones lie buried neath pyramids. Yet still the voice of the Muezzin rings Throughout the earth, still the Community Of the World-Islam maintains its ancient forms. Love is the universal law of life, Mingling the fragmentary elements Of a disordered world. Through our hearts' glow Love lives, irradiated by the spark There is no god but God.15 For Iqbal the faith of Islam provided an abiding spiritual bond which held together people of different colors, races, languages and other external manifesta­ tions of culture, and transformed all of them into a universal community.

As mentioned earlier, Iqbal was

greatly influenced by the writings of Fichte, Renan, and others who had emphasized spiritual factors as the basis of nationalism. Iqbal's Islamic universalism was a com­ plete negation of any other principles of national inte­ gration, such as race and common ancestry: The bond of Turk and Arab is not ours. The link that binds us is no fetters chain Of ancient lineage; our hearts are bound To the beloved Prophet of Hejaz, And to each other are we joined through him. Our common thread is simply loyalty To him alone; the rapture of his wine Alone our eyes entrances; from what time This glad intoxication with his love Raced in our blood, the old is set ablaze In new creation. As the blood that flows Within a people's veins, so his love Sole substance of our solidarity. Love dwells within the spirit, lineage The flesh inhabits; stronger far than race And common ancestry is love's firm cord. True loverhood must overleap the bounds Of lineage, transcends Arabia And Persia. Love's community is like The light of God; whatever being we Possess, from its existence is derived. "None seeketh when or where God's light was born; What need of warp and woof, God's robe to spin?"

53 Who suffereth his foot to wear chains Of clime and ancestry is unaware How he begat not, neither was He begat. Iqbal also believed in the role of history in shap­ ing the destiny of the community and in creating what he called "this new-won consciousness" in the following verses f Like to a child is a community Newborn, an infant in its mother's arms; All unaware of Self. • • • But when with energy it falls upon The world's great labors, stable then becomes This new-won consciousness; it raises up A thousand images, and casts them down; So it createth its own history. . . . The record of the past illuminates The conscience of the people; memory Of past achievements makes it Self-aware; But if the memory fades, and is forgot, The folk is again lost in nothingness. . . . What thing is history, 0! Self-unaware? A fable? Or a legendary tale? Nay 'tis the thing that maketh thee aware Of thy true Self, alert unto the task, A seasoned traveler; this is the source Of the soul's ardor, this nerves that knit The body of the whole community. This whets thee like a dagger on its sheath. To dash thee in the face of all the world. . . If thou desirest everlasting life.l? Thus Iqbal declared to the Muslims around the world that it was only through a process of integration of the Self with the Community that they could regenerate the body politic of Islam to play its destined role in the his­ tory of mankind. Iqbal's political philosophy had no room for either secularism or democracy of the West. In this manner Iq­ bal demolished the basic principles of modern nationalism and pleaded for the restoration of the majesty of the un­ iversal community of Islam. Along with nationalism, he also condemned what he called "atheistic socialism," as illustrated in one of his lectures:

54 The technique of medieval mysticism by which religious life in its higher manifestations, developed itself both in the East and in the West has now practically failed. And in the Muslim East it has, perhaps, done far greater havoc than anywhere else. Far from reinte­ grating the forces of average man's inner life, it has taught him a false renuncia­ tion and made him perfectly contented with his ignorance and spiritual thralldom. No wonder then that the modern Muslim in Turkey, Egypt, and Persia is led to seek fresh sources of energy in the creation of new loy­ alties such as patriotism and nationalism which Nietzche described as "sickness and unreason" and "the strongest force against culture". . . Both nationalism and atheis­ tic socialism, must draw upon the psychologi­ cal forces of hate, suspicion, and resent­ ment which tend to impoverish the soul of man and close up his hidden sources of spiritual energy. Neither the technique of medieval mysticism nor atheistic socialism can cure the ills of a despairing humanity.18 In 1930 Iqbal presented his mature political opinion on the political fate of the Indian Muslims in his presi­ dential address at the Allahabad Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League. In outlining a course for po­ litical action for the Indian Muslims, Iqbal mooted the idea of a separate single state in the Northwestern re­ gion of the sub-continent. I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-govern­ ment within the British empire or without the British empire the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.19 (Emphasis added.) Here was Iqbal's prophetic vision of Pakistan as we find it at present. This passage from his presidential.ad­ dress should be read in the perspective of the political events of the thirties and also in the context of the whole address itself. In substance, his address can be treated as a discourse on the future of Islam and the

55 Muslim community in the Indian sub-continent. Reflecting upon the formation of the Muslim commun­ ity in the sub-continent Iqbal had observed: It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity— by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal— has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country where Islam, as a people-building force, has worked at its b e s t (Emphasis added.) Islam as the sole principle of communal integration, naturally implies a categorical rejection of any other bases of group cohesion such as culture, language, terri­ tory or region.

In the opinion of Iqbal, the crux of

the Indian problem was that the Hindu-Muslim conflict was a much deeper ideological cleavage— Islam versus na­ tionalism. For him, the construction of a polity on national lines, if it meant a displacement of the Is­ lamic principle of solidarity, was unthinkable. Iqbal offered a solution for the existing conflict between Islamid solidarity and national unity: Experience, however, shows that various casteunits and religious-units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective indi­ vidualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral conscious­ ness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense,demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and cooperation of the many. . . .And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as Asia really depends. India is Asia in min­ iature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east, and part

56 witn nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of cooperation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual good will to this land. • • • And it will at the same time solve the entire prob­ lem of Asia.21 It is obvious that Iqbal did not consider communal­ ism and nationalism to be mutually exclusive concepts. However, most of the Hindu champions of Indian nation­ alism were not willing to nnncede anything more than a minority status to the Muslim community.

The latter

position would have ultimately undermined the unique character of the Indian Muslims as a community in two ways— firstly, it would imply a complete break from the universal urnrnah? and secondly, it would reduce the In­ dian Muslims to a religious minority.

In defending Mus­

lim communalism, Iqbal remarked: And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declar­ ing that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free develop­ ment on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognized as the basis of a permanent com­ munal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The prin­ ciple that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. . . . I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religions and social institutions of other communities. . . . Yet I love the com­ munal group which is the source of my life and behavior and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby recreat­ ing its whole past as a living factor in my present consciousness.22 He concluded, "communalism in its higher aspects then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India." 23 Iqbal had built the whole edifice of his theory of Muslim communalism in support of the political demands of the Indian Muslims which

57 were agqregated in the Resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at oelhi (1929) and which later sum­ med up Jinnah's Fourteen Points (1929). (The immediate background o£ these two documents was the Nehru Report which was adopted after amendments by the All-Parties National Convention at Calcutta on January 1, 1929. This Report had rejected the crucial Muslim demands for a separate electorate and weightage for minorities.) A close and careful analysis of the text of Iqbal's presidential address clearly brings out Iqbal's concern for a compromise between his ideal theory of a Consoli­ dated Muslim State in the North-West zone of India and "the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politician with a view to secure per­ manent communal domination in the whole of India."

It

appears that he was willing to forego his demand for the proposed Consolidated Muslim State "within the British empire or without the British empire," if the Congress leaders would accept in substance the Muslim demand for the creation of a "Muslim India" as contained in the resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference.

Ac­

cording to the Resolution, "the Muslims demand federa­ tion because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, i.e., the communal problem," Therefore, Iqbal rejected in a forthright manner both the Simon Report and the Nehru Report as these did not visualize a genuine federal solution of the communal problem.

Commenting on these Reports, Iqbal had

observed: Thus it is clear that, insofar as real feder­ ation is concerned the Simon Report virtually negatives the principles of federation in its true significance. The Nehru Report realizing Hindu majority in the Central Assembly, reaches a unitary form of government because such an institution secures Hindu dominance throughout India? the Simon Report retains the British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation. • • • To my mind a unitary form of

58 government is simply unthinkable in a selfgoverning India. What is called "residuary power powers" must be left entirely to self-govern­ ment states, the Central Federal State exer­ cising only those powers which are vested in it by the free consent of federal states. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation, or fails to recognize them (Muslims) as a distinct polit­ ical unity.24 Iqbal was equally critical of including the Indian Native States in the proposed nominal federation under the Simon Commission scheme. Reflecting on this aspect, Iqbal observed: The truth is that the participation of the Indian Princes— among whom only a few are Muslims— in a federation scheme serves double purpose. On the one hand, it serves as an all important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is, on the other hand it gives overwhelming major­ ity to the Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly.25 After rejecting both the Simon Report and the Nehru Report, Iqbal concluded with a note of pessimism: A federal scheme born of an unholy alliance between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such a uni­ tary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority in British India (Hindus) and to the Indian Princes; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims unless they get majority rights in five out of eleven In­ dian provinces with full residuary powers, and one-third share of seats in total house of the Federal Assembly.26 Obviously, in this passage, Iqbal was reaffirming the fundamental principles which were already outlined in the Muslim proposals contained in the Resolution of the Muslim Conference and was not referring to his own pro­ posal of a consolidated Muslim State.

59 In the course of his presidential address Iqbal also referred to the serious mistakes which were com­ mitted by the Muslim leaders during the past years. He observed: There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism, and de­ prived the Muslims of India from chances of acquiring political power in India* The second is the narrow-visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the interests of what may be called "Punjab Ruralism" resulting in a proposal which reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.27 The above passage is the most revealing insofar as it purports to reject categorically the League policies of the past and aims at providing a new direction. What did Iqbal mean by a "false view of Indian nationalism"? The Lucknow Pact, while resolving Hindu-Muslim differ­ ences, had recognized the Indian Muslims merely as a community of religious minority and, therefore, sought to provide essential Constitutional safeguards for their cultural and religious rights. However, at the same time, it established beyond any doubts, the prin­ ciple of a united Indian nation. According to Iqbal this was basically a mistaken view, because according to his assessment the problem of India was international and not national: We are seventy millions and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. Indeed, the Muslims of India are the only people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are anxious to become a nation but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of

60 travail, and in the case of Hindu India, involves a complete overhauling of her social structure*23 (Emphasis added.) In the above passage, Iqbal, in enunciating the theory that Indiam Muslims were truly a nation in the modern sense, did not discard his original theory of the Muslim Millat? he simply gave it a new name— Muslim nation— in the political context of India. In so doing he in fact translated the idea of Muslim community into the vocabu­ lary of modern political science as the true basis of Muslim nationalism. After demolishing the erroneous assumptions of In­ dian nationalism underlying the Lucknow Pact, Iqbal had to face squarely the dangers which were inherent in the existing political situation in the predominantly Muslim majority province of the Punjab, In the Punjab, the Sikhs and the Hindus had constituted politically aggres­ sive minorities and, therefore, could assert themselves effectively in the provincial politics.

Sir Fazl-i-

Husain and, subsequently, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana were the architects and mainstay of the Unionist Party which was based on the fundamental concept of the essential unity and cooperation of the three important Punjabi communities, vis., the Muslims, the Sikhs and the Hindus,

With respect to its socio­

economic background, it was an alliance of Muslim land­ lords, Hindu entrepreneurs, and Sikh tradesmen.

In its

political orientation, it was obviously pro-British and had been opposed to both the Congress as well as the Muslim League. In regard to the overall Indian politi­ cal situation, it could at best be described as a purely provincial party, but Iqbal was quick to realize the grave dangers which were inherent in the Unionist domin­ ated political scene in the Punjab.

He thought that the

only possible way in which the Punjabi Muslims could be saved from the clutches of the trinitarian Unionist

61 Party was to break that unholy alliance, dissect the province so tnat the political thrust of the Sikhs and the Hindus was permanently diffused, and finally to re­ integrate the solidly Muslim majority areas of the pro­ vince with the neighboring Muslim majority provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, and the NWFP.

Perhaps, his proposal

was based on the assumption that the idea of a Muslim Nation in the North-West of India could never be recon­ ciled with the basically false notion of a single Indian nationhood and the narrow prejudices of provincialism. Therefore, by mooting the proposal of creating a Consol­ idated Muslim State, he could demolish both the myth of a United Indian Nation and the phantom of regionalism which he preferred to describe as "Punjab Ruralism."^^ In his opinion once the Indian segment of the Muslim Millat secured for itself a territorial consolidation in the North-West region of the sub-continent, it would always be possible for it to forge further bonds of unity with the neighboring Muslim states of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Arab countries. For Iqbal, the estab­ lishment of a Muslim state in India was not an end in itself; it was a means to acnieve a higher goal:

the

consolidation of the World Islamic Community. Thus the contradiction between Iqbal's theory of the Islamic Millat and his proposal for the establishment of a Con­ solidated Muslim State in the North-West Indian region was, in fact, more apparent than real.

In lending sup­

port to the "Two-Nations" theory, Iqbal was chiefly concerned with the consolidation of the Muslims in the North-West of India where they were in a predominant majority. It seems that he had used the "Two-Nations" theory only in order to counteract the viewpoint of the Indian nationalists, who had persistently maintained that the Indian people were a single nation despite differences of religion and caste. According to Iqbal, after achieving independence from colonialism, the

62 Muslims would naturally move towards achieving the higher goal of the political consolidation of their World Community, We may, therefore, rightly conclude that Iqbal had demanded the creation of a separate North-West Indian Muslim state on the basis of his theory of Muslim communalism. The other important point to note is that the idea of a separate Muslim state was mooted by Iqbal as a political alternative in case the leaders of the All Indian National Congress did not concede the demands made at the aforementioned All-Parties Muslim Confer­ ence, which still sought a federal solution to the Hin­ du-Muslim conflict. Iqbal himself talked about it at the end of the address: I am not hopeless of an intercommunal under­ standing but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our commun­ ity may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present c r i s i s . 30 Iqbal left it to Muhammad Ali Jinnah to elaborate the "Two-Nations" theory in all its details, to assert the right of national self-determination for the Muslim community in India, and similarly to set the minds of all Muslim leaders towards achieving a separate Muslim state. Jinnah on the "Two-Nations" Theory In the early thirties, Iqbal's suggestion of a con­ solidated Muslim State in the North-West of India was not taken seriously by the Muslim leaders. However, he was successful in sharpening Muslim consciousness* The subsequent political developments in the mid and late thirties, however, once again brought into sharp focus Iqbal's earlier proposal. It was, perhaps, during the Round Table Conference (19 31) in London that Iqbal and Jinnah had several oc­ casions to discuss the future dispensation of the Indian

63 Muslims.3^ Jinnah, until then, had not given up hope of a permanent political settlement of the Hindu-Muslim conflict within the framework of a United Indian federal structure. However, Jinnah's faith in the ultimate na­ tional solution of the Hindu-Muslim conflict was com­ pletely shaken after the short period (1937-39) of Con­ gress rule in the Hindu majority provinces.

Now Jinnah

realized the force of the arguments which had been ad­ vanced earlier by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and later by Iqbal against the dangers which were inherent in the functioning of a Westminster brand of representative government in India. The publication of the Pirpur Re­ port and other such inquiries brought to light the tra­ gic misdeeds of the Congress ministries against the Mus­ lim minorities. The other factor which might have con­ vinced Jinnah of the futility of pursuing the ideal of Hindu-Muslim unity was the persistence of the All India National Congress to foist upon India a highly unitary constitution. In addition, the two claims of the Con­ gress leaders that 1) the All India National Congress was the sole representative of the Indian nation, and 2) the All India Muslim League at best represented a Muslim minority and, therefore, could not be treated at par with the Congress were the most irritating factors for Jinnah. Consequently Jinnah decided to heed Iqbal's suggestion. Iqbal had already mooted the idea of a separate state as a permanent solution of the HinduMuslim problem and had expounded his theory of Muslim Communalism as its theoretical justification. Now it was for Jinnah to present both these concepts in the terminology of contemporary politics. Therefore, Jin­ nah propounded his thesis that India was not a country but a continent, that it was inhabited by many peoples, among whom the chief were the Hindus and the Muslims who constituted two distinct nations according to all prevalent standards, and that, consequently, the Muslim

64 nation in India was entitled to enjoy its right of selfdetermination. In expounding the "Two-Nations" theory Jinnah had, in fact, transformed Iqbal's theory of Mus­ lim communalism into what may be called Muslim national­ ism.

Similarly, Iqbal's idea of communal autonomy was

re-enunciated as the right of self-determination or na­ tional sovereignty. In the course of his presidential address at the La­ hore Session of 1940, Jinnah asserted emphatically, "The Mussalmans are not a minority. The British and particu­ larly the Congress proceed on the basis, 'well, you are a minority after all, what do you want'. . . .But surely Mussalmans are not a minority.

We find that even accord­

ing to the British map of India we occupy large parts of this country where the Mussalmans are in a majority— 32 such as Bengal, Punjab, N.W.F.P., and Baluchistan." In explaining the idea of "Two-Nations" Jinnah was obviously influenced by Iqbal as it becomes evident from the following passage from his speech: It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends failed to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and dis­ tinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a com­ mon nationality and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. Hindus and Mus­ lims belong to two different religious phil­ osophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry, nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on con­ flicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects of life and on life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and,

65 likewise, their victories and defeats over­ lap, To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final des­ truction of any fabric that may be built up for the government of such a state. . • Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homeland, their territory and their state.33 (Emphasis added.) The Iqbal-Jinnah correspondence during 1936-37 clearly brings out the kind of ideological feedback that Iqbal had been constantly providing to Jinnah impelling him to strike an independent course of political action for the All-India Muslim League. A few quotations from his letters may not be out of place here in order to judge the overall impact of Iqbal in re-shaping Jinnah’s political orientation regarding the future of the Indian Muslims. In his letter of May 28, 1937 Iqbal wrote to Jinnah emphasizing the need for a program of social and economic upliftment of the Muslim masses: After a long and careful study of Islamic law, I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impos­ sible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. . . .But as I have said above, in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve these problems, it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majori­ ties. Don1t you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived?34 (Emphasis added.) Again in his letter of June 21, 1937, Iqbal wrote to Jinnah:

66 In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redis­ tribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affini­ ties. • . .To my mind the new Constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federa­ tion of Muslim provinces, reformed on tKe~ lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India a r e ? 3 5 (Emphasis added*) These letters containing reaffirmation of Iqbal's earlier idea of a consolidated Muslim State in the much broader sense of a separate federation of Muslim provincespro­ vide the essential ideological linkage between Iqbal and Jinnah. Therefore, it may not be far from truth to assert that the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, as adopted by the All-India Muslim League under the leader­ ship of Jinnah, had, in fact, finally transformed the political vision of Iqbal into a popular demand of the Indian Muslims for Pakistan. Even earlier in 1938, the idea of the "Two-Nations" was asserted at the Sind Provincial Muslim League Con­ ference at Karachi in its Resolution which read as follows: This Conference considers it absolutely essen­ tial in the interest of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment, and political selfdetermination of the two-nations known as Hindus and Muslims,to recommend to All-India Muslim League ^ o Review and revise the en­ tire question of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure hon­ orable and legitimate status due to them, and that this Conference, therefore, recommends to the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslims may attain full i n d e p e n d e n c e . 36 (Emphasis added.)

67 It was in pursuance of such a policy that finally the famous Lahore Resolution was adopted at the TwentySeventh Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on March 23, 1940. In rejecting categori­ cally the Government of India's act of 1935, the Resolu­ tion demanded emphatically, "Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is con­ sidered de novo and that no revised plan would be ac­ ceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.-^7 In the following paragraph, the Resolution put forward its political demand which read: Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic princi­ ples, vis., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial read­ justments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Inde­ pendent States" in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.33 In a nutshell, the plan had visualized division of India, partition of the provinces, and creation of two inde­ pendent and sovereign states of Muslims in the North West and North East based on the principles of genuine federalism. These basic principles had already been spelled out by Iqbal as we have reviewed earlier. Jinnah, in advocating the "Two-Nations" theory, went even further at the Madras Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League in 1941 when he asserted that in the Indian sub-continent, there were not only two nations "but indeed more than two different nations." Here he was referring to the people of the Tamilnadu when he observed:

68 In this land of yours (meaning the Madras Province) there is another nation, the Dravidians. This land is really Dravidistan. Imagine that three percent of the Brahmin high caste, by skillful maneuver­ ing and by skillful methods of electioneer­ ing which they have studied, should secure the majority. Is this democracy or is it farce? Therefore, I give my fullest sym­ pathy and support to the Non-Brahmins. I say to them: The only way for you to come into your own, live your own life according to your own culture and according to your language— thank God that Hindi did not go very far here— and your own history is to go ahead with your ideal. I have every sympathy for you, and I shall do all I can to support you to establish Dravidistan. The seven percent of Muslims will stretch their hand of friend­ ship to you and live with you on lines of equality, justice and fair play.39 Jinnah was equally sympathetic towards the Sikh claim for a Sikh state based on Sikh nationalism. How­ ever, it seems that the Sikhs had preferred partition of the Punjab province as a solution to their own problem. Whether their problem has been solved by the subsequent creation of the Punjab state within the Indian Union is still open to question. It was in the course of his meetings with Gandhi that Jinnah endeavored hard to convince him regarding the Muslim demand for Pakistan based on the "Two-Naticns"

theory. The Gandhi-Jinnah correspondence throws light on the subject. 40 Gandhi in his letter addressed to Jinnah dated September 15, 1944, raised a number of vital questions concerning the text of the Lahore Resolution. Regarding the "Two-Nations” theory which was not re­ ferred to in actual text of the Resolution. Gandhi declared: I find no parallel in history for a body of con­ verts and their descendents claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam it

69 must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children.41 He further argued that tne Muslim claim to a separate nationality based on "conversion had introduced a new test of nationhood," while for him the only legitimate test of nationhood could be "nothing else except common 42 political subjection." This had been the crux of the united Indian political nationalism. Jinnah, in coun­ tering Gandhi's argument, wrote the following passage in a detailed letter: We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hun­ dred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, his­ tory and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of Inter­ national Law we are a nation.43 In the above passage, Jinnah used both objective and subjective tests in order to prove the truth of the "Two-Nations" theory. In further support of his thesis he referred to Ambedkar*s treatise entitled; Pakistan or the Partition of India. Dr. Ambedkar himself leader of the Scheduled Castes had observed: "The political and religious antagonisms divide the Hindus and the Mus­ lims far more deeply than the so-called common things 44 are able to bind them together." According to Ambedkar, the Hindus and the Muslims did not have any common

historical antecedents "to share as matters of pride or 45 as matters of sorrow." As a matter of fact, different perceptions of the past, still haunted their minds. Em­ phasizing the element of forgetfulness as pointed out by Renan, Ambedkar observed: "The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their

70 past. Their past is embedded in their religion and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion* To 46 hope for this is to hope in vain*" Finally, the crux of the argument in support of the "Two-Nations" theory was very well summed up by Ambedkar, and it truly represented Jinnah1s line of argument as well: For nationality to flame into nationalism two conditions must exist. First, there must arise the "will to live as a nation." Nation­ alism is the dynamic expression of that desire* Secondly, there must be territory which na­ tionalism could occupy and make it a state, as well as a cultural home of the nation. . . . The Muslims have developed a "will to live as a nation." For them nature has found a ter­ ritory which they can occupy and make it a state as well as a cultural home for the new born Muslim nation.47 Further examination of the Gandhi-Jinnah corres­ pondence clearly brings out tneir basic differences over the question of "Two-Nations"; however, they pro­ ceeded to discuss the Muslim right of self-determination. Gandhi wrote to Jinnah, "Can we not agree to differ on the question of 'two-nations' and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination? It is this basis that has brought me to you. If the regions holding Muslim majorities have to be separated according to the Lahore Resolution, the grave step of separation should be specifically placed before and approved by the people in tnat area." 48 Here we note that though Gandhi had rejected the idea of "Two-Nations" categorically, still he was willing to solve the problem on the basis of a plebiscite in the Muslim majority areas. In answer to this, Jinnah rejoindered: . . . .Can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self determi­ nation as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which

71 is our birth-right? Whereas you are labor­ ing under the wrong idea that "self-deter­ mination" means only that of a "territorial unit" which by the way is neither demarcated nor defined, and there is no Union or Federal constitution of India in being, functioning as a sovereign central government. Ours is a case of division and carving out two inde­ pendent sovereign states by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession from any existing Union which is non-existent in India. The right of self-determination which we claim postulates that we are a nation, and as such it would be the self-determination of the Mussalmans, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right.49 Thus it becomes quite obvious that both Gandhi and Jin­ nah had fundamental conceptual differences concerning the "Two-Nations" theory and the right of Muslim SelfDetermination. The League's demand for Pakistan as con­ tained in the Lahore Resolution was based on their claim that Muslims in India constituted a distinct nation, and as such they were entitled to their inherent right of self-determination.

On the other hand, Gandhi had pro­

pounded the thesis that Hindus and Muslims were members of a single family, and in order to resolve their dif­ ferences, he had agreed that Muslims might separate or secede from India in such areas where they were in major­ ity on the basis of a plebiscite in those areas.

It

appears that Gandhi had deliberately ignored the Rajaji Formula as the basis of discussion with a view to con­ fuse the issues, and in this process was anxious to demolish both the "Two-Nations" theory and the Lahore Resolution.

Therefore, these negotiations failed to

achieve any agreement. It was against this background that the Muslim League Legislators' Convention was held in Delhi on April 9, 1946, and a comprehensive resolution was adop­ ted stating clearly the position of the Indian Muslims This resolution, in fact, is an elaboration of the

72 Lahore Resolution of 1940, and therefore, the two docu­ ments are to be read in conjunction with each other. The Lahore Resolution had not made any specific mention of the "Two-Nations" theory which was its very founda­ tion, and therefore, the resolution of the Legislators' Convention elaborated specifically the idea that the Muslims of India constituted a distinct nation: Whereas different historical backgrounds, traditions, cultures, social and economic orders of the Hindus and the Muslims made impossible the evolution of a single nation inspired by common aspirations and ideas and whereas after centuries they still remain two distinct major nations. . . . There was also left another lacuna in the Lahore Resolu­ tion insofar as it had visualized- the creation of "Inde­ pendent States" in the North-Western and North-Eastern regions and did not envision creation of a single State. Also the name Pakistan had not been mentioned. There­ fore, with a view to fill in these gaps, the 1946 Reso­ lution revised the Lahore Resolution in the light of the political developments which had taken place during 1940-46 in India. It stated: That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely Pakistan zones, where Muslims are a dominant majority, be con­ stituted into a sovereign independent State and that an unequivocal understanding be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay.52 (Emphasis added.) Conclusions In tracing the development of Muslim politics in India, one may clearly discover three distinct stages: (1) 1906-1920, when the All-India Muslim League en­ deavored to secure constitutional safeguards for the Indian Muslims as a religious minority— separate elec­ torates? (2) 1921-1939, when the League*s approach was

73 to secure regional consolidation of the Muslim majori­ ties within the framework of a loose federal constitu­ tion; and (3) 1940-47, when the League demanded the creation of an independent state of Pakistan, In each phase the status of the Muslims of India was differently defined, i.e., as a minority in British India, as major­ ities in certain provinces, and as a distinct nation in the sub-continent, respectively.

It was during the

second phase that Iqbal, for the first time, redefined Muslim communalism and proposed the idea of a separate Muslim state.

For Iqbal, the Indian Muslims were not a

political minority, but constituted a separate political nationality, and as such had no other option except either to demand full autonomy in the Muslim majority provinces within a very loose federal structure or to carve out a separate sovereign Muslim state.

When Jin­

nah took up Iqbal's idea he elaborated it into a coher­ ent "Two-Nations" theory on the basis of which the Mus­ lim League made its formal demand for a separate Muslim state (Pakistan).

But Jinnah, like Iqbal, remained will­

ing to negotiate with the Congress some honorable settle­ ment within the framework of a very loose federal scheme. This view gets support from the fact that in 1946, Jinrah accepted in substance the Cabinet Mission Plan, which was a compromise formula between the two extremes— the idea of a highly centralized, unitary Indian state ad­ vocated by the Congress and tne League’s demand for an independent Pakistan.

Ultimately the Plan had to be

abandoned since the Congress refused to accept the pro­ posed federal solution. rejected it.

Consequently, the League also

This paved the way for the Mountbatten

Plan which recognized the Muslim claim, and the division of the sub-continent followed.

Thus was Jinnah finally

able to translate the poet's vision into political reality.

74

Notes 1. References to Iqbal's speech will refer to the reprint in Appendix I. See also M. Iqbal, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, complied by "Shamloo" (Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1944); Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Move­ ment (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1970), pp. 121-137; Sir Mauria Gvyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1937), Vol. II, pp. 435-443. 2. This document is reprinted In Appendix II. See Gvyer and Appadorai, op. d t ., p. 443. 3« Jinnah*s Presidential Address isreprinted IV.See also Ahmad, oj>. cit., p. 379. (London:

also

inAppendix

4. Steward C. Easton, The Twilight of European Colonialism Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1961), p« 3. 5.

Ibid.. p. 3.

