Introduction to Homeland Security [3 ed.] 2020055239, 2020055240, 9781138588998, 9781032011110, 9780429491962

Introduction to Homeland Security, Third Edition provides the latest developments in the policy and operations of domest

212 82 16MB

English Pages [495] Year 2021

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Authors
1 Introduction to Homeland Security and Emergency Management
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Safety and Security
1.3 Threats Are a Step Away and Often Walk among Us
1.4 Why Homeland Security and Emergency Management?
1.5 What Are Homeland Security and Emergency Management?
1.6 Emergency Management: A Key Element in Homeland Security Operations
1.7 What Are the Threats and Dangers Facing Our Nation?
1.8 When and Where Does Disaster Strike?
1.9 Who Are the Responders, and What Is Their Role?
1.10 The Department of Homeland Security: A Brief Examination
1.11 Chapter Comments and Summary
1.12 Key Terms
1.13 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
2 Vital National Interests and the Defense of the Homeland
2.1 Introduction
2.2 A Brief History and Reflection
2.3 Threats and Challenges to the Nation
2.4 Vital National Interests and Instruments of National Power
2.5 Foundations of a Nation
2.6 Foundations of National Security
2.7 The Monroe Doctrine
2.8 Early Conflicts
2.9 The Early Twentieth Century
2.10 World War II, Challenging the Spread of Communism, Superpower Emergence, and the Competing World Philosophies
2.11 Intelligence and National Security
2.12 World Organizations Promoting Peace: The League of Nations and the United Nations
2.13 Evolution of the Cold War
2.13.1 Containment
2.13.2 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
2.13.3 Containment and Continuation of MAD: Attempts to Isolate the Soviet Union
2.13.4 Small Wars and the Domino Theory
2.13.5 Détente
2.13.6 Rollback
2.13.7 Glasnost
2.14 The Complexity of the Modern World
2.15 After the Cold War and the Emerging of a New World
2.16 Terrorism: Introduction to the New Threat to the United States
2.17 Desert Shield and Desert Storm
2.18 The Shock and Impact of 9/11
2.19 Global War on Terrorism
2.20 Role of the Military in Support of Homeland Security
2.21 Emerging Threats
2.22 Homeland Defense and a New Type of Warfare
2.23 Chapter Comments and Summary
2.24 Key Terms
2.25 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
3 Principal Hazards
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Overview of Domestic Safety and Security
3.3 Major Incidents: A Brief Historical Examination
3.3.1 Natural Disasters
3.3.1.1 New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812
3.3.1.2 Galveston Hurricane of 1900
3.3.1.3 San Francisco Earthquake of 1906
3.3.1.4 Hurricane Katrina
3.3.2 Urban Disasters
3.3.2.1 Chicago Fire of 1871
3.3.2.2 Johnstown Flood of 1889
3.3.3 Industrial Accidents: Domestic and International
3.3.3.1 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911
3.3.3.2 Texas City Explosion of 1947
3.3.3.3 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
3.3.3.4 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
3.3.3.5 1984 Union Carbide Industrial Accident
3.3.3.6 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Explosion
3.3.3.7 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Disaster
3.3.4 Epidemics
3.3.4.1 Yellow Fever Epidemic of the 1800s
3.3.5 Terrorism
3.3.5.1 The 1993 World Trade Center Attack
3.3.5.2 Oklahoma City Bombing of 1995
3.3.5.3 Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
3.4 Today’s Challenges
3.4.1 Droughts
3.4.2 Heat Waves
3.4.3 Tsunamis
3.4.4 Earthquakes
3.4.5 Volcanoes
3.4.6 Tornadoes
3.4.7 Blizzards
3.4.8 Fires
3.4.9 Floods
3.4.10 Hailstorms
3.4.11 Dust Storms
3.4.12 Landslides
3.4.13 Sinkholes
3.4.14 Cyclones
3.4.15 Whirlpools
3.4.16 Limnic Eruptions
3.5 Aftermath of Incidents
3.6 Chapter Comments and Summary
3.7 Key Terms
3.8 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
4 Protection of the Homeland and the Establishment of the United States Department of Homeland Security
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Department of Homeland Security
4.3 The Department of Homeland Security
4.4 Federal Actions and Assistance in Disaster Response and Recovery
4.5 Homeland Security Goals
4.6 Significant Homeland Security Presidential Directives
4.7 Funding and Vision
4.7.1 Safeguarding the Nation’s Transportation Systems
4.7.2 Enhancing Cyber Security and Technology R&D
4.7.3 Strengthening Border Security and Immigration Services
4.7.4 Supporting State Homeland Security Activities
4.8 The Organizational Structure and Mission of the Department of Homeland Security
4.9 Department of Homeland Security Organizational Structuring and Components
4.9.1 Directorate for National Protection and Programs
4.9.2 Directorate for Science and Technology
4.9.3 Directorate for Management
4.9.4 Office of Policy
4.9.5 Office of Health Affairs
4.9.6 Office of Intelligence and Analysis
4.9.7 Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
4.9.8 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
4.9.9 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
4.9.10 Federal Emergency Management Agency
4.9.11 Transportation Security Administration
4.9.12 United States Customs and Border Protection
4.9.13 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
4.9.14 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
4.9.15 United States Coast Guard
4.9.16 United States Secret Service
4.9.17 Office of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
4.9.18 Advisory Panels and Committees
4.10 Future of the Department of Homeland Security
4.11 Chapter Comments and Summary
4.12 Key Terms
4.13 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
5 Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Function and Operations
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Resource Management and Utilization
5.3 A Perspective of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
5.4 Coordination and Standardization: The Backbone of Homeland Security Operations
5.5 Response
5.6 Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Operations Center
5.7 Protect: Disciplines, Functions, Operations
5.8 Intelligence as Related to Homeland Security: An Overview
5.9 Strategic, Near-Term, and Operations Plans and Periods
5.9.1 Strategic Concepts
5.9.2 Near-Term Tactical Concepts
5.10 Concepts of Processes and Procedures
5.10.1 Long-Term Strategic Processes
5.10.2 Near-Term Tactical Processes
5.10.3 Operational Processes
5.11 Summary
5.12 Key Terms
5.13 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
6 The Partnerships of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Why Are Partnerships Important?
6.3 An Overview of Partnerships
6.4 The Whole Community Approach and the Challenges of Building Response Partnerships
6.5 Building and Sustaining Partnerships
6.6 Scope of Work
6.6.1 Emergency Operations Centers and National Response Framework
6.7 Planning, Training, and Equipping Partnerships
6.8 Partnerships
6.8.1 Lessons from the Past: Hurricane Camille
6.9 Nongovernmental Organizations
6.9.1 The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations
6.9.2 Framework for NGOs
6.9.3 Volunteers
6.10 Key Partnerships Organizations
6.10.1 National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
6.10.1.1 NVOAD Core Principles (Disaster, 2020)
6.10.2 Private Business and Industry
6.10.3 Faith-Based Organizations
6.10.4 Community Emergency Response Team
6.10.5 Citizen Corps
6.10.6 The Fire Corps
6.10.7 National Neighborhood Watch
6.10.8 The Medical Reserve Corps
6.10.9 The Civil Air Patrol (U.S. Air Force Auxiliary)
6.10.9.1 Homeland Security Role
6.10.10 The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary
6.10.11 Military Auxiliary Radio System
6.10.12 Local Emergency Planning Committees
6.10.13 The Private Sector
6.11 International, National, and State Military Resources
6.12 Federal Regulations Related to Use of Military Resources
6.12.1 Title 10 of the U.S. Code
6.12.2 Defense Memoranda of Understanding and Agreements
6.12.3 Purchasing Requirements
6.12.4 The Defense Industrial Reserve
6.12.5 U.S. Government Contracts and Foreign Awards
6.13 Summary
6.14 Chapter Comments and Summary
6.15 Key Terms
6.16 Thought and Discussion Questions
References
7 Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Strategies
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Where’s the Threat? The Event for Which We Prepare: Natural Disaster or Man-Made Events?
7.2.1 Natural Disasters
7.2.2 Terrorism and Extremism
7.3 Planning: Strategies and Operations
7.4 Community Response
7.5 State Response
7.6 Federal Response
7.7 Private and Nonprofit Sector
7.8 Special Circumstances
7.9 Planning: The Challenges
7.10 Risk Management and Assessments
7.11 Threat Assessments
7.12 Vulnerability Assessments
7.13 Consequence Assessments
7.14 Federal: Preventing Extremism and Terrorism and Enhancing Security
7.15 Federal: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters
7.16 Federal: Maturing and Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise
7.17 Federal: Comments Regarding the Budget
7.18 Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study
7.19 Chapter Comments and Summary
7.20 Key Terms
7.21 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
8 Disaster Response, Recovery, and Resilience
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Brief Examination of Response and Recovery
8.3 Disaster Response Community Overview
8.4 Command and Control
8.5 Information Management in a Disaster
8.6 The Disaster Frameworks
8.7 The Role of FEMA
8.8 Human Sustenance—Food and Shelter
8.9 Sheltering “In Place”
8.10 NASA Disasters Program
8.11 The Economics of Response and Recovery
8.12 Insurance, Risk, and the Potential of Disaster
8.12.1 Flood Insurance
8.12.2 Fire Insurance
8.13 Disaster Declarations
8.14 Considerations of Response and Recovery
8.15 Chapter Comments and Summary
8.16 Key Terms
8.17 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
9 Domestic Extremism: Threats, Threat Groups, and Terrorism
9.1 Introduction
9.2 What Is Domestic Terrorism?
9.3 Domestic Terrorism: A Short Historical View
9.4 Domestic Terrorism and Threat Groups
9.5 The Radical Right: A Variety of Perspectives
9.6 Supremacy Groups
9.6.1 Ku Klux Klan
9.6.2 Neo-Nazi and Aryan Movement
9.6.3 The Sovereign Citizens Movement
9.6.4 Militias and the Militia Movement
9.6.5 Racist Skinheads
9.6.6 Black Separatists
9.6.7 Patriot Groups
9.6.8 Inspiration, Leaderless Resistance, Phantom Cell, and the Lone Wolf
9.6.9 Right to Life: Revolutionary Reaction to Abortion
9.6.10 Other Organizations That Pose a Domestic Threat
9.6.10.1 Narco-Terrorist Groups along the U.S. Border
9.7 The Radical Left: Ecological and Animal Rights
9.7.1 Antifa and the Return of the Anarchist Movement
9.8 Major Law Enforcement Agencies Battling Terrorism and Hate
9.8.1 Federal Agencies
9.8.2 State, Local, and Tribal Agencies
9.9 Nongovernmental Agencies Battling Terrorism and Hate
9.9.1 Southern Poverty Law Center
9.9.2 The Anti-Defamation League
9.9.3 American Civil Liberties Union
9.10 Chapter Summary
9.11 Key Terms
9.12 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
10 International Terrorism and Extremism: Operations and Sustainment
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Understanding and Defining Terrorism and Extremism
10.3 The Evolution of Terrorism and Extremism: A Brief Historical Perspective
10.3.1 Tyrannicide
10.3.2 Early Examples of the Use of Terror
10.3.2.1 The Zealots
10.3.2.2 The Assassins
10.3.2.3 Thugees or Thugs
10.3.3 Continuation of the Use of Terror
10.3.3.1 Terrorism and the French Revolution
10.3.3.2 Gunpowder Plot (England) of 1605
10.3.4 Terrorism and Extremism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, the Influence of Revolutions and Nationalism, and the Anarchist Movement
10.3.4.1 The Propaganda of Deed and The Catechism of the Revolutionary
10.3.4.2 Russia
10.3.4.3 Bosnia
10.3.4.4 Violence and Extremism in Europe after World War I
10.3.5 Anti-Colonialism, Terrorism, and Extremism after World War II
10.3.5.1 Anti-Colonialism and Terrorism after World War II
10.4 Terrorism and Extremism in the Modern Era
10.5 An Overview of Terrorism and Extremism Internationally Today
10.5.1 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: The Middle East and Afghanistan
10.5.2 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Europe
10.5.2.1 The United Kingdom
10.5.2.2 Germany
10.5.2.3 Spain
10.5.3 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Africa
10.5.3.1 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
10.5.3.2 The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
10.5.4 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Asia
10.5.5 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Central and South America
10.5.5.1 Cuban Revolution (1952–1958)
10.5.5.2 Carlos Marighella
10.5.6 The Tupamaros of Uruguay
10.5.7 Sendero Luminoso
10.5.8 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
10.5.9 Mexico
10.6 Funding of International Terrorism and Extremism
10.6.1 Logistics of Funding Terrorism and Extremism
10.7 Narco-Terrorism
10.8 The Role of the Media and the Use of the Web
10.9 Response Strategies
10.10 Cyber Terrorism
10.11 The Twenty-First Century and the Struggle against Terrorism: Now and the Future
10.12 Operations against the Threat of Terror
10.13 Summary
10.14 Key Terms
10.14.1 Terms
10.14.2 People
10.14.3 Organizations
10.14.4 Events
10.15 Questions and Discussions
References
11 The Role of Intelligence in Homeland Security
11.1 Introduction
11.2 What Is Intelligence?
11.3 Contemplating Intelligence
11.4 The Intelligence Cycle
11.5 The United States Intelligence Community: History
11.5.1 IC History: The Revolutionary War to World War II
11.5.2 IC History: World War II and the Cold War
11.5.3 IC History: Iraq to the Present
11.5.4 IC Success in the Struggle against International Extremism and Terrorism
11.6 The Modern U.S. Intelligence Community
11.7 State and Local Intelligence Efforts
11.7.1 Intelligence-Led Policing/Law Enforcement
11.7.2 Fusion Centers
11.8 Legal Guidelines Pertaining to Intelligence Collection
11.9 Foreign Intelligence Services
11.10 The Function of Intelligence in Homeland Security
11.11 Intelligence Gathering versus Privacy
11.12 Intelligence Challenges for the New Century
11.13 The Intelligence Partnership
11.14 Regional Information-Sharing Systems
11.15 Chapter Comments and Summary
11.16 Key Terms
11.17 Thought and Discussion Questions
References
12 Protecting Our Nation’s Infrastructure: Border and Transportation Security
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Overview: Border and Transportation Security
12.3 An Overview of Transportation Security
12.4 Historical Perspective: Aviation and Aerospace Security
12.5 Modern Perspective: Aviation and Aerospace Security
12.6 Additional Commentary: Aircraft Hijacking
12.7 Historical Perspective: Maritime Security
12.8 Modern Perspective: Maritime Security
12.9 Historical Perspective: Mass Transit and Railway Security
12.10 Modern Perspective: Mass Transit and Railway Security
12.11 Container and Cargo Security
12.12 The Mexican Border and Violence
12.13 Human Trafficking
12.14 Transportation and Border Security Initiatives
12.14.1 Border Permeability
12.14.2 Border Security: Immigration
12.14.3 Border Security: Searches
12.14.4 Border Security: U.S.-Mexican Border Fence
12.14.5 Border Security: Aviation Surveillance and Reconnaissance
12.15 Small Vessel Security Strategy
12.16 Federal Flight Deck Officers
12.17 Terrorist Watch List and the No-Fly List
12.18 Legislation Pertaining to Transportation and Border Security
12.18.1 The Magnuson Act of 1950
12.18.2 Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972
12.18.3 Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978
12.18.4 International Maritime and Port Security Act
12.18.5 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
12.18.6 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006
12.18.7 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
12.18.8 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
12.18.9 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001
12.18.10 Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002
12.18.11 The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005
12.19 Chapter Comments and Summary
12.20 Key Terms
12.21 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
13 International Emergency Management
13.1 Introduction
13.2 International Emergency Management: An Overview
13.3 Historical Scope of the Challenge
13.4 Global and International Scope of the Challenge
13.4.1 Natural Disasters
13.4.2 Accidents
13.4.3 Pandemics
13.4.4 Conflicts and Violence
13.5 International Assistance
13.5.1 International Support Involving Other Nations
13.5.2 International Support from Nongovernmental Organizations
13.5.3 International Military Assistance
13.5.4 United Nations Disaster Relief Support
13.6 The U.S. Response to an International Crisis
13.6.1 U.S. Emergency Response Protocol
13.7 Chapter Comments and Summary
13.8 Key Terms
13.9 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
14 Globalization, Geopolitics, and Homeland Security
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Globalization Explained
14.3 Ramifications of Globalization for Homeland Security
14.4 Clash of Civilizations
14.5 Terrorism: A Backlash to Globalization?
14.6 Globalism: U.S. Security along the U.S.-Mexican Border
14.7 Globalism: U.S. Security along the U.S.-Canadian Border
14.8 Case Study: The Rise of a Theocratic Iran
14.9 Case Study: Mara Salvatrucha
14.10 Globalization and Organized Crime
14.11 Chapter Comments and Summary
14.12 Key Terms
14.13 Thought and Discussion Questions
Notes
References
Index

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Daniel Adrian Doss
Barbara Russo
Greg Etter
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Joseph Skinner
Michael Corey
Carl J. Jensen III
Michael Wigginton
Robert Nations

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Introduction to Homeland Security

Introduction to Homeland Security

Third Edition

David H. McElreath, Daniel Adrian Doss, Barbara Russo, Greg Etter, Jeffrey Van Slyke, Joseph Skinner, Michael Corey, Carl J. Jensen III, Michael Wigginton, Jr. and Robert Nations

Third edition published 2021 by CRC Press 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742 and by CRC Press 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN © 2021 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC First edition published by CRC Press 2009 Second edition published by CRC Press 2013 CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, LLC The right of David Hughes McElreath, Adrian Doss, Barbara Russo, Greg Etter, Jeffrey Van Slyke, Joseph Skinner, Michael Corey, Carl Jensen, Michael Wigginton and Robert Nations to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint. Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, access www.copyright.com or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978–750–8400. For works that are not available on CCC please contact [email protected] Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging‑in‑Publication Data Names: McElreath, David, author. Title: Introduction to homeland security / David Hughes McElreath, [and nine others]. Description: Third edition. | Boca Raton : CRC Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020055239 (print) | LCCN 2020055240 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138588998 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032011110 (paperback) | ISBN 9780429491962 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: United States. Department of Homeland Security. | National security—United States. | Terrorism—United States—Prevention. | Civil defense—United States. | Emergency management—United States. Classification: LCC HV6432.4 .M395 2021 (print) | LCC HV6432.4 (ebook) | DDC 353.30973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020055239 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020055240 ISBN: 978-1-138-58899-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-01111-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-49196-2 (ebk) Typeset in Garamond by Apex CoVantage, LLC

This text is dedicated to the professional in emergency management and homeland security who is willing to go into harm’s way to ensure our nation and world remain as safe as possible so that we can live, work, and raise our families. We also would like to dedicate this work to our families and friends who have encouraged us throughout this project. —The Authors

Contents

Authors �� xix 1 Introduction to Homeland Security and Emergency Management �� 1 1.1 Introduction�� 1 1.2 Safety and Security�� 3 1.3 Threats Are a Step Away and Often Walk among Us�� 4 1.4 Why Homeland Security and Emergency Management?�� 5 1.5 What Are Homeland Security and Emergency Management?�� 6 1.6 Emergency Management: A Key Element in Homeland Security Operations��10 1.7 What Are the Threats and Dangers Facing Our Nation?�� 12 1.8 When and Where Does Disaster Strike?�� 13 1.9 Who Are the Responders, and What Is Their Role?�� 14 1.10 The Department of Homeland Security: A Brief Examination�� 14 1.11 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 16 1.12 Key Terms�� 17 1.13 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 18 Notes�� 18 References�� 19

2 Vital National Interests and the Defense of the Homeland ��21 2.1 Introduction�� 21 2.2 A Brief History and Reflection�� 22 2.3 Threats and Challenges to the Nation�� 23 2.4 Vital National Interests and Instruments of National Power�� 24 2.5 Foundations of a Nation�� 25 2.6 Foundations of National Security�� 26 2.7 The Monroe Doctrine�� 27 2.8 Early Conflicts�� 27 2.9 The Early Twentieth Century�� 28 vii

2.10 World War II, Challenging the Spread of Communism, Superpower Emergence, and the Competing World Philosophies�� 32 2.11 Intelligence and National Security�� 33 2.12 World Organizations Promoting Peace: The League of Nations and the United Nations�� 34 2.13 Evolution of the Cold War�� 34 2.13.1 Containment�� 35 2.13.2 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)�� 36 2.13.3 Containment and Continuation of MAD: Attempts to Isolate the Soviet Union�� 38 2.13.4 Small Wars and the Domino Theory�� 38 2.13.5 Détente�� 39 2.13.6 Rollback�� 40 2.13.7 Glasnost�� 41 2.14 The Complexity of the Modern World�� 42 2.15 After the Cold War and the Emerging of a New World�� 44 2.16 Terrorism: Introduction to the New Threat to the United States�� 44 2.17 Desert Shield and Desert Storm�� 47 2.18 The Shock and Impact of 9/11�� 48 2.19 Global War on Terrorism�� 48 2.20 Role of the Military in Support of Homeland Security�� 49 2.21 Emerging Threats�� 50 2.22 Homeland Defense and a New Type of Warfare�� 50 2.23 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 51 2.24 Key Terms�� 53 2.25 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 53 Notes�� 53 References�� 55

3 Principal Hazards ��57 3.1 Introduction�� 57 3.2 Overview of Domestic Safety and Security�� 60 3.3 Major Incidents: A Brief Historical Examination�� 61 3.3.1 Natural Disasters�� 61 3.3.1.1 New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812�� 61 3.3.1.2 Galveston Hurricane of 1900�� 62 3.3.1.3 San Francisco Earthquake of 1906�� 63 3.3.1.4 Hurricane Katrina�� 64 3.3.2 Urban Disasters�� 65 3.3.2.1 Chicago Fire of 1871�� 65 3.3.2.2 Johnstown Flood of 1889�� 66 3.3.3 Industrial Accidents: Domestic and International�� 67 3.3.3.1 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911�� 67 3.3.3.2 Texas City Explosion of 1947�� 67 3.3.3.3 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill�� 67 3.3.3.4 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill�� 68 3.3.3.5 1984 Union Carbide Industrial Accident�� 68 3.3.3.6 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Explosion�� 69 3.3.3.7 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Disaster��69 viii

Contents

3.3.4 Epidemics�� 70 3.3.4.1 Yellow Fever Epidemic of the 1800s�� 70 3.3.5 Terrorism�� 71 3.3.5.1 The 1993 World Trade Center Attack�� 71 3.3.5.2 Oklahoma City Bombing of 1995�� 72 3.3.5.3 Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001�� 72 3.4 Today’s Challenges�� 73 3.4.1 Droughts�� 73 3.4.2 Heat Waves�� 74 3.4.3 Tsunamis�� 75 3.4.4 Earthquakes�� 76 3.4.5 Volcanoes�� 79 3.4.6 Tornadoes�� 80 3.4.7 Blizzards�� 80 3.4.8 Fires�� 80 3.4.9 Floods�� 81 3.4.10 Hailstorms�� 82 3.4.11 Dust Storms�� 82 3.4.12 Landslides�� 83 3.4.13 Sinkholes�� 83 3.4.14 Cyclones�� 84 3.4.15 Whirlpools�� 84 3.4.16 Limnic Eruptions�� 85 3.5 Aftermath of Incidents�� 85 3.6 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 87 3.7 Key Terms�� 88 3.8 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 88 Notes�� 88 References�� 92

4 Protection of the Homeland and the Establishment of the United States Department of Homeland Security��95 4.1 Introduction�� 95 4.2 The Department of Homeland Security�� 96 4.3 The Department of Homeland Security�� 98 4.4 Federal Actions and Assistance in Disaster Response and Recovery�� 100 4.5 Homeland Security Goals�� 101 4.6 Significant Homeland Security Presidential Directives�� 102 4.7 Funding and Vision�� 103 4.7.1 Safeguarding the Nation’s Transportation Systems�� 104 4.7.2 Enhancing Cyber Security and Technology R&D�� 105 4.7.3 Strengthening Border Security and Immigration Services�� 107 4.7.4 Supporting State Homeland Security Activities�� 109 4.8 The Organizational Structure and Mission of the Department of Homeland Security��109 Contents

ix

4.9 Department of Homeland Security Organizational Structuring and Components�� 116 4.9.1 Directorate for National Protection and Programs�� 118 4.9.2 Directorate for Science and Technology�� 119 4.9.3 Directorate for Management�� 120 4.9.4 Office of Policy�� 120 4.9.5 Office of Health Affairs�� 120 4.9.6 Office of Intelligence and Analysis�� 121 4.9.7 Office of Operations Coordination and Planning�� 121 4.9.8 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center�� 122 4.9.9 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office�� 123 4.9.10 Federal Emergency Management Agency�� 123 4.9.11 Transportation Security Administration�� 126 4.9.12 United States Customs and Border Protection�� 126 4.9.13 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services�� 128 4.9.14 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement�� 128 4.9.15 United States Coast Guard�� 129 4.9.16 United States Secret Service�� 131 4.9.17 Office of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security�� 134 4.9.18 Advisory Panels and Committees�� 136 4.10 Future of the Department of Homeland Security�� 137 4.11 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 137 4.12 Key Terms�� 138 4.13 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 139 Notes�� 139 References�� 141

5 Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Function and Operations�143 5.1 Introduction�� 143 5.2 Resource Management and Utilization�� 144 5.3 A Perspective of Homeland Security and Emergency Management�� 145 5.4 Coordination and Standardization: The Backbone of Homeland Security Operations�� 146 5.5 Response�� 147 5.6 Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Operations Center�� 148 5.7 Protect: Disciplines, Functions, Operations�� 149 5.8 Intelligence as Related to Homeland Security: An Overview�� 152 5.9 Strategic, Near-Term, and Operations Plans and Periods�� 156 5.9.1 Strategic Concepts��157 5.9.2 Near-Term Tactical Concepts��159 5.10 Concepts of Processes and Procedures�� 160 5.10.1 Long-Term Strategic Processes�� 160 5.10.2 Near-Term Tactical Processes�� 161 5.10.3 Operational Processes�� 163 x

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5.11 Summary�� 163 5.12 Key Terms�� 164 5.13 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 164 Notes�� 164 References�� 166

6 The Partnerships of Homeland Security and Emergency Management�� 167 6.1 Introduction�� 168 6.2 Why Are Partnerships Important?�� 168 6.3 An Overview of Partnerships�� 169 6.4 The Whole Community Approach and the Challenges of Building Response Partnerships�� 171 6.5 Building and Sustaining Partnerships�� 172 6.6 Scope of Work�� 173 6.6.1 Emergency Operations Centers and National Response Framework�� 173 6.7 Planning, Training, and Equipping Partnerships�� 174 6.8 Partnerships�� 176 6.8.1 Lessons from the Past: Hurricane Camille�� 177 6.9 Nongovernmental Organizations�� 178 6.9.1 The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations�� 181 6.9.2 Framework for NGOs�� 182 6.9.3 Volunteers�� 184 6.10 Key Partnerships Organizations�� 185 6.10.1 National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster�� 185 6.10.1.1 NVOAD Core Principles (Disaster, 2020)�� 186 6.10.2 Private Business and Industry�� 187 6.10.3 Faith-Based Organizations�� 188 6.10.4 Community Emergency Response Team�� 190 6.10.5 Citizen Corps�� 191 6.10.6 The Fire Corps�� 193 6.10.7 National Neighborhood Watch�� 193 6.10.8 The Medical Reserve Corps�� 194 6.10.9 The Civil Air Patrol (U.S. Air Force Auxiliary)�� 195 6.10.9.1 Homeland Security Role�� 196 6.10.10 The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary�� 198 6.10.11 Military Auxiliary Radio System�� 201 6.10.12 Local Emergency Planning Committees�� 202 6.10.13 The Private Sector�� 203 6.11 International, National, and State Military Resources�� 204 6.12 Federal Regulations Related to Use of Military Resources�� 205 6.12.1 Title 10 of the U.S. Code�� 205 6.12.2 Defense Memoranda of Understanding and Agreements�� 205 6.12.3 Purchasing Requirements�� 208 6.12.4 The Defense Industrial Reserve�� 208 6.12.5 U.S. Government Contracts and Foreign Awards�� 210 Contents

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6.13 Summary�� 211 6.14 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 212 6.15 Key Terms�� 213 6.16 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 213 References�� 214

7 Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Strategies �� 217 7.1 Introduction�� 218 7.2 Where’s the Threat? The Event for Which We Prepare: Natural Disaster or Man-Made Events?�� 218 7.2.1 Natural Disasters�� 219 7.2.2 Terrorism and Extremism�� 220 7.3 Planning: Strategies and Operations�� 221 7.4 Community Response�� 222 7.5 State Response�� 223 7.6 Federal Response�� 223 7.7 Private and Nonprofit Sector�� 223 7.8 Special Circumstances�� 224 7.9 Planning: The Challenges�� 227 7.10 Risk Management and Assessments�� 229 7.11 Threat Assessments�� 230 7.12 Vulnerability Assessments�� 231 7.13 Consequence Assessments�� 232 7.14 Federal: Preventing Extremism and Terrorism and Enhancing Security�� 232 7.15 Federal: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters�� 233 7.16 Federal: Maturing and Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise�� 233 7.17 Federal: Comments Regarding the Budget�� 234 7.18 Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study�� 236 7.19 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 238 7.20 Key Terms�� 239 7.21 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 239 Notes�� 240 References�� 240

8 Disaster Response, Recovery, and Resilience�� 243 8.1 Introduction�� 243 8.2 Brief Examination of Response and Recovery�� 245 8.3 Disaster Response Community Overview�� 246 8.4 Command and Control�� 246 8.5 Information Management in a Disaster�� 248 8.6 The Disaster Frameworks�� 249 8.7 The Role of FEMA�� 250 8.8 Human Sustenance—Food and Shelter�� 251 xii

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8.9 Sheltering “In Place”�� 252 8.10 NASA Disasters Program�� 252 8.11 The Economics of Response and Recovery�� 253 8.12 Insurance, Risk, and the Potential of Disaster�� 255 8.12.1 Flood Insurance�� 256 8.12.2 Fire Insurance�� 256 8.13 Disaster Declarations�� 259 8.14 Considerations of Response and Recovery�� 261 8.15 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 263 8.16 Key Terms�� 263 8.17 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 264 Notes�� 264 References�� 266

9 Domestic Extremism: Threats, Threat Groups, and Terrorism��267 9.1 Introduction�� 268 9.2 What Is Domestic Terrorism?�� 268 9.3 Domestic Terrorism: A Short Historical View�� 270 9.4 Domestic Terrorism and Threat Groups�� 273 9.5 The Radical Right: A Variety of Perspectives�� 274 9.6 Supremacy Groups�� 274 9.6.1 Ku Klux Klan�� 275 9.6.2 Neo-Nazi and Aryan Movement�� 277 9.6.3 The Sovereign Citizens Movement�� 279 9.6.4 Militias and the Militia Movement�� 280 9.6.5 Racist Skinheads�� 281 9.6.6 Black Separatists�� 281 9.6.7 Patriot Groups�� 282 9.6.8 Inspiration, Leaderless Resistance, Phantom Cell, and the Lone Wolf�� 283 9.6.9 Right to Life: Revolutionary Reaction to Abortion�� 285 9.6.10 Other Organizations That Pose a Domestic Threat�� 286 9.6.10.1 Narco-Terrorist Groups along the U.S. Border�� 286 9.7 The Radical Left: Ecological and Animal Rights�� 286 9.7.1 Antifa and the Return of the Anarchist Movement�� 288 9.8 Major Law Enforcement Agencies Battling Terrorism and Hate�� 289 9.8.1 Federal Agencies�� 289 9.8.2 State, Local, and Tribal Agencies�� 290 9.9 Nongovernmental Agencies Battling Terrorism and Hate�� 292 9.9.1 Southern Poverty Law Center�� 292 9.9.2 The Anti-Defamation League�� 293 9.9.3 American Civil Liberties Union�� 294 9.10 Chapter Summary�� 295 9.11 Key Terms�� 295 9.12 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 295 Notes�� 296 References�� 300 Contents

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10 International Terrorism and Extremism: Operations and Sustainment�� 303 10.1 Introduction�� 303 10.2 Understanding and Defining Terrorism and Extremism�� 305 10.3 The Evolution of Terrorism and Extremism: A Brief Historical Perspective�� 306 10.3.1 Tyrannicide�� 306 10.3.2 Early Examples of the Use of Terror�� 307 10.3.2.1 The Zealots�� 307 10.3.2.2 The Assassins�� 307 10.3.2.3 Thugees or Thugs�� 307 10.3.3 Continuation of the Use of Terror�� 308 10.3.3.1 Terrorism and the French Revolution�� 308 10.3.3.2 Gunpowder Plot (England) of 1605�� 309 10.3.4 Terrorism and Extremism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, the Influence of Revolutions and Nationalism, and the Anarchist Movement�� 310 10.3.4.1 The Propaganda of Deed and The Catechism of the Revolutionary�� 310 10.3.4.2 Russia�� 311 10.3.4.3 Bosnia�� 312 10.3.4.4 Violence and Extremism in Europe after World War I�� 313 10.3.5 Anti-Colonialism, Terrorism, and Extremism after World War II�� 313 10.3.5.1 Anti-Colonialism and Terrorism after World War II�� 314 10.4 Terrorism and Extremism in the Modern Era�� 319 10.5 An Overview of Terrorism and Extremism Internationally Today�� 320 10.5.1 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: The Middle East and Afghanistan�� 321 10.5.2 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Europe�� 322 10.5.2.1 The United Kingdom�� 322 10.5.2.2 Germany�� 323 10.5.2.3 Spain�� 324 10.5.3 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Africa�� 324 10.5.3.1 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership�� 325 10.5.3.2 The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism�� 325 10.5.4 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Asia�� 325 10.5.5 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Central and South America�� 327 10.5.5.1 Cuban Revolution (1952–1958)�� 327 10.5.5.2 Carlos Marighella�� 330 10.5.6 The Tupamaros of Uruguay�� 331 10.5.7 Sendero Luminoso�� 332 10.5.8 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia�� 332 10.5.9 Mexico�� 333 10.6 Funding of International Terrorism and Extremism�� 334 10.6.1 Logistics of Funding Terrorism and Extremism�� 336 10.7 Narco-Terrorism�� 337 10.8 The Role of the Media and the Use of the Web�� 337 10.9 Response Strategies�� 340 10.10 Cyber Terrorism�� 340 xiv

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10.11 The Twenty-First Century and the Struggle against Terrorism: Now and the Future�� 341 10.12 Operations against the Threat of Terror�� 341 10.13 Summary�� 342 10.14 Key Terms�� 342 10.14.1 Terms�� 342 10.14.2 People�� 343 10.14.3 Organizations�� 343 10.14.4 Events�� 344 10.15 Questions and Discussions�� 344 References�� 344

11 The Role of Intelligence in Homeland Security ��349 11.1 Introduction�� 350 11.2 What Is Intelligence?�� 350 11.3 Contemplating Intelligence�� 351 11.4 The Intelligence Cycle�� 353 11.5 The United States Intelligence Community: History�� 356 11.5.1 IC History: The Revolutionary War to World War II�� 356 11.5.2 IC History: World War II and the Cold War�� 357 11.5.3 IC History: Iraq to the Present�� 358 11.5.4 IC Success in the Struggle against International Extremism and Terrorism�� 359 11.6 The Modern U.S. Intelligence Community�� 359 11.7 State and Local Intelligence Efforts�� 361 11.7.1 Intelligence-Led Policing/Law Enforcement�� 361 11.7.2 Fusion Centers�� 362 11.8 Legal Guidelines Pertaining to Intelligence Collection�� 362 11.9 Foreign Intelligence Services�� 363 11.10 The Function of Intelligence in Homeland Security�� 364 11.11 Intelligence Gathering versus Privacy�� 365 11.12 Intelligence Challenges for the New Century�� 366 11.13 The Intelligence Partnership�� 368 11.14 Regional Information-Sharing Systems�� 369 11.15 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 370 11.16 Key Terms�� 370 11.17 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 371 References�� 371

12 Protecting Our Nation’s Infrastructure: Border and Transportation Security��375 12.1 Introduction�� 375 12.2 Overview: Border and Transportation Security�� 376 12.3 An Overview of Transportation Security�� 377 Contents

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12.4 Historical Perspective: Aviation and Aerospace Security�� 379 12.5 Modern Perspective: Aviation and Aerospace Security�� 379 12.6 Additional Commentary: Aircraft Hijacking�� 382 12.7 Historical Perspective: Maritime Security�� 383 12.8 Modern Perspective: Maritime Security�� 385 12.9 Historical Perspective: Mass Transit and Railway Security�� 388 12.10 Modern Perspective: Mass Transit and Railway Security�� 389 12.11 Container and Cargo Security�� 393 12.12 The Mexican Border and Violence�� 397 12.13 Human Trafficking�� 398 12.14 Transportation and Border Security Initiatives�� 399 12.14.1 Border Permeability�� 400 12.14.2 Border Security: Immigration�� 400 12.14.3 Border Security: Searches�� 400 12.14.4 Border Security: U.S.-Mexican Border Fence�� 402 12.14.5 Border Security: Aviation Surveillance and Reconnaissance�� 402 12.15 Small Vessel Security Strategy�� 402 12.16 Federal Flight Deck Officers�� 402 12.17 Terrorist Watch List and the No-Fly List�� 403 12.18 Legislation Pertaining to Transportation and Border Security�� 403 12.18.1 The Magnuson Act of 1950�� 403 12.18.2 Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972�� 403 12.18.3 Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978�� 404 12.18.4 International Maritime and Port Security Act�� 404 12.18.5 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002�� 404 12.18.6 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006�� 405 12.18.7 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990�� 405 12.18.8 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996�� 405 12.18.9 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001�� 406 12.18.10 Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002�� 406 12.18.11 The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005�� 406 12.19 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 406 12.20 Key Terms�� 407 12.21 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 408 Notes�� 408 References�� 410

13 International Emergency Management�� 413 13.1 Introduction�� 414 13.2 International Emergency Management: An Overview�� 414 13.3 Historical Scope of the Challenge�� 415 13.4 Global and International Scope of the Challenge�� 415 13.4.1 Natural Disasters�� 416 13.4.2 Accidents�� 416 13.4.3 Pandemics�� 416 13.4.4 Conflicts and Violence�� 419 xvi

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13.5 International Assistance�� 419 13.5.1 International Support Involving Other Nations�� 419 13.5.2 International Support from Nongovernmental Organizations�� 421 13.5.3 International Military Assistance�� 421 13.5.4 United Nations Disaster Relief Support�� 423 13.6 The U.S. Response to an International Crisis�� 424 13.6.1 U.S. Emergency Response Protocol�� 425 13.7 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 425 13.8 Key Terms�� 426 13.9 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 426 Notes�� 427 References�� 428

14 Globalization, Geopolitics, and Homeland Security ��431 14.1 Introduction�� 431 14.2 Globalization Explained�� 433 14.3 Ramifications of Globalization for Homeland Security�� 436 14.4 Clash of Civilizations�� 439 14.5 Terrorism: A Backlash to Globalization?�� 441 14.6 Globalism: U.S. Security along the U.S.-Mexican Border�� 442 14.7 Globalism: U.S. Security along the U.S.-Canadian Border�� 444 14.8 Case Study: The Rise of a Theocratic Iran�� 446 14.9 Case Study: Mara Salvatrucha�� 447 14.10 Globalization and Organized Crime�� 447 14.11 Chapter Comments and Summary�� 449 14.12 Key Terms�� 449 14.13 Thought and Discussion Questions�� 450 Notes�� 450 References�� 451

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453

Contents

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Authors

David Hughes McElreath, PhD, was professor and former chair, Department of Legal Studies, University of Mississippi; former professor and chair, Department of Criminal Justice, Washburn University; associate professor, Southeast Missouri State University; assistant professor, University of Southern Mississippi; instructor, Itawamba Community College (Miss); and adjunct faculty, The United States Marine Corps University. Dr. McElreath is a retired Colonel (USMC), former law enforcement officer (police officer and deputy sheriff), corrections officer, and park ranger. His education and training include a PhD in Adult Education and Criminal Justice, University of Southern Mississippi; MSS, United States Army War College; MCJ, University of Mississippi; and BPA, University of Mississippi. He is a graduate of the United States Army War College. He is also the author of numerous publications in the fields of criminal justice and homeland security. A former member and chair of the Mississippi Crime Stoppers Council, he currently serves on the Mississippi State Board of Veterans Affairs. He and his wife live outside of Oxford, Mississippi, in the College Hill community. They have three daughters and three grandchildren. Daniel Adrian Doss, PhD, is an adjunct faculty member with Tulane University in the School of Professional Advancement. Previously, at other institutions, he held department chair, doctoral program director, and MBA program director positions as well as professorships. His professional career consisted of software engineering and analytical positions in both the defense and commercial industries. Corporate entities include fulltime and contract positions with FedEx and uMonitor.com and contract positions, via Data Management Consultants, with Loral Corporation (formerly IBM Federal Systems) and Lockheed Martin. Additional credentials include Colonel, Mississippi State Guard; graduate of the Lafayette County Law Enforcement Officers Academy; and graduate of the Law Enforcement Mobile Video Institute. He coauthored 12 textbooks, a variety of peer-reviewed journal articles, and numerous conference items. His education consists of a PhD in Higher Education, Jackson State University; PhD in Police Science, University of South Africa; PhD in Business Administration, Northcentral University; MCJ in Homeland Security, University of Mississippi; MA in Computer Resources and Information Management, Webster University; MBA, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; graduate certificate in Forensic Criminology, University of Massachusetts (Lowell); graduate certificate in Nonprofit Financial Management, University of Maryland (Adelphi); and a BS in xix

Computer Science with a mathematics minor, Mississippi State University. He completed additional graduate studies in Cyber Security at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Barbara Russo, PhD, is a 19-year veteran of the fire service, serving as both a volunteer and career professional, most recently as the Division Chief of Training and Standards for the City of Jacksonville (NC) Fire Department (2009–2012). She was selected as the Emergency Management Coordinator for Ole Miss in March of 2016. Dr. Russo returned to the academic setting in fall 2012 to head the Fire and Emergency Services Administration bachelor’s degree program at Fayetteville State University (NC), where she also served as an assistant professor in the Department of Government and History. She has had the privilege of presenting at the 2015 Virginia Fire and Rescue Conference, International Association of Women in the Fire & Emergency Services 2015 Leadership Conference, the 2015 Fire-Rescue International Conference held in Atlanta, and the 7th Annual Women in Public Service Conference in Portsmouth, Virginia. Dr. Russo’s research interests include race and gender issues in the fire and emergency services and fire service law and policy. She earned her Doctorate of Philosophy in Fire and Emergency Management Administration from Oklahoma State University in 2013 and holds a master’s degree in the same discipline, also from OSU. Greg Etter, EdD: Dr. Etter’s background includes a professorship in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Central Missouri. He is a retired lieutenant with the Sedgwick County, Kansas, Sheriff’s Office. His education and training include an EdD in Occupational and Adult Education, Oklahoma State University; an MA in Criminal Justice, Wichita State University; and a BGS, Wichita State University. Dr. Etter is a graduate of the USAF Air Command and Staff College. He is considered a gang expert by the National Gang Crime Research Center and the courts. He is the author of numerous books and articles on criminal justice, gangs, and extremist groups. Dr. Etter has trained police and military forces in the United States and Canada. Jeffrey Van Slyke, PhD, is a professor at Jacksonville State University. His professional background is extensive, with a wide range of justice, homeland security, and emergency management–related positions. He is a retired Chief of Police with an inclusive background of emergency management/crisis response, threat assessment, law enforcement services, and special security details. During his career as Chief of Police, Dr. Van Slyke has experientially managed and responded to such emergencies as tornadoes, bomb threats, Hurricane Katrina, nor’easter storms, a plane crash, suicides/homicides, chemical spills, and residence hall fires and mitigated two credible active-shooter scenarios. Dr. Van Slyke also assisted with facilitating 21 presidential visits and was responsible for maintaining the security of a presidential library, a nuclear laboratory, a university airport, athletic events, concerts, and movie sets. While serving as Chief of Police at the University of Texas at Austin, Dr. Van Slyke assisted the United States Secret Service with the protective responsibilities of President George W. Bush’s daughter Jenna and was awarded the U.S. Secret Service Certificate of Appreciation by President Bush in recognition of his efforts. Dr. Van Slyke earned a bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice, Auburn University; a master’s degree in Public Administration, Western Carolina University; and a doctorate in Higher Education, University of Texas. Dr. Van Slyke also attended the FBI National Academy and the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center. Captain Joseph Skinner, MCJ, (USN) is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, the United States Naval War College (Master’s in National Security and International Relations), the University of Mississippi (Master’s in Criminal Justice), and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Throughout a distinguished naval career, he served in a wide xx

Authors

variety of command and staff positions, including, but not limited to, command of the nuclear-powered submarine USS Louisville (SSN 724) and assignment with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Taiwan. He and his wife, Elizabeth, live in Oxford, Mississippi. Michael Corey, BGS, MCJ, is the Chairman of Connecticut Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD), National VOAD Volunteer Management Committee Chairman, and Diocesan Disaster Coordinator for the Episcopal Church in Connecticut. He has two decades of experience in emergency management, disaster response, and public safety. He has held emergency management and public safety telecommunications positions with the Howard County Sheriff’s Department (IN), University Police Department (MS), and St. Helena Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (LA). His education includes a bachelor’s in Political Science from Indiana University and a master’s in Criminal Justice from the University of Mississippi. His areas of expertise include volunteer management, disaster communications, training, emergency planning, organizational partnerships, emergency management, disaster intelligence, mass care, emotional and spiritual care, donations management, media and public relations, and corporate and organizational response to disasters. Carl Jensen III, PhD, serves as Professor and Head of the Department of Intelligence and Security Studies at The Citadel. He is a 1978 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and served in the Navy from 1978 until 1983, first aboard the nuclear fleet ballistic missile submarine USS George Washington Carver and then as an aide to the Commander of Submarine Group Five. He subsequently enjoyed a 22-year career in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he served as a field agent in the Atlanta, San Francisco, and Cleveland field offices; a forensic examiner/cryptanalyst in the FBI Laboratory; and Supervisory Special Agent in the Behavioral Science Unit (BSU). As a member of the BSU, Dr. Jensen taught law enforcement officers about violent serial offenders and the linking together of serial crimes through behavioral analysis. He was also the lead instructor for the FBI National Academy’s terrorism course for several years. While in the FBI, Dr. Jensen founded the Futures Working Group (FWG), a collaboration between the FBI and the Society of Police Futurists International. He and his family reside in South Carolina. Michael Wigginton, Jr., PhD, was Assistant Teaching Professor, the University of Southern Mississippi. He formerly held appointments as Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and Director of the University of Mississippi Master of Criminal Justice Executive Cohort Program, Department of Legal Studies with the University of Mississippi; Assistant Professor, Troy State University; Assistant Professor, Southeast Louisiana University; Adjunct Professor, Tulane University; Senior Special Agent, United States Customs Service; Special Agent, United States Drug Enforcement Administration; detective and state trooper, Louisiana State Police; police officer, New Orleans Police Department; and a United States Air Force Security Police Dog Handler with service in Vietnam. His education and training include a PhD in Criminal Justice, University of Southern Mississippi; MS, The University of New Orleans; MS, The University of Alabama; and BA, Loyola University of New Orleans. He is also the author of numerous publications on the criminal justice system. Robert Nations, Jr., MA, is the former Director of the Shelby County Office of Preparedness, which represents the coordination of both Homeland Security and the Emergency Management Agency for Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee, and the Memphis/Shelby Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Mr. Nations is a career law enforcement officer and police administrator serving in those related fields from 1972 through Authors

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his current position. Prior to coming to Shelby County, he served as State Director of Homeland Security for Mississippi and was Chief of Operations for homeland security during Hurricane Katrina. Mr. Nations is in project management with the University of Mississippi in the Legal Studies Department and is a part-time faculty member at the University of Memphis in the Department of Criminal Justice. He is a graduate of the Naval Post Graduate School’s Center for Homeland Security and Defense Executive Leadership Program. He currently serves on the Homeland Security Advisory Board at Daniel Webster College in Nashua, New Hampshire. Mr. Nations is a recognized public speaker/writer at regional and national conferences.

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Authors

1 Introduction to Homeland Security and Emergency Management

I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail.1 —William Faulkner The objectives of this chapter are to: • Familiarize readers with the concept of homeland security; • Understand the history of homeland security; • Introduce the all-hazards concept; • Examine a brief history of disasters that have impacted the United States; • Discuss the complexity of homeland security; • Introduce multiple perspectives of homeland security; and • Emphasize the importance of homeland security for the continuance of society and of the nation.

1.1 Introduction As stated by William Faulkner in his speech at the Nobel Prize banquet in 1950, “[M]an will not only endure, but will prevail” (Hoyt, 2013, p. 34).2 The words of Faulkner can well be used to describe disaster response and resilience and the challenges faced by the nation in regard to homeland security. Disasters challenge individuals and communities. These events change lives and in many cases are responsible for significant injuries, physical damages, financial losses, and even deaths. Disasters challenge the human spirt and test the resiliency of both body and spirit. The world is an active, dynamic, and ever-changing place. Since the emergence of the nationstate and the concept of national sovereignty, nations have formed and competed for power, wealth, and influence. Within the global community, diversity, economics, social standing, politics, religion and ethnicity have defined and redefined us, serving as the basis for national alliances as well as opponents.

1

Figure 1.1 Satellite image of Hurricane Katrina. (Source: National Weather Service)

From a perspective of security, domestic as well as from international threats, safety and security are the critical themes. The safety and security of our families, our homes, our nation, and our global community remain critical concerns. Though some may debate the point, we are very fortunate to live in the United States. Our nation is not without its threats, but it remains a nation of hope and promise. Since its founding, it has proven to be a land of opportunity. It is a nation that many risk their lives to enter, understanding the nation presents countless opportunities. For many, it remains, as stated by President Ronald Reagan, a “destination, a shining city upon a hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere, where the hope of a better life can be achieved” (DeMarco, 2013, p. 69).3 It is a nation built on the concept of freedom and respect for individual rights, but it is not a nation without challenge. Though reexaminations of immigration and immigration policies are underway, the nation remains remarkably open. The safety and security of our nation, our communities, and our citizens cannot be taken for granted. Life is fragile, often much more so than many realize. Events can and do occur that 2

Introduction to Homeland Security

change or even end lives. What we know about the future is that it is a balance between certainty and uncertainty. From a homeland security and emergency management perspective, we can be certain that something uncertain will occur in the future. What we hope is that we will be prepared to respond to events that threaten our safety as quickly and as effectively as possible. Often, lives, property, and related infrastructure depend upon rapid and efficient responses by our nation’s first responders.

1.2 Safety and Security Our nation has been shaped by moments and events in times of both conflict and peace. The origins of our citizens reflect what may be considered the most diverse of any nation. The United States of America is a nation that continues to be a melting pot from which emerge Americans. It is a nation that plays a major role on the world stage. As a powerful member of the global community, it exerts significant power and influence. The attacks on September 11, 2001, were a substantial game changer for our nation. The threat posed by radical international extremists became painfully apparent. The destruction inflicted (both physically and psychologically) would serve as a catalyst for change, not only domestically, but also globally. The results of the attacks led to diplomatic, economic, and military action that continue two decades later. Eleven days after the September 11, 2001, extremists’ attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was appointed as the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House. The office was tasked with the oversight of the development and coordination of a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against extremism and to respond to any future attacks. Within this national strategy, local, state, tribal, and federal agencies gained new roles and expectations toward ensuring domestic security. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, a major reexamination of domestic security occurred. President George W. Bush proposed the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security. Bush stated, “America needs a single, unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future”4 (Cook & Raia, 2017, p. 136). A decision was made to create a new agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), that was entrusted with the protecting of American society. As a result, in November 2002, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act creating the Department of Homeland Security as a Cabinet-level department tasked with coordinating and unifying national homeland security efforts. Opening its doors on March 1, 2003,5 the Department of Homeland Security included over 20 agencies with various domestic security roles into the new organization. The role and mission of the DHS is to “ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.”6 All missions of the DHS involve a variety of goals and objectives that “prevent, to protect, to respond, and to recover, as well as to build in security, to ensure resilience, and to facilitate customs and exchange.”7 The DHS does not accomplish its missions alone. Instead, it involves the cooperation of a plethora of individuals, government agencies, and private entities.8 Over the years since the founding of the Department of Homeland Security, the United States and much of the world were transformed. Conflicts, attacks, and threats of attacks, combined with the impact of natural and man-made disasters, forced many nations to reexamine domestic safety and security. Within these examinations, national security, vital national interests, and the safety of nations and their populations became even greater concerns. Introduction to Homeland Security

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For any nation, domestic security does not occur in a vacuum; rather, it is multidimensional and depends on the role of the nation in the international community. It has potentially global ramifications. Security includes responders and the development and implementation of response strategies, including local responders to an international recovery effort. It includes professionals and volunteers and is built on a foundation of the philosophy that every disaster is local in nature and that event response must involve a whole community response strategy. Event response is also built on the understanding that it unfolds in a setting of uncertainty. Threats facing our nation and allies are often complex, fluid, evolving, and changing, and in some cases, they are difficult to characterize. From each new event, new lessons are learned. It is hoped that, from those lessons, event response and resiliency are improved. The United States is a major player on the world stage in a wide range of areas; economically, socially, politically, informationally, and militarily. Our nation’s economy is a major part of the global economy. Imports and exports, fueled by domestic consumption, have redefined trade and with it global economics and market access. Our nation is dependent upon international trade and commerce. As a result, it is important that the international community maintain a reasonable level of stability economically, socially, and politically.

1.3 Threats Are a Step Away and Often Walk among Us As mentioned earlier, the future is uncertain. Intentional man-made events, natural disasters, and accidents change and dramatically disrupt lives. As an example, over the span of a few short days in April 2013, the United States experienced two events that captured our attention and, in different ways, displayed an essential need for coordinated efforts between homeland security, public safety, emergency management, and the community. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the explosion of a fertilizer plant in Texas are examples of events that may challenge the safety of our communities, the capabilities of our response community, and the resiliency of our people. In both cases, responders reacted quickly to save lives and limit damage. Of these two events, one was a tragic industrial accident whereas the second was an intentional attack. These events are just two examples of the types of events that may occur and how the response community responds in an environment of uncertainty. Throughout our history, our nation and our communities have demonstrated significant response and resiliency when faced with adversity. Our nation has endured wars and military conflicts, responded to and recovered from natural disasters (e.g., droughts, pestilence, and diseases), and internal disputes associated with hate crimes and domestic terrorism and endured a plethora of natural disasters and man-made accidents. Each experience presents lessons from which steps may be taken toward the improvement of response capabilities and abilities, ultimately contributing toward improved societal security and safety. As an example, the enactment of fire codes, building safety standards and inspection, and advancements in fire technologies have resulted from lessons learned from fire-related disasters, many of which resulted in loss of life and property. Similarly, many of the changes in airport security, including the creation of the Transportation Security Administration, occurred in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite any increase in knowledge or changes in safety and security standards or policies, our nation and the communities within our nation remain vulnerable to natural and man-made threats. 4

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Our history serves as an outstanding point from which we can anticipate our future. From this historical analysis, today’s homeland security and emergency management professional may determine the reasonable threats most likely to impact their communities and, with that determination, plan for and develop response strategies, including mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery: the basic components of emergency management. The need to remain vigilant regarding our preparedness for both natural and man-made incidents is important. We must possess a strong ability to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover quickly from any event. We must glean lessons learned from our experiences with events and apply these lessons toward reducing the chances of the reoccurrence of such incidents. As the second decade of the twenty-first century draws to a close, homeland security and emergency management continue to evolve. These disciplines are more than merely acknowledging the dangers of man-made and natural events. These are disciplines that involve art and science and contain organizations that are important to our nation’s infrastructure. These disciplines involve professionals and volunteers working for hundreds of agencies, with the goal of protecting lives and property. The response community is composed of our friends and neighbors, working to ensure that, in times when our nation and the communities of our nation are in the greatest of need, responders are ready to assist. As stated, homeland security and emergency management are much more than mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Homeland security and emergency management are complex domains working to respond to hundreds, if not thousands, of threatening possibilities with imaginative countermeasures. They integrate numerous agencies, organizations, and people; affect laws, regulations, and policies; and require a vast range of tangible and intangible resources. These disciplines are viewed from a variety of different perspectives and involve every facet of American society.

1.4 Why Homeland Security and Emergency Management? As stated, our nation is not the only nation to face a wide range of threats from natural and man-made events that can well overwhelm the resources of local communities. Within our global community, hundreds of examples exist of events that threaten individual and community safety. During recent years, a few of the major events that have been witnessed include earthquakes, industrial accidents, and attacks by extremists. History is filled with events that have inflicted devastation, havoc, property damage, injury, and death on a major scale. As examples, Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and the 2010 Gulf Coast oil spill from a British Petroleum platform both inflicted millions of dollars in damages. Endangerments do not respect national boundaries. One of the significant concerns within our nation is related to the dangers posed by extremists of both domestic and international origins. Extremism, once viewed as either international or domestic in origin, is now less clear. As an example, the extremists involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, originated from a foreign country. Those responsible for the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, though foreign born, included two brothers who had lived in the United States for years and who were educated in our public school system. Timothy McVeigh, who perpetrated the Oklahoma City bombing; Ted Kaczynski, the nefarious Unabomber; Eric Rudolph, the Atlanta bomber; and Dylann Storm Roof, who attacked and killed nine in the 2015 Charleston church attack, were native-born citizens of the United States. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 1.2 Deepwater Horizon, April 21, 2010. Fire boat response crews battle the blazing remnants of the offshore oil rig. A Coast Guard MH-65C dolphin rescue helicopter and crew document the fire aboard the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon while searching for survivors. Multiple Coast Guard helicopters, planes, and cutters responded to rescue the Deepwater Horizon’s 126-person crew. (Source: U.S. Department of Defense)

The nation’s security is a serious responsibility of the federal government. Domestically, that security falls greatly upon law enforcement, first responders, emergency management personnel, and homeland security officials. Since its founding, the Department of Homeland Security and the general response to the threats facing the nation have involved natural disasters, intentional attacks, and accidents. Such experiences contributed toward the emerging of an “all hazards” or “all reasonable hazards” approach to homeland security planning. This “all-hazards” or “all reasonable hazards” approach is intended to be comprehensive and to consider natural and man-made threats to the communities of our nation. Threats, both natural and man-made, may erupt into events that impact the safety of local communities, states, the nation, and global partners. Natural threats, such as major hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, or fires, will always occur. Threats to the national supplies of food and water will always be of great concern. The safety of national resources will always be a vital national interest.

1.5 What Are Homeland Security and Emergency Management? Homeland security itself is diverse and complex. It can be viewed as a series of organizations, located at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels of government; it can be viewed as a process, one that today attempts to embrace preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. It represents an all-hazards paradigm through which American society is protected from natural 6

Introduction to Homeland Security

Figure 1.3 Eric Robert Rudolph. (Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation)

and man-made events, and its implementation affects every individual within the nation. Emergency management has many of the components of homeland security but in itself is also unique. Emergency management is one element that can be included within the spectrum of homeland security. Certainly, homeland security can be viewed from a variety of perspectives. Some common views are as follows: Science—Homeland security is, without question, a science. Quantitative analysis permeates homeland security in a variety of ways, ranging from the financial and economic attributes of disasters to the metrics of evaluating organizational preparedness. Forensics examiners may quantitatively investigate the chemical, biological, geological, and physical attributes of incidents. Art—Homeland security is also inexact and imprecise in many ways. Despite the best intelligence and best attempts to forecast and predict dangers, there is no guarantee that any estimate or projection will become reality. Further, protective and preparedness activities and measures that may be appropriate for one organization may be completely inappropriate for a different organization; no universal paradigm exists through which homeland security activities and practices may be integrated among all organizational environments. Philosophy—Homeland security may be viewed from a philosophical perspective. Morals, ethics, and values differ among cultures and societies globally. The attacks against the United States perpetrated on September 11, 2001 are a testament to the many differences of ideological and philosophical beliefs that permeate societies around the world. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 1.4 Wildfires. (Source: U.S. Department of the Interior)

Figure 1.5 A Coast Guard member deployed to Puerto Rico in support of Hurricane Maria relief efforts delivers water to residents of Moca, Puerto Rico, in an example of the “all-hazards” concept and flex‑ ible event response. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

Strategy—Homeland security may be viewed strategically. It involves facets of vision representing the perceived future state of existence that is desirable for the continuance of American society through time. Typically, strategic periods encompass an average of five years (or longer) wherein the long-term concerns of homeland security and emergency management are addressed. Therefore, the federal government 8

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pursues homeland security strategically, incorporating numerous missions, objectives, goals, contingencies, values, and evaluations over time. Policy—Homeland security may be considered from a perspective of policy. Across the nation, local, federal, state, and tribal entities have policies regarding organizational behavior and conduct that affect processes and procedures that are enacted when disaster and inclement conditions strike. For example, within the Department of Homeland Security, its Office of Policy is tasked with providing “a central office to develop and communicate policies across multiple components of the homeland security network and strengthen the Department’s ability to maintain policy and operational readiness needed to protect the homeland.”9 Management—Homeland security involves management practices representing the concepts of controlling, leading, organizing, planning, and coordinating. Most notably, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) expresses the principles, tenets, and concepts that are necessary for determining “how to manage emergencies from preparedness to recovery regardless of their cause, size, location or complexity.”10 Economic—Economic interests represent a salient perspective of homeland security. Simply, economics examines the allocating of scarce resources to satisfy the unlimited wants and needs of humans over time. When disasters occur, personnel, materials, and other necessary resources are not limitless; they have constraints. Thus, three primary economic questions are addressed throughout the emergency management cycle: for whom to produce, what to produce, and in what quantity to produce. Therefore, practitioners of homeland security must be mindful of how to allocate their available resources to achieve the best and highest benefit of their use when experiencing inclement circumstances. Creative—All incidents are unique; no universal, one-size method is appropriate to accommodate the needs of all localities. Homeland security encompasses a variety of imaginings through which possible scenarios that endanger society are expressed and examined. Examples range from how terrorists may attack the nation to what may happen if a chemical spill occurs in a small town involving certain characteristics of weather (e.g., wind patterns). Crafting countermeasures is just as creative—the protecting of society at all levels requires much thought and imagination. Chronological—Homeland security may be viewed from a chronological perspective. Since the founding of the nation, numerous man-made and natural disasters have endangered society. A review of history easily shows acts of war in every century that followed the American Revolution that necessitated the involvement of the United States. Natural incidents of national severity have been recorded in every century since the origin of the nation. Even the outcome of the American Revolution was impacted by hurricanes contributing to an American victory.11 During the 1780s, over 35,000 people died because of hurricanes.12 These hurricanes destroyed much of the British Navy. The British incurred more losses from hurricanes than “from the battles fought in the Revolutionary War itself.”13 Lifestyle—Homeland security may be viewed from a lifestyle perspective. People must be vigilant to observe anything that may be threatening and report it accordingly. Before the events of September 11, 2001, people could flow through airports relatively unimpeded without experiencing any searches of persons or baggage. However, modern times and security concerns now disallow the friends and families of travelers from meeting them directly at an airport terminal. Business and Commerce—Homeland security is big business for both the commercial and government sectors of the American economy. Many organizations were created in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Most notably, the U.S. Department of Introduction to Homeland Security

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Homeland Security is the primary example of a government organization. Within the private sector, numerous entities have crafted business models to support homeland security endeavors. For example, numerous organizations, such as DynCorp, Intercon, and American Security Group, have protected various American resources and interests, both domestically and internationally, with respect to both man-made and natural incidents.14 Infrastructure—Homeland security may be considered from the perspective of critical national infrastructure. Across the nation, roadways, rivers, and airlines connect American society, thereby facilitating the logistics of goods and services. Television, radio, and telephone networks provide a basis for communication within American society. Hospitals and medical laboratories provide a basis for treating people who may be harmed during inclement incidents. Dams and nuclear facilities generate electric power. Many other components of critical national infrastructure (CNI) exist, and all CNI components are integrated with varying levels of extensiveness. Any failure in one area may incite cascading failures that impact related areas of CNI. Protecting CNI is a paramount interest of homeland security to ensure the production, logistics, and availability of resources throughout the nation. Individuals—Homeland security is a matter that affects everyone. Anyone can contribute to a safer nation. For example, truck drivers may be used as the eyes and ears of the road. They may observe the actions and behaviors of others during their journeys, notice strange situations, and relay information to proper authorities when they believe they have observed something that is suspicious. Many more perspectives may be listed if one only ponders the many ways in which homeland security influences daily life and impacts the nation. Homeland security is not relegated to the constraints of government coffers or the confines of protected offices; instead, it is a concern of every American citizen and resident. Homeland security is many things to many people and organizations and involves a myriad of different, complex perspectives. Regardless, homeland security is an essential concept embedded within every facet of American society.

1.6 Emergency Management: A Key Element in Homeland Security Operations According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), emergency management is the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters. The primary objective of emergency management is to sustain life, minimize damage to property, and maintain the safety and welfare of a community. Fundamentally, emergency management is a two-fold comprehensive process. The first part necessitates knowing what to do, which involves the coordination of the personnel, procedures, and provisions that are essential for the prevention of, the preparation for, the response to, and the recovery from the effects of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, man-made hazards, disasters, emergencies, and critical incidents. The second part requires doing what you know, which involves an inclusive collaboration among all key stakeholders, including the government, the private sector, the public, and the media. The collaboration aspect must be designed to identify functions, roles, and responsibilities and requires a commitment to promote the communication and trust components that are essential to sustaining the functional effectiveness of all service deliverables during a disaster event. Comfort and Cahill acknowledge the essential nature of collaboration within the emergency management function: “In environments of high uncertainty, this 10

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quality of inter-personal trust is essential for collective action. Building that trust in a multi- organizational operating environment is a complex process, perhaps the most difficult task involved in creating an integrated emergency management system.” The importance of collaboration is a critical dynamic of emergency management. In essence, collaboration involves the development of mutual cooperation within a community, which creates the environment in which coordination can function effectively. The profession of emergency management has become an inclusive triad of process, responsibility, and discipline. First, the process of emergency management can be found in the actual response, or “boots on the ground,” to an emergency, disaster, or critical incident after it happens. Because every incident/event seemingly has a life of its own, this often requires different response and recovery approaches that were not documented in standard protocol, were unforeseen, or demanded immediate modification of “best practice.” Understanding that every incident or event is different, it is important to understand each event can serve as a valuable learning tool when objectively reviewed and the lessons learned captured. Invariably, the process or “game plan” results in the often-used paradigm of “adapt, improvise, and overcome.” The Four Ds can serve as a basic foundation for the emergency management process: 1) Discover—lessons learned, achievements, deficiencies, effectiveness; 2) Determine—what needs to be done, necessary resources, relationships, readiness; 3) Develop—mitigation, preparedness, operational response/recovery methods; and 4) Deploy— when, where, set out, set up, step up, stand down. The continuously shifting dynamics associated with an adverse event will continue to develop and influence the emergency management process to the extent that there will never be a panacea or “one method fits all” approach. The responsibility of emergency management involves key stakeholders, including local/state/ federal government agencies, first responders, Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs), and community members. For example, during the response and recovery phases, the leadership involved must take the responsibility to ensure that the necessary provisions, such as personnel and supplies, are adequate to the extent that the front-line responders and the public can depend upon and trust those tasked with the readiness to react when needed. Emergency managers often have few resources under their immediate control but have access to an incredible amount of assistance from government, nongovernmental partners, and the private sector. Specifically, the emergency manager must act responsibly and “diplomatically” to create and sustain an environment of cooperation within which they can engage with community and emergency response partners, envision and understand how agencies may work together in an effort to make the best use of partner-agency resources so needed in an emergency, and exercise responsible leadership often under some of the most trying of conditions. In addition, communication is the responsibility of everyone involved prior to, during, and after an incident. The absence of or a deficiency in communication may hinder the response of those involved with the emergency management process and compromise the safety and welfare of the public, responders, property, and the environment. The profession and practices of emergency management have continued to evolve as a valid discipline and necessary subject matter that has earned its rightful place in the national headlines as well as in the mindset of the public. Emergency management has evolved into the discipline of ensuring that communities, businesses, and organizations are able to successfully endure through all aspects of an emergency or significant critical incident. Thus, the field of emergency management has become in itself a science that does more than just “deal with” extreme events. The discipline employs methods, means, and mindset to ensure Introduction to Homeland Security

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the protection of people, property, and the environment. This goal is accomplished through mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

1.7 What Are the Threats and Dangers Facing Our Nation? For the United States and its allies, the threats faced are extremely diverse. Natural events, such as earthquakes or hurricanes, may inflict wide-ranging damage; other events, such as tornadoes, though deadly, will normally, though not always, be limited in the area they impact. Attacks against the national or the global economic and banking systems, domestic communications, energy reserves, or supplies of food or water could well have devastating effects. Accidents, such as industrial or transportation incidents, also may be devastating within the immediate area of the event, but they are typically limited in scope. Regardless, the individuals whose lives are adversely impacted feel the detriments of devastation and rely upon the assistance of others to recover from inclement circumstances and events. Other accidents, such as major chemical spills, fires, or nuclear disasters, are prevented by constantly improving and monitoring a variety of safety procedures. Pandemics pose their unique threats to the population. Intentional attacks against the national infrastructure remain a possibility. The diversity of the threats facing the nation is so great that it is impossible to completely eliminate the risk of a disastrous situation occurring at any time. Because of such a great range of threats, it is also impossible to completely envision and imagine a complete array of endangerments that could possibly be harmful. Even as a potential threat is identified, it may be impossible to determine all the combinations and permutations of events that may be harmful. Thus, great complexity exists regarding the threat domain. Intentional attacks upon the nation may come in many forms. Attacks against the communications and financial systems, attacks against the industrial sector, attacks against the agricultural sector, pandemics, and transnational crime (including drug smuggling) are examples of potential dangers that challenge the nation. Those that would harm the U.S. are typically

Figure 1.6 Medical teams assist those injured from the bombing at the 2013 Boston Marathon. (Source: FEMA. Photo by Robert Rose)

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motivated by deeply held views that the nation, the population, and the American lifestyle should be shocked or forced into radical change. This notion is commensurate with the behavioral modification goals of terrorism. Therefore, potential aggressors define the legitimacy of targets with respect to the inciting of behavioral change. Domestically, Timothy McVeigh viewed a federal building as a legitimate target. His choice of targets had little regard for the welfare of the individuals who were killed during his murderous attack, which resulted in the destruction of the building, the city infrastructure, and the lives of many Oklahomans. His actions showed little concern regarding the effects of collateral damage. Even the most innocuous appearances may conceal the deadliest of dangers. The 2013 bombing at the Boston Marathon is another example of how the freedom of the nation makes the nation vulnerable. In the case of this attack, two young men from Europe, allowed into the United States, used the freedoms of the nation to attack the nation. Since the origin of the American government, numerous anti-government crimes against both property and persons have occurred. Regardless of their motivations, potential aggressors and threat elements identify their targets. The vulnerabilities of potential targets are assessed and evaluated to determine the feasibility of successfully completing an attack. Afterward, depending on the outcomes of such evaluation and assessment, strikes against the target may occur.

1.8 When and Where Does Disaster Strike? In a nutshell, disaster is only a heartbeat away; it may strike anytime, anywhere. Some incidents may have little or no warning, whereas other incidents may be preceded by numerous warnings and countermeasures. Often, disaster strikes with speed, surprise, and violence. During 2005, Hurricane Katrina was preceded by various warnings and evacuation activities. Hurricanes may be tracked across the ocean, and their trajectories may be plotted to determine potential impact locations along the coastline. Any changes in their intensities may be observed as they travel across the ocean. These observations may be used to forecast quantitatively over time a range of possible storm strengths that may or may not occur upon landfall. Although no one can guarantee with 100% certainty that such storm intensities and landfalls will occur exactly as projected, there is generally time to issue warnings, if necessary. In contrast, some incidents may have little or no warning. Typically, earthquakes have no warning whatsoever.15 Although ongoing research is investigating potential methods of earthquake prediction and various warning systems, they are highly ineffective with respect to the ability to enact any countermeasures or mitigation efforts. For example, in 2013, when an earthquake affected the region of Southern California, an experimental earthquake warning system predicted the event only 30 seconds before it actually happened.16 This amount of time was insufficient to make a difference in the lives of the Californians who were impacted by the earthquake. Regardless of any warning that may or may not precede incidents, human life is often affected by natural and man-made hazards, both indirectly and directly. For example, a train carrying dangerous chemicals may be derailed in an uninhabited region. However, because of wind patterns, the citizens of nearby communities, towns, and cities may be endangered by poisonous fumes. Although the 2010 BP oil spill occurred unexpectedly many miles offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, it affected the residents and the economies of “hundreds of miles of coastline.”17 It also affected the price of petroleum products, driving them upward. Introduction to Homeland Security

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1.9 Who Are the Responders, and What Is Their Role? The thousands of emergency response organizations throughout the country are all unique. They have separate budgets, different levels of training and expertise, varying levels of interaction with state and federal officials, and different threat environments in which they must work. The heaviest burden of preparing for domestic emergencies falls on the emergency medical personnel, firefighters, and police officers of the “first responder” community. Concerns about mass casualties from conventional attacks and the potential use of smallpox and other biological weapons have focused renewed attention on public health and hospital preparedness, which are thought to be woefully lacking. Behind the first responders and health-care personnel are state emergency management offices, the offices of the state adjutant generals, and finally the many federal agencies with roles to play. All these organizations are composed of people. Some may have many years of experience with emergencies and disasters, whereas others may just be entering their respective occupations. An organization is only as good as the people it employs, their training, and the resources that it has available. Therefore, responders must be well trained and properly equipped to perform their respective missions and tasks. Responders come from a variety of backgrounds. Some may be college students working part time as law enforcement officers, whereas others may be unpaid volunteers working as firefighters in small communities. Some responders may be full-time medical personnel working in the most notable and well-equipped hospitals, whereas others may be paramedics assigned to a rural ambulance service. Such individuals comprise the basic elements of all response organizations and agencies. Within the domain of homeland security, their skills, abilities, and expertise are critical during periods of calamity.

1.10 The Department of Homeland Security: A Brief Examination As stated, the White House Office of Homeland Security was created on October 8, 2001, with Congress passing legislation mandating the Department of Homeland Security on November 19, 2002. The Department of Homeland Security today is different than the agency first established over 15 years ago. The extremists’ attacks of 2001 set the tone for domestic security from such events. The impact of Hurricane Katrina brought home the realization that natural events pose as great or an even greater threat to the communities of our nation. Now functioning under the leadership of Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas within the administration of President Joe Biden, the Department performs a wide range of missions enhancing the protection and security of the nation. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (Administrative Law, n.d.). This mission statement was developed early in the evolution of the Department of Homeland Security. It has caused concern throughout the history of the department in that it seems to limit the scope of the mission of homeland security. It particularly causes policy questions to arise when discussing natural disasters and man-made incidents such as acts of terrorism, incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, or any other event that incites national distress. In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the mission statement reflected the “mood” of the country, with a focus on terrorists, acts of terrorism, and what direction the United States should take in the anti-terrorism preparedness role. The country and its leadership, in a natural reaction to the attacks, were not focused on natural hazards. 14

Introduction to Homeland Security

Figure 1.7 First responders. (Source: U.S. Department of Defense)

The Department became operational on January 24, 2003, with most component agencies merging on March 1, 2003. The Department of Homeland Security incorporates 22 governmental agencies. Some of those agencies are the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Transportation Security Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Border Patrol, along with 16 other agencies. This reorganization was the largest one in the federal government since the U.S. Department of Defense was created in 1947. As stated by the President, “The mission of the Office will be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks” (Administrative Law, n.d.). The Department of Homeland Security is led by the Secretary of Homeland Security. As of 2019, an array of individuals had been appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and served in the position. The first Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security was the former governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, named by President George W. Bush to direct the Office, beginning his duties on October 8, 2001. Ridge resigned on November 30, 2004. The second Secretary was Michael Chertoff, also appointed by President Bush, beginning on February 15, 2005. The third Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security was former Arizona governor Janet Napolitano. She was followed by Jeh Charles Johnson (fourth Secretary), General John F. Kelly (fifth Secretary), and later Kirstjen M. Nielsen, who assumed the office on December 6, 2017. According to a report from the Department of Homeland Security, in fiscal year 2017, the Department was allocated a net discretionary budget of $40.6 billion. With more than 240,000 employees, DHS was the third largest Cabinet department, after the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. The Department has many undersecretaries, assistant undersecretaries, Introduction to Homeland Security

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administrators, and directors. All the directorates, programs, and personnel ultimately report to the Office of the Secretary. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan highlights mission statement concerns. Secretary Chertoff outlined four operational objectives: 1) Clarifying, defining, and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels; 2) Strengthening accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse; 3) Consolidating efforts to integrate the Department’s critical mission of preparedness; and 4) Enhancing capabilities to respond to major disasters and emergencies, including catastrophic events, particularly in terms of situational assessment and awareness, emergency communications, evacuations, search and rescue, logistics, and mass care and sheltering (Department of Homeland Security, 2019). The fourth objective seems to be making a subtle shift to the natural hazards environment. As the first phase of the development of the Department of Homeland Security was directed by the administration of President George W. Bush, the second phase, under President Barack Obama, witnessed a further evolution of the agency. During the early phases of the Obama administration, Arizona governor Janet Napolitano was appointed Director of the Department of Homeland Security, replacing Michael Chertoff. Secretary Napolitano initiated a review and evaluation of each function within the Department of Homeland Security. Under the administration of President Obama, the Department of Homeland Security continued to evolve. By 2010, significant attention had been directed to transportation and border security and the ability of responding to threats much broader than terrorism. Violence and unrest in Mexico, combined with poverty in Central America, are issues that have fueled illegal immigration and violence along the nation’s southwest border. As a response, the Department of Homeland Security strengthened enforcement and intervention efforts on the southwest border to disrupt the drug, cash, and weapon smuggling that fuels cartel violence in Mexico by adding manpower and technology to the southwest border. Some of the programs included under the Department of Homeland Security include the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a program intended to help increase the security of containerized cargo shipped to the United States from around the world; the National Fugitive Operations Program, to enhance the apprehension and deportation of fugitive aliens, especially those who have been convicted of crimes; and Operation Community Shield, a nationwide initiative that targets violent transnational street gangs by partnering with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies at all levels and making use of its authority to deport criminal aliens. Clearly, the role of the Department of Homeland Security continues to evolve.

1.11 Chapter Comments and Summary Although most threats have limited impact upon the nation, the September 11, 2001 attack and the damage inflicted by Hurricane Katrina converged to serve as a catalyst for enhancing homeland security. The September 11, 2001 attacks made Americans confront the unpleasant reality that foreign terrorists could routinely operate within the U.S. to investigate and exploit security weaknesses and use them to their advantage, giving them the ability to strike a target at the time of their choosing. During modern times, the legacy of the terrorist attacks continues to be felt by the American public as they find themselves subjected to an increasing level of inspection at the nation’s airports before boarding their flights. Terrorism itself is fluid; as measures are taken to remove a potential target from the terrorist, the terrorist changes their tactics and targets. It is a constant chess game with deadly stakes in play. 16

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Such calamities and threats are not uncommon in American history. Since the founding of the nation, it has faced various challenges, ranging from wars to natural disasters. Domestic and international events have contributed to the maturing of protecting American society over time. Each incident represents a unique experience from which lessons were learned that bettered preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery. Despite such lessons, the United States is not an invulnerable society or nation. An all-hazards and whole-community paradigm exists, through which modern efforts of homeland security are instantiated. This all-hazards approach accommodates the realities of both man-made and natural disasters. Calamities may occur with varying degrees of warning. In some cases, warnings may be sufficient to facilitate evacuations, whereas other situations may involve little or no warning. In any case, any threat, whether natural or man-made, has the potential to impact human life. People are the primary element of homeland security efforts. The preservation of human life is a top priority of the homeland security domain. Although there are numerous organizations, both public and private, that contribute to homeland security, all organizations are composed of people. An organization is only as good as its people and its available resources. Therefore, responders must be well trained, well equipped, and prepared to encounter both man-made and natural events. Responders come from all walks of life and have varying amounts of experience with disasters. Homeland security encompasses a complex domain. The homeland security activities that may be appropriate for one organization may be completely inappropriate for a different organization. No solitary perspective of homeland security exists; it is many things to different organizations and people. Examples of such perspectives include policies, strategies, and philosophies. Homeland security is both an art and a science. It exhibits various attributes of uncertainty and inexactness while simultaneously possessing quantitative methods within its implementation.

1.12 Key Terms All-Hazards All Reasonable Hazards American Revolution Calamity Complexity Contingency Creativity Critical National Infrastructure Department of Homeland Security Disaster Earthquake Extremists Event First Responder Flexible Event Response Homeland Security Hurricane Incident

Infrastructure Lifestyle Man-Made Incident Management Mitigate Natural Incident Policy Preparedness Protection Responder Recover Response Security Society Strategy Terrorism Threat Whole-Community Approach Introduction to Homeland Security

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1.13 Thought and Discussion Questions

1. Homeland security is a relatively new term that was coined after the events of September 11, 2001. However, the concept of homeland security has existed throughout the history of the United States. Review American history, and cite examples from each century of the nation’s existence that involved the concept of homeland security. Write a brief essay that discusses your findings. 2. The termination of the Cold War necessitated many changes in the U.S. homeland security philosophies. Beginning in the 1990s, how do you believe that homeland security has adapted to the complexities of modern threats? Write a brief essay that discusses your opinion. 3. Domestic threats originate from a variety of sources, ranging from individual agents (e.g., Tim McVeigh, Major Nidal Hassan) to group-based and cell-based entities (e.g., Animal Liberation Front [ALF], Earth Liberation Front [ELF]). From the perspective of domestic terrorism, please consider the actions of either an individual agent or group/ cell that have impacted American commercial or government operations. Select a case example of your choice, substantively discuss the characteristics of the case, and provide a critical analysis of the case. Within your response, please discuss the homeland security implications of your selected event. 4. Global society is dynamic over time. Now that nearly two decades have passed since the events of September 11, 2001, how do you believe American society views homeland security? Write a brief essay that discusses your opinion.

Notes

1. Faulkner, W. Nobel Banquet Speech December 10, 1950. Stockholm, Sweden. Retrieved September 1, 2016, from www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1949/faulkner-speech.html. 2. Hoyt, M. F. (2012). Therapist Stories of Inspiration, Passion, and Renewal: What’s Love Got to Do with It? New York: Routledge. 3. DeMarco, A. (2013). What Is Your Passion? In the Light of Time and Eternity. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse. 4. Cook, T. A., and Raia, K. (2017). Mastering Import & Export Management. New York: American Management Association. 5. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security. Retrieved August 22, 2015, from www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 6. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Our Mission—Overview. Retrieved May 3, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/our-mission. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Strategic objectives. Office of Policy. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/office-policy. 10. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2013). NIMS and National Preparedness. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from www.fema.gov/national-preparedness/national-incident-management-system. 11. Williams, T. (2009). Hurricane of Independence: The Untold Story of the Deadly Storm at the Deciding Moment of the American Revolution. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, Inc. 12. Neely, W. (2012). The Great Hurricane of 1780: The Story of the Greatest and Deadliest Hurricane of the Caribbean and the Americas. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, p. 113. 13. Ibid. 14. Scahill, J. (2005). Blackwater Down. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from www.tulanelink.com/tulanelink/ blackwater_box.htm. 15. University of Hawaii. (2013). Earthquake Mitigation Hazards. Retrieved May 3, 2013, from www.uhh. hawaii.edu/~nat_haz/earthquakes/.

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16. Serna, J. (2013). Quake tested warning system. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved May 3, 2013, from http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/14/local/la-me-quake-early-warnings-20130314. 17. Leader, J. (2013). Gulf oil spill anniversary: 3 years later, ramifications are still felt from BP’s tragedy. The Huffington Post. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/20/gulf-oil-spillanniversary_n_3118965.html.

References Administrative Law. (n.d.). Summary of the President’s Executive Order: The Office of Homeland Security & the Homeland Security Council. Retrieved from https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/adlaw/homeland_security_ summary.htm. Cook, T. A., and Raia, K. (2017). Mastering Import & Export Management. New York, NY: American Management Association. DeMarco, A. (2013). What Is Your Passion? In the Light of Time and Eternity. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse. Department of Homeland Security. (2019). The DHS Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2020–2024. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2013). NIMS and National Preparedness. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from www.fema.gov/national-preparedness/national-incident-management-system. Hoyt, M. F. (2013). Therapist Stories of Inspiration, Passion, and Renewal: What’s Love Got to Do with It? New York, NY: Routledge. Neely, W. (2012). The Great Hurricane of 1780: The Story of the Greatest and Deadliest Hurricane of the Caribbean and the Americas. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, p. 113. Serna, J. (2013). Quake tested warning system. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved May 3, 2013, from http:// articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/14/local/la-me-quake-early-warnings-20130314. University of Hawaii. (2013). Earthquake Mitigation Hazards. Retrieved May 3, 2013, from www.uhh.hawaii. edu/~nat_haz/earthquakes/. Williams, T. (2009). Hurricane of Independence: The Untold Story of the Deadly Storm at the Deciding Moment of the American Revolution. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, Inc.

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2 Vital National Interests and the Defense of the Homeland

That I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . —U.S. Military Officer Oath of Office The objectives of this chapter are to: • Understand the concept of vital national interests and how they are important to a nation; • Gain an understanding of the instruments of power available to a nation; • Examine the historical evolution of the United States from its independence from Britain through its emergence as a global superpower; • Identify the phases of the Cold War and its impact on United States foreign policy; and • Recognize the impact on the United States of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the changes in homeland security polices, and its influence on the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

2.1 Introduction The world is a very dynamic and dangerous place, and the United States plays a major role in global dynamics. In the history of nations, the United States is remarkable. Over a period of approximately 250 years, the country evolved from a small group of European colonies into a global superpower, economically, socially, diplomatically, and militarily. Its roots were derived from not only the English colonists, but also the Spanish, French, and Native American lands in the new world. Over the centuries, many challenges and difficulties impacted the homeland. Examples include pestilence and disease, wars and military conflicts, political issues, natural incidents, and many other happenings that influenced society toward adjustments of the balance between liberty and security. Notable incidents included yellow fever in the 1800s and the Spanish influenza in the early twentieth century; numerous conflicts, ranging from the American Revolution to the modern War on Terror; the flooding of the Mississippi River; the San Francisco earthquake; the Dust Bowl years; the Red Scare of 1950s; the erupting of Mount St. Helens in 1980; Super Storm 21

Figure 2.1 Map of the United States of America. (Source: Shutterstock. Used with permission)

Sandy; and many others. At the time of this authorship, American society is debating erecting a security wall to demarcate the border between the United States of America and Mexico. Each unique incident contributed toward the slow emergence of the modern notions of homeland security and emergency management. Even the last decade and a half showed that the world is a very dangerous place. Cultures clashed, violence and warfare erupted, economies were shaken, and populations were threatened and became targets of extreme violence—in some cases, to the point at which the violence edged on genocide. For better or worse, the United States is one of the most significant, if not the most significant, of the global powers. Despite its power, in many ways, it is not invulnerable. Both man-made and natural disasters continuously pose considerable risks to the safety and security of its citizenry and communities.

2.2 A Brief History and Reflection While a complete and in-depth examination of the history and evolution of the United States is beyond the scope of this chapter, even the most basic of studies reveals that the birth, growth, and development of the United States comprise a remarkable story. Moving from a set of colonies into a global superpower over a span of two centuries is a unique feat in world history. With the conclusion of the American Revolution and the decision by the British government to relinquish its hold on the thirteen American colonies, a new nation was established, one that 22

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was intended to operate with a representative government at a time in history in which most of the world’s powerful nations were controlled by monarchies. Contrary to popular belief, the United States of America is a republic, not a democracy. However, some constrained amount of democracy exists within its political infrastructure. The combination of a governmental republic and the incorporation of democracy has proven to be a continually evolving form of government. With independence, the young United States turned to the task of commencing a process that continues today of the development of its state and federal governments, including (but not limited to) their relationships, roles, and responsibilities. Since its founding, the United States has matured greatly as a nation. Beginning as a small collection of colonies along the Eastern seashore, the nation now spans the continent, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean; contains two states (Alaska and Hawaii) beyond its continental mass; maintains various territories; and commands a global influence. The nation’s demographics and national interests are diverse and represent a variety of different societal dimensions that have proven to be a melting pot of cultures.

2.3 Threats and Challenges to the Nation The United States has endured, and shall continue to endure, both natural and man-made threats. Natural events, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, droughts, and floods, have caused devastation. Wars and conflicts both at home and abroad have also shaped the nation’s identity. Throughout such challenges, the nation has survived and thrived. If history has any lesson for the modern practitioners and theoreticians of homeland security, it is that maintaining the security of the American homeland is both daunting and challenging.

Figure 2.2 King George III of England.

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2.4 Vital National Interests and Instruments of National Power The decision to exert military power should never be made lightly and should only be reached if vital national interests are jeopardized. Vital interests are those of such importance that the nation cannot afford to compromise their principles. The United States government has identified four interests as vital to national security. They are survival and security, political and territorial integrity, economic stability and well-being, and national stability.1 While these national interests are frequently discussed in vague or generalized terms by the government, they serve as the foundation for the development and implementation of national strategy and national security policies. In theory, vital national interests should be the only things that would lead a nation to engage in military action. To ensure the safety of its vital national interests, a country can call upon all its instruments of national power to influence other nations. Nations are in a constant state of change, economically, socially, and politically; they continually engage with other nations. Normally, this process of change and interaction occurs peacefully because nations recognize that change is in their best interests strategically. However, there are times when peaceful change is replaced by aggression. There are only two ways for a nation to make another nation comply with its wishes. A nation can peaceably convince the other nation through dialogue and reward. Otherwise, a nation may be influenced through threats of the use or application of force. The tools used by a nation to make another nation comply with its wishes are called “instruments of national power.” There are four instruments of national power: diplomatic/political power, informational power, military power, and economic power (DIME). Within the contexts of national security and the defense of the homeland, diplomacy is the art of employing communications and establishing global relationships to advance national objectives. Within the setting of national security, all governmental agencies must work together to achieve the common goal of protecting the nation. The United States Department of State is the primary agency that facilitates international relations and diplomacy. The functions of diplomacy and the effects of diplomatic power are the key elements of national strategy and are the predominant instruments of national power. These diplomatic resources can be used to influence international polices, international negotiations, political recognition, treaties, and alliances. The diplomatic instrument is normally emphasized before hostilities begin and remains critical in any conflict situation.2 Essentially, war represents a failure of diplomacy. Governments should always first consider the diplomatic option to counter a threat. The costs of diplomacy are lower than those expended during military conflicts. However, the misapplication of diplomacy can amplify asymmetric threats, especially if they legitimize violence.3 Asymmetric warfare involves leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against the vulnerabilities of a superior opponent to achieve a disproportionate effect. This concept includes a goal of undermining the opponent’s will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor’s strategic objectives. The misapplication of diplomacy contributes negatively to the resolution of problematic situations. During the months preceding World War II, one of the greatest failures of diplomacy involved the appeasement of Adolf Hitler. This appeasement included the Munich Pact of 1938. In an attempt to avoid war with Germany, the nations of France, Britain, and Italy permitted the German annexation of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland. As parts of Czechoslovakia were absorbed under German control, the French and British leaders believed they had ensured peace. However, Germany was clandestinely preparing to invade Poland. During September 1939, the German invasion of Poland sparked a declaration of war against Germany by both France and Britain. This event proved to be the opening days of World War II in Europe.4 24

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Information or informational power, the second instrument of national power, is the use of information and ideas to advance national interests. Information is used to influence opinions, views, and attitudes of both allies and adversaries. Informational resources that can be used to influence international polices include any information designed and focused to influence or shape human opinion. These informational resources include propaganda, media, news, and press releases.5 Examples of the use of information to influence international opinion by the United States include Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE), and Radio Marti (RM). In the conflict in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese were ultimately successful through their use of information warfare, influencing the opinion of the U.S. population against the conflict and demanding the withdrawal of United States forces and support. The third instrument of power is economic power. Economic power considerations remain a major concern for any nation. Economic strategies thar can be employed to influence other nations include the regulation of trade practices, the provision of international loans and loan guarantees, the supplying of foreign aid and subsidies, international investment and monetary policies, and technology.6 For example, since 1975, the heads of state or government of the major industrial democracies meet annually, in what is now known as the G7/8, to deal with the economic and political issues facing their domestic societies and the international community. Six countries were represented during the first summit in November 1975. These nations consisted of France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy. The G7/8 ministers and officials also meet on an ad hoc basis to deal with pressing issues such a terrorism, energy, and development. Periodically, the leaders also create task forces or working groups to focus intensively on certain issues of concern. Such issues include drug-related money laundering, nuclear safety, and transnational organized crime. Military power is the fourth instrument of national power. It may be implemented by a government to influence international policies, but it is the instrument that should be used as a last resort. Though most of the defense of the United States centers on the capabilities of its military, the three additional instruments of national power available to the nation are extremely important. All instruments of national power are interconnected; for example, military power is frequently dependent upon a diplomat’s ability to enlist other nations in alliances and coalitions or in obtaining basing rights and over-flight permissions. It is also directly dependent on the financial and technological strength of the nation’s industrial, scientific, and economic capacities.7

2.5 Foundations of a Nation Over the course of two centuries, the United States rose from obscurity to global superpower, with extensive power and influence. The United States has been viewed as a nation that values rough independence and great pride that some observers have described as arrogance. A nation blessed with extensive resources and a population empowered with freedoms, the United States has attracted and continues to attract refugees fleeing oppression or in search of religious tolerance, economic opportunity, or a chance for a better life. The United States became a nation of dreamers and doers. It is a nation that would choose leaders to serve as the chief executive as diverse as the autocratic George Washington and the rough woodsman Andrew Jackson, from the intellectuals Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson to the truly American Theodore Roosevelt. It became a nation that would survive an internal struggle and defeat, on land, at sea, and eventually in the air, aggressor nations that would dare to challenge/threaten the vital national interests of the country. Introduction to Homeland Security

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The United States has defined itself as a country that believes in manifest destiny, seeing itself as the primary nation in the Western Hemisphere. It is a nation that developed its unique culture and exported it globally. The United States is many things. President Ronald Reagan, in his 1989 farewell address to the nation, drawing from the words of John Winthrop, famously said the United States remains “the shining city upon a hill” with its doors “open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here.”8 President Reagan’s speech highlighted the United States as an example to other nations that freedom is important and is something to be valued and protected. To others, the United States is a power to be feared. For much of its history, while European powers were continually on alert for possible aggression from their neighbors, the United States was protected by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. With no major threat to challenge the sovereignty of the nation, investments in national defense and homeland security were limited, if not outright inadequate. Because the Army served primarily as a constabulary force and the Navy possessed limited power and capability, America was not perceived as a threat to stronger nations during its formative years.

2.6 Foundations of National Security At the conclusion of the American Revolution, few funds were available for national defense. The Continental Navy and Marine Corps ceased to exist. The Continental Army disbanded. In its place, a small national army was formed with the support of local militias. Soon realizing that the nation needed some type of naval security, on August 4, 1790, Congress authorized the formation of the Revenue Marine Service, which would serve as a coastal security force charged with, among other things, suppressing smuggling. For several years, the Revenue Marine Service would serve as the nation’s quasi-navy until growing, sea-going, international commerce made it clear the nation needed a navy. The birth of the United States Navy did not mean an end for the Revenue Marine Service. Rather, the Service would prove remarkably flexible as it responded to changing needs over the next 200 years, eventually becoming what we know today as the United States Coast Guard (USCG). Today, the Coast Guard operates as part of the Department of Homeland Security and serves as the nation’s front-line agency for enforcing United States laws at sea, including drug trafficking interdiction; protecting the marine environment, coastline, and ports; and providing emergency search and rescue operations. In times of war, or at the direction of the President, the United States Coast Guard serves as a direct supplement to the Navy Department. Today, as in the past, maritime security is important to the United States. Protection of the sea lanes ensures that ocean-going commerce, so important to the nation, proceeds unhindered. Since the earliest colonial days, the sea has served as the highway system for much of the nation’s international trade, even as the United States relied on the British for protection in the early days of the republic. The War of 1812, fought against the British, showed that both the United States and the Western Hemisphere were susceptible to the influences of the major European powers. The British were successful in their use of their sea power to control the sea lanes, disrupt maritime trade, blockade ports and land British ground forces. During this conflict, Baltimore was bombarded, Washington was burned, and Louisiana was invaded. Although the United States won against Britain and uncontestably reinforced its existence as an independent nation, the war demonstrated the need for a strong national defense. At the end of the war, few debated the need for the United States to develop a stronger military capability. 26

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Figure 2.3 Revenue service cutter.

2.7 The Monroe Doctrine In December 1823, the administration of President James Monroe (1817–1825) established the first major United States policy toward European intervention into the Americas. In what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, the President presented a broad proclamation that was intended to define the relationship between the Americas and Europe. In this “Doctrine,” he warned foreign powers against interfering in the affairs of the United States and the newly independent Latin American countries, many of which had recently overthrown European rule. The Monroe Doctrine, which was actually written by John Quincy Adams, was based on three major principles that would serve as the foundation for the homeland security vision of the United States for much of its history: 1) a separate sphere of influence for the Americas and Europe, 2) the cessation of European colonization of the Americas, and 3) the non-intervention of Europe in the affairs of the nations of North and South America. This was a very bold step, considering the fact that the United States did not possess the military or political power to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, nor did the nation necessarily consider the desires of the other countries in the region. No matter, the primary tenets of the Monroe Doctrine established the United States as the self-proclaimed guardian of the Western Hemisphere.

2.8 Early Conflicts During the years between the War of 1812 and the turn of the century, the nation continued its expansion, fought a brief war with Mexico, and survived a major internal conflict. Except during the Civil War (1861–1865), the United States military remained quite small and poorly Introduction to Homeland Security

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funded during this period. Though these conflicts helped shape the nation, they had little impact on the larger world stage. Few, if any, nations threatened the sovereignty of the United States. European powers were more concerned with expanding their influence in Africa and Asia. Beginning about 1898, the United States entered the world stage with a series of military expeditions and small wars in Cuba, the Philippines, China, Latin America, and the Caribbean, many of which, such as the small wars in Latin America and the Caribbean, continued for decades.

