Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages 3884050478, 0813205883

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Jorge J. E. Gracia Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages

Analytica Investigations in Logic, Ontology and the Philosophy of Language Editors: Ignacio Angelelli · Austin (Texas/USA) Joseph M. Bochenski· Fribourg (CH) Christian Thiel · Erlangen Editor-in-chief: Hans Burkhardt · Erlangen

Philosophia Verlag Miinchen Wien

Jorge J. E. Gracia

Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages

The Catholic University of America Press Washington, D.C.

Philosophia Verlag Miinchen Wien

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Gracia, Jorge J.E.: Introduction to the problem of individuation in the early Middle Ages/ Jorge J.E. Gracia. -Miinchen ·Wien : Philosophia Verlag, 1984. (Analytica) ISBN 3-88405-047-8 (Philosophia Verlag) ISBN 0-8132-0588-3 (Catholic Univ. of America Press)

Published with subsidies from the Forderungs- und Beihilfefonds Wissenschaft der VG WORT. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Gracia, Jorge J.E. Introduction to the problem of individuation in the early Middle Ages Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Individuation-History. 2. Philosophy, Medieval. I. Title. BD394.G7 1983 111'.2 83-1947 ISBN 0-8132-0588-3

Available in North and South America from The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C. ISBN 0-8132-0588-3 ISBN 3-88405-047-8 © 1984 by Philosophia Verlag GmbH., Miinchen All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means without written permission except in the case of short quotations in the context of reviews. Typesetting: FotoSatz Pfeifer, Germering Manufactured by Pera Druck, Matthias KG., Grafelfing Printed in Germany 1984

"But the principium individuationis ... was to me, at all times, a consideration of intense interest ... " Edgar Allan Poe, "Morella" "Every ontology must solve the problem of indi­ viduation, i.e. in the example, it must account for there being two spots [ of the same color] and not just one." Gustav Bergmann, Logic and Reality, Ch. VII.

Table of Contents

Preface

11

Chapter I. The Problem of Individuation

17

I. II.

18 21 22 22 26 27 27 29 30 31 31 32

Nomenclature The Problem A. Intension of Individuality 1. Indivisibility 2. Distinction 3. Division 4. Identity 5. Impredicability 6. Relation of the Five Features B. Extension of Individuality 1. Nothing that Exists is Individual 2. Everything that Exists is Individual 3. Some Things that Exist are Individual and Some are not C. Ontological Status of Individuality D. Principle of Individuation 1. Individuation of Substances a. Bundle theory of individuation b. Theories of accidental individuation c. Theories of essential individuation d. Theory of existential individuation e. Theories of external individuation 2. Individuation of Properties and Accidents a. Substantial individuation b. Accidental ( or proper) individuation 3. Individuation of Other Entities E. Discernibility of Individuals 1. Discernibility of Substances a. Bundle theory of individual discernibility b. Spatio-temporal theory of individual discernibility C. 'Sui generis' theory of individual discernibility

33 34 36 39 39 40 42 45 45 46 46 47 48 48 50 50 51 51

2. Discernibility of Properties and Accidents a. Discernibility through substance b. Discernibility through accidents F. Function of Proper Names and Indexicals III. Concluding Remarks Notes

52 52 52 53 54 55

Chapter II. Formulation of the Issues: Boethius

65

67 Porphyry's View in the /sagoge Boethius' View in the Commentary on Porphyry's "/sagoge" 70 A. First Edition 70 74 B. Second Edition III. Boethius' View in the Commentary on the "Categories" 82 IV. Boethius' View in the Commentary on "De interpretatione" 89 V. Boethius's View in De Trinitate 97 107 VI. Conclusions 111 Notes I. II.

Chapter III. The Tradition Based on Boethius' De Trinitate: Eriugena, Odo, Thierry, and Gilbert I. II. III. IV.

123

John Eriugena Odo of Tours Thierry of Chartres Gilbert of Poitiers A. Singularity and Individuality B. Diversity Notes

129 135 142 155 156 165 178

Chapter IV. The Tradition Based on Boethius' Logical Works: Peter Abailard and John of Salisbury

195

Peter Abailard A. The Accidental Theory of Substantial Individuation 1. Abailard's Criticism B. The Essential Theory of Individuation 1. Abailard's Response C. The Formalist Theory of Individuality and Its Criticism D. Word View of Individuality E. Numerical Diversity in the Theologia christiana II. John of Salisbury Notes

196 198 204 210 212 212 215 227 236 241

I.

Chapter V. Conclusions

I. The Problem's Philosophical and Historical Context II. Intension of Individuality III. Extension of Individuality IV. Ontological Status of Individuality V. Principle of Individuation VI. Discernibility of Individuals VII. Function of Proper Names and Indexicals VIII.Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles IX. Conclusions Notes

255

255 261 263 264 266 270 272 273 275 278

Bibliography

281

Index of Proper Names

287

Index of Subjects and Terms

291

Sig/a

303

Preface

One of the recurring problems discussed by contemporary philosophers is the problem of individuation. Both in the Analytic tradition and in Continental philosophy, important thinkers have been puzzled by the issues surrounding individuality: its nature, causal explanation and its relation to many other philosophical notions. This interest, moreover, has turned their attention to early modern, medieval and classical views on the subject. In particular, attention is being paid to late scholastic figures such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Nonetheless, little has been done to develop a comprehensive understanding of the problem, the reason why it concerned scholastics in particular, and the basic differences between the medieval approaches and the contemporary ones. The result has often been confusion and misunderstanding. Moreover, nothing has been �one with the early and formative period of the Middle Ages, which extends from Boethius to the time just before the impact of the translations from Arabic was felt. Yet, it is at this period that the framework for future discussions is developed, having as a result a substantive importance for the historical understanding of what comes later. As will become clear in the course of this study and particularly in the last chapter, some of the most basic issues and terminology concerning individuality were raised at this time and, although much of what early medieval authors thought about individuality was discarded in the thirteenth century and after, there were some principles and formulations that were not. These filtered into later centuries through the texts of authors like Boethius, Gilbert of Poitiers and others, whose works, in spite of the influx of new ideas through the translations of ancient and Arabic sources, were never entirely neglected. Important doctrines such as the understanding of individuality as a kind of difference, for example, survived the period of translation and are found in modified form in some of the work of major scholastics like Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, even those views which were generally rejected by most, like the accidental doctrine of substantial individuation, continued to be discussed until the very end of the period ( a discussion of it is found in Suarez), and therefore influenced the formulation of issues and the discussion of problems associated with individuality. In this introductory study of the problem of individuation in the early

11

medieval period I propose, first, to lay the general bases for future, more detailed investigations, which may be undertaken by others. I do not claim, therefore, to have provided a comprehensive and definitive treatment of it. There are too many gaps in the early medieval history of this problem, too many unedited or badly edited texts, and too many conflicting accounts to be able to reach such a goal at this time. I attempt only to clarify the most common confusions surrounding this problem and to eradicate from the literature a few basic misunderstandings. Second, I attempt to develop a general understanding of the approach to the problem used in the early Middle Ages based on the detailed investigation of the views of a few but key authors of this period. Again I do not claim an exhaustive treatment of them, since not much has been written about many of the authors I discuss and their contributions to the controversy surrounding individuation. In most cases I have not had the advantage, as a result, of previous findings and interpretations. Hence, I claim only to have developed the parameters for subsequent, more detailed studies. The temporal boundaries of the book have not been set arbitrarily. There are historically significant reasons for adopting them. The period covered by the study is self-contained. In addition to the linguistic, religious and cultural unity which the authors of this period shared with other Latin writers of later centuries, they depended for their study and speculations on a limited number of philosophical and theological texts. As a result they have not only a common general background, but also a common textual foundation on which to reflect and base their speculations. This limited textual foundation changes and increases enormously in the latter part of the twelfth century, when numerous translations from ancient and Islamic medieval works enter the West. The introduction of new ideas into centuries old controversies and problems had the effect of changing perspectives and forcing scholastics to rethink and reformulate them. This is only particularly evident in the discussions about individuation, where the introduction of metaphysical views concerning the status of natures and the concept of being among others significantly alter the approach to it. The work of Peter Abailard and John of Salisbury, therefore, who were the last authors to work largely unaffected by the influx of new ideas introduced by the translations, constitutes an appropriate historical boundary at which this study may stop. With respect to the beginning, on the other hand, the matter may not look so simple. After all, one may ask, why begin with Boethius and Porphyry's Isagoge rather than with Plotinus and Augustine? But here again there is a historical rationale. Porphyry is discussed and Plotinus is not in spite of the first's indebtedness to the second, because early medievals had no direct access to Plotinus while 12

they did have access to Porphyry through Boethius' translation of the Isagoge. Indeed, early medieval discussions of individuation make no mention as a general rule of ancient Greek authors except for Aristotle and Plato, whom they knew largely second hand. Greek authors could hardly have been used since there were practically no Latin translations of their works and early medieval writers, except for very few such as John Eriugena, knew no Greek. The lack of reference to ancient Greek authors in discussions of individuality, then, is easily explained. The lack of reference to Latin authors, on the other hand, may not be so easily explained. Nevertheless, there is good reason for their omission. Latin writers, including such important figures as Augustine, did not seem to be concerned with individuality. As a result, the discussion of individuation in the early Middle Ages is almost entirely based on the textual tradition begun by Boethius' Commentaries on Porphyry's "Isagoge", his theological treatise De Trinitate, and to a lesser extent, his Commentaries on Aristotle's "Categories" and "De interpretatione". Boethius' texts, including the key passages from Porphyry and Aristotle he _translated, constitute the historical origin and source of all subsequent discussions of individuation until the translations from Arabic begin to appear in the latter part of the twelfth century. There is, therefore, a very evident unity in the discussions of individuality in the period which goes from Boethius to John of Salisbury, which is difficult to find in any other period or in most other subject matter in the history ofmedieval thought. The study of the views of authors who preceded this period, such as Plotinus, is no doubt necessary and interesting for a complete historical reconstruction of the development of the problem of individuation in Western thought. But such study belongs rather in a history of ancient philosophy and not here. The history of the development of this problem in the early Middle Ages must begin with Boethius and end with Peter Abailard and John of Salisbury. As far as the particular authors discussed in the study is concerned, the justification for their inclusion will be given when their views are taken up. For now it suffices to repeat that no attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive history for the reasons already alluded to before. The book begins with a chapter on the problem of individuation which makes no specific reference to the medieval tradition. Its purpose is twofold: ( a) to develop a general framework that will help in the philosophical understanding and evaluation of the various doctrines of individuation proposed in the early Middle Ages and discussed in subsequent chapters; and (b) to provide a common ground whereby medieval views from different traditions may be compared with each other and with contemporary views. This framework is not intended and does not function as a Procrustean bed; no limbs have been cut. Each 13

author's views are determined on the basis of detailed textual exegesis and are placed in their historical context. Generally, it is only after this analysis has been carried out that their views are summarized in terms of the framework developed in the first chapter and only with the aim of making easier their comparison with other medieval and contemporary views as well as their overall historical and philosophical evaluation. No violence to them has been intended and I hope no violence has been inadvertently committed. In addition, it should be made clear that the framework developed in the first chapter does not constitute a systematic exposition and defense of my own views, since a historical study like the one undertaken here is hardly the place for such an enterprise. This does not mean, on the other hand, that the book has been completely purged of value judgments or that it does not rely on various philosopical assumptions. Indeed, it would be hard to conceive a work of philosophy, even a historical one, so well sanitized. I have tried, however, to make my views explicit when appropriate in order to avoid confusion with the views of the authors I discuss, a procedure which I regard simply as a matter of intellectual honesty. With the second chapter I begin the historical discussion proper. It deals with Boethius, who introduced several aspects of this problem to the Middle Ages. The way Boethius discussed individuation suggests two basic approaches that were taken up by later figures. The first of these, which I see as primarily metaphysical, is presented in Chapter III in the context of the views of John Eriugena, Odo of Tours, Thierry of Chartres, and Gilbert of Poitiers. The second, of a more logical bent, is represented primarily by Peter Abailard and discussed in Chapter IV. The last chapter summarizes the points made in earlier chapters and presents a general characterization of the approach to individuation used at this time. It also attempts briefly to explain the medieval fascination with this problem which, in Leibniz's words, led the scholastics "to torment themselves so much". For it would have been quite unsatisfactory to describe the problem and its development without accounting for its being raised in the first place and for its subsequent popularity. Indexes of terms and names as well as a bibliography of the sources to which I refer in the text have been added at the end to facilitate the use of the volume. This study contains a considerable number of translated texts. Some of these had never been translated before, while others exist in various English versions. In the latter case I have consulted the available translations, although in every case I have introduced substantial modifications. This was necessary because most translators have made little effort to preserve the terminological distinctions related to 14

individuality. With few exceptions I have given preference to literal renditions of the texts and, therefore, style has been sacrificed for the sake of accuracy. All additions to the texts have been placed within square brackets [ ] . The spelling of the Latin texts found in the editions used has been preserved as a matter of courtesy to the editors. Finally, I must close by thanking all those who have read the manuscript and have given me their advice. I am particularly indebted to Peter O. King and Paul V. Spade. King read one of the last drafts of the manuscript and made many useful comments. He also made available to me a copy of his dissertation, Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals, which proved invaluable, particularly as far as some aspects of Abailard's thought are concerned. Spade read parts of an early draft of the manuscript; his suggestions and criticisms, based on a deep knowledge of Latin and the medieval philosophical tradition, put me in his debt. He also allowed me to read his course notes on Abailard. I am also grateful to Newton Garver and Kenneth Barber. Garver's relentless pursuit of clarity and intelligibility made his comments on the first chapter particularly helpful. And Barber's questions, originating from his familiarity with modern and contemporary discussions of individuation, helped me see some aspects of t�e problem which I had overlooked. I am also indebted to other scholars and philosophers, who read and commented on various parts of the manuscript. Among these I would especially like to single out Martin M. Tweedale, Eleonore Stump, Richard Westley, James Bogen, Victor Balowitz, George Hourani, Luca Obertello, T. McTighe and a few students who have taken my graduate seminar on the topic of this book, such as Scott Roberts, Thomas Donahue and Douglas Davis. I received helpful suggestions from all of them. I would also like to thank Marquette University Press for allowing me to reprint the revised versions of a few paragraphs from the Introduction to my book, Suarez on Individuation, to the Scientific Committee of the International Congress of Boethian Studies headed by Luca Obertello for allowing me to use a revised version of a section of the paper on Boethius published in the Congress' Proceedings, and to Ralph Mcinerny, editor of The New Scholasticism for his permission to use parts of a paper on Thierry of Chartres I published recently in the journal. I should like to point out as well that some sections of chapters II, III and IV were read at the Pacific Division Convention of the American Philosophical Association, the Conference on Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Villanova University, sessions of the Society for Neo-Platonic Studies at the Western Division Convention of the American Philosophical Association, the XVIIth Conference on Medieval Studies at Kalamazoo, and a session of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at the Eastern Division Convention of the 15

American Philosophical Association. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to Marie Fleischauer for the patience and good will with which she typed the numerous drafts of the manuscript and to Joel Tierno, Andrew Winston, and James Griffis for helping with the proof reading. Jorge J. E. Gracia 1982

Chapter I The Problem of Individuation

Perhaps the most immediate metaphysical intuition that human beings have about the world is thatitiscomposed of individual entities, which (a) lose their fundamental character if they are divided into parts, (b) are distinct from all other entities, even from those that are of their same specific kind, (c) are one of a group type or class which has or can have several members, (d) remain the same through time and various changes, and (e) are not predicated of other things. The first point is quite obvious in the case of some natural beings. A man, for instance Socrates, if divided into parts, ceases to be a man, and the man he is, Socrates, and becomes a collection of inert limbs. But even in the case of artifacts it is also quite evident, for a table broken up into pieces is no table at all. The second point seems also a basic datum of our experience, for each of these particular entities that compose the world with which we are acquainted seems unique and distinct in some way from everything else. True, Socrates is, like Aristotle, a man and philosopher to boot; but they are distinct, separate beings. The same can be said about the table on which I am writing these words or even, some philosophers have argued, about the color and other characteristics of such a table. A similar case can be made for the third, fourth and fifth points. Socrates is one within the group of all men and the same could be said about the table or its brown color. Indeed, even if all tables were destroyed but one, the remaining table would be one within the group of all possible tables; that group would include the real table and all other tables, past and future. Also intuitively obvious is that Socrates endures and that he is not predicable of other beings. It cannot be said of Aristotle that he is Socrates - unless, of course, Socrates and Aristotle are the same man, in which case there is no real predication, but an identity. Now, what makes these intuitions the subject of philosophical reflection and interest is not just their immediacy, but their possible conflicts. For example, if the philosopher takes sameness or similarity among things as basic, namely, that they seem to belong to a group or class distinct from other groups or classes, how does he explain the uniqueness of each of the members of the class? But, on the other hand, if he takes individuality as fundamental, how does he explain the individual's similarity with other individuals? Likewise, how can the philosopher explain the individual's apparent inability to be divided and

17

remain the same, or its capacity to endure through time and change? Or how is he to explain the epistemic criteria used in distinguishing individuals from each other? It is not surprising then that philosophers have been attracted to the philosophical issues surrounding these intuited features of the world. In the Middle Ages in particular, for reasons which will be discussed in Chapter V, these issues seem to have been of paramount concern. Most major thinkers of the age and even many minor ones dedicated questions, disputations and even entire treatises to the discussion of these issues. And in our century, there has been likewise a marked interest in what is normally called "the problem of individuation", although the contemporary understanding both of the problem in itself and of the problem as debated by medieval authors has not been by any means satisfactory. One frequently finds discussions filled with elementary misunderstandings of a historical as well as a conceptual nature. These misunderstandings are most often the result of two factors. The first is the terminological confusion prevailing in the literature. Terms such as 'individuation', 'individuality', 'numerical unity', 'numerical diversity', 'distinction', 'sameness', 'difference', and a score of others are frequently used but their meanings seldom explained. A second and no less important source of misunderstanding is the mistaken assumption that there is only one philosophical problem connected with individuality. For some this is the problem of finding the cause or principle of individuation; for others it is the problem of finding acceptable criteria to determine individuality. In both cases they omit consideration of some of the most basic issues surrounding this notion. Our task here, then, is to clarify the terminology of individuation and to distinguish the various issues which surround it. Once this is done, we will be in a better position to examine the early medieval discussions and views on these issues.

I. Nomenclature It is common experience that when thinking about an individual, concrete thing such as a man, or a tree, 1 one may consider those features that the thing has or seems to have in common with other things, or alternatively, those features that are peculiar or unique to the thing under consideration. The features that are common to the thing and other things are usually referred to as the thing's "nature". In turn the nature can be specific, generic or accidental. The specific nature consists of the common features which are part of what distinguishes the thing from a

18

larger group or a kind of things2 and at the same time makes it part of a smaller group of things, the members of which can be distinguished only in terms of individual features. One such specific feature, for example, may be the capacity to reason in man. The features that all members of several species have in common and which make them belong to a larger group which is in turn distinct from other larger groups, constitute the genus or generic nature. Both generic and specific features are essential to the thing, i. e. they are necessary conditions of its kind and existence. A man, for example, is not a man and cannot exist as a man if he does not have the capacity to reason (specific feature) and a body (generic feature). The features which a thing may or may not have, and thus are not necessary conditions for its kind or existence, are usually called "accidental". The brown color of a man's hair, for example, is an accidental nature to him. 3 On the other hand, those features that set a thing apart from all other things, including those falling together with it into a group, constitute the thing's "individuality". In both the case of the nature and individuality the content of the thought involved when one thinks about them seems to be different. Take, for example, the case of Peter. A consideration of his, say, specific nature, focuses on his humanity, that is, the group offeatures such as rationality, capacity to laugh, etc., that make him human and which render him both indistinguishable from other human beings and distinguishable from non-human beings such as dogs, trees and rocks. A consideration of Peter's individuality, on the other hand, will focus only on that feature or group of features which separate Peter from Paul and any other individual being, whether human or not. In the first case we think of how and in what respects Peter is the same as others, in the second of how and in what respects Peter is unique. The cluster of philosophical issues concerned with natures go by the generic name, "the problem of universals", those concerned with individuality are usually gathered under the term "the problem of individuation". The latter is the subject of our inquiry. But before we turn to the discussion of the various issues concerned with individuation it is necessary to make some terminological clarifications. The term 'individuation' is used in the literature for two things: (1) the process by which an individual acquires the feature or features which make it the individual it is, or (2) the very feature or features which render it such. In terms of the morphology of the term and its etymology, 'individuation' is used only in sense (1). For 'individuation', like 'universalization', 'externalization', and many other substantives derived from verbs, refers primarily to the process which is carried out by the action expressed by the verb. 4 The universalization of a principle, such as the moral imperative, "Do unto others as you would have them do 19

unto you", is the process by which the principle is extended beyond a particular case to all cases. Likewise, 'individuation' refers primarily to the process whereby something universal, say man, becomes individual, a man. In English, the term used to refer to the feature or features which characterize an individual as individual, that is (2), is 'individuality'. It should be noted, however, that this ambiguity is already present in Latin, where the medieval term 'individuatio' took on both meanings, even though there is also another Latin term for individuality: 'individualitas'. 'Jndividualitas', however, is not frequently encountered and its use is recorded primarily in late Medieval Latin. 5 Closely related to the terms 'individuation' and 'individuality' is the term 'individual' (individuum). In the Middle Ages the term developed a peculiar meaning which still lingers in some contemporary discussions. In addition to its standard reference to individual things such as a man (Socrates) or a quality (the particular black color of Socrates' beard for , those who hold that such things as qualities are individual), 'individual was used interchangeably with 'individuality' to refer to those features of a thing which render it individual. It is in this sense that one finds the term used in late scholastic expressions such as "the cause of the individual is matter" or "an individual is really distinct from the nature". 6 For the causes of an individual according to medieval scholastics were the four Aristotelian causes and not just matter, or form, or , as Thomas Aquinas would put it, matter designated by quantity. Obviously what is meant by 'individual' in this context is individuality: "the cause of the individuality [ of an individual] is matter". Similarly, one cannot properly speak of the nature of an individual as really distinct from it. For the specific nature of an individual, for example, is the group of characteristics that the individual has in common with other members of the species to which the individual belongs and, therefore, the individual cannot be considered to be really distinct from it. If it were, the individual would not really be a member of the species: A man , for example Socrates, would not be human. This use of 'individual', therefore , is confusing, although frequently found in medieval and even some contemporary sources. Individuality is to be distinguished from the individual. The former is the feature whereby the latter has its unique character. The individual is opposed to the universal, while individuality is opposed to universality. Universality, on the other hand, is the feature whereby a nature (specific, generic or accidental) has its special character as universal. How these terms are explained or defined (using 'definition' here in a nominal sense) is a separate problem which shall be discussed shortly. At present my concern is only to explain how they are related. 'Individual', therefore, has at least two uses in this context, although to avoid confusion I shall use

20

it primarily to refer to individuals rather than to their character as individuals. The problem of individuation then is concerned with individuality , namely , with that feature of things which characterizes them as individuals. Its complexity will become evident immediately .

II. The Problem

Contrary to a widespread misconception, the problem of individuality , as I shall refer to it from now on, is quite complex. There are at least six basic issues involved in it. These are , in logical order, the intension of individuality , the extension of individuality , the ontological status of individuality in the individual and its relation to the individual's nature, the cause or principle of individuation, the discernibility of individuals and , finally , the function of proper names and indexical terms. The first of these issues is logical, since it is concerned with the understanding of individuality and its distinction from other notions ; it has to do with the clarification of concepts. The second , third and fourth issues are metaphysical. They concern the description of reality - how far individuality extends and its status and basis in things. The fifth issue is epistemic , for it has to do with determining the conditions upon which the discernibility of individuals is possible. And finally , the sixth issue is linguistic , since it deals with the nature and function of proper names and indexicals. From this it should be obvious that one's views about the nature of philosophy will determine to a large extent the sorts of issues one will address with respect to individuality . The logical positivist, for example , will find little to say about the metaphysical issue surrounding individuality and will concentrate on the logical, epistemological and linguistic issues. On the other hand , the traditional metaphysician will pay little attention to the first, fifth and sixth issues and will concentrate on the second, third and fourth, which are metaphysical in character. Most of these issues have concerned at one time or another those philosophers who have worked on this problem and , as it should be expected, they were discussed at length by medieval authors . Nevertheless, it is the fourth and fifth that are most often regarded as '"the problem of individuation". Of these , the fourth is the favorite choice of scholars concerned with the history of the problem of individuality in the Middle Ages. And, indeed, there is some reason for this attitude . For it is true that, up to the fourteenth century, one seldom finds a careful and clear distinction between these six different issues and much more effort is put into the solution of the fourth than into the solution of the others .

21

Yet , it is also evident that as the age progresses they become more and more defined uHtil we find late scholastics , such as Suarez , carefully separating some of them in their discussions . Some of the issues never became quite independent in treatment . For example , the first one , concerned with the intension of individuality , was usually discussed in the context of the second , the extension of individuality . And even this one does not become subj ect of separate investigation until late in the Middle Ages . Only the ontological status of individuality and its principle and the discernibility of the individual were generally discussed separately in the latter part of the period . In non-historical contemporary treatments of the problem it is the last two issues , concerned with the discernibility of individuals and the function of proper names and indexicals , that are discussed most often . This is no doubt the result of the epistemic, logical , and linguistic approach which characterizes most modern philosophical discussions . Let us turn , then , to the six basic philosophical issues involved in individuality and deal with them one by one . A. Intension of lndividuality Individuality is what characterizes an individual as individual . To ask , therefore , about the intension of individuality is to ask about what it is to be an individual 7 as opposed to something else . 8 Traditionally there have been five features in terms of which individuality has been explained . Although philosophers have frequently disagreed on this issue , the general tendency has been to regard one of these as basic and some or all of the rest as secondary but somehow related to individuality . Four of these features are what might be called metaphysical , since they are supposed to characterize the things which are said to be individual . These are : indivisibility, distinction , division , and identity . The fifth feature , on the other hand , can be interpreted as metaphysical or logical , depending on the approach used , for it may be regarded as characterizing individual things and/or the words ( or alternatively , signs or concepts) used to refer to them . It is impredicability .