6 . S. Whittmayer Baron, Modem Nationalism and Religion (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., I960), Foreword to the Second Edition. 7. Simon Dubnow, Nationalism and History (New York: Mer­ idian Books, Inc., 1960), (The World Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 86, 87. 8.

Ibid.. p. 87.

9.

Ibid., p. 87.

10. K. P. Karunakaran, Religion and Political Awakening in India (Calcutta: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1965); see also R. C. Majumdar, Three Phases of India's Struggle for Freedom (Bombay: 1961), p. 7. 11. For Muslim Response, see W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf, 1946); and see his later work, Islam In Modem History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958); see also E.I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, in William Theodore de Bary (Ed.), Sources of Indian Tradi­ tion (New York: Columbia University, 1958), pp. 602-659. 12. D. Mackenzie Brown, Indian Political Thought. From Ranade to Bhave (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califor­ nia Press, 1961). See also his earlier work, The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953); see D. S. Sarma, The Renaissance of Hinduism (Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1944); see also Daniel Argov, Moderates and Extremistsin the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1885-1920 (New York : Asia Publishing House, 1967). 13.

De Bary, Sources of Indian Tradition, p. 756.

75 14.

Ibid.,

p. 756.

15« Ibid.,

pp. 756, 757.

16.

Ibid..

p. 758.

17.

Ibid.,

p. 757.

18. M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1944), pp. 186-188. 19.

Appendix I (this volume), p. 195.

20.

Ibid.. p. 191.

21.

Ibid., p. 194.

22.

Ibid., p. 195.

23.

Ibid.. p. 195.

24.

Ibid., p. 198.

25.

Ibid.. p. 199.

26.

Ibid.,

pp. 199-200.

27.

Ibid.,

p. 202.

28.

Ibid.,

pp. 204-205.

29.

Ibid., p. 202.

30.

Ibid., p. 206.

31. Hector Bolitho, Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 99. 32.

Ahmad, op. cit., p. 381.

33.

Ibid., p. 380.

34.

Ibid., pp. 207, 208.

35.

Ibid.. pp. 209, 210.

36.

Ibid., p. 257.

37.

Appendix II (this volume) , p. 208.

38.

Ibid.

39.

Ibid., p. 407.

40.

Ibid.,

41*

Ibid., p. 449.

42.

Ibid.,

43.

Ibid., pp. 453-454, letter dated September 17, 1944.

44. (Bombay: p. 18.

B. R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India Thacker & Co., 1946; first published December 1940),

pp. 440-471.

p. 449.

45.

Ibid.,

p. 17.

46.

Ibid., p. 19.

76 47.

Ibid., p. 21.

48. 19p 1944.

Ahmad, op. cit.. p. 456, Gandhi's letter of September

49-

Ibid.. p. 458, Jinnah's letter of September 21, 1944.

50.

Appendix III (this volume), pp. 209-210.

51.

Ibid, p. 209.

52.

Ibid., p. 210.

Chapter 3 IQBAL AND JINNAH ON ISSUES OF NATIONHOOD AND NATIONALISM* Anwar H . Syed Since the East Pakistani secession in December 1971, Pakistani commentators have been debating issues of national identity, integrity, and survival. The "Islam-pasand"— meaning those who believe that Pakistan remains unfulfilled until its society and polity are Islamized— maintain that domestic conspirators and for­ eign interventionists succeeded in dismembering Pakistan mainly because the Pakistani ruling elite's persistent neglect of the ideology of Muslim nationalism— in whose name Pakistan was demanded and attained— had disrupted the nation's sense of solidarity and cohesion. In this train of reasoning, Muslim nationalism means that a com­ mon faith in Islam (rather than regional, ethnic, or cultural affiliations) suffices as a basis of political group-making, and that the group is to organize itself and function as an Islamic polity. When a Muslim com­ munity is free to choose, because it is politically inde­ pendent, and does not choose to conduct its affairs ac­ cording to the law of Islam, its behavior amounts to nothing less than "a form of national apostacy."^ The MIslam-pasand” assert also that the obligation to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan is in the nature of a social contract. The founding fathers, Iqbal and Jinnah, projected Muslim nationalism in the above terms and envisaged that Pakistan would be an Islamic state. The generality of Indian Muslims strug­ gled for Pakistan in the same expectation, and the *An earlier version of this paper appeared in The Indian Review, Vol. I, No. 1 (Autumn 1978), pp. 23-42.

78 country came into being "solely to demonstrate the effi2 cacy of the Islamic way of life." The argument goes on to say that none other than the original community mak­ ing impulse— tnat is, Muslim nationalism— can preserve Pakistan* A Pakistani nationhood or nationalism, embrac­ ing both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, would ruin and disintegrate the state.

In his well known work, Islamic

Law and Constitution, Maulana Abul A 1la Maududi, perhaps the chief spokesman of the "Islam-pasand," claimed that Muslims in pre-independence India had opposed a joint electorate with Hindus because they rejected the notion of territorial nationalism. They believed instead in a concept of ideological nationalism that transcended geo­ graphical, ethnic, and linguistic attachments. The creation of Pakistan had in no way changed their think­ ing:

they still opposed territorial nationalism, know­

ing that it would lead to the construction of a secular state, which they did not desire.

For if that had been

their goal, "what was the harm in a united India?

What

was the need of offering a heavy price of life and prop­ erty for the establishment of a separate state?"3 The position that if Pakistan does not become an Islamic state, Pakistan is not worth having, has obvious disintegrative implications. Since there is no assurance that, in any foreseeable future, Pakistan will become an Islamic state, to the satisfaction of the political forces in the country, this verdict subverts the Pakis­ tani people's patriotism and their sense of solidarity with one another.

It distracts them from introducing

into their value consensus ingredients that would meet the needs of their particular situation.

It should be

noted that the forces that bring a national community into being and those which preserve it may have much in common but they are not identical. The Indian Muslims' identification with Islamic values and symbols, and their regard for an Islam-related culture, sufficed to

79 initiate the Pakistani union but did not suffice to preserve it. Additional values and symbols, even if unrelated to Islam, were needed to make up a national personality with which the regions might be able to identify. In other words, a Pakistani nationalism was, and is, needed to assemble a more viable cluster of pre­ servative assets. The following study of the position of Iqbal and Jinnah on issues of nationhood and nationalism will show that the "social contract** behind the struggle for Pakistan was not quite the same as alleged by Maududi and his associates. Both Iqbal and Jinnah knew that an independent Muslim state would need more than a common faith in posed to they did ing only

Islam to preserve itself. They were not op­ the development of a Pakistani nationalism and not believe that Pakistan would be worth hav­ if it were Islamic in a pre-determined measure.

First and foremost, they wanted as many Indian Muslims as possible to be free to determine their destiny un­ daunted and unhindered by a hostile and overbearing non-Muslim power.

They believed that an independent

Muslim community was bound to be Islamic to some degree. A half-loaf, they thought, was better than none. Muhammad Iqbal Muhammad Iqbal, the most important exponent of Mus­ lim nationalism in the Indian sub-continent, was a man of many parts. A profound student of Muslim history, philosophy, law, and theology, he was at home with Western law, philosophy, and literature. He was a philosopher himself, but he was also a creative artist, lawyer, and politician. As a philosopher, he formula­ ted ideals; as a politician, and as a man of affairs, he applied them to concrete situations and, in the pro­ cess, gave us an indication of the ideal’s capability as an operating principle. He was aware of the tension between these roles. Addressing the All India Muslim

80 Conference in March 1932, he observed: To reveal an ideal freed from its temporal limitations is one function: to show the way how ideals can be transformed into living actualities is quite another. If a man is temperamentally fit for the former function his task is comparatively easy, for it in­ volves a clean jump over temporal limita­ tions which waylay the practical politician at every step. The man who has got the courage to migrate from the former to the latter function has constantly to take stock of, and often yield to, the force of those very limitations which he has been in the habit of ignoring. Such a man has the mis­ fortune of living in the midst of perpetual mental conflict and can be easily accused of self-contradiction. However, I gladly accept the difficult position in which you have placed me. . The empirical reality may itself be amenable to change. But if it is not, or if men must act before it changes, the ideal will have to bear a measure of modification. Alternatively, the idealist, while maintaining the ideal

in its original pure form on the drawing board, will have to be content with its partial implementation on the ground. Iqbal expounded Muslim nationalism both as a high ideal and as a prescription for Indian Muslims in the practical politics of his time. Let us first consider his statement of Muslim nationalism at the purely ideo­ logical plane. It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe . . . that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a poten­ tially expansive group of concrete personal­ ities. It is not dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a

81 particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, non-spatial.5 Iqbal sees Islam and nationalism as rival princi­ ples for organizing the ultimate political group. Na­ tionalism brings people together, but it also divides them and keeps them divided, for its criteria of solid­ arity among men— race, language, territory— cannot readily be met by the outsider. One cannot change the place of one's birth and upbringing or the color of one's skin and eyes at will. In its divisive aspect, nationalism generates pride in one's own group and low regard for others. It legitimizes one group's imperial­ istic control and exploitation of another. In its iden­ tification with secularism, it makes religion a private affair, consigning it to the individual's relationship with God. Thus, it authorizes rulers, majorities, kings, dictators to usurp religion's regulatory juris­ diction in social interaction. It makes coercive power the ultimate author and arbiter of morals. A Muslim community's acceptance of such nationalism entails a subversion of Islam. Iqbal's concern with the unity and solidarity of the world-wide Muslim community, the ummah, and his re­ jection of the ethnic, linguistic, and territorial cri­ teria for political group-making, are interspersed in his poetical works. Brief references to them will also be found in his major philosophical work, The Recon­ struction of Religious Thought in Islam, and his presi­ dential address to the All India Muslim Conference on March 21, 1932 in Lahore. But for a sustained discus­ sion one should turn to his presidential address to the 19 30 annual Muslim League session in Allahabad, his rejoinder to Jawaharlal Nehru (who had criticized his stand regarding the Ahmadis), and his rejoinder to Husain Ahmad Madani in March 1938,^ It cannot be over­ emphasized that, in these addresses and rejoinders, his

82 argument issues from his anxiety over the destiny of Indian Muslims. His observations on nationalism are often preceded and followed by a discussion of how best the Muslim personality in India may be preserved. In espousing Muslim nationalism he wants to dissuade the Indian Muslims from submerging themselves in a Hindudominated Indian nationalism. Misunderstanding and distortion will result from ignoring this contextual

relationship. Iqbal's presidential address to the Allahabad meet­ ing of the Muslim League is important not only because it was on this occasion that he demanded the establish­ ment of an autonomous Muslim state in northwestern India, the territorial dimensions of which, as he spelled them out, are virtually the same as those of today's Pakistan. He was addressing a group of politicians, not academi­ cians and philosophers. He was to speak to them of Is­ lamic ideals, but he was to do so with reference to the facts of Indian political life with which they must deal. He began by telling his audience that Islam, as an ethi­ cal ideal and as a politico-legal value system, had pro­ vided generations of Indian Muslims "those basic emo­ tions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered in­ dividuals and groups and finally transform them into a 7 well-defined people." One might even say that Islam had functioned as a "people-building force" more ef­ fectively in India than anywhere else in the world. Laws and institutions associated with Islamic culture had given the Indian Muslim community a remarkable de­ gree of inner unity and homogeneity* Its future as a "distinct cultural unit" would depend on the maintenance of this Islamic connection. He went on to say that In­ dian Muslims were far more homogeneous than any other group in the country. Indeed, they were the only Indian people "who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the world." Even the Hindus, he thought,

83 had not yet achieved

the cohesion necessary

for being

nation, "which Islam

has given (the Muslims)

a

as a free

gift."8 The "communal" problem in India was then not a mat­ ter of aggregating the varying interests of specific groups within a single nation.

India was a land of

many nations and her problems could not be resolved without the recognition that these problems were "inter­ national and not national." The Indian Muslim national personality would be stifled if it fell under the dom­ inance of a non-Muslim national personality. demand for a "Muslim India within India":

Hence the

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Selfgovernment within the British Empire or without the Britisn Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.9 In his rejoinders to Nehru and Madani, Iqbal dis­ tinguished between patriotism and nationalism, as some of his Arab contemporaries had also done.

Madani, en­

dorsing the concept of territorial nationalism, had said that "nations are formed by countries." True, answered Iqbal, in the sense that historically nations had been associated with countries and countries with nations. There was nothing wrong with loving one's land of birth and residence; it was a "natural in­ stinct."

But Iqbal felt he must object to Madani1s

proposition when it was urged upon Indian Muslims as a political concept, implying that they should put aside their faith, stop thinking of themselves as a separate nation, and sink their identity into a larger Indian nationhood.

Madani was only echoing the Hindu leaders,

who gave Muslims the same advice, with a view to secur­ ing their own "permanent communal dominance in the whole of India."10

84 Iqbal sees Islam more as a principle of social ac­ tion than as a way of securing eternal bliss in the hereafter. Tne solidarity which it has given Indian Muslims is to be valued because it is the basis of their group cohesion for developing that "organic wholeness of a unified will" which is necessary for taking effective political action, especially in crisis situations.^ Likewise, the basic beliefs in Islam have a social func­ tion: tney serve as prerequisites of admission to the Muslim group. He wants to place the Ahmadis outside the pale of Islam, principally because their denial of the finality of Muhammad's prophethood tends to disrupt the Muslim community's corporate life as a social organism. A Muslim state's attitude towards heresy, he says, is a political matter to be determined on the basis of whether the "heresy," and the attitude towards it, are life-preserving or life-destroying for the community. Otherwise, disputation among the 'ulama may be healthy, and he would reinitiate them into the "function of log­ ical contradiction as a principle of movement in the 12 theological dialectic." It is of a piece with his position as set forth above that Iqbal does not worry over the tendency of some Muslim nations, such as Iran and Turkey, to embrace modern territorial nationalism. This nationalism, he says, becomes objectionable where Muslims are in a min­ ority so that it can demand their "self-effacement" by establishing that Islam, or religion as such, cannot be a "living factor" in national life. But where Muslims themselves are in the majority, and therefore politically dominant, Islam accommodates nationalism and the two be­ come "practically identical." Even if a Muslim state declares itself to be secular, its legislature cannot disregard "the conscience of the people which has for centuries been trained by the spirituality of Islam. It follows that nationalism is not an issue in a Muslim

85 country. Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani nationalisms may flourish, for they pose no threat to the Muslim per­ sonality of the people concerned. Again and again in his works, Iqbal asserts that Islam is a state more than anything else. Would the proposed Muslim state in northwestern India be an Is­ lamic state? In his letters to Jinnah, Iqbal identi­ fied poverty as the Indian Muslims1 main problem and looked to the law of Islam and "its further development in the light of modern ideas" for its solution.

But

the modernization and enforcement of this law, he said, would be impossible except in a free Muslim state in the 14 Indian sub-continent. He hoped that such a state would help Islam "mobilize its law, education and cul­ ture and bring them closer to its original spirit and to the spirit of modern times." It might then be said that he would expect Pakistan to develop and enforce Islamic law.

But once again this expectation must ac­

commodate the world of reality. It should first be emphasized that Iqbal thought the Muslim law, as formulated by the medieval jurists, needed massive reorientation and revision to be rele­ vant to a Muslim community's needs in our time. Muslim lawyers, conversant with modern jurisprudence, working together with the 'ulama, might accomplish this task. He hoped that a Muslim polity might be led by men who had "a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam" and "an equally keen perception of the trend of modern h i s t o r y . I n any case, this modernization would be an ongoing process in the fashioning of which the community must be self-determining while remember­ ing that "life is not change, pure and simple" but con­ tains within itself "elements of conservation also." He denied any final or binding authority to the inter­ pretations and judgments of the Prophet's companions or the founders of the various schools of Islamic law.

86

"The teaching of tne Quran that life is a process o f progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessor, should be permitted to solve its own problems."1^ Iqbal maintains that Islam as a polity demands loyalty to God, not to kings, but loyalty to God "virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature." The Islamic principle of the unity of God in effect means equality, solidarity, and freedom among men--ideals, which the state in a Muslim country should endeavor to actualize.17 Iqbal's response to the innovations and reforms un­ dertaken in republican Turkey is further illustrative of what he would regard as good enough behavior on the part of a Muslim state. He welcomed the abolition of the caliphate, saying that it had been a corrupt institution since the beginning of Umayyad rule in 661. He praised the new Turkish leaders1 materialistic outlook on the ground that Islam had had too much of renunciation. The spirit of Islam is not afraid of contact with matter; indeed, the Quran says: "Forget not thy share in the world." A dose of materialism would help counter "mullah-craft" and "sufi-craft" which had mystified and exploited the Muslim masses for centuries. Kemal Ataturk's decrees requiring his people to wear Western clothes and write their language in the Roman script were acceptable because Islam, as a society, had no canmitment to any particular dress or language. Nor would he object to the licensing of the 'ulama or the aboli­ tion of polygamy, for under Islamic law the government could withdraw the permissions if it thought that, be­ cause of misuse, tney were liable to produce social cor­ ruption. Recitation of the Quran in the vernacular was inexpedient though not un-Islamic, since Arabic, of all the Muslim languages, had the greatest future. The adoption of the Swiss Code was a serious error, but even this might only be an excusable excess arising

87 from the youthful zeal of a people "furiously desiring to go ahead. The joy of emancipation from the fetters of long-standing priestcraft sometimes drives a people 18 to untried courses of action." Iqbal was just as pragmatic while addressing the Muslim League at Allahabad. He wished to reassure the Indian Hindus that the Muslim state he was proposing would not join hands with a Muslim invading force from outside the Indian sub-continent. But, more importantly, he declared: "Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states [in the sub-continent] will mean the introduction of a kind of reli­ gious rule in such states." By way of illustration, and furtner reassurance, he chose to refer to the fact— cited in a Times of India editorial on a recent Indian Banking Enquiry Committee report— that while the state in ancient India had usually regulated interest rates, the Muslim state in India did not impose restrictions on the giving or taking of interest on loans despite the Islamic injunction against it. 19 Why then, as Maududi later asked, a separate Mus­ lim state? It is clear that, unlike the purist, Iqbal thinks that the first order of business for a Muslim community is to attain independence of political choice-making and action. Then it can Islamize itself to the extent, and at the pace, of which it is capable. A Muslim state will, in any case, be Islamic to some degree inasmuch as its value system has been influenced by the value preferences of Islam over a long period of time. Such a state, even if it is not fully Islamic at any given time, is worth having and Muslims should pre­ fer it to one where a non-Muslim majority dominates the making of value and policy choices. We have seen that Iqbal thinks of Islam as a dynamic agent for restruc­ turing the social order on an egalitarian basis. More than the forbidding of "song and dance," Islamic

88 resurgence means the unleashing of massive energy on the part of a Muslim people for building material pros­ perity subject to the overall framework of Islamic dis­ tributive justice. His aspirations regarding the goals

and directions of an independent Muslim community may be gauged from the following statement he made while addressing the All India Muslim Conference: The peoples of Asia are bound to rise against the acquisitive economy which the West has developed and imposed on nations of the East. . . . The faith which you represent recognizes the worth of the individual, and disciplines him to give away his all to the service of God and man. Its possibilities are not yet ex­ hausted. It can still create a new world order where the social rank of man is not determined by his caste or colour or the amount of dividend he earns, but by the kind of life he lives; where the poor tax the rich. . .where an Untouchable may marry the daughter of a king, where private ownership is a trust and where capital cannot be allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the reed producer of wealth. This superb ideal­ ism of your faith, however, needs emancipation from the medieval fancies of theologians and legists.20 Beyond this matter of how far Indian Muslims might order their individual and collective lives according to the 1aw of Islam, Iqbal was vitally concerned with the preservation of their cultural personality which, he feared, would be destroyed in a Hindu-dominated polity. At Allahabad, he reasoned that Muslims must have their own homelands so that they might develop themselves "on the lines of their own culture and tradition." He said he respected the customs and institutions of the Hindus and other Indian communities, but "I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour.and which has formed me."

He cautioned that India's politi­

cal problems would not ease until the Muslims were assured "fullest cultural autonomy." And again: "the

89 life of Islam, as a cultural force, in this country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified 21 territory." At the All India Muslim Conference, he declared that one's faith, culture and historical tradition were indeed the things worth living for and dying for. In closing his rejoinder to Nehru, he said he was certain that Indian Muslims "will not submit to any kind of political idealism which would seek to an22 nihilate their cultural entity." On the other hand, he felt they might even drop their insistence on separ­ ate electorates if the Indian provinces were reconsti­ tuted so as to ensure "comparatively homogeneous com­ munities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and 23 religious unity." In this connection, it is note­ worthy that he excluded those parts of the Punjab, "where non-Muslims predominate," from the autonomous Muslin state he was proposing. (All emphases added.) Iqbal's letters to Jinnah dated March 20, May 28, and June 21, 1937 are also relevant to an understanding of his position. He wrote that to most Indian Muslims the preservation of their culture was even more impor­ tant than the advancement of their economic well-being. He again urged the formation of one or more autonomous states where Muslims would have "absolute majorities." A separate federation of the Muslim majority provinces, he thought, was the only way "to save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims." In order to ensure that the Muslin majority, and thus the Muslim control of the pol­ icy realm, in the proposed state would be unambiguous and firm, he was not only willing to let go of parts of the Punjab, as mentioned above, but urged the Muslim League to ignore, "at present," the provinces where Mus­ lims were in the minority and concentrate on organizing Muslin power in northwestern India. How different is Muslim nationalism from modern territorial nationalism which Iqbal opposed? In its

90 "pure" form Muslim nationalism was wholly ideological. Ethnic, linguistic, and territorial affiliations were not only irrelevant but repugnant to its spirit. In its application to Indian Muslims, however, the same discarded components were put back to work: territory became crucial, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity and historical tradition became valuable, and Islam itself became virtually the same thing as "culture." This wculd seem to be almost like a metamorphis. My own view is that this contradiction is more apparent than real. Muslim nationalism with Iqbal is the same that it has more often been: a Muslim community's unwill* ingness to be ruled by a non-Muslim political power. Territorial, ethnic, and linguistic appeals are to be rejected if tney are being addressed by a non-Muslim group to a smaller Muslim group. Muslim nationalism is preeminently ideological in actually or potentially confrontational situations involving the non-Muslim. But when only a Muslim group is involved, territorial, ethnic, and linguistic sympathies may be summoned in aid of ideology to strengthen the group's inner cohe­ sion necessary for plain survival as well as for under­ taking significant collective action. Where Muslims are politically dominant Islam has no quarrel with modern territorial nationalism. Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah M. A. Jinnah, with whom the "Two-Nation" theory is more generally associated, did not press it in its Pan-Islamic aspect and, to that extent, his position is simpler to handle. His interest is focused on the destiny of Indian Muslims. But the linkage between the idea of Muslim nationalism and that of Islam as a polity is present in his thought also and, therefore, has to be examined.

91 Jinnah*s best known statement of the "Two-Nation" theory was made during his presidential address at the annual meeting of the Muslim League in March 1940, where a resolution demanding independent Muslim states in the sub-continent was adopted. His argument merits extended quotations The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. • . • They [Islam and Hinduism] are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality. . . .The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on con­ flicting ideas and conceptions. . . .Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspirations from dif­ ferent sources of history. They have differ­ ent epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. . . .Musalmans are a nation according to any definition , . . and they must have their homelands, their terri­ tory and their state.24 The Muslims, he said, would not accept an Indian polity in whicn a permanent Hindu majority— often hos­ tile to their cultural personality— predominated. Be­ yond that, they wished to develop their spiritual, cultural, economic, and political life according to their own "genius" and their own ideals. Jinnah ex­ horted his listeners at Lahore to "come forward as ser­ vants of Islam" and organize the Muslim masses for the attainment of these goals. Numerous references to Islam, as a major factor in the Indian Muslims' personality and destiny, will be found in Jinnah1s observations both before and after Pakistan's establishment. Addressing the Punjab Muslim Students Federation on Marcn 18, 1944 he called Islam

92 "our bedrock and sheet-anchor," and asked the Communist Party to leave the Muslims alone for whom Islam was "the guide and a complete code of life." A few days later, he observed that Pakistan alone could ensure the Muslims their own freedom and the greater "glory of Is­ lam." On June 18, 1945 he told Muslim students in Peshawar that they must help organize "our nation" to achieve independence and to be able to live according to Islamic ideals and principles. "Pakistan not only means freedom and independence but the Muslim ideology which has to be preserved, which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure and which we hope others will 25 share with us." After independence Jinnah invoked the Islamic idiom to hearten the Pakistani people whose new state faced severe problems arising from mass migration of populations on both sides of the border, in addition to a variety of Indian pressures. In an Eid message on August 18, 1947 he hoped there would be a "renaissance of Islamic culture and ideals" in Pakistan. In another Eid message on October 24, 1947 he asked the people to show the spirit of sacrifice that Ibrahim (Abraham) had shown and then hope that "God would rend the clouds and shower on us his blessings as he did on Ibrahim." He urged them to persevere in their objective of creating a state "of our own concept" and show the world that the state exists not to order life as such but to orC ganize the "good life." On October 30, 1947, refer­ ring once again to the Indian pressures and related problems facing the country, Jinnah said: "We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours." He reminded Pakistanis that their history— that is, Islamic history— was full of instances of heroism. He urged them to make whatever

93 sacrifices might be necessary to save the "honour of Pakistan and Islam" and make Pakistan into a "bulwark of Islam."27 Jinnah*s use of the Islamic idiom was not limited to confrontational situations involving India but ex­ tended to domestic reconstruction policy.

Thus, on

February 4, 1948, he told a Sibi audience that in want­ ing to give Baluchis a voice in the administration of their province, he had been moved by nis commitment to the principle of Islamic democracy, God had taught Mus­ lims that they should settle the affairs of state through mutual discussion and consultation,

"It is my belief

that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set for us by our great lawgiver, the Prophet of Islam,

Let us lay the foundations of our democracy on 28 the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles," On the other hand, it may be recalled that in a speech in the Indian legislative Assembly on February 7, 1935 he had asserted that religion as such, being "merely a matter between man and God,' should not be 29 allowed to come into politics. Soon after the adop­ tion of the Pakistan Resolution in March 1940, he sought to assure the Sikhs that they would have much more po­ litical influence in Muslim Pakistan than they could possibly have in Hindu India,

After independence, he

declared that Hindus were not unwanted in Pakistan and, on several occasions, deplored their nass migration from Sind. He urged Pakistani Muslims— in the name of Islam, ordinary decency, and the country's good order— to protect Pakistani Hindus,

Repeatedly he declared

that, as citizens, Hindus and other non-Muslims had the same rights and obligations as Muslims.

In a radio

broadcast intended for American audiences, recorded in February 1948, he said Pakistan's constitution should incorporate the essential principles of Islam which were good and relevant in our day as they were thirteen

94 hundred years ago.

But Pakistan would not be a "theo­

cratic state" ruled by "priests."

He went on to say

that "we have many non-Muslims . . . [and] they are all Pakistanis."30 Jinnah*s presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947 deserves close attention. The partition of India, he said, had been inevitable.

But it was equally unavoidable that minor­

ities would be left in each of the successor states: Hindus in Pakistan, Muslims in India. Now tnat Pakistan had been attained, Muslims and Hindus in the country should "bury the hatchet" and work together to advance the well-being of the masses. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations fie had with you in the past . . . is first, secondhand last a citizen of this state with eoual rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you w i T l m a k e . I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and the minority, the Hindu community and the Muslim community . . . will vanish. . . .You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your nosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pak­ istan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed--that has nothing to do with the business of the StVte. ^ (Emphasis added.) Now that Pakistan had materialized, would the idea of Muslim nationalism, and the "Two-Nation" theory, their work done, retire from the political scene and yield to a Pakistani nationhood to which not only Mus­ lims but Pakistani Hindus and other non-Muslims might belong?

It would seem that at the time of making the

above address to the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah re­ garded this as a desirable development. But it appears also that his mind was not entirely made up. Hindus had

95 equal rights as citizens; religion had nothing to do with the business of the state— these were radical * enough positions to take after all that had been said, and was being said, about Islam and its connection with Pakistan. Jinnah could not bring himself to declaring flatly that the validity of the "Two-Nation" theory had been situational, and that henceforth Muslims and Hin­ dus would belong to the same and one Pakistani nation.

He went about it indirectly, telling the Assembly that the Protestants and Catholics in England, who once bat­ tled and persecuted each other, had changed their atti­ tudes and, politically speaking, ceased to be Protes­ tants and Catholics. Over time they had all become British citizens, "and they are all members of the Na­ tion. Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state." 32 (Emphasis added.) Jinnah was not to make quite the same kind of a statement again. Note that it was made on August 11, 1947, that is, before the terrible massacres of Muslims in the Indian Punjab pushed millions of refugees into Pakistan. There were massacres of Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan and refugees, again by the million, streamed into India. Jinnah believed that militant Hindu groups in India had deliberately planned the massacres to crush the new state of Pakistan under the weight of hav­ ing to care for so many refugees. On the other hand, they had sought to disrupt the Pakistani economy by instigating the Sindhi Hindus to leave the country. He suspected that elements within Pakistan's Hindu popula­ tion were participants in this conspiracy. He still asserted that non-Muslims in Pakistan had equal rights.