2.9 The Early Twentieth Century Many have referred to the twentieth century as America’s century. During the twentieth century, the United States evolved from a naive country, which was itself unaware of its potential, into the world’s only global superpower. Throughout this period, the nation endured World War I, World War II, conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and the Gulf War. It also experienced the Great Depression as well as a period of unrivaled economic prosperity. The nation invoked and repealed Prohibition, experienced the New Deal, and witnessed much social change regarding civil rights. Throughout the twentieth century, the face of America changed considerably. In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency upon the assassination of President William McKinley. Roosevelt visualized the United States as an emerging power and expected the nation to be the leader in the Western Hemisphere and a global presence. He thought that the United States had a responsibility to maintain the Monroe Doctrine and that the nation should continue to use its power and influence to limit European involvement within the Western Hemisphere. In 1904, Roosevelt extended the Monroe Doctrine through the proclamation of the Roosevelt Corollary. This Corollary altered the original meaning of the Doctrine, justifying unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America when deemed necessary, including taking action to ensure that nations in the Western Hemisphere fulfilled their economic obligations to international creditors. Under the Corollary, foreign nations were disallowed from violating the U.S. rights or inviting “foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.”10 Acting on the Corollary, the U.S. increased its involvement in the internal affairs of other nations, using the elements of international power: diplomacy, military force, and economic outreach to influence or shape policies in the various nations in the Americas. At various times during the early 1900s, the United States deployed military forces to Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic while simultaneously deterring European intervention.11 After the administration of President Roosevelt, American presidents continued to focus on international issues while again assuming a degree of isolationism toward Europe and European affairs. During the second decade of the century, as the First World War in Europe spread across the globe, the United States was drawn out of isolationism. By 1917, America possessed a strong navy built around a fleet of modern battleships, but the army was nothing more than a third-rate power still relying on the state militias in the event of a national emergency. The United States had not been involved in a major war for over 50 years. When drawn into World War I in the third year of the conflict, America found itself unprepared for the struggle. Untrained and ill equipped for a European war, the United States had limited involvement, compared to the contributions of France, Germany, Russia, and Britain. Although America engaged in World War I for less than two years, the conflict propelled the nation into 28

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Figure 2.4 President Theodore Roosevelt.9

international affairs, especially those in Europe. On the home front, espionage, domestic and international terrorism, unrest in labor, and the challenge of Communism were just a few of the things we would today call homeland security threats. Tactically, World War I changed the way nations fought wars. Battlefields became much more lethal with the introduction of such weapons as aircraft, poisonous gas, machine guns, and tanks; the extensive use of artillery; and a greater reliance on logistics (which had to overcome the threat of submarine warfare). Much of the globe was affected by the war, and the longterm impact of the conflict was great. The “war to end all wars,” as it was termed, changed the map of the world. New nations emerged from the struggle, many national borders were reshaped, and changes in governmental structures occurred in some countries. After World War I, many nations abolished their monarchial forms of government and replaced them with national governments that ranged from republics and democracies to both Communism and fascism. Colonialism declined as independence movements gained momentum in many parts of the world. Russia experienced a revolution that resulted in the removal of its monarch and replacement with a Communist government. Germany attempted to establish a democratic government, but high unemployment and urban unrest led to its failure; Germany eventually fell under the control of the Nazis. Italy also moved toward socialism when it adopted a fascist government under Benito Mussolini in 1922. A significant outcome of World War I, with respect to world security, was the importance of determining diplomatic solutions to international problems. World War I inspired President Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 2.5 Roosevelt Corollary of 1904.

Woodrow Wilson to attempt the establishment of the League of Nations during his presidency (1913–1921). Through international cooperation and diplomacy, it was hoped that future international conflicts could be avoided. The League of Nations was formed at the end of World War I, in conjunction with the Treaty of Versailles, for the purposes of promoting “international cooperation,” achieving “peace and security,” and bringing nations together with the intent of avoiding future wars.12 President Wilson advocated American membership in the League of Nations, though the United States Senate voted not to join in 1919. Although the League of Nations was possibly doomed from its origin, it represented an attempt to find alternative solutions to international conflicts. Despite President Wilson’s best efforts to expand the international role of the United States, America again reverted to isolationism and dramatically downsized its military forces. Although the League of Nations existed until 1946, its power and influence fell far short of the original vision held by its founders.13 Despite its formation with the noblest of intentions, the League of Nations never fulfilled its potential and was disbanded. However, it was replaced with the United Nations in the hopes of forming a global alliance. By the late 1930s, a global economic depression and a strong sense of nationalism gripped the world. Around the globe, many nations, such as Germany, Italy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) (also known as the Soviet Union), and Japan, witnessed their national governments fall under the control of repressive regimes intent on aggression toward their neighbors. During 1931, Japan commenced military operations with the Mukden or Manchurian Incident, which even at the time was believed to have been perpetuated by the Japanese and 30

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Figure 2.6 President Woodrow Wilson.

served as the excuse for the Japanese to commence military operation resulting in the invasion of Manchuria. By 1933, the Japanese were conducting offensive operations in China while the international community watched. By the 1930s, Germany was under the control and direction of Adolph Hitler. It began an aggressive rearmament program in violation of the Treaty of Versailles (which brought World War I to closure). By signing the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had admitted and accepted guilt for the war and was mandated to pay reparations. The closing of World War I left Germany with extensive indebtedness that some deemed practically impossible to pay. It was also prohibited from maintaining a large-scale military and lost much of its territorial land. Specifically, Germany lost approximately 10% of its land, 16% of its coal resources, approximately 12.5% of its national population, and about 48% of its iron industries.14 Its military was constrained to a maximum of 100,000 personnel; conscription into military service was abolished; armored vehicles, submarines, and aircraft were disallowed; the German Navy was limited to a maximum of six battleships; and the Rhineland was demilitarized (i.e., no German forces were allowed in the region).15 Essentially, the Treaty of Versailles financially devastated and societally humiliated the German nation and its people. The economic depression of the 1920s impacted not only the United States, but also the entire world. The depression, coupled with Germany’s obligations per the Treaty of Versailles, provided the opportunity for Hitler to ascend to power via his political promises to restore Germany to states of power and wealth. After attaining power, Hitler produced and increased Germany’s army and its necessary munitions. Some believed that enhanced German power might counter the potential spread of Russian Communism. Later, in 1936, Hitler ordered Introduction to Homeland Security

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military forces into Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Rhineland. He also forged alliances with Japan and Italy, which became known as the Axis powers. World War II inevitably followed these events. Although Hitler’s power increased, the United States, Britain, and France were unprepared for war. Politically, both Britain and France attempted appeasement to quell Hitler’s and Germany’s aggression. For instance, in 1938, via the Munich Agreement, both Britain and France permitted the German annexation of Germanspeaking regions in Czechoslovakia, provided that Germany would agree to discontinue its invasions of other nations. However, in 1939, Hitler’s armies invaded Poland. As a result of the German transgression of the Munich Agreement via the invasion of Poland, both Britain and France responded by immediate declarations of war against Germany. Thus, Hitler’s invasion of Poland sparked World War II. Even as the world moved toward war, many in the United States hoped the nation could remain neutral and retain its philosophy of isolationism. Such sentiments resulted from a combination of the losses experienced in World War I and the Great Depression. From a historical context, isolationists argued their views from the farewell speech of President George Washington in which he advocated non-involvement in European wars and politics. During 1939, as war exploded in Europe, many in American society advocated isolationism. However, with time, the expanding of the European war, and concern for American interests, public opinion slowly shifted away from absolute neutrality to advocating constrained U.S. support for the Allied nations. However, the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, swayed the majority of the American populace to support war and global interventionism. As World War II approached, America was slow to build a military from the small force that served the nation. The United States possessed a small army, limited air assets, and a poorly funded navy. During 1933, Franklin Roosevelt became President of the United States. Recognizing the dangers facing the nation, Roosevelt struggled to guide the nation out of the Great Depression and prepare the population for the possibility of war as storm clouds gathered in Europe and Asia.

2.10 World War II, Challenging the Spread of Communism, Superpower Emergence, and the Competing World Philosophies Many will argue that the seeds for World War II were planted at the conclusion of World War I. During the two decades between the conflicts, Communists, fascists, and socialists gained control of the Soviet Union, Italy, Spain, and Germany. In Asia, Japan looked to the rich resources held by its neighbors and realized if it were to continue as an emerging Asian power, it would have to gain control of oil, rubber, minerals, and arable land unavailable in Japan. Japan also understood its ambitions in the region would place it on a collision with the European powers maintaining Asian colonies—the British, French, and Dutch—or the other major power in the Pacific, the United States. In the 1920s and 1930s, dictators, including Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, Franco in Spain, and Stalin in the Soviet Union, looked to expand their power and influence, suppressed domestic opposition, and rearmed their nations in anticipation of future conflict. While history points to World War II beginning with Japanese aggression in Asia or the German invasion of Poland, in reality, many factors and events led to the conflict. For the United States, support for the Allied powers, especially England, moved the nation toward war. Under President Roosevelt and against a strong sense of national isolationism, 32

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steps were slowly taken to strengthen and protect the nation. American public opinion changed on December 7, 1941 when the Japanese naval attack upon Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, provided a harsh reality for the United States concerning the dangers of war. The Japanese attack brought America into World War II. National mobilization placed the nation on a firm war footing. By the end of the war, the United States had emerged as one of two international superpowers and the only power with a nuclear capability. World War II devastated Europe and much of China and Japan. During the years following the war, the world quickly divided under the influence of the two superpowers. The nations of Eastern Europe and much of Asia were forced to align with the U.S.S.R., whereas Western Europe and the Pacific aligned with the United States. For the first time in modern history, two distinct philosophies of government stood in direct competition with one another. Many countries, such as America, France, and England, believed that governments should be democratic and that economies should be capitalistic. In direct opposition, the U.S.S.R. promoted Communism, drawing under its influence many of the nations of Eastern Europe. In 1949, the civil war in China ended with a Communist victory.16 As Europe divided, the United States took a bold step to rebuild its former enemies with an economic recovery effort. This economic initiative, entitled the Marshall Plan, was based on the concept that economically viable European and Asian regions would result in a safer world. The Marshall Plan stimulated the economic recoveries and stabilities of both Western Europe and Asia.17

2.11 Intelligence and National Security The United States government has embraced intelligence since its earliest days. President Washington believed in the value of intelligence, in both war and peace. In every conflict, commanders desire to gain insight into the mind of the enemy. Politicians and business leaders want to gain and employ intelligence to improve their decisions. During World War II and the post-war years, both intelligence and the function of intelligence came to assume an extremely important role in homeland security. During World War II, in an effort to better collect, process, and utilize intelligence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933– 1945) authorized the U.S. establishment of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Directed by World War I Medal of Honor recipient and lawyer William “Wild Bill” Donovan, the OSS conducted spectacular operations, such as assisting underground movements in Europe, gathering intelligence, and landing commando teams in Borneo. The wartime success of the OSS demonstrated its value to the nation.18 Between the period immediately following World War II and the manifestation of the Cold War, the need for a civilian intelligence gathering organization seemed obvious. President Harry Truman was reluctant to continue the OSS because he feared that it might become too powerful within the national government. Additionally, the President also resisted the efforts of the military and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, to take over the nation’s espionage mission. Instead, during 1947, President Truman authorized the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Today, the CIA is organized into four mission components, called directorates, which together implement “the intelligence process”— the cycle of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. Within the modern United States, an extensive intelligence community exists to serve the nation. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the federal head of the intelligence Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 2.7 General William J. Donovan.

community (IC). The DNI oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and acts as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters. The goal of the DNI is to protect and defend American lives and interests through effective intelligence.

2.12 World Organizations Promoting Peace: The League of Nations and the United Nations The League of Nations had been created with the highest of ideals, to form an organization of nations that could provide a forum to further world peace. However, without the United States as a member, the organization was doomed to failure. Even as World War II raged, however, a decision was made to establish a new organization of nations, with many of the original goals of the League of Nations. Consequently, on January 1, 1942, the “Declaration by United Nations” was issued. The declaration brought together representatives of 26 nations who pledged that their governments would work together in a unified effort against the Axis powers (New York Times, 2004). Over the next three years, the vision for the United Nations continued to evolve. During 1945, it formally began operations when representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to design the United Nations Charter. Over the next six decades, the membership of the United Nations expanded to include 192 countries, including the former Axis powers.19 Today, the United Nations is central in addressing international problems, including enhancing the cause of peace, conducting peace-keeping operations, advancing human rights, promoting economic and social development, and advancing international law.

2.13 Evolution of the Cold War To a great extent, the Cold War defined the United States. World War II ended, and the United States emerged as one of the two global superpowers. Germany was divided between the Allied powers, and Japan and Italy were occupied. The nations that had worked together to defeat the 34

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Axis now viewed each other with suspicion. The United States would soon see the Soviet Union as the next major threat, not only to the security of the nation but also to world peace. On March 5, 1946, Sir Winston Churchill, the former British Prime Minister, delivered what has become known as his “Sinews of Peace” or “Iron Curtain” speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Within this speech, Churchill stated: [A]n iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone—Greece with its immortal glories—is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation.20 Essentially, he spoke of an “iron curtain” descending across Europe, dividing self-governing nations of the West from those in Eastern Europe under Soviet Communist control. Churchill perceived the emerging of a global dichotomy of conflicting worldviews that leaned toward either liberty or totalitarianism. The insight of Churchill proved remarkable. During the last half of the twentieth century, the Cold War became the primary focus of national security planning for both the United States and the U.S.S.R., with each nation spending enormous effort toward gaining an advantage over the other for the next 50 years. For the United States, the Cold War can be viewed in six phases: containment, mutually assured destruction, small wars and the domino theory, détente, rollback, and glasnost.

2.13.1 Containment At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union took two different approaches to the post-war period. The United States demobilized much of its military, relying instead of the nation’s growing nuclear arsenal to assure national safety. To avoid the economic problems that had led the defeated nations to move toward dictatorships at the end of World War I, the United States pumped billions of dollars into the economies of its former enemies under the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union took a different approach. The Soviets worked to strengthen their grip on Eastern Europe and extend their influence in Asia. President Harry Truman (1945–1953) pursued the goal of containing the U.S.S.R. while increasing U.S. quantities of nuclear, biological, and chemical armaments, believing the threat of nuclear war would deter Soviet hostility and aggression. During 1948, the Soviets challenged the United States by blockading West Berlin, bringing the two nations to the brink of conflict. This blockade was intended to demonstrate U.S. weakness and to force the Western allies to abandon Berlin. A strategy was quickly developed and implemented to provide West Berlin with the necessary supplies required for survival, with the U.S. forces establishing an “air bridge” to fly tons of supplies to the city daily. Over the period of nearly a year, the siege continued. In May 1949, the Soviets abandoned the siege and reinstated a land route between West Germany and West Berlin. This was the first, but not the last, collision between the two nations. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides often pushed the other to the “brink” of conflict. During these periods, the Cold War threatened to become “hot.” This so-called brinkmanship on multiple occasions caused the world to consider the unthinkable—a nuclear conflict that would have resulted in the deaths of millions. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 2.8 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

While the attention of the United States primarily focused on Europe, Asia proved to be the next international flashpoint.21 Within Asia, the Nationalist Chinese were driven from the Chinese mainland during 1949, and the Communist Chinese gained control of the nation. As a result, the balance of power shifted in Asia.

2.13.2 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) When World War II ended, the United States was the only nation to possess nuclear weapons. The nation’s nuclear monopoly was short lived. On August 29, 1949, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb. Soviet nuclear capability shocked the United States, which could no longer depend on its nuclear arsenal alone to serve as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. With the Soviets adding nuclear weapons to their arsenal, an arms race began that eventually included not only nuclear weapons but also chemical and biological weaponry. The arms race produced a half century of struggle that, on the one hand, saw attempts to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) while simultaneously the span of control of both sides. The possession of significant quantities of WMD by both the United States and the U.S.S.R. contributed to the notion of mutually assured destruction (MAD) between these nations. The basic tenet of MAD was that both sides would be destroyed if a nuclear war occurred. Despite attempts to redefine MAD by phrasing it in contemporary terms such as flexible response and nuclear deterrence, it remained the central theme of American defense planning for well over three decades. 36

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Figure 2.9 President Harry Truman.

By 1950, the conventional military capabilities of the United States had been greatly reduced because of the downsizing that occurred following World War II. As a result, the national security ability of the United States was also weakened. In America, naval ships were decommissioned, and military service personnel were discharged. In the first part of the decade, the international struggle for power again changed thanks to a conflict in Korea. In June 1950, Soviet-backed North Korean forces invaded South Korea, an ally of the United States. The United Nations condemned the North’s aggression, and the Security Council authorized military support for the South. Between 1950 and 1953, U.N. forces, in conjunction with the U.S. military, conducted an attrition-based conflict limited to the Korean Peninsula, which severely tested the American will to support its allies. By the winter of 1950, the United Nations’ forces had essentially defeated the North Korean Army and moved to occupy North Korea. With U.N. forces moving to the North Korean border along Communist China, the Chinese warned both the United Nations and the United States that it would intervene in the conflict if the United Nations did not leave North Korea. Ignoring the warnings, the UN forces continued their attack all the way to the Chinese border. During the month of December 1950, the Communist Chinese Army entered North Korea and engaged UN forces. In 1953, an armistice was reached; however, a state of war technically still exists between the North and the South. As a result of the Korean conflict, the Truman administration recognized the need for a stronger military and began a massive buildup of America’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. In addition, the United States commenced the re-arming of Western Europe and furnished its European allies with the military equipment required for defense. Under Truman’s plan for the enhancement of the military, the size of the U.S. military increased to 3.5 million personnel.22 Introduction to Homeland Security

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2.13.3 Containment and Continuation of MAD: Attempts to Isolate the Soviet Union The administration of President Dwight Eisenhower (1953–1961) continued the containment strategy of MAD pursued by the Truman administration. If anything, the Eisenhower administration had greater faith that the growing nuclear inventory of the United States could serve as the foundation for a defense strategy. Conceptually, this reliance on WMDs to deter international aggression was similar to the reliance on the national protection of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans during the 1800s. Because of the MAD doctrine, the United States and the Soviet Union could not attack each other directly. Hence, the Cold War was “war by other means.” Propaganda, proxy wars, arms races, and the massive expansion of each side’s intelligence capability became the battlefields. In a further effort to deter Communist aggression, several Western nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. During the next 60 years, NATO matured into a capable military alliance that enhanced European defenses. In a move that mirrored NATO, America and its Asian allies formed the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. As with NATO, the purpose of SEATO was to further a U.S. policy of containing Communism within Asia. SEATO member nations included Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. In 1977, two years after the Communist victory in Vietnam, SEATO was dissolved. In 1955, the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European bloc nations responded to NATO and SEATO through the formation of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact was a treaty between Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R.; the actual treaty was signed in Poland during 1955. The official title of the agreement was The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance. Commencing in 1955, the Warsaw Pact and NATO would face each other, ready for war in Europe, for 35 years (Soviet News, 1955). The Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved in 1991, and many of the former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO. While it is easy to conceptualize the Cold War as merely a struggle between two superpowers, the reality is more complex; the truth is that many longstanding rivalries between nations continued. As an example, the United States military involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s is often termed a “proxy war.” In fact, the Vietnamese people had struggled for centuries for unified self-government. The people of the North considered theirs a nationalistic conflict while Americans considered it a struggle to contain Communism.

2.13.4 Small Wars and the Domino Theory The administration of President John Kennedy (1961–1963) identified regional conflicts, revolutions, and potential confrontations as “small wars.” Such incidents were considered major threats to U.S. national security. Kennedy was concerned with the “domino theory.” The domino theory was first discussed within the Eisenhower administration following the Communistbacked French defeat and withdrawal from Indochina. The domino theory suggests that once one nation falls to Communism, others will soon follow. Therefore, it was important to U.S. national security to limit the spread of Soviet influence, by military means if necessary.23 The Kennedy administration placed an emphasis on the development of an enhanced “special operations” capability within its military, intelligence, and diplomatic services. Special operations forces, such as the United States Army Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, were committed around the world. During this period, the nuclear arms race continued, 38

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with both the United States and the U.S.S.R. developing large stockpiles of weapons. Fears of nuclear conflict between the two superpowers peaked during the aftermath of the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. These events, combined with the weapons race, paved the way for some of the earliest agreements on nuclear arms control, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. President Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969) assumed the presidency upon the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963. In an effort to halt the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, the United States found itself drawn into the conflict in Vietnam. The Vietnam conflict proved to be a turning point regarding U.S. national security and homeland security. Backed by the U.S.S.R., North Vietnam conducted combat operations to unify Vietnam. The conflict itself divided the American people and gave American allies a reason to question the resolve of the United States regarding its support of international mutual defense treaties. The administration of President Richard Nixon (1969–1974) worked to end the Vietnam conflict. Despite massive support in materials and personnel from the United States, South Vietnam fell to the Communist North in 1975. The Vietnam conflict greatly impacted the U.S. national security functions. At its end, the military capability of the United States was significantly reduced. Military equipment was battle worn, and military morale was at an all-time low. It would take more than a decade to repair the damage. Even as America and the U.S.S.R. faced each other in Europe, the struggle in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab neighbors drew both of the superpowers further into Middle Eastern affairs. The Middle East was similar to Europe in that national alliances were divided between the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia were aligned with the America while Egypt, Syria, and Jordan sided with the U.S.S.R. Each superpower provided significant economic and military support to its allies. Perhaps the greatest issue facing the Middle East came with the formation of the state of Israel in 1948. Many Palestinian Arabs who were living within the boundaries of the newly formed state either fled or were displaced. Many settled in refugee camps throughout the Middle East, most notably in Jordan. The Palestinian cause brought together many Arab countries that immediately declared war against Israel. To the surprise of many, the small, fledgling state prevailed. To this day, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a central issue in Middle Eastern politics. Since 1948, Israel has fought several wars against its Arab neighbors. To date, it has prevailed militarily, but many experts worry that, unless a solution is found, more wars will result; this is particularly worrisome as some Middle Eastern countries appear interested in developing or obtaining nuclear weapons (e.g., Iran). With the outbreak of each war between the Arab nations and Israel, the United States and the U.S.S.R. were increasingly immersed in regional politics. Over the next 40 years, many incidents drew the Soviet Union and the United States further into Middle Eastern affairs. Such events as the oil shortages of the early 1970s, the continued tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Soviets’ invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and America’s involvement in Iraq, to name but a few, practically guarantee that the Middle East will remain a hotspot for U.S. interests the coming years.

2.13.5 Détente President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, worked toward achieving détente with the U.S.S.R. Détente, or the lessening of tensions between the two superpowers, led to the reassessment of military spending and increased the sense and importance of national security for both nations. Because of the efforts of President Introduction to Homeland Security

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Nixon and Secretary Kissinger, the United States and the U.S.S.R. seriously commenced discussions pertaining to nuclear, biological, and chemical arms limitations. The Nixon administration also reached out to the other major powers and facilitated the American recognition of the People’s Republic of China.24 President Nixon’s 1972 visit to China was a major step in formally normalizing relations between the two nations. Modern China has become a major trading partner with the United States and is in the process of becoming a global superpower.

2.13.6 Rollback Eventually, a proactive strategy termed “rollback” was crafted to counter Communism. Breaking with the doctrine of “containment” that was established during the Truman administration, President Ronald Reagan’s (1981–1989) foreign policy was based on John Foster Dulles’s more offensive strategy from the 1950s. This mandated that the United States would actively push back or “roll back” the influence of the U.S.S.R. (United States Department of State: Reagan Doctrine). However, President Reagan’s policy differed from that of Dulles in that it relied primarily on the overt support of those fighting Soviet dominance. This strategy was perhaps best encapsulated in the National Security Council’s (NSC) National Security Decision Directive 75. This 1983 directive stated that a central priority of the United States regarding its policy toward the U.S.S.R., would be “to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism,” particularly in the developing world.25 An excerpt from the directive notes that: The United States must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on United States interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy.26

Figure 2.10 President Ronald Reagan.

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Being mindful of this goal, the Reagan administration focused much of its efforts on supporting proxy armies to curtail Soviet influence. Among the more prominent examples of the Reagan Doctrine’s application occurred in Nicaragua, where the United States sponsored the contra movement in an effort to force the leftist Sandinista government from power. In Afghanistan, the United States provided material support to Afghan rebels, known as the Mujahedeen, to help them terminate the Soviet occupation of their country, which had started in 1979.

2.13.7 Glasnost By the 1980s, the efforts of President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. (1985–1991), focused the diplomatic efforts of both nations on ending the Cold War. As a result of their collaboration, both nations worked to reduce tensions and open dialogue. These efforts resulted in a more open, cooperative relationship between the two countries. Such openness reduced some of the tensions between the two superpowers. In the U.S.S.R., Gorbachev introduced a policy of glasnost. This policy emphasized maximum publicity, openness, and transparency in the activities of all government institutions in conjunction with freedom of information. This openness, combined with the demands for increased freedoms across the Soviet sphere of international influence, proved contagious. By the early 1990s, the Soviet economy could no longer support the U.S.S.R.’s bureaucracy. In an incredibly short period of time, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. In its place, independent countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia emerged. The policy of glasnost raised expectations among the Russian people, some of whom believed that a democracy along the lines of the United States should be established. While that has not happened, the tensions between Russia and the United States have decreased significantly since the Cold War days. That does not mean, however, that the two countries are close friends. Just as in the Cold War days, Russian submarines armed with nuclear missiles patrol off the coast of the United States, just as American submarines patrol near Russian waters.

Figure 2.11 President Ronald Reagan and Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

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2.14 The Complexity of the Modern World Today, we live in a complex world. The existential threat of nuclear annihilation has not disappeared, and we are faced with myriad other challenges, running the gamut from deadly pandemics to climate change to terrorism. New technologies have paved the way for nonstate actors to gain increasing clout in our increasingly connected world. Today, a single individual with computer savvy can wreak havoc on a scale that was once the domain of sophisticated militaries. The computer age is, in reality, a double-edged sword—while it brings with it the potential of great good, it also becomes a force multiplier for those who wish to do harm. Although the modern world contains a variety of different threats, one would be naïve to assume that these same threats did not exist during the Cold War. Internationally, the United States experienced varying amounts of terrorism throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Up until the terrorist attacks of 9/11, however, a U.S. citizen and Army veteran carried out the largest terrorist attack on American soil. On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a bomb outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City; this attack claimed the lives of 168 Americans, including 19 children under the age of six. Economic alliances and international collaborations also have the potential to challenge the United States and its allies. The combined economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) are predicted to “double in the coming decade, eventually surpassing the size of the economies of both the United States and the European Union.”27 The nation of South Africa joined this collective in 2011, thereby necessitating the BRICS acronym.28 During 2012, the economic potential of the BRICS’s nations was “ranked among the fastest-growing economies in the world,” and their individual influences globally were observed to be increasing.29 At the time of this authorship, the individual members of this alliance were struggling to determine some commonness through which they could “act as a unified geopolitical alliance.”30 Only time will determine the future cohesiveness and influence of the BRICS. American society and the world are dependent on fossil fuels for a variety of purposes. Petroleum is used to make gasoline as well as various plastics, and the U.S. is dependent on a variety of foreign sources for some of the nation’s fossil fuel requirements. Given the changing dynamics of the Middle East and the forming of new governments among various Middle Eastern nations following the Arab Spring, only time will determine the outcomes of U.S. policies and relationships within the region, but at this point (2019), the region remains very unstable and volatile, especially with the rise of ISIS/ISIL and the ongoing conflict in Syria. The United States also experiences violence and much criminal activity along its border with Mexico. Organized crime entities routinely smuggle drugs and traffic humans across the border. The violence and dangerousness of the Mexican drug war affects the border region, and the corruption within the Mexican government is concerning. Some experts are concerned that Mexican violence will find its way into the United States. While this has not happened to any great extent at present, it may only be a matter of time before cartel violence relocates north. These are but a few of the challenges presently confronting the United States. To be sure, during the Cold War, the United States faced an adversary that threatened its very existence. However, America understood the threat posed by the Soviets. Modern times are not so black and white. Today’s threats are complex and varied; no single approach is universally appropriate for handling all the events that could negatively impact American society. Therefore, the U.S. must remain vigilant to protect itself from the dangerousness of many different threats of both known and unknown origins. 42

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Figure 2.12a The Murrah Building before and 2.12b after being bombed. Source: Department of Defense. Photo by Staff Sgt. Preston Chasteen)

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2.15 After the Cold War and the Emerging of a New World At the end of the Cold War, America’s military and intelligence establishments were configured to confront an adversary that possessed a large and sophisticated military. Terrorist and criminal groups, while they existed, were seen as secondary threats to Communism. Within the United States, every governmental agency was positioned and structured to respond to a large, hierarchical enemy whose characteristics could be easily identified. “Homeland security” was primarily defined as security against the Soviets. Reconceptualizing this paradigm was difficult. Because of changing threats, approaches to homeland security and national defense had to be re-evaluated. Advancements in the areas of technology, information, communications, transportation, and international business changed the nature of the world and increased globalization. It was now difficult, if not impossible, for any nation to withdraw from the world community. The end of the Cold War found the United States as the last standing superpower. However, other nations would soon position themselves to challenge that status. The United States further increased its international engagements after the Cold War. Support for traditional allies, such as Israel and South Korea, the “war on drugs,” the threats of transnational crime, and both domestic and international terrorism received increased attentiveness from policy makers. Although international terrorism specifically directed toward the United States had been quite limited during the Cold War, several U.S. allies, such as Britain and Israel, were engaged in a struggle with terrorists and terrorist organizations. International terrorists were evolving, increasing their recruitment efforts, and refining their tactics. Events during the final days of the Soviet Union, including aircraft hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings, focused primarily on Middle Eastern political issues. These events helped terrorists refine their tactics and strategies.

2.16 Terrorism: Introduction to the New Threat to the United States During the decade between 1980 and 1990, American international interests were increasingly affected by international terrorism. This decade was a precursor to the heinous events that affected and changed modern American lifestyles and worldviews with the attacks of September 11, 2001. In August 1981, the Red Army Faction, a German ultra-leftist terrorist group, exploded a bomb at the United States Air Force base in Ramstein, West Germany. In December 1981, three American nuns and one lay missionary were murdered outside San Salvador, El Salvador. On the evening of December 17, 1981, United States Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier, a senior American official, present at a NATO headquarters facility in Verona, Italy, was abducted by Red Brigades terrorists. Each of the three groups had a somewhat different motivation for their attacks but each shared something in common—they sought to communicate a message through violence; that, in essence, is the power of terrorism. Unlike previous terrorist activities in Italy, which had targeted senior Italian politicians, industrialists, jurists, newspaper publishers, and police officials, the kidnapping of General Dozier signaled that important foreign nationals were no longer immune from terrorists (Phillips, 2002). The Red Brigades held General Dozier until a team of Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza (NOCS) (Central Security Operations Service, a special-operations unit of the Italian police) successfully implemented rescue operations and captured the terrorists. In the 1980s, terrorist bombings became common. In April 1983, the Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut. This event killed 63 44

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people, including the Middle East director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This attack also injured 120 individuals. In 1983, in El Salvador, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front assassinated a United States naval officer. Later in 1983, another naval officer was killed in Athens, Greece. The 1983 terrorist attacks on the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killed 241 American service members and sent shockwaves through the Marine community. The terrorist organization claiming responsibility was the Islamic Jihad, later known as Hezbollah. During early 1984, in Beirut, the Islamic Jihad kidnapped and murdered CIA Political Officer William Buckley. In 1984, 18 U.S. servicemen were killed, and 83 people were injured during a bomb attack on a restaurant near a United States air base in Torrejon, Spain. The responsibility for this attack was claimed by Hezbollah.31 In February 1985, Mexican narco-trafficker Rafael Caro Quintero ordered the kidnapping, torture, and murder of Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and his pilot, Alfredo Zavala. In 1985, Caro was arrested in Costa Rico and extradited to Mexico to stand trial for the murders. He was convicted and sentenced to 40 years in prison. In June 1985, U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem was murdered by terrorists during the hijacking of the commercial airliner TWA Flight 847. The terrorists hijacked the aircraft, with 153 passengers, in Athens, Greece. They forced the pilot to fly twice to Algiers and twice to Beirut during the 17-day siege.32 Recognizing Stethem as a member of the U.S. military, they

Figure 2.13 Suicide truck bombers attacked the Marine barracks in Beirut; 241 American troops were killed in that attack. (Source: https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/tod-robberson/robberson-when-hezbollahleft-its-calling-card-in-a-1983-bombing-the-era-of-suicide/article_8bbbfa4b-d633-5ce0-925a3812f1d4f4da.html)

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Figure 2.14 Pan Am Flight 103. (Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation)

beat and tortured him before his murder. After the murder of Stethem, the hostages aboard the aircraft were released after Israel released 435 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. In June 1985, members of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) fired on a restaurant in the Zona Rosa district of San Salvador. Four U.S. Marines, who were assigned to the United States Embassy security detachment, and nine Salvadorian civilians were killed in this attack. On October 7, 1985, Leon Klinghoffer, an American tourist aboard the Achille Lauro cruise ship, was captured by Palestinian terrorists who seized the vessel. Once identified as an American, Klinghoffer was murdered and thrown overboard (American Memorial Site, n.d.). The violence of terrorism continued during the remainder of the 1980s. During 1986, two U.S. soldiers were killed, and 79 American servicemen were injured in a Libyan bomb attack on a nightclub in West Berlin, West Germany. This attack was launched in retaliation for the United States’ attacks in and around Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya. During 1987, 16 U.S. servicemen who were riding in a Greek Air Force bus near Athens were injured in a bombing attack that was perpetrated by the revolutionary organization known as November 17. One of the most gruesome attacks of the decade occurred on December 21, 1988, when a civilian airliner, Pan Am Flight 103, exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. This attack killed all 259 people on board as well as 11 on the ground. While the flight contained passengers from 21 countries, a total of 189 were Americans (United States Department of State: Significant Terrorist). Through painstaking forensic investigation, it was determined that the attack was linked to Libya. Eventually, a Libyan intelligence agent, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, was convicted of the 46

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crime; he was released from Greenock Prison by the Scottish government and returned to Libya in 2009. During the decade prior to the Soviet Union’s collapse, the impact of terrorism on the United States increased. The support of terrorism was initially linked to states that were thought to sponsor activities such as the Libyan bombing of Pan Am 103, and the Soviets support many leftist terrorist groups, like the Red Brigades. However, with the demise of the U.S.S.R., terrorists no longer found automatic safe havens or refuge behind the Iron Curtain.

2.17 Desert Shield and Desert Storm In 1990, the country of Iraq invaded its neighbor, Kuwait. Under President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993), an American-led coalition was formed to force Iraq out of Kuwait and to reestablish its sovereignty. The conflict itself was short, but the major regional presence of the United States continued after the war was over. The U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East was seen by some as an attempt by America to extend its influence throughout the region. All this played out against a history of Western involvement in Middle Eastern affairs that led many in the Arab world to believe that the United States was their enemy. For example, the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 by the United Nations, which had great U.S. support, met with fierce Arab resistance; to this day, the issue of a Palestinian homeland has not been resolved. As well, the United States supported unpopular dictators in the Middle East, such as the Shah of Iran, who was installed in a CIA-engineered coup in 1953.

Figure 2.15 Damage inflicted on the USS Cole. (Source: U.S. Department of Defense)

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After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, remnants of the Mujahedeen re-formed into a group that became known as al-Qaeda, Arabic for “the base.” One of its leaders was Osama bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi Arabian construction company owner. Bin Laden had become a follower of a radical version of Islam while a college student. Blessed with superior organizational skills, he formed al-Qaeda around this radical version of Islam. With the Soviet Union in ruins, bin Laden turned his sights on a new enemy: the United States. Between 1993 and 2001, during the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait, the United States became the target of increased international terrorist attacks. In 1993, the World Trade Center, located in the city of New York, was attacked for the first time. During 1998, al-Qaeda carried out a series of attacks on various U.S. embassies, which claimed over 200 lives. In October 2000, the Navy destroyer USS Cole was attacked by suicide bombers while in the Yemeni port of Aden, resulting in the death of 17 sailors. Each of these attacks signaled a new type of conflict that was quickly engaging the United States. However, unlike with previous enemies, the characteristics of this new conflict were based on global terrorism and a faceless enemy. For the American military, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic services, this was a new type of conflict that presented new challenges.

2.18 The Shock and Impact of 9/11 Despite the fact that America had been in the crosshairs of terrorists for several years, most citizens of the United States felt secure within their national borders. The activities of terrorism remained largely unnoticed by the American populace. However, the State Department, the intelligence community, and the Pentagon were observing these events with great interest and concern. Finally, on September 11, 2001, the American homeland was attacked in an unprecedented manner. Four commercial aircraft were hijacked and used as weapons, targeting the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. These suicide attacks changed the rules of international terrorism. In short order, these events placed the United States and its allies on a war footing. Including the 19 hijackers, approximately 3,000 people died or were missing and presumed dead as a result of the attacks. The overwhelming majority of casualties were civilians, including nationals from over 90 different countries. Because of these attacks, the vision of homeland security dramatically changed. The United States and its allies now faced a new type of threat, new tactics, and a new enemy. This threat was not linked to a specific country, but rather to a transnational movement. In the ensuing years, American allies such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and Turkey were also attacked. This threat of terrorism presented new challenges from non-state actors for the United States and its allies. Historically, the United States dealt with threats that were sponsored by nationstates. It soon became clear that this non-state threat, with its lack of clear targets, structured organizations, and lines of battle, would be extremely difficult to combat.

2.19 Global War on Terrorism The attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed a divergence between military and defense philosophies. Previously, the military had responded commensurately to the challenges of the Cold War. However, the new threat of terrorism necessitated an expansion of established capabilities, such as special operations and civil affairs, and the creation of new capabilities, such as cyber warfare.33 In the ensuing years, America and her allies have conducted major military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. These operations reflected 48

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new approaches to waging war, in which conventional forces, such as airpower, special operations forces, and intelligence units, are combined with law enforcement, Justice and State Department assets, and non-military resources.

2.20 Role of the Military in Support of Homeland Security With the heightened concern about large-scale terrorism have come efforts to involve the Department of Defense (DOD) more closely with federal, state, and local agencies in their homeland security activities. The Department of Defense, with its active duty and reserve forces, and the potential of federalizing National Guard units, has the largest and most diversified personnel assets in the federal government. As was demonstrated in the months after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, they can be used in a variety of security and emergency response roles. The Department of Defense remains the greatest federal repository of resources for responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident. In response to Hurricane Katrina and Super Storm Sandy, Department of Defense resources quickly deployed both active duty and National Guard units to the areas impacted and performed in a wide range of mission-essential areas, including military support to civilian authorities engaged in response and recovery operations, search, rescue, and evacuation; medical and health operations; security; and emergency reestablishment of critical infrastructure. State National Guard organizations are well positioned to represent local Department of Defense emergency planners and responders. They are known in their communities and in 25 states; the state Adjutant General is the state emergency management director. The National Guard has both a federal and a state mission. Its federal mission is to provide forces to the Army and Air Force. Its state mission is to “provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state laws.”34 In the Report of the Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study on DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, the Department of Defense examined the potential roles and missions of the Department in support of Homeland Security operations. This study advanced major findings and recommendations: • In the area of information, the study recommended new tools and capabilities be developed to enhance information collection, analysis, and sharing. This recommendation also identified the need for improved collection and integration of foreign and domestic intelligence. • Improvement of the integration of cyber security and the protection of cyber-based critical infrastructure into the Department of Defense mission was recommended. • The Department of Defense should improve its capability against low-level airborne threats, such as cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft. • The Department should retain the capability to surge medical assistance in support of homeland security relief operations. • The Department should work with other law enforcement and homeland security agencies to enhance their capabilities to include training and operational planning and support those operations when needed.35 It is anticipated that the Department of Defense will remain an important partner in the protection of the nation and its infrastructure well into the future. Introduction to Homeland Security

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2.21 Emerging Threats Internationally, the United States is fully engaged in the world community—economically, politically, and socially. With a stated goal of enhancing the spread of democracy and freedom, the global U.S. presence provides potential aggressors with a wide range of potential targets. The United States will always face a wide variety of domestic and international threats. The top emerging threats, acknowledged by contemporary national security experts, are categorized as follows: 1) weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional explosives that can inflict great damage; 2) terrorism, domestic and foreign; 3) narcotics trafficking and narco-terrorism, including the violence in Mexico; 4) transnational crime; 5) global conflicts and regional stability as seen in Bosnia, Kosovo, Russia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and the Aegean; 6) the transitions occurring in Russia and China; and 7) information warfare or “Netwar,” including cyber warfare and cyber terrorism.36 Most experts believe that the greatest current threat challenging the United States is international terrorism. Terrorism becomes a tactic of choice when its potential to achieve political aims outweighs the cost of its use. Terrorism, by nature, is irregular and relatively inexpensive to perpetrate; it is a tactic employed by the weak against the strong. Like proxy wars, it can also be used by superpowers that wish to avoid direct conflict. For example, during the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. sponsored both terrorist and separatist groups.37 Currently, al-Qaeda and other terror groups engage the United States in the Global War on Terror.

2.22 Homeland Defense and a New Type of Warfare Few would argue that the nature of war and warfare is in a constant state of change. For the United States and its allies in the struggle against terrorism, the enemy is no longer only a state-sponsored adversary whose military forces are organized and employed on the field of battle. This notion necessitates a consideration of the chronological dynamics of war. After the events of September 11, 2001, a new term was familiarized within American society: the “long war.” The long war represents the notion that United States engagements are no longer limited to weeks, months, or a few years, but may span decades (or generations). This term was used by General John Abizaid to communicate and emphasize the notion of the “judgment within the high command of the United States military that it will be engaged against terrorists and extremists for a very long time to come.”38 The United States is now engaged with an asymmetric enemy that employs forces and tactics that are significantly different from the forces and tactics of conventional powers. Enemies, by adopting an asymmetric approach to warfare, can engage United States forces across the spectrum of political, economic, social, and military activities. Attacks against non-military targets and rapid strikes against military forces are standard among enemy forces. For the United States and its allies, military forces, equipment, and tactics are constantly evolving to respond to the tactics demonstrated by the enemy. During major wars, the organized forces of two peer states seek a decisive battle outcome. Within small wars, the forces of a major power will often clash with irregular forces, and the conflict typically degenerates into guerrilla warfare or terrorism. When this occurs, irregular troops may disregard, in part or entirely, international law and the Rules of Land Warfare when conducting hostilities. 50

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2.23 Chapter Comments and Summary Although it takes more than military strength to protect a nation’s homeland, a sturdy and resilient military is an essential element. During its early years, the United States only possessed a small army with no significant navy. Because of this problem, the Revenue Marine Service was established in 1790, eventually becoming the Coast Guard. Because of the success of the Revenue Marine Service’s protection of maritime assets in the vicinity of the U.S., Congress eventually authorized the formation of the United States Navy to protect U.S. maritime assets around the world. During most of the nineteenth century, with the exception of the Civil War, the U.S. military remained small in size and received poor funding. However, as the United States expanded its borders across the continent, it faced more enemies and international involvement. President James Monroe established the first policy that warned Europe against meddling in U.S. affairs and the affairs of the newly formed Latin American nations. This edict was known as the Monroe Doctrine, and it defined the relationship between Europe and America. President Theodore Roosevelt, who assumed the presidency after the assassination of President William McKinley, strongly backed the Monroe Doctrine and believed that it was the fiduciary duty and obligation of the United States to protect the Americas. He expanded the basic premise of the doctrine through the establishment of the Roosevelt Corollary of December 1904. The Corollary rationalized unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America when necessary and mandated U.S. intervention to ensure that other nations in the Western Hemisphere fulfilled their economic obligations. Foreign nations were disallowed from violating U.S. rights, and the Corollary dissuaded foreign aggression or onslaught. As time passed, the influence of the United States in the world expanded, and it increasingly used diplomatic and military force to influence or shape policies among various countries throughout the world. During the early twentieth century, as the First World War spread across Europe, the United States was lured away from isolationism. At this time, the U.S. Navy was strong, but the U.S. Army was nothing more than a third-rate power. Although the United States was involved in World War I for less than two years, its participation integrated it among the affairs of Europe and the international arena. World War I also changed the way in which wars were fought and made battlefields much deadlier places. Many national borders were reshaped, and changes in forms of government occurred for some countries. After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson proposed a collective organization of nations in the hope that future international conflicts could be avoided. Because of the efforts of President Wilson, the League of Nations was formed at the end of World War I under the Treaty of Versailles. It promoted Wilson’s vision of unity and harmony among various nations throughout the world. However, the United States did not join the League of Nations because the U.S. Senate voted against membership. The League of Nations was eventually dissolved in 1946 and replaced by the United Nations. By the late 1930s, the United States was in the midst of the Great Depression, which continued until World War II. The 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor catapulted the United States into a war in which intelligence assumed a significant role. President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor of the CIA. Directed by William “Wild Bill” Donavan, the OSS conducted operations such as assisting underground movements in Europe, gathering intelligence, and landing commando teams in Borneo. Introduction to Homeland Security

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World War II devastated Europe and Japan. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. emerged as superpowers. Two distinct philosophies of government, capitalism and Communism, underscored the adversarial philosophies and competitiveness between these nations. The struggles and differences between these two countries eventually instigated the Cold War, which lasted for 50 years, and spanned six phases: containment, mutually assured destruction, small wars and the domino theory, détente, rollback, and glasnost. During this time, both superpowers became involved in the Vietnam War and Middle Eastern conflicts. After the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s, the United States became the only remaining superpower. Since the 1970s, the United States has been targeted by international terrorism. Some examples include the kidnapping of Brigadier General James L. Dozier, the murder of 18 servicemen in Spain, the murder of Robert Dean Stethem, the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103. Each attack moved the nation closer toward the Global War on Terror. During 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait integrated the United States further into the affairs of the Middle East. A radical response from potential adversaries, who wanted the United States and its influence out of the Middle East, was facilitated in conjunction with the U.S. presence. In 1993, the World Trade Center in New York was attacked for the first time. This attack caused extensive damage. Later, in 1998, a series of attacks against various U.S. embassies in Africa claimed over 200 lives. During the month of October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by suicide bombers while in the Yemeni port of Aden; 17 sailors were killed. On September 11, 2001, four commercial aircraft were hijacked and used as weapons against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.; the fourth airplane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. These suicide attacks changed the rules of international terrorism and placed the United States and its allies on a war footing. Because of these attacks, international terrorism was recognized as a major threat to international peace and security. The United States and its allies commenced the Global War on Terrorism. Since that time, the United States perspectives on the nature of war and warfare have changed. The United States is currently engaged with an enemy that is employing forces and tactics that differ significantly from those employed by America and its allies. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union could be quantified and many of its behaviors predicted; however, the modern enemies are less quantifiable and less predictable. For instance, the Islamic State leveraged the modern use of the internet to recruit and radicalize natural-born Americans to enact violence against American society, both at home and overseas. Thus, the ability to predict where, when, and how danger occurs is far more complex during modern times. Though they may be stated in other ways, the interests vital to United States are and shall remain national security and survival or national survival and security, political and territorial integrity, economic stability and well-being, and national stability. Because of the current nature of the threats we face, the very notions of war, warfare, and response have changed in the United States. The enemy is no longer only a state-sponsored adversary whose military forces are organized and employed on the field of battle. The principles of asymmetric warfare and the notion of a long war now characterize the new global threat; these, combined with other new and existing threats, such as cyber warfare, transnational crime, pandemics, earthquakes, and a whole host of other man-made and natural disasters, will likely remain with us well into the twenty-first century. 52

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2.24 Key Terms Asymmetric Conflict Cold War Complexity Containment Desert Shield Desert Storm Détente Domino Theory Emerging Threats Glasnost Iron Curtain Korean War League of Nations Low-Level Conflict

Murrah Building Mutually Assured Destruction Proxy War Rollback Strategy Tactic Technology Terrorism United Nations USS Cole Vietnam War World War I World War II

2.25 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. Enemies of and threats against the United States were quantifiable during the Cold War. In essence, we were capable of conceptualizing, understanding, and forming strong mental models of nation-states that endangered America. Given the complexities of the modern world and the cessation of the Cold War, do you believe that conceptualizing, understanding, and forming mental models of threatening entities is more difficult during modern times? Write a brief essay that summarizes your opinion. 2. Some may consider the attack against the USS Cole an act of war. Looking back through history, do you believe that the response of the United States was appropriate when its naval vessel was attacked? Why or why not? Write a brief essay that expresses and substantiates your opinion. 3. This chapter introduced various historical perspectives of national security throughout numerous presidential administrations. Given the current policies of national security, do you believe that the homeland is safer or less safe than in previous years? Why? Write a brief essay that expresses and substantiates your opinion. 4. Threats against the United States may originate from any point globally. Do some research concerning current events, and formulate an opinion of what you believe are emerging threats. Write a brief essay that expresses and substantiates your opinion.

Notes

1. U.S. Marine Corps. (2007). U.S. Marine Corps Strategy. New York: Cosimo, p. 38. Retrieved February 8, 2013, from http://books.google.com/books?id=gJ6fvI4t78YC&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=survival+and+ security;+political+and+territorial+integrity;+economic+stability+and+wellbeing;+and+national+stability.+ %22vital+interests%22&source=bl&ots=mICUEAkkAd&sig=R1mfh5DM5MbnQM1qqXY8q9AfKmg& hl=en&sa=X&ei=5GEUUf2mFoie9QSBhYGgBQ&ved=0CE8Q6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=survival%20 and%20security%3B%20political%20and%20territorial%20integrity%3B%20economic%20stability%20 and%20wellbeing%3B%20and%20national%20stability.%20%22vital%20interests%22&f=false. 2. United States Marine Corps. (1997). MCDP 1–1: Strategy. Retrieved July 28, 2008, from www.clausewitz. com/CWZHOME/Bibl/mcdp1_1.pdf. 3. Rubin, M. (2007, May 31). Asymmetrical Threat Concept and Its Reflections on International Security. Retrieved July 29, 2008, from www.aei.org/docLib/20070502_AsymmetricalThreatConcept.pdf.

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4. BBC News. (1999, September 2). Hitler’s War. Retrieved August 4, 2008, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ low/special_report/1999/08/99/world_war_ii/430918.stm. 5. United States Marine Corps. (1997). MCDP 1–1: Strategy. Retrieved July 28, 2008, from www.clausewitz. com/CWZHOME/Bibl/mcdp1_1.pdf. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Reagan, R. (1989). Farewell Address to the Nation. Retrieved from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/ farewell-address-the-nation. 9. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from www.public.navy.mil/airfor/cvn71/Pages/BIOGRAPHY.aspx. 10. Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. (1904). MileStones: 1899–1913. United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. Retrieved March 21, 2013, from http://history.state.gov/ milestones/1899-1913/RooseveltandMonroeDoctrine. 11. Ibid. 12. Princeton University Library. (2003). The League of Nations: A Primer for Documents Research. Retrieved July 24, 2008, from www.princeton.edu/~sbwhite/un/leagwebb.html. 13. The League of Nations. (1920). Milestones: 1914–1920. United States Department of State Office of the Historian. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/League. 14. British National Archives. (2019). The Great War, 1914 to 1918. Retrieved from www.nationalarchives. gov.uk/education/greatwar/g5/cs2/background.htm. 15. Ibid. 16. Keylor, W. R. (1992). The Twentieth Century World: An International History, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 17. Eichengreen, B. (1992). The Marshall Plan: Economic effects and implications for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Economic Policy, 7, 14–75. 18. Donovan, W. J. National Park Service. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from www.nps.gov/prwi/historyculture/ donovan.htm. 19. United Nations. (2005). History of the United Nations. Retrieved August 6, 2008, from www.un.org/ aboutun/unhistory/. 20. Churchill, W. (1946). The Sinews of Peace (‘Iron Curtain Speech’). Retrieved from https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/. 21. Tusa, A. (1997). The Last Division: A History of Berlin. New York: Basic Books. 22. Keylor, W. R. (1992). The Twentieth Century World: An International History, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 23. Tanenhaus, S. (2003, March 23). The World from Vietnam to Iraq: The Rise and Fall and the Rise of the Domino Theory. Retrieved August 1, 2008, from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05 EEDF1630F930A15750C0A9659C8B63 &sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 24. United States Department of State. (n.d.). Ending the Vietnam War, 1973–1975. Retrieved August 2, 2008, from www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dr/. 25. Reagan, R. (1983). National Security Decision Directive 75: U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R. Retrieved August 5, 2008, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm. 26. Ibid. 27. BRICS Group. (2012). The New York Times. Retrieved February 7, 2013, from http://topics.nytimes.com/ topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/b/bric_group/index.html. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. United States Department of State. (n.d.). Significant Terrorist Incidents. Retrieved August 2, 2008, from www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm. 32. Ibid. 33. Barnett, T. (2004). The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. New York: G.P. Putnam’s. 34. Report of the Defense Science Board. (2003). Summer study on DoD roles and missions in homeland security. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved January 23, 2013, from www.fas.org/irp/ agency/dod/dsb/homelandv2.pdf. 35. Ibid. 36. Garcia, M. L. (1997). Overview of Emerging Threats to the United States. Retrieved August 5, 2008, from http://engr.nmsu.edu/~etti/fall97/security/mlgarcia.html.

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37. Rubin, M. (2007, May 31). Asymmetrical Threat Concept and Its Reflections on International Security. Retrieved July 29, 2008, from www.aei.org/docLib/20070502_AsymmetricalThreatConcept.pdf. 38. Cooke, J. (2007). Reporting the War: Freedom of the Press from the American Revolution to the War on Terrorism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan Publishing, p. 243.

References American Memorial Site. (n.d.). Leon Klinghoffer Shot and Thrown Overboard, October 7, 1985. Egypt. Retrieved August 4, 2008, from http://americanmemorialsite.com/leon.html. Barnett, T. (2004). The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. New York: G.P. Putnam’s. BBC News. (1999, September 2). Hitler’s War. Retrieved August 4, 2008, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/ special_report/1999/08/99/world_war_ii/430918.stm. BRICS Group. (2012). The New York Times. Retrieved February 7, 2013, from http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/ reference/timestopics/organizations/b/bric_group/index.html. Cooke, J. (2007). Reporting the War: Freedom of the Press from the American Revolution to the War on Terrorism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, p. 243. Eichengreen, B. (1992). The Marshall Plan: Economic effects and implications for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Economic Policy, 7, 14–75. Garcia, M. L. (1997). Overview of Emerging Threats to the United States. Retrieved August 5, 2008, from http:// engr.nmsu.edu/~etti/fall97/security/mlgarcia.html. Keylor, W. R. (1992). The Twentieth Century World: An International History, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press. The League of Nations. (1920). Milestones: 1914–1920. United States Department of State Office of the Historian. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/League. Nations of the world: The United Nations. (2004). New York Times. Retrieved August 1, 2008, from http://topics. nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/u/united_nations/index.html?inline=nyt-org. Phillips, C. T. D. (2002, February 7). The Dozier Kidnapping: Confronting the Red Brigades. Retrieved July 28, 2008, from www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/phillips.html. Princeton University Library. (2003). The League of Nations: A Primer for Documents Research. Retrieved July 24, 2008, from www.princeton.edu/~sbwhite/un/leagwebb.html. Reagan, R. (1983). National Security Decision Directive 75: U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R. Retrieved August 5, 2008, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm. Report of the Defense Science Board. (2003). Summer Study on DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, United States Department of Defense. Retrieved January 23, 2013, from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ dsb/homelandv2.pdf. Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. (1904). MileStones: 1899–1913. United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. Retrieved March 21, 2013, from http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/ RooseveltandMonroeDoctrine. Rubin, M. (2007, May 31). Asymmetrical Threat Concept and Its Reflections on International Security. Retrieved July 29, 2008, from www.aei.org/docLib/20070502_AsymmetricalThreatConcept.pdf. Soviet News. (1955). The Warsaw Pact, 1955. Retrieved July 28, 2008, from www.fordham.edu/halsall/ mod/1955warsawpact.html. Tanenhaus, S. (2003, March 23). The World from Vietnam to Iraq: The Rise and Fall and the Rise of the Domino Theory. Retrieved August 1, 2008, from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05EEDF1630 F930A15750C0A9659C8B63 &sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. United Nations. (2005). History of the United Nations. Retrieved August 6, 2008, from www.un.org/aboutun/ unhistory/. United States Department of State. (n.d.). Ending the Vietnam War, 1973–1975. Retrieved August 2, 2008, from www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dr/. United States Department of State. (n.d.). Significant Terrorist Incidents. Retrieved August 2, 2008, from www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm. United States Marine Corps. (1997). MCDP 1–1: Strategy. Retrieved July 28, 2008, from www.clausewitz.com/ CWZHOME/Bibl/mcdp1_1.pdf. William, J. D. National Park Service. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from www.nps.gov/prwi/historyculture/ donovan.htm.

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3 Principal Hazards

The likelihood of a major natural disaster, flood, hurricane, or earthquake affecting our communities was inevitable. —George Haddow and Jane Bullock, Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management The objectives of this chapter are to: • Understand the primary natural threats facing the United States; • Understand the threats that are most likely to occur in American society; • Examine some of the major accidents that have resulted in significant damage and loss of life; • Understand examples of man-made events that may impact society; • Understand that the aftermath of disaster may be just as dangerous as the incident itself.

3.1 Introduction Nations around the globe, including the United States, face a wide range of national safety and security threats. Some of these threats result from naturally occurring events, such as severe weather or earthquakes. These events can quickly devastate a community or a region and quickly overwhelm response and recovery capabilities. Other threats may result from the intentional or unintentional acts of man. As an example, the infamous attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the view of domestic security and pushed the nation into a conflict that continues almost two decades later. Later, in 2013, the Boston Marathon bombing showed the ease with which sporting events may be targeted. The 2017 Las Vegas massacre resulted in 58 deaths and 851 injuries (422 from weapons fire). Each event received national attention and showed that mass casualties are possible despite increased security nationally after the events of September 11, 2001. The 2010 British Petroleum oil rig disaster and subsequent oil spill that devastated much of the Mississippi Gulf Coast was an extreme example of an industrial accident. Natural disasters, 57

Figure 3.1 Weather-related and hazard events.

including the 2017 impact of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico, reflected the complexity of response that can be connected to a natural disaster. In the case of Hurricane Maria, the fact that the storm impacted Puerto Rico, an island, made the transportation and distribution of relief supplies from the mainland of the United States even more difficult. Internationally, the chemical disaster that occurred in Bhopal, India, in 1984 and the disaster at Chernobyl were reminders that disasters can occur in the least-anticipated location. Similar to natural incidents, they may occur with speed, surprise, and violence. Little, if any, warning may occur beforehand. Thus, such incidents have the potential of inflicting mass damage or harm quite surprisingly. The United States is one of the most open nations in the world. Sharing an international border that stretches 8,000 miles with Canada to the north and Mexico to the south, the United States also has over 13,000 miles of open coastal waters. Critical national infrastructure (CNI) includes power grids, ports, rail stations, airports, and river bridges, and each is a potential target. They must be protected and maintained to ensure the survival and continuity of the nation. Although one may contemplate a variety of both natural and man-made events that may endanger these constructs, it is impossible to predict every type of scenario that poses hazards for the critical national infrastructure. Regardless, ensuring the integrity of the critical national infrastructure is a paramount concern of American homeland security. Within the context of homeland security, one must be cognizant of the threats posed by nature that may impact negatively on various components of the critical national infrastructure. Nature often wreaks unparalleled havoc surprisingly or with little warning. Individuals and communities may experience irreparable harm resulting from natural calamities. Although some amount of preparedness may be achieved to mitigate the potential consequences of natural disasters and calamities, some amount of varying risk is always associated with the forces of nature. Across the U.S., numerous natural threats endanger localities. Figures 3.2a and 3.2b show natural threats that have the potential to impact American society negatively. Natural events occur globally in varying magnitudes and scopes. Some nations and societies are better prepared than others to experience and mitigate the consequences of natural disasters and calamities. In many cases, the responses to natural disasters comprise participants representing the international community. Such efforts and collaborations are generally influenced by international and global politics.1 Natural disasters involving international efforts often have high levels of volatility and complexity that also impact international efforts and collaborations.2 Regardless, depending upon the severity of the incident and the resources of 58

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Figure 3.2a: 2019 U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters. (Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

Figure 3.2b: Year-to-date U.S. billion-dollar disaster events, 1980–2019. (Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

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the nation, humanitarian assistance is often rendered internationally during the aftermath of natural calamities.3 No nation is insusceptible to the dangers of natural disasters and calamities. Numerous disasters have impacted the globe during recent years. For instance, in 2012, the U.S. experienced Super Storm Sandy, and it experienced a drought that was acknowledged as having an approximately 99% probability of being the warmest ever recorded within the nation.4 The nations of Afghanistan, Italy, Iran, and the Philippines experienced earthquakes.5 Typhoon Bopha also affected the Philippines.6 Regardless of the location, natural disasters may strike with little or no warning and may inflict various amounts of damage ranging from minor impediments to utter destruction. In 2019, devastating winter cold was indicative of record low weather temperatures nationally.7 Similarly, accidents may involve both lethality and varying levels of complexity. Their effects may involve long periods of detrimental consequences within society. For instance, the coal mine fire of Centralia, Pennsylvania, has burned unceasingly for over 43 years.8 Throughout these four decades, this accident has resulted in the baking of “surface layers” of the Earth, the venting of “poisonous gases,” and the opening of “holes large enough to swallow people or cars.”9 This fire may continue to burn for approximately another 250 years, underneath nearly 3,700 acres of land, until it expends the underground coal supply that represents its source of fuel.10 A common theme permeates any incident: the preserving of human life. However, each incident is unique, and accomplishing such a goal may be complex and difficult. Regardless of the origin of an incident, either man-made or natural, various complexities and dynamics exist that may inject unpredictability regarding its outcomes and long-term effects. Nature is a tremendous force that often strikes with speed, surprise, and violence and whose potential endangerments are continuous. Accidents may arise for any number of reasons, ranging from mechanical equipment failure to human error, and their effects may be commensurate with those of natural disasters. In any case, American society must acknowledge and respect the danger that is posed by both man-made and natural events.

3.2 Overview of Domestic Safety and Security The lines between domestic and international security for the United States are not clear and distinct. On one extreme, the Department of Defense operates within the executive branch of government under the command of the President of the United States. On the other extreme, local communities rely on the services of their state and local law enforcement, fire and emergency services, sheriffs, and corrections officials. In the middle are agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which maintain both domestic and international missions. Although recovery from disaster is unique to each community, depending on the amount and type of damage caused by the disaster and the resources that the community has ready or can receive, state governments have the legal authorities for emergency response and recovery and serve as the point of contact between local and federal governments. With the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself as the world’s only remaining superpower but challenged on multiple fronts: economically, diplomatically, scientifically, and militarily. The threats of the Cold War disappeared and were replaced by an explosion of new threats: illicit drug production, trafficking and consumption; illegal immigration; global terrorism; and natural and accidental disasters. Various nations became battlefronts, centers of drug production, or havens from those deemed terrorists or drug czars. Natural and accidental events resulted in great damage and impacted the lives of citizens across multiple states. 60

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As a response to these threats, National Guard personnel found themselves deployed to support border security initiatives. The Coast Guard and Navy responded to the Gulf oil spill, the Drug Enforcement Administration accepted a global mission (as did most other federal law enforcement agencies), and states established emergency management and homeland security organizations. States challenged the national government on immigration. This was a world in which the United States faced new dangers, and to respond, new solutions had to be developed. One of the national responses to these evolving threats and challenges was the development of the Department of Homeland Security.

3.3 Major Incidents: A Brief Historical Examination The United States has faced and experienced many challenges. From the perspective of homeland security, several “incidents” or “events” can be examined to provide a brief but valuable insight into an incident as it unfolds and its impact. This chapter examines briefly a wide range of incidents, including earthquakes, fires, floods, hurricanes, disease, and terrorist attacks, to demonstrate the diversity of dangers faced by our nation. Some of these incidents resulted in extensive injury, loss of life, and property damage; others had the potential but did not inflict massive human injury. Although major events are relatively uncommon, they can and do occur. The role of the federal government in disaster response has evolved throughout the past 200 years. The Congressional Act of 1803 was the earliest effort to provide federal disaster relief after a fire devastated a New Hampshire town. From that point forward, assorted legislation provided disaster support. Between 1803 and 1950, the federal government intervened in approximately 100 incidents (earthquakes, fires, floods, and tornadoes). Incidents such as the New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812, the Chicago Fire of 1871, the Memphis Yellow Fever Epidemic of the 1870s, the Johnstown Flood of 1889, the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 and the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906 impacted the nation and overwhelmed local capabilities. In each of these cases, with the exception of the New Madrid Earthquakes, significant loss of life and extensive property damage occurred. Each incident, again with the exception of the New Madrid Earthquakes, exceeded the capabilities of local resources to respond. This chapter briefly examines each of these incidents, placing them in historical context and identifying those lessons painfully gained.

3.3.1 Natural Disasters 3.3.1.1 New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812 Along the Mississippi River, during the period of 1811–1812, a series of earthquakes, now known as the New Madrid Earthquakes, occurred. This fault line between St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee, was sparsely populated. As a result, the quakes inflicted little personal injury but did cause property damage, including the destruction of the town of New Madrid, Missouri, on February 12, 1812. In a letter dated January 13, 1814, Missouri Territorial Governor William Clark asked for federal relief for the “inhabitants of New Madrid County.” The damage inflicted as a result of the New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812 was quite limited, but today an earthquake in the same region with similar intensity would devastate cities along the Mississippi River, ranging from St. Louis down below Memphis, disrupt the nation’s Introduction to Homeland Security

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economy, potentially displace hundreds of thousands of individuals, and require decades to accomplish community recovery.

3.3.1.2 Galveston Hurricane of 1900 On September 8, 1900, a Category 4 hurricane ripped through Galveston, Texas, The Galveston Hurricane inflicted great damage and loss of life. It was estimated that over 3,600 homes were destroyed, and a death toll between 6,000 and 12,000 individuals (Weems, n.d.) gave the storm the highest number of deaths attributed to an Atlantic hurricane. Recovery efforts were hampered by poor communications, damage to roads and bridges leading into the impacted areas, and the general confusion resulting from poor command and control of the response effort. The Galveston Hurricane of 1900 is, to date, the deadliest natural disaster ever to strike the United States. After the hurricane, a large seawall was eventually built to protect Galveston from flooding. The city was pummeled again by major hurricanes in 1961 and 1983, but these

Figure 3.3 Galveston Hurricane of 1900.

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inflicted less damage than the hurricane of 1900. A strong economy is crucial for an area’s security. Interestingly, before the hurricane, Galveston was a strong port with much commerce. However, after the incident, even to this very day, it neither regained nor recovered the amount of economic function that occurred beforehand. By contrast, the second-deadliest storm to strike the United States, the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane, caused more than 2,500 deaths, and the deadliest storm of recent times, Hurricane Katrina, claimed the lives of approximately 1,800 people.

3.3.1.3 San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 In April 1906, the San Francisco area experienced an earthquake and fire that resulted in over 500 deaths and the destruction of over 28,000 buildings, leaving an estimated 225,000 people homeless. The earthquake shook the city. Buildings fell, roads crumbled, power lines were severed, and gas lines ruptured. Almost immediately, fires, fueled by debris and gas escaping from broken lines, sprang up in various sections of the city. Waterlines, critical in combating the fires, were severed. As police and fire departments struggled in the recovery effort, fires spread throughout the city. In a desperate attempt to halt the flames, city officials decided to dynamite buildings to create fire lanes. When they realized that the extent of the disaster overwhelmed law enforcement and fire responders, the Army forces stationed in the area were asked for help.

Figure 3.4 The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Fire.

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3.3.1.4 Hurricane Katrina In 2005, Hurricane Katrina decimated the Gulf Coast. The storm damage caused a massive loss of response capabilities/assets in many of the response agencies in the path of the storm. Resources quickly flowed into the area. National Guard, active military, law enforcement, firefighters, and emergency responders from across the nation provided their assistance. There was a huge response by the faith-based community, nonprofit organizations, and relief organizations providing temporary shelter, food, and clothes to displaced citizens. Significant efforts were directed to the initial short-term recovery: opening roads; removing debris; providing supplies and shelters; and reestablishing communications, banking, water, power, and other basic services. Long-term recovery has extended into years, reestablishing governmental services and revitalizing the economic infrastructure and housing. At the time of Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security’s mission statement did not include natural hazards. This observation is critical, if for no other reason than FEMA was a vital function under the supervision of the Department of Homeland Security. It became a more obvious concern in the post-Katrina environment when many felt that FEMA had failed

Figure 3.5 Residents are evacuated from their homes by a FEMA urban search and rescue team from Florida. (Source: FEMA. Photo by Jocelyn Augustino)

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in its mission. This notion led to the passage of legislation called the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Post-Katrina Act called for yet another major reorganization within the Department of Homeland Security. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–295) returned most preparedness powers to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and renamed the Undersecretary for Federal Emergency Management as the administrator of FEMA, effective March 31, 2007. The Act also elevated the administrator to the same level of authority as a deputy secretary. Additionally, the President may designate the administrator to serve as a member of the Cabinet in the event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters (Bea et al., 2006).

3.3.2 Urban Disasters 3.3.2.1 Chicago Fire of 1871 Cities around the world have been devastated by fires. Significant improvements in fire prevention and fire response have greatly reduced urban vulnerability to major fires. Though many towns and cities in the United States have been impacted by fires, one of the most extensive was the Great Chicago Fire of 1871. There is still discussion as to the actual cause of the fire, but what is known is that the city burned from October 8 to early October 10, 1871. Throughout the 1800s, Chicago had experienced rapid development. As the town grew, little thought was given to the construction of fire-resistant buildings. As a result, when the city burned, the material used to build many of the structures fueled the flames, compounding the challenge facing the firefighters and quickly overwhelming available response resources.

Figure 3.6 1871 Chicago Fire.

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In the wake of the fire, the center of the city, including the central business district, was destroyed. It was estimated the fire destroyed an area about four miles long and averaging three-quarters of a mile wide, encompassing more than 2,000 acres. Destroyed were more than 17,500 buildings and $222 million in property—about a third of the city’s valuation. Of the 300,000 inhabitants, an estimated 300 were dead and 90,000 homeless. General Philip Sheridan, of Civil War fame, was present during the fire and coordinated military relief efforts. The mayor, to calm the panic, placed the city under martial law and issued a proclamation placing Sheridan in charge. Because there were no widespread disturbances, martial law was lifted within a few days. Relief operations began immediately. The Great Chicago Fire demonstrated how rapidly local resources of the era could be overwhelmed in a major incident. The rebuilding of Chicago resulted in a much stronger city with greater consideration given to building fire-resilient structures; enhancing urban-related engineering, including building codes; and improving first responder resources.

3.3.2.2 Johnstown Flood of 1889 The most devastating flood to impact a community in the United States occurred in 1889, when an earthen dam above the community of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, collapsed under the pressure of the lake, releasing millions of gallons of water in a rapidly moving tidal wave that devastated the town of about 30,000, killing over 2,200 and injuring countless others. The impact of the flood destroyed the town and overwhelmed the local ability to recover. The response to the disaster was immediate as over 100 newspapers and magazines sent writers and illustrators to Johnstown to recount the story for the world. As a result, a spontaneous outpouring of time, money, food, clothing, and medical assistance flowed into the devastated area.

Figure 3.7 Johnstown Flood.

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3.3.3 Industrial Accidents: Domestic and International The emergency management community must be prepared to respond to a wide range of accidents, both major and minor. Over the last several decades, major events such as the tragic 1984 Union Carbide industrial accident in Bhopal, India; the 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union; the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska; the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010; and the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster have demonstrated the potential scope of an accidental disaster. Each of these events presented unique and very grave challenges to responders.

3.3.3.1 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911 On March 25, 1911, a fire broke out on the eighth floor of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company located in New York City, which employed approximately 500 workers. Low pay and difficult working conditions combined with environmental factors to cause a fire. Fire rescue arrived but found their ladders too short to reach the trapped women on the eighth and ninth floors. Workers found that the main stairwell was too engulfed in smoke and fire to exit, and the door to the only other exit was locked, trapping the workers. About 20 escaped down the outside fire escape before it collapsed, killing several workers. Some tried to escape using the elevators, until they quit, trapping other workers. A total of 62 workers jumped from the eighth and ninth floors to their deaths on the street below. The fire resulted in the deaths of 146 young women. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire was the largest mass casualty event in New York City’s history. The owners were placed on trial, but no convictions resulted. Many lessons were learned from this disaster that resulted in the crafting of regulations related to workplace safety.11

3.3.3.2 Texas City Explosion of 1947 The worst industrial disaster in United States occurred on April 16, 1947 in Texas City, Texas when initially the cargo of the SS Grandcamp and then the SS High Flyer exploded. The SS Grandcamp was loaded with 2,300 tons of explosive-grade ammonium nitrate, the same type of explosive that would be used years later in the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The SS High Flyer held a cargo of over 2,000 tons of sulfur. As the ship burned, firefighters were called to respond. As they battled the fire, onlookers gathered, including a group of school children. When the explosions occurred, all the firefighters and practically all the onlookers on their pier were killed, as were many employees in the Monsanto Chemical Company and throughout the dock area. There were 362 freight cars in the Texas City Terminal Co. yards, all of which were damaged and many of which were totally destroyed. Approximately 600 automobiles in the Monsanto parking lot and the dock area were practically a total loss. It is estimated that over 500 people were killed, and over 2,000 were injured, making the Texas City Explosion the worst industrial disaster in the United States.12

3.3.3.3 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling into the Sound between 260,000 and 750,000 barrels of crude oil. In response to the spill, the United States Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The legislation included a clause that prohibits any vessel that, after March 22, 1989, has caused an oil spill Introduction to Homeland Security

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of more than one million U.S. gallons in any marine area from operating in Prince William Sound.13 Although this accident occurred more than 30 years ago, the disaster site remains tainted with lingering traces of oil.14 It is estimated that the remaining oil contaminants are “decreasing at a rate of approximately 0–4%” annually.15 Given this rate, it will take decades to centuries for the contaminants to be completely eliminated.16

3.3.3.4 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill This oil spill, along with response and cleanup activities, caused extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats and the Gulf of Mexico’s fishing and tourism industries. It surpassed the severity of the Exxon Valdez incident and represented the worst U.S. offshore oil spill in American history.17 It resulted in the spillage of approximately 206 million gallons of oil, whereas the Exxon Valdez incident involved a spillage of approximately 11 million gallons.18 The U.S. Coast Guard was an integral component of the federal response to the incident.19 This oil spill also resulted in the deaths of 11 workers.20 This incident resulted in the passing of the RESTORE Act in 2012. This legislation represented a mechanism through which the penalties associated with the Clean Water Act could be implemented.21 It also provided a foundation for creating the Gulf Coast Environmental Restoration Council.22 As a result of this incident, the BP Corporation pled guilty to instances of felony misconduct and was tasked with paying a billion dollars in penalties.23 This amount represented the largest such fine in American history.24 Although close to ten years have passed since this incident, environmental concerns remain important topics within the affected region and nationally. Both crustaceans and fish were discovered to have various abnormalities, including skin lesions.25 The dispersant used to treat the affected region is also known to alter the DNA of organisms and to be carcinogenic.26

3.3.3.5 1984 Union Carbide Industrial Accident The 1984 Union Carbide industrial gas leak in Bhopal, India, is considered the world’s worst industrial disaster. Bhopal was a city of approximately one million. In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one-quarter of its production capacity because of decreased demand for pesticides. At 11:00 p.m. on December 2, 1984, while most of the one million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designed to neutralize toxic discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks before.27 Over 500,000 people were exposed to MIC gas and other chemicals. The toxic substance made its way in and around the communities located near the plant. Even though Bhopal had four major hospitals, there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was no plan for mass casualty emergency response. As casualties filled the hospitals, health-care professionals desperately searched to identify the cause and soon linked the illness back to the Union Carbide plant. More than 20,000 people required hospital treatment for symptoms including swollen eyes, frothing at the mouth, and breathing difficulties. As with many accidents, the Union Carbide industrial gas leak resulted from a series of events and failures of safety measures that were expected to neutralize any potential industrial accident.

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Following the disaster, environmental awareness and activism in India increased significantly. In 1986, the Indian government enacted the Environment Protection Act, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forests and strengthening India’s commitment to the environment. Under the new act, the Ministry of Environment and Forests was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for the country.

3.3.3.6 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Explosion Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster was a catastrophic nuclear accident that occurred on April 26, 1986, at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine. The Chernobyl disaster is widely considered to have been the worst nuclear power plant accident in history and is one of only two classified as a Level-7 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale. Even to this day, Chernobyl remains abandoned as the result of the nuclear incident. The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was the result of a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel. The resulting steam explosion and fires released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind. This resulted in the largest uncontrolled radioactive release into the environment ever recorded for any civilian operation, and large quantities of radioactive substances were released into the air for about ten days. The response to the fire and explosion reflected the confusion that is often typical during major disasters. First responders had no idea of the degree of danger they faced. Two Chernobyl plant workers died on the night of the accident, and a further 28 people died within a few weeks as a result of acute radiation poisoning. The scope of the disaster, combined with the secrecy in the Soviet Union at the time, impacted operations to first stabilize the disaster as recovery steps were implemented. Within a few days of the disaster, the decision was made to evacuate the approximately 45,000 residents of the town of Pripyat. Later, other evacuations occurred, with as many as 200,000 people being permanently displaced from their homes.28 The legacy of Chernobyl remains as more nations look to the use of nuclear power as an alternative to traditional fuels.

3.3.3.7 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Disaster Technically the result of an act of nature, the Fukushima Daiichi earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster revealed how a natural disaster could be compounded. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was the largest since the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 and only the second disaster, along with Chernobyl, to measure Level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. There were no casualties caused by radiation exposure, though approximately 25,000 died because of the earthquake and tsunami. With an analysis of the quantity of radiation released and the number of people exposed, the range was deemed to be 0 to 100 cancer deaths in the coming decades. Researchers affiliated with Stanford University initially estimated that approximately 130 deaths and 180 incidents of cancer were expected to occur within the populace near the affected locality.29 However, research indicated that this initial determination may have underestimated the health effects associated with the incident. Instead, it was estimated that approximately 1,000 cancer deaths were expected.30 Figure 3.8 shows the aftermath of the tsunami against the Japanese shoreline in 2011.

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Figure 3.8 An aerial view of damage to Wakuya, Japan, after a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subse‑ quent tsunami devastated the area. (Source: U.S. Navy. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Alexander Tidd)

3.3.4 Epidemics 3.3.4.1 Yellow Fever Epidemic of the 1800s Throughout the 1700s and the 1800s, yellow fever was one of the most feared diseases in the United States. The cause of the disease was unknown, and its arrival in a community created panic. Throughout the 1800s, the Mississippi River region experienced a series of yellow fever outbreaks with major epidemics in 1828, 1855, and 1867. While these epidemics raged with intensity, those in the 1870s proved to be the deadliest. With an outbreak first detected in the New Orleans area, the disease appeared to move up the river. It impacted community after community and very often quickly overwhelmed the available medical resources. While the population of many towns was impacted, the 1873 and 1878 epidemics impacting Memphis provide a solid case study reflecting the impact of a pandemic of the period. The 1873 epidemic claimed at least 2,000 lives in Memphis alone. In 1878, yellow fever returned. Quickly spreading fear through the town, an estimated 25,000 Memphians fled the city to escape the danger. New Orleans newspapers reported the epidemic in late July as Memphis officials established checkpoints to control entry into the city. The fever raged in Memphis until mid-October. It infected over 17,000 and killed 5,150. The yellow fever epidemics of the 1800s revealed significant gaps in the understanding of the cause of the disease and the lack of effective treatments. Since that time, significant advancements in the fields of medical training, research, and treatment have greatly changed the impact of both epidemics and pandemics. Today, most major medical challenges related to epidemics 70

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Figure 3.9 Yellow Jack (yellow fever).

occur among Third World countries, where medical resources have traditionally proven to be inadequate by “modern” standards. Global pandemic outbreaks, such as COVID-19, strain the capacity of virtually every country’s health-care capabilities, supplies, and resources.

3.3.5 Terrorism 3.3.5.1 The 1993 World Trade Center Attack Although overshadowed by the attacks of September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center was the target of international terrorists in 1993. On February 26, 1993, terrorists detonated a truck bomb in the parking area under Tower One of the World Trade Center with the intent of bringing down the structure in the hope that as Tower One fell, it would fall into and destroy Tower Two. The explosion killed six people and injured over 1,000. Those responsible were Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 3.10 Timothy McVeigh.

identified, arrested, and convicted. The attack brought what would become known as the “Global War on Terror” home to the United States.

3.3.5.2 Oklahoma City Bombing of 1995 Inspired by his ultra-right-wing beliefs, Timothy McVeigh perpetrated one of the deadliest terrorist attacks on United States soil when he detonated a truck bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people. The attack shocked the nation. It demonstrated that areas in the nation, well away from the coasts or major cities, could become the target of an attack. Probably more disturbing was the fact that the attack was executed by an ultra-right-wing, “lone wolf” American citizen who was an Army veteran.

3.3.5.3 Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 The coordinated suicide attacks by al-Qaeda on the United States, on September 11, 2001, shocked the nation and put into motion what became known as the Global War on Terrorism. On that morning, 19 al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. The hijackers intentionally crashed two of the airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. Their actions killed everyone aboard the airliners and many others working in the buildings. Both buildings collapsed within two hours, destroying nearby buildings and damaging others. The hijackers crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. The fourth plane crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania after some of its passengers and flight crew attempted to take control of the plane, which the hijackers had redirected toward Washington, D.C. 72

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3.4 Today’s Challenges The United States has faced and experienced many challenges. From the perspective of homeland security and emergency management, “incidents” or “events” can be examined to provide a valuable insight into an incident. As it unfolds, impacts and efforts are made to begin the process of recovery. An array of natural disasters have impacted the United States. They include, but are not limited to, droughts and subsequent dust storms, earthquakes, extreme heat waves, fires, floods, landsides and debris flow, severe weather, and storms. Other examples include hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, volcanoes, wildfires, winter storms, extreme cold, and disease. Though some events have caused extensive property damage, rarely has the United States experienced extensive loss of life as a result of a natural disaster. Incidents, such as the New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812, the Memphis Yellow Fever Epidemic of the 1870s, the Johnstown Flood of 1889, the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, and the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906 impacted the nation and overwhelmed local capabilities. In all these cases, with the exception of the New Madrid Earthquakes, losses of life and extensive property damages occurred and exceeded the capabilities of local resources to respond. Not all danger results from human origins. Nature is full of deadly surprises and harmful calamities. Natural threats and hazards are continuous and may involve localized events as well as events that impact the entirety of the nation. One need only review news articles to learn the details of natural disasters that impact the nation throughout almost any given year. Natural disasters are defined as follows: A natural disaster is a serious disruption to a community or region caused by the impact of a naturally occurring rapid onset event that threatens or causes death, injury or damage to property or the environment and which requires significant and coordinated multi-agency and community response. Such serious disruption can be caused by any one, or a combination, of the following natural hazards: bushfire; earthquake; flood; storm; cyclone; storm surge; landslide; tsunami; meteorite strike; or tornado.31 Certainly, many more natural events may be listed within the context of this definition. Regardless of the type of natural disaster, society is imperiled with loss of life occurring in the worst cases. Natural disasters have the potential to disrupt supply lines and logistics, impacting economic and agricultural functions. Many natural disasters have impacted the United States throughout its history. This section describes a variety of natural disasters that are within the domain of emergency management and homeland security.

3.4.1 Droughts A drought is defined as “a period of dryness, especially when prolonged” and a period that “causes extensive damage to crops or prevents their successful growth.”32 Drought has often affected the U.S. throughout its history locally, regionally, and nationally. During the last century, three of the worst droughts were the Dust Bowl of the 1930, the 1950s drought, and the drought between the years 1987 and 1989.33 During the 1930s, drought conditions were so severe that “soil, depleted of moisture, was lifted by the wind into great clouds of dust and sand which were so thick they concealed the sun for several days at a time.”34 The 1950s drought resulted in some regional crop yields being reduced Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 3.11 U.S. drought monitor. (Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

by approximately 50%.35 The 1980s drought was severe and represented one of the most expensive natural disasters in U.S. history. Cumulatively, the costs of the 1980s drought were approximately $39 billion.36 At the turn of the twenty-first century, China found itself suffering from a rapid deterioration of cropland resulting in part from decades of programs instituted to increase agricultural output and an expansion of urbanization and industrial development. The urbanization and industrial development contributed to the reduction in forestation and other vegetation that once provided moisture to the region. Additionally, three decades of satellite imagery from those areas of northern China have revealed the loss of thousands of lakes due to the reduction in annual rainfall and increased demands on the available water.37 During modern times, drought is a natural force that impacts communities across the nation. The Figure 3.11 shows drought conditions for 2012 throughout the U.S.

3.4.2 Heat Waves A heat wave represents a “prolonged period of excessive heat, often combined with excessive humidity” involving extreme heat.38 During such conditions, temperatures may “hover 74

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Figure 3.12a: U.S. Heat Index from 2019. (Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

10 degrees or more above the average high temperature for the region and last for prolonged periods of time.”39 Heat waves are extremely dangerous and are associated with losses of life. Within the U.S., in average terms, events of “excessive heat” are responsible for claiming “more lives each year than floods, lightning, tornadoes, and hurricanes combined.”40 Across the nation, during the 1980 heat wave, approximately 1,250 people perished, with 700 victims being in the city of Chicago.41 In the month of August 2003, a heat wave resulted in approximately 50,000 deaths.42 Heat waves affect all segments of the nation. Figures 3.12a and 3.12b show examples of the scopes of heat waves that often occur across the U.S.

3.4.3 Tsunamis The word “tsunami” is derived from the Japanese language.43 It is comprised of two parts: “tsu, meaning harbor, and nami, meaning wave.”44 A tsunami is generally caused by landslides or earthquakes beneath the ocean.45 The warning signs of a tsunami include “a strong earthquake lasting 20 seconds or more near the coast” and “a noticeable rapid rise or fall in coastal waters.”46 Although many individuals may think of Asian disasters involving large Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 3.12b: An illustration showing the increase in the frequency and severity of heat waves. (Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

ocean waves, the U.S. is not insusceptible to the dangers of tsunamis. The states of Alaska and Hawaii have felt the impacts of tsunamis, as has the U.S. West Coast.47 The deadliest tsunami to impact the U.S. occurred in 1964 off the coast of Alaska and resulted in “many casualties.”48 The Figure 3.13 describes the forming of a tsunami.

3.4.4 Earthquakes Earthquakes are quick displacements of “land/rock mass, which typically [occur] along a fault line” and result in the forming of “seismic waves from the origin outward” and the release of energy.49 Earthquakes are one of the most costly natural hazards faced by the nation and pose a risk to 79 million Americans in 39 states.50 Earthquakes are often described according to the characteristics of magnitude and intensity.51 Incidences of earthquakes represent approximately “20% of insured catastrophic losses” and approximately one-third of “economic losses” that result from “natural hazards.”52 Very common after an earthquake are aftershocks. An aftershock is an earthquake of similar or lesser intensity that follows the main earthquake. Aftershocks may continue for some time after the main shock and can well cause additional damage. The epicenter of an earthquake is the location on the earth’s surface directly above the point on the fault where the earthquake rupture began.53 76

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Figure 3.13 Tsunami’s creation. (Source: U.S. Department of the Interior)

Several parts of the United States rest on fault lines that are prone to earthquakes. These areas include California, Alaska, Hawaii, and the central part of the nation running north and south along the Mississippi River. It was along the Mississippi River, during the period of 1811–1812, that a series of earthquakes now known as the New Madrid Earthquakes occurred. This fault line between St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee, was sparsely populated. As a result, the earthquakes inflicted little personal injury but did cause property damage, including the destruction of the town of New Madrid, Missouri, on February 12, 1812. In a letter dated January 13, 1814, Missouri Territorial Governor William Clark asked for federal relief for the inhabitants of New Madrid County. This was one of the earliest examples, if not the first example, of a request for disaster relief from the United States federal government. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 3.14 U.S. West Coast earthquake hazards. (Source: FEMA)

This incident is not the largest recorded earthquake to strike the United States. Such an event was the Prince William Sound, Alaska, earthquake and ensuing tsunami that caused $300 million in property damages and claimed around 128 lives. Another New Madrid earthquake along the same fault line would inflict property damage and fatalities estimated to range from Memphis, Tennessee, in the south, to St. Louis in the north, clearly overwhelming local, state, and federal response capabilities. Figure 3.14 presents an example of earthquake risk for the Western U.S. 78

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3.4.5 Volcanoes Though most Americans do not consider the possibility of volcanic action to be a major threat, the reality is that volcanic activity is ongoing. A volcano is defined as “a vent in the crust of the earth or another planet or a moon from which usually molten or hot rock and steam issue” or “a hill or mountain composed wholly or in part of the ejected material.”54 Most volcanoes exist at the boundaries of the Earth’s tectonic plates. It is estimated that about 550 volcanoes have erupted on the Earth’s surface in recorded history. History is full of examples of the impact of volcanic action on communities. The famous eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 AD buried the towns of Pompeii and Herculaneum and resulted in an estimated loss of over 3,000 lives. The most lives lost to volcanic action were related to the 1815 volcanic eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of as many as 92,000. Other incidents resulted in many deaths. The 1883 eruption and tsunami in Krakatau, Indonesia, was estimated to have killed over 36,000. The 1902 eruption of Mount Pelee in Martinique may have resulted in the deaths of over 29,000.55 Notably, within the U.S., a significant volcanic eruption occurred during 1980 when Mount St. Helens erupted in the state of Washington. This event was “the most studied volcanic eruption of the twentieth century.”56 Figure 3.15 shows monitored volcanic presences within the U.S.

Figure 3.15 Volcano threat map. (Source: U.S. Geological Service)

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3.4.6 Tornadoes Tornadoes are common throughout the United States. It is estimated that as many as 1,000 tornadoes occur in the nation annually.57 A tornado is defined as “a violently rotating column of air extending between, and in contact with, a cloud and the surface of the earth.”58 Tornadoes are usually associated with thunderstorms and may involve “speeds that exceed 200 mph” and that may “approach 300 mph” in “extreme cases.”59 The deadliest tornado in world history was the Daultipur-Saturia tornado in Bangladesh on April 26, 1989, which killed approximately 1,300 people. For homeland security and emergency response personnel, tornadoes always pose a great challenge. Often quickly forming and with the potential to both move rapidly and change course, large tornadoes can create a wide path of destruction over a vast area. As a result, search and rescue operations may be hampered not only by poor weather but also by downed power lines, trees, and other debris, including the wreckages of buildings and vehicles.

3.4.7 Blizzards According to the National Weather Service, a blizzard occurs when the following conditions are observed over a period of three or more hours: “sustained wind or frequent gusts to 35 miles an hour or greater; and considerable falling and/or blowing snow (i.e., reducing visibility frequently to less than a ¼ mile).”60 Blizzards occur throughout various geographic segments of the U.S. In 2013, a blizzard occurred in the New England states that resulted in death, destruction, and calamity for many people and organizations.61 This event generated over three feet of snow, necessitated the cancelling of approximately 5,000 flights, and “knocked out power to more than 635,000 customers.”62 It also necessitated the evacuating of coastal regions and the suspending of postal service in seven states.63

3.4.8 Fires Throughout the history of the United States, the nation has faced the challenges and dangers of fire. In 2011, there were 1,389,500 fires reported in the United States. These fires caused 3,005 civilian deaths, 17,500 civilian injuries, and $11.7 billion in property damage. Of those, an estimated 484,500 were structure fires, causing 2,640 civilian deaths, 15,635 civilian injuries, and $9.7 billion in property damage.64 Any region of the United States is susceptible to incidents of fire. In 1871, possibly as many as 2,500 people were killed as a result of what became known as the Peshtigo Fire. Occurring the same day as the Great Chicago Fire, it burned over 1,875 square miles and destroyed 12 communities. In terms of lives lost, the Peshtigo Fire was the worst natural disaster to strike the United States.65 As for property damage and loss, the National Fire Protection Association identified the Oakland Fire Storm of 1991 as the costliest wild land fire in the United States, with damages estimated to exceed $1.5 billion.66 Even today, with the resources available to combat major fires, major fires still pose great challenges to emergency management professionals. During 2012, the U.S. wildfire season was so extreme that “the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service ran out of money to pay for firefighters, fire trucks and aircraft that dump retardant on monstrous flames.”67 This funding situation necessitated the transferring of funds from fire prevention programs to satisfy outlying costs.68 Eventually, congressional intervention was necessary to generate approximately $400 million toward fire prevention.69 80

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The United States is not the only nation that has experienced the impact of uncontrolled fires, in 1987, the Black Dragon Fire in China burned a total of 18 million acres of forest along the Amur River.

3.4.9 Floods Flash floods occur when excessively large quantities of rain occur within short periods of time, generally less than six hours, thereby causing water levels to increase and decrease quickly.70 Flooding also occurs when mass amounts of water, originating from “a river or other body of water” either cause damage or represent a threat.71 Flooding impacts many regions throughout the U.S. annually. According to the National Hurricane Center, inland flooding has been responsible for more than half the deaths associated with tropical cyclones in the United States over the last 30 years.72 Some of the major flooding that impacted the nation included the 1913 Ohio Flood, which resulted in over 450 deaths and over $100 million in property damages, and the 1927 Mississippi River Flood, which impacted states from Missouri down to Louisiana and sparked a nationallevel debate on finding solutions to combat flooding.73 During 2013, Hurricane Isaac impacted the American Gulf Coast region. Figure 3.16 shows the flooding that occurred in Braithwaite, Louisiana, in the aftermath of the storm.

Figure 3.16 Community flooding, Dyersburg, TN. An ariel view of a flooded neighborhood near New Orleans shows Coast Guard crews the extent of the damage sustained following Hurricane Isaac, September 1, 2012. A survey flight was conducted using a Coast Guard Air Station Mobile HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter that flew from New Orleans to Grand Isle, LA, to check for any potential naviga‑ tion hazards, pollution or hazardous materials following the storm. (Source: U.S. Department of Defense)

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3.4.10 Hailstorms Hail is defined as “precipitation in the form of small balls or lumps usually consisting of concentric layers of clear ice and compact snow.”74 Therefore, a hailstorm represents “a storm accompanied by hail.”75 Damages from hail are not insignificant, either economically or financially. Hail may fall to the Earth at speeds as fast as 100 miles per hour and may also “contain foreign matter, such as pebbles, leaves, twigs, nuts, and insects” within their icy content.76 Annually, hail inflicts approximately $1 billion dollars in damages to both crops and property.77 During 2003, the largest hailstone ever discovered in the U.S. was found in Aurora, Colorado.78 It was nearly the size of a soccer ball and was measured to be approximately seven inches wide.79 Hail has impacted the outcomes of historical events. In 1360, a hailstorm affected the Hundred Years’ War that occurred between the nations of England and France.80 Hail killed thousands of horses and hundreds of English troops near Paris.81 During modern times, the effects of hail are just as deadly and severe. In 2013, within a period of 20 minutes in the nation of India, nine people were killed, and both crops and homes were destroyed when a hailstorm deposited a “snow like blanket” among seven villages in Chevella, Moinabad, and Shankarpally.82 Hailstorms may not occur in a small area. In fact, some may cover large swaths of land. For instance, in 2018, a hailstorm in Northeast Mississippi spanned the distance between the towns of Holly Springs and Booneville, about 50 miles.83 Among some areas across the affected region, the hail was several inches deep.84

3.4.11 Dust Storms A dust storm is an event that may arise surprisingly and without warning and generally has the appearance of an “advancing wall of dust and debris which may be miles long and several

Figure 3.17 A huge dust storm approaches Maricopa, Arizona. (Source: NASA. Photo by Meggan Woo)

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thousand feet high.”85 Dust storms are quite dangerous even though they may require small periods of time for completion. The conditions of dust storms often include no or extremely limited visibility, thereby increasing the dangers of travel. During the 1930s, the famous Dust Bowl represented one of the “worst environmental disasters of the twentieth century” globally.86 It resulted in three million people abandoning their Great Plains farms and approximately 500,000 people migrating to the Western states.87 Figure 13.17 shows a 2011 dust storm encompassing Phoenix, Arizona.

3.4.12 Landslides A landslide represents the mass wasting of materials. Mass wasting is defined as the “down slope movement of soil and/or rock under the influence of gravity.”88 This movement occurs because of slope failure involving a moment in which “gravity exceeds the strength of the earth materials.”89 Notably, landslides have often occurred in the Western U.S., where residents have endured much damage, including the losses of homes and property. In 1998, the El Nino season sparked landslides near the San Francisco Bay area.90 During 2011, in the state of California, entire sections of roadways slid into the Pacific Ocean because of landslides.91 In monetary terms, landslides are expensive. For instance, in 1985, in American society, it was estimated that the cumulative financial losses from landslides averaged between $1 billion and $2 billion annually. In modern times, a twenty-first century estimate showed that landslides incurred overall between $2 billion to $4 billion annually. In limited regions, landslides can be costly, too. The 1998 San Francisco Bay area landslide was estimated to have incurred about $210 million in damages (adjusted to modern dollars).92

3.4.13 Sinkholes Sinkholes are “depressions or holes in the land surface” which result from “the dissolving of the underlying limestone.”93 Sinkholes may occur in open areas as well as underneath structures or roadways. The damages that result from sinkholes may be both excessive and costly.94

Figure 3.18 Sinkholes. (Source: U.S. Department of Transportation)

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Within the State of Florida, many lakes are actually “relic sinkholes.”95 Figure 3.18 shows a sinkhole in the State of Florida (2013).

3.4.14 Cyclones Cyclones are analogous with rotating storms (e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.). A cyclone is defined as “a storm or system of winds that rotates about a center of low atmospheric pressure, advances at a speed of 20 to 30 miles (about 30 to 50 kilometers) an hour, and often brings heavy rain.”96 The deadliest natural disaster to impact the United States was the Galveston Hurricane of 1900. Striking on September 8, 1900, it caused between 6,000 and 12,000 deaths and devastated the city, destroying approximately 3,600 homes and buildings.97 The 1926 Miami hurricane is considered the costliest hurricane to strike the United States.98 During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the most notable example of a cyclone storm was Hurricane Katrina. During 2012, Super Storm Sandy devastated the Eastern seaboard of the United States, and caused significant destruction in regions of New York and New Jersey, which rarely experience hurricane activity.99 This storm killed more than 100 people, destroyed whole communities in coastal New York and New Jersey, left tens of thousands homeless, crippled mass transit, triggered paralyzing gas shortages, inflicted billions of dollars in infrastructure damage and cut power to more than 8 million homes, some of which remained dark for weeks.100 This event impaired the regional economy and impacted numerous organizations around the nation that had relationships with the impacted area. Each hurricane event is different. No two are identical but all are memorable for those who experience them directly. Throughout American history, several storms have left a lasting impact in the national memory. According to the Smithsonian, Table 3.1 shows the ten most prominent hurricanes in U.S. history.101

3.4.15 Whirlpools A whirlpool is a “swirling body of water usually produced by ocean tides,” and more powerful whirlpools are known as maelstroms.102 During the fifteenth century, it is conjectured that a Malian fleet of ships was destroyed by a whirlpool when attempting to explore the Atlantic Ocean.103 Out of the 200 vessels that were deployed, only one returned.104 Although their occurrences may not be well known, whirlpools are dangerous entities. In 2010, in the nation of India, a total of 36 people drowned in conjunction with a whirlpool, and another 25 remained missing after the incident.105 The incident occurred when an overcrowded boat was caught in a whirlpool and then capsized.106 Whirlpools are not constrained to oceans. For instance, in 2018, a Malaysian teenager and four first responders died after being caught in a whirlpool that had formed in a mining pond.107 Although rescuers attempted to assist and save the youth, they also fell prey to the whirlpool’s currents. Following standard procedures, the rescuers were linked together with a rope, but the currents overwhelmed them. After struggling for half an hour in the whirlpool, all six of the responders were unconscious when they were eventually retrieved from the pond and died afterward.108 84

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Table 3.1 The Most Prominent Hurricanes in U.S. History Order

Year

Event

Description

1

1926

Great Miami Hurricane

Category 4 storm. In terms of 1926 dollars, it incurred about $105 million. In terms of modern dollars, the equivalent amount would be approximately $178 billion—more than twice the cost of Katrina. When normalized with other hurricanes (using current conditions), if it had occurred during modern times, it would have produced damages nearly doubling those of Hurricane Katrina.

2

2005

Hurricane Katrina

It was deemed the “most destructive hurricane” when it impacted the Mississippi Gulf Coast and Louisiana shores.

3

1900

Galveston Hurricane

Deemed the greatest and deadliest natural disaster to ever impact the United States. It resulted in somewhere between 8,000 and 12,000 deaths, destroyed 3,600 buildings, and generated financial damages exceeding $20 million.