1. Indivisibility

The understanding of individuality as some kind of indivisibility has been perhaps the most widespread view of individuality in the history of philosophy . The medieval period is no exception , although in the early part of the age the situation is somewhat different , as we shall see later . Those who uphold this view find support for it in the very etymology of the term 'individuality' , which suggests that the intension of individuality

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has to do with indivisibility. For many, then, to be an individual is to be indivisible. But not to be indivisible in just any sense. For it is plain from experience that physical individuals are divisible in some ways and yet they are properly called individuals. A man, for example, can be cut up into parts and a table broken up into pieces. Indivisibility, therefore, is not to be taken in this sense. For the medievals, who took a long time to clarify this issue, 9 the indivisibility which characterizes individuals is that feature which prevents them from "being divided into individuals belonging to the same species or kind as the individual in question". A man cannot be divided into many men and his right leg cannot be cut up into many right legs. Of course, one may want to object that this may be clear in the case of human beings and such like, but not in cases of homogeneous substances and collections. A quantity of water, for example, is individual and at the same time divisible into other quantities of water; and a pile of stones is likewise divisible into other piles of stones. These examples purport to show that individuality cannot be understood primarily as indivisibility into individuals of the same species as the original individual. The type of answer that is most frequently given to this objection runs something like this: 1 0 This objection is not effective, for those who view individuality as indivisibility into individuals of the same specific kind as the original hold also ( 1) that what is individual is a particular quantity of water or a particular number of stones, for example one gallon of water or ten stones, not just any quantity of water or any number of stones; and (2) that the quantity in homogeneous substances and the number in collections function as kinds. Consequently, a particular quantity of water cannot be said to be divisible into particular quantities of water equal to the original one. To make the example more clear, a gallon of water is not divisible into gallons of water, even if it is divisible into smaller quantities of water. The original quantity (a gallon of water), therefore, is not divisible into individuals similar in quantity to itself. Likewise, a group of ten stones is not divisible into several groups of ten stones each, although it is divisible into two groups of five, five groups of two, etc. 1 1 That (1) is true seems quite obvious: it is not quantity that is individual but this quantity, i. e. one gallon or two. Moreover, although (2) is not as obvious as (1), it is certainly not an unusual position . Aristotle, for example, treated quantity as a category and all categories for him were groups of kinds. This sort of answer appears at first quite plausible, but upon reflection it is not quite convincing. For one might want to point out, for example, that an infinite collection of things is individual and at the same time divisible into other infinite collections. 1 2 This brings to the fore the inadequacy of the definition of individual given above if left unchanged . 23

Those who adopt that definition, however, explicitly add, or implicitly assume, a further condition, namely, that the original individual must not disappear or change in the process of division. Since an infinite collection when divided into other infinite collections would no doubt change or disappear altogether, the fact that it is divisible into individuals similar in kind to itself would not militate against its individuality. By itself, indivisibility into specifically similar individuals, then , is not a sufficient condition of individuality. This brings up another important point , namely, that 'indivisibility' , with its physical connotations , is not an appropriate term to use in the elucidation of individuality. A more appropriate term, which has some bases in contemporary literature , is 'non-instantiability'. 1 3 For this term points , better than indivisibility, to the basic condition of individuality, that is , that individuals cannot be instantiated as universals can. It is because Socrates cannot be instantiated, as man or white can, that Socrates is an individual and man or white are not. 14 Individuality, then , is opposed to universality, since to be a universal consists precisely in being subject to instantiation, or , in the traditional terminology, divisible into individuals of the same specific kind as itself. That a universal, say "man" , is subject to instantiation hardly needs explanation. But that the individuals into which it is divided are of the same specific kind as the original is not so clear. For it seems obvious that ,, there is a basic difference between the universal "man and '"an individual man" . This difficulty is usually resolved by proponents of this view by pointing out that the difference between "man" and "a man" is the difference between universal and individual, not a difference of kind. Men belong to the same species because they have the same essence and that essence is expressed by the definition, whose definiens can be predicated of each of the individuals who belong to the species. If we take the definiens to be "'rational animal" , Socrates can be said to be a rational animal and so can Peter and Paul. It is because the definiens can also be predicated of man, that is, of the species , that both men and man are said to be specifically the same. This provides us with further bases in support of the traditional interpretation of individuality. For the definiens predicable of a whole and that predicable of its integral parts are differenC the definiens predicable of '"a man" and that predicable of his "head" or of "a pile of stones" and "a stone" are not the same. So even though a man and a pile of stones are physically divisible, they are not divisible in the way a universal must be. In other words, they cannot be instantiated. 1 5 Indivisibility is also called incommunicability (incommunicabilitas in scholastic Latin) just as divisibility is referred to as communicability (communicabilitas). Although there are several senses in which the term

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'communicable' (communicabile) is used by philosophers and particularly by scholastics , the most central and pertinent to the present issue is the one in which the universal, for example, tree, is communicable to its instances, trees. To be communicable, therefore, means to be able to be made or become common to many. This relation is exactly the converse of the relation of participability. That which is capable of participation is simply what is able to take part in or be a part of something else, which by that very fact of participation is made or becomes common to those things that participate in it. An individual, therefore, is said to be incommunicable because, unlike the universal, it cannot be made common to many or, as some followers of Plato prefer to put it, it cannot become "participated oy many". Many terms are used to refer to individuality. One of the most common is the term 'individual unity'. It was introduced by scholastics because they thought, following Aristotle, that to be an individual was to be one, and consequently that individuality was a kind of unity. 1 6 Often individual unity is also called "numerical" (numerica) and opposed to "specific" (specifica) unity. The latter is the unity which a species has in spite of the potential or actual plurality of its members. All members of a species are one in the sense that they are of the same kind or belong to the same type. For example, Peter and Paul are one specifically in that each of them is a man in the same sense in which the other is. Numerical unity, on the contrary, is the separate unity of each individual within the species. It is called numerical because to be an individual is to be one thing and that involves nothing but to be a unit or, as it is frequently put in medieval discussions of this issue, to be a number. 1 7 And this contrasts with being a kind of thing such as a man or a dog. Strictly speaking, however, one may distinguish conceptually (i. e. intensionally) between numerical and individual unity even though the adjectives 'individual' and 'numerical' can be, and in fact are, interchanged since they refer to the same thing in reality (i. e. extensionally) , namely , to the unity proper to individuals. Thus the unity of the individual is called numerical, as already stated , because the individual is one; it is called individual because the individual is not divisible into individual units of its own specific kind. Also in use are the terms 'singularity' and 'particularity'. The extension of these and that of 'individuality' are usually taken to be the same, but conceptually the terms can be distinguished. For particularity has to do with an individual's "participation in" or "partaking of" a universal. In this sense the individual is considered as being a part of something else , or as partaking of it. Thus a man, for example, is particular (particularis) in that it participates in man, which itself is not particular. The case with singularity is similar. An individual is called singular (singularis) or is said

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to have singularity because it is not many ( 'plural' or 'multiple' are also used). A singular tree, unlike the species tree, is not a plurality or collection but a "single" thing. 2. Distinction A second feature which is regarded by many as fundamental to individuality is the distinction of each and every individual from all other individuals, including those belonging to the same species. They argue that it is a matter of experience that individuals are distinct from each other. Socrates is a distinct being apart from the dog he owns, for example. Socrates may move, change position, become senile and even die and nothing of the kind may happen to his dog. This distinctiveness of the individual from other individuals which seems to accompany all individuals is called by different names in the literature. Some call it "individual distinction" in order to separate it from other types of distinctions, such as the distinction which exists between two concepts, say "featherless biped" and "rational animal". Others, however, prefer the term 'numerical distinction' in order to emphasize the contr'ast between it and the specific and generic distinctions. The specific distinction is the distinction there is among species, for example, between man and dog. The generic distinction holds among genera, say man and plant. The distinction between Socrates and Aristotle is not specific or generic; it is only numerical. For each of them is, as it were, a different unit or number within the species. But between Socrates and his dog there is not only this sort of individual distinction, but also a distinction of kind (species). Other terms used in this connection are 'numerical diversity' and 'difference' (diversitas or differentia numerica). Strictly speaking these are not synonymous terms. Traditionally, two things are said to be "diverse" if they differ by themselves. For example, in Aristotelian metaphysics the categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, etc.) are said to be diverse because they have no single feature in which they agree. Substance is wholly diverse from quantity and vice versa. They do not differ in just one thing but, we might say, in everything. On the other hand, two things are said to be "different" because there is just some feature or features in which they differ; using the same example of Socrates and his dog, they are said to differ, among other things, in rationality. Both are members of one generic class, but within it there are one or more characteristics which set them apart. Another term also used in this context is 'otherness' (alteritas). This is a term of Boethian origin. In the medieval period it is not encountered frequently except in commentaries on Boethius. Although its opposite, 'sameness' (identitas) is frequently found both in the Middle Ages and in 26

contemporary discussions. The sense of 'otherness' in these contexts should not be confused with the contemporary phenomenological usage of the term, in which it is supposed to underscore the foreign and alienating barriers between a person and the world, even though the phenomenologists may have in fact borrowed the term from the scholastics. 3. Division A third characteristic which is often associated with individuals is their actual or at least potential capacity to divide a species or kind into many. It is pointed out that it is a fact of our experience that within each specific kind of thing there are many individuals. Indeed, even if we have experience of only one, there seems to be nothing to prevent the multiplication of such individuals. There are many men, but even if there were only one, there is nothing illogical in thinking that perhaps there could be more, although the way to bring about this multiplication may present serious practical difficulties. The terminology used in connection with this feature of individuals varies a great deal. Boethius, following Porphyry, introduced the term 'divisiveness' (used as an adjective, divisivum) as we shall see later. This term has the advantage that it points to a feature of the individual; for it is the individual that has the capacity to divide the species. Its main disadvantage, however, is that in contemporary English this term has the connotation of creating dissension or of separating what ought to be kept whole. 1 8 In the Middle Ages the terms most commonly used in this connection were 'multiplicity' (multiplicitas or multiplicatio) and 'plurality' (pluralitas) . But these are even less satisfactory, first, because multiplicity and plurality are the result of the dividing effect of individuals within the species, rather than the cause of it, and, second, because they, unlike divisiveness, are not features of an individual but of a group: What is multiple or plural is the whole group of individuals within the species, not each individual. 4. Identity Another feature which is frequently regarded as important for an understanding of individuality is identity. By this is usually meant the capacity of some things to remain the same through time and partial change. A tree, for example, will go through the four seasons, lose and add leaves and branches, change color and yet remain the same tree it was. Something similar is often claimed about properties and accidents insofar as they characterize a changing substance. Socrates' black hair color, for example, changes location with Socrates but seems to remain 27

the same black hair color. Another case is that of accidents subject to changes of intensity or degree, such as heat, although this is an area where there is little agreement. For not all philosophers accept that accidents are individuals, let alone that they can undergo change. Various terms are used in medieval and contemporary literature to refer to this feature of individuals in addition to 'identity'. Among these the most common ones are 'duration', 'permanence', 'continuity', 'persistence', and others. None of these is sufficiently neutral to be regarded as satisfactory; all of them have connotations which carry with them unfortunate consequences for the understanding of this feature either apart from or within a historical context. 'Identity' and 'sameness', although used often by contemporary authors and also by some scholastics, normally carry a mental, epistemic connotation which is foreign to many discussions of this feature. For example, what medieval authors generally called "identitas" (identity, sameness) was not primarily a feature of things but of the observer, who "identified'' a particular thing as being the same as itself. As such they held that identity was a mental phenomenon based on the conceptual distinction necessary for a thing to be regarded as the same as itself, and not a real feature or unity present in individuals. 19 The term 'duration' has the disadvantage of an earthly temporal connotation. Things which endure are generally taken to be "in earth's time", i. e. "to be the same through time on earth". But this temporal­ terrestrial aspect introduces an unnecessary limitation in the concept, at least for some authors, who desire to extend identity to beings not subject to earthly time, such as angels. The term 'permanence', which literally means "remaining through", has the undesirable connotation of a complete lack of change, a fact which would exclude material individuals from its extension. The term 'persistence', although appropriate in many ways, is not entirely suitable. For it means "to exist through" and not every author holds that individuals must necessarily exist. This is the case, for example, with merely possible individuals: a possible Socrates seems to be as much a Socrates as an existing one, according to some. 20 Fi nally, 'continuity', like 'duration', seems to involve the notion of "being one through something " (change, time), a point which would offhand exclude God from the category even though he is frequently regarded as individual. Moreover, scholastics generally associated this term primarily with physical change. As they put it: "continuity pertains to the essence of motion". 2 1 And this could create confusion. In short, then, none of the terms in use is completely satisfactory, but among them the least harmful may be 'identity' and 'sameness'. If it is kept in mind that the feature in question is not a conceptual phenomenon

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in some mind, but a feature of individuals themselves, their main undesirable connotation is removed. 5. Impredicability To predicate is to say something of something else. Using Thomas Aquinas' explanation of the term in On Being and Essence, we could say that predication is "something achieved by the intellect through its act of combining and dividing, having for its foundation in reality the unity of those things, one of which is attributed to the other". 22 Some philosophers hold predication to be a mental relation between concepts (or words) expressed in judgment. As such predicability is a feature of concepts or words, not of the things for which those concepts and words stand. It is, for example, the term 'man' or the concept "man" that are predicable of Socrates. This is properly speaking what predication is and for this reason later scholastics called it "formal predication". On the other hand, other philosophers also like to speak of "things" being predicated or being predicable of other things. In that case predication refers to the conjunction of the thing predicated and the subject of which it is predicated. For example, the quality white is said to be predicated of a piece of paper, and not just the term or concept "white". Later scholastics, recognizing the derivative nature of this usage, called this type of predication "material" (praedicatio materialis). Under these conditions predicability becomes a feature of things (i. e. properties and accidents) and not just of words and concepts. In any case, whether predicability is interpreted as a feature of things or of words and concepts alone, a common understanding of individuality is that it consists in impredicability. That is, the individual is that which cannot be predicated. This analysis of the individual is generally contrasted with that of the universal, which is, in turn, said to be predicable. Take for example, the case of Socrates. 'Socrates' is not predicable, for if it should be found in third place in a sentence of the form "x is y" (x is Socrates), the copula in that case would not be the 'is' of predication but rather of identity. The sentence 'x is Socrates' can only mean that x and Socrates are the same thing and not that Socrates belongs to x or characterizes x as some property or accident. 23 Since the distinction between the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of identity was not widely used by ancients and medievals, they were forced to talk about the individual as "being predicable of only one''. 24 For example, 'Socrates' is predicable of Socrates and only Socrates. By contrast, they defined the universal as "that which is predicable of many". For instance, 'man' is predicable of Peter, Paul and any other man. Both of these definitions are based on texts of Aristotle25 and were passed down to the Middle Ages by Boethius, 26 as we shall see later.

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6. Relation ofthe Five Features All five of these features have been regarded at one time or another as fundamental to individuality . Therefore, the first and foremost problem confronting the philosopher concerned with the analysis of individuality is to determine to what extent these claims are correct and what is the relation between these five features. Not all philosophers who have addressed this problem have succeeded in isolating these five features, let alone explain their interrelations, however. Often one finds that even if they succeed in distinguishing some of them, they regard others as equivalent. Indeed, only the most lucid philosophers have isolated some of these notions and attempted, although not always with success , to develop a coherent framework in which to fit them. Given the limited scope of the present discussion, I cannot address this matter here with any degree of completeness. Nevertheless, at least a few comments may help clarify the issue and point the way toward what may be a satisfactory solution. That these five features are quite distinct seems obvious. For something may be indivisible (i. e. non-instantiable) and yet not distinct from anything else . Consider, for example, the case of a universe in which there is only one individual. In such a universe the single individual , although indivisible, (i. e. non-instantiable) , would not be distinct from anything else, since to be distinct involves a relational aspect impossible in this type of universe. 2 7 And the same could be said concerning the division of the species. There is no logical reason why individuals should divide the species into many. For there is nothing wrong with the conception of an individual who is the only possible member of an entire species. Indeed, some medievals thought all purely spiritual creatures , which they called angels, are such. 28 Again, the same can be said concerning identity . 29 For an instantaneous individual, not subject to temporal duration, is perfectly conceivable. Some medievals, again, thought there was at least one being like this , namely , God. 30 And regardless of whether God exists or not , it seems obvious that the notion of a being not subject to the passage of time is not contradictory . Finally, if predicability is a relation between words or concepts, it would appear only as a feature resulting from a reflection about the world and, therefore, subordinate to non-instantiability or whatever it is that constitutes individuality . Consequently , since individuality , conceived as non-instantiability or indivisibility into other individuals of the same specific kind, seems to be not only distinct from but logically independent of and prior to all four other notions, it is reasonable to conclude that it is non-instantiability that constitutes the one and only necessary condition of individuality . Distinction is a necessary condition only in a universe where there are 30

more than one, real or possible, individuals. The division of the species into many is a condition operative only within species capable of being instantiated in more than one case. Identity is a feature of individuals which are part of a universe subject to time and change. And impredicability is a feature of individuals as subjects of reflection; it is therefore a logical notion. Identity and the capacity to divide the species into many are in fact features of individuals which depend on the kind of individual the individuals are. Distinction is a relational feature which depends on the kind of universe of which an individual is a part. It is only non-instantiability that can properly be regarded as a fundamental feature of individuals considered in themselves and as such; for it seems to be both a necessary and sufficient condition of individuality. 3 1 Now, not all philosophers believe in this point of view, a situation which, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, is also prevalent in the early Middle Ages. Indeed, during this early period individuality was generally intepreted as a kind of distinction rather than as non-instantiability. We have to wait for the thirteenth century to see this view change. B . Extension of Individuality

Next to the intension of individuality, the most basic of the issues raised above concerns its extension. For even if it is granted that individuality is a viable concept, the question as to whether there are any entities that have it and, if there are any, which do and which do not, are still questions that must be answered. Traditionally, there have been three basic positions that philosophers have taken with respect to this issue. One, adopting the well known formula that became established in the Aristotelian tradition, holds that "everything that exists is individual". 32 A second view, taking its cue from Plato, proposes the contrary, that "nothing that exists is individual". And a third, attempting a compromise between these two extremes, holds that "some things that exist are individual and some are not". The existence to which all three formulae refer is real existence, and opposed to imaginary, mental, possible, or apparent existence. How this is unpacked further varies considerably from author to author. 1. Nothing that Exists is Individual The second view is hard put to justify its blatant rejection of the witness of experience. After all, we seem to experience the world in terms of individual entities which are not subject to instantiation and which have some or all of the features discussed in section A. It succeeds in making sense of its commitment only by dividing the world into two realms: the 31

realm of the real, composed of universal entities, and the realm of the unreal, composed of individual entities. Individuality then is relegated to the world that is not real; it is turned into an illusory feature of the world. What is real is not Socrates or the act of justice he just did, but humanity and justice. The individual Socrates and his act are mere appearances and, as it were, reflections of real natures. According to this view, then, what most scholastics called substances, such as a man or a tree, and what they called properties and accidents of those substances, such as the capacity to laugh or a particular black color of hair, are individual, but they are not real; they do not truly exist. It is only the properties and accidents considered as abstract entities, humanity, justice, blackness, etc., that are considered real, but not individual. Indeed, it is their very nature to be divisible and subject to instantiation. This view is generally regarded as a most extreme form of realism. 33

2. Everything that Exists is Individual The contrary view to this one holds that everything that exists is individual. Like the Platonic view it divides the world into two realms. One is regarded as real; the other is unreal. But this time the terms are shifted, for it is abstract entities that are regarded as unreal. These universal entities are called concepts and believed to be the product of mental operation. Humanity, justice, etc. are concepts abstracted or derived in some way from a world composed of individuals. It is the individuals that are real, both substances and their properties and accidents. There is an ambiguity in the formulation of this view, for one can interpret it in at least two ways. In one, more extreme way the view can be taken as holding that everything that exists is essentially individual or, as others prefer to put it, individual by itself (per se). Both substances and their properties and accidents are individual and even concepts themselves are no more than the individual acts of understanding of individual minds, although their denotation may be multiple. '"Man", for example, is nothing but this very act in my mind, or in the reader's mind, here and now, by which I , or the reader, understand what a particular man is. This position is generally called '"nominalism", although other terms such as 'conceptualism', etc . , are frequently used to describe various versions of it which put different emphases on the nature and reality of concepts. A second understanding of the formula "everything that exists is individual" is possible if one interprets it to mean that all existing things are individual, but that in at least some cases their individuality is derived or, as the medievals would put it, per aliud. In this sense both substances and their properties and accidents are individual, but they are so as a 32

result of some action or causation due to an extrinsic principle or factor. A man's nature , for example, his humanity, is individual and therefore it exists as his and only his humanity. It is not shared with or common to any other human being. And the same can be said about the color of his hair or the size of his waist. But the individuality of his humanity and of his hair color and waist size is due to a special action by a principle such as matter , or form, or spatio-temporal dimensions, etc. This view has been traditionally called the moderate realist view, although it could as well be called the moderate nominalist view. There are , however, two versions of it. The first holds strictly to the notion that, although individuated, things like natures do have some unity and being ( not existence , but nevertheless some ontological status) in addition to the unity and being they have as individuals. Horseness, for example, in addition to being this horseness, that is, the horseness of this horse and of none else , has in some sense some being and unity which is not the unity and being of this horse. 34 It is the interpretation of this "some sense" that measures the degree of realism of this view. Certainly it is a moderate realism if compared with the Platonic view, but it could become quite close to it if enough emphasis is placed on the unity and being proper to natures considered apart from individuals. The second version, on the contrary, borders on nominalism. For it holds that the natures that exist as individuated have no unity and being except for the unity and being which they have as individuals. Horseness, for example, has no ontological status in itself - no being and unity, except the unity and being of an individual horse. 35 But if this is so, then, one may ask, can it really be individuated? For the process of individuation seems to presuppose some entity. This is the question that has led many to criticize this position. 3. Some Things that Exist are Individual and Some are not The third position holds a middle ground between these two: "Some things that exist are individual, and some are not." The non-individual things are generally interpreted to be the properties and accidents of substances. 3 6 Substances, such as a man or a tree, are considered to be individual but their properties and accidents are not. A man, Socrates, is individual, but his height, weight, hair color, etc. are not, since some other man, for example Aristotle , may be as tall as he is, and as heavy, and he may have the same hair color. This position, then, differs from the other two outlined above. It does hold to the same notion that there are two sorts of worlds, but contrary to the other two views holds that these two worlds are both real. Universal entities, such as whiteness, beauty and the like are as real as individual substances, such as a man or a dog, although different ontologically.

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Most authors refer to this sort of position as a form of realism, since it is committed to the existence of universal entities. It could also be regarded as a form of nominalism, however, since these universal entities are thought to exist only in their instances, not in a separate realm as the standard interpretation of Plato proposes. As we shall see in what follows, early medieval authors tended to adopt realism as their view concerning the extension of individuality. With time, however, there is a move toward a moderate form of realism which coincides with the increasing popularity of Aristotle and a growing emphasis on logic.

C. Ontological Status of lndividuality Once individuality is defined and its extension established, its ontological status in the individual and its relation to the individual's nature still remain to be determined. Philosophers have generally framed this issue in terms of two questions : (1) whether there is some distinction in reality which corresponds to the distinction in thought between individuality and the individual's nature, and (2) what the basis of the distinction is. In the Middle Ages these two questions were usually united and explored under one question: "Whether in all natures the individual as such adds something to the common nature. " The term ·common nature , in this context referred to the nature of the individual, that is , the feature or features which the individual has or seems to have in common with other individuals. 37 The term 'individual', on the other hand, referred sometimes to the individual considered as a whole, say Peter. At other times , owing to the peculiar usage mentioned above in the section on terminology, it referred to the individuality of the individual; for example, the feature or features that characterize Peter as the individual he is. 38 For this reason , the question can be interpreted in two ways. In one way it meant to ask (a) whether it is the case for all natural beings that an individual, considered as individual, is distinguished by some feature or features from its nature; (b) the nature of this distinction , that is, whether it is real, conceptual, or otherwise; and ( c) the ontological status of the individual. For example, (a) whether Peter has something that man does not have and, therefore, is different from man, (b) the nature of the distinction between Peter and man, and (c) the status of Peter. In another way the question was meant to ask : (i) whether it is the case for all natural beings that the individual's individuality is distinct from its nature; (ii) the nature of this distinction, that is, whether it is real , conceptual , or otherwise; and (iii) the ontological status of individuality . For instance , (i) whether Peter's individuality is different from man , (ii) 34

the nature of the distinction between Peter's individuality and man, and (iii) the status of Peter's individuality. The first of these two intepretations raises a more basic set of issues than the second since an answer to it determines the answer to the second set as we shall' see. It is perhaps for this reason that scholastics generally chose the first interpretation. Basically there have been three positions that traditional and contemporary philosophers have adopted with respect to this issue. The first not only rejects the distinction in reality between the individual and its nature, but goes so far as to disregard the conceptual distinction. Moreover, as a result of this rejection of the distinction between the individual and its nature, it concludes further , that there can be no distinction between its nature and individuality, since the latter is nothing but the feature which characterizes the individual as an individual. According to this view, then, there is no distinction, for example, between Peter and man or between what characterizes Peter as Peter (his Petrinity) and man ( or his humanity as some would prefer to put it). For various reasons there have been few philosophers who have held this view. Indeed , given the pressing witness of experience, it is difficult to reject at the outset the fact that there is at least some sort of conceptual distinction between an individual and/or its individuality on the one hand and the individual's nature on the other. Nevertheless, although experience and practice seem to warrant this distinction, it should be noted that when philosophers try to clarify it even at this level it becomes difficult to do so. The main problem seems to be that intellectual consideration takes place always in terms of universal concepts and thus seems to preclude a proper determination and understanding of the individual qua individual. The second position has been more popular. It accepts the conceptual distinction between common nature and individual , but argues that there is no distinction in reality that corresponds to the conceptual distinction. There are two main versions of this view , quite opposed to each other. The first, which is the position usually attributed to Plato, argues that what is real is the nature, that is, the common features of things, and thus, as a result, that there cannot be a real distinction between the nature and the individual since there are no two real entities which may be distinguished in reality from each other. Man, from this perspective, for example, is real , while Peter is not, and consequently man cannot be really distinguished from Peter, or vice versa. It also follows from this view that Peter's individuality is not real and, therefore, that it is only conceptually distinct from Peter ' s nature, in this case man. The obvious problem that this view faces is the explanation of how the conceptual distinction arises, given the lack of distinction in reality. How is it that we 35

can distinguish between Peter and man, for example, when man is nothing at all in the world apart from Peter (and Paul, etc. . . )? What gave rise to the distinction in the first place? How do we come to it? These questions may have answers, but the difficulties of finding them have made many philosophers choose other views. The second version argues that what is real is the individual and/or its individuality, but that the individual's nature is a conceptual phenomenon only. 39 As such there cannot be a real distinction between the individual and/or the individuality of the individual on the one hand and the individual's nature on the other. 40 Peter and/or Petrinity are real; man is not. Therefore, there is no real distinction between Peter and/or Petrinity on the one hand and man on the other. What supporters of this view generally fail to explain adequately is the cause or causes of conceptual community, i. e. the causes that give rise to the notions of natures in the mind. For example, what is the source of the concept of man? In addition, as some have made quite plain, this sort of view puts into question the objectivity of scientific concepts and thus undermines the bases of science. The third, more eclectic position is the one that has found more adherents in the philosophical community. Like the second, it does not question experience, accepting the conceptual distinction between the individual and its nature, but it goes further by positing as well some sort of real distinction between them and also, in a few cases, some sort of real distinction between the individual's individuality and its nature. What the distinction is, however, is differently interpreted by different philosophers. 41 Very few early medieval authors addressed the issue of the ontological status of individuality. This is a concern which became fully explicit only in the thirteenth century. Therefore, we need not dwell on it further. We raise it at this point because no discussion of individuality could be complete without reference to it. Moreover, its importance in the later period requires that we look for clues as to its origin at this time. In contrast, we shall have to pay particular attention to the next one, concerned with the principle of individuation , for early medieval authors made a special effort in this direction. D. Principle of Individuation Once the ontological status of individuality is established, the philo­ sopher must turn ( 1 ) to the identification of its principle or cause and (2) to the determination of whether this principle, or cause, is the same for all entities. These two issues are exclusively regarded as ''the problem of

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individuation , , by many, particularly scholars of medieval scholasticism. And not without reason, for Aristotelians regard as the fundamental function of science the identification of principles or causes, and thus, a scientific investigation of individuality must be primarily directed to that end. The use of the term 'principle' in this context is widespread, and it is particularly understandable in contemporary contexts where the approach to this issue is epistemic, as we shall see shortly. But in the present context it needs some explanation, since its use might not be fully clear to the present day reader. The use and meaning of this term dates back to the medieval schoolmen and through them to Aristotle's arche. The Latin term 'principium' meant not only principle, but also beginning, source, and element, as well as cause. Its extension was much wider than that of the term 'cause'. Some causes could be regarded as principles, but not all principles were causes. 'Cause' was used by scholastics to refer specifically to physical causes, that is, one of the four types of causes identified by Aristotle as the sources of motion (form, matter, the agent, and the end). But principles need not be physical. Logical rules, for example, such as the principle of non-contradiction, the rules of inference, and in many cases, just the premises of particular demonstrations were called principles because they were considered the starting points of knowledge. Moreover, scholastics spoke of metaphysical principles as well. Like logical principles, these are not generally separable from the things of which they are principles, but unlike them and like physical principles they are really distinct from that of which they are principles. As such they are neither physical things nor mental concepts, but, nevertheless, they are real metaphysical constituents of things. The most commonly accepted of these were form and matter, essence and existence, and substance and accident. Those philosophers who reject metaphysics as a proper science, or who at least reject metaphysical principles as constitutive of things, prefer to speak of the cause or causes of individuation, although often they will use the two words as synonymous. Before we examine this problem further, it should be clear from section A above that the positions adopted with respect to the issue of the principle or cause of individuation will depend to a large extent on the interpretation of individuality adopted. If, for example, individuality is understood primarily as non-instantiability, the principle or cause of it must have to do with rendering a thing such that it cannot be instantiated. On the other hand, if individuality is understood as distinction or difference, then it would have to do with a principle- or cause that distinguishes a thing from all others. And so on with the other ways of