96 but he did not return to the theme of a single Pakistani nationhood embracing all citizens. He may have con­ cluded, perhaps regretfully, that this was an idea of which the time had not yet arrived. The problem of "provincialism," which eventually broke up Pakistan, arose within months of the new state's birth. The presence of non-Bengali higher civil ser­ vants, the status of the Bengali language, Bengali under-representation in the nation's armed forces agi­ tated East Pakistani minds. In Baluchistan also the issue of non-Baluchis holding positions of power and profit became troublesome. Jinnah's response to this problem in the two regions was substantially the same. "We are all Pakistanis, we are all Muslims"— he would say. He placed more emphasis on Islam while addressing audiences in East Pakistan where Hindus constituted about 20 per cent of the population. Jinnah thought that some of the more influential among them were actively in league with their militant co-religionists in India for the purpose of disrupting Pakistan.

By contrast,

no credible threat to the Muslim personality existed in Baluchistan: the Baluchis were all Muslim and the nonMuslim were too few to be politically significant. Responding to an address of welcome presented to him by the Ouetta Municipality, Jinnah observed that it was right to love one's town or region and to work for its welfare but one must love one's country even better. "Local attachments have their value but what is the value and strength of a part except within the 'whole'?" It was appropriate to demand provincial autonomy and local liberty to avoid British control. But now that they had their own government, it was folly to think and act in the old way, especially when their new state faced difficult external and internal problems. At this juncture any subordination of the larger interest of the state to the provincial

97 or local or personal interest would be sui­ cidal. • • .These whisperings of Mulki and non-Mulki (local and non-local) are neither profitable for the land [Baluchistan] nor worthy of it. We are now all Pakistanis • . . and we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing e l s e . 33 At the same time, Jinnah expressed great concern, and a sense of personal responsibility, for Baluchi­ stan's welfare. He told his listeners that their affairs were not out of his mind even "for one moment." He was most anxious to hasten their material advancement and to enable them to have the same degree of selfgovernment as "their brothers in the other provinces" did. 34 As an immediate measure, he offered them an ad­ visory council and assured them that plans for their political, economic, social and educational development would be made and implemented in consultation with this body. In East Pakistan too, except in the matter of accepting Bengali as a national language, Jinnah iden­ tified with the people's aspirations for participation and equality of access to the means of material well­ being. He sought to awaken in them a sense of Pakis­ tani identity. He gave them the example of America where, he thought, the various ethnic groups had been sensible enough to overcome their sectionalism and think, live and act in terms that your country is Pak­ istan and you are a Pakistani." But with even greater emphasis he appealed to their sense of Muslim identity. He warmed them that Indian propagandists and their agents "in our midst," posing as champions of East Pak­ istani rights, were spreading the poison of provincial­ ism to sabotage Pakistan by driving a wedge between Muslim and Muslim. As long as you do not throw off this poison in our body politic, you will never be able to

98 weld yourself • . . intoa real true nation. What we want is not to talk about Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Pathan and so on. They are of course units. But I ask you: have you forgotten the lesson that was taught to us thirteen hundred years ago? • • .So what is the use of saying "we are Bengalis, or Sindhis, or Pathans, or Punja­ bis?" No, we are Muslims.35 His insistence that Urdualone must be the national language of Pakistan was alsolinked with Islam. He ar­ gued that Urdu was understood all over Pakistan, and that the hundred million Muslims of the sub-continent had nurtured it. But above all it was a language "which, more than any other provincial language, embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the languages used in other Islamic countries. Jinnah's prescription for preserving the national community may be said to have had the following ingredi­ ents. In both Baluchistan and East Pakistan he appealed to the people's Muslin personality for the defense and development of which Pakistan had been demanded and attained. At the same time, he attempted to impart to them a sense of a Pakistani nationhood. Like Iqbal he saw no conflict between Muslim nationhood and Pakistani nationhood in a polity where the Muslims were dominant because of their overwhelming majority. Secondly, he linked his appeal to nationalism, Muslim and Pakistani, with the government's obligation to accommodate the popular urges for participation and egalitarianism. We have seen Jinnah urging Pakistanis to follow the Quran and establish their affairs according to the ideals and principles it enunciates. Is this a plea for an Islamic state that the 'ulama might accept as the genuine thing? Jinnah's reasons for demanding Pakistan, and his notion of the content of Muslim nationalism, are sub­ stantially the same as those of Iqbal. There is first

99 the Muslim community's historic reluctance to be ruled by the non-Muslim. In the Indian context, this is heightened by the harshness of the alternative. Jinnah maintained that, its protestations of secularism notwith­ standing, the Congress Party was a Hindu organization, dedicated to the establishment of Hindu Raj in India, and that it had no intention of developing a non­ sectarian, genuinely liberal polity which might value the diversity of religious and cultural expressions in the country. Hindu leaders had made it abundantly clear that "Hindustan is for the Hindus" and the Congress leadership, Jinnah thought, was "absolutely determined" to crush all other communities and cultures. Congress governments in the Hindu majority provinces between 1937 and 1939 had attempted to stifle Urdu and force Hindi on Muslims. They had adopted the Bande Matram— a "hymn of hate" against the Muslims— as a national song. They had tried to impose Hindu ideals on Muslims, interfered with their religious and social life, and violated their economic and political rights. They meant to destroy the Muslim community as a distinct cultural entity in India. There could then be no honor­ able settlement with the Congress: Muslims must have their own governments in the two regions which they regarded as their homelands where they might live by their own culture.3^ Pakistan was sought to protect and promote the political, economic, cultural, and religious interests of Muslims. In Jinnah's justifications of the demand for Pakistan these four interests are almost invariably

mentioned together. He sees the Muslim personality as a seamless whole in which numerous elements are enmeshed. Thus, speaking in the Indian Legislative Assembly on February 7, 1935, Jinnah observed that the minority problem in India was not a matter purely of language, race or religion. It was rather a "combination of

100 all these various elements--religion, culture, race, language, art, music, and so forth [that] makes the minority a separate entity in the state, and that sep38 arate entity as an entity wants safeguards." It will be seen that this position is vastly dif­ ferent from that of the purist. The Indian Muslim per­ sonality has Islamic elements. But it also has many other elements that are non-Islamic and some that are, strictly speaking, un-Islamic. The purist wants to throw them out. He would, for instance, be gratified if a Muslim community were to banish most, if not all, of its poets, playwrights, storytellers, jokesters, painters, sculptors, musicians, dancers, bridge players, coffee house chatters--to mention only a few categories. He rejects much of what he sees and wants to rebuild the Muslim personality in conformity to his own model. But Iqbal and Jinnah regard the existing Muslim personality, despite its imperfections, as something precious that deserves to be defended. They too seek its improvement. But the community itself, and not the purist, is to be the author and agent of this improvement. In the mean­ time, they love and cherish this personality as they find it, because they feel they belong to it. An insight into Jinnah's understanding of Islam should also be helpful in answering the question we posed above. He was not a scholar of Islam as Iqbal was. Yet, like Iqbal, he was inclined to regard Islam more as a social order, a basis of solidarity among men, and a principle of dynamic social action than as a pre­ scription for securing tranquility in the hereafter. Islam to him was a civilization, a culture, a way of life. Islam was everything good and decent. Consider an Eid Day radio broadcast he made on November 13, 1939*

"Islam, as you all know, really means action,"

which implies a societal context. In emphasizing action, the Prophet was not thinking of "the solitary life of

101 a single human being, the deed he accomplishes only within himself." The discipline of fasting, for in­ stance, was designed to give Muslims the capability for social action. The obligation to pray also had a so­ cial significance. Congregational prayer, being the preferred mode, offered "many wonderful opportunities" to meet, study, understand, and serve our "fellow beings." In the same broadcast Jinnah maintained that the value of self-discipline taught by Islam applied to all aspects of one's behavior, including such mundane things as doing an honest job of one's work, eating and going to bed at the proper time, and abstaining from litter­ ing the road. At the loftier plane, he reminded his audience, "Islam expects every Muslim to do his duty to his people," serve them and, if necessary, make sacrifices for them.

He went on to say:

If we have any faith in love and toleration towards God's children, to whatever commun­ ity they may belong, we must act upon that faith in the daily round of our siirtple duties and unobstrusive pieties. I .1 would ask you to remember . . . that no injunction is con­ sidered by our Holy Prophet more imperative or more divinely binding than the devout but iupreme realisation of our duty of love and toleration towards all other human beings.39 (Empnasis added.) In Jinnah's statements and speeches there are countless references to the Muslim community's right, and obligation, to fashion and conduct its politics according to Islamic ideals and principles. But it would be a mistake to think that in acknowledging this obligation'he was issuing a call for the enforcement of Abu Hanifa's Figh (or that of any other Muslim jurist's). He often identified Islamic ideals and principles as democracy, equality, social justice, tol­ erance, and brotherhood of man. The values he urged in the name of Islam are honesty, hard work, dedication

102 to duty, discipline, orderliness, national solidarity and unity. His speech in Chittagong on March 26, 1948 is a good example of his understanding of Islam as a polity: You are only voicing my sentiments • . * when you say that Pakistan should be based on the secure foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism which emphasises equality and brotherhood of man. Similarly, you are voicing my thoughts in asking • . • equal opportunities for all. These targets of progress are not controversial in Pakistan. . • . Brotherhood, equality, and fraternity of man— these are all the basic points of our religion, culture and civilisation. And we fought for Pakistan because there was a danger of denial of these human rights in this sub­ continent. 40 In defining what Jinnah would regard as good enough behavior on the part of Muslim Pakistan the answer may be the same as that we gave with reference to Iqbal: a Muslim community, conscious and proud of being Muslim, endeavoring to implement the values of tolerance, egal­ itarianism, and democracy, and applying the values of dynamism, inventiveness, and hard work to improve its material environment, is Islamic enough. It should be noted that Jinnah, being more of a politician than Iqbal, was even more aware that in the actual conduct of affairs one may have to make concessions and com­ promises which detract from the ideal. In the Eid Day radio broadcast in 19 39, to which we referred earlier, he said: In the pursuit of truth and the cultivation of beliefs we should be guided by our rational interpretation of the Quran . . . .In the translation of this truth into practice, how­ ever, we shall be content with so much, and so much only, as we can achieve without en­ croaching on the rights of others, while at the same time not ceasing our efforts to achieve more.41

103 It is apparent that many of Jinnah’s references to Islam are made in an exhortative context.

Men are

being asked to work hard, resist temptation, make sacri­ fices, fight, build, incorporate order and discipline into their lives, respect the opinions of others and consult with them before making collective decisions. But for these restraints and exertions no immediate material rewards are being offered. Then, can we ex­ pect that the desired values will be imparted to one's audience unless these are traced or related to a source the audience respects?

Will a Pakistani, or for that

matter a Korean or a Chinese, audience value equality, tolerance, or discussion and debate on the ground that John Locke and Thomas Jefferson commended them as dic­ tates of "reason"? Locke and Jefferson?

Why should it pay any attention to They are not its men.

Assuming

their argument is sensible, one may turn to it if the same or a similar argument is not available in one's own tradition.

But if it is, it would be inexpedient

not to make the connection and forego the additional receptivity resulting from a people's loyalty to their own heritage.

It may be that the values being urged

in the name of Islam are not uniquely Islamic and that they are upheld in other systems of thought also.

But

if some of the values advanced by Jefferson and Paine were also advanced by Confucius, this coincidence does not constitute a reason for Americans to drop their identification with their own tradition and start ex­ horting one another in the name of Confucius. Conclusion In the above discussion, we have made comparisons between the positions of Iqbal and Jinnah with regard to the rationale and destiny of a separate Muslim state in the Indian sub-continent. While there may be dif­ ferences of emphasis between them, it is clear that

104 they agree on essentials. Neither is willing to see a Muslim community subjected to non-Muslim rule if an alternative exists. They both feel a Muslim community derives its separate identity from having a cultural personality that combines local influences with an Is­ lamic content, which is not only ritualistic but attitudinal and philosophic in character.

A Muslim polity

is therefore inevitably Islamic to some extent and is to be valued regardless of its stage of Islamization. In such a polity nationalism, even if it means dedica­ tion to a composite cultural personality, is acceptable and may be harmonized with the sense of solidarity the polity entertains towards the rest of the Muslim world. Both Jinnah and Iqbal are concerned with the problem of poverty and backwardness among Muslims for the eradica­ tion of which they look, on the one hand, to the urges of dynamism, struggle, and creativity in Islam and, on the other, to the Islamic principle of distributive justice.

Both regard as Islamic the values of liberty

under law, equality, and participation, and hope that these would be implemented in a Muslim polity.

Neither

is a "secularist" in the sense of maintaining either that morals are irrelevant to politics or that the will of the ruling authority is the final arbiter of morals. The foregoing discussion of the thought of the two men who contributed the most to the making of Pakis­ tan will not sustain the proposition that the establish­ ment of an Islamic state, satisfactory to the 'ulama, was a part of the "social contract" that brought Pakis­ tan into being. Nor can it be argued that the idea of Pakistani nationalism is repugnant to the nation's Mus­ lim personality and must therefore remain unavailable as one of the preservatives of its unity and integrity.

105

Notes 1. Abulala Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, trans­ lated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, I960), pp. 5-6. 2.

Ibid. , p. 11.

3.

Ibid.. pp. 331-332.

4. "Shamloo," ed., Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1948), p. 37. 5. S. A. Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), p. 376. Additional statements of Muslim nationalism along the same lines may be seen in ibid.» p. 51, and in Shamloo, oj>. cit.. p. 222. 6 . The texts of "Presidential Address Delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League on 29th December, 1930*' (this work hereinafter referred to as "The Allahabad Address" and reprinted as Appendix I), "Reply to Questions Raised by Pandit J. L. Nehru" (this work hereinafter referred to as "A Rejoinder to Nehru11), and "Statement on Islam and Nationalism in Reply to a Statement of Maulana Husain Ahmad [Madani] Published in Ehsan on 9th March, 1938" (this work hereinafter referred to as "A Re­ joinder to Madani") are Included in Shamloo, op. cit., pp. 3-36, 111-144, and 223-239 respectively. 7.

"The Allahabad Address," p. 191

8 . Ibid. , p . 205 9.

Ibid.,

p p .

195-196

10.

"A Rejoinder to Madani," pp. 223, 229.

11.

"The Allahabad Address," p. 206

12.

"A Rejoinder to Nehru," pp. 116-119.

13.

Ibid.. pp. 139-141.

14.

Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Lahore:

Ashraf, n.d.) ,

p. 16. 15. "The Allahabad Address." Also see Muhansnad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Ashraf, 1962, Reprint), p. 176. (This work hereinafter referred to as The Reconstruction.) 16.

The Reconstruction, p. 168.

17.

Ibid.. pp. 1-4.

18.

"A Rejoinder to Nehru," pp. 135-137.

19.

"The Allahabad Address," p. 196

106 20.

"Shamloo," oj>. cit.,

21.

Ibid.. pp. 11-13.

22.

Ibid., p. 143.

23.

Ibid., p. 16.

p. 54.

24. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Ashraf, I960, reprint), Vol. I, pp. 159-162. (This work hereinafter referred to below as Speeches and Writings. Vol. I.) 25. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed.f Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964, reprint) , Vol. II, pp. 24, 28, 175. (This work hereinafter referred to below as Speeches and Writings. Vol. II.) 26. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches as GovernorGeneral of Pakistan 1947-1948 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 27. (This work hereinafter referred to below as Speeches asGovernor-General.) 27.

Speeches as Governor-General, p. 30.

28.

Ibid.. p. 56.

29.

Speeches and Writings. Vol. I. p. 5.

30.

Speeches as Governor-General, p. 65.

31.

Ibid., pp. 8-9.

32.

Ibid., p. 9.

33.

Ibid., pp. 157-158.

34.

Ibid., p. 52.

35.

Ibid., pp. 87-88.

36.

Ibid., p. 90.

37. Speeches and Writings, Vol. I, pp. 27-28, 30, 70-73, 77 139 , 185, 204, 220 and passim. 38.

Ibid., p. 5.

39.

Ibid., pp. 95-96.

40.

Speeches as Governor-General, p. 98; also see p. 65.

41.

Speeches and Writings, Vol. I, pp. 97-98.

Chapter 4 METAPHORS OF CHANGE IN EARLY IQBAL Sheila McDonough I confess I am a bit tired of metaphysics. But whenever I happen to argue with people I find that their arguments are always based on certain propositions which they assume with­ out criticism, I am, therefore, driven to examine the values of these propositions. The practical in all its shapes drives me back to the speculative. It seems to me to be impossible to get rid of metaphysics altogether.1 This quotation from the collection of notes and comments that Iqbal wrote in a diary in 1910 may serve to set the stage for our analysis of his attitudes to­ ward change and nationalism. Nineteen hundred and ten is a significant period in the evolving attitudes to­ ward nationalism in India. Following the tumultuous upheavals associated with the 1905 partition of Bengal, people everywhere in India were beginning to articulate their hopes for a new and different way of life. It is the year in which Gandhi, in a period of transition be­ tween his South African experience and his life in India wrote Hind Swaraj— the vehement manifesto that gives shapes to his dream of a different India, It is also the time when the Bengali nationalists were expressing their ideas about the Indian national movement in Bande Matarem, For Iqbal, his thinking on this issue is re­ corded in Stray Reflections: A Notebook of Allama Iqbal For Iqbal, the year 1910 marks a period of reflec­ tion, Having returned from his tine of study in Europe* he seems to be re-ordering his thoughts and seeking for a synthesis of many ideas.

Examining his notes from

this year is a process similar to looking at the

108 preliminary sketch which a great painter often makes before he produces his masterpiece. In Iqbal's case, in these early jottings, we can see the seeds of many of the ideas that later were to be expressed with great power in his magnificent poetry. Although Iqbal does not tell us exactly who he was arguing with, the contents of his notebook make it fairly clear that he was, in a sense, taking on every­ one; he was reconsidering the religious thought of the Islamic tradition in debate with the whole of European and Indian thought. In other words, he was inwardly digesting the ideas that were in his milieu and in his library and creating his own synthesis. In responding to Iqbal's emphasis on the importance of the metaphysical assumptions that underlie the prac­ tical ideas of people, we would make the further point that metaphysical assumptions are often formulated in metaphor. In particular, the assumptions people make about the relationship between past, present and future are commonly articulated by a metaphor such as a hidden 2 hand or a divine plan guiding the historical process. "There is a spectre haunting Europe" is a good example of the use of a poetic image to convince people of a political reality. Hence we nope to pursue Iqbal's point by looking at some of the metaphors that were in use by those formu­ lating new nationalistic ideas in the India of the early twentieth century. In particular, we will compare the images and metaphors used by some of the Bengali nation­ alists and by Gandhi in Hind Swaraj with the images and metaphors found in Iqbal's notebook.

This comparison

should be useful in discussing Iqbal's point of view toward change and nationalism in India.

109 The Metaphors of the Bengali Nationalists In the case of the Bengali nationalists, we note that Bande Mataram came to exercise great importance because it articulated a compelling metaphor. Haridas and Uma Mukherjee describe the effect of the song: It is not a religious song in the ordinary sense of the term. . • . Intense nationalism is the very spirit which the poem breathes. The Mother conceived is not an ordinary reli­ gious deity, but a new entity, the mothercountry . . . a living entity working through her sons and fulfilling her mission through them. 3 When a metaphor of this kind— the mother-country as a living entity fulfilling her mission— is taken as literal, it tends to have the power of a kind of reli­ gious revelation over its adherents. The believers are not aware that they are responding to metaphor; for them, a persuasive truth has been revealed. Their be­ ings leap up, as it were, to accept and to submit to the truth that has taken them over, Tney come to understand their own lives in the framework of the metaphor and to think of themselves in tne terms revealed to them— in this case as the instruments of the mother's mission. There are numerous instances of metaphors used in this way to convince people that they are the servants of unseen powers— the unseen hand of Adam Smith is one well-known example. Speech that is intended to convey a vision of the future tends necessarily to be couched in metaphor, since the notion that people are subservi­ ent to the hidden power of some form of divine plan is seductive. Such metaphors can help to dispel fears of chaos and to suggest harmonious order. The metaphors of the nationalist movement in the period 1906-1908 in Bengal as expressed in the pages of tne journal Bande Mataram were influenced by a Coroptian notion of humanity expressed in images from

110 Hinduism.

For example:

The dominant note of Hindu culture, its sense of the spiritual and universal, will, therefore, be the peculiar feature of this composite, Indian Nationality, The new movement which seeks to embody the ideals and aspirations of this nationality, is therefore, an essentially spiritual move­ ment. And the type of spirituality that it seeks to develop, is essentially Hindu. Its key-note is the essential unity of God and man. The divinity of man is its highest gospel. To evolve God out of man, is its highest aim. It seeks to bring the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, in a sense not yet real­ ized by Christian consciousness in Europe or America. It seeks to establish a New Jerusalem in tnis world, • . . It aims at realizing an ideal of democracy which pro­ claims that man is your God,4 The ideal creates tne means of attaining the ideal, if it is itself true and rooted in the destiny of the r a c e . 5 Bande Mataram is a divine emanation, a vibra­ tion which was convulsing India.6 God is behind this movement and He does not need anyone to tell Him how to bring it to success . . . whoever thinks he can play chess witn a revolution will soon find how terrible is the grasp of God and how insig­ nificant the human reason before the whirl­ wind of His breath.^ These quotations represent a fair sampling of the attitudes of tne more Leftist Indian nationalists im­ mediately following 1905. The vision articulated in these phrases was an effective driving force behind the Indian nationalist movement. The metaphors imply a new understanding of man's relationship to the cosmos. Divine power is por­ trayed as the immanent will to revolution— "the whirl­ wind of his breath"? the image conveys to those who respond to it conviction that nothing, no human force of any kind, can obstruct the revolutionary change. Iqbal's city of Lahore certainly heard the singing of

Ill Bande Mataram and witnessed the devotion of those caught up in the new movement. These images therefore form part of the intellectual milieu in the midst of which the Muslim poet was reacting and thinking. The Metaphors of Gandi The fact that 1910 was a year of withdrawal and re­ flection for both Gandhi and Iqbal is noteworthy.

It

seems to have been a time of pause just before outbreak of the sustained creative power of each of them. They were not at all reacting to each other at this point, although Iqbal, as an educated Indian, was doubtless aware of Gandhi's South African activities.

Gandhi was

most certainly aware of the new imperatives emanating from Bengal. The editor of Gandhi's Collected Works has com­ mented on the significance of this year. The period . • . marked a decisive stage in Gandhiji’s inward development and the matur­ ing of his thought, when he sought to give precise verbal expression as well as practical shape to the ideals which would satisfy his imperative ethical urges.8 In particular, this year marked the publication of Hind Swaraj, first in Gujarati, then in English. Although Gandhi is not usually credited with skill as a poet, he was occasionally very gifted in the formu­ lating of effective metaphors and similies. example:

For

Passive resistance is an all-sided sword, it can be used anynow; it blesses him who uses it and him against whom it is used. Without drawing a drop of blood it produces far-reacning results. It never rusts and cannot be stolen.9 Sometimes Gandhi's images tend to fall over each other as they tumble out on the pages of his impassioned rhetoric. Even so, they were effective as instruments to stir his hearers to conviction and to action. On

112 the condition of India under British rule, he wrote: In thinking of it my eyes water and my throat gets parched, I have grave doubts whether I shall be able to explain what is in my heart* • • .India is being ground down, not under the English heel, but under that of modern civilization* It is groaning under the monster's terrible weight • • • there is no end to the victims destroyed in the fire of civilization* Its deadly effect is that people come under its scorching flames believing it to be all good* * • .Civilization is like a mouse gnawing while it is soothing us.10 These four images— the heel, the monster, the fire, and the gnawing mouse are characteristic of the modes of expression that Gandhi used to focus awareness on the historical process as he saw it* As with Iqbal in1910/ the real battle had not been joined, but we can see

the

forming of the attitudes that were later to exercise enormous power over the minds of those who responded to them* Gandhi's vision is essentially that of an ethical dualist— somewhat of the Zoroastrian type*

The metaphors

that he finds most persuasive are those of two powers locked in a struggle to the death, with humans free to bring about by their actions the final victory of either good or evil. Good and evil, God and Satan, Ram Raj and Ravanna Raj are conceived of as systems. An instance from a later speech in 1920 shows how interchangeably Gandhi used Hindu or Muslim terminology for God and the devil* The present Government is no Ramarajya? it is Ravannarajya. We suffer under this Ravannarajya and learn the ways of wickedness under it* How are we to be rid of this Ravannarajya? By becoming evil men in dealing with evil men? . * .How can we ever match them in their wickedness? • • .If we want to kill Ravanna with brute force, we should have ten heads and twenty arms like him. From where are we to get these? it is only a man ot Rama's strength who can do

113 so. What was that strength of his? He had observed brahmacharya and he was God-fearing ... if you are men who would never cast lust­ ful glances at chaste and devoted women like Sita, then alone will you be able to mobilize sufficient strength to destroy this Empire. If any power has succeeded in subduing Satan, it is God's.He it was who created Satan and He it is Whocankill him. Man can never van­ quish him byhisown strength. It is God who subdues him through the agency of a man serv­ ing him with single-minded devotion.H This imagery has obvious similarities with the ex­ ample we gave from the Bengali nationalists, but there are significant differences. In this case, the victory of God is not inevitable and indeed will not even happen without tne single-minded devotion of the servant. The servant gets tne strength to serve the divine purpose through his own self-purification. In Gandhi's termi­ nology, the battle against Ravanna or Satan must occur first in the human heart, and then the external world can be transformed. Non-co-operation is a golden weapon, a weapon of the gods. When you see injustice, see someone as evil incarnate, you should forsake him: Shri Krishna taught this to the Hindus, the Prophet Mahomed to the Mus­ lims and the Zend-Avesta teaches it to the Parsis. Tulsidas has said, in his gentle way, that one should keep away from the wicked, tnat their company is a source of suffering. You should run away from evil men and from injustice as you would from a forest f i r e . 12 In Hind Swaraj, the evil system is linked with machinery, doctors, lawyers, railways, modern civiliza­ tion and parliaments. Over against these works of the devil, Ganahi envisages an original purity, an uncon­ taminated Eden, which was ancient India. Machinery is like a snake-hold which may con­ tain from one to a hundred snakes.13 If we keep our own house in order, only those who are fit to live in it will remain.14

114 Who is the nation? • • .It is only those Indians who are imbued with real love who will be able to speak to the English . . . without being frightened, and only those can be said to be so imbued who conscientiously believe that Indian civilization is the best and that the European is a nine-days wonder. . . . Those only can be considered to have been so imbued who are intensely dissatis­ fied with the present pitiable condition# having already drunk the cup of p o i s o n . 1 * India will never be godless . . . . Only the fringe of the ocean has been polluted and it is those who are within the fringe who alone need cleansing . . . my remarks do not apply to the millions. In order to restore India to its pristine condition, we have to return to it. . . .one effort is required, and that is to drive out Western civilization. All else will follow.16 I believe that the civilization India has evolved is not to be beaten in the world. Nothing can equal the seeds sown by our an­ cestors . . . India is still, somehow or other, sound at the foundation. . . . What we have tested and found true on the anvil of experience, we dare not change. Many thrust their advice upon India and she re­ mains steady. This is her beauty; it is the sheet-anchor of our hope. . . . If this definition be correct, then India . . .has nothing to learn from anybody else, and this is as it should be.17 These selections from Hind Swaraj indicate how rich in imagery Gandhi's writing was. His works are full of varied metaphors and similies, and his mind moved easily from "polluted oceans," to "ancestors sow­ ing seeds," and "sheet-anchors of hope." But the power of tne language derives from the consistency of the vision. No matter what image might burst forth from his bubbling and fertile brain, it was always controlled by the basic metaphor that dominated his consciousness, namely devil-system versus God-system.