4

1915

Galveston Hurricane

The storm exhibited 21-foot waves. The second Galveston Hurricane was less damaging because residents had built a protective seawall following the 1900 incident.

5

1992

Hurricane Andrew

It impacted Dale County, Florida as a Category 5 storm and generated $26.5 billion in damages.

6

1938

Great New England Hurricane

The storm pelted Connecticut and Long Island without any warning during high tide. It exhibited 12-foot to 25-foot surges in the New England area. Because of its suddenness, it caused at least 600 deaths and generated approximately $300 million in damages.

7

1944

Cuba-Florida Hurricane

The storm occurred during World War II. Because of an abundance of military personnel, evacuation was effected both efficiently and effectively. Havana Harbor was decimated. Its death toll was around 300 individuals.

8

1928

Lake Okeechobee Hurricane

It was the second deadliest storm in American history. The hurricane caused 4,078 deaths (with a total of 2,500 in South Florida).

9

1960

Hurricane Donna

The storm occurred in the Florida Keys. It exhibited storm surges of 13 feet. Incredibly, the storm maintains a record for sustaining its hurricane status for a total of 17 days.

10

1969

Hurricane Camille

The storm devastated the Mississippi Gulf Coast as a Category 5 event. Its damages amounted to approximately $1.4 billion. Although tragic, the storm resulted in the crafting and implementing of the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale.

3.4.16 Limnic Eruptions Limnic eruptions occur rarely. However, they represent situations in which carbon dioxide erupts suddenly from “water, posing the threat of suffocating wildlife, livestock, and humans.”109 The conditions that generate these events are rare.110 During 1986, in the Cameroon region, a limnic eruption occurred that expelled approximately 1.6 million tons of carbon dioxide from a lake at a speed of roughly 60 miles per hour.111 The resulting cloud “displaced all the oxygen in several small villages, suffocating between 1,700 and 1,800 people, not counting all their livestock.”112

3.5 Aftermath of Incidents The aftermath of any incident, whether natural or man-made, may have various risks and unpredicted effects. Although rare in developed nations, various infectious diseases may occur within the environments of undeveloped countries.113 Examples include cholera, typhoid fever, Introduction to Homeland Security

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dysentery, hepatitis, balantidiasis, leptospirosis, malaria, and dengue fever.114 Such diseases may be spread through the drinking of contaminated water that is infected with animal waste or through insect and animal bites.115 Various venoms may be experienced from insect and animal bites.116 Within disaster relief shelters, diseases such as measles, tuberculosis, gastroenteritis, and hepatitis may be communicable between humans.117 Such diseases and the effects of venoms may result in death or severe health consequences for survivors if they are untreated. Other outcomes may involve the effects of poisonous gases following incidents. During 2005, in Graniteville, South Carolina, a train wreck resulted in the release of toxic gases when two trains collided, thereby derailing 16 cars.118 The wreck involved the release of approximately 120,000 pounds of chlorine gas.119 A total of 9 people were killed, over 500 people were injured, and approximately 5,400 people were evacuated from the town.120 During the aftermath of the incident, many people suffered damage to their respiratory tracts and vocal chords.121 A year after the accident, some people also suffered from memory loss and pulmonary disease.122 This accident represented the “deadliest train wreck involving hazardous material since 1978.”123 Nuclear accidents often involve long-term detrimental effects associated with radiation and contamination. After the Chernobyl incident, the city was abandoned. It remains abandoned and uninhabitable to this day. Twenty-five years after the accident, the health effects remained unascertained.124 Since the accident, approximately 6,000 instances of thyroid cancer were detected within the affected region near Chernobyl.125 It is unclear whether all of these diagnoses were related to the nuclear accident.126 In the U.S., following the events of 9/11, many first responders experienced delayed health impediments during the aftermath of the incident. The resulting debris, noxious fumes, and dust contained a mixture of asbestos, cement, dioxins, glass fibers, lead, and an array of other chemicals.127 The pasty substance often coated the rescuers’ faces and bodies—even up to half an inch in thickness.128 Many inhaled the dangerous mixture without protective masks or respirators. Years after the event, at least 150 of the first responders died from illnesses related to their work involving 9/11.129 Approximately 8,000 were diagnosed with cancer, and 72,000 were enrolled in the World Trade Center Health Program for individuals whose illnesses were related to the 9/11 events.130 The scars of 9/11 service are not only tangible but also intangible.131 Many responders suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).132 Such illnesses and effects were not limited to responders; individuals in the general public also exhibited similar ailments. Illness may result from a natural disaster. After Hurricane Katrina, much of the Gulf Coast infrastructure was destroyed. Numerous chemicals, poisons, biological endangerments, and waste products contaminated the region. During the hurricane’s aftermath, individuals reported a variety of health problems and complaints. Among the prominent issues were hypertension and cardiovascular issues, diabetes, psychiatric issues, rashes, asthma, pneumonia and other respiratory illness, flu-like maladies, diarrhea and other gastrointestinal illnesses, and toxic exposure.133 Other complaints included hepatitis, tuberculosis, varicella, rubeola, encephalitis, meningitis, pertussis, and an array of other communicable illnesses.134 Given such a listing, it is undeniable that the aftermaths of disasters may be just as dangerous as the incidents themselves. The dynamics of natural disasters and accidents are often complex and unpredictable. They may have long-term implications for the economies of the affected regions, involve long-term damage ecologically, and have long-term health consequences for people near the location of the incident. Despite the best efforts to mitigate the effects of calamities, there is no guarantee that detrimental consequences will not occur in the aftermaths of events. In many cases, only time will reveal the effects of natural disasters, man-made incidents, and accidents. 86

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3.6 Chapter Comments and Summary The role of the federal government in disaster response has evolved throughout the past 200 years. The Congressional Act of 1803 was the earliest effort to provide federal disaster relief after a fire devastated a New Hampshire town. From that point forward, assorted legislation provided disaster support. Between 1803 and 1950, the federal government intervened in approximately 100 incidents (earthquakes, fires, floods, and tornadoes). Such events are severe reminders of the power of natural hazards and disasters to negatively affect not only the impacted area but also of entire segments of the nation. These calamities necessitate emergency management and response and also involve various degrees of preparedness, depending on location and resources. Although they do not result from human activities, these natural events are just as deadly and as powerful as any threat that could be unleashed from human origins. This notion represents a dichotomy of threats: man-made events and natural disasters. Although these categories may differ with respect to their origins, their potentials to cause mass death, destruction, and suffering are comparable. Modern American society must acknowledge the danger of both categories and craft methods to mitigate the effects of a range of incidents that may arise from many different origins. The U.S. experiences a variety of natural disasters. Depending upon one’s locality, the types of disasters may be different. For example, it is highly unlikely that someone living in Florida will experience a blizzard, whereas someone in Montana may well prepare for much snowfall annually. Regardless of the type of event or incident, all natural calamities have some amount of risk and potential of lethality. Deaths may result from landslides just as easily as they may result from volcanic explosions. One must not discount the dangerousness of nature. Each natural incident represents a learning experience locally, regionally, and nationally that often results in the crafting of legislation to improve preparedness, mitigation, and recovery regarding the potential hazards of future natural calamities. For instance, the events involving the Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon resulted in Congressional legislative activities. Such legislation often improves the enforcing of regulations and imposes punitive measures that may be necessary during the aftermaths of events. It also provides a framework for supporting preparedness and mitigation initiatives. The U.S. possesses a large land mass that exhibits a variety of different ecological, meteorological, and geological attributes. Dangers may arise from storms, volcanoes, earthquakes, floods, fires, blizzards, and many other natural factors. Given the size of the nation, these dangers are unequally distributed within American society. Each locality is susceptible to the unique threats that endanger its region within the nation. The U.S. also exhibits a complex variety of roadways, airways, railways, and waterways. It also possesses complex municipal infrastructures. Accidents may occur along any of these venues. After any such accidents, the consequences may be detrimental in many ways. Long-term health effects may impair the functioning of the human body and may result in death. The aftermath of many incidents, both accidental and natural, may also support the incubation and transmission of numerous diseases. In any case, it is undeniable that American society faces many dangers representing both natural and man-made origins. These dangers are not constrained solely to the U.S. Instead, any nation is susceptible to man-made and natural disasters. Such events may occur with speed, surprise, and violence and have differing levels of lethality. All practitioners and theoreticians of homeland security must acknowledge and respect the potentials of such incidents to impact Introduction to Homeland Security

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American society. If such events occur, society must evaluate and assess these instances as a method of crafting betterments that may improve its ability to prepare for, mitigate, and recover from future calamities.

3.7 Key Terms All-Hazards Blizzard COVID-19 Cyclone Drought Dust Storm Earthquake Emergency Epidemic Fire Flood Hailstorms Hazard Heat Wave Hurricane Landslide

Limnic Eruption Natural Disaster Man-Made Incident Mitigation Pandemic Policy Recovery Response Safety Security Sinkhole Tornado Tsunami Volcano Whirlpool

3.8 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. Perform some research concerning your locality. What types of natural incidents pose risk annually? Historically, what types of incidents have affected your locality? Write a brief essay that addresses both issues. 2. Perform some research concerning your state. What types of man-made incidents affected it historically? Write a brief essay that addresses your findings. 3. What types of preparatory measures exist in your state regarding the types of incidents you discovered via the preceding questions? Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. 4. Perform some research concerning the cost of incidents in your state. How much have certain incidents cost over time? How much money is expended toward preparatory measures? Write a brief essay that highlights your findings.

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1. Veenema, T. (2007). Disaster Nursing and Emergency Preparedness: For Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terrorism and Other Hazards, 2nd edition. New York: Springer Publishing, p. 575. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Worst Natural Disasters of 2012. (2012). The Huffington Post. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.huffing tonpost.com/2012/12/28/worst-natural-disasters-of-2012_n_2349311.html#slide=more270588. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Sauter, M. B. (2019). Talk About the Polar Vortex! A List of the Coldest Weather Ever Recorded in Each State. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/01/30/polar-vortex-2019-cold-weatherrecord-temperatures/38974589/.

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8. Krajick, K. (2005). Fire in the hole. Smithsonian Magazine. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/firehole.html. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Rosenberg, J. Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire. About.com 20th Century History. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from http://history1900s.about.com/od/1910s/p/trianglefire.htm. 12. Fire Prevention and Engineering Bureau of Texas. Texas City Disaster. Retrieved March 31, 2013, from www.local1259iaff.org/report.htm. 13. Oil Pollution Act of 1990—Summary. (1990, August 18). Federal Wildlife and Related Laws Handbook. Retrieved March 10, 2008. 14. Oil Remains: The Persistence, Toxicity, and Impact of Exxon Valdez Oil. (2013). State of Alaska. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.evostc.state.ak.us/recovery/lingeringoil.cfm. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. A Look Back at the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. (2013). The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://darkroom.baltimoresun.com/2012/11/a-look-back-at-the-bp-deepwater-horizon-oilspill/#1. 18. Ecological Impacts of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. (2012). Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://ihrrblog. org/2012/05/08/ecological-impacts-of-deep-water-horizon-oil-spill/. 19. Carden, M. (2010). Military Support to Mitigate Oil Spill Continues. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www. defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60040. 20. A Look Back at the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. (2013). The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://darkroom.baltimoresun.com/2012/11/a-look-back-at-the-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/#1. 21. Florida Department of Environmental Protection. (2013). Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response and Restoration. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/. 22. Ibid. 23. A Look Back at the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. (2013). The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://darkroom.baltimoresun.com/2012/11/a-look-back-at-the-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/#1. 24. Ibid. 25. Ecological Impacts of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. (2012). Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://ihrrblog. org/2012/05/08/ecological-impacts-of-deep-water-horizon-oil-spill/. 26. Ibid. 27. Shrivastava, P. (1987). Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, p. 184. 28. Chernobyl Accident. (1986). World Nuclear Association. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from www.worldnuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident/#.UU8whVfyCSp. 29. McClure, M. (2012). Stanford Researchers Calculate Global Health Impacts of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from ttp://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/july/fukushima-healthimpacts-071712.html. 30. Brodie, R. (2013). Reassessing the Health Effects of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2013/01/reassessing-health-effectsfukushima-daiichi-nuclear-accident. 31. Australian Emergency Management. (2002). Natural Disasters in Australia: Reforming Mitigation, Relief, and Recovery Arrangements. Retrieved February 11, 2013, from www.em.gov.au/Documents/ Natural%20Disasters%20in%20Australia%20-%20Review.pdf. 32. Drought. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/drought. 33. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2013). North American Drought: A Paleo Perspective. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/drought/drght_history.html. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Royston, R. (2010, October 28). China’s dust storms raise fears of impending catastrophe. National Geographic News. Retrieved March 18, 2013, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/06/ 0601_chinadust.html. 38. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2013). Community Emergency Response Team Appendix 1-A: Hazard Lesson Plans. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/downloads/04Heat-PM-Rev2.doc. 39. Ibid.

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40. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2013). Heat: A Major Killer. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.nws.noaa.gov/os/heat/index.shtml. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Dudley, W., and Lee, M. (1998). Tsunami! 2nd edition. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 51. 44. Ibid. 45. Geist, E., Earle, P., and McCarthy, J. (2005). Could It Happen Here? Tsunamis That Have Struck U.S. Coastlines. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2005/01/fieldwork2.html. 46. American Red Cross. (2013). Tsunami. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.redcross.org/prepare/disaster/ tsunami. 47. Geist, Eric, Earle, P., and McCarthy, J. (2005). Could It Happen Here? Tsunamis That Have Struck U.S. Coastlines. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2005/01/fieldwork2.html. 48. Ibid. 49. Banks, E. (2005). Catastrophic Risk Management: Analysis and Management. West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, p. 19. 50. Fact Sheet Earthquakes. FEMA. (2007, December). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Catalog No. 07337–7. 51. U.S. Geological Survey. (2013). The Severity of an Earthquake. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http:// pubs.usgs.gov/gip/earthq4/severitygip.html. 52. Oliveira, C., Roca, A., and Goula, X. (2008). Assessing and Managing Earthquake Risk Geo-Scientific and Engineering Knowledge for Earthquake Risk Mitigation: Developments, Tools, and Techniques. Dordrecht: Springer Publishing, p. 388. 53. Fact Sheet Earthquakes. FEMA. (2007, December). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Catalog No. 07337–7. 54. Volcano. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/volcano. 55. The Deadliest Volcanic Eruptions. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from www.chm.bris.ac.uk/webprojects 2003/silvester/Page6Famous.htm. 56. Mt. St. Helens Eruption 1980. (2013). San Diego State University. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from www.geology.sdsu.edu/how_volcanoes_work/Sthelens.html. 57. Ibid. 58. The Weather Channel. (2013). Tornadoes: Definition & Prevalence. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from www.weather.com/outlook/wxready/articles/id-54. 59. Ibid. 60. National Weather Service. (2013). Blizzard. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://w1.weather.gov/ glossary/index.php?letter=b. 61. PHOTOS: Blizzard 2013 blasts through Northeast. (2013). Fox News Insider. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://foxnewsinsider.com/2013/02/09/photos-blizzard-northeast-nemo-2013/. 62. Snow, M., Ford, D., and Ariosto, D. (2013, February 11). Northeast digs out after deadly blizzard. CNN News. 63. Ibid. 64. Deadliest/Large-Loss Fire. (2012, February). National Fire Protection Association. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=954&itemID=44745&URL=Research/Fire%20 statistics/Deadliest/large-loss%20fires. 65. Hemphill, S. (2002, November 27). Peshtigo: A tornado of fire revisited. Minnesota Public Radio. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200211/27_hemphills_peshtigofire/. 66. Deadliest/Large-Loss Fire. (2012, February). National Fire Protection Association. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=954&itemID=44745&URL=Research/Fire%20 statistics/Deadliest/large-loss%20fires. 67. Fears, D. (2012). U.S. Runs Out of Funds to Battle Wildfires. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from http:// articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-07/national/35500576_1_battle-wildfires-wildfire-suppressionworst-wildfire-season. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Flash Flood. (2013). U.S. Geological Survey. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://ks.water.usgs.gov/ waterwatch/flood/definition.html. 71. Ibid. 72. Fact Sheet Floods. FEMA. (2007, December). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Catalog No. 07337–3.

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73. Perry, C. (2010, October 12). Significant floods in the United States during the 20th century—USGS measures a century of floods. USGS. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from http://ks.water.usgs.gov/pubs/factsheets/fs.024-00.html#HDR1. 74. Hail Storm. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hail. 75. Ibid. 76. Largest Hailstone in U.S. History Found. (2013). National Geographic. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/08/0804_030804_largesthailstone.html. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. May 8th: A Hail of a Day. (2012). Accuweather. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from www.accuweather.com/ en/weather-news/may-8th-a-hail-of-a-day/64926. 81. Ibid. 82. Reilly, J. (2013). Nine people killed as freak hailstorm rains massive boulders down on Indian villages. The Daily Mail. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2271147/Nine-peoplekilled-freak-hailstorm-rains-massive-boulders-Indian-villages.html. 83. Associated Press. (2018). Update: Storm Brings Hail to Northern Mississippi, Spawns Tornadoes Across Southeast. Retrieved from www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2018/03/19/mississippi-stormbrings-hail/439130002/. 84. Ibid. 85. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2013). Motorist Beware! Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/duststrm.htm. 86. Cook, B., Miller, R., and Seager, R. (2011). Did dust storms make the Dust Bowl drought worse?” Columbia University—Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.ldeo. columbia.edu/res/div/ocp/drought/dust_storms.shtml. 87. Ibid. 88. What Is a Landslide? (2013). University of Wisconsin. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from www.geology. wisc.edu/courses/g115/projects03/emgoltz/definition.htm. 89. Ibid. 90. American Geosciences Institute. (2018). How Much Do Landslides Cost the U.S. in Terms of Monetary Losses? Retrieved from www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq/how-much-dolandslides-cost-terms-monetary-losses. 91. California Road Slides into Ocean After Landslide. (2011). BBC News. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15819302. 92. American Geosciences Institute. (2018). How Much Do Landslides Cost the U.S. in Terms of Monetary Losses? Retrieved from www.americangeosciences.org/critical-issues/faq/how-much-dolandslides-cost-terms-monetary-losses. 93. U.S. Department of Transportation. (2017). Expediting project delivery self-assessment workbook. Retrieved February 10, 2020, from www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/env_initiatives/shrp2/workbook. aspx#workbook/. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid. 96. Cyclone. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2020, from www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cyclone. 97. Ripley, A. (2008, September 15). The 1900 Galveston Hurricane. Time. Retrieved April 1, 2013, from www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1841442,00.html. 98. Barnes, J. (1998). Florida’s Hurricane History. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 99. Hurricane Sandy: Covering the Storm. (2012). The New York Times. Retrieved February 11, 2013, from www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/28/nyregion/hurricane-sandy.html. 100. Ibid. 101. Smithsonian. (2018). Top Ten Most Damaging U.S. Hurricanes. Retrieved from www.smithsonianmag. com/smart-news/top-ten-most-damaging-us-hurricanes-98657141/. 102. Bhagat, S. B. (2009). Foundations of Geology. New Delhi: New Vision Publishing House, p. 532. 103. Wright, E. (2008). Lost Explorers: Adventurers That Disappeared Off the Face of the Earth. Sydney and St. Leonards, NSW: Murdoch Books, p. 11. 104. Ibid.

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105. At least 36 killed after Indian boat sinks in Whirlpool. (2010). Thaindian News. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india/at-least-36-killed-after-indian-boat-sinks-in-whirlpool_100442672.html. 106. Ibid. 107. McElreath, D., Jensen, C., Wigginton, M., Doss, D., Nations, R., and Van Slyke, J. (2014). Introduction to Homeland Security. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 108. Murdock, J. (2018). Six Rescue Divers Drown in ‘Whirlpool’ Trying to Save 17-Year-Old Boy. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com/six-rescue-divers-drown-whirlpool-while-trying-save-17-year-old-boy-1152432. 109. Bhagat, S. B. (2009). Foundations of Geology. New Delhi: New Vision Publishing House, p. 532. 110. Frater, J. (2010). Ultimate Book of Bizarre Lists. Berkeley, CA: Ulysses Press, p. 52. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. Disaster Aftermath: The Risk of Epidemic Diseases. (2010). CBC News. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2008/05/16/f-health-disaster-diseases.html. 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. 118. Toxic Train, Deadly Crash. (2006). ABC News. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://abcnews.go.com/ Primetime/story?id=2375087&page=1#.UVuoRDdXqYo. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 122. Jarvie, J. (2006). Effects of deadly train crash still rumble through town. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/16/nation/na-graniteville16. 123. Ibid. 124. Vengerowsky, K. (2011). Chernobyl impact felt 25 years later. USA Today. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-04-26-chernobyl-anniversary-nuclear-radiation.htm. 125. Ibid. 126. Ibid. 127. Dunn, L., and Fox, M. (2018). 9/11 First Responders Begin to Feel Attack’s Long-Term Health Effects. Retrieved from www.nbcnews.com/storyline/9-11-anniversary/9-11-first-responders-begin-feel-attack-slong-term-n908306. 128. Ibid. 129. Ibid. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. 132. Ibid. 133. Posid, J. (n.d.). Infectious Disease Issues Associated with Hurricane Katrina (HK). Retrieved from https:// depts.washington.edu/einet/symposium/USA031210.pdf. 134. Ibid.

References American Red Cross. (2013). Tsunami. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.redcross.org/prepare/disaster/ tsunami. At Least 36 Killed After Indian Boat Sinks in Whirlpool. (2010). Thaindian News. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india/at-least-36-killed-after-indian-boat-sinks-in-whirlpool_ 100442672.html. Australian Emergency Management. (2002). Natural Disasters in Australia: Reforming Mitigation, Relief, and Recovery Arrangements. Retrieved February 11, 2013, from www.em.gov.au/Documents/Natural%20 Disasters%20in%20Australia%20-%20Review.pdf. Banks, E. (2005). Catastrophic Risk Management: Analysis and Management. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, p. 19. Barnes, J. (1998). Florida’s Hurricane History. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. Bea, K., Halchin, E., Hogue, H., Kaiser, F., Love, N., McCarthy, F., Reese, S., and Schwemle, B. (2006). Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes after Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

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Bhagat, S. B. (2009). Foundations of Geology. New Delhi: New Vision Publishing House, p. 532. Brodie, Rebecca. (2013). Reassessing the Health Effects of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2013/01/reassessing-health-effectsfukushima-daiichi-nuclear-accident. California Road Slides into Ocean After Landslide. (2011). BBC News. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15819302. Carden, Michael. (2010). Military Support to Mitigate Oil Spill Continues. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www. defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60040. Chernobyl Accident. (1986). World Nuclear Association. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from www.world-nuclear. org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident/#.UU8whVfyCSp. Cook, B., Miller, R., and Seager, R. (2011). Did Dust Storms Make the Dust Bowl Drought Worse? Columbia University—Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.ldeo.columbia.edu/ res/div/ocp/drought/dust_storms.shtml. Cyclone. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/cyclone. Deadliest/large-loss Fire. National Fire Protection Association. (2/12). Retrieved March 30, 2013, from www. nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=954&itemID=44745&URL=Research/Fire%20statistics/Deadliest/ large-loss%20fires. Deadliest Volcanic Eruptions. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from www.chm.bris.ac.uk/webprojects2003/silvester/Page6Famous.htm. Disaster Aftermath: The Risk of Epidemic Diseases. (2010). CBC News. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.cbc. ca/news/health/story/2008/05/16/f-health-disaster-diseases.html. Drought. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/drought. Dudley, W., and Lee, M. (1998). Tsunami! 2nd edition. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 51. Fact Sheet Earthquakes. FEMA. (2007, December). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Catalog No. 07337–7. Fact Sheet Floods. FEMA. (2007, December). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Catalog No. 07337–3. Fears, D. (2012). U.S. Runs Out of Funds to Battle Wildfires. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from http://articles. washingtonpost.com/2012-10-07/national/35500576_1_battle-wildfires-wildfire-suppression-worst-wildfire-season. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2013). Community Emergency Response Team Appendix 1-A: Hazard Lesson Plans. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/downloads/04Heat-PM-Rev2.doc. Fire Prevention and Engineering Bureau of Texas. Texas City Disaster. Retrieved March 31, 2013, from www. local1259iaff.org/report.htm. Flash Flood. (2013). U.S. Geological Survey. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://ks.water.usgs.gov/waterwatch/flood/definition.html. Florida Department of Environmental Protection. (2013). Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response and Restoration. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/. Frater, J. (2010). Ultimate Book of Bizarre Lists. Berkeley, CA: Ulysses Press, p. 52. Geist, E., Earle, P., and McCarthy, J. (2005). Could It Happen Here? Tsunamis That Have Struck U.S. Coastlines. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2005/01/fieldwork2.html. Haddow, G., and Bullock, J. (2010). The Future of Emergency Management. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann. Hail. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/hail. Hemphill, S. (2002, November 27). Peshtigo: A tornado of fire revisited. Minnesota Public Radio. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200211/27_hemphills_peshtigofire/. Hurricane Sandy: Covering the Storm. (2012). The New York Times. Retrieved February 11, 2013, from www. nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/28/nyregion/hurricane-sandy.html. Jarvie, J. (2006). Effects of deadly train crash still rumble through town. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/16/nation/na-graniteville16. Largest Hailstone in U.S. History Found. (2013). National Geographic. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/08/0804_030804_largesthailstone.html. A Look Back at the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. (2013). The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://darkroom.baltimoresun.com/2012/11/a-look-back-at-the-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/#1. May 8th: A Hail of a Day. (2012). Accuweather. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.accuweather.com/en/ weather-news/may-8th-a-hail-of-a-day/64926.

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McClure, M. (2012). Stanford Researchers Calculate Global Health Impacts of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/july/fukushima-healthimpacts-071712.html. Mt. St. Helens Eruption. (1980). 2013. San Diego State University. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from www. geology.sdsu.edu/how_volcanoes_work/Sthelens.html. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2013a). Heat: A Major Killer. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.nws.noaa.gov/os/heat/index.shtml. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2013b). Motorist Beware! Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/duststrm.htm. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2013c+). North American Drought: A Paleo Perspective. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/drought/drght_history.html. National Weather Service. (2013). Blizzard. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://w1.weather.gov/glossary/ index.php?letter=b. Oil Pollution Act of 1990—Summary. (1990, August 18). Federal Wildlife and Related Laws Handbook. Retrieved March 10, 2008. Oil Remains: The Persistence, Toxicity, and Impact of Exxon Valdez Oil. (2013). State of Alaska. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.evostc.state.ak.us/recovery/lingeringoil.cfm. Oliveira, C., Roca, A., and Goula, X. (2008). Assessing and Managing Earthquake Risk Geo-Scientific and Engineering Knowledge for Earthquake Risk Mitigation: Developments, Tools, and Techniques. Dordrecht: Springer Publishing, p. 388. Perry, C. (2010, October 12). Significant Floods in the United States during the 20th Century—USGS Measures a Century of Floods. USGS. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from http://ks.water.usgs.gov/pubs/fact-sheets/ fs.024-00.html#HDR1. PHOTOS: Blizzard 2013 Blasts Through Northeast. (2013). Fox News Insider. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://foxnewsinsider.com/2013/02/09/photos-blizzard-northeast-nemo-2013/. Reilly, J. (2013). Nine people killed as freak hailstorm rains massive boulders down on Indian villages. The Daily Mail. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2271147/Nine-peoplekilled-freak-hailstorm-rains-massive-boulders-Indian-villages.html. Ripley, A. (2008, September 15). The 1900 Galveston Hurricane. Time. Retrieved April 1, 2013, from www. time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1841442,00.html. Rosenberg, J. Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire. About.com 20th Century History. Retrieved March 30, 2013, from http://history1900s.about.com/od/1910s/p/trianglefire.htm. Royston, R. (2010, October 28). China’s dust storms raise fears of impending catastrophe. National Geographic News. Retrieved March 18, 2013, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/06/0601_chinadust.html. Shrivastava, P. (1987). Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, p. 184. Snow, M., Ford, D., and Ariosto, D. (2013, February 11). Northeast digs out after deadly blizzard. CNN News. State of Florida. (2013). Sinkholes. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/hydrology/ sinkholes/ (accessed February 12, 2013). Toxic Train, Deadly Crash. (2006). ABC News. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/ story?id=2375087&page=1#.UVuoRDdXqYo. U.S. Geological Survey. (2013). The Severity of an Earthquake. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from http://pubs. usgs.gov/gip/earthq4/severitygip.html. Veenema, Tener. (2007). Disaster Nursing and Emergency Preparedness: For Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terrorism and Other Hazards, 2nd edition. New York: Springer Publishing, p. 575. Vengerowsky, Konstantin. (2011). Chernobyl impact felt 25 years later. USA Today. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-04-26-chernobyl-anniversary-nuclear-radiation.htm. Volcano. (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Retrieved February 12, 2013, from www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/volcano. The Weather Channel. (2013). Tornadoes: Definition & Prevalence. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from www. weather.com/outlook/wxready/articles/id-54. What Is a Landslide? (2013). University of Wisconsin. Retrieved February 13, 2013, from www.geology.wisc. edu/courses/g115/projects03/emgoltz/definition.htm. Worst Natural Disasters of 2012. (2012). The Huffington Post. Retrieved April 2, 2013, from www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/worst-natural-disasters-of-2012_n_2349311.html#slide=more270588. Wright, E. (2008). Lost Explorers: Adventurers That Disappeared off the Face of the Earth. St. Leonards, NSW: Murdoch Books, p. 11.

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4 Protection of the Homeland and the Establishment of the United States Department of Homeland Security

A homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. —Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan FY 2012–2016 The objectives of this chapter are to: • Gain an understanding of the formation of the Department of Homeland Security; • Familiarize readers with many of the major threats identified by the nation; • Review the roles and missions of the major components of the Department of Homeland Security; and • Understand the organizational constructs necessary for protecting the homeland.

4.1 Introduction The security of the nation has been and will remain an essential responsibility of our government. Since the founding of the United States, the nation has faced a wide variety of threats to its independence and sovereignty. During the formalization of the governmental infrastructure, the founding fathers recognized that the survival of the United States depended on the developing and maintaining of appropriate diplomatic and military capabilities. During 1789, as a result, two of the first items of business for the new government were to create the Department of Foreign Affairs which was soon renamed the Department of State, and to review the needs for a small national military. From this humble beginning, the United States would mature into the world’s only superpower. Despite this powerful status, America is vulnerable to both man-made and natural threats. Each threat, when it evolves into an event, is unique. For example, hurricanes present challenges that force responders to adapt to demanding and often-changing situations. The ability to respond as disasters unfold is the result of years of drawing from lessons learned, improving response techniques, developing new equipment, and strengthening agency cooperation and interaction.

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4.2 The Department of Homeland Security By 2020, the Department of Homeland Security was the third largest department of the U.S. government, with a workforce of 229,000 employees and 22 components including TSA, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, FEMA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, the National Protection and Programs Directorate, and the Science and Technology Directorate. The Department was created in the shadow of the attacks of September 11, 2001; the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was authorized in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and was officially established on November 25, 2002, in response to the 2001 attacks on the United States. President George W. Bush illustrated the need for the DHS by comparing it to President Harry Truman’s proposal in the National Security Act of 1947 to significantly reorganize the United States military. President Bush stated, “America needs a single, unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future.”1 The creation of DHS proved to be a significant move by the United States. It transformed and realigned a confusing patchwork of government activities and agencies into a single department whose primary mission was to protect the nation (i.e., the “homeland”). Some of the issues addressed when creating the DHS involved considerations of the Department’s mission, which agencies would be incorporated into the Department, and how those agencies would be expected to interact with national, state, tribal, and local governments.

Figure 4.1 Seal of the Department of Homeland Security. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

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The Establishment of the U.S. DHS

Although the 2001 attacks proved to be the event that ultimately solidified the legislative support for a major reorganization of the national response community, there were at least two primary programs that preceded the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and ultimately influenced the creation of DHS: the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. During 1996, President Bill Clinton tasked the United States Department of Defense to serve as the lead agency for domestic preparedness. That same year, the United States Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act/Domestic Preparedness Program, also known as the WMD Defense Act of 1996. This Act was created under Title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104–201. It was named for the three Senators who sponsored the legislation: Senator Sam Nunn (Georgia), Senator Richard G. Lugar (Indiana), and Senator Pete V. Domenici (New Mexico). Under this legislation, the Department of Defense was tasked with identifying shortfalls in anti-terrorism initiatives and developing recommendations to respond to those shortfalls. The Department of Defense identified over 120 major cities throughout the United States that needed anti-terrorism equipment and training. Much of the initial work under this legislation concentrated on the detection and decontamination of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Because the Department of Defense had no legal authority to make grants or provide other financial assistance to local jurisdictions, the equipment program was a “loaner” initiative. Essentially, the Department of Defense “loaned” equipment to participating jurisdictions, which then became responsible for the maintenance of the equipment. The loan was based on a five-year performance cycle. At the end of the cycle, local jurisdictions would return the equipment to the Department of Defense. However, it was apparent that no one really expected the equipment to be returned. Once the five-year cycle was completed, it was anticipated that much of the equipment would be obsolete or used. Therefore, it would have no value or use to other organizations. Although the original idea for the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act was a step in the right direction, it lacked longevity because it was a difficult program for local governments to engage in, especially considering the costs of maintaining the equipment. During 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, with the endorsement and support of President Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, created the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. It was also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission in recognition of Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) and Senator Warren Rudman (R-New Hampshire). The focus of this Commission was the study of the global threat environment and its impact on the security of the United States. The Commission comprised 14 panelists consisting of seven Democrats and seven Republicans. A little over two years later, on January 31, 2001, the Commission submitted its report of 50 recommendations relative to combating terrorism in the twenty-first century. One of the recommendations was to create a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA), but this proposal was discarded. During March 2001, Texas Representative Mac Thornberry again addressed the issue and proffered legislation to create the NHSA. In a news release on March 21, 2001, Thornberry stated: Based on a recent recommendation by the bipartisan Commission on National Security/21st Century, the measure would bring together four federal agencies currently on the front lines of homeland defense—the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol. Under this legislation, FEMA would be renamed the National Homeland Security Agency.2 Introduction to Homeland Security

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Thornberry further described how the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the Institute of Information Infrastructure Protection, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, and the National Domestic Preparedness Office would also be transferred to the NHSA. Thornberry’s proposed legislation incorporated President Bush’s idea that FEMA should lead and coordinate homeland security efforts. It also integrated recommendations of the 1998 Hart-Rudman Commission. These were not new ideas. There was a provision in the WMD Defense Act of 1996 that allowed the President to transfer the lead agency responsibility, on or after October 1, 1999, from the Department of Defense. The initial concept was that FEMA would be the new agency to assume the program from the Department of Defense. However, there was little interest at the time in FEMA assuming a terrorism-focused program because their primary mission focused on natural disaster planning and response. In 2000, the President transferred the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program to the Department of Justice. With respect to both state and local governments, Attorney General Janet Reno realized the need for such a program to collaboratively address the response to the emerging threat of fundamentalist terrorism.

4.3 The Department of Homeland Security The Department of Homeland Security emerged from the ashes of September 11, 2001, and redefined itself after Hurricane Katrina; it became a major component of a national effort to respond to the evolving global dynamics of the post–Cold War period. The world would face a new and very sinister threat: the threat of global terrorism. This threat targeted the United States and changed the roles of the first response community in America. President George W. Bush proposed the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security. Bush stated, “America needs a single, unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future” (para. 31). The White House Office of Homeland Security was created on October 8, 2001, with Congress passing legislation mandating the Department of Homeland Security on November 19, 2002. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (Homeland Security Council, 2007). This mission statement was developed early in the evolution of the Department of Homeland Security. It has caused concern throughout the history of the department in that it seems to limit the scope of the mission of homeland security. It particularly causes policy questions to arise when discussing natural disasters and manmade incidents such as acts of terrorism, incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, or any other event that incites national distress. In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the mission statement reflected the “mood” of the country, with a focus on terrorists, acts of terrorism, and what direction America should take in the anti-terrorism preparedness role. The country and its leadership, in a natural reaction to the attacks, were not focused on natural hazards. The Department became operational on January 24, 2003, with most component agencies merging on March 1, 2003. The Department of Homeland Security incorporates 22 governmental agencies. Some of those agencies are the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Transportation Security Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Border Patrol, along with 16 other agencies. 98

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This reorganization was the largest one of the federal government since the U.S. Department of Defense was created in 1947. As stated by the President, “The mission of the Office will be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks” (Homeland Security Council, 2007). The Department of Homeland Security is led by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The former Governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, was named by the President to direct the Office, beginning his duties on October 8, 2001. Ridge resigned on November 30, 2004. The second Secretary was Michael Chertoff, beginning February 15, 2005. According to a report from the Department of Homeland Security, in 2007, the Department had 208,000 employees. Its budget for 2009 was $53 million. This makes the Department of Homeland Security the third-largest Cabinet-level agency within the government. The Department has many undersecretaries, assistant undersecretaries, administrators and directors. All the directorates, programs, and personnel ultimately report to the Office of the Secretary. In the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013, the language seems to address mission statement concerns. Secretary Chertoff outlines four operational objectives: 1) Clarifying, defining, and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels; 2) Strengthening accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse; 3) Consolidating efforts to integrate the Department’s critical mission of preparedness; and 4) Enhancing our capabilities to respond to major disasters and emergencies including catastrophic events, particularly in terms of situational assessment and awareness, emergency communications, evacuations, search and rescue, logistics, and mass care and sheltering (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The fourth objective seems to be making a subtle shift to the natural hazards environment. As the first phase of the development of the Department of Homeland Security was directed by the administration of President George W. Bush, the second phase under President Barack Obama witnessed a further evolution of the agency. During the early phases of the Obama administration, Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano was appointed Director of the Department of Homeland Security, replacing Michael Chertoff. Secretary Napolitano initiated a review and evaluation of each function within the Department. Under the administration of President Obama, the Department of Homeland Security continued to evolve. By 2010, significant attention had been directed toward transportation and border security, responding to threats much broader than terrorism. Violence and unrest in Mexico, combined with poverty in Central America, are issues that have fueled illegal immigration and violence along the nation’s southwest border. As a response, the Department of Homeland Security strengthened enforcement and intervention efforts on the southwest border to disrupt the drug, cash, and weapon smuggling that fuels cartel violence in Mexico by adding manpower and technology to the southwest border. Some of the programs included under the Department of Homeland Security include the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a program intended to help increase the security of containerized cargo shipped to the United States from around the world; the National Fugitive Operations Program, to enhance the apprehension and deportation of fugitive aliens from the United States, especially those who have been convicted of crimes; and Operation Community Shield, a nationwide initiative that targets violent transnational street gangs by partnering with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies at all levels and making use of its authority to deport criminal aliens. Clearly, the role of the Department of Homeland Security continues to evolve. Introduction to Homeland Security

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4.4 Federal Actions and Assistance in Disaster Response and Recovery The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidates the federal government’s emergency response capabilities under the Department of Homeland Security. With respect to emergency management and response, the Homeland Security Act directs the Secretary to, among other things, coordinate the federal government’s response to both natural and man-made disasters, including terrorist attacks, that occur within the United States; develop and implement a comprehensive national incident management system that enables federal, state, and local governments to efficiently coordinate the mobilization of resources during emergency response; and consolidate the existing emergency response plans of individual federal agencies into a single, comprehensive national response plan. The Homeland Security Act also provides that FEMA shall remain the lead agency in federal disaster response, including in the development and implementation of the national response plan; planning is a multi-level function. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (“Stafford Act”) sets forth the statutory framework governing presidential declarations of “emergencies” and “major disasters” and the extent to which federal resources may be utilized pursuant to such declarations. The President may declare a “major disaster” in response to a request for assistance from a state governor, certifying that circumstances within the governor’s state are “of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary.” The President also may declare an “emergency” in response to such a request, but only if the request is supported by an additional finding that federal emergency assistance is required to “save lives and to protect property, public health and safety, or to lessen the treat of a disaster.” The President may also declare an “emergency” without a request from a state governor in circumstances that involve “a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority.” Under these circumstances, the regional director of FEMA must initiate the request. Immediately following a declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the President must appoint a federal coordinating officer to the affected area. That officer is required to “make an initial appraisal of the types of relief most urgently needed,” set up a field office, coordinate relief in the region, and assist the local citizens and officials in obtaining federal assistance. The President must also form emergency support teams of federal personnel that may be deployed to the affected area to assist the federal coordinating officer. In each case, the FEMA Associate Director determines the particular types of federal relief that will be provided to the affected region. Once the President properly declares the existence of a major disaster or an emergency, and depending on the type of declaration, he may, among other things, direct any federal agency to utilize the resources and authorities granted to it by federal law (including personnel; equipment; supplies; facilities; and managerial, technical, and advisory services) to support state and local relief efforts; coordinate all disaster relief assistance provided by federal agencies, private organizations, and state and local governments; provide technical and advisory assistance for (i) performance of essential community services, (ii) the issuance of warnings of risks and hazards, (iii) dissemination of public health and safety information, (iv) provision of health and safety measures, and (v) management, control, and reduction of immediate threats to health and public safety; assist in the distribution of medicine, food, and other supplies; utilize, lend, or donate federal equipment, supplies, facilities, personnel and other resources (only if necessary to meet immediate threats to life and property); distribute medicine, food, and other consumable supplies (only if necessary to meet immediate threats to life and property); and 100

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perform any work or services essential to saving lives and protecting and preserving property, health and safety, including debris removal; search and rescue; emergency medical care; emergency shelter; clearance of roads; provision of facilities for schools and other community services; demolition of unsafe structures; warning of risks and hazards; provision of technical advice; and reduction of immediate threats to life, property and public health and safety. In addition to authorizing the President to utilize federal resources upon the declaration of an emergency or major disaster, the Stafford Act authorizes the President, upon the request of a state governor, to utilize Department of Defense (DOD) resources to perform emergency work that is essential to the preservation of life and property. Use of DOD resources pursuant to this grant of authority must take place “during the immediate aftermath” of an incident that may ultimately trigger federal assistance and may not exceed ten days. All these federal resources are intended to assist local recovery efforts.

4.5 Homeland Security Goals During the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the first National Strategy for Homeland Security contained the following goals (McElreath et al., 2014): • Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; • Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and • Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The five years between 2002 and 2007 witnessed changes in the definition and goals of homeland security. Although terrorism was still a major issue, several other issues also began to take precedence, including natural disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; border problems, including smuggling and illegal immigration; increased violence along the border; and diverse concerns such as pandemics and the security of the nation’s food supply. The nation’s awareness level was heightened, and it became blatantly obvious that threats to the security of the United States could be both natural and man-made. This realization and recognition have been pivotal in the continual evolution of the Department of Homeland Security. Thus, the United States has the enormous responsibility of preparedness as it relates to natural and man-made incidents and disasters. This mission is now an all-hazards mission. During 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). The purpose of this directive is to “establish policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal” (para. 2). By 2007, the 2002 goals of the Department of Homeland Security had evolved to reflect a much broader definition of threats (Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 1): • Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; • Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; • Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and • Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success. The term “all hazards” has been the traditional language used to communicate the idea that the preparedness would encompass natural and man-made hazards. The phrase appears frequently in training materials and guidelines published by the Department of Introduction to Homeland Security

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Homeland Security. For some reason, the phrase has not found its way into the formal mission statement of the Department of Homeland Security, but it is the planning concept used by state, local, and tribal governments. Further, within the 2008 Strategic Plan, the mission states, We will lead the unified effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will secure our national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 3) The phrase, “respond to threats and hazards to the Nation” indicates a subtle policy shift that is necessitated by politics and practice.

4.6 Significant Homeland Security Presidential Directives The White House announced Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) on February 28, 2003. The purpose of HSPD-5 was to manage domestic incidents as duly noted in the first paragraph of HSPD-5: “[The purpose is] to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system.” The directive further states that The Secretary [of DHS] will also provide assistance to State and local governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities including those of greatest importance to the security of the United States, and will ensure that State, local and Federal plans are compatible.3 HSPD-8 was announced by the White House on December 17, 2003. The purpose of HSPD-8 is national preparedness. Paragraph 1 of the directive describes how policies are established that strive to bolster the ability of the United States to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and all other emergencies. The directive states that this will be accomplished through “requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, state and local entities.”4 Paragraph 2a of this directive further describes the meaning of the term “all-hazards preparedness” and explains that “all-hazards preparedness refers to preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.” It was later decided that there were some additions that needed to be made to the original HSPD-8 in order to foster its effectiveness. An important addition to the directive included establishing a “standard and comprehensive approach” to any and all national planning and preparedness, while also providing direction on how to comply with the Homeland Security Management System of the National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2007.5 Key terms to be extracted from HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 are: • All-hazards plans and capabilities; • Ensure plans are compatible; • All-hazards preparedness goal; 102

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• All-hazards preparedness refers to . . . domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies; and • Formally establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. There were 21 Homeland Security Presidential Directives issued as of January 2009. This text examines two of these directives that were published during 2003. The language in these directives might cause one to conclude that a comprehensive planning model exists. Supposedly, between 2001 and 2006, the Department of Homeland Security met the preparedness goal by reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing, from a measurable perspective, the capabilities of the first responders. However, research indicates otherwise. The American Disaster Preparedness Foundation Inc., in its 2006 study of 30 top metropolitan areas, cited this finding: Overall results from the study indicate a poor prognosis for future disaster response efforts unless actions are taken to make significant improvements in emergency planning. Preparedness in at least half of all major metropolitan areas was rated worse than a C while the highest ranked city, Phoenix, received only a B+ to its position at the top of the list.6 Local officials may give little attention to the planning model chosen for preparedness planning. Conversely, they may give an inordinate amount of attention to the end product, especially the funding model. Risk analysis identifies gaps in capabilities. Funding is required to build, enhance, and sustain capabilities. Planning is the tool designed to guide the execution process that includes a funding model.

4.7 Funding and Vision Homeland security is expensive. Within the Department of Homeland Security, the annual fiscal year budgets range into the billions of dollars. However, such expenditures did not occur until after the events of 9/11. Over the course of the 1990s, the nation witnessed a sudden increase in Homeland Security funding. During 1996, an earmark of $5 million was included in the Department of Justice’s budget to develop and deliver training among metropolitan fire departments in an effort to improve their responses to chemical weapons and other terrorism threats. Realizing that this was not a program typically found in the Department of Defense, a decision was made to ask the Office of Justice Program’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to administer it. The BJA section that was assigned this responsibility was headed by Director Butch Straub and Deputy Director Andrew (Andy) Mitchell. The program was designed to develop a training course for urban fire departments to enhance their response capabilities. According to Mitchell, the legislation necessitated the Attorney General and the Administrator of Federal Emergency Management to coordinate the program with BJA, which developed training in conjunction with the National Fire Academy. During this same time, the Department of Justice programs received additional funding for a modest locality equipment program and the establishment of two national training centers to train state and local personnel to respond to terrorist incidents domestically. Since the 1990s, various programs and ideas were integrated to represent a common direction and vision for the twenty-first century. The ultimate goals were to preserve peace and to ensure security within the nation. These programs, working with state, tribal, and local governments, were eventually administered through DHS. Since the founding of DHS, billions were spent on key national security priorities, ranging from border control to cyber security. Typically, Introduction to Homeland Security

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funding priorities included initiatives involving safeguarding the transportation systems of the nation, cyber security research and development, border security and immigration services, and state homeland security activities. During modern times, federal monies were allocated not only for such DHS endeavors but also emerging ones across a variety of government entities that involve some aspect of homeland security. For instance, the creation of the U.S. Space Force and efforts addressing the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic necessitated funding allocations.

4.7.1 Safeguarding the Nation’s Transportation Systems Homeland security budgets have funded key investments to reinforce public transportation, enhance maritime transportation, and accelerate the deployment of explosives detection equipment to improve airline security. Within DHS is the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Formed shortly after the attacks of 9/11, the Transportation Security Administration employs approximately 50,000 people. It oversees security for highways, railroads, buses, mass transit systems, ports, and over 450 U.S. airports, where approximately 48,000 Transportation Security Officers screen approximately 2 million people a day. Within its homeland security budgets, funding has been provided for a variety of purposes. Examples included visual intermodal prevention and response (VIPR) teams, as components of the TSA, to increase additional risk-based force protection capability by deploying resources to transit hubs. Funding supported integrated planning. Funding was also allocated to the Department of Transportation to modernize the intermodal freight infrastructure by developing a coastal link that would connect inland ports to highway and rail networks. Additional funding supported critical investments to strengthen the security of U.S. airports and to add bomb appraisal officers who specialized in explosives and improvised explosive device (IED)

Figure 4.2 Seal of the Transportation Security Administration. (Source: U.S. Transportation Security Administration)

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recognition and response. The budget also included money for modernizing the infrastructure used to screen travelers and workers.

4.7.2 Enhancing Cyber Security and Technology R&D Homeland security also necessitates much funding toward the virtual world. Threats exist within cyber environments just as they do in physical reality. Monies were allocated and used for a variety of purposes. For instance, funding was used for supporting the development of capabilities to prevent, prepare for, and respond to incidents that could degrade or overwhelm the nation’s critical information technology infrastructure and key cyber networks. Funds were purposed for identifying and reducing vulnerabilities, mitigating threats, and ensuring that cyber intrusions and disruptions caused minimal damage to public and private sector networks. Funding was necessary for enhancing cyber security coordination capabilities across the federal government, including mission integration, collaboration and coordination, situational awareness and cyber incident response, analysis and reporting, knowledge management, and technology development and management. Funding is necessary for enhancing the resiliency and security of private and public sector cyber infrastructures. These funds supported the base operations of the National Cyber Security Division as well as initiatives under the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative to protect information networks. Funding supported ongoing projects to improve surveillance technologies involving the detection of enhanced, emerging, and advanced biological threats. Efforts to develop next-generation BioWatch sensors that could detect bioattacks at the earliest possible instant were also funded. The budget also supported the termination of outdated systems, such as the terrestrial-based, long-range radio-navigation (Loran-C), operated by United States Coast Guard. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) bolsters the ability of the United States to protect its technological infrastructure. Money is also used by the U.S. Cyber Command to ensure military readiness concerning cyberspace operations and a “full range of cyber contingencies.”7 The provisions of the NDAA facilitate communication between the public and private sectors, including the reporting of any security penetrations that occur among the computer networks of defense contractors.8 The reporting of such incidents must include the techniques and methods used during the penetration, samples of any malicious software program code that were obtained, and the assessment of any “potentially compromised” information.9 Ensuring the security of the American nation cannot be accomplished solely through government interventions and activities. Instead, collaborative partnerships between the public and private sectors must exist. During the last two decades, the federal government has failed to keep pace with challenges to critical infrastructures, including technological infrastructures and technological research environments. Threats that endanger such entities may arise internally or externally. Protecting and safeguarding against them necessitates the sharing of information, cooperative efforts, and strong leadership between private sector executives and the leaders of various levels and forms of government administration. Some experts argue that one of the most damaging security threats in recent years concerned the release of classified materials on the Wikileaks website. The release of this classified information into the public domain necessitated a review of security policies, processes, and procedures that were associated with the handling of such materials.10 The outcome of this review mandated changes regarding the “oversight structure” and the implementation of stringent policies to strengthen the integrity of technological security.11 It also mandated the forming of a “classified information sharing and safeguarding office” that provided a Introduction to Homeland Security

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continuous emphasis regarding the “sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information.”12 Although these security improvements enhance internal security paradigms, the scopes and varieties of external threats are also considerable. Cooperation between government and private entities is also a necessary aspect of technological security. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) embraces such partnerships to exhibit a “whole-of-government cyber security strategy.”13 These partnerships involve the participation of both government entities and the defense industrial base. Entities within the defense industrial base include organizations that provide “defense technologies, weapons systems, policy and strategy development, and personnel.”14 When partnering with the DOD, organizations may voluntarily share information regarding “malicious or unauthorized cyber activity and protective cyber security measures.”15 Such collaboration involves trust and communication and may involve the use of incentives to motivate private entities to participate and cooperate with the DOD.16 In any case, the purpose of such external collaboration is to improve cyber security and to “further the public good.”17 Cyber security encompasses an astounding array of different components. For example, securing and maintaining the electrical power grid is absolutely essential, and the grid is monitored and controlled by a variety of different computer networks. Ensuring the safety of these networks involves protecting “privately owned corporate computer networks” against threats of “potentially intrusive” activities.18 Although these networks are the property of private corporations and electric cooperatives, they provide electricity to the entire nation. Therefore, their protection and security are of paramount importance within the context of homeland security. Threats against American cyber security must be taken seriously—destroying any aspect of the technological infrastructure may produce cataclysmic cascading effects throughout the nation. The potential of a massive cyber attack against the United States could impede or terminate functions of the “country’s banking system, power grid, and other essential infrastructure,” including the transportation system.19 Because of American vulnerability within its technological infrastructure, great concern is expressed regarding the potential of a cyber attack whose outcomes may rival the effects of September 11, 2001.20 Both domestically and around the world, other events signal the potential of such a calamity. Various cyber attacks have targeted the American banking system, including “Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America.”21 A Saudi corporation, Saudi Aramco, experienced a devastating cyber attack that “erased data on two-thirds” of its “corporate PCs.”22 Another threatening scenario could involve collaboration between nation-states and factions of organized crime to attack American technological infrastructure. Such an attack could involve “a country like Iran working with Russian criminals or Chinese hackers to target banks, the power grid, and all the computers that control routing and ticketing for planes and trains.”23 This type of scenario would halt economic, electrical, and logistics functions within the American economy. Regarding such potential scenarios, the pertinent question is not whether it will happen, but when it will occur because “it is only a matter of time before the sophisticated tools needed fall into the wrong hands.”24 Although such scenarios may be unimaginable to some, the potential for such dangers must be neither discounted nor ignored. Collaboration between the government and private entities is essential to safeguard technological infrastructure. Sharing data regarding suspicious activities is mutually beneficial and may prevent or mitigate the effects of cyber threats. Collaboration between public and private entities also improves the ability to perform risk assessment and to mitigate the consequences of cyber threats. Through collaboration, government and private entities become complements whose mutual goal is the preservation of technological infrastructure. 106

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4.7.3 Strengthening Border Security and Immigration Services The United States shares national borders with the nations of Canada and Mexico. The expansiveness of these borders provides unique challenges and dangers regarding homeland security functions. The preceding chapters of this textbook highlighted the dangers that are presented by the physical borders of the nation. However, it must be noted that borders are not necessarily defined geographically. Instead, borders exist in airports and seaports through which many travelers arrive via aircraft and ships. Regardless of whether a national border is tangible or intangible, it must be secured. Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security performs a myriad of functions involving border security. This section describes the functions associated with border security and border management. The contents of the following sections, unless otherwise noted, were obtained from the Department of Homeland Security. The United States has attracted immigrants since its earliest days. Immigrants in search of freedom, escaping oppression, or just seeking a better life for themselves and their families have been drawn to our nation’s shores. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, security concerns, including concerns related to terrorism, drug trafficking and its related violence, led to a reevaluation of national policies related to immigration. Budget funding has included millions for the expansion of border security. An amount of $4 billion for Customs and Border Protection funded support for the 20,000 Border Patrol agents protecting nearly 6,000 miles of United States borders. An amount of $112 million was provided for E-Verify, an electronic employment eligibility verification system, which helps employers comply with immigration law and ensures that American jobs are available to U.S. citizens and those authorized to work in the United States. The budget also supported strengthening the delivery of immigration services by streamlining and modernizing immigration application processes. Budgets have accommodated approximately billions toward net discretionary funding.25 Such monies were used for Border Patrol agents, CBP personnel, and surveillance resources along the U.S.-Mexican border.26 It also requested funding to recapitalize assets of the U.S. Coast Guard, including the renovation and restoration of some of its shore facilities.27 The budget request also included funding for the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and policies.28 Such enforcement involves addressing the needs of changing demographics and for better identification and removal of illegal aliens.29 It also provides funding for the expansion of the E-Verify system, for the enforcement of other workplace employment laws regarding monitoring and compliance, and for the prosecution of employers who violate legal hiring practices.30 Regardless of the amount of money expended toward protecting the American borders, whether land, sea, air, or virtual, from external threats, one cannot ignore the dangers that arise domestically. In some cases, threats originate within the agencies that are entrusted to protect society. Thus, variations of corruption and transgression of the principal-agency agreement have occurred, in which those responsible for protecting the nation were compromised. Over time, approximately 150 border and immigration agents were either arrested or indicted for criminal offenses involving direct corruption charges of drug and human smuggling.31 Some of the corruption may have been associated with shortcomings in the applicant screening process and the monitoring of agents after hiring.32 In some cases, the Office of Internal Affairs of the CBP failed to maintain and track the results of polygraph examinations, drug testing, and background checks.33 Approximately 2,170 agents were arrested for offenses that were not directly related to corruption, such as domestic violence and driving while intoxicated.34 Also, approximately 900 corruption allegations originated from both ICE and CBP.35 Introduction to Homeland Security

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Ensuring the safety and the security of the American borders is an essential aspect of homeland and national security. Employing personnel who exhibit the highest caliber of integrity and personal conduct is critical in fulfilling the homeland security objectives and the goal of border security. Any instance of human corruption among the ranks of those whose duties and responsibilities are to protect American society imperils the nation. For example, terrorist organizations that collaborate with Mexican organized crime, such as Hezbollah, working in conjunction with a corrupt American border agent, could catastrophically endanger the United States.36 Other border threats are not always visible. In many cases, criminal organizations expend much time, money, and resources creating tunnels beneath the U.S.-Mexican border through which humans and illegal items are trafficked and transported. Since 2008, over 70 tunnels have been discovered underneath the U.S.-Mexican border.37 These tunnels circumvent the stringent security exhibited by the “heightened enforcement” of laws “on land” along the U.S.Mexican border.38 During recent years, these tunnels have demonstrated an increased level of sophistication and design. For example, during 2011, a 600-yard tunnel was discovered underneath the U.S.-Mexican border that resulted in the seizure of approximately “32 tons of marijuana,” representing one of the largest “pot busts in U.S. history.”39 This tunnel contained ventilation and lighting systems and also incorporated “electric rail cars.”40 Generally, such tunnels are used for the trafficking of illegal narcotics. However, these tunnels could also act as entry routes for terrorists or other entities whose goals are to harm Americans. Ensuring the integrity of the sea, land, air, and virtual borders of the United States is imperative within the context of homeland security. However, safeguarding the United States-Mexican border is rife with fallibility and imperfection. Approximately 61% of probable illegal aliens

Figure 4.3 P-3 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft are utilized primarily for long-range patrols along the entire U.S. border and in source and transit zone countries throughout Central and South America. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

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Figure 4.4 Predator B unmanned aircraft system. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

are intercepted along the U.S.-Mexican border, regardless of manpower strength used to bolster border security.41 Along the border, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine (OAM) operates the Predator B unmanned aircraft system (UAS) in support of law enforcement and homeland security missions. The system also supports the disaster relief efforts of its Department of Homeland Security partners, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard. Few methods exist by which the effectiveness of border security initiatives may be identified and judged.42 Baseline concepts for new practices and methods are currently being considered.43 Regardless, ensuring border security is inarguably a critical aspect of protecting American society.

4.7.4 Supporting State Homeland Security Activities The budget was also tasked with making the federal government a better partner to states and localities regarding key homeland security initiatives. Funding was provided to improve coordination between all levels of government, to support first responders, and to create more effective emergency response plans. A risk-based national exercise program provided assistance to state, local, and tribal partners with respect to offsetting costs of critical homeland security activities. The budget further expanded medical surge capacity and aided in the stockpiling and storing of essential supplies. Funding of $260 million from the existing Homeland Security Grant program fortified intelligence systems by improving information sharing and analysis through the addition of state and local intelligence analysts.

4.8 The Organizational Structure and Mission of the Department of Homeland Security Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush announced the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, whose mission was to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The former governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, was named the first head of this organization on October 8, 2001. Under the direction of Governor Ridge, the Office of Homeland Security took early, critical steps in the development of an identity that would eventually evolve into the United States Department of Homeland Security and Cabinet-level status within the executive branch of the United States government. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 4.5 Washington, D.C., March 6, 2008. President Bush speaks with employees at the fifth-year commemoration of DHS. (Source: FEMA. Photo by Barry Bahler)

Figure 4.6 Secretary Thomas Ridge (2003–2005). (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

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During the short history of the Department of Homeland Security, it has been led by some extremely capable secretaries. The aforementioned Governor Ridge is generally credited with providing solid leadership and vision during the early days of the agency. Ridge worked with more than 180,000 employees from combined agencies to strengthen the borders, provide for intelligence analysis and infrastructure protection, improve the use of science and technology to counter weapons of mass destruction, and create a comprehensive response and recovery division. Upon the resignation of Governor Ridge in November 2004, Judge Michael Chertoff accepted the position of Secretary of Homeland Security. On February 15, 2005, Judge Chertoff was unanimously confirmed by the Senate and sworn in as the second Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Chertoff stepped down as Secretary in January 2009. Under the leadership of Judge Chertoff, the agency experienced great growth. Upon assuming office in January 2009, President Obama selected Governor Janet Napolitano of Arizona as the third Secretary of Homeland Security. Prior to joining the Obama administration, Napolitano was midway through her second term as governor of the state of Arizona. Napolitano’s homeland security background is extensive. As a U.S. attorney, she helped lead the domestic terrorism investigation into the Oklahoma City bombing. As Arizona attorney general, she helped write laws to break up human smuggling rings. As governor, she implemented one of the first state homeland security strategies in the nation, opened the first state counterterrorism center, and spearheaded efforts to transform immigration enforcement. The Department of Homeland Security incorporates 22 governmental agencies. Some of those agencies are the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Transportation Security Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and 16 other agencies. From its humble beginning within the Department of Defense, by 2007, the Department of Homeland Security had approximately 208,000 employees. This growth and level of funding makes the Department of Homeland Security the third largest Cabinet-level agency within the government. By 2005, the mission of the Department of Homeland Security was stated to be “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” This mission statement has caused concern because it seems to limit the scope of the mission of homeland security with respect to a limited policy focus upon terrorism. During the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the mission statement reflected the “mood” of the country. It involved a focus on terrorists, acts of terrorism, and the direction Americans should take in the anti-terrorism preparedness role. The country and its leadership, in a natural reaction to the attacks, were unfocused on the threats of natural hazards. During 2005, Hurricane Katrina decimated the Gulf Coast, and the proverbial pendulum swung back to addressing natural hazards. The Department of Homeland Security’s mission statement posed a challenge because it did not incorporate these natural hazards. Again, the policy and mission statements of the Department of Homeland Security were reviewed and revised. This review was critical, if for no other reason than the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is expected to perform a vital function under the supervision of the Department of Homeland Security. It became an obvious concern, in the post-Katrina environment, when many felt that FEMA had failed in its mission. This scenario led to the passage of legislation called the Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 4.7 Secretary Michael Chertoff (2005–2009). (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Post-Katrina Act necessitated another major reorganization within the Department of Homeland Security. The nation was seven years into the reorganization that created the United States Department of Homeland Security. The department went through major restructuring following Hurricane Katrina with the Post-Katrina Act of 2006. The debate continues regarding whether FEMA should be in the Department of Homeland Security or should be returned to independent status. The funding appropriations and allocations are part of the homeland security debate. Some believe that funding for homeland security will “dry up.” Others take the position that some programs will be decreased whereas others will increase. However, it is agreed that local governments must be prepared to sustain projects that have been funded through the homeland security grant programs. The United States Congress consistently asks: How prepared are we? Unfortunately, the country has not developed a method for measuring preparedness. Others ask if the nation is better off and more prepared now than it was before September 11, 2001. These questions can be answered, but not everyone agrees on the answers. There are definite certainties regarding homeland security. The country will experience other hurricanes. There will be earthquakes. Other natural disasters will occur. Many believe the nation will be struck by terrorist attacks again. The threats of natural disasters and man-made incidents exist. The response landscape has changed dramatically since the attacks of 9/11. National preparedness is a permanent part of the response environment. The Department of Homeland Security has outlined four mission areas that define the goal of preparedness: prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Each of the respective response 112

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Figure 4.8 Secretary Janet Napolitano (2009–2013). (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

Figure 4.9 Secretary Jeh Johnson. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

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disciplines has responsibilities that support at least one of those mission areas. Federal, state, local, and tribal partnerships collaborate to secure America by supporting those four mission areas. With the transition from the administration of President George W. Bush to that of President Barack Obama, the national strategy for securing the homeland against twenty-first century threats was reviewed and refocused. Modern strategy targets the prevention of terrorist attacks against the homeland, preparing and planning for emergencies, and investing in strong response and recovery capabilities. It was the intent of President Obama to strengthen the U.S. homeland against all hazards, including natural or accidental disasters and terrorist threats, and to ensure that the federal government works with states, localities, and the private sector as a partner in prevention, mitigation, and response. The results of the efforts of the Obama administration in the areas of homeland security and emergency management were, at best, mixed. Frustration in relationship to understanding and implementing clear and workable policies addressing immigration, border security, drug trafficking, and terrorism led to confusion on all levels of government. The 2016 election of President Donald Trump opened a new chapter in both homeland security and emergency management. In 2017, President Trump appointed John F. Kelly Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Secretary Kelly was born and raised in Boston, Massachusetts. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1970 and was discharged as a sergeant in 1972, after serving in an infantry company with the 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Following graduation from the University of Massachusetts in 1976, he was commissioned an officer in the Marines. He resigned from his position as Secretary of Homeland Security in 2017 to become Chief of Staff to President Trump. Kirstjen Michele Nielsen was sworn in on December 6, 2017, as the sixth Secretary of Homeland Security and served until April 10, 2019. She had previously served as White House Deputy Chief of Staff. Secretary Nielsen joined the Trump administration in January 2017 as Chief of Staff to then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly. In that position, she was responsible for advising the Secretary on all operational, policy, and legal matters, including counterterrorism, cyber security, and border security. She resigned her position in 2019. On November 13, 2019, Chad F. Wolf was designated the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security by President Trump and was also confirmed as the first Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY). Previously, he served as the Acting Undersecretary. During his tenure, Mr. Wolf made significant progress to strengthen U.S. border security, address the humanitarian crisis on the U.S. Southwest border, and improve the integrity of the U.S. immigration system. The highlights of the current efforts of the nation under the Trump administration to strengthen its security include the defeat of terrorism worldwide. This goal includes the following efforts: • Emphasize the enforcement of existing laws related to homeland and domestic security; • Find, disrupt, and destroy ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other international threat groups; • Develop and apply new capabilities to defeat extremists terrorists with the more effective use of international partners and alliances; 114

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Figure 4.10 Secretary John F. Kelly. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

Figure 4.11 Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, who succeeded John Kelly upon his appointment as White House Chief of Staff. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

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• Prepare the United States military to meet twenty-first century threats while strengthening the capabilities of our nation’s allies to play a greater role in responding to and combating these threats, including assuming a greater responsibility for defense funding; • Engage in the cyber theater of the conflict, in both the military and civilian arenas; • Win the battle of ideas by returning to an American foreign policy that is consistent with America’s traditional values; • Work with moderates within the Islamic world to counter ISIS, al-Qaeda and other threat groups’ influence; and • Enhance American influence and capability internationally. With respect to the prevention of nuclear terrorism, homeland security efforts include the following activities: • Focus on securing nuclear weapons materials and ending nuclear smuggling; • Strengthen policing and interdiction efforts: convene summits on preventing nuclear terrorism; • Eliminate Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs through diplomacy; • Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); • Control fissile materials and prevent nuclear fuel from becoming nuclear weapons; and • Set the goal of a nuclear-free world and seek reductions in international nuclear stockpiles. Within the area of the strengthening of American bio-security, the following activities are mandated: • Prevent bio-terror attacks; • Increase capacity to mitigate the consequences of bio-terror attacks; • Accelerate the development and production capabilities of new medicines and vaccines; and • Lead an international effort to diminish impact of major infectious disease epidemics. The role and function of the DHS are daunting and massive. Although the organization is experiencing its formative years, it provides valuable services to protect American society and interests from threats that impact national security. During its short history, the organization has experienced a variety of “growing pains” through organizational restructuring and resizing. However, given enough time, many believe that the DHS will mature as it serves the needs of America in dynamic environments that threaten U.S. tranquility.

4.9 Department of Homeland Security Organizational Structuring and Components The modern version of the Department of Homeland Security comprises a myriad of government agencies. Three primary factions form the basis of the Department of Homeland Security: 1) departmental components; 2) Office of the Secretary; and 3) various advisory panels and committees. The departmental components represent the primary factions that implement the functions of homeland security. The Office of the Secretary provides the functions of leadership. The various advisory panels and committees provide research and advice regarding homeland security issues. The following sections of this chapter provide a brief synopsis of each entity and its primary components. 116

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U.S. Customs & Border Protection

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office

U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services

Office of Partnership & Engagement

Chief Financial Officer

Science & Technology Directorate

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Office of Intelligence & Analysis

Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

U.S. Coast Guard

Office of Operations Coordination

Office of the General Counsel

Office of Legislative Affairs

Military Advisor

Executive Secretary

U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement

Office of Citizenship & Immigration Services Ombudsman

Chief of Staff

(Source: Department of Homeland Security)

Figure 4.12 Department of Homeland Security organizational structure, as of December 2019.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers

Chief Information Officer

Management Directorate

Deputy Secretary

Secretary

U.S. Secret Service

Privacy Office

Office of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Transportation Security Administration

Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties

Office of Inspector General

The following entities comprise the departmental components of the Department of Homeland Security: • Directorate for National Protection and Programs; • Directorate for Science and Technology; • Directorate for Management; • Office of Policy; • Office of Health Affairs; • Office of Intelligence and Analysis; • Office of Operations Coordination and Planning; • Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; • Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; • Transportation Security Administration (TSA); • United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP); • United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; • United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); • United States Coast Guard; • Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and • United States Secret Service. The previous list consists of a variety of agencies that are responsible for providing a myriad of functions within the context of homeland security. These responsibilities and functions range from military to health-related fields. Regardless, each function is a critical component of facilitating the security of the American nation and its society. Unless otherwise noted, the primary source of information for each of these sections is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.44

4.9.1 Directorate for National Protection and Programs According to the DHS, the Directorate for National Protection and Programs (DNPP) “works to advance the Department’s risk-reduction mission, and reducing risk requires an integrated approach that encompasses both physical and virtual threats and their associated human elements.” Reducing risk requires an integrated approach that encompasses both physical and virtual threats and their associated human elements. The DNPP comprises the following components:

1. Federal Protective Service (FPS); 2. Office of Cyber Security and Communications (CS&C); 3. Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP); 4. Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA); and 5. US-VISIT.

The FPS “provides integrated security and law enforcement services to federally owned and leased buildings, facilities, properties, and other assets,” and the FPS is a federal law enforcement entity. The CS&C is tasked with “assuring the security, resiliency, and reliability of the nation’s cyber and communications infrastructure.”45 The IP is tasked with the “coordinated national effort to reduce risk to our critical infrastructures and key resources (CIKR) posed by acts of terrorism.” Therefore, this agency “increases the nation’s level of preparedness and the ability to respond and quickly recover in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.” The RMA is the departmental “Executive Agent for national risk management 118

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and analysis.” The US-VISIT implements the use of “innovative biometrics-based technological solutions—digital fingerprints and photographs—to provide decision-makers with accurate information” expediently when necessary.46

4.9.2 Directorate for Science and Technology The Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T) is the primary research and development entity within the Department of Homeland Security. According to the DHS, “it provides federal, state, and local officials with the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland.” Its mission improves “homeland security by providing to customers state-of-the-art technology that helps them achieve their missions. S&T customers include the operating components of the Department, and state, local, tribal and territorial emergency responders and officials.” The S&T comprises three portfolios, six divisions, and eight offices and institutes. The following entities comprise the portfolios of the S&T entity:47 • The Director of Research Portfolio involves strategic research needs, supporting the Department of Homeland Security mission, and providing America with a robust homeland security capability. The Research Portfolio contains the Office of National Laboratories, the Office of University Programs, and the Program Executive Office— Counter Improvised Explosives Devices. • The Director of Innovation/Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) Portfolio “focuses on homeland security research and development that could lead to significant breakthroughs and greatly enhance departmental operations.” • The Director of Transition Portfolio (DTP) focuses on delivering capabilities that satisfy the operational requirements of “Department components and first responders.” The DTP includes the Commercialization Office, the Safety Act Office, the Long Range Broad Agency Announcement Program, and the Technology Transfer Program.48 The following entities comprise the divisions of the S&T entity: • The Borders and Maritime Security Division “develops and transitions tools and technologies that improve the security of national borders and waterways without impeding the flows of commerce and travel.” • The Chemical and Biological Division increases national “preparedness against chemical and biological threats through improved threat awareness, advanced surveillance and detection, and protective countermeasures.” • The Command, Control, and Interoperability Division “develops interoperable communication standards and protocols for emergency responders, cyber security tools for protecting the integrity of the Internet, and automated capabilities to recognize and analyze potential threats.” • The Explosives Division “develops the technical capabilities to detect, interdict, and lessen the impacts of non-nuclear explosives used in terrorist attacks against mass transit, civil aviation, and critical infrastructure.” • The Human Factors Behavioral Sciences Division applies the social and behavioral sciences to improve detection, analysis, and understanding of and response to homeland security threats. • The Infrastructure and Geophysical Division focuses on identifying and mitigating the vulnerabilities of the 18 critical infrastructure and key assets that keep our society and economy functioning. Introduction to Homeland Security

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The following entities comprise the offices and institutions of the S&T entity: • Business Operations, Services, and Human Capital; • Corporate Communications Division; • Interagency Programs; • International Cooperative Programs; • Operations Analysis Division (consisting of the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute and the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute); • Strategy, Policy, and Budget; • Special Programs; and • Test and Evaluation and Standards.

4.9.3 Directorate for Management The Directorate for Management is tasked with “budgets and appropriations, expenditure of funds, accounting and finance, procurement; human resources, information technology systems, facilities and equipment, and the identification and tracking of performance measurements.” The Directorate for Management “ensures that the Department’s over 230,000 employees have well-defined responsibilities and that both managers and employees have effective communications methods among themselves, with other governmental and nongovernmental bodies, and with the served public.”

4.9.4 Office of Policy The Office of Policy is the primary policy formulation and coordination component and provides a centralized, coordinated focus to the development of departmental strategic planning to protect the United States. This component develops and integrates departmental policies, planning, and programs in order to better coordinate the departmental prevention, protection, response, and recovery missions. According to the Office of Policy (2010), its basic responsibilities include the following functions: • Leading coordination of Department-wide policies, programs, and planning, which will ensure consistency and integration of missions throughout the entire Department; • Providing a central office to develop and communicate policies across multiple components of the homeland security network and strengthen the Department’s ability to maintain policy and operational readiness needed to protect the homeland; • Providing the foundation and direction for Department-wide strategic planning and budget priorities; • Bridging multiple headquarters’ components and operating agencies to improve communication among departmental entities, eliminate duplication of effort, and translate policies into timely action; and • Creating a single point of contact for internal and external stakeholders that will allow for streamlined policy management across the Department.

4.9.5 Office of Health Affairs The Office of Health Affairs coordinates all DHS medical activities to ensure appropriate preparation for and response to incidents having medical significance. The Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is tasked as the “principal agent for all medical and health matters” 120

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and is responsible for leading the development and support of a “scientifically rigorous, intelligence-based bio-defense and health preparedness architecture” to facilitate an allhazards approach to ensuring national security. The OHA also “oversees the Department’s bio-defense activities; leads a coordinated national architecture for biological and chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) planning and catastrophic incident management; and ensures that Department employees have an effective occupational health and safety program.”49

4.9.6 Office of Intelligence and Analysis The Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) uses “information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the United States.” The I&A is a member of the national intelligence community (IC) and facilitates the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to the full spectrum of homeland security customers in the DHS; at state, local, and tribal levels; in the private sector; and in the IC. According to the I&A, “The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in the capacity of Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT), implements a mandate to integrate the Department’s intelligence components and functions—the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (IE)—by driving a common intelligence mission.”50 The Department IE comprises I&A and the intelligence elements of: • U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); • U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); • U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); • U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and • Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The I&A is the “Executive Agent for the Department State and Local Fusion Center Program,” and the “Under Secretary leads several additional activities for the Department, such as information sharing, stewardship of National Security Systems, and management of classified information systems security.”51

4.9.7 Office of Operations Coordination and Planning The Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OOCP) is responsible for the daily monitoring of U.S. and coordinating activities within the Department, with governors, Homeland Security Advisors, law enforcement partners, and critical infrastructure operators among all 50 states and more than 50 major urban areas nationwide. According to the OOCP, its mission is to “deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts by coordinating the work of federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector partners and by collecting and fusing information from a variety of sources.” Through the National Operations Center (NOC), the OOCP provides real-time national “situational awareness and monitoring of the homeland, coordinates incidents and response activities, and, in conjunction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issues advisories and bulletins concerning threats to homeland security, as well as specific protective measures.” The NOC daily “coordinates information sharing to help deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts and to manage domestic incidents. Information on domestic incident management is shared with Emergency Operations Centers, at all levels, through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).”52 Introduction to Homeland Security

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4.9.8 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center FLETC was established in 1970 in temporary facilities in suburban Washington, D.C. It began as an interagency “police academy” operating within the Department of the Treasury. Congress intended that police officers and criminal investigators of all government agencies, except the FBI, would be trained at the new center in order to facilitate a uniform training program. FLETC came to Georgia in the summer of 1975 and began training in September of that year. On March 1, 2003, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) formally transferred from the Treasury Department to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. The FLETC provides career-long training for law enforcement professionals, to assist them in fulfilling their responsibilities both safely and proficiently. The FLETC is an “interagency law enforcement training organization for 91 Federal agencies,” and it facilitates services among “state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement agencies.” In addition to its Glynco, Georgia, facility the FLETC operates other residential training centers in Artesia, New Mexico, and Charleston, South Carolina. The FLETC also conducts training at a non-residential facility in Cheltenham, Maryland. The Cheltenham center is primarily intended for use by agencies with large concentrations of personnel in the Washington, D.C., area. The FLETC maintains an office in Orlando, Florida, which provides a gateway to the technology and training expertise within a nationally recognized hub for simulation and training. According to the FLETC, it has “oversight and program management responsibilities at the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana, and Bangkok, Thailand. The FLETC also supports training at other ILEAs in Hungary and El Salvador.” 53

Figure 4.13 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

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4.9.9 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) enhances the “nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments, and the private sector and to ensure a coordinated response to such threats.” The DNDO was established on April 15, 2005, to improve the national capabilities of detecting and reporting “unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.” According to the DNDO, its strategic objectives are as follows:54 • Develop the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture; • Develop, acquire, and support the domestic nuclear detection and reporting system; • Fully characterize detector system performance before deployment; • Establish situational awareness through information sharing and analysis; • Establish operation protocols to ensure detection leads to effective response; • Conduct a transformational research and development program; and • Establish the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to provide planning, integration, and improvements to USG nuclear forensics capabilities.

4.9.10 Federal Emergency Management Agency The lead emergency response agency on the national level is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Currently, FEMA has more than 2,600 full time employees. They work at FEMA headquarters in Washington D.C., at regional and area offices across the country, the Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center, and the National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. FEMA also has nearly 4,000 standby disaster assistance employees who are available for deployment after disasters. Often, FEMA works in partnership with other organizations that are part of the nation’s emergency management system. These partners include state and local emergency management agencies, 27 federal agencies, and the American Red Cross. The involvement of the federal government in disaster relief or disaster support operations can be traced back to the Congressional Act of 1803 and the assistance it provided in the wake of fires in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. This Act was the earliest effort to provide disaster relief on a federal level; from that point forward, assorted legislation provided disaster support. In 1979, FEMA was established by an executive order, which merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into a single agency. Since then, FEMA has dedicated itself to helping communities nationwide prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural and manmade disasters—a mission strengthened when the agency became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. Although there are over 20 agencies currently within the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA has primary responsibility for disaster response. Before 1979, several governmental agencies were involved in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. During both World War II and the period of the Cold War, Americans were familiar with the Department of Defense program commonly known as the Civil Defense Agency (which in reality was the Civil Preparedness Agency). In the shadow of the threat of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, public awareness was at its height; for example, many schoolchildren and teachers participated in “duck and cover” civil defense drills that were conducted in schools. During these drills, children were trained to take shelter in the event of a potential attack. On reflection, the training used to prepare for a nuclear attack was very primitive and unreliable. The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, initially Introduction to Homeland Security

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established within the Department of Housing and Urban Development by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, was another forerunner to FEMA. It also assisted state and local governments during disasters. During the 1930s, the federal government incorporated disaster relief as part of its widereaching legislation to rebuild the U.S. economy. By the middle of the decade, laws were in place that provided federal funds for the new and reconstructed public facilities, highways, and bridges and those damaged by natural disasters. For example, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was given authority to make disaster loans for the repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities following an earthquake and, later, other types of disasters. During 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads was given authority to provide funding for highways and bridges damaged by natural disasters. The Flood Control Act, which gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers greater authority to implement flood control projects, was also passed during this period. This piecemeal approach to disaster assistance was problematic, and it prompted legislation that required greater cooperation between federal agencies.55 In January 1937, the Ohio River experienced its worst flooding in history, a situation that has since been referred to as the “Super Flood.” Subsequently, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the Flood Control Act of 1937. This act has been revised several times since its codification, but it remains as a significant piece of legislation. Widespread discontent in the 1960s and the 1970s produced massive man-made disasters requiring assistance from the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, which had been established within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Events such as Hurricane Carla in 1962, the Alaskan Earthquake of 1964, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969, the San Fernando Earthquake of 1971, and Hurricane Agnes in 1972 emphasized the issue of natural disasters and necessitated increased legislation. During 1968, the National Flood Insurance Act offered new flood protection to homeowners, and in 1974, the Disaster Relief Act firmly established the process of presidential disaster declarations.56 The laws that were adopted during the first two centuries of U.S. history demonstrate the piecemeal approach that the federal government took toward disaster relief. They formed the foundation for the debate that facilitated the passage of the Post-Katrina Act of 2006. Undoubtedly, during 2002, when a decision was made to house FEMA under the newly formed United States Department of Homeland Security, it was no small policy or political task. President Jimmy Carter’s 1979 executive order merged many separate disaster-related responsibilities into FEMA, including the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department’s Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. During its inception, John Macy, who was the first director of FEMA, emphasized the similarities between natural hazards preparedness and civil defense activities. FEMA began development of an integrated emergency management system with an all-hazards approach that included “direction, control and warning systems which are common to the full range of emergencies from small isolated events to the ultimate emergency—war.”57 During its formative years, FEMA experienced unusual challenges that emphasized the complexity of emergency management. Early disasters and emergencies included the contamination of Love Canal, the Cuban refugee crisis, and the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Later, the Loma Prieta Earthquake in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 tested FEMA’s response capability. During 1993, President Bill Clinton nominated James L. Witt as 124

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the new FEMA director; Witt was significant in that he became the first agency director with experience as a state emergency manager. He soon initiated sweeping reforms that streamlined disaster relief and recovery operations, placed a new emphasis on preparedness and mitigation, and focused agency employees on customer service. The ending of the Cold War facilitated the redirection of FEMA’s limited resources from civil defense toward disaster relief, recovery, and mitigation initiatives. During 2001, President George W. Bush appointed Joe M. Allbaugh as the director of FEMA. The attacks of September 11, 2001, necessitated an emphasis on national preparedness and homeland security and unprecedentedly tested the agency. The agency coordinated its activities with the Office of Homeland Security, and the FEMA Office of National Preparedness was given responsibility for ensuring that the nation’s first responders were both trained and equipped to deal with weapons of mass destruction. Once a governor has declared a disaster area or an emergency and has requested federal aid, the President can direct FEMA to administer federal disaster assistance. The magnitude and severity of the destruction must warrant federal assistance. The type of assistance offered to individuals or families includes, but is not limited to, one or more of the following: temporary housing, disaster loans, federal income tax assistance in claiming casualty losses, legal services, consumer aid, disaster unemployment benefits, crisis counseling, and both individual and family grants. Additionally, FEMA assistance can be used for the following endeavors: • Search and rescue; • Public hazard reduction; • Emergency communication; • Emergency shelter and temporary housing; • Food and medical assistance; • Essential repairs to homes so occupants can return; • Temporary assistance with mortgage or rental payment for people who have lost their residences because the disaster has created financial hardships for them; • Unemployment assistance; • Limited funds to pay for necessary expenses or serious needs for those unable to pay expenses not covered by other programs or means; • loans to individuals, businesses, and farmers for repair, rehabilitation, or replacement of real and personal property; • Legal services for low-income families and individuals; • Crisis counseling; • Agricultural assistance; • Veteran’s assistance and adjustments; • Tax relief and casualty losses from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and • Penalty waivers for early withdrawal of funds from various time deposits. The mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is to support “our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.” FEMA has more than 3,700 full time employees and 4,000 standby disaster assistance employees who are available for deployment after disasters. As of November 2007, FEMA has responded to more than 2,700 presidentially declared disasters. The preceding sections of this textbook provide a greater discussion of FEMA and its modern responsibilities.58 Introduction to Homeland Security

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During 2009, W. Craig Fugate was appointed as the administrator of FEMA. An experienced emergency management professional, Fugate served as director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) prior to his appointment. In that role, he managed 138 full-time staff and a budget of $745 million, and his agency coordinated disaster response, recovery, preparedness, and mitigation efforts among the state’s 67 counties and local governments. In the aftermath of Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security has continued to disassemble FEMA’s emergency management programs and operations. The FEMA director has, in five short years, gone from being a member of the President’s Cabinet to an office director. The many disaster programs and operations that were brought together in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter from across the federal government to form FEMA have been disassembled and spread among the many agencies and directorates of the Department of Homeland Security.59

4.9.11 Transportation Security Administration The TSA was created in the wake of 9/11 to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems while ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. Within a year, it assumed responsibility for security at the nation’s airports and deployed a federal workforce to meet congressional deadlines for screening all commercial airline passengers and baggage. In March 2003, the TSA transferred from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security. The TSA is responsible for ensuring the security of all modes of transportation, including cargo placed aboard airplanes, and particularly focuses on passenger-carrying planes. By 2010, approximately 48,000 transportation security officers served in 457 U.S. airports, screening approximately two million people a day. In 2014, as an example, TSA screened over 653 million airline passengers, intercepting 2,212 firearms, as well as bomb-making supplies and hundreds of other weapons. In addition to its duties and responsibilities in the nation’s airports, the TSA provides grants and facilitates law enforcement programs, security programs, and security screening within the transportation system of America.

4.9.12 United States Customs and Border Protection The United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has a long and distinguished history of service to the United States, tracing back to the earliest days of the nation. Realizing the importance of revenue to fund the government of the new nation, in July 1789, Congress began enacting a series of acts that established a system of tariffs and customs in order to fund the national government. On July 4, 1789, the 2nd Act of the First Congress of the United States established a system of tariffs on imported “goods and merchandises” in order to create a funding source for the government. The 3rd Act of Congress two weeks later established a system of tariffs on the tonnage of ships. Before the month ended on July 31, Congress had established 59 customs collection districts under the jurisdiction of a Collector of Customs. Soon, the origination would be known as the United States Customs Service. In 1790, Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790 that required applicants for citizenship to meet a residency period, be of good character, and take an oath to support the 126

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Figure 4.14 CBP aircraft providing relief operations in Haiti. (Source: Author’s collection)

Constitution. In 1795, residency requirements would be changed from two to three years and two years later, residency would again be changed, this time to fourteen years and, four years later, again reduced to five years. In 1853, the United States Customs Border Patrol was established when the Treasury Secretary authorized the Collector of Customs to hire customs mounted inspectors for patrol duty along the U.S. land borders. Today, the CBP is a large and complex component of the DHS and has a priority mission of keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S. The CBP “also has a responsibility for securing and facilitating trade and travel while enforcing hundreds of U.S. regulations, including immigration and drug laws.” According to the CBP, its strategic goals are:60 • Preventing terrorism; • Unifying as one border agency; • Balancing trade and travel with security; • Protecting America; and • Modernizing and managing for results. According to the CBP, on average, it accomplishes the following every day:61 • Processes 989,689 passengers and pedestrians; • Processes 57,761 truck, rail, and sea containers; Introduction to Homeland Security

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• Executes 2,139 apprehensions between the ports for illegal entry and 107 arrests of criminals at ports of entry; • Seizes 6,643 pounds of narcotics; and • Seizes 454 pests at ports of entry. In addition to its border mission, in fiscal year 2014, CBP referred more than 57,000 unaccompanied children entering the country across the U.S.-Mexican border to the care and custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement. This increase in arrivals strained both DHS’s and HHS’s capacities to process and care for these children, ultimately requiring temporary housing assistance for the increase. DOD temporarily housed approximately 7,700 unaccompanied children on three military installations (Security, 2015).

4.9.13 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) secures America’s promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to its customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of the immigration system. According to the CIS, its strategic goals include:62 • Strengthening the security and integrity of the immigration system; • Providing effective customer-oriented immigration benefit and information services; • Supporting immigrants’ integration and participation in American civic culture; • Promoting flexible and sound immigration policies and programs; • Strengthening the infrastructure supporting the USCIS mission; and • Operating as a high-performance organization that promotes a highly talented workforce and a dynamic work culture.

4.9.14 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) promotes homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration (Department Subcomponents, 2010). ICE is the principal investigative arm of the DHS—indeed, it is the second-largest investigative agency in the federal government. Created in 2003, ICE is a major federal agency employing more than 20,000 employees in more than 400 offices in the U.S. and 46 foreign countries. Its primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. ICE has an annual budget exceeding $5.7 billion dollars, and this funding is primarily allocated among the functions of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). The enforcement focus of ICE is diverse and includes, among other things, combating the smuggling of United States currency. ICE operates the Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC), which serves as a central source for information and support for identifying, investigating, and disrupting bulk cash smuggling activities around the world. Customs laws allow ICE to seize national treasures, especially if they have been reported lost or stolen. It works with experts to authenticate the items, determine their true ownership, and return them to their countries of origin. ICE is the lead U.S. law enforcement agency responsible for fighting human smuggling and human trafficking. It also leads money laundering and financial crime 128

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investigations. In recent decades, U.S. law enforcement has encountered an increasing number of major financial crimes, frequently resulting from the need for drug trafficking organizations to launder large sums of criminal proceeds through legitimate financial institutions and investment vehicles. ICE investigates narcotics smuggling organizations and the methods utilized to smuggle contraband across U.S. borders. Many of the narcotics smuggling methods ICE encounters include the use of high-speed vessels, cargo containers, aircraft, commercial trucks, commercial vessels, and human carriers. ICE also is engaged in combating illegal weapons smuggling between the U.S. and foreign entities; in recent years, the focus has increasingly turned to Mexico. Weapons smuggled into Mexico from the United States often end up in the hands of the drug cartels or other illicit organizations, where they can be employed against law enforcement officers and citizens in either country. These firearms continue to fuel violence along the Southwest border and in the interior of Mexico. To combat the illicit smuggling of weapons from the United States into Mexico, ICE initiated Operation Armas Cruzadas. As part of this initiative, agencies within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the government of Mexico have partnered on interdiction, investigation, and intelligence-sharing activities to identify, disrupt, and dismantle transborder criminal networks that smuggle weapons from the United States into Mexico. ICE also pursues corrupt foreign officials who plunder state coffers for personal gain and then attempt to place those funds in the U.S. financial system. The agency’s Foreign Corruption Investigations Group, part of ICE Homeland Security Investigations, is charged with spearheading investigations that hold these individuals accountable. During June 2010, ICE issued its strategic plan for Fiscal Years 2010–2014, demonstrating its expected responsibilities for criminal investigation and civil immigration enforcement over the next five years. This strategic plan highlights the following goals for the agency’s future:63 • Prevent terrorism and enhance security; • Protect the borders against illicit trade, travel, and finance; • Protect the borders through smart and tough interior immigration enforcement; and • Construct an efficient, effective agency.

4.9.15 United States Coast Guard Though the United States Coast Guard (USCG) was briefly discussed in Chapter 2, it is an important agency within the Department of Homeland Security and performs a series of vital missions for the nation. The United States Coast Guard is one of the five armed forces of the United States, and it is the only military organization within the Department of Homeland Security. The USCG protects the maritime economy and the environment, defends maritime borders, and saves those in peril. The USCG originated as the United States Revenue Marine Service on August 4, 1790, when the first Congress authorized the construction of ten vessels to enforce tariff and trade laws and to prevent smuggling. Known variously through the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century as the Revenue Marine and the Revenue Cutter Service, the USCG expanded in both size and responsibilities as the nation grew.64 The USCG is one of the oldest entities in the U.S. federal government. Until the Navy Department was established in 1798, the USCG served as the nation’s only armed force afloat. The Coast Guard is the product of five different agencies merged over time: Revenue Marine (est. 1790), the United States Lifesaving Service (est. 1848), the United States Lighthouse Service (est. 1789), the Steamboat Inspection Service (est. 1838), and the Bureau of Navigation (est. 1884). Introduction to Homeland Security

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In 1915, the USGC received its present name under an act of Congress, when the Revenue Cutter Service merged with the Lifesaving Service to produce the nation’s initial solitary maritime service, dedicated to saving life at sea and enforcing the nation’s maritime laws. The USCG began to maintain the country’s aids to maritime navigation, including operating the nation’s lighthouses, when President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the transfer of the Lighthouse Service to the Coast Guard in 1939 (USCG, 2010). In 1946, Congress permanently transferred the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation to the USCG, resulting in its oversight of merchant marine licensing and merchant vessel safety. The USCG has protected America since its inception over two centuries ago and has served in all U.S. national conflicts. During times of peace, the USGC is an organizational component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security while it serves in the Navy Department during periods of war or per the direction of the President. Regardless of its organizational structuring, the USCG is responsible for enforcing U.S. laws at sea, protecting the marine environment, protecting the national coastline and ports, and saving life. Throughout its history, the missions performed by the USCG have been very diverse. From the interdiction of smugglers to conducting rescues on the high seas and the nation’s waterways, the Coast Guard has proven ever vigilant. The Coast Guard also serves to reinforce the nation’s border security initiatives by providing a layered defense to deter, detect, and interdict undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally. In 2009 alone, the Coast Guard interdicted nearly 3,700 undocumented immigrants.65 In 2008, the Coast Guard responded to more than 24,000 search and rescue cases and saved more than 4,000 lives. It conducted more than 70,000 commercial inspections of U.S. flagged vessels, performed more than 12,000 safety and environmental examinations of foreign vessels entering United States ports, conducted nearly 4,700 marine casualty investigations,

Figure 4.15 The USCG Bertholf (WMSL-750), the first legend-class maritime security cutter of the U.S. Coast Guard. (Source: Department of Homeland Security)

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Figure 4.16 A Coast Guard HC-130J Super Hercules. (Source: U.S. Coast Guard. Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Jonathan Harper)

boarded nearly 3,700 underway fishing vessels to perform safety and compliance checks, and performed nearly 7,300 dockside safety examinations. Working with the departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other partners, in 2008, the Coast Guard seized nearly 185 tons of cocaine bound for the United States, interdicted nearly 5,000 undocumented migrants attempting to illegally enter the United States, deployed six patrol boats and 400 personnel to protect Iraq’s maritime oil infrastructure, trained Iraqi naval forces, enforced U.N. sanctions in the Arabian Gulf, conducted more than 1,500 security boardings of high-interest vessels bound for the United States, and provided waterside security and escorts for nearly 500 military freight conveyances during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

4.9.16 United States Secret Service The United States Secret Service (USSS) protects the President and Vice President and safeguards the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems. It also protects visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and national special security events (Department Subcomponents, 2010). During 1865, the Secret Service Division was created to suppress counterfeit currency; Chief William P. Wood was sworn in by Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch as its first head. As time went on, Secret Service responsibilities were broadened to include “detecting persons perpetrating frauds against the government” and resulted in investigations of the Ku Klux Klan, nonconforming distillers, smugglers, mail robbers, and a number of other infractions against the federal laws.66 A major national security concern is the protection of the national government from threats and the protection of the leaders of the government. The protection of the President is a major concern. Four United States Presidents have been assassinated while serving in office: Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and Kennedy. The security protecting Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley was either unorganized or totally absent. As a result of the 1901 assassination of President McKinley, the Secret Service assumed full-time responsibility for protection of the President. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 4.17 United States Secret Service. (Source: https://www.fleta.gov/program academy/uniformed-division-trainingcourse-usss)

Figure 4.18 Assassination of President McKinley (1901). (Source: https://www.loc.gov/item/96521677/)

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Figure 4.19 Lee Harvey Oswald: suspected assassin of President John F. Kennedy. (Source: Dallas, Texas, Police Department)

The Secret Service began protecting the President-Elect in 1908 and during the 1913 election; Congress authorized permanent protection of the President and the President-Elect. In 1951, through the Public Law 82–79, Congress enacted legislation that permanently authorized Secret Service protection of the President, his immediate family, the President-Elect, and the Vice President. During 1961, Congress authorized protection of former presidents for a reasonable period of time. In 1965, Congress authorized protection of former presidents and their spouses during their lifetime and minor children until age 16. The 1970s witnessed the additional duties of diplomacy protection. During this decade, Congress authorized Secret Service protection for visiting heads of a foreign state or government and other official guests, as directed; expanded its duties to include protection of foreign diplomatic missions located throughout the United States and its territories; and increased its responsibilities to include the protection of diplomatic missions in the Washington, D.C., area (Public Law 91–217). The Patriot Act (Public Law 107–56) increased the role of the Secret Service regarding investigating fraud and related activity in connections with computers. It authorized the Director of the Secret Service to establish nationwide electronic crimes task forces to assist law enforcement, the private sector, and academia in detecting and suppressing computer-based crime; increased the statutory penalties for the manufacturing, possession, dealing, and passing of counterfeit U.S. or foreign obligations; and allowed enforcement action to be taken to protect financial payment systems while combating transnational financial crimes directed by terrorists or other criminals. The Department of Homeland Security was established with the passage of Public Law 107–296, which partially transferred the United States Secret Service from the Department of the Treasury to the new department effective March 1, 2003. During 2007, protection began for presidential candidate Illinois Senator Barack Obama, and this protection was the earliest initiation of Secret Service protection for any candidate in history. Presidential candidate New York Senator Hillary Clinton already received protection before she entered the race because of her status as former first lady. Since 2003, the Secret Service has made nearly 29,000 criminal arrests for counterfeiting, cyber investigations, and other financial Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 4.20 Randolph “Tex” Alles, Director of the U.S. Secret Service. (Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection)

crimes, 98% of which resulted in convictions, and seized more than $295 million in counterfeit currency. The Secret Service investigated and closed financial crimes cases in which actual loss amounted to $3.7 billion and prevented a potential loss of more than $12 billion.67 As with all of the agencies in the Department of Homeland Security, changes have been made as the administration of President Trump redirects the Department’s focus. Included in these changes is a redirection of the United States Secret Service. The modern instantiation of the Secret Service provides valuable contributions toward the facilitation of the security of the U.S. Through its protection of the President, Vice President, and diplomatic entities, it embellishes the concept of government continuity and the safety of elected leaders. Because of its responsibilities regarding financial crimes, the Secret Service facilitates the security and integrity of the economic and financial systems that form the basis of U.S. commerce and trade.