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understanding individuality we saw earlier: division, identity and impredicability. Moreover, the principles or causes identified in each case may not be the same. One could hold, for example, that the principle of individuation understood as distinction is the bundle of features which characterize a thing and at the same time hold that the principle of division ( what causes plurality within the species) is one of those features , such as materiality. So that, it is not by any means clear that when authors speak about the principle of individuation they are speaking about the same issue and, therefore, that their solutions to it are comparable. Often, however, the difficulty is that they themselves do not clearly understand the notion of individuality and as a result muddle related issues. Most authors, either because they do not separate the various notions related to individuality or because they aim to develop parsimonious theories, or further , because they think all these features to be related, try to offer theories that would be sufficient to account for several of these features at once. In particular, they regard non­ instantiability and distinction as inseparable and , therefore, as accountable by the same principle. For this reason I shall pay particular attention to these two features in what follows. From the discussion of the extension of individuality it should be clear that not all ontologies confront the issue of identifying a principle or cause of individuation. What was called above the nominalist view , namely , the view that holds that everything that exists is essentially or per se individual, faces no such issue. For, if there are no universals or natures , no realities which in some way must undergo a process or change in order to become individual, the issue of identifying the principle or cause of such a process or change does not arise. It is only within a realist context that this question surfaces. This does not mean that nominalists do not raise the issue. They do. But their purpose is usually to provide a platform for attacks against realist ontologies where universals are given some status. The two issues of individuation discussed in this section are germane to realist or moderately realist views. The nominalist has to worry about other matters. To the variety of realist ontologies corresponds a variety of theories of individuation. What follows is a discussion of the most important ones and particularly of those that , as we shall see in subsequent chapters, were exemplified in the Middle Ages. Because many philosophers who address this issue accept some kind of distinction between substance on the one hand (Socrates, my dog) and accidents and properties on the other (Socrates' knowledge, my dog's capacity to bark), the discussion is divided into three parts: the individuation of substances, the individuation of properties and 38

accidents, and the individuation of other entities.42 In the third group are included all those entities which do not easily fall within the other two groups. Among these are constituents or principles of substance, events, and such like. 1. Individuation ofSubstances For our present purposes it is not necessary to give an exact definition of substance. It is sufficient to illustrate the concept by examples, such as a man, a dog, a horse, a tree, a table, a gallon of water. 43 Substances are characterized by properties and accidents. Properties, according to traditional terminology, are features which always accompany the substance; accidents are features which do not necessarily do so. It is the individuation of substances, not their features, whether they be properties or accidents, that concerns us at present. There are at least five different kinds of theories concerning the individuation of substances: bundle theories, accidental theories, essential theories, existential theories, and theories of external individuation. We shall pay particular attention to one type of bundle theory, several accidental and essential theories, an existential theory, and two theories of external individuation. We turn to these presently. a. Bundle theory of individuation. One of the most widespread views of the individuation of substances is variously called the bundle or cluster theory. It holds that the uniqueness and individuality of each individual substance is to be explained in terms of the group of characteristics it has. This paper on which I am writing, for example, is an individual substance because it has a particular set of characteristics: It is white; it is 12 inches long, 8 inches wide; it is smooth ; it is thin; etc. Its characteristics, let us say, are a, b, c, d and e. And it is because it has this set of characteristics and no other that it is this paper and not the one next to it on which I shall begin writing shortly. That other paper is also white (a); it has the same size (b, c); it is smooth (d); but it is thick (f) rather than thin (e), for example. Still another sheet of paper may have other characteristics, such as a different color, or a different texture, and those are the characteristics which, taken together with all its other features, make it an individual numerically different from the first two. Most of those who hold this view readily accept one of its consequences, namely that no two individuals can have the same set of characteristics. This consequence is generally known by the misnomer, "Principle of the Identity of lndiscernibles". 44 This principle is sometimes formulated as follows: If x has the same characteristics as y, then x is identical with y . This consequence alone is sufficient reason to question this view, for there does not seem to be any compelling reason why two 39

things may not share all their characteristics . Indeed, if individual substances can share their necessary attributes, why shouldn't they share their contingent ones? Two individual men, according to this view, share in the same humanity, so why can't they share also in their non-essential characteristics, such as country of birth, height, hair color, etc . ? True , there seems to be an incompatibility concerning certain accidents , for instance, place, but this is a restriction which may apply only to physical objects. In cases of non-physical objects , e. g. minds and thoughts , (provided they are viewed as individual, of course) one would be hard put to argue for such an incompatibility. But this is only one worry bundle theorists have. They have to worry also about the obliteration of the very distinction between individual and universal which their theory aims to support. For a bundle of universals is a complex universal and not an individual. There is no way in which indivisibility or non-instantiability can be derived from grouping universals. Socrates and Aristotle in this theory must necessarily be complex universals. 45 Indeed, it is not clear how the bundle theory can possibly explain non-instantiability. And perhaps this is the source of its troubles: that it is not designed to account for non-instantiability , but only for difference. The bundle theorists confuse individuality with distinction. 46

b. Theories of accidental individuation. If the set of properties and accidents a thing has does not properly account for its individuality , then it must be particular properties and/or accidents that function as individuators. But properties cannot do it, since they are supposed to be common to all members of the species or genus. Therefore, we are left with accidents as the only alternative. Let us take an example to clarify the point: if Socrates is not the individual man he is because of all his features (call them a, b , c and d) taken together, or because of his specific or generic features, say his humanity (d) , then , perhaps it is because of some accident in particular (say b) that is not shareable and, therefore , renders him unique and non-instantiable. What this accident is considered to be , however, may vary since there are a number of possibilities available. Accordingly , there are several views of accidental individuation , but of these two are most popular: the spatio-temporal and the quantitative views. A. Spatio-temporal individuation. The most commonly accepted view of accidental individuation is the one that holds it to be a result of spatial­ and/or temporal location . The strongest version of this view is the one that ( 1 ) combines space and time into a single principle of individuation and (2) does not identify spatio-temporal location with external relations. The version of the view that does not combine space and time 40

together is weak, for one could always object to it that distinct individuals can occupy the same space at different times or, alternatively, exist at the same time in different places. Similarly, the view that makes space and/or time an external relation is also weak, for then the individual's individuality would be a result of an external relation which would change no doubt with changing circumstances outside of it. 47 Indeed, every time something moved in the universe, the spatio-temporal location of everything else would be changed and presumably its individuality. The strongest view, consequently, rejects both of these approaches. It is spatial and temporal location, considered together and as non-relational and intrinsic, that must be used. It is because I am here, now, that I am an individual, and different from Peter, for example, for no other individual can be in the place I am at this very time. In order for Peter to take my place I would have to move and then at least the temporal requirement would be missing. Spatio-temporal location, in this sense, is very much like what Aristotle called "the innermost motionless boundary of what contains" a thing (Physics IV, 4; 212a 20). It is the sort of feature that cannot be shared and that is independent from external circumstances. It is not location or position with respect to other things, but more like "inner space". Without a doubt, the appeal of this view is great. It is a matter of common sense and experience that spatio-temporal location cannot be shared. This view, however, has several problems. The first and foremost is that it attempts to explain what is a substantial feature of things (individuality) by reference to an accident or accidents ( time and space). Things seem to occupy space and be in time after they are already constituted in their individuality. That is, their individuality seems logically and metaphysically prior to their temporality and spatial location. It is I who is here now, and my being here now seems somewhat dependent on me, not vice versa. 48 A second difficulty concerns the individuation of spiritual beings, such as minds, angels, souls, etc. in ontologies where such entities are considered to be individual. For what space and time do they occupy? Some might want to argue that thoughts are in time and others even that they are in space, but those are claims that are indeed far from being well­ supported and therefore cannot be used to support something else unless they are first well established. 49 And, at any rate, within metaphysical schemes where there are individual entities that are not bound by spatio­ temporal limitations this reply is ineffective. This difficulty is not insurmountable, however, for the principle of individuation of spiritual beings need not be the same as the principle of individuation of physical beings. Consequently, the fact that they are not subject to spatio­ temporal location does not necessarily imply that they are not individual 41

or that their individuality cannot be accounted for. What the objection succeeds in doing is in forcing those who accept spatio-temporal location as the individuator of physical entities to complicate their theory by having to add a different individuator for spiritual entities if they desire to preserve their individuality . 50 In addition , those views that hold that not only substances but also the accidents of substances are individual would be hard put to explain their individuation in terms of space and time . For , as some traditional critics of the view have put it , what individuates space and time? This is another way of asking why it is that "this spatio-temporal location" is not subject to multiple instantiation. Or, to put it still in another way: Why couldn't there be two or more individuals sharing the same spatio-temporal location? (Can more than one angel dance on the head of a pin?) The spatio-temporal or , more generally , the relational theory of individuation is compatible only with a semi-realist ontology in which substances are individual but their accidents are not. But even in those it faces some general objections. B. Quantitative individuation. Because space and time seem too extrinsic, some have explained the individuality of substances in terms of their quantitative features such as width, length, etc. These seem at least intuitively to be more closely related to the substance than the time or space substances occupy . Yet , this view faces basically the same objections the previous one encountered , for the quantitative features of a thing, except perhaps for its weight, are related to the space it occupies. Moreover, this view would have the same difficulties than the previous one in explaining the individuality of substances not subject to quantification (minds, angels , souls , etc . ) . c. Theories of essential individuation. The extrinsic nature of some accidents and the fact that particular ones are not indispensable to individual substances undermine all accidental theories of individuation, leading some philosophers to search among the constituents of substance , i . e. those features essential to it, for an adequate principle or cause of individuality . Three important theories of individuation have appeared as a consequence: material , formal , and a sui generis kind , which we shall examine next . A . Material individuation . The theory of material individuation posits matter as the cause or principle of individuation. 5 1 Socrates is an individual because of his matter. It is in the nature of matter to be unshareable and therefore all material things are rendered distinct and indivisible by it . The strength of this view lies in its apparently commonsensical bases. For, indeed , the stuff out of which a thing is made seems to be what determines it to be this rather than that . In the classic

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example of the marble statue, is it not the pieces of marble out of which two identical statues of Apollo are carved that make them (a) non­ instantiable and (b) two distinct statues? For all their specific features are the same and even many of their accidental ones. Their only difference seems to be the marble. That is what they do not and cannot share with each other or with anything else. But there are problems with this view. Perhaps the most important is that matter as such does not itself seem to be individual and, therefore, it is difficult to see how it can be the source of the individuation of other things . Indeed , as some have argued , matter qua matter is common and therefore requires something extrinsic to be added to it in order to become "this matter". In the example given, marble is common to the two statues ; it is "this piece of marble" that is individual. But what turns "matter" into "this matter" or "marble" into "this marble"? It is for this reason that many philosophers have added to matter certain features such as (1) actual particular dimensions or (2) dimensionality , in order to allow for both its individuality and its individuating effect. It is not marble then that individuates this statue of Apollo, but this marble, that is , marble plus certain dimensions (7x4x4 feet, in this place, etc . ). Or, alternatively, it is marble considered as potentially dimensional, that is , marble as always having to have a set of particular dimensions , but not as actually having them , that individuates . Because it must have always a particular set of dimensions , it must necessarily be always "a this" when it exists and consequently the source of individuality. 52 But in the first case matter is combined with an accident and as such the principle of individuation becomes partly accidental. This opens the theory to all the objections against accidental theories. And in the second case it is difficult to see how dimensionality can help matter to individuate. For if it is understood as general, then it can belong to any individual and , therefore, it is communicable or shareable to many , even if this could happen only in succession . But if it is conceived as particular, there is no difference between this theory and that of material-accidental individuation. Marble considered as marble must necessarily have particular dimensions , but those dimensions could in principle be shared by many. If they are actually particular, then the dimensions (say 7x4x4 feet, here) are accidental and therefore dispensable. 53 There are other problems with the theory of material individuation as well. For example, it necessarily limits individuality to the physical world, an unwelcome and restricting feature as we saw above. 54 In addition, in metaphysical frameworks where matter is conceived as pure potentiality, it is hard to explain how it can actively cause or be a principle of a feature such as individuality. This is a standard modern objection to Aristotelian metaphysics which in spite of its popularity with some critics 43

has only limited merit, as we shall see later. It is, however, the reason why some philosophers have substituted form for matter as the principle of individuation, since form, unlike matter, is actual and the source of a being's features. B. Formal individuation. According to this view a man, for example, is this man owing to his substantial form, his humanity. It is the form after all that determines what a thing is and it should be it that is the source of its individual unity. 55 The problem with this view is that form, considered in itself, is general. In fact, the very notion of form, as opposed to matter, is the notion of what is shareable and common to many. Equinity is what is common to all horses, and not what is particular to Black Beauty alone. How can form, then, be the source of individuality? Most objections to this view are variations of this basic one. Proponents of this view may answer that it is not "form" but "this form" that individuates; it is not equinity but "this equinity" that makes Black Beauty this particular horse. But this answer does not help much, for as we saw in the case of matter, we can very well ask : and what turns "form'' into "this form"? C. Sui generis individuation. The difficulties with matter and form have led some philosophers to formulate another theory of substantial individuation. According to this view the principle of individuation is nothing more than the principle of individuation. Its only function in a substance is to individuate and as a result it cannot be identified with any other component, cause or principle in it. We know there is such a principle dialectically, that is, because we need it in order to explain the ontological features of things. Its existence, therefore, is based on the requirements of reason. 56 Without it we cannot account for the individuality of things. To ask, however, about what it is over and beyond being the principle of individuation is to misunderstand its role in the make-up of a substance. For this principle, as the basis of an individual's characteristics, must itself be characterless. That is why it is sometimes called a "bare particular". 5 7 In each substance there is, then, a bare particular which belongs to that substance and no other and which is the basis of its non-instantiability and its distinction from all other substances. Socrates is unique because of his Socrateity, and this Socrateity is not reducible to Socrates' various features or characteristics. Although it is difficult to argue with this view insofar as it emphasizes the need for positing a principle of individuation, it is not difficult to criticize its choice of a characterless entity for this role. For, as characterless, this principle cannot be described. What we know are its effects and the fact that it has to be posited, but nothing about the principle itself beyond the fact that it is a principle of individuation. Indeed, although this principle seems to be the source of the distinction 44

between entities, it is itself not subject to distinction since it has no feature by which it may be distinguished. Critics argue, then, that this view is not legitimate. It consists simply in giving a name to an entity which is mysterious on all accounts. As such it does not propose a principle of individuation but simply recognizes that substances are individual and that there must be a source of their individuality.58 d. Theory of existential individuation. Some philosophers make a distinction betw:een essence and existence, regarding the latter as a separate principle or act. Concerning a phoenix, for example, one can consider two questions: What is it? And this is answered by the definition which expresses the essence of the phoenix. Or, does it exist? And this is answered affirmatively or negatively, independently of what the essence is. For these philosophers it is possible, then, to hold that the principle of individuation of individual substances is their existence or act of existence. 59 This theory has initial support in the seeming unshareable character of existence. For who can exist for me? My existence and yours, certainly, are distinct and unshareable, and so it seems with everybody else's. Nor does this theory have any of the problems of the accidental theories existence is indeed a substantial principle - or of the material and formal theories - existence is not formal in any way and as non-material it can extend individuality to non-material beings. But there are other difficulties. For individuality seems to extend not only to existing entities but to possible entities as well. A non-existing one hundred dollar bill seems to be as individual as an existing one. 60 Moreover, it has been argued also that the same individual may cease to exist and begin to exist again later, in which case it would have two separate existences, not one; accordingly, existence could not be what individuates it.6 1 e. Theories of external individuation. This approach argues that individuality is the result of the action of a natural agent or cause.62 Socrates is an individual due to the actions of his father and mother, which generated him. After all, it is one's parents that are responsible for those features which make one unique. Similarly, a statue's individuality is the result of the sculptor's action, which brought it about. The difficulties usually raised against this theory are based on the extrinsic nature of an agent's action and the intrinsic character of individuality. True, the agent is responsible for bringing about the individual substance; but that does not explain why the substance cannot be subject to multiple instantiation. That it cannot be so must be the result of some intrinsic feature of the substance, not a feature of something else. As in the case of accidents, so the argument goes, there is something odd 45

in holding that an individual owes its own individuality to another individual. An alternative to this theory, held primarily by theologians, states that individuation is the result of a supernatural agent . It is argued that God, as creator of each individual substance, is related to it in a unique way and thus that owing to this relation the substance is rendered individual. The disadvantage of this theory springs from its reliance on religious authority. Its suitability depends not only on the existence of God, which is after all a topic of philosophical controversy, but on purely theological assumptions concerning creation and God's nature and will. For these reasons it cannot be, and indeed seldom has been , taken seriously as a viable philosophical alternative to the problem of individuation. 63

2. Individuation of Properties and Accidents As in the case of substances, for our present purposes it is not necessary to give a definition of property and/or accident. It is sufficient to illustrate the concepts by examples . An example of the first is Aristotle's capacity to laugh and an example of the second is his act of laughter. There are two basic types of theories about the individuation of properties and accidents: the substantial and the accidental. a. Substantial individuation. The most widespread theory concerning the individuation of properties and accidents holds that they are individuated by the substance in which they inhere; Socrates' black hair color , for example, is this black color because it belongs to Socrates. If the black hair color didn't belong to Socrates, it could be universal or be individual, depending on whether it belonged or not to someone else. There are two varieties of this view. In one properties and accidents are said to be individuated by a substance which is ofitselfindividual. According to this view , a man for example, is always individual. What are not individual and therefore require individuation are his characteristics. The substance, then , requires no individuation. Now , in some cases, the view is subdivided further. For some consider the substance to consist only of those features which are essential (including properties) to the entity in question (in the example of a man, for example, his rationality , capacity to laugh, etc . ). In other cases , the substance is considered to consist of both properties and accidents. According to the first subview, it is only the accidental features that require individuation , since those may or may not belong to it . When they do, they become part of the individual and as such are individuated. But when they do not , they are not individual since they may belong to something else. According to the second subview , it is both properties and accidents that require individuation , since the fact that a feature is essential or accidental has nothing to do with whether it is

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individual or not. Sometimes this view, in which properties and/or accidents are said to be individuated by a substance which is of itself individual, is called "the characterized particular theory". Its name derives from the fact that it holds (1) that particulars which are substances are always characterized and (2) that all other particulars, i. e. properties and/or accidents, owe their particularity to characterized particulars. 64 The main problem with this view is that it fails to explain why the complex notion of a characterized particular is unanalyzable. For as a complex entity, a characterized particular is composed of the particular and its characteristics. And if this is so, then the question of what the particular is apart from its characteristics emerges. According to this view, however, the characterized particular is not capable of analysis, but the reasons for such an incapacity remain mysterious. A second, more traditional alternative holds that properties and accidents are individuated by substances, but substances are themselves individuated by something else. A man's black hair color is this black hair color because it is his, but the man is individual for other reasons. The reasons for the individuation of the substance may vary, as we saw above. But that is a different issue. The weakness of this view, as of all views which rely on substance for the individuation of properties and accidents, is similar to that of the accidental theory of individuation of substance. The problem with that one was that, after making a distinction between what is essential and what is accidental, it went on to identify in what is accidental to the substance the source of its individuality. The situation with the present theory is similar, for it identifies as the source of individuality in a property and/or accident something which is "external" to it. True, it is essential to properties and accidents to be present in substances, but it is certainly not essential to them to be present in this substance rather than that one. "Black hair color" must always belong to this man, or that man, etc., but it is not necessary that it belong to this particular man. Its individuality, then, if taken from this man, comes from a source which is external and as it were accidental to it. 65 b. Accidental (or proper) individuation. Another alternative for the individuation of properties and accidents is to hold that they are individuated by properties and accidents, either ( 1) by the set of properties and accidents present in a substance taken together and including themselves, or (2) by some specific properties and/or accidents such as spatio-temporal location, or (3) by the properties and accidents themselves. The last view is really not a view of individuation, since to say that properties and accidents are individuated by themselves is equivalent, for all intents and purposes, to say they are individual. This is

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a nominalist position which is sometimes referred to as the "perfect particular view" , because according to it each property and accident is wholly and completely , i. e. perfectly, particular. 66 The first and second views have some of the same advantages and disadvantages as the accidental theories of substantial individuation. It seems, for example, commonsensical that this black hair color is "a this" because it is in this place, at this hour, on this large head, etc. , that is, together with these other properties and accidents. But it is also a fact that this black hair color seems to have no intrinsic relation to this place , this hour , this large head, etc. It could be somewhere else at some other time , for example, even while still belonging to the same substance. Peter's hair color would seem to be individual, if it is indeed individual, whether he is sitting next to me or not, and therefore, whether it is part of this particular set of properties and accidents or not. The extrinsic relation among properties and accidents themselves, then, goes against the accidental (or proper) theory of individuation of properties and accidents. 67

3. Individuation of Other Entities In addition to substances and accidents, philosophers often speak of other entities such as matter, substantial forms , modes, etc. which are regarded as principles and metaphysical components of things. 68 In an ontology where these entities are individual it is, therefore, necessary to account for their individuality. However, since the theories concerning their individuation are similar to those concerning the individuality of properties and accidents , it is not worthwhile to investigate the issue further at this point. The early Middle Ages, as we shall see later , did not produce a great variety of theories of individuation. Most authors adopted bundle and/or accidental views of the kind popular among neo-Platonists , but there are a few who leaned toward a more nominalist approach based on self­ individuation. All of this will become clear in later chapters. E. Discernibility of Individuals In contrast to the logical and ontological issues discussed thus far , the issue of the discernibility of individuals is epistemic . It concerns the way we discern or distinguish them. 69 How do I distinguish Socrates, for example, from Plato and all other human and non-human individuals? What is the cause or principle that allows me to separate him from all others? While the ontological approach to individuation attempts to identify the cause or principle of an individual's individuality, this approach seeks the cause or principle on the bases of which minds

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become aware of an individual as constituting an indivisible unit distinct numerically from all others. 70 That these two problems are different seems obvious. For the proposition "x is an individual because of y" is different from the proposition "I know that x is an individual because of y". Indeed 'y' in the second proposition could easily be substituted by the expression 'Peter told me it was individual', for example, and still make perfectly good sense: "Iknowthat x is anindividual because Peter told me it was individual". It is altogether possible to know about the individuality of something on the basis of hearsay or authority. But the substitution in the first proposition yields an absurdity: "x is an individual because Peter told me it was individual". What would this mean? Suppose x is an ape, what causal relation could Peter's statement have with the individuality of an ape? For the ape's existence, individuality, and other ontological features are without a doubt independent of Peter's statement. Peter's statement may be important and relevant, but not to the ape's individuality - rather it is relevant to my understanding of the ape's individuality. Similarly, we could point out some causes which, at least in principle, could be taken as principles of individuation but that could under no circumstances be taken as principles of individual discernibility. Take, for example, matter. This, as we saw earlier, is a favorite individuator for some philosophers. After all, the stuff out of which something is made seems to be what causes it to be this rather than that - the marble in the two identical statues of Apollo appears to be the cause of their non­ instantiability and numerical distinction. But matter cannot be the cause of our distinguishing between individuals, since matter, considered in itself and apart from the particular circumstances and features that accompany it, has no perceptual characteristics. It must be remembered that within the Aristotelian framework accepted by most of those who adopt this view, matter in itself has no quantity, quality, relations, etc. ; it has no features which fall within the Aristotelian categories. Under these conditions, then, how could matter be the source of individual discernibility? Indeed, the example of the two statues of Apollo is misleading, for marble may have perceptual characteristics while matter does not. So if it is marble that is considered an individuator, this is a theory of "characterized matter" not of matter. Matter, however, has been defended as a proper principle of individuation by many philosophers. To say that "x is an individual because of matter" makes some sense, but to say that "I know x to be an individual because of matter" is at least odd and possibly absurd. Not all philosophers, however, have distinguished between these two issues, namely, between the problem of individuation and the problem of individual discernibility, and many have attempted to identify or at least 49

relate them or their solutions. 7 1 Perhaps the most well known of these attempts is the one proposed by those who accept the so called "'identity of indiscernibles". 72 This view can be formulated as a principle thus : If x is indistinguishable from y , x and y are the same entity. 73 This is another way of saying that if there is no discernibility, there is no distinction. But this does not follow. For , as we saw earlier, one may want to argue that individuality and distinction, on the one hand, and discernibility , on the other, are two different things. The first two could be interpreted as features of individuals , while the last could be understood as a feature of some mind who plays the role of observer of individuals. Therefore, a lack of discernibility does not necessarily entail the non-existence of distinct individuals. That these two issues are different, however , does not imply that their solutions must be different. In fact, most theories of individual discernibility resemble closely the theories we examined concerning individuation. The most common exceptions to this are those which , because they involve non-observable entities , such as matter , bare particulars and the like, do not readily lend themselves to account for discernment.

1 . Discernibility ofSubstances The issue of individual discernibility, just like the issue of individuation , can be divided into two parts: discernibility of substances and discernibility of properties and/or accidents. 74 Concerning the first there are three main theories: the bundle theory , the relational theory and the sui generis theory. a. Bundle theory of individual discernibility. This theory is similar to the one discussed earlier concerning individuation. The only difference is that instead of claiming that the bundle of characteristics individuates , it claims that such a bundle constitutes the basis of the numerical distinction we make between individuals. The advantages of the theory are clear , for it seems quite reasonable to suppose that I know Socrates is an individual numerically distinct from Plato because the first was short , snub-nosed, had a beard, was the main speaker at a certain symposium, etc. , while Plato was taller, had an aquiline nose, was the writer of the Republic, etc. The characteristics of things seem to be what make us aware of their distinction from other things and of their particular character as individuals. But there are problems with the theory. Perhaps the most important of these are the fact ( 1 ) that we never know the complete bundle of characteristics which a thing has , and (2) that most characteristics do not appear to function as distinguishers , at least in principle. The first point 50

seems quite obvious. If it is all the characteristics of a thing taken together that constitute the basis for discerning it as an individual, then we can never discern it in fact, since we do not know all the characteristics a thing has. Indeed, we do not even know all the characteristics each of us has·' so how can we know those belonging to other things? Similarly, the second type of objection seems quite strong, for not all, indeed not even most, characteristics of things serve as distinguishers. Take, for example, the case of two identical bronze statues of Venus. How do I know there are two and not just one? Certainly not by the color, weight, shape, etc . . . I might know there are two only if I see them at the same time in different places but not by any of their most obvious features. It is not, therefore, the bundle of features that makes us discern two individuals as two. b. Spatio-temporal theory of individual discernibility. It is considerations such as these that have led some philosophers to point to specific properties and/or accidents as individual distinguishers. Of these by far the most popular view argues that two things can appear to share in our experience all properties and accidents but one; their spatio-temporal location. 75 Consequently, it is through this one that we discover their individuality. It is that I see Peter here, now, what makes me distinguish him from Paul, who is there, now, for example, oi that Peter is to my left and Paul is to my right. Indeed, all experience seems to be structured along these spatio-temporal axes and as such every part of it occupies a unique position within it. The Kantian bent of this view is clearly evident. Its strength is also quite obvious, but so are its shortcomings. The most serious of these is the circularity of the view when spatio-temporal location is considered to be relational rather than absolute. For if that is the case, this theory would be attempting to account for the identification of individual substances on the basis of times and places. But do not time and places, if they are relational, presuppose the identification of individual substances? In other words, don't I have to know Peter and Paul as distinct individuals before I know that their spatio-temporal locations are different? Of course, if spatio-temporal location is not viewed as relational or external, then the objection is not so serious. But then it might be difficult to see how spatio-temporal location serves the purpose of discernibility . 76 c. 'Sui generis ' theory of individual discernibility. Another attempt to account for individual discernibility is proposed by those who hold that individuals have a unique feature called individuality which is subject to direct intuition and which is the basis of their discernibility as individuals. Paul and Peter each have something unique which, when intuited, makes us perceive them as individuals. But what is this unique feature? 51

Proponents of this view answer that given the individual nature of this feature it is impossible to explain it, for all explanations are made in terms of universal and ,shareable characteristics. It can only be intuited. That there is such a feature is clear because we do in fact discern individuals. We know, therefore, its effects, although we cannot give an analysis of it. Those who oppose the view find this account unconvincing. Its strength is deceptive, for what the theory accomplishes is only to give a name to something unknown . 2. Discernibility of Properties and Accidents For those philosophers who regard properties and accidents as individuals the question of their discernibility also arises. The theories here correspond pretty well to the theories discussed under the individuation of properties and accidents. There is a substantial theory and various accidental ( or proper) ones. a. Discernibility through substance. According to some, we become aware of the individuality of properties and accidents and of their numerical distinction through the substance in which they inhere. We discern Socrates' black hair color as individual because it belongs to Socrates. The substance is the principle or cause of the discernibility of the color as an individual. For in fact it is the substance that is first and most immediately known to be individual and properties and accidents only subsequently . The problems that plague this view are not easy to solve, however. In the first place it is not clear that properties and accidents are posterior to substance in knowledge, although logically or even metaphysically at least accidents must be so if the substance-accident distinction is to be maintained without contradiction. It is altogether possible to hold that the first things we know about a substance are the external circumstances and accidental characteristics which it has and that it is only later that we proceed to know the substance itself. For example, one could argue that it is "a red" that I first perceive when I see a red object, particularly if the object has large proportions and has been placed at a close range. Place a person with closed eyes three feet away from a red wall and what the person sees at first when she opens her eyes is the color; only later does she identify the color as belonging to a wall. Experience, then, may militate against this view . But the view has other problems as well similar to those discussed when dealing with the individuation of properties and accidents. For it is not altogether convincing to argue that the individuality of a property and/or accident is known through the individuality of something else. b. Discernibility through accidents. Others argue that properties and 52

accidents are known to be numerically distinct (1) because they belong to a particular set, or, alternatively, (2) because of their association with some properties and accidents such as spatio-temporal location, or, again, ( 3) because of a unique feature intuited by the knower. These views have advantages and disadvantages similar to those pointed out when similar theories concerning the discernibility of substance were discussed. For this reason there is no need to give them separate consideration. It is also for this same reason that consideration of the discernibility of entities other than substances, properties and accidents is omitted. F. Function of Proper Names and lndexicals

If instead of using an ontological or epistemic approach to individuality one adopts a linguistic perspective, 77 one ends up with an entirely different issue. While the ontologist is concerned with individuals and the epistemologist with the way we know them, the linguist is interested in the nature and function of proper names and indexical terms that refer to individuals. He wants to know, for example, how terms such as 'Socrates', 'Aristotle', 'this ', and 'that' function. How they are used, how they are instituted, and the differences between them and terms which refer to many individuals, that is, class or generic terms such as 'man' or 'tree'. That this is a separate issue or set of issues from those raised within the ontological and epistemic approaches seems quite evident even from a superficial inspection of the question. It is one thing to ask, for example, about what makes Socrates an individual or what makes us distinguish him as such and to ask how the term 'Socrates' functions. True, it is altogether possible to give accounts of the usage and meaning of 'Socrates' which will take into consideration both what Socrates is and what we know about him. We could say, for example, that the function of 'Socrates' is to refer to Socrates and no other individual. But even in such cases the semantic, as opposed to ontological and epistemic, nature of the answer is evident. Proper names and indexicals are, of course, quite different. Ever since Peirce, the term 'indexical ' has been used in connection with demonstratives, pronouns and tenses. None of these are names. Proper names, on the other hand, are names which apply to one and only one individual. The main difference between proper names and indexicals is usually thought to be that the referent of indexicals changes according to circumstances. When I say "I am here'', the term 'I' refers to me. But if you say "I am here", it refers to you. This is why Russell called them '"egocentric particulars". 78 Proper names are unlike indexicals in that

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they refer to one and the same individual regardless of circumstances. 'Socrates' refers to Socrates and no one else. Of course, this difference may not be as strong as has been suggested, since several individuals can have the same name. For example, my friend's cat is also named Socrates. All of this goes to show that the distinction is not as clear as it is often thought to be. But that is immaterial to our present purposes and so we shall leave it at that. In addition to these questions there are many other issues that surround the notions of proper names and indexicals. Perhaps the most pressing of these concerns the issue of whether proper names have meaning and sense as common names have or whether they do not. The so called "classical" answer is that they do not. 79 Proper names have only reference. The problem with this is that if that were the case, then all identity statements in which the subject and predicate are proper names referring to the same individual become non-informative; for example, "Cicero is Tully". 80 Yet, it seems that some of those propositions, such as the one given as an example, seem to convey information. This is what led Frege among others to reject this view and suggest that proper names have sense and meaning even if this sense and meaning is somewhat different from the one common names have. 81 But this view also has problems which stem from the fact that our common sense intuitions seem to be contrary to it. Proper names do not seem to be equivalent to definite descriptions. When I say "Socrates", I do not intend to describe or do in fact describe Socrates; I am only naming or singling him out. 82 In the early part of the medieval period there is not much attention paid to the problems which surround proper names and indexicals if compared with the attention given to the problem of individuation. Only the authors who use a more logical approach to individuality, such as Abailard, and those who fall within the grammatical tradition , such as the author of the Glosulae super Priscianum to whom I shall refer later , seem to posit the problem of individuation in terms of '"singular names" . And then their concerns are primarily with distinguishing proper names from common ones, as we shall see later. For this reason there is no sense in dwelling on this issue at length at this point. More will be said about it in the chapter where Abailard's views are presented.