115 The Metaphors of Iqbal An analysis of Iqbal's thoughts and writing in 1910 will reveal wnether he was using metaphor in ways comparable to the Bengali nationalists and Gandhi. His 18 notebook oeginss "Art is a sacred lie." This sug­ gests that the images conceived by the artist are sacred in that the more faithful they are to the reality of an actual situation, the more they can serve to heal chaos and to direct human action towards better modes of ex­ istence which are morfe holy because they are more virtu­ ous. But it is also a lie, because it is necessarily imperfect and incomplete as a way to focus awareness. Another provocative statement from the notebook: "Matthew Arnold defines poetry as criticism of life. 19 That life is criticism of poetry is equally true." This statement together with the statement about the lie suggests that Iqbal was aware, even as he was on the brink of articulating with enormous power his own great vision, that no matter what he or any poet or thinker said, nothing from human minds could fully do justice to actual existence. Those later writers who have felt that Iqbal's imagery sometimes misled people by giving them false expectations and romantic hopes might take from these comments recognition that Iqbal knew that all that he could say would be inadequate, because the in­ tractability of existence could not be finally dominated by his or anyone else's language. Much, of course, was common to Iqbal and Gandhi as men of their time. For instance, in 1910, they were equally horrified by suffragettes. In Gandhi's view: This civilization is irreligious, and it has taken such a hold on the people in Europe that those who are in it appear to be half mad. . • . Women, who should be the queens households wander in the streets or they slave away in factories. . . . This awful fact is one of the causes of the daily growing suf­ fragette movement.20

of

116 Iqbal had a similar view of the "awful fact," He wrote: Superfluous women • • . are compelled to "conceive" ideas instead of children. Re­ cently they have conceived the inspiring idea of "votes for women*" • • . The Suf­ fragist movement in Europe is at bottom a cry for husbands rather than votes. To me it is nothing more than a riot of the unemployed.21 It is noteworthy that for Iqbal the solution was polygamy; for him, the suffragette movement was a fur­ ther proof of the inferiority of Western civilization. In Gandhi's view, the movement proved the superiority of ancient Indian village life, with woman the queen at home. Thus the "awful fact" proves to one the greater wisdom of the Shariah, and to the other the moral deg­ radation of industrialized society. At this time both men were preoccupied with power because they saw weak, fearful attitudes as the worst disease of their people. In Gandhi's terminology, power would come in the ancient Indian way, by self-purifica­ tion. Fear was to be driven out by the cleansing power of a powerful will. "Real home-life is self-rule or 22 self-control." Sometimes he expresses this belief in a manner indistinguishable from Muslim modes of speech. For example: "A man who has realized his manhood, who 23 fears only God, will fear no one else." Iqbal made the same point many times throughout his writings. During tnis reflective period of his life, he was musing a lot on the nature of power. In thinking about the Christian emphasis on God as love, he concluded that God is better described as power: "God reveals 24 Himself in history more as power than love." Iqbal's ideas on this question differ from tne convications of the Bande Mataram Bengali nationalists. He does not envisage the power of God as a will to revolu­ tion that would inevitably bring about its purposes.

He

117 is like Gandhi in his insistence that individuals must appropriate the truth that they understand and then try to implement it. The success depends on human efforts. Neither he nor Gandhi was so seized by the metaphor of an unseen force at work that they preached only submis­ sion to the will of that force. It is noteworthy that in 1910 it is Gandhi rather than Iqbal who is preoccupied with Satan. Iqbal's musings in this year have relatively little to do with the devil, whereas Gandhi's thought tends to be shaped by the metaphor of an earthly contest between divine and satanic forces. Of course, there are many passages in Iqbal's later writings dealing with Satan and also many verses about the corruption of western civilization— with banks towering over cathedrals and so forth. Yet even so, it seems that the mental set of Iqbal's mind as indicated by his reflections in this early period remains essentially the same for the rest of his life. He was not at this time nor later an ethical dualist of the Gandhian type. One can't imagine Iqbal personally throwing an ink bottle at the devil. Why not? If he were a Christian, I think the argu­ ment would be that he followed that type of Christian theology which saw the power of Satan truly broken by the death and resurrection of Christ. Might one say that for Iqbal the coming of the Quran has, as it were, des­ troyed the efficacy of Satan? In his terms, guidance is now available for all those with ears to hear and hearts to respond. Satan may whisper and plot, but he cannot finally reach the hearts of the faithful if they remain aware, prayerful, and on guard. Even in Satan's Parliament/ Iqbal's great poem written at the end of his life about the rampant evil roaring around the world of the thirties, there is no suggestion of equal or final power in Satan— all the power the demonic forces acquire comes from the

118 obtuseness and sloth of human beings.

It is partly for

this reason that one never gets the same quality of urgency in Iqbal's affirmations that one gets from the Bande Mataram nationalists or from Gandhi. Iqbal says neither that God is an immanent will to revolution nor that God's power can be realized only by the triumph of the God-system over the devil system. It may seem paradoxical, but Iqbal's poetic mind, brimming over with magnificant imagery though it was,

is

the one not dominated by metaphor; that is to say, he was not caught up by one confining metaphor that control­ led his grasp of reality. The many-sided nature of his interests and the reflective skepticism of many of his attitudes freed him from the obsession that history must be understood as the inexorable product of a simple process. God is not single, nor are His purposes self-evident. Nationalism, Iqbal said in his reflections, is for Muslims a "sort of mental agreement in a certain view 25 of the world." It is not an identification with place, or race, or any notion of immanent will active through the historical process. In his words: Islam appeared as a protest against idol­ atry. And what is patriotism but a subtle form of idolatry; a deification of a material object. The patriotic songs of various nations will bear me out in my calling patri­ otism a deification of a material object. Islam could not tolerate idolatry in any form. It is our eternal mission to protest against idolatry in all its forms. What was to be demolished by Islam could not be made the very principle of its structure a political community. The fact that the Prophet pros­ pered and died in a place not his birthplace is perhaps a mystic hint to the same effect.26 I don't know whether he had Bande Mataram in mind in this reference to patriotic songs, but it is cer­ tainly obvious that this condemnation of nationalism as idolatry is a notion pregnant with significance for the

119 later thought of Iqbal and for those who responded to his vision* Also, this idea separates him from both the Bengali nationalists and from Gandhi.

Although the

coming of Islam nay have broken the domination of the devil, in Iqbal's terms, satanic power is not a system which is the antithesis of Muslim society.

Muslims

themselves are always susceptible to demonic tempta­ tion, as all humans are, and therefore no Islamic soci­ ety is, or ever could be, an unpolluted purity or an idol. Iqbal tends to view history as the implementation of ideas:

in history, ideas are conceived and tested.

From Iqbal's perspective, philosophers of history would always be necessary in order to help people see to what extent philosophical ideas have helped them and to point out when people have become the victims of their unex­ amined convictions.

Thus Iqbal writes:

The idea of nationalism is certainly a healthy factor in the growth of communities. But it is apt to be exaggerated, and when exaggerated it has a tendency to kill the broad human ele­ ments in art and literature.27 This reflection of the young Iqbal contains in capsule form much of what divides him from the Bengali nation­ alists and from Gandhi.

In his view, an idea may be

useful, but it is only an idea, not a revelation.

When

the nationalists say the Mother is working out her pur­ pose, that metaphor is, for them, a revelation not sub­ ject to critical examination for its possible usefulness. And when Gandhi asks "who is the nation?" and replies "only those who believe that Indian civilization is the best can speak" he is requiring faith in a kind of rev­ elation rather than tentative acceptance of a possibly useful idea. Iqbal's recognition that exaggerated nationalism kills creativeness indicates his awareness that uncrit­ ical adherence to unexamined metaphysical assumption,

120 or metaphor, can blind the adherents to many aspects of reality. He writes: History is a sort of applied ethics. If ethics is to be an experimental science like other sciences, it must be based on the reve­ lations of human experience. A public declar­ ation of this view will surely shock the sus­ ceptibilities even of those who claim to be orthodox in morality but whose public conduct is determined by the teachings of history.28 Gandhi also spoke of experiments; for example, he titled his autobiography The Story of My Experiments with Truth. But I think there is a subtle yet signifi­ cant difference in the notion of experiment in the think­ ing of the two men. It is somewhat presumptuous to attempt to paraphrase what Iqbal means by this sort of provocative statement, but I assume that he is talking about the actual testing of ideas in social and other institutions to see if they do make human life better and richer. He may also mean that what doesn't work in the long run, like the idea of divine kingship for in­ stance, is proved untenable in the light of historical experience. This attitude is very different from Gandhi's notion that the ancient society was right and that all that has happened since is pollution and demonic evil. From an Iqbalian perspective, it could well be argued that if ancient Indian civilization is no longer with us, that in itself is proof that the ideas that constituted that civilization were not durable enough to endure and had to give way to new and sometimes better ways of under­ standing existence. Another way to make that point might be to say that the metaphors that shaped that ancient society proved inadequate in the face of a* wider and more complex reality. If one were to argue with Gandhi as to why village people were bound to want to come to the city, the writ­ ings of Ibn Khaldun might provide the best basis for

121 discussion. The latter had explained, perhaps more forcefully than anyone else has ever done, the strength of the human drive to move away from known securities into new experiences and new forms of development. Al­ though we don't know when Iqbal first read Ibn Khaldun, the influence of the great Muslim philosopher is clearly present in the Reconstruction lectures. It seems that the attitude toward history in the Iqbal of 1910 owes much to his distinguished predecessor. Gandhi's notion of experimenting does not contain within it an awareness that the basic metaphor that con­ trolled him— the struggle between Ravanna Raj and Ram Raj--should be subject to critical analysis. His faith led him to assume that reality conformed to that meta­ phor. His experiments within the confines of the reality defined by his faith were concerned with how to defeat the devil and to bring in God's system. His con­ cerns were with various forms of self-purification— ibod, sexuality and so forth— and with inter-personal relation­ ships. Much of his effort was devoted to devising means to convert the hard of heart and to transform brutal responses into gentleness. In brief, experimentation in his terms tended to mean trying out new modes of behav­ iour to see how best to achieve the assumed goal. The goal itself was sacrosanct. In Iqbal's case, the experimentation is more in the realm of ideas. As a self-conscious philosopher, he was ready to examine his own assumptions, and he knew that the most dominating assumptions are often the ones that people are least aware of. He also had an awareness, quite unlike anything one finds in .Gandhi, of the finitude of his or anyone else's ideas and beliefs in the face of the awesome strangeness of the cosmos that con­ fronts us.

He wrote in 1910:

As a plant growing on the bank of a stream heareth not the sweet, silver music which

122 sustains it from beneath, so man growing on the brink of infinity listeneth not to the Divine undertone that maketh the lifie and harmony of his soul.29 If we are to look for a basic metaphor that remains constant throughout all of Iqbal's writings, this one of "man growing on the brink of infinity" will best serve to indicate the assumption that shaped all his subse­ quent thought.

As a person has his mind rooted in this

image, he is free to experiment with ideas, since all intellectual, social and political structures can be taken as necessarily limited and finite. The experi­ mentation takes the forms of investigating which struc­ tures might be more adequate than others in certain periods. But it follows that nothing within history will be final or absolute. Thus neither spinning wheels nor factories would have absolute validity as ways for humans to arrange their common life. Nor are people necessarily limited to those two options. Other aspects of the contrast between the two thinkers as exhibited in their early writings are the metaphors which shape their different understandings of the relationship of body and mind. Gandhi takes the metaphor of body-mind dualism very literally. From Hind Swaraj some instances are: Let us first consider what state of things is described in the word "civilization." Its true test lies in the fact that people living in it make bodily welfare the object of life. . . . This civilization is such that one has only to be patient and it will be self-destroyed. According to the teaching of Mahommed this would be considered a Satanic civilization. Hinduism calls it the Black Age. . . . It must be shunned. Parliaments are really em­ blems of slavery.30 The poet Tulsidas has said: "Of religion, pity, or love, is tne root, as egotism of the body. Therefore, we should not abandon pity so long as we are alive." This appears to me

123 to be a scientific truth* I believe in it as much as I believe in two and two being four. The force of love is the same as the force of the soul or truth. We have evidence of its working at every step. . . .31 It is difficult to become a passive resister unless the body is trained. As a rule, the mind, residing in a body that has become weakened by pam­ pering, is also weak, and where there is no strength of mind there can be no strength of s o u l . 32 The differences Iqbal might have with Gandhi on these matters are partly a matter of nuance. I doubt that the Muslim poet would have radically disagreed with the quotation from Tulsidas; indeed it represents an affirmation that most religious or humane people would accept. Yet to leap from the affirmation that compassion is better than greed to insistance on abso­ lute chastity, as Gandhi does, represents a long jump of the mind. Gandhi makes that jump because his view of the microcosm of the person is shaped, as ishis view of the macrocosm of the universe, by a dualisticmeta­ phor. In the microcosm, body represents the demonic system and mind the divine system. Mind tends to mean will in this believe-system. In Iqbal, by contrast, there is little trace of a dualistic splitting of the person. In Stray Reflections he makes various observations about personality that are characteristic of his later attitudes. Given character and healthy imagination, it is possible to reconstruct this world of sin and misery into a veritable p a r a d i s e . 33 At lease in one respect sin is better than piety. There is an imaginative element in the former which is lacking in the latter. Sin has an educative value of its own. Vir­ tuous people are very often s t u p i d . 35 One aspect of imagination may be the mental flexi­ bility that makes it possible for persons to achieve new understanding or new solutions to problems. It is

124 possible that none of the ways through which we try to grasp reality and to fit it into our mental molds and patterns is adequate to our needs. Iqbal's emphasis on imagination stresses the urgency of training minds that will be continually ready to transcend their former ways of interpreting life and to formulate ever-new tentative solutions. Gandhi trusted that the will to love purely would be enough; Iqbal insisted that the problem-solving mind had to continue to stretch and to strain itself and to make new leaps into as yet unimagined ways of dealing with existence. In Iqbal's terminology, imagination is very impor­ tant, whereas with Gandhi it never appears as a desirable quality. This difference is related to the fact that for Iqbal new ideas and insights into self, nature and his­ tory were always being sought after— the whole person was continually growing, and more and more knowledge and awareness on all levels of the person were desirable. For Gandhi, no change in the basic affirmation was wanted; growth of the self was understood rather as con­ tinually strengthening of the power of the mind (will) over the demands of the body. One cannot imagine Gandhi having a comparable good word for sin. Of sin, he typically says: "Machinery is the chief symbol of modern civilization; it represents a great sin."36 Gandhi, accepting Tolstoy's warning, saw Japan as one more instance of a demonic system. Iqbal didn't comment on that matter in 1910, although presumably his remarks about the dangers of exaggerated nationalism would apply. The Muslim poet did have much to say about the evils of imperialism and European civilization; he commented in 1910 that Nietzsche's madness was a kind of justification for, and expression of, that civilization. But Iqbal never used one dominating metaphor to control his understanding of the relationship of his people to

125 industrialization. He did not envisage one type of society as the necessary or inevitable alternative to the imperfections of the industrialized West. Rather he saw the need to create new values. In his words: God created things; man created the worth of things. The immortality of a people de­ pends upon their incessant creation of "worths" said Nietzsche. Things certainly bear the stamp of Divine manufacture; but their meaning is through and through human. ^ This recognition that values, belief-systems, soc­ ial systems and so forth are man-made is one aspect of the awareness that frees Iqbal's mind from a simplistic notion of the historical process. If all the structures are human products, they are finite, limited and subject to change. In this respect, Iqbal's attitude is almost the antithesis of romantic, since he implies probable imperfection in anything that humans might do. This notion of the fallibility of the human mind is one of the reasons why Iqbal is consistently loyal to the idea of democracy. Gandhi dismisses parliaments as nothing but a facet of the demonic system, unneces­ sary for pure and unpolluted India. Iqbal is not willing to accept uncritically any model from history because, he says, history is only an interpretation of motives, and since we do not know much about the motives of our friends and intimates in the present, it is foolish to imagine that we could ever know much about the motives of those long dead. "The record of history, therefore, should be accepted with M38 great caution." If Iqbal is as skeptical as we have indicated here, why then has he the reputation of a romantic adherent of a return to a vision of the past? If he agreed tnat we do not know much about any bygone age, why did he exalt one historical period? Nationalistic movements are gen­ erally characterized by some form or otner of what might

126 be called "ancestor worship," that is, in the face of an oppressive power, a faith that the roots of the indige­ nous system will somehow provide weapons. This mental process lies behind the Bengali nationalists' faith in the Mother, as it does behind Gandhi's trust in ancient, village India. The difference in Iqbal's case is that he was much more conscious of his own assumptions. Iqbal accepted a metaphor of struggle as an unques­ tioned truth. In his words: "What is the law of things? 39 Continual struggle." He conceived of history as the conflict of ideas. Such faith as he had in his ancestors was a conviction that the ideas they had been attempting to implement in human structures, ideas of equality and justice, were potent and valuable. Iqbal's loyalty was to the ideas and not to race or place. Parliaments were necessary because ideas had to be debated and tested if their real worth were to appear. A final point of comparison between Iqbal and Gandhi emerges on the question of duty. Gandhi wrote that West­ ern education was bad because "it does not enable us to 40 do our duty." Duty for him meant clinging to the moral system of ancient India. The tendency of the Indian civilization is to elevate the moral being, that of the Western civilization is to propagate immorality. The latter is godless, the former is based on a belief in God. So understanding and so believ­ ing, it behoves every lover of India to cling to the old Indian civilization even as a child clings to the mother's breast. This image of clinging is not one that would be found in Iqbal.

Although Gandhi was more the activist

of the two and was much more optimistic about the possi­ bility of radically changing the course of history in his lifetime, there was also a pessimism involved in his total rejection of modern civilization that is for­ eign to the' Muslim poet.

In 1910 Iqbal commented that

127 he doubted that anything significant could be done: To my mind government, whatever its form, is one of the determining forces of a people's character. Loss of political power is equally ruinous to nations' character. Ever since their political fall the Musalmans of India have undergone a rapid ethical deterioration. Of all the Muslim communities of the world they are probably the meanest in point of character. I do not mean to deplore our former greatness in this country, for, I con­ fess, I am almost a fatalist in regard to the various forces that ultimately decide the destinies of nations. As a political force we are perhaps no longer required? but we are, I believe, still indispensable to the world as the only testimony to the absolute Unity of God. Our value among nations, then, is purely evidential.42 The contrast of optimism/pessimism in the two vi­ sionaries is an important key to their later attitudes. Gandhi expressed the need for immediate change extremely forcefully because he viewed history as a matter of either/or alternatives.

He was optimistic that the good

system could be immediately restored, but if that failed, he saw little alternative but domination by a totally evil way of life. Iqbal, by contrast, was not hopeful for immediate rhange for the better; if anything# he seemed to have expected a possibly worse situation in the short run.

But he expected Muslims to survive if

they were faithful, and in the long run he saw many possibilities of change for the better.

Iqbal's pessi­

mism was not cosmic; that is to say, he did not see evil forces as totally in control, even though any ac­ tual period might be grim. The linking of the notion of character with polit­ ical responsibility is another significant aspect of Iqbal's understanding of human maturation. In his Stray Reflections, he comments* "True political life begins not with the claiming of rights, but with the 43 doing of duties.”

128 The duty to accept political responsibility and to govern is, m a way, the antithesis of romanticism, since it implies a process of growth tnat comes about through the difficult processes of making decisions and bearing responsibility for actions. Duty in Gandhi’s frame of reference tends to suggest an image of service to the despairing and the miserable— nursing and binding up the wounds of the suffering is the dominant motif of his idealism. For Iqbal, on the other hand, the image of duty is rather that of the responsible government official— taking actions, but aware of the finitude and imperfection of decisions and of the incal­ culable complexity of the forces in the midst of which he is trying to carve out some justice and reason. In Gandhi*s thinking, martyrdom is another aspect of responsibility and duty, and he describes it in a compelling metaphor: "That nation is great which rests 44 its head upon death as its pillow." This call to mar­ tyrdom was understood as such by the few, and misunder­ stood, as might be expected, by the many. Iqbal's appeal, on the otner hand, is for respon­ sible citizensnip. He does not deny the significance of martyrdom, but neither does he exalt it as a model for all. Rather, if it is taken as universally valid that character develops through the exercise of power and responsibility, then it follows that every citizen will mature to the extent that he or she exercises these duties; democracy is a necessity given these assumptions. So also is the re-opening of the doors of ijtihad for all Muslims. Conclusion We nave used this method of comparing the reflec­ tions of Iqbal in 1910 with the thinking of the Bengali nationalists and the thoughts of the early Gandhi with the hope that a comparison of the ideas, and especially the images, of this period might put into perspective

129 Iqbal's subsequent attitudes toward nationalism. Iqbal's later exaltation of the forces of passion as opposed to reason and his vivid portrayals of dynamic world-conquer­ ing Muslim heroes have given him a reputation for uncrit­ ical romanticism. Yet, we would argue that while anyone responding to Iqbal's imagery might be carried away by unrealistic entnusiasm, Iqbal himself was not guilty of excess of that kind. The poet and the philosopher ought not to be separated. Anyone who tries to understand the full scope of Iqbal's work must become as critical of untried assumptions as Iqbal was himself. It is important to recognize that he did not make a metaphor of the nation. The past for him was a seed bed— a source of latent potentiality— from which persons in the present could derive inspiration, as from the Mosque of Cordoba. That inspiration could be appropri­ ated by those who could use the present and move on to the future by creating something new. But the person in the present is the creative link between past and future; he or she is not the blind instrument of a hid­ den force. Some metaphor is necessary to provide a way of un­ derstanding the connection between what has been, is, and will be. But of the three types of metaphor we have examined— the Mother fulfilling her purposes through her sons, the God-system locked in combat with the devil-system, and the person growing on the brink of eternity, the third leaves much more room for the au­ tonomous person to create what structures he or she will within history.

As a metaphor, it does not bind or re­

strict as much as the other two do. It pushes responsibility onto individuals, since if they cope adequately with their problems, no unseen plan is going to take over and do all the work

all the fail to divine for them.

130

Notes 1. Javid Iqbal, ed., Stray Reflections: A Note-Book of Allama Iqbal (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam All and Sons, 1961), p. 22. 2. Robert Nlsbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). 3. Haridas and Uma Mukherjee, *Bande Mataram1 and Indian Nationalism (1906-1908) (Calcutta! Firma K. L. Mukhopadhay, 1957), p. 7. 4. Editorial, Bande Matram, June 14, 1908, quoted in Mukherjee, o£. cit., pp. 94-95. 5. Editorial, Bande Matram, May 3, 1908, quoted in Mukherjee, oj>. cit., p. 87. 6 . Editorial, Bande Matram, October 27, 1908, quoted in Mukherjee, op. cit. , p. 31. 7. Editorial, Bande Matram. March 1, 1908, quoted in Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 63-64. 8 . The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. X (Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broad­ casting, Government of India, 1963), p. v. 9. 10.

"Hind Swaraj,"

ibid., p. 51.

Ibid., p. 24-25.

11. "Speech at Public Meeting, Dakor, October 27, 1920,"in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. XVIII, pp. 386-387. 12.

Ibid.,p. 388.

13. "Hind Swaraj," in Vol. X, p. 59.

Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,

14.

Ibid., p. 40.

15.

Ibid.,p. 62.

16.

Ibid.,p. 57.

17.

Ibid., pp. 36, 37.

18.

Iqbal, 0£. cit.,

19.

Ibid., p. 37.

20.

Gandhi, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 21.

21.

Iqbal, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

22.

Gandhi, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 64.

23.

Ibid.. p. 49.

24.

Iqbal, 0£. cit.. p. 10.

p. 1.

131 25*

Ibid.. p. 24.

26.

Ibid.. pp. 26, 27.

27.

Ibid.. p. 95.

28.

Ibid.. p. 21.

29.

Ibid.. p. 140.

30.

Gandhi, oj>. cit., Vol. X, pp. 19-21.

31.

Ibid. p. 47.

32.

Ibid.. pp. 51, 52.

33.

Iqbal, op. clt., p. 102.

34.

Ibid.. p. 108.

35.

Ibid.. p. 109.

36.

Gandhi, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 58.

37.

Iqbal, oj>. clt.. p. 88.

38.

Ibid.. p. 86,

39.

Ibid., p. 89.

40.

Gandhi, o£. cit., Vol. X, p. 54.

41.

Ibid.. p. 38.

42.

Iqbal, o£. clt.. pp. 14, 15.

43.

Ibid.. p. 132.

44.

Gandhi, 0£. clt., Vol. X, p. 51.

Chapter 5 IQBAL:

IDEOLOGY IN SEARCH OF AN AUDIENCE Barbara Metcalf

In recent years most historians of modern South Asia have come to distrust tne importance of ideology in explaining historical development. In examining the development of nationhood in the sub-continent, they have moved away from the simplistic conception that panIndian notions of nationhood, drawn from a stable, con­ sistent ideology, were cherished by small elites of thinkers in the early Congress and Muslim League, and were then spread gradually and relentlessly and inevit­ ably, like light, to every corner of the country, draw­ ing more and more people by their persuasiveness. In fact, the growth of the nationalist movement was very unlike tnis orderly, model of ideology— its development was uneven, having spurts in one area, then in another, in a way that ideology cannot explain. Moreover, pub­ licists and politicians have been found to speak incon­ sistently and contradictorily, to a point that many historians have therefore argued that ideology was tai­ lored to suit only the need of circumstance and hence had no life of its own. Finally, the fact that many Indians did not subscribe to a nationalist ideology at all has been interpreted to mean that other interests must have shaped their behavior. Because of these difficulties in interpreting po­ litical behavior in light of ideology, some historians have begun searching for other ways to analyze and un­ derstand political change. A group of historians now known as the Cambridge School have found, through a number of local and provincial studies, explanations of political behavior that do not depend on the importance

134 of ideology.1 These historians, rather, have determined the motives of political actors to be largely based on personal interest groups defined by patronage, kin, com­ mercial and marriage networks, and caste and religious affiliation. This interpretation has been challenged in part on the grounds that political figures ultimately act in larger geographic areas where these interests are not salient. In some cases, to be sure, patronage or commercial contacts might have extended as far as the provincial level and defined interest groups there. But how political activity at the provincial and national levels came about is a question not wholly answered by a focus on interest groups alone. The very formulation of this problem of the use and role of ideology in political change as well as a theory for its analysis has been offered by Anil Seal, the Cam­ bridge historian wno has inspired many of these local 2 and regional studies. Seal's scheme for integrating the study of "locality, province, and nation" depends on a fresh recognition of the importance of the administra­ tive framework created by the British that, in fact, linked localities into a larger imperial system. At first, in the final decades of the nineteenth century that system fit very loosely over the localities. But with constitutional changes that provided for more active Indian participation, first at local, then provincial, and finally national levels, a structure was built from the bottom that cemented the politics of the locality to that of the larger areas, Indians dealt increasingly with the raj by having a structure of their own to match the larger imperial system. Significant constitutional reforms began in 1882 when the establishment of municipal councils and dis­ trict boards initiated local representative politics. In 1909, the Morley-Minto Reforms provided for the elec­ tion from the local bodies to provincial bodies of a

135 limited number of Indians; and in 1919, with the scheme for election changed, the provincial councils were de­ cisively made the main focus of Indian political activ­ ity. This focus remained constant until the late 1930's. Only then, with tne preparations for and final issuance of the Government of India Act of 1935, did politicians concentrate on the national arena of politics and only then did local politicians consistently concern them­ selves with Congress politics as well as with those closer to home. It was then too, as is well known, that the Muslim League succeeded in winning adherence to its all-India political concerns. Against this background, Seal points to the impor­ tance of examining political activity in relation to the opportunities offered in different times and places. As increasingly larger arenas were offered, the nature of political activity and ideology changed. Thus, one finds a wide variety of ideologies in different times and places, each reflecting important cultural and soc­ ial realities salient in eacn context. By focusing on a particular arena we have a way of examining ideology apart from such abstract questions as the power of ideas over the minds of men. We can ask why particular ideas appealed or failed to appeal to people in a given context and see that apparent contradictions may reflect not mendacity or opportunism but a shift in the level or arena of political activity. It is in this context that I would like to look at the role of Iqbal, testing the validity of Seal's the­ sis against the experience of Iqbal in gaining an audi­ ence for his ideology. Iqbal was, to point out the ob­ vious, very much a man who formulated ideology. He had, moreover, the most powerful of vehicles for disseminat­ ing nis ideology, that of poetry that sang and resounded. Iqbal was not a Ghalib or a Mir wno was absorbed in his own art but very much a public man who hoped to

136 influence the form and values of society. As a public man he held a brief tenure in the Legislative Council of the PunjaD; he was an office holder in tne Muslim League, and ne was a representative at one of the Round Table Conferences.^ He was not, in fact, an effective politician, out an ideologue: a man who made public statements about identity, about characteristics and values tnat defined a group's membership and aspirations Iqoal's verse and prose were largely didactic and above 4 all directed to issues of social identity. There has been considerable debate over the exact features of Iqbal's political positions, but throughout the 1920's and 1930*s their basic thrust was to foster political strategies that provided for a distinct and separate role for Indian Muslims.5 The very fact that he emphasized the common interests of the Muslim commun­ ity set him apart from those whose interests were prima­ rily regional or economic concerns. Among those commit­ ted to the interests of Indian Muslims were two groups: those willing to join with other Indians in the Indian National Congress with the purpose of securing independ­ ence, and those not willing. Iqbal was part of the lat­ ter group, sharing the Muslim League's orientation favor ing Muslims dealing directly with the British for such concessions as separate electorates? the formation of Muslim provinces; substantial provincial and even re­ gional autonomy; population movements to areas that were primarily Muslim, and ultimately a sovereign state for Muslims. This was an ideology of urban Muslims and in particular of those in minority provinces where they had little political influence. In Iqbal's case it was also an ideology that grew out of rage and anger toward tne British, anger for the injustice he felt directed to­ ward him personally and his co-religionists generally. Such an ideology had little appeal in Iqbal's own region of Punjab, and if, returning to Seal's argument,

137 we look at the arena of politics relevant to the 1920's and 1930's, it becomes clear why.6 After a flurry of all-India activity during the Khilafat and non­ cooperation movements, politics had settled down to be almost wholly the concern of the individual provinces, the arena defined as significant in the Reforms of 1919. A newly enlarged electorate chose Indian councillors to exercise what were heretofore unprecedented powers in provincial matters. In the Punjab the interests of the Unionist Party dominated the entire period. This party consisted of both Muslim and Hindu landlords; among the Muslim landlords there were an influential number of landed sufi pirs whose structural position in society was identical to that of the landlords. The landlords felt less anger toward the British than gratitude. They owed their position, bolstered by law and moral support, to the British government as epitomized in the cele­ brated Land Alienation Act of 1901 that had sought to keep the land in the hands of its owners and specific­ ally forbade its purchase by non-agricultural castes, largely the urban Hindu moneylending class. This coali­ tion of Hindu and Muslim landlords very successfully controlled provincial politics and saw its interests wholly separate from those of the urban classes, whether Hindu or Muslim. The countryside controlled the pro­ vince and the province was the significant arena of political action. In this context an ideology that defined a larger sphere, as did that of Iqbal and the Muslim League was meaningless. Iqbal, moreover, represented not only an all-India political perspective that seemed irrelevant, but, to Punjabis in the countryside, a religious orientation that was threatening. The Muslim landlords and pirs resisted Iqbal's religious thought, not because they were irreligious, but because they cherished a differ­ ent style of religious thought and practice.