4.9.17 Office of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security The DHS also includes the Office of the Secretary. The Office of the Secretary consists of 11 separate agencies, which provide a variety of functions and services. The following entities comprise the Office of the Secretary: • Privacy Office; • Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; • Office of the Inspector General; 134

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• Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman; • Office of Legislative Affairs; • Office of the General Counsel; • Office of Public Affairs; • Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE); • Office of the Executive Secretariat (ESEC); • Military Advisor’s Office; and • Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA). Each of these offices fulfills an administrative capacity that facilitates the effective and efficient functioning of the DHS. These offices collaboratively and separately perform a variety of functions, ranging from public interaction to facilitating cooperation and dialogue among peer government entities. Regardless of the function, each of these offices provides a unique service within the context of homeland security. The Privacy Office works to preserve and enhance privacy protections for all individuals, to promote transparency of Department of Homeland Security operations, and to serve as a leader in the privacy community. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties provides legal and policy advice to Department leadership on civil rights and civil liberties issues, investigates and resolves complaints, and provides leadership to Equal Employment Opportunity Programs. The Office of the Inspector General is responsible for conducting and supervising audits, investigations, and inspections relating to the programs and operations of the Department, recommending ways for the Department to carry out its responsibilities in the most effective, efficient, and economical manner possible. The Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman provides recommendations for resolving individual and employer problems with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in order to ensure national security and the integrity of the legal immigration system, increase efficiency in administering citizenship and immigration services, and improve customer service. The Office of Legislative Affairs serves as primary liaison to members of Congress and their staffs, to the White House and the executive branch, and to other federal agencies and governmental entities that have roles in assuring national security. The Office of the General Counsel integrates approximately 1,700 lawyers from throughout the Department into an effective, client-oriented, full-service legal team and comprises a headquarters office with subsidiary divisions and the legal programs for eight Department components, and it also includes the ethics division of the Department. The Office of Public Affairs coordinates the public affairs activities of all the Department’s components and offices and serves as the federal government’s lead public information office during a national emergency or disaster. Led by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, it comprises the press office, incident and strategic communications, speechwriting, Internet content management, and employee communications. The Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) coordinates policy and operations to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United States and to track and sever the connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. The Office of the Executive Secretariat (ESEC) provides all manner of direct support to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, as well as related support to leadership and management across the Department. This support takes many forms, the most well known being accurate and timely dissemination of information and written communications from throughout the Department and homeland security partners to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. The Military Advisor’s Office advises on facilitating, coordinating, and executing policy, procedures, Introduction to Homeland Security

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preparedness activities, and operations between the Department and the Department of Defense. The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs has the mission of promoting an integrated national approach to homeland security by ensuring, coordinating, and advancing federal interaction with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.68

4.9.18 Advisory Panels and Committees The DHS also manifests a myriad of panels and committees, each of which provides an administrative capacity that facilitates the effective and efficient functioning of the DHS. These collaboratively and separately perform a variety of functions, ranging from issues of labor to facilitating cooperation and dialogue among peer government entities. Regardless of the function, each of these provides a unique service in the context of homeland security. The following entities comprise a partial list of panels and committees in DHS: • Homeland Security Advisory Council; • National Infrastructure Advisory Council; • Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee; • Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council; • Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities; • Task Force on New Americans; and • DHS Labor-Management Forum. Similar to the components of the Office of the Secretary, each of these panels and committees provides an administrative capacity that facilitates the effective and efficient functioning of the DHS. These entities also collaboratively and separately perform a variety of functions, ranging from issues of labor to facilitating cooperation and dialogue among peer government entities. Regardless of the function, each of these offices provides a unique service in the context of homeland security. The Homeland Security Advisory Council provides advice and recommendations concerning homeland security matters and is composed of leaders from state and local government, first-responder communities, the private sector, and academia. The National Infrastructure Advisory Council provides advice to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the President concerning the security of information systems for the public and private institutions that constitute the critical infrastructure of the national economy. The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee is a source of independent, scientific, and technical planning advice for the Undersecretary for Science and Technology. The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council facilitates effective coordination between federal infrastructure protection programs and the infrastructure protection activities of the private sector and those of state, local, territorial, and tribal governments. The Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities ensures that the federal government appropriately supports safety and security for individuals with disabilities in disaster situations. The Task Force on New Americans is an interagency effort to assist immigrants in learning English, embracing the common core of American civic culture, and becoming fully American. The DHS Labor-Management Forum supports cooperative and productive labor-management relations.69 Committee and panel responsibilities are domain specific with respect to their individual functions. These entities are primarily responsible for analyzing situations and rendering advice 136

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regarding a myriad of topics and situations. They work collaboratively with entities of the public and private sectors to craft advice regarding strategic courses of action that impact the long-term pursuits of the homeland security community. Through the use of such entities, the DHS gains the ability to analyze a variety of issues from multiple perspectives.

4.10 Future of the Department of Homeland Security The nation is seven years into the reorganization that created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The department went through major restructuring following Hurricane Katrina and in compliance with the Post-Katrina Act of 2006. The debate continues regarding whether FEMA should be in the Department of Homeland Security or returned to independent status. The funding appropriations and allocations are part of the debate. Some will say that the funding for homeland security will “dry up.” Others take the position that some programs will be decreased whereas others will be increased over time. However, it is agreed that local governments must be prepared to sustain projects that have been funded through the homeland security grant programs. The U.S. Congress consistently asks: How prepared is the nation? Unfortunately, the country has not developed a method for measuring preparedness. Others ask if the nation is better off or more prepared now than it was before September 11, 2001. These questions can be answered, but not everyone would agree on the answers. There are definite certainties. The country will experience other hurricanes. There will be earthquakes. Natural disasters will occur. And many believe we will be struck again by a terrorist attack. The threats of natural disasters and man-made incidents exist. The response landscape has changed dramatically since 9/11. National preparedness is a permanent part of the response environment.

4.11 Chapter Comments and Summary The American Revolution was hard fought to create an independent nation. Since that time, a legacy of protecting the borders of the United States and its territories has been preserved. The most important function of government is keeping the country secure. Terrorism has a long history, but until September 11, 2001, few Americans were touched by it. The responders across the country were not unaware of the threat of terrorism; however, it was not a focus in equipment and training programs. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center received short-lived attention. During this time, the Hart-Rudman idea for creating a commission to study global threats began to prick the political consciousness. The WMD Defense Act of 1996 was passed in the wake of the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building. On the domestic front, there was evidence that awareness of the threats was part of the policy and political environment. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security was not simply a reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. That day of the attacks was the catalyst that set the priority for government to create a focal point for combating terrorism and securing the United States, not in the traditional military mode but in preparing the civilian response community and the citizens at large. All the questions relative to how the Department of Homeland Security should function and the clarification of its mission remain unanswered. Indeed, critics charge that many DHS Introduction to Homeland Security

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programs are given little chance to mature before they are changed. It would do well to learn from history. During 1947, President Truman did not indicate that the President and the United States Congress thought the Navy or the Army had failed in their missions, but that there was a need to create the Department of Defense. This seems to be the idea in creating the Department of Homeland Security. The optimal end product in the concept is determined by whether the function of an agency is enhanced within the incorporation of its partners. The focus should be on the function instead of the positioning. In February 2009, then-Representative James Oberstar (D-MN) proffered legislation to bring FEMA out of Department of Homeland Security and make it a stand-alone agency. Mr. Oberstar disagrees with the notion that disasters are local incidents. He further believes that FEMA is too restricted in its present position with DHS to be optimally effective. Others disagree with these positions and hold that FEMA should stay within Department of Homeland Security, reporting to the Secretary (McCarter, 2009). The FEMA debate is linked to perceptions created during Hurricane Katrina and the breach of the levee system in South Louisiana. It became popular to decry the failure of the response. However, such a notion is an oversimplification. Some of the leadership at the various levels of government may have failed, but the response was not a failure in all the jurisdictions across the Gulf Coast. Local communities are ultimately responsible for the disasters that strike them. Long before state and federal governments are on scene to make assessments, local governments and neighborhoods respond to the crisis. The response results are not based on where FEMA is positioned in an organization. The assistance provided to local governments is based on whether the function is prepared to act or not. Many first responders experienced FEMA protocols when FEMA was an independent agency and not during a period in which FEMA is a directorate within the Department of Homeland Security. That experience indicates that it is not a matter of positioning that is debatable; instead, it is the matter of functioning. The future will manifest transitional years for the Department of Homeland Security. The debate regarding the placement of FEMA will apparently occupy future instantiations of Congress. Just as the Department of Defense plays a significant role in homeland defense, the Department of Homeland Security must lead in initiatives of homeland security. It is imperative that these two models have the shared vision and the common direction to create the greatest possible stronghold against terrorism and aggression that targets the homeland, American interests, and American citizens both at home and abroad. There is a reason the American citizenry remembers and memorializes Pearl Harbor and the attacks of September 11, 2001. The history of how well prepared the nation is to endure disasters is still being written. Is the nation better prepared now than before 2001? Probably. Does the nation have more to accomplish? Definitely.

4.12 Key Terms Border Security Coordination Customs and Border Protection Cyber security Disaster Recovery Disaster Response Department of Homeland Security Directorates Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Homeland Security Act 138

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National Strategy for Homeland Security Nuclear Detection Organizational Structure Plan Planning Policy Presidential Directive Risk Stafford Act Transportation

4.13 Thought and Discussion Questions

1. Define the term “policy.” Consult your state’s homeland security department to determine its policies that parallel those of the federal government. Further, determine which of its policies differ from those of the federal government. Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. 2. Consult the Department of Homeland Security regarding its primary mission. Compare and contrast it with the mission of your state’s homeland security department. Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. 3. Cyber security is an emerging domain. Such issues exist in cyberspace. Perform some research concerning the basic notion of cyberspace. Based on your findings, how would you define the concept of cyberspace? Write a brief essay that discusses your definition. Additionally, within the essay, include the five most prominent threats you believe will occur in cyberspace. 4. Given the emergency of cyberspace as a new threat domain, perform some research concerning how the Department of Homeland Security protects against virtual endangerments. Write a brief essay that highlights your findings.

Notes

1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2002). Homeland Security Proposal Delivered to Congress. Retrieved December 12, 2008, from www.Department of Homeland security.gov/xnews/speeches/ speech_0039.shtm. 2. Thornberry. (2001). Thornberry Introduces Legislation to Realign Federal Government so It Is Better Prepared to Respond to Homeland Security Threats. Retrieved February 19, 2009, from http://govinfo. library.unt.edu/nssg/News/PhaseIII/press_release_thornberry.doc. 3. Bush, G. W. (2003, February 28). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html. 4. Bush, G. W. (2003, December 17). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html. 5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2007, September 9). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Annex 1. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1199894121015. shtm#content. 6. American Disaster Preparedness Foundation. (2006, January). A Study of the Preparedness of the Largest Metropolitan Areas in the U.S: How Prepared Is Your City? Phoenix, IL: American Disaster Preparedness Foundation. 7. Kincaid, M. (2013). Cybersecurity News Round Up: 2013 Defense Budget Outlines New Mandates to Enhance Cybersecurity. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.clearancejobs.com/defense-news/1048/ cybersecurity-news-round-up-2013-defense-budget-outlines-new-mandates-to-enhance-cybersecurity. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. The White House. (2011). Fact sheet: Safeguarding the U.S. government’s classified information and networks. Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2011/10/07/fact-sheet-safeguarding-us-governments-classified-information-andnetwor?utm_source=related. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Department of Defense. (2011). Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, p. 8. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., p. 9. 18. Clayton, Mark. (2013). ABC News. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ secret-nsa-cybersecurity-program-aims-defend-us-power/story?id=18134323. 19. Taylor, P. (2012). Former US spy warns on cybersecurity. CNBC News. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.cnbc.com/id/100267883/Former_US_Spy_Warns_on_Cybersecurity.

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20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Secretary Napolitano Announces Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/news/2012/02/13/secretary-napolitanoannounces-fiscal-year-2013-budget-request. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Kolb, J. (2013). Study finds corruption on rise among border agents, rep says security ‘at risk.’ Foxnews. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/15/study-finds-corruption-onrise-among-border-agents-rep-says-security-at-risk/%20?test=latestnews. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Associated Press. (2012). Man Charged with Building 2 Major Border Tunnels. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from http://bigstory.ap.org/article/man-charged-building-2-major-border-tunnels. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Dinan, S. (2013). Interceptions of immigrants stubbornly low. The Washington Times. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/9/interceptions-immigrants-stubbornly-low/. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Department Subcomponents. (2010). Department subcomponents and agencies. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/. 45. DNPP. (2010). Directorate for National Protection and Programs. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0794.shtm. 46. Ibid. 47. Department Subcomponents. (2010). Department subcomponents and agencies. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/. 48. Science. (2010). Science and Technology Directorate. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/ xabout/structure/editorial_0530.shtm. 49. OHA. (2010). Office of Health Affairs. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/ editorial_0880.shtm. 50. Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2010). Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm. 51. Ibid. 52. OOCP. (2010). Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0797.shtm. 53. FLETC. (2010). Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www. fletc.gov/. 54. DNDO. (2010). Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/ xabout/structure/editorial_0766.shtm. 55. FEMA. (2010). Federal Emergency Response Agency. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.fema.gov/ about/index.shtm. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Department Subcomponents. (2010). Department subcomponents and agencies. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/. 59. Haddow, G., and Bullock, J. The Future of Emergency Management. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from www.fema.gov.

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60. CBP. (2010). Customs and Border Protection. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.cbp.gov/link handler/cgov/about/accomplish/snapshot.ctt/snapshot.pdf. 61. Ibid. 62. CIS. (2010). Citizen and Immigration Services. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.uscis.gov/ portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM 10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD. 63. ICE. (2010). Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.ice.gov/ about/overview/. 64. USCG. (2010). United States Coast Guard. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.uscg.mil/history/ faqs/district.asp. 65. Ibid. 66. U.S. Secret Service. (2010). Secret Service History. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.secret service.gov/history.shtml. 67. Ibid. 68. Department Subcomponents. (2010). Department subcomponents and agencies. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/. 69. Ibid.

References Bush, G. W. (2003). Homeland Security Directive 8: National Preparedness. Retrieved February 20, 2009, from www.Department of Homeland Security.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm#1. CBP. (2010). Customs and Border Protection. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/ cgov/about/accomplish/snapshot.ctt/snapshot.pdf. CIS. (2010). Citizen and Immigration Services. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.uscis.gov/portal/ site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000 045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD. Clayton, M. (2013). ABC News. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ secret-nsa-cybersecurity-program-aims-defend-us-power/story?id=18134323. Department of Defense. (2011). Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, p. 8. Department Subcomponents. (2010). Department subcomponents and agencies. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/. Dinan, S. (2013). Interceptions of immigrants stubbornly low. The Washington Times. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/9/interceptions-immigrants-stubbornly-low/. DNDO. (2010). Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/ structure/editorial_0766.shtm. DNPP. (2010). Directorate for National Protection and Programs. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www. dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0794.shtm. FEMA. (2010). Federal Emergency Response Agency. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.fema.gov/ about/index.shtm. FLETC. (2010). Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.fletc.gov/. Haddow, G., and Bullock, J. The Future of Emergency Management. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from www. fema.gov. Homeland Security Council. (2007). National Strategy for Homeland Security. Retrieved February 19, 2009, from www.Department of Homeland Security.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007. pdf. ICE. (2010). Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.ice.gov/about/ overview/. Kolb, J. (2013). Study finds corruption on rise among border agents, rep says security ‘at risk.’ Foxnews. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/15/study-finds-corruption-on-riseamong-border-agents-rep-says-security-at-risk/%20?test=latestnews. McCarter, M. (2009). Post Katrina Reform Act Augments Both FEMA and Department of Homeland Security, Experts Say. Retrieved March 30, 2009, from www.hstoday.us/content/view/7676/149/. McElreath, D., Jensen, C., Wigginton, M., Doss, D., Nations, R., and Van Slyke, J. (2014). Introduction to Homeland Security. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2010). Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm.

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Office of Policy. (2010). Office of Policy. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/ editorial_0870.shtm. OHA. (2010). Office of Health Affairs. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/ editorial_0880.shtm. OOCP. (2010). Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www. dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0797.shtm. Science. (2010). Science and Technology Directorate. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/ xabout/structure/editorial_0530.shtm. Taylor, P. (2012). Former US spy warns on cybersecurity. CNBC News. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www. cnbc.com/id/100267883/Former_US_Spy_Warns_on_Cybersecurity. Thornberry. (2001). Thornberry Introduces Legislation to Realign Federal Government so it is Better Prepared to Respond to Homeland Security Threats. Retrieved February 19, 2009, from http://govinfo.library.unt. edu/nssg/News/PhaseIII/press_release_thornberry.doc. USCG. (2010). United States Coast Guard. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.uscg.mil/history/faqs/ district.asp. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2002). Homeland Security Proposal Delivered to Congress. Retrieved December 12, 2008, from www.Department of Homeland Security.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0039. shtm. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008). One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: U.S Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008–2013. Retrieved February 20, 2009, from www.Department of Homeland Security.gov/xlibrary/assets/Department of Homeland Security_ StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Secretary Napolitano Announces Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/news/2012/02/13/secretary-napolitanoannounces-fiscal-year-2013-budget-request. U.S. Secret Service. (2010). Secret Service History. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.secretservice.gov/ history.shtml. The White House. (2011). Fact sheet: Safeguarding the U.S. Government’s classified information and networks. Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved January 17, 2013, from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2011/10/07/fact-sheet-safeguarding-us-governments-classified-information-and-networ?utm_source= related.

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5 Homeland Security and Emergency Management Function and Operations

The vision of homeland security is to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. —United States Department of Homeland Security The objectives of this chapter are to: • Understand homeland security and emergency management functions and operations; • Understand the role and mission of emergency response operations centers, including, but not limited to, emergency support functions (ESFs); • Understand the role and mission of Joint Terrorism Task Forces; • Review the major purpose and intent of the USA Patriot Act of 2001; • Understand the purpose of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act; • Review the major purpose of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7; and • Understand the purpose of Presidential Decision Directive 39.

5.1 Introduction We are fortunate that most of us will live our entire lives without being directly impacted by a disaster. The majority of our communities will remain safe and secure, but that safety cannot be taken for granted, and resources must be continually committed to ensure that threats facing our communities are identified and steps taken to reduce those vulnerabilities. In the effort to reduce community or jurisdictional vulnerabilities, each level of government plays a role in ensuring the safety of its citizens and their property. Governmental services such as firefighting, emergency response, and law enforcement are just three of the activities provided through the function of government. Identifying, supporting, and coordinating nongovernmental organizations that may play a major role in disaster response and relief, such as medical businesses and not-for-profit organizations and facilities, is also an important role that must be accomplished on the spectrum of governmental operations. 143

Figure 5.1 Department of Homeland Security. (Source: Department of Homeland Security, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c)

Citizens expect much from their government and the public service organizations that function within their communities. They expect their government will provide assistance in the event of an emergency or disaster. They expect public services, such as water and utilities, to be restored quickly. In any response, citizens expect that the top priority will be the preservation of human life. All levels of government share the responsibility for working together in preparing for, mitigating, preventing, responding to, and recovering from the effects of an emergency or disaster event. It has been clearly shown that few, if any, communities have adequate resources organically to effectively employ in the event of a major disaster. It is therefore essential for jurisdictions on all levels to anticipate needs. Such evaluations often occur through the crafting of plans, processes, and procedures with respect to identified potential threats. The attacks of 2001 against the United States and the subsequent impact of Hurricane Katrina and, later, Super Storm Sandy clearly proved that our communities are not immune from disaster. These events set into motion or further stimulated dynamic changes in the way the nation viewed its national security and disaster response. As a nation, we found ourselves taking another step away from the old system of civil defense that greatly characterized domestic preparedness during the Cold War toward a new and much more robust system of domestic preparedness centered around local and state level emergency management.

5.2 Resource Management and Utilization True disaster response success is built on a foundation of preparation. Effective preparation is built on a foundation of the identification of vulnerabilities and the further identification of resources that can be reliability called upon and employed in the event of a disaster. Resource management is essential before, during, and after an event. Resources include, but are not 144

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Emergency Operations/ Response Plans

s ond esp R o Wh nd How a

Wh ere Res to Obt a our ces in

Figure 5.2 Emergency operations plans, resources, and response. (Source: U.S. Department of Transportation)

limited to, people, equipment, and supplies; organizations all play an important, if not critical, role in disaster response and the operations of both emergency management and homeland security. When local government capabilities are overwhelmed or just stretched to a point of concern, state resources and expertise are expected to be available and capable of filling response gaps. Within the concept of all disasters being local, states should be expected to play a supporting role when viewed from a local perspective. State disaster response and support should provide that next level of coordination, of “command and control,” to reduce wasted effort and resources, coordinate efforts across local jurisdictional boundaries, and expedite the movement from response to recovery. Thus, state-level operations assist and support local governments in saving lives, relieving human suffering, sustaining survivors, protecting property, and reestablishing essential services. Federal government resources and expertise are available and can, if properly authorized, be mobilized to augment emergency or disaster efforts beyond the capabilities of state government.

5.3 A Perspective of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Neither homeland security nor emergency management is a solitary concept. Each can be viewed from a perspective of function/process, discipline, and/or organization. As a function or process, those involved in homeland security and emergency management operations examine vulnerabilities, anticipate realistic threats, recommend policies and policy changes that reduce vulnerabilities or enhance security, and develop and maintain realistic operational plans. Few threats facing our communities are new; rather, realistic threats such as natural disasters, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes are reoccurring, though in some cases, it may be decades or even centuries between major events. While some threats facing our communities cannot be prevented, such as major natural disasters, other threats can, upon identification, be reduced. As an example, significant improvements have occurred in reducing the threat of major fires in our cities. Improved fire response capabilities combined with urban planning and improved building codes have realistically eliminated the chances for a great urban fire such as those that devastated Chicago in the 1800s, unless it is related to a larger event, such as a major earthquake. As a discipline, homeland security is quickly evolving into an area of research and study similar to criminal justice, moving from an area once viewed as exclusively vocational to one in which all aspects of the sciences—management, budgeting, and planning—are included within the field. Thus, the vocation is becoming a profession. Homeland security as a discipline is integrative regarding the functions of a wide range of first responders such as law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical technicians, and emergency management. It Introduction to Homeland Security

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is typically thought to be a system of protocols and practices. The activities of a discipline exhibit these functions. The homeland security and emergency management functions are an extensive, comprehensive system of activities. The functions of homeland security are best identified by identifying the disciplines and the agencies that perform the activities of homeland security and emergency management at each level of government. Organizationally, one can examine the structures, missions, functions, and characteristics of the many agencies with primary or secondary missions supporting disaster planning, response, or recovery. These agencies include the local, state, tribal, and private emergency management and emergency response agencies involved in homeland security planning, prevention, and recovery efforts.

5.4 Coordination and Standardization: The Backbone of Homeland Security Operations Effective local operations are essential to any successful and efficient emergency response and recovery effort. Key in response is local-level operational coordination. Every state has a multi-agency coordination center (MACC) or state emergency operations center (EOC). EOCs are the physical location where multi-agency response coordination occurs. In these centers, coordination occurs between state; tribal; local; and, when called upon, federal response environments through emergency support functions (ESFs) and the private sector. EOCs may be permanent organizations and facilities that are staffed full time, or they may be established to meet short-term needs. Standing EOCs (those activated to support larger, more complex incidents) are typically established in a central or permanently established facility. Such permanent facilities in a state or larger community are typically directed by a full-time emergency manager. The physical size, staffing, and equipping of an EOC will depend on the size of the jurisdiction, the resources available and the anticipated incident management workload. EOCs may be organized and staffed in a variety of ways. Regardless of its specific organizational structure, an EOC should include the following core functions: coordination; communications; resource allocation and tracking; and information collection, analysis, and dissemination. EOCs must be organized to timely gather/collect and utilize other information, including weather, geospatial and remote sensing imagery, damage assessments, media reports, financial impacts, and social effects. They may need assistance in gathering this event- or incidentspecific information for planning, response, and/or recovery purposes. These centers should function as “unified commands,” with this command-and-coordination structure discussed and agreed upon collectively by the designated primary agencies and, as appropriate, support agencies during planning and well before an event and event-related activation. Within the MACC/EOC construct, and in compliance with the National Response Framework, these operational centers must be functional and have the capacity to communicate and coordinate response activities. For those who have served in the military, an EOC is very similar to a military operations center, serving as an informational and activity hub. While EOCs vary in physical size and structure, the functions they perform and how they perform those functions are very similar. In an effort to provide a degree of standardization and seamless coordination in emergency response operations, key response elements, known as primary emergency support functions (ESF) have been identified and categorized by a standardized numerical system. 146

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Within EOCs, especially those with significant capabilities, ESF coordinators are typically drawn from the discipline reflected by the support function, such as firefighter personnel serving as the coordinators for ESF 4, firefighting. Personnel who will serve as ESF coordinators are key members of the EOC team and thus must be trained to understand their roles within the larger operations of the center. The coordinator has ongoing responsibilities throughout the preparedness, response, and recovery phases of incident management within their function. • ESF 1 Transportation; • ESF 2 Communications; • ESF 3 Public Works and Engineering; • ESF 4 Firefighting; • ESF 5 Emergency Management; • ESF 6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services; • ESF 6a Care of Companion and Service Animals; • ESF 7 Resource Support; • ESF 8 Public Health and Medical Services; • ESF 8a Behavioral Health; • ESF 9 Search and Rescue; • ESF 10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response; • ESF 11 Agriculture and Natural Resources; • ESF 12 Energy; • ESF 13 Public Safety and Security; • ESF 14 Long-Term Community Recovery; and • ESF 15 External Affairs.

5.5 Response Disaster response operations do not occur in a vacuum. Successful homeland security and emergency management operations require effective planning in which engaged, cooperative partnerships are established; command, communication and control issues addressed and resolved; response goals and priorities identified, developed, and agreed upon; response resources identified and committed for use; and response capabilities aligned with response goals and priorities. This collaboration is designed to prevent an unnecessary response delay or any response level being overwhelmed in times of crisis. Successful homeland security and emergency management operations must be conducted in a tiered response approach and must also be scalable, flexible, and adaptable to both the operational situation and existing capabilities. Tiered response refers to the efficient management of incidents so that such incidents are handled at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities only when needed. Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities must be applied with the understanding that incidents change in size, scope, and complexity. Within events, operational tempo will vary, with levels of intense activity and levels of reduced activity throughout the response and recovery operations. Homeland security and emergency management operations are designed to anticipate the potential jurisdictional needs of each sector prior to events and develop the procedures necessary to address those needs in collaboration with the private sector. With about 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure private and with the vast and diverse range of the country’s business and industry, the ability to coordinate and utilize private sector resources through ESF 7 Introduction to Homeland Security

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(logistics), when appropriate to streamline and bolster response efforts, is essential. Response efforts must rely on the private sector to provide emergency services support resources such as bottled water; food; supplies; generators; temporary housing; and, as important, the private logistical supply network to move materials into the areas where they are most needed.

5.6 Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Operations Center In addition to emergency response support, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a vast and diverse organization that includes over 20 major federal agencies. One of the many functions performed on the spectrum of homeland security and emergency management is obtaining and providing timely information and intelligence to decision makers. One of the very valuable organizations within DHS is the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). The Homeland Security Operations Center serves as the nation’s nerve center for information sharing and domestic incident management, enhancing the vertical coordination between federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector partners. The HSOC collects and fuses information to help deter; detect; and, when possible, reduce or prevent the impact of threats. The HSOC provides real-time situational awareness and monitoring of the homeland; coordinates incidents and response activities; and, in conjunction with the DHS Office of Information Analysis, issues advisories and bulletins concerning threats to homeland security, as well as specific protective measures. The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) is a functional component of the HSOC. The NRCC is a multi-agency center that provides overall federal response coordination. At the regional level, the RRCC coordinates regional response efforts and implements local federal program support until a joint field office is established. Information on domestic incident management is shared with emergency operations centers at all levels through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). In addition, many states have created intelligence fusion centers since 9/11, in which state and major urban area fusion centers serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners. The term “fusion” refers to the overarching process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and the private sector. It goes beyond establishing an information/intelligence center or creating a computer network. The fusion process is a cornerstone of the effective prevention of threats, including terrorism and other crimes, by state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local entities with support from federal partners in the form of deployed personnel, training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, connectivity to federal systems, technology, and grant funding. Many fusion centers have undertaken an all-crimes and/or all-hazards approach, as well as including multi-disciplinary and non–law enforcement partners in their processes. Though they have distinct missions and responsibilities, fusion centers and EOCs are partners in the homeland security enterprise. Coordination and collaboration between fusion centers and EOCs are crucial to improving the safety of the public. Different information requirements are associated with a fusion center in a steady state versus an active state. On a daily basis, fusion centers should be prepared to provide information on potential events to the EOC coordinators. In response, EOCs should provide fusion centers with situational awareness and warnings that can support ongoing all-hazards prevention and protection efforts. Exchanging 148

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actionable information and building relationships between fusion centers and EOCs provides for the timely exchange of accurate and useable information, thus improving the seamless execution of their respective prevention and response missions.

5.7 Protect: Disciplines, Functions, Operations Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 states, “This directive establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.” Most critical infrastructure and key assets are in local communities. The Protect mission area is one of the four mission areas that highlight the operational component in homeland security. In the Protect mission area, four target capabilities exist: critical infrastructure protection, food and agriculture safety and defense, epidemiological surveillance and investigation, and public health laboratory testing. In the Protect mission area, as in the Prevent mission area, law enforcement and public health are lead agencies. Operationally, one of the most critical tasks public safety undertakes is protecting critical infrastructure. Most of the critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. Critical infrastructure protection places a huge burden on local government. However, from a physical security perspective, protection of the critical infrastructure is a traditional role of law enforcement and public safety agencies. The traditional role has changed significantly since the 1990s. Because terrorism has been effective worldwide, a priority has been placed on protecting critical infrastructure within the United States. During 1996, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 13010. This executive order addressed the issues and concerns regarding critical infrastructure. The definition of “infrastructure” in this executive order is: The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society as a whole.1 Executive Order 13010 identified critical infrastructure as: • Telecommunications; • Electrical power systems; • Gas and oil storage and transportation; • Banking and finance; • Transportation; • Water supply systems; • Emergency services (including medical, police, and fire and rescue); and • Continuity of government.2 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 (Public Law 107–56) defines critical infrastructure as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. Introduction to Homeland Security

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This definition was adopted in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In Executive Order 13228 of 2001, President Bush articulated these critical infrastructures to be protected: • Energy production, transmission, and distribution services and critical facilities; • Other utilities; • Telecommunications; • Facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of nuclear material; • Public and privately owned information systems; • Special events of national significance; • Transportation, including railways, highways, shipping ports, and waterways; • Airports and civilian aircraft; and • Livestock, agriculture, and systems for the provision of water and food for human use and consumption. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, the following list identifies critical infrastructure and the agencies that are directed to act as lead in the Protect mission area. United States Department of Homeland Security: • Information technology; • Telecommunications; • Chemicals; • Transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems; • Emergency services; and • Postal and shipping services. United States Department of Agriculture: • Agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products). United States Department of Health and Human Services: • Public health, health care, and food (other than meat, poultry, and egg products). Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): • Drinking water and waste-water treatment systems. United States Department of Energy: • Energy, including the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas, and electric power (except for commercial nuclear power facilities). United States Department of the Treasury: • Banking and finance. United States Department of the Interior: • National monuments and icons. 150

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United States Department of Defense: • Defense industrial base. For each of the federal agencies, there is a corresponding function in both state and local governments. Banks and financial sector offices are located in local jurisdictions. The monuments and icons are in local jurisdictions. Military installations, farms, dairies, transportation systems—all are part of local jurisdictions. Disasters and acts of terrorism occur in local jurisdictions. The critical infrastructure protection is a priority in public safety for local jurisdictions. The priority is to prevent loss incidents from occurring. Hopefully, the intelligence function will provide the capability of intervening prior to an actual loss experience. If prevention is breached, the protection mission and initiatives are prioritized. To assist in protection planning and operational missions, the Department of Homeland Security publishes the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). As stated in that document, the overarching goal is to Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation’s CIKR (Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources) and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of CIKR in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.3 The NIPP further outlines the task for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. It states, “Develop and implement a CIKR protection program, in accordance with the NIPP risk management framework, as a component of their overarching homeland security programs.”4 The risk management scheme, in simplistic terms, examines consequence, vulnerability, and threat in a matrix format. Among local jurisdictions across the United States, as a matter of routine, there are personnel assigned to planning the protection of the critical infrastructure. They are training to protect those systems. They are equipping their first responders to ensure a safe operational environment, and they are exercising, along with the private sector, to ensure that the protection initiatives are adequate. In the risk analysis, as a facility, system, or event is identified as critical infrastructure, its vulnerability to a hazard is examined against the potential threat element. Once that examination or assessment is concluded, the public and private partnership works toward “target-hardening” efforts. What can be done to harden that target facility from the vulnerability to an attack? To facilitate the target-hardening efforts, the U.S. Congress, through the Department of Homeland Security, developed the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP). The purpose of the BZPP is stated in the 2009 program guidance: The FY 2009 BZPP provides funding to increase the preparedness capabilities of jurisdictions responsible for the safety and security of communities surrounding high- priority pre-designated Tier 1 and Tier 2 critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) assets, including chemical facilities, financial institutions, nuclear and electric power plants, dams, stadiums, and other high-risk/high consequence facilities, through allowable planning and equipment acquisition. (FEMA, 2009, p. 4; Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 1)5 Introduction to Homeland Security

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The local law enforcement jurisdiction containing the critical infrastructure is the recipient of the BZPP funds. The recipient agency or agencies work in partnership with the private sector to plan a buffer zone protection program for that site. It is a target-hardening initiative in an effort to enhance the protection for that jurisdiction and the facility. As examined in the prevention mission area, there are an infinite number of considerations and concerns within the context of protection initiatives. Later in this chapter, we will review a scenario in The Dalles, Oregon, involving the intentional contamination of two restaurant salad bars. This scenario can also be applied to the protection operations to observe how public health integrates into the protection mission. The protection of the food supply chain is an intricate balance between supply and demand, the free market economy, and public safety. Restaurants are at the end of the food supply chain. Protection causes the examination of the production environment and affiliated processing environments. It is an intricate examination. One may consider the production of cotton. Cotton is not a consumable. Primarily, one thinks of cloth and clothing as a main product from cotton. However, one may consider cotton seed oil as a derivative. Many consumable products contain cotton seeds. As cotton is harvested from the field, it is taken to a cotton gin to be ginned and processed into bales. The cotton seed is extracted from the cotton during the ginning process. Cotton gins sell the cotton seed to food processors for human and animal consumption. What is the consequence if contaminated cotton seed is fed to a million head of cattle in a Texas feed lot? Within the food supply chain, this question would have a large impact on the beef industry and the fast-food industry. All these scenarios and more are assumed in the planning process to protect critical infrastructure against acts of terrorism, criminal acts, and accidental events. The laws, strategies, and preparedness documents outline and lend guidance in how the country, through its homeland security function, will develop protection initiatives to guard the food supply and the public against these types of incidents. As evidenced in this discussion, the Prevent and Protect mission areas must collaborate. Threats, whether specific or nonspecific, require federal, state, local, and tribal governments to plan, train, equip, and exercise the public safety community in protection initiatives. Further, the need to form strong partnerships between the public and private sectors is evident when examining the infinite vulnerabilities that exist in the country’s critical infrastructure and key resources.

5.8 Intelligence as Related to Homeland Security: An Overview Decision makers rely on the information and intelligence upon which they make their decisions. While it would be outstanding to believe all information was valuable and all intelligence was accurate, sadly, that is not the case. Information may be inaccurate, intelligence incorrect, decisions flawed. From a state and local law enforcement perspective, the intelligence and information collection and sharing has fallen far below its potential value. The intelligence community was greatly criticized after the attacks of 9/11 in conjunction with materials provided to decision makers concerning the military and diplomatic operation in Iraq and, subsequently, in the Middle East. From a homeland security perspective, the intelligence capability may provide the potential for interrupting man-made incidents. Information sharing is the ability to transmit information 152

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to the “need to know” partners in the prevention mission area. Prevention capabilities move the preparedness initiatives closer to a proactive action, thereby reducing loss. Law enforcement operates within the prevention mission area as a lead discipline, especially in regard to the threats posed by terrorists. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the primary agency responsible for investigating suspected and overt acts of terrorism.6 This status is standard protocol for the FBI. Some make the mistake of interpreting this to mean that the FBI becomes the lead response agency. Do not be confused on this issue. Certainly, when an act of terrorism occurs or is threatened, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead agency in the investigation, and the U.S. Department of Justice is the lead in the prosecution. To repeat what is a recurring theme in this text, incidents occur in local communities. At no time, except in failed circumstances, does the federal government or its agencies take over a local community. The local law enforcement agencies are the lead in local intelligence, information sharing, and responding to a suspected and/or overt act of terrorism. The same is true for the local government responding to a natural disaster. However, to assist local and state governments, the President of the United States, in Presidential Decision Directive 39, followed in PDD 62, identified the FBI as the lead law enforcement agency in the investigation of acts of terrorism. This structure is the same model practiced when local communities have a robbery of an FDIC-insured bank and in other crimes having a federal jurisdiction. In 1980, the FBI, along with law enforcement partner agencies, established the first Joint Terrorism Task Force. Currently, there are over 100 JTTFs throughout the United States. Their membership comprises 2,196 FBI special agents, 838 state and local law enforcement officers, and 689 other professionals. The JTTFs are designed to provide a relatively small group of subject-matter experts, multi-disciplined and multi-jurisdictional, to work with federal, state, and local agencies in information sharing, intelligence, investigations, and resource support relative to acts of terrorism and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). The local JTTFs coordinate with the National Terrorism Task Force located in the Washington, D.C., headquarters of the FBI. State and local units of law enforcement participate in the JTTFs. Law enforcement, at every level of government, performs prevention initiatives. Within this discussion, the effectiveness of these initiatives is unexamined. It is important, within a discussion regarding homeland security as a function and operationally, to identify the various efforts made by law enforcement in the prevention mission area. It is also important to recognize that many federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies other than the FBI are involved in homeland security prevention initiatives. The FBI has been emphasized based on their being the lead in investigating potential and realized acts of terrorism within the United States. The threat of biological weapons has been prioritized by the federal government. The lead in responding to and investigating a suspected and/or actual biological incident is directed to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which is commonly referred to as Public Health (PH). Presidential Decision Directive 39 gives the lead in a biological incident to Public Health. The awareness of this directive has become relevant with the heightened threat of pandemic and avian flu outbreaks. When preparing for a CBRNE incident, the focus is not simply on some rogue laboratory creating a weapon from a benign substance or a violator bringing a substance into a jurisdiction. Instead, the focus concerns a potential threat element creating a weapon from an agent currently in the jurisdiction. For example, if a jurisdiction has a chemical manufacturing Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 5.3 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. (Source: FBI. From a 2010 presentation)

plant in their community, how can that facility or the product at that facility be weaponized and used against the jurisdiction? Is there a laboratory in the jurisdiction that works in the biological industry? Is there something manufactured within that entity that could be weaponized? Suspicious substance responses among local communities are common. Local governments spend a significant amount of money and time annually in responding to “white powder” and suspicious substance incidents. Most of the incidents involve suspected anthrax, which is later determined to be artificial sweeteners, baking soda, flour, etc. However, because governments must respond to these incidents, it is evident that it is a persistent threat that demands appropriate response. Public Health, at each level of government, is the lead entity in the prevention mission relative to the plethora of threats posed by biological incidents. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002 continued and expanded the legal intent of Public Health’s role in bioterrorism incidents. Excerpts from the Act promote the idea of operations relative to biological incidents. The Act states its purpose: “To improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.” Further, SEC. 2801. 154

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National Preparedness Plan states, “(a) in General (1) Preparedness and response regarding public health—The Secretary shall further develop and implement a coordinated strategy, building upon the core public health capabilities established pursuant to section 319A,42 USC 300hh.” Further the Act states, Public Law 107–188—June 12, 2002 116 STAT. 597 for carrying out health-related activities to prepare for and respond effectively to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies, including the preparation of a plan under this section. The Secretary shall periodically thereafter review and, as appropriate, revise the plan. (b) Preparedness Goals.—The plan under subsection (a) should include provisions in furtherance of the following: (1) Providing effective assistance to State and local governments in the event of bioterrorism or other public health emergency. . . (2) Ensuring that State and local governments have appropriate capacity to detect and respond effectively to such emergencies including capacities for the following.7 During 1984, a criminal biological incident occurred in The Dalles, Oregon. The incident involved a strain of salmonella. Salmonella is a food-borne pathogen. Its incubation period is between six and seventy-two hours. Symptoms may include diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, fever, and chills. In extreme cases, it can be fatal. The investigation involved the local health department and local law enforcement entities. Because of the preliminary concerns in the case, the Centers for Disease Control and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were requested. It took well over a year for authorities to determine that this incident was an intentional act. Once this suspicion is reached in an investigation that may involve weapons of mass destruction, the guiding law is Title 18, U.S.C. Section 2332(a), which defines a weapon of mass destruction. During the investigation, a vial was discovered at the Rajneesh ranch that matched the type of agent found at the restaurants. During1986, four people were convicted of the crime. A total of 751 people were infected by the salmonella. Bioterrorism represents the “intentional use of infectious agents, or germs, to cause illness.”8 Much has changed since this event occurred in the 1980s. Although its basic concept involved bioterrorism, the seriousness of bioterrorist dangers is unabated. During 2002, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act was enacted by Congress. This legislation contained the following items: • Authorization for approximately $1.5 billion of grant funding to assist “states, local governments, and healthcare facilities to improve their planning and preparedness, enhance lab capacity, and train personnel and to develop new drugs and vaccines”;9 • Authorization for approximately $1.15 billion for expanding the “Strategic National Stockpile, including the supply of smallpox vaccine”;10 • Authorization for approximately $300 million to support upgrades to components of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that deal with “public health threats”;11 • Mandating requirements for registering “all possessors of the 36 biological agents and toxins” that are deemed the “most dangerous to humans”12 and “similar regulation of agents that are devastating to crops and livestock”;13 • Authorization for approximately $545 million in funding for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for the purpose of hiring “food-import inspectors” and developing “new methods to detect contaminated foods, and protect crops and livestock”;14 Introduction to Homeland Security

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• Empowering of the FDA to detain and inspect “suspicious foods,” requiring “advance notice” of imported foods, and the gaining of improved “access to records” necessary for investigating the “source of food contamination”;15 and • Authorizing of at least $100 million in funding to assist “water utilities” when analyzing the vulnerabilities of “drinking-water systems to deliberate contamination.”16 One must neither discount nor ignore the potential dangers of bioterrorism. During 2013, three ricin-laced letters were mailed to President Barak Obama, U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, and Sadie Holland, a local judge in Tupelo, Mississippi.17 Initially, an Elvis impersonator named Paul Kevin Curtis was identified as the culprit.18 However, he was released, and charges were dropped.19 A second individual, Everett Dutschke, a martial arts instructor, was identified as the alleged culprit.20 Dutschke was arrested and charged with the crime.21 As an operational concern, it is necessary for law enforcement and Public Health to create a model of working the bioterrorism incident in partnership. The Public Health official must adapt to the protocols established and upheld by the courts as these protocols manage crime scenes, confidential information that may be under the supervision of grand juries and courts, and chain of custody issues. What may be considered a sample by Public Health is evidence to the law enforcement investigator. Evidence must be secured and preserved based on the court standard in chain of custody models. Conversely, law enforcement must learn the protocols mandated to Public Health authorities in assuming responsibility for the identification of substances, laboratory intake and analysis, and risk communications. Law enforcement and Public Health have a tremendous responsibility with respect to the mission of prevention. Public Health becomes a significant partner in the intelligence environment and indispensable in the information-sharing component. The broad spectrum of biological incidents that can occur causes the partnership between law enforcement and Public Health to continue to mature as the threat of biological incidents remains. This discussion emphasized the roles of both law enforcement and Public Health regarding the prevention initiatives. Law enforcement and Public Health are highlighted to exemplify the operations and functions within two lead agencies relative to prevention initiatives.

5.9 Strategic, Near-Term, and Operations Plans and Periods Implementing the functions and activities of homeland security operations involves careful consideration of a number of things: logistics, security, safety, command and control, intelligence, risk, public affairs, technology, contingencies, finances and costs, infrastructure, and a host of others. Although an incident may occur unexpectedly, addressing the incident involves implementing several emergency management functions and operations. Basically, responses become operational. Homeland security operations are neither desultory nor aimless. Instead, they require the use of some type of plan. A plan represents a methodical approach to dealing with a situation toward achieving some expected end state. Plans may be long term, be near term, or have some immediacy. For instance, a long-term plan may represent the recovery operations that occur during the aftermath of an incident (e.g., hurricane, earthquake, etc.) that span years. Strategic actions may be the rebuilding of neighborhoods, the recovering of economic transactions and business sectors (including infrastructure), litigation, or the recreation of highways or ports. Such long-term plans are usually referred to as strategic plans and typically accommodate periods averaging about five years in duration. Near-term, tactical plans may accommodate shorter periods ranging from months to years but are not necessarily strategic in their intent or duration. An example would be 156

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repairing and reopening damaged highway overpasses following an earthquake. Operational plans involve some consideration of immediacy. For instance, emergency management may craft a work schedule that encompasses a period of weeks, allocate necessary resources, assign tasks, and designate the necessary personnel and shifts. An old adage says, “If you take care of the short-term, the long-term takes care of itself.” This notion can be viewed from the perspectives of homeland security functions and operations. All three perspectives—strategic, near term, and operations—are integrated to form a cohesive, seamless relationship over time with respect to fulfilling some desired end state of vision. Basically, the strategic level provides the visionary, long-term perspective of what is to be accomplished over time. The near-term perspective represents the middle of the construct whereby managing occurs to fulfill long-term plans and influence operations commensurately. The operations perspective is where the lowest levels of planning and working occur daily (or over some period of relative immediacy).

5.9.1 Strategic Concepts Before the events of September 11, 2001, the New York World Trade Center (WTC) housed seven buildings, including the famous Twin Towers, which opened in 1973. The Twin Towers, designated One World Trade Center and Two World Trade Center, respectively, were the tallest buildings worldwide. The remainder of the WTC was erected between 1975 and 1985 and consisted of Three WTC (Marriott World Trade Center), Four WTC, Five WTC, Six WTC, and Seven WTC.22 The WTC buildings were located in the Financial District and accommodated 13,400,000 square feet (1,240,000 m2) of commercial office space overall.23 The cascading effects of the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers led to the destruction of the entire WTC complex. From the perspective of recovery, infrastructure, and economic functions, the September 11 incident had many strategic connotations. For instance, One World Trade Center was completed in 2014 and rose 1,776 feet, including its spire.24 It height was symbolic of the year 1776, in which American independence was established, and it represented the tallest building in the Western Hemisphere.25 Regarding the building’s use, the restoration of economic functions involved recruiting both commercial and government tenants.26 Three World Trade Center was completed in 2016 and rose to 1,079 feet.27 Some of its leases encapsulated periods of 20 years.28 Nearly 20 years after the terrorist attack against the New York World Trade Center that demolished the Twin Towers and surrounding infrastructure, complete replacements for the obliterated entities and disrupted economic functions are still absent. Nearly two decades after the attack, infrastructure and its corresponding economic activities continue to emerge again in New York. In June 2018, it was announced that the third of the planned replacement skyscrapers would open, with 3M as its anchor tenant.29 At the time of this authorship, strategic planning for another replacement tower continues. Although an anchor tenant had not been identified, debate ensued regarding the commencing of construction for Two World Trade Center.30 It would necessitate upward of four years of construction for completion.31 Five World Trade Center will contain 190,000 square feet of office space; a 12,000-square-foot community facility space; 55,000 square feet of public amenity space; 7,000 square feet of retail space; and 1.2 million square feet of residential space divided into 1,325 apartments. Among these, 330 units (i.e., 25% of the total inventory) will represent affordable housing. Five World Trade Center will be erected on the former site of the 39-story Deustsche Bank Building that was damaged during the 9/11 attacks and later demolished.32 The case of erecting World Trade Center buildings and instigating economic functioning presents a unique perspective of the strategic concepts of homeland security functions and Introduction to Homeland Security

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operations. Throughout its history, other than during the Civil War, the United States was blessed to have emerged victorious from its conflicts without substantial damages to its physical, environmental, and economic infrastructures. The events of 9/11 changed every American’s perspective of the homeland’s invulnerability to the domestic effects of warfare. Until 9/11, reconstruction and revitalization following conflicts were concepts that citizens related to other nations. For instance, after World War II, Europe and Japan were devastated in many ways— physically, politically, financially, economically, environmentally, agriculturally, socially, and so on. American assistance was crucial in their cumulative rebuilding and economic growth. Reconstruction in Europe and Japan did not occur overnight. Instead, it involved decades of effort toward fulfilling the strategic vision and enacting long-term plans. American infrastructure

Figure 5.4 The Twin Towers. (Source: U.S. National Archives)

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was largely untouched by the ravages of World War II and was a source of resources for other nations that experienced devastation. However, the events of September 11 impacted the homeland in many ways that were previously unexperienced by and unknown in American society. Akin to the experiences of other countries, the nation required decades merely for the planning, crafting, and erecting of replacement buildings and reinstating their corresponding economic activities following a solitary act of war. At the time of this authorship in 2019, strategic efforts toward completing the World Trade Center campus are ongoing. By the time all of its buildings are erected, tenants established, and economic functions vitalized, between three and four decades may pass. In other words, New York may experience a recovery period of 30 years or longer. Given these notions, homeland security functions and operations certainly have long-term strategic connotations.

5.9.2 Near-Term Tactical Concepts The concept of a near-term tactical plan may be considered from the perspective of 2017’s Hurricane Harvey. The storm was of immense proportions, devastated the Southeast Texas area with rains and floods, and was deemed one of the wettest events in portions of the state.33 Its financial damages were approximately $125 billion, making it one of the nation’s costliest disasters.34 Its financial costs rivaled those of Hurricane Katrina.35 After the storm, it was expected that a minimum of one month was necessary for floodwaters to recede.36 The storm dumped approximately 14.5 trillion gallons of water onto Houston, Texas, flooding the area and either damaging or destroying infrastructure.37 Figure 5.5 shows an example of flooding within the city. Following incidents, localities may need medical resources. However, they may become unavailable because of the incident. However, in due time, a locality may be able to recover some or all its medical services. In the case of Hurricane Harvey, the Townsen Memorial

Figure 5.5 Flooding in Houston, Texas, after Hurricane Harvey. (Source: U.S. Department of the Interior)

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Hospital took nearly a calendar year after the hurricane before it was able to open and become operational again.38 Thus, the overall effort toward refitting and reopening the hospital involved a near-term tactical plan and period. In some cases, situations may dictate the permanent cessation of services. Although the Townsen Memorial Hospital reopened after nearly a year of inactivity, not all the region’s medical centers were deemed repairable and capable of resuming services. For instance, the East Houston Regional Medical Center was deemed unsafe for further operation because it was located in a low area that was susceptible to floods.39 Despite its continued operations for over 40 years, Hurricane Harvey flooded it with over six feet of rainfall.40 A medical center is more than the physical infrastructure that constitutes its existence because its services are provided by its constituent personnel. Because of its closure, an example of a near-term tactical decision involved reassigning its human resources. Around 500 employees of the hospital were transferred to other locations around the areas of South Texas, Corpus Christi, and Houston.41 Hurricane Harvey presented scenarios in which tactical decisions influenced the overall strategic functioning of the health care sector. Basically, by deciding to not reopen certain medical facilities, the services that they would have rendered within society were lost, unless a new competitor attempted to become a substitute entity. If medical services are lost, then consumers who partake of them must locate alternative providers in other areas. As a result, services offered may differ, service times may differ, logistics may differ, costs may differ, and so on. Thus, any crafted plans that depended on the closed entities must be altered to accommodate the effects of the change.

5.10 Concepts of Processes and Procedures A process is a methodical series of sequential steps that must be completed over time in order to achieve some overarching purpose or outcome. Processes may be strategic and near-term (i.e., tactical) or operational. In other words, processes may be considered from long-term, near-term, or relatively immediate perspectives. Regardless, organizational processes contribute to the overall functioning toward fulfilling vision and satisfying both goals and objectives.

5.10.1 Long-Term Strategic Processes Within the context of homeland security and emergency management, processes and procedures may be examined from the perspective of long-term strategic functions involving the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The QHSR represents the DHS’s long-term strategic capstone document. By law, it is updated and changed to reflect contemporary strategic concerns every four years.42 Each cycle for generating the QHSR necessitates a copious three-year process of generating and finalizing its reported contents and providing them to the U.S. Congress.43 It provides insight into strategic priorities and long-term strategy with respect to the functions and operations of constituent agencies and organizations.44 Excerpted from the 2014 QHSR, Figure 5.6 depicts an example of the strategic organizational associations among emergency service functions, coordinators, and agencies. The activities and long-term endeavors detailed in the QHSR are the result of the strategic planning process. Strategic planning is the process of crafting organizational strategy. It is often supplemented by additional processes, including implementing strategy, evaluating strategy, and maintaining strategy. Typically, strategic planning contributes to fulfilling the long-term organizational vision. 160

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5.10.2 Near-Term Tactical Processes Homeland security functions necessitate consideration of near-term tactical processes. A primary example involves the context of human resources. No matter the organization, whether government or civilian, its most important asset is the individual human. Humans are the leaders, managers, and line workers for every organization, including those in the homeland security domain. Within the context of human resources, an example of near-term processes involves those necessary for developing a workforce that suits the needs of the homeland security enterprise Therefore, near-term processes must address issues associated with “training the workforce” strategies and identifying pertinent contacts for the crafting of a national research agenda (Tolk & Oren, 2017, p. 365).45 Generating trained individuals capable of fulfilling any number of homeland security roles can be done in varying amounts of time. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides a myriad of workshops, grants, fellowships, and internships for people to acquire and hone the knowledge and understanding that meets the demands of the challenges that impact the nation.46 For instance, modeling and simulation are tools for examining and exploring any number of pertinent homeland security fields, including engineering, economic, health care, and defense applications.47 From the perspective of intelligence analysis, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Education is tasked with developing and maintaining a specialized and integrated national intelligence workforce.48 Depending on the organization, training times may range from days and weeks to months and years. Although resources exist through which individuals are trained to work in the homeland security domain, generating qualified individuals occurs through systematic processes. For instance, when implementing a two-year program that graduates certified registered nurses, a variety of processes are necessary, both administratively and academically. Application, candidate selection and acceptance, orientation, financial aid, location scheduling, and course scheduling are examples of the administrative processes that facilitate movement through the program. In the academic context, teaching, lecturing, testing and assessment, and transcription are examples of relevant academic processes. Such notions are relevant for developing and managing similar training programs. Another example of processes involving a near-term perspective is the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) Security and Resilience Challenge. This entity provides opportunities for the critical infrastructure domain to assist in developing technologies, tools, processes, and methods that address the immediate requirements and bolster the long-term security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure.49 More specifically, the program touts itself as follows: Projects funded under the NIPP Challenge are meant to not only have tangible, nearterm results so they can be quickly developed and implemented, but to also be financially, practically, and logistically sustainable in the long term so that they can enhance the security and resilience of critical infrastructure across multiple sectors for years to come.50 The description alludes to the intermediary nature of the near-term perspective. It expects that ideas can be turned into functional entities quickly to support homeland security functions, endeavors, and activities. Thus, it has some connotations of immediacy whereby the homeland security community may develop and use resources within an acceptable period. However, in doing so, such resource development must contribute to fulfilling the overall needs of long-term strategic concerns from the perspective of critical infrastructure. Introduction to Homeland Security

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ESFs and ESF Coordinators ESF #

ESF

ESF Coordinator

Primary Agency

1

Transportation

Department of Transportation

Department of Transportation

2

Communications

DHS/National Protectionand Programs/Cybersecurity and Communications/National Communications System

DHS/NationalCommunications System DHS/FEMA

3

Public Works and Engineering

Department of Defense/U.S. Ar my Corps of Engineers

Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

4

Firefighting

Department of Agriculture/Forest Service, DHS/FEMA

Department of Agriculture/Forest Service

5

Information and Planning

DHS/FEMA

DHS/FEMA

6

Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services

DHS/FEMA

DHS/FEMA, AmericanRed Cross

7

Logistics

General Services Administration, DHS/FEMA

General Services Administration, DHS/FEMA

8

Public Health and Medical Services

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Healthand Human Services

9

Search and Rescue

DHS/FEMA

DHS/FEMA, DHS/U. S. Coast Guard, DHS/Customsand Border Protection, Department of the Interior/National Park Service, Department of Defense

10

Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

Environmental Protection Agency

Environmental Protection Agency, DHS/ U.S.Coast Guard

11

Agriculture and Natural Resources

Department of Agriculture

Department of Agriculture, Department of the Interior

12

Energy

Department of Energy

Department of Energy

13

Public Safety and Security

14 15

Department of Justice/ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosive s

Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

Superseded by National Disaster Recovery Framework External Affairs

DHS

DHS/FEMA

Figure 5.6 Associations among ESFs, coordinators, and agencies. (Source: Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, p. 90)

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5.10.3 Operational Processes Operational processes have some immediacy. Conceptually, they may be deemed the processes that are necessary for developing, generating, or maintaining a service or good. For instance, if a fire department is dispatched to the location of a rail car explosion, certain processes for allocating resources, activating units, and routing and deploying resources are necessary to ensure an efficient response. They also represent the processes that are necessary for the day-to-day running of an organization. From the perspective of information security, organizations may employ a variety of processes and procedures for maintaining the safety, security, and integrity of their information resources and assets. For instance, database systems may use some form of check-in or check-out system or otherwise restrict access to physical and virtual environments (Elmasri & Navathe, 2017).51 Some processes exist as service processes. Examples of virtual services include creating backups of database resources and data sets, maintaining user accounts, applying security software updates and patches, and so forth (Snedaker, 2007).52 Physical processes include searches at security checkpoints, processes to issue or recover an employee identification card, processes for patrolling assigned areas, and so forth (Shukla, 2017).53 Regardless of the process, it contributes to the overall functioning of the organization and its endeavors.

5.11 Summary The operational components of homeland security and emergency management are performed through prevent, protect, respond, and recovery mission areas. The capabilities within the four mission areas are performed among a myriad of disciplines and agencies at every level of local, state, and federal governments. Homeland security is tasked with coordinating and supporting those disciplines in performing within the mission areas. True disaster response success is built on a foundation of preparation. Effective preparation is built on a foundation of the identification of vulnerabilities and the further identification of resources that can be reliably called upon and employed in the event of a disaster. Thus, resources must be controlled, coordinated, led, planned, organized, directed, and staffed in accordance with plans and procedures. Tremendous demands are placed on the first-responder community. Police, fire, and emergency services must be prepared through planning, training, equipment, and exercises to meet challenges that continue to grow in scope and complexity among the myriad of potential response environments. Emergency responders, such as public health, emergency management, public works, and others must subsequently be prepared to support the immediate needs of the first responders. It is awesome to consider preparing disciplines for the challenges that may be met on any given day at any given time. The threat of terrorism exists. It could be biological, an improvised explosive device, or a dirty bomb. The nation must question whether it is prepared to meet all these challenges. Police officers, fire personnel, and emergency personnel can only spend so much money on equipment, supplies, and manpower. Training is challenging for civilian responders because frequently, they are not paid to train in first response although they are trained to be at work in the patrol car, at the firehouse, and in the ambulance. The average patrol car, fire truck, and ambulance carry much more equipment than they did ten years ago. Another concern is responder safety and health. The first responder today must be aware of the various types of environments that may be experienced during disasters. The idea of being exposed to a weaponized biological agent Introduction to Homeland Security

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is looming. What about being contaminated with a chemical used as a weapon? What are the chances terrorists have a second bomb hidden in the vicinity of the first bomb with a delayed detonation designed to kill first responders? Such considerations are indicative of threats that are posed to the emergency response community. Homeland security has an awesome task. Undoubtedly, homeland security has an operational component. It is a critical component among modern preparedness environments. The function of homeland security is to plan, train, equip, and exercise the operational model for eventual deployment. Homeland security may or may not be a discipline, depending on one’s perspective. Regardless, it is a vital function of government.

5.12 Key Terms Coordination Emergency Management Emergency Operations Center Homeland Security Homeland Security Operations Center Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 Intelligence Multi-Agency Coordination Center National Response Coordination Center National Response Framework Operational Process

Procedure Process Protect Recovery Resource Response Standardization Strategic Process Strategy Tactical Process

5.13 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. This chapter introduced the concept of a strategic process. Perform some research in your locality about long-term strategic processes affecting emergency management. Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. 2. This chapter discussed the notion of recovery. Please define the term “recovery.” Select a disaster in your state in which recovery efforts were pursued toward normalcy. Perform some research, and determine whether you believe full normalcy was achieved after the event. Write a brief essay that presents your findings and justifies your opinion. 3. This chapter discussed the notion of a resource. Please define the term “resource.” Within your locality or state, what do you believe are the most important assets for emergency management? Write a brief essay that substantiates your choices. 4. This chapter introduced the concept of standardization. Please define the term “standard.” Examine your state’s homeland security department from the perspective of standards. What standards did you discover? Write a brief essay that highlights your findings.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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Executive Order 13010–Critical Infrastructure Protection. 1996. Ibid. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. 2009. Ibid. FY 2009 Buffer Zone Protection Program. Retrieved from www.FEMA.gov. 2009.

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41. Ibid. 42. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2019). Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). Retrieved from www.dhs.gov/quadrennial-homeland-security-review. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Tolk, A., and Oren, T. (2017). The Profession of Modeling and Simulation: Discipline, Ethics, Education, Vocation, Societies, and Economics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing. 46. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2019). Building America’s future homeland security sci‑ ence and engineering workforce. Retrieved from www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/workforcedevelopment-initiatives#. 47. Ibid. 48. Alperen, M. J. (2017). Foundations of Homeland Security: Law and Policy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing. 49. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2019). National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) Security and Resilience Challenge. Retrieved from www.dhs.gov/cisa/nipp-security-and-resilience-challenge. 50. Ibid. 51. Elmasri, R., and Navathe, S. (2017). Fundamentals of Database Systems, 7th edition. Essex: Pearson. 52. Snedaker, S. (2007). Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery for IT Professionals. Burlington, MA: Syngress Publishing. 53. Shukla, S. M. (2017). Security Management: A Comprehensive Guide for Improving the Security Environment. Chetpet: Notion Press.

References Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy. (2013). University of Minnesota. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/index.html (accessed April 27, 2013). Department of Homeland Security. (2009). NIPP Plan, p. 1. Retrieved March 19, 2009, from Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved March 19, 2009, from www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf. Elmasri, R., and Navathe, S. (2017). Fundamentals of Database Systems, 7th edition. Essex: Pearson. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2004, December 1). Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved March 19, 2009, from www.fbi.gov/page2/dec04/jttf120114.htm. Feds Charge Mississippi Man in Case of Ricin-Laced Letter Sent to Obama. (2013). Fox News. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/04/27/feds-make-arrest-in-case-ricin-laced-letter-sent-to-obama/. FEMA. (2009a). FY 2009 BZPP Guidance. FEMA, p. 4. Retrieved March 19, 2009, from www.fema.gov/pdf/ government/grant/bzpp/fy09_bzpp_guidance.pdf. FEMA. (2009b). Federal emergency management agency. About the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Retrieved September 17, 2009, from www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/AboutNIMS.shtm. King County, Washington. (2013). Bioterrorism Preparedness. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from www.king county.gov/healthservices/health/preparedness/bioterrorism.aspx. The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. (1996, July 15). Executive Order Eo 13010 Critical Infrastructure Protection. FAS.org, p. 1. Retrieved March 19, 2009, from www.fas.org/irp/ offdocs/eo13010.htm. Shukla, S. M. (2017). Security Management: A Comprehensive Guide for Improving the Security Environment. Chetpet, Chennai: Notion Press. Snedaker, S. (2007). Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery for IT Professionals. Burlington, MA: Syngress Publishing. Tolk, A., and Oren, T. (2017). The Profession of Modeling and Simulation: Discipline, Ethics, Education, Vocation, Societies, and Economics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing.

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6 The Partnerships of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

What I’ve always found is that people will respond to meet a need in a crisis if they know what to do. You give people the opportunity to be a part of something that will make a difference and they will step up. —James Lee Witt, Former FEMA Director The way it’s best described is DHS is the conductor of an orchestra. All of these partners . . . are the various musicians playing beautiful music together creating a symphony of preparedness. We’ve made great progress. —George Foresman, Undersecretary for Preparedness, DHS Partnerships are critical; trust, understanding and clear communications between partners are essential. —David Hughes McElreath, University of Mississippi The objectives of this chapter are to: • Gain an understanding of the importance of partnerships in support of homeland security and emergency management operations; • Understand the Whole Community approach as it applies to the response community; • Describe nongovernment organizations and discuss the role they play during an emergency and their role with stakeholders; • Examine the history and current role of Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs); • Within the response community, examine the roles that may be performed by faithbased organizations; and • Summarize the functions of nongovernmental organizations in emergency management.

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6.1 Introduction Emergency management is a critical component of homeland security. It is the tip of the spear when we discuss disaster response. Emergency management is about preventing the loss of human life, the preservation of property, and preparedness in the event of a significant accident or natural or man-made disaster. The profession of emergency management has steadily evolved over the last several decades with preparation, response, and recovery strategies adapting with changes in capabilities and technologies. With respect to disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery, it is apparent that governments alone cannot meet the growing demand for services and resources to fully protect a community. As a result, the homeland security, emergency management, and disaster response communities have to look to other elements within society to provide the various resources necessary for disaster response and recovery. Many of these resources can be found in the private sector and attained through partnerships (Buttarazzi, 2013). Within the emergency management environment, much depends on achieving a balance between available resources and the wisdom to effectively use those resources. For the emergency manager, it is important to recognize the capabilities that may be provided by volunteer, nongovernmental, faith-based, and auxiliary governmental organizations. Today, these organizations play an important role, serving as a force multiplier for the homeland security and emergency management communities (McElreath et al., 2014b).

6.2 Why Are Partnerships Important? No one agency or level of government can be entirely responsible for the security of the United States, when one considers the wide variety of threats that potentially face the

Figure 6.1 Partnerships are a key element in response.

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Prevention -Mitigation

Preparedness Figure 6.2 Emergency response cycle.

Recovery

Response

nation. As a result, public officials, including, but not limited to, homeland security, emergency management, and first responders, must continually examine their vulnerabilities and develop realistic response plans that take into considerations resources that may be called upon and utilized, especially during the first critical hours related to a major event. Every disaster is different, and the dynamic process of community recovery is shaped by the level of destruction or disruption that is experienced. The resources available to support the recovery effort, the time available to recover, the effectiveness of the recovery effort, and the efficiency of the human element are greatly influenced by the pre-event planning and coordination (McElreath et al., 2014a). Recovery on a large scale is often a massive effort that typically includes a wide spectrum of participants and is conducted over months or years. In events that greatly overwhelm local resources, response and recovery efforts typically involve the combined efforts of many public and private agencies and organizations (Levy & Prizzia, 2018). The question may be asked: Why create and maintain partnerships? Many things can be achieved. Public-private partnerships are an integral part of strengthening resilience because they can help increase efficiency and effectiveness in disaster management (Busch & Givens, 2013). In addition to serving as a resource and personnel force multiplier (McElreath et al., 2014a), the additional eyes and minds serve to enhance situational awareness and contribute to improved decision making and enhanced team building (FEMA, Building Better Resiliency–Together, 2013).

6.3 An Overview of Partnerships The nature of disaster response has always lent itself to community-based cooperation in recovery. Neighbors assisting neighbors, from the earliest times, recognized that cooperation was a key element of survival. The communities of our nation faced disasters and the challenges of disaster response long before the creation of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), President George W. Bush described the government’s efforts to perform homeland security activities as a “patchwork” of efforts. Introduction to Homeland Security

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This term referred to the many agencies and programs that were working toward ensuring the security of the United States relative to domestic preparedness but whose efforts were not effectively coordinated. One of the major purposes in creating the Department of Homeland Security was to establish a framework to enhance a comprehensive and cohesive coordination of the agency and organizational partnerships. Response partnerships combine public and private sector resources that provide support and assistance in the event of a disaster contingency. The concept of partnerships in government has a long history, as reflected in the Declaration of Independence. Partnerships, both domestically and internationally, are essential to the success of the national domestic preparedness program called homeland security. The DHS is demonstrative of a myriad of partnerships that facilitate homeland security initiatives; it is a government entity. Given the advent and proliferation of globalization, any consideration of homeland security must also incorporate some attributes of the private sector with respect to both for-profit and nonprofit entities. Numerous alliances exist that provide America with the ability to prepare for disasters, respond to disasters, and recover from disasters. From a nonprofit perspective, the American Red Cross provides a myriad of services during hurricanes and other incidents. From the for-profit perspective, a variety of corporations may donate resources to support disaster response and relief operations and initiatives (GAO, 2019). The post-September 11, 2001 and Katrina environments required homeland security to be not the solitary responsibility of any one individual, agency, or organization but a shared responsibility across all sectors of our national life (Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011). The manifestation of security and safety occurs through collaboration, cooperation, coordination, and the sharing of information and resources. Therefore, many partnerships exist that provide opportunities for both organizations and individuals to participate in numerous activities and roles commensurate with their skills, abilities, and resources (McElreath et al., 2014a). An example is the provision of mass quantities of canned and bottled water that were supplied by beer and cola companies during the 2005 hurricane disaster relief operations. Anheuser-Busch has a longstanding tradition of providing water and supplies to those affected by natural disasters nationwide. In 2016, Anheuser-Busch produced and shipped emergency drinking water to communities hit by natural disasters, including the California wildfires, the Louisiana floods, and Hurricane Matthew. Since 1988, the St. Louis–based brewer has provided over 76 million cans of drinking water to aid disaster-stricken areas. The notion of securing the homeland is not a new concept. The basic premise of ensuring the safety and security of American communities and localities originated during the Colonial period. A cornerstone of achieving such safety and security exists among all American communities: the individual. Following the tragic events of 9/11, federal, state, and local government officials increased opportunities for individuals to volunteer their time, skills, and expertise to assist first responders during times of emergency. Individuals may volunteer through corporate community service programs in the private sector, through traditional volunteer-based organizations such as Catholic Charities and the Salvation Army, or through the programs of Citizen Corps. Each of these sectors contributes positively toward the goals of homeland security preparedness and response initiatives. Volunteers in these sectors commit to training, preparedness, planning, and implementation of services when called upon by their community, state, or nation. Through such efforts, local communities demonstrate the ability to provide some level of security and safety for their citizens. 170

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A characteristic shared by all these organizations is the land-based approach they all manifest regarding potential disasters. However, threats may not always be land based. Instead, they may involve aerial or maritime attributes that impact America. Although disasters may occur inland, aerial functions (e.g., search and rescue or damage assessment) or maritime functions (e.g., relief supply transportation for environmental disasters) may be needed during disaster response and recovery. Organizations that provide these needed services are found in the government and nonprofit sectors. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP), the auxiliary branch of the U.S. Air Force, includes emergency services in their mission. The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and the United States Power Squadron (a nonprofit organization) both provide maritime emergency services. All three organizations utilize volunteers to carry out their respective missions and activities. Another aspect of homeland security partnerships involves the basic nature of the relationships that define and govern the partnered entities. Partnerships may be either willful or mandated. Within the government architecture, DHS partnerships may be mandated through legislation or through the creation and implementation of various government agencies. With respect to the private and nonprofit sectors, partnerships may be willful and may be exercised through contracts, agreements, or memorandums of understanding (MOUs) to govern the basic attributes of the relationships among the participating entities. Regardless of the construct, relationships exist among both governmental and private entities that facilitate the effective and efficient conveyance of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities across the country. Historically, the U.S. has fought a variety of wars successfully and overcome numerous challenges that threatened its existence. Although many agencies and organizations have come and gone, their legacy and conceptual basis continue to influence modern homeland security paradigms. For example, the World War II Merchant Marine is no longer an entity that pervades ocean sea routes. However, within the context of homeland security, its basic principle of protecting and facilitating American shipping and logistics remains an important consideration of the modern U.S. Maritime Administration. Another timeless concept involves the provision of resources that are necessary for overcoming any obstacle or threat that challenges the nation. An example of this concept is the War Powers Act of World War II that provided the President with an unprecedented level of control affecting U.S. industrial and economic activities.

6.4 The Whole Community Approach and the Challenges of Building Response Partnerships Disasters are never easy. Lives are disrupted and, in some cases, lost. Property is damaged. Incidents may happen with little or no warning and involve speed, surprise, and violence. Communities are challenged. Whether the disaster is a natural event, the result of an accident, or an intentional situation, the ability to transition from shock to response is essential. Following a disaster, citizens expect resources to arrive quickly and recovery to a sense of normalcy. There is often an assumption that state and federal resources will arrive in a timely manner to do this needed work; however, the reality is that initial disaster response and recovery start at the local level—all disasters are local. Structuring disaster response around the Whole Community concept is our current approach to enhancing emergency management response. Whole Community is a means by which residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community leaders, and government officials can collectively understand and assess the needs of their respective communities and determine the best ways to organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests. By doing so, a more effective path to societal security and resilience is built (Levy & Prizzia, 2018). Introduction to Homeland Security

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In many ways, Whole Community is a philosophical approach to conducting emergency management. It attempts to engage the full capacity of the private and nonprofit sectors, including businesses, faith-based and disability organizations, and the general public, in conjunction with local, tribal, state, territorial, and federal governmental partners (FEMA, 2011). The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to “safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values” from the many threats we face. To effectively accomplish this major feat, the DHS must rely upon its agencies, as well and those public, private, local, state, and tribal organizations called upon to support preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), U.S. Marshals, and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) also assist the DHS in making arrests, interrupting criminal acts, and responding to scenes of national emergencies. Another major resource is the United States Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD can activate significant quantities of personnel and equipment that can operate in the most difficult of environments, and even more importantly, military units can sustain themselves while assisting in major recovery operations. Generations of Americans have become accustomed to the Marines, Navy, Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and National Guard being deployed in short-term and longer-term conflicts throughout the world. Americans have also witnessed Army National Guardsmen work side by side with civilian responders in filling sandbags along river levees, providing security during national emergencies, and assisting in maintaining law and order at scenes of civil unrest.

6.5 Building and Sustaining Partnerships Within the disciplines of homeland security and emergency response, the creation and sustainment of response partnerships is an essential factor in successful event response (Cellucci, 2018). With the Whole Community approach to disaster response, the pre-event identification of capabilities and assignment of roles for disaster response partners prior to an event pay dividends. It falls to the homeland security and emergency management professionals to ensure the capabilities promised by response partners actually can be achieved. Frequent training of response partners that includes the actual inspection and testing of their promised capabilities remains essential. Emergency response operations often require coordinated action among many actors across multiple jurisdictions under conditions of urgent stress, high demand, and tight time constraints (Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011). The resources of local, state, and federal government agencies, supplemented by the resources of volunteers and NGOs, play an integral role significant to the effective management of a critical incident or disaster. These NGOs are positioned in the private sector (corporate entities) or as nonprofit groups (charitable support). Preparedness cannot be accomplished by the public sector alone. All preparedness efforts are corporately organized by the joint partnerships through these solution areas (Chandra, Moen, & Sellers, 2016). For example, local responders, in partnership with private partners, conduct scheduled risk assessments, identifying critical infrastructure vulnerable to natural and man-made incidents. Risk assessments are part of the master planning tasks. The development and sustainment of dependable partnerships within the domain of emergency management requires effort. Identifying a list of potential private sector (and voluntary) partners that could participate in emergency and disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery can be a difficult (Buttarazzi, 2013). The steps require an assessment of needs, identification of potential sources to need those needs, articulating a clear understanding of expectations and requirements, and sustaining those relations. 172

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6.6 Scope of Work Partnerships in homeland security and emergency management may include utilities (infrastructure, damage assessment), transportation firms (evacuation, supply chain), engineers (infrastructure, damage assessment), communications (equipment, damage assessment, staff augmentation for communications staff within jurisdiction), debris removal, temporary housing, construction companies (equipment, materials, supplies, personnel for repairs), food and water suppliers, hardware retailers, health-care facilities (hospitals, senior living, clinics), temporary staff services, private security companies, and warehouse space/temporary storage/mass storage (Buttarazzi, 2013).

6.6.1 Emergency Operations Centers and National Response Framework Partnerships may also be established in specialized areas often considered outside typical emergency management partnerships. As an example, FEMA and the Smithsonian Institution developed the Heritage Emergency National Task Force, which includes federal and national service agencies and is supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. The role of the program is to provide expertise to assist emergency managers and cultural institutions about how to save cultural heritage threatened or impacted by disasters (McKay, 2018). The National Response Framework (NRF) outlines and gives explanation to the national emergency management system. The response, operational model, and partnerships are well defined. The response system outlined in the NRF has been institutionalized; a national model was replicated from federal to state to local emergency management agencies. FEMA activates the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and regional coordination centers (RCC). Each state has a state Emergency operations center (SEOC). Local governments have one or more emergency operations centers (EOC). Usually, at the local government level, the state statutes will recognize one local EOC as the primary point of coordination. When activated, these tiered operation centers are hubs of coordination for the resources and assets, communications, and command and control of the incident. This system provides immediate connection with the local, state, and federal officials and response personnel in coordination of the event. Although this is an oversimplification of the greater system, it provides a high-level look at the basic operational function. Within the national emergency management system, there are emergency support functions (ESFs). ESFs represent the primary partnerships in response. There are some differences among jurisdictions in the assignment of ESFs, but most are common. The system is simple. Its design makes it easy to move from one jurisdiction to another and recognize the functions without requiring extensive training. Some jurisdictions have functions that other jurisdictions do not. However, the ESF model remains consistent regardless of the number of ESFs identified and/or the tasks within the designated ESFs. The Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework identifies fifteen emergency support functions and the disciplines that operate within those categories. They are as follows: • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF

1: Transportation; 2: Communications; 3: Public Works and Engineering; 4: Firefighting; 5: Information and Planning; 6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services; Introduction to Homeland Security

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• ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF • ESF

7: Logistics; 8: Public Health and Medical Services; 9: Search and Rescue; 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response; 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources; 12: Energy; 13: Public Safety and Security; 14: Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure; and 15: External Affairs.

Each of the ESFs is coordinated by emergency support coordinators (ESCs). ESCs are personnel assigned to the operation centers upon activation; they may come from the private sector, community VOADs (COADs), or government entities. ESF 6, which includes housing, may be coordinated by a representative from American Red Cross while ESF 14 may be handled by a representative from the long-term recovery group. Personnel designated as ESCs are uniquely qualified within their disciplines and trained in the emergency management system. To understand how the partnership works, there must be an understanding of the ESF and ESC relationship. There is little knowledge on the part of the public and in some response agencies regarding the work of the ESC and the integration with the operations center. The lack of knowledge probably is caused by the inherent lack of visibility of this part of the system and the lack of realistic training that would educate the public about EOCs. The media and public information officers generally report from the incident scene(s). The operations centers and the ESCs are behind the scene. The emergency operations centers are usually in low-traffic areas and in as secure an environment as available to the jurisdiction. When the operations center is activated, the respective ESC’s respond to that location. Each ESC represents a discipline as outlined and suggested in the NRF. These centers are the link from operations to the scene of all other logistical support. The operation centers offer an excellent snapshot of the preparedness partners at work in a coordinated and cohesive effort. The ESC at the local government EOC has a counterpart at the state EOC. The state ESC has a counterpart at the NRCC. This system offers a foundation for clear, concise, and orderly management of the resources and assets needed to resolve the incident. Communications are critical and essential during a response. This system enhances the ability to communicate and remain orderly in potentially chaotic environments. At the local EOC, the local response partners are coordinated, and command and control is established. As needs arise, the local EOC contacts the SEOC, and state resources are coordinated. If further needs arise, the SEOC contacts the NOC, where the federal resources are coordinated. Each of these centers can be operational from fixed or mobile locations. The emergency operations system is an excellent venue to capture who the preparedness partners are and how the multi-disciplined, multi-jurisdictional partnerships integrate into a single mission organism.

6.7 Planning, Training, and Equipping Partnerships For homeland security and emergency management professionals, threat assessment, planning, training, equipment, and exercise partnerships are essential to ensure rapid and efficient response. Partnerships in the solution areas require participation by the public sector and the private sector. 174

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Data assimilated from those assessments are used to develop strategic plans, operational plans, and tactical plans. These plans are then incorporated into the continuity of operations and continuity of government plans as part of the recovery mission area. It is impossible to develop these plans in the absence of police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, public health, and government administration. It is equally impossible to develop these plans in the absences of the private sector, including financial, industrial, and business partners. These integrated plans outline the guidelines for prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Proper planning then supports the training, equipping, and exercising of programs. In the shared responsibility environment of the Whole Community, training is essential for all partners. First responders have core competencies and professional standards that must be met, and these are often established through regulatory, legislative, or professional bodies. The police, fire, and emergency medical services have standard training to meet these core competencies, and emergency managers have professional certification available to them through the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). While local and state governments make available some funding for first-responder training, often those funds are limited. The federal government, through the Department of Homeland Security, has provided fiscal resources through grant programs, targeting training gaps in areas including, but not limited to, anti-terrorism efforts. Additionally, the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services have provided funding to assist in providing other training to complement the preparedness mission. Today, though, training has moved well beyond core competencies. FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) offers first responders, emergency management professionals, disaster response volunteers, and even the public access to a wide range of training topics. FEMA EMI’s online independent study program offers much of this training free of cost, and completing the training often meets the requirements for continuing education. Currently, nearly 200 courses are available, including critical training in National Incident Management System and Incident Command. EMI also offers on-campus training for response partners at their facility in Emmitsburg, Maryland. Partners in the volunteer sector, or VOADs, have also increased training offerings. The Red Cross has, for many years, offered training in their key areas of response—disaster response, sheltering, case management, and food distribution. Each VOAD has developed training and training partnerships to prepare their volunteers for the roles they will be called to carry out when disaster strikes. Training moves well beyond the basics. The public and private responders must be prepared to respond to potentially lethal chemical incidents that may be accidental or intentional. There is a continued, nonspecific threat of biological agents being employed as weapons. In some jurisdictions, biological agents are developed, stored, and used in laboratories. The entire chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and explosive (CBRNE) spectrum must be integrated into the planning, training, equipment, and exercise tasks for emergency response personnel. In addition, the public health partnership has training demands that require the participation of the response partnership. The threat of pandemic and avian flu causes contingency planning and training to prepare for the consequences associated with these potential health incidents. This consideration is further exacerbated by concerns about exposure to smallpox and other contagious outbreaks. Technology has advanced the development and the utility of response equipment. Not too many years ago, the traditional “gas mask” had been in use for decades. Today, that has Introduction to Homeland Security

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evolved into masks designed to keep responders safe in chemical and biological environments. Software for detecting of chemical and biological agents has matured through several product generations and is now used routinely at incident scenes. To assist federal, state, local, and tribal partners in examining this huge array of equipment, the U.S. Congress, within the Homeland Security Science and Technology Enhancement Act of 2006, adopted homeland security equipment among national standards. The exercise area concept brings together entities to rehearse the plans, utilize the training, and test equipment and evaluates the effectiveness of those solution areas. There are three types of exercise: tabletop, functional, and full scale, and each plays an important role in enhancing response readiness. The most cost-effective types are tabletop and functional, with tabletop the most inexpensive. While cost is always a consideration, well-planned and wellconducted exercises from which lessons may be drawn that ultimately enhance response and recovery capabilities are vital investments. The tabletop is generally accomplished by designing a national incident and talking through the scenario with the group to be exercised. The functional is somewhat larger because it may require the activation of the EOC or other operational components. It does not necessitate an actual field response. Instead, it is accomplished through messages, a simulator, or in some virtual environment. The full-scale exercise is a full deployment of the disciplines and jurisdictions being evaluated. FEMA now offers virtual tabletop exercises (VTTX), which allow participants take part remotely. VTTX are offered monthly, addressing one of forty-seven disaster/hazard scenarios.

6.8 Partnerships Government agencies, including federal, state, and local organizations, are responsible for maintaining the safety and welfare of the lives and property of their citizens through protective safeguards and supportive assistance. The government, however, cannot and should not work alone during a critical incident. The many facets of an emergency incident require that collaborative partnerships are developed and coordination sustained between the government, the private sector, and NGOs during the emergency management process. The private partners are concerned with these contingencies, and they engage in training programs. Potential incidents, if realized, will impact their ability to operate. Fire department personnel, including the emergency medical personnel, are continuing to train for the response to the CBRNE threats. This broad spectrum of threat response is demanding and costly for police, fire, EMS, emergency management, and health responders. The training is costly and time consuming, but necessary. Many private enterprises that manufacture, use, transport, store, or otherwise handle hazardous materials, biological agents, and explosives have highly trained personnel who work with the public safety personnel in planning, training, exercise, and equipment programs on a continuous schedule. A critical partnership exists with vendors that make and sell the infinite categories of equipment necessary in the contemporary preparedness environment. Training and equipment are inseparable. Equipment needs range from highly sophisticated software for intelligence, detection, and management purposes to personal protection equipment and hand sanitizer. The National Fire Protection Association works with the DHS toward equipment safety and standardization. These standards are not always without challenge but generally are accepted and adopted for use. 176

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While it may be within local budgets to allocate funds for exercise, the U.S. Congress, through the DHS, has made an attempt to resolve such issues by funding the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). For many local agencies, it is difficult to release personnel for the timeframe some of the exercise programs require, and many jurisdictions do not have personnel trained in exercise design and management. As the national preparedness program matures, more jurisdictions are being trained in exercise development and may participate in exercise programs more frequently. Additional exercise resources can also be found through FEMA’s National Exercise Division.

6.8.1 Lessons from the Past: Hurricane Camille The emergency management community has long understood the importance of volunteer responders. These volunteers may work directly with emergency management or with a Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster (VOAD). In fact, most disaster volunteers are associated with a VOAD. Since 1970, National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD) has been a leader in bringing together individual VOADs in a coordinated response. National VOAD is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization formed after the August 1969 impact of Hurricane Camille along the Gulf Coast and the realization that response efforts, especially as they pertain to a major event, could be vastly improved with increased coordination of effort. Hurricane Camille, a Category 5 storm, devastated the Gulf Coast in August 1969. As in earlier disasters, numerous governmental, private sector, and nonprofit organizations responded to the crisis and served disaster survivors independently. Governmental disaster response command and control did not, or could not, effectively coordinate the diverse response and relief efforts. Due to the lack of coordination, cooperation, communication, and collaboration between volunteer responders, the result ended up a being a second disaster. In the response area, there was duplication of effort while needs in some areas went unmet. Competition between volunteer response organizations only meant that disaster survivors were not adequately served or did not receive important information on services. On July 15, 1970, representatives from seven nongovernmental organizations that conduct and perform relief operations—the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Southern Baptist Convention, Mennonite Disaster Service, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee, the National Disaster Relief Office of the Roman Catholic Church, and the American Red Cross—convened in the American Red Cross headquarters to establish a unified response to national disasters. Thus, the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) was formed as a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that serves as the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle— preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation—to help communities prepare for and recover from disasters. National VOAD members work together under the shared values of National VOAD, known as “the 4 Cs”: communications, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration. The value of the National VOAD movement has caught on outside the United States. In 2017, it was announced that Japan would be the next country to establish a National VOAD, and Australia is exploring the possibilities of bringing their volunteer responders together in a National VOAD. Nearly two-thirds of National VOAD members are faith-based organizations. Nearly every faith has as an integral part a commitment to helping and aiding those in need, particularly survivors of disaster and at-need/at-risk populations. National VOAD member organizations represent nearly every major Christian denomination, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Sikh. Introduction to Homeland Security

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The desire to help communities recover can bring together volunteers from diverse religious backgrounds to work together for the common good. FEMA understands the importance of these faith-based disaster responders and fosters partnerships and initiatives through their voluntary agency liaisons (VALs), through assigned liaison from the FEMA administrator’s office, and through the DHS Center for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships. National VOAD members, along with the state and territorial VOADs, work together to help improve the capability of and capacity for volunteer disaster response. Through the work of committees, National VOAD produces points of consensus on a wide range of disaster response work in areas such as volunteer management, donations management, long-term recovery, and mass care, to name a few. Additionally, through partnerships, additional response tools are made available to volunteer responders. By 2017, National VOAD was a coalition of 59 of the nation’s most reputable national organizations (faith-based, community-based and other nonprofit organizations) and 57 state/ territory VOADs, which represent local/regional VOADs. Additionally, National VOAD includes corporate, nonprofit, government, academic, and association partners. National VOAD also serves as the primary point of contact for voluntary organizations in the National Response Coordination Center (at FEMA headquarters), a signatory to the National Response Plan and an emergency support function partner of many other federal agencies as delineated in the National Disaster Recovery Framework.

6.9 Nongovernmental Organizations Throughout the United States, there are literally thousands of organizations, both large/ nationwide and small/local, that play integral roles during the response and recovery phases of a disaster, by either filling the gaps that government agencies lack immediate resources for or complementing the dual response and recovery efforts of government agencies. Notwithstanding, every organization and agency plays a key role in emergency management from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Given the diversity and purpose of humanitarian organizations, it remains a challenge to develop a standard categorization with respect to public involvement in disaster response and recovery. Thus, the most prolific and well-recognized moniker within the arena of emergency management is the term “nongovernmental organizations.” Most importantly, it should be well emphasized that NGOs are clear stakeholders in the field of emergency management, and partnerships should be developed and maintained during all four phases, which include mitigation/prevention, preparation, response, and recovery (Federal Emergency Management Agency, www.fema.gov/). Essentially, the term “nongovernment organization” distinguishes groups that are voluntary organizations and private sector organizations (PSOs). Typically, NGOs are characterized as being nonprofit, community based, corporate sponsored, or religious and are supported by private citizens who are motivated by and maintain a humanitarian disposition. Such voluntary organizations are strictly nonprofit and tax exempt, and their funding consists exclusively of private donations from both citizens and business contributors (HBR, 2019). These particular NGOs may function due to their specific association with the PSOs to include members of the local chamber of commerce (various businesses) or alliance to the corporate sector (nationwide companies, industries, and businesses) that are willing to provide foodstuff, financial assistance, and other resources during a disaster. The voluntary contributions may also consist of work (labor), monetary (cash endowment), or provisions (foodstuff, clothing, 178

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hardware, etc.). In an effort to maintain their definitive commitment to disaster response and recovery, NGOs value their independence and neutrality. For the most part, NGOs prefer to be nonpolitical and free of the bureaucracy that often impedes organizations. Instead, NGOs prefer to be well organized through greater field-level management and less hierarchy. Doing so marginalizes the possibility of civil conflict and perceived favoritism toward a particular agency or facet of the public (Jerolleman & Kiefer, 2016). Another significant characteristic of NGOs is their purpose-driven motivation to maintain a long-term commitment to recovery. Oftentimes, volunteers will have a tendency to come and go, be in the game but not of it, and once the “at the scene” attention has dissipated, evaporate from the situation themselves, whereas NGOs maintain a passion for the welfare of the public to the extent that members of NGOs may put themselves in harm’s way. Within the context of discussing the assets and resources allocated to NGOs, it is important to understand the distinct differences between donations and grant funds. Primarily, a donation consists of cash or property but may also include the expenditure of time, muscle, and energy during labor provided for reconstruction, security, or medical or caretaking business, whereas grant funding involves the discretionary appropriation of monetary funds designated exclusively to established NGOs for well-defined resources that may include personnel, equipment, utilities, technology, or other property, as well as for education or training purposes. Generally, nonprofit voluntary NGOs exist within a local community. The most common and easily recognized NGOs include volunteer fire departments, homeless shelters and soup kitchens, community emergency response teams (CERTs), civil defense groups, and church outreach programs. Other NGOs that function exclusively and are sponsored by the local citizenry include educational organizations (student groups and faculty/staff), occupational organizations (athletics, health care, hospitality, retail, technology), civic organizations (Rotary, VFW, American Legion, Lion’s Club), and religious/denominational groups (Baptist, Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian). The advantage of a local, voluntary, nonprofit NGO is its familiarity with the culture in the community. During a disaster, local NGOs are a reliable source of information about at-risk persons and have connections with many local resources and community leaders. As a result, the victims and outside responding agencies are glad to see the commitment to, and knowledge of, the various neighborhoods and areas that the local NGOs maintain, which foster strong collaborative continuity during the disaster. All these groups are vital to the successful management of a disaster, and these groups must be included in all phases of the disaster planning process. Various prominent NGOs, such as the American Red Cross, Habitat for Humanity, Salvation Army, and the United Way, maintain nationwide and global partnerships. They are involved in providing disaster assistance such as counseling, food and shelter, monitoring environmental hazards, and lobbying for public safety regulations and are inherently involved in promoting the professionalization of emergency management. Such established NGOs are well organized and respected and have the resources necessary to respond immediately to disasters with great effectiveness (Kapucu, 2006). Because of their vast alliances within the corporate sector and local business communities, these specific NGOs have developed and maintained strong partnerships with state and local governments to the extent that interoperability and interdependency have become a by- product of the emergency management process. While not directly affiliated with federal, state, or local government, such renowned NGOs do receive grant funding from FEMA to support and sustain shelters and to purchase or replace equipment that is essential during the response and recovery phases. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 6.3 Volunteers embarking to Puerto Rico during the 2017 response to Hurricane Maria. (Source: Michael Corey)

Some of the larger, well-known NGOs are also recipients of support from reputable corporations and industries, such as Motorola, Dell, Verizon, AT&T, Microsoft, Exxon, Chevron, and the auto manufacturers Chrysler and Ford. The vast amounts of donations and grants contributed to NGOs by the corporate/industrial sector are expended toward supporting high-level disaster training institutes, safety education and training programs for first responders, and other necessary resources that are specifically designated for disaster preparedness, response, and recovery purposes. Enough cannot be said about the equal partnership between the government and the private sector. This partnership in the national preparedness program is an essential collaborative effort. During 2006, John McCarthy stated, As 80 to 90 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States is owned and operated by the private sector. . . . Learning to manage this public private intersection is at the heart of our homeland security discussion today. (McElreath et al., 2014b) Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson, following McCarthy, stated, I think the right strategy is assessments, knowing where we are, and identifying the critical assets and infrastructure that needs to be protected. . . . Partnerships are an important part of that cooperation. . . . [O]ur emphasis should be on building the support in the private sector. (McElreath et al., 2014b) 180

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The application of risk management through assessment models is a binding task between the public and private sector. It is not difficult to establish a priority when 80% to 90% of America’s infrastructure is privately owned. This statistic alone should cause focus on the planning, training, equipment, and exercise value where critical infrastructure is located. It also should guide government in prioritizing efforts to develop and maintain private sector partners.

6.9.1 The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations The role of an NGO is an integral part of response and recovery support regarding disaster victims. This support includes food, shelter, counseling services, and medical assistance. NGOs are often able to provide specialized services to assist members of the public who may have special needs, including individuals with disabilities. In addition, an important facet of NGOs is their ability to provide valuable assistance that truly exemplifies commitment, competency, and caring. The value-driven purpose of each NGO remains the inherent operational foundation for prioritizing the service deliverables to disaster victims. Examples of NGO and voluntary organization contributions include the following: • The training of volunteers; • Identifying options to be used as possible shelters; • Managing supplies and resources used in a disaster; • Discovering the actual disaster victims who are in need of assistance, determining what their exact needs are, and deploying the necessary provisions; and • Identifying and providing essential resources for post-emergency cleanup, including cleaning, foodstuff, clothing, shelter, and labor needs. Some NGOs are authorized as official support groups that are responsible for delegation and management of all support resources during a disaster. This status arises because of their prolific ability to respond during a disaster. For example, the American Red Cross provides services in six major areas: domestic disaster relief; community services that help the needy; support and comfort for military members and their families; the collection, processing, and distribution of lifesaving blood and blood products; educational programs that promote health and safety; and international relief and development programs (GAO, 2019). In October 2010, the American Red Cross and FEMA signed a new memorandum of agreement (MOA), in which the Red Cross was authorized to co-lead mass care responses during emergencies. Specifically, the unprecedented agreement involves the Red Cross serving “as a national leader tasked with supporting state governments and other nonprofit organizations to build stronger disaster response plans and capabilities in mass care” (McElreath et al., 2014a, 2014b). Simultaneously, the Red Cross continues to provide shelter, food, emotional support, first aid services, cleanup supplies, and comfort items to needy people. These mass care responsibilities are part of the National Response Framework, a federal guide indicating how the country will respond to anything from local emergencies to large-scale terrorist attacks and catastrophic natural disasters (Meyer, 2020). The Salvation Army, an international movement, is a Christian faith-based organization that has responded to emergencies and disasters for over a century, with groups of trained and committed volunteers who are immediately capable of responding anywhere in the United States and virtually anywhere in the world. Introduction to Homeland Security

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The Salvation Army’s disaster work began in the United States in Galveston, Texas, after the hurricane of 1900. Galveston was virtually destroyed, and over 5,000 residents were killed. Since the Galveston Hurricane event, the Salvation Army has played an integral part in disaster response and recovery by maintaining a strong contingent of volunteer response teams and considers it a special assignment not only to attend to the needs of victims during a disaster but also to assist first responders (McElreath et al., 2018). A traditional and well-renowned part of the Salvation Army is its numerous response vehicles strategically located throughout the United States. These resources are known as canteens and are a fleet of mobile feeding units stocked and ready to respond wherever and whenever needed. In addition to providing food, clothing, shelter, and hygiene kits, the Salvation Army response teams provide emotional support to residents. The Salvation Army also maintains highly trained volunteers who are prepared to assume incident command responsibilities, which is a significant dynamic of the response and recovery phases (McElreath et al., 2014a).