III. Concluding Remarks In this chapter I have tried to do two things: ( 1 ) clarify the basic terminology surrounding the concept of individuality and (2) distinguish the various issues which are most often discussed with respect to this

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notion. I have also presented some of the standard alternatives chosen by philosophers in their attempt to solve these issues and a few of the most basic arguments commonly adduced in their support and objections brought against them. The discussion has been kept general in order to preserve the comprehensive but propedeutic character of the chapter. In the chapters that follow I probe deeper into some of these problems while discussing the views of the most important early medieval figures who addressed them. We are ready, then, with the general framework developed in this chapter to turn to the particular views on individuality proposed in the early Middle Ages. Notes 1

2 3 4

5 6

7

The use of these examples does not preclude the extension of individuality to other things such as events , statements , sentences , ideas , characteristics of trees , etc. The examples indicate that individuality extends to what Aristotle called "primary substances" in the Categories, but they are not intended to suggest that only primary substances are individual . Indeed, the issue of precisely what things are individual ( substances, properties and characteristics , events, etc . ) has been and still is a matter of intense debate among those who concern themselves with the problem of individuation and/or the problem of universals . I have used substances as examples to make easier the presentation of the problem of individuation , since their individuality is quite obvious and generally uncontested . The members of the group do not have to exist , of course ; the group could be composed of possible beings. What in fact constitutes or does not constitute the generic , specific and/or an accidental nature of a particular thing is of no concern or relevance in this study. In some cases , however , as in 'coloration' and 'restoration ' , both the process and the feature brought about by the action of the verb a re called by the same name . This may be the result of morphological analogy. In some cases, such as ·restoration' , the language has no term by which it refers to the feature ; in other cases , such as 'coloration ' , the term is extended to the feature in question in spite of the fact that the language has a term for it ('color') . Neither 'individuatio' nor 'individualitas ' are recorded in Classical Latin . '/ndividuitas ·, however, is recorded in Tertullian (Monogamia 5 ) . These formulae can b e found in most scholastic literature after the thirteenth century . See , for example , my book , Suarez on Individuation (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press , 1 980) , pp . 78 and 41 . The term 'individual' is used often in contemporary discussions to refer exclusively or at least primarily to human persons . This usage is particularly evident in Continental philosophy, al though it is also frequent in analytic circles . The medievals did not suffer from the confusion of individuals and persons as some contemporary philosophers do . As early as Boethius ( Contra Eutychen, Loeb, p. 84) , it was clear that a person was an individual of a certain kind and that the notions of individual and person were not equivalent . Consequently, the problems posed by the individuality of persons are only particular cases of the more basic problem of the individuality of individual things . Many contemporary writers have argued, however, that only persons are individual and/or that the individuality

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8

9

10 11

12 13

14

15

of persons and of other things.is so different that they cannot come under the same heading. For our present purposes all of this is immaterial and therefore will be ignored. The term 'nature of individuality' is also used in this context although it is not entirely appropriate , since individuality is not a nature which can be shared by several individuals , but rather that which cha{acterizes each individual as such and distinguishes it from all others. The use of 'nature' in con�ection with things that have no nature in the strict sense is widespread among contemporary writers and is also frequent among some medieval authors (for exampfe , B.oethius) . Strictly speaking, however, scholastics held that only individuals which belong to kinds, such as a man , have natures, and only in theories of individuation which make individuality a formal principle , as Scotus and his followers did , can one speak of the nature of individuality. Suarez, in the sixteenth century , is one of the few who gives a clear analysis of the intension of individuality . See my Suarez . . . , pp. 4 and 30. Suarez uses it:for example. See my Suarez . . . , p. 3 1 . Although a particular quantityor number is not essential to members of natural kinds such as a man or a dog, those who hold this view could argue that it is essential to collections . For it is in the essence ofa collection to be a group of so many , say ten . Consequently , a pile often stones is essentially different from a pile of twenty stones. Of course , both are piles . but that is a generic feature since there can be many piles often stones ; the particular number is what corresponds to the specific difference of the pile . And essence involves both the genus and th'e specific difference . Related to it , however , is the size of the stones in question . For a group of ten stones could be divided into two groups of ten stones each . but in that case the stones would be different , since the original stones would have to be broken into pieces in order to account for the larger group . This example was brought to my attention by Scott Roberts . To my knowledge , the term 'non-instantiability' is not found in the medieval or contemporary literature , but the notion of instantiability has been used often in contemporary discussions. D. J. O'Connor, for example , uses it to define an individual : "By an individual I shall mean any entity that possesses qualities (including relational properties) and is not itself an instance of either a quality or a relation ; " in "The Identity of Indiscernibles" , Analysis 14 ( 1 954) , 103 . McTaggart had defined substance in a similar way in The Nature of Existence, according to O'Connor. See also E. D. Phillips , ''On Instances" , Analysis 1 ( 1 934) , 60---61 and M. Loux , "Kinds and the Dilemma of Individuation " , Review of Metaphysics 26 ( 1 974) , 773-784 . The terms 'non­ exemplification' or 'exemplification' are also used in this connection (see Edwin B. Allaire , "Bare Particulars" , Philosophical Studies 14 ( I 963) , 7 ; G . Bergmann, Logic and Reality, Madison : Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1 964 , p. 255 and statim; and much earlier C. A . Baylis. "Meanings and Their Exemplification" , Journal of Philosophy 27 ( 1 930) . 169-1 74) , but they are not as good as the terms 'instantiability' and 'non-instantiability' . One of the reasons why 'non-exemplification' is not as apropriate is that individuals can be models or exemplars, as for example , when I say that Peter's conduct is a model for us to follow . As such , then , individuals can be exemplified and therefore non-exemplification cannot be their defining feature . I have defended the view of individuality as non-instantiability in " I ndividuos como instancias" , Re vista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 10 ( 1 982 ) , 197-2 1 3 and " Individuals as Instances'' , Review of Metaphysics 36 ( 1 983) . Someone might want to obj ect at this point that cloning is a case of the instantiation of an individual. But this objection is misguided , for cloning is not an instantiation ; it is a reproduction or copying. An individual cannot become a kind by the production of individuals similar to it . In such a case both the clones and the original would be instances of a kind . See my article cited in n . 1 3 . l have argued against this solution in "Individuals as Instances" ; see n . 1 3 .

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16

Metaphysics V , ch . 6; 1 0 1 5 b 1 5ff. This is the term which Suarez uses most frequently . See my Suarez on Individuation, p. 275 . 17 Each individual is a number in the sense that it is "one" in the group . For example , Paul is one man , and Peter is another one, and Socrates is still another one. Each is one and all together they form the total number of men , which is composed of all these units or numbers : the first one , the second one , the third one , etc . 1 8 The term 'divisivum' does not appear in Classical Latin . The term 'divido' from which it is derived is a common term and can have also a negative connotation of breaking and destroying. It is interesting to note that it was Boethius, a Platonist of sorts who believed in the higher ontological status of universals over individuals, who first introduced the term 'divisivum' in connection with individuals in his translation and commentary to Porphyry's Isagoge. 19 The issue involved in developing criteria to determine the identity of persons in particular has been a matter of intense debate among modern and contemporary philosophers . See John Perry's anthology , Personal Identity (Berkeley: Univ . of California Press , 1975) , and Newton Garver , "Criterion of Personal Identity" , The Journal of Philosophy 61 ( 1 964) , 779-784. For the notion of identity in medieval sources see my Suarez . . . , p. 223 and also G. G. Bridges , Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae (St. Bonaventure , N . Y . : The Franciscan Institute, 1959) . 20 Suarez among others . See my Suarez on Individuation, pp . 19 and 1 1 4 . 2 1 See Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae XL, Sect . VIII, § 7. 22 Ch . 3 . In Maurer's translation , § 8 (Toronto : PIMS, 1 968) , p . 49 . 2 3 Some contemporary philosophers , such as Quine , have tried to obliterate the difference between proper names and universal terms . Indeed , one could speak , for example, of 'Aristotle' as being predicable of many, as when I say of a particular contemporary philosopher , "He is an Aristotle" . But, of course , the 'Aristotle' that is being predicated in that sentence is not the ' Aristotle' which is the proper name of the Greek philosopher. The first 'Aristotle' is as much a universal as 'man' . The same can be said about other proper names , such as the well known example of ' Pegasus' . See W. V. Quine , Word and Object (Boston : M . I . T. , 1 966) , p . 1 9 1 and elsewhere . N . Goodman has tried something similar in The Structure of Appearance (Cambridge : Harvard , 1 95 1 ) . See also Strawson's perceptive response to Quine in "Singular Terms, Ontology and Identity" , Mind 65 ( 1956) , 433--454. 2 4 In fact , as an explicit view, this distinction does not appear in ancient or medieval texts , . although it may have been used at times (see Plato's Sophist) . It is only in the nineteenth century , with the arrival of quantification theory , that this distinction is explicitly formulated and becomes part of the common philosophical stock . 2 5 On Interpretation, ch . 7 ; 17 a 38 . 26 PL 64, 3 1 8-3 1 9 . 2 7 O n e could argue against this example that i n a universe where there i s only one being the notion of individual would not be meaningful . To speak about individuality makes sense if one can also speak about universality . But , of course , in a universe where there is only one individual , instantiation and therefore individuality would be impossible . One could also argue that , when one describes the single being of this universe as individual , one is in fact and surreptitiously introducing other entities in the universe and , therefore , violating the conditions under which the example is supposed to work . Frankly , I am not sure at the moment whether either one of these two obj ections are effective . But even if one or both of them were , one could still hold that there is a difference between non-instantiability ( or indivisibility) and distinction , the first being intrinsic or absolute and the second extrinsic or relative . Hector-Neri Castaneda defends a similar view to the one presented here in "Individuation and Non-Identity : A New Look" , American Philosophical Quarterly 1 2 ( 1 975) , 1 3 1-140. See also Michael Loux's response i n Critica 8 ( 1 975 ) , 1 05-1 16.

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28 29

30

31

32 33

34

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See Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, § 5 , p. 54. The confusion between identity and individuality pervades much of contemporary literature even though some philosophers have called attention to the distinction between the two. For the distinction see , for example, G. E. M. Anscombe's paper in the symposium "The Principle of Individuation" , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume for 1953. For a recent discussion which treats individuality as identity, see David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, ch . 2 (Oxford : Blackwell , 1980) . See also my paper "Numerical Continuity in Material Substances : The Principle of Identity in Thomistic Metaphysics" , The South western Journal of Philosophy l O ( 1 979) , 76-78, and my critical review of Wiggins' book forthcoming in Revis ta Latinoamericana de Filosofia, 1983 . Indeed , they also discussed , and some of them accepted , the possibility of an instantaneous created will . See Ockham's Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus, q . 3 , ed. P . Boehner (St. Bonaventure , N . Y . : The Franciscan Institute , 1945 ) . From a strictly philosophical point o f view my remarks concerning the notion o f non­ instantiability and its relation to the other features are insufficient. My excuses for not expanding them are ( 1 ) a desire for brevity , (2) the fact that no author of the ones to be discussed here explored this issue in sufficient depth , and (3) the introductory and hence limited aim of this chapter. As stated in the Preface , my aim is not to defend a point of view but to develop parameters within which medieval views may become philosophically intelligible. Like many Aristotelian formulae, this one is recorded in the writings of Aristotle's followers but not in his own . The terms 'realism' and 'nominalism' have been used so differently in the history of philosophy that they help little to clarify anything . It is for this reason that I have tried to avoid them as much as possible . The few times in which they will be used in this work , I shall stick to my understanding of them in this section . I believe , moreover, that the way of understanding them presented here is the most consonant with the medieval tradition . Some contemporary definitions of these terms, such as that of Bergmann , would create considerable confusion if used to discuss medieval views . Bergmann 's definition of a realistic ontology , in Logic . . . , p. 133 , is as follows: An ontology is realistic "if and only if its individuals and its universals are both things and there are only two fundamental ontological differences between them; one , the obvious one ; the other, that individuals are only numerically different (bare ) " . Armstrong, however, has given definitions more concordant with the medieval tradition in Nominalism and Realism, vol . 1 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1978) , p. 12. In the Middle Ages only rarely do we find this view. Among those who may be credited with it are John Eriugena , as we shall see later. Formulated in this way , this view is close to that of Duns Scotus. See Opusoxoniense II. d . 3, q. 1 . This is very close to the Thomistic view. For Thomas . however, the nature can also have the being and unity proper to universals , i. e. concepts. See On Being and Essence, ch . 3 . This i s the sort o f view that P. F. Strawson holds in Individuals (New York : Doubleday , 1 963) , p. 2 . Versions of it are widespread in contemporary circles . But there is one qualification that must be made : many of those who accept this view nowadays regard it as being part of what Strawson has called "descriptive metaphysics'' , that is , a description of the way we think about the world , not of the way the world is in itself. In that respect the view of many contemporary philosophers differs drastically from that of most medieval authors . The latter, adapting Strawson 's own words to our purposes, were "revisionists" , since they were attempting to describe the way things are and consequently were engaged in many ways in changing the way we think about them. It must be remembered that there are two types of natures : substantial (generic or specific)

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and accidental . Moreover, the nature can be considered as a whole (for example , man) , or as a part (for example , Peter's humanity). The status of all of these was discussed at length in the Middle Ages . But since this concerns more the problem of universals than the problem of individuality , I shall not discuss these issues here . 38 Again , for reasons of convenience , the examples used here are taken from substances , but it should be kept in mind that for many philosophers individuality extends also to properties and accidents as well as other things . In those cases the individuals in question also have natures . 39 In the latter part of the Middle Ages , William of Ockham seems to have adhered to this point of view . See the Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 6. 40 Some hold , however , that there is a real distinction between the individual and/or its individuality on the one hand and the nature on the other even if the nature is not real . For in order to have a real distinction it is sufficient that one of the distinct entities ( or distinguishing features) be real . This is Suarez's view in Disputation V. See my Suarez . . . , pp . 9 ff. 41 For Duns Scotus it is a formal distinction , for example, while for others it is real. See Opus oxoniense II, d . 3 , q . 6. 42 For present purposes , the distinction between property and accident is not important and , therefore , will be ignored. Properties , j ust like accidents , characterize substance and are , consequently , individuated in the same way . 43 Things like a gallon of water and a table are not regarded by many philosophers as substances in the strict sense of the term , since they both seem to be the result of human action and the second is homogeneous . However, since they are certainly not accidents or properties of substances and they are generally treated as individuals of some sort in the literature , we will regard them as substances for our present purposes . 44 The expression , 'principle of the identity of indiscernibiles' , is a misnomer because it suggests an epistemological principle , while the principle is frequently formulated as a metaphysical one . The classical formulation of the principle is found in Leibniz , who states it in various ways : " . . . it is not true that two substances may be exactly alike and differ only numerically" (Discourse on Metaphysics, trans . G. R. Montgomery , LaSalle , 1968 , s. 9, p. 14 and Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt , (Berlin : 1875-1 890) ; rep . Hildesheim , 1965 , vol. IV , p. 433) and '' . . . there is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from each other" (Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. L. E. Loemker, Dordrecht , 1969 , p. 687 and Die Philosophischen . . . , vol . VII, p. 372) . Others , such as B . Russell (A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London : Allen and Unwin , 197 1 , pp. 55 ff. ) and N. Rescher (Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy, Oxford : Basil Blackwell , 1 979 , p. 5 1 ) claim the principle or its foundation to be purely logical . L. B. McCullough has recently argued that in Leibniz the principle is both metaphysical and epistemological (''Leibniz and Traditional Philosophy" , Studia Leibnitiana 10, 2 ( 1978) , 269) . See also A. J . Ayer, "The Identity of Indiscernibles" , in Philosophical Essays (New York: Macmillan , 1954) , pp. 26 ff. 45 This applies only to what might be called a pure bundle theory. If modifications are introduced in it , for example in the tie represented by the function of the copula , then the theory may still be able to account for the distinction between a universal , a bundle of universals, and a complex universal . But then, of course , it would be a different , and more complicated theory and , therefore , one in which individuation is not due to or expressed by only the bundle . One such recent modification of the theory has been proposed by Kenneth Barber in "On Representing Numerical Difference " , South western Journal of Philosophy 1 O ( 1979) , 93--103. He argues that "numerical difference is grounded in the instantiations of such [i. e. substances] kinds and that instantiation is handled by the tie . . . " . 46 Some, i n order t o avoid this and other difficulties , reject the universality o f the members of

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the bundle , claiming that the bundle is individual because its members are . But then one must answer first the question of what makes the members of the bundle individual. D. C. Williams has developed this sort of bundle theory in "The Elements of Being" , Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953) , pp . 3-18 and 17 1-192. Nevertheless, the version of the view which holds that spatio-temporal relations ( external) constitute the primary individuator has had wide appeal among contemporary writers . See , for example , J . W. Mei land , "Do Relations Individuate? " , Philosophical Studies 1 7 ( 1 966) , 65--69. V. C. Chappell has also defended a relational view o f individuation i n "Particulars Re-Clothed" , Philosophical Studies 1 5 ( 1 964) , 60--64 . Herbert Hochberg, in "Moore and Russell on Particulars , Relations and Identity" , (in E. D. Klemke , ed. , Studies in the Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Chicago : Quandrangle Books , 1969) propounds as well a relational theory . For a recent and quite interesting criticism of this sort of position , see A . Quinton , The Nature of Things (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul . 1 973) , pp. 1 7 ff. Quinton's point, briefly stated , is that any description of an individual in terms of positional predicates includes singular terms and therefore is not fully determinate as it should be if position were to be the primary individuator. Other authors interpret individuality as dependent on identity through time and thus point to spatio-temporal location as a necessary condition of individuality if not as a sufficient condition of it . For an approach of this sort see Hans Reichenbach , Space and Time, trans. M . Reichenbach and J . Freund (New York : Dover, 1958) , p. 142. We shall see in ch . 4 that Abailard uses a version of this obj ection against one of the realist views he examines . The view that thoughts are in time is much more plausible than that they are in space . Expressions such as "What are you thinking about now?" and ''Were you thinking about her yesterday?" point this out. Peter King brought this point to my attention . This is the sort of problem that arises in Thomas Aquinas' ontology. For him , the principle of individuation is designated matter (i . e . , matter and quantity or dimensions) . Therefore , spiritual beings who lack matter and quantity must be individuated in another way, even if they are differentiated from other beings in virtue of their species . The point is that a specific difference , which is formal , cannot account for non-instantiability , let alone numerical distinction . This view is popular with contemporary interpreters of Aristotle . See , for example , Lukasiewicz, Anscombe and Popper, all of whom accept it in the symposium "The Principle of Individuation" , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume for 1953 , and , more recently , A. C. Lloyd in his article "Aristotle's Principle of Individuation" , Mind 79 ( 1 970) , 5 19-529 . W. Charlton has tried to cast doubt on the assignation of this view to Aristotle in '· Aristotle and the Principle of Individuation" , Phronesis 1 7 ( 1 972) , 239-249 . His approach , unfortunately, fails to distinguish between the metaphysical , epistemic and logical issues of the problem . Anscombe's article has had a very wide circulation . It was reprinted in the recent collection Articles on Aristotle, ed. J . Barnes et al. , vol . III (London : Duckworth , 1979 ) . See also "Aristotle : The Search for Substance" , in Three Philosophers, coauthored with P. T. Geach (Ithaca : Cornell Un iversity Press , 1961 ) , p. 55 . According to Suarez, this is the difficulty that led Thomas and/or Thomists to add dimensions to matter. In this way they could still preserve a material theory of individuation . See my book, Suarez . . . , p. 78 . Duns Scotus was one of the first who pointed to the common character of matter as a difficulty for a theory of material individuation . See Ordinatio II , dist. 3, q. 5. Thomas seems to have held both versions of this view. In the Commentary on Boethius ' 'De Trinitate ', q. 4, a. 2 (in Decker, pp . 142-1 43) , he held the dimensions to be indeterminate , but in De ente et essentia, ch . 2, he regarded the dimensions to be determinate (in Roland-Gosselin, Paris: J. Vrin, 1 948 , p. 1 1 ) .

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This is the sort of criticism used by Suarez. See my Suarez . . . , pp . 8 1 ff. This is the case only if the view holds that matter is the sole individuator as we saw earlier. 55 This view has traditionally been identified as that of Averroes . Some also hold it to be Aristotle's. See the articles by Charlton and Lloyd cited above. For the assignation of the view to Averroes, see my Suarez . . . , p. 1 05 . Others have argued that it is Thomas Aquinas' view in spite of Thomas' repeated insistence that the principle of individuation is designated matter. Their claim is based on a text of Thomas' De anima, q. 1 , ad 2, where he says that in all things being and individuation are due to the same. Now , since it is well known that he accepted that being comes through form , the proponents of this interpretation argue , individuation must also come through form . See J . H . Robb's ed . (Toronto: PIMS , 1 968) , p . 61 . 56 Recently , there has been an effort among proponents of this sort of view to find what might be characterized as empirical bases for the principle . Bergmann, for example , claims that one is acquainted and/or presented with these individuators , which he calls "bare particulars". See Logic . . . , p. 288. More traditional views such as that ofDuns Scotus did not have this empirical twist . See next note . 57 See Gustav Bergmann , The Metaphysics ofPositivism (London: Longmans Green , 1954) , pp . 1 97 ff. and passim, and Logic and Reality, ed. cit. , pp. 1 33 and 3 1 8 ff. , and E . B . Allaire , "Bare Particulars" , pp . 1-8 . In the later Middle Ages , the Scotist notion of haecceitas may have had a similar function to that of the bare particular ; see Opus oxoniense II, dist . 3 , q . 6. 58 There have been a number of contemporary critics who follow this or a similar line of reasoning (see Loux, ed. , Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology, New York : Doubleday, 1 970, p . 1 93) . But the same approach is found among critics of Scotus' haecceitas in the Middle Ages as well . See my Suarez . . . , pp. 45 and 1 39 . For a different sort of criticism see Wilfred Sellars , Science, Perception and Reality (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1 966) , pp . 282 ff. 59 The doctrine and example belong to Thomas Aquinas (De ente et essentia, ch . 4) , but he never identified existence as a principle of individuation . In my article cited above , "Numerical Continuity in Material Substances . . . " , I argue that within a Thomistic framework existence must be the principle of identity, but I distinguish that from the principle of individuation . 60 One may want to argue that non-existing obj ects are not individual and , therefore , that this difficulty does not constitute a serious obj ection against this view . On the other hand , the fact that non-existing obj ects do not seem to be universal either, i. e. are not subj ect to multiple instantiation , creates some problems for those who would want to follow this course . For , what would possible obj ects be if they were neither individual nor universal? In the face of these problems it seems better to adopt the traditional view which holds them to be non-existing individuals. All the same , it should be clear that this obj ection is not beyond question and, therefore , that the view of existential individuation may very well have a way out if assailed only on these grounds. Moreover, one may also want to point out that non­ existing obj ects are of two sorts : possible obj ects and impossible obj ects . The latter are clearly non-individual , but the former are individual and individuated by their mode of existence as possibles . This is, of course , a very controversial issue . I bring it up only to make sure that the theory of existential individuation is not dismissed summarily . It has all sorts of ways of addressing this obj ection . 6 1 One may also want to dispute this last point on two grounds . First , one might point out that there is no reason why the obj ect should have two existences and not j ust one . The answer to that is that it seems obvious that if A ceases to exist at t 1 and begins to exist again at t2 , its existence prior to t 1 is different from its existence after t 7- • The burden uf proof, then , rests on those who claim they are the same . Second , one might want to say that the obj ection is based on a confusion between individuality and identity , for even though the individual in 54

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question would not be the same before it ceased to exist and after it began to exist again , there is no reason why it should not be individual . And so , one could argue, this objection does not count against existence being a principle of individuation but only against it being a principle of identity or continuity . For medieval discussions of this view see my Suarez . . . , pp . 1 1 3 ff; also Scotus, Ordinatio II , d . 3 , q . e ; and Wiggins , op. cit. , p. 91 . This view seems to be restricted to a few medieval authors . To my knowledge no contemporary philosophers adhere to it . See my Suarez . . . , p. 76. This is not an exhaustive discussion of all the views on this issue . Many contemporaries , who use a logical rather than a metaphysical or epistemological (the issue of discernibility discussed next) approach to this issue have come up with other views. See , for example , N . L. Wilson , "Space , Time and Individuals" , Journal of Philosophy 52 ( 1 955 ) , 589-598. This view , also called the ''Qualified Particular Theory" , has been defended , among others, by D. C. Long , in "Particulars and Their Qualities" , Philosophical Quarterly 18 ( 1 968) , in M. Loux, Universals . . . , pp . 264-284 , and by A. Quinton , op. cit. , pp . 28 ff. The view should not be considered only as a view of the individuation of accidents . It is also a view about the individuation of substances. As such it is a modified version of the bundle view as Quinton points out . This is the sort of obj ection used by Suarez against this view. See my Suarez . . . , pp . 1 40 and 142. The best known exponent of this view in contemporary philosophy was G. F. Stout. See , for example , his "The Nature of Universals and Propositions" , Proceedings of the British Academy 1 0 ( 1 92 1 ) , reprinted in his Studies in Philosophy and Psychology (London , 1936) , pp . 384-403 , and his response to G . E . Moore's criticisms in "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular? " , Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, Suppl . vol. 3 ( 1 923) , 1 14-1 22 . For a more recent criticism see Bergmann , Logic . . . . p. 282 . One may still want to argue , as Michael Cantwell pointed out to me , that in a bundle theory accidents and/or properties would of necessity be part of a bundle , and therefore that it would not do to say that they "could be" part of some other bundle . In such a case , the relation of an accident and/or property to the other accidents and/or properties of the bundle is not extrinsic but intrinsic. To argue otherwise would be to beg the question . The answer to this is twofold : first , bundle theories do not as a rule accept the individuality of properties and/or accidents , but only of clusters or bundles . Therefore , they do not need to account for the individuality of properties and/or accidents. Second , in cases where they do , then it is clear the objection raised here is not applicable . However, in such a case all features are to be considered essential to the individual , that is , all members of the bundle must be taken as indispensible . Moreover, although this view might be able to explain the "uniqueness'' of a feature in terms of the uniqueness of the bundle of which it is a part . the position would be hard pressed to explain its non-instantiability in those terms . In short , bundle theories , like so many others , may do a fair job of accounting for uniqueness or difference but they fail miserably when it comes to the fundamental feature of individuality , i. e . non-instantiability . There are also other entities which prima facie do not seem to fall into any of these categories , such as documents , novels , etc . The problem they pose , however , is of classification within an ontology , not a problem of individuation as such . For this reason , and also because medievals were not particularly concerned about the m , I have ignored them here . P . F. Strawson , who has written one of the most important contemporary discussions of this issue , formulates it in terms of "identification" (Individuals, pp. 2 ff. ) . Bertrand Russell uses an epistemic approach to individuation in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1948) , pp . 292 ff. Both of these issues are different from the problem of identity or sameness through time .

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The problem of sameness concerns the identification of an individual at various times . How do we know , for example , that the man who was a teacher of Plato is the same man who drank the hemlock? This is an epistemic dimension of the problem . The metaphysical dimension would investigate the cause or principle of such identity . These problems are related to the problem of individuality but not equivalent to it. See my article , ''Numerical Continuity . . . " , pp. 73-92 . See , for example , D . C. Long, "Particulars and Their Qualities" , p. 275 . A. J . Ayer, for example , in the work cited earlier. This is a more appropriate way of formulating this principle than the one mentioned earlier. For further discussion of this see the last chapter. Again, as with the problem of individuation , the distinction between accidents and properties does not make much difference here . This is the sort of view defended by Strawson , Individuals, pp. 10 ff. Another well known obj ection is that in order to know the location of something, it would be necessary to know the location of everything else in the universe . But there are many ways to answer this obj ection . The objection is more serious , however, if one is dealing with the issue concerned with the principle of individuation and not with discernibility. See Bertrand Russell , "The World of Universals" , in The Problems of Philosophy, rep . in Loux's Universals . . . , p. 2 1 . It should be clear that linguistics here is not to be understood as the science that studies various natural languages , but as a part of logic concerned with the study of language apart from any natural languages. It is not , therefore , an empirical pursuit. In Human Knowledge, pp. 84 ff. This is the sort of view that is usually associated with John Stuart Mill in A System ofLogic (proper names denote but do not connote) and more recently with Russell in ''The Philosophy of Logical Atomism " , in Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (London , 1956) , pp . 20�201 , and with Wittgenstein's views in the Tractatus, even though Kripke has recently tried to show that Russell holds j ust the opposite view . See ''Naming and Necessity" , in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds . ) , Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht-Holland : Reidel , 1 972) , p . 343 , n . 4. Elsewhere Kripke defends the part of the theory that has to do with proper names in the same article (see p. 327). Another example that is commonly found in the literature is "The Evening Star is the Morning Star" . But this example is problematic, for it is not clear that the terms 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star' do not constitute definite descriptions. It has been argued by some , for example , J . Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions" , The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol . 5-6 (London: Macmillan, 1967) , that it is this example that may have led Frege to think proper names have sense . See , "Sense and Reference" , in P . T. Geach and Max Black , eds . , Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford , 1 952) . Again , this view has been challenged by many. For example , Quine in "On What There is" , Review of Metaphysics 2 ( 1 948) , rep . in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge , Mass : Harvard , 1953) , and elsewhere .