Their

138 religion revolved around their faith in the power of pirs, a power derived from heredity.

The pir did not

even have to be a learned or holy man himself.

He

solved personal problems, mediated among his followers, and God.

He operated in specific contexts, using his own

intuition to offer guidance. frequented his presence.

Those who followed a pir

The dominant religion in the

countryside was one of fixed place and time, of pilgrim­ age, and celebration of °urs, of audience with the pir. Iqbal disdained this kind of religion and directed his reforms against it.

Daud Rahbar has quoted an ac­

count told by Iqbal himself of his encounter with a pir; One day in summer a Pir Sahib came to see me. The heat was at its height and the glare of the sun was too much for the eyes. A man drenched in sweat and breathless from exhaus­ tion cane and flung himself at the feet of the Pir. This was a disciple. He said, MI heard that your Holiness had arrived. I left Mughulpura quite early in the morning. I followed your trail failing to find you at numerous places until I was directed here. Thank God I found you. . . . I am starving and under a debt of two hundred rupees." Here the disciple took out two rupees and offered them to the Pir. Pir Sahib pocketed the money and raised his hands to pray, ask­ ing me to join him. I said to him, “You go ahead yourself. I shall pray when you con­ clude." Pir Sahib shut his eyes, mumbled for a while, and concluded by covering his face with his hands, sweeping them down to the tip of his beard, and blowing his holy breath upon the disciple. The disciple was overjoyed with great hope of the instant subsiding of the clouds of misfortune and destitution. I then said to Pir Sahib, "Now it is my turn." So I lifted my hands and said aloud, "0 God! The Pirs of our days have gone astray. Guide them to the right path." Pir Sahib protested, demanding an explanation for the uncalled for suppli­ cation. I said, "Look here, Pir Sahib! I did not interrupt your prayer at all. Let me make my supplication in peace now." He became silent and I continued, "0 Lord, en­ lighten the disciples of our times, and

139 keep them safe from the misguidance of their Pirs.” Plr Sahib interrupted again, but I paid no heed to his protest and continued. "The poor disciple says he is under a debt of two hundred rupees, not realizing that now his debt has grown to be two hundred and two rupees•" At this Plr Sahib became more indignant, say­ ing, "This is an insult, mind you. Sir." I said, "Alright. I end my prayer but on one condition: You return tne two rupees to the disciple, arrange for his relief from his debts, and get him some job.*' Plr Sahib was highly displeased, but re­ turned the two rupees and promised to look after the needs of the disciple.7 This episode suggests that Iqbal disapproved of the re­ ligion of the countryside and reveals now different were the styles of religion that the pir represented Q

and that which Iqbal himself espoused. Iqbal's religion shared a basic strategy with a wide range of religious movements that had been devel­ oping since the late nineteenth century, among them those of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the Ahl-i Hadith, the Ahl al-Qur'an, the Deobandi, and even the Ahmadiyyah. All these groups opposed each other to be sure, but their mutual opposition, I would argue, was the more intense because they shared elements in common. All were alike in being opposed to the religion espoused by the pirs? instead they fostered a religious style that focussed on principles, on texts, on rules that could be gener­ alized. Their religion opposed local cults and festi­ vals. It shared a common emphasis, above all, on re­ ligious law, whether based on the classical schools of Law, or on the Qur'an, or on the Qur'an and the hadith. They were scriptualists. This emphasis on Law has been, I would argue, the primary shift in perspective in modern Islam in South Asia. uli.

This shift was the result of a complex of stim­ It was in part defensive, an attempt to

140 reinvigorate the religion in a time of evident decay. It was a quest for self-respect, an attempt to defend the faith against Western attack by offering a version less susceptible to foreign criticism and more an anal­ ogy of tne legal and religious system of the opposition. It was, moreover, a shift to a religion more functional in this period of enhanced social and geographic mobil­ ity— to a religion that traveled with one, that provided a community of Muslims wherever they met. It was, in short, a religion that did not necessitate one's follow­ ing a pir from place to place through the dusty streets of Lahore in quest of his intercession. Iqbal's espousal of this religious orientation was in keeping with his all-India orientation. His perspective was a more uni­ versal one, not restricting a Muslim’s religion to one locale, one pir, but encouraging a new perspective based on law that did not change with location. This emphasis is analogous to the increased emphasis on bhakti devo9 tionalism noted by Singer among Brahmins in the South. The scripturalist religion is, moreover, one that has substantial appeal to the upwardly mobile. Iqbal himself was of a family not so long ago converted. His generation was the first to be educated. He was in his youth a member of the Anjuman-i-Kashmiri-i Musalmanan, one of the many "caste associations" of the period which sought through social reform and emulation of higher caste practices to enhance the status of their members, Iqbal's espousal of scripturalist norms thus had not only spiritual but social significance. Of sim­ ilar social significance, one might add, was his use of Persian and his attention to pan-Islam, which together identified him with the Muslim elite who claimed an or­ igin outside the borders of South Asia. Iqbal's concerns— religious, political and social— were those of the urban elite or aspiring elite. These were the people to whon the Muslim League— or the

141 nationalist pan-Indian movement of the Jamiat-i Ulama-i Hind— appealed. Specifically, such a movement as the Khilafat agitation found its main supporters anong them. Such a movement had little appeal to those whose reli­ gion and social life were locally based. Nor did the nationalist movement appeal to those who saw the reli­ gious ideas of the urban intelligentsia as threatening. Nor, above all, did it appeal to those whose interests were tied up with the British. Thus support of the Khilafat in the Punjab— or indeed support of the Muslim League itself— was not a measure of religious feeling per se but, in part, a measure of a specific kind of religious orientation. During Iqbal's lifetime the Muslim League in the Punjab continued to be a small group, mostly lawyers, clustered around him in Lahore. In 1936-7, Fazl-i Husain, the leader of the Unionist Party, explicitly re­ fused to join the League because he saw the important locus of politics as provincial, not pan-Indian? he ar­ gued that the importance of political activity in the provinces required decentralization and a need to co­ operate with other provincial powers, whether Muslim or not.10 Jinnah1s retort that if he wanted a non-communal party he should join tne Congress, completely raissed Fazl-i Husain's basic point of the importance of the provincial, not the national level, of activity. Only when the Congress, sought to intervene in the province through its mass contact campaign, did the Unionists feel they had to answer in kind. Jinnah then in 1938 succeeded in making a deal with Sikandar Hyat Khan that the Unionist Party would follow the League in all-India matters. The nature of their pact indicates that the Unionists were forced to recognize that the political arena had changed and that they could not encapsulate themselves in their province any longer.

142 The League was subsequently able to win to their party the one group of rural pirs, largely Chishti, whose reformist ideology defined their religious style as much closer to that of the scripturalist thinkers of the city than to that of their fellow pirs. This group had never been committed to the Unionist ideology and now found a framework for expressing their anti-British and reformed religious sentiments. To them Islamic rhetoric was meaningful; to them cooperation with secu­ lar political leaders a long standing tradition. Indeed they preferred such an alliance to cooperation with the c urban ulama. Their influence accounted for much of the popular support the League was ultimately able to secure in the Punjab.11 Those few left in the Unionist ranks were ultimately, in the 1946 election, forced to forge for themselves some kind of arrangement with an allIndia organization and they chose no other than their £

old enemy, the Jamiat ul- Ulama-i Hind who were allied with Congress. The Jamiat ul-°Ulama were the scriptur­ alist reformers, anti-British, and anti pir, hardly the likely allies of the Unionists. It is just this kind of development that makes those assessing the influence of ideology despair. What could be more blatantly opportunist than the Unionists turning to their old enemies? In fact, one could argue, the Unionists could do no other, for they had to have some tie to an allIndia organization when the structure of politics changed and their interests required the umbrella of some more inclusive organization. Only with the shift to a larger structure of polit­ ical activity did Iqbal's idea, heretofore salient only to urban educated groups, have meaning for larger num­ bers. Iqbal's specific insistence on the need for a sovereign state was accepted even later. As late as 1938 Jinnah declared to Nehru that there had to be a 12 united front against the British.

143 In his lifetime neither the specific features of Iqbal's religion nor those of his political thought had significant followings. His approach to Islamic law and philosophy was largely ignored. In contrast, his songs of the perfections and triumphs of Islam, both in religion and in history struck a responsive chord in those seeking a source of cultural pride, self-esteem, and hope for the future. Iqbal's songs of the power of the individual, through his faith, to achieve any height, to rise above ordinary life, were similarly es­ poused. Iqbal's specific political thought, both his separatism and his socialism* were rarely accepted, but his vision of a society more just and more united cer­ tainly was. Seal's model, then, while clearly helpful in under­ standing why a particular ideology is or is not espoused has certain limitations. A complex message like Iqbal's has a life of its own, its various levels embraced by various people for a variety of personal as well as group interests. It is obvious that a message can be effective even outside a political arena. Moreover Seal's scheme does not help explain the popularity of one ideology as against another. Any number of ideol­ ogies presumably could have fit the new political grid. Why in this case were only religious ideologies (whether Muslim League or Jamiat ul-°Ulama) drawn on in 1946 and why of these was one more popular than the other? Such questions must find their answers outside the framework posed by Seal. Yet one is encouraged to follow Seal's example by examining such questions in their social and political context and to study not ideology, but ideologies, in their particular time and place.

144

Notes 1. These works are conveniently listed in a review article by Eugene F. Irschlck, "Interpretations of Indian Political Devel­ opment," Journa^ol^AsjLan^ XXXIV (1975), pp. 461-472. 2. Anil Seal, "Imperialism and Nationalism in India," in John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson, and Anil Seal (eds.), Locality, Province, and Nation; Essays on Indian Politics, 1870-1940 (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 1-28. 3. For a review of his life see Hafeez Malik and Lynda P. Malik, "The Life of the Poet-Philosopher," in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan (New York, 1971), pp. 3-35. 4. For translations of his poetry see V. G. Kiernan, Poems from Iqbal (London, 1955). 5. This summary of his political views is largely based on the items included in A. R. Tariq, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore, 1973).

6. This argument is based on the doctoral dissertation on the Unionist Party by David Gilmartln (Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1979), "Tribe, Land, and Re­ ligion in the Punjab: Muslim Politics and the Making of Pakistan." 7* Quoted in Mohammad Daud Rahbar, "Glimpses of the Man," in Hafeez Malik, op. cit., p. 52.

8. For a suggestive sociological approach to what she calls the "ritual" and "anti-ritual" styles of religion, see Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (New York, 1973 ed.). 9. See Milton Singer, When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropolotical Approach to Indian Civilization (New York, 1972), especially chapter six. 10. Hafeez Malik, "The Man of Thought and Action," in op. cit., pp. 95-96. 11* David Cilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab," Modern Asian Studies 13 (July, 1979), pp. 485-517. 12. Michael Brecher, Nehru: 1959), p. 233.

A Political Biography (London,

Chapter 6 THE PHASES OF PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL HISTORY Lawrence Ziring There are great tasks to be accomplished and great dangers to be overcome: overcome them we certainly shall but we shall do so much quicker if our solidarity remains unim­ paired and if pur determination to march forward as a single, united nation remains unshaken. This is the only way in which we can raise Pakistan rapidly and surely to its proper, worthy place in the comity of nations. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, March 28, 1948 Pakistan was a divided nation at birth. Islam provided Pakistan with its life-force but it could not promote national solidarity. This is the central para­ dox in the Pakistan story and it holds as much signifi­ cance today as it did almost thirty years ago. The two most celebrated leaders of the Pakistan Movement, Moham­ mad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, best articulated those sentiments shared by millions of Muslims living in close proximity to the Hindu majority. As Jinnah noted in a 194 8 speech: "Pakistan was made possible because of the danger of complete annihilation of [the) human soul in a society based on caste."1 The cry, "Islam in Danger" exemplified this fear, it also galva­ nized an ethnically diverse and otherwise disparate people into a massive demand for national selfdetermination. Fear, however, is a negative force and of little value in the building of a community, let alone a nation. None expressed this thought better than Jin­ nah who once having achieved Pakistan, was burdened with the awesome task of reducing those suspicions which he so artfully exploited in the struggle for independent statehood. As Governor-General of the new state and

146 the people's Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), Jinnah insisted that Pakistan's primary concern must be the promotion of principles of equality and social justice for all its citizens. Although he urged his followers to support the Muslim League and did nothing to open its membership to non-Muslims, Jinnah stressed that Pakistan was not and would not become a theocratic state. Although he did not use tne term "secularism" there can be little question that his vision of Pakistan was shaped by his immersion in a European experience. In a broadcast to the people of Australia Jinnah deemed it essential to comment on the common experience of people like himself with that of the British. "It comes, perhaps from a practical way of thinking and an aversion from mere 2 theorizing and sentiment."Jinnah's Pakistan may have been realized through religious expression, but in the eyes of its principal leader it could only be sustained through secular procedures that promoted national inte­ gration. Before his death in September 1948, Jinnah acknowledged that the job of holding Pakistan together would be far more difficult than the one that made inde­ pendence possible. "That is why I want you to be on your guard against this poison of provincialism," he remarked.3 People seldom speak with one voice.

In time of

trouble there is a need to rally around a forceful and confident leader. However, when the cause of the per­ ceived trouble appears to have been controlled or neu­ tralized that particular form of unity can quickly evaporate. Collective purpose is very hard to sustain through artificial means. In part this explains Pakis­ tan's early preoccupation with India. But it also sug­ gests why so many Pakistanis refused to come to grips with their personal responsibilities. Blaming someone else for your own failings is certainly not unique with Pakistanis.

Nevertheless, they so completely convinced

147 themselves that their primary difficulties were exter­ nally contrived that they could not appreciate dilemmas of their own making. This too must be judged part of Pakistan's negative legacy and Mohammad Ali Jinnah is not without blame. Still, Jinnah was influenced in his behavior by the movement that he led, his effectiveness determined by his intimacy with the Muslim complaint in an India dominated by Hindus that many could not trust. Most Muslims who joined Jinnah in his quest for Pakistan were concerned with the recreation of an Islamic polity based on some aspects of holy scripture, and were largely oblivious to the demands of a heterogeneous nation-

4

state. Jinnah, of necessity, had to wait to correct this orientation after independence had been realized, but as subsequent events were to show the effort was tco limited and certainly too late. Jinnah must have believed he could modernize tradi­ tion once his government had consolidated its power and the nation was relatively tranquil. No doubt he felt he was more dedicated to this proposition than his counterparts in India. Jinnah prided himself on being more cosmopolitan in his tastes, more constitutional in his performance and less demogogic in his tactics than Gandhi, Nehru or Patel. Moreover, he believed Pakis­ tan's example of fairness and justice with its popula­ tion, and no less with its minorities, would influence India's treatment of its non-Hindu population and es­ pecially the forty million Muslims who were expected to remain in place there.^ Jinnah was consumed by the quest for an independent Pakistan, and delegated respon­ sibility for organizing the new government to senior civil servants and the prominent political leaders in the several Muslin-dominant provinces that were to com­ prise Pakistan. Mot all of the latter had been eager to join Jinnah in his quest for Pakistan and when they were "won over" it was with the understanding that they

148 would improve not lessen their status.

Therefore,

while Jinnah was concerned with tne instruments that might draw Muslims, Hindus, Muhajirs, Bengalis, Pun­ jabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Balucnis into a united na­ tion, these local leaders were more intent on maintain­ ing special privilege. After Jinnah's death the forces of division and especially tnose of provincialism could not be contained and his dream of a unified, secular, modern nation-state was buried with him.

I The creation of Pakistan in 1947 would have proved impossiDle had it not been for the role played by Moham­ mad Ali Jinnah. It was Jinnah who persuaded the Brit­ ish that Partition was both necessary and morally cor­ rect. It was Jinnah who took the measure of the Con­ gress leaders and who deftly frustrated their hopes to rule over a united India. It was Jinnah who pressured dissident Muslim leaders in the Punjab, Sind and on the North West Frontier to fall in line behind him and the Muslim League* Above all it was Jinnah desires ana aspirations of those Indian could not reconcile themselves to Hindu Jinnah, for all his success, was also a

who embodied the Muslims who government. But creature of cir­

cumstances. British weakness after World War II de­ manded a quick resolution of the Indian drama. To have resisted Jinnah would have intensified the struggle and undoubtedly provoked a physical confrontation. Insofar as the British government had already agreed to quit India, they saw little purpose in British forces becom­ ing embroiled in a controversy that could not serve their interests. Although the British authorities in India and at home appeared to favor the Congress the prevailing view was "a plague on both your houses." Hence the British left the people of tne sub-continent to settle their own affairs.

The terrible bloodletting

149 that climaxed with the division of India must have been anticipated by the British.7 The magnitude of the car­ nage and the general panic that it spawned throughout northern India, however, came as a shock to Jinnah* Jinnah had demonstrated that he could deal effectively with men of stature and power, but he could not control the passions of the masses* Pakistan was a fragile experiment that could not be preserved through the working of the parliamentary in­ stitution alone* The overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims who now were transformed into Pakistanis knew virtually nothing about representative government, but they could be expected to respond to strong leaders who displayed compassion and understanding* Jinnah, there­ fore, arrogated more power to himself than he might otherwise have felt necessary. In assuming the office of the Governor-General he made it quite clear that his position would be more than ceremonial. Jinnah's decision-making role left intact the vice-regal tradi­ tion that the British had developed in India.

Its per­

petuation also circumscribed the power of the parliameng tary system. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was known to be unhappy with the arrangement but until Jinnah en­ tered his last bout with tuberculosis, he comply* Jinnah1s critics have pointed to ment in explaining why Pakistan failed to ent representative institutions. Nor can

was forced to this develop­ establish coher­ they be faulted

for taking this position. Still, it cannot be proved that Pakistan would have fared any differently had Jin­ nah retired from the political arena, as had Gandhi, once independence was won* Comparisons with India are of little value. Pakistan was a new nation as well as a new state and the reality of what had transpired had yet to influence popular behavior*

Moreover, India's

leaders were numerous, gifted and reasonably cooperative. Pakistanis had only Jinnah and a congeries of landlords

150 and disparate and argumentative regional personalities to address themselves to. With Jinnah's passing and later Liaquat's assassination, it was the vice-regal tradition which again asserted itself— but the politi­ cians were not the ones to make use of it. Tne civil-military bureaucracy was accustomed to ruling and from its vantage point the nation could only be preserved so long as they had control of the main governmental apparatus. Politicians and parliamentar­ ians were a quarrelsome lot and given their incessant bickering it was doubtful they could serve the nation with wisdom and dedication. The bureaucrats, civil and armed, compared their sense of public service with that of the politicians and quickly concluded that they were not only more competent to rule but also more patriotic. The members of the permanent services (the civil bureauc­ racy and the military) never discarded their colonial outlook or temperament. The traditional role of the public services highlighted their aloofness from the masses. Moreover, they were just as successful in con­ vincing the public that they were equally aloof from

9

politics. History was to show, however, that their non­ interference in politics "was reduced to a farce" as Ghulam Mohammad, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and Iskander Mirza "fiddled with politics and scrambled for power." Indeed, this segment of the Pakistan drama did not end until these same individuals had attained the highest offices in the country including that of Governor Gen­ eral, Prime Minister and President respectively. This is not to say that the bureaucrats simply usurped power. On the contrary, it was the politicians who stifled democratic impulses hence shifting the balance of polit­ ical power to the advantage of the permanent services. As one commentator of the period noted: "the so called representatives of the public through their political impotence and spineless abdication of real power allowed

151 the public servants to assume real authority in the gov­ ernance of the country.**1^ This evolution was perhaps predictable, given the complexities of the modern state and the proven inadequacies of Pakistan's elected offi­ cials. The inevitability of bureaucratic growth and power in a developing country is often taken for granted given specific economic and social pressures. The bureaucrat/technocrat is supposedly better equipped to cope with the mundane questions involving nationbuilding. But the change requirements which give bu­ reaucracy prominence, and even dominance, also demand a commensurate change in the administrator's attitude and behavior. And this was not forthcoming. The mistrust among the people is aggravated by the indifference of the public servant to the higher values of life and national pride of the people. He has been tardy in affirm­ ing his loyalty to the ideology that provided the impulse for the creation of Pakistan.11 Jinnah knew that Pakistan had few genuine institu­ tions upon which to found a new nation.

Those that did

exist were either withered fragments or inchoate. Hence he was particularly mindful of the need to strengthen the bureaucracy and the military establishment while not neglecting the Muslim League— but not necessarily strengthening it either. The bureaucracy and military were of crucial importance due to the communal warfare, the resultant shift in populations which produced enor­ mous refugee colonies, and the hostilities with India over Kashmir. The civil-military authorities assumed maximum responsibility for managing the state's inter­ nal as well as external affairs. In the meantime the Muslim League endeavored to transform a movement into a political organization. Faced with almost no politi­ cal opposition this should have been a simple task, however, given an inability to engender cooperation between the politicians of the several provinces, the

152 process was retarded. With the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 the purpose of the Muslim League was lost in a futile exercise of provin­ cial oneupsmanship. Constitution-making was delayed as the politicians engaged in petty conflicts which aroused considerable unrest among the general population. Dis­ turbances degenerated into serious rioting in Dacca, Karachi and Lahore and calm could only be restored by calling upon the army and imposing limited martial law. It was in these circumstances that the civil bureaucracy asserted itself and began its long dominance of the Pak­ istan government.

Ghulant Mohammad, Iskander Mirza and

Ayub Khan are the outstanding personalities who sought to give Pakistan direction in subsequent years. Neither was a politician nor could they be described as Jinnah's 12 disciples. II It is possible to divide Pakistan's political his­ tory into four segments. The decade from 194 8 to 1958 can. be designated the Punjabi period; the period from 1958 to 1971 might be called the Pathan period; the years from 1971 to 1977 might appropriately be termed the Sindhi period; and the current phase the Fundament­ alist period. The purpose of this section is to briefly describe the principal characteristics of each period and to suggest how the one influenced the other. This survey will also assist in understanding Pakistan's current crisis of identity. The Punjabi Period Jinnah believed that the Muslims were a nation in the sub-continent and could be protected and preserved only if a Muslim state were carved out of British India. The Muslim-dominant-state as he envisaged it would be a liberal, constitutional democracy in which fundamental rights and social justice would be paramount concerns.

153 The new state would safeguard the interests of its mi­ norities who would enjoy full and equal citizenship with the majority community, Pakistan thus would stand as a reminder to the Indian authorities, whom Jinnah sus­ pected of narrow designs, that they must uphold and ex­ pand the rights and opportunities of all the people residing within tne Indian Union. Islam was in danger but obviously not in the Muslim majority areas that became Pakistan, Rather it was in Hindu-controlled India tnat the Muslims needed support and Jinnah did not entertain the possibility of India's millions of Muslims shifting their domicile to Pakistan. Therefore Pakistan's two stand sentinel and hence keep ario displayed

far-flung wings would, in Jinnah's eyes, over the destinies of India's minorities the Indian leaders honest. This scen­ its gross limitations the moment Pakis­

tan was declared independent. The evolution of Pakistan into a genuine represent­ ative democracy necessitated modernizing a polity that was versed in parochialism and influenced by medieval thinking and performance. Except for the western Punjab the other regions that became Pakistan were either back­ ward hinterlands or tribal territories where little po­ litical consciousness focused on the idea of the cor­ porate state. Moreover, even the western Punjab con­ tained few persons whose primary allegiance was owed the nation and the national government that ruled over it. Most Pakistanis were inclined to give their sup­ port to the more familiar patrimonial landlords, head­ men, tribal chiefs and religious teachers in their particular region.

What the average villager knew of

formal government he learned from the presence of the administrative officer who was traditionally preoccu­ pied with tax collections and maintaining law and order. This was true in the British period and it did not change in the post-independence years. Pakistan was

154 also a very poor country, literacy levels were among the lowest in the world and endemic diseases took a regular toll of the population. Add to this picture the lack of preparation for self-government, the influx of millions of impoverisned and harrassed refugees from India, and a minor war with its major neighbor in Kashmir and the conclusion would have to be drawn that Jinnah's vision was certainly unsuited to Pakistan's reality. As an afterthought it might be argued that Jinnah's ideas might have had more success had Pakistan been chiseled out of northcentral India where tne most sophisticated and enlightened generation of Indian Muslims resided. But this of course was impossible given the arguments made in defense of a separate Muslim state in South Asia. As it was, however, it was those elite members of the refugee community who migrated to Pakistan that played the dominant role in trying to lead Pakistan into the twentieth century. The refugees or Muhajirs, however, were hardly in a position to modify or tamper with the traditional power structure in vogue in the country. The leading politicians of the period were the Punjabis who con­ trolled the land in the predominantly agrarian nation. These landlords had always worked in relative harmony with the colonial bureaucracy and they had no difficulty in continuing that practice with the new administrators. In a short time something akin to a Punjabi-bureaucratic power structure was erected and it tended to determine or influence the more significant policies of the early regimes. The fundamental problem facing the politicians was constitution-making and a protracted debate ensued not as to whether Pakistan was to be guided by Islamic principles, but how Bast Bengal or East Pakistan was to be represented in the central legislature. In this crucial area the Bengalis who represented more than half of the total population of the country insisted on

155 representation proportionate to their numbers.

The Pun­

jabis, however, considered themselves to be more vital and certainly more productive than their eastern breth­ ren and hence sought to block every Bengali maneuver which might give them leverage in the decision-making process. Moreover, East Bengal soon after independence sensed that its interests were being ignored by West Pakistan. Jinnah was compelled to go to East Pakistan, even though in declining health, as the first rumblings of discontent (labeled provincialism) began to be , 13 heard. Jinnah insisted that the Muslim League government was committed to the establishment of Urdu as the na­ tional language of Pakistan.

The Bengali population,

especially the politicians and students, were vehe­ mently opposed to this idea and a conflict developed which boiled over in February 1952. By this time, Jin­ nah and Liaquat Ali Khan were both gone and in their places were men with less vision who did little to relieve the tense situation. 14 The result was a full­ blown Bengali nationalism which nourished itself on numerous socio-economic and political issues before attaining a crescendo in the 1971 creation of Bangla­ desh.

In the years between 1952 and 1958 the Punjabi-

bureaucratic elite did its utmost to antagonize the Bengali population. Assured that the Bengalis were more bluster than promise, the West Pakistani authority dismissed the East Pakistani Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, without seeking a vote of confidence in the parliament.

The following year, the opposition United

Front swept the provincial elections in East Pakistan and completely shattered the once powerful Muslim League. But before the United Front government could assume responsibility for governing East Pakistan, the Punjabi-bureaucratic elite in the person of GovernorGeneral Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the new government,

15b imposed President's Rule, and dispatcned the former De­ fense Secretary, Iskander Mirza, to the province armed with virtual dictatorial powers. A few months later the same Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly and set about to reorganize the Pakistan political struc­ ture when the Supreme Court intervened and called for the establishment of a second constitution-making body. The Second Constituent Assemoly met in 1955 and hurriedly amalgamated the four provinces of the west wing into a single province or One Unit. The One Unit was supposed to give the Punjabis control over all of West Pakistan and thus more than balance the influence of East Pakis­ tan. Tne Punjabi-bureaucratic elite now considered itself strong enough to weatner constitutional questions, hence Pakistan's first constitution was completed by the Second Constituent Assembly in 1956 and officially promul­ gated in March of that year. The new constitution contained a parity formula pro­ viding East and West Pakistan with equal representation at the Centre but the former was clearly at a disadvan­ tage and they gave the document only token support. Iskander Mirza had also succeeded to the post of Gover­ nor-General after Ghulam Mohammad's death and under the constitution he became Pakistan's first President.