6.9.2 Framework for NGOs The evolution and necessity of emergency management in recent years has required the obvious need to prepare for future disasters and makes it imperative that the vast array of stakeholders involved in the response and recovery efforts include competent and committed people of the best quality, who are held to the highest standard of professionalism. The nearly immeasurable contingent of resources available to local, state, and federal government has enabled emergency management agencies to handle almost any incident that occurs in our nation. Yet despite the government’s tremendous assets, oftentimes there are other organizations or groups that have a unique or specific function that is critical to effectively handling a crisis. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the host of public, private sector, and nonprofit sector NGOs, which range from worldwide recognized groups such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army to local business owners, all play key roles in emergency management. Emergency management in the United States has a history of being haphazard and ineffective in terms of professional organization and effective legislation. In fact, the term “emergency management” is relatively new, despite the long history of people and governments actually managing an emergency. Comprehensive emergency management can be defined as the process of developing the operational emergency functions necessary to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all man-made or natural disasters. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States experienced a series of disasters that forced a reassessment of disaster response in the nation. Hurricane Carla (1962), Hurricane Betsy (1965), Hurricane Camille (1969), Hurricane Agnes (1972), the Alaskan Earthquake (1964), and the San Fernando, California, Earthquake of 1971. During that period, the management process of response and recovery operations was primarily the responsibility of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, which was organized within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with support from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. National Guard, and various other agencies (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2014). Basically, the emergency management process was fragmented and not aligned with a comprehensive framework. As a result, the magnitude and nature of these events served as the impetus for increased legislative efforts to address disasters. Eventually, new legislation, such 182

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Figure 6.4 Salvation Army emergency disaster response vehicle. (Source: Shutterstock)

as the 1968 National Flood Insurance Act, offered flood protection to homeowners. In 1974, the Disaster Relief Act firmly established the process of presidential disaster declarations. Primarily, the United States began the professionalization of emergency management during the administration of President Jimmy Carter in 1979 (McElreath et al., 2014a). After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security, whose primary mission was to fight against terrorism. Within the context of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FEMA was transitioned to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Thereafter, in February 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which specifically developed an all-hazards national system for emergency preparedness and response and required all federal agencies to cooperate in the effort to establish the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which are the operational foundation of all existing emergency management plans (Waugh & Tierney, 2007). Subsequently, in December 2003, another significant Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8) was implemented, which directed FEMA to develop an emergency management process known as the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). For the first time, the NDRF created by FEMA outlined recovery principles, roles, and responsibilities of stakeholders and provided standards for effective and efficient coordination and collaboration among all stakeholders, including NGOs. Eventually, the FEMA NDRF established six new recovery support functions that provide a comprehensive framework, in which all stakeholders could partner together and communicate, collaborate, and coordinate in an effort to improve resource allocation and foster an integrated approach to the response and recovery phases of emergency management. Introduction to Homeland Security

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6.9.3 Volunteers Responding to incidents frequently exceeds the resources of government organizations. Volunteers and donors support response efforts in many ways, and it is essential that governments at all levels plan ahead to effectively incorporate volunteers and donated goods into their response activities. The success of managing any emergency, critical incident, or disaster is contingent on partnerships between all stakeholders in an emergency management situation that are grounded in the following principles: collaboration, coordination, integration, flexibility, and professionalism. Without these critical concepts and ideas, the wide array of law enforcement, fire, medical, legal, media, community leaders, volunteers, and friends and families of the victims will quickly overwhelm and render any incident command ineffective. Collaboration is a matter of building relationships and consensus. This method has been found more effective than a command and control approach. Collaboration is built on trust and open communication and is essential in today’s network of emergency managers. The ability to work collaboratively with public, private, and nonprofit agencies is a crucial leadership trait for an emergency manager. Integration is bringing all levels of government, private, nonprofit, and volunteer sectors together and making them active participants in all phases of the emergency management process. The American emergency management system is founded on the principle of voluntarism and community aid from agencies such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and other groups. It is vital that an emergency manager has a relationship with these groups before a disaster strikes. Coordination is of vital importance among agencies before, during, and after a disaster. Effective channels of inter- and intra-agency communications are essential to plan and conduct training exercises, to perform risk and needs assessments, and for operational

Figure 6.5 Medical response partners participating in a disaster response exercise. (Source: FEMA)

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decision making during a crisis. The importance of coordination is seen in the activation of multi-agency coordination systems and unified command structures (MacManus & Caruson, 2010). Flexibility is the ability to adapt plans to the dynamic circumstances of a disaster. Rigid plans are to be avoided to allow for innovation and improvisation. Any operational plan is merely a starting point or a guide, instead of a step-by-step disaster response or recovery. In an effective emergency management environment, responders and officials will have the capabilities to interpret plans and adjust to the circumstances on the ground. Flexibility does not mean that there are no rules guiding or controlling actions. Understanding the boundaries and limitations of authority and actions requires an extensive knowledge of the legal, social, and political realm, which is only developed over a career of experience and education. Professionalism is a critical key component for the effective coordination of an emergency management situation. Leadership, followership, problem solving, planning, evaluating, and budgeting are just a few of the skills needed in an emergency manager. All these traits contribute to a professional warrior and a professional scholar that who have the appropriate traits not to let ego or personal or political desires interfere with the accomplishment of the mission.

6.10 Key Partnerships Organizations As we have discussed, for the emergency manager and homeland security professional, the scope of individuals who can be incorporated into an emergency management plan is limited only by the imagination and creativity of those examining response needs. Some of the key specific organizations are addressed next.

6.10.1 National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster Throughout the United States, there remains a vast conglomeration of NGOs that diligently serve the public by providing the basic necessities to survive and recover during a disaster or emergency situation, including food, shelter, clothing, and medical assistance. One of the most prominent nonpartisan, nonprofit membership associations that serves as a forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation—to help communities prepare for and recover from disasters is known as the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, or NVOAD (Ready. Gov, 2019). Formed in 1970, NVOAD assists member organizations with the coordination and communication processes during a disaster in order to provide the most efficient and effective response and recovery efforts. National VOAD consists of a coalition of some 55 state/territories VOADs, which are considered to be some of America’s most reputable organizations, include faithbased, community-based, nonprofit, and humanitarian NGO groups. The foremost objective of NVOAD is to complement the capability of state and local VOADs by ensuring that they are adequately prepared for future disasters and equipped to effectively execute their disaster response and recovery plans (Disaster, 2020). NVOAD helps coordinate any assistance that NGOs may need to facilitate the operational services necessary during all phases of a disaster, which may involve both short- and longterm recovery efforts. NVOAD, for lack of a better term, is nonoperational. NVOAD does not have resources such as canteens, shelters, clothing, etc. Instead, the principal role of NVOAD involves coordination. Basically, once a disaster strikes, NVOAD rings the bell, communicates Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 6.6 Volunteers operating radio communications during the 2017 response to Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. (Source: Michael Corey)

to members, and coordinates what needs to be done and where, and NVOAD member groups then take action by providing the actual disaster response services. The national VOAD motto remains exemplary evidence of its tremendous commitment. Aligned along the emergency management continuum of prevention, preparation, response, and recovery, National VOAD members represent a powerful force of good will in America and provide the leadership necessary to provide the resources that make communities stronger and more resilient. The NVOAD is a coalition that aims to streamline planning efforts by many voluntary organizations responding to disasters.

6.10.1.1 NVOAD Core Principles (Disaster, 2020) • Cooperation. Operationally, “cooperation” recognizes the value of working together on at least one specific delivery of service or event, distinct from the more comprehensive “coordination” principle listed later. • Communication. Members must develop and maintain effective channels for sharing information, listen carefully to each other, and deal openly with concerns. • Coordination. Through careful planning and preparation, National VOAD member organizations form tactical partnerships to work in a coordinated, predictive fashion to more effectively utilize resources to accomplish a set of tasks. • Collaboration. Member organizations establish shared goals and actively work together to achieve specific goals and undertake specific projects throughout the disaster cycle. 186

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The NVOAD works very diligently to minimize duplication of services by sharing information among NGOs prior to and during a disaster, which will efficiently allocate the necessary provisions and prevent loss of resources. Essentially, once a disaster occurs, NVOAD initiates their communication process and contacts other state VOADs to encourage members and other NGOs to assemble and deploy to the scene. NVOAD helps a wide variety of volunteers and organizations work together in a crisis. In time of need, members of NVOAD deliver hope for a more positive future (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2014).

6.10.2 Private Business and Industry When disaster strikes, many corporations respond generously. In 2000 less than one-third of the world’s 3,000 largest companies donated anything to disaster relief, but by 2015, the share had surpassed 90%. Among the 500 largest U.S. companies, the share contributing to disaster relief increased from less than 20% in 1990 to more than 95% in 2014. After the 2004 tsunami, for instance, U.S. firms alone contributed more than half a billion dollars in cash and in-kind donations (Thomas & Fritz, 2006). Major retailers are increasingly creating their own in-house departments designed to facilitate their response and recovery to any sort of interruption of their business. Beverage companies including Coca-Cola and Anheuser-Busch have converted their beverage production lines to bottle large quantities of drinking water and employed their distribution networks to deliver it to relief sites. Similarly, British Airways, UPS, FedEx, and DHL have worked with their existing aid agency partners to furnish free or subsidized transportation for relief cargo (Thomas & Fritz, 2006).

Figure 6.7 Whole Community engagement. (Source: FEMA)

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As an example, in the three weeks following the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, Walmart shipped almost 2,500 truckloads of merchandise and supplies to the affected areas. In several cases, store managers allowed either emergency personnel or local residents to take store supplies as needed. In one Walmart store, an employee used a forklift to knock open a warehouse door to get water for a local retirement home. In another store, police officers were allowed to use the store as a headquarters and a sleeping place, as many had lost their homes. In Waveland, Mississippi, Walmart improvised a store, setting up a 16,000-square-foot tent in the parking lot immediately after the storm to provide the basics, including pharmacy services (Horwitz, 2008). The private sector can handle virtually any task related to emergency management, such as issuing warnings, facilitating evacuation, or organizing food service (Busch & Givens, 2013).

6.10.3 Faith-Based Organizations Religion plays a central role in the lives of most Americans. Some interesting statistics are: • 77% of Americans are affiliated with a religious tradition (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (2014), http://religions.pewforum.org/ reports). • 38% of Americans would expect to rely on the faith-based community for assistance in the first 72 hours after a disaster (“Preparedness in America,” FEMA, August 2014). In terms of numbers, there are approximately 345,000 congregations in the U.S., compared to 105,000 schools/universities. In fact, congregations are second only to retail stores and shops in the United States. While 71% of Americans identify as Christian, there are nearly 200 denominations and religious traditions in the U.S., with representation of almost every major world religion. This brings social, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity to both urban and rural settings. When considering the vast number of congregations and the role they play in American society, it should come as no surprise that faith transcends worship areas. People of faith may live, work, and worship in three different geographic areas. However, it’s important to understand that faith communities are more than just congregations. 1. Congregations—Congregations are what you would think of when you think of churches, mosques, and synagogues. However, congregations refer to the people and not the buildings. 2. Denominations and Judicatories—Denominations and judicatories are groups within a religion. For example, Eastern Orthodox is a denomination of Christianity. 3. Federations, Networks, Conferences, and Associations—Federations, networks, conferences, and associations are groups that include members of different religions working toward a common goal. 4. Schools, Colleges, and Theological Institutions—Schools, colleges, and theological institutions are secondary or post-secondary educational facilities that enable students to develop and explore their religious beliefs. 5. Social Service Organizations—Social service organizations offer benefits and facilities such as education, food subsidies, health care, job training, and subsidized housing. 6. Hospitals and Clinics—Social service organizations offer benefits and facilities such as education, food subsidies, health care, job training, and subsidized housing. 7. Burial Societies and Cemeteries—Social service organizations offer benefits and facilities such as education, food subsidies, health care, job training, and subsidized housing. 188

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8. Disaster Human Services Organizations—Disaster human services organizations help ensure continued service delivery when emergency events disrupt services and address unmet human services needs created or exacerbated by the disaster. Many of these organizations operate under a religious mission to serve. One example is the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). 9. Clubs and Youth Groups—Clubs and youth groups are organizations of people, usually under the sponsorship of a church, who work for the common good of the community. A key private sector partner in each community, and critical to the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery cycle, is the faith-based community. A majority of the national members of NVOAD have a religious affiliation (approximately 36 of 57 as of October 2015). Furthermore, local congregations are among the most visible and likely sources of aid and trusted information post disaster. As a result, many disaster lifecycle operations are led, funded, and staffed by those who are active in faith communities, including NVOAD members. Now that we understand the role of faith communities, we can begin to look at the assets these communities bring to the whole community. • Mission to Serve—Faith communities brings the compassion to help people cope and recover. • Trust—Faith communities bring a level of trust to those within the community. This includes the moral authority and legitimacy brought by their leaders, as well as the mission to serve that may be included in their doctrine. It is important to note that moral authority may work both positively and negatively. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, a pastor in Mississippi told congregants that if they followed evacuation orders, then they did not have faith in Jesus. • Resources—Faith communities bring significant resources that may be used during disasters. This includes space, people, money, capacities, and national affiliates. • Knowledge—Faith communities may best understand the needs and desires of those affiliated with the community. Moreover, they are likely the best to communicate with these individuals as they share the same language and culture. • Networks—Communication through the faith communities may extend nationally as they can often reach beyond their congregations into larger geographical areas. • Programs—Faith communities typically already have programs in place to help those in the community, including humanitarian services and disaster volunteers. • Presence and Staying Power—Faith communities typically have longevity in a particular area and will want to see any disaster recovery efforts through until the end. Perhaps the role of faith communities during and after a disaster was best described by Amy Worden, who wrote: From tiny storefront congregations to deep-pocketed denominations, the communities of faith arrived first. In the harrowing hours and days after Hurricane Katrina, when survivors roamed the desolate streets in search of water, food and medicine, church groups . . . provided dazed residents with their first hot meal, their first clean water, and their first aspirin. (Worden, 2006) Introduction to Homeland Security

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State, county and local government agencies serve as the primary point of contact for faithbased and community organizations interested in engaging in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery activities. Examples of efforts include: • Praise and Preparedness (Georgia Emergency Management Agency); • Ready NOVA Faith (Northern Virginia Emergency Management Agencies); • Prep4Faith (City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Division); and • Disastersandfaith.com (an effort supported by Arlington County EMA). The whole community includes not only secular and civic organizations but also the different religious and cultural groups that are present throughout the United States. To be effective, emergency management personnel must be aware of the different religious and cultural groups they may encounter during a given engagement. Ignoring these religious and cultural institutions excludes not only valuable individuals but also the vast networks and resources these groups have created—networks and resources that go beyond geographical boundaries. Including these networks greatly increases the resilience created by the Whole Community approach. The International Association of Emergency Managers Community Service and Faith-based Caucus represents a first-responder association. The purpose of the IAEM-USA Community Service and Faith-Based Organizations Caucus is to engage community service– and faithbased organizations to encourage, build, and support community-level partnerships for capacity building, in order to sustain preparedness, mitigation, response, resiliency, and recovery awareness from a Whole Community perspective. It should be noted that as we discuss the different religious and cultural communities that are included in the whole community, we are neither endorsing a particular set of religious beliefs or practices nor suggesting that government prioritize faith communities over secular communities and organizations. As you learn more about these communities, you’ll find that religious identity and culture are often tightly interconnected. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish something that is purely cultural from something that is purely religious. As a result, understanding these faith and cultural communities, their institutions, and their cultural norms is essential for working competently and effectively in a disaster-impacted community.

6.10.4 Community Emergency Response Team Another important volunteer NGO that plays an integral role during the response phase is known as a community emergency response team (CERT). The purpose of a CERT is to provide training through Citizen Corps and FEMA in an effort to equip the public and volunteers with the ability to protect themselves and their surrounding communities in the event of a critical incident or disaster. After a major disaster, emergency managers and first responders are significantly challenged to meet the demands for services to survivors. Challenges may include hazardous waste, roadblocks, communication failures, and a number of traumatized victims in need of immediate medical assistance. Such issues may initially hamper the progress of emergency services and marginalize the public’s ability to access needed deliverables. Thus, the bottom line is that ordinary citizens will have to rely on one another for help in an effort to meet their immediate life-sustaining needs (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2014). Basically, a CERT consists of homeowners organized as groups to perform emergency management tasks in their neighborhoods. CERTs may also be known as neighborhood emergency response teams or by other, similar names and are organized to train neighborhood 190

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volunteers to perform basic emergency response tasks, including search and rescue, first aid, fire suppression, and estimating costs of damage (McElreath et al., 2014a). Essentially, a CERT will offer volunteers education programs about potential hazards they may face and offer lifesaving skills training. Becoming an official member of a local CERT requires a citizen to complete FEMA training courses, including disaster preparedness, disaster fire suppression, disaster medical operations, light search and rescue, disaster psychology and team organization, and disaster simulation. Based on the circumstances following a disaster, these citizen responders use their training as part of a neighborhood or workplace team to help others when professional responders are overwhelmed or not immediately available. CERT members are trained and equipped to provide immediate assistance to victims in their area, organize spontaneous volunteers who have not had the training, and collect disaster intelligence that will assist professional responders with prioritization and allocation of resources when they arrive (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2014). Over the years, the public, along with emergency managers and first responders, has acknowledged the tremendous benefit of partnering with a CERT during the response and recovery stages of a disaster.

6.10.5 Citizen Corps Another common partnership within the NGO arena that brings together local government, civic leaders, and the private sector for the purpose of readiness and response to critical incidents, emergencies, and disasters is known as a Citizen Corps Council. Following the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001, state and local government officials determined that promoting and maintaining a safe and secure society required citizen involvement regarding the support of local first responders. Eventually, as a result of an intensive and proactive agenda, federal and state officials agreed that creating a training blueprint was necessary to prepare citizens to be proactive participants in supporting first responders. Thus, in January 2002, President George W. Bush introduced Citizen Corps, which was coordinated and managed by FEMA’s Individual and Community Preparedness Division. Citizen Corps is composed of federally sponsored programs and nonprofit affiliate programs and organizations that share the common goal of helping communities prevent, prepare for, and respond to crime, disasters, pressing public health needs, and emergencies of all kinds. It encourages all Americans to take an active role in building safer, stronger, and better-prepared communities. The purpose of Citizen Corps is to encourage citizen involvement through education, training, and volunteer service in an effort to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of all kinds. For example, the objectives of Citizen Corps include supporting the initiatives of local Neighborhood Watch programs by fostering a proactive effort to report suspicious activity to the authorities, increasing training for disaster preparedness in local communities, and recruiting and training retired physicians to assist first responders during emergencies. The mission of Citizen Corps is as follows: • Preparing the public for local risks with targeted outreach; • Engaging voluntary organizations to help augment resources for public safety, preparedness, and response capabilities; and Introduction to Homeland Security

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• Integrating Whole Community representatives with emergency managers to ensure disaster preparedness and response planning represents the whole community and integrates nontraditional resources. Essentially, the mission of Citizen Corps is accomplished through a nationwide network involving state, local, and tribal coalitions known as Citizen Corps Councils. The Citizen Corps Councils put together the leadership and resources within a community to implement the Citizen Corps training blueprint, which is meant to develop and direct education and training programs for local volunteers in an effort to maintain support for emergency management and first responders. Such ad hoc councils are created by elected or appointed local officials with involvement from the area emergency managers. As duly noted, “Citizen Corps Councils build on community strengths to implement the Citizen Corps preparedness programs and carry out a local strategy to involve government, community leaders, and citizens in all-hazards preparedness and resilience.” Citizen Corps Council activities include the following: • Educating the community about disaster preparedness measures; • Implementing public education and outreach efforts; • Providing training to improve citizen preparedness; • Promoting the importance of making personal, family, and work emergency plans; • Coordinating volunteer opportunities that support local emergency efforts; and • Coordinating citizen participation in community disaster response activities. Citizen Corps Councils utilize FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute, which offers many online courses for citizens to be trained in and familiar with emergency preparedness, mitigation, the NIMS, the Incident Command System (ICS), and the disaster response process. Examples of independent study courses offered to citizens by FEMA through the Citizen Corps include: • IS • IS • IS • IS • IS • IS • IS • IS

10.a–Animals in Disasters: Awareness and Preparedness; 11.a–Animals in Disasters: Community Planning; 22–Are You Ready? An In-Depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness; 244–Developing and Managing Volunteers; 288–The Role of Volunteer Agencies in Emergency Management; 317–Intro to Community Emergency Response Teams; 324–Community Hurricane Preparedness; and 394.a–Protecting Your Home or Small Business in Disaster.

Another component of the Citizen Corps is the Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), which is managed and implemented by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) through support from the Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice. The goal of VIPS is to “enhance the capacity of state and local law enforcement to utilize volunteers,” and it pursues this goal through the provision of “support and resources for agencies interested in developing or enhancing a volunteer program and for citizens who wish to volunteer their time and skills with a community law enforcement agency” (Miller, Hess, & Orthmann, 2018). Volunteers in the VIPS program can assist law enforcement with a wide range of non- emergency functions. Volunteers may provide police with a wide range of services including, but not limited to, citizen patrols, disabled parking enforcement, translation services, and chaplaincy services. This helps law enforcement make effective use of personnel and community members and can create good working relationships in the community. 192

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Citizen Corps includes affiliate programs and organizations along with its core partner programs. Currently there are 26 Citizen Corps affiliates including associations, government agencies, VOADs, public safety groups, and scouting organizations. These affiliates offer communities resources for public education, outreach, and training. Further, they represent volunteers dedicated to making their communities safe and supporting first responders and disaster relief efforts.

6.10.6 The Fire Corps Fire Corps, established in 2004, is managed by the National Volunteer Fire Council and works with the fire service organizations that make up the Fire Corps National Advisory Committee (NAC). Fire Corps is funded through FEMA and Citizen Corps. Fire Corps helps fire and EMS departments build capacity through engaging volunteers to assist in non-emergency roles. This is accomplished through providing resources for departments to utilize citizen advocates in non-operational roles so they can develop, implement, and sustain programs and services that will help their department meet the needs of their community. According to the Fire Corps (Summit Fire and EMS, n.d.), within the context of this mission, the Fire Corps seeks to: • Learn about promising practices being used in existing non-operational volunteer programs; • Share this information with departments that want to expand or improve their programs; • Increase the use of non-emergency volunteers in existing programs; • Help citizens learn about and get involved in Fire Corps programs in their communities; and, • Help agencies without a program get one started. This organization provides willing volunteers whose services complement and supplement existing fire departments locally in American communities. The Fire Corps is a collaborative entity that is contained within the organizational structure of the Citizen Corps and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It provides an integration of both community and government leadership with respect to the all-hazards emergency preparedness and response goals of homeland security.

6.10.7 National Neighborhood Watch The primary emphasis of the National Neighborhood Watch program involves crime reduction and community improvement. An effective neighborhood watch program provides a cooperative environment for citizens and law enforcement to work together, and, for law enforcement, it provides much-needed extra sets of eyes and ears in the community. In a 2008 National Crime Prevention Council survey of 36 communities utilizing neighborhood watch, 19, or 53%, showed reduced crime rates. This National Neighborhood Watch initiative regarding local neighborhood watch programs was initiated in 1972 and has matured into the “the nation’s premier crime prevention and community mobilization program.” The “information, training, technical support, and resources, provided to local law enforcement agencies and citizens” are foundational characteristics of the neighborhood watch initiative (National Neighborhood Watch, 2021). The training paradigm enhances the potential of law enforcement entities to collaborate with citizens with respect to the identification, reporting, and deterring of criminal activities. Introduction to Homeland Security

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The involvement of community citizens is paramount to the success of neighborhood watch programs. Further, the use of such programs emphasizes community-oriented policing initiatives and provides a tool that facilitates improved communications between law enforcement entities and their served communities. Because citizens become engaged actively within their communities, they experience bonding through neighborhood watch programs. The visibility of the initiative is manifested through use of “street signs, window decals, community block parties, and service projects” (National Neighborhood Watch, 2021). Figure 6.8 shows an example of such graphics. During 2002, a collaborative approach was implemented among government entities and local communities to improve and strengthen neighborhood watch programs. According to National Neighborhood Watch (2021), the “the NSA—in partnership with USA Freedom Corps, Citizen Corps and the U.S. Department of Justice—launched USAonWatch, the face of the revitalized Neighborhood Watch initiative, which represents the expanded role of watch programs throughout the United States.” Through the use of neighborhood watch programs, local communities become active participants in “homeland security efforts” (National Neighborhood Watch, 2021).

6.10.8 The Medical Reserve Corps In 2002, the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) was created to motivate American citizens “to volunteer in support of their country.” The composition of the MRC includes “organized medical and public health professionals, who serve as volunteers to respond to natural disasters and emergencies,” who serve through assisting “communities nationwide during emergencies and for ongoing efforts in public health” (MRC, 2010). The MRC resulted from the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Because of the scope and magnitude of these events, the need for “trained, supplemental medical and public health personnel, to assist with emergency operations” was manifested (MRC, 2010). Although a myriad of medical personnel and public health personnel supported the emergency response efforts of September 11, 2001, there existed “no organized approach to channel their efforts” (MRC, 2010). This shortcoming is resolved through the organizational structure, processes, and procedures of the MRC. The structuring of the MRC facilitates organized deployments of “medical and public health personnel in response to an emergency, as it identifies specific, trained, credentialed personnel available and ready to respond to emergencies” (MRC, 2010). The MRC is a national network of approximately 175,000 volunteers in roughly 850 community-based units, organized locally to improve the health and safety of their communities. Nationally, MRC is divided into ten regions that correlate to Department of Health and Human Services regions. Each region is led by a regional coordinator. The regional coordinator’s responsibilities include gathering situational awareness, providing technical assistance

Figure 6.8 Medical Reserve Corps. (Source: www.ready.gov/medical-reserve-corps)

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to unit leaders, conducting technical assistance assessments, serving as regional liaisons, and promoting awareness of MRC. Within these regions, coordination occurs between MRC state coordinators and local MRC unit leaders. Local MRC units are “responsible for implementing volunteer capabilities, for emergency medical response and public health initiatives, to match specific community needs” (MRC, 2010). The local MRC units are led by unit coordinators who match “community needs—for emergency medical response and public health initiatives— with volunteer capabilities,” and who are “also responsible for building partnerships, ensuring the sustainability of the local unit, and managing the volunteer resources” (MRC, 2010).

6.10.9 The Civil Air Patrol (U.S. Air Force Auxiliary) The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) is a Congressionally chartered, federally supported, nonprofit corporation that is the official auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force. With a membership of over 50,000 people, CAP performs a variety of missions tasked by the Air Force, as well as for state and local government, and many of these missions entail homeland security functions. The formal mission of the CAP involves three functions: 1) emergency services, 2) aerospace education, and 3) cadet training (youth program). The modern existence of the CAP complements homeland security services and functions, but its origin occurred in 1941, days before the Pearl Harbor attack. During World War II, the CAP’s private pilots and aviation enthusiasts used their light aircraft and flying skills in civil defense efforts for the U.S. Army Air Forces, including costal patrols for enemy submarines, courier flights among Army Air Corps flight training bases, target towing to allow military personnel to practice aerial marksmanship, ferrying of aircraft, search and rescue missions, and logistics missions to facilitate the movement of material resources and personnel. The costal patrols lasted approximately 18 months between 1942 and 1943 and demonstrated the significance of civilian volunteers providing community services during war-time situations. Today, the CAP maintains a fleet of 560 small single-engine aircraft used for aerial photography, airborne damage assessment, and visual searching. Over 19,000 CAP members are trained in the use of these radio systems, including close to 4,500 holding or in training for advanced communications qualifications. Many, but by no means all, are amateur radio operators. CAP’s HF/VHF system includes over 500 HF-ALE base stations, close to 750 non-ALE HF radios, and about 260 ground vehicle mobile HF units, plus an extensive VHF network with over 500 100-watt analog/P25 repeaters and thousands of VHF portable, mobile, and base stations. The CAP system also includes nearly 150 low-power portable repeaters for temporary ground or airmobile use. All equipment operates on federal frequencies assigned to CAP and is NTIA compliant and thus capable of interoperability with military and federal agencies. CAP’s radio systems are well prepared to provide contingency communications when commercial communications systems are unavailable or overloaded. CAP holds 15 national voice nets a week on multiple HF frequencies with close to 120 daily check-ins. All 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are represented in the national nets. There are many regional and state-level HF nets on various schedules. Some areas conduct local VHF nets. CAP also maintains duty station watch on a national suite of dedicated ALE frequencies, ready for unscheduled relay of internal and external traffic, and is developing an infrastructure of MilStd 188–110 data communications, which will have HF modems installed at all levels of the organization. Formal traffic is passed daily, with procedures based on meticulous implementation of military ACP-125 procedures. Members use Air Force–assigned tactical call signs but, in interagency Introduction to Homeland Security

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operation, may also use functional designators, in accordance with ICS/NIMS standards. Strict operational security is maintained on the air. CAP participates in Department of Defense (DOD) communications exercises, in preparation for actual national emergency taskings. CAP also tests its capabilities via preauthorized international exercises.

6.10.9.1 Homeland Security Role The member training and infrastructure of CAP are engineered and managed to be ready for tasking to support Homeland Security, FEMA, and military disaster relief operations. CAP deploys air and ground teams and its extensive communications network to provide an aerial platform for responder agencies. In particular, CAP has over 25 years of aerial photography experience, which is ideal for damage assessment photos, flood-stage monitoring, critical infrastructure observations, and highway/traffic conditions during times of emergency. These missions are flown under the authority of the U.S. Northern Command, the joint command responsible for the continental United States. CAP receives national tasking from the air component of Northern Command, 1st Air Force, with headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Similar flight operations may also be performed for state and local officials, when not in conflict with federal tasking. Examples of such missions include air and ground disaster relief and emergency services following natural and man-made disasters, including 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the Texas and Oklahoma wildfires, tornadoes in the South and Central U.S., North Dakota and Missouri flooding, and the Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill, as well as humanitarian missions along the U.S. and Mexico border. • Grew from 21 bases at the conclusion of the program; • Reported 173 U-boats sighted, sunk 2, and dropped a total of 83 bombs and depth charges on 57 of these—with several other “probables”; • Flew 86,865 missions over coastal waters for a total of 244,600 hours—approximately 24 million miles; • Summoned help for 91 ships in distress and for 363 survivors of submarine attacks; • Sighted and reported 17 floating mines and, at the request of the U.S. Navy, flew 5,684 special convoy missions; and • Although the victory against the submarine was a joint operation of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and CAP, German U-boats disappeared in direct proportion to the spread of CAP operations. U-boat commanders were well aware of CAP’s “little yellow planes.” CAP became a permanent peacetime noncombatant institution July 1, 1946, when President Harry S. Truman signed Public Law 476, establishing it as a federally chartered, benevolent, civilian corporation. In 1948, Public Law 557 made CAP the official auxiliary of the Air Force and authorized the Secretary of the Air Force to assign military and civilian personnel to liaison offices at all levels of CAP. During the Cold War, the relevance of CAP was undiminished. Because of its expertise in search and rescue missions developed during World War II, the CAP became the clear choice for Air Force–assigned inland search and rescue in the post-war years. Although the aerial resources of the U.S. military were expensive, they were much more expensive than CAP operations. 196

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In addition, single-engine CAP aircraft could fly considerably lower and slower, as needed for visual spotting of downed planes and personnel. Additionally, CAP aircraft were available in every state, allowing a fast response time when aircraft were overdue or had disappeared from radar or when emergency locator transponder (ELT) signals were detected via satellite. Because of these factors, the CAP was reinvigorated and implemented as a valid resource. During the 1990s, the CAP experienced an increasing number of missions stemming from its involvement in disaster relief operations. These events included the 1991 San Francisco earthquake, Midwest floods, and major hurricanes. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, when all civilian aviation was grounded, a CAP aircraft was the first civilian flight authorized in the country and performed aerial damage assessment photography of the World Trade Center site. During 2003, the U.S. Congress “amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to make members of the Civil Air Patrol eligible for Public Safety Officer death benefits” (McElreath et al., 2014b). Because of this legislation, when CAP personnel perish or become permanently disabled in the line of duty, they become “eligible for the same federal death benefit provided to other public safety personnel” (McElreath et al., 2014b). This legislation also was known as the Civil Air Patrol Homeland Security Benefits Act (H.R. 3681). During the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005, the CAP demonstrated its value to disaster relief operations. The CAP responded to dozens of locations across the region with more than 1,500 CAP members volunteering support, ranging from aircraft missions such as search and rescue, transportation of critical personnel and supplies, and aerial imagery of flood-damaged areas for civil authorities to ground team missions such as house-to-house searching of neighborhoods and passing out emergency supplies. In total, the CAP flew nearly 1,000 aircraft sorties in support of the hurricane relief efforts. Because commercial communications systems were unavailable, CAP radio nets operated at a high tempo on multiple frequencies, relaying mission tasking and reporting to and from the CAP’s National Operations Center. After the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the CAP flew more than 2,300 hours collecting airborne damage-assessment photography over a period of 118 days. Over 280 CAP volunteers from ten states contributed more than 20,000 man hours and captured tens of thousands of images of the damage. The imagery they captured and provided would have cost between $20 million and $30 million for the U.S. Coast Guard to collect, and the CAP performed the mission for just $305,000. CAP members wear military-style uniforms, with insignia that are distinctive to CAP, as well as non-military corporate uniforms. The CAP uses the Air Force ranking system, with officer and NCO grades, to denote leadership experience and professional development within the CAP. Many active duty Air Force officers, including generals, are past members of the CAP youth program, known as the cadet program. Today, the CAP organizational structure involves the operation of eight geographic regions. State and local levels of the organization use Air Force terminology so that each state organization is a “wing” containing “groups” and close to 1,500 local chapters, known as “squadrons.” CAP’s national headquarters is at Maxwell Air Force Base, located in Alabama, and is staffed with approximately 100 full-time civilian employees who provide administrative and logistics support to CAP members nationwide. Air Force liaison with CAP is assigned to the Air Combat Command. The CAP flies more than 95% of the inland search and rescue missions directed by the Air Force Rescue and Coordination Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and is credited with an average of 100 lives saved each year. Introduction to Homeland Security

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6.10.10 The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (USCGA), a volunteer-based organization whose presence serves the maritime interests of American communities and coastlines, maintains presences in each of the 50 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Guam (USCGA, 2020). The USCGA, through its relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard, is a component of both the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard that provides maritime services for the benefit of the American public (USCGA, 2020). On June 23, 1929, Congress gave the United States Coast Guard a mandate to use civilian volunteers to promote safety on and over the high seas and the nation’s navigable waters. During this period, the Coast Guard Reserve was a non-military service comprising unpaid, volunteer U.S. citizens who owned motorboats or yachts (USCGA, 2020). The auxiliary was created two years later when the U.S. Congress “amended the 1939 act with passage of the Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 1941” that designated the Coast Guard Reserve as a “military branch of the active service.” As a result of this legislation, the array of civilian volunteers, who were “formerly referred to as the Coast Guard Reserve, became the Coast Guard Auxiliary” (USCGA, 2020).

Figure 6.9 The Coast Guard Auxiliary. (Source: U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, http:// cgaux.org/about.php)

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The entry of America into World War II witnessed the joining of “50,000 Auxiliary members” in the “war effort” (USCGA, 2020). These volunteers performed a variety of missions that supplemented wartime security activities and search and rescue activities. The organization “guarded waterfronts, carried out coastal picket patrols, rescued survivors from scuttled ships,” and performed a myriad of other assignments (USCGA, 2020). Many private vessels were used during this period. After the end of World War II, the USCGA was tasked with missions and duties involving “recreational boating safety” (USCGA, 2020). According to the USCGA (2020), the Auxiliary’s four primary missions, consisting of vessel examination, education, operations, and fellowship, “were established and remained the Auxiliary’s pillars into the 1990s.” After the passage of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, the USCGA supplemented the Coast Guard as “authorized by the Commandant, in performance of any Coast Guard function, duty, role, mission or operation authorized by law” (USCGA, 2020). The modern functions of the USCGA involve the operation of “safety and regatta patrols,” and it is “an integral part of the Coast Guard Search and Rescue team” (USCGA, 2020). Auxiliary personnel also perform “communication watches, assist during mobilization exercises, perform harbor and pollution patrols, provide platforms for unarmed boarding parties, and recruit new people for the service” (USCGA, 2020). According to the USCGA, the modern USCGA is “a force multiplier of vetted and trained volunteers devoted to the support of Coast Guard missions and provides a broad inventory of vital skills, assets, and experience.” The USCGA is the “leading volunteer organization” within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and is an “essential component of daily operations and an effective resource primed to prevent and respond to catastrophes in the maritime region”. Its strategic purpose is to continuously hone its expertise to perform three prioritized functions. These functions are to “promote and improve recreational boating safety,” to “support Coast Guard maritime homeland security efforts,” and to “support the Coast Guard’s operational, administrative, and logistical requirements”. The USCGA, through its Incident Management Division (IMD), provides a variety of services that embellish disaster preparedness, response, and relief initiatives. The primary goal of the USCGA IMD is to “foster communication, standardization, and interoperability in USCG Auxiliary planning, response, and incident management systems” using a variety of models that “promote alignment with Coast Guard mechanisms and procedures to improve communication, coordination and cooperation in planning and response activities” (USCGA, 2020). The USCGA IMD provides tools, training, and assistance to Auxiliary leadership and members to improve our overall planning, readiness and response capability for all-hazard scenarios, including acts of terrorism, wild-land and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, typhoons, war-related disasters, and others. (USCGA, 2020) Complementing the USCGA IMD is the USCGA aviation component (AUXAIR). The AUXAIR units perform a variety of missions that support homeland security initiatives. According to the USCGA (2020), the AUXAIR entity supports many Coast Guard missions, including: • Search and Rescue; • Port Security; • Waterways and Coastal Security; Introduction to Homeland Security

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• Marine Safety; • Pollution Response; • Aids to Navigation; • Ice Reconnaissance; and • Logistic Transport. The personnel in the USCGA AUXAIR complete “auxiliary aviation training,” which is required for the completions of levels of qualification. Upon the approval of their knowledge and skills by an auxiliary flight examiner, USCGA AUXAIR personnel “may be certified by the District Director of Auxiliary (DIRAUX) as Pilots, Observers or Air Crew in the AUXAIR Program” (USCGA, 2020). Air patrol orders are issued in air facility operations in a fashion that is analogous to the dissemination of orders in surface operations. According to the USCGA, “orders are issued based on schedules created by crew and facility availability and the needs of the Coast Guard,” and the “Coast Guard Air Stations are the Order Issuing Authority for AUXAIR” (USCGA, 2020). This type of organizational structuring is demonstrative of the “squadron concept because aviation orders and directions flow directly between the air station and the district aviation staff” (USCGA, 2020). The organizational structuring of the USCGA is similar to the structuring of the U.S. Coast Guard. Although it operates in accordance with the “authority of the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard,” the USCGA represents an “internally autonomous” structuring (USCGA, 2020). The basic structures of the USCGA are 1) flotilla, 2) division, 3) district/regions, and 4) national. Each of these levels provides both complementary and supplementary services to internal and external factions of Coast Guard and USCGA entities. According to the USCGA (2020), here are synopses of each organizational level: • Flotilla—The flotilla is the basic organizational unit of the auxiliary. A flotilla comprises at least 15 qualified members who carry out auxiliary program activities. Each of the auxiliary personnel is assigned to a billet within a local flotilla. Each flotilla is headed by a flotilla commander (FC). • Division—For maximum administrative effectiveness in carrying out auxiliary programs, flotillas are grouped into divisions. These divisions comprise the flotillas in the same general geographic area. The division provides administrative, training, and supervisory support to flotillas and promotes district policy. Each division is headed by a division captain (DCP) and division vice captain (VCP) and usually consists of five or more flotillas. • District/Region—Flotillas and divisions are organized in districts, which are comparable to the Coast Guard districts and must be assigned the same district number. Some districts are further divided into regions. The district/region provides administrative and supervisory support to divisions, promotes policies of both the District Commander and National Auxiliary Committee. All districts and regions are governed by a district commodore (DCO), district vice commodore (VCO), and district rear commodore (RCO), under the guidance of the Coast Guard District Commander. At this level, Coast Guard officers are assigned to oversee and promote the auxiliary programs. • National—The auxiliary has national officers who are responsible, along with the Commandant, for the administration and policy making for the entire auxiliary. These officers comprise the National Executive Committee (NEXCOM), which is composed of the Chief Director of Auxiliary (an active duty officer), the National Commodore and the National Vice Commodores. NEXCOM and the national staff make up the auxiliary 200

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headquarters organization. The chief director is a senior Coast Guard officer and directs the administration of the auxiliary on policies established by the Commandant. The overall supervision of the Coast Guard Auxiliary is under the Assistant Commandant for Operations (G-O), who reports directly to the Commandant. The significance of USCGA contributions were highlighted during Hurricane Katrina. In 2005, when Hurricane Katrina impacted the American Gulf Coast, numerous active-duty Coast Guard resources were damaged and became inoperable. USCGA volunteers provided “radio and boat assets, and the trained manpower” that was necessary to supplement normal USCG operations during both the progression and aftermath of the storm. The USCGA also provided supplementary resources and services during Hurricane Earl. A testament to the effectiveness of the USCGA involved the relaying of a distress signal that was received by an auxiliarist in Pennsylvania. This Pennsylvanian, located near Philadelphia, received a distress signal that was broadcast from a vessel which was “located on the Mississippi River, just south of New Orleans” (Terrell, 2016). This ability to intercept messages from such a great distance and to route the necessary assistance is demonstrative of the strength of the communications network maintained by the USCGA. Such a robust network provides the capacity to communicate efficiently and effectively during homeland security training scenarios and incidents. Through the maintaining and operating of such a networked communications resource, the USCGA establishes itself as a robust first-responder entity during emergencies.

6.10.11 Military Auxiliary Radio System The Department of Defense Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) is a Department of Defense (DOD)–sponsored auxiliary communications program that is implemented by the Army and the Air Force. The primary mission for the MARS program is to provide contingency high-frequency (HF) radio communications for the DOD and the services. MARS members may also be called upon to provide contingency HF communications to civil authorities when requested and approved by proper authorities, to provide contingency communication support to the regional combatant commands supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and to assist in providing basic HF training for military personnel. MARS volunteers are all FCC-licensed amateur radio operators holding a minimum of a technician class license who receive training in military messaging formats as well as military standard protocols for sending digital messages and using the advanced encryption standard (AES) type III encryption for over-the-air transmissions on DOD frequencies. MARS members must maintain a minimum number of on-air hours per quarter in order to remain certified and authorized to support the DOD. The MARS program began in 1925 as the Army Amateur Radio Service (AARS), whose mission was to enlist the talents of volunteer amateur radio operators who could train soldiers in the new radio technology. The AARS became the Military Affiliate Radio System in 1948 with the creation of the Air Force as a separate service, and the Air Force stood up the Air Force MARS program in 1952. The Navy sponsored the Navy Marine Corps MARS program from 1962 until 2015. Today, the MARS program consists of approximately 2,400 volunteer amateur radio operators between the Army and Air Force supporting the DOD. Over the past few years, the MARS program began refocusing its efforts on the core mission of providing contingency HF communications to the DOD. To that end, MARS now participates Introduction to Homeland Security

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in quarterly DOD-level communication exercises focused on “very bad day” scenarios in which MARS members train on their ability to interface with amateur radio operators across the United States. The focus of these quarterly exercises is to partner with local amateur radio operators in order to gather situational awareness information such as county status information and other relevant infrastructure information in the local area as requested by DOD authorities. During these exercises, MARS members use not only local VHF and UHF repeaters and nets but also HF traffic nets, as well as the 5 MHz discrete channels that allow communications with amateur radio operators. In 2016, MARS also began using high-power HF stations to broadcast exercise information on the 60 meter channels to the amateur radio community. MARS members continue to provide critical 24/7 HF phone patch support to the DOD forces as a backup to other DOD-provided high-power HF communication systems. Phone patches allow phone calls to be placed using radio linking. This service has been a staple of MARS for many years. During 2016, MARS operators conducted more than 2,000 official phone patches for DOD aircrews, ranging from declaring in-flight emergencies to routine calls such as updating flight plans, receiving updated weather reports, and requesting ground support upon arrival. In 2014, MARS members began supporting a series of U.S. Northern Command–sponsored homeland defense exercises called Vital Connections. The Vital Connections exercises are communications interoperability events that bring together a state’s National Guard elements with federal entities such as FEMA, TSA, and DHS; DOD forces including active-duty and reserve component units; state, county, and local first responder and emergency management personnel; and auxiliary communication entities, including amateur radio operators, MARS, and Civil Air Patrol squadrons. In 2013 and 2014, MARS members trained with amateur radio operators in Nepal, collecting situational awareness information following a notional earthquake that struck the capital. Following the May 2015 earthquake that devastated Kathmandu, MARS and Nepalese amateur radio operators went into action, relaying disaster information to the U.S. Pacific Command, which was preparing to provide humanitarian assistance. In 2016, after Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti, MARS members partnered with the amateur radio Hurricane Watch Net to collect disaster situational awareness information from amateur radio operators in Haiti. MARS members provided this information to the U.S. Southern Command operations center. Amateur radio information gathered from the Hurricane Watch Net by MARS members was provided to the hospital ship USNS Comfort deploying to Haiti in response to the hurricane. With DOD’s renewed interest in reviving its use of HF communications during what it calls “a day without space,” the MARS programs are well positioned to continue providing critical contingency HF communications support to the DOD for many years to come.

6.10.12 Local Emergency Planning Committees Local emergency planning committees (LEPC) are another framework that can be utilized to coordinate efforts between stakeholders, including NGOs, first responders, chemical/industrial businesses, utility companies, the public, and numerous government agencies. The primary purpose of LEPC is to assist in the preparation of emergency response plans for chemical emergencies (Lindell, 1994). 202

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Basically, LEPC evolved from the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA Title III) of 1986, which stipulated that each state develop and maintain a LEPC in order to prevent, prepare, and plan for local industrial accidents that would be chemical, biological, or gas (hazardous waste). Under SARA, each state is responsible for establishing a state emergency response commission (SERC) to plan for hazardous material emergencies (HAZMAT). One of the primary aspects of a SERC is to assist local governments in developing a LEPC. Since October 1, 2005, all states have been required to become NIMS compliant in order to qualify for FEMA grants and other assistance. As stipulated by FEMA per the NIMS Integration Center, which was created by HSPD-5: LEPCs are nonprofit community organizations (NGOs) that must include in their membership, at a minimum, local officials including police, fire, civil defense, public health, transportation, and environmental professionals, as well as representatives of facilities subject to the emergency planning requirements, community groups, and the media. (Henstra, 2010) According to the NIMS Integration Center, the following elements are required to be part of the community emergency response plan that is developed by an LEPC: • Identify facilities and transportation routes of extremely hazardous substances; • Describe emergency response procedures, on- and offsite; • Designate a community coordinator and facility coordinator(s) to implement the plan; • Outline emergency notification procedures; • Describe how to determine the probable affected area and population by releases; • Describe local emergency equipment and facilities and the persons responsible for them; • Outline evacuation plans; • Provide a training program for emergency responders (including schedules); and • Provide methods and schedules for exercising emergency response plans.

6.10.13 The Private Sector Obviously, the amount of resources, size of the business (structure), number of employees, and type of business (retail or industrial) within the private sector will affect the emergency management continuity relative to the nature of the incident itself. As distinctly highlighted within the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework, there are five functional responsibilities that can serve as a major foundation for the ability of PSOs to be as prepared as possible, respond accordingly, and recover within reason, as summarized in Table 6.1. Thus, PSOs can be important resources that may serve as a significant factor prior to, during, and after a disaster. In addition to ensuring the safety and welfare of their respective employees, PSOs must collaborate with local emergency managers regarding post-incident preparedness for a disaster or emergency. PSOs must maintain the attitude of preparing for the worst but hoping for the best and be progressive minded regarding resource sustainability (water, power, communication networks, transportation, medical care, security, etc.) during the response and recovery process. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Table 6.1 Private Sector Response Role Category

Role in this category

Impacted Organization or Infrastructure

Private-sector organizations may be impacted by direct or indirect consequences of the incident. These include privately owned critical infrastructure, key resources, and other private sector entities that are significant to local, regional, and national economic recovery from the incident. Critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) are grouped into 17 sectors that together provide essential functions and services supporting various aspects of the American government, economy, and society. Examples of privately owned infrastructure include transportation, telecommunications, private utilities, financial institutions, and hospitals.

Regulated and/or Responsible Party

Owners/operators of certain regulated facilities or hazardous operations may be legally responsible for preparing for and preventing incidents from occurring and responding to an incident once it occurs. For example, federal regulations require owners/operators of nuclear power plants to maintain emergency plans and facilities and to perform assessments, prompt notifications, and training for a response to an incident.

Response Resource

Private sector entities provide response resources (donated or compensated) during an incident— including specialized teams, essential service providers, equipment, and advanced technologies— through local public-private emergency plans, through mutual aid and assistance agreements, or in response to requests from governmental and nongovernmental volunteer initiatives.

Partner with State/Local Emergency Organizations

Private sector entities may serve as partners in local and state emergency preparedness and response organizations and activities.

Components of the Nation’s Economy

As key elements of the national economy, private-sector resilience and continuity of operations planning, as well as recovery and restoration from an actual incident, represent essential homeland security activities.

6.11 International, National, and State Military Resources The Department of Defense is a key resource for the disaster response community, both domestically and internationally. The capabilities possessed by the militaries of the more developed nations are significant. As an example, when the United States experienced the impact of Hurricane Katrina, the militaries of other nations deployed force to assist in a wide range of the response and recovery efforts. Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) within the United States is not a new mission for the military. Military resources bring many assets to disaster response: disciplined and trained personnel, operating within a well-established organizational and leadership structure; a ready fleet of vehicles, surface craft, and aircraft; the capability to operate in austere environments for extended periods of time; a solid logistics tail; reach-back capability; long- and short-range communications; an in-place command and control system; and a detailed method for planning, executing, and resourcing missions. Add those strengths to an array of specialized units and equipment, and it is easy to see why the Department of Defense can be tasked. Members of the National Guard and State Defense Forces (i.e., State Guard) provide personnel and equipment that, when called upon, can respond quickly and efficiently to areas impacted by an event. The National Guard serves a dual role. Its members serve both their state and our nation and may be called to federal duty. Until called into federal service, each National Guard unit is a state entity, and its members are civilians who are subject to state military control. While under state control, Guard personnel operate under the command of their state governor and his adjutant general, and state laws generally provide that the governor may activate 204

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its National Guard when necessary for the welfare or safety of the state. State governors routinely activate their National Guard in the wake of natural disasters or civil disturbances that overwhelm local resources. Until called into federal service, Guard personnel are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act. State Defense Forces (i.e., State Guards) are authorized by state and federal laws and are under the command of the governor of each state. They operate under the sole authority of a state government; they are partially regulated by the National Guard Bureau, but they are not a part of the Army or Air National Guard of the United States. Instead, they are military organizations within the state and without federal obligation. State Guard personnel can and have been called to state active duty and remain a vital part of the emergency response team available for crisis response. State Defense Forces are a force multiplier for the federal military, reserves, and National Guard.

6.12 Federal Regulations Related to Use of Military Resources 6.12.1 Title 10 of the U.S. Code Section 10 of the U.S. Code governs the U.S. military. Within this section are requirements specifying the tenets of general military law, the Army, the Navy and Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the reserve components of the U.S. military. Within Section 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 148, Subchapter V are delineated the parameters regarding national defense, technology and industrial base, defense reinvestment, and defense conversion. Although the entirety of contents of the preceding passage is a salient aspect of homeland security, various excerpts may be examined within the context of this chapter regarding homeland security partnerships. Specifically, these sections are as follows: • § 2531. Defense memoranda of understanding and related agreements; • § 2533b. Requirement to buy strategic materials critical to national security from American sources; exceptions; • § 2535. Defense Industrial Reserve; and • § 2536. Award of certain contracts to entities controlled by a foreign government: prohibition.

6.12.2 Defense Memoranda of Understanding and Agreements The preceding chapters discussed the necessity of worldwide collaboration given the advent and proliferation of globalism. Although the U.S. seeks to actively participate within the global economy, it must still acknowledge its sovereignty with respect any agreements and partnerships into which it may enter as a salient consideration of homeland security. The following is an excerpt from the U.S. Code that highlights the scope and limitations that are associated with memorandums of understanding and national agreements. These concepts are highlighted within Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Specifically, the following excerpt of the U.S. Code expresses the ability of the U.S. to ensure that its resource needs and requirements are satisfied during any periods of distress. Unless otherwise noted, the contents of the following excerpt were obtained from Cornell University Law School (Legal Information Institute, 2021). Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 6.10 United States Marines providing support during Hurricane Matthew. (Source: United States Southern Command. Photo by Sgt. Adwin Esters)

Figure 6.11 National Guard personnel providing support for disaster support operations. (Source: FEMA)

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Figure 6.12 The Mississippi State Guard (State Defense Force). (Source: Author’s Collection)

§ 2531. Defense memoranda of understanding and related agreements (a) Considerations in Making and Implementing MOUs and Related Agreements.—In the negotiation, renegotiation, and implementation of any existing or proposed memorandum of understanding, or any existing or proposed agreement related to a memorandum of understanding, between the Secretary of Defense, acting on behalf of the United States, and one or more foreign countries (or any instrumentality of a foreign country) relating to research, development, or production of defense equipment, or to the reciprocal procurement of defense items, the Secretary of Defense shall— (1) consider the effects of such existing or proposed memorandum of understanding or related agreement on the defense technology and industrial base of the United States; and (2) regularly solicit and consider comments and recommendations from the Secretary of Commerce with respect to the commercial implications of such memorandum of understanding or related agreement and the potential effects of such memorandum of understanding or related agreement on the international competitive position of United States industry. (b) Inter-Agency Review of Effects on United States Industry.— Whenever the Secretary of Commerce has reason to believe that an existing or proposed memorandum of understanding or related agreement has, or threatens to have, a significant adverse effect on the international competitive position of United States industry, the Secretary may request an inter-agency review of the memorandum of understanding or related agreement. If, as a result of the review, the Secretary determines that the commercial interests of the United States are not being served or would not be served by adhering to the terms of such existing memorandum or related agreement or agreeing to such proposed memorandum or related agreement, as the case may be, the Secretary shall recommend to the President the renegotiation of the existing memorandum or related agreement or any modification to the proposed memorandum of understanding or related agreement that he considers necessary to ensure an appropriate balance of interests. Introduction to Homeland Security

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(c) Limitation on Entering into MOUs and Related Agreements.— A memorandum of understanding or related agreement referred to in subsection (a) may not be entered into or implemented if the President, taking into consideration the results of the inter-agency review, determines that such memorandum of understanding or related agreement has or is likely to have a significant adverse effect on United States industry that outweighs the benefits of entering into or implementing such memorandum of agreement.

6.12.3 Purchasing Requirements The maturation of global markets presents a variety of opportunities for American entities to purchase goods and services from a myriad of nations globally. These goods and services may be solely available from overseas sources, or overseas suppliers may be attractive because their prices may be lower than those prices offered by domestic producers. However, the U.S. must be mindful of this concept with respect to ensuring national security and its ability to generate resources during periods of distress. Therefore, it is prudent to obtain critical resources from domestic suppliers. Through the use of domestic suppliers, the U.S. practically guarantees the ability to produce critical resources during period of distress. Because of such independence, the U.S. avoids dependencies that could impede its ability to obtain critical resources. This concept is not unnoticed by the U.S. Congress. Within Section 10 of the U.S. Code are requirements that constrain the purchasing of critically strategic materials to sources that are within the domestic U.S. Specifically, the following excerpt of the U.S. Code expresses the ability of the U.S. to ensure that its resource needs and requirements are satisfied during any periods of distress.

6.12.4 The Defense Industrial Reserve Within the preceding chapters of this textbook, the essential dependence of the U.S. economy on butter as well as munitions was conceptually both identified and explained within the context of homeland security. It is imperative that America retain and maintain the ability to design, develop, test, produce, and implement an industrial base that is capable of supplying the resources that are necessary components of national defense and national security. This concept is relevant with respect to maintaining the current American status among the myriad of allied and adversarial nations that exist within the global society. Given the necessity of safeguarding America against any aggressors, the Defense Industrial Reserve represents a concept through which the capacity to provide resources and materials during periods of distress is retained and maintained. These concepts are highlighted within Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Specifically, the following excerpt of the U.S. Code expresses the ability of the U.S. to ensure that its resource needs and requirements are satisfied during any periods of distress. Unless otherwise noted, the contents of the following excerpt were obtained from Cornell University Law School (Legal Information Institute, 2021). § 2535. Defense Industrial Reserve (a) Declaration of Purpose and Policy.—It is the intent of Congress— (1) to provide a comprehensive and continuous program for the future safety and for the defense of the United States by providing adequate measures whereby an essential nucleus of Government-owned industrial plants and an industrial reserve of machine tools and other industrial manufacturing equipment may be assured for immediate use 208

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to supply the needs of the armed forces in time of national emergency or in anticipation thereof; (2) that such Government-owned plants and such reserve shall not exceed in number or kind the minimum requirements for immediate use in time of national emergency, and that any such items which shall become excess to such requirements shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible; (3) that to the maximum extent practicable, reliance will be placed upon private industry for support of defense production; and (4) that machine tools and other industrial manufacturing equipment may be held in plant equipment packages or in a general reserve to maintain a high state of readiness for production of critical items of defense materiel, to provide production capacity not available in private industry for defense materiel, or to assist private industry in time of national disaster. (b) Powers and Duties of the Secretary of Defense.— (1) To execute the policy set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall— (A) determine which industrial plants and installations (including machine tools and other industrial manufacturing equipment) should become a part of the Defense Industrial Reserve; (B) designate what excess industrial property shall be disposed of; (C) establish general policies and provide for the transportation, handling, care, storage, protection, maintenance, repair, rebuilding, utilization, recording, leasing and security of such property; (D) direct the transfer without reimbursement of such property to other Government agencies with the consent of such agencies; (E) direct the leasing of any of such property to designated lessees; (F) authorize the disposition in accordance with existing law of any of such property when in the opinion of the Secretary such property is no longer needed by the Department of Defense; and (G) notwithstanding chapter 5 of title 40 and any other provision of law, authorize the transfer to a nonprofit educational institution or training school, on a nonreimbursable basis, of any such property already in the possession of such institution or school whenever the program proposed by such institution or school for the use of such property is in the public interest. (2) (A) The Secretary of a military department to which equipment or other property is transferred from the Defense Industrial Reserve shall reimburse appropriations available for the purposes of the Defense Industrial Reserve for the full cost (including direct and indirect costs) of— (i) storage of such property; (ii) repair and maintenance of such property; and (iii) overhead allocated to such property. (B) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations establishing general policies and fee schedules for reimbursements under subparagraph (A). (c) Definitions.— In this section: (1) The term “Defense Industrial Reserve” means— (A) a general reserve of industrial manufacturing equipment, including machine tools, selected by the Secretary of Defense for retention for national defense or for other emergency use; (B) those industrial plants and installations held by and under the control of the Department of Defense in active or inactive status, including Government-owned/ Introduction to Homeland Security

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Government-operated plants and installations and Government-owned/contractoroperated plants and installations which are retained for use in their entirety, or in part, for production of military weapons systems, munitions, components, or supplies; and (C) those industrial plants and installations under the control of the Secretary which are not required for the immediate need of any department or agency of the Government and which should be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. (2) The term “plant equipment package” means a complement of active and idle machine tools and other industrial manufacturing equipment held by and under the control of the Department of Defense and approved by the Secretary for retention to produce particular defense materiel or defense supporting items at a specific level of output in the event of emergency.

The essence of this excerpt provides the basis for ensuring the industrial capacity of the U.S. during periods of distress. This excerpt also pertains to government ownership and control of any such resources that are mandated during emergencies and periods of distress. Therefore, partnerships among such government organizations may not necessarily be willful. Instead, they may be mandated by government decree and direction unless they contemplate collaboration with entities within the private sector. Regardless, this portion of the U.S. Code is an essential aspect of providing the ability to generate materials and resources that satisfy the requirements of emergency situations.

6.12.5 U.S. Government Contracts and Foreign Awards The U.S. must consider the integrity of its national security with respect to the characteristics of its trading partners. Therefore, a variety of prohibitions exist that affect the awarding of contracts. Section 10 of the U.S. Code constrains the awarding of contracts with respect to characteristics of entities that are controlled by foreign governments. Unless otherwise noted, the contents of the following excerpt were obtained from Cornell University Law School (Legal Information Institute, 2021). § 2536. Award of certain contracts to entities controlled by a foreign government: prohibition (a) In General.— A Department of Defense contract or Department of Energy contract under a national security program may not be awarded to an entity controlled by a foreign government if it is necessary for that entity to be given access to information in a proscribed category of information in order to perform the contract. (b) Waiver Authority.— (1) The Secretary concerned may waive the application of subsection (a) to a contract award if— (A) the Secretary concerned determines that the waiver is essential to the national security interests of the United States; or (B) in the case of a contract awarded for environmental restoration, remediation, or waste management at a Department of Defense or Department of Energy facility— (i) the Secretary concerned determines that the waiver will advance the environmental restoration, remediation, or waste management objectives of the department concerned and will not harm the national security interests of the United States; and

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(ii) the entity to which the contract is awarded is controlled by a foreign government with which the Secretary concerned is authorized to exchange Restricted Data under section 144 c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2164 (c)). (2) The Secretary concerned shall notify Congress of any decision to grant a waiver under paragraph (1)(B) with respect to a contract. The contract may be awarded only after the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by the committees. (c) Definitions.— In this section: (1) The term “entity controlled by a foreign government” includes— (A) any domestic or foreign organization or corporation that is effectively owned or controlled by a foreign government; and (B) any individual acting on behalf of a foreign government, as determined by the Secretary concerned. Such term does not include an organization or corporation that is owned, but is not controlled, either directly or indirectly, by a foreign government if the ownership of that organization or corporation by that foreign government was effective before October 23, 1992. (2) The term “proscribed category of information” means a category of information that— (A) with respect to Department of Defense contracts— (i) include special access information; (ii) is determined by the Secretary of Defense to include information the disclosure of which to an entity controlled by a foreign government is not in the national security interests of the United States; and (iii) is defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this section; and (B) with respect to Department of Energy contracts— (i) is determined by the Secretary of Energy to include information described in subparagraph (A)(ii); and (ii) is defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Energy for the purposes of this section. (3) The term “Secretary concerned” means— (A) the Secretary of Defense, with respect to Department of Defense contracts; and (B) the Secretary of Energy, with respect to Department of Energy contracts.

6.13 Summary The homeland security program is a national preparedness program. It is national because it is dependent on local communities. It is a partnership program. The number of partnerships at the federal, state, and local levels is difficult to estimate. The military, federal agencies, state agencies, local agencies, and tribal agencies tasked to provide support for preparedness initiatives are incredible. These partnerships recognize their interdependency. That idea is further recognized in partnering with the private sector. In modern environments, the public and private sectors are interdependent and cannot support planning, training, equipment, and exercise initiatives without the partnership. The information-sharing efforts could not perform optimally without the partnerships. The public and private sectors must operate in the proverbial “hand in glove” relationship. The interests are common: to prevent incidents from occurring, to protect the citizens and critical infrastructure, to respond as necessary to reduce the consequence, and to recover the vitality of the community when disaster has interrupted its routine.

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Citizen partners have the same interests. The myriad of volunteer groups and individuals are working to make their neighborhoods safe. They are making tremendous efforts in providing public awareness and training. Citizens are participating in training programs and in preparedness activities that will aid them in surviving and also assist them in helping their community survive. Examples of such programs include the Citizens Corps, VIPS, the Medical Reserve Corps, the Fire Corps, and USAonWatch. In addition to these entities, two others exist that have historically benefitted the U.S. during times of peace and war: the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (USCGA). The Civil Air Patrol was mandated by the U.S. Congress as the official auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force. The CAP provides a variety of homeland security functions and services that supplement the missions of the U.S. Air Force and embellish the preparedness and response capabilities of local communities. The USCGA provides commensurate benefits in American localities and also supplements missions of the U.S. Coast Guard. Both organizations are composed of citizen volunteers. Partnerships must also be considered in the long-term strategic context of national security. The U.S. must maintain as much control as is possible over its ability to produce critical resources. Such independence eliminates dependencies that could impede the ability of the nation to wage war or to respond during periods of distress. Section 10 of the U.S. Code delineates a variety of tenets that facilitate the long-term strategic perspective of national security and national sovereignty. The United States government is a partnership. The founders captured that vision and incorporated it into the fundamental document describing the anticipated American republic. “These United States” provided the partnership to break away from the potential threat caused by abuse of power, tyranny, and oppression. That partnership has survived many military campaigns, both inside its borders and on foreign soil. It has survived periods of civil unrest and disagreements that threatened its existence. The partnership of the United States is a lesson in resiliency. It keeps recovering. Preparedness is a partnership.

6.14 Chapter Comments and Summary Disasters begin and end at the local level. Private sector businesses and NGOs (e.g., the Red Cross and Red Crescent, the Chambers of Commerce, etc.) that exist at the local level play a key role in providing goods, services, and technical expertise that complement effective preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation operations in an emergency or disaster (Buttarazzi, 2013). Partnerships must be considered within the long-term strategic context of national security. The U.S. must maintain as much control as is possible over its ability to produce critical resources. Such independence eliminates dependencies that could impede the ability of the nation to wage war or to respond during periods of distress. Section 10 of the U.S. Code delineates a variety of tenets that facilitate the long-term, strategic perspective of national security and national sovereignty. There remain numerous communities in the United States that still lack the formality of a response and recovery plan in the event of a disaster. Ideally, prior to a disaster, it is obviously incumbent on local government leadership to plan and prepare accordingly. In reality, however, a lack of personnel and provisions and complacency serve as the proverbial stumbling

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blocks. Such poor preparation may be problematic because of leadership, budgetary constraints, or the abhorrent attitude of “it’ll never happen.” This chapter presented highlights of numerous volunteer organizations whose members, in many cases, may be unpaid for their time and service unless compensation is received during a disaster. All organizations have a common attribute: people. Human resources are the most important aspect of any organization. An organization is no better than its people. Thus, the individual human may be the strongest or weakest link of any organization. Consequently, informal citizen groups are becoming more commonplace within communities. Quite often, the visionary process for promoting and maintaining a safe and prepared community is initiated by citizens of a community who pursue the resounding resources offered by NGOs. Such advocacy groups quickly learn of significant links to a key stakeholder, which then develops into a collaborative partnership with an NGO that is integrated with a state VOAD and NVOAD. The incredible resources provided by NGOs and the private sector for the sole purpose of addressing preparedness, resiliency, relief, and recovery truly resonate during and after disaster. Thanks to such commitment on behalf of the public’s welfare, the vision of citizens can become a reality as they prepare for the worst and hope.

6.15 Key Terms American Red Cross Citizen Corps Councils Citizens Corps Civil Air Patrol Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Donation Emergency Response Cycle Faith-Based Organizations Fire Corps Funding Gaps and Needs Government Organizations Habitat for Humanity Humanitarian Organizations Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC)

Medical Reserve Corps Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) National Neighborhood Watch National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) Nongovernmental Organizations Private Sector Organizations Response Partnerships Red Cross Salvation Army Stakeholders State Defense Forces United States Coast Guard Auxiliary United Way Volunteerism Whole Community

6.16 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. In this chapter, we examined the role of volunteers and NGOs within the framework of emergency management. From your readings and class discussions, what do you feel were your three most significant takeaways from this chapter? 2. Perform some research concerning volunteer organizations in your locality. Select two organizations, and write a brief essay that highlights their respective functions in the context of emergency management.

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3. Regarding your response to the preceding question, consider the financial statuses of the selected organizations. Determine the methods whereby these organizations obtain funding. Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. In your response, consider how you believe the selected organizations may improve their abilities to attract financial sponsors. 4. This chapter introduces nongovernmental organizations, including NVOAD, the Red Cross, and the Salvation Army. Perform some research regarding the primary missions and functions of nongovernmental organizations. Write a brief essay pertaining to their roles and missions.

References Busch, N. E., and Givens, A. D. (2013). Achieving resilience in disaster management: The role of public-private partnerships. Journal of Strategic Security, 1–19. Buttarazzi, O. (2013). Using Public-Private Partnerships to Enhance Emergency Management. Arlington, VA: Institute for Public-Private Partnerships. Cellucci, T. (2018, November 27). Innovative public-private partnerships help secure critical infrastructure. Homeland Security Today. Retrieved from www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/infrastructure- security/perspective-innovative-public-private-partnerships-accelerate-technology-and-secure-criticalinfrastructure/. Chandra, A., Moen, S., and Sellers, C. (2016). What Role Does the Private Sector Have in Supporting Disaster Recovery, and What Challenges Does It Face in Doing So? RAND. Retrieved from www.rand.org/pubs/ perspectives/PE187.html. Disaster, N. V. (2020). About Us. NVOAD. Retrieved from www.nvoad.org/about-us/. FEMA. (2011). A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action. Washington, D.C.: FEMA. FEMA. (2013, November 5). Building Better Resiliency—Together. Federal Emergency Management. Retrieved from www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1383654912681-508c2ec178c9741b3eb78ddddf106428/Public_ Private_Partnerships.pdf. GAO. (2019). FEMA and the American Red Corss Need to Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations are Included in Coordination and Planning. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office. Haddow, G., Bullock, J. A., and Coppola, D. P. (2014). Introduction to Emergency Management. Waltham, MA: Elsevier. HBR. (2019). When corporate disaster relief helps—and when it doesn’t. Harvard Business Review, 17–20. Henstra, D. (2010). Evaluating local government emergency management programs: What framework should public managers adopt? Public Administration Review, 247–258. Horwitz, S. (2008). Walmart to the Rescue: Private Enterprise’s Response to Hurricane Katrina. Canton and New York: St. Lawrence University. Jerolleman, A., and Kiefer, J. J. (2016). The Private Sector’s Role in Disasters. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis. Kapucu, N. (2006). Public-nonprofit partnerships for collective action in dynamic contexts of emergencies. Public Administration, 11–21. Koliba, C. J., Mills, R., and Zia, A. (2011). Accountability in governance networks: An assessment of public, private, and nonprofit emergency management practices following hurricane Katrina. Public Administration Review, 480–497. Legal Information Institute. (2021). 10 U.S. Code § 2531—Defense Memoranda of Understanding and Related Agreements. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2531. Levy, J., and Prizzia, R. (2018). Building effective emergency management public-private partnerships (PPP) for information sharing. Security by Design, 375–401. Lindell, M. (1994). Are local planning commites effective in developing community disaster prepaerness? International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 159–182. MacManus, S. A., and Caruson, K. (2010). Emergency management: Gauging the extensiveness and quality of public-and private-sector collaboration at the local level. Urban Affairs Review, 280–299. McElreath, D. H., Doss, D. A., Jensen, C. J., Wigginton, M. P., Nations, R., Van Slyke, J., and Nations, J. (2014a). Foundations of Emergency Management. Debuque: Kendall Hunt. McElreath, D. H., Doss, D. A., Russo, B., Tesiero, R., Jensen, C., Van Slyke, J., Schulenberg, S. E., . . . Nations, R. (2018). Disasters that Shaped Emergency Management. Kendall Hunt.

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McElreath, D. H., Jensen, C. J., Wigginton, M. P., Doss, D. A., Nations, R., and Van Slyke, J. (2014b). Introduction to Homeland Security. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. McKay, J. (2018, January 5). Public-private partnership links emergency managers and cultural institutions. Emergency Management. Retrieved from www.govtech.com/em/disaster/Public-Private-PartnershipLinks-Emergency-Managers-and-Cultural-Institutions.html. Meyer, C. (2020). After Hurricanes Tested Capabilities, Mass Care Organizations Regroup. Retrieved from https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2020/01/after-hurricanes-testedcapabilities-mass-care-organizations-regroup/. Miller, L., Hess, K., and Orthmann, C. (2018). Community Policing: Partnerships for Problem Solving. Boston, MA: Cengage. MRC. (2010). About the Medical Reserve Corps. Medical Reserve Corps. Retrieved from https://mrc.hhs.gov/ pageViewFldr/About. National Neighborhood Watch. (2021). Our History. Retrieved from https://www.nnw.org/our-history. Ready.Gov. (2019, September 17). Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from www.ready.gov/voluntary-organizations-active-disaster. Summit Fire and EMS. (n.d.). Fire Corps. Retrieved from https://summitfire.org/250/Fire-Corps. Terrell, C. (2016, August 25). The long blue line: Coast guard responders during record-setting Hurricane Katrina. Coast Guard On-Line. Retrieved from https://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2016/08/ the-long-blue-line-coast-guard-responders-during-record-setting-hurricane-katrina/. Thomas, A., and Fritz, L. (2006). Disaster relief, inc. Harvard Business Review. USCGA. (2020). USCG Auxiliary History. United States Coast Guard Auxiliary Department of Hoemland Security. Retrieved from http://join.cgaux.org/history#:~:text=Members%20initially%20conducted% 20safety%20and,the%20U.S.%20Coast%20Guard%20Auxiliary. Waugh, W., and Tierney, K. (2007). Emergency Management: Principles and Practices for Local Government. Washington, D.C.: ICMA Press. Worden, A. (2006, August 23). Faith in Action: Faith-based groups early and enduring: Before agencies aided Katrina’s victims, religious groups did—And still do. Philadelphia Inquirer, 1.

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7 Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Strategies

Figure 7.1 A Center for Domestic Preparedness training exercise. (Source: FEMA/Center for Domestic Preparedness)

Nevertheless, there are gaps in receiving funding or planning for emergency preparedness. We must identify and address them, because these issues will remain with us for years to come. Unfortunately, there is no quick fix. —Michael Shea

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The objectives of this chapter are to: • Examine the 15 planning scenarios identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; • Discuss the prodromal cycle; • Review the Homeland Security Planning Model; • Gain an understanding of the roles of local, state, and federal governments in the development of disaster preparation and mitigation strategies; • Emphasize the importance of homeland security for the continuance of society and of the nation; and • Identify some of the major challenges encountered in disaster planning.

7.1 Introduction All societies face geophysical, climatological, and technological events that reveal both physical and social vulnerabilities.1 According to the American Red Cross, more than 200 million people are affected by disasters worldwide each year.2 No matter the event that strikes, communities impacted are changed, in many cases lives lost, injuries inflicted, economies disrupted, and the human spirit and resiliency tested. But humans have proven to be a resourceful species. In the face of major disaster, the human spirit, though tested, has proven persistent. Those involved today in the many and very diverse aspects of our nation’s security face the same philosophical challenge: how do we identify realistic threats and, once we have identified them, can we take steps to reduce our vulnerabilities while also improving our resiliency? We shall divide threats into two very broad categories—natural and man-made. Within those categories are a wide range of specific threats and challenges, in some cases so obscure or considered so unrealistic that they fall well outside reasonable disaster planning consideration. Effective disaster preparation and mitigation strategy development must be based on a realistic threat assessment from which can be developed an impact analysis (the real question of what will happen to our community if this event occurs). From this point—the impact analysis—courses of action may be constructed, needs determined, resources identified, and a wide range of stakeholders engaged. While we desire response efforts conducted successfully at the lowest level possible, the scope of the event greatly shapes, if not defines, the response. If multiple jurisdictions find themselves competing for resources, it is often the next tier in the response level—as examples, regional or state EOC—that may determine what area(s) receive the requested support first or at all.

7.2 Where’s the Threat? The Event for Which We Prepare: Natural Disaster or Man-Made Events? Our clear desire is to avoid an event. Local efforts may identify vulnerabilities, and, if both possible and realistic, steps may be taken to reduce those vulnerabilities. Regional or state

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analysis may also discover vulnerabilities, but it is often extremely difficult to prevail in the local and state budget battle when competing with diverse social services or educational initiatives. This funding challenge makes it even more important to initiate and accomplish disaster mitigation measures intended to reduce or eliminate the impacts and risks of hazards through proactive measures taken before an emergency or disaster occurs. Also, on the local level, disaster mitigation measures may be structural (e.g., flood dikes) or nonstructural (e.g., land use zoning). Mitigation activities should incorporate the measurement and assessment of the evolving risk environment. Nationally, homeland security planning is a priority in the programs funded by the U.S. Congress, and administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. However, the emphasis on homeland security occurred after two major events: terrorism, as emphasized by the 9/11 attacks, and natural disasters, as emphasized by Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, strategic planning must accommodate both types of events—natural and man-made.

7.2.1 Natural Disasters Not long ago, terrorism was a vague, elusive term to most Americans. Modern acts of terrorism were remote to the continental United States. As a practical matter, local communities identified the realistic threats they faced and understood that natural events, primarily weatherrelated hazards, posed the greatest danger to their lives and property. For the majority of communities, the old Civil Defense program of the Cold War served as the framework of a wider range of local-level disaster response preparedness activities. Typically, community first responders consisted of civil defense coordinators, fire prevention and suppression professionals, and law enforcement anti-crime, anti-drug, and antigang efforts, and emergency medical personnel. Emergency management went about the business of planning for natural disasters that included tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods. High-profile incidents that captured the nation’s attention were rare, but by the 1980, workplace violence, school shootings, gang violence, and hate crimes had become more common. In response to those threats and challenges, grants and programs, most often fueled by federally provided funds, were designed to respond to or combat these types of activities. But changes were slow to come. As cited in Burton (2008): In the 1970s, after the impact of Hurricane Camille along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, the National Governor’s Association adopted a common framework for describing these functions, in part to facilitate governments of neighboring states coming to each other’s aid in disaster situations. The four functions sometimes referred to as phases in the allhazards management approach, are mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. It is collectively described as the all-hazards approach.3 This citation is particularly interesting as it illustrates a national discussion taking place when the response community was a collection of stove-piped disciplines. Public response agencies rarely addressed integrated planning and collaborative initiatives. It is also interesting to note the use of the term “all-hazards” in the national conversation during the 1970s.

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7.2.2 Terrorism and Extremism It was into this setting that the events of September 11, 2001, emerged. According to Christopher Bellavita, “We have been at war with the terrorists since September 11, 2001. They have been at war with us [emphasis added] since October 23, 1983, when 241 U.S. service members were killed in Lebanon.” Bellavita further stated, “A relatively small group of people were alarmed by the rising threat of terrorism. As has been well documented in the post 9/11 era, most of those calls to pay attention were ignored” (McElreath et al., 2014). During 1983, the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was bombed, resulting in the deaths of 241 U.S. service personnel, including 220 Marines, 18 sailors, and 3 soldiers, and injuring 60 others in the largest one-day death toll experienced by the United States military since World War II. In 1993, terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in New York City. In 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City. The incident resulted in the deaths of 168 men, women, and children. Next, the attacks of 9/11 occurred. Steven Fink used the word “prodrome” to describe predictors. Its root meaning is “things that come before,” and Fink described the “prodromal cycle” as an environment in which the routine life was lived. It is also described as one part of a four-part cycle of crisis.4 The prodromal cycle comes before the eruption (incident) and follows the resolution (closure) cycle. This cycle is in perpetual motion. Figure 7.2 shows the conceptual relationships within the prodromal cycle. Within the prodromal environment, avoidance and prevention initiatives can be optimized if global experiences are observed and integrated into organizational objectives. It requires the recipient to borrow from the profit and loss experience and the economy of the global partners. Simply illustrated, if an event occurs in California today and then occurs in Florida tomorrow, the question would then be: Is anyone in Florida observing and reacting?5 Historically, public safety leadership, elected officials, and emergency management leaders did not deny the presence of terrorists or the potential consequences posed by catastrophic natural disasters. These were incidents experienced elsewhere or so infrequently that decades could

Figure 7.2 The prodromal cycle.

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pass without an occurrence. Catastrophic events were not the priority. However, that priority has changed. Given the dangers of the modern world, strategic planning should acknowledge the potentials of both human-made and natural disasters. Although it is impossible to predict with full certainty and accuracy the threats that may endanger a locality, one must identify and prepare for events that are deemed the most likely to become reality.

7.3 Planning: Strategies and Operations The U.S. Department of Homeland Security suggested the use of 15 planning scenarios within the planning cycle by those planners tasked in creating preparedness plans. Here are the 15 planning scenarios identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: • Improvised Nuclear Device; • Aerosol Anthrax; • Pandemic Influenza; • Plague; • Blister Agent; • Toxic Industrial Chemicals; • Nerve Agent; • Chlorine Tank Explosion; • Major Earthquake; • Major Hurricane; • Radiological Dispersal Device; • Improvised Explosive Device; • Food Contamination; • Foreign Animal Disease; and • Cyber Attack. For the typical community, how realistic are these planning scenarios? These planning scenarios represent a conflict within the all-hazards planning model. The all-hazards planning approach, relative to the current capabilities-based planning model, exemplifies the planning and policy conflicts and inconsistencies present within the homeland security program. The issue with the 15 planning scenarios is attempting to compare natural disasters to man-caused incidents within a threat matrix. Some jurisdictions do not choose to use these scenarios in their planning schemes. According to the mission of homeland security within the national strategy, it is difficult to encompass natural disasters. Some are concerned that the inconsistency can be minimized by using these scenarios. Planning initiatives within the homeland security and preparedness program migrate from the federal government and trickle down to state, local, and tribal governments. However, it is common for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to be flexible and not to prescribe specific scenarios for state, local, and tribal partner. Although the model causes some debate, these 15 scenarios can be considered as suggestions for planning purposes. Two foundational documents related to the planning task in the national homeland security and preparedness program are considered within the scope of this textbook. Those

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two documents are the National Homeland Security Strategy and the National Response Framework. The National Homeland Security Strategy states that its purpose is to guide, organize, and unify our nation’s homeland security efforts.6 The strategy goes on to list areas of concern that the United States and its people should acknowledge: • Preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks; • Protecting the citizens, infrastructure, and key resources; • Responding to all incidents that occur, terrorist acts or otherwise; and • Continuing to make improvements in order to ensure triumph. The strategy stresses the importance of planning and proactive initiatives. There must be collaboration between local, state, and federal agencies for the strategy to be effective. The safety of the nation improves in conjunction with greater numbers of available tools and resources. There must be a clear and concise set of rules and regulations that every agency must follow, as well as precisely thought-out scenarios that can assess our nation’s ability to respond to any event. With all that being said, the most important qualities for agencies to possess are flexibility and the ability to adapt to any situation as not every possible scenario can be imagined before it occurs. Every incident will be different and have its own characteristics and obstacles that must be overcome (Homeland Security Council, 2007).7 The National Response Framework (NRF) is a rudimentary document that outlines the operational and response system that is institutionalized to assist federal, state, local, and tribal governments in the planning for response. Within the National Homeland Security Strategy (Department of Homeland Security, 2002), roles and responsibilities were identified in the following manner: 1) community response, 2) state response, 3) federal response, and 4) private and nonprofit sector responses.

7.4 Community Response This is where response begins. All emergencies are local. This means that, no matter the scope of an event, to each citizen impacted, recovery is personal. One of the fundamental response principles is that all incidents should be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. The initial response to the majority of incidents typically is handled by local responders within a single jurisdiction and goes no further. When incidents exceed available resources, the local or tribal government may rely on mutual aid agreements with nearby localities or request additional support from the state. It is worth noting that for certain types of federal assistance, tribal nations work with the state, but, as sovereign entities, they can elect to deal directly with the federal government for other types of assistance. One of the greatest challenges for the local responders is the decisions resulting in actions in the initial stages of an event. First responders can easily become casualties responding to an incident. Local preparation is important. As an example, the community emergency response team (CERT) training program is a positive and realistic approach to prepare citizens for emergency and disaster situations. Through training, citizens learn basic disaster response skills such as fire safety, light search and rescue, team organization, and disaster medical operations. CERT members can assist others in their neighborhoods or workplaces 222

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when professional responders are not immediately available to help during a disaster or emergency.

7.5 State Response State governments have the primary responsibility for assisting local governments to respond to and recover from disasters and emergencies. When an incident expands to challenge the resources and capabilities of the state to coordinate requests for additional support, the state may request support from the private and nonprofit sectors, turn to other states for support through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or call upon the federal government for assistance. States also may collaborate with one another to ensure a broader, more effective regional response. Within the assets of the states are the forces contained in military departs, including the National Guard, Air National Guard, and, in over 20 states, the State Guard or State Defense Force; state-level law enforcement assets; and state-level emergency management assets, each of which may be called upon in the event of an emergency.

7.6 Federal Response The federal government maintains a wide array of capabilities and resources that may be made available to states and local governments. Federal assistance is provided when needed to support state and local efforts or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe within the United States. Accordingly, federal response efforts are designed to complement and supplement, rather than supplant, the state and local response. The federal government also maintains relationships with private- and nonprofit-sector entities to aid in facilitating additional support.

7.7 Private and Nonprofit Sector The private and nonprofit sectors fulfill key roles and collaborate with communities, states, and the federal government. The private sector plays an essential role when implementing plans for the rapid restoration of commercial activities and critical infrastructure operations. This activity can help mitigate consequences, improve quality of life, and accelerate recovery for communities and the nation. A 2009 review of the 25 leading homeland security contractors reflected the increasing emphasis on border security and a decreasing focus on the post-Katrina recovery. The top 10 homeland security-–related vendors included Boeing, IBM Corporation, Accenture, General Dynamics, Cooperative Personnel Services, Science Applications International Corporation, Unisys, L-3 Communications Holdings, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and Integrated Coast Guard Systems. Nonprofit organizations serve a vital role by performing essential services within communities in times of need, such as mass sheltering, emergency food supplies, counseling services, and other vital support services. Increasingly, it is common for the faith-based community to become a robust partner in these functions. Introduction to Homeland Security

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7.8 Special Circumstances There are special circumstances in which the federal government exercises a larger, more proactive role. Such situations include catastrophic incidents when local and state governments require significant assistance. They also include incidents in which federal interests are directly implicated, such as those involving primary federal jurisdiction or authorities. For example, the federal government leads response efforts to render safe weapons of mass destruction and coordinate related activities with state and local partners as appropriate. The National Homeland Security Strategy and the National Response Framework promote and support the comprehensive efforts in national preparedness. It is not absent conflict. However, prior to a discussion regarding areas of conflict within the planning task, it is necessary to examine the current planning model. Figure 7.3 is a visual concept of the current model: Preparedness is the goal, as shown in Table 7.1. The goal of preparedness is supported by four mission areas. The four mission areas are performed by the appropriately identified response disciplines. The Target Capabilities List (TCL) assists in matching identified capabilities to the appropriate response discipline, which is then matched to one or more of the four mission areas. Superimposed on the model are the 15 national planning scenarios. This model engages the idea that the response will be a multi-disciplined, multi-jurisdictional

Figure 7.3 Homeland Security Planning Model.

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Table 7.1 Target Capabilities List Categorized by Mission Area Common Mission Area

Respond Mission Area

Communications Community Preparedness and Participation Planning Risk Management Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination Prevent Mission Area CBRNE Detection Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings Intelligence Analysis and Production Counter-Terror Investigations and Law Enforcement

Animal Health Emergency Support Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Environmental Health Explosive Device Response Operations Fatality Management Fire Incident Response Support Isolation and Quarantine Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) Mass Prophylaxis Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Medical Surge

Protect Mission Area Critical Infrastructure Protection Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Laboratory Testing Onsite Incident Management Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Responder Safety and Health Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Search and Rescue (Land Based) Volunteer Management and Donations WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Recover Mission Area Economic and Community Recovery Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Source: Target Capabilities List, as of September 2007

effort. Within this model, the planning unit or team chooses a scenario and applies it to the TCL. What capabilities are necessary for a jurisdiction to respond to this incident? There are many response disciplines (e.g., fire, police, EMS, etc.) that are required to perform one or more of the mission areas related to this scenario. Once these activities are accomplished, the supposition is that the planner should have a product that will support risk analysis, resulting in determinations of gaps in capabilities. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 7.4 Threat assessment.

This model should be a cyclic exercise that becomes a process in continuum. According to its framers, it should enhance capabilities, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide information relative to consequence management. There are three overarching elements in risk management employed by the DHS: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. In his testimony to the United States Congress in February of 2007, William O. Jenkins, Jr., stated, “While risk-based allocation decision making is still evolving, GAO has proposed a systematic risk management approach for allocating resources that reflects an assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential consequences of terrorist attacks and other risks.” Jenkins further testified that “Full adoption of a risk management framework is essential for DHS to assess risk by determining which elements of risk should be addressed in what ways within available resources.”8 Planning and risk management are identified as common capabilities in the TCL. Planning is the critical capability. Risk management strategies and models cannot be effectively integrated absent a strong planning program. The organizational planner or the planning unit is usually considered a function that assimilates disparate particles and reduces them to a cohesive collection of ideas that mature into the goals and objectives, identifying the mission of the organization and guiding it toward the intent of its existence. Those disparate particles may be thoughts and ideas, products, designs, resources, or assets, both tangible and intangible. The planning function is transparent to the obvious and visible parts of the organization. Certainly, it seems unusual or rare to find planning being the tip of the spear for controversy or to be the catalyst for crisis. Planning synchronizes by integrating ideas and resources. However, there are conflicts within the framework of homeland security and preparedness guidance planning guidelines. The DHS is a very robust department that includes 22 agencies of government. One of the agencies placed under the DHS is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The integration with FEMA has been one of the most conflict-filled transitions in the history of the DHS. The definition of the DHS does not offer any resolution to this conflict. In fact, until Hurricane Katrina occurred in 2005, the national focus emphasized terrorism. This emphasis seemed to coalesce with the rationale in creating the DHS and the definition describing its function. It seems to conflict with the mission and function of FEMA simultaneously in its responsibilities in natural disasters. This conflict was unresolved when Hurricane Katrina came ashore. Shortly before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, a meeting occurred in Washington, D.C., with state homeland security advisors, state emergency management directors, the DHS (including the FEMA Director), and DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff. The Secretary 226

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had requested the meeting for the purpose of discussing the all-hazards environment. The other, less visible agenda item related to the positioning of FEMA. The Secretary listened very attentively for two days. His closing remarks were resolute. The all-hazards approach was the model, and FEMA would remain within the DHS. A few days later, Hurricane Katrina impacted the nation. Hurricane Katrina provided the opportunity that FEMA needed to make its case. The proponents who believed there had been too much emphasis on terrorism felt some vindication. This certainly was obvious during the post-Katrina testimony before the U.S. Congress and associated congressional inquiries. The DHS went through another change as a result of the reaction to Hurricane Katrina.

7.9 Planning: The Challenges As a result of Hurricane Katrina, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The DHS/FEMA conflict is further exacerbated in this legislation. The National Response Framework is not reconciled with the legislation. The fundamental question regarding this conflict is: Who is in charge? The legislation states that the Administrator of FEMA “[s]hall lead the nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risks of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters” (Stockton, 2007, speech). This statement would appear to reconcile the conflict. However, the National Response Framework indicates that the Secretary of DHS is the federal official responsible for coordinating the response and reporting to the President. This conflict trickles down to states, local, and tribal governments. It impacts the effectiveness at each level. Therefore, the conflict remains unresolved. The DHS versus FEMA conflict impacts the definitions of terms. The use of the term “all hazards” is part of the conflict. Therefore, one may question whether hazards may be interchanged with threat. May risk assessment methods encompass a standard of measure that provides equity in the natural hazard versus the man-made events (i.e., acts of terrorism) question? Do the all-hazards planning characteristics of the current model adequately engage natural disasters as opposed to acts of terrorism? Of the 15 national planning scenarios, 12 are terrorism based. Further planning and management conflicts are indicated within the incident command level of the model. The current model identifies four mission areas: 1) prevention, 2) protection, 3) response, and 4) recovery. A model from the 1970s, which remains in contemporary literature and conversations, identifies four functions in the all-hazards approach: 1) mitigation, 2) preparedness, 3) response, and 4) recovery. “Mitigation” is used in the earlier model, rather than “prevention.” Using “mitigation” would not be compatible with the current TCL. The other obvious conflict between these two models involves preparedness as one of the four mission areas. Preparedness is either a goal or the goal—otherwise, it is a function. Within the current model of the DHS, preparedness is the goal. The current DHS model is a capabilities-based planning model. This model is borrowed from the Department of Defense (DOD). Borrowing from the DOD is not new for the DHS. It does pose a few challenges in attempting to adapt a DOD model to the civilian response agency. Similar to other federal, state, and local partnership enterprises, homeland security has to be adapted to its working environment. State and local responders are challenged by laws and ordinances that are not applicable to federal agencies. The civilian responders are well versed in civil rights and constitutional safeguards in their relationships with the citizens of their state and local communities. These constraints cause some differences between the state and local and the federal and military partners. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Other challenges for state and local responders are the finite number of personnel who can be deployed at any given time. Deployment and budgetary issues, such as backfill, overtime, number of hours worked, and skill sets, as well as many other issues, are considerations for both state and local response agencies. When using the capabilities-based planning model as outlined by the DHS, these considerations integrate within the overall process of planning. There has been hesitancy on the part of local jurisdictions to fully accept the current model. For local jurisdictions, it is often difficult to work within the target capabilities. One of the more obvious challenges is selecting a capability that is not sustainable by local appropriations, which means the capability is only in place for the performance period of the grant funds allocated. The current capabilities-based planning encourages regional collaboration and multi-jurisdictional partnerships. This situation is often challenging. It is naïve to consider that because language exists promoting the idea of an integrated plan, it will be produced or duplicated. The funding challenge is caught in the conflict when collaboration is at stake. It is inherent in the system that jurisdictions first take care of their own needs and then consider the collaborative partnerships. However, mutual aid agreements have been effective for many years. Those agreements continue to provide capabilities in cross–jurisdictional boundary incidents. Two of the most formidable challenges in identifying capabilities, or gaps in capabilities, from a regional approach are geographic and demographic differences. Many of the regionally based programs place rural, less populated jurisdictions within the regional model, among large metropolitan communities. The relationship is often tense. Because there are limited prescriptive guidelines and policies from the DHS related to state and local government confusion is rampant within the programmatic objectives. Within the capabilities-based model, a planning unit comprising representatives of both large and small jurisdictions can find it difficult to work their way through the process of identifying capabilities and disciplines to support the TCLs. The process easily becomes a funding strategy rather than a planning model. Sharon Caudle testified regarding regional approaches: “Moreover, it will be difficult to develop and implement regional approaches where core capabilities can be supported and supplemented by other jurisdictions in the region.” Caudle further testified: “[R]isk assessment is not defined and presented as an integral part of homeland security CBP decision-making.”9 Capabilities-based planning may be the model as the national homeland security program progresses. If so, it must result in a method to measure preparedness. No model has provided the answer to the prevailing question regarding the level of preparedness. Therefore, one may continue to ask a simple question: How prepared are we? U.S. Representatives Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, and Howard L. Berman, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, issued a report in September 2008. This report was their evaluation of the Bush administration’s performance regarding homeland security. The report examined the following areas of interests: 1) aviation security, 2) rail and public transportation security, 3) port security, 4) border security, 5) information sharing, 6) privacy and civil liberties, 7) emergency response, 8) bio-surveillance, 9) private sector preparedness, and 10) national security. The Bush administration assessment did not receive passing or high marks in this report. The report stated, [T]he Bush Administration has not delivered on myriad critical homeland and national security mandates set forth in the “Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations 228

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Act of 2007.” Without them, the Administration has failed to provide the American people the security they expect and deserve. (Committee on Homeland Security, 2008) Similarly, on September 11, 2007, the Brookings Institute released the following statement: “A just released Government Accountability Office report bashed DHS for making limited progress on emergency-response capabilities and the management of human capital.”10 The all-hazards approach to capabilities-based planning is immersed in controversy and conflict. Some of the conflict is inherently political and bureaucratic. Some of the conflict is definitional. Some of the conflict is also based on the question of whether planning relative to homeland security and preparedness can be employed as a universal model or whether it is better employed on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. For example, the TCL may not be the model for each jurisdiction, and it may not be the model for the civilian response community. Barry R. Posen stated, As has often been pointed out, the United States and most developed, democratic countries are extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are open societies. . . . Dangerous activities occur in modern society every day. Prosaic means can be employed against everyday targets to produce catastrophic results.11 For now, the preparedness planner is guided by the all-hazards approach to capabilitiesbased planning. It is the driver to funding allocations and programmatic priorities. Regardless of whether it is ultimately deemed effective or successful, it is the current planning model expressed by the DHS. The planner must encompass natural disasters and man-made incidents in the comprehensive basic preparedness plans in his jurisdiction.

7.10 Risk Management and Assessments The model for national preparedness is designed by the DHS. The National Preparedness Guidelines are published by the DHS to facilitate a suggested planning format. Congress and the DHS agree that risk management principles must be employed within the threat and that both vulnerability and consequence assessments are promulgated within the DHS policy and program. It may not be obvious to the practitioner, but underlying and supporting the assessments are the principles of risk management. The practitioner may only be trained in the use of the planning model and not necessarily the principles embedded in the design model. According to Jenkins (2007), during his testimony to Congress, “However, adoption of a comprehensive risk management framework is essential for DHS to assess risk by determining which elements of risk should be addressed in what ways within available resources.” Contemporary discussions will continue to focus on the all-hazards approach to capabilitiesbased planning. It is vital that jurisdictions incorporate a uniform planning model into their preparedness programs. It is also critical that jurisdictions within the United States and its territories consistently assess threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, but are we prepared, and, more importantly, can we be prepared? In 2006, five years after the events of September 11, 2001, and one year after the devastating hurricane season of 2005, which included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the United States Conference of Mayors (USCM) disseminated a survey that investigated the levels of preparedness and homeland security that existed within the United States. Given the preceding Introduction to Homeland Security

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discussions regarding planning and preparedness, this survey yielded some interesting findings regarding the status of American cities regarding these characteristics of homeland security. According to the USCM (2006), this survey was disseminated in 183 cities in 38 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. According to the USCM (2006), three categories of cities were examined: 1) populations ranging up to 100,000 individuals, 2) populations ranging between 100,001 and 300,000 individuals, and 3) populations exceeding 300,000 individuals. A total of 104 respondents represented the first category, a total of 49 respondents represented the second category, and a total of 30 respondents represented the third category. Overall, the survey responses demonstrated some levels of preparedness and some levels of unpreparedness. Although it is impossible to imagine and predict each and every combination and permutation of events that may devastate an urban area, the outcomes of the study are demonstrative of functions that necessitate improvements regarding emergency planning and responsiveness. Admittedly, the survey outcomes are dated, given that fourteen years have passed since the dissemination of the survey instrument. However, regardless of this passage of time, the survey queries and findings present issues that all urban areas must contemplate with respect to emergency and contingency planning. It is anticipated that readers will heed these issues and consider the best and highest use of planning initiatives to enhance public safety.

7.11 Threat Assessments Threat assessments examine a full spectrum of incident types. The National Preparedness Guidelines, assimilated and published by the DHS in 2007, contain 15 national planning scenarios that suggest both natural and man-made hazards. The Local Official All-Hazards Preparedness Executive Handbook emphasizes catastrophic planning and low-probability versus high-consequence hazards in federal emergency management. With respect to these 15 national planning scenarios, a question arises regarding the use of the term “hazards”: Can the terms “hazards” and “threats” be used interchangeably? Can a consistent assessment methodology be employed to assess threat as it relates to natural disasters and acts of terrorism? James Carafano (2007) asserted that “hurricanes are not national security threats.” Within the threat assessment, the practitioner will examine, among a myriad of threats, the chemical, biological radiological, nuclear and explosive agents and devices (CBRNE) threat. Explosives remain the weapons of choice for terrorist groups. CBRNE is closely related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One rudimentary question when surveying CBRNE and WMD threats: What is in a jurisdiction that can be used as weaponry? This question is not solely focused on what might be brought into a jurisdiction. Instead, it questions the identification of what is already present that can be used against the jurisdiction. An example is the 9/11 weapons. The terrorist did not purchase the fuel or the airplanes that were used as weapons. Instead, they used the airplane as weapons. Chemical agents are common to everyday life. Some are harmful, and some are lethal. Common chemicals can become effective weapons. Chlorine, gasoline, and alcohol are examples of common chemicals that can be used as weaponry. Others are designed for injury and death. An example of a deadly chemical agent is sarin nerve gas. In March 1995, a terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo (later using the name Aleph), released the sarin nerve agent onto three trains in Japan. Eight people died, hundreds were injured, and a total of five thousand people were treated for injuries. 230

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The potential consequence caused by a bioterrorism incident is unfathomable. During 2001, five people died after handling mail contaminated with anthrax. Bruce Ivins, a bio-defense researcher, became the primary suspect. He committed suicide in 2008. Within the United States and throughout the world, anthrax is common in some soils. It is associated with animals, such as horses, goats, and cattle. Any form of anthrax can be used as a lethal weapon. The “dirty bomb” is a commonly used planning scenario relative to the use of a radiological agent in conjunction with a radiological dispersal device (RDD). This weapon combines a conventional explosive (e.g., TNT) with radioactive materials. Experts consider the conventional explosive agent in the RDD to be the most harmful. The radiological agent is used more as a psychological weapon to instill panic, fear, and hysteria in a population. The nuclear threat is such an overwhelming incident that local jurisdictions struggle with accomplishing threat assessments on the nuclear incident potential. The use of a nuclear weapon would immediately require all federal resources available for response. The threat assessment is useful in determining the risk factors associated with the use of a nuclear weapon. Information derived from the threat assessment assists local jurisdictions and states in prevention and protection planning. Explosive and incendiary devices and the associated modus operandi are the weapons of choice for acts of terrorism. The World Trade Center bombing of 1993, the Murrah Building bombing of 1995, and the attacks of September 11, 2001, are tragic examples of the effectiveness of these weapons. The improvised explosive device (IED) is used frequently and effectively. The vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) has been very effective in Afghanistan and Iraq. The DHS prioritized deterrence and detection training for IED interventions within the 2008 homeland security program. The use of IEDs (e.g., roadside bombs and suicide car bombs) caused over 60% of all American combat casualties in Iraq and 50% of combat casualties in Afghanistan (Wilson, Updated 2007). These figures include both killed and wounded individuals (Wilson, Updated 2007). In a threat-based scenario, the CBRNE agents and devices are the weapons of choice identified with the threat element. The threat element is the individual or group identified as the threat. The threat-based assessment identifies the threat element, linking that identification to the weapons of choice and method of employing the weapons and subsequently linking those findings to the vulnerability data.