Chapter II Formulation of the Issues : Boethius

Boethius' statement of intent in the second edition of his Commentary to Porphyry's "Jsagoge " is well known: The reason for the present undertaking is that in these writings , in which knowledge of things is sought , there must be expressed , not a charm of translucent style but the uncorrupted truth . It seems to me that I shall have accomplished a great deal to this end if books of philosophy should be composed in the Latin language by painstaking and complete translation , until nothing more were missing from the literature of the Greeks. 2

Boethius did not succeed in translating all the philosophical literature of the Greeks into Latin, but the little he translated and discussed in his works became the basis of all philosophical and most theological speculation in the West until the arrival of the n_ew translations in the middle of the twelfth century . 3 Even beyond this period, his influence can be clearly seen in such important thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. It is only in very late scholasticism that references to his name and works begin to disappear from logical and metaphysical treatises. 4 The texts translated by Boethius and the way he interpreted them, therefore, played a very important historical role in the development of philosophical ideas in the Middle Ages. In most instances his influence was beneficial - he opened up horizons for the medieval thinker, introducing him to subtle philosophical issues such as the problem of universals, paronymy and, as we shall see shortly, individuality . 5 But sometimes this beneficial effect was marred by misunderstandings and confusions, which were the result of several factors such as Boethius' own conflicting statements, the nature and number of texts he translated and discussed, or the availability of only limited and fragmentary sources to later writers. The very phrases and formulae Boethius used, whether precise or ambiguous, felicitous or infelicitous, became entrenched in the literature in a way that even those who disagreed with them found it difficult to discard or even modify them. This is particularly true with individuality. 6 All medieval discussions of this notion before the thirteenth century depend to a large extent on Boethius, and even after this period the views of thinkers as important as Thomas Aquinas were determined to some degree by Boethius' formulation of some of the 65

problems surrounding it and by the terminology he used. 7 It is , therefore , most important to begin an introduction to the problem of individuality in the Middle Ages with an analysis of what Boethius said about it . I propose to begin with an examination of Boethius' view of individuality and with a tentative evaluation of its weaknesses and strengths. There are six basic sources for Boethius' views : his two editions of the Commentary on Porphyry 's "/sagoge ", the Commentary on the "Categories", the two editions of the Commentary on "De interpretatione", and the theological tractate commonly known as De Trinitate. 8 There are also occasional relevant comments in other works, particularly in Contra Eutychen, but they usually repeat in sketchy form what is already found in the mentioned works. Owing to the homogenous nature of the two editions of each of the Commentaries on the "/sagoge " and "De interpretatione", these Commentaries are best treated as two rather than four sources. The Commentary on the "Categories" and the treatise De Trinitate present problems of their own and , therefore , must be dealt with separately. None of these six works contains a systematic treatment of individuality. Indeed, the key passages from De Trinitate do not even record the term 'individual' or its derivatives , as we shall see later. The comments pertinent to our discussion are scattered throughout the texts and contain little to suggest that Boethius had a systematic and comprehensive theory of individuality. Nonetheless, because of the historical importance of Boethius' remarks and the various interpretations to which they were subsequently subjected, it is indispensable to attempt on their basis a limited reconstruction of Boethius' position. From a philosophical standpoint , Boethius' three Commentaries are the most interesting texts for a reconstruction of his view of individuality. Nevertheless , from a historical perspective their importance is not so great , since their influence seems to have been less and to have waned earlier than that of De Trinitate.9 This was no doubt a result of the theological emphasis of the age. Although logic, the subject matter of the Commentaries, was of concern to medievals , theology and particularly issues related to the nature of God, were much more important to them. It was De Trinitate, therefore, that received most of their attention. 1 0 Moreover , the Commentaries pose some problems of interpretation emanating from their literary genre, since it is not easy to separate the commentator's opinions from those of the author. In the case of Boethius , this problem is aggravated by the attitude he adopts when commenting on a text , which inclines him to adopt the opinion of the author even if it goes contrary to his own. 1 1 I t is, therefore , quite difficult to be absolutely certain about what Boethius held with respect to individuality or any other philosophical notion on the basis of an analysis

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of his Commentaries alone . The best we can do is contrast what he says with the text on which he comments and see if there are noticeable differences. For this reason we must begin by saying something about Porphyry's statements on individuality in the /sagoge, and later on about Aristotle's text in the Categories and in De interpretatione.

I. Porphyry's View in the lsagoge Porphyry says little about individuality in thelsagoge. 1 2 Although he uses the terms 'individual' (choµov) , 'singular' (to xa8 Ixab·rov) , and 'particular' (to xm;a µEgo�) a number of times throughout the treatise , there are only three texts which tell us, either explicitly or by i'mplication, something about what an individual is. 1 3 The first text reads: For of those which are predicated , some are said of only one , as individuals like 'Socrates' , and 'this' , and 'that' , but others of m any [ such as the genus] . . . 14

The same formula is repeated elsewhere. The second text is found later. It reads: The highest genus is predicated of all the subordinate genera, species , and individuals ; the genus prior to the lowest species of all the lowest species and individuals ; the species alone of all individuals ; but the individual of one only of the particulars . Socrates , this white , and this [one] approaching , for example the son of Sophroniscus, if Socrates be his only son , are called individual . . . Such [things] are called individuals because each [ thing] is composed of a collection of properties which can never be the same for another; for the properties of Socrates could not be the same for any other particular [man] . 15

The third text does not use the term 'individual ' , but is clearly dealing with the same subj ect matter: . . . particulars [ and singulars] , on the other hand , [ divide what is] one into a multitude . . . ; for what is singular is always divisive . . . 1 6

In none of these three texts is Porphyry concerned with the elucidation of individuality as such. The first is used to clarify what a genus is by contrasting it with the individual : the genus is predicable of many , the individual of only one. The second is used to clarify what a species is by contrasting it with the genus and the individual: the genus is predicable of species and individuals, the species of individuals, and the individual of only one. For example, "animal '' (genus) is predicable of man (species) 67

and Socrates (individual); "man" is predicable of Socrates; but "Socrates" is predicable only of Socrates . That we find out something about individuality in this text is incidental. For, clearly, Porphyry does not think about this notion as requiring separate analysis , at least at this point. Moreov.er, in the third text he clarifies only the notion of singularity. It is interpreted as fundamentally divisive. Whether this divisiveness is a feature to be associated with individuality as well, or whether it is only to be associated with singularity , and, as the text perhaps suggests, particularity, we are not told. If it is , then it is clearly a view of individuality which associates it with what was called in the first chapter "division". The first two texts seem to lend support to his interpretation. More important than this, however, is that in spite of their brevity, Porphyry's texts suggest two basic approaches to individuality which take on great importance for Boethius and his early medieval readers , although it is not at all clear whether Porphyry, being aware of them as distinct possibilities, decided to ignore them or whether he simply was unaware of the distinction. The first approach might be called "logical". According to it the individual is to be interpreted basically as a term which is used in connection with, "predicated of" in Porphyry's language , only one thing. The bases for this approach to individuality can be found in the first text cited and in the first part of the second text. Both places refer to "predications". The second part of the second text, however, lends itself to a different interpretation. It can be read as proposing a metaphysical view which identifies an individual with a composite made up of a unique collection of characteristics (he calls them "properties'') , and therefore different from everything else. Obviously, a term cannot be made Up of a collection of characteristics. So when Porphyry says that "such things" as Socrates "are called individual because each thing is composed of a collection of properties" , he can be taken to be speaking not of a term but of a thing, a being, and therefore as moving from a logical notion of individuality to a metaphysical one. The distinction between the logical and metaphysical approaches to individuality is not clearly drawn or maintained in the text , however. And one should keep in mind that at this time it was not unusual to talk about "things being predicated of other things" , and not just , as some of us would like to say today, of "terms being predicated of other terms". 1 7 This lends credence to the belief that Porphyry did not differentiate , or at least not well , between these two approaches; or that , if he did , he thought it made little difference which one was adopted . The fact is , however , that , as we saw in the introductory chapter and will see in subsequent chapters , the approach used to individuality makes considerable difference when one aims to provide a coherent and comprehensive view of it. Moreover,

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the lack of proper distinction between these two approaches tends to obscure the various issues surrounding individuality and impede progress towards their satisfactory solution. There is still another important difficulty which arises from Porphyry's text. As put by him "things are called individuals because each [ thing] is composed of a collection . . . ". His use of the expression 'are called' here would suggest that Porphyry is offering a solution to what I called in the introductory chapter "the issue of individual discernibility", i. e. how we distinguish an individual from other individuals. Yet when he adds later that "the properties of Socrates could not be the same for any other particular [man]" he seems to be making a much stronger claim, namely, that individuals are such because they have a unique set of characteristics. 1 8 Here again there seems to be an ambiguity, but this time the ambiguity is between an epistemic issue related to our knowledge of individuals and a metaphysical issue related to the structure of individuals. Moreover, it is not clear whether this lack of distinction between the epistemic and ontological dimensions of the problem of individuation ( discernibility vs. individuation) is a matter of choice or just of inattention. The fact that most neo-Platonists seem to follow this pattern, as we shall see later, indicates perhaps th�t this is more a matter of choice than of inattention. We shall return to this later, in Chapter III. As we shall see immediately, Boethius does not go much farther than Porphyry in the clarification of the notion of individuality and the issues surrounding it in spite of the increased attention he pays to it. More specifically, as far as I have been able to determine, he does not clarify the distinction between (1) the logical and metaphysical views of individuality and (2) the epistemological and metaphysical issues involved in it. In terms of the framework developed in the introductory chapter we can summarize Porphyry's position in the /sagoge as follows: 1. Intension of individuality He points to two features: predicability of only one and division of the species. The latter, however, is given as a feature of singulars rather than individuals. Singularity, individuality and particularity seem to be regarded as equivalent. Moreover, Porphyry makes no effort to relate, explain or distinguish impredicability of many and division. And from what he says about "things being called individuals because each is composed of a collection of properties which can never be the same for another" one may infer that individuality has to do as well with distinction or difference from others.

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2. Extension ofindividuality The examples of individuals Porphyry gives in the cited texts are: Socrates , this white, and this approaching son of Sophroniscus. 1 9 He also says that the properties of Socrates "could not be the same for any other particular [man]". This suggests that substances as well as their properties and accidents can be individual, although this is by no means explicit. Moreover it is not clear whether all or just some substances , properties and accidents can be individual , and whether their individuality differs somehow due to their different ontological status. 3. Ontological status ofindividuality This is not discussed. 4. Principle or cause ofindividuation Porphyry's text in which he states that "things are called individuals because each is composed of a collection of properties which can never be the same for another" could be interpreted as suggesting that the cause or principle of individuation is the collection of characteristics belonging to the individual. We are not told, however, (a) whether this refers to all the characteristics of a thing or just a subset of the complete set, (b) whether some characteristics within the group are more important than others for this purpose, or (c) whether the characteristics themselves are individual or it is just the set that is so. 5. Discernibility ofindividuals The fact that Porphyry uses the term 'are called' to introduce what was tentatively interpreted in (4) as the principle or cause of individuation might suggest , on the other hand, that he is discussing the principle or cause of discernibility and not the principle or cause of individuation. In this case what we have is a theory of discernibility and not of individuation, although the theory presents the same basic features. 6. Function ofproper names and indexicals Porphyry says nothing of importance about this issue in the Isagoge. II. Boethius' View in the Commentary on Porphyry's "lsagoge" A . First Edition In the first edition of Boethius' Commentary on the "/sagoge" we find only three important texts which deal with individuality : 70

But since individuals are singly under species , we call individuals those [things] which cannot be divided into species or into some other parts . Examples [ of individuals] are Cato or Plato or Cicero or whatever belongs to singular men . . . we cannot distribute a singular man such as Cicero into any other [men] , and therefore it is called atomon, that is, individual . 20

And later he adds: Individuals , since they have nothing under them in which they could be cut up and distributed , are predicated of nothing other, except of themselves. They are singular and one . 2 1

Finally, at the end of the first book of the Commentary he writes: The nature of individuals is this , that the properties of individuals exist only in each individual and are transferred to no others and therefore are not predicated of any others . For [ what is] a property of Cicero , of whatever sort , is never to be found in Cato , or B rutus or Catulus . But the properties of man , which are the same as rational , mortal , sensible , capable of laughter, can be found in many and in all and each individual . For every man is singly individual and rational , mortal , sensible and capable oflaughter. And , therefore , those [things] whose properties can agree with another can be predicated of others . But the [things] ·whose properties do not agree with others , except singularly, cannot be predicated singularly of others beyond themselves . It must be repeated therefore that every individual is contained in the species . . . the individual , however, is always a part , never a whole . The species, however, is correctly called both a part and a whole , for it is a part with respect to the genus [ and] a whole with respect to individuals ; for it divides the genus . . . and collects individuals. 22

These texts contain at least three different views of individuality. In the first text individuality is identified with indivisibility (a) into species or (b) into parts. An individual, Boethius states, is something which cannot be divided into species or other parts. It is not clear, however, whether the parts in question are to be interpreted as integral parts, as other individuals, or as "other parts of the same sort" , i. e. specific or generic. 23 If one adopts the first interpretation, then the conception of individuality proposed in this text appears defective, for on the one hand it could very well be argued that universals are indivisible in just this way. Take, for example, the universal "man". "Man" is not divisible into species, since it is itself a species, or into parts, since men are certainly not parts of man. On the other hand, it could also be objected, that there are some individuals, for example, Socrates, which although not divisible into species are at least divisible into parts - the head, arms, etc. - and yet are no less individual because of that. Moreover, the kind of indivisibility involved in what Boethius says is not clear. For the term ·parts' is an

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ambiguous term which could refer to physical parts ( an arm or leg), or to metaphysical parts (matter, form), or to logical parts ( different ways of thinking about the same thing, for example, Socrates as the son of Phaenerete or as the husband of Xanthippe). The reference to species and the way the sentence begins (''we call") may be interpreted as supporting the last of these three possibilities, although it could also be viewed as establishing a contrast between a logical and a physical or metaphysical division. At any rate, interpreted thus Boethius' definition of individuality is unclear. Moreover, the help we receive from the second text is limited, for there Boethius identifies individuals with "what can [not] be cut up and distributed", even though he refers to predication as well. A similar reasoning could be applied to the view if it is interpreted to hold that the indivisibility applies to individuals. For, although man is divisible into individuals, so is Socrates. The latter can be divided into cells, hairs, etc., all of which are individual. This goes to show that this interpretation of individuality as indivisibility into species and/or individuals is not adequate unless a further modification is applied, such as Boethius himself added when he pointed out in the second edition of the Commentary that the individuals in question must be of the same specific type as the original. 24 Here, however, this element is missing. Moreover, the interpretation given receives strong support from a text of the Commentary on the "Categories", where Boethius explicitly defines the individual as what is not divisible into species or other individuals. 25 If on the other hand, one adopts the third interpretation, i. e. that the parts in question are to be interpreted as generic, then the view proposed becomes much more plausible. Individuals, according to this view, "cannot be divided into species or other [generic] parts". In such a case, "man" cannot be an individual, since, although not divisible into species, it is divisible into individuals, that is, into specific parts. And Socrates can be an individual even though he is divisible into physical parts, for he is indivisible into generic or specific ones. This more favorable, interpretation seems to draw support from the latter part of the first text, where we can see that Boethius is working towards a definition of individuality which is the opposite of universality. For it is the fact that Cato, a man, cannot be distributed into other men, that makes him individual. Presumably this contrasts with the universal "man", which is divisible into men ; but this is left unstated. In addition to the understanding of individuality as a kind of indivisibility, Boethius, following one of Porphyry's formulae, adds in the second text that the individual is not predicable of any other thing but itself. To use an example: 'Socrates' is predicable of Socrates and of no other. This, as we saw with Porphyry, suggests a logical rather than a 72

physical or metaphysical understanding of the individual even though it is not clear that Porphyry , or Boethius for that matter, had such distinction in mind here. In addition, Boethius says something important as well about the extension of the notion in the first edition of the Commentary. For although his examples point only to what Aristotle called "primary substances" in the Categories, and human substances at that, he seems to indicate that "whatever belongs to them" is also individual. 26 Since what belongs to primary substances are their properties and accidents, it would seem appropriate to assume that for Boethius both primary substances, at least human ones, and their characteristics are or at least can be individual. This has to be balanced, however, with what Boethius says elsewhere about characteristics of substances and even substances themselves as not being individual. 27 Moreover, the third text cited suggests that not all characteristics of substances are individual after all. In it Boethius seems to be making a distinction between two types of characteristics that may belong to primary substances. First are those which are, in his own words, '"properties of individuals". These belong only to the individual they characterize. His example is "a property of Cicero". This seems to indicate that this sort of property is individual. Second are those which are '"properties of man", presumably generic or specific properties, and these are found in every member of the species, all of which suggests they are not individual. The examples given are rationality, mortality, sensibility and the capacity to laugh. It should be clear that 'property' as used by Boethius in this context is not a technical term referring to one of the predicables (genus, species, difference, property and accident) since rationality, for example, is not properly speaking a property, but a difference (differentia). What Boethius has in mind is more a term such as 'characteristic' or 'feature' . Further, it should be noted that, although we can readily see what the specific properties are, we cannot easily see what the properties of individuals are. From what the text says we do not know whether a property of an individual is (i) a characteristic or set of characteristics sui generis to the individual or (ii) rather a characteristic or set of characteristics which, although not sui generis to the individual, happens to belong only to it. But this is clarified in the second edition of the Commentary, as we shall see. What seems fairly clear is that if the property of an individual does not include specific and generic features, then it must be accidental. This, as will become evident immediately , is consistent with what Boethius says elsewhere. It is also clear, as stated earlier, that not all the characteristics of a substance are individual. The third view of individuality is present in the third text. There Boethius identifies the nature of individuals with the non-transferability of their properties into others. This, moreover, is given as the reason of 73

their impredicability of many. Impredicability, 28 then, is still conceived as involved in individuality, but only as a result of a more fundamental feature: the non-transferability of the properties of individuals. The understanding of individuality as non-transferability is clearly metaphysical in contrast with the understanding of individuality as impredicability of many, which can be, depending on the approach, logical and/or metaphysical as we saw earlier. That Boethius finds the root of impredicability in non-transferability seems to suggest that he saw the first as a logical feature resulting from a metaphysical one. If this is so, he was following a well accepted principle in ancient philosophy: thought follows being. The discussion is too sketchy, however, to be sure how much Boethius had worked this out. The second edition of the Commentary restates some of these points, but it is not until we get to the second edition of the Commentary on "De interpretatione" that we find a clear statement of this view of individuality. There, as we shall see, he uses the term 'incommunicability' , which was going to become popular in the thirteenth century and after. 29 B. Second Edition

These points are developed further in the more extensive second edition of the Commentary on the "/sagoge". In the first place , Boethius presents his view of individuality more clearly, although not all ambiguities are resolved. And secondly, he adds what may be interpreted as a theory concerning the principle of individuation of substances and another one for accidents. The notion of individuality is explained first in the following way: Individual is said in many ways : That is said [ to be] individual which cannot be cut up in any way , for example , unity or mind ; that is said [to be] individual which cannot be divided because of [its] solidity , for example , a diamond ; that is said [to be] individual which cannot be predicated of other things [specifically] similar [ to itself] , for example , Socrates . 30

Here we have three different ways of understanding individuality. The first is metaphysical , the second, physical, and the third, logical. The individuality of unity or of mind cannot be physical , for neither of them is a physical thing. For Boethius mind was spiritual and unity was a metaphysical feature of all being . 3 1 In a well known text from De Trinitate he points out that there are two kinds of number and consequently of unity. 32 One is the number with which we count ; the other is the number which is found in things. The latter number is a reality; the first is not. For 74

the repetition of the first type of unity produces a plurality of things, but that of the second does not. One sword, for example, may also have one blade and one brand and, therefore, it may be three in concept, but in reality it is just one. That unity is the one that, according to Boethius, is not subject to division. The individuality of diamonds, on the other hand, is clearly physical. Moreover, their indivisibility is due precisely to their physical features such as their solidity, as Boethius points out. Finally, the third type of individuality seems to be logical, for it belongs to those things which are not predicable of other things specifically similar to themselves - 'Socrates' of other men. 33 It should be noted that, although Boethius distinguishes these three ways of understanding individuality, he does not classify them as metaphysical, physical and logical, as has been done here. Nor does he seem to preserve the distinction he makes throughout the text, thus contributing to the confusion surrounding this issue in subsequent centuries. Indeed, as in the case of the problem of universals, so likewise with individuality, Boethius seems to have had no qualms about mixing freely what many philosophers today would consider separate metaphysical, physical and logical issues. 34 It is not until the thirteenth century that a clear change of attitude with respect .to this develops in the Middle Ages. 35 Both the metaphysical and physical views of individuality have to do with indivisibility; the logical view with impredicability. Elsewhere, in the Commentary, however, Boethius follows Porphyry and points to the dividing and disgregative character of all individuals, although he does not identify this new feature as a sufficient condition of individuality. 36 The ambiguity between the metaphysical and logical understandings of individuality is perpetuated throughout the Commentary. For example, in the following text: For individuals are predicated of singulars , as Socrates and Plato . And those [things ] are individual to the highest degree which fall under the pointing and indication of a finger , as this bench [ and] this [one] approaching , and those which are designated by some noted accidental peculiarity , as if someone wishes to pick , out Socrates he does not say "Socrates, lest there be another who perhaps is called by this name , but he says "the son of Sophroniscus" , provided Sophroniscus had only one [son] . For individuals can be pointed out most of all if either, leaving the name unmentioned, they are pointed out to the eye or shown by touch or signified by some accident or proper name , if such a name is applied only to it or if he is the only son of some parents , or if [his ] singularity is indicated by any other accident, when these accidents have only one predication and their saying is not transferred to another [thing] , as [is the case] indeed with the genus to the species and the species to individuals. 3 7

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The first sentence of the text refers to individuals as "being predicated" of singulars, something which could be taken to imply a logical approach. But from then on the passage seems to refer to things and their features, except that toward the end of the text what is said to be "non­ transferable" is not the properties or accidents of individuals, as we had in the first edition of the Commentary, but the saying, i. e. the predication, of these properties and accidents. The metaphysical and logical approaches to individuality, therefore, are not clearly distinguished. This passage, however, adds two important dimensions to the discussion. For in it Boethius appears to be concerned first with the discernibility of individuals and, second, with the function of proper names and definite descriptions. That he is concerned with discernibility is suggested when he points out that "individuals can be pointed out most of all" in cases where they are pointed out or indicated by reference to a proper name or some unique accident they have. This by itself, however, does not indicate that he is consciously raising a new issue. He may just be mixing the metaphysical dimension of the problem of individuality (individuation) with its epistemological dimension (discernibility) , since at the beginning of the text he refers not to the individuals "standing out" but about them "being individual": "Those [things] are individual to the highest degree which ... " Related to this issue of discernibility is the second, concerned with the function of proper names and definite descriptions. For he indicates that proper names, such as 'Socrates' , do not function appropriately as indexicals unless they are applied to one and only one individual. He finds less trouble with expressions such as 'the son of Sophroniscus', which are currently called definite descriptions, although even here some qualification is necessary since Sophroniscus could have other sons. If that were the case , then some other method has to be used , such as pointing , touching , or making reference to a unique feature not shared by others. This, of course, shows only that Boethius was aware of some problems related to reference, but it does not indicate whether he had a view of the matter. Elsewhere the same ambiguity between the problems of individuation and discernibility is repeated: ... and concerning those which are individual under it [i. e. the species] . . . he infers [ i . e. Porphyry] the distinction from the genus on the bases of the diversity of difference and of accident.38

Is this to be taken as saying that accidents are the principle or cause of individuation? Or are we to interpret them as the principle or cause of the inference? In the first case we have a theory of individuation, in the second only of individual discernibility. The text is not conclusive.

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A different text seems to be concerned with the metaphysical issue. But this time the solution to it is not clear. [What is a] property of individuals is common to none. For [ what was] a property of Socrates , - if he had been bald, snubnosed, had a protruding belly , and other bodily features , or customs, or a [peculiar] way of speaking - was not found in another. For these properties which happened to him accidentally and formed his shape and figure, were found in no other. But that whose properties are found in no other will have properties common to none. And that whose property is common to none, has nothing which participates in its property . But what is such that none participates in its property cannot be divided into those [things] which do not participate [in it] . Therefore, these whose property is not found in another are rightly called individuals . . . 39

There are at least two ways of interpreting this text . According to one, a thing is individual because it has individual (i. e. non-shareable) characteristics . For example, in the case of Socrates , he is individual because his baldness , way of speaking , etc. are all unique to him. They are not common to others. According to this view, then, the individuation of substances is to be traced to the individuality of their characteristics , although we are not told here what makes these characteristics individual in turn. We are told they are not shared , but we are not told why . Note, moreover , that the term property' is again used non-technically to refer to any feature of a thing which "happened to it accidentally". This seems to indicate that the features which are unique to Socrates are accidents and not generic or specific features , something which is consistent with what Boethius says in the first edition of the Commentary as we saw earlier. And, although it is not clear whether the text refers to one, more than one, or all the substance's accidents , the point is immaterial for this interpretation. But according to a second interpretation, the individuation of Socrates and other substances is due to the unique set of accidental characteristics they have, not to the individuality of those characteristics . In short , it is the fact that Socrates has a unique bundle of accidental features which renders him individual, not the individuality of any , some or all of his features. Indeed, whether the characteristics themselves are individual or not is immaterial to this view. For this or that accidental characteristic could in principle be common to Socrates and someone else, say Aristotle, but the set of accidental characteristics which Socrates has is regarded as unique to him and, therefore, as not shared with anything else. The set, considered as such, then, is Hthe property of Socrates" , a view which was going to be adopted later by Odo and other eleventh and twelfth century authors. As we shall see immediately, however, the 4

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accidental characteristics of individual substances were in fact considered to be individual by Boethius. A third possible interpretation of Boethius' view, plausible as an interpretation of a text from the first edition of the Commentary and discussed earlier, namely , that individuals have a sui generis feature which renders them individual, is not plausible as an interpretation of Boethius' text here and, therefore, must be abandoned if we are to assume that he had a consistent view throughout his life . For he clearly identifies what is a property of Socrates as a set of or at least as some characteristics belonging to Socrates, such as baldness, etc . What makes Socrates individual, then, cannot be considered a sui generis feature, but rather one or more of the features of the individual substance . Consequently, we are left with only two plausible interpretations of Boethius' view. Unfortunately, both of these alternatives involve serious difficulties . The first one runs into problems because it holds both that accidental features are individual and that they individuate substance, while elsewhere Boethius clearly makes substance the source of individuation for accidents and all other features present in individual substances . This produces the sort of vicious circle to which I referred in the introductory chapter: x is individuated by y and y is in turn individuated by x . That Boethius thought accidents and other features of individual substances are individual and individuated by the substance is open to no doubt , as the following text makes explicit: [Porphyry] says that of those [things] which are predicated , some are predicated of a singular [thing] and others of a plurality [ of things] . Concerning the singular [thing] , moreover , he says that whatever is predicated has one subj ect of which it can be predicated , so that those [things] which [have] singular subjects , such as Socrates and Plato , are individual , for example , this white which is in this snow we see , and this bench in which we now sit , not every bench (for this is universal) , but this which is under us now ; nor the white which is in snow (for white is universal and [ so is] snow) , but this white which is perceived in this snow now . For this [white] which is in this snow cannot be predicated of any other white [thing] , because it is forced to singularity and it is constrained to an individual form by the participation in an individual . . . For as it is said of snow , the white which is present in this snow subj ect is not a common accident , but [is] proper to this snow which appears to the eyes as a subj ect . . . Because Socrates is individual and singular , animal is made individual , since Socrates is an animal . Again , man is predicated of many men indeed , but if we consider the humanity which is in the individual Socrates , it is made individual , since Socrates is individual itself and singular. Again , the difference , such as rationality , can be predicated of many , but in Socrates is individual ; the capacity to laugh , also is made unique in Socrates, since it is [of itself] predicable of many men . Also , a common accident , such as white , which can be predicated of many . is perceived as an individual in a singular [body] . 40

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According to this text, then, both the accidental (example: this white), the generic (example: this animality) and the specific (example: this rationality) features of an individual substance such as Socrates are individual. Moreover, their individuality is the result of the fact that they are present in or belong to Socrates. A more clear statement of the principle of individuation of the features of individual substances could hardly have been made. In the last sentence of the text, where Boethius states that common accidents "are perceived" as individuals in singular bodies, he seems to be moving again in an epistemic direction. For he seems to be concerned with the source of individual discernibility rather than with the source of individuality . This lack of clear delineation between the metaphysical and epistemic issues is in keeping with what he says elsewhere, as we saw earlier. The second alternative view, in which it is the bundle of accidental characteristics that individuates the substance, also runs into difficulties . For, again, it falls into a vicious circle when trying to explain the individuation of accidental characteristics themselves. Moreover, the fact that accidents play the leading role in the individuation of substances, according to this view, goes against the substance-accident distinction on which it rests. Indeed, for Boethius, as for Porphyry, substance is prior to accidents. 41 Accordingly, it is perfectly acceptable to hold that accidents owe their ontological status as individuals to substance . But to turn around and say that substance itself owes its ontological status as individual to accidents is circular, as we saw in the first chapter. In either case we should add, however, that Boethius' view of individuality as presented in the last two texts seems primarily metaphysical. He talks about things and their features and the fact that they are not common. The use of the term 'common' marks a clear transition from the understanding of individuality as non-transferability in the Commentary on the "/sagoge" to the understanding of it as incommunicability in the Commentary on "De interpretatione ". One last point before we summarize Boethius' view in the Commentary on the "/sagoge". In this Commentary Boethius seems to keep the notions of individuality and numerical difference quite separate. He does not explicitly distinguish them, but his analysis of individuality is evidently different from his analysis of numerical difference. In the second edition of the Commentary, prompted by a comment by Porphyry, he explains what he understands by numerical difference as follows: For something will seem to differ numerically whenever a number differs from a number, as a herd of cattle which contains perhaps thirty heads differs numerically from another herd of cattle if it contains one hundred heads . For they do not differ

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in that it is a herd, nor indeed in that [it is composed] of cattle, therefore they differ in number [alone] because , [although] they [have] many [cattle] , the ones [in the former herd] are fewer. Therefore, how do Socrates and Plato, who do not differ in species, [differ] in number when Socrates is one and Plato [is also] one, and unity does not differ numerically from unity? But what has been said, "different in number" , must be understood as different in counting, that is , while they are counted as different . For when we say , "This is Socrates" [and] "This [is] Plato" , we make two unities, and if we touch Socrates with the finger , saying "This is one" , [ and] then touch Plato , saying "This is one" , the same unity which is in Plato is not numbered in Socrates . 42

According to this text, numerical difference is the difference present among things which are not counted as one, as Plato and Socrates are not. Numerical difference then is based on a difference of unities. Number in this sense is a kind of unity. It is clear from the examples given by Boethius that substances, such as Plato and Socrates and presumably trees and dogs as well, are numerically different. But it is not clear whether this notion extends to the properties and accidents of those substances. Nor are we told anything about its cause or principle , or, for that matter, about its discernibility. Also unexplained is the matter of the relation between numerical difference and/or unity to individuality. All of this will give rise to speculation in later centuries as we shall see in Chapter III. In terms of the framework developed in the introductory chapter we can summarize Boethius' views as presented in the two editions of the Commentary on the "/sagoge " thus:

1 . Intension of individuality Boethius can be interpreted as introducing several different views of individuality. In the first edition of the Commentary he introduces three, and perhaps a fourth. According to the first, individuality consists in indivisibility into species , individuals , or other generic parts. For the second, individuality is impredicability of others. Thirdly, a non­ satisfactory interpretation would hold individuality to be indivisibility into integral parts. And fourthly, perhaps to be identified with the first, individuality is conceived as non-transferability. In the second edition , he presents again four views of individuality. The second is physical (individuality consists in indivisibility into parts) and the third seems to be logical (individuality is impredicability of other things [specifically] similar to itself). These two resemble the second and third views proposed in the first edition. The first view of the first edition (indivisibility into species, individuals , or other generic parts) is not present in the second, and the first view of the second ( absolute indivisibility) is not recorded in the first. The fourth view of the first edition is also found in the second edition , but non-transferability seems to be interpreted logically in a key passage. Elsewhere, Boethius turns to

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the related notion of commonality . Moreover, in the second edition Boethius also adds another feature which is, according to him, common to all individuals, namely , divisiveness. In addition , it should be noted that in no place does Boethius distinguish between the notions of individuality , singularity and particularity . Indeed, the terms 'individual' , 'singular' , and 'particular' are interchanged freely throughout the text. Numerical difference , on the other hand, is kept quite separate from individuality , although it is not explicitly distinguished from it. Boethius understands numerical difference as the difference among things counted differently .