Is­

kander Mirza like Ghulam Mohammad before him was a civil servant not a politician and he displayed a lack of appreciation for the Muslim League.

Moreover, the de­

bacle suffered by the Muslim League in East Pakistan caused the party to disintegrate in West Pakistan as well. Other political parties emerged to fill the vacuum. Among these was a Republican Party which was actually sponsored by Mirza and was comprised mainly of Punjabi landlords.

For a brief period it became the

dominant party in West Pakistan.

In East Pakistan the

situation was more fluid as the United Front split into its various parts.

The dominant parties were H. S.

157 Suhrawardy's Awami League (Mujibur Rahman was General Secretary), Fazlul Hug's Krishak Sramik and Maulana Bhashani's National Awami Party, The fragmentation of the political scene produced considerable instability and Iskander Mirza considered imposing a "guided democ­ racy" system on the country. General elections which were forecast and which would have put the constitu­ tion into full force were repeatedly postponed as the several political groupings made and unmade governments both at the Centre and in the provinces. By the autumn of 1958 Iskander Mirza, in league with the Array commander-in-chief, Mohammad Ayub Khan, abrogated the new constitution, dissolved the political parties, closed the assemblies and declared martial law.15 This deci­ sion brought a close to the Punjabi period in Pakis­ tan's political history as the power shifted away from the landed politicians and settled in the Army and civil bureaucracy. An altercation in East Pakistan's provincial assembly was declared to be the final justi­ fication for this drastic action but the declaration of martial law did not calm the Bengalis who argued that the elections would have given them control of the state apparatus. The Pathan Period The Pathan period is so characterized not only be­ cause Ayub Khan considered himself a Pathan, but be­ cause power was monopolized by the civil-military bu­ reaucracy. Bureaucratics, which emphasized blind obedience, unconditional grants of authority and arbi­ trary decision-making, replaced an incipient form of politics that at the very least could not stifle fac­ tional competitiveness, a broad range of choice and an unusual flow of information. The Pathan period by con­ trast with the Punjabi thus emphasized the bureaucrat's penchant for law and order and the soldier's code of discipline and efficiency. Material development became

158 an all consuming concern and political activities were sacrificed on an altar of stability and national growth. Soon after the declaration of martial law Ayub Khan forced Mirza from power, sent him into exile and took full control of the country* Martial law was sustained for approximately forty-four months and chiefly adminis­ tered by members of the higher bureaucracy, i.e., the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Under Ayub Khan Pakis­ tan developed into a full-fledged administrative state The bureaucracy was Ayub Khan's political party even though he would later give lip-service to his own politi­ cal creation, the Conventionist Muslim League* Ayub was determined to see Pakistan developed and he had concluded long before that the country could ill-afford political competition* The latter he considered wasteful and un­ productive, hence he emphasized economic planning and social engineering and the bureaucrats and technocrats were in the best position to manage these programs. En­ amored by its prowess the bureaucracy was seemingly pre­ pared to pit its professionalism against the politicians who were hopelessly divided and by contrast blundering. They assumed that the people would prefer their brand of dedication and expertise over the opportunistic and selfaggrandizing political elites* Ayub Khan introduced his Basic Democracies scheme witn this mind. Basic Democ­ racies were aimed at uplifting the rural masses while the urban intelligentsia and professional classes were held in limbo. It must be noted that when Ayub Khan seized power from the politicians there was considerable popular approval. However, with the passage of time and growing awareness that Ayub had no intention of return­ ing power to civilian hands, opposition to his authority began to grow. Basic Democracies were criticized as serving the entrenched elite not the rural poor.

Even

the Rural Development Scheme which Ayub launched with help from the United States did not convince the urbane

159 critics that the system was in the interest of the nation. When Ayub presented Pakistan with still another 17 constitution in 1962 it was similarly condemned. The new constitution replaced the parliamentary model with a centralized presidential system.

Although political

parties were permitted to operate, the indirect elec­ tion system that the constitution described minimized the role of the parties and reinforced the power and influence of the bureaucrats. Stifled and frustrated, the politicians could only agitate but this could prove costly without popular support.

Ironically that popu­

lar support soon appeared as the result of war with India in the late summer of 1965, The war was short and at first proved a great rallying ground for the Ayub government— that is until the time arrived for restoring the status quo ante. The Tashkent Agreement in which Ayub agreed to reestablish relations with India was in­ terpreted in West Pakistan as a sellout of the Kashmiris. In East Pakistan the impression gained from the war was that the province could not be defended if India were intent on an invasion.

To the Bengalis Kashmir was of

lesser significance. Moreover, when the West Pakistini students took to the streets and the politicians soon joined them, the anti-government forces in East Pakis­ tan soon began to demonstrate.

If there was a common

theme in these developments it was the determination to bring down the Ayub administration. 18 In February 1966, in the midst of the antiTashkent agitation, a meeting of the opposition politi­ cal parties was convened in Lahore.

Mujibur Rahman was

the only representative from the East Wing to appear and it was here that he first presented his six-point autonomy program for East Pakistan* 19 The West Pakistan poli­ ticians did not favor Mujib's proposals, however, and he was forced to return to East Pakistan empty-handed.

160 Nevertheless, the Ayub Administration did not overlook the six points. Once the Tashkent demonstrations were quelled and its leaders imprisoned, the Ayub government arrested Mujio, and a year later accused him of plotting secession in collaboration with the Indian government. The Agartala Conspiracy trial sought to put Mujib out of the way but it only added to nis martyrdom and under­ lined tne importance of his autonomy program. Ayub's bout with pneumonia at this time threw his government into confusion as the trial proceeded to grind on. The fall of 1968 marked the tenth year of Ayub Khan's rule and the period was to be celebrated as tne "Decade of Development." Pakistan had made unquestion­ able economic advances but there was no doubt who had profited from the country's growth. The impoverished, illiterate masses in both wings of the country were no better off despite the claims of the government. Thus when large sums of public revenue were allocated to publicize the regime's accomplishments, it was not s u r ­ prising to find a seething discontent rise and break through the surface calm. Mass demonstrations erupted throughout West Pakistan, in the towns as well as the cities. Students led tne cnarge but they were not alone. Labor, lower government functionaries, and professional people joined with the politicians in villifying Ayub Khan, the government/ and its policies. The president's erstwhile confidant and minister of several portfolios, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, used the oc­ casion to organize his Pakistan People's Party. Dissat­ isfied with the existing political organizations, he wanted a party of his own in order to enlist students and other sectors of society heretofore not associated with the operative organizations. Bhutto's brand of socialism appealed to the post-independence generation and he insisted he had to be free of the conventional parties and their special interests. Although leaders

161 like Bhutto were imprisoned, there was no ending the violent protests and Ayub was forced to make conces­ sions. The politicians were released from custody and even Mujib was freed and the Agartala Conspiracy trial abruptly terminated. Ayub promised a return to parlia­ mentary government and direct elections, but even this concession did not stop the rioting. Ayub's promises were unacceptable.

Nothing less than his departure was

demanded by Bhutto, Mujib and the lesser personalities. Weakened by disease and frustrated at not finding a so­ lution which the opposition politicians could accept Ayub turned to the Army and asked Yahya Khan to pick up the pieces. Yahya followed in the footsteps of his fallen commander-in-chief.

He abrogated the 1962 constitution,

banned the parties, and reimposed martial law.

The

politicians retreated once more but with Bhutto and Mujib each being heralded as the "giant killer" in his respective province, Yahya could not prevent the poli­ ticians from pressing for a return to "democratic" proc­ esses. After his assumption of power, Yahya agreed to the breakup of the One Unit and the provinces of the Punjab, Northwest Frontier, Baluchistan and Sind were reconstituted as administrative political units.

He

also reinstated the parties and allowed them to campaign for national elections which were held in December 1970. But the road to Pakistan's first general elections was strewn with unforeseen obstacles. The floods in East Pakistan preceding the election were more severe than in previous years. Then, in November, a cyclone and tidal wave struck the province taking an enormous toll of life.

The Yahya Khan government proved unequal to

the task of aid and rehabilitation and was soundly con­ demned by the Awami League led by Mujib and his six point program of provincial autonomy.^0

Thus when the

ballots were counted in December Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's

162 party had swept nearly every seat designated for East Pakistan in the new National Assembly. It is important to note that tihashani's National Awami Party decided not to contest the elections, hence leaving the field wide open to Mujib's forces. As overwhelming as this victory was for the Awami League the party could not lay claim to a single seat in all the provinces of West Pakistan. Bhutto was the victor in West Pakistan although his success was not nearly so complete as that of Mujib. Bhutto's PPP took a majority of seats in the Punjab and Sind but displayed almost no appeal on the Northwest Frontier or in Baluchistan. Still Bhutto was by far the outstanding winner in West Pakistan and the moment de­ manded a rapprochement between him and Mujib. Under p a r ­ liamentary rules Mujib snould have been granted the right to form the new government given his clear majority in the National Assembly but Bhutto would have none of that. Bhutto's discontent was even more pronounced when Mujib insisted on making the six point program the theme for a new Pakistani constitution. Given Bhutto's refusal to deal with Mujib on his terms Yahya was forced to post­ pone the meeting of the National Assembly. The Bengalis read sinister motives into this decision and feared a re­ peat of 1954 when the powers in West Pakistan snatched 21 This time, their hard fought victory away from them. however, the Bengalis were not prepared to wait for the next government maneuver and displayed open defiance of the government in Islamabad. Mujib's hand was actually forced by his supporters and by the more radical members of the East Pakistan political scene. As Mujib went about the chore of organizing a government in East Pakis­ tan, the Pakistan Army implemented plans to liquidate all opposition to its authority. On the night of March 25, 1971 guns and bayonets replaced speeches, strikes and ballots. Soon East Pakistan was consumed in a civil war. Mujib was seized by the military and flown to West

163 Pakistan as a "traitor." The Awami League leaders who managed to escape to India, however, quickly set up a government-in-exile for a new state called Bangladesh. It was the beginning of the end of Pakistan as Jinnah had created it. By the end of the year the Indian Army had entered the struggle and the Pakistan force was com22

pelled to surrender. The defeat of the Pakistan Array heralded the formal dismemberment of the Pakistani state. Perhaps no single individual contributed more to the fall of Yayha Khan than Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. All through that year of crisis Bhutto stumped West Pakistan calling for a transfer of power to civilian leadership. So effective were his speeches that in October 197lYahya was pressured to announce his intention to transfer au­ thority to the country*s politicians by January 1972. The loss of East Pakistan with its sizeable garrison, however, effectively terminated Yahya*s career. And when the dust had settled it was Bhutto who had been called upon to take over the crestfallen and demoralized nation. Effigies of the ruling military junta were burned throughout the country. Yahya was ridiculed for his in­ eptness and corruption, and worse still for the pious Muslim population, he was described as a womanizer and alcoholic. The New York Times of December 24, 1971 im­ plied tnat lower echelon military officers joined in the condemnation of the junta. One was quoted as saying: "We have been betrayed by drunken pigs. We have had no government for three years and Pakistan has been at the mercy of all its foes, with the loyal armed forces made the scapegoat. It is time for real government— civilian government."

The Pathan perioa in Pakistan*s political

history drew to an ignominous close with Pakistan shorn of more than half its population and approximately onesixth its land area.

East Pakistan would no longer

plague Pakistan's unity but the lesson of Bangladesh still had to be learned by Pakistan's new leaders.

164 The Sindhi Period The Sindhi period focuses on the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after December 1971 and dramatizes his effort to remake Pakistan in his own image. Bhutto, perhaps be­ cause of his aristocratic Sindhi background, his excel­ lent education and his long experience in government and politics was the most aggressive leader that Pakistan has yet had. Self-centered, egotistical and full of amour propre— Bhutto gave lip-service to the restoration of competitive politics in Pakistan but virtually all his policies were aimed at mass mobilization and the extoll­ ing of his virtues and vision. After the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistan seemed to require an articulate and inventive spokesman. The question remains, however, whether the country also needed a cult of the personal­ ity. Bhutto, an absolute Sindhi landlord, more so than Ayub Khan, the professional soldier who was accustomed to delegating authority, demanded total power and full compliance. He clothed himself in a cloak of infallibil­ ity and created a variety of police and paramilitary structures to protect his person. Sindhi landlords are reputed to be suspicious of anyone who might challenge their pre-eminence and hence they cannot be content until all their rivals have been eliminated. The struggle therefore is relentless. The Sindhi period in Pakistan's political history is the story of a brooding leader whose deep-seated fears were at least commensurate with his ex­ ternal self-confidence. Bhutto had proven himself to be the most popular politician in Pakistan following the loss of East Pakis­ tan. He had the most formidable political organization in the country and was zealously supported by virtually 23 every major opinion group. Bhutto's success, however, was owed as much to circumstances as to his own driving personality. The Pakistani bureaucracy had been heavily criticized during the Yahya Khan interregnum.

Its ranks

165 had been thinned through forced resignations and dis­ missals, and the prevailing situation during and follow­ ing the civil war had thoroughly undermined its confi­ dence. It certainly was in no position to play apolit­ ical role. Tne military establishment suffered even greater disillusionment.

The armed forces considered

themselves to be the guardian of the nation's territor­ ial integrity and yet it had presided over and bore chief responsibility for the dismemberment of the coun­ try. It clearly needed to remove itself from the polit­ ical mainstream so that it could treat its wounds and restore its lost prestige. Finally, there was no polit­ ical personality or organization that could even come close to challenging Bhutto's strength.

The older poli­

ticians were either deceased or discredited. Others had very limited constituencies. Generally speaking, in the years since 1958 there was little opportunity for the development of coherent political organizations or the training of future political leaders.

It would

not be wrong to assert that Pakistan suffered from severe political atrophy. Bhutto was thus the benefi­ ciary of a condition that did not augur well for Pakis­ tan’s future. Yayha's last official act was to sign the transfer of authority documents which made Bhutto the new Presi­ dent of Pakistan.

Other high-ranking officers were sent

into early retirement in the days and weeks that followed but observers were not surprised by these actions until March 1972 when Bhutto accused his acting Commander-inChief of the Pakistan Army as well as his head of the Air Force witn showing "Bonaparte tendencies."

Lieu­

tenant General Gul Hassan Khan and Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan were alleged to have been the masterminds be­ hind Yahya's dismissal and Bhutto's rise. Both were earlier described as flexible and conciliatory and de­ termined to return government to civilian leadership.

166 Now Bhutto identified them as professional soldiers who had become "professional p o l i t i c i a n s I n addition to Rahim Khan six other senior members of the Air Force were dismissed. Later many more high positioned officers would be forced into early retirement. Bhutto had begun to consolidate his power and he sought to make certain that the armed forces would not interfere with his plans or policies. Officers were hand-picked to rise to the highest posts even if it meant passing over numerous, worthy candidates. Moreover, Bhutto succeeded in abolish­ ing the role of Coramander-in-Chief and brought the m i l i ­ tary under his personal charge.

With this reform accom­

plished he elevated Lieutenant General Tikka Khan to be his Chief of Staff. Immediately upon taking power Bhutto announced that Pakistan would be reshaped along popular lines. His would be a people's government and this meant gaining control of all sectors of the economy. Prominent ind us ­ trialists and commercial leaders were placed under house arrest and generally intimidated prior to the nationali­ zation of their firms. The Economic Reform Order of 1972 aimed at collapsing the empires of Pakistan's "twentytwo" privileged families and the government announced its intention to substitute socialist programs for c a p i ­ talist performance* Major industries, insurance compan­ ies, banks were all converted to government enterprises in the first wave of nationalization directives. Numer­ ous other enterprises heretofore identified with the private sector were likewise seized, cotton ginning and rice-husking industries as late as the summer of 1976* Government corporations multiplied many fold and the ranks of those employed by government swelled. Workers in these installations all had their salaries raised although productivity was not necessarily improved. Des­ pite inflationary pressures, the government endeavored to hold the line on staple food items and other basic

167 necessities. Increasing costs for imports and scarci­ ties, however, frustrated these efforts. Although prices could not be prevented from climb­ ing the nationalization program had neutralized the wealthy industrialists who now had the option of follow­ ing Bhutto's lead or leaving the country. In more or less the same fashion Bhutto brought the once formidable landlords under his determined control. Land reforms were announced in 1972 and again in 1976 which put the landlords at the mercy of the administration. The land reforms also provoked some peasants, especially in the Frontier province, to seize holdings of their traditional patrons and tnis led to ugly confrontations which ulti­ mately the government had to quell. Bhutto promised that the peasants would be allocated the lands resumed from the large landlords. In 1976 he also declared that state held lands would be similarly distributed. At the same time the government sought to protect lands desig­ nated for retired members of the armed forces and for those favored by the regime.

It can be said that sev­

eral million acres of land were distributed among the landless peasants, but their capacity to operate as in­ dependent farmers was limited by their dependence on government financial and technical support as well as the administration's dominance of the marketing mechan­ ism. In the final analysis Pakistan's economy suffered from many causes but it was obvious that the private sector's ability to influence the political life of the nation had been effectively constrained. On March 20, 1973 Bhutto announced sweeping admin­ istrative reforms in which he revealed the termination of "Naukarshahi,11 a derisive term employed to emphasize that the bureaucrats had usurped power and thus had failed to meet the nation's needs. In point of fact, Bhutto wanted it known that the privileged higher bu­ reaucracy, especially the Civil Service of Pakistan

168 (CSP), was being dissolved and would be integrated within a new unified civil service structure. Bhutto justified his action by noting that the elite administrators "had developed a bara sahib attitude" and that the general population had grown weary with administrative inaction and apparent indifference to popular needs. Bhutto's declaration of course met with a positive response from those who had long perceived the bureaucracy as a primary obstacle in Pakistan's quest for self-government. Pakis­ tan's "Brahmins" and "Mandarins" (Bhutto's terms) tum­ bled from their lofty perches and landed in a turbulent 24 sea created by the winds of political change. More important, the reform emphasized the new political order that Bhutto was relentlessly pursuing. Bhutto's PPP could not tolerate a government within a government which was what the CSP represented. Furthermore the CSP was linked with vested interests, and given Bhutto's empha­ sis on socialist reconstruction, the elite service was certainly expendable. The clear intention of the gov­ ernment was to politicize the bureaucracy and to bring it firmly under the control of the Pakistan People's Party. The consolidation of the regime's power was now 25 virtually complete. The first serious test of Bhutto's power came from within his own organization and personal coterie. There were clashes over the matter of martial law in 1972 and whether the country should have another try at a presi­ dential system as Bhutto preferred. On both counts Bhutto was forced to yield on his position and martial law was lifted but not the state of emergency which had been imposed in 1971. When the new constitution was promulgated in March 1973 Bhutto had to accept the.par­ liamentary model but the document was drafted so as to make his Prime Ministership not only the head of the government but the head of state as well. Although Pak­ istan would still have a President, the position was

169 emptied of all traditional powers.

Despite his successes,

Bhutto was unhappy with the attempt to restrict or limit his authority and in the months and years that followed he would purge all but a handful of those who helped bring him to power. The first to go were those individuals identified with the radical left, and rumors began circulating that Bhutto was certainly modifying if not discarding his socialist program. When he began to recruit special assistants from among the conservative bureaucracy these elements felt their worst fears were justified. Later he appeared to come to terms with elite members of the industrial and landlord classes and this even more infuriated the leftist component of his PPP. As a result of these maneuverings the PPP or­ ganization began to show signs of wear and its reorgan­ ization was forecast. Bhutto's organizational problems were complicated by difficulties in Baluchistan and on the Northwest Frontier where a coalition involving the National Awami Party (NAP) and the Jamiatul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) had formed provincial governments. Bhutto’s PPP had failed to win the confidence of the tribal and frontier popu­ lation and the NAP-JUI governments were judged a threat to Bhutto's system. Thus both governments were accused of conspiratorial behavior and seized by the central government. In Baluchistan this precipitated an armed struggle which ultimately required heavy military con­ centrations in the province. The Northwest Frontier Province resisted along more political lines until the National Awami Party was accused of plotting the seces­ sion of the province and was made responsible for the assassination of Bhutto's primary supporter on the Fron­ tier, Hyat Mohammad Khan Sherpao in February 1975. The NAP was banned and its leader Abdul Wali Khan and all his lieutenants throughout the country were arrested. All property and funds belonging to the NAP were

170 confiscated and the security forces were ordered to "wipe out all pockets of subversion." Bhutto called an emergency session of the National Assembly and in an emotional speech said the country was passing through another serious test. He solemnly exclaimed that the country was facing the "politics of violence" and he was duty bound to liquidate "all anti-national elements and anti-national forces." He concluded his presentation with the view that Pakistan had to be saved from "the *26 scourge of secession." It can be argued that Bhutto created the opposition to his rule by his own deeds and particularly by his in ­ satiable appetite for power. He was no ordinary Prime Minister. He was addressed as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the People), in the tradition of the Quaid-i-Azam (the Great Leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah). He was the founder and Chairman of the Pakistan People*s Party. H e was engaged in what he judged to be a broad, long-range program aimed at transforming Pakistani society from a tradition-bound, fatalistic congeries of disparate and impoverished peoples to a modern, disciplined, unified and nationally motivated nation. It was no secret that Bhutto wanted to dominate the Pakistan scene for some time to come. Indeed the political and administrative system which Bhutto erected was supposed to assure his longevity.

The symbols employed spoke to the question

of organized mass mobilization; and the capacity to succeed in such an endeavor was dependent on the loyalty and efficiency of the state apparatus, namely, the PPP but especially the civil-police and military bureauc­ racies. It would not be a misreading of Pakistan"s last five years to say that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave maximum attention to the consolidation of his power. Although he often spoke of the need to develop popular government 27 institutions, both the constitution which he gave the country in 1973 and the PPP did far more to enhance his

171 personal role than increase popular awareness and par­ ticipation. The litany of the struggle is long but it includes the arrest and/or intimidation of former con­ fidants and aides such as J.A. Rahim, Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Mukhtar Rana, Hanif Ramay, Khurshid Hasan Meer and Mustafa Khar; the incarceration of all the principal opposition leaders and many thou­ sands more of lower station; and the assassination or disappearance of numerous political and quasi-political figures. Moreover an elaborate police bureaucracy was created to both protect Bhutto and his closest advisors as well as strike out against the regime's real or im­ agined enemies. Among these the Federal Security Force (FSF) was the most feared and it was speculated that it had been modeled after the notorious SAVAK in Iran. "Dictatorship," "Police State" arp but two of the terms employed by Bhutto's critics to describe his new Pakis­ tan. A notable critic and one time supporter of Bhutto, Malik Ghulam Jilani, summed up the situation under Bhutto's rule in the following manner: Justice is no longer a matter of right. It is a matter of accident notwithstanding the elaborate judicial farce. All your rights are suspended and there is no nope that the rulers are likely ever to revive them. All laws are meant only for the convenience of the rulers and to mislead the world. Any law which a citizen can invoke in his defence or for his protection is quickly changed. The so-called constitution finds itself amended and mutilated the moment any court of law appears likely to grant relief to a citizen under its provisions and the courts accept amendments with obvious satisfaction. The Press works as an elaborate device for circulating the printed word. Expression is stifled and dissent is frowned upon. The Press dances to the music of its c h a i n s . 28 These words were written shortly after Bhutto an­ nounced that general elections would be held for the new National Assembly on March 7, 1977 and for the

172 provincial legislatures three days later. Jilani was in effect noting that the government could not lose the elections and it would be unrealistic to assume that the opposition had even a small chance of unseating Bhutto. When the election results were made known Jilani had proved correct in his prognosis. But the election results were condemned by the political opposition which accused the government of massive rigging and fraud as well as high-handed pressure tactics. The opposition called upon the Army to cancel the vote, force Bhutto's resignation and take control of the government until such time as new elections could be conducted and another government formed. Bhutto countered the attack directed against him and his administration by conceding that there were some unfair practices but that he could not be forced to step down. The general strike called by the opposition which degenerated into rioting in Karachi on March 11 is significant commentary on this election. The Army was ordered to restore law and order when the police could no longer contain the unrest, and the Prime Minister's dependence on the loyalty of the armed forces was pronounced. The Army crackdown in Karachi, however, could not prevent the riots from spreading throughout the country. Largescale arrests followed, martial law was imposed in the major cities and shoot-to-kill orders went out to the police and military.

The violence at

first seemed to play into Bhutto's hands. He insisted that he had won the elections fairly even if some of his cohorts nad resorted to incorrect activities. He also reaffirmed his responsibility for maintaining the peace and integrity of Pakistan. It was clear that a more im­ portant test of Pakistan's unity and stability was in the offing. Bhutto struggled to retain the loyalty of the civil-military bureaucracy but the persistence of his opposition, despite the imprisonment of almost every

173 political leader, caused the steel frame to consider the price involved in sustaining the PPP administration. Under pressure from the armed forces Bhutto announced he would call for a referendum and allow the people of Pakistan to determine whether he should remain or leave office.

But even this was rejected by his opponents.

Finally, Bhutto agreed to the cancellation of the March election results and announced his willingness to hold new elections in the Fall. But even this gesture was no longer satisfactory. The military was itself divided and further support for Bhutto by the high command was judged a threat to the survival of the nation. In the last analysis, Bhutto had lost his capacity to awe, to insist on unquestioned support* The armed forces had the clear choice of fidelity to Bhutto or love of coun­ try. On July 5, 1977 the military establishment made its decision and General Zia ul-Haq Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army announced that the Bnutto government had been dissolved and that martial law was in effect throughout the country. General Zia declared he had no intention to govern Pakistan indefinitely and called for new elections in October 1977. General Zia could not ignore the demands of his brother officers, however, and they were adamantly op­ posed to Bhutto*s being returned to power. Thus, after a brief moment of freedom Bhutto was again arrested, the October election date was cancelled, and the former Prime Minister began a long ordeal that was to lead to his execution in April 1979. Bhutto had been accused of ordering the death of a political rival. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to death. Numerous ap­ peals, including tnose made in his behalf by many of the world's leaders, were of no avail. In carrying out the execution order, Zia, by this time having installed himself as the President of Pakistan, noted that the law had to apply to all equally.

Some observers had

174 forecast widespread disorders if Bhutto were hanged. Although some disturbances followed the announcement of his death, they were quickly brought under control. The Sindhi period in Pakistan's brief history was over.

The current phase can best be described as the Fun­ damentalist period. Zia has moved ahead with an Islamization program which aims at reducing regional antagon­ isms. As a representative of the Muhajir or refugee conmunity, Zia recognizes the need to bring Islam more di­ rectly into the political process. Islam signifies com­ munity, the drawing together of diverse peoples to form an integrated collectivity. It is seen as Pakistan's only remaining possibility for cultural fusion and hence for the creation of a dynamic community with similar in­ stincts, duties and obligations. The question raised by the challenge is the capacity of a people to form a com­ mon solidarity without the assistance of outstanding 29 leaders.

175

Notea 1. Quald-I-Azam Mohsmuid All Jinnah; Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948 (Karachi: Governaent of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n,d«), p. 99* 2. Ibid.. p. 60. 3. Ibid.. p. 104. 4* Lai Bahadur, The MuslinLeague (Agra: 1954), p. 359.

Agra Book Store,

5. Hector Bolltho, Jinnah. Creator of Pakistan (London: John Hurray, 1954), p. 197.

6. Falz Mohamad Soomro, "Mohamad Ali Jinnah: The Maker of a Nation,” Proceedings. International Congress on Quald-l-Azam, Islamabad, 1976, pp. 55-62. 7. See Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit (Berkeley: sity of California Press, 1962).

Univer­

8. A* K.Brohl, "Reflections onQuaid-i-Azam's Self Selec­ tion as the First Governor-General of Pakistan,"Proceedings. International Congress on Quaid-i-Azam, Islamabad, 1976, pp. 133149. 9. See Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) and Ralph Bralbantl, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966). 10. The Expanding Role of the Public Servant in Pakistan's Democratic Structure. Social Science Research Council, Panjab University, 1960, p. 26, 11.

Ibid.p. 27.

12. See M. Raflque Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan. 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976); K, K, Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Comlsslon on Historical and Cul­ tural Research, 1976); and S, Q, Ahsan, Politics and Personalities in Pakistan (Dacca: Mohiuddln & Sons, 1967), 13. See Lawrence Zlrlng, "Politics and Language in Pakistan: Prolegomena, 1947-1952," Contributions to Aslan Studies I (January 1971):102-122; and by the M a e Author, "The Second Partition of Bengal," Scrutiny III (January-July 1976):65-79, 14. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integ -atlon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), especially Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 5, See also L, Rushbrook Williams, The East Pakistan Tragedy (London: Tom Stacey, 1972) and Tarlq Ali, Pakistan: Mil­ itary Rule or People’s Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970).