7.12 Vulnerability Assessments Vulnerability assessments may be among the most difficult of the assessment activities. In these assessments, a simple question is posed: What are the vulnerabilities within the jurisdiction relative to all-hazards planning? The chemical plant that is located on the coastal waterfront may be more vulnerable to hurricane than if it were located 25 miles north of the coastline. However, it may be equally vulnerable to man-made attacks in either location. The relationship of threat to vulnerability is in the absence of a threat, there is no vulnerability. If the jurisdiction has no railway, the jurisdiction is not threatened by a train derailment. However, it is interesting that, in its 2008 funding awards for the Urban Area Security Initiatives across the nation, the DHS considered all urban areas equally vulnerable to similar type threats. In so doing, the DHS may have solved a funding challenge, but it weakened the integrity of vulnerability assessments. Introduction to Homeland Security

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7.13 Consequence Assessments Consequence assessments continue the assessment process. Consequence is a comprehensiveimpact assessment. It is a concentric process. Consequence assessments pose more queries: What is the impact to the local jurisdiction? What is the impact to the state, the nation, and the international community? Consequence assessments, from a proactive perspective, enhance the efforts of each of the mission areas. They aid in designing prevention strategies and protection practices, such as target-hardening initiatives. Consequence assessments also support response and recovery planning. The consequence assessment is the data source for resiliency strategies. The data assimilated from the assessment process guide jurisdictions in planning; management; and, most importantly, prioritization of funding allocations.

7.14 Federal: Preventing Extremism and Terrorism and Enhancing Security A variety of functions occur involving the deterrence of terrorism and other acts of crimes. These functions necessitate both human and technological infrastructures and resources. Deterrence efforts include initiatives that vary widely. Such activities include the inspection of individuals during transit to the provision of law enforcement officers along aviation routes. Regardless of the function, the deterrence of terrorism and the provision of security are both costly functions within the Department of Homeland Security. This section describes the entities that perform the functions of terrorism prevention and security enhancement. The contents of the following sections, unless otherwise noted, were obtained from the Department of Homeland Security.12 Advanced imaging technology (AIT): In 2009, 500 advanced imaging technology machines was requested by airport checkpoints to detect dangerous materials, including non-metallic materials. This request, along with planned deployments for 2010, was designed to provide AIT coverage at 75% of Category X airports and 60% of the total lanes at Category X through II airports. Nearly a decade later, the 2018 budget proposal indicated the deployment of 155 AIT systems to airports with lower volume and updated software algorithms to 88 units across 75 airports.13 Transportation security officers (TSOs) to staff AITs: Numbers of transportation security officers (TSOs), managers, and associated support personnel were deployed to AITs at airport checkpoints. Passenger screening was deemed critical to detecting and preventing individuals carrying dangerous or deadly objects from boarding planes. Federal air marshals (FAMs): Federal air marshals must operate independently without backup and rank among those federal law enforcement officers holding the highest standard for handgun accuracy. They blend in with passengers and rely on their training, including investigative techniques, criminal terrorist behavior recognition, firearms proficiency, aircraft specific tactics, and close quarters self-defense measures to protect the flying public.14 Canine teams: At the onset, threat potentials necessitated 275 proprietary explosives detection canine teams, 112 teams at 28 Category X airports and 163 teams at 56 Category I airports. During 2018, training was completed for a total of 54 explosives detection canines and 135 passenger screening canines.15 Domestic nuclear detection office systems engineering and architecture: Systems engineering efforts addressed vulnerabilities in the global nuclear detection architecture, the multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. 232

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Radiological/nuclear detection systems: These are resources for the procurement and deployment of radiological and nuclear detection systems and equipment to support efforts across the Department. Law enforcement detachment teams: Deployable U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachment (LEDET) teams help prevent terrorism, secure U.S. borders, disrupt criminal organizations, and support counter drug missions overseas. In FY 2009, for example, LEDETs aboard U.S naval and partner nation assets accounted for more than 50% of total maritime cocaine removals. Presidential campaigns: Presidential campaigns include training for candidate/nominee protective detail personnel as well as security operations. The Secret Service also procures and pre-positions equipment, services, and supplies to support candidate/nominee protective operations throughout the country. Secret Service information technology: Such resources allow the Secret Service to successfully continue its comprehensive information technology (IT) transformation and provide a multi-year, mission-integrated program to engineer a modernized, agile, and strengthened IT infrastructure to support all aspects of the Secret Service’s mission.

7.15 Federal: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters Any consideration of homeland security must include the robustness of responsiveness regarding any incidents that impact the nation. Regardless of the scope, magnitude, or type of event, the characteristics of responsiveness must be robust to facilitate public safety. This section describes resources that enhance the robustness of responsiveness. The contents of the following sections, unless otherwise noted, were obtained from the Department of Homeland Security. Disaster Relief Fund (DRF): The DRF provides a significant portion of the total federal response to victims in declared major disasters and emergencies. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) facilities: FEMA maintains plans for critical regional facility acquisitions and repairs. Thus, not only does FEMA require human resources; it also necessitates physical infrastructure ranging from real estate to buildings. Pre-disaster mitigation grants: Funding provides program support and technical assistance to state, local, and tribal governments to reduce the risks associated with disasters, support the national grant competition, and provide the required monies per state allocation. Resources support the development and enhancement of hazard mitigation plans, as well as the implementation of pre-disaster mitigation projects. Flood maps: Maintenance and currency of flood hazard data and map products are crucial for communicating flood hazard risk. The funding will support the review and update of flood hazard data and maps to accurately reflect flood hazards and monitor the validity of published flood hazard information.

7.16 Federal: Maturing and Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise The Department of Homeland Security is a new organization relative to the existences of other state and federal government entities. However, over time, it is maturing and identifying itself Introduction to Homeland Security

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as a unique component of the national security infrastructure. This section considers examples of resources and activities that enhance national security efforts. The following itemization, unless otherwise noted, was obtained from the Department of Homeland Security. St. Elizabeth’s Headquarters consolidation: Continue the construction and expansion of the DHS Headquarters consolidation for the Federal Emergency Management Administration at the St. Elizabeth’s campus. This initiative will link FEMA’s operational command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) operations with our National Operations Center (NOC) capability, resulting in a stronger operational capability. Further, it offers an opportunity to reduce the Department’s rent costs, fosters integrated decision making and collaboration, and provides for more efficient use of shared resources across the Department. Modernization of DHS’s financial management system: The DHS has made great strides in achieving clean audit opinions on all its financial statements. There is, however, a critical business need to modernize several of its financial systems. The Department’s investment to date has produced a modern solution that is in production and working. With this additional funding, DHS will be able to better manage its resources, provide DHS-level information more quickly to support critical decision making, reduce costs, promote good business practices, integrate strong information technology controls through standardizing processes and data, and eliminate manual and labor-intensive business processes. Border security: Procuring high-priority infrastructure, border security technology improvements, and aircraft acquisition will provide a layered defense at the border and ensure CBP law enforcement personnel are supported with effective surveillance technology and equipment to improve their ability to detect and interdict illegal activity. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC): Training personnel from over 95 law enforcement agencies government wide, including an increase of $25.7 million over the President’s FY 2018 budget for tuition and basic training costs associated with the training of the additional ICE and CBP law enforcement officers. Detainment: Non–U.S. citizens who are apprehended and determined to need custodial supervision are placed in detention facilities. For unaccompanied children, DHS coordinates closely with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to ensure the timely and safe transfer of these children to ORR custody in accordance with both the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008.

7.17 Federal: Comments Regarding the Budget Although the preceding budgetary requirements are demonstrative of functions that contribute toward the maximization of public safety and enhance national security, the financing of homeland security is not without debate. According to Miller and Carafano (2005), issues of pork barrel expenditures were considered regarding the early homeland security finances. Warnings ensued concerning “earmarks” that could potentially “take funding from building a truly national homeland security system and addressing the highest priority risks and divert it to the special interests of individual legislators.”16 Such debates questioned the methodology through which early funding of homeland security was accomplished. Arguments occurred regarding the allocations and disseminations of funds among the American states. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff made a powerful appeal to 234

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the senators to distribute the money based on risk. A foundation of such arguments indicated that funds were allocated to low-risk settings without regard to areas of higher risk and probability of attack. Government financing comprises taxpayer dollars and foreign investment. American leaders have a fiduciary obligation and responsibility to ensure that their financial decisions are rendered toward the best interests of American society, the nation, and its stakeholders. Therefore, these decisions must be conducted and rendered to achieve the highest and best use of financial resources. These concepts are applicable to all years of homeland security accounting, budgeting, and finance. The Department of Homeland Security is experiencing its stages of infancy and is a maturing organization. However, despite its newness, it must be mindful of its use of monies with respect to the benefits of national interests. In 2009, this concept was emphasized during the testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security. According to Secretary Napolitano, As the Department highlights its spending priorities in this Budget, it is simultaneously conducting a bold and far-reaching Efficiency Review initiative to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent in the most effective way possible. Efficiency Review encompasses both simple, common-sense reforms and longer-term, systemic changes that will, over time, make DHS a leaner, smarter department better equipped to protect the nation.17 This commentary provided the basis for conducting evaluation to optimize the performance of the Department of Homeland Security, over time, toward the benefit of national interests. Assessments involved the use of 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, and 120-day periods to implement a variety of improvement initiatives. According to the Department of Homeland Security, these initiatives are as follows:18 30 Days: • Eliminate non–mission critical travel and maximize use of conference calls and webbased training and meetings; • Consolidate subscriptions to professional publications and newspapers; • Minimize printing and distribution of reports and documents that can be sent electronically or posted online; and • Maximize use of government office space for meetings and conferences in place of renting facilities. 60 Days: • Implement an electronic tracking tool for fleet usage data to identify opportunities for alternative fuel usage; heighten vigilance for fraud, waste, or abuse; and optimize fleet management; • Conduct an assessment of the number of full-time and part-time employees and contractors to better manage our workforce; • Utilize refurbished IT equipment (computers and mobile devices) and redeploy the current inventory throughout DHS; and • Leverage buying power to acquire software licenses for Department-wide usage.

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90 Days: • Develop cross-component training opportunities for employees; • Develop a process for obtaining preliminary applicant security background data for candidates referred for final consideration; • As replacements are needed, convert new printers, faxes, and copiers into all-in-one machines; and • Streamline decision-making processes in headquarters offices to eliminate redundancies. 120 Days: • Establish a plan to ensure the DHS workforce has employees sufficient in number and skill to deliver our core mission; • As replacements are needed for non–law enforcement vehicles, initiate acquisition and leasing of hybrid vehicles, or alternative-fuel vehicles in cases where hybrids are not feasible (estimated mileage improvement of above 30%); • Maximize energy efficiencies in facility management projects; and • Standardize content for new-employee orientation and mandatory annual training modules department wide. The preceding evaluation periods contribute toward the strategic optimizing of government resources regarding the performance of the homeland security function. Therefore, these evaluations are designed to minimize wastefulness, improve efficiency, and either maintain or improve the effectiveness of the homeland security function. Further, through the allocating of monies for specific tasks and purposes, the use of such evaluations facilitates accountability regarding the allocation and use of monies regarding homeland security. Through the use of such methods, various arguments associated with unjustified pork and preferential allocations of financial resources may be avoided because of the accountability resulting from periodic evaluations.

7.18 Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study On August 29, 2005, New Orleans and the Gulf Coast were struck by one of the costliest and deadliest natural disasters to hit the United States. With sustained winds of 125 miles per hour during landfall, over 1,800 people were killed, thousands of lives were disrupted, and damage estimates exceeded $150 billion. Hurricane Katrina is the natural disaster case study most often used by today’s homeland security and emergency management professionals as an extreme example of a major disaster and its impact, response, and recovery efforts. The Gulf Coast states, including Southern Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, were heavily damaged. Communities in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties in Mississippi were decimated. Before Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Camille in 1969 was the most devastating hurricane to occur on the Gulf Coast. Katrina came ashore with sustained winds of 140 miles per hour and was classified as a Category 4 storm. Its sustained winds were less than Camille’s at 190 miles per hour. However, Katrina was a much larger storm. For the Mississippi Gulf Coast, Camille was the benchmark storm until Katrina struck. Consider the following planning questions, as both pre-disaster and post-disaster considerations, that a public safety and emergency management planner might use in developing contingency plans for their jurisdiction: 236

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Figure 7.5 Hurricane Katrina. (Source: NOAA National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service)

• Did anyone wake up on August 30, 2005, a day after Katrina landfall, surprised to find that Mississippi was a Gulf Coast state? • Did anyone awaken surprised to discover that Gulf Coast states experience hurricanes? • If Camille was the benchmark, what changed on the coast in the ensuing 30 years? Were there more businesses? Were they located with a vulnerability to hurricanes? • Had the population increased or decreased? • Had there been any residential areas established that were different than in 1969? What about highways, bridges, airports, and utility infrastructure? • What changes had occurred in Waveland, Bay St. Louis, and Pass Christian? • How many casinos were operating at the time of Camille compared to Katrina? • What industry and business interests were most threatened by this hazard? • How much of the population was threatened? These are questions the planner would be continuing to ask when the state, local, and tribal jurisdictions have identified such a massive vulnerability. When answering these questions, consider the following queries: • Would knowledge of vulnerabilities enable the planner to make some preliminary determinations in the pre-disaster environment? • Could risk assessments be conducted that would assist in determining potential economic impact if the region sustained a catastrophic hurricane? • Would pre-disaster planning assist response agencies in identifying the types of equipment necessary to respond to a major hurricane on the coast? • What about training? • What about exercises? • Would employing the DHS planning model assist in mitigating this storm? • Are the vulnerabilities today different on the Gulf Coast than in August 2005? Introduction to Homeland Security

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• Does the threat of a tropical storm or hurricane exist in the Gulf Coast region? • Has planning since 2005 changed any risk factors on the coast? • Are response agencies better prepared today than in 2005? Additional questions may be posed regarding the allocation of resources: • What happens during the planning scenario if assets and resources are focused on the Gulf Coast and hurricanes, and the New Madrid seismic region erupts, causing catastrophic damage in the midsouth region that includes Northern Mississippi and Western Tennessee? • What considerations does this pose for the planner? The planner must consider these and many other questions. For example, once risk assessment data is analyzed, it then requires planning actions to be taken to integrate any new threat information into the plan. The planner must impose on the four mission areas the questions of: • Can this incident be prevented? • Can the population and critical infrastructure be protected against the threat/hazard? • What is required in the response? • What will it take to recover the community from the impact of this threat/hazard? It is a daunting task to consider planning for the safety and protection of a community when having to consider catastrophic natural disasters such as Katrina and incidents such as the attacks of September 11, 2001. This case study presents a mere subset of the issues that must be considered regarding such events.

7.19 Chapter Comments and Summary Homeland security as a function and as a bureaucracy is new to the American system of government. It is evolving. Planning for preparedness in the all-hazards environment is a reality. Risk assessments must be a fixed function within the response community. Planning, by any model or means, must engage risk management principles and integrate the results into the preparedness initiatives. All efforts should be concentrated on local units of government to facilitate a national preparedness program instead of a federal program that ignores the needs of the heartland of America. Homeland security planning parallels much from the domain of organizational strategy. For instance, it involves some vision, representing the expectation of a future state of being or existence; incorporates some types of goals and objectives; involves mission; and necessitates a consideration of values. It also necessitates identification of threats and contingencies. Regardless of the best efforts to craft homeland security strategy, its implementation necessitates financial funding among many organizations, functions, and domains. Preparedness is performed in the execution of initiatives in the four mission areas. These mission areas, consisting of prevent, protect, response, and recovery, demand their unique planning considerations. Within the modern public safety environment, the planner must engage the complexities of the four mission areas and the infinite categories of threats and hazards that have become a very real potential, if not probability. 238

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Appropriate planning uses risk assessment data in the prodromal cycle to optimize both strategic and operational planning. Strategic planning promotes a high-level vision of the goals and objectives to be reached by the operational plans. Strategic planning will cause planners to consider the potential threat/hazard, the resources required to prevent and protect from those threats, and the “what ifs” in the consequence experience. Planning guides jurisdictions in the pre-disaster and post-disaster environments. Employing a risk assessment model and integrating the resultant data into the strategic and operational plans optimizes strategic and operational planning. Regardless of the best plans possible, there are always contingencies that impact the implementation of emergency plans. Leaders must be mindful of events that could transpire that would impede the anticipated progression and performance of any expressed emergency plans. Further, regardless of the best efforts of planning initiatives, it is impossible to imagine, predict, and calculate the permutations and combinations of events that necessitate emergency responses. Homeland security is an expensive component and function of local, state, tribal, and federal governments. Although the federal budget provides a large amount of monies to support these functions, financial decisions must be rendered with respect to the benefit of the nation, American society, and its stakeholders. Therefore, homeland security leaders have a fiduciary obligation to render decisions that exploit the highest and best uses of homeland security funding.

7.20 Key Terms Community Response Consequence Assessment Extremism Natural Disaster Nonprofit Sector Private Sector Prodromal Cycle

Resilience Risk Assessment Risk Management Target Capabilities Terrorism Threat Assessment Vulnerability Assessment

7.21 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. Planning is an essential activity that must be thoroughly contemplated within the context of homeland security. Consider the preparedness level of your organization or state regarding either natural disasters or man-made threats. How strongly has your state or organization planned regarding such endangerments? Write a brief essay that details your response. 2. Homeland security is a necessary expense. Obtain a copy of your locality’s municipal budget, and examine the amounts of funds that it expends toward homeland security endeavors. Do you believe the funding level is sufficient? Why or why not? Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. 3. Threat assessment is a valid aspect of planning and preparedness. Converse with your municipality’s leaders, and determine the types of threats that they contemplate when performing tasks of preparedness planning. Do you believe that their assessments are thorough enough? Why or why not? Write a brief essay that substantiates your opinion. 4. Given your response to the preceding question, identify some unique planning and preparedness challenges that impact your locality. Write a brief essay that describes these challenges. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Notes

1. Lindell, M., Tierney, K., and Perry, R. (2001). Facing the Unexpected. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. 2. Disaster Preparedness. The American Red Cross. Retrieved September 29, 2015, from www.redcross. org/what-we-do/international-services/disaster-preparedness. 3. Burton, L. (2008). The constitutional roots of all-hazards policy, management, and law. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 5(I), Article 35. 4. Fink, S. (1986). Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York: American Management Association. 5. Ibid. 6. Homeland Security Council. (2007). The National Homeland Security Strategy. Retrieved August 18, 2008, from www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf. 7. Ibid. 8. U. S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, February 7). Statement of William O. Jenkins Jr.: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.gao.gov/new.items/d07386t.pdf. 9. Caudle, S. L. (2005). Homeland Security Capabilities-Based Planning: Lessons from the Defense Community. Homeland Security Affairs, I(2), Article 2. 10. Byman, D. L. (2007, September 11). Homeland insecurities: Six years after 9/11 we’re still not thinking strategically. Brookings Institute. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.brookings.edu/ articles/2007/0911defense_byman.aspx. 11. Rosen, B. R. (2002). The struggle against terrorism, grand strategy, strategy and tactics. International Security, 26(3), 39–55. 12. Fact Sheet. (2010). Fact Sheet: Secretary Napolitano Announces Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request. Retrieved November 21, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1265049379725.shtm. 13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2018). FY 2019 Budget in Brief. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 14. Federal Air Marshals. (2013, February 26). Transportation Security Administration. Retrieved April 13, 2013, from www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/federal-air-marshals. 15. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2018). FY 2019 Budget in Brief. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 16. Carafano, J. J. (2007, October 10). New Homeland Security Strategy Misses the Mark. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.heritage.org/research/HomelandDefense/wm1659.cfm. 17. Testimony. (2009). Testimony of Secretary Napolitano Before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security, “FY 2010 Budget Request” (Written Testimony). Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1242246808937.shtm. 18. Ibid.

References American Disaster Preparedness Foundation. (2006, January). A Study of the Preparedness of the Largest Metropolitan Areas in the U.S: How Prepared is Your City? Moore, SC: American Disaster Preparedness Foundation. Burton, L. (2008). The constitutional roots of all-hazards policy, management, and law. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 5(I), Article 35. Bush, G. W. (2003a, February 28). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 5. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html. Bush, G. W. (2003b, December 17). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html. Byman, D. L. (2007, September 11) Homeland insecurities: Six years after 9/11 we’re still not thinking strategically. Brookings Institute. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0911defense_ byman.aspx. Carafano, J. J. (2007, October 10). New Homeland Security Strategy Misses the Mark. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.heritage.org/research/HomelandDefense/wm1659.cfm. Caudle, S. L. (2005). Homeland security capabilities-based planning: Lessons from the defense community. Homeland Security Affairs, I(2), Article 2.

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Committee on Homeland Security and Committee on Foreign Affairs. (2008, September). Wasted Lessons of 9/11: How the Bush Administration Has Ignored the Law and Squandered Its Opportunities to Make our Country Safer. Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives. Department of Homeland Security. (2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. Fact Sheet. (2010). Fact Sheet: Secretary Napolitano Announces Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request. Retrieved November 21, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1265049379725.shtm. Federal Air Marshals. Transportation Security Administration. (2013, February 26). Retrieved April 13, 2013, from www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/federal-air-marshals. Federal Emergency Management. (2008). Local Officials All-Hazards Preparedness Executive Handbook. Washington, D.C.: FEMA. Fink, S. (1986). Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York: American Management Association. Homeland Security Council. (2007). The National Homeland Security Strategy. Retrieved August 18, 2008, from www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf. Jenkins, J. (2007). Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues. Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-386T/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07386T.htm. McElreath, D., Jensen, C., Wigginton, M., Doss, D., Nations, R., and Van Slyke, J. (2014). Introduction to Homeland Security. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Miller, K., and Carafano, J. (2005). The specter of pork barrel homeland security. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2005/04/ The-Specter-of-Pork-Barrel-Homeland-Security. Rosen, B. R. (2002). The struggle against terrorism, grand strategy, strategy and tactics. International Security, 26(3), 39–55. Stockton, P. (2007, September). Readiness in the Post Katrina and Post 9/11 World: An Evaluation of the New National Response Framework (speech). Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives. Testimony. (2009). Testimony of Secretary Napolitano Before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security, “FY 2010 Budget Request” (Written Testimony). Retrieved November 22, 2010, from www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1242246808937.shtm. USCM. (2006). United States Council of Mayors. Retrieved November 21, 2010, from www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/documents/ disasterpreparednesssurvey_2006.pdf. Wilson, C. (Updated 2007, August 28). CRS Report for Congress: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ weapons/RS22330.pdf.

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8 Disaster Response, Recovery, and Resilience

As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever. —President Ronald Reagan, 1981 Inaugural Address Resilient people will be resilient. —Robert Nations, Former Director, Shelby County (TN) Office of Emergency Preparedness The objectives of this chapter are to: • Understand disaster response, civil defense, emergency management, and homeland security; • Differentiate between response and recovery; • Understand the uses of command and control; • Understand the basic concepts of insurance; • Understand the use of information during disaster operations; • Understand sheltering concepts; and • Emphasize the importance of homeland security strategies for response and recovery.

8.1 Introduction Communities are not immune to the impact of tragic events that will, in many cases, shake the foundations of the communities themselves. Whether it is a major natural event, such as the damage inflected along the East Coast of the United States by Hurricane Joaquin in 2015 or the senseless violence of the Boston bombing, communities will always have vulnerabilities.

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Figure 8.1 FEMA Disaster Declarations 1953–2016. (Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis, based on data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available from FEMA data; Stafford Act Declarations 1953–2016: Trends, Analyses, and Implications for Congress, July 28, 2017, CRS)

Incident response is always difficult, but it is even more so if event contingency planning has not been effectively conducted. Regardless of any response or contingences, the sanctity of human life pervades any response endeavor. Therefore, response priorities consist of saving lives, protecting property and the environment, stabilizing the incident, and providing for basic human needs. While no one can discount the value of realistic emergency management planning, each event presents its own unique situations and thus challenges the first responders and the resiliency of the community impacted. Part of disaster-related contingency planning is the identification of response needs and the development of mutual aid and assistance agreements with adjacent communities to fill recognized response shortfalls. These actions are of great importance to ensure as much as possible that adequate resources will be available to support the response effort. Events that threaten communities range not just in scope but also in the impact of that scope (i.e., magnitude). As an example, in 2014, a series of tornadoes swept through parts of Mississippi. One of these tornadoes, with the power of EF-4, impacted the small town of Louisville, Mississippi. As the storm moved through the small town, the community’s primary medical center, the Winston Medical Center, was devastated, essentially destroying the

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community’s major health-care resource. The responders rapidly realized the extensive damage inflected on the medical facility and quickly adjusted their response strategy to function without the assistance of this major response partner. The lesson learned from this event and so often relearned in a catastrophe is that disaster response and recovery must be flexible and extremely responsive to often rapidly changing events in a very fluid environment. Thus, disaster response and recovery requires significant efforts, physical and mental, in which bold and often very quick decisions are made in a dynamic environment, often with incomplete and conflicting information. In this setting, responders work to save lives, limit damage, and initiate disaster recovery efforts.

8.2 Brief Examination of Response and Recovery The planning, response, and recovery phases are interrelated. Planning is based on what is known, our jurisdictional boundaries, reasonable expectations of equipment, and personnel available locally who can be called upon in an event. Planning must also consider the unknown or assumed, including what threats are realistic, what the level of impact may be, the damage sustained, and how quickly and efficiently the response plan can be initiated and executed. What we do know is that disasters have occurred in the past and will occur in the future, but fortunately, they do not occur very often. The positive aspect of the fact that disasters do not occur often is communities may go decades or even centuries without a major event. One of the negatives aspects of the infrequency of events impacting communities is that those living in these areas may not prepare for a disaster, and their unpreparedness results in increased vulnerability to a major event. Knowledge is important for the responder, decision makers, and residents who may be directly impacted. As an example, living over a significant earthquake fault line possesses dangers, but the residents of the area may not understand and may even discount the potential impact of an event in their area and thus find themselves unprepared if a major event occurs. As stated, every disaster, no matter the scope, is a local event, though the actual scope of the event may cover a multi-state region. Most events impacting our communities are limited in scope and do not require major assistance from state or federal agencies. In events, the initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on state and local authorities; the federal government may render assistance when state and local resources are overwhelmed or when federal interests are involved. For those disasters that do require state or federal intervention, command and control during the disaster response and recovery phases take on a more complex and often very complicated role, often impacting in some way the majority of, if not all, aspects of response and recovery. For today’s first responders, disasters and the response to those disasters are the final examination, revealing for all to see and analyze the success or failure of the efforts to plan, develop cooperative partnerships, examine vulnerabilities, and take actions to reduce or, where practical, eliminate those vulnerabilities. While today’s response community is better led and more robust, informed, responsive, and resilient than ever before, response

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success depends on the effectiveness of response partners, realistic planning, and the commitment of a resilient population who believe in and are committed to the recovery of their community.

8.3 Disaster Response Community Overview Key in disaster response is the disaster response community, how well it understands its roles and responsibilities, and how well it maintains its capability to respond. The disaster response community is, in fact, not just one organization, but rather a confederation, drawn together for a specific purpose and collected from a wide range of participants, often including public, private, for-profit, not-for-profit, and volunteer agencies and individuals. The emergency response environment is ever changing. As an example, many of the individuals serving in the ranks of the first responder partners will change over time, due to promotions, retirements, resignations, and new appointments. Since a major element of response success is based on the positive personal and professional relationships among response professionals, response personnel must ensure that they know each other and understand individual abilities and capabilities that may come into play during an event response. Over the last two decades, much attention has been directed toward the disaster response community and its capabilities. The expectations today of the first response community are much more than just opening roadway access to structures; search, rescue, treatment, and transport of occupants; self-protection and survival; and providing food, water, housing, and sanitary needs for their communities. They now include a much wider range of robust response and recovery services. Events and the lessons learned from past events fuel changes in the response community. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent series of major storms, beginning with Hurricane Katrina, revealed response successes, shortfalls, and deficiencies on all levels. As a result, all aspects of preparation and response continue to be examined in an effort to identify response strengths and weaknesses, determine steps to improve response, implement realistic changes to enhance the safety and resilience, and initiate the steps to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen resiliency.

8.4 Command and Control In any event, the initial efforts to respond are very important and, every event presents its own unique challenges. One of the most significant issues facing first responders is the development of a survivable and effective system of command and control prior to an event. Each jurisdiction needs to set up an incident/emergency operations command post (ICP) that has the legal authority to manage the incident and/or an emergency operations center (EOC), which is a hub of communication and coordination, depending on the scope of the jurisdiction and the resources expected to be available during an event. This system must include the identification of facilities and equipment to be used, how to obtain or access that equipment, personnel to be involved, command and control authority, and logistical considerations. Aspects of command and control operations must be exercised

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prior to an event to ensure any major issues affecting operational effectiveness are identified, addressed, and resolved. A successful participant in the environment of disaster response must be able to function effectively under pressure in a dynamic environment. Decisions made at every level of the response function impact lives and property. Response often requires quickly assembling personnel from diverse disciplines into an effective and responsive team that understands response capabilities and can effectively communicate across disciplines, including an understanding of the meaning of terminology within the various disciplines involved. It is through the establishment of an incident command center that the emergency management personnel can exercise command, control, and coordination and establish and maintain an effective, consistent response despite what would otherwise be a chaotic situation. In an event in which the command and control infrastructure planned for is rendered unusable, an incident command post from a neighboring jurisdiction needs to assume control. To facilitate the transfer, memoranda of understanding and delegation of authority to an alternate jurisdiction should be in place prior to an event. In a disaster/event, typically each of these first response disciplines supporting the response effort must also continue to perform its primary mission. The systems that guide the management of resources, organizations, information, and individuals during the event response fall outside what is considered normal or routine, and, as a result, there is great potential for both confusion and a loss of control. Systems developed to guide the command, control, and coordination of emergencies and disasters—the incident management systems—are intended to increase the capability of those responsible for managing disaster response efforts. If the event in question is of limited scope, the response effort is typically localized. In this setting, command and control of the event may be relatively informal. If the event is larger, it is essential to quickly establish and maintain some type of incident command function that can operate continually once the determination is made to return to “normal” operations outside the scope of the functions of the command operations center. Incident command and control systems in play in the emergency operations center are considered tactical-level tools because they are typically the systems used to organize the process of completing tasks once those tasks have been decided. While the EOC is critical in the response effort, it must allow for the flexibility to function under a range of different management structures and incident sizes. Confusion and uncertainty are ever present in emergency response. Confusion and uncertainty inhibit efforts to gain a clear assessment of the extent of damage and needs. It falls on the emergency operations center to create a common operating picture from which response priorities can be established and addressed. Within this setting, EOC operations balance tasks including, but not limited to, command and control, logistics acquisition, distribution and management, response and recovery operations, finance, and further contingency planning. Some of the major challenges impacting effective disaster command and control include ensuring multiple response agencies understand their linkages and organizational hierarchy/ jurisdiction in reference to each other; functioning as a director of response resources to reduce duplication of effort; and, where necessary, deconfliction of response efforts to ensure

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disparate and unaffiliated agencies do not respond to the same or similar response requirements that do not contribute to the overall response effort. Event responders drawn together from various agencies must be capable of functioning as part of a larger system. Whether the event is a natural or man-made disaster, response personnel will typically find themselves working together to mitigate the damage and facilitate event recovery. In some cases, state and federal resources may be available. For example, the National Guard may be activated following an extremely heavy snow, in the case of wildfire, during the aftermath of a hurricane, or following a terrorist incident. Federal resources including disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs) and disaster mortuary teams (DMORTs) may be activated following a mass casualty incident. Throughout this process, command and control performs an essential function that facilitates response and recovery. Personnel assigned to an operations center must be able to understand what is before them and analyze the data they receive, from which they must develop a situational understanding from which decisions may be made. Also, realizing major events may involve multiple operations centers across jurisdictions, it falls to the emergency management professional to identify response challenges and quickly eliminate those issues and reduce the impact of those challenges; lives are at stake.

8.5 Information Management in a Disaster Major disasters and emergencies bring chaos and confusion. Typical government and bureaucratic procedures are upset, resulting in difficulties in obtaining and delivering information. While these factors complicate communications, they should never justify a lack of information. Maintaining the public’s trust throughout an emergency or disaster requires transparency. In disaster response situations, a critical function that cannot be overlooked or taken lightly is information management. The public must see that competent decisions are being made, and response and recovery efforts are being conducted with efficiency. Information management and communication, including public and social communication and media relations, have become key elements in efficient emergency management. Information management should be part of planned design and execution of the EOC and be integral to an organization’s risk and disaster management plans. Improvised communication can be costly and can have unsatisfactory results. During an emergency, timely and transparent production and dissemination of information generates trust and credibility. National authorities, international agencies, humanitarian assistance organizations, the affected population, and the communications media will demand information in the form of data, figures, reports, and situation analyses or recommendations. These stakeholders depend on this information to guide their work and to translate their interest and concern into action. Information management and exchange should be based on a system of collaboration, partnership, and sharing. There should be a high degree of participation and ownership by multiple stakeholders, especially representatives of the affected population. Information is the main element in the damage and needs assessment process and is the basis for coordination and decision making in emergency situations. Such processes and decisions

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permeate the emergency management cycle (EMC). Information management necessitates some form of catalyst or enabler within the context of the EMC. These enablers consist of collecting information, communication, and collaboration.1 Information collection represents a form of primarily one-way communication for the purpose of gathering information from various sources (e.g., social media, human interviews, and so on) to generate understanding of the meaning of the crisis or event.2 Among organizations and responders, and with the public, communication may also occur in a two-way fashion.3 Collaboration occurs in a two-way fashion among responders, response organizations (both intra-organizational and inter-organizational), and the general public.4

8.6 The Disaster Frameworks The most important factor of any response is the preservation of human life. Safeguarding human lives occurs neither randomly nor haphazardly. When disaster strikes, response actions adhere to the tenets of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). Upon requests originating from states, tribes, territories, or insular areas, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) leads the necessary response efforts, establishes a joint field office (JCO), appoints a federal coordinating officer (FCO) as the response leader, and appoints a federal disaster recovery coordinator (FDRC) as the FCO’s deputy officer.5 The recovery support functions (RSFs) field support operations adhere to six key operational stages for ensuring that recovery organizations and stakeholders experience a shared understanding of the sequence and synchronization of operational activities. The six stages are: 1. Monitoring and situational awareness; 2. Advance evaluation; 3. FDRC and RSF activation/deployment; 4. Recovery support strategy (RSS) report development; 5. RSS report implementation; and 6. Transition and return to steady-state operations. These operations are commensurate with the NDRF’s recovery federal interagency operational plan. The stages listed next provide the flexibility necessary to address the unique recovery challenges of each disaster while also providing federal recovery support in a consistent, timely, and efficient manner. The NCR RSF could be activated by FEMA for all or some of the six stages of disaster recovery, depending on the NCR needs for a particular disaster.6 Typically, recovery commences during the progression of emergency response activities. The disaster recovery process facilitates the restoration, redevelopment, and revitalization of communities impacted by a disaster. The NDRF established six RSFs to guide recovery initiatives in accordance with the priorities of impacted communities. The RSFs are as follows: 1. Community planning and capacity building; 2. Housing;

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3. Economics; 4. Infrastructure systems; 5. Health; and 6. Natural and cultural resources (i.e., the NCR RSF).

Each RSF is led by a federal coordinating agency and has a core group of primary agencies along with a cadre of supporting organizations. The purpose of the RSFs is to integrate interagency resources for recovery support by facilitating problem solving; improving access to resources; and fostering coordination among local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area partners, nongovernmental partners, the private sector, and stakeholders.7 The National Response Framework (NRF) guides the national response to all types of disasters, calamities, and emergencies. Its foundations consist of scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts delineated within the National Incident Management System for aligning key roles and responsibilities nationally. The NRF describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents ranging from the serious (but purely local) to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF describes the principles, roles and responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required for incident response and expresses how response efforts integrate with those of other mission areas. Within the NRF, the response mission includes 14 core capabilities: planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, critical transportation, environmental response/health and safety, fatality management services, infrastructure systems, mass care services, mass search and rescue operations, on-scene security and protection, operational communications, public and private services and resources, public health and medical services, and situational assessment. The NRF’s primary tenets are as follows:8 • Describe scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures, as well as key roles and responsibilities for integrating capabilities across the whole community to support the efforts of the local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal governments in responding to actual and potential incidents; • Describe, across the whole community, the steps needed to prepare for delivering the response core capabilities; • Foster integration and coordination of activities within the response mission area; • Outline how the response mission area relates to the other mission areas, as well as the relationship between the Response core capabilities and the core capabilities in other mission areas; and • Provide guidance through doctrine and establish the foundation for the development of the supplemental Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP).

8.7 The Role of FEMA The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) performs multiple roles. Although it is tasked with leading responses, it also contributes toward protecting communities and locales during early segments of the emergency management cycle. It assists with assessing and reducing risks, preparing for identified threats, and assisting people during response and recovery endeavors. When disaster strikes, FEMA acts as the federal coordinator for the logistical and operational responses that are necessary for saving and sustaining human lives, 250

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minimizing suffering, and protecting property. FEMA facilitates recovery via numerous methods, including financial assistance for both individuals and the public. Assistance provided to individuals often consists of housing (either permanent or temporary), counseling services, legal assistance and services, case management, unemployment assistance, and so on. Public assistance also is available during the aftermath of a disaster. Its purpose provides assistance toward recovering infrastructure that benefits society. Examples of public assistance include roadway construction and debris clearance. It also includes reconstruction or repair of libraries, schools, and other types of public facilities. Public assistance often is disbursed in the form of grant monies. Such funds are provided to government entities and certain private nonprofit organizations. A presidential declaration of disaster occurs before any financial assistance occurs. The monies provide a means for impacted locales to respond to and recover from incidents in a timely, effective fashion. During the recovery period, financial assistance also provides a basis to facilitate hazard mitigation against the chance of another disaster occurring. Typically, the federal portion of assistance is no less than 75% of the eligible costs.9 Recipients, usually states, determine how other portions (to a maximum of 25%) are divided with any eligible applicants.10

8.8 Human Sustenance—Food and Shelter During a disaster, the human needs and wants associated with food and beverage cannot be ignored. State agencies and school food authorities (SFAs) that participate in the national school lunch (NSLP) and school breakfast programs (SBP), institutions that participate in the child and adult care food program (CACFP), and sponsors who participate in the summer food service program (SFSP) have the ability of responding to disasters. Such entities should be incorporated into emergency plans among states and localities. Children who reside in or are evacuated from disaster areas may be deemed homeless under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act. Such children are automatically eligible for free meals in the child nutrition programs (CNPs). A school district’s homeless coordinator determines the homeless status and provides a listing of all children who were deemed homeless. The institution or sponsor certifies these children for free meals.11 Institutions and sponsors requiring eligibility information receive homeless status certification from the agency that assisted with the evacuation or that provides shelter. If the child does not reside at an emergency shelter, the institution should have an adult who lives with the child complete an income eligibility form to show that the child is homeless. No further information is required for eligibility certification.12 Emergency shelters that provide temporary housing to refugees are eligible participants in foodstuff programs. If substantial numbers of people are temporarily housed at a facility, then state organizations may designate it as an emergency shelter. The state may also provide waivers regarding institutional application requirements during such situations. If the site is deemed an emergency shelter, then all children through age 18 may receive a maximum of three free meals (breakfast, lunch, and supper) daily. An “appropriate facility” includes schools and institutions, which, although they are not providing actual shelter, are nevertheless providing meals to refugees who are housed elsewhere temporarily, in locations that may not have the means to provide meal services to the temporary residents.13 Introduction to Homeland Security

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8.9 Sheltering “In Place” During response or recovery, no guarantees exist that refugees may access an emergency shelter and its benefits. Since disasters may strike unexpectedly with speed, surprise, and violence, individuals or groups may often have a need to shelter themselves “in place” at their current locations. During these situations, movement elsewhere does not occur. Instead, people make the best of their current circumstances with respect to experiencing the calamity. If someone must remain at their location, then it is advisable to be indoors. The location is dependent on the type of incident experienced. Sheltering may occur either alone or with other people. Pets may also be included in the shelter. It is recommended that one have available emergency supplies. One should remain at the sheltered location until proper authorities indicate that is safe to leave the shelter.14 Communication is essential during any calamity. One should have someone established as an emergency contact so that another individual will have knowledge of the refugee’s whereabouts and status. Therefore, people should inform others of their location and status after settling into their shelter. One should provide a shelter location, how they are doing, whether anyone is missing, and whether anyone is injured. Text messaging, email, or social media posting may be just as effective as a telephone call. Although telephones may be readily available, they should be used sparingly. Such judicious use preserves battery power and does not lock any necessary communication lines. When sheltering, people should periodically listen to radios, view television newscasts, or review text messages or electronic mail. One should not leave the shelter until proper authorities have deemed it safe to do so.15 Some “in place” shelters may necessitate the sealing of rooms, such as in the case of toxic fumes. When sealing a room, anything that moves air (e.g., fans, air conditioners, etc.) should be rendered inoperative. Air should be blocked from entering the sheltered room. Seals should remain in place and occupants inside the shelter until proper authorities have deemed it safe to exit the shelter.16 The use of “in place” sheltering may be necessary when someone is traveling via automobile. In such cases, one should pull to the shoulder of the roadway, stop the vehicle in the safest possible place, and turn off the engine. During warmer periods or in warmer locations, it may be advisable to park under a bridge or in the shade to avoid overheating. Because modern vehicular radios do not use much battery power, one may listen to the radio for an hour or so to gain some situational awareness. One should not leave the location until it is deemed safe to do so by proper authority.17

8.10 NASA Disasters Program The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) contributes substantially to disaster response endeavors via its NASA Disasters Program. The program uses Earth observations for improving the activities of prediction, preparation, response, and recovery from disasters. Disaster applications and applied research support emergency preparedness leaders in developing mitigation approaches, such as early warning systems. They also contribute by providing information and maps to disaster response and recovery teams.18 The NASA Disasters Mapping Portal hosts collective geospatial data that is disseminated to emergency managers, first responders, and the public before, during, and after an incident at a specific location. The use of geographic information facilitates free and publicly available 252

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scientific data in a user-friendly environment. Emergency managers are also able to integrate NASA with their own national, state, or local datasets to gain a better understanding of potential hazards. By doing so, they better they abilities to inform disaster response entities.19 An example of the program’s effectiveness was the 2018 Hurricane Florence event that affected Fort Bragg. The Army installation was one of the most damaged areas. During the hurricane, personnel at Fort Bragg used NASA’s program for identifying hazardous areas and for assessing power outages and residential flooding. Specifically, Army personnel used NASA’s Black Marble product during the hurricane to better their situational awareness. Using night imagery obtained from NASA’s Suomi satellite, NASA’s Black Marble system provided information regarding both pre-event and post-event mapping and monitoring of power outages. The Black Marble system was used to assess disruptions in energy infrastructure and utility services during the aftermaths of major disasters. Soldiers at Fort Bragg used it to locate power outages on the Army base. The product was relatively easy to use. In fact, soldiers were able to view any necessary information directly from their cellular telephones.20

8.11 The Economics of Response and Recovery In the 1800s, John Stuart Mill, an economist, stated, [W]hat has so often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the ravages of war. An enemy lays waste a country by fire and sword, and destroys or carries away nearly all the moveable wealth existing in it: all the inhabitants are ruined, and yet in a few years after, everything is much as it was before.21 Given Mill’s (1896) statement, any response and recovery endeavors necessitate economic considerations. Although Mill’s (1896) sentiments have strong accuracy, some happenings are so devastating that entire societies, regions, or cities may either be obliterated or incrementally destroyed over time. For instance, Shaw (2012)22 and Jusseret and Sintubin (2017)23 indicated that the demise of the ancient Cretan civilization could possibly be attributed to a series of events (including the Mycenean invasion) exacerbated by a substantial earthquake that affected at least the north central region of Crete. Another example is the ancient Mexican site of Teotihuacan. Speculation exists that its demise was attributed to droughts, famines, and invasions.24 Thus, disaster has the potential to eliminate the entirety of a society. In other cases, society may have been greatly impacted but not destroyed completely. In such cases, there existed various forms of disaster response and recovery. Regarding antiquity, a prime example was the city of Pompeii. Some estimates of the population of the city and its surrounding areas were 12,000 and 24,000 individuals, respectively.25 The Plinian eruption of Mount Vesuvius resulted in approximately 2,000 human deaths in Pompeii.26 The eruption also devastated the neighboring city of Herculaneum and impacted Nuceria.27 However, many survived the catastrophe. Although land resources (primarily consisting of roadways and bridges) necessary for accessing the city to facilitate response efforts were destroyed, naval ports at Minsenum were approximately two hours away from the devastated area.28 Naval forces were capable of supplying the “ropes, pulleys, and grappling hooks” that were necessary for methodical rescue operations.29 Introduction to Homeland Security

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As in to modern times, eyewitnesses to the event recorded their knowledge of the happenings. For instance, Pliny the Younger, who directly observed the 79 AD eruption, glorified the selfless acts of heroism exhibited by his uncle, who served as admiral of the fleet.30 He acted independently and on his own authority to commence rescue operations to retrieve refugees from the beaches that were within the range of fire and toxic fumes.31 However, because it was not the sailing season, many ships were in dry docks, and their personnel and crews were dispersed.32 Therefore, it was several days before relief operations were prepared and launched.33 The preceding examples showed two economic perspectives of calamities: macroeconomic and microeconomic. The former represents disasters that necessitate national concern, whereas the latter represents incidents that may be more localized, perhaps to cities, regions, or areas. The Cretan and Mayan examples showed complete societal collapses wherein economic considerations became moot. After all, if a nation ceases to exist, so does its economic activities. The latter example showed a localized incident since the eruption of Mount Vesuvius affected Pompeii primarily and impacted both the neighboring locales of Herculaneum and Nuceria. Despite devastation, some people survived the danger of Mount Vesuvius. The concepts of macroeconomic and microeconomic worldviews are pertinent for the periods of response and recovery following modern disasters. For instance, Hurricane Katrina necessitated both national and international efforts during its response. From a macroeconomic perspective, Hurricane Katrina necessitated staging areas; maintaining refugee centers; logistics systems consisting of air, land, and sea modalities; production of goods and services; and cooperation among agencies and organizations across the nation. It also destroyed much infrastructure that was necessary for the production of goods and services. Internationally, Canada, Mexico, and other nations contributed to the response operations. The effects of Hurricane Katrina were expected to diminish aggregate supply of oil because the productive abilities of the Gulf Coast were impeded.34 Reductions of aggregate demand were also expected because market consumers were anticipated to reduce their spending levels as a response to higher fuel prices.35 Thus, Hurricane Katrina exhibited macroeconomic considerations during its response and recovery. Hurricane Katrina devastated regions along the Gulf Coast and substantial inland areas. Microeconomic concepts provide a basis for understanding the devastation of New Orleans and the succeeding periods of response and recovery. The response necessitated housing 146,292 people; moving 11,000 trucks of meals, water, and ice (an amount that exceeded by three times all the hurricanes before 2004 combined); the largest domestic deployment of federal military troops since the Civil War; 50,000 National Guard soldiers (the most in domestic U.S. history); 220,000 Red Cross personnel (20 times more than any preceding mission); and servicing 3.7 million survivors.36 Over the ten-month period between September 2005 and June 2006, approximately 25.4% of jobs lost in the private sector represented losses in the accommodation and food services sectors.37 The losses represented approximately 14.5% of losses in total wages within the New Orleans economy.38 Approximately 19.6% of lost wages occurred within the health-care and social services sectors.39 Approximately 10.5% of lost wages involved the retail trade sector.40 Both the macroeconomic and microeconomic views show the vast complexities of disaster responses in many fashions—logistics, health care, rescue, benevolence, finance, and so on. However, despite the best efforts to enact response operations, no guarantees exist that recovery will occur either completely or partially. In its fullest sense, recovery represents the attaining of a state of existence that either is equivalent to or surpasses the state of existence that existed before the calamity occurred. For instance, at the turn of the twentieth 254

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century, Galveston, Texas, experienced a devastating hurricane that ravaged the city.41 Before the event, Galveston was a thriving economic hub within the region that exhibited much trade throughout its ports and exchanges.42 However, even a century after the tragic hurricane and its succeeding response operations, Galveston never fully recovered its previous status as an economic power.43 Similarly, during modern times, even a decade after Hurricane Katrina and its associated response operations, regions along the Gulf Coast had not recovered completely their previous economic potencies.44

8.12 Insurance, Risk, and the Potential of Disaster Although humans may decide how best they believe scarce resources should be deployed and expended to pursue response operations, no guarantees of success exist whatsoever. All endeavors involve some forms of risk. In its simplest terms, risk is merely the chance or odds of an event either occurring or not occurring. Risk affects every decision made by humans in light of disasters. It is present when crafting emergency plans with respect to threat matrix compilation and affects decisions regarding what one believes are the best and highest uses of resources to address items that were identified as potential endangerments within a threat matrix. Insurance may provide some protection or mitigation for specific identified risks. Reavis (2012, p. 2) defined insurance as the method through which “interested members of a society can band together and collect funds to pay losses suffered later by members of the group.”45 Risk is a salient concept of insurance. In the context of insurance, risk is deemed “uncertainty to loss.”46 In this sense, despite the assumption of some certainty that someone will suffer loss, uncertainty also exists whether any specific individual will be impacted in any given situation and when the situation may occur.47 In other words, the combination of potential threats and the corresponding risks provides a basis for crafting insurance policies. Insurance is a contract. Basically, a contract is a legally binding instrument that necessitates some type of performance among the participating parties. A contract must have some type of offer detailing the terms of the agreement, acceptance by the offeree, consideration ensuring that a bargain exists, an intention to create a legal relationship, and certainty of terms.48 The procuring and maintaining of insurance may either be mandated by law (where applicable) or volitional. The use of contractual agreements, instantiated as insurance policies, is common in the context of disaster response and recovery. Typical insurance examples accommodate a variety of happenings that endanger society and individuals: aviation insurance, property insurance, business insurance, health insurance, flood insurance, vehicle insurance, disability insurance, terrorism insurance, earthquake insurance, fire insurance, liability insurance, life insurance, and many others. The use of insurance facilitates shared losses across vast populations. Insurance policies addressing certain calamities may be purchased as separate entities or, in some cases, as riders to existing policies. Some catastrophes are so large that they bankrupt insurance companies. For instance, Hurricane Andrew in 1992 caused the bankruptcy of nine small insurance companies and greatly diminished the profits of several large insurance companies.49 Eventually, Hurricane Andrew caused the liquidation of 13 insurance companies.50 Catastrophes pose great risk for insurers. Therefore, insurance companies may obtain reinsurance as a means of countering risk. In other words, the insurance company may obtain insurance whereby it is insured, to some degree, against loss. Introduction to Homeland Security

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8.12.1 Flood Insurance Floods are the most commonly and costly form of natural disaster that affects American society.51 Within the context of homeland security, one of the most familiar flood insurance entities is the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program. In 1968, Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) originated from the legislation. The program enables property owners in participating communities to purchase insurance protection, administered by the government, against flood losses. Among locales that participate in the NFIP, it also mandates flood insurance for all loans or lines of credit that are secured by existing buildings, manufactured homes, or buildings under construction. In 1973, the NFIP was amended by the Flood Disaster Act, which mandated the purchasing of flood insurance to protect properties within SFHAs. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982 again amended the legislation to enact an array of maps that depicted a Coastal Barrier Resources System in which federal flood insurance was not available for new or substantially improved structures. During 1994, as another amendment, the National Flood Insurance Reform Act, codified the community rating system to encourage locales to surpass the minimal federal requirements for development within floodplains. The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 amended the legislation with respect to reduction of property losses for which repetitive flood insurance claim payments were made. Over a decade later, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 modified the legislation to alter premiums to match actuarial risk premiums that showed anticipated losses and real flooding risk. An example of the necessity of flood insurance was Hurricane Florence in 2018. The storm generated 18 trillion gallons of rainwater that caused the flooding of 16 major rivers.52 It also exhibited 36 inches of rain within a solitary 24-hour period.53 Estimates of financial losses to real estate were approximately $33.5 billion.54 Figure 8.2 shows the regions that were affected by the storm’s rainfall, and Figure 8.3 shows the depth of its floodwaters. During 2018, after Hurricane Florence, debate occurred about whether the legislation required amending to better reflect the devastation of modern times. Hurricane Florence devastated the Eastern coasts and inland areas. The NFIP used outdated map data that incorporated risk without accommodating the impacts of climate.55 Through the NFIP, the government assumed the entirety of the risk, and property owners who had policies could rebuild in high-risk areas that exhibited urban expansion over time.56 Much of the debate regarding legislative change involved not only such observations of the NFIP but also the fact that people had historically rebuilt in danger-prone areas while relying on the program’s protections and benefits.57 Essentially, debate ensued on whether the government should subsidize risky, dangerous behavior within the populace.58 At the time of this writing, the debate was ongoing. Time will tell its eventual outcome.

8.12.2 Fire Insurance The Western U.S. is susceptible to wildfires annually. For instance, the 2018 California wildfire season was the deadliest in the state’s recorded history.59 The fires caused damages that exceeded $3.5 billion, including $1.792 billion in fire suppression costs.60 Across California, a total of 8,527 fires burned and destroyed an area of 1,893,913 acres, the largest amount of burned acreage recorded in a fire season.61 Figure 8.4 shows the number of fires that affected California in 2018. 256

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Figure 8.2 Hurricane Florence rainfall and geographic footprint. (Source: National Weather Service)

Although fire response operations may save lives and quash some fires, no guarantees exist that response operations will be successful. Changing winds, resource availability for fighting fire, human error, and an array of other factors may affect response operations. For instance, despite fire response operations, in 2018, the town of Paradise, California, was gutted by fire within 24 hours. The entire population of 27,000 was ordered to evacuate the area.62 Refugee shelters were opened and operated in neighboring towns and cities.63 Although many escaped the devastation with their lives and nothing more, they had no homes to return to after the abating of calamity. Unlike for flooding, no national government program or legislative mandate exists to sponsor fire insurance or fire programs across the nation. Instead, individuals and organizations may acquire fire insurance of their own volition from the market of competing fire insurers. Fire insurance policies differ across the country and among the states; thus, differences may exist regarding what may be reimbursable or allowable. For many, fire insurance is a prime consideration when either rebuilding or purchasing new property after a fire incident. Depending on the situation and the tenets of the insurance contract, some policies may not reimburse the costs of new property.64 With respect to vast calamities, individuals may lack appropriate Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 8.3 Hurricane Florence flooding. (Source: National Weather Service)

insurance or may not understand their existing policies.65 As a result, shortcomings may arise when attempting to recover from disasters. Similar to the financial challenges of hurricane disasters, fire incidents are also financially devastating. Estimates of financial losses were expected to exceed $19 billion.66 In the month of November 2018, California wildfire insurance claims totaled $11.4 billion.67 Given the vastness of financial loss, California’s largest utility company, Pacific Gas and Electric, filed for bankruptcy as a protective measure against the potential of billions of dollars of liability claims.68 Because of the financial impact, the Merced Property and Casualty Company was unable to meet its insurance obligations, which totaled approximately $64 million in just the city of Paradise.69 As a result, the state of California was forced to take over the Merced company because of its inability to pay the anticipated claims resulting from the fires.70 An examination of the California wildfires reveals some realistic aspects of response and recovery: no guarantees of success exist; disaster responses and recoveries are complex; despite the best efforts of preparedness, one may truly be unprepared; insurers may be unable to satisfy their obligations; and any attempt toward recovery may be uncertain. However, residents who are able to rebuild and begin anew may incorporate lessons learned in their attempts toward recovery. For instance, residents may opt for less flora near buildings and fewer towering trees nearby; ensure that buildings satisfy state fire marshal’s standards; plan multiple potential escape routes with respect to the odds of future incidents; and increase the amount of insurance held at any time. 258

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Figure 8.4 A screen capture listing 2018 California fires’ incident archive. (Source: State of California, www.fire.ca.gov/)

8.13 Disaster Declarations Responses and their recoveries may necessitate the declaring of disaster officially by appropriate government authority. The Stafford Act provides a means of presidential declaration for disasters upon the request of the governor of an impacted state. (Within the context of the Stafford Act, “states” also include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Both the Republic of Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia are also eligible to request a declaration and receive assistance through the Compacts of Free Association.) Resulting from the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, federally recognized Indian tribal governments also possess the option of pursuing a declaration directly from the President. All emergency and major disaster declarations are made solely per the discretion of the President of the United States. Introduction to Homeland Security

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If it is apparent that a presidential disaster declaration may be necessary to assist in the recovery of the impacted area, the impacted government should contact the appropriate regional FEMA office to request a joint federal, state/tribal preliminary damage assessment (PDA). When possible, local government representatives should be included in order to jointly conduct a thorough assessment of the impacted area to determine the extent of the disaster, its impact on individuals and public facilities, and the types of federal assistance that may be necessary. This information is necessary to show that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state, the affected local governments, or the Indian tribal government and that supplemental federal assistance is necessary. Once the PDA is complete and the state or Indian tribal government determines that the damage exceeds their resources, the governor or tribal chief executive may submit a declaration request to the President through their FEMA regional office. As part of the request, the governor or tribal chief executive must take appropriate action under state or tribal law and direct the execution of the state or tribal emergency plan. The governor or tribal chief executive shall furnish information on the nature and amount of state and local or Indian tribal government resources that have been or will be committed to alleviating the results of the disaster, provide an estimate of the amount and severity of damage and the impact on the private and public sectors, and provide an estimate of the type and amount of assistance needed under the Stafford Act. In addition, the governor or tribal chief executive must certify that, for the current disaster, state and local government or Indian tribal government obligations and expenditures will comply with all applicable cost-sharing requirements. Generally, the PDA is completed before the submission of the governor’s or tribal chief executive’s request for a major disaster declaration. However, when an obvious calamity occurs, the governor’s or tribal chief executive’s request may be submitted before PDA completion. In such circumstances, the major disaster will generally be limited to public assistance categories A and/or B and hazard mitigation assistance. For severe incidents where empirically overwhelming evidence of residential damages exists, individual assistance may be included in the declaration. Additional assistance types may be added later, pending PDA completion. In some cases, the federal government may be the catalyst for a disaster declaration. In such cases, the President declares an emergency without a request from the governor of the affected state or the tribal chief executive of the affected tribe. However, governors or tribal chief executives may request a disaster declaration at a later date to procure additional resources that were unavailable at the time of the initial declaration. The Stafford Act accommodates two types of disaster declarations: emergency declarations and major disaster declarations. Both declaration types authorize presidential provision of supplemental federal disaster assistance. However, not all disasters, scopes of magnitude, and assistance rendered are identical. They differ according to the specifics of incident. The President can declare an emergency for any occasion or instance when he determines the need for federal assistance exists. Emergency declarations supplement state, local, and Indian tribal government efforts toward emergency services (e.g., protecting lives, property, public health, and safety; lessening or averting catastrophic threat in any part of the United States; and so on). Monetarily, the amount of assistance per a single emergency may not exceed $5 million. The President shall report to Congress if the amount is exceeded. Within 30 days of the calamity, the governor or tribal chief executive must submit a request to the President through the appropriate regional administrator. The request includes several components, as follows: 260

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• Confirmation that the governor or tribal chief executive took appropriate action legally and executed the appropriate emergency plan; • Descriptions of the state and local or Indian tribal government efforts and resources used for alleviating the emergency; • Descriptions of federal agency efforts and resources used during the response; and • Descriptions of the types and scopes of necessary additional federal assistance. Individual assistance and public assistance comprise the types of disaster assistance available. The Individuals and Households Program (IHP) is the only type of individual assistance that is rendered in conjunction with an emergency declaration, but its authorization is very rare. Housing assistance is provided at a 100% federal share while other needs assistance is provided on a 25% non-federal cost-sharing basis. Regarding public assistance, only Categories A (debris removal) and B (emergency protective measures) are authorized during an emergency declaration. Usually, emergency declarations include only Category B. Assistance is generally rendered at a 75% federal, 25% non-federal cost-share approach. A governor or tribal chief executive may request an advance emergency declaration with respect to the expected impact of an imminent incident that could result in a major disaster. Such requests must meet all the statutory and regulatory requirements for an emergency declaration request. Requests must demonstrate the existence of critical emergency protective measure needs before impact that are beyond the capability of the state, affected local governments, or Indian tribal government. They must specify unmet emergency needs that can be satisfied through direct federal assistance. Examples of federal direct assistance include human resources, equipment, supplies, and evacuation assistance. A declaration is usually not needed for the advance positioning of resources. Direct federal assistance is typically Category B (emergency protective measures).

8.14 Considerations of Response and Recovery A hazard is something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome. Natural hazards are caused by natural events that pose a threat to lives, property, and other assets. Technological hazards are caused by the tools, machines, and substances we use in everyday life. Intentional hazards, such as terrorism or riots, are deliberately caused by people attacking or damaging what is valuable in a society. Any type of hazard involves risk. Risk represents the probability that an event with either occur or not occur. It also represents the predicted impact that a hazard would have on people, services, and specific facilities and structures in the community. A severity rating quantifies the expected impact of a specific hazard. Within the context of the emergency management cycle, mitigation exists as a way to safeguard against identified threats. Mitigation represents the activities that are designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Preparedness accommodates the range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and between government and private sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources. Similarly, prevention is the set of actions taken to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring, actions taken to protect lives and Introduction to Homeland Security

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property, and applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include countermeasures. Disasters occur in a variety of fashions. Basically, a disaster is an occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological accident, or human-caused event that results in severe property damage, deaths, and/or multiple injuries. During the last few years, certain incidents, such as fires and floods, set new records in terms of both dangerousness and destruction. Regardless, such events constitute an emergency. The response to a calamity may involve a variety of agents—police, fire, medical, military, search and rescue, aviation, and so on. It involves a process that allows all levels of government and all disciplines to work together more efficiently and effectively. Multi-agency coordination occurs across the different disciplines involved in incident management, across jurisdictional lines, and across levels of government. An emergency may be viewed as any incident, whether natural or man-made, that requires responsive action to protect life or property. Typically, emergencies can be handled at the local level. However, in some cases, emergencies have the capacity of affecting the entirety of the nation. Response operations may occur under conditions of emergency and necessitate systematic management. Any systematic or methodical approach to managing an emergency is deemed emergency management. Typically, emergency management consists of organized analysis, planning, decision making, and the assignment of available resources to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of all hazards. Managing of emergencies is primarily done at emergency management centers (EMCs). An EMC is a central location where agency representatives can coordinate and make decisions when managing an emergency response. The aftermath of a disaster involves both response and recovery. A response consists of the activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response also includes the execution of EOPs and of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and unfavorable outcomes. Recovery consists of the development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and services through individual, private sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance programs. Regarding the return to normalcy, no guarantees exist that the version of normalcy that existed before the incident can be fully recovered and experienced again. In some cases, achieving the same normalcy may never occur. For instance, following the Galveston Hurricane, the city never experienced the same economic status and commerce that existed beforehand despite its efforts to recover and create bulwarks to safeguard the city against future hurricanes. Determining and judging the effects of long-term recovery require time. From a policy perspective, an average of 20 years of data should be accumulated and examined before an effective assessment of policy can be implemented (Frei & Ruloff, 1989).71 This notion involves the concept of time. In other words, if actions are taken toward recovery today, it may be years before the full effect of the actions and any externalities may be fully observed and understood historically. Thus, from a historical context, gaining insight and understanding of the fullness of an event, its externalities, and its succeeding policies toward recovery cannot happen quickly. After all, economic systems must be established; the effects of infrastructure and population changes require time; political processes and actions toward recovery also require time; environmental damages require time for recovery; and so on. Although a new normal emerges in due time, it may be different from the normalcy that existed before the occurrence of the incident. Determining the differences between the two scenarios necessitates analyzing much data. The data only emerges through the passing of time. 262

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8.15 Chapter Comments and Summary Depending on the impact and scope of the event, agencies providing response and recovery support may be drawn from federal, state, local, tribal, or private assets. The need exists to conduct, prior to an event, jurisdictional risk, vulnerability and needs assessments that guide incident management relationships, strategies, and the operational/tactical planning necessary for effective response and recovery once an incident or event has occurred. Emergency managers and their teams examine potential emergencies and disasters based on the risks posed by likely hazards, develop and implement programs aimed at reducing the impact of these events on the community, prepare for those risks that cannot be eliminated, and prescribe the actions required to deal with the consequences of actual events and to recover from those events. Emergency management involves participants at all governmental levels and in the private sector. Activities are geared according to phases before, during, and after emergency events. The effectiveness of emergency management rests on a network of relationships among partners in the system. Command and control are critical elements in any emergency management response effort. The agency or individuals responsible for managing the incident or disaster must have the authority to direct the people and agencies involved in the response effort to perform certain tasks. If no mechanism is in place to guide or facilitate response efforts in an organized and controlled manner, the response efforts will fall short. Additionally, effective command and control and effort coordination requires response participants be trained and to understand the terminology, systems, and structures of the framework that will be in play during an event response. As communities move from the impact of the disaster into recovery, lives are changed, and, depending on the scope of the disaster, response and recovery may be ongoing for years. As response and recovery operations conclude, those involved in the response efforts close down the operations. Comprehensive emergency plans help ensure that communications, responders, resources, supplies, and shelters are made available when needed. Life is series of new “normals.” Either one adapts or fails to adapt to changing circumstances that affect their world. Given these notions, efforts toward recovery occur after calamities. However, no guarantees exist that the normality that existed beforehand can be achieved after an incident. For instance, during the early years of the twentieth century, Galveston, Texas, experienced a hurricane that exceeded even modern storms in terms of losses of life and destroyed infrastructure. Despite efforts to bolster its physical infrastructure against future storms, the city never regained its status as an economic hub that existed previously. Any incident has an aftermath. Since each incident is unique, the activities, efforts, and methods toward recovery differ per incident. Although leaders may make decisions throughout incidents and their aftermaths that affect recovery, judging such actions historically requires the passing of time to fully understand and derive meaning from a larger worldview of the incident. Typically, about 20 years will pass before an effective assessment of recovery policy occurs.

8.16 Key Terms California Wildfires Command and Control Disaster

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Emergency Operation Center (EOC) Hurricane Florence Hazard Mitigation Multi-Agency Coordination Normalcy

Preparedness Prevention Recovery Response Risk

8.17 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. Command and control are not identical. Identify and select a national, regional, or local disaster that necessitated command and control. Write an essay that defines both concepts and discusses examples of both within the context of your selected disaster. In your essay, compare and contrast the basic concepts of command and control. 2. The National Response Framework exists as a tool for guiding responses that impact the nation. Perform some research concerning similar frameworks in your state or surrounding states. Write an essay that highlights the salient tenets of your identified framework. In your response, compare and contrast the contents of your selected entity with those of the National Response Framework. 3. This chapter introduced the economics of disaster responses and recoveries. Perform some research concerning a national, regional, or local calamity that was not discussed herein. Write an essay that assesses your selected incident with respect to the economics of disaster. In your response, speculate whether you believe recovery was fully achieved in due time, and justify your response. ‑4. Select a disaster of your choice, either national, regional, or local. Write an essay that critically analyzes the response operations to your selected disaster. In your essay, delineate five positive and five negative aspects of the response to your disaster. Further, assess whether you believe the response was successful. Justify your answer.

Notes

1. Lee, N., Hirschmeier, S., Muller, S., and Luz, L. (2017). Enablers in crisis information management: A literature review. Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 274–283. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. U.S. Department of the Interior. (2019). Natural Disaster Response and Recovery. Retrieved from www. doi.gov/recovery. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. . U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). National Response Framework, 2nd edition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government. 9. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2019). Public Assistance: Local, State, Tribal, and Private Non-Profit. Retrieved from www.fema.gov/public-assistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit. 10. Ibid. 11. U.S. Department of Agriculture. (2019). Disaster Response. Retrieved from www.fns.usda.gov/disasterresponse-0. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2019). Stay Put—Learn How to Shelter in Place. Retrieved from www.emergency.cdc.gov/shelterinplace.asp. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid.

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17. Ibid. 18. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2019). About the NASA Disasters Program. Retrieved from https://disasters.nasa.gov/. 19. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2019). NASA Helped to Keep Soldiers Safe During Hurricane Florence. Retrieved from https://blogs.nasa.gov/disaster-response/. 20. Ibid. 21. Mill, J. S. (1896). Fundamental Propositions Respecting Capital, Book I, Chapter V. Retrieved from www. econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP.html?chapter_num=8#book-reader. 22. Shaw, B. (2012). Active Tectonics of the Hellenic Subduction Zone. Berlin: Springer Publishing. 23. Jusseret, S., and Sintubin, M. (2017). Minoan Earthquakes: Breaking the Myth Through Interdisciplinarity. Leuven: Leuven University Press. 24. Gill, R. (2000). The Great Maya Droughts: Water, Life, and Death. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 25. Beard, M. (2008). Pompeii: The Life of a Roman Town. London: Profile Books. 26. Merrill, J. M. (2012). Building Bridges of Time, Places, and People, Volume II: Tombs, Temples, and Cities of Egypt, Israel, Greece, & Italy. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse. 27. Butterworth, A., and Laurence, R. (2013). Pompeii: The Living City. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Mankiw, N. (2007). Principles of Macroeconomics, 4th edition. Mason, OH: Thomson Higher Education. 35. Ibid. 36. Moynihan, D. P. (2009). The Response to Hurricane Katrina. Geneva: International Risk Governance Council. 37. Dolfman, M., Wasser, S., and Bergman, B. (2007). The effects of Hurricane Katrina on the New Orleans economy. Monthly Labor Review, 3–18. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. McElreath, D., Doss, D., Jensen, C., Lackey, H., Jones, D., and Wigginton, M. (2017). Dangers from the sea: Considerations of the 1900 Galveston Hurricane. International Journal of Maritime History, 29(3), 529–543. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Doss, D., McElreath, D., Goza, R., Tesiero, R., and Gokaraju, B. (2018). Assessing the recovery aftermaths of selected disasters in the Gulf of Mexico. Logistics & Sustainable Transport, 9(1), 1–10. 45. Reavis, M. W. (2012). Insurance: Concepts & Coverage. Victoria, BC: Friesen Press. 46. Ibid., p. 2. 47. Ibid. 48. Marson, J., and Ferris, K. (2015). Business Law, 4th edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 49. Navarro, M. (1996). Florida Facing Crisis in Insurance. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/1996/04/25/ us/florida-facing-crisis-in-insurance.html. 50. Seemuth, M. (2018). Hurricane Michael Is a New Test of Florida’s Odd Property Insurance Market. Retrieved from https://therealdeal.com/miami/2018/10/13/hurricane-michael-will-test-floridas-oddproperty-insurance-market/. 51. The Pew Charitable Trusts. (2017). Flooding Disasters Cost Billions in 2016. Retrieved from www. pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2017/02/01/flooding-disasters-cost-billions-in-2016. 52. Sisson, P. (2018). Flood Insurance Is Broken: Hurricane Florence Underscores How Our Current System of Rebuilding After Storms Can’t Afford a Future of More Frequent and Powerful Weather. Retrieved from www.curbed.com/2018/9/20/17884382/hurricane-florence-storm-flood-climate-change-insurance. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid.

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59. Nicas, J., and Fuller, T. (2018). Wildfire Becomes Deadliest in California History. Retrieved from www. nytimes.com/2018/11/12/us/california-fires-camp-fire.html. 60. National Interagency Fire Center. (2018). 2018 National Large Incident Year-to-Date Report. Retrieved from https://gacc.nifc.gov/sacc/predictive/intelligence/NationalLargeIncidentYTDReport.pdf. 61. CAL FIRE. (2019). Fire Statistics. Retrieved from http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents/incidents_stats. 62. Kiggins, S., Shulman, A., Benda, D., Chapman, M., and Simon, C. (2018). ‘Destroyed’: In Paradise, California, Entire Community of 27,000 Was Ordered to Evacuate. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com/ story/news/nation/2018/11/09/camp-fire-paradise-california-destroyed-evacuations/1940450002/. 63. Ibid. 64. CBS News. (2018). After California’s Wildfires, Insurance Hardly Covers Rebuilding. Retrieved from www.cbsnews.com/news/after-californias-wildfires-insurance-hardly-covers-rebuilding/. 65. Ibid. 66. Dobush, G. (2018). Losses from California Wildfires Expected to top $19 Billion, Further Stressing an Already Struggling Insurance Industry. Retrieved from http://fortune.com/2018/11/12/californiawildfire-camp-fire-insurance-cost/. 67. Gonzales, R. (2019). California Wildfire Insurance Claims Total $11.4 Billion for November 2018. Retrieved from www.npr.org/2019/01/28/689494921/california-wildfire-insurance-claims-total-11-4billion-for-november-2018. 68. Penn, I., Fuller, T., and Friedman, L. (2019). PG&E Bankruptcy Tests Who Will Pay for California Wildfires. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/business/energy-environment/pge-bankruptcy- california.html. 69. Yan, H., and Boyette, C. (2018). Insurance Company Goes Under After California’s Most Destructive Wildfire. Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2018/12/04/us/camp-fire-insurance-company-liquidation/ index.html. 70. Granda, N. (2018). State Takes Over Merced Insurance Company Unable to Pay Out Claims After Camp Fire. Retrieved from https://abc30.com/state-takes-over-merced-insurance-company-unable-to-pay-outclaims-after-camp-fire/4833887/. 71. Frei, D., and Ruloff, D. (1989). Methods for Practical Application in Foreign Policy Planning, Strategic Planning, and Business Risk Assessment. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

References Frei, D., and Ruloff, D. (1989). Methods for Practical Application in Foreign Policy Planning, Strategic Planning, and Business Risk Assessment. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Jusseret, S., and Sintubin, M. (2017). Minoan Earthquakes: Breaking the Myth Through Interdisciplinarity. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press. Mill, J. S. (1896). Fundamental Propositions respecting Capital, Book I, Chapter V. Retrieved from https:// www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP.html?chapter_num=8#book-reader. Reavis, M. W. (2012). Insurance: Concepts & Coverage. Victoria, BC: Friesen Press. Shaw, B. (2012). Active Tectonics of the Hellenic Subduction Zone. Berlin, Germany: Springer Publishing.

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9 Domestic Extremism Threats, Threat Groups, and Terrorism

Figure 9.1 A 2019 report from the FBI on lone offenders. (Source: FBI)

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The Folk, namely the members of the race, are the Nation. Racial loyalties must always supersede geographical and national boundaries. If this is taught and understood, it will end fratricidal wars. Wars must not be fought for the benefit of another race. —Aryan Nations website (Aryan Nations, 2009) The objectives of this chapter are to: • Define the basic concept of domestic terrorism; • Understand the terrorism issues created by domestic threat groups; • Recognize the diversity of domestic threat groups; and • Explore the history and origins of domestic threat groups.

9.1 Introduction Domestic-related fringe and hate groups pose a threat not only to law enforcement and governmental authorities but also to citizens in general. While the United States embraces diversity, fringe elements, those who use violence and the threat of violence to advance their agenda, pose a danger. Throughout the history of the United States, there are those who have attempted to achieve their political and personal ambitions by means of force. When these plots failed, the plotters were subject to trial in the American justice system. The American judicial system is unique in that these plotters are tried in civil rather than in military courts.1 In recent years, while many have fixed their attention on international threat groups, such as al-Qaeda, there remains a domestic element, varied and diverse, that also poses a threat to our communities and nation. This threat differs from that of gangs, which have an economic motive for their crimes. The motives of a domestic terrorist group have always been political.

9.2 What Is Domestic Terrorism? Domestic terrorism and hate crimes can take on many forms. From the actions of the Ku Klux Klan in the post–Civil War period to the actions of the Unabomber as he waged a decadelong terror campaign or the 2002 Beltway Sniper killings carried out by Lee Malvo and John Muhammed, the nation and our communities have proven to be vulnerable.2 The FBI defines domestic terrorism as: the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individuals based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.3 When discussing terrorist and extremist movements, careful consideration must be given to differentiating between citizens involved in legitimate protest and those who cross the line into terrorism. For example, many Americans are not in favor of abortion and participate in peaceful protest activities outside clinics. These citizens are definitely not terrorists. On the other hand, some anti-abortionists have taken it upon themselves to assassinate doctors who perform abortions and plant bombs outside clinics. These actions could definitely be classified as terrorism. 268

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According to Martin,4 many definitions of the term “terrorism” exist; one generally accepted by experts holds that terrorism is a pre-meditated and unlawful act in which groups or agents of some principal engage in a threatened or actual use of force or violence against human or property targets. . . . [These entities] engage in this behavior intending the purposeful intimidation of governments or people to affect policy or behavior with an underlying political objective. Gerstenfeld expands this definition and identifies such variables as “power,” “racial separatism,” “religion,” “common antipathy for the same groups,” and a “common antipathy for particular beliefs and actions” as terrorist characteristics.5 Because of the many varieties of domestic terrorism that exist today, some experts craft definitions specifically designed for certain movements. For example, Chalk, Hoffman, Reville, and Kasupski define eco-terrorism as “the use of or threat to use violence in protest of harm inflicted on animals and the world’s biosphere.”6 Bennett indicates that eco-terrorism is the “use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally oriented, sub-national group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature.”7 Hall reinforces this notion and indicates that environmental and animal-advocacy groups were recently considered by law enforcement to be threats in the United States.8 According to Hall, both the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) are representative members of such groups. Further, he indicates that: [In] 2002, FBI domestic-terrorism section chief James Jarboe said the FBI had ranked the ALF and ELF as the top domestic-terrorism threat, and told Congress they had committed more than 600 criminal acts in the United States since 1996, resulting in damages topping $43 million.9 The economic potential of such acts of terror must be neither ignored nor understated. Jackson, et. al., provide additional financial and economic considerations regarding the United States. According to Jackson et al.: [S]ince 1976, 1,100 criminal acts have been committed in the United States by radical environmentalist groups, resulting in more than $110 million in property damage alone, a figure that does not include the significant additional costs associated with lost research, increased security, and dampened productivity.10 Deshpande also describes pyro-terrorism incidents and crimes in the nations of Israel, Greece, Spain, Estonia, and the United States that have environmental attributes and significant consequences. Given the discussions of Deshpande and Jackson, both the economic and financial potentials of eco-terrorism are significant concerns.11 Although the ALF and the ELF have different origins, many of their ideological beliefs and much of their threat potential are similar. Walsh and Ellis indicate that the ALF and the ELF were closely linked because of their common ideological beliefs and respective agendas.12 Hall provides similar observations of commonness regarding the prosecution of crimes committed by the ALF and the ELF.13 Alexander indicated that both the ALF and the ELF attacked businesses because they viewed corporate America as harmful to the environment and animals and caused approximately $42 million in damages between 1996 and 2002.14 Introduction to Homeland Security

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These observations of eco-terrorism demonstrate just how difficult it is to craft a “one size fits all” definition of domestic terrorism. While violence and murder can certainly be key components of such a definition, damaging infrastructure and impeding societal functions can also be considered “terroristic.” As the next section makes clear, the United States has witnessed myriad examples of terrorism throughout its history. There is little reason to believe that these dangers will not prove problematic for future generations.

9.3 Domestic Terrorism: A Short Historical View Probably the first documented case of domestic terrorism in the United States was the case of Aaron Burr in 1807.15 Burr and his confederates had plotted to create an independent nation in the Southwestern part of North America by seizing Spanish land in Texas (which was a part of Mexico at the time) and separating the Mississippi Valley from the United States. The plot failed. Burr was tried for treason in federal court. Two important legal results of this case were that there would be a strict constitutional definition of the crime of treason (rather than a common-law definition as argued by the government) and that these types of cases would be tried in civil rather than military courts.16 The next major case of domestic terrorism was the raid conducted on the federal armory at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, in 1859. John Brown, along with several other plotters, seized the armory in an attempt to obtain arms to incite a slave rebellion. They were captured, and the plot failed.17 Some acts of violence that invoked large law enforcement responses were not acts of domestic terrorism but violence that was a result of a labor dispute or union activity. Examples of this type of violence would include the Molly Maguires (1862–1875) and the bombing of the Los Angeles Times building in 1910. While these were certainly violent crimes, they had a labor rather than a political motive.18,19 The anarchist movement was very active in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Anarchists were involved in bombings and assassinations. The anarchists of this period often were lone wolves, but they sometimes worked in groups. The first documented incident of an anarchist bombing in the United States was the Haymarket bombing that occurred in Chicago, Illinois, in 1886.20 A lone wolf anarchist named Leon Czolgosz assassinated President William McKinley in Buffalo, New York, in 1901.21,22 Anarchists conducted a series of coordinated bombing attacks in 1919 in Washington, D.C., and six other U.S. cities in a vain effort to overthrow the United States government. This attack resulted in the Palmer raids against those in the anarchist movement.23 The Red Scare of the 1920s spawned thousands of investigations of United States citizens by the Department of Justice, in an effort to identify subversives. In 1920, the anarchists stuck again, with a bomb that was delivered by a horse-drawn cart to Wall Street. The bombing killed 38 people and injured another 143.24,25,26 In 1932, a lone wolf anarchist named Giuseppe Zangara attempted to assassinate President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami, Florida. Zangara missed Roosevelt and killed Chicago mayor Anton Cermak instead.27,28 In the 1920s and again in the 1950s, the United States worried about the influence of Communism on the nation. In the immediate post–World War II period, another Red Scare occurred in which, again, thousands were investigated. Other nationalist groups, such as the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, became terrorist threats. On November 1, 1950, two members 270

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of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman. Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola armed themselves with handguns and attempted to attack President Truman in Washington, D.C., at his temporary residence, Blair House. The two would-be assassins were intercepted by federal law enforcement officers outside the building and began shooting. In the ensuing gunfight, Collazo and Torresola killed a Secret Service agent, wounded a White House police officer, and wounded a Washington, D.C., police officer. In turn, Torresola was killed by the Secret Service agent he had shot, and Collazo was wounded by another Secret Service agent. Collazo was tried and convicted in federal court of murder, attempted assassination, and assault with the intent to kill. Collazo was sentenced to death, but this was commuted to life imprisonment by President Truman. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter commuted his sentence, and Collazo was released. Upon his release, Cuban Communist leader Fidel Castro praised Collazo for his actions against American imperialism.29,30,31 During the 1960s, as the United States was deeply embroiled in the Vietnam conflict and the struggle for civil rights, many domestic groups, generally on the far left of the political spectrum, gained prominence. Many of these groups either expressed or adhered to Marxist/Leninist/ Maoist teachings and philosophies. Some of these included the Weather Underground, the Black Panthers, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, and the Symbionese Liberation Army. Research has shown that in the period between 1968 and 1975, there was an average of one terrorist act in the United States every week. The FBI of the period combated these groups and others of the leftist underground as a serious threat that wished to violently overthrow the government.32 The Weather Underground Organization (WUO) was active from 1969 to 1981. The Weather Underground Organization began in 1969 at Michigan State University as a radical splinter group of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). They originally were called the Weathermen. They espoused a Marxist/Leninist philosophy and advocated the violent overthrow of the United States government. The influence of Communist philosophies on the WUO and other radial groups was the focus of hearings in the United States Senate in 1976.33 The WUO opposed the war in Vietnam and supported radicals such as the Black Liberation Army. In 1970, the faction declared war on the United States government in response to the killing of Black Panther Fred Hampton in Chicago by the police.34 The Weather Underground participated in a number of bombings of government offices, including military induction centers, the Pentagon, the State Department, and several police stations. Although they were small in number (400 radicals attended the Flint War Council in 1969; by the end of the WUO, membership was estimated to be less than 30),35 the WUO participated in bombings and riots that spanned from California to New York.36 Probably the last violent act by members of the WUO was on October 20, 1981, when three members joined members of the Black Liberation Army in the robbery of a Brinks armored car in Nanuet, New York. The robbery resulted in the deaths of three people, including a police officer. Kathy Boudin, Judith Alice Clark, and David Gilbert, who had joined a WUO faction called the May 19th Communist Organization, were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. This is often thought of as the last gasp of the Weather Underground Organization.37,38 The Black Panther Party (BPP) was founded by Bobby Seale and Huey Newton in Oakland, California, on October 15, 1966, to protest alleged brutality by the Oakland Police Department. The Black Panthers were unique in that they made no attempt to go underground. Seal and Newton developed a quasi-uniform for members consisting of blue shirts, black pants, black leather jackets, and black berets. Members were encouraged to go around armed and were often photographed with firearms. The BPP viewed itself as a radical political action group Introduction to Homeland Security

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with an anti-racism, anti-fascism, anti-war, anti-imperialism, and black nationalism agenda (although the BPP never called for a separate black nation). To further this political agenda, BPP issued a ten-point program calling for action in 1967. The BPP published a newspaper and conducted some educational and social service programs for minority youth. The BPP was often considered to be Marist/Leninist/Maoist politically. This view was bolstered by the BPP’s frequent sale of Mao Tse-tung’s Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (often called “the little red book”) as a fund raiser. This publication is often cited as an inspiration of some of the BPP-sponsored survival programs that were being run out of some churches in Oakland. BPP leader Eldridge Cleaver is credited with having coined the BPP’s political slogan: “Black power!” Indeed, several of the BPP leaders ran unsuccessfully for various political offices, such as the mayor of Oakland and the President. At its height, the BPP is estimated to have had as many as 5,000 members in 68 cities across the United States. Large contingents of BPP were located in Oakland-San Francisco, Chicago, New York, Seattle, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. However, it was the confrontational and armed tactics of the BPP that often brought them into armed conflict with law enforcement authorities. The BPP initially began armed anti-police patrols in Oakland, California, in 1966 with the stated aim of observing and preventing abusive police behavior.39 The BPP utilized a provision in California law that allowed the open carry of rifles and shotguns as long as they weren’t pointed at anyone.40 These tactics resulted in a number of deadly armed confrontations with police in which both police officers and Black Panthers were killed or wounded. These confrontations sent many Black Panthers to jail or made them fugitives from justice. The BPP had died out as a movement by 1982 with the conviction of Newton for embezzlement of $600,000 from a Black Panther–supported school. Newton was murdered by a member of the Black Guerilla Family in 1989.41 The Black Liberation Army (BLA) was active from 1970 to 1981. Many of the original members of the BLA had defected in various disputes with the BPP. Other new BLA members came from other radical groups such as the Revolutionary Action Movement. The BLA advocated class struggle and the establishment of a socialistic system in support of their anti-capitalist, anti-racist, ant-sexist, and anti-imperialist agenda. The influence of Communist philosophies on the BLA and other radial groups was the focus of hearings in the United States Senate in 1976.42 The BLA was suspected by the Department of Justice of involvement in over 70 incidents of violence, including the murder of 13 law enforcement officers between 1970 and 1976. Arguably, the last action of the BLA was in 1981, when BLA members joined members of the WUO in the attempted robbery of a Brinks armored car in Nanuet, New York.43,44 Former BPP leader Eldridge Cleaver joined the BLA after he was expelled from the central committee of the BPP in 1971. Cleaver eventually fled to Algeria and then to France, where he became a born-again Christian. Upon his return to the United States in 1977, Cleaver plea bargained his outstanding legal problems. After further legal problems in 1988 for burglary and cocaine addiction, Cleaver died in 1998. Former BLA leader Assata Shakur (a.k.a. JoAnne Deborah Byron) was shot during a drug deal in 1971. After her involvement in several BLA criminal activities, including the New Jersey Turnpike shootout of 1973, Shakur was indicted on multiple criminal counts. Shakur was in various prisons and jails from 1974 to 1979, when she escaped the Clinton Correctional Facility for Women in New Jersey. Shakur fled to Cuba and is still in exile there.45 Although it was founded in the 1960s by Filiberto Ojeda Rios, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) was most active between 1974 and 1983. The influence of Communist philosophies on the FALN and other radial groups was the focus of hearings in the United States Senate in 1976.46 The FALN adhered to Marxist/Leninist principles and 272

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advocated a Stalinist line on the concept of “nation.” The FALN campaigned for the independence of Puerto Rico and the establishment of a socialist state there. The FALN was involved in over 130 bomb attacks in the United States between 1974 and 1983. In 1999, President Bill Clinton pardoned 16 FALN members who were still serving time in federal prisons. FALN member Oscar Lopez Rivera rejected the pardon and remained in prison until his sentence was commuted by President Barack Obama in 2017.47,48 The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) operated from 1973 to 1975. The SLA was never very big; it is estimated that they never had more than about 22 actual members. The SLA never operated outside California. However, at one time, because of their propensity for extreme violence, they were considered to be a major threat by law enforcement. The influence of Communist philosophies on the SLA and other radial groups was the focus of hearings in the United States Senate in 1976. Twenty-five SLA members assassinated the school superintendent in Oakland, California, on November 6, 1973. Two SLA members were arrested and convicted for the murder. One of the convictions was overturned in 1981. The SLA kidnapped Patty Hearst on February 4, 1974. SLA ransom demands included distributing food for the poor. Hearst later participated in a SLA bank robbery on April 15, 1974, in San Francisco, in which two people were shot. After a nationwide manhunt, law enforcement tracked the fugitive SLA members to a residence in Los Angeles. On May 16, 1974, they conducted a raid on the SLA hideout. In the resulting shootout, six SLA members were killed. On April 21, 1975, the SLA struck again and robbed a bank in Carmichael, California, killing a customer during the robbery. Hearst and four other SLA members were arrested in San Francisco on September 18, 1975. Several SLA members went on the run; some stayed as fugitives until 2002 before being captured. Hearst was convicted of aiding the bank robbery in San Francisco. Her sentence was commuted by President Carter in 1979. Hearst was pardoned by President Clinton in 2001.49 As the radicalism of the far left receded following the Vietnam War, groups on the far right of the extremist spectrum and those with an interest in single issues emerged. During the 1980s and 1990s, law enforcement dealt with a resurgence of white supremacists, radical survivalists, so-called constitutionalists and freemen, violent anti-abortionists, and extreme environmentalists. Some of these groups and movements continue to persist and thrive within American society.50 The deadliest terrorist act in the United States, prior to September 11, 2001, was the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, carried out by right-wing extremist sectarians.51

9.4 Domestic Terrorism and Threat Groups The United States has a long history of democracy. National history is replete with the contributions of a variety of individuals and groups whose efforts and works provided benefits to society. However, despite such positive events, American history also contains the blemishes and crimes of domestic terrorism. In an effort to understand the dynamics of domestic terrorist activity within the United States, it is important to categorize groups based on the inherent motivation that serves as the adversarial norm of each group. Basically, there are three main categories of domestic terrorist groups: hate-motivated, right-wing patriot-militia, and special-interest groups.52 1. Hate-motivated groups consist of movements such as: a. White Supremacy—these groups maintain an ideology of cultural supremacy and anti-government sentiment (KKK, Neo-Nazi, Aryan Brotherhood, Posse Comitatus). Characterized by intolerance, racism, religious dogma. Introduction to Homeland Security

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b. Racial-Religious—these groups adhere to radical religious beliefs that are distinctly either non-Christian or anti-Christian (White Aryan Resistance, World Church of the Creator, Odinism). Characterized as terrorism based on interrelated religious ideas that are subordinated to political, ethnic, or ideological objectives. c. Black Separatism—these groups advocate racial separatism, ethnocentricity, and antigovernment sentiment (Nation of Islam, New Black Panther Party). Characterized by anti-Semitism, strict racial separation, and government opposition. 2. Right-wing patriot militia groups consist of movements that are characterized as sovereign citizen groups that maintain conspiracy beliefs that the federal government is tyrannical in having compromised or are trying to dissolve constitutional rights and that the government has become anti-Christian and anti-American. Basically, such groups are organized cells motivated by their beliefs that the condition of America’s present political, economic, and judicial status is meant to strip them of their constitutional right to bear arms, tax the nation into poverty, and diminish the value of the nation’s currency.53 3. Special-interest groups consist of prominent movements committed to a particular cause that focuses on the resolution of a specific issue. Special-interest groups are well organized and engage in direct forms of action characterized as either extremist or terrorist. Their respective actions range from legal forms of civil disobedience (protests), to illegal forms of activity (arson, vandalism, murder), comprising both extremist and terrorist actions. Extremist groups include animal rights groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), pro-life and abortion groups, and ecological/environmentalist groups such as Earth First and Greenpeace.54 Terrorism has been used against the domestic United States for a variety of reasons. Some of the contributing factors include economic, political, and religious philosophies.

9.5 The Radical Right: A Variety of Perspectives The term “radical right” is applied to a wide range of groups and movements, including white supremacists, so-called sovereign citizens and freemen, tax protestors, anti-abortionists, and militia groups. To the extent that one assumes groups categorized as radical right all follow a conservative or ultra-conservative agenda, the term can be misleading. For example, most militia groups believe in a strict, idiosyncratic interpretation of the United States Constitution, whereas many white supremacists are true revolutionaries, enamored with the overthrow of the American government or intent on the establishment of a “whites only” nation. Nevertheless, for sake of simplicity, this textbook adheres to the generally understood classification scheme referred to as “radical right.” Readers, however, are cautioned to approach each group as an individual entity and not to read anything into a group’s political orientation just because it is classified as belonging to the radical right. The following will examine some groups considered to be right-wing extremist:

9.6 Supremacy Groups As the name implies, supremacy groups believe that their race or ethnicity is superior to all others. Of course, the First Amendment guarantees that individuals are free to hold these beliefs and espouse them publicly. However, history has demonstrated that these views propel some to believe they have the right—indeed, the responsibility—to act out violently 274

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against others to “protect” their race. When the word “supremacy” is mentioned, many people automatically assume this refers to white supremacist groups, like the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations. However, there are many such groups with diverse racial, religious, and ethnic orientations.