2. Extension ofindividuality Both primary substances and their characteristics (properties , generic and specific features, and accidents) are individual. Secondary substances , of course , and properties and accidents considered apart from individual substances are not individual. That non-human spiritual creatures are not discussed should not deter us from inferring that they are individual, since Boethius explicitly refers to minds as individual and all spiritual substances are minds of some sort. 43 The extension of numerical difference is not discussed , but the e�amples given include only primary substances. 3. Ontological status ofindividuality Nothing very clear is said about this concerning individuality . But Boethius speaks of "the property of individuals" such as Socrates. This seems to refer to the set of accidental features which primary substances have . As such it would seem to be a bundle of features which appear to be individual themselves , although later authors did not take them to be so (see Odo and Thierry) . Apart from this , number, moreover, is regarded as a kind of unity . 4. Principle or cause ofindividuation Boethius does not use the terms "cause' or 'principle' in this context , but he does use Latin terms which suggest causality such as 'facit' (makes) and the like . His theory , however, is not sufficiently developed so that this would make a difference . He can be interpreted as proposing two views of individuation of primary substance : an accidental view, in which it is the individuality of accidents that individuates substance , and a bundle view , in which it is the uniqueness of a group of accidents that individuates substance. The generic, specific and accidental features of things are individuated by the substance they characterize . Nothing is said about the principle or cause of numerical difference . 81

5. Discernibility ofindividuals Individual substances are distinguished by their accidents, and common accidents , at least according to one text, are distinguished by the substance in which they inhere. Boethius did not seem to regard the problem of the discernibility of individuals as different from the problem of individuation. He says nothing about the discernibility of numerically different things. 6. Function ofproper names and indexicals Nothing very important is said about this matter beyond the statement that proper names cannot be used effectively to refer to individuals unless they are applied only to one of them. The same seems to be the case with what nowadays are called definite descriptions such as "the son of Sophroniscus". The comparison of Boethius' view and that of Porphyry yields some interesting contrasts, for Boethius advances or at least changes Porphyry's formulae in a number of ways. Concerning the intension of individuality, Boethius accepts Porphyry's view about the dividing character of individuals with respect to the species , but modifies Porphyry's formula from "predicability of only one" to "impredicability of other things [specifically] similar to itself" . Moreover, he emphasizes the indivisible character of individuals both at the physical and metaphysical level and introduces the notions of non-transferability and commonality. With respect to extension, Boethius does not advance much beyond Porphyry, and the same can be said about the issue related to the function of proper names and indexicals and about the issue of discernibility. Boethius adopts likewise Porphyry's formula concerning the principle or cause of individuation of primary substances , but qualifies it by seeming to restrict the features in question to accidental ones . Moreover, he traces the individuation of accidents to substance, a new development not present in Porphyry's text. Now let us turn to Boethius' Commentary on the " Categories", where he adds some interesting points to the view of individuality he seems to have been developing in his Commentary on the "/sagoge ".

III. Boethius' View in the Commentary on the "Categories" Relevant comments to individuality are found throughout Boethius' Commentary on Aristotle 's "Categories". But most of them are too brief and/or restate points already made elsewhere. There is, however, one

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place in the Commentary where substantial discussion of individuality occurs. The occasion is Aristotle's text in chapter 2 of the Categories, where toward the end he states : But, simply put , those [things] which are individual and singular in number are predicated of no subj ect . However , nothing prevents some of these from being [present] in a subj ect , for a certain [knowledge of] grammar is [present] in a subject , but it is not said of the subject . 44

The two points which Aristotle makes here are quite clear. First, individuality and numerical singularity - which are listed side by side without telling us whether they are extensionally and/or intensionally equivalent - are said to be incompatible with predicability. Individuality and/or numerical singularity, then, have to do with impredicability. Second, individuality and/or numerical singularity extend not only to subjects, which are of course not predicable of other subjects , but also to accidents of subjects. For there are some accidents, such as the particular knowledge of grammar which Socrates has, for example, which is both impredicable and present in Socrates. Boethius' discussion of this passage and the part of chapter 2 which precedes it is rather substantial, covering six columns in the Patrologia latina. Moreover, a considerable portion of the discussion is related to the quoted passage and is directly related to individuality. In order to simplify matters the relevant portions of the passage have been grouped into three texts. The first reads as follows: For every thing is either substance or accident, universal or particular . . . when I say "man " , I have said a universal thing, [ and] therefore that this name is predicated of many . But when I say "Socrates" or "Plato" , I have said a particular thing, since Socrates is said of no subject . And this applies also to accidents ; for when I say " knowledge" , I have stated a universal thing, [ and] therefore that "knowledge" is predicated of grammar and rhetoric and all others placed under it . If, however, I say "Plato's knowledge " , since every accident which comes to individuals is made an individual , I say a particular knowledge , for indeed Plato's knowledge , j ust as Plato himself, is particular . . . The universal is what is established to be predicated of many ; the particular, however, what is predicated ofno subj ect . . . If particular is united to substance , it makes the substance particular , as it is [ the case] with Socrates or Plato , and whatever is found in the substance is an individual . . . When particularity is united to an accident , it makes the accident particular, as [is the case of] Plato's or Aristotle's knowledge . For they make four combinations: Universal substance , particular substance , universal accident , particular accident . . . However, neither particularity nor universality are transformed into each other. For universality can be predicated of particularity , as "animal" of Socrates or Plato, and particularity admits the predication of universality , but not as [if] universality were particularity or as [if] what is particular may produce universality

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. .. Particularity, since it is the lowest of things and is nothing in the subject, is predicated of no subject. For, since universality is predicated of the subject , particularity indeed is not universality . ..45

The passage begins by pointing out that there are two divisions of things which are exhaustive, that is, every thing must be one or the other. These divisions are between substance and accident, on the one hand, and universal and particular, on the other. Moreover, Boethius goes on to explain, the second division applies to both members of the first division. Substances can be either universal, as is the case with man, or particular, as is the case with Socrates. And the same is true of accidents. Knowledge is an example of a universal accident, and Plato's knowledge is an example of a particular accident. This brings Boethius to the question concerning the intensions of universality and particularity. He understands the first as predicability and the second as impredicability. As such, therefore, they are incompatible: the same thing cannot be both universal and particular, though universals are predicable of particulars. But this does not change their exclusive character: "animal " may be predicable of Socrates, but this does not make Socrates universal or animal particular. By making this qualification Boethius has in fact made clear that in these cases the copula does not function as what is called today the 'is' of identity when a universal is predicated of a particular. Indeed, the notion of predicability in this passage , although not the subject of explanation, is more developed than the one he used in the Commentary on the "/sagoge", where he had simply taken over Porphyry's formulae and described the individual in one way as what is predicable of only one, i. e. itself, or in another way as what is not predicable of many. Here, however, we find that the individual is what is not predicable of any subject , with the implication that self-predication is no predication at all. Of course, this is in keeping with Aristotle's text and the view he presents in some other places where he seems to hold that identity statements are not regarded as predication statements in a strict sense of the term, since they do not "affirm of the subject either some element constituting its essential nature , or that it is in some way qualified, quantified, essentially related, etc. ". 46 Interestingly enough, however, it is the other formulae found in Porphyry as well as in Aristotle (see text from De interpretatione cited below), which are most frequently found in the early medieval period, a fact which supports the conclusion that the Commentary on the "Categories" was not in wide use at the time. One exception to this, as we shall see, is Odo of Tours. This is the basic import of the text. However, in passing Boethius makes two remarks which are also important . The first states that accidents are made individual by the individual they characterize,

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namely, the substance in which they are present. Substance, therefore is the individuator of accidents. On the other hand, we are not told what individuates substance. But we are told that particularity is "nothing in the subject", this being the reason that it is not predicable of it. This is important because it is an indication that particularity for Boethius has no ontological status in itself. And if that is the case, then we need to look for the basis of particularity elsewhere . Notice also that there is no explicit attempt in this text to distinguish between particularity and individuality, but that implicitly one could begin to detect that they are not equivalent. The terms are kept separate at least in the sense that it is particularity that is always understood as impredicability, although particular things are also called individual. The second text reaffirms much of what was stated in the first: Other [things] moreover, are indeed [present] in a subject, but are said of no subject . For what [Aristotle] says are [present] in a subject, he regards as accidents , but what are said of no subject, he adds, [are] particular. For an accident is [present] in a subject, [ and] particularity is predicated of no subject. Therefore, anything which is itself [present] in a subject indeed, but is not predicated of any subject, is a particular accident, as is [the case for example] of a certain [knowledge of] grammar, that is, the individual [knowledge of] grammar of Aristarchus or of some [other] man . For, since [ this knowledge of grammar] belongs to an individual man, it is also made individual and particular. Therefore, since a certain [knowledge of] grammar is [present] in the soul , it is an accident, and since it is predicated of no subject, it is particular; for j ust as Aristarchus himself is said of no subject, so also his [knowledge of] grammar is said of no subject. However, [Aristotle] does not say that grammar itself is particular, but [only] that a certain [knowledge of] grammar of some individual man, which [knowledge of grammar] the particular man holds by his own cognition [is particular] . . . 47

In this passage, Boethius is particularly keen in emphasizing the distinction between "being present in a subject" and '"'being predicable of a subject" as well as between "not being present in a subject" and "not being predicable of a subject". In other words, as in the first text cited, Boethius wants to make clear that the distinction between substance and accident is not the same as the distinction between particular and universal. This is what makes possible for accidents to be particular even though it is in their nature to be present in subjects. Note should be taken of this point, for in subsequent centuries, both during the Middle Ages and later, indeed even today, many philosophers tend to identify (or confuse in some cases) substantiality with individuality. 48 Another important point reiterated in the text is the fact that what makes accidents individual and particular is the subject in which they are found. It is Aristarchus that individualizes and particularizes the 85

knowledge of grammar he has. And although the examples Boethius uses here concern immaterial accidents such as knowledge, this principle extends to all accidents and, as he explicitly adds shortly thereafter, to corporeal accidents as well. 49 Most of this is again repeated in the third text we shall cite, but an important element is added: . . . for what is not [present] in a subj ect , is substance , and what is not predicated of a subj ect , [is] particularity . . . concerning "particular accident" he said that it is [present] in a subj ect and is not predicated of a subj ect . However, by "universal accident" he means what is both [present] in a subj ect and said of a subj ect . Concerning "particular substance" he added that it is neither [present] in a subj ect , nor predicated of a subject . In short , those [things] which are individual and singular in number are said of no subj ect ; but nothing prevents them from being [present] in a subj ect , for [ as seen earlier] a certain [knowledge of] grammar is [present] in a subj ect . Every particularity is either a substance or an accident . For when I say "Socrates" , I have meant an individual and particular substance ; when I say "a certain [knowledge of] grammar" , I have said an individual and particular accident. Moreover, individuals are those [things] which cannot be divided into other species or into other individuals . For just as "animal" is divided into the species man and horse , and "man" into single men , that is , into Socrates and Plato and the rest , so Plato and Socrates are not divided into others . And the same is to be applied to accidents ; for j ust as "knowledge" is divided into the species grammar and rhetoric [for example] , "grammar" itself [is divided] into particular [knowledges of] grammar which particul ar men have , so a particular [knowledge of] grammar itself is not cut up into [further] particular [knowledges of] grammar. Therefore , individuals are those [things] which are singular in number, and are not divided into any other groups whether of species or of individuals . Every individual , since it is particular, is not predicated of a subj ect ; and every [ thing] which is not predicated of a subj ect is either a substance , such as Plato , or an accident , such as a certain [knowledge of] grammar . Therefore , of these particulars, namely substance and accident , which are not predicated of a subj ect , the substance indeed is not [present] in a subj ect , but the accident is [present] in a subj ect , but nothing prevents other individuals, which are said [to have] an accidental nature , from being [present] in a subj ect . . . 50

As with the other passages cited, the basic thrust of this one is to distinguish the notions of substance, accident, particular and universal and to emphasize that both substances and accidents can be particular and universal . What is new and important in this text is the distinction Boethius makes between individuality and particularity. Although extensionally there seems to be no difference between individuality and particularity since Boethius uses the terms interchangeably, intensionally there seems to be a clear difference. For he tells us that "individuals are those [things] which cannot be divided into other species

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or into other individuals". And later he adds that "every individual, since it is particular, is not predicated of a subject". Clearly the use of the particle 'since' indicates that individuality is not the same as particularity and that it is the latter which consists in impredicability, while the first, as we saw earlier, must consist in indivisibility. But indivisibility understood in the way Boethius does here is insufficient to account for individuality as we saw in the previous section. For, although the examples he gives are not divisible into species, a man is certainly divisible into individuals, such as hairs, cells, etc. As pointed out in the Introduction, this view of individuality presents problems which later medieval and scholastic authors try to solve, but which Boethius did not address explicitly. It should be added, moreover, that the distinction which Boethius makes between individuality and particularity is not frequently found in the subsequent literature concerned with individuality. Most authors make no mention of the distinction, treating individuality and particularity not only as extensionally but also as intensionally equivalent. They also tend to extend individuality to substances, excluding accidents from the category, and as a result do not identify any principle of individuation of accidents. This indicates, again, that Boethius' comments on Chapter 2 of Aristotle's Categories did not have much influence in subsequent discussions of individuality, a fate similar to that accruing to Boethius' Commentary on "De interpretatione". Indeed, as will become clear in subsequent chapters, of Boethius' logical works it is primarily his Commentary on Porphyry's "lsagoge" which is used for reference. Now, briefly, let us Sllmmarize Boethius' doctrine of individuality as presented in his Commentary on the "Categories" in terms of the framework developed in the first chapter:

1. Intension ofindividuality Individuality is distinguished from particularity. The first is understood as indivisibility into species and other individuals; the second is understood as impredicability. No intensional or extensional distinction is attempted between these notions and numerical singularity . 2. Extension ofindividuality Individuality and particularity are regarded as having the same extension: they extend to both substances and accidents, although not all substances and all accidents are individual and particular; some are universal . 3. Ontological status ofindividuality Particularity is explicitly regarded as being nothing in the thing which is particular. This means presumably that it has no ontological status . 87

Moreover, since individuality and particularity seem to be coextensional, individuality must likewise have no ontological status.

4. Principle or cause of individuation No principle or cause of individuation is identified in substances beyond particularity itself, which, as we saw in 3 , is nothing. What makes accidents, and presumably properties as well, individual and particular is the substance in which they are present. 5. Discernibility of individuals Nothing about this is said . 6. Function ofproper names and indexicals Nothing about this is said. If compared with the view we reconstructed based on Boethius' comments in the two editions of his Commentary on the "/sagoge", the view of individuality presented in the Commentary on the "Categories" is generally less developed. Its main contribution to the elucidation of the notion of individuality is the distinction it introduces between individuality and particularity. The fact that the latter is defined logically as impredicability and the former as indivisibility may indicate a growing awareness on the part of Boethius of the distinction between the logical and metaphysical approaches to individuality . On the other hand , the Commentaries on the "/sagoge" are much richer , containing various interpretations of individuality , including the introduction of the notion of non-transferability . The only other area where the Commentary on the "Categories" advances the view of the earlier Commentaries is the brief and passing statement that particularity is nothing in the subject. This is one of the few explicit references to the ontological issue of individuality contained in Boethius' writings. As far as the issues of extension , individuation , discernibility and proper names and indexicals is concerned , either nothing is said or what is said is a reiteration of what had already been established in the Commentaries on the "/sagoge ". On the whole , therefore , not much progress is made in this Commentary over the previ ous works . If one compares what Boethius says here with Aristotle's statements in Chapte r 2 of the Categories, however, it becomes quite clear that Boethius goes substantial ly beyond Aristotle 's statements . For Aristotle makes no distinction between particularity and individuality ­ indeed , the term 'particular' does not appear in the Latin translation of Aristotle's text -, nor does he give definitions of these notions. Likewise , he says nothing about the ontological status of particularity and makes no reference to the source of the individuality of accidents. In short , most of

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what B oethius says about individuality is his own, even if he may have borrowed it from somewhere else. And it is perhaps important to note ' that much of what Boethius adds has a stronger metaphysical flavor than one finds in Aristotle's text. This metaphysical approach is further developed in the two editions of Boethius' Commentary on "De interpretatione".

IV. Boethius' View in the Commentary on "De interpretatione" Boethius' comments about individuality in the Commentary on Aristotle's "De interpretatione" are particularly important for the historical understanding of the discussions of individuality that took place in the thirteenth century and after, since it is here that we find, as we shall see shortly, some of the terms that would become standard in those centuries. These texts, however, do not seem to have had the substantial impact one would have expected on the development of these issues in the early Middle Ages. There are few traces of tpe terminology which became popular later on and which is found here, but is absent in the Commentary on the "lsagoge", the Commentary on the "Categories" and in De Trinitate. Early medieval authors seem to have paid attention primarily to the first and last of these works. The logicians, as we shall see, concentrated their efforts on the Commentary on the "lsagoge", while those who adopted a more metaphysical approach governed by theological concerns turned to De Trinitate for reasons which have been already suggested earlier and will become more explicit in subsequent chapters. The locus of Boethius' remarks in the Commentary on "De interpretatione" is a short text in which Aristotle introduces the notions of universality and singularity before he proceeds to a discussion of universal and singular propositions in the square of opposition. The context, then, is logical and Aristotle's remarks are quite concordant with this context. This text as interpreted by Boethius appears as follows: Moreover, among things, some indeed are universal , and others singular. I call universal , moreover, what is naturally predicated of many , and singular what is not , as man indeed is universal but Plato is among those [things] which are singular. 51

First it must be pointed out that Boethius' Latin translation reads quite different from the Greek. Indeed, Boethius goes so far as to change the

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example of a singular, which Aristotle gave as Callias, to Plato. But that is, of course, of little consequence at present, since we are not concerned here with a comparison of Aristotle's views and those of Boethius. For us what is important is to see how Boethius understood Aristotle and for that we need look no farther than his translation and the ensuing commentary . The second point is more relevant. It has to do with the fact that both universality and singularity are defined in terms of predicability . The universal is what is naturally predicated of many, while the singular is not . There is not much more of interest in the text, at least for us, so we can turn to Boethius' gloss. Boethius' Commentary on "De interpretatione", like his Commentary on the "lsagoge ", is available in two editions. In the first, his comments, which are rather short, do not go significantly beyond Aristotle's text . He adds more examples, introduces the terms 'individual' and 'particular', which seem to be used as equivalent to each other and to the term 'singular' in this context, and recasts Aristotle's description of a singular, "what is not predicable of many" as "what is not predicable of any other". He makes these points as follows: Moreover, some things are universal , others particular. That is universal which is predicated of many, as 'man' is said of many, and is universal . That is singular, for example any individual thing, to which it does not pertain to be predicated of a subj ect , such as 'Plato' or 'Socrates' . . . 'man ' indeed [is] universal , but 'Plato' is among those [things] which are singulars . For if the universal is what is predicated of many, 'man' is universal , for it is said of many individuals. On the contrary , if the singular is what is not predicated of any other, 'Plato' is singular. And so individuals are not predicated of any others . 52

The most important feature of these comments is that , on the surface at least, they keep the discussion of individuality within logical bounds . For even though there is a certain ambiguity involved in the nature of the universals and individuals in question, that is, on whether they are things, words, or concepts, still the main thrust of the discussion appears to be logical . This changes drastically in the comments we find in the second edition of the Commentary. There Boethius comments extensively on the text of Aristotle. For our purposes , the most important points are made in the following excerpts: And so we see that there are some qualities of this sort in things , [namely , qualities] which cannot accrue to any but one particular and singular substance . For one is the singular quality of, for example , Plato or Socrates, [ and] another is [the quality] which , having been communicated to many, is completely displayed in singulars and in all [ of them] , as is that very humanity . For there is a quality of this sort which

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is completely in singulars and is completely in all [ of them] . . . Whence it is that this [kind of quality] indeed is common to all , but the first one [is] indeed incommunicable to all , [being] , nevertheless , proper to one . For if we were allowed to m ake up a name , we would call that certain quality , singular and incommunicable to any other subsistence , by its made up name , in order that the form of what is proposed be m ade more clear . For let the incommunicable property of Plato be called " Platonity" , for we can call this quality " Platonity" by a m ade up word , in the way in which we call the quality of man " humanity" . Therefore , this [ quality] "Platonity" belongs only to one man , and not to [j ust] any [man] , but only to Plato ; humanity , on the other hand, [belongs both to] Plato and all those others who are subsumed under the term . Whence , since Platonity accrues to one Plato , the soul , upon hearing the term 'Plato' , turns to one person and particular substance , but when it hears 'man ' , it turns to many . . . therefore . . . man , indeed , is said [to be] something universal , but Platonity and Plato [are said to be] particular . . . for ' man' is said of one , and 'Plato' is [also] said of one , but they are not said in the same way of each particular. For 'Plato' indicates a one definite substance and property which cannot accrue to another . . . This name, however, which we call 'Plato' , may seem perhaps to be common to many in speech ; but that property of Plato , which was the property or nature of the Plato who was a disciple of Socrates , will not accrue to any [other] even if he were called by the same term . This is so , moreover, because humanity is natural but a proper n ame [is] conventional. This does not mean now, however, that the name of 'Plato' cannot be predicated of many, rather [it means that] the property of Plato [ cannot be so predicated] . For that property is not naturally said of many , unlike [ the property] of man , and therefore that very Platonity , as has been said, is an incommunicable quality ; a communicable universal quality , on the other hand , [is one] which is [present] in many and in singulars . 53

It is clear that the thrust of this text is metaphysical. As usual with Boethius, he does not keep metaphysics and logic separate, even in the context of Aristotle's clearly logical text. Gone are the definitions of universal and individual in terms of predicability. The only time predicability is mentioned is at the end and that is to emphasize the point that Boethius' concern is not with words and how they are applied, but with properties and features of things. What for Aristotle seems to have been terms, even though strictly speaking they could have been interpreted also as things, become qualities for Boethius. Both the universal and the singular are qualities of substances. At the beginning of the gloss he gives the quality of Socrates and the quality of Plato as examples of singular qualities, but later on in the passage he introduces the term 'Platonity' to describe that quality of Plato which belongs only to him. Singular qualities are distinguished from universal qualities in that they are proper to only one thing, while universal qualities are common to many. Moreover, singular qualities are incommunicable, that is, they cannot become common to many even in principle, while universal 91

qualities are indeed communicable. This inability to be made common is what renders the reference of singular terms clear . A term like 'Plato', for example, indicates a definite substance. A term like 'man', on the other hand, lacks clear reference since the property for which it stands is common to many things. That Boethius is speaking metaphysically becomes even more evident when he contemplates the possible objection that even terms like 'Plato' are in fact or can be predicable of many things, that is, of all those things which are properly called Plato. For his answer to this consists in pointing out that even if the name is common, that is a matter of speech and not of fact; the property of Plato, namely, his Platonity, is not and cannot be common. In other words, what cannot be common or predicable of many is not the name, but the property. This is a matter of "nature", not of "words". There are many questions that Boethius leaves unanswered in this text. For example, are these individual or singular qualities composites of the other qualities and features which belong to the individual, or are they qualities separate from them? Given his statements elsewhere, the former would seem the proper answer, but the fact is that this text is not clear on the point. Moreover, how is this sort of quality, say Platonity, to be distinguished from the individual in which it is present, say, Plato? On this point the text is obscure, referring at times to Platonity and Plato as equivalent and at other times as different. And, finally, are these singular qualities composed of accidents alone or do they include properties and differences as well? The text seems to contrast specific and other class features with singular features, but a definite answer is not clear. And, from what he says in the Commentary on the "Isagoge " about ""the property of individuals", it would seem that these qualities, if they are conglomerates, must be made up of accidental features alone. Finally, one could also ask about the relation between these qualities and the particularity Boethius spoke of in the Commentary on the "Categories". 54 All these matters have to do primarily with two of the issues distinguished in the first chapter, the issues involved in the intension of individuality and its ontological status: Boethius mentions nothing about three of the other four issues here. What he says about the function of proper names is neither very clear nor very important.55 Following a well established ancient tradition, he regards proper names as established by convention . 56 He adds, moreover , that proper names, such as 'Plato', and names of individual qualities, such as 'Platonity' , are used to make clear references, while universal terms do not function in this way . In other words, we use terms like 'Plato' to refer to one and only one definite thing. Likewise, he would like to use a term like 'Platonity' to refer to one and only one definite property or, as he also calls it , quality. He is aware , however, of the fact that ' Plato' may be a proper name of more than one

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individual, but that does not seem to worry him. After all, his understanding of the function of a proper name, or of a name of a singular quality such as Platonity, is not that they refer only to one thing or quality, as the case may be. Rather, what he believes is that they help, as he puts it, "to make clear what is proposed" . Indeed, these terms may and indeed often do refer to various individuals, and as such they do not have an absolutely clear reference . Boethius had already referred to the latter point in a text from the Commentary on the "/sagoge" discussed above . In spite of this problem, however, Boethius regards proper names as more helpful than universal terms for the purposes of picking out the referent. Finally, there is another text in the first edition of the Commentary on "De interpretatione" which adds something with respect to the particularity of accidents . It is a comment on the passage where Aristotle remarks that "a verb is always a sign of something said of something else, i . e . of something either predicable of or present in some other thing" . 57 In his comments Boethius makes a distinction between individual and general accidents as follows : . . . of those [things] which are accidents , some are individual , others general. And indeed those which are individual are [present] in a subj�ct only , as [for example] , an accident of any particular body ; but others are general accidents and these are predicated of other accidents as of a subject , as is [ the case of] color [ for example] , for [color] is predicated of whiteness and blackness , etc.58

According to this distinction, then, accidents are divided into two sorts: individual (or singular or particular, since Boethius does not differentiate among these here) and general or universal (he interchanges these terms as well) . The first are accidents which are present in a subject. Examples of these are the accidental features of particular bodies, such as, we may surmise, the gray color of Aristotle's hair. The second are accidents which are predicated of other accidents, such as color, which is predicable of whiteness, etc. Other examples of accidents given are running and motion. ' Running' is a particular accident because it is predicable of a subject only, since it is only found in a subject. 'Motion', on the other hand, is predicated both of a subject and of running, since running is a kind of motion and therefore is a general accident. 59 This same distinction is repeated in quite similar terms in the second edition of the Commentary. But nothing of importance is added there over what is said here. 60 Now, the questions that we confront are: (1) How are we to interpret this distinction? That is, is Boethius simply making a purely logical distinction between two types of accidents, or is he going beyond logic and making a metaphysical distinction between them? (2) Does what he