176 15. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakis­ tan, 1958*1969 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), pp. 7-10. 16.

Ibid.. pp. 114-141.

17. See Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), and the same author's From Crisis to Crisis 1962-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). 18. Russell Brines, The Indo-Paklstani Conflict (London: Pall Mall, 1968), pp. 401-432. 19. See Mujibur Rahman, Six-Point Formula: Live (Dacca: East Pakistan Awaml League, 1966). 20. David Loshak, pp. 40-44.

Our Right to

Pakistan Crisis (London:

21. See Lawrence Ziring, "Militarism in Pakistan: Yahya Khan Interregnum," in W. Howard Wrigglns, Pakistan in Transi­ tion (Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 1975). D.C.:

22. Wayne Wilcox, The Emergence of Bangladesh (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1973), pp. 27-47.

23. See Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibantl and Howard Wrigglns, eds., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977). 24. The Pakistan

Times, 21 August 1973.

25. See Lawrence Ziring and Robert LaPorte, Jr., "The Pak­ istan Bureaucracy: Two Views," Aslan Survey XIV/12 (December 1974):1086-1103. 26. Dawn, 11 February 1975. 27. See Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan in Political Perspective," Asian Survey XV/7 (July 1975):629-644. 28. Malik Ghulam essay), p. 3.

Jilani, "Time Always Passes," (unpublished

29. A version of this article was published in Asian Af­ fairs, Vol. 4, No. 6 (July-August 1977).

AFTERWORD C. M. Naim Iqbal saw

the vision, Jinnah gave it a concrete

shape, so goes the popular story about the creation of Pakistan, perhaps the only modern nation other than Is­ rael that owes its existence to a nationalism inspired by religion. But the similarity ends there. Israel was created as the home-land for all Jews. Though the term occurs in Iqbal's writings too he did not have in mind a home-land for Muslims at large, the Muslims of South Asia,

not

even for all

What Iqbal had envisioned in

1930 was a territorial fulfillment of the "final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India," who were later in the same paragraph described as being "the most living portion of the Muslims of India whose military and police service has . . . made the British rule pos­ sible in this country," and who "will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia."1 A bit fur­ ther on Iqbal said, "I . . , demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India, it means security and peace re­ sulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam, an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact witn its own original spirit and with 2 the spirit of modern times," Several points can be noted here,

Iqbal tacitly excluded the Muslims of Ben­

gal, although they also formed a majority within their region and had in fact briefly enjoyed a separate state of their own. Typically for Iqbal, whose favorite image in poetry was the "royal falcon," the salvation of Islam and India lay with the "virile and martial"

178 races of Punjab, N.W. Frontier, Baluchistan, and Sind, the areas where the Muslims were relatively backward in education and economic and social status. One cannot accuse Iqbal of blatant regionalism— he was scathing about what he called "Punjab Ruralisra"— rather one should be aware of the romantic streak that underlay his remarks: his faith in the strength of the untainted primitive that would transform both India and Islam, ridding the former of Western political imperial­ ism and the latter of Perso-Arabic cultural imperialism. Depending solely on his faith, Iqbal, Janus-like, had one face toward the past— a recovery of the pristine nature of Islam— and another toward the future— a soci­ ety fully assonant with m o d e m times.

Such a posture

is easy in the realm of ideals, where all contradic­ tions melt away in the heat of one’s vision. In the realm of reality, Iqbal had to demand a Muslim majority state, with the proviso that the more undiluted the majority the better. It was only coincidental that Iqbal's envisioned consolidated state happened to be the region to which he belonged. Be that as it may, Iqbal's vision reached its terrtorial fulfillment in the post-1971 Pakistan with its boundaries almost what he had in mind and with its min­ uscule non-Muslim population. How does one, then, view the pre-1971 history of Pakistan? As an aberration? Should one regard the current Fundamentalist Phase as a fresh beginning, or should one way that after what Professor Ziring calls the Punjabi, the Pathan and the Sindhi phases things have come full circle and we are back at a new Muhajir phase? self in Pakistan?

Must history repeat it­

That is why one must be extremely

careful extrapolating relationships between visions and realities. Iqbal remained a visionary till his end, although his vision did not remain limited to the Muslims of the

179 North West India, tial

In 1937, in a

private and confiden­

letter to Jinnah, he wrote, "Personally I think

that the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority provinces. This is the best course to adopt in the interests of both Muslim majority and minority provinces."^ Even as Iqbal expanded his vision to include Bengal, Jinnah's Muslim League was gearing itself to launch a major cam­ paign "to protect Islam and the Muslims" in those same minority provinces. It was the hue and cry raised against the atrocities allegedly perpetrated by the Congress ministries in the United Provinces and Bihar that eventually gave the League the nationwide stature and strength to challenge the regional parties in the so-called Muslim majority provinces where it had not fared well at all. One may well conclude that for quite a while Jinnah and others in the Muslim League paid lit­ tle attention to Iqbal's vision. We have no evidence on record to indicate otherwise. The only immediate response in 1930 was from Ch. Rahmat Ali and his asso­ ciates at Cambridge who were themselves not taken ser­ iously,

We don't have Jinnah's letters to Iqbal, but

reading between the lines of Iqbal's correspondence one gatners the impression that Jinnah was rather dubious of the whole thing. In 1937 Iqbal wrote at length on the matter of separate states and warned Jinnah about the rising demand in the Punjab, He repeatedly asked Jinnah 4 to hold the annual eeseion of the League xn Lahore. Jinnah, however, stayed away, not only in 1937 but also in 1938, Only after Iqbal's death did the League hold its historic session of 1940 in Lahore, where the Pak­ istan Resolution was passed. Thus Iqbal's idea went a-begging for a long while as did Ch. Ramat Ali's Pakis­ tan Scheme, Their time came only when the nature of the political arena changed and it became expeditious for the Muslim League in its strategy to overcome the

180 regional groups and emerge as the authoritative voice of the Muslims of India. As sketched by Professor Met­ calf, it was not that the ideology overwhelmed the minds of the leaders by its sheer irrefutability, it was that the leaders adopted the ideology when the limited pro­ vincial arenas became more open and more likely to be effected by national events. This development in the final analysis was perhaps more dependent on the deci­ sions made by the British colonial power than on what was said by either the Congress or the Muslim League. Looking back— no doubt with the advantage of hind­ sight— one can see that at the time Iqbal made his ini­ tial proposal there were only two core issues: (1) pro­ vincial autonomy within a loose federal scheme? and (2) a realignment of state boundaries, including the partition of some states, to better reflect the linguis­ tic and ethnic loyalties of the people of those states. The matter of provincial autonomy seemed particularly important to the Muslims, who feared a strong center con­ trolled by a non-Muslim majority. The Nehru Report (1928) was perhaps the last Congress document that mean­ ingfully sought to come to some understanding with the Muslims of India while treating them as a communal whole. More importantly, it was the last Congress state­ ment in favor of a relatively loose federal system for future India. Rejected by the League, by 1930 the Nehru Report had been forsworn even by the Congress. The "Progressives" led by Motilal's son Jawaharlal, prefer­ red a polity which should consist of weak states and a strong center, a scheme they thought necessary given the objective conditions in India. A strong center was also very attractive for the Hindu communal elements, who during the Twenties had come to be quite powerful within the Congress. Tnis ironic coalition doomed for­ ever any chance of creating a loose federal system in India. It also made it impossible for the Muslim

181 League, i.e., Jinnah, to give up anything in the way of separate electorates, weightage in seats, or autonomous states. It was against this background that Iqbal made his bold, ideological statement in Allahabad, while Jin­ nah was in London at the Round Table Conference making a last ditch effort on behalf of nis cherished goals of constitutional reforms and protection of the rights of the Muslims within a unitary India. It was the growing intransigence of the Hindu communal elements and the shortsighted self-righteousness of the other leaders within the Congress, and not just some intrinsic truth in Iqbal's message, that gradually turned Jinnah into a votary— at least publicly— of the of Iqbal.

higher communalism

Nevertheless, Jinnah remained flexible.

As late as

1946, he would have gone along with an All India federal system if the Congress had agreed to the Cabinet Mission Plan in its entirety. As for the ideological bias be­ hind Iqbal's vision— the gated

Two-Nation

theory— Jinnah ne­

it in no uncertain terms on August 11, 1947, in

his very first speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

There is not a single remark in that speech

that pertains to the concept that the Hindus and the Muslims are two separate nations with two separate des­ tinies. In fact, the word Islam does not even occur in it. Jinnah exhorts the members of the Constituent Assembly to keep in mind the problems of

law and order,

bribery and corruption, black-marketing, and nepotism and jobbery

but not one word is said about any expected

unfolding of the pristine nature of Islam.^ According to Jinnah, religion had "nothing to do with the business of the State."

While Iqbal believed that Islam itself

was no less a polity, Jinnah declared to his listeners: If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what

182 relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. . . . We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the major­ ity and minority communities, the Hindu com­ munity and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on— will vanish. . . . We should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Mus­ lims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.6 Notwithstanding Prof. Syed*s arguments, one still wonders what Iqbal might have thought of Jinnah*s re­ marks if he had been alive. After all, in that same address of 1930, Iqbal had asked his listeners: Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favor of national politics in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part?? Obviously Iqbal's own answer to these questions was a resounding no. It thus becomes difficult to go along with the no­ tion that Iqbal had a vision which Jinnah put into reality as Pakistan. More likely that Jinnah found in Iqbal's vision a potent rallying cry for the Muslims at a particular moment in the political history of colonial India, a common enough kind of political opportunism. On the other hand, it may even be more plausibly argued, as suggested by S.M. Ikram, that a major shift had

183 already taken place in the previously politically back­ ward Muslim majority provinces and their new leadership was making itself felt in national councils, leading to a "marked shift in the community's political objecg tives." In other words, the rallying cry had become so loud by 1940 that Jinnah had to adopt it for his own, much in the way he had earlier championed separate elec­ torates after he was convinced that they were what the community desired even though he was personally against them, not out of any opportunism but out of his convic­ tion in a certain style of political behavior. It was not the irrefutability of some ideology but the inevit­ ability generated by diverse forces— many of them be­ yond Jinnah's control— which forced his conversion. It is also clear that Iqbal and Jinnah did not al­ ways see eye to eye. The 1916 pact between the League and the Congress, a crowning achievement for Jinnah, was roundly criticised by Iqbal, who was opposed to any scheme that adversely affected, even in the slightest way, the majority position of the Muslims in the Punjab. In 1928, Iqbal resigned as Secretary of the All India Muslim League because he felt that the League was hedg­ ing on the issue of full provincial autonomy. In the Thirties, Iqbal was dubious of any attempt to create ties between the League and the Unionist Party in the Punjab. He gave full support to a splinter group, the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, after it was set up in 1936, and repeatedly protested to Jinnah about the socalled Jinnan-Sikandar Pact of 1937. Nehru, in his Discovery of India, quotes a comment that Iqbal made to him a few months before his death: "What is there in common between Jinnah and you? He is a politician, you 9

are a patriot." Jinnah was aware of Iqbal's prominent position— his hold over the Indian Muslim imagination— and his high regard for Iqbal was no doubt also genuine. But it is also true that he often followed an independent

184 line and, as said earlier, if one carefully reads Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, it seems that Jinnah usually avoided talcing tne ideological stances urged upon him by Iqbal.*** Why then did Iqbal choose Jinnah for his confiden­ ces? He apparently did so because, ideological differ­ ences aside, he believed in Jinnah's integrity, because Jinnah was the only Muslim leader with an unchallenged national status, and because Jinnah had no provincial or regional ties of any kind. Iqbal was struggling to crystalize an ideology— what he called a "communalism of a higher kind"— that would reflect, on the one hand, the universals of Islam as seen by Iqbal and, on the other, take advantage of the particular demographic configura­ tion in India. Iqbal could confide in Jinnah because Jinnah wa3 an outsider. The leaders from the Muslim majority provinces, judging by their behavior at the time, could not be expected to give up their class inter­ ests for the sake of Iqbal's communal gains. On the other hand, the leaders from the Muslim minority areas could justifiably be very suspicious of any political scheme that left them out in the cold.

Iqbal needed

Jinnah and his Muslim League. Likewise, Jinnah needed a rallying cry that would make the League invulnerable against the Congress as well as against the regional parties in the Muslim majority states. Earlier, Gandhi had captured the Indian political scene with his mixture of religion and politics. The popularity of the frenzied Khilafat movement had also shown how easy it was to bring the Muslims of India to a common platform in the name of religion. Jinnah and the League decided to go the same way. Their politic? of protecting separate electorates and reservation of seats turned into a program to protect Islam. Given the heightened communal antagonism at the time and the fact that the impending implementation of the federal part of the Government of India Act of 1935 made the

185 regional parties eager to obtain some national affilia­ tion, the new program of the Muslim League and its per­ manent President met with total success on both the fronts. The leaders of the Muslim minority provinces, reacting against the short-sighted policies of the Con­ gress, carried the cry of "Protect Islam" to the Muslim masses and enrolled them by hundreds of thousands into the ranks of the League, while the leaders of the Muslim majority provinces came humbly to Jinnah in 1937 and re­ luctantly agreed to acknowledge the League's hegemony over them.

Iqbal, in his presidential address of 1930,

had remarked, "One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not vice versa."11 The question whether the League saved Islam is not worth ask­ ing, but it is clear that Islam did save the Muslim League: in 1937, the League had won only 4.6 percent of the total Muslim votes, in 1964 it polled 75 percent.12 By 1940 Jinnah had indeed brought the League quite a way, but in the process the vision of Iqbal had also gone through a transformation, perhaps of a kind that Iqbal may not have approved of. In 1930, before an au­ dience of less than 75 people, Iqbal had said, "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the Britisn Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West I n d i a . I n 1940, the Pakistan Resolution, presented before a crowd of over 50,000 people, demanded that ". . . geographically contiguous units (be) demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may. be necessary that the areas in whicn the Muslims are numerically in a major­ ity as in the North Western and Eastern Zones of India

186 should be grouped to constitute "Independent States* in which the constituent units should be autonomous 14 and sovereign," When someone suggested during the d e ­ bate that followed that instead of the vague word "zones" the names of the provinces should unambiguously be indicated, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, the permanent Honorary Secretary of the League and the right hand man of Jinnah, replied amidst a burst of applause, "It is for a reason that we have not mentioned the names of the provinces. If we say the Punjab that would mean the boundary of our state would be at Gurgaon, whereas we want to include in our proposed dominion Delhi and A l i ­ garh, which are centers of our culture and education. Rest assured that ‘territorial adjustments' does not mean that we will have to give away any part of the Punjab." Is it still fair to Iqbal to identify his

vision

with Jinnah's reality? Jinnah's presidential address in Iqbal's home city contained not one mention of Iqbal's scheme or the reasons he gave for it, instead Jinnah a n ­ chored his ideological remarks in a letter from Lajpat Rai to C.R. Das written some fifteen years earlier!16 It is hard not to believe Edward Thompson when he asserts that Iqbal, near the end of his life, had very serious reservations about the proposed Pakistan. In The Observer I once said that he (Iqbal) supported the Pakistan plan. Iqbal was a friend, and he set my misconception right. After speaking of his despondency at the chaos he saw coming 'on my vast undisciplined and starving land' . . . he went on to say that he thought the Pakistan plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to the Hindu community, disastrous to the Moslem com­ munity. "But I am the President of the Mos­ lem League and therefore it is my duty to support it.* I? The Pakistan that came into existence in August 1947 was not the

consolidated state

that Iqbal had

187 envisioned in 1930? it certainly did not consist of the "independent states" that the resolution of 1940 called for? in its cut-up form it was not even the "independent state" of the resolution of 1946. Neither did it come about through some smooth transition that Jinnah may have envisaged* It was a truncated Pakistan and its emergence was preceded by the worst communal carnage that the sub-continent had ever experienced. Jinnah may have had near-dictatorial powers within the Muslim League, but he had himself become a prisoner of the rhetoric about Pakistan that he had allowed to be let loose around him. By 1945-46, the Pakistan concept had taken on a life of its own, independent of what Jinnah may or may not have felt about it. Inflamed communal passions, the urgency of the British to conclude their rule in India, the resolve of the Sikhs to ensure their own right of self-determination, the growing determina­ tion of the Congress leaders to obtain a strong unitary India, no matter what its size— on all this Jinnah had no control, Pakistan became inevitable, not because that was the destiny of Islam in India, but because of the particular configuration of a number of diverse forces at a certain moment in history. By the same token, after 1947, Jinnah, in spite of the accumulation of power in his hands, could not have curbed the con­ flicts that soon began to appear within Pakistan even if he had lived longer, for if Pakistan was inevitable then Bangladesh was inevitable too. If one is not careful in choosing one's means one may discover that they have chosen the end for one. This is not to denigrate the role of Iqbal's vision and Jinnah's leadership in the creation of Pakistan. It is merely to suggest that, by defining the existing real­ ity of Pakistan too much in terms of the popular equation IQBAL PLUS JINNAH EQUALS PAKISTAN, the people of that nation are not likely to resolve the dilemma concerning

138 their political and cultural identity which has plagued them during their short but eventful history. The new boundaries, the existence of strong ethnic and regional groups, the minuscule size of the non-Muslim population, the prevalent socio-economic conditions— all demand that a new, totally fresh start should be made.

To make such

a start the people of Pakistan will have to do two things. First, they will have to use critical scrutiny to thaw away the charisma that seems to have frozen around Iqbal and Jinnah, and make them more real and hu­ man and thus more relevant. To paraphrase the words of Bertolt Brecht's Galileos Unfortunate is not that country that lacks in heroes but that which needs heroes. Second, they will nave to delve deep into themselves as they are now, and not as they think they were in the past, recent or remote. After all Iqbal did tell them: Why should I ask the 'wise men' what my be­ ginning was? I am busy discovering what my destiny is.13

189

Notes 1. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Historic Documents of the Mus­ lim Freedom Movement (Lahore: Publishers United, 1970), pp. 126127. 2.

Ibid.. p. 128.

3. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, n.d.), p. 23, Letter dated June 21, 1937. 4. Ibid.. pp. 23, 24. 11, 1937, respectively.

Letters dated June 21 and August

5. Quaid-l-Azam MohammaH alt Jinnah. Speeches as GovernorGeneral of Pakistan lQ£7-lQ£ft (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), pp. 6-10.

6. Ibid 7.

pp. 8-9.

Ahmad, 0£. cit.. pp. 123-12^.

8. S. M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pak­ istan (1858-1951) (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970, 2nd revised edition), p. 191. 9. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: John Day, 1946), p. 355. According to Ashiq Husain Batalvi (Iqbal Ke Akhirl Do Sal. Lahore: Iqbal Akadami, 1969, reprint, pp. 571-575), this meeting took place in January 1938. Batalvi's version does not contain the above remark; he excludes it even when he quotes from Nehru. He makes a point, however, to in­ clude another remark that Iqbal was reported to him to have made: "Jinnah is the real leader of the Muslims, I (Iqbal) am only an ordinary footsoldier of his." Batalvi also reports another in­ teresting exchange between Iqbal and Nehru: "Dr. Sahib (Iqbal) asked Pundit Nehru, 'How many people in the Congress agree with you on Socialism?' 'About half-a-dozen,' Punditji replied. Dr. Sahib said, 'How strange! In your own party you have only halfa-dozen men who think like you, yet you ask me to advise the Muslims to join the Congress! Should I consign ten crore Muslim to flames for the sake of just six men?' At that Punditji became silent." Betalvi's version is based on what was reported to him by two persons who were present at that meeting. There is no reason to reject either version outright. 10. We don't have Jinnah's replies, but from Iqbal's let­ ters one does get the Impression that Jinnah's replies must have been cursory and dealt only with the Issues of realpolitlk. In his later letters Iqbal seems to have given up on discussing ideological issues with Jinnah. 11.

Ahmad, op. cit., p. 137.

12. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 18571948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968, 2nd edition), pp. 177-178.

190 13* Ahmad, op. cit., p. 126. For the number of people at the Allahabad session, see Sayeed, op. cit., p. 176. 14.

Ahmad, 0£. cit.. p. 382.

15. Adhiq Husain Batalvi, Hatnari Qauai Jidd-o-Jahd— Jan. 1940-Dec. 1942 (Lahore: Maj. Altaf Husain, Retd., 1975), p. 22. The amendment was suggested by Batalvi, who had been very close to Iqbal in his last years. 16. Ahmad, 0£. cit.. pp. 377-378. 17. Edward Thompson, Enlist India for Freedom! (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1940), p. 58. From 19 May 1936 till his death on 21 April 1938 Iqbal was the President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League. The letter to Thompson must have been written early in 1938. Batalvi (Iqbal Ke Akhlri Do Sal, pp. 580590) makes a valiant effort to cast doubt on Thompson but fails to convince. He is right, however, in his criticism of Nehru’s version (Discovery of India, p. 354). But then Nehru was writ­ ing from memory while he was in prison, and had no access to books to check for accuracy. 18. Muhammad Iqbal, Kulliyat-l-Iqbal, Urdu (Lahore:Sh. Ghulam Ali, 1973), p. 347. Bal-i-Jibril, ghazal no. 33, second set.

APPENDIX I PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE ANNUAL SESSION OF THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE AT ALLAHABAD ON THE 29TH DECEMBER, 1930 Muhammad Iqbal Gencle&en! I am deeply graceful to you for the honour you have conferred upon ne In Inviting me to preside over the delib­ eration* of the All-India Mualln League at one of the most critical moments in the history of Muslim political thought and activity in India. I have no doubt that in this great assembly there are men whose political experience is far more extensive than mine, and for whose knowledge of affairs I have the highest respect. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on my part to claim to guide an assembly of such men in the political decisions which they are called upon to make today. I lead no party; I follow no leader. I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history and Its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds It* self In time, has, I think, given me a kind of Insight into its significance as a world-fact. It is in the light of this insight, whatever its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit of Islam, I propose not to guide you in your decisions but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions. It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity— by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal— has been the chief formative factor in the lifehistory of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emo­ tions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people. In­ deed, it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country In the world vhere Islam, as a people-building force, has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere, the structure of Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture Inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What 1 mean to say Is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The Ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries without any critical appreciation of the facts which have deter­ mined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity was under­ stood to be a purely oonastlc order which gradually developed into

192

a vast church-organisatlon. The protest of Luther was directed against this church-organisatlon, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And Luther was perfectly jus­ tified in rising in revolt against this organisation; though, I think, he did not realize that in the peculiar conditions which ob­ tained in Europe, his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into mutually illadjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national out­ look, requiring a more realistic foundation, such as the notion of country, and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved on national lines, i.e., on lines which recognise territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has noth­ ing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an Irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the Universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not the citi­ zen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit, realizing Itself in Space and Time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter probably from Manichaean thought. Her best thinkers are realizing this initial mistake today, but her states­ men are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestion­ able dogma. It is, then, this mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal which has largely influenced European religious and polit­ ical thought and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European states. The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted states dominated by interests not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted states after tramp­ ling over the morals and convictions of Christianity, are today feeling the need of a federated Europe, i.e., the need of a unity which Christian church-organisatlon originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ's mission of human brotherhood, they considered it fit to destroy under the in­ spiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam, however, is an impossible phenomenon; for here there is no church-organisatlon similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, inviting a de­ stroyer. In the world of Islam, we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose struc­ ture, owing to our legists' want of contact with modern world, stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of different spirits, or allow a radical transformation of its own

193 structure by the force of this Idea, is hard to predict. Professor Wenslnck of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day: "It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christian­ ity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Christianity, still less what it will be for Islam. At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanizing work of I9lam. And the growth of racial conscious­ ness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam." I hope you will pardon me for this apparently academic discus­ sion. To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states, and finally, who believes that Islam is itself destiny and will not suffer a destiny. Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating, is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your future as a distinct cultural unit in India. Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it today. It is open to a people to modify, reinterpret or reject the foundational princi­ ples of their social structure, but it is absolutely necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way In which I am approach­ ing this important problem, lead anybody to think that I Intend to quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Mus­ lim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirit and Ideal of Islam. My sole desire, therefore, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone it is possible for me to illuminate, according to my light, the avenues of your political action. What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political Ideal, meeting the same fate In the world of Islam, as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national polities, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be In a minority. The proposition that religion Is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit led, by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Holy Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the

194 sense of a purely biological event, happening Inside Che experient and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its Immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with Implicit legal con* cepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, there­ fore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the re­ jection of the other. Therefore, the construction of a polity on national lines, if It means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. "Man," says Renan, "is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his re­ ligion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of moun­ tain ranges* A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation." Such a formation Is quite possible, though it Involves the long and arduous process of practically remaking men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in In­ dia if the teaching ofKablr and theDivine Faith of Akbar had seized the imaginationof the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste-unlts and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individual* itles in a larger whole. Each group Is Intensely jealous of Its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral conscious­ ness which constitutesthe essence of a nation in Renan's sense, demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation but In the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statesmanship cannot Ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognise facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual good-will to this ancient land which has suf­ fered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any Inherent Incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia. It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to dis­ cover such a principle of Internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher inter­ ests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but Inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still

195 feel hopeful* Events seem to be tending In Che direction of some sore of Internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, 1 have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-lands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines, is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities, is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty according to the teaching of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet I love the communal group, which is the source of my life and be­ haviour and which has formed me what I am, by giving me its reli­ gion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby re­ creating its whole past as a living operative factor In my present consciousness. Even the authors of the Nehru Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say: "To say from the larger view-point of nationalism that no communal provinces should be created, is, in a way equivalent to saying from the still wider international view­ point that there should be no separate nations. Both these state­ ments have a measure of truth in them. But the staunchest inter­ nationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create the international state. So also without the fullest cultural autonomy, and comrunalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a har­ monious nation." Communalism in Its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European coun­ tries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different reli­ gions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common raceconsclousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India with­ out recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a ’'Muslim India" within India is, therefore, per­ fectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Confer­ ence at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole, which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this house will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied in It. I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State, appears to me to be

196 the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India• The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They re­ jected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy state. This is true in so far as the area is con­ cerned; in point of population, the State contemplated by the pro­ posal, would be much less than some of the present Indian Provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population, so that the exclusion suggested will enable this con­ solidated State to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area. The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world* The life of Islam, as a cultural force, in this country, very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India, whose military and police service has, notwithstanding un­ fair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will Intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West India Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a for­ eign Invasion, be the invasion one of ideas or of bayonets. The Punjab with 56 per cent Muslim population supplies 54 per cent of the total combatant troops in the Indian army, and if the 19,000 Gurkhas recruited from the Independent state of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to 62 per cent of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into account nearly 6,000 combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of North-West Indian Muslims in regard to the defence of India against foreign aggression. The Right Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim states along the North-West border is actuated by a desire "to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India." I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contem­ plated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to securing permanent comaunal dominance in the whole of India. Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim States will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states* I have already Indicated to you the meaning of the word "religion" as applied to Islam. The truth is that Islam is not a Church. It is a state conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and an­ imated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of social mechanism, and pos­ sessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. The character of a Muslim State can be judged from what the Times of India pointed out some time ago in a leader on the Indian Banking

197 Enquiry Committee. "In ancient India," the Paper points out, "the State framed laws regulating the rates of Interest, but in Muslim times, although Islam clearly forbids the realization of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim states imposed no restrictions on such rates." I therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India, it means security and peace resulting from an Internal balance of power; for Islam, an opportunity to rid Itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, Its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times. Thus it is clear that in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous states based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India, The con­ ception of federation underlying the Simon Report necessitates the abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly as a popular assembly, and makes it an assembly of the representatives of federal states. It further demands a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated. And the Report does recommend both, I give my whole-hearted support to this view of the matter and venture to suggest that the redistribution recommended in the Simon Report must fulfil two conditions. It must precede the Introduction of the new constitution and must be so devised as finally to solve the conniunal problem. Proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India. It is the present structure of the provinces that is largely responsible for this controversy. The Hindu thinks that separate electorates are contrary to the spirit of nationalism, because he understands the word 'nation' to mean a kind of universal amalgamation in which no communal entity ought to retain its private Individuality, Such a state of things, however, does not exist. Nor is it desirable that it should exist. India is a land of racial and religious variety. Add to this the general economic inferiority of the Muslims, their enormous debt, especially in the Punjab, and their insufficient majorities in some of the Provinces as at present constituted, and you will begin to see clearly the meaning of our anxiety to retain separate elec­ torates. In such a country and in such circumstances territorial electorates cannot secure adequate representation of all interests and must inevitably lead to the creation of an oligarchy. The Mus­ lims of India can have no objection to purely territorial elector­ ates if Provinces are so demarcated as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity. But insofar as the question of the powers of the Central Fed­ eral State is concerned, there is a subtle difference of motive in the constitutions proposed by the Pundits of India and the Pundits of England, The Pundlt3 of India do not disturb the Central author­ ity as it stands at present. All that they desire is that this au­ thority should become fully responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain Intact and where their majority will become