9.6.1 Ku Klux Klan Perhaps the longest surviving domestic threat group is the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), which has proven remarkably adept at reconstituting itself over the years. The Ku Klux Klan is one of the best known ultra-right-wing groups in the United States. When first formed, the Klan was a single organization that quickly spread across major portions of the South. The nature of the organization, built on a foundation of the secrecy of a loosely connected confederation, quickly saw it evolve into highly independent, locally based groups. Today, there are over 150 Klan groups of various sizes located in over 30 states. The Klan was founded in 1865 in Pulaski, Tennessee, and was initially a social organization. By 1867, the Klan had shifted its emphasis. Quickly spreading across much of the South, the Klan selected former Confederate Cavalry Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest as its leader. During the period of the late 1860s and early 1870s, the Klan terrorized citizens. By

Figure 9.2 Nathan Bedford Forrest. (Source: Library of Congress, https://cdn.loc.gov/service/pnp/ppmscd/00000/00082v.jpg)

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the late 1870s, with the conclusion of Reconstruction in the South, the first era of the Klan concluded, and for the next three decades, the organization lay dormant. In the early 1900s, a series of events led to the second incarnation of the Klan. Massive immigration occurred in which thousands of Eastern Europeans, many of whom were Catholic and Jewish, flooded into the United States. Also, African Americans migrated from the agricultural South to the industrial North in record numbers. Because of such events, many people felt threatened and believed that their lifestyles were under assault. During 1915, while these events were occurring, filmmaker D.W. Griffith produced The Birth of a Nation. Based on Thomas Dixon’s 1905 novel The Clansman, Birth of a Nation portrayed the Ku Klux Klan in a sympathetic and heroic light. The movie made a huge impact; it was screened at the White House and became wildly popular with many audiences. The movie was considered to be one of the most innovative films ever made. By the 1920s, Klan membership was estimated to be approximately 5,000,000. Its anti–African American orientation had expanded to include anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, and anti-immigrant biases. In some locations, the Klan existed as a social organization instead of a terrorist group. During this time, it was common for politicians to join the KKK if they wished to hold office. Less than ten years later, mismanagement, outrage by various media outlets and politicians, and a series of sensational sexual and criminal scandals had decimated the ranks of the Klan. It would not regain its power and influence until much later in the twentieth century.55 The third incarnation of the KKK started during the 1950s in response to civil rights groups that were attempting to secure rights for African Americans. A series of sensational bombings

Figure 9.3 The KKK marches down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., in 1925. (Source: FBI)

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and murders gripped the South during the 1950s and 1960s. Very often, perpetrators were never brought to justice. Eventually, law enforcement efforts on the federal and state levels began to erode the power of the Klan. Ironically, the largest attack on the Klan came not in criminal court, but in civil actions. Groups like the Southern Poverty Law Center won judgments of millions of dollars against various KKK members and groups.56 This has forced the KKK into a new era. After the death of Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton in 1987, the KKK began to follow a more militant path and ally themselves with neo-Nazi groups and other white supremacists. The racist community began to openly speak of a possible “White Revolution” and the establishment of “White Homelands.” As warriors in the forthcoming race war, some KKK members donned fatigues and saved their sheets for parades and formal ceremonies. Gone were the days of the 1960s, when Rockwell’s Nazis made fun of the KKK and were dismissed by Klansman as un-American. They viewed themselves as allies and began to appear at the same rallies together.57 The Ku Klux Klan continues to exist within American society. Groups today tend to be small and engage primarily in attempting to gain members and in spreading their message through public protests, internet postings, and publications. Perhaps ironically, the American Civil Liberties Union has defended the Klan in various lawsuits and has successfully argued that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the KKK and members of other fringe organizations the right to free speech. Today, it is estimated that there are between 5,000 and 8,000 Klan member in the United States.58

9.6.2 Neo-Nazi and Aryan Movement The Nazi movement in the United States predates World War II. In 1936, the German-American Bund was established as a pro-Nazi quasi-military organization that was most active in the years immediately preceding the United States’ entry into World War II. The Bund’s members were mostly American citizens of German ancestry. The organization received covert guidance and financial support from the German government. Military drills and related activities were provided for adults and youths at Bund-maintained camps: Camp Siegfried in Yaphank, New York, and Camp Nordland, in Andover, New Jersey59 With the United States entry into World War II, the German-American Bund lost public support. After World War II, an American Nazi movement re-emerged most noticeably under the leadership of George Lincoln Rockwell. Rockwell was a United States naval officer in World War II who, in March 1959, founded the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS), a name selected to denote opposition to state ownership of property. In December, the name was changed to the American Nazi Party and the headquarters relocated to Arlington, Virginia. In 1967, Rockwell was assassinated by a disenchanted follower of his own movement.60 While some neo-Nazi groups emphasize simple hatred, others are more focused on the revolutionary creation of a fascist political state. Nazism, of course, has roots in Europe, and links between American and European neo-Nazis are strong and growing stronger. American neoNazi groups, protected by the First Amendment, often publish material and host internet sites that are aimed at European audiences—materials that would be illegal under European antiracism laws. Similarly, many European groups put up their internet sites on American servers to avoid prosecution under the laws of their native countries. By the 1960s, the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan had found much common ground in their views. Both organizations advocated similar agendas. Many of the leaders of radical right-wing organizations at one time or another were affiliated with one of these organizations. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 9.4 William Pierce, author of The Turner Diaries. (Source: Creative Commons. Used unchanged per 3.0 unported licenses. Image posted by user Robert Hartnell)

Several major leaders of the neo-Nazi movement emerged from the influence of the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan. After Rockwell’s assassination in August 1967, Pierce became one of the principal leaders of the National Socialist White People’s Party, the successor to the ANP. In 1970, Pierce left the NSWPP and joined the National Youth Alliance. By 1974, Pierce had formed the National Alliance, and he led it until his death in 2002. One of the most significant impacts Pierce had on the radical right was the authorship of The Turner Diaries, which he wrote using the pseudonym of Andrew MacDonald.61 The Turner Diaries, published in 1978, are the fictional diaries of Earl Turner, a member of an underground white supremacist army involved in an Aryan revolution that overturns the United States government in the near future. In the book, Turner’s guerrilla unit detonates a homemade bomb at FBI headquarters, killing hundreds—a passage that came to be seen as foreshadowing, and as an inspiration to, Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. The book is one of the most widely read and cited books on the far right.62 Other extreme-right leaders have also emerged from the foundations of the neo-Nazi movement. Richard Butler led the Aryan Nations and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, the nation’s most well-known bastion of neo-Nazism and Christian identity. In 2000, the Aryan Nations lost its church and 20-acre compound in northern Idaho after a $6 million civil judgment led to a bankruptcy filing. Butler’s use of religion as a foundation to advance his agenda would be seen in other organizations.63 278

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The neo-Nazi and Aryan Nations movements have a major presence in the nation’s correctional system. As an example, the Aryan Brotherhood is one of the most violent white supremacist groups in the nation. It has been linked to over 100 murders throughout its existence. Aryan Brotherhood leaders have been the recent target of the FBI, DEA, and ATF, which are trying to dismantle the ruthless gang. The Aryan Brotherhood also has been linked to a series of murders and assaults on law enforcement officials. The Aryan Brotherhood is one of the largest prison gangs in the nation and has branches in California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio, and Colorado.64

9.6.3 The Sovereign Citizens Movement Sovereign citizens are anti-government extremists who believe that even though they physically reside in this country, they are separate or “sovereign” from the United States. As a result, they believe they don’t have to answer to any government authority, including courts, taxing entities, motor vehicle departments, and law enforcement. However, they recognize the authority of the county sheriff. They have created their own “common law” court system and often file fictitious suits against government officials in it. Sovereign citizens are often confused with extremists from the militia movement. But while sovereign citizens sometimes use or buy illegal weapons, guns are secondary to their antigovernment, anti-tax beliefs. However, because of their anti-government views, they have frequently taken armed action against law enforcement officials, especially during traffic stops. On the other hand, guns and paramilitary training are paramount to militia groups.65 The idea behind the movement originated during the 1970s with a group known as the Posse Comitatus and enjoyed some popularity in extremist circles during the 1980s and 1990s. Early

Figure 9.5 Examples of illegal license plates used by so-called sovereign citizens. (Source: FBI)

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on, the movement featured white supremacist elements, but this has not kept some African Americans from subscribing to its ideals in recent years. In the 1990s, the movement attracted 250,000 followers and was marked by the FBI’s standoff with a group known as the Montana Freemen that lasted 81 days. Current estimates suggest a membership of 300,000. Sovereign citizens have in some instances created fictitious entities and used fake currency, passports, license plates, and driver licenses. In 2009, a federal jury found three men guilty of conspiring to use and sell fraudulent diplomatic credentials and license plates that they believed allowed “their customers to enjoy diplomatic immunity and to no longer pay taxes.”66

9.6.4 Militias and the Militia Movement A militia is a military force composed of citizens designed to provide defense, law enforcement, and other services during a time of emergency. The primary militia in the United States is the National Guard. The National Guard, along with reserve forces and State Defense Forces, supplements the active duty military. Additionally, these units serve their state governments during the response cycles to natural disasters—hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, forest fires—and during emergency circumstances such as riots and episodes of civil unrest. The Militia Act of 1903 created the National Guard and an “unorganized” militia that consists of all males between the ages of 17 and 45 (with certain exceptions). For most of the twentieth century, the unorganized militia did not exist in any real sense. However, during the 1990s, a confluence of factors convinced many private citizens to take up arms and form their own militia units. Like the Patriot movement, citizens who gravitated toward the militia believed that the United States was in extreme danger. They were convinced that “black helicopters” and other sinister forces from outside America were about to take over the country. Some of these groups had a strong religious orientation while others did not. Some were racist, but many had no racial bias. Many militia members were average American citizens concerned about the future of the United States. They believed that they were the last line of defense for their government and community, and they prepared themselves to resist efforts by both foreign subversives and those who would commit treason from within. When the new millennium began, many computer specialists believed that a global economic and physical catastrophe would occur. It was called the Year Two Thousand (Y2K) phenomenon, and it was believed that most computers would fail during the early hours of the year 2000. Stories of cataclysm were common. This sensationalism, unfortunately, fed the hyperbole around the militia movement, and many American citizens, fearing financial disasters, global crop failures, and abuses against private citizens by what they considered to be an oppressive government, joined militia units to ensure their own safety from the predicted disaster. Fortunately, very few terrorists have come out of militia brigades or even the Patriot movement, for that matter. To some degree, these units became a catharsis for those Americans who had extreme concerns about the government. However, during the 1990s, there was great concern that a single incident could trigger a violent reaction from militia personnel, thereby setting off a firestorm. Some far-right groups tried to ally themselves with the militias without much success because while the militias were anti-government, as a whole, the militias were not very racist or anti-Semitic.67 Although there have been exceptions. On January 25, 2019, two Kansas militia members convicted of taking part in a foiled plot to massacre Muslims in Southwest Kansas were sentenced in federal court to decades in prison in an emotional court hearing during which one of the targeted victims pleaded, “Please don’t hate us.”68 280

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9.6.5 Racist Skinheads In the United States, racist skinheads have a legacy stretching back to the early 1980s. However, skinhead culture originated in the United Kingdom in the late 1960s and today has a global reach. Since the early 2000s, the movement in the United States has been characterized by a proliferation of regional groups or crews rather than a united core organization. In law enforcement circles, racist skinheads have a reputation for violence. This is reinforced by hate-filled white power music and literature. In the mid-1990s, many U.S.-based racist skinhead groups allied with one another to form the Hammerskin Nation (HSN). HSN eventually developed chapters throughout the United States and in Europe.69

9.6.6 Black Separatists The definition of “separatist” is often misconstrued with respect to threat groups. Basically, a separatist is a person or movement composed of a group of individuals who seek to withdraw, secede, or be separate from others in society. The main beliefs that motivate separatists include all or several of the following: sectarian, which is an attitude of bigotry, discrimination, and hatred; ethnic ideologies; gender; economic or social status; and religious beliefs. For example, per the position of the Southern Poverty Law Center, Black separatists typically oppose integration and racial intermarriage, and they want separate institutions—or even a separate nation—for black people in America. Most contemporary forms of black separatism are strongly anti-white and anti-Semitic, and a number of religious versions assert that blacks—not Jews—are the Biblical “chosen people” of God.70 For example, the New Black Panther Party (NBPP) is a black separatist group that believes black Americans should have their own nation. The New Black Panther Party is a virulently racist and anti-Semitic organization whose leaders have encouraged violence against whites, Jews, and law enforcement officers. NBPP claims to have been founded in 1989, although the group was not active until 1990. That year, Aaron Michaels, a Dallas radio personality, assembled a group of black citizens to engage in community activism. He called the group the New Black Panther Party.71 The NBPP characterizes itself as a militant, modern-day expression of the black power movement. Its leaders have blamed Jews for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and for the slave trade. The NBPP demands that blacks be given a country or state of their own, within which they can make their own laws. They demand that all black prisoners in the United States be released to “the lawful authorities of the Black Nation.” They claim to be entitled to reparations for slavery from the United States, all European countries, and “the Jews.”72 The NBPP also holds black-supremacist religious beliefs and is most notable for its anti-white and anti-Semitic hatred. NBPP members believe that blacks are God’s true “chosen people” and that the people normally called “Jews” actually are impostors. (This ideology is remarkably similar to the white racist theology of Christian Identity, which says whites are God’s real chosen people.) They believe that blacks are naturally superior to people of other races.73 A document on the NBPP website entitled “The Nationalist Manifesto” claims that white men have a secret plan to commit genocide against the non-white races. It also refers to black people who condone mixed-race relationships as the “modern day Custodians [sic] of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.” The now-deceased Khalid Abdul Muhammad, who formerly served as the NBPP chairman, emphatically stated, “There are no good crackers, and if you find one, kill him before he changes.”74 Introduction to Homeland Security

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Interestingly, members of the original Black Panther Party, which has no connection to the NBPP, have heavily criticized the New Black Panther Party. An open letter from the Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation, which is run by members of the original Black Panther Party, decries the NBPP for being a hateful and unconstructive group. Bobby Seale, a famous founding member of the original Panthers, calls the organization “a black racist hate group.”75

9.6.7 Patriot Groups The Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project identified 1,360 anti-government “Patriot” groups active in 2012. Generally, Patriot groups define themselves as being opposed to the “New World Order,” engage in conspiracy theorizing, and advocate or adhere to extreme anti-government doctrines. The philosophical roots of the Patriot movement are derived from those of the John Birch Society (during the 1950s and 1960s) and the Posse Comitatus. Patriots are sometimes called Constitutionalists. It is their position that they—and, perhaps, they alone—represent the ideals intended by the authors of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Internationally, they are isolationists. Domestically, Patriots believe very strongly in independent speech protected by the First Amendment and the right to bear all types of firearms and weaponry as they believe the Second Amendment intended. They favor small government and resent the intrusion of public policies that influence their lives on a daily basis. Most of the men and women of the Patriot movement believe that the Federal Personal Income Tax Law (the Sixteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution) and the application of the tax through the Internal Revenue Service are unconstitutional. The Federal Reserve Banking System is also challenged regarding its constitutionality. Many believe that a vast conspiracy is underway to establish a “new world order.” Author Michael William Haga provides a glimpse of this mindset in Taking Back America: Are there different levels of conspirators? Are there people who control and others who simply collaborate without even knowing, half the time that they are collaborating with a conspiracy? Although some theories are delusional, it’s also just as much of a mistake to brand all theories about any conspiracy as being delusional. For example: The Federal Reserve Banking System was created at a secret meeting among Congressmen and bankers at Jekyll Island, Georgia, in 1913. It wasn’t a plan to save the United States banking system, it was a plan to consolidate power, monetary power, in the hands of a few bankers. They did it secretly. It was a conspiracy. And it affects us to this very day.76 For many, if not most, Patriots, the government is not to be trusted. This charge is directed primarily at the federal government but includes state and local governments. The idea of a world government, such as one run by the United Nations, is anathema to the Patriot. During 1991, President George H.W. Bush made a speech discussing “the new world order.” Insofar as the Patriot movement was concerned, he might as well have said that the apocalypse was beginning the following week. A gauntlet had been thrown down by a casual reference to what President Bush considered a better world. Patriot movement members believe the government of the United States no longer represents the people’s interests and has become increasingly intrusive in private and business matters. According to some supporters, law enforcement officers have gone too far and are, in fact, state terrorists. Many Patriots continue to recognize only elected sheriffs and their deputies as constitutional law enforcement officers. Likewise, the Patriot membership does not recognize many of the federal and state courts. In response to these beliefs, the movement has created 282

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its own court system, known as the common law court. Mirroring the courts of state and federal governments, the common law court issues its own subpoenas, facilitates court proceedings, and issues judgments. However, the verdicts are clearly unbinding. Further, some common law adherents have misled county officials and had liens placed on properties owned by individuals who have been successfully “sued” in these pseudo-courts. As well, because they believe in the legitimacy of their own system, common law adherents have been violently confrontational to state and local law enforcement officials when subjected to traffic stops or in the routine service of warrants. Additionally, there have been ideological confrontations with members of the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is considered to be a “shadow government,” with citizen prisons located on military reservations.

9.6.8 Inspiration, Leaderless Resistance, Phantom Cell, and the Lone Wolf Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss, a former U.S. intelligence officer with the OSS and CIA, is credited with coining the term “leaderless resistance” or the “phantom cell” in the 1950s and 1960s. An anti-Communist, Amoss saw leaderless resistance as a way to prevent the penetration and destruction of CIA-supported resistance cells in Eastern European countries under Soviet control.77 According to Amoss: [W]e do not need “leaders”; we need leading ideas. These ideas would produce leaders. The masses would produce them, and the ideas would be their inspiration. Therefore, we must create these ideas and convey them to the restless peoples concerned with them. In 1961 leaflets were airdropped over Cuba by anti-Castro Cuban exiles and their allies with close ties to the Central Intelligence Agency. The leaflets used the concept of leaderless resistance and called for the creation of “phantom cells.”78 Louis Beam, a Vietnam War veteran, became Grand Dragon of the Texas Ku Klux Klan during the 1980s. Considered an intellectual of the white supremacist movement, Beam studied the right-wing terror organizations that had failed or were harmed by law enforcement and United States Justice Department efforts. He soon realized that the large bureaucracy of an organization such as the Ku Klux Klan of the 1960s and 1970s was itself a weakness. Too many Klansmen were privy to confidential knowledge of criminality, and infiltration by undercover operatives was relatively easy. Individual Klan units had sought various solutions to this problem. For example, the Mississippi White Knights of the KKK had a specialty unit called the “wrecking crew.” This unit was separated from the normal Klan organization. Beam expanded the initial concept. He proposed the creation of a “leaderless cell” network where individuals would take their inspiration, but not their orders, from leaders in the movement. Each cell would act independently, without knowing the identity of individuals in other cells. These cells would be invisible for the large part and answerable to few, if any, individuals. The leaderless resistance concept is not limited to white supremacists. Indeed, eco-terrorists and international groups have employed this structure. Another term that has been used to describe this concept is “phantom cells.” Closely related to this notion is the concept of the “lone wolf,” which denotes an individual who acts totally on his or her own. Many things drive radical ideas and individuals and groups to radical action. Two of the major events that have most recently inspired the radical actions of some have been the Randy Weaver and Waco sieges. Introduction to Homeland Security

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In August 1992, Randy Weaver, a United States Army veteran, and his family were engaged in an 11-day standoff with federal law enforcement agents. Weaver had been targeted in a federal firearms-related violation investigation in which he was accused of selling a shortbarreled shotgun. After his arrest, Weaver was approached to serve as a federal informant. Weaver refused to serve as an informant and chose not to appear in court on firearms-related charges in 1991. Subsequently, an unsuccessful operation to arrest Weaver led to the death of his 14-year-old son and a U.S. marshal. It also precipitated the standoff. During the standoff, Weaver and a friend were shot and wounded. An FBI sniper also shot and killed Weaver’s wife, Vicki.79 On February 28, 1993, an unsuccessful attempt by ATF agents to arrest the Branch Davidian sect’s leader, David Koresh, initiated a 51-day siege near Waco, Texas. Koresh was wanted on suspicion of federal firearms and explosives violations. Four ATF agents and six Branch Davidians died in a gunfight during the operation. Protracted discussions followed between federal negotiators and Koresh. These failed. On April 19, federal agents assaulted the Davidian compound, which caught on fire. At least 75 Branch Davidians perished in the assault. The sieges of the Weaver home and the Branch Davidian compound stimulated many on the radical right, including the militia and sovereignty movements.80 Eric Rudolph (Figure 9.6) is a good example of a “lone wolf.” During the 1990s, he bombed abortion centers and set off a bomb at the Atlanta Olympics. Rudolph operated alone and independently. Once he began his terrorist activities, he ceased using credit cards, bank accounts, and his social security number. Instead, he paid his rent and other bills with cash

Figure 9.6 Images of Eric Rudolph. (Source: FBI)

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or a money order. In essence, he rejected the political values of America. This rejection is sometimes referred to as “severation.” This term was first used by the tax protesters of Posse Comitatus as a plan to “retire from America.” Acting and living by himself, Rudolph was able to evade capture for many years despite a massive manhunt by the FBI. His survivalist skills and his lack of communications with outsiders made him difficult to apprehend. Despite his lone-wolf status, Rudolph claimed that he carried out his acts on behalf of the “Army of God.” This entity is a shadowy, anti-abortion movement that follows the tenets of leaderless resistance. Although the true motivation for his crimes remains unknown, Rudolph had an extended exposure to bloodline identity.81 Another example of leaderless resistance may be found in the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building by Timothy McVeigh. (See Figure 3.10.) McVeigh was a former Army enlisted man who claimed he was “radicalized” by the government actions at Ruby Ridge in 1992 and Waco in 1993; in both those incidents, individuals died after standoffs with the federal government. On the morning of April 19, 1995, McVeigh parked a rented truck, loaded with approximately 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate and motor racing fuel, in front of the federal building. Shortly after 9:00 a.m., his homemade bomb exploded, obliterating the front of the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City and killing 168 people. (See Figures 2.12a and b.) McVeigh was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death, and his associates, Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier, were convicted of assisting him in the plot. McVeigh remains the only United States citizen to be executed for domestic terrorism by the federal government in the modern era.82 Former FBI Agent Mike German, who spent years undercover with white supremacist groups, cautions that even lone wolves may receive assistance and support from others. German notes: Tim McVeigh seemed able to find a militia meeting wherever he went. He was linked to militia groups in Arizona and Michigan, white supremacist groups in Oklahoma and Missouri, and at gun shows he sold copies of The Turner Diaries, a racist novel written by the founder of a neo-Nazi organization. No one finds such groups by accident.83 The notions of leaderless resistance and lone wolf actors are both deadly and dangerous. These methods provide an effective means by which a variety of organizations can perpetrate acts of terror without detection. Because of these basic tenets, terrorist entities need not be large or require a large quantity of resources to cause significant damage.

9.6.9 Right to Life: Revolutionary Reaction to Abortion In 1973, the United States Supreme Court legalized abortion in the Roe v. Wade decision. Almost immediately, groups and individuals started protesting the decision. Recently, a movement calling itself the “Army of God” emerged with a mandate to violently oppose abortion. This mandate included the assassination of doctors and the bombing of clinics. Although two different groups claim the title “Army of God,” or “Soldiers of God,” the first is a pro-life group established to stop abortion, and the second is the name that some in the Christian Identity movement have given to themselves. The Christian Identity movement represents an amalgamation of white supremacy groups and those that adhere to ideologies of anti-Semitism.84 Although both these groups occasionally target abortion centers, they perpetrate attacks for different reasons. Introduction to Homeland Security

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The Christian Identity members believe that abortion is racial treason because white children are aborted in numbers greater than those of other races. The Army of God members oppose all abortions for any reason. Sometimes, the movement is called “anti-choice.” The Army of God was most active during the 1980s, indicated by the frequent bombings of abortion clinics throughout the United States. During the mid-1990s, support for the group began to grow exponentially because increasing numbers of Americans objected to abortion. The Army of God has an active website, and it publishes a manual containing instructions for the sabotage, arson, or bombing of abortion clinics. Operating in the shadowy network of the right-wing underground, they are anti-government to the degree that they believe that any government authorizing the murder of innocent children does not have the right to exist. Two examples of Army of God “warriors” include Eric Rudolph and Paul Hill. On July 29, 1994, Hill killed three people, including an abortion doctor, at a clinic in Pensacola, Florida.85

9.6.10 Other Organizations That Pose a Domestic Threat 9.6.10.1 Narco-Terrorist Groups along the U.S. Border Mexico has experienced a dramatic increase in violence and crime in the years since 2006. Much of the violence is related to competition between drug cartels for market share of the profitable drug trade. However, drug cartels and the drug trade existed before this dramatic increase of violence of the 2000s. The drug market moved from Colombia to Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Colombian cartels were slowly dismantled by the collaboration between U.S. and Colombian authorities. Contemporary drug cartels are heavily armed with military weapons that overwhelm Mexican authorities. The tactics, strategy, organization, and even (to a limited extent) the goals of the Mexican drug cartels are all perfectly consistent with those of recognized terrorist organizations. The United States’ war on drugs has not only resulted in greater violence in Mexico; it may also make Mexico’s transition to consolidated democracy very difficult. Many of the Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have developed alliances with American street gangs and other members of organized crime. This has resulted in the Mexican DTOs developing an operational base inside the United States in larger American cities. This base facilitates their drug and human trafficking operations into the United States while it also allows the Mexican DTOs to obtain weapons and stolen cars to smuggle to Mexico.86

9.7 The Radical Left: Ecological and Animal Rights Ecological militants are “single issue” terrorists. Many such groups exist, one of which involves eco-terrorism. The goal of eco-terrorism is to preserve the environment through direct action and engage in activities to protect biological and ecological diversity. Domestic ecological terror is primarily focused on preserving the environment and protecting animal life. The two primary groups who practice eco-terrorism today are the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), both of which are labeled terrorist groups by the FBI. According to Best and Nocella, the ELF was formed in 1992 in England.87 During 2001, the FBI added ELF to its domestic terrorist list because it was involved in militant criminal activities. A prime example of ELF’s activities is their attack on a ski resort near Vail, Colorado, which caused $12 million in damage.88 ELF opposes oil drilling, the timber industry, genetic 286

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research, and the development of recreation and housing construction sites. Their attack on the ski resort occurred because it encroached on the habitat of the Canadian lynx. Like ELF, ALF was also formed in England. However, ALF can trace its philosophical roots at least as far back as the nineteenth century, when a group that called itself the Band of Mercy formed to oppose fox hunting. During the 1970s, the Band of Mercy was resurrected to oppose fox hunting. However, the scope of the group began to expand to include opposition to medical research involving animals. Around 1976, Ronnie Lee, a member of the Band of Mercy, founded the spinoff group ALF. Within a short period of time, ALF activities, which include damaging animal research laboratories, releasing animals from farms and ranches, and attacking private meat packing plants, began to occur throughout the United States.89 ELF and ALF, as well as groups like them, commonly use property damage and vandalism to further their cause. Both ALF and ELF have proven to be elusive adversaries for law enforcement. Because individuals act on their own initiative without direct guidance from higher officials (a practice termed “leaderless resistance”), it has been quite difficult to infiltrate and investigate these groups. Given their close ties and willingness to work together, there is debate about whether ALF and ELF, in fact, represent two separate entities or are one and the same. As stated in a 2006 article by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “In 2004, [it was] estimated that ELF, ALF, and related extremist groups had committed more than 1,100 criminal acts since 1976 with damage estimates over $100 million.” Despite this success, the FBI terms eco-terrorists and animal rights extremists as “one of the most serious domestic terrorism threats in the U.S. today.”90 According to the FBI, individuals involved in these activities are especially dangerous given the huge volume of the crimes they commit, their large economic impact, and the wide range of victims affected. The FBI is also worried about what it calls the increasingly violent rhetoric and tactics demonstrated by eco-extremists.91 The violence perpetrated by these groups is varied. The targets of ALF have included research laboratories at the University of California at Los Angeles and employees of the New York Stock Exchange.92 Other ALF targets were located at the University of Minnesota and the University of California at San Francisco.93 The financial impact of these attacks was in the millions of dollars. According to Joosse, eco-terrorist groups attempt to strategically leverage leaderless resistance to “avoid state detection, infiltration, and prosecution by powerful government agencies” during the course of their terrorist activities.94 Walsh and Ellis indicate that both the ALF and the ELF share the strategy of leaderless resistance and have “close ties” regarding agendas and ideological tenets.95 According to Leader and Probst, the eco-terror events of both the ALF and the ELF “have been perpetrated in virtually every region of the US against a wide variety of targets.” Further, Leader and Probst indicate that, during 1993, the ELF and the ALF declared “solidarity” and that increasing amounts of “convergence of leadership, membership, agendas and funding” have occurred between these organizations.96 The global and international aspects of the ALF are considerable and demonstrate terror incidents in a variety of nations. Flükiger describes ALF attacks in Germany and Switzerland involving the use of arson97 while Marris and Simonite document ALF movements, organizations, and events in nations including the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States.98 The ELF also demonstrates a history of ecoterrorism and violence. According to Leader and Probst, during 1992, the ELF originated in the United Kingdom (Brighton, England) and was a derivative of the “activist environmental group, ‘Earth First!’ who believed criminal acts would better advance their environmentalist agenda than would legal protest.”99 Further, Leader and Probst indicate that the “American Introduction to Homeland Security

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branch announced its creation in October 1996 with an arson attack on a U.S. Forest Service truck in Oregon’s Willamette National Forest.”100 Perlstein acknowledges a paradigm shift over time regarding the types of targets selected by the ELF, which demonstrates a change from rural settings (e.g., farms, crops, etc.) to urban settings (e.g., apartment complexes, warehouses, etc.).101 These instantiations of the ELF demonstrated its organizational tenets of “direct action and revolutionary violence.”102 According to the ELF literature, a goal of its ideology is to “defend and protect the Earth for future generations by means of direct actions,” using tactics that were manifested by its predecessor eco-terrorist entities (e.g., Environmental Life Force) that involved the use of “eco-guerilla” tactics.103 The ELF manifests “small cells consisting of anywhere from one to several people without a central command structure,” maintains the anonymity of its members through such cells, and “one cell does not know the members or plan of another cell.” This organizational structuring, using leaderless resistance, increases the difficulties of law enforcement when attempting to infiltrate “cells.”104 The targets of the ELF are also varied. They range from Colorado ski resort to a car dealership in California that sold sport utility vehicles. Additional targets of the ELF have included research laboratories and logging corporations.105 Two examples of such activities are perpetrating arson at a meat-packaging facility in Oregon and an act of arson at Michigan State University.106 The financial damages of such terrorist acts also range in the millions of dollars.107 Similar to the ALF, the activities and ideologies of the ELF are not constrained solely to the United States and are pervasive among nations. The activities of ELF have also been observed in England, Scotland, and Canada and also in international waters.

9.7.1 Antifa and the Return of the Anarchist Movement Due to the very nature of Anarchist movement, Anarchists are not prone to being involved in large, complex organizations. Anarchists are more prone to being involved in small groups or acting as individual lone wolves in their hatred of the establishment. Antifa is no exception, although Antifa arguably has the deepest historical roots of any of the Anarchist groups in existence today. The Antifa movement is a conglomeration of autonomous left-wing, militant anti-fascist groups. There is no central Antifa headquarters or leadership structure. Antifa began in Germany somewhere between 1929 and 1932 in direct response to the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. They originally had several names, including Antifaschistische Ausschusse and Antifaschistische Komitees, which developed into Antifaschistische Aktion, or Antifa for short.108 The Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) allied with the fledgling Antifa movement and fought NSDAP Sturmabteilung (Nazi Stormtroopers or Brown Shirts) for control of the streets and the politics of Weimar Republic Germany.109,110 They were street brawlers who thought that they could advance their political ideas through direst physical confrontation and rioting with the Nazis. The activities of both the KPD and Antifa were brutally suppressed after the Nazi victories in the German elections that resulted in the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor by President Paul von Hindenburg in 1933. The Antifa movement spread to Great Britain in the 1930s as a response to Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists. The most notable anti-fascist action by Antifa in the United Kingdom was on October 4, 1936, when thousands rioted in London’s East End to prevent a march by Mosley’s BUF members in what became known as the Battle of Cable Street. The start of World War II in 1939 meant the end of the BUF.111 288

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After World War II, Antifa resurfaced and took reprisal actions against former Nazis. They were supported by the KPD and allowed to operate by the occupying forces for a time. The Allied bans on political organizations and the start of the Cold War sidelined both Antifa and the KPD, which was replaced by a Soviet-approved Communist Party in the Democratic Republic of Germany, or East Germany, by 1948.112 The Antifa movement began a revival in Europe after skinheads began to appear in Great Britain in the 1960s and 70s. The Antifa movement revived in Germany in the 1980s during the squatter scene and autonomist movements in the 1980s.113 The BBC reported that: Like other protest movements dating back to Cold War era West German anarchists, Antifa supporters will often dress all in black, sometimes covering their faces with masks or helmets so they can’t be identified by opposing groups or the police. It’s an intimidating tactic—known as a “black bloc”—which also allows them to move together as one anonymous group. There are also offshoots—one Antifa group in Oregon said they also have a “snack bloc” of people who provide food and water for their allies during protests.114 The BBC described the tactics of Antifa as follows: Antifa look to disrupt alt-right events and far-right speakers. They use a variety of tactics to do this—including shouting and chanting and forming human chains to block off right-wing demonstrators. Some are unapologetic about their online tactics, which include monitoring the far right on social media. They also release personal information about their opponents online, commonly known as “doxxing”—they’ve gotten some alt-right supporters fired from their jobs after identifying them online.115 Antifa seems to have come to the United States with the skinhead movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Mark Bray credits the Anti-Racist Action (ARA) group (1987–2013) as being one of the predecessors of Antifa in the United States.116 The Antifa groups in the United States are usually very left wing in their politics. Bray notes that “Some antifa groups are more Marxist while others are more anarchist or anti-authoritarian.”117 There is no central leadership or organization. However, many individual Antifa members or groups will travel across the United States to participate in political protests and confrontations with what they believe to be neo-Nazi or alt-right groups. Violence in an accepted tactic in these demonstrations. Thus, like their forebears in the Germany of the 1920s and 1930s, the modern Antifa are political street brawlers. Other anarchist-like groups such as the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement have sprung up but have had only limited success.

9.8 Major Law Enforcement Agencies Battling Terrorism and Hate 9.8.1 Federal Agencies The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially list domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist Introduction to Homeland Security

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“threats.” These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and anti-abortion beliefs.118 The FBI and DHS have recently popularized the phrase “homegrown violent extremist.” It separates domestic terrorists from U.S.-based terrorists motivated by the ideologies of foreign terrorist organizations. According to DHS and the FBI, a “homegrown violent extremist” is a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.

9.8.2 State, Local, and Tribal Agencies The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has fully understood the necessity of integrating its policies, practices, and procedures into state, local, and tribal jurisdictions, the obvious rationale being the danger posed by both domestic threat groups and international terrorists. As duly noted in 2011, Los Angeles Deputy Police Chief Michael P. Downing included “black separatists, white supremacist/sovereign citizen extremists, and animal rights terrorists” among his chief counterterrorism concerns.119 Although the federal government maintains a plethora of law enforcement agencies, such resources cannot take on and operate the functions of state, local, and tribal agencies (SLTA). During its evolution process, DHS fully recognized and acknowledged within its sphere of influence the shared responsibilities it has with SLTA. With respect to the diversity of roles and resources, the federal government and SLTA must remain decentralized but progressively interoperable. Thus, in an effort to create a synergistic landscape of operability between DHS and SLTA, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which mandated the following: The Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic incident management. Initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authorities. The Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State and local governments to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities. The Secretary will also provide assistance to State and local governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities, including those of greatest importance to the security of the United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal plans are compatible.120 Subsequently, with the development of DHS, the objective remained to apply the recommendations within HSPD-5 in a collaborative and integrative manner that would complement the autonomy of SLTA but also provide the continuity necessary to apply the homeland security initiatives. Thereafter, DHS created the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government 290

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Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC), which sought SLTA membership based on the following requirements: • A state, local, tribal, or territorial homeland security director or equivalent with relevant programmatic planning and operational responsibilities; • Accountable for the development, improvement, and maintenance of critical infrastructure protection policies or programs at the state, local, and tribal level; • Recognized among his or her peers as a leader; and • Committed to acting as a national representative regarding homeland security practices relevant to states and localities.121 More often than not, the federal system takes the lead by creating laws, regulations, and policies. Invariably, the crutch to successful implementation remains in the hands of the states and localities, which must cooperate and operate by adopting policies and practices consistent with, and equivalent to, the principles of homeland security directives within the operational guidelines of DHS. Shortly after the events of 9/11, every state created its own Office of Homeland Security in an effort to be as prepared as possible for terrorist attacks as well as to monitor and manage domestic threat groups. Basically, the governor of each state was responsible for the creation of its Office of Homeland Security and designated an individual to provide the leadership to create the organizational structure necessary to protect a state’s infrastructure by coordinating the various needs, resources, and operations of the state emergency management office, various state agencies (law enforcement, health, public safety functions), local governments, the private sector, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and the federal government.122 Most state homeland security offices are organized to include an advisory panel consisting of various agencies so that there is constructive and proactive collaboration and communication regarding preparation and response. In addition, some states have also fully integrated into their homeland security design other existing agencies such as the National Guard and specialized task forces like the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and data fusion centers in regional and major metropolitan areas for the primary purpose of maintaining a unified effort to report, track, access, and analyze intelligence and other information deemed relevant to the mission of homeland security.123 With respect to the local level, the operational integration is of equal importance and just as necessary to promote and maintain the objectives and strategic initiatives of the federal and state entities. Given the complexities of working within the scope of the federal and state nexus, local governments have either on their own initiative or through state-mandated guidelines become fully integrated into the collaborative operational demands of the federal and state levels. As of now, there remains very few, if any, organizational boundaries regarding homeland security operations. For example, in an effort to develop and maintain efficient operability, many states have restructured their homeland security operations by creating regional operational programs to include the following objectives: • Develop county task forces; • Develop regional counterterrorism task forces; • Integrate federal/state/local response; • Institutionalize mutual aid in the region; • Establish standing regional response groups; and • Encourage and develop regional networking.124 Introduction to Homeland Security

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Such regional design is a geographical composition of local, state, and federal agencies, which share a working operation within a specific part of the state. Included in the scope of such a regional structure and depending on availability, a regional homeland security program may consist of state and local agencies that partner with such federal entities as the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Environmental Health and Protection Agency; the Drug Enforcement Agency; and the United States Marshals.125

9.9 Nongovernmental Agencies Battling Terrorism and Hate While most Americans expect federal law enforcement officials in the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BAFTE) to protect the nation from both foreign and domestic terrorists, there are some American groups that have remarkably impacted hate crimes, anti-Semitism, and direct violence against minorities. These groups include the Southern Poverty Law Center, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Anti-Defamation League.

9.9.1 Southern Poverty Law Center This Montgomery, Alabama–based organization has had significant success in dealing with radical, racist, and terrorist groups. Perhaps more than any other agency, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) has protected the weak and oppressed. Using the federal statute known as the RICO (Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations) Act, it has taken many radical organizations to civil court, recovering buildings, grounds, bank accounts, and many other assets for their clients. The Southern Poverty Law Center office building was formerly the United Klans of America headquarters. The building was seized by the federal court as the result of a lawsuit against that Klan chapter. The SPLC has its own intelligence arm that tracks hate groups across the country. Their intelligence reports have aided law enforcement officials and district attorneys all across the United States, giving them the background they needed on particular groups and individuals. Although this function is representative of the modern SPLC mission, the SPLC historically championed civil rights causes. According to the SPLC (2021), “[I]t has dismantled institutional racism in the South, reformed juvenile justice practices, shattered barriers to equality for women, children and the disabled, and protected low-wage immigrant workers from abuse.” Further accomplishments include eliminating “some of the nation’s most dangerous hate groups by winning crushing, multimillion-dollar jury verdicts on behalf of their victims.” According to the SPLC, examples of these victories include the following court cases: Keenan v. Aryan Nations: Victoria and Jason Keenan were chased and shot at by members of the Aryan Nations in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. Held at gunpoint, the mother and son feared for their lives. The Center sued and obtained a $6.3 million jury verdict; Aryan Nations was forced to turn its compound over to the victims it had terrorized.126 Macedonia v. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan: On a summer evening in 1995, members of the Christian Knights of the KKK set a fire, completely destroying a 100-year-old black Baptist church in South Carolina. The Center sued the Klan on the church’s behalf, winning the largest judgment ever awarded against a hate group.127 292

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Mansfield v. Church of the Creator: For killing an African American Gulf War veteran, a white supremacist “reverend” received an award of honor from the leaders of the racist Church of the Creator (COTC). In the wake of this horrible crime, the Center sued the COTC for inciting violence against African Americans.128 The SPLC also monitors active hate groups within the domestic United States. According to the SPLC, during 2012, it tracked the activities of 1,007 hate groups. The SPLC disseminates its findings publicly via the use of an online interactive map that delineates the geographical locations and activities of its monitored groups. Such tools provide the public with information regarding the activities of hate organizations within their locales. This monitoring provides law enforcement with demographic information that is necessary for the combating of these organizations. Further, the SPLC pursues lawsuits against such organizations for the purpose of destroying “networks of radical extremists.”129 In 2019, amid a shakeup of leadership of the organization, some of its data pertaining to hate groups came into question, especially its information on the strength of the KKK in the United States.

9.9.2 The Anti-Defamation League The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) was established to protect the interests of Jewish people, who were often discriminated against in unlawful ways. The ADL, like the Southern Poverty Law Center, is always ready to consider lawsuits against those who would discriminate or attack members of the Jewish community. The ADL has an excellent intelligence division, and it issues a quarterly news report alerting its membership to civil or criminal dangers. The ADL serves a variety of purposes. According to the ADL, its mission involves the following functions: • Scrutinizes and exposes extremists and hate groups; • Monitors hate on the internet; • Provides expertise on domestic and international terrorism; • Probes the roots of hatred; • Develops and delivers educational programs; • Fosters interfaith/intergroup relations; and • Mobilizes communities to stand up against bigotry.130 The consistent performance of these functions provides the ADL with a strong basis for effectively combating a variety of terrorist actions and other crimes that impact American society. The ADL maintains and operates the Center on Extremism, which exposes and documents the “groups and individuals whose ideologies and activities perpetuate hatred and extremism.” This function contributes to the diminishing of criminal activity in America and the raising of awareness regarding such entities within U.S. society. The ADL tracks the primary extremist groups that impact American society. Each synopsis contains discussions regarding the recent known activities of various extremist organizations, discussions of ideology, leadership characteristics, known affiliations, organizational tactics, and organizational history. The ADL does not monitor any specific type of extremism. Instead, it monitors a variety of categories ranging from the activities of the Aryan Nations and the New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense to the activities of the National Socialist Movement and the Little Shell Pembina Movement. Introduction to Homeland Security

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The ADL also enjoys a strong relationship with law enforcement entities. In the state of California, the ADL provides training for the San Bernardino County and Kern County law enforcement personnel. This training encompasses the “distinction between hate crimes and hate incidents, identifying and recognizing hate motivated behavior, the California white power subculture and recognizing hate symbols.” Additional law enforcement relationships include the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the California Highway Patrol, and the Bureau of Land Management.131

9.9.3 American Civil Liberties Union The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sees itself as a champion of the Constitution. Through the years, it has staunchly defended the rights of free speech, even for unpopular groups like the neo-Nazis. The ACLU also has developed intelligence databases, which they have provided to public authorities when appropriate. The ACLU also publishes intelligence reports and gives information to the public about entrenched domestic radical groups seeking to limit the activities of others and to use violence. The domain of the ACLU is not limited solely to terrorism; they champion a variety of issues. Examples include voting rights, human rights, capital punishment, prisoners’ rights, drug law reform, and women’s rights. Regardless of the issue considered, the ACLU provides a myriad of information outlets through which it facilitates public awareness of sensitive issues that impact American society. Historically, privacy was a primary issue considered by the ACLU. Given the proliferation of anti-terrorism and counterterrorism activities mandated by the U.S. government, the privacy aspects of the liberty-versus-security argument remain salient ACLU issues. During the time of the authorship of this textbook, American airports are implementing full-body X-ray scanners as a method of dissuading crime and terrorism. A variety of arguments indicates that these full-body scans are unacceptably perverse invasions of privacy. Arguments also involve the dangers of these scanners regarding the potential of contributing to the development of cancer, the diminishing of human reproductive potential, the developing of cataracts and impaired vision, and other health concerns. Although such scanning systems are preventive measures to thwart the potential of unwanted items entering an aircraft, they are controversial with respect to the liberty-versus-privacy argument. At present, the ACLU is collecting data to “determine the scope of this problem and evaluate future action” of scanning technologies. Although these technologies have had limited use within the United States, their use among other nations has sparked vigorous debates regarding the basic premise of security versus liberty. In the United States, the ACLU has not announced any actions or positions regarding the implementation of these scanning systems. The ACLU has been a controversial organization historically. During modern times, its challenges to homeland and national security efforts have incited much debate within the legal system. Currently, the ACLU is challenging the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008. According to the ACLU (2021), [T]his controversial piece of legislation not only effectively legalized the secret warrantless surveillance program that President Bush had authorized in late 2001, it gave the NSA new power to conduct dragnet surveillance of Americans’ international telephone calls and e-mails en masse, without a warrant, without suspicion of any kind, and with only very limited judicial oversight. 294

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The ACLU pursued a lawsuit to “enforce a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records related to government agencies’ implementation of the invasive FAA surveillance power” with respect to “information about how the FAA spying power is being interpreted and used, how many Americans are affected, and what safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of Americans’ privacy rights.” Further, the ACLU is currently challenging the constitutionality of the FAA.132

9.10 Chapter Summary As we have seen, terrorists are typically driven by particular ideologies. In this respect, domestic terrorists are a widely divergent lot, drawing from a broad array of philosophies and worldviews. Over the years, the nation has witnessed terrorism from both the left and the right. While left-wing groups such as the Weather Underground and Symbionese Liberation Army no longer exist, other entities, like ALF and ELF, have taken their place. The 1980s and 1990s saw a resurgence of groups on the radical right. In some instances, these groups have engaged in acts of terror and murder. As well, single-issue groups, such as the anti-abortion Army of God, escalated their use of violence to include assassination and bombing. In addition, the Patriot and militia movements emerged to protect America from what was perceived to be an impending takeover by hostile foreign interests and domestic traitors. Although domestic terrorism has fallen from the radar screens of many, replaced by the alltoo-real danger of international entities like al-Qaeda, many experts fear that current realities, including an economic crisis, runaway illegal immigration, and the fear of massive gun control, could easily inspire the movement. Domestic terrorism is a bona fide threat within the United States. Recent American history records the horrific results of this reality. The strength of American society is its freedom to pursue life, liberty, and happiness. This open lifestyle is also its greatest vulnerability, one that has been exploited over the years and will be exploited again.

9.11 Key Terms Anarchist Animal Rights Movement Aryan Movement Black Separatist Domestic Terrorism Earth First Ecological Group Extremism Greenpeace

Ku Klux Klan Militia Act of 1903 Neo-Nazi People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals Radical Right Skinheads Sovereign Citizen Terrorism Threat Group

9.12 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. This chapter introduced a variety of domestic threat groups. However, several others exist. Perform some research, and write a brief essay highlighting the characteristics of a domestic threat group that was not discussed herein. Introduction to Homeland Security

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2. Examine the actions of the domestic threat groups discussed herein. Based on your research, do you believe their activities are increasing, decreasing, or remaining static? Why? Write a brief essay that substantiates your response. 3. Although this chapter discussed Timothy McVeigh’s actions, several others also exhibited aberrant behavior in favor of domestic terrorism. Identify five others who endangered American society domestically. Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. 4. A plethora of domestic threat groups exist. How do you believe their messages may be mitigated and recruiting reduced? Write a brief essay to justify your opinion.

Notes

1. Etter, G. (2008). Prosecuting domestic terrorists in the American court system: A study of three cases. The Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies, 8.p. 99. 2. Malvo. (2006). Malvo takes the stand in beltway sniper trial. FOX News. Retrieved November 14, 2010, from www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196606,00.html. 3. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2002). Congressional Testimony of James F. Jarboe: The Threat of EcoTerrorism. Retrieved March 15, 2009, from www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm. 4. Martin, G. (2010). Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, 3rd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing, p. G-22. 5. Gerstenfeld, P. (2010). Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls, and Controversies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing, pp. 143–151. 6. Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Reville, R., and Kasupski, A. (2005). Trends in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Management Act. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, p . 47. 7. Bennett, B. (2007). Understanding, Assessing, and Responding to Terrorism: Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Personnel. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing, p. 45. 8. Hall, L. (2009). Disaggregating the scare from the greens. Vermont Law Review, 33(4), 689. 9. Ibid, 690. 10. Jackson, B., Baker, J., Cragin, K., Parachini, J., Trujillo, H., and Chalk, P. (2005). Aptitude for Destruction: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, p. 142. 11. Deshpande, N. (2009). Pyro-terrorism: Recent cases and the potential for proliferation. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(1), 36–44. 12. Walsh, A., and Ellis, L. (2007). Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing, p. 357. 13. Hall, L. (2009). Disaggregating the scare from the greens. Vermont Law Review, 33(4). 14. Alexander, D. (2004). Business Confronts Terrorism: Risks and Responses. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, p. 24. 15. United States v. Burr, 4 Cr. (8U.S.) 469 (1807) 16. Etter, G. (2008). Prosecuting domestic terrorists in the American court system: A study of three cases. The Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies, 8. pp. 99–119. 17. Ibid. 18. Kumamoto, R. (2014). The Historical Origins of Terrorism in America 1644–1880. New York: Routledge. 19. McCann, J. (2006). Terrorism on American soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Feinman, R. (2015). Assassinations, Threats, and the American Presidency: From Andrew Jackson to Barack Obama. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 23. McCann, J. (2006). Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications. 24. Ibid. 25. Gage, B. (2009). The Day Wall Street Exploded: A History of America in its First Age of Terror. New York: Oxford University Press. 26. Martinez, J.M. (2012). Terrorist Attacks on American Soil: From the Civil War Era to the Present. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Litchfield.

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27. McCann, J. (2006). Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications. 28. Feinman, R. (2015). Assassinations, Threats, and the American Presidency: From Andrew Jackson to Barack Obama. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 29. Ibid. 30. McCann, J. (2006). Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications. 31. Martinez, J.M. (2012). Terrorist Attacks on American Soil: From the Civil War Era to the Present. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Litchfield. 32. Burrough, B. (2015). Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age. New York: Penguin Press. 33. Eastland et al. (1976). Terroristic activity: interlocks between communism and terrorism. In Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. Washington D.C.: GPO. 34. Martinez, J.M. (2012). Terrorist Attacks on American Soil: From the Civil War Era to the Present. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Litchfield. 35. Burrough, B. (2015). Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age. New York: Penguin Press. 36. FBI. (2018). History: Weather Underground Bombings. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from www.fbi. gov/history/famous-cases/weather-underground-bombings. 37. Harris, J. (1987). Domestic terrorism in the 1980s. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56(11), pp. 5–13. 38. Burrough, B. (2015). Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age. New York: Penguin Press. 39. Baruch, R., Jones, P., and Cleaver, K. (2002). Black Panthers 1968 Los Angeles: Greybull Press. 40. Pearson, H. (1996). The Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the Price of Black Power in America. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing. 41. Ibid. 42. Eastland et al. (1976). Terroristic Activity: Interlocks Between Communism and Terrorism. Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. Washington D.C.: GPO. 43. Burrough, B. (2015). Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age. New York: Penguin Press. 44. Harris, J. (1987). Domestic Terrorism in the 1980’s. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56(11), 5–13. 45. Burrough, B. (2015). Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age. New York: Penguin Press. 46. Eastland et al. (1976). Terroristic activity: Interlocks between communism and terrorism. In Hearing Security Act and Other Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Internal Security Laws. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 47. Burrough, B. (2015). Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age. New York: Penguin Press. 48. Harris, J. (1987). Domestic Terrorism in the 1980s. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56(11), 5–13. 49. Burrough, B. (2015). Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, The FBI, and the Forgotten Age. New York: Penguin Press. 50. Harris, J. (1987). Domestic Terrorism in the 1980s. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56(11), 5–13. 51. German, M. (2005, June 5). Behind the lone terrorist, a pack mentality. Washington Post, p. B01. 52. Bolden M., Raymer, G., and Whamond, J. (2001). Domestic Terrorism and Incident Management. Springfield, IL: Thomas Publisher, Ltd, p. 15. 53. Bolden M., Raymer, G., and Whamond, J. (2001). Domestic Terrorism and Incident Management. Springfield, IL: Thomas Publisher, Ltd. 54. Ibid. 55. The Various Shady Lives of the Ku Klux Klan. (1965). Time Magazine. Retrieved March 21, 2009, from www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,898581-3,00.html. 56. Lay, S. (2005). Ku Klux Klan in the Twentieth Century. Retrieved March 21, 2009, from www.georgiaen cyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-2730. 57. Etter, G.; McElreath, D., and Quarles, C. (2005, Spring) The Ku Klux Klan: Evolution Towards Revolution. Journal of Gang Research, 12(3). 58. Ku Klux Klan. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved January 23, 2013, from www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan#.UYB8lsryCSo.

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59. German-American Bund. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved April 30, 2013, from www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/230640/German-American-Bund. 60. Clark, C. S. Death of an Arlington Nazi. North Virginia Magazine. Retrieved January 23, 2013, from www.northernvirginiamag.com/entertainment/entertainment-features/2010/12/30/death-of-anarlington-nazi/. 61. McDonald, A. (1980). The Turner Diaries, 2nd edition. Arlington, VA: National Vanguard Books. 62. Ibid. 63. White Supremacist Richard Butler Dies. (2004, September 9). The Washington Post, p B05. Retrieved January 23, 2013, from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6967-2004Sep8.html. 64. Aryan Brotherhood. Retrieved April 30, 2013, from www.prisonoffenders.com/aryan_brotherhood.html. 65. Domestic Terrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/april/sovereigncitizens_041310/ domestic-terrorism-the-sovereign-citizen-movement. 66. Bjelopera, J. P. (2013, January 17). The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved February 22, 2013, from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf. 67. Levitas, D. (2002). The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 68. Hegeman, R., and Andres, C. (2019). Kansas militia members sentenced to decades in prison for bomb plot. KSN.com. Retrieved from www.ksn.com/news/kansas/3-militia-members-face-sentencing-in-kansasbomb-plot/1725064717. 69. Bjelopera, J. P. (2013, January 17). The domestic terrorist threat: Background and issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved February 22, 2013, from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf. 70. Black Separatist—Intelligence Files. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www. splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/black-separatist#. 71. New Black Panther Party—Intelligence Files. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/groups/new-black-panther-party#. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Haga, M.W. (1995). Taking back America: The revolution begins. New York: Acclaim Publishing Company, p. 34. 77. Leader. 78. Ulius Louis Amoss, Wikipedia Retrieved October 16, 2015, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Ulius_Louis_Amoss. 79. Levitas, D. (2002). The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 80. Bjelopera, J. P. (2013, January 17). The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved February 22, 2013, from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf. 81. McCann, J. (2006). Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications. 82. Ibid. 83. German, M. (2005, June 5). Behind the lone terrorist, a pack mentality. Washington Post, p. B01. 84. Wright-Neville, D. (2010). Dictionary of Terrorism. Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 61. 85. Mullins, W.C. (1997). A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses, 2nd edition. IL: Charles Thomas Publishers, p. 233. 86. Knox, G., Etter, G., and Smith, C. (2019). Gangs and Organized Crime. New York: Routledge. 87. Best, S., and Nocella II, A.J. (2006). Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals. New York: Lantern Books. 88. Swanson, C.R., Territo, L., and Taylor, R. (2008). Police administration. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/ Prentice Hall. 89. Best, S., and Nocella II, A.J. (2006). Terrorists or freedom fighters? Reflections on the liberation of ani‑ mals. New York: Lantern Books. 90. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2008). Putting intel to work against ELF and ALF Terrorists. Retrieved February 12, 2009, from www.fbi.gov/page2/june08/ecoterror_063008.html. 91. Ibid. 92. Bohacik, A. (2008). When activists attack. Risk Management, 55(3), 30–34. 93. Lamberg, L. (1999). Researchers urged to tell public how animal studies benefit human health. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 282(7), 619.

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94. Joosse, P. (2007). Leaderless resistance and ideological inclusion: The case of the Earth Liberation Front. Terrorism & Political Violence, 19(3), 364. 95. Walsh, A., and Ellis, L. (2007). Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing. 96. Leader, S., and Probst, P. (2003). The Earth Liberation Front and environmental terrorism. Terrorism & Political Violence, 15(4), 38. 97. Flükiger, J. (2008). An appraisal of the radical animal liberation movement in Switzerland: 2003 to March 2007. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(2), 145–157. 98. Marris, E., and Simonite, T. (2005). Animal-rights militancy exported to United States and Europe. Nature, 438(7096), 717–717. 99. Leader, S., and Probst, P. (2003). The Earth Liberation Front and environmental terrorism. Terrorism & Political Violence, 15(4). 100. Ibid. 101. Perlstein, G. (2003). Comments on Ackerman. Terrorism & Political Violence, 15(4), 171–172. 102. Leader, S., and Probst, P. (2003). The Earth Liberation Front and environmental terrorism. Terrorism & Political Violence, 15(4). 103. ELF. (2010). Earth Liberation Front. Retrieved June 18, 2010, from http://earth-liberation-front.org/. 104. McCann, J. (2006). Terrorism on American Soil: A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications. 105. Leader, S., and Probst, P. (2003). The Earth Liberation Front and environmental terrorism. Terrorism & Political Violence, 15(4), 38. 106. Coombs, T. (2008). PSI Handbook of Business Security, Vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing. 107. Alexander, D. (2004). Business Confronts Terrorism: Risks and Responses. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 108. Balhorn, L. (2017). The lost history of Antifa. Jacobin. Retrieved from www.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/ antifascist-movements-hitler-nazis-kpd-spd-germany-cold-war. 109. Ibid. 110. Bray, M. (2017). Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House. 111. Penny, D. (2017, August 22). An intimate history of Antifa. The New Yorker. Retrieved from www.new yorker.com/books/page-turner/an-intimate-history-of-antifa. 112. Balhorn, L. (2017). The lost history of Antifa. Jacobin. Retrieved from www.jacobinmag.com/2017/05/ antifascist-movements-hitler-nazis-kpd-spd-germany-cold-war. 113. Ibid. 114. BBC. (2019). Seven things you need to know about Antifa. BBC Radio 4. Retrieved from www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/articles/X56rQkDgd0qqB7R68t6t7C/seven-things-you-need-to-know-about-antifa. 115. Ibid. 116. Bray, M. (2017). Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House. 117. Ibid. 118. Bjelopera, J. P. (2013, January 17). The domestic terrorist threat: Background and issues for congress. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved February 22, 2013, from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf. 119. Gertz, Bill. L.A. police use intel networks against terror. Washington Times, April 11, 2011. 120. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html. 121. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/state-local-tribal-and-territorial- governmentcoordinating-council. 122. Nemeth, C. (2013). Homeland Security: An Introduction to Principles and Practice, 2nd edition. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid. 126. Keenan v. Aryan Nations. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved February 1, 2013, from www.splcenter. org/get-informed/case-docket/keenan-v-aryan-nations#.UYB14cryCSo. 127. Macedonia v. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved February 1, 2013, from http:// splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/macedonia-v-christian-knights-of-the-kuklux-klan#.UYB2osryCSo. 128. Mansfield v. Church of the Creator. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved April 1, 2013, from www. splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/mansfield-v-church-of-the-creator#.UYB6rcryCSo.

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129. Hate M. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from www.splcenter.org/get-informed/ hate-map. 130. ADL. (2010). Anti-Defamation League. Retrieved November 17, 2010, from www.adl.org/home.asp?s= topmenu. 131. Ibid. 132. American Civil Liberties Union. (2021). FAA FOIA Documents. Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/ other/faa-foia-documents#:~:text=The%20ACLU%20has%20challenged%20the,only%20very%20 limited%20judicial%20oversight%2C

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McDonald, A. (1980). The Turner Diaries, 2nd edition. Arlington, VA: National Vanguard Books. Mullins, W. C. (1997). A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses, 2nd edition. Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas Publishers. Nemeth, C. (2013). Homeland Security: An Introduction to Principles and Practice, 2nd edition. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. New Black Panther Party—Intelligence Files. Southern Party Law Center. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from www. splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/groups/new-black-panther-party#.UYU-dowo6M8. Pearson, H. (1996). The Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the Price of Black Power in America. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing. Penny, D. (2017, August 22). An intimate history of Antifa. The New Yorker. Retrieved February 25, 2019, from www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/an-intimate-history-of-antifa. Perlstein, G. (2003). Comments on Ackerman. Terrorism & Political Violence, 15(4), 171–172. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2021). About Us. Retrieved from https://www.splcenter.org/. Swanson, C. R., Territo, L., and Taylor, R. (2008). Police Administration. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/ Prentice Hall. United States v. Burr, 4 Cr. (8U.S.) 469 (1807). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html. The Various Shady Lives of the Ku Klux Klan. (1965). Time Magazine. Retrieved March 21, 2009, from www. time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,898581-3,00.html. Walsh, A., and Ellis, L. (2007). Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing. White Supremacist Richard Butler Dies. (2004, September 9). The Washington Post, p. B05. Retrieved January 23, 2013, from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6967-2004Sep8.html. Wright-Neville, D. (2010). Dictionary of Terrorism. Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 61.

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10 International Terrorism and Extremism Operations and Sustainment

The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. —U.S. Department of Defense The objectives of this chapter are to: • Define terrorism; • Explore the concepts of terrorism and extremism; • Examine the historical and modern facets of international terrorism and extremism; • Differentiate between terrorism and extremism; • Explore terrorism within the context of antiquity with attention to the French Revolution and the European Anarchist movement; • Identify primary terrorist groups who use terror to endanger the United States and its allies; and • Speculate on the characteristics of twenty-first century terrorism.

10.1 Introduction The deaths of Osama bin Laden, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Qasem Soleimani did not eliminate the threat of international terrorism or extremism faced by the United States or our allies. Violence by non-nation actors and nation-states has, unfortunately, become commonplace. Regional violence destabilizes areas of a nation, and significant violence can spread, destabilizing multinational regions. Violence can fuel significant humanitarian crises, resulting in deaths, injuries, human displacement, economic instability, or collapse that can take generations to achieve recovery.

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Figure 10.1 Terrorism and extremism. (Source: Shutterstock)

The use of terrorism and extremism on the international stage is widespread. Terrorism is a mode of warfare. It is a tactic, and those who employ the tactic use it to provide themselves with some type of tactical advantage—military, political, and/or psychological—over their foes. While it is easy to discount or condemn the use of terrorist tactics, this type of violence is not expected to cease; rather, the tactics will evolve as the terrorists identify vulnerabilities within the defensive strategies of those they face. The decades between 2001 and 2021 proved a remarkable time in world history. The great expectations of a new and more peaceful world following the conclusion of the Cold War tragically proved incorrect. Regional violence, forced migration, and pandemic disrupt global economics. The use of terror continues. As we entered the third decade of the century, terrorist and extremist organization continued to employ violence across the globe. Nations understand these struggles are deadly. The terrorists push their agendas, which often are found to be linked to a variety of cultural, religious, nationalist, territorial, or philosophical dispute. To survive, the terrorists and their organizations must continually find ways to recruit and raise funds, which enables them to purchase weapons and supplies or compensate combat-seasoned individuals who are willing to engage in various struggles (Jensen, McElreath, & Graves, 2018). The results of this type of violence are countless deaths, population displacement as people flee the violence, economic disruption, persecution, and political instability. In this new world of conflict, the United States has found itself directly involved in a violent, multi-decade struggle. For the United States and our allies, the conflict has been frustrating and expensive, and no real end is in sight.

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10.2 Understanding and Defining Terrorism and Extremism There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, many with slight differences. As an example, Title 22 of the U.S. Code Section 2656 refers to terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear. It is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies. . . [to attain] political, religious, or ideological goals.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” The definitions of terrorism also vary on the international stage. The perceptions and definitions of terrorism differ among the nations and peoples that comprise the continent of Europe. The European Union (EU) indicated that terrorism involved events that, because of their natures or contexts, had the potential to seriously damage a country or an international organization with the aims of: 1) seriously intimidating a population; 2) unduly compelling a governmental or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or 3) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an international organization (McElreath et al., 2014b). The United Kingdom (U.K.) defined terrorism as events that were designed to interfere seriously with or substantially disrupt an electronic system (McElreath et al., 2014b). The French Criminal Code provided multiple specifications of activities that defined terrorism. Among these activities were volitional attacks against life; hijackings of planes, sea vessels, or any other types of transport; various money laundering offenses, and a myriad of other activities (McElreath et al., 2014b). Another French definition considered terrorism as “violence committed by an organization in order to create a climate of insecurity or in order to overthrow the established government” (McElreath et al., 2014b). Certainly, other definitions of terrorism exist among the nations of Europe. What is often difficult to understand, especially initially, is the motivation, dynamics, support, and intended outcome behind the group or movement that employs terror. For those who oppose the group using terror, it is very difficult to succeed if you respond only to the tactic and do not understand the often-complex issue behind the struggle itself. History reveals many cases of stronger powers playing into the hands of the terrorist by the miscalculation of the application of response strategy. The strategy a terrorist will use and the target they select depend on their capability, support, and desired end outcome. Acts of terrorism and extremism usually have the following characteristics: The violence may be directed against civilian targets and is often carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The use or the threat of violence is often coupled with or linked to specific demands and/or goals. Events may occur with speed, surprise, and violence. For instance, in the colonial setting of the post–World War II era, local populations often employed low-intensity combat, including the use of terrorism, in an attempt to expel a socalled “occupying” or colonial force and gain independence. This strategy often focused on inflicting what would be considered unacceptable pain and loss on the occupiers. The idea

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was to increase the costs and reduce the benefits of continued occupation of the territory. Whether intended or not, the struggle proved to be a political contest as well as a military struggle, such as the French struggle in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Russians in Afghanistan.

10.3 The Evolution of Terrorism and Extremism: A Brief Historical Perspective There are many examples throughout time and around the world of the use of extreme methods to effect a political, social, economic, or religious change. The examples included in this work are not intended to be all inclusive but, rather, to provide a broad and informed overview. Throughout recorded history, tactics we consider as “terrorist” have been employed. Political murders and systematic assassination were common in Greek and Roman history. The murder of Julius Caesar preoccupied writers and artists for hundreds of years; this will be discussed in more detail in the section that follows.

10.3.1 Tyrannicide According to Harty (1912), “Tyrannicide is the killing of a tyrant, and usually is taken to mean by a private person for the common good” (p. 1). The term does not apply to tyrants killed in battle or killed by an enemy in an armed conflict (Harty, 1912). Tyrannicide is considered a form of political assassination. The ancient Greeks believed it was a civic duty and not a crime to assassinate a despot. Catholic theologians of the Middle Ages claimed that tyrannicide was permissible when the tyranny became extreme, and no other means was available. Many scholars claim that the assassination of Julius Caesar on the Ides of March in 44 BC, by Marcus Julius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus, along with other Roman senators, was an act of tyrannicide. Many contend Caesar was assassinated because he deviated from the founding principles of the republic. Shortly after Caesar’s death, it is claimed that Brutus yelled in the streets of the capitol “People of Rome, we are once again free” (Waterkeyn, 2007, p. 38). Political assassinations have occurred throughout world history and have been a tactic used by terrorist organizations. McCann (2006) stated, “The assassination of a political leader is a favored form of violence among terrorist groups because the death of a single individual can often bring about dramatic and profound changes in government” (p. 24). Moreover, McCann (2006) added that the assassination of a significant political leader has international ramifications as well as national implications. The United States has not been immune to political assassinations. While certainly not considered tyrants in any way, as of 2020, four United States Presidents had been killed while serving in office: Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and Kennedy. President Woodrow Wilson stated, “America is the place where you cannot kill your government by killing the men who conduct it.” These presidential assassinations shocked the nation, but the national government remained functional. Any region may experience tyrannicide. One of the world’s most famous acts of tyrannicide occurred in 1914 when a Bosnian anarchist assassinated Archduke Ferdinand. Historians credit this assassination as the spark that ignited World War I and ultimately resulted in the deaths of millions. 306

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10.3.2 Early Examples of the Use of Terror 10.3.2.1 The Zealots An early, if not the earliest, organization employing what can be considered terrorist tactics was the Zealots of Judea. Known to the Romans as Sicarii, or dagger-men, they carried on a campaign of assassination of Roman occupation forces, as well as those they felt had collaborated with the Romans in Judea. The dagger (sicae) was their weapon of choice. They believed they could not remain faithful to the dictates of Judaism while living as Roman subjects. In Latin, the word “sicarii” is a common term for an assassin. They would conceal their daggers under their clothing and often attack in public places such as town squares or markets in and around Jerusalem. These assassinations inflicted a deep psychological fear, which is a goal of modern terrorists. The Sicarri threat lasted approximately twenty-five years. In 74 AD, the Romans laid siege to their fortress stronghold of Masada. Rather than surrender, the Sicarii chose to commit suicide instead of being subjugated by the Romans. The mass suicide at Masada for all practical purposes ended the Sicarii reign of terror.

10.3.2.2 The Assassins The Assassins were a sect within Shi’a Islam (also known as the Ismailis or Hashishin) during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. They were noted for their murderous acts, most notably during the Crusades. “They viewed themselves as enforcers of proper Islamic conduct, which included killing public officials and other prominent individuals who were deemed to have strayed from the right path of Islam” (Yungher, 2008, p. 71). The assassins were a well-disciplined fighting organization who adopted a rigorous physical training program, and the consumption of cannabis and alcohol was strictly prohibited. They were described as tenacious fighters who appeared in battle to be in a crazed, intoxicated state, though there is no evidence that they consumed hashish prior to battle. Similar to many other religion-inspired terrorists’ organizations, the Assassins believed that if they perished in battle, they were guaranteed to ascend to heaven or paradise. This same ethos of self-sacrifice and suicidal martyrdom can be seen in many modern Islamic organizations (Hoffman, 2003). The Assassins’ mountain stronghold of Alamut was destroyed by the Mongol invasion of Persia in 1256, reducing them as a formidable terrorist organization. During their campaigns of terror, the Assassins were also referred to as Fedayeen, a term describing a person who offers himself sacrificially in a holy struggle (Anderson & Sloan, 2003). The reader should be mindful of the fact that the insurgents who fought against the coalition forces during the second Iraqi war were called Fedayeen.

10.3.2.3 Thugees or Thugs According to Yungher (2008), the Thugs or Thugees were worshipers of the Hindu goddess Kali and were active from the thirteenth until the mid-nineteenth century. Their modus Introduction to Homeland Security

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operandi was to ingratiate themselves with merchants who traveled throughout India, and, when the moment was right, they would strangle their victim with a yellow scarf or a noose (called a phansi), mutilate them, and then ritually bury them with a pickaxe. While their objectives are obscure, it is believed their acts were undertaken for personal and ritualistic reasons rather than political aims (Dash, 2006). Today, the word “thug” is English slang for a gangster, a petty thief, or a minor villain, deriving from the aforementioned cult. During the 1830s, the British focused on the eradication of the Thugs. The British campaign consisted of a sophisticated intelligence network and informants to identify the Thugs. These were the same types of tactics the British Intelligence Services would later use in their struggle against the Irish Republican Army during the 1980s. It is believed that the threat of the Thugs was eliminated by the mid-1850s.

10.3.3 Continuation of the Use of Terror The use of tactics we consider terroristic continued through the end of the Middle Ages into modern times. This was a time of the development of the nation-state. Great wars, such as the Thirty-Years War (1618–1648) and the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) shaped the face of Europe. The majority of the stronger nations were led in some form or fashion by monarchies, often connected by marriages or other alliances. In the late 1700s, France was on the edge of revolution.

10.3.3.1 Terrorism and the French Revolution The French Revolution was violent and bloody. The overthrow and deaths of the monarchy shook the crowned heads of Europe. While the dynamics leading up to the Revolution are complex and beyond the scope of this text, the violence was of such as degree that many consider it the birth of modern-era terrorism. During the 1790s, the hold on France by King Louis XVI began to slip. Overall conditions in the country led to unrest. This movement evolved into a revolution, resulting in the overthrow of the monarchy. The tricolor flag flown by the rebellious mob represented the Republic’s three ideals: liberty, equality, and fraternity for all French citizens. With the overthrow of the king, a new government was established. The violence erupting during the unrest was termed the “reign of terror.” Thousands were executed. Other monarchies of Europe believed the violence in France could well inspire uprisings and spread into their countries. During the reign of terror, approximately 400,000 men, women, and children were imprisoned, with many executed (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). King Louis XVI was tried, convicted, and executed on January 21, 1793. By the summer of 1794, this reign of terror that had engulfed France had come to an end. The new republic became a reality, and the aristocratic resistance subsided. The French Revolution provided the first uses of the words “terrorist” and “terrorism,” and Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irish statesman and philosopher, is generally given credit for originating the term (McElreath et al., 2014b). 308

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Figure 10.2 The Storming of the Bastille, painting by Jean-Pierre Houël. (Source: National Library of France)

10.3.3.2 Gunpowder Plot (England) of 1605 During 1605, in England, the Gunpowder Plot took place, in which a number of Catholics conspired to blow up British Parliament while King James I attended the opening ceremony. At the time, the British government was intolerant of Catholicism, and King James had issued a proclamation calling for the expulsion of all Catholic priests. This proclamation infuriated many, and this sense of religious intolerance led Guy Fawkes and his conspirators to plot to blow up Parliament and kill the king. Fawkes and his followers managed to smuggle approximately 36 barrels of gunpowder into a cellar that was located below the House of Lords. Parliament was scheduled to convene on November 5, 1605, and, according to their plan, Fawkes would be responsible for igniting the fuse. On the morning of November 5, 1605, Fawkes was arrested while guarding the gunpowder before the opening ceremonies of Parliament. The Gunpowder Plot is an example of religious terrorism. Following the plot, King James I ordered the people of England to build a great bonfire on November 5 to celebrate the thwarting of the Gunpowder Plot (Trueman, 2000). The fire was usually topped off with an effigy of the pope instead of Fawkes. This ritual became known as Guy Fawkes Night, and the celebration continues today. Greenspan (2018) claims that the interpretation of Fawkes has undergone a tremendous makeover since the infamous Gunpowder Plot. Fawkes was once known as a notorious traitor, and centuries later, he has become a “revolutionary hero” (Greenspan, 2018). This is largely Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 10.3 In New York, Anonymous and the Stop Mass Incarcerations Network held a million-mask march and rally. (Source: Shutterstock)

attributed to the 2005 film V for Vendetta, in which the protagonist wore a Guy Fawkes mask while rebelling against tyranny and oppression. Since the debut of the film, many dissidents, such as Anonymous and the “occupiers,” have adopted the Guy Fawkes mask as a symbol of their movements.

10.3.4 Terrorism and Extremism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, the Influence of Revolutions and Nationalism, and the Anarchist Movement Terrorist groups normally identify themselves with national liberation movements; fighters against social, economic, religious, or imperialist oppression; or any combination of these. On the other side of the barricade, in an understandable attempt to degrade terrorism and extremism, politicians have presented the terms “terrorists” and “freedom fighters” as contradictory (McElreath et al., 2014b). The use of what we consider terrorism rose toward the end of the nineteenth century. Among the main groups were the Irish rebels, the Russian socialist revolutionaries, and assorted anarchists all over Europe and North America. Secret societies were also actively engaging in terrorism outside Europe. In Egypt, India, and China, movements aiming at national liberation gained popularity.

10.3.4.1 The Propaganda of Deed and The Catechism of the Revolutionary During the late nineteenth century, radical political theories such as The Propaganda of Deed and The Catechism of the Revolutionary, along with the invention of dynamite, helped 310

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propel anarchist groups to strike against numerous European countries and even the United States of America. Anarchists believed in the total rejection or destruction of all forms of government so that the people could live and network together without government interference. Carlo Pisacane was an Italian aristocrat who abrogated his nobility to participate in an unsuccessful revolution against the Bourbon monarchy. Pisacane is credited with advancing the theory (i.e., propaganda of the deed) that advocated the use of physical violence against political enemies that would rally the masses toward revolution. Pisacane’s writings served as the framework for the anarchist movement of the nineteenth century.

10.3.4.2 Russia The Russian anarchist group Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) was the first terrorist organization believed to have put the propaganda of the deed into practice. The People’s Will, a group of Russian constitutionalists, was founded in 1878 (Hoffman, 2003) and was believed to have an estimated 500 members, of whom 25% were women. The objective of the Narodnaya Volya was to overthrow the regime of the tsars. Inspired by the American and French Revolutions, they sought democratic and social reform within Russia (Zalman, 2019). The Narodnaya Volya was a group of self-proclaimed terrorists who strongly believed that terrorism was a just means to achieve their political goals. They employed the tactic of selective assassination to create a sense of fear and to disrupt the ruling class of Russia. The group targeted the tsar, the royal family, police officials, and high-ranking government and military leaders in an attempt to topple the tsarist government. Tsar Alexander II, a reform-minded monarch, abolished serfdom and relaxed government control over freedom of speech and assembly. According to Greist and Mahan (2003), the progressive actions of Alexander II were influenced by the European “Age of Enlightenment,” which led to his assassination, which the assassins believed would rally the citizens of Russia and propel the country into revolution, resulting in the people would take control of the nation (Zalman, 2019). By 1881, the People’s Will was determined to assassinate the tsar. Having made as many as eight earlier attempts, on March 1, 1881, members of the Narodnaya Volya were ready to strike again. They awaited the arrival of Tsar Alexander II in St. Petersburg, near the Winter Palace. A bomb detonated, injuring several civilians. After the explosion, the tsar left his sleigh to check on those injured. “Thank God, I am safe,” the tsar reportedly declared, just as the second bomber emerged and detonated his weapon, killing both himself and the tsar (Hoffman, 2003, pp. 18–19). The Narodnaya Volya was also greatly influenced by the publication Catechism of the Revolutionary, co-authored by Sergey Nechaev in 1869. Nechaev, a Russian revolutionary/anarchist, espoused the pursuit of revolution through any means possible, including political violence. In the first few lines of his manifesto, Nechaev wrote that the revolutionary must be prepared to face torture or death. Nechaev added that he knew only one science, the “science of destruction,” and for that reason, the revolutionary should study mechanics, physics, chemistry, and perhaps medicine. He claimed that the only objective of the revolutionary was the destruction of the “filthy order” (government). The Narodnaya Volya was one of the first terrorist organizations to employ the use of dynamite (explosives) in their acts of terrorism, and they developed a bomb that could be thrown at its target (an explosive device similar to today’s hand grenade). Following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, a group of radical anarchists in London convened an “anarchist conference,” which publicly applauded the assassination and extolled Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 10.4 Portrait of Tsar Alexander II. (Source: Glogster)

tyrannicide as a means to achieve revolutionary change. The conference decided to establish an Anarchist International or Black International in an attempt to coordinate worldwide anarchist activities.

10.3.4.3 Bosnia In 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, causing concern for the people now controlled by the Hapsburg monarchy. Following the annexation of their country, a semi-secret society known as the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense or People’s Defense) was organized. The purpose of the organization was to recruit and train partisans for a war between Serbia and Austria (Shackelford, 2007). Members of the Narodna Odbrana engaged in antiAustrian propaganda and established of a network of spies and saboteurs who operated within the Austrian empire. In 1911, what became known as the Black Hand (also known as Unification of Death) was established to unite all the territories annexed by the Austrian-Hungarian empire. Former 312

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Figure 10.5 The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.

members of the Narodna Odbrana formed the Black Hand, and they took over the Serbian terrorist activities (Shackelford, 2007). Many members were Serbian military officers who were conspiring to overthrow the Hapsburg monarchy. The Black Hand began to plan to assassinate Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian crown. On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, shot and killed Archduke Ferdinand. This assassination, as mentioned earlier, has been credited with catapulting the world into World War I.

10.3.4.4 Violence and Extremism in Europe after World War I World War I not only changed the face of Europe, but also set the world on the path for an even more destructive global conflict within two decades. During the 1920s and 1930s, fascists and National Socialists took power in Italy and Germany. In the Soviet Union, Communists, under first Lenin and then Stalin, used their power, ultimately taking the lives of millions of people. From the 1930s until 1945, the world would experience a true global conflict. At the end of the war, the balance of global power had shifted, with the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as superpowers. After World War II, many of the colonies held by the European powers embraced movements toward independence. These movements would often witness extreme violence waged by all concerned (McElreath et al., 2014b).

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low-level and unsophisticated attacks into a much more sophisticated usage of violence. The rise of guerrilla tactics by non-state actors in the last half of the twentieth century was due to several factors. These included the rise of ethnic nationalism (e.g. Irish, Basque, Zionist), anticolonial sentiments and the spread of ideologies, such as Communism.

10.3.5.1 Anti-Colonialism and Terrorism after World War II The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Kohn & Reddy, 2017) defines colonialism as “a practice involving the subjugation of one people to another” (p. 1). Colonialism involves political and economic control over another country or region. During both World Wars, England and France petitioned their colonies for military assistance to help them defeat the Axis powers. Many of these areas were promised independence after victory—promises that would often go unkept after the defeat of Germany and Japan. These broken promises inspired nationalism movements, in which colonies demanded their right of self-determination, or the right to rule themselves. In essence, nationalism during this era began to mean “resistance to foreign domination.” Significant anti-colonialism movements included the Jewish struggle for the creation of the state of Israel and the fight for independence by the FLN against the French in Algeria. 10.3.5.1.1 Irgun and Zionism Those who embrace the Jewish religion have been persecuted for thousands of years. Modern Zionism emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to the violent persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe and anti-Semitism in Western Europe. The term “Zionism” was coined in 1890 by Nathan Birnbaum and means “the national movement for the return of Jewish people to their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel” (McElreath et al., 2014b). The detailed complexity of the history of the tension in Palestine between the English, Arab, and Jewish populations is beyond the scope of this text. Briefly, the British government promised the Arabs support for regional independence after World War I in exchange for military support in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire. The British gained the desired Arab support, but rather than ensuring independence, they and France increased their control over the region. As time passed, the regional population developed movements intended to push their agendas for independence. By the 1930s, the violence, divided along religious lines with both sides responsible, escalated. In what became known as the Arab Rebellion, a violent campaign occurred targeting the Jewish. Concurrently, the Irgun or the National Military Organization in the land of Israel was formed in response to the Arab Rebellion (1936–1939). The region experienced violence, further dividing the population. As World War II erupted in Europe, the Irgun suspended its attacks on the British, fearing their terrorist campaign would impair the Allies chances of winning the war. Many Irgun members joined the British Army. The Irgun members hoped their support for the Allies would result in British withdrawal from the region and the establishment of an independent Israel. However, the United Kingdom was not prepared to relinquish control over Palestine. In 1943, Menachem Begin, who would later serve as Prime Minister of Israel, assumed command of the Irgun. He approved the resumption of the terrorist campaign against the British. Begin’s strategy was to target symbolic British targets, demoralize the occupying government, and to wear down the British resolve to occupy Palestine. The most infamous attack conducted by the Irgun was the bombing of the King David Hotel located in Jerusalem, which 314

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served as the civilian and military headquarters for the occupying British government. On July 22, 1946, the Irgun bombed the King David Hotel, which resulted in 91 killed and 45 injured—British, Arabs, and Jews (Hoffman, 2003). Begin insisted that, prior to the bombing of the hotel, employees and British officials were warned of the impending attack. Realizing the Irgun could not defeat the British militarily, Begin’s strategy hoped to cause massive disruption of the daily operations of the British, forcing them to overreact and impose harsh and repressive countermeasures (Hoffman, 2003), resulting in the public viewing the British as oppressors rather than protectors. Begin’s strategy to wear down the British began to succeed. Public opinion shifted away from the British role in the region in Britain and abroad. The United States encouraged Britain withdrawal from the region. On May 15, 1948, the United Kingdom’s rule over Palestine concluded, and the establishment of the state of Israel was proclaimed (Hoffman, 2003, p. 53). It should be noted that Begin, the former leader of the Irgun, became the Prime Minister of Israel and in 1978 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for signing the Camp David Peace Accord with Egyptian Prime Minister Anwar Sadat, a major step in reducing future conflicts between nations in the region.

Figure 10.6 The bombing of the King David Hotel, July 22, 1946.

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Figure 10.7 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

10.3.5.1.2 The War for Algerian Independence (1954–1962) During the years following World War II, the idea of anti-colonialism or de-colonialism had spread throughout the world. The British were battling rebellions in Palestine, Cyprus, Malaya, and Kenya while the Dutch were countering revolts in Indonesia. The French were attempting to maintain control of French-Indochina, but after the defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French role in Indochina changed. While disengaging in Southeast Asia, the French still played a major role in Africa. French Algeria, like many other European colonies, supported France in World War I and World War II. In Algeria, an independence movement gained significance, but France refused to grant independence. Organizing against the French, the National Liberation Front began the struggle to obtain their right to self-determination. On November 1, 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLA) launched attacks against the French, igniting a conflict that would continue for eight years and claim approximately one million lives (Grose, 2007). This date became known as the Toussaint Rouge (Red All Saints Day). This was a brutal conflict. French security forces, including military, law enforcement, and intelligence services, successfully countered the FLN resistance in the outlying areas of Algeria, causing the FLN to redirect much of their terrorist campaign to the city of Algiers. The FLN employed violence to gain full independence from France and adopted the philosophy of Carlos Marighella, who wrote the famous Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. In his manual, Marighella introduced tactics and organizational methods specifically designed for use in an urban environment. This tactic became known as urban terrorism. The FLN’s strategy of urban terrorism was in direct opposition to the prevailing doctrine of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Communist China), who espoused that guerilla warfare should be 316

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Figure 10.8 The symbol of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN).

conducted in the countryside. According to Towers (2002), the leaders of the FLN were young, well-educated, and sincere admirers of Ho Chi Minh, who led the Viet-Minh to victory against the French in Vietnam. The Viet-Minh was an organization formed of nationalist and Communist parties in 1941 to win independence for Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh was no stranger to the United States. He would lead the fight against the U.S. during the Vietnam conflict and ultimately established a Communist form of government in a united Vietnam. During the Battle of Algiers, the FLN began a campaign of bombing and political assassinations. Responding, the French restricted movement throughout the city in an attempt to control the travel of possible insurgents. With tactics ever evolving, the FLN began using attractive women who appeared European as a way to move weapons through French security checkpoints to predetermined targets. In December 1956, the mayor of Algiers was assassinated, and the FLN orchestrated a campaign of organized demonstrations, labor strikes, and work stoppages to further hurt France economically. It became apparent that the French were losing control of Algiers, and within France, support for the effort, governmental and public, declined. As the situation became more intense, the French Colonial governor of Algeria requested emergency military assistance from France. The French deployed the elite 10th Parachute Division to Algeria. The majority of these “paras,” a nickname that was given to airborne troops (paratroopers), were veterans of the French-Indochina war and were experienced in the counterinsurgency operations and tactics that the Algerians had adopted from the Viet-Minh (Towers, 2002). The mission given was to defeat the insurgency. The operations proved harsh and brutal, and, as in most struggles, it was both military and psychological. The 10th Parachute Division assumed significant law enforcement duties in the city. The paratroopers examined police records on those suspected of collaborating or sympathizing with the FLN. Thousands were incarcerated and interrogated. The FLN initiated labor strikes, work stoppages, and massive demonstrations. The French paratroopers were instructed to “break the strike,” and paratroops forcibly opened shops. Merchants were forced to open or face arrest. After several days of employing these tactics, the strike was broken (Towers, 2002). Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 10.9 Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet-Minh.

Figure 10.10 Insignia of the French 10th Parachute Division. (Source: Wikipedia. Used per Creative Commons 1.0 license. Posted by user BrunoLC)

The French military established a sophisticated criminal intelligence network, which included the use of informants to infiltrate the FLN for the purpose of identifying high-ranking members of the organization. The French employed harsh interrogation methods to gain information believed to be valuable in dismantling the FLN. Militarily, the French won the Battle of Algiers, but they lost the war. Their counterterrorism measures were successful in dismantling the National Liberation Front and forced them to flee to Tunisia. In June 1962, after losing political and public support for the conflict, France 318

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granted Algeria independence. It is estimated that approximately 30,000 French and 500,000 Algerians died during this conflict (Aussaresses, 2002).

10.4 Terrorism and Extremism in the Modern Era The use of tactics associated with terrorism has evolved over the last several decades. Violence directed toward soft or vulnerable targets is intended to instill fear and often stimulates a violent response. When the systematic study of terrorism began in the 1970s, it was believed that terrorism was a monopoly of extreme left-wing groups, such as the Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army, and various Latin American groups (Laqueur, 2007). Today, the use of terror by extremists is commonplace. Many extremists are willing to risk their lives in their struggle. With organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), there appeared to be an almost unlimited pool of volunteers during the early stages of their success. As the tactical situation changed dramatically, as expected, the pool of volunteers dried up quickly. The leaders of these organizations typically prefer surviving the struggle and living to benefit from the accomplishments and changes resulting from the conflict in which they are engaged. Leaders of significant extremist movements direct the violence. They realize they are waging a struggle in a multidimensional theater of operation. They are often fighting a physical conflict against the government or, today, a coalition of nations. They are struggling for public support: what was termed during the Vietnam conflict “the hearts and minds of the people.” They are waging a struggle for financial sustainment, needing money and resources to continue their fight. They are waging a logistical battle to ensure they and their forces have food, fuel, weapons, ammunition, equipment, and other items needed to sustain them. They are also waging a battle on the world stage. Attempting to gain international support or, at a minimum, to recruit fighters and financial supporters to their cause. This is a multidimensional, extremely complex endeavor. The degree to which the extremist or the extremist group succeeds in these arenas has a direct impact on the ultimate success or failure of their struggle. By the second decade of the twenty-first century, the ongoing conflict against those using terror had proven to be an extreme challenge to the nation-states engaged in the struggle. The battle against extremism remains a long-term endeavor and will truly test the willpower of those engaged, with both sides struggling to achieve a psychological and tactical advantage over their adversary. The extremists and terrorists have proven to be very tough opponents. Their ability to adapt has increased the difficulty of defeating them. Their military successes and, in some cases, establishment of alliances, allow them to continue their fight. Their tactics have been designed to avoid a decisive military engagement that would result in their defeat. As a result, they avoid, where possible, military operations in the traditional sense, which would lead to a decisive battle with forces prepared and committed to defeat them militarily. When they have tried to hold territory against a well-trained and supported force, they have sustained defeat. As a result, they continue to rely on a wide range of tactics, including suicide bombing. Suicide bombers are dramatic weapon delivery instruments. The individuals selected to carry the weapons typically fall into one of three categories: first, extremists who strongly believe in the cause and desire the role of martyr; second, members of the extremist group who are viewed to have little long-term value and are thus expendable to the organization; Introduction to Homeland Security

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or third, non-organizational members kidnapped or captured and forced into the role of a suicide bomber. For the extremists, the use of suicide bombing as a tactic is logical. It is a relatively simple operation that is low cost and does not require a rescue operation or exit plan for the perpetrator. Suicide bombings also can be planned and executed targeting specific locations, maximizing both casualties and the drama related to the event. Suicide bombings are calculated to create a sense of fear and uncertainty in those targeted, thus achieving a psychological damage often much greater than the physical damage of the attack itself (Thomas, 2003).

10.5 An Overview of Terrorism and Extremism Internationally Today Today, indiscriminate violence and the use of terror have become commonplace. Much of this violence impacts “non-combatants” who have been caught up in the conflict, rather than targeting leading politicians or senior military leaders. Of the 17,958 people who died in terrorist attacks in 2013, 82% were in one of five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, or Syria. The links between terrorist groups are extremely important. They provide small terrorist organizations with the resources to undertake far more serious operations than they would be capable of otherwise. They make identification more difficult, since local citizens can be used to carry out attacks (McElreath et al., 2014b). As an example of the fluid nature of a terrorist organization on a much larger scale, al-Qaeda adopted numerous brands, which serve to mask the extent of its influence, inculcate al- Qaeda’s radical ideology in local populations, and attract support from individuals, organizations, and governments that may not want to be seen as openly assisting al-Qaeda.

Figure 10.11 Deaths from terrorism, 2000–2013. (Source: Adapted from the Global Terrorism Database/Institute for Economics and Peace)

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In 2011, President Barack Obama authorized an operation employing United States Special Operations Forces to kill or capture Osama bin Laden. On May 2, 2011, the United States Navy Special Operations Unit SEAL Team Six successfully carried out the operation, killing bin Laden in his Abbottabad compound in Pakistan. While the death of bin Laden did not end the threat of al-Qaeda, his death significantly disrupted the leadership and funding of the organization.

10.5.1 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: The Middle East and Afghanistan The Middle East is a hotbed of violence. Political, religious, cultural, geographical, and ethnic differences fuel the conflicts. The Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh) has carefully marketed its “caliphate,” an area about the size of Belgium that the terror group controls in Iraq and Syria. Under its former name, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), it was formed in April 2013, growing out of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). It has since been disavowed by al-Qaeda but has become one of the main jihadist groups fighting government forces in Syria and Iraq. Initially, the group relied on donations from wealthy individuals in Gulf Arab states, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who supported its fight against President Bashar al-Assad. ISIS took hundreds of millions of dollars from Mosul’s branch of Iraq’s central bank and earned significant amounts from the oil fields it controlled in eastern Syria, selling some of the supply back to the Syrian government. It also sold anything of value and looted antiquities from historical sites and people (Ferran, 2015). While there are important differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda, and the two were at odds with one another in a variety of ways, they were both inherently anti-American and anti-Western. Thus, they constituted a threat to the interests of the United States and its allies. In late 2014, the CIA estimated the strength of ISIS to be 30,000 fighters and local supporters. Most disturbing to Western security officials was the portion of foreign fighters who left their homes and traveled great distances to join the conflict. ISIS was also successful in military operations and in using the internet and various social media platforms to recruit fighters and support personnel (Engel, 2015). Nicholas Rasmussen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, told Congress in February 2015 some 20,000 foreign fighters from 90 countries had traveled to Syria to join one group or another, 3,400 of whom were said to have come from Western nations, including over 150 from the U.S. “who have either traveled to the conflict zone, or attempted to do so (Ferran, 2015). In Syria and Iraq, ISIS executed Western hostages and/or used them as bargaining chips. Videos depicted European IS members participating in executions. At the height of its power, ISIS controlled territory in Iraq and Syria, which was home to almost eight million people. ISIS killed, injured, displaced, kidnapped, and sold into slavery tens of thousands of people. In 2014, the U.S. announced the formation of a broad international coalition to defeat ISIS. The U.S.-led coalition expanded its bombing campaign. By 2019, ISIS sustained substantial losses in both territory and leadership. In October 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, was killed in a raid conducted by the United States Special Operations Command. While ISIS regional control has been greatly diminished, the organization and its followers remain a threat throughout the region. With the defeat if ISIS, Western intelligence agencies also remain concerned about the long-term threat posed by the surviving foreign ISIS fighters attempting to return to their native nations. These individuals might well prove to be national security threats. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Another United States strike in 2020 against the support of terrorism was the targeting and killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. By the late 2010s, General Qasem Soleimani was viewed by the United States as a major factor in the regional violence in the Middle East. On January 3, 2020, the United States employed a drone, targeting Soleimani and killing him and other Iran-backed militia. With his death, the regional threat of Iran has not ended, but its operations have been disrupted. The relationship between the United States and Iran has been extremely strained since the late 1970s when the US-backed national leader, the Shah of Iran, was deposed and accepted exile. In 1979, the United States Embassy in Tehran was seized, and with its seizure, 52 Americans were captured and held hostage for 444 days. An attempt to conduct a military operation to free the hostages was authorized by President Jimmy Carter in 1980. Unfortunately, the rescue operation failed, resulting in the loss of eight United States military personnel. Some believe the inability of President Carter to achieve the release of the U.S. hostages was a significant factor in his loss to Ronald Reagan in the presidential race.

10.5.2 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Europe Europe has experienced violence throughout history. Viking raids on England terrorized the local populations. Warfare shaped nations. The French Revolution resulted in thousands of deaths. Finally, systemic genocide was employed to purge specific ethnic groups. The reigns of monarchies sometimes showed disagreements and feuds that were parlayed into warfare. In recent decades, the ongoing violence in the Middle East will have a decades-long, if not generational, impact. The number of completed, failed, and foiled terrorist attacks in Europe is low compared to Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, but attacks are expected to continue. Between 2009 and 2013, over 1,000 failed, foiled, or completed attacks targeting EU member states occurred, reminding citizens and policy makers alike of the danger of terrorism. Fully understanding and interpreting historical incidents and policies necessitates both perspective and the passing of time (about 20 years after an incident) from which meaning may be generated and examined. Thus, future generations will have stronger understanding of meaning and context with respect to these events of terrorism and extremism. Another major concern is the long-term impact of immigration into Europe from the Middle East. More than 1.5 million migrated into Turkey from the Middle East. Millions more fled to Lebanon, Jordan, and outside their homes in Syria. Jihadi network members were among the immigrants in moving into Europe. Terror groups use Europe’s open borders, where few restrictions exist regulating individual travel between nations, to their advantage.

10.5.2.1 The United Kingdom The Gunpowder Plot was addressed earlier in this text, but the United Kingdom has faced the violence connected with terrorism throughout much of its modern history. While much of that violence is linked to the Irish Republican Army and the complex struggle between those groups, one of the most tragic terrorist attacks linked itself forever with Scotland. Pan Am Flight 103, operating the transatlantic leg of the route, was destroyed by a bomb, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew in what became known as the Lockerbie bombing (McElreath, 2014a). While aircraft had proven to be vulnerable terrorist targets, often the victims of hijacking, this attack shook the global community. Ultimately, the attacks were linked to Libya and the government of Muammar Gaddafi. In 2001, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence 322

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officer, was jailed for life after being found guilty of 270 counts of murder in connection with the bombing. In August 2009, he was released by the Scottish government on compassionate grounds after being diagnosed with cancer. He died in May 2012 as the only person to be convicted for the attack (McElreath et al., 2014b). The United States would be painfully reminded of the vulnerabilities of commercial aircraft in 2001, when four commercial airliners were hijacked and used as weapons, striking the New York World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. (McElreath et al., 2014b). Although the attacks occurred on U.S. soil, many British citizens were located within the Twin Towers and the surrounding areas. Thus, the United Kingdom also was affected by the events of 9/11. The United Kingdom, like so many other parts of Europe, has experienced attacks by various Islamist groups. In July 2005, four Islamic terrorists detonated three bombs aboard London Underground trains across the city. Later, a fourth exploded on a double-decker bus. Their attacks killed 56 and injured over 700 (McElreath et al., 2014b). In May 2017, an Islamist suicide bomber, 22-year-old Salman Abedi, blew himself up at Manchester Arena as people were leaving a concert, killing 22 and injuring 139. It became the deadliest terrorist attack in Britain since the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. Many of the victims were children or teenagers, the youngest being an eight-year-old girl (McElreath et al., 2018). In 2020, Islamic State supporter Safiyya Shaikh was arrested after she admitted plotting to blow herself up in a bomb attack on St. Paul’s Cathedral, stating that she would kill till she was dead. 10.5.2.1.1 The Irish Republican Army In a more traditional sense of the use of violence to gain an advantage against a stronger foe, we will examine the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The violence between the IRA and the British continued for decades. Targets included local officials and government, commercial, and private properties. In 1979, the IRA targeted and killed Louis Mountbatten, World War II hero and the last Viceroy of India. In 1993, an IRA truck bomb was detonated within the London financial sector. The explosion injured over 40 people and killed 1 person. The financial cost of the damages was approximately $1.25 billion dollars (McElreath et al., 2014b). This event contributed to the installation of camera systems in the public areas of Britain.

10.5.2.2 Germany The German perspective on extremism was that of a struggle, performed with endurance, for political goals that were intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the lives and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes (McElreath et al., 2014b). Another German perspective on terrorism and extremism was the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in article 129a, sect. 1 of the penal law book (above all: murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off a blast by explosives) or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of such criminal acts. (Schmidt, 2011) Introduction to Homeland Security

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In 1972, the German city of Munich hosted the Olympics. There was much symbolism to the event. The last time Germany had hosted the Olympics was in 1936, when the nation was in the grips of the Nazis and Hitler. In 1972, five Arab terrorists affiliated with Black September entered the Olympic compound and captured and ultimately murdered 11 Israeli athletes. The German attempt to rescue the hostages failed, revealing the need for Germany to develop an effective counterterrorist special operations–capable organization within the police service, Border Protection Group 9 of the Federal Police (GSG 9). Based on the concepts proven of the British SAS from 1972 to 2003, they reportedly completed over 1,500 missions. The Israeli response to the attack on their athletes was lethal. The response included assassinations of those involved in the attack and military strikes targeting bases in Syria and Lebanon. In 1976, an Air France flight with 248 passengers was hijacked by two members of the German Revolutionary Cells and two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The aircraft was diverted to Entebbe, Uganda, where the Jewish passengers were separated from those of other faiths. Recognizing the threat, the Israeli Prime Minister authorized a rescue mission. Of the 106 remaining hostages, 102 were rescued, and 3 were killed. A final hostage, who had been taken earlier to a hospital, was also believed to have been killed. Kenyan sources supported the rescue operation conducted by Israel; as a result, the dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin Dada, ordered the execution of 245 Kenyans in retaliation (Thomas, 2003).

10.5.2.3 Spain Spain also experienced the impact of terrorism. From 1961 to 2011, the Basque separatist group ETA carried out more than 3,300 attacks, with total deaths estimated to be between 829 and 952. During a similar period, far-right terrorist groups opposed to the Spanish transition to democracy were active. They caused between 66 and 95 deaths. In 2004, a train was bombed in which 191 people were killed. In 2009, a car bombing injured or killed approximately 60 people. The Basque group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna was blamed for this attack. In March 2004, commuter trains in Spain were bombed, killing 193 people and injuring more than 1,800. These bombings are the deadliest terrorist attack in Spain’s history (McElreath et al., 2014b).

10.5.3 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Africa Complex tribal, ethnic, and religious dynamics mean that any summary of the situation in Africa will be necessarily incomplete. Africa is a great continent, with a diverse population that, like all other parts of the world, experiences wars, regional conflicts, hate, intolerance, and violence, often taking or disrupting the lives of thousands. Over the last two decades, alQaeda’s international network has built alliances and launched attacks across the continent. Some of these operations directly target foreigners. The September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. mission and annex in Benghazi and the raid on the U.S. embassy in Tunis three days later were carried out by al-Qaeda-linked groups. The Ansar al Sharia organizations in Libya and Tunisia, both of which are tied to AQIM, were involved in these assaults on America’s diplomatic presence in North Africa (Joscelyn, 2005). Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s official branch in Somalia, killed more than 140 people at the Garissa University College in Kenya and remains the primary terrorist threat in the region. Somali security forces and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continue to make gains against al-Shabaab. Various East African countries continue to detect, deter, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist incidents; enhance domestic and regional efforts to bolster border security; and create 324

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integrated and dedicated counterterrorism strategies. Counterterrorism cooperation across the region picked up following the Westgate attack, and nations began to examine their procedures for responding to attacks on soft targets. In West Africa, conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northern part of the country, with Boko Haram and related actors committing hundreds of attacks, reportedly resulting in over 1,000 casualties in 2013 alone. ISIS gained a significant footing in West Africa by merging with Boko Haram, with Boko Haram now calling itself the Islamic State in West Africa, or the Islamic State’s Province in West Africa. The violence inflicted by Boko Haram has reportedly spilled over into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

10.5.3.1 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Established in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S.-funded and implemented, multi-faceted, multi-year effort designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counter terrorism. Areas of support include 1) enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct counterterrorism operations; 2) integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and other supporting partners to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts; 3) enhancing individual nations’ border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; 4) strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; 5) monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism and extremism, such as that related to kidnapping for ransom; and 6) reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.

10.5.3.2 The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism Established in 2009, the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including 1) reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, 2) developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations, 3) enhancing border security, 4) countering the financing of terrorism and extremism, and 5) reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. PREACT member countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Today, United States military and civilian government personnel are engaged throughout the region.