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says here add anything to what we already know concerning individuality from the Commentary on the "/sagoge" and the Commentary on the "Categories"? The answer to the first question is indeed difficult, for Boethius seems to make the distinction both in terms of (a) predication some accidents are predicable of more than one thing, others are not and, (b) inherence - some accidents are present in a subject, others are predicated of other subjects . Note that none of these formulae, derived from Aristotle, are purely logical or purely metaphysical. The first would seem to be purely logical since it involves only the notion of predicability. But, as we have seen , predicability for Boethius is not always a purely logical notion. And the second formula openly mixes the metaphysical notion of inherence with the quasi-logical notion of predicability. We cannot, therefore, settle the first question, and that makes it very difficult to give an answer to the second. For if we take this distinction as a purely logical one, then it does not have an important bearing on most of the issues distinguished in the first chapter. But if the distinction is metaphysical, then it clearly has a bearing. What it might be exactly is not clear, however. It is only clear that some accidents are universal and others particular. In neither case, moreover, can we make an exact determination of Boethius' understanding of the relation of this view to that discussed in the Commentary on the "/sagoge", and the Commentary on the "Categories", although it seems clear that the distinction between individual and general accidents presented here is not equivalent to the distinction between particular and universal accidents given in the latter work. There, we might recall, an accident was particular if it was present in a subject (Aristarchus' knowledge of grammar , for example) and universal if it was predicable of many (knowledge of grammar, for example). Here the distinction is made in quite different terms. Let us , then, summarize the points Boethius makes in the two editions of the Commentary on "De interpretatione " in terms of the framework developed in Chapter I . 1 . Intension ofindividuality The terms 'individual' , "particular' , and "singular' are used interchangeably. In the first edition of the Commentary, Boethius , following Aristotle closely , defines individuality as what is not predicable of any other. But this changes drastically in the second edition, where individuality is seen as incommunicability . This seems to be a development of the notion of non-transferability used in the Commentary on the "/sagoge ". 2. Extension ofindividuality In the first two texts discussed , nothing important is said about this except 94

for the minor point that there are some things which are individual. These are said to be substances and/or some of their qualities. The examples Boethius gives are human subjects, such as Plato, and their incommunicable features, such as Platonity in Plato. We are not told whether other types of substances, beyond human ones, are individual, even though it would be reasonable to conclude that Boethius intends them to be regarded as such, or whether other features of things are also individual . The classification of humanity as a universal, however, seems to suggest that features of things, other than those like Platonity or Socrateity, are to be regarded as universal. This goes quite contrary to what he had stated in the Commentary on the "Isagoge" and the Commentary on the "Categories". In the third text, however, Boethius states that some accidents are individual ( or particular or singular for him) and some are universal ( or general). But it is not clear whether this classification is to be interpreted metaphysically or logically. 3. Ontological status ofindividuality Individual substances, such as Plato, have both individual and universal qualities ( also called "properties"). The individual quality of each individual substance seems to be one and only one - in Plato, it is his Platonity. Boethius does not explain in what ·sense these individual qualities are qualities. It certainly does not seem that they are on the same level with other qualities of the individual belonging to the appropriate Aristotelian category. Nor does he explain whether they are simple or composite, or the sort of distinction there is between them and the substances in which they are or between them and the universal qualities present in the substance. 4. Principle ofindividuation Nothing is said concerning this, although it would seem reasonable to suppose that individual qualities have something to do with this. 5. Discernibility of Individuals Nothing is said about this matter, but again it would seem reasonable to relate this issue to individual qualities. 6. Function ofproper names and indexicals The text suggests only that individual terms, i. e. proper names, such as 'Plato', and names of individual qualities, such as 'Platonity', are conventional and function as indicators, helping to pick out individual substances and/or features. The main advance of the position taken by Boethius m the 95

Commentary on "De interpretatione" over the Commentary on the "/sagoge" and the Commentary on the "Categories" is the shift from a primarily quasi-logical understanding of individuality to what appears to be a purely metaphysical one based on the notion of incommunicability . True , in the Commentary on the "/sagoge" Boethius speaks of non­ transferability and commonality. And in the Commentary on the "Categories" he distinguishes between particularity , understood as impredicability , and individuality , conceived as indivisibility . But, as we saw in the discussion, these notions are not developed sufficiently and in some cases they seem to be interpreted logically or quasi-logically . 61 The evidence we have points to the second edition of the Commentary on " De interpretatione" as the only place in his logical works where Boethius presents a purely metaphysical view of individuality . Interestingly enough, this development seems to have been largely ignored by both those who used a logical and those who used a metaphysical approach to individuality in the early medieval period. The term 'incommunicable' is not recorded in any of the texts that we shall discuss in subsequent chapters. It is, however , picked up later , and we find it , for example � in Thomas Aquinas and even in such late figures as Suarez , who makes a great deal of it. 62 Whether the authors borrowed the term from Boethius directly or found it in some intermediary , I have not been able to determine . But that is of no consequence at present . What is important for us to note is that in spite of its obvious metaphysical advantages , this view of individuality was not developed in the early period. Nor was the terminology of "individual quality" , introduced in this Commentary, picked up even though some writers in the twelfth century did speak of "the property" and of "the total property" of an individual , and many referred to "individual forms" , such as the form of Socrateity , as we shall see later . The terminology of "total property'' is not found only in this Commentary. As we saw earlier , it was introduced in the Commentary on the "/sagoge", where Boethius uses expressions such as ""the property of Socrates" . In that Commentary, however, Boethius did not clarify what he meant, seeming to use the expression for both the set of accidental features unique to Socrates or just any one feature peculiar to him . Significantly , he did not talk about Socrateity there. It is only in Commentary on "De interpretatione " that it becomes clear that he is talking about Socrateity , whatever that may be , and not just about any individual feature belonging to Socrates. Twelfth century authors must have put the two texts together in order to come up with their views. Two other points merit mention. The first has to do with the ontological status of the "individual quality" of individual things and its relation to what Boethius called their particularity in the Commentary on the "Categories". Are they the same or not? On the one hand, if they are

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the same, then must we regard the individual quality as having no ontological status just as particularity had none, or did Boethius change his view here? On the other hand, if they are not the same, what is their relationship? The second point is that in this Commentary Boethius goes back to the less discriminate notion of predication which he had adopted in the Commentary on the "Isagoge". This, no doubt, is a result of the content of the Aristotelian text on which he comments. Now we turn to De Trinitate, a treatise which was going to be put to considerably more use in the early Middle Ages than the Commentary on "De interpretatione", or the Commentary on the "Categories" by those whose primary concerns were theological .

V. Boethius' View in De Trinitate In addition to the texts we have examined from the two editions of the Commentary on the "Isagoge", the Commentary on the "Categories" and the two editions of the Commentary on "De interpretatione" the most important, both philosophically and historically, . text of Boethius that has to do with individuality is found in De Trinitate. The theological nature of this treatise is evident from its full title: Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii ( Concerning How the Trinity is One God and not Three Gods) . Its purpose is to show how unity and multiplicity are reconciled in God, who is, according to the traditional orthodox statement of the trinitarian doctrine, one God and three persons. As Boethius puts it : The doctrine of this [ Catholic religion] concerning the unity of the Trinity is [ as follows] : "the Father, they say , [is] God , the Son [is] God , the Holy Spirit [is] God . '' Therefore , Father, Son and Holy Spirit [are] one [God] , not three gods . 63

The way Boethius solves this problem and the details of the argumentation are immaterial to the present discussion. It suffices to point out that God's unity is explained through the unity proper to substance; his multiplicity through the category of relation. Substantial predicates, that is, predicates which are descriptive of the substance itself, such as 'just', 'good', etc ., are applied to the whole divine nature. Relational predicates, on the other hand, such as 'Father', 'Son' , 'Second Person of the Trinity', and the like, are predicated separately of each of the members of the Trinity. 64 The organization of the discussion in the text is governed by Boethius' strategy to solve his theological concerns. What he wants to do is to show

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how there is substantial unity in the Trinity and, therefore, one rather than three gods, while at the same time maintaining a trinity of persons. In order to do this he contrasts the notions of unity and plurality and, after examining the nature and cause of the latter, he points out that there is no such feature in God. There are no generic, specific or accidental ( except for the non-substantial accident of relation) distinctions in God. Since these are the only differences which could account for plurality within him, he must be regarded as having a perfect unity. It is plurality and distinction, therefore, to which he pays most attention in this treatise, leaving unity aside and dealing with it only insofar as he must in order to clarify the two former notions. Unity is conceived negatively as a lack of difference, as the opposite of plurality. Moreover, it is the cause of plurality in its various types that is explored, not the cause of unity. For our purposes, the key text is the following: The principle (ratio) of this union [i . e . the union of the Trinity] is indifference . Difference cannot b e avoided b y those who add t o o r take from [ this unity}, a s do the Arians , who , by positing degrees of merit within the Trinity , break it up and convert it to plurality . For the source (principium) of plurality is otherness ; apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. And so , the diversity between three or more things lies in genus or species or number. For 'diverse' is predicated of everything of which 'the same' (idem) is said. B ut 'the same' is said in three ways: By genus , as when a man [is said to be] the same as a horse because their genus , animal , is the same. Or by species , as when Cato [is said to be] the same as Cicero because [ they belong] to the same species , man . Or by number, as with Tully and Cicero , because he is one in number. This is why 'diverse' also is said by genus, species , and number. But variety of accidents causes (Jacit) numerical difference . Three men differ neither by genus nor species but by their accidents , for if we mentally remove from them [ all other] accidents , still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each , since two bodies cannot occupy the same place , and place is an accident. Wherefore , it is because they are plural by their accidents that they are plural in number. 65

The historical importance of this passage lies as much in what it says as in what it omits, for subsequent generations of medieval thinkers endeavored not only to understand and interpret it, but also to fill in the gaps it appeared to them to contain . The passage has at least three clearly discernible parts. In the first part, Boethius, concerned with the explanation of the unity characteristic of the Trinity, identifies indifference or, 66 as some translators prefer to put it, lack of difference, as the principle or source of unity. Indeed, he argues, the introduction of difference results in the destruction of unity and the creation of plurality. Plurality, therefore, is contrasted to unity ; its nature, according to Boethius, is otherness. The example which

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illustrates the interrelation between these concepts is taken from the heretical Arians, who, having introduced degrees of merit within the Trinity (the Father is greater than the Son, the Son greater than the Holy Spirit) , destroyed its unity , transforming it into a plurality. One God became three. The second part of the text is concerned with an analysis of the various kinds of differences. Although the term used at this point is 'diversity' rather than 'difference' , this change in terminology has no conceptual import here. These terms are generally interchangeable in Latin, although in some philosophical contexts they are not so, as we shall see in the following chapter. Technically , 'difference' refers to the "specific" difference which, united to a genus, gives the definition of the species ­ rational for man, for example. "Diversity" is the feature of those things or entities which differ by themselves , such as the categories: relation and quality, for example. But in this text Boethius does not seem to use the terms in these senses. There are three kinds of differences corresponding to three kinds of sameness ; generic, specific and numerical. Just as there is generic sameness between a man and a dog, presumably there is generic difference between a man and a rose bush. The same can be said about two men and a man and a dog , and about Tully" and Cicero, who are numerically the same (Cicero was also called Tully) , and Cicero and Socrates, who are numerically different. The sense in which 'numerically different' is used here is fairly clear from the example, although from it we are not sure whether numerical difference is to be restricted to members of the same species and/or genus. Is a man numerically different from a tree, for example? A more detailed analysis of numerical difference is given in the passage from the second Commentary on the "lsagoge", discussed earlier. There Boethius explains that things are numerically different when they can be counted as separate, and even though there he does not state explicitly that members of different species are numerically different the implication is clear. The third part of the passage in De Trinitate identifies the cause of numerical difference. The cause of specific and generic difference or sameness is identified later, in Section II, where Boethius writes: . . . a statue is not said [ to be] a statue on account of the brass which is [its] matter, but on account of the form whereby the likeness of a living thing is impressed upon it : the brass itself is not said [ to be] brass because of the earth which is its matter , but because of its form . Likewise the earth is not said [ to be] earth by reason of unqualified matter but by reason of dryness and weight , which are forms . 67

The cause of specific and generic difference or sameness, then, is form. A

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man is said to be the same as another man and different from a monkey because of form. The kind of forms these are is not clear from what Boethius says, but it is reasonable to conclude that he is referring to substantial forms, since the function of accidental forms is another. According to the passage we were discussing accidents are the cause (facit) of numerical difference. This man and that man are different because they have different accidents. One is short, the other tall; one is fat , the other thin, etc. However, immediately after Boethius points to the "variety of accidents" as the cause of numerical difference, he seems to have second thoughts, adding that even not taking into consideration any accident other than place, place is sufficient to account for numerical difference, for "two bodies cannot occupy the same place". The passage ends by drawing the further conclusion that men are plural in number due to the plurality of their accidents. We have, therefore, what looks like three different theories or at least three different statements of the same theory of the source of numerical difference. 68 The first explains numerical difference in terms of "variety of accidents", the second in terms of "place", and the third in terms of "plurality of accidents". In order to distinguish the first from the third we would have to assume that Boethius accepts a distinction between variety (varietas) and plurality (pluralitas). One may want to argue that a variety involves not only quantitative but also qualitative differences among the members of the group, while plurality may only entail quantitative differences. But although such a distinction seems plausible prima facie, when applied to accidents it loses all its plausibility. For it might not be easy to argue that there can be a plurality of qualitatively similar accidents in the same subject. 69 For example, that Socrates may have many heights or colors of hair, etc. simultaneously (or even successively). If there is no distinction between variety and plurality of accidents, then we are left only with two theories. One advocates numerical difference on the basis of variety of accidents, another on the basis of place. But again here it is not clear that we have two distinct theories. For Boethius introduces place after he introduces variety of accidents and only , it seems, in order to leave no doubt as to the effectiveness of a theory of numerical difference based on the variety of accidents. It is clear from the passage that place is a sufficient condition of numerical difference even if other accidents are not , but it is not at all clear that it is a necessary condition. This brings to the fore two important aspects in the formulation of the view. First is that the extension of numerical difference is not specified. On the one hand , it seems that Boethius restricts it to corporeal beings since (1) not only does he not discuss other types of beings here , but (2) place, which is given as the only sufficient condition of numerical difference, characterizes only material beings. Moreover, (3) God, who 100

is of course not material, is explicitly excluded from the set of numerically different beings. He is not numerically different because he has no accidents: In God there is no diversity , no plurality arising out of diversity , no multiplicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number. 70 God, as a simple being, can have no number, for he is neither a this nor a that, unlike a man, for example , who is a body and a soul and his accidents. 7 1 But, on the other hand, there does not seem to be any prima facie reason why spiritual creatures should not be individual. Indeed, there are theological and philosophical reasons which seem to support this view . Unfortunately , Boethius tells us nothing about them in this respect, although the alternatives are limited. If they are to be considered as numerically different from other creatures, then they must be held to be so on account of accidents other than place, since being spiritual they do not occupy space. On this point Boethius' answer would seem to be quite definite, since he explicitly ruled out any distinctions among spiritual beings on the basis of place: "For it is a canon of absolute truth that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences and not by place". 72 But this does not commit him to hold that spiritual beings are or are not numerically different. At first the view that spiritual beings are indeed subject to numerical distinction and tp.at they are so due to accidents other than place seems plausible enough, but under scrutiny it appears weak. For, as pointed out in the introductory chapter, there appears to be no good reason why two beings cannot share all their accidents , particularly when they share, as Boethius holds, their substantial features. Why should angel A , for example, not have all accidents that angel B has, when A and B are both angels? Moreover, as a hypothesis about what Boethius might have held on this matter, it is probable. For Boethius himself seems quite well aware of the fact that all accidents except place might be shared simultaneously by several numerically different beings. In fact, this is the very reason why he seems to point to place as a sufficient condition of numerical difference. A second alternative is to interpret Boethius as holding that spiritual beings are not numerically differentiated within species at all, and that whatever differences there are among them are due to the species, i. e. they are the result of specific features. This in fact makes each spiritual being a unique being different from others specifically , not numerically. Spiritual being A , for example, is different from spiritual being B in the same way dogs are different from cats, not in the way a dog is different from another dog. Now, what makes this interpretation plausible is that it was adopted by other medieval authors, such as Thomas Aquinas, who was well acquainted with Boethius and wrote an important commentary on De Trinitate, where he dwells extensively on the issues surrounding numerical difference and individuality. 73

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Accidents as such, therefore, do not constitute a sufficient condition of numerical difference among corporeal beings. Only place plays this role. What place is, however, Boethius does not specify clearly. One would have expected him to have in mind the Aristotelian notion of place as "the innermost motionless boundary of what contains" (Physics, IV, ch. 4 , 212 a 20) . For according to this definition place cannot be shared, since each body has a boundary of its own , determined by its matter and shape. But the statement that we find in De Trinitate is quite different. According to it, place is more a relational, extrinsic accident than an intrinsic feature. As Boethius puts it: " . . . for this predicate [ of place] simply declares how far a man is given a particular setting amid other things". 74 This interpretation of place as position obviously creates serious problems for the theory. In spite of this, however, it was enthusiastically adopted by some early medieval authors, as we shall see in the following chapter. Part of the evidence Boethius provides in support for this view of the basis of numerical difference brings out another important point. The evidence is that one can always leave out of consideration all accidents belonging to numerically different things, but as long as one considers place, the things in question will appear to have a difference, a place of their own, which will distinguish them from each other. From this it may be inferred that place could serve another function in addition to being the cause or principle of the numerical difference between things; it could also be the cause of our recognition of numerical difference , i. e . of the discernibility of numerically different things as numerically different . Boethius does not call place a necessary cause or condition of this discernibility, but he clearly states that apart from all other accidents it will serve this role. And that is equivalent to having said that it is indeed a sufficient condition. Therefore, we might infer that he probably thought numerical difference could be discerned on the basis of all sorts of accidents, but if all of these failed to establish it, place would be sufficient to do so. It should be noted, however, that it is not at all clear that Boethius distinguished between the issue concerned with the principle or cause of discernibility of numerical difference and the issue concerned with the principle or cause of numerical difference. Indeed , if at all, he seems not to make a distinction between them , something which is concordant with his general attitude toward metaphysical and epistemological issues, as we saw earlier. Boethius' view as contained in the cited passage of De Trinitate is not complex. In fact, it is based on common sense. Its difficulty comes from the unsystematic use of terminology . The two basic notions he uses are "unity" and '"plurality" , since it is these two that seem to create a conflict in the doctrine of the Trinity ; it is their understanding that is at stake .

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Unity is to be understood through indifference (indifferentia), which is called sameness (idem, the same) later in the passage. That is, any two things are said to be the same ( or one) when they are not different with respect to something. Socrates and Aristotle are the same with respect to their natures because they both are men; they are the same in that they are men. But not all sameness is of this sort. Things can be the same, according to Boethius, in three ways: generically, specifically and numerically, depending on whether that in which they are the same is a generic, specific or numerical feature. Plurality, on the other hand, is to be understood through the notion of difference (differentia), which in turn is called diversity (diversum, diverse) later in the passage. Any two things are said to be different when they are different with respect to something, that is, when they have something in which they differ. Socrates and a horse, for example, are different in that they have different natures. Corresponding to the three types of sameness there are three kinds of differences: generic, specific and numerical. Boethius, however , is not content to leave the matter concerning numerical difference at that. Since unity is explained in terms of the absence of a difference, Boethius seems to imply that plurality must be explained in terms of the presence of a difference, even if he does not explicitly say so. If there are two things instead of one, there must be something in which they differ. They can do so in substantial form if they differ generically or specifically. But in what do they differ if they do not differ substantially? The answer is that they differ in accidents and of these, if nothing else, in place. What makes two things two, then, whether they belong or not to the same species - that is irrelevant - is their accidents and in particular their place. Moreover, accidents and place seem to be also the means through which we discern two things as two. In terms of the framework developed in the introductory chapter , we can summarize the doctrine of De Trinitate as follows: 1. Intension ofindividuality The text contains no reference to individuality ( or particularity or singularity) at all. It discusses numerical difference, plurality, and to a certain extent numerical unity or sameness, but it does not attempt to explain what this unity is. Nor does it refer to indivisibility or distinguish explicitly between plurality, numerical difference and individuality. The intension of numerical difference is explained elsewhere, in the Commentary on the "/sagoge ", as we saw above. 2. Extension ofindividuality It is not explicitly discussed. Even the extension of numerical difference goes largely without mention. From the examples he gives and what he 103

says about God, however, it may be inferred that material substances in general and human substances in particular are subject to number, while God is not. We are not told anything about other types of spiritual substances or about accidents, although it is plausible to infer that they are not subject to numerical difference.

3. Ontological status ofindi viduality It is not mentioned directly. Indirectly, however, we are told that number (considered as the unity of each numerically distinct substance) is real. But this is not elaborated. 4. Principle ofindividuation It is not discussed. On the other hand, the principle of numerical difference of substances is identified as the variety of accidents, presumably the set of accidents belonging to a substance, and ultimately place. No principle of individuation or of numerical difference of accidents is identified. 5. Discernibility ofindividuals It is not discussed. But the source of the discernibility of numerically distinct substances seems to be the same as the source of numerical difference. There is no mention of the discernibility of numerically distinct accidents. 6. Function of proper names and indexicals Nothing is said about this issue. A comparison of the views presented in the two editions of the Commentary on the "/sagoge", the Commentary on the "Categories", the two editions of the Commentary on "De interpretatione", and De Trinitate yields the following results:

1. Intension ofindividuality The Commentary on the "/sagoge" can be interpreted as presenting at least four different views of individuality: Individuality as (a) i ndivisibility into generic or specific parts, (b) impredicability of others , (c) indivisibility into integral parts, and (d) non-transferability. A common feature of all individuals also added is division. This Commentary also discusses what numerical difference is, but its relation to individuality is not specified, unless, of course, Boethius meant his comments about division to be taken as referring to numerical difference. If this is the case , then numerical difference (as division) accompanies all individuals. It is very much like a property of individuals, i. e. , a feature 104

which they all have, but which does not enter into their definition. The Commentary on the "Categories" is the only text of Boethius where he explicitly makes a distinction between individuality, which is understood as indivisibility into species and other individuals, and particularity, which is conceived as impredicability. The first edition of the Commentary on "De interpretatione" presents a view equivalent to the second view given in the Commentary on the "/sagoge", and the understanding of particularity in the Commentary on the "Categories". But the second edition views individuality metaphysically as incommunicability. This is equivalent to the third view ( d) and may be related to the first view (a) of the Commentary on the "/sagoge". In De Trinitate, on the other hand, there is no discussion of individuality, and numerical difference is discussed but no clear analysis of it is given. The result of all this is that we are left in the dark as to the exact relation between individuality and numerical difference. From what Boethius says one could hold any of three interpretations. In the first place, since he seems to regard the principle of individuation and the principle of numerical difference as the same or at least very similar, one could infer that he also regards individuality and numerical difference as cointensional and coextensional or at least as closely related . Alternatively, based on what he says about division (which may be the distinguishing feature of numerically different entities) as being common to ail individuals and the fact that he does not include it in the definition of individuality, one may want to view him as holding that numerical difference is a sort of property resulting from individuality and therefore coextensional but not cointensional with it. And finally, from his view in the Commentary on the "lsagoge" that spiritual substances are individual but, as inferred from De Trinitate, not numerically different, one may want to see a further distinction between individuality and numerical difference, making the second a feature of only some individuals. But which of these interpretations is correct? It is impossible to know with certainty, since the evidence for either of them is very inconclusive. In addition, it is clear from the Commentaries that Boethius does not draw a clear distinction there between individuality and singularity, although in the Commentary on the "Categories" he distinguishes individuality from particularity. Moreover, from De Trinitate it is clear that plurality within a species is the result of the numerical difference among the members of the species. Plurality and numerical difference are thus implicitly distinguished, but their exact intensional and extensional relationship remains obscure. 2. Extension of individuality In the Commentary on the "/sagoge" both primary material substances

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(including human ones) and their features (generic , specific and accidental) are regarded as individual , and this is confirmed in the Commentary on the "Categories". Purely spiritual substances seem likewise to be regarded as individual , although it is not clear whether Boethius actually held that view , since he does not explicitly state it . In the Commentary on "De interpretatione" individuality seems to extend to what Aristotle called primary substances and to the proper properties (my terminology) of each , such as Platonity in Plato . Other features of things seem to be regarded as universal except for those accidents which are said to be present in a subj ect and , therefore , not predicable of other subj ects . In De Trinitate nothing is said about the extension of individuality , but something is said indirectly about numerical difference . Material substances , including human substances (not j ust minds) , are numerically different . God , on the other hand , is not . There is strong evidence to conclude that other purely spiritual substances do not differ numerically , which would imply , then , a lack of plurality within their species - each angel would comprise a whole species . B ut this is , of course , not explicit in the text of Boethius . Moreover , although Boethius draws an explicit conceptual distinction between particularity and individuality and up to a certain extent an implicit distinction between these and numerical difference in the logical works , there does not seem to be any extensional distinction between them . One last point not brought up before : In Contra Eutychen, while discussing the nature of substance , Boethius states that "individuals not only subsist , but also substand" , that is , they have both subsistence and substance , ""for they need accidents in order to be" . 75 This seems to suggest , contrary to what he says in most works we have discussed , that individuality extends only to substances . Indeed , that seems to have been the way in which some of Boethius' followers understood it, as we shall see later . This is , of course , supported by the Commentary on "De interpretatione ".

3. Ontological status ofindividuality Nothing very clear is said in the Commentary on the "Jsagoge " about this

beyond the talk of "the property of individuals" , which seems to be identified with a bundle of accidents . In the Commentary on the "Cate­ gories " we are told only that particularity (and hence individuality since they are coextensional) is nothing in particular things . The Commentary on "De interpretatione ", on the other hand , suggests that individuals are both qualities ( also called properties) of a sort (ex . Platonity) and the substances in which those qualities are present ( ex. Plato) , but it does not clarify the status of these qualities or how and whether individuality is to be distinguished from individuals or from their components . In De Trinitate it is added that one kind of number is real and constitutes a sort of unity .

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4. Principle ofindividuation In the Commentary on the ''Isagoge" two views of individuation of substances may be present : an accidental view, in which the individuality of individual accidents individuates the substance and a bundle view in ' which the uniqueness of a set of features considered as a whole' is responsible for the individuation of the substance. Accidents themselves as well as other properties and features are individuated by the substance, a point which is reiterated in the Commentary on the "Categories". In De Trinitate no principle of individuation is given, but the principle of numerical difference is identified as the variety of accidents belonging to the substance and, in the last analysis, as place. And this can also be interpreted as an accidental or as a bundle view . The Commentary on " De interpretatione" says nothing about this issue. 5. Discernibility ofindividuals In both the Commentary on the "Isagoge" and De Trinitate it seems that Boethius makes no distinction between the principle of individuation (or numerical difference in De Trinitate) and the principle of discernibility of individuals (or of numerically different beings in De Trinitate). Consequently, they could be regarded as the same. The Commentary on "De interpretatione" and the Commentary on ihe "Categories" have nothing on this issue. 6. Function ofproper names and indexicals Nothing is said about this issue in De Trinitate or the Commentary on the "Categories". The Commentary on "De interpretatione" suggests only that individual terms such as 'Plato' and 'Platonity' have clear reference, while universal terms do not . The Commentary on the ''Isagoge" mentions only that proper names and what are nowadays called definite descriptions can be used to refer to individuals.