198 further reinforced on Che nominated element ceasing Co exist. The PundlCs of England, on Che ocher hand, realising chac democracy in Che Cencre tends Co work contrary Co Chelr Interests and Is likely Co absorb Che whole power now in Chelr hands, in case a furCher advance is made cowards responsible governmenC have shifced the experience of democracy from Che Cencre co Che Provinces. No doubc, Chey introduce the principle of federaClon and appear Co have made a beginning by making cercain proposals; yet Chelr evaluation of Chls principle is determined by consideraClons wholly differenc Co chose, which decermlne its value in the eyes of Muslia India. The Muslims demand federation because 1c is pre-eminently a solution of India's mosc difficult problem, i.e., the communal problem. The Royal Commissioners' view of federation, chough sound in principle, does noc seem co aim ac responsible governmenC of federal scaces. Indeed, 1C does noc go beyond providing means of escape from Che slcuacion which Che lncroduccion of democracy in India has created for Che Brlclsh, and wholly disregards Che com­ munal problem by leaving 1 c where ic was. Thus ic is clear chac, Insofar as real federaClon is con­ cerned, Che Simon Reporc virtually negaClves Che principle of federaClon in its true significance. The Nehru Report realizing Hindu majority in the Central Assembly reaches a unitary form of govern­ ment, because such an institution secures Hindu dominance through­ out India; the Simon Report retains the present British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are naturally unwilling to part wich Che power Chey have so long wielded, and parcly because it is possible for them, In the absence of an inter-communal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the retention of that power in their own hands. To my mind a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. What is called "residuary powers" must be left entirely to self-governing states, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal states. I would never advise the Mus­ lims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of In­ dian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true fed­ eration, or fails to recognize them as a distinct political entity. The necessity for a structural change in the Central Govern­ ment was seen probably long before the British discovered the most effective means for introducing this change. That is why at rather a later stage it was announced that the participation of the Indian Princes in the Round Table Conference was essential. It was a kind of surprise to the people of India, particularly the minorities, to see the Indian Princes dramatically expressing their willingness at the Round Table Conference to join an all-India federation, and as a result of their declaration Hindu delegates— uncompromlsing ad­ vocates of a unitary form of government— quietly agreeing to the evolution of a federal scheme. Even Mr. Sastrl who, only a few days before, had severely criticised Sir John for recommending a federal scheme for India, suddenly became a convert and admitted his conversion in the plenary session of the Conference— thus of­ fering the Prime Minister of England an occasion for one of his wittiest observations in his concluding speech. All this has a

199 meaning both for the British who have sought the participation of the Indian Princes, and for the Hindus who have unhesitatingly ac­ cepted the evolution of an all-India federation* The truth is that the participation of the Indian Princes, among whom only a few are Muslims, In a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it serves as an all-important factor In maintaining the British power In India practically as It is; on the other hand, it gives over-whelming majority to the Hindus In an all-India Fed­ eral Assembly* It appears to me that the Hlndu-Musllm differences regarding the ultimate form of Central Government are being clev­ erly exploited by British politicians through the agency of the Princes who see in the scheme prospects of better security for their despotic rule. If the Muslims silently agree to any such scheme, it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India. The policy of the Indian federation, thus created, will be practically controlled by Hindu Princes forming the largest group in the Central Federal Assembly* They will always lend their sup­ port to the Crown in matters of Imperial concern; and insofar as internal administration of the country is concerned, they will help In maintaining and strengthening the supremacy of the Hindus* In other words, the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of under­ standing between Hindu India and British Imperialism— you perpet­ uate me in India and I, in return, give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection. If, therefore, the British Indian Provinces are not transformed into really autonomous states, the Princes' participation in a Scheme of Indian federation will be Interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned— Muslims with the word Fed­ eration, Hindus with a majority in the Centre, the British im­ perialists— whether Tory or Labourite— with the substance of real Power. The number of Hindu States in India is far greater than that of Muslim States; and It remains to be seen how the Muslim demand for 33 per cent seats In the Central Federal Assembly Is to be met with in a house or houses constituted of representatives taken from British India as well as Indian states* I hope the Muslim dele­ gates are fully aware of the Implications of the federal scheme as discussed in the Round Table Conference. The question of Muslim representation In the proposed all-India federation, has not yet been discussed* "The interim report," says Reuter's summary, "con­ templates two chambers In the federal legislature, each containing representatives both of British India and states, the proportion of which will be a matter of subsequent consideration under the heads which have not yet been referred to the Sub-Conmittee." In my opinion the question of proportion Is of the utmost Importance and ought to have been considered simultaneously with the main question of the structure of the Assembly* The best course, I think, would have been to start with a British India federation only* A federal scheme born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such

200 unitary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority community in British India and to the Indian Princes; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims, unless they get majority rights in five out of the eleven Indian provinces with full resid­ uary powers, and one-third share of seats in the total house of the Federal Assembly* Insofar as the attainment of sovereign pow­ ers by the British Indian provinces is concerned, the position of His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal, Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Jinnah is unassailable* In view, however, of the participation of the Princes In the Indian federation we must now see our demand for representation In the British Indian Assembly In a new light* The question is not one of Muslim share in a British Indian Assembly, but one which relates to representation of British Indian Muslim in an all-India Federal Assembly* Our demand for 33 per cent must now be taken as a demand for the same proportion in the all-India Federal Assembly exclusive of the share allotted to the Muslim states entering the Federation. The other difficult problem which confronts the successful working of a federal system in India is the problem of India's defence. In their discussion of this problem the Royal Commission­ ers have marshalled all the deficiencies of India in order to make out a case for Imperial administration of the army. "India and Britain," say the Commissioners, "are so related that India's de­ fence cannot now or in any future which is within sight be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army must rest in the hands of agents of Imperial Government." Now does it necessarily follow from this that further progress towards the realisation of responsible government in Brit­ ish India is barred until the work of defence can be adequately discharged without the help of British officers and British troops? As things are, there Is a block on the line of constitutional ad­ vance* All hopes of evolution in the Central Government towards the ultimate goal prescribed in the declaration of 20th August, 1917, are In danger of being indefinitely frustrated, if the atti­ tude illustrated by the Nehru Report is maintained that any future change involves the putting of the administration of the army under the authority of an elected Indian Legislature* Further to fortify their argument they emphasize the fact of competing religious and rival races of widely different capacity, and try to make the prob­ lem look Insoluble by remarking that "The obvious fact that India is not in the ordinary and natural 9ense a single nation, is no­ where made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest*" These features of the question have been emphasized in order to demonstrate that the British are not only keeping India secure from foreign menace but are also the "neutral guardians" of its internal security. However, in federated India, as I understand federation, the problem will have only one aspect, l*e., external defence. Apart from provincial armies necessary for maintaining Internal peace, the Indian Federal Congress can maintain, on the North-West frontier, a strong Indian Frontier Army, composed of units recruited from all provinces and officered by efficient and experienced military men taken from all communities* I know that India is not in possession

201 of efficient military officers and this fact is exploited by the Royal Commissioners in the Interest of an argument for Imperial administration* On this point I cannot but quote another passage from the Report which to my mind furnishes the best argument against the position taken up by the Conralssloners* "At the pre­ sent moment," says the Report, "no Indian holding the King's Com­ mission is of higher army rank than a captain. There are, we be­ lieve, 39 captains of whom 25 are in ordinary regimental employ. Some of them are of an age which would prevent their attaining much higher rank, even if they passed the necessary examination before retirement* Most of these have not been through Sandhurst, but got their Commissions during the Great War." Now, however genuine may be the desire, and however earnest the endeavour to work this transformation, over-riding conditions have been so forcibly expressed by the Skeen Committee (whose members, apart from the Chairman and the Army Secretary, were Indians) in these words: "Progress must be contingent upon success being secured at each stage and upon military efficiency being maintained, though it must, in any case, render such development measured and slow. A higher command cannot be evolved at short notice out of the exist­ ing cadres of Indian officers, all of junior rank and limited ex­ perience* Not until the slender trickle of suitable Indian re­ cruits for the officer class— and we earnestly desire an Increase in their numbers— flows in much greater volume, not until suffi­ cient Indians have attained the experience and training requisite to provide all the officers for, at any rate, some Indian regi­ ments, not until such units have stood the only test which can possibly determine their efficiency, and not until Indian officers have qualified by a successful army career for the high command, will it be possible to develop the policy of Indianization to a point which will bring a completely Indianized army within sight* Even then years must elapse before the process could be completed." Now I venture to ask who is responsible for the present state of things? Is it due to some inherent Incapacity of our martial races, or to the slowness of the process of military training? The military capacity of our martial races is undeniable* The process of military training may be slow as compared to other processes of human training* I am no military expert to judge this matter. But as a layman I feel that the argument, as stated, assumes the process to be practically endless. This means perpetual bondage for India, and It makes it all the more necessary that the Frontier Army as suggested by the Nehru Report, be entrusted to the charge of a com­ mittee of defence, the personnel of which may be settled by mutual understanding. Again, It is significant that the Simon Report has given ex­ traordinary Importance to the question of India's land frontier, but has made only passing reference to its naval position. India has doubtless had to face Invasions from her land frontier; but it is obvious that her present masters took possession of her on ac­ count of her defenceless sea coast* A self-governing and free India will, in these days, have to take greater care of her sea coast than land frontiers*

202 I have no doubt that if a federal government Is established, Muslim federal states will willingly agree, for purposes of India's defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and navel forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India was a reality in the days of Mughal rule. Indeed in the time of Akbar the Indian frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme for a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India will inten­ sify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspi­ cion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of an invasion. I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought, in my opinion, to look at the two most im­ portant constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslin demand of a territorial solution of the com­ munal problem Is Ignored, then I support as emphatically as pos­ sible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. The Muslims of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which affect their major­ ity rights, to be secured by separate electorates in the Punjab and Bengal, or fall to guarantee them 33 per cent representation in any Central legislature. There were two pitfalls Into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism and deprived the Muslims of India of chances of acquiring any political power in India. The second is the narrow-visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the Interests of what may be called "Punjab Rurallsm," resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal. The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the Muslims stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint electorates. The despatch of the Government of India on the Slnon Report admits that, since the publication of that document, the Muslim community has not expressed its willing­ ness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The despatch recognizes that it may be a legitimate grievance to de­ prive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the councils in proportion to their population merely because of welghtage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the despatch of the Government of India falls to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned— and this is the most crucial point— it endorses the so-called 'carefully bal­ anced scheme' worked out by the official members of the Punjab Government, which gives the Punjab Muslims a majority of two over Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 per cent of the house as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a clear majority in the total house. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognize that the

203 justification for communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless and until by the extension of franchise their voting strength more correctly reflects their population; and further unless a two-thirds majority of the Muslim members In a provincial council unanimously agree to surrender the right of separate representation. I cannot, however, understand why the Government of India, having recognized the legitimacy of the Muslim grievance, have not had the courage to recommend a statutory major­ ity for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal. Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes which fail to create at least Sind as a separate province and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Balu­ chistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilization the Royal Commissioners find It more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Mas'udl noticed this kinship long ago when he said: "Sind is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam." The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt: "Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia." With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact sit­ uation of Sind. She has her back cowards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can Invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the Inevit­ able growth of Karachi Into a second metropolis of India. I think it unwise to keep her attached to a presidency which, though friendly today, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any definite authoritative pronouncement on the matter. But assuming there are any such difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary finan­ cial help to a promising province in her struggle for independent progress. As to the North-West Frontier Province, it is painful to note that the Royal Commissioners have practically denied that the people of this province have any right to reforms. They fall far short of the Bray Committee and the council recommended by them is merely a screen to hide the authority of the Chief Commissioner. The in­ herent right of the Afghan to light a cigarette is curtailed merely because he happens to be living in a powder house. The Royal Com­ missioner's epigramatlc argument is pleasant enough, but far from convincing. Political reform is light, not fire; and to light every human being is entitled whether he happens to live in a pow­ der house or a coal mine. Brave, shrewd and determined to suffer for his legitimate aspirations, the Afghan is sure to resent any attempt to deprive him of opportunities of self-development. To keep such a people contented is in the best interests of both England and India. What has recently happened in that unfortunate province is the result of a step-motherly treatment shown to the people since the introduction of the principle of self-government in the rest of India. I only hope that British statesmanship will

204 not obscure its view of the situation by hoodwinking itself into the belief that the present unrest in the province is due to any extraneous causes* The recommendation for the introduction of a measure of re­ form in the North-West Frontier Province made in Government of India's despatch is also unsatisfactory* No doubt, the despatch goes farther than the Simon Report in recommending a sort of repre­ sentative council and a semi-representative cabinet, but it falls to treat this Important Muslim province on an equal footing with other Indian provinces. Indeed the Afghan is by instinct more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India* I think I am now called upon to make a few observations on the Round Table Conference* Personally I do not feel optimistic as to the results of this Conference. It was hoped that away from the actual scene of communal strife and in a changed atmosphere, better counsels would prevail and a genuine settlement of differ­ ences between the two major communities of India would bring In­ dia's freedom within sight. Actual events, however, tell a dif­ ferent tale* Indeed, the discussion of the communal question in London has demonstrated more clearly than ever the essential dis­ parity between the great cultural units of India* Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. He is reported to have said that "His Government would find it difficult to submit to Parliament proposals for the maintenance of separate electorates since joint electorates were much more in accordance with British democratic sentiments." Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution of the problem. Nor Is the Minorities Sub-Committee likely to reach a satisfactory settlement* The whole question will have to go before the British Parliament; and we can only hope that the keen-sighted representatives of British nation, unlike most of our Indian politicians will be able to pierce through the surface of things and see clearly the true fundamentals of peace and security In a country like India* To base a constitution on the concept of a homogeneous India or to apply to India princi­ ples dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war. As far as I can see, there will be no peace in the country until the various peoples that constitute In­ dia are given opportunities of free self-development on modern lines without abruptly breaking with their past. I am glad to be able to say that our Muslim delegates fully realize the Importance of a proper solution of what I call Indian international problem. They are perfectly justified in pressing for a solution of the communal question before the question of responsibility in the Central Government is finally settled. No Muslim politician should be sensitive to the taunt embodied in that propaganda word— "communalism"— expressly devised to exploit what the Prime Minister calls British democratic sentiments, and to mislead England into assuming a state of things which does not really exist in India* Great interests are at stake. We are 70

205 millions and far more homogeneous chan any other people in India. Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a "Nation" In the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt, they are anxious to become a nation, but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of travail, and, in the case of Hindu India Involves a complete overhauling of her social structure. Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but placid arguments that Turkey and Iran and other Muslim countries are progressing on national, i.e., territorial lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim In population. The minorities there belong, In the language of the Quran, to the "People of the Book." There are no social barriers between Muslims and the "People of the Book." A Jew or a Christian or a Zoroastrian does not pollute the food of a Muslim by touching it, and the Law of Islam allows intermarriage with the "People of the Book." Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realization of a final combination of humanity, was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran declares: M0 People of the Book! Come, let us join together on the word (Unity of God) that is com­ mon to us all." (3:63) The wars of Islam and Christianity, and later, European aggression In its various forms, could not allow the Infinite meaning of this verse to work Itself out in the world of Islam. Today it is being gradually realized in the countries of Islam in the shape of what is called "Muslim Nationalism." It is hardly necessary for me to add that the sole test of the success of our delegates Is the extent to which they are able to get the non-Muslim delegates of the Conference to agree to our demands as embodied in the Delhi Resolution. If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of a very great and far-reaching impor­ tance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for an independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your ideals and aspirations, you must be ready for such an action. Our leading men have done a good deal of political thinking and their thought has certainly made us, more or less, sensitive to the forces which are now shaping the destinies of peoples in India and outside India. But I ask, has this thinking prepared us for the kind of action demanded by the situation which may arise in the near future? Let me tell you frankly that, at the present moment, the Muslims of India are suf­ fering from two evils. The first is the want of personalities. Sir Malcolm Hailey and Lord Irwin were perfectly correct in their diagnosis when they told the Aligarh University that the community has failed to produce leaders. By leaders I mean men who, by divine gift or experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, along with an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history. Such men are really the driving forces of a people, but they are God's gift and cannot be made to order. The second evil from which the Muslims of India are suffering is that

206 the comauniCy is fast losing what is called the 'herd instinct! * This make8 it possible for individuals and groups to start inde­ pendent careers without contributing to the general thought and activity of the community. Ve are doing today in the domain of politics, what we have been doing for centuries in the domain of religion* But sectional bickerings in religion do not do much harm to our solidarity. They, at least indicate an Interest in what makes the sole principle of our structure as a people. More­ over, this principle is so broadly conceived that it is impossible for a group to become rebellious to the extent of wholly detaching Itself from the general body of Islam. But diversity in political action, at a moment when concerted action is needed in the best in­ terests of the very life of our people, may prove fatal. How shall we, then, remedy these two evils? The remedy of the first evil is not in our hands. As to the second evil, I think It is possible to discover a remedy. I have got definite views on the subject; but I think it is proper to postpone their expression till the ap­ prehended situation actually arises. In case it does arise, lead­ ing Muslims of all shades of opinion will have to meet together, not to pass resolutions but finally to determine the Muslim atti­ tude and to show the path to tangible achievement. In this ad­ dress I mention this alternative only, because I wish that you may keep it in mind and give some serious thought to it in the mean­ time. Gentlemen, I have finished. In conclusion I cannot but im­ press upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organization and unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interest as a comnunlty, and in the Interest of India as a whole. The political bondage of India has been and Is a source of Infinite misery to the whole of Asia. It has suppressed the spirit of the East and wholly deprived her of that joy of self-expression which once made her the creator of a great and glorious culture. We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die. We have a duty towards Asia, especially Muslim Asia. And since 70 millions of Muslims in a single county constitute a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim point of view but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally performed without an organized will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own interest, as a polit­ ical entity among other political entitles of India, such an equip­ ment is an absolute necessity. Our disorganized condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the commun­ ity. I am not hopeless of an inter-communal understanding, but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that In the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an Independent line of polit­ ical action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalized on a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will? Yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions, and learn to determine the value of your individual and collective

207 actions, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity; spirit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not vioa versa* If today you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever-vitalizing idea embodied in it, you will be only reassembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of the profoundeat verses in the Holy Qur'an teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth and rebirth of a single individual. (5:32) Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a "single individual"? I do not wish to mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be. The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you have achieved a real collective ego to look at them. In the words of the Qur'an: "Hold fast to yourself; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are well-guided." (5:105).

APPENDIX II RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE AT LAHORE IN ITS TWENTY SEVENTH ANNUAL SESSION ON 23RD MARCH 1940, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE "PAKISTAN RESOLUTION" While approving and endorsing Che action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indi­ cated in their resolution dated the 27th of August, 17th and ISth of September and 22nd of October 1939, and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional Issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of federation em­ bodied In the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India* It further records its emphatic view that while the declara­ tion dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1939, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, Interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent* Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, vis*, that geograph­ ically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as In the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities In these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and Interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are In a minority adequate, effective and man­ datory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitu­ tion for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them. This Session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic prin­ ciples, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communica** tions, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary.

APPENDIX III

RESOLUTION PASSED AT THE CONVENTION OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE LEGISLATORS HELD AT DELHI ON 8TH & 9TH APRIL 1946 "Whereas In this vast sub-continent of India hundred million Muslims are the adherents of a faith which regulates every depart­ ment of their life (educational, social, economic and political), whose code is not confined merely to spiritual doctrines and tents or rituals and ceremonies, and which stands in sharp contrast to the exclusive nature of. Hindu Dharma and philosophy, which has fostered and maintained for thousands of years a rigid caste sys­ tem resulting in the degradation of 60 million human beings to the position of untouchables, creation of unnatural barriers between man and man and super-imposition of social and economic inequali­ ties on a large body of the people of this country, and which threatens to reduce Muslims, Christians and other minorities to the status of irredeemable helots, socially and economically* "Whereas the Hindu caste system is a direct negation of na­ tionalism, equality, democracy and all the noble ideals that Islam stands for: ’Vhereas different historical backgrounds, traditions, cul­ tures, social and economic orders of the Hindus and Muslims have made impossible the evolution of a single Indian nation Inspired by common aspirations and ideals; and whereas after centuries they still remain two distinct major nations; "Whereas soon after the Introduction by the British of the policy of setting up political institutions in India on the lines of Western democracies based on majority rule, which meant that the majority of one nation or society could Impose its will on the majority of the other nation or society in spite of their opposi­ tion, as was amply demonstrated during the two and a half years' regime of Congress Governments in the Hindu majority provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935, when the Muslims were sub­ jected to untold harassment and opposition as a result of which they were convinced of the futility and ineffectiveness of the socalled safeguards provided in the constitution and in the Instru­ ment of Instructions to the Governors and were driven to the irresistible conclusion that in a United Indian Federation, if established, the Muslims even in majority provinces would meet with no better fate, and their rights and interests could never be adequately protected against the perpetual Hindu majority at the Centre* "Whereas the Muslims are convinced that with a view to saving Muslim India from the domination of the Hindus, and In order to afford them full scope to develop themselves according to their genius, it is necessary to constitute a sovereign independent State comprising Bengal and Assam In the north-east zone and the Punjab,

210 the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west zone* "This convention of the Muslim League legislators of India, Central and Provincial, after careful consideration hereby de­ clares that the Muslim nation will never submit to any constitu­ tion for a united India and will never participate in any single constitution-making machinery set up for the purpose, and that any formula devised by the British Government for transferring power from the British to the peoples of India, which does not con­ form to the following just, equitable principles, calculated to maintain internal peace and solution of the Indian problem: "First that the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north­ east and the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Bal­ uchistan in the north-west of India, namely, Pakistan zones where the Muslims are a dominant majority be constituted into a sovereign Independent State and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay. "Second, that two separate constitution-making bodies be set up by peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective constitutions. "Third, that the minorities in Pakistan and Hindustan be pro­ vided with safeguards on the lines of the All-India Muslim League resolution passed on March 23, 1940, at Lahore. "Fourth, that the acceptance of the Muslim League demand of Pakistan and its Implementation without delay are the sine qua non for the Muslim League co-operation and participation in the forma­ tion of an interim Government at the Centre. "This convention further emphatically declares that any at­ tempt to impose a constitution on a united India basis or to force any interim arrangement at the Centre contrary to the Muslim League demand will leave the Muslims no alternative but to resist such im­ position by all possible means for their survival and national existence."

APPENDIX IV INAUGURAL ADDRESS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN ON 11TH AUGUST, 1947, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ITS FIRST PRESIDENT M. A. Jinnah I cordially thank you, with the utmost sincerity, for the hon­ our you have conferred upon me— the greatest honour that is possible for this Sovereign Assembly to confer— by electing me as your first President. I also thank those leaders who have spoken in apprecia­ tion of my services and their personal references to me. I sin­ cerely hope that with your support and your co-operation we shall make this Constituent Assembly an example to the world. TheCon­ stituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future Con­ stitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete Sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. We have to do the best we can in adopting a provisional constitution for the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. You know really that not only we ourselves are wondering but, I think, the whole world is wondering at this unprecedented cyclonic revolution which has brought about the plan of creating and establishing two independent Sovereign Dominions in this sub-continent. As it is, it has been unprecedented; there is no parallel in the history of the world. This mighty sub-continent with all kinds of inhabitants has been brought under a plan which Is titanic, unknown, unparalleled. And what is very Important with regard to it is that we have achieved it peacefully and by means of an evolution of the greatest possible character. Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, 1 cannot make any well-considered pronouncement at this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasise is this: remember that you are now a Sovereign Legislative body and you have got all the powers. It, therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your decisions. The first observation that I would like to make is this: You will no doubt agree with me that the first duty of a Government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State. The second thing that occurs to me is this: One of the big­ gest curses from which India is suffering— I do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think, our condition is much worse— is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible for this Assembly to do so.

212 Black-marketing is another curse. Well, I know that blackmarketeers are frequently caught and punished. Judicial sentences are passed or sometimes fines only are Imposed. Now you have to tackle this monster which today is a colossal crime against society, in our distressed conditions, when we constantly face shortage of food and other essential commodities of life. A citizen who does black-marketing commits, I think, a greater crime than the biggest and most grievous of crimes. These black-marketeers are really knowing, intelligent and ordinarily responsible people, and when they indulge in black-narketing, I think they ought to be very severely punished, because they undermine the entire system of con­ trol and regulation of food-stuffs and essential commodities, and cause wholesale starvation and want and even death. The next thing that strikes me is this: Here again it Is a legacy which has been passed on to us. Along with many other things, good and bad, has arrived this great evil— the evil of nepotism and jobbery. This evil must be crushed relentlessly. 1 want to make it quite clear that 1 shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any Influence directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. Wherever I will find that such a practice is in vogue, or is continuing anywhere, low or high, I shall certainly not countenance it. 1 know there are people who do not quite agree with the divi­ sion of India and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted, it is the duty of everyone of us to loyally abide by it and honourably act according to the agreenent which is now final and binding on all. But you must remember as I have said, that this mighty revolution that has taken place is unprecedented. One can quite understand the feeling that exists between the two communities wherever one community is in majority and the other is in minority. But the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act other­ wise than what has been done. A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgement there was no other solution and I am sure future history will its verdict in favour of it. And what is more it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was the only solution of India's constitutional problem. Any idea of a United India could never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to ter­ rific disaster. Maybe that view is correct; maybe it is not; that remains to be seen. All the same, in this division it was im­ possible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solu­ tion. Now what shall ve do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what rela­ tions he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour,

213 caste or creed, is first*second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shlas, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatrls, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on— will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independ­ ence and but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong Co any religion or caste or creed— chat has nothing to do with the business of the State. As you know, history shows that in England condi­ tions, some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in In­ dia today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States In existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are noc starting in those days. We are start­ ing in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction be­ tween one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State* The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and bur­ dens placed upon them by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step* Today, you might say with justice that Roman catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation. Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that Is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State* Well, gentlemen, I do not wish to take up any more of your time and thank you again for the honour you have done to me. I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fairplay without any, as is put In the political language, prejudice or illwill, in other words, partiality or favouritism. My guiding prin­ ciple will be justice and conplete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest Nations of the world.

The following papers published in the Occasional Papers Series of the Muslim Stud­ ies Subcommittee of the Committee on Southern Asian Studies of the University of Chicago -are available at a cost of $1.50 per paper. Orders with checks payable to the University of Chi­ cago should be mailed to the Committee on Southern Asian Studies, 1130 E. 59th Street, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL. 60637. 1. Barbara Metcalf, "The Compleat 'Alim: Muslim Religious Leadership in the Late Nineteenth Century." 2.

Nasim A* Jawed, "Nationalism and Islamic

Consciousness in Pakistan and Bangladesh."

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS Manzooruddin Ahmad, Professor of Political Science, Karachi University is currently the Quaid-l-Azam Distinguished Professor of Pakistan Studies at Columbia University. Author of Pakistan, The Emerging Islamic State, he Is also the editor of The Journal of Pakistan Studies and The Pakistan Political Science Review, A forthcoming book is Muslim Political Theory in Modern Age, A much expanded version of Professor Ahmad's paper appeared in the Inaugural issue of The Journal of Pakistan Studies (1978). Sheila McDonough is Professor of Religion at Concordia Univer­ sity. She is the author of The Authority of the Past and Jinnah, Maker of Modern Pakistan. Forthcoming are studies of S. Abld Husain, Shibli Numanl, and Fatima Jinnah. Barbara Metcalf is an Assistant Professor of History and South Aslan Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. She Is the author of Islamic Revival in British India: The Deobandl cuiama. 186U-19U0 (Princeton University Press, forthcoming) and is currently preparing a trans­ lation of Ashraf cAli Thanawi's Blhishti Zewar. C. M. Naim is Associate Professor of Urdu at the University of Chicago. Author of Introductory Urdu (2 vols.)» he has published a number of articles dealing with Urdu language and literature and the Muslims of South Asia. Saleem M. M. Qureshl is Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. He is the author of Jinnah and the Making of a Nation. Fazlur Rahman, currently Professor of Islamic Philosophy at the University of Chicago, was the Director of Islamic Research Institute at Islamabad, Pakistan, from 1962 to 1968. Among his major books are Islamic Methodol­ ogy In History, Islam, and The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra. A book on the Qur'an and another on Muslim Education are forthcoming. Anwar H. Syed is Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. His most recent publication was China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale. His essay, “Pakistani Nation­ hood: To Be or Not To Be," will appear in the Summer 1980 Issue of Polity. Lawrence Ziring is Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo. Author of The Ayub

216 Khan Era: Politics In Pakistan, 1958-69, he also edited and co-authored Pakistan: The Long View (with Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins). His Pakistan; The Engima of Political Development is scheduled for release in 1980.