VI. Conclusions As a few concluding remarks, something must be said concerning the value of Boethius' discussion of individuality. Philosophically, Boethius' views have limited value today. In the first place, he does not seem to have been aware of the various issues which surround the notion of individuality as distinct issues. Indeed, some may want to argue that he was not aware of any issue at all, since he did not give any of them separate consideration. But that is too strong. For clearly he was puzzled about the notion of individuality in his Commentary on the "Isagoge", at 107

least enough to try to distinguish several senses of it, and in the Commentary on the "Categories" he distinguished it from particularity. Yet , it is true that he did not distinguish the issue concerning the principle of individuation and the issue of discernibility. And he did not explicitly address the ontological , extensional and logical issues. In the second place, even the solutions given when he identified an issue were given without indication of their relation and value. One such case concerns the manyfold interpretation of individuality presented in the two editions of the Commentary on the "Isagoge". And perhaps even more serious , in some cases the solutions were stated in such a way that they are open to conflicting interpretations. For example, the cases of the principle or cause of individuation and the extension of individuality. On the other hand, one must recognize that he keeps some of the terminology separate - for example, 'numerical distinction' , 'particularity' , and 'individuality' , - although this is not done consistently . Moreover , he clearly discussed questions concerning the principle of individuation and discernibility , a · fact which has escaped many philosophers , including perhaps even Aristotle. 76 In addition , he is perhaps the only author of this period who held a view of individuality as incommunicability - another term for non­ instantiability, as we saw in Chapter I -, even though he did not sufficiently develop it or distinguish it carefully from other views he had presented elsewhere. And he clearly pointed out that impredicability was a result of incommunicability (or non-transferability , as he called it in the pertinent passage). This and his distinction between individuality and particularity are indications that Boethius was moving in the direction of a clear distinction between logic and metaphysics , or to put it more precisely, between the logical and metaphysical approaches to individuality, and that he gave preference to the metaphysical one. But this assessment , of course, assumes that impredicability is a primarily logical notion. And this, as we saw above , cannot be taken for granted for Boethius or in fact for anybody in the early Middle Ages. 77 On the other hand, from a historical standpoint , Boethius' strong influence must be recognized. As mentioned earlier , his texts became the source of all subsequent discussions of individuality until the thirteenth century and even after. The value of their influence , however , is another matter , for their effect was not always salutary. It was salutary in that it made medievals aware of some of the philosophical and, more important to them , theological issues raised by individuality. But it was less than salutary because Boethius' texts became the source of much misunderstanding , even though most often he cannot be blamed for it. Let me explain by referring to four areas in which I believe his influence was decisive one way or another. The first concerns the relation between individuality and numerical difference. It is largely a result of Boethius'

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influence that most early medieval writers identified individuality with numerical difference. That they did so was not Boethius' fault, for he kept the terminology separate and never explicitly identified them. He dealt primarily with individuality in the Commentary on the "Isagoge" while in De Trinitate he discussed only numerical difference. Yet he did not explicitly distinguish them or explain their relationship. Moreover, what he says about them, their principles, their discernibility, etc. in these two works ( two of the few philosophical works available to the early Middle Ages) appears so similar that it was very easy to infer that he thought they were both intensionally and extensionally indistinguishable. Indeed, it may be because of this that later authors regard the cause or principle of both as the same in some of their texts. 78 The second area concerns two different approaches to individuality that became quite common in the early Middle Ages. The first is a largely metaphysical approach which views individuality as a feature of things in the world. Those who adopt this approach devise various theories, both about the nature and causes or principles of individuality, which are clearly metaphysical. The second is primarily a logical approach in which individuality is posed as a feature of words or concepts. As such, those who adopt this perspective develop views about the nature and principles of individuality which are largely logical in character. The first group might ask, for example, what it is that makes the man Socrates individual. The second group might ask, on the other hand, how does the proper name 'Socrates' function in the language and how it signifies. These two approaches can be traced directly to Boethius even though, as we saw above, it is not at all clear that he regarded them as different and or incompatible. Indeed, as pointed out in the first chapter, there is no incompatibility between them and a comprehensive view of individuality should use both. The first of these approaches comes out of Boethius' understanding of an individual as a real entity whose individuality is the result of the accidental features which characterize it ( as presented in the Commentary on the "/sagoge"), or as an entity whose individuality consists in its incommunicability ( as stated in the second edition of the Commentary on "De interpretatione" and suggested in the Commentary on the "/sagoge"). The second results from Boethius' understanding of an individual as "what is not predicable of many" or just "impredicable" (also in the Commentary on the "/sagoge", the Commentary on the "Categories", and the first edition of the Commentary on "De interpretatione"). The notion of predication may be interpreted as primarily logical ( even though it is questionable whether Boethius regarded it as such, as has been repeatedly stated above) and later logicians, such as Abailard, used it primarily in connection with words (and/or concepts), not things. As a consequence, they tended to treat 109

individuality as a feature of words (and/or concepts). This dichotomy between a metaphysical and a logical approach acquired further support from the fact that in De Trinitate the approach is exclusively metaphysical, while in the Commentary on the "lsagoge" (the Commentary on the "Categories" was seldom used in this connection) it is primarily logical or at most mixed. Those who, then, commented on De Trinitate were inclined to follow a metaphysical approach and those who dealt with the Commentary on the "Jsagoge" tended to use a primarily logical approach. The Commentary on "De interpretatione" tended to be ignored, as stated above, and, therefore, does not seem to have had a substantial impact one way or the other with regard to this issue. And the Commentary on the "Categories", besides not presenting a clear view in either case, was also neglected. It should be repeated, however, that these aproaches are not exclusive and/or incompatible. Indeed, a complete view of individuality must use both, although it must also distinguish them. However, the fact is that in the early Middle Ages either they tended to be separate, even if they may not have been regarded as such, or they were confused. We shall see, for example, that Abailard used primarily the logical approach, although his view on that seems to entail a metaphysical view as well, which, however, he never fully developed in the texts which have survived. The third area of Boethian influence can be seen in the subsequent medieval views concerning the principle of individuation. For it became standard procedure after Boethius to hold accidents , considered as a set or in particular (place), as a principle or cause of individuation, and substance as the individuator of accidents. Almost everyone until Abailard seems to have held a version of this view , and even after Abailard's serious criticisms there are authors, such as Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, who will hold modified versions of the Boethian position. 79 Indeed, it is not until the fourteenth and later centuries that most major figures, such as Scotus, Ockham and Suarez , abandon this view altogether. 80 Finally, the fourth area concerns the fact that Boethius did not distinguish clearly between the epistemological issue concerning the principle or cause of discernibility of individuals and the metaphysical issue concerning the principle or cause of individuation. As we saw, Boethius seems to talk about both of these issues , but either he does not wish to separate them in any clear way or is unable to do so. As a result, most medieval authors ( Gilbert of Poitiers is a rare exception to th is) continued to treat them as one in most instances. Only later in the M i �d le Ages do we find a consistent and prolonged attempt to deal with these l wo problems separately , although the epistemic issue was never regarded as important as the metaphysical one. 8 1 This is, of course, only to be

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expected of an age which had no place for epistemology as a separate science. In the next two chapters we shall see how Boethius' influence molded early medieval discussions of individuality. I have arranged the discussion according to the two textual traditions which came out of Boethius. The immediately following chapter deals with the views of John Eriugena, Odo of Tours, Theirry of Chartres, and Gilbert of Poitiers , all of whom, except for Odo, commented on Boethius' De Trinitate and adopted a primarily metaphysical approach to individuality. They also adopted versions of what I shall call "the Standard Theory of Individuality" , based largely on Boethius' thought. This is followed by a chapter on Abailard and John of Salisbury. Abailard is the most distinguished exponent of those who commented on Porphyry's Isagoge, using Boethius' translation and Commentary. He used a primarily logical approach to individuality and was a sharp critic of some of the basic tenets of the Standard Theory. Notes 1

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I would like to express my appreciation to Eleonore Stump for reading an early draft of this chapter and for bringing to my attention a number of ambiguities and problems present in the text . In "lsagoge" Porphyrii commentorum editio secunda, ed. Samuel Brandt , in Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, vol . XXXXVIII (Vienna: Tempsky , 1906; rep . New York : Johnson Rep. Corp . , 1 966) , p . 135 ; PL 64 , 7 1 . The high regard with which Boethius' translations and commentaries were held by early medieval authors can be illustrated by the eloquent statement of Cassiodorus : Boethius , he says , "was so eminent in translating the art of logic or dialectic, and in the mathematical disciplines, that he equalled or excelled the ancient authors". Ordo generis Cassiodorum , in CCSL, vol . XCVI, p . 5 ; quoted by Jonathan Barnes , "Boethius and the Study of Logic'' , in Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 1 981 ) , p. 74 . And as we shall see later (Ch . III , n. 2 1 ) , Eriugena regarded him as "the best of all Latin and Greek philosophers". For an excellent discussion of the influence of Boethius' logical works which incorporates and corrects the work of Isaac and others, see Osmund Lewry , "Boethian Logic in the Medieval West", in Boethius: His Life . . . , pp . 90---134. On p. 104 he writes: "The Boethian commentaries may , then , have been most copied in the eleventh and twelfth centuries , before the new logic and the glosses of later masters were added to the literature of logic , and before the use of the universities" . The preference for Aristotle over Boethius is revealed by John of Salisbury's words : "For the rest , much could be brought against those who through attachment to the past shun the more rigorous books of Aristotle, being satisfied for the most part by Boethius alone" . (Metalogicon IV , 27, ed . C. C. I. Webb, Oxford , 1 929 , p . 1 40; cited by Lewry , p . 1 1 0) . The newly translated works of Aristotle and his Greek commentators, such as Simplicius and Ammonius, slowly replaced some of Boethius' texts, although his infl uence never ceased completely .

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The importance of Boethius' texts in the development of some philosophical issues is well recognized . B. Haureau's judgment last century is still largely unchallenged . See Histoire de la philosophie scolastique, vol . I, (Paris, 1872) , pp . 42 ff. We shall see a good example of this in Ch. III , when Gilbert of Poi tiers feels forced to use Boethius' expressions even though he disagrees with them . He solves this predicament by interpreting Boethianformulae in a way which is clearly different from both their literal and intended meaning. See the text given in n . 135 in particular. Thomas' interpretation of individuality as a kind of difference in his Commentary on Boethius' "De Trinitate " is influenced by Boethius' own views . See my comments in Suarez . . . , pp . 5-6 and the corresponding footnotes . The edition of Boethius' two editions of his Commentary to Porphyry 's ''Isagoge " is that of Brandt , found in the volume of the Vienna Corpus cited in n . 2 . The first edition will be abbreviated as CI-I henceforth , and the second edition as CI-2. References to Migne's edition in the PL will also be given. For the Commentary on the "Categories " we shall use the edition found in Patrologia latina 64 , 1 59-294. References to the two editions of the Commentary on "De iterpretione " will be to the Patrologia latina 64 , 294-640 and to Meiser's ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1877-80) . References to De Trinitate (henceforth DD will be to the Latin edition contained in H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand , Boethius, The Theological Tractates (Cambridge , Mass . and London : Harvard Univ . Press and W. Heinemann , 1968 rep . of the 1 9 1 8 ed . ; in the Loeb Classical Lib . series) . For a recent study and complete bibliography of Boethius see Luca Obertello , Severino Boezio, 2 vols. (Genova : Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere , 1974) . My review of this text appeared in Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (I 975 ) , 523-525 . According to Marenbon, the first commentary on the /sagoge. based on a transla t ion of Marius Victorinus , was generally ignored and the second commentary received attention only after the tenth century . Likewise , Boethius' Commentary on the ''Categories '' seems to have received scant attention before the eleventh and t\.i:clfth centuries . See From the Circle ofAlcuin to the School ofA uxerre, ch . 1 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 198 1 ) , pp. 17-18. See also n . 4 above . In the thirteenth century , for example , most important figures were paying considerable attention to De Trinitate while the Commentaries were subj ect to less attention , even though some authors , such as Thomas Aquinas , commented on some of them . Of course , another reason for this partial neglect was that thirteenth century scholastics were occupied with all the newly translated texts from Aristotle and other ancients . See Marenbon , op. cit. , p. 19 and also Lewry , art. cit. CI-2, p. 167 ; PL 64 , 86 : ''quorum diiudicare sententias aptum esse non duxi , altioris enim est philosophiae . idcirco uero studiosius Aristotelis sententiam executi sumus , non quod earn maxime probaremus , sed quod hie liber ad Praedicamenta conscriptus est , quorum Aristoteles est auctor" . To explain an author's views within his general framework is simply a question of good scholarship, but to adopt his views is an entirely different matter. Bocthius seems to confuse the two . This is not surprising since the lsagoge is an introduction to Aristotle's Categories, which deals primarily with universal terms . What the Isagoge does is to explain the predicables , i . e . the ways in which these universal terms (or predicates) are predicated of the subject . The predicables, according to Porphyry , were five : genus , species , difference , property and accident ; "individual " was not one of them. The list differed from Aristotle's. See A. C. Lloyd , "Neo-Platonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic" , Phronesis 1 ( 1955) , 155 ff. As stated in the introductory chapter these three terms have the same subject , but they signify it in different ways . E. W. Warren , in his translation of the Isagoge (Toronto: PIMS, 1 975 , pp . 30-3 1 , n . 19) distinguishes them thus: ''There are three terms used in the text for individuals and particulars: �hoµov , 'ihmornv , and xma µEQXOS. By far the most frequent is

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arnµov , uncuttable . . . Boethius translates [ them as] individuum, singulare, and particulare. 'Individual' refers to the undivided or indivisible and is usually applied to space­ time objects , but the metaphor would allow the term to be applied to God who is both undivided and indivisible . Arnµov indicates that the integrity and wholeness of the object l ies in its cohesiveness but does not necessarily make clear the kind of whole referred to . In its reference to the space-time individual it indicates what can no longer be divided in existence without its destruction . 'Singular' involves a linear metaphor of things set side by side , one after another, each having independent existence . 'Particular' , on the other hand , connotes the smallest part of division of the circle of being which has independent existence'' . In the Isagoge Porphyry does not make any attempt to distinguish these terms. Indeed , he seems to use them interchangeably . He also calls things that are individual ''numerically different" . See , for example, Porphyry's text as translated by Boethius in C/2, pp. 1 88 and 295 (PL 64, 94 , 1 38) ; in L . Minio-Paluello's edition in Aristoteles latinus (henceforth A L ) vol . I, 6-7 , Categoriarum supplementa (Bruges-Paris: Desclee de Brower , 1 966) , pp . 7 and 22-23 . Since Boethius' translation and understanding of Porphyry's text is the most pertinent for our purposes and the one which had most influence , CI-2 will be used for all references to Porphyry . CI-2, p. 1 83 (PL 64 , 92 ; AL, p . 7): "Eorum enim quae praedicantur, alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut indiuidua ut Socrates et hie et hoc, alia uero de pluribus . . . " See also CI2, p . 1 94 (PL 64, 97 ; A L p . 8) . CI-2, pp . 23 1 and 234-235 (PL 64 , 1 12 and 1 14; A L, pp. 13-14) : "dicitur enim generalissimum quidem de omnibus sub se generibus speciebusque et de indiuiduis, genus autem quod ante specialissimum est , de omnibus specialissimis et de indiuiduis, solum autem species de omnibus indiuiduis, indiuiduum autem de uno solo particulari. indiuiduum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc album et hie ueniens, ut Sophronisci filius , si sol us ei sit Socrates filius . . . Indiuidua ergo dicuntur huiusmodi , quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unum quodque eorum, quarum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit. Socratis enim proprietates numquam in alio quolibet erunt particularium " . CI-2, p . 228 (PL 64 , 1 1 1 ; A L, p. 12) : "particularibus autem unus . . . plures ; diuisiuum est enim semper quod singulare est . . . " We shall see later that as late as the twelfth century John of Salisbury complained bitterly about those who wanted to restrict predication to terms and/or concepts when in fact Aristotle himself accepted the predication of things . See reference to the pertinent text, in Ch . IV. The term 'property' in Porphyry's text is non-technical ; it simply means "characteristic" or "feature " . This is not an unusual usage , as we shall see . In the thirteenth century , some authors, such as Thomas Aquinas, used the term 'accident' generically in a similar way . See De ente et essentia, ch . 6. The interpretation of Porphyry as holding the individual to be a unique bundle of properties is standard in the literature . See A . C. Lloyd , art. cit. , p. 158 , and P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, vol . 2 (Paris : Etudes Augustiniennes , 1968) , p. 99, n . 4. See also E. A . Moody, The Logic ofWilliam ofOckham (New York : Russell and Russell , 1 965), p . 73 . These and other similar examples (Plato, this man , this thing, this house , this ox) are repeated elsewhere. CI-2, pp. 1 88, 206, 21 1 , 286 (PL 64, 94, 102, 104, l32 ; A L, pp. 7, 9, 10, 20) . CI-I, p . 47 (PL 64, 29) : "sed quoniam sub speciebus singillatim indiuidua sunt - indiuidua autem uocamus quae in nullas species neque in aliquas iam alias partes diuidi possunt , ut est Cato uel Plato uel Cicero et quicquid hominum singulorum est ; . . . hominem uero ipsum singulum, id est Ciceronem , in null us alios distribuere possum us atque ideo a:wµov, id est individuum , uocitatum est" . CI-1, p . 49 (PL 64, 30) : " indiuidua uero quoniam sub se nihil habent ubi secari distri-

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buique possint, ad nihil aliud praedicantur nisi ad se ipsa, quae singula atque una sunt" . C/-J , pp. 8 1-82 (PL 64 , 47-48) : "natura autem indiuiduorum haec est , quod proprietates indiuiduorum in solis singulis indiuiduis constant et in nullis aliis transferuntur atque ideo de nullis aliis praedicantur. Ciceronis enim proprietas cuiuslibet modi fuerit, neque in Catonem neque in Brutum neque in Catulum aliquando conueniet . at uero proprietates hominis quae sunt idem quod est rationale , mortale , , risibile , in pluribus et in omnibus indiuiduis possunt et singulis conuenire . omnis enim homo et singulatim indiuiduus et rationalis est et mortalis et sensibilis et risibilis . atque ideo ilia quorum proprietates possunt aliis conuenire , possunt de aliis praedicari , haec autem quorum proprietas in aliis non conuenit , nisi ipsis tan tum singulariter, de aliquibus aliis praeter se singulariter praedicari non possunt . Repetendum est igitur quod omne indiuiduum specie continetur . . . indiuiduum uero pars semper est , numquam est totum. species autem et pars et totum merito nuncupatur, nam ad genus pars est , ad indiuidua tot um ; diuidit enim genus . . . et indiuidua colligit". The distinction between a generic whole (totum genericum) and an integral whole (totum integrum) and the corresponding distinction between generic parts and integral parts is to be found in De differentiis topicis, B k . 11; PL 64, 1 1 88 B-C. Eleonore Stump brought to my attention both this text and the favorable interpretation of Boethius' text in the Isagoge that may be derived from it. In her book , Boethius' "De topicis differentiis " (Ithaca, New York : Cornell , 1978) , the translated passage appears on p. 5 1 . Integral parts are very similar to what Boethius calls proper parts (partes proprias) in C/-2, p. 154 . Scholastics regularly followed this procedure in the latter part o f the Middle Ages. See my Suarez . . . pp . 2 ff. See the third text from Boethius cited in the section which discusses the Commentary on the "Categories". CI-1, p. 19 (PL 64, 16) : ''et primas substantias dicit [i . e . , Aristoteles) esse indiuiduorum corporum et singulorum , ut est Cicero aut Plato aut Socrates'' . This is reported as Aristotle's view , however . Although primary substances seem to be individual for Boethius , not all substances are such . In Contra Eutychen (Loeb, p. 84) , Boethius divides substances into universal and particular: "Vniuersales [ substantiae] sunt quae de singulis praedicantur ut homo, animal , lapis, lignum ceteraque huiusmodi quae uel genera uel species sunt ; nam et homo de singulis hominibus et animal de singulis animalibus lapisque ac lignum de singulis lapidibus ac lignis dicuntur . Particularia [ substantiae] uero sunt quae de aliis minime praedicantur ut Cicero , Plato , lapis hie unde haec Achillis statua facta est , lignum hoc unde haec mensa composita est". And , while commenting on Aristotle 's Categories, he accepts the distinction between primary and secondary substances (PL 64 , 182 B-C) : "Facit autem quandam substantiarum divisionem cum di cit , alias prim as esse substantias , alias secundas ; . . . Sunt ergo primae substantiae quae neque in subjecto sunt , neque de subj ecto dicuntur, ut est Socrates vel Plato . Hi enim quoniam substantiae sunt , in subjecto nullo sunt . Quoniam vero particulares individuique sunt , ne nulla subj ecto praedicantur. Secundae vero substantiae sunt , quibus commune est cum primis substantiis , quod in subj ecto non sunt , proprium vero quod de subjecto praedicantur, quae secundae substantiae sunt universales , ut est homo atque animal ; homo namque et animal in nullo sunt subjecto , sed de subjecto aliquo praedicantur. Sunt igitur primae substantiae particulares , secundae universales " . Impredicability is of course not eq uivalent to "impredicability of many" or to "predicability of only one " , as we shall see later, although many authors in the early part of the medieval period did not distinguish between these notions . See also chapter I, section A-S . It is used by Thomas , Suarez and many others. See Suarez's Disp. V , Sect . I . I n my Suarez . . . , pp . 30 ff.

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C/-2, p . 195 (PL 64 , 97) : "indiuiduum autem pluribus dicitur modis. dicitur indiuiduum quod omnino secari non potest , ut unitas uel mens; dicitur indiuiduum quod ob soliditatem diuidi nequit , ut adamans ; dicitur indiuiduum cuius praedicatio in reliqua similia non conuenit , ut Socrates" . The principle that unity and being are convertible (i . e . coextensive) was widely accepted in Ancient philosophy and universally accepted in the Middle Ages . Boethius formulates it explicitly in Contra Eutychen (Loeb , p. 94) : "Quod enim non est unum, nee esse omnino potest ; esse enim atque unum conuertitur et quodcumque unum est est " . Also in C/-2, p. 1 62 (PL 64, 83) : "omne enim quod est , idcirco est , quia unum est" . For developments in the thirteenth century see my article , "The Convertibility of unum and ens according to Guido Terrena" , Franciscan Studies 33 ( 1973) , 143--170. D T, pp . 1 2-14 : ''Numerus enim duplex est , unus quidem quo numeramus , alter uero qui in rebus numeralibus constat. Etenim unum res est ; unitas , quo unum dicimus. Duo rursus in rebus sunt ut homines uel lapides ; dualitas nihi l , sed tantum dualitas qua duo homines uel duo lapides fiunt . Et in ceteris eodem modo . Ergo in numero quo numeramus repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem ; in rerum uero numero non facit pluralitatem unitatum repetitio , uel si de eodem dicam 'gladius unus mucro unus ensis unus' . Potest enim unus tot uocabulis gladius agnosci ; h aec enim unitatum iteratio potius est non numeratio , uelut si ita dicamus 'ensis mucro gladius' , repetitio quaedam est eiusdem non numeratio diuersorum, uelut si dicam 'sol sol sol ' , non tres soles effecerim , sed de uno totiens praedicauerim" . Elsewhere Boethius repeats this last interpretation . For example, in his Commentary on "De interpretatione" (PL 64, 3 1 8 ) ; see n . 5 1 below . See also the texts cited in n . 27 above . It should be kept in mind, however, that the notion of predicability , as we saw earlier, may not be purely logical for Boethius. Indeed many medievals explicitly rejected such interpretation. For example, John of Salisbury writes in the Metalogicon ( ed. Clemens C. I . Webb , Oxford , 1929, p . 92) : ''Rem d e re predicari monstrum ducunt ; licet Aristotiles monstruositatis huius auctor sit , et rem de re sepissime asserat predicari . . . " For example, following Aristotle ( On Interpretation, ch . 6 ; 17 a 37) Boethius defines the universal as "what is predicable of many" (first ed . of Commentary on "De interpretatione", PL 64, 3 19), but elsewhere he defines the necessary conditions of a genus ( usually identified with the universal) as "that which is common to many individuals" ( 1 ) as a whole , (2) at the same time , and (3) in such a manner that it be able to constitute and form the substance of those things to which it is common ( C/-2, p. 163 ; PL 64 , 83) . In the work cited earlier , Marenbon states with good reason that in Boethius' discussion , "logical terms are loaded with metaphysical and theological implications". (p. 1 ) . Yet even then, the same author will concomitantly hold different views o f individuality or universality depending on the aproach he uses . (See Paul V. Spade's review of Tweedale's book on Abailard, in Nous 14(/ 980) , 479-483. ) What they do not do , generally speaking , is mix these approaches. C/-2, p . 229 (PL 64, 1 12) : "Omnia enim indiuidua disgregatiua sunt et diuisiua . . . " CI-2, pp . 233-234 (PL 64 , 1 1 3-1 14) : "indiuidua autem de singulis praedicantur, ut Socrates et Plato , eaque maxime sunt indiuidua quae sub ostensionem indicationemque digiti cadunt, ut hoc scamnum , hie ueniens atque quae ex aliqua proprie accidentium designantur nota, ut, si quis Socratem significatione uelit ostendere , non dicat 'Socrates' ne sit alius qui forte hoc nomine nuncupetur, sed dicat 'Sophronisci filius' , si unicus Sophronisco fuit . indiuidua enim maxime ostendi queunt , s i uel tacito nomine sensui ipsi oculorum digito tactuue monstrentur, uel ex aliquo accidenti significentur uel nomine proprio , si solus illud adeptus est nomen , uel ex parentibus, si illorum, est unicus filius , uel ex quolibet alio accidenti singularitas demonstratur, eo quod ad esse unam preadicat10nem habeat eiusque dictio non transeat ad alterum , sicut generis quidem ad species, specierum uero ad indiuidua . " The use of the term 'designantur' has led some to see here a possible source of

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later doctrines of "designated" matter. See M . D . Roland-Gosselin , "Le principe de I' individualite" , in Le "Ente et essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin , 1 948) , p . 58. C/-2, p. 193 (PL 64 , 9fr-97) : "et de his quae sub illa sunt indiuiduis . . . differentiae atque accidentis discrepantiam a genere una separatione concludit . " C/-2, pp. 235-236 (PL 64, 1 14) : "at uero indiuiduorum proprietas nulli communis est . Socratis enim proprietas, si fuit caluus , simus, propenso aluo ceterisque corporis lineamentis aut morum institutione aut forma uocis , non conueniebat in alterum ; hae enim proprietates quae ex accidentibus ei obuenerant eiusque formam figuramque coniunxerant , in nullum alium conueniebant. cuius autem proprietates in nullum alium conueniunt, eius proprietates nulli poterunt esse communes, cuius autem proprietas nulli communis est , nihil est quod eius proprietate participet. quod uero tale est , ut proprietate eius nihil participet , diuidi in ea quae non participant, non potest ; recte igitur haec quorum proprietas in alium non conuenit , indiuidua nuncupantur . " C/-2, pp. 1 83-196 (PL 64, 92-93) : "omnium , inquit , quae praedicantur , alia de singularitate, alia de pluralitate dicuntur. de singularitate uero , inquit , praedicantur quaecumque unum quodlibet habent subiectum de quo dici possint, ut ea quibus singula subieta sunt indiuidua , ut Socrates , Plato , ut hoc album quod in hac proposita niue est , ut hoc scamnum in quo nunc sedemus , non omne scamnum - hoc enim uniuersale est-, sed hoc quod nunc suppositum est , nee album quod in niue est - universale est enim album et nix -, sed hoc album quod in hac niue nunc esse conspicitur ; hoc enim non potest de quolibet alio albo praedicari quod in hac niue est , quia ad singularitatem deductum est atque ad indiuiduam formam constrictum est indiuidui participatione . . . ut enim de niue dictum est , illud album quod in hac subiecta niue est, non est communiter accidens , sed proprie huic niui quae oculis ostensionique subiecta est . . . - Socrates enim animal est -, ipsum animal fit indiuiduum , quoniam Socrates est indiuiduus ac singularis . item homo de pluribus quidem hominibus praedicatur, sed si illam humanitatem quae in Socrate est indiuiduo consideremus, fit indiuidua , quoniam Socrates ipse indiuiduus est ac singularis. item differentia ut rationale de pluribus dici potest , sect in Socrate indiuidua est . risibile etiam cum de pluribus hominibus praedicetur, in Socrate fit unicum . communiter quoque accidens, ut album , cum de pluribus dici possit , in uno quoque singulari perspectum indiuiduum est . " Porphyry ( C/-2, p . 314; PL 64 , 155) : " . . . sed tamen prius est illud cui accidit quam accidens. " And Boethius (p. 315): "oportet enim prius esse cui aliquid accidat , post uero ipsum accidens superuenire ; nam si subiectum non sit quod suscipiat , accidens esse non poterit . . . " The point can also be found in Aristotle's Categories, of course . C/-2, pp . 1 90-191 (PL 64 , 95-96) : "numero enim differre aliquid uidebitur quotiens numerus a numero differt, ut grex boum qui fortasse continet triginta boues, differt numero ab alio boum grege , si centum in se contineat boues ; in eo enim quod grex est , non differunt , in eo quod boues, ne eo quidem: numero igitur differunt , quod illi plures, illi uero sunt pauciores. quomodo igitur Socrates et Plato specie non differunt , sed numero , cum et Socrates unus sit et Plato unus , unitas uero numero ab unitate non differat? sect ita intelligendum quod dictum est numero differentibus , id est in numerando differentibus , hoc est dum numerantur differentibus. cum enim dicimus 'hie Socrates est , hie Plato' , duas fecimus unitates , ac si digito tangamus dicentes 'hie unus est' de Socrate , rursus de Pl atone 'hie unus est' , non eadem unitas in Socrate numerata est quae in Platone . " This explanation is prompted by Porphyry's use of the term 'numerically different' , when he discusses the relation of genus to species . See C/-2, p. 188 . There i s also some support for this inference in Contra Eutychen VI , in Loeb ed . , p . 1 10 . Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor, Bk . I , ch . 2 ( l b5) ; P L 64, 169 . W e use Boethius' Latin translation of the Aristotelian text, since that is what is pertinent for an understanding of Boethius and the history of early medieval thought: "Simpliciter autem

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quae sunt individua et numero singularia, de nullo subj ecto dicuntur: in subjecto autem nihil prohibet horum aliqua esse , quaedam enim grammatica in subj ecto est , de subj ecto autem nullo dicitur . " P L 64, 1 69-1 7 1 : "Omnis enim res aut substantia est, aut accidens, aut universalis , aut particularis . . . nam cum dico homo , rem dixi universalem, idcirco quod nomen hoc de multis individuis praedicatur: cum vero dico Socrates vel Plato , rem dixi particularem ; quoniam Socrates de nudo [ nullo ?] subj ecto dicitur: et accidens quoque eodem modo ; nam cum dixero scientiam , rem protuli universalem , idcirco quod scientia et de grammatica et de rhetorica, et de aliis omnibus sub se positis praedicatur ; si vero dixero Platonis scientiam , quoniam omne accidens quod individua venit individuum fit, particularem scientiam dico , namque Platonis scientia, sicut ipse Plato , particularis est . . . Universale autem est quod aptum est de pluribus praedicari . Particulare vero quod de nullo subj ecto praedicatur . . . Si vero particularis substantiae copulatur, fit substantia particularis, ut est Socrates vel Plato , et quidquid in substantia individuum reperitur . . . Cum vero particularitas accidenti conj ungitur , fit accidens particulare , ut Platonis vel Aristotelis scientia . Fiunt enim quatuor complexiones, substantia universalis, substantia particularis , accidens universale , accidens particulare . . . At vero nee particularitas, nee universalitas in se transeunt. Namque universalitas potest de particularitate praedicari , ut animal de Socrate vel Platone , et particularitas suscipiet universalitatis praedicationem , sed non ut universalitas sit particularitas , nee rursus ut quod particulare est universalitas fiat . . . Particularitas vero quoniam ipsa est rerum ultima et nihil est illi subjectum , de nullo subjecto praedicatur ; nam quoniam universalitas de subj ecto praedicatur, particularitas vero universalitas non est . " I n the translation o f this and the remaining texts from the Commentary o n the "Categories" I have taken some liberties with the verb tenses for the sake of a smoother reading. Posterior A nalytics I, ch . 22 ; 83a2 1 . PL 64, 1 7 1-172 : "Alia autem in subj ecto quidem sunt, de subj ecto autem nullo dicuntur. Nam quod ait in subj ecto sunt , accidens monstrat , quod vero addidit, de subj ecto autem nullo dicuntur, particulare . Accidens enim in subj ecto est , particularitas de nullo subjecto praedicatur. Ergo quaecumque res ipsa quidem in subj ecto est , sed si de nullo subjecto praedicatur, accidens est particulare , ut est de quaedam grammatica , id est Aristarchi , vel alicuj us hominis individua grammatica : ilia enim quoniam individui hominis , ipsa quoque facta est individua et particularis; ergo quoniam quaedam grammatica in anima est , accidens est , et quoniam de nullo subjecto praedicatur, particularis est ; quemadmodum enim ipse Aristarchus de nullo subjecto dicitur, ita quoque ej us grammatica de nullo subjecto praedicatur. Non autem