10.5.4 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Asia The continent of Asia has manifested a variety of terrorist organizations and events. During 2003, the nation of China announced its initial list of terrorist organizations and terrorists. The primary entities contained in the listing consisted of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC), and the Eastern Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) (McElreath et al., 2014b). These organizations are sub-components of the Eastern Turkistan category of terrorist organizations (China Identifies). The Eastern Turkistan category comprised over 40 organizations that often openly advocated violence in their political platforms. Introduction to Homeland Security

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During 2010, the activities of the ETIM were impeded when they were apprehended by Chinese authorities. Chinese public security officials displayed photographs of knives, hatchets, bullets, and homemade explosives that were claimed to have been confiscated between July and October from members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (McElreath et al., 2014b). The ETIM was a component of terrorist networks that were headed by Osama bin Laden and manifested approximately 320 terrorists from Xinjiang (McElreath et al., 2014b). From the perspectives of terrorism and extremism, China considered the ETIM to be a primary security threat. The WUYC was an organization that conspired to split Xinjiang from China (McElreath et al., 2014b). Through accession, China acquired Xinjiang during 1949. After the accession of the territory, Uyghurs reported living as second-class citizens or under government oppression (McElreath et al., 2014b). The goal of the Uyghurs was to separate their region from China. The planning regarding separation involved plotting to bomb public buildings, poison kindergartens, destroy oil pipelines and railways, and assassinate people (McElreath et al., 2014b). The nation of China attributed to the WUYC the plan to assassinate “party, government and military leaders of the autonomous region, damaging railroads and bridges, bombing, attacking Chinese agencies in foreign countries, and disrupting China’s borders with India, Tadzhikistan and Afghanistan” (McElreath et al., 2014b). The ETIC leveraged information outlets, the media, and the internet to disseminate information and facilitate terrorism and extremism. It called for “jihad” (holy war) by means of violence and terrorism. The ETIC enlisted Chinese Muslims to stage terrorist events that targeted kindergartens, schools, and government buildings of the Han nationality by methods of bombing and poisoning (McElreath et al., 2014b). During 2003, the organization crafted a plan to bomb a railway that connected Xinjiang with Gansu. Thus, it anticipated a variety of targets. The Philippines have been susceptible to terrorism and extremism by various groups struggling for regional independence. The presence and growth of private armed groups pose a security threat in the Philippines. The growth of armed, private groups increasingly threaten national security. They have been deemed one of the nation’s highest security concerns, along with local Communist movements and Muslim secessionist movements. Other threats involve disputes between Christian and Muslim factions within the region of Basilan. The nation of Japan also is concerned with terrorism and extremism. Japan lacks various natural resources and significant energy sources and depend on a myriad of nations to satisfy its demands for such resources. Because of such dependencies, large events of terrorism and extremism represent threats that impact the ability of Japan to satisfy its demand for critical resources. In 1995, Japan endured a terrorist attack against its citizenry. It was perpetrated by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. The event resulted in the deaths of 12 people and injury to approximately 5,300 others. Certainly, many other events may be identified that highlight the dangerousness of Asian terrorism and extremism. These events are motivated by a wide range of desires, from securing freedom from the government of China and establishing independence to the goals of religious extremism and cultism. Asian terrorism and extremism are motivated by ethnic, religious, and political catalysts and facilitated through cooperation with organized crime factions. Regardless of the motivations, methods of execution, or origins of terrorism and extremism, acts of terror are deadly and threaten Asian and global societies. 326

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10.5.5 Regional Terrorism and Extremism: Central and South America Latin and South America were predominately colonized by the Spanish and Portuguese. Most of the colonies in this region of the world would gain independence in the 1800s. The history of these nations varies. Some have experienced violent political turmoil. The United States has a history of intervening in the region politically, economically, and militarily. Terrorism and extremism in Central and South America are essentially products of class conflict. Until recently, nearly all Latin American nations were controlled by corrupt authoritarian regimes that gave little consideration to the welfare of their people. The result: a majority of Latin Americans live in poverty. The undereducated and impoverished people were very receptive to the egalitarian Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist philosophies espoused by extremists. In the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America was the epicenter of global terrorism and extremism. In the first of those two decades, the region experienced more terrorist attacks (17,293) than all other regions combined (13,643) and nearly four times as many as the next most active region, Western Europe (4,729) (Jensen, 2014). Nearly every Latin American nation has had an active guerrilla or terrorist insurgency. The driving force behind most of these groups has been a desire to reorganize society along socialist lines, remove foreign business interests, and redistribute land and wealth. Currently, terrorist violence is largely confined to Colombia, where both the FARC and the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) are still quite active. However, while levels of violence in other countries are low in comparison to Colombia, some still face challenges from armed organizations, including Peru (remnants of the Shining Path) and Paraguay (Paraguayan People’s Army, or EPP) (Jensen, 2014). There has been significant U.S. concern in recent years about the increasing and brutal violence of Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations, with more than 80,000 drug trafficking– related deaths in Mexico from 2007 through 2020. In response to some concerns that these criminal organizations may be adopting terrorist tactics, the State Department asserted in its 2010 and 2011 terrorism and extremism reports that there was no evidence of direct ties between Mexican criminal groups and terrorist groups (Sullivan, 2014). South America’s Triple Frontier, where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet at a bend in the Paraná River, has long served as a hub of organized crime and narcotics, weapons, and other contraband smuggling. For decades, these borderlands have been home to a large and thriving Arab merchant community. The area first came to Washington’s attention following the 9/11 attacks when security experts suspected jihadists were taking safe harbor in the region (Folch, 2012).

10.5.5.1 Cuban Revolution (1952–1958) During the early 1950s, Fidel Castro established the 26th of July Movement, which was a Cuban revolutionary group whose goal was to overthrow the reign of Fulgencio Batista and restore the 1940 constitution. Batista was well known for his close ties to United States organized crime figures, including Charles “Lucky” Luciano and Meyer Lansky. According to English (2007, p. xv), “These mobsters had always dreamed of one day controlling their own country, a place where they could provide gambling, narcotics, booze, prostitution and other forms of vice free from government or law enforcement intrusion.” English (2007) added, Gaming and leisure were only part of the equation. The idea formulated by Lansky, Luciana and others was for Havana to serve as the front for a far more ambitious agenda: the creation of a criminal state whose gross product, union pension funds, public utilities, Introduction to Homeland Security

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banks, and other financial institutions would become the means to launch further criminal enterprises around the globe. (p. xv) The mobsters believed that they could conceal their proceeds from their criminal activity underneath the patina of a legitimate government in Cuba (English, 2007). With that stated, Batista’s job was to control the Cuban revolutionary fervor so that it would not interfere with or threaten the mob’s criminal enterprise. By 1959, the country of Cuba was enmeshed in a revolution to remove Batista. Instead of restoring a democratic form of government in Cuba, Castro instituted an oppressive Communist form of government and became a surrogate of the Soviet Union. Upon the successful overthrow of the Batista regime, Fidel Castro, along with his close associate Ernesto “Che” Guevara, engaged in a campaign of guerilla warfare and revolution that would attempt to expand Communism throughout Latin America and the continent of Africa.

Figure 10.12 Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

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During this era, theories of guerilla warfare and urban terrorism emerged and were put into practice by many Latin American terrorist organizations. Upon defeating Batista, the Cuban people expected Castro to implement his promises to reinstall a democratic form of government and restore “civil liberties” to the people of Cuba. However, Castro aligned himself with the former U.S.S.R. and implemented a “Soviet-style” Communist regime in Cuba, much to the dismay of the United States (McElreath et al., 2014b). As time progressed, Communist Cuba became a “thorn” in the side of the United States that included incidents such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Bay of Pigs, and the Mariel boatlift. During the Cold War, the United States viewed Cuba as a “surrogate” of the former U.S.S.R., extremely active in conducting insurgency operations throughout the continent of Africa as well as overthrowing the U.S.-backed government in Nicaragua (Martin, 2013). In 1982, Cuba was designated as a “state sponsor” of terrorism by the U.S. State Department. According to the U.S. State Department, Cuba had been a “safe haven” for terrorists and wanted international fugitives. Cuba has provided a sanctuary for members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the National Liberation Army (FLN), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Moreover, Cuba has provided a refuge for Joanne Chesimard, a member of the Black Liberation Army who murdered a New Jersey state trooper in 1972. She was tried, convicted, and incarcerated. In 1977, she escaped from prison, and several years later, she made her way to Cuba, where she was granted political asylum. It is believed she has been living under the assumed name Assata Shakur since 1984 in Cuba, where she continues to espouse anti-American rhetoric by advocating revolution and terrorism (Porter, 2013). Chesimard is the first woman to be added to the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist List. In 2015, the Obama administration removed Cuba from the United States Department of State’s list of nations that sponsor terrorism. With that, New Jersey law enforcement officials

Figure 10.13 Joanne Chesimard. (Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation)

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remain hopeful that the Cuban government will act in good faith and extradite Chesimard to the United States (Spetalnick, 2020).

10.5.5.2 Carlos Marighella Carlos Marighella was a Brazilian legislator and a leader of the nationalistic Communist Party who eventually became a fiery terrorist and theorist (White, 2009). Moreover, Marighella has been widely acclaimed by terrorist organizations throughout the world for writing his manifesto, The Minimanual Of The Urban Guerrilla. Marighella (1969) defines the urban guerrilla “as a man who fights the military dictatorship with arms, using unconventional methods” (p. 71). Marighella (1969) added, “The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particularly North Americans” (p. 71). The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla is the most widely read, translated, and studied urban terrorist manual in modern history. In his manifesto, Marighella offers a beguiled vision of urban revolutionary warfare, in which the anonymity and alienation of the modern city could be superseded by a new revolutionary hero, part bandit, part guerrilla, fighting in the name of a just cause, the cause of the people. (Carr, 2006) Marighella strongly believed that a revolution must begin in the city. His strategy was to create a mass movement of citizens who would engage in labor strikes, marches, protests, and boycotts similar to those tactics that were utilized by the FLN in Algeria. The purpose of this urban mass movement was to create an infrastructure of armed struggle by the working class, students, and other forces; to employ urban guerrillas; and to unleash their operations through the use of armed mass groups (Marighella, 1969). This strategy of urban warfare was in direct opposition to the prevailing doctrine espoused by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Communist China) and Fidel Castro during the 1950s and 1960s, which advocated that the revolution should begin in the countryside. With that stated, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara regarded the city as the “graveyard” of the revolution: where the government forces are the strongest and where the “revolutionaries” would probably sustain heavy casualties (Carr, 2006). In his Minimanual, Marighella (1969) claimed that “violence” or “terrorism” is a quality that no longer has the negative meaning that it use to have. “Today, to be violent or a terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in an armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its atrocities” (p. 3). White (2009) claims that Marighella’s strategy of urban terrorism was to begin with two distinct phases, one designed to bring about actual violence and the other designed to give violence meaning. White (2009) added that the “violent portion of the revolution was to be carried out by deploying armed revolutionary cells to carry out the most deplorable acts of violence” (p. 164). It should be noted that “violence” was essential to Marighella’s strategy to overthrow the Brazilian government and replace it with a government based on socialist principles. With that stated, in 1969, Marighella died a violent death at the hands of the Brazilian police while attempting to rob a local bank (Laqueur, 2009). Marighella’s theory of urban terrorism influenced many terrorist organizations throughout the world, including the United States. With that stated, the Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla was extremely popular among revolutionary leftists, and as a consequence, many Latin American and European countries banned its publication and distribution (Anderson & Sloan, 2003). 330

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One terrorist organization that was greatly influenced by Marighella was the Tupamaros of Uruguay.

10.5.6 The Tupamaros of Uruguay During the 1950s, Uruguay was experiencing “economic hardship” because of high unemployment and severe inflation, which caused stagnation in the country’s livestock and industrial sectors. Needless to say, the poor economic conditions in the country created a sense of frustration within the general population, who were facing a “pauperization” of the middle class. With that stated, citizens along with union workers began to engage in acts of civil disobedience and clashed with the police during the early 1960s. The Uruguay government denounced the labor activists as Marxists and revolutionaries (Martin, 2013). Demonstrators who were arrested were mistreated and tortured while incarcerated. One of the arrestees was Raul Sendic, a young socialist law student from the capital city of Montevideo, who was apprehended for supporting the labor activists. While incarcerated, Sendic witnessed prisoner abuses, which motivated him to write his treatise Waiting for the Guerilla, in which he called for a revolt in Montevideo. Upon being released from prison, Sendic aligned himself with numerous labor dissidents and formed an organization known as the National Liberation Movement, more commonly known as the Tupamaros. Porzecanski (1973) states The name Tupamaro comes from Tupac Amaru the famed Inca rebel who during 1780–81 tried to free his people from the Spanish. After the defeat of his forces and his execution, the Spanish called “Tupamaros” all members of rebellious groups that sprang up through most of Latin America particularly to those engaged in independence movements. (p. ix) The Tupamaros were considered to be a “Leftist-Marxist” terrorist organization whose objective was to establish a socialist form of government. During this era, Uruguay was considered to be the most highly urbanized society in Latin America, and 80% of its inhabitants were classified as “urban” (Porzecanski, 1973). The Tupamaros believed that the demographics of the population were conducive to adopting an urban terrorism strategy, and as a consequence, the Tupamaros began a campaign of “urban guerrilla” warfare in the streets of Uruguay. The Tupamaros have been described as an extremely sophisticated terrorist organization because they established a network of safe houses, prisons, and arms caches across Montevideo (Carr, 2006). They even created their own medical corps with its own ambulance service for wounded guerrillas. Carr (2006) added, “Few urban revolutionary organizations have exceeded the Tupamaros in their use of the modern city as a theatre of revolutionary warfare” (p. 115). As time progressed the Tupamaros failed to win over the hearts and minds of the working class and convince them to join their cause, and as a consequence, their plan to overthrow the ruling government failed. Failure to convince the working class to join their cause, along with a swift and brutal response by the Uruguayan government, led to the end of the Tupamaros. Since their demise, the Tupamaros have been emulated by other terrorist organizations from around the world. For example, the notorious Baader-Meinhof group of West Germany stated that they must learn from the revolutionary movements of the Tupamaros (Churchill, 2010). In the United States, the Tupamaros influenced several domestic terrorist groups, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the infamous radical left-wing group the Weather Underground, during the 1960s and 1970s. Introduction to Homeland Security

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10.5.7 Sendero Luminoso Sendero Luminoso (SL) (the Shining Path) is a Peruvian Maoist terrorist group that began in the late 1960s and was founded by a philosophy professor named Abimael Guzman. The goal of the SL is to destroy the existing Peruvian government and replace it with a peasant revolutionary regime (U.S. Department of State, 2021). To achieve their political goal, the SL embarked on a campaign of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The SL funded their terrorist operations by engaging in drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and weapons dealing. The emphasis of their strategy was “revolutionary mass mobilization.” This principle follows the doctrine of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, who believed that any revolution must begin in the countryside by mobilizing and organizing the rural peasantry (masses). Maoism is “the political, social, economic, and military theories and policies advocated by Mao Tse-Tung, as those concerning revolutionary movements and guerrilla warfare” (Dictionary.com, 2021). Like Marighella, the SL advocated the use of violence to bring down Peru’s democratic government, disrupt the economy, and destroy the state’s reputation among the peasantry, ultimately destroying the government’s reputation with the general population as well. Their violent acts of terrorism targeted local government officials such as mayors, midlevel bureaucrats, police, and local political leaders. With that stated, 70,000 people were killed in SL’s campaign of revolution and violence. The large number of casualties can be attributed to the inability of the Peruvian police and military entities to distinguish the SL members from the local peasantry. In 1997, The U.S. Department of State designated the SL as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) because of the terrorist tactics it has utilized, including car bombings, kidnappings, and staged political assassinations (COHA, 2008). In an attempt to create a perfect Communist state, the Shining Path took the revolution to the countryside and imposed its ruthless rule on the rural area by killing villagers suspected of collaborating with the government. Moreover, in an attempt to create a sense of “psychological fear” that the Peruvian government could not protect its citizens, the SL often attacked targets in Lima, the capital of Peru, to prove that they could eventually take over the capital city. Anderson and Sloan (2003) claim that the SL “was the most brutal and violent of the recent leftist insurgencies in Latin America and made the most effective use of terrorism as part of an overall strategy” (p. 366). Like the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the SL failed to win over the hearts and minds of the peasantry. In 1992, the leader of SL, Abimael Guzman, was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. Guzman’s arrest is considered to be the beginning of the end for the SL.

10.5.8 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia When we think of narco-terrorism, we usually think of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). FARC was established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. Their goal was to overthrow the incumbent government and replace it with a Communist regime. They were considered to be the largest, best trained and equipped, and most effective insurgent group in Colombia and have been recognized as the most important guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere (Rollins & Wyler, 2013). With that stated, FARC’s revenue raising includes drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. According to Trecarten (2014), FARC earned approximately $400 to $500 million per year from the sale of illegal drugs. FARC’s share of the cocaine revenue was controversial, because in 2000, Colombia’s cocaine production was estimated at a peak of 700 tons, and by 2014, it had diminished to 290 metric tons per year (Ois, 2014). The reduction in cocaine 332

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production has been attributed to Peru reestablishing itself as a major cocaine producer, and this resulted in a loss of revenue for FARC. To make up for the loss of cocaine revenue, FARC engaged in other criminal activity, such as the illegal mining of gold, tungsten, and tantalite (Ois, 2014). In 1997, the U.S. Department of State designated FARC as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) because of their history of carrying out terrorist tactics such as bombings, murders, mortar attacks, sniper attacks, kidnappings, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military attacks that include the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against Colombian political, military, civilian, and economic targets (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Global Security (2014) noted that FARC were involved in a terrorist campaign against the Colombian government and, since 1964, approximately 200,000 Colombians have died during the bloody civil war. Since 2012, FARC has been attempting to negotiate a peace treaty toward ultimately ending the five decades of war (Global Security, 2014). On June 22, 2015, the FARC bombed the Tansandio pipeline, an oil pipeline in Nariño, causing 10,000 barrels of oil to contaminate waterways. The water contamination resulted in 150,000 people losing access to water, and the Colombian government speculates that the environmental damage resulting from this attack is the worst environmental disaster in Colombia’s history. Since that time, FARC has officially become a political party, but some ex-guerrilla members have refused to demobilize and have continued militant and drug trafficking activities under the FARC’s original name (CISAC, 2019).

10.5.9 Mexico The Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have established a reputation for being extremely violent and brutal while engaging in the illicit drug trade. Their tactics include mass killings, the use of torture and dismemberment, and the assassination of journalists and government officials, along with the phenomenon of car bombs (Beittel, 2013). The level of violence in Mexico is unprecedented and even rivals the ongoing war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is estimated that from 2006 to 2012, the number of deaths as a result of the drug wars has ranged from 45,000 to 70,000 (McElreath et al., 2014b). It should be noted that there has been a great disparity in the reporting of drug war–related deaths in Mexico. There were some reports that estimated the death toll at 90,000 (McElreath et al., 2014b). In 2006, when Phillipe Calderon was elected president of Mexico, there were four major DTOs—Tijuana, Sinaloa, Juarez, and Gulf—operating in Mexico. Since then, many analysts believe that those four DTOs have now fragmented to between nine and twenty criminal organizations (Beittel, 2013). Moreover, it is widely believed that the Sinaloa and Zetas are currently the most powerful DTOs in Mexico (Beittel, 2013). According to Payan (2006), 92% of all the drugs consumed in the U.S. traversed through Mexico. Moreover, it was estimated that the Mexican DTOs generated approximately $80 billion in revenue derived from the sale of illicit drugs. However, it is widely believed that approximately 50% of the drug proceeds were utilized to bribe government officials. It is important to remember that neither organized crime nor terrorism can exist without corruption. To further exacerbate the situation along the Southwest border, the chaos in Mexico has also posed a threat to our nation’s security. The majority of illegal immigrants who attempt to enter the U.S. have been overwhelmingly Mexican nationals. However, since the horrific Introduction to Homeland Security

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terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) observed an increase in the apprehension of those other than Mexicans (OTMs) from special interest countries (SICs). According to former USBP Chief David Aguilar, SICs have been designated as such by the U.S. intelligence community because they could export individuals who could bring harm to our country in the form of terrorism (Neto, Siskin, & Vina, 2005). The proper USBP protocol for processing OTMs from SICs is to scrutinize the individuals’ backgrounds more closely and to notify the FBI, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the National Targeting Center for the purpose of consulting with counterterrorism specialists regarding the OTMs in question (Neto, Siskin, & Vina, 2005). The age of modern terrorism and extremism might be said to have begun in 1968 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al airliner in route from Tel Aviv to Rome. Though terrorism has been a perennial part of the Palestinian/Jewish struggle since the early 1920s, the violence took on an increased international flavor when aircraft hijackings became an increasingly popular tactic, along with the deliberate use of the passengers as hostages for demands made publicly against the Israeli government (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). The 1972 Munich Olympics attacks were politically motivated. Black September, a Palestinian group, kidnapped and killed Israeli athletes preparing to compete. Black September’s political goal was negotiating the release of Palestinian prisoners. They used spectacular tactics to bring international attention to their national cause (Zalman, 2020).

10.6 Funding of International Terrorism and Extremism Terrorist organizations derive their funding from a wide variety of sources. During the 1920s, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) received much of its funding from supporters in the United States. In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) demanded a ransom of $132.5 million in exchange for James Foley, an American journalist, before beheading him (Bergen & Schneider, 2014). The ISIS group also demanded a ransom of $6.6 million in exchange for another American woman who was kidnapped in 2013 (Ross, 2014). During the eight months that preceded the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, it was believed that the al-Qaeda organization obtained somewhere between $30 million and $50 million in diamonds (Kieh, 2013, p. 77). Human trafficking has generated annual revenues of approximately $32 billion (Crime, 2012). The financing of terrorism and extremism is undeniably of considerable interest to nations when attempting to quash or diminish acts of terror. Human trafficking now serves three main purposes for terrorist groups: generating revenue, providing fighting power, and vanquishing the enemy. For terrorists, human trafficking is a dual-use crime like drug trafficking and kidnapping. It not only generates revenue but it also decimates communities. In both Nigeria and Iraq, trafficking intimidated populations and reduced resistance just as enslavement and rape of women were used as tools of war in the past (Shelley, 2014). ISIS was reported to kidnap both women and children. ISIS performed sexual assaults and sold some of its victims for as little as $25.00 as it moved through Syria and Iraq, targeting various religious minorities, including members of the Yazidi (Botelho, 2014). Maoist insurgents in Nepal have exploited the longstanding trade of young girls taken from their country to the brothels of India to finance their activities. Pakistani terrorists bought 334

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children to serve as suicide bombers. Rebels in Africa traded in children to fund their conflicts and obtain child soldiers (Shelley, 2014). There were reports in late 2014 that ISIS commanders hired foreign doctors to run an extensive organ trafficking system from a hospital in the captured city of Mosul, northern Iraq (Blake, 2014). Additionally, ISIS was believed to harvest organs from its “slain civilians” and traffic them to generate revenues (Sanchez, 2015). Many other methods of financing terrorist entities exist both tangibly and intangibly. Convenience stores may be used as shells through which money is laundered and funneled to terrorist entities. Many terrorist organizations such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, FARC, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the Irish Republican Army, Shining Path, the Kosovo Liberation Army, Hezbollah and the Kurdistan’s Workers Party have utilized the drug trade to finance their acts of terrorism and extremism (Felbab-Brown, 2006). The Taliban generated a large portion of its financial revenue through the trading of heroin (Felbab-Brown, 2006). The Afghan poppies from which heroin is derived are agricultural resources; thus, they are a renewable commodity. Because of this renewable characteristic, poppies represent a virtually continuous revenue source for both terrorist entities and organized crime factions. The proceeds obtained from the illicit drug trade were used to bribe public officials, purchase weapons and ammunition, and pay the salaries of the standing armies of these terrorist organizations. The producing, trafficking, and consuming of illegal drugs and counterfeit products generate billions in revenues annually toward supporting terrorist endeavors and organizations. Regardless of the operational modality or the purpose of a terrorist entity, there is usually a common theme with respect to perpetrating acts of terror: money. Animal poaching is used to support the funding of terrorist organizations. On the African continent, elephant poaching represented a method of obtaining monies to support terrorist organizations (Quarterman, 2013). Elephants were slaughtered in order to sell their tusks illegally in a variety of markets, most notably in Thailand and China (Quarterman, 2013). Elephant tusks were also bartered and traded for weapons, food, and ammunition to support terrorist organizations (Quarterman, 2013). Decades ago, many scoffed at the notion that any linkage existed between factions of organized crime and terrorist entities. However, during modern times, it is undeniable that such a relationship exists, and it is becoming increasingly dangerous. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the following attributes characterized this relationship (Defense, 2012): • Terrorist organizations are implementing criminal activities, such as trafficking drugs, as methods of raising funds. • Criminal organizations are exhibiting terrorist characteristics, such as beheading, within their operations and activities. • Criminal organizations and terrorist entities that were one separate entities now cooperate with each other (e.g., the assassination attempt against a Saudi ambassador in the United States). • Some nations are using criminality as a method of generating financial revenue. The money-laundering efforts and activities of terrorist organizations and organized crime entities are often immense. They may also be facilitated through well-known financial institutions and banking systems, both domestically and internationally. For instance, during 2012, Introduction to Homeland Security

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international banking giant HSBC was accused of allegedly processing funds for organized crime and terrorist entities (Hsu, 2012). The accusations against HSBC involved exposing the U.S. financial system to instances of illegal monies that were associated with “Saudi Arabian terrorists, Mexican drug cartels, and rogue regimes in North Korea and Cuba” (Hsu, 2012). Between its Mexican and U.S. banking locations, HSBC transferred approximately $7 billion between 2007 and 2008 (Jamieson, 2012). During court proceedings, HSBC admitted to the laundering of “at least $881 million” of funds that were associated with Colombian and Mexican organized crime factions (Mazur, 2013). HSBC also admitted to facilitating the laundered transfers of “hundreds of millions of dollars to nations subject to trade sanctions, including Iran, Cuba, and Sudan, in violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act” (Mazur, 2013). Because of its illegal actions, HSBC agreed to a settlement of approximately $1.92 billion (McCoy, 2012). HSBC is not the only banking institution that purposefully and blatantly facilitated moneylaundering activities. Others include Wachovia, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Western Union, and Citigroup. Often, such transactions benefitted terrorist organizations and factions of organized crime (Murphy, 2013). The financial sums processed by these banking institutions were not insignificant. For instance, between the years 2004 and 2007, Wachovia processed and laundered at least $378.3 billion (Vulliamy, 2011).

10.6.1 Logistics of Funding Terrorism and Extremism Sponsoring terrorism and extremism necessitates the moving and transiting of money most cunningly. Certainly, such movements involve the logistics of domestic and international transactions. In many cases, monies often cross national boundaries. Regardless of the scenario, six defined methods of transiting monies exist: 1) money couriers, 2) informal systems, 3) money services businesses, 4) formal bank methods, 5) invoicing false trade, and 6) commodities (Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013). Money Couriers—This method involves the use of humans to transport cash physically. Cash may be transited across national boundaries at points where border security is weak. This method of transiting funds was employed by al-Qaeda before the 9/11 attack and during the 1990s (Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013). When arriving in the U.S., the terrorists deposited their cash monies in banks, including the Bank of American. Some amounts of cash were used as attack funding (Vulliamy, 2011). Informal Systems—Informal methods of transiting money exist where banking systems are not well developed and among people who share ethnic relationships (Vulliamy, 2011). An example is the hawala system that originated in South Asia. Its use is now common globally. Hawala is a method in which money or something of value is given to a receiving banking party for payment to a receiving party that is located elsewhere geographically. The receiving banking party communicates with a counterpart at the receiving location and indicates that funding should be disbursed to the intended recipient. For this service, the original “hawaladar” either invokes a percentage of the transferred funding amount (approximately 5%) or charges a straight fee (Siegel & Nelsen, 2008, p. 116). Money Services Businesses—This method involves 1) currency dealers or exchangers; 2) check cashers; 3) issuers of traveler’s checks, money orders, or stored value; 4) sellers or redeemers of traveler’s checks, money orders, or stored value; and 5) money transmitters. Although such businesses may conduct legal transactions, they are also capable of transiting money to a variety of locations globally and illegally. For instance, in 336

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2014, a money service business was closed and fined for transmitting money to the nation of Yemen (Meyerowitz, 2014). Formal Bank Methods—This method involves the use of traditional banking systems, such as credit unions, banks, savings and loans, and so forth. For instance, unethical employees may facilitate the transferring of funds to support terrorist activities, bank records may be falsified, and so forth. Invoicing False Trade—This method involves the use of “complex and sometimes confusing documentation associated with legitimate trade transactions” (Enforcement, 2018). Examples include the uses of numerous invoices for one transaction; pricing items for less than the fair market value and using the difference between this value and the “invoiced amount” to sponsor terrorism and extremism; misrepresenting the types of goods, prices, quantities, or qualities; and so forth (Gurul, 2008, p. 80). Commodities—Commodities of substantial value may be used to facilitate the funding of terrorism and extremism. Examples include gold trading, diamond trading, and so forth (Maitra, 2009).

10.7 Narco-Terrorism Although it was first defined in 1983 by Peruvian President Belaunde Terry, the term narcoterrorism was used to describe terrorist attacks against his country’s drug enforcement police (McElreath et al., 2014b). The typical terrorist tactics that have been utilized by narco-traffickers include car bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings. Moreover, Bjornehed (2004) contends that narco-terrorists attempt to influence the policies of government by systematic threat or the use of violence. To that end, narco-terrorist organizations have threatened the national security of many sovereign nations. For an example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) along with the Medellin and Cali cocaine cartels, brought the country of Colombia to the brink of becoming a “failed state.” It took the assistance of the U.S. through the “Colombian Plan” to restore a democratic form of government to Colombia. Many terrorist organizations such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, FARC, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the Irish Republican Army, Shining Path, the Kosovo Liberation Army, Hezbollah, and the Kurdistan’s Workers Party have utilized the drug trade to finance their acts of terrorism (Brown, 2006). The proceeds obtained from the illicit drug trade are used to bribe public officials, purchase weapons and ammunition, and pay the salaries of the standing armies of these terrorist organizations.

10.8 The Role of the Media and the Use of the Web Terrorist attacks are useless if no one knows about them. A terrorist’s goal is to spread fear, panic, and instability through a populace. Most acts of intentional extreme violence or terror are committed to gain publicity and, in doing so, instill fear within a population much wider than the one specifically impacted. Extremists play to the media. Without a media to inform the public about terrorist attacks, a government could potentially suppress news of the incidents and negate the terrorist’s strategy. A terrorist act in and of itself is often not nearly as significant as the public and government reaction to it. Modern groups that employ terrorist tactics understand the value of the media and understand how to use it to their advantage. There has been an explosion of terrorist related websites. In 1998, there were a total of 12 terrorist-related websites active. By 2003, there were Introduction to Homeland Security

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approximately 2,630 sites, and by January 2009, a total of 6,940 terrorist-related websites were active (Bott et al., 2009). The internet is used to establish social media sites, such as websites, chat rooms, online message boards, forums, and magazines. Examples included al-Qaeda’s Inspire and social platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, RapidShare, and other sites. The report notes that indexing of these materials by search engines makes them easily findable for prospective recruits and has proved to be a very effective recruiting tool, both domestically and internationally (Kaczynski, 2013). For years, domestic groups have used the internet to recruit, with a wide range of websites spreading their messages more effectively than historically possible. As an example of using the web to effectively send a message intended to generate recruits, announcing the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate appears to have been a turning point that allowed IS/ISIS to attract thousands of extremist fighters from across the globe (McElreath et al., 2018). The combination of these unique events, added to the international scope of the operation, gained significant media attention. The founder of PFLP, Dr. George Habash, observed that the level of coverage was tremendously greater than for battles with Israeli soldiers in their previous area of operations: “At least the world is talking about us now.” In modern times, mass media is the primary mechanism for disseminating ideology. Mass media not only serves as a receptor for ideological messaging; it is also the manner by which these ideological messages are shared in the society (Kenix, 2014). Over time, the repeated exposure to ideological messaging can gradually affect personal individual views of “social reality,” and with mass audiences, this accumulates into broader changes in society’s overall opinion and perspective. Thus, societal change may occur insidiously and slowly. Web forums and chat rooms appear to be used to reach older teens. These mediums are where peer-to-peer interactions take place and where youth can move from passively gathering radical information to actively participating in discussions of radical topics. From September through December 2014, it was estimated that at least 46,000 to 70,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time (Berger & Morgan, 2015). The web has also proven to be a recruitment and radicalization resource for extremist groups. Casting a wide net, the messages sent by extremist groups have proven to achieve their intent of attracting supporters and even, in some cases, inspiring individuals to violent action in a role that has been referred to as lone wolves: individuals often without a direct connection to the extremist organization but inspired by their message to act. These individuals, inspired to act on their own, have proven to be both a great concern to and a great challenge for authorities. There are many examples showing the ability of radical organizations to recruit globally, especially targeting young individuals and drawing them into the struggle. In 2016, 20-year-old former Mississippi State University student Jaelyn Young and her fiancé, Muhammad Dakhlalla, pleaded guilty to federal terrorism charges after they attempted to travel to Istanbul, Turkey. Both were charged with attempting and conspiring to provide material support to a terrorist group. Terrorist organizations want to use this mechanism for their own purposes. By accessing mass media, terrorist organizations are able to disseminate their ideology, deeds, and rhetoric to a large audience. By treating violence as a method of communication that propagates their ideologies in mass media, they attempt to generate a groundswell of popular sentiment and force governments to concede to their demands (Sahu, 2014). 338

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Figure 10.14 “Jihadi John,” a suspected Briton named Mohammed Emwazi who engaged in the murder of ISIS hostages and was ultimately killed by a coalition drone strike.

Terrorist organizations do not ignore this aspect of the news media business model. They exhibit professional marketing savvy by preparing statements, fact sheets, and follow-up videos for news media to use after an attack. For instance, before he attacked the London subway system in 2005, Shehzad Tanweer recorded a video that received airtime on the Al-Jazeera network during the aftermath of his attack. In this video, Tanweer stated that the London subway bombing was the beginning of a series of attacks that would become increasingly stronger until British troops were withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan (Vries, 2006). When Bin Laden released an 18-minute video in 2004 in which he announced his goal of forcing the U.S. into bankruptcy, Al-Jazeera aired nearly the entire video (Arak, 2004). Bin Laden was attempting to create doubt in the minds of Americans regarding the cost of the Global War on Terror, and he was able to exploit mass media to deliver his message. Both Shehzad Tanweer and Osama Bin Laden leveraged mass media as a means of disseminating their messages to mass audiences. Both men sought to shape public opinion, generate doubt, incite fear, and impair the war effort. While both men ultimately failed to achieve their goals through violence and rhetoric, they were successful in transmitting their messages to mass audiences. Just as mass media news outlets must generate large audiences in order to survive as businesses, terrorist groups must access large audiences in order to incite fear, further their rhetoric, influence public opinion, and recruit new members. Thus, news media and terrorist organizations can be said to have a terrible codependency, as each perpetuates and sustains the other. Though news corporations can certainly prosper without terrorism coverage, those corporations that do cover terrorism will gain larger audiences and higher incomes than those that don’t. Media coverage of terrorist incidents invariably draws world attention to the group that perpetrated the attack, along with its cause, demands, and grievances. Committing a terrorist attack is one of the most effective ways to obtain free global publicity for one’s cause. Introduction to Homeland Security

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10.9 Response Strategies The most extreme counterterrorist measures include the use of force. These actions are usually a last resort, in which police or military units must engage in combat to end a terrorist situation. Israel has energetically used force against terrorists, often very controversial measures. Israeli forces have bombed villages containing terrorist camps, in addition to kidnapping and assassinating terrorists. Terrorists have shown the ability to adapt to the techniques and methods of counterterror agencies and intelligence organizations over the long term. The decentralization of the network form of organization is an example of this ability to change. Adopted to reduce the disruption caused by the loss of key links in a chain of command, a network organization also complicates the tasks of security forces and reduces the predictability of operations. Terrorist ideologies and actions are exhibited through a variety of organizational structures, both formally and informally. For instance, ISIS exhibits a command structure, whereas some terrorist factions incorporate the use of clandestine cells. Since terrorism and extremism often attract common criminals who are motivated by greed, offering rewards for terrorists can be an effective strategy. Between robbery, kidnapping, and extortion, terrorism and extremism can be rather lucrative. Some individuals join terrorist groups not for “the cause,” but simply for the money or adventure. Reward programs are aimed at these individuals. The idea is that a large sum of money can prove an excellent incentive for a greedy terrorist to give up his compatriots. The U.S. State Department’s counterterrorism rewards program offers up to $4 million for information leading to the arrest of terrorists.

10.10 Cyber Terrorism The advent and proliferation of the internet provided numerous opportunities for terrorism to seep into the virtual world. Crimes that may be perpetrated in the physical world also have counterparts in the virtual world—including terrorist acts and endeavors. The virtual domain is a medium through which various terrorism-related activities occur. In many cases, one does not know that a cyber event occurred until it has already passed, given that such events occur in the intangibleness of virtual reality. Examples of cyber-terror activities include using the internet as a medium wherein the radicalizing of individuals occurs, a communications medium wherein terrorist actors interact, and a medium through which terror exploits can be marketed to mass audiences. Other incidents also involve some form of harm, such as ransomware events. For instance, ransomware attacks involve interjecting rogue software into an organization’s computer systems that takes the computing environment hostage. If the organization does not comply with the demands of the attacker and pay a monetary sum, then the computer systems will be permanently impaired or destroyed. In some cases, especially with legacy systems, replacement may be difficult or impossible. If the organization does pay the ransom, no guarantees exist that the aggressor will release the captured systems (either partially or completely) or that the system was not altered while being held captive. The internet makes it possible for terrorist entities to spread their messages and ideologies to mass audiences as well as individuals. Any number of groups, ranging from eco-terror entities to radical Islamic terrorists, leverage the internet for their respective purposes. Through the use of terrorist propaganda and literature disseminated via the internet, many individuals became 340

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sympathetic to terrorist causes and were radicalized to commit acts of terror. Regardless, the potential for such discourses involves various legal issues, such as freedom of speech and jurisdictions spanning international boundaries (Doss et al., 2014; Glover & Doss, 2017). Other purposes include recruiting individuals and coordinating attacks (Kenney & Clarke, 2020). Not all uses of virtual space are overt and visible; others may be anonymous or unnoticed. The cyber domain represents an emerging venue for terrorism. Each new event reveals some weakness or opportunity that must be considered by organizations, both now and in the future. Because of the newness of cyberspace, laws and policies are emerging and evolving to accommodate security needs and wants. However, only time will reveal the relationships between events and their outcomes. Regardless, in all likelihood, the cyber domain is here to stay. As terror events occur within its environment, future generations will pass judgment on such happenings.

10.11 The Twenty-First Century and the Struggle against Terrorism: Now and the Future The twenty-first century has proven to be dangerous and lethal. The new century ushered the tragedy of September 11, 2001. After nearly 20 years of war, the dangerousness of the global community continues. Many individuals, groups, and nations desire to harm the United States and our allies. We find this struggle against international extremism involves many of our major Cold War–era foes. Both China and Russia have suffered attacks by various organizations, each of which has its own agenda. Our allies have also suffered. Attacks in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy show those who would do harm have the capability to attack or inspire attacks. Attacks at home by internationally sponsored or inspired individuals or groups remain a threat. In 2009, Army Major Nidal Hasan opened fire on American soldiers stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. His attack resulted in the deaths of 13 service members and the wounding of more than 30 others. The Boston bombing of 2013 was conducted by two Chechen KyrgyzstaniAmerican brothers. In 2015, Mohammad Abdulazeez opened fire on a military recruiting center and a Naval reserve facility in Chattanooga, Tennessee, killing four U.S. Marines and a Navy sailor. In 2016, Omar Mateen, an American-born man who pledged allegiance to ISIS, killed 49 people in Florida. What we realize from these attacks is that the threat remains real and close. In addition to the Middle Eastern–centric organizations that sponsor terror, other threats impact the nation. Examples included various dangers along the U.S.-Mexican border, given the drug-related violence in Mexico and other parts of Central and South America.

10.12 Operations against the Threat of Terror The way we battle this enemy has changed over the last several decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States and most of our allies tried to ignore the threat of terrorism without success. The United Kingdom suffered attacks by the Irish Republican Army, including bomb attacks in London. The British military was committed to Northern Ireland for several decades. France combated insurgencies in its former colonies in Africa and Asia. As stated, the operational approach and capabilities have dramatically evolved over the last several decades. Today, engagement with military ground forces in a battle of attrition is avoided whenever possible. Negotiations, such as those ongoing with the Taliban in Afghanistan, are Introduction to Homeland Security

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intended to achieve a degree of peace and stability in the region. The military defeat of ISIS has yet to restore stability in the region, but it is a step in the right direction. Much of the struggle against these groups today is driven by intelligence developed identifying high-value targets. The successful operations against Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Qasem Soleimani, and Osama Bin Laden are just three examples of using intelligence to identify and neutralize high-value targets. While the attack on Osama Bin Laden involved United States Special Operations Forces, other attacks, including the one on Qasem Soleimani, were conducted through the use of armed drones.

10.13 Summary Terrorism is a tactic that is typically used by a lesser power in an attempt to wear down an opponent while avoiding decisive engagement. It may be employed by individuals, subnational groups, or nation-states to advance their agendas. Often, the targets of the attacks are vulnerable targets that are considered soft or unprepared. One of the most significant objectives of those who resort to the use of terrorism is to ultimately break the will of those targeted, forcing some desired change. This type of violence has become commonplace. Regional violence destabilizes areas of nations, nations, and multinational regions. This violence results in deaths, injuries, human displacement, and economic instability or collapse that can go on for decades, affecting generations. The tactics used by terrorists and extremists continually evolve. They have become proficient at determining targets and the vulnerabilities of those targets. They understand avoiding decisive engagement with greater military powers and further understand the importance of public support for their causes. They understand that to be successful, they have to wage their conflict on multiple fronts, including in the cyber world. With the remarkable and rapid advance in information technology, the cyber world has become a desirable target of extremists and hackers alike as a point of attack or as a platform for recruitment or radicalization. ISIS proved very successful in both its recruiting and funding efforts, much of which was linked to the cyber world. It is expected that terrorist and extremist organizations will remain a threat in both the physical and cyber arenas well into the future. To counter or defeat these threats requires strong and focused national leadership, using the national instruments of power—diplomatic, informational, economic and military—in an intelligent and focused manner, with clear and attainable objectives as a pathway to success, identifying their vulnerabilities and targeting their centers of gravity. These struggles against an extremist ideology are never easy. Successful operations against an organized extremist, terrorist, or insurgency organization often take decades. The terrorists and extremists understand this.

10.14 Key Terms 10.14.1 Terms Anti-Colonialism Assassination Extremism Freedom Fighters Funding Extremism 342

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Hawala System Human Trafficking National Instruments of Power Non-Combatants Non-State Actors

The Propaganda of Deed and The Catechism of the Revolutionary South America’s Triple Frontier Suicide Bombers Tactics of Extremists and Terrorists

Terrorism Thugs Tyrannicide Weapons Trafficking

10.14.2 People Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Carlos Marighella Carlo Pisacane Che Guevara Fidel Castro Gavrilo Princip Guy Fawkes Joanne Chesimard Maximilien Robespierre Menachem Begin Qasem Soleimani Osama Bin Laden Tsar Alexander II

10.14.3 Organizations Al-Qaeda Al-Shabaab Assassins Aum Shinrikyo Black Hand Black September Boko Haram Drug Cartels Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement German Red Army Irish Republican Army Italian Red Brigades Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) National Liberation Army of Colombia Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Russian Socialist Revolutionaries Shining Path Sicarri Taliban Thugees or Thugs Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Viet-Minh World Uyghur Youth Congress Zealots of Judea Introduction to Homeland Security

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10.14.4 Events 1972 Munich Olympics Attacks 2005 London Bombings Bastille French Revolution Gunpowder Plot Pan Am Flight 103

10.15 Questions and Discussions 1. What are your three most significant takeaways from this chapter? Why? Justify them. 2. What role do human trafficking, drug trafficking, and weapons trafficking play for terrorists and extremists? 3. Recent history has shown terrorist and extremist groups have found the cyber world to be very valuable as they struggle to advance their agendas. What are three ways you see terrorists and extremists using the cyber world to gain additional advantage in their struggles? 4. Why is the use of terrorism appealing to sub-national groups in a struggle to gain power and influence? 5. What role does the media play in relation to extremism and terrorism? 6. What is the hawala system, and what role does it play in the world of terrorism and extremism? 7. We believe to be successful against terrorism or insurgency, a nation-state or group of nationstates must employ all their instruments of power—diplomatic, economic, information, and military—in a wise manner. What role do you see each of these instruments of power playing in the struggle against extremists and terrorists?

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Carr, M. (2006). The Infernal Machine a History of Terrorism from the Assassination of Tsar Alexander II to Al-Qaeda. New York: The New Press. Chaliand, G., and Blin, A. (2007). The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda. Berkeley: The University of California Press. Churchill, L. B. (2010). Imaging the Tupamaros: Resistance and Gender in Uruguayan and U.S. Revolutionary Movements, 1960s–1980s (2010). FSU Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5f62/f07da768486b657f8903520511bf5eb6ea86.pdf. CISAC. (2019, July). The revolutionary armed forces of Colombia FARC. Stanford. Retrieved from https://cisac. fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc. COHA. (2008, May 6). The Rise and Fall of Shining Path. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Retrieved from www.coha.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-shining-path/#:~:text=In%20the%20DESCO%20study%2C%20 leftist,1988%20and%20then%20slowly%20declining.&text=Shining%20Path’s%20tactic%20to%20 force,calculated%20to%20eliminate%20the%20competition. Crime, U. N. (2012, July 19). Human Trafficking: Organized Crime and the Multibillion Dollar Sale of People. Retrieved from www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/July/human-trafficking_-organized-crimeand-the-multibillion-dollar-sale-of-people.html. August www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/ July/human-trafficking_-organized-crime-and-the-multibillion-dollar-sale-of-people.html. Dash, M. (2006). Thug: The True Story of India’s Murderous Cult. London: Granta Books. Defense, U. D. (2012). Link Grows Between Terrorism, Organized Crime, Officials Say. U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=67721. Dictionary.com. (2021). Definition of Maoism. Retrieved from https://www.dictionary.com/browse/maoism?s=t. Doss, D. A., Glover, W. H., Goza, R. A., and Wigginton, M. (2014). The Foundations of Communication in Criminal Justice Systems. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Enforcement, U. I. (2018, January 1). Money Laundering. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Retrieved from www.ice.gov/money-laundering. Engel, P. (2015, May 9). ISIS has mastered a crucial recruiting tactic no terrorists group has ever conquered. Business Insider. Retrieved from www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-revolutionizing-international-terrorism-20. English, T. (2007). Havana Nocturne How the Mob Owned Cuba and Lost it to the Revolution. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. Felbab-Brown, V. (2006, January). A Better Strategy Against Narcoterrorism. MIT Center for International Studies. Retrieved from www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20577/Strategy_Narcoterrorism-02.pdf. Ferran, L. A. (2015, February 23). ISIS trail of terror. ABC News. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/WN/ fullpage/isis-trail-terror-isis-threat-us-25053190. Folch, C. (2012, September 6). Trouble on the triple frontier: The lawless border where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/argentina/2012-09-06/ trouble. Freeman, M., and Ruehsen, M. (2013). Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview. Perspectives on Terrorism. Retrieved from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/279/html. Glover, W. G., and Doss, D. A. (2017). Business Law for People in Business. Austin, TX: Sentia. Greenspan, J. (2018, August 22). Guy Fawkes Day: A brief history. History,Com. Retrieved from http://www. history.com/news/guy-fawkes-day-a-brief-history. Greist, P., and Mahan, S. (2003). Terrorism in Perspective. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Grose, T. (2007, August 7). The terrorist playbook: Contemporary lessons from the bloody Battle of Algiers. U.S. News and World Report. Gurul, J. (2008). Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism. Northampton, MA: Edward-Elgar Publishing, p. 180. Harty, J. (1912). Tyrannicide. The Catholic Encyclopedia. Retrieved from www.newadvent.org/cathen/15108a.htm. Hoffman, B. (2003). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Hsu, T. (2012, July 17). HSBC linked to drug lords and terrorists, Senate report alleges. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-hsbc-senate-20120717,0,3041182. story#axzz2qcZ42cq1. Jamieson, A. (2012). Report: HSBC allowed money laundering that likely funded terror, drugs. NBC News. Retrieved from www.nbcnews.com/business/report-hsbc-allowed-money-laundering-likely-fundedterror-drugs-889170. Jensen, C. J., McElreath, D. H., and Graves, M. (2018). Introduction to Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge. Jensen, M. (2014, July 15). Terrorism in Latin America. War on the Rocks. Retrieved from http://warontherocks. com/2014/07/terrorism-in-latin-america-infographic/.

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Joscelyn, T. (2005, April 29). Terrorism in Africa: The imminent threat to the United States. The Long War Journal. Retrieved from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/terrorism-in-africa-the-imminentthreat-to-the-u. Kaczynski, A. (2013, April 22). 8 ways terrorists use the internet for recruitment. BuzzFeed. Retrieved from www. buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/8-ways-terrorists-use-the-internet-for-recruitment#.bn0KGweYn5. Kenix, L. (2014, April 29). Alternative and mainstream media: The converging spectrum. Bloomsbury Academic. Retrieved from www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/alternative-and-mainstream-mediathe-converging-spectrum/. Kenney, M., and Clarke, C. (2020). What ANTIFA Is, What It Isn’t, and Why It Matters. Retrieved from https:// warontherocks.com/2020/06/what-antifa-is-what-it-isnt-and-why-it-matters/. Kieh, G. A. (2013). West Africa and the U.S. War on Terror. New York: Routledge Publishing. Kohn, M., and Reddy, K. (2017, August 29). Colonialism. Stanford Encyclopedia. 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Terrorism on American Soil A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten. Boulder, CO: Sentient Publications. McCoy, K. (2012, December 11). HSBC will pay $1.9 billion for money laundering. USA Today: McCoy. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/12/11/hsbc-laundering-probe/1760351. McElreath, D. H., Doss, D. A., Jensen, C. J., Wigginton, M. P., Nations, R., Van Slyke, J., and Nations, J. (2014a). Foundations of Emergency Management. Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt. McElreath, D. H., Doss, D. A., McElreath, L., Lindsley, A., Lusk, G., Skinner, J., and Wellman, A. (2018). The communicating and marketing of radicalism: A case study of ISIS and cyber recruitment. International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (IJCWT), 26–45. McElreath, D. H., Jensen, C. J., Wigginton, M. P., Doss, D. A., Nations, R., and Van Slyke, J. (2014b). Introduction to Homeland Security. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Meyerowitz, S. (2014, February 10). Money Service Business Shut Down for Sending Wire Transmissions to Yemen Without Anti-Money Laundering Controls. Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/ financial-fraud-law/b/blog/archive/2014/02/10/money-service-business-shu www.lexisnexis.com/ legalnewsroom/financial-fraud-law/b/blog/archive/2014/02/10/money-service-business-shu. Murphy, D. (2013, May 13). Money laundering and the drug trade: The role of the banks. Global Research. Retrieved from www.globalresearch.ca/money-laundering-and-the-drug-trade-the-role-of-the-banks/. Neto, B., Siskin, A., and Vina, S. (2005). Border Security: Apprehensions of “Other Than Mexican” Aliens. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from www.congressionalreaearch.com/RL33097/documents.php. Ois, J. (2014, November). The FARC and Colombia’s illegal drug trade. Wilson Center. Retrieved from www. wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-farc-and-colombias-illegal-drug-trade. Payan, T. (2006). 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Sanchez, R. (2015, February 18). United Nations investigates claims of ISIS organ theft. CNN. Retrieved March 22, 2015, from www.cnn.com/2015/02/18/middleeast/isis-organ-harvesting-claim/. Schmidt, A. P. (2011). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. New York: Routledge. Security, G. (2014). Revolutionary armed forces of Colombia Fuezas Armadas Revolucionaries de ColombiaFARC. Global Security. Retrieved from www.globalsecurity.org. Shackelford, M. (2007). The Black Hand. Brigham Young University. Retrieved from https://net.lib.byu. edu/~rdh7/wwi/comment/blk-hand.html. Shelley, L. I. (2014, December 26). ISIS, Boko Haram, and the growing role of human trafficking in the 21st century terrorism. The Daily Beast. Retrieved from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/26/ isis-boko-haram-and-th. Spetalnick, M. (2020, May 14). U.S. considers returning Cuba to list of state sponsors of terrorism. Reuters. Retrieved from www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-blacklist-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-considers-returningcuba-to-list-of-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-source-idUSKBN22Q35O. Spindlove, J., and Simonsen, C. (2010). Terrorism Today: the Past, the Players, the Future. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Sullivan, M. P. (2014, August 15). Latin America: Terrorism issues. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf. Thomas, A. R. (2003). Aviation Insecurity. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Towers, J. (2002). The French In Algeria, 1954–1962 Military Successes Failure Of Grand Strategy. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategy Research Project. U.S. Army War College. Trecarten, N. (2014). War on two fronts: The global convergence of terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Fraser Institut. Retrieved from www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/ research/articles/war-on-two-fronts-convergence-of-terrorism-and-narcotics-trafficking.pdf. Trueman, C. (2000). The Gunpowder Plot of 1605. History Learning Site. Retrieved from www.historylearning site.co.uk/gunpowder_plot_of_1605.htm. U.S. Department of State. (2021). Countries and Areas. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/ peru/. Vries, L. (2006, July 6). London bomber: ‘Only the beginning.’ CBS News. Retrieved from www.cbsnews.com/ news/london-bomber-only-the-beginning/. Vulliamy, E. (2011, April 3). How a big US bank laundered billions from Mexico’s murderous drug gangs. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-drug-gangs. Waterkeyn, X. (2007). Assassination: Political Murder Through The Ages. London: New Holland Publishers. White, J. (2009). Terrorism and Homeland Security. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Yungher, N. (2008). Terrorism: The Bottom Line. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. Zalman, A. (2019, February 22). Terrorism Issues: Narodnaya Volya (The People’s Will, Russia). Retrieved from www.thoughtco.com/narodnaya-volya-the-peoples-will-russia-3209147. Zalman, A. (2020, January 7). History of terrorism. ThoughCo. Retrieved from www.thoughtco.com/ the-history-of-terrorism-3209374.

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11 The Role of Intelligence in Homeland Security

Figure 11.1 An intelligence briefing. (Source: Shutterstock)

[No] analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground. —9/11 Commission, quoting an unnamed government official (2004, p. 7)

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The objectives of this chapter are to: • Understand the concept of intelligence and gain an understanding of the role of intelligence in homeland security and in the field of emergency management; • Examine the “intelligence cycle” with the intent of understanding the purpose and value of the different steps in the process; • Examine the historical events that influenced the evolution of the field of intelligence in the United States; • Identify the primary intelligence agencies that function within the intelligence community of the government of the United States; • Recognize some of the more significant foreign intelligence organizations; • Discuss the role and mission of fusion centers; • Examine the concept of intelligence-led policing/law enforcement; and • Examine the legal limitations of the intelligence function as it pertaining to the collection and distribution of intelligence and classified materials.

11.1 Introduction The inability to detect the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, before the fact and the flawed national intelligence estimate regarding Iraq’s supposed 2003 possession of weapons of mass destruction are widely considered intelligence failures. That is, neither scenario provided decision-makers with the accurate and timely assessments they needed to carry out operations and formulate policy. Given modern dangers, it is essential that the United States maintain a robust, competent intelligence capability that can help its leaders understand the world around them and the threats they face. But just what is intelligence? What is its role in homeland security? Finally, which agencies in the United States are responsible for carrying out this important function? This chapter investigates such questions and provides an introduction to the concepts of intelligence and intelligence analysis.

11.2 What Is Intelligence? Perhaps the best way to define intelligence is to describe what it is not. Intelligence is not merely information or data. In the modern world, there are billions of bits of information surrounding humans all the time. One may consider the internet, which contains untold volumes of information and whose capacity grows by the minute. Certainly, some of this information is accurate while some of it is inaccurate. As well, buried amid all this “noise” may be pieces of information that, when properly addressed, might assist the nation in knowing the intentions and plans of national enemies. In order to get to the “wheat” of information, however, it must first be separated from the considerable “chaff” that exists and then integrated to gain a fuller understanding of its characteristics. These concepts, in essence, are what intelligence collection and analysis are all about. Many entities of the U.S. government are engaged in intelligence, and each has its own unique definition for the term. The Department of Defense has a two-part definition for intelligence:

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1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (WALTZ, 2003, pp. 15–16) The Central Intelligence Agency, which functions as the primary civilian intelligence service in the United States, provides a more informal definition, “Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us—the prelude to deciEach of these definitions sion and action by U.S. policymakers” (Warner, 2007, para. 14). emphasizes a different and important facet of good intelligence; the DOD version explains that intelligence is produced by a specific process, whereas the CIA makes clear that intelligence should be “actionable” or helpful to decision-makers as they choose between various courses of action. Generally, intelligence agencies engage in four activities: collection, analysis, covert operations, and counterintelligence. Collection and analysis will be discussed in the next section. Covert operations are those carried out against other countries or enemies in secret. In many cases, these activities would be considered highly embarrassing if they could be traced back to their country of origin. Some famous covert operations carried out by the United States include the attempted assassination of Cuban leader Fidel Castro in the 1960s and the successful coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. Counterintelligence involves the hunt for spies. Within the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has primary responsibility for counterintelligence. However, even the FBI was famously penetrated by spies such as Earl Pitts and Robert Hanssen.

11.3 Contemplating Intelligence According to Lowenthal (2009, p. 4), intelligence “largely refers to issues related to national security” involving “defense and foreign policy and certain aspects of homeland and internal security”; such notions of intelligence became increasingly relevant during the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. Domestically, Lowenthal (2009, p. 4) indicates that intelligence comprises three categories: “foreign, domestic, and homeland security.” However, the discussions of Lowenthal (2009, p. 5) indicate that these categories are not mutually exclusive and demonstrate ambiguity regarding their unique discernments among “practitioners.” According to Lowenthal (2009, p. 5), the intelligence domain is limited to neither a solitary scope nor a single perspective. Instead, it encapsulates an array of “areas of concern” that include the “actions, policies, and capabilities of other nations and of important non-state groups (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 5).” Further, Lowenthal articulates that activities within the intelligence domain must also monitor and evaluate the characteristics of “powers that are neutrals, friends or even allies, but are rival in certain contexts.” Therefore, intelligence is unrestricted regarding its scope and limitations of observing entities within the intelligence domain and is not solely limited to considerations of aggressive entities or “enemies” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 5). Given these considerations, Lowenthal defines intelligence as the

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process by which specific types of information important to national security is requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers, the products of that process, the safeguarding of these processes, and this information by counterintelligence activities, and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities. (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 8) To be sure, “intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed” (Intelligence-Led, 2009, p. 3). Further, “field operations generally collect information (or data)” even though “intelligence may be collected by and shared with intelligence agencies and bureaus” (Intelligence-Led, 2009, p. 3). The conceptual differentiation between information and intelligence concerns the processing of information into a product that supports decision-making. Therefore, intelligence is derived from processed information. Intelligence products rarely supply “the” answer; that is because the information on which they are based can be fragmentary, incomplete, contradictory, or just plain wrong. While most people think of intelligence in the context of national security, it serves other functions as well. Businesses, for example, employ analysts to understand the markets and to gain a competitive advantage over rivals. According to McElreath et al. (2010, p. 32): “our security depends as much upon butter as it does upon guns; few would argue today that ‘security’ depends upon stable, reliable financial markets.” This observation invokes mental connotations of the economic and financial ramifications of national security. Economic and financial characteristics are salient aspects of intelligence with respect to the crafting of national policy and strategy over time. Therefore, contemporary definitions of intelligence must encompass considerations of the characteristics and demographics of international economics and finance. However, such characteristics are not the only considerations of regional, national, and international entities that are within the domain of intelligence functions. Economic intelligence and financial intelligence may be enhanced through the use of political intelligence. According to Shulsky and Schmitt (2002, p. 55), political intelligence “consists of information concerning the political processes ideas, and intentions of foreign countries, factions, and individual leaders.” Blakeney and Borins (1998, p. 61) indicate that political intelligence serves as a measure of the strengths of responses to “policies and programs.” However, it must be noted that an amount of instability exists regarding political intelligence because of the dynamics of political change among regions and nations and internationally. Such change is considered by Heuer (1999, p. 180) through observations regarding “political judgments” affiliated with intelligence functions. According to Heuer (1999, p. 180), “political judgments are generally couched in imprecise terms, and are generally conditional upon other developments,” and “there are no objective criteria for evaluating the accuracy of most political intelligence judgments as they are presently written.” Treverton, on the other hand, views intelligence from the perspective of a service-oriented industry. According to him, this service perspective is “designed to serve American foreign policy” and is “charged with providing information for its ‘customers’ in both the executive branch and Congress” (Treverton, 2003, p. 20). The service approach is influenced by changes within the intelligence domain and by the “redefining” of customer objectives.

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Intelligence does not just support the economic or political decision-maker; it is of critical importance to the military as well. According to Warner (2009, p. 27), military intelligence involves the interpretation of evaluated observations regarding “information of the enemy and of the terrain over which operations are to be conducted.” Similarly, Austin and Rankov (1995, p. 1) indicate that military intelligence is “that which is accepted as fact, based on all available information about an actual or potential enemy or area of operations.” These notions transcend time with respect to necessities of intelligence among military organizations. Austin and Rankov (1995), for example, discuss military intelligence in an historical context, describing its use by the Romans. By now, it should be obvious that there are many definitions of intelligence; each is mediated by the specific end user. So, for example, a law enforcement agency would define intelligence in terms of understanding criminal groups while a military unit would describe it in terms of providing advantage on the battlefield. Each of the aforementioned definitions is representative of the notion that intelligence encompasses a variety of domains and is characterized among a myriad of perspectives within these domains. This notion is commensurate with the writings of former CIA analyst Mark Lowenthal (2009, p. 5) because such an array may consist of domains involving areas of “political, economic, social, environmental, health, and cultural” considerations and applications. Intelligence is also important in the business world (Seah, Hsieh, & Weng, 2010), the medical community (Oliver, 2007), and myriad other areas. Lowenthal provides perhaps the most comprehensive definition of intelligence, noting that at least three perspectives are relevant to its definition (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 8): Processes—“Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted.” Products—“Intelligence can be thought of as the product of these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves.” Organizations—“Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various functions.” Given the variety of definitions noted here, the authors postulate another, which has applicability to the wide variety of situations that involve homeland security: Intelligence— That which is derived from the interpretation of processed data and information; it facilitates decision-making over time and a variety of problem domains for the purpose of achieving a desired end state. This definition is purposely generic; it embodies many of the concepts of noted intelligence professionals as well as the dynamic facets of multiple domains of application. Nevertheless, we recognize that such a definition is imperfect. Indeed, the crating of a “model” definition, acceptable to all, continues to elude the profession.

11.4 The Intelligence Cycle Over the years, analysts and researchers have worked to improve the manner in which they produce intelligence. Most agencies employ some version of the “intelligence cycle.” The Introduction to Homeland Security

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intelligence cycle is a process that specifies all aspects of how information is turned into intelligence and provided to those who need it for a specific purpose. This process has developed over the years. Army publications from World War I describe a process that incorporated a variety of techniques (e.g., collection, analysis), but it is not until 1948 that authors Robert Glass and Philip Davidson used the term “intelligence cycle” for what appears to be the first time (Wheaton, 2011). The most current version of the intelligence cycle was dissemination by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the leader of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) in 2011. It appears in Figure 11.2. Yet what exactly do the terms means? In the words of the DNI (Director of National Intelligence, 2011, p. 11): • Planning and Direction: Establish the consumer’s intelligence requirements and plan intelligence activities accordingly. The planning and direction step sets the stage for the Intelligence Cycle. It is the springboard from which all Intelligence Cycle activities are launched. Oftentimes, the direction part of the step precedes the planning part. Generally, in such cases, the consumer has a requirement for a specific product. That product may be a full report, a graphic image, or raw information that is collected, processed, and disseminated, but skips the analysis and production step. Given the customer’s requirement, the intelligence organization tasked with generating the product will then plan its Intelligence Cycle activities. • Collection: Gather the raw data required to produce the finished product. • Data collection is performed to gather raw data related to the five basic intelligence sources (Geospatial Intelligence [GEOINT], Human Intelligence [HUMINT], Measurement and Signature Intelligence [MASINT], Open-Source Intelligence [OSINT], and Signals Intelligence [SIGINT]). The sources of the raw data may include, but are not limited to, news reports, aerial collection, satellite collection, and government and public documents. • Processing and Exploitation: Convert the raw data into a comprehensible format that is usable for production of the finished product. • The processing and exploitation step . . . involves the use of highly trained and specialized personnel and technologically sophisticated equipment to turn the raw data into usable and understandable information. Data translation, data decryption, and interpretation of filmed images and other imagery are only a few of the processes used for converting data stored on film, magnetic, or other media into information ready for analysis and production. • Analysis and Production: Integrate, evaluate, analyze, and prepare the processed information for inclusion in the finished product. • The analysis and production step also requires highly trained and specialized personnel (in this case, analysts) to give meaning to the processed information and to prioritize it against known requirements. Synthesizing the processed information into a finished, actionable intelligence product enables the information to be useful to the customer. Note that, in some cases, the Intelligence Cycle may skip this step (for example, when the consumer needs only specific reported information or products such as raw imagery). This was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) when

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PLANNING & DIRECTION

COLLECTION

PROCESSING & EXPLOITATION

ANALYSIS & PRODUCTION

DISSEMINATION

EVALUATION

Figure 11.2 The intelligence cycle.

President Kennedy needed only the actual number of pieces of Soviet equipment in Cuba and facts concerning reports on observed Soviet activity with no analysis of that information. • Dissemination: Deliver the finished product to the consumer that requested it and to others as applicable. • The consumer that requested the information receives the finished product, usually via electronic transmission. Dissemination of the information typically is accomplished through such means as websites, email, Web 2.0 collaboration tools, and hardcopy distribution. The final, finished product is referred to as “finished intelligence.” After the product is disseminated, further gaps in the intelligence may be identified, and the Intelligence Cycle begins all over again.

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• Evaluation: Continually acquire feedback during the Intelligence Cycle and evaluate that feedback to refine each individual step and the cycle as a whole. • Constant evaluation and feedback from consumers are extremely important to enabling those involved in the Intelligence Cycle to adjust and refine their activities and analysis to better meet consumers’ changing and evolving information needs. According to Richelson (1999, p. 5), seven primary domains of applications exist in which the use of the intelligence cycle is leveraged for such strategic and tactical benefits: “political, military, scientific and technical, economic, sociological, and environmental.” Cumulatively, the intelligence cycle provides a methodical process through which intelligence is provided to a variety of organizations and individuals to support a variety of decisions that influence national policies and strategies. However, the intelligence cycle is no better than the fallible humans who manage its stages or perform necessary activities within its stages, and there is no guarantee that the consumers of intelligence services and products will render wise or prudent decisions. Indeed, the intelligence cycle is rarely used in its pure form. Decision-makers often request “real time” raw data that shortcuts the very important analysis phase; as well, analysts may go back to collectors on a regular basis to obtain additional information if there are “gaps.” Nevertheless, the cycle provides a useful model to understand how, in a perfect world, the production and use of intelligence unfolds.

11.5 The United States Intelligence Community: History Today, the 17 federal agencies that perform the bulk of intelligence gathering and analysis on the national and international level refer to themselves as the U.S. “intelligence community” (IC). They strongly emphasize the notion of “community,” implying that they work together well and share information freely. However, this concept of a “community” is a relatively recent innovation. In order to understand how and why the IC is set up in its present form, it is important to understand the history of intelligence activities since the earliest days of the republic.

11.5.1 IC History: The Revolutionary War to World War II Up until World War II, the United States did not have a permanent civilian agency devoted to intelligence gathering and analysis. This was a sharp contrast to the rest of the world, where spy agencies had been in service for years. For example, England, France, and Russia all had intelligence organizations by the 1600s (Lowenthal, 2009). Protected by its oceans and surrounded by nonthreatening neighbors, American administrations did not see the need for a permanent intelligence capability. In addition, the constitutional protections afforded to U.S. citizens made spying appear unseemly and undesirable. In 1929, for example, Secretary of State Henry Stimson made the famous statement that “gentlemen don’t read each other’s mail” to justify discontinuing a State Department code-breaking operation (BrainyQuote, n.d.). That is not to say that the United States did not engage in spying; it did so in earnest during times of war. Indeed, one of the biggest proponents of intelligence throughout U.S. history was George Washington, who formed secret committees during the Revolutionary War to carry out sabotage and spy on British troop and ship movements.

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Figure 11.3 General George Washington, America’s first spymaster. Washington Crossing the Delaware by Emanuel Leutze, 1851. (Source: https://search.usa.gov/search/images?affiliate=usagov&query=washington+crossing+ delaware+image)

During the Civil War, both sides employed spies. The Union in particular received a great deal of information by interviewing escaped slaves who had found their way north; in some cases, African Americans who had escaped slavery voluntarily returned south to engage in espionage. By the late nineteenth century, it had become clear to the military that it needed to remain abreast of technological advancements by other armies and navies. As a result, the Office of Naval Intelligence was formed in 1882, followed by the Army’s Military Information Division in 1885 (Lowenthal, 2009). However, despite the presence of numerous warning signs, neither these agencies nor other governmental entity accurately predicted the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941. As it in other wars, the United States immediately reinstituted intelligence gathering—only time, the organization it created, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), would survive the of the war in an altered form as the Central Intelligence Agency.

any had this end

11.5.2 IC History: World War II and the Cold War The Office of Strategic Services was established by a presidential military order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt on June 13, 1942, to collect and analyze strategic information

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required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. During the war, the OSS supplied policy makers with facts and estimates, but the OSS never had jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities. The head of the OSS was William “Wild Bill” Donavan (see Figure 2.7), a lawyer, Army Major General and World War I Medal of Honor recipient. At its height, the OSS had a $10 million budget and engaged in covert operations in both Europe and the Pacific (Smith, 2005). World War II also saw enhanced counterintelligence activities by the FBI. In 1942, the Bureau disrupted “Operation Pastorious,” a German operation in which prospective saboteurs were transported clandestinely to the United States by U-boat. Soon after they landed, one of the saboteurs turned himself in to startled FBI agents in Washington, D.C. Thanks to information he provided, the others were soon arrested. Following the end of World War II, the United States found itself in a “Cold War” against the Soviet Union and its allies. Realizing the need for a permanent civilian intelligence service but wary of the power possessed by the OSS, President Harry Truman established the CIA in 1947. Because he did not want to create a U.S. “Gestapo,” Truman watered down the authority of the CIA, specifically denying it law enforcement powers and forbidding it to conduct activities inside the United States (Zegart, 2007). From its formation until the fall of the Soviet Union, the primary mission of the CIA was to engage in intelligence activities directed against Communist countries. It was soon joined by other agencies like the National Security Agency, founded in 1952, whose mission was to intercept and analyze foreign communications. During the Cold War, the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies enjoyed both success and failure. For example, while the IC did not foresee the invasion of South Korea by the North in 1950, they were remarkably prescient in predicting the difficulty of defeating the North Vietnamese. As well, the CIA could not dislodge Castro from Cuba, but it successfully supplied the mujahedeen in Afghanistan with weapons that led to the Soviet withdrawal from that country in 1989. By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union had collapsed. Unfortunately, the IC was slow to retool itself to fight other enemies, such as al-Qaeda, despite its brazen attacks on two U.S. embassies in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000. All that changed, however, when commercial jets slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Even as the fires in New York and Arlington raged, experts realized that the IC had failed in a catastrophic way. It was clear that changes would have to be made in the manner the United States gathered and analyzed intelligence; however, there was far from unanimity in deciding exactly what should be done.

11.5.3 IC History: Iraq to the Present In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the national commission formed to ascertain why the attacks were not prevented directed significant criticism at the IC: The Intelligence Community struggled throughout the 1990s up to 9/11 to collectintelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge. (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 12) 358

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The 9/11 Commission made several recommendations for reforming the IC. Chief among these was the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a Cabinet-level position responsible for coordinating all federal-level intelligence activities; prior to this, the Director of the CIA served in this capacity. Around the same time that the 9/11 Commission was releasing its report, another governmental agency was finding further fault with the IC. In October 2002, the IC had delivered a secret report, called a national intelligence estimate (NIE), to the President, detailing its findings on Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In short, the NIE concluded that Iraq was continuing its WMD programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Saddam Hussein’s regime was alleged to possess both chemical and biological weapons and missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions. The NIE further concluded that Iraq would likely have a nuclear weapon before 2010 (Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004). After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the expected stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction were not located. As a result, the Senate began an investigation into the preparation of the Iraq WMD NIE. In part, it concluded that most of the key judgments in the NIE were overstated or not supported by the intelligence at hand. The Senate committee further reported that faulty analysis had led to the erroneous conclusions (Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004). In response to IC failures, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law on December 17 of that year. That Act called for the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which is responsible for overseeing all federal intelligence activities, including making sure that agencies work well together and share intelligence (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.).

11.5.4 IC Success in the Struggle against International Extremism and Terrorism The need for timely and effective intelligence became clear with the rise of al-Qaida and ISIS. A U.S.-led initiative entitled Operation Gallant Phoenix enabled the widespread sharing of intelligence on ISIS foreign fighters that started out with eight countries and expanded to more than twenty. Gallant Phoenix allows allied nations not only to share intelligence on the foreign fighter threat, but also to get that information back to their law enforcement and homeland security agencies so they have visibility on the movement of foreign fighters in order to deal with this challenge. As a result, a wide range of military operations were conducted targeting ISIS assets in the battle area and well and, very importantly, identified foreign fighters, providing the ability to deal with them from a military or law enforcement aspect.

11.6 The Modern U.S. Intelligence Community There are 16 agencies that currently report to the DNI. (See Figure 11.4.) Regardless of the agency, each is responsible for ensuring that timely, objective, accurate intelligence is provided to the President and other decision-makers. The office of the DNI is relatively new and was founded as a response to the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, and the “fruitless search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq” (Tucker, 2008, p. 47). Such events raised concern regarding the robustness, Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 11.4 U.S. intelligence agencies.

effectiveness, and efficiencies of U.S. intelligence efforts. Prior to the establishment of this new office, the head of the U.S. IC had been the Director of Central Intelligence, a role held by the Director of the CIA. The DNI position is not without critics; some contend it does nothing more than add a layer of unnecessary bureaucracy that only serves to slow U.S. efforts. However, others argue that such a position is necessary to ensure that agencies work well together and that there is a single individual responsible for intelligence efforts. The missions of the remaining 16 agencies are as follows: • Central Intelligence Agency: Independent agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior U.S. policy makers; • Defense Intelligence Agency: Department of Defense combat support agency that produces foreign intelligence in support of the military; • Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Provides technical intelligence analyses on all aspects of foreign nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and energy issues worldwide; 360

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• Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis: Responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the United States; • Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Provides the Secretary of State with analysis of global developments as well as real-time insights from all-source intelligence; • Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis: Responsible for foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence related to the operation and responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury; • Drug Enforcement Administration Office of National Security Intelligence: Responsible for providing drug-related information responsive to IC requirements; • Federal Bureau of Investigation National Security Branch: Conducts counterterrorism and counterintelligence activities inside and outside the United States; • National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Provides geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives; • National Reconnaissance Office: Designs, builds, and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites; • National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. information systems; produces foreign signals intelligence information; and • United States Military: The Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy all have intelligence components that support each service’s mission.

11.7 State and Local Intelligence Efforts Up to this point, this textbook has focused on the federal government’s efforts in intelligence matters. However, to leave it at that would miss the significant role that state and local agencies play in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence. Two of the areas in which intelligence is proving crucial are intelligence-led policing and the creation of fusion centers; both are described here.

11.7.1 Intelligence-Led Policing/Law Enforcement Intelligence has always been important in policing. During the early years of the Cold War, most large departments had “red squads” that were created to keep tabs on dissidents and radicals. By the 1970s, however, a series of commissions revealed that police agencies at all levels—federal, state, and local—had abused their authority and infringed on citizens’ rights. In response to this, many police departments disbanded their intelligence divisions. However, that was not the case in the United Kingdom. In the 1990s, the Kent Constabulary experimented with a strategy it dubbed “intelligence-led policing” to combat a series of motor vehicle thefts. Kent’s use of systematic analysis led to the arrest of a small number of offenders who were responsible for a majority of the thefts (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). The success of the Kent experiment convinced British authorities that intelligence should drive investigations rather than the other way around. Until the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, most American agencies ignored the intelligence-led approach. Today, organizations such as the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit have been pushing to have intelligenceled policing adopted by all U.S. agencies. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the International Introduction to Homeland Security

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Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) established the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). In effect, the NCISP is a blueprint for a U.S. variant of the British model. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has joined forces with the IACP to promote the adoption of intelligence-led policing. DOJ established the Regional Intelligence Sharing System (RISS), a computer network designed to enable intelligence to be shared between the 18,000 law enforcement agencies that serve the United States (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2008). Some local agencies have needed little or no incentive from the federal government to institute their own version of intelligence-led policing. Perhaps the most significant example of this involves the New York City Police Department, which has taken a number of steps to enhance its intelligence capabilities, including hiring a number of analysts, stationing officers overseas, and appointing a former CIA deputy director as its Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. Law enforcement and homeland security personnel are continually increasing their use of biometric data, including fingerprints, facial recognition, and iris scans, to identify and interdict those suspected of presenting a danger to our nation. To aid in such efforts, the FBI initiated the Next Generation Identification biometric program in 2010, which replaced and expanded upon the capabilities of the FBI’s longstanding system. In September 2014, the FBI announced that the new program was fully operational and available nationwide, including two new components called Rap Back and the Interstate Photo System. The Rap Back system notifies agencies that conduct background checks of subsequent criminal activity by individuals who undergo those checks; as of February 10, 2015, four states and several federal agencies had been working toward participation in Rap Back. Using facial recognition software, the Interstate Photo System will aid investigations by allowing authorized officials to query more than 21 million images of criminals. During fiscal year 2014, CBP had 264,580 hits in its biometric database, which the agency referred for additional screening at air, land, and sea ports of entry (Security, 2015).

11.7.2 Fusion Centers One difficulty in sharing intelligence between law enforcement and intelligence agencies is the sheer number of police and sheriff’s departments that exist in the United States: the number exceeds 18,000. This is a unique situation in the world. In many countries, policing is a federal concern, which limits the number of agencies that a country will house. In the United States, however, policing is primarily a state and local function. Hence, most agencies tend to be small and serve a particular community. Sharing information between 18,000 agencies, many of whose computers cannot “talk” to one another, approaches the nightmarish. Additionally, many local police lack the computer security protocols required to handle national-level intelligence. As a result, many states have taken an intermediate approach: they have established fusion centers to coordinate the analysis and sharing of intelligence. (See Text Box 14.0.) While the jury is still out regarding whether fusion centers work, the concept seems practical and necessary. In 2014, fusion centers responded to over 4,300 requests for information from the FBI Terrorist Screening Center (Security, 2015).

11.8 Legal Guidelines Pertaining to Intelligence Collection The federal government took several steps in 2014 to strengthen its oversight of intelligence activities, affecting the mechanisms for sharing classified and unclassified information. The 362

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United States makes a strong distinction between intelligence that can be gathered on U.S. citizens and that which can be gathered on non-U.S. persons. In general, it is much more difficult to open a case and gather evidence against U.S. citizens than it is against non–U.S. citizens, who are not afforded the protections of the United States Constitution. That is one of the major reasons the FBI is so careful to classify groups as either “domestic” or “international.” When U.S. intelligence abuses were revealed in the 1970s, there was an outcry to pass legislation that would strictly regulate intelligence-gathering activities. One of the first pieces of legislation to pass was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which describes procedures and requirements necessary to obtain authority for the physical and electronic surveillance of suspected agents of “foreign powers.” In other words, agents and police officers cannot merely seize evidence against suspected terrorists on a whim; as they must in conventional criminal cases, they must articulate reasons for their surveillance, and these must pass muster with a specially appointed FISA judge (Federation of American Scientists, n.d.). The overriding legal authority that determines what law enforcement agencies may or may not do in terms of intelligence collection is Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23.18. CFR Part 23 contains standards for operating federal grant–funded multi- jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems. It provides guidance in five areas: submission and entry of criminal intelligence information, security, inquiry, dissemination, and reviewing and purging files. The passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly referred to as the USA Patriot Act, increased the ability of law enforcement agencies to engage in various acts of electronic and physical surveillance, eased restrictions on regulating suspected terrorist-related financial transactions, and expanded immigration authority in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts (U.S. Congress, 2001). In January 2014, the White House also issued Presidential Policy Directive 28: Signals Intelligence Activities, which represents the first-ever unclassified public document to outline the federal government’s standards for collecting signals intelligence. The directive limits government collection of bulk signals intelligence, outlines principles for safeguarding personal information, and requires relevant departments and agencies to annually review intelligence requirements and advise on the necessity of maintaining classified intelligence programs (Security, 2015).

11.9 Foreign Intelligence Services The nature of transnational threats in a globalized world means that cooperation must occur between countries. Many allies of the United States have developed intelligence agencies that serve the unique cultural and legal requirements of their respective governments. Since the attacks of 9/11, sharing of intelligence between these agencies has reached unprecedented levels. Perhaps America’s greatest ally in the war on terror has been the United Kingdom. Like the United States, Britain has separate agencies that deal with international and domestic threats. Military Intelligence 6 (MI-6) is England’s equivalent of the CIA, dealing with external threats. Military Intelligence 5 (MI-5), like America’s FBI, deals with threats inside the country. However, unlike the FBI, MI5 lacks law enforcement powers. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figure 11.5 Britain’s MI-5.

Israel also divides domestic and external intelligence gathering between two agencies: the Mossad (external) and Shin Bet (internal). Given the extreme level of threat facing Israel on a daily basis, both organizations enjoy excellent reputations as effective, if sometimes ruthless, intelligence agencies. Like the United States, Canada did not establish a formalized intelligence service until the twentieth century. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, formed in 1984, is the primary intelligence agency of the Canadian government, responsible for collecting, monitoring, and analyzing intelligence on threats to Canada and for conducting covert operations (Canadian Intelligence Security Service, 2008). The list of international intelligence services could continue for quite some time: most countries have some intelligence capability. Of interest: even as belligerents, it is not unusual for intelligence agencies to communicate with one another. Even at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union communicated in secret, in the hope that nuclear catastrophe could be avoided.

11.10 The Function of Intelligence in Homeland Security Most readers will clearly understand the role of intelligence in such things as countering foreign spies and preventing the next big terrorism event. However, this represents only the tip of the iceberg with regard to intelligence and homeland security. Consider law enforcement. Today’s transnational criminal organizations differ markedly from those of the past. Some years ago, the typical gang consisted of a handful of mostly young males who attempted to exert control over a geographical area of a few city blocks. Contrast that with today’s notorious gangs, like Mara Salvatrucha, whose membership includes many thousands who operate across several countries. Without robust intelligence efforts, it would be impossible to understand the operation of the group, its leadership, and the extent of its criminality. Intelligence is especially important in understanding the lifeblood of any organization: its finances. Warde (2007) indicates that money trails “yield invaluable clues and unmask vast conspiracies.” The case of Al Capone is instructive. According to Warde (2007, p. 25), during 1931, Capone was “perhaps the best-known gangster of his time” and “was convicted for tax evasion and sent to jail.” Further, Warde (2007, p. 26) indicates that law enforcement was 364

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unable to prosecute him for his more heinous criminal offenses, such as murder, but was able to send him to prison on charges of tax evasion. During this period, Capone “avoided paying income taxes by investing illegal profits in legitimate businesses” (Northrup, 2003, p. 445). Such funds were earned through the illegal activities of “prostitution, drug trafficking, and the production and distribution of alcohol were invested in legitimate, cash-based businesses, such as clothes laundries and restaurants” (Northrup, 2003, p. 445). The downfall of Capone was based on evidence regarding his claimed net worth versus his actual net expenditures. Because Capone was spending more than he claimed to be taking in, he was obviously underreporting his income to the Internal Revenue Service. Upon conviction, he was sent to prison for eight years, the longest time anyone up to that point had served on tax charges. A very specific analytical function, and one that mirrors the intelligence process, is crime analysis. Students familiar with such TV shows as Criminal Minds are aware of the “profiling” conducted by the FBI’s behavioral analysis units (BAU). In reality, the bureau doesn’t use the term “profiling”; it instead refers to the process as “criminal investigative analysis.” Agents assigned to the BAUs use the criminal investigative analysis protocol to help them understand the “what, why, and who” of violent criminal acts. Rossmo (2000) describes how law enforcement authorities utilized criminal analysis in the case of the Zodiac Killer, who murdered five people in the San Francisco area between 1968 and 1969. The Zodiac taunted the police by sending them coded and cryptic notes about the killings. According to Rossmo (2000, p. 194) “a letter to the Chronicle newspaper postmarked June 26, 1970, included a cipher and a map providing clues to the location of a bomb intended for a school bus.” Additional details were provided in a second note, which was received on July 26, 1970 (Rossmo, 2000). According to Rossmo (2000, p. 194), the geographic map “focused on Mt. Diablo (‘Devil’s Mountain’) in Contra Costa County, across the Bay from San Francisco.” Further, a “compass symbol was hand drawn in the middle of the map, the center of which contained the Naval Radio Station” (Rossmo, 2000, p. 194). Rossmo (2000, p. 194) indicates that, despite analysis, “the bomb was never found, the mystery of the map never solved, and the Zodiac Killer never apprehended.” Cryptanalysis is another activity that occurs within the intelligence function. Especially important during wartime, Shulsky and Schmitt (2002) note that, among other things, the deciphering of Japanese military codes provided the means through which intelligence was used to significantly sway the course in favor of the U.S. during the Midway battle. The Allies were also able to decode German traffic, thereby shortening World War II.

11.11 Intelligence Gathering versus Privacy A quick reading of the Constitution reveals the strong importance Americans place on limiting the power of their government (e.g., in most cases, the police need a warrant before they can search your home). This notion of privacy, which was ultimately recognized by the Supreme Court, is deeply imbedded in the American psyche. How, then, does one reconcile the right to privacy with the potential intrusiveness of intelligence gathering? To be sure, it is a difficult balancing act and one that has not always been carried out well by the agencies of the IC. For example, beginning in the 1950s and lasting until the early 1970s, the FBI engaged in a program called COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) that targeted individuals who Introduction to Homeland Security

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had not necessarily broken the law but who were deemed subversive (e.g., Communists, white supremacists, members of far-left political organizations). The bureau both spied on these individuals and engaged in “dirty tricks” to try to destabilize their organizations. In some cases, COINTELPRO proved quite effective. Upon the public’s discovery of the program in the early 1970s, the FBI was sharply criticized. New laws were passed that significantly curtailed what law enforcement could do in the intelligence arena. However, the FBI wasn’t the only organization that had overstepped its proper boundaries. Lawmakers also discovered that both the military and the CIA had spied on American citizens during the Vietnam War, an unprecedented breach of the law. Of course, in today’s digitized world, where the amount of data increases at an exponential rate, it is essential that a method be available to understand what is happening and to “separate the wheat from the chaff.” Only a proper, robust intelligence and analysis function will provide that. At the same time, agencies must remain vigilant in protecting civil liberties. This can be especially problematic during a time of national struggle, such as what occurred immediately after the 9/11 attacks. At that time, people were understandably afraid, and many were willing to trade a certain amount of privacy for a feeling of security. As the attacks have receded into history, the pendulum has swung back in the direction of privacy. This is a natural and inevitable phenomenon and one that helps maintain the stability of the republic. According to Foxman (2006, p. 1043) the “best way to fashion effective and appropriate security measures is to rely on the constitutional structure that those measures are designed to protect” as a method of facilitating “the right balance between safety and civil liberty.”

11.12 Intelligence Challenges for the New Century A primary goal of intelligence is to preempt, or prevent, tragedy. Today, the foremost priority of the FBI is to prevent the next 9/11; this stands in sharp contrast to the FBI’s historic mission of solving crimes after they have occurred. Prevention implies the ability to foresee future threats. In his publication titled Vision 2015 (2008), the DNI looked to the probable future rather than merely current challenges. Interestingly, his concerns were not confined to just crime or terrorism; they covered a wide range of threats. This implies that intelligence agencies can no longer concentrate their field of vision on a single area as they did in the Cold War. Instead, they must be prepared to deal with many different challenges simultaneously. The emerging threats identified by the DNI are contained in Figure 11.6: Perhaps the most salient part of Vision 2015 was the introduction by then-DNI J. M. McConnell, who noted: We are engaged in a dynamic global environment, in which the pace, scale, and complexity of change are unprecedented. It is a networked world where what happens in Peshawar affects Peoria—and vice versa. . . [a]dapting the Community to this new environment is our fundamental challenge. (Director of National Intelligence, 2008) Attempting to anticipate the future is a major function of the IC. Every few years, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the DNI’s “think tank,” produces its latest addition to its Global Trends series. Among other things, the NIC forecasts that certain resources (e.g., water) will become increasingly scarce and that non-traditional powers (e.g., China and India) will emerge as superpowers. 366

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Figure 11.6 Persistent threats and emerging missions. (Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008)

Certain environmental factors “drive” change. The main four “drivers” that will likely affect the future are: • Technology; • Demographics; • Economics; and • Politics/Governance. The most rapidly changing driver in the world today is technology. Think of the many new technologies that didn’t exist just ten years ago; consider how things may change over the course of the next ten years. Things like nanotechnology (the manipulation of atomic and subatomic particles), artificial intelligence (computers that can “think” like humans), and the emergence of human/machine interfaces that will prolong human life for significant periods are but a few of the technologies experts think may soon arrive. The intelligence function must remain at the forefront of technology. Many law enforcement experts believe the most significant threat we will soon face will not come from terrorists with bombs but from terrorists, criminals, rogue states, and others operating in the cyber arena. Talk of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” is becoming more and more common; some experts believe it is not a matter of “if” but “when” such an attack will come. Considering how many things are linked together and dependent on the internet, the results could prove catastrophic. Technology will have a significant effect on the future; so will demographics. By 2025, the world’s population should reach eight billion; Africa and East Asia will account for the majority Introduction to Homeland Security

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of that growth. The population of developed countries will continue to “age.” That is, the average age of the population will increase. This phenomenon is already occurring in the United States, producing much angst with regard to health care and entitlements such as Social Security. Other parts of the world, such as Africa and the Middle East, are expected to have “youth bulges,” in which the high birth rates will produce large numbers of young people. Unfortunately, these same countries have some of the world’s worst economies; they likely won’t be able to support the young populations. This will likely lead to unprecedented levels of immigration. America may resemble less a melting pot of gradual assimilation into the culture than a salad bowl, where individuals representing many different ethnicities, religions, and cultures will be living side by side. U.S. intelligence agencies are especially concerned with border security or the lack of same. America’s borders, especially the one with Mexico, have grown exceptionally porous as a result of lucrative smuggling opportunities for both humans and illicit goods. Terrorists could exploit both legal and illegal immigration to introduce themselves and/or weapons of mass destruction into the United States. The last two drivers—economics and politics—are related. Experts realize that “globalization” (the linking together of economies and cultures) has caused the world to shrink. National borders are becoming increasingly irrelevant, which allows people to form allegiances with entities other than their country of origin—things like their religion or ethnic heritage, for example. Globalization has provided some definite benefits. Consider, for example, the low prices one pays for goods manufactured in China as a result of their cheap labor costs. It has also provided significant dividends for countries like China and India, which have managed to exploit globalization to their advantage.

11.13 The Intelligence Partnership The emergency operation centers are legacy functions in the emergency management system. The new centers are the intelligence or fusion centers. The mission statement from the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2021) states, “to provide homeland security intelligence and information to the Secretary, other federal officials, and our state, local, tribal, and private sector partners.” According to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2021), 58 fusion centers are operating throughout the United States. Since 2004, the creation of fusion centers for intelligence gathering and information sharing has been a priority. Much progress has been made. Historically, intelligence units were extremely limited in state and local jurisdictions. The intelligence capability was limited at best. Intelligence units for most state and local governments are cost prohibitive. Homeland Security has enhanced building intelligence units throughout the United States through the grants and training program. According to the DHS, from 2004 through 2007, approximately $254 million dollars were allocated to states and local governments to support fusion centers. Fusion centers assemble a corps of preparedness partners to collect, analyze, and disseminate information relative to threat priorities. The fusion centers are represented by a diverse group of partners, depending on the needs of and resources available to the state or local jurisdiction. The centers generally are staffed by federal, state, and local personnel, including the private sector. Centers are in various phases of development but will perform similar functions when they are completed. 368

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The need for information and information sharing is common to both the public and private sectors. The information sharing partnership is one of the most essential and needed relationships identified by the efforts of the preparedness programs.

11.14 Regional Information-Sharing Systems Regional information-sharing systems (RISS) are a tool through which an integration of information resources exists to support the collaborative activities and efforts of law enforcement entities. They may also be used to support homeland security initiatives. According to the RISS website (McElreath et al., 2014b), the primary categories of its organizational functions are information sharing, analysis, equipment loans, confidential funds, training, technical assistance, provision of disaster information for first responders, conflict management for officer safety, and intelligence functions concerning gang-related crimes. Each of these categories contributes to the fulfillment of the functions of criminal analysis. RISS defines a “major goal” as the provision of “law enforcement member agencies with the necessary tools to share information about known or suspected criminals and criminal activity” (RISS, 2009). Based on the writings of Boba (2005) and RISS (McElreath et al., 2014b), this function of RISS is commensurate with homeland security functions and may be accomplished through the use of computerized, electronic, and software technologies. Because of such shared information, the efficiency and effectiveness of homeland security initiatives may be improved. Based on the descriptions of the RISS services (McElreath et al., 2014b), these services have the potential to impact the strategic, tactical, and operational decisions that influence homeland security functions and environments. Based on the writings of Sweet (2006, p. 267), such decision attributes, with respect to shared resources, support “threat analysis and warning functions” and influence “national decision-makers responsible for securing the homeland from terrorism.” This consideration is commensurate with the writings of Baker (2005) regarding terrorism and counterterrorism activities. The RISS functions provide emergency responders with support for the performance of their duties through the use of “RISS ATIX,” in which pertinent information regarding incidents is provided (McElreath et al., 2014b). Therefore, the RISS services demonstrate the capacity for embellishing the homeland security function with respect to decisions regarding addressing threat assessment and terrorism response activities. Further, both Boba (2005) and Baker (2005) indicate that various forms of quantitative analysis are components of the criminal analysis function. Based on the contents of the RISS site (McElreath et al., 2014b), RISS may support the implementation of such forms of mathematical analysis (e.g., trend analysis, forecasting, etc.) through its provision of a unique “compilation and analysis of investigative data to develop analytical products as requested by the member agency” (McElreath et al., 2014b). Therefore, RISS manifests the potential to contribute to the successful achievement of the functions of homeland security initiatives. Based on the writings of Boba (2005), Baker (2005), and Sweet (2006), one may determine that information sharing and collaboration, the rendering of decisions, and the use of quantitative analysis are salient considerations within the context of the functions of criminal analysis. According to RISS documentation (McElreath et al., 2014b), materials and discussions are presented that demonstrate the capacity of RISS to contribute to the fulfillment of homeland security tasks. Such materials and discussions consist of the capacity to generate unique analytical tools for individual entities, provision of emergency services support toward the Introduction to Homeland Security

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rendering of decisions, and the provision of the “necessary tools to share information about known or suspected criminals and criminal activity” (McElreath et al., 2014b). Given such observations, when considered from perspectives of the functions of criminal analysis, RISS demonstrates the capacity of supporting homeland security initiatives.

11.15 Chapter Comments and Summary In today’s world, it is essential that every country have a robust, competent intelligence capability that can help its leaders understand the world around them and the threats they face. Policy makers need to understand that intelligence is not merely information or data. Instead, it is the product of a specific process that generally involves collecting, planning and direction, processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation. This process is often referred to as the “intelligence cycle.” Today, 17 federal agencies make up what is termed the U.S. “intelligence community.” However, up until World War II, the United States did not have a permanent civilian agency devoted to intelligence gathering and analysis. That differed greatly from the rest of the world, where spy agencies had been in service for years. In the early days of the republic, U.S. spying was generally confined to periods of war. However, after America failed to predict the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, it was decided that the United States needed a permanent civilian intelligence capability. After the war, the Office of Strategic Services was remade into the Central Intelligence Agency, which led U.S. intelligence efforts during the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the IC was slow to retool itself to fight other enemies, such as al-Qaeda. In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, however, it was recognized that U.S. intelligence required a major overhaul. The 9/11 Commission recommended that a central Director of National Intelligence be appointed to oversee all activities of the IC. In 2004, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was established. Currently, all IC agencies report to the DNI. The federal government is not the only entity that engages in intelligence matters. Through fusion centers, intelligence-led policing, and the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, state and local authorities also have a major role to play. In addition, a great deal of cooperation currently exists between the intelligence services of the United States and its foreign allies. This is essential in combating transnational terrorist and criminal organizations. Intelligence professionals today must adhere to a series of laws and guidelines that dictate what can be done in investigations. These laws include FISA, the USA Patriot Act and 28 CFR 23.

11.16 Key Terms Assessment Central Intelligence Agency Consumer Data Director of National Intelligence Emerging Threats Foreign Intelligence Services Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 370

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Fusion Center Information Intelligence Intelligence Agencies Intelligence Community Intelligence Cycle Intelligence-Led Policing Intelligence Report

Mission Observations Privacy Process

Product Regional Information Sharing Systems Technology Threat

11.17 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. Intelligence analysis and information processing are two separate entities. Write a brief essay that defines both entities and that discusses the salient characteristics of both concepts. Compare and contrast these terms in your response. 2. Historically, intelligence analysis has a long history in the United States. It experienced a myriad of successes and failures. One of the most shocking events of the Cold War occurred when an intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo, was captured by North Korea during the 1960s. Do some historical research, and write a brief essay that speculates how extensive the damage was to U.S. intelligence efforts because of this loss. 3. Intelligence is used by large government organizations and small-town police departments. Consult your local law enforcement agency, and determine how they leverage intelligence and intelligence analysis to solve crimes. Write a brief essay that highlights your findings. 4. When discussing intelligence with your local agency, determine whether they participate in any type of fusion center. In your essay, include a description of how your local law enforcement agency leverages a fusion center relationship to solve cases and to deter crime.

Text Box 14.0: Fusion Centers. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. (2003). National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Retrieved November 29, 2008, from www.iir.com/global/products/NCISP_Plan.pdf Excerpt from the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan: What Is a Fusion Center? A fusion center is an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources. In addition, fusion centers are a conduit for implementing portions of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP).

References

9/11 Commission. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Executive Summary). Retrieved November 29, 2008, from www.911commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf. Austin, N., and Rankov, N. (1995). Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople. New York: Routledge Publishing. Baker, T. (2005). Introductory Criminal Analysis: Crime Prevention and Intervention Strategies. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall Publishing. Boba, R. (2005). Crime Analysis and Crime Mapping. California: Sage Publications. Blakeney, A., and Borins, S. (1998). Political Management in Canada: Conversations on Statecraft, 2nd edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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BrainyQuote. (n.d.) Henry Stimson Quotes. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www.brainyquote.com/ quotes/quotes/h/henrylsti295174.html on 11/30/2008. Canadian Intelligence Security Service. (2008). Homepage. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www.csis-scrs. gc.ca/index-eng.asp. Director of National Intelligence. (2008). Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Director of National Intelligence. (2011). U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2011. Retrieved January 25, 2012, from www.odni.gov/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf. Federation of American Scientists. (n.d.). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/. Foxman, A. (2006). Security and freedom of speech. In Kamien, D. (Ed.), The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, pp. 1031–1045. Heuer, R. (1999). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Retrieved July 12, 2010, from www.cia.gov/library/centerfor-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/ PsychofIntelNew.pdf. Institute for Intergovernmental Research. (2008). Regional Information Sharing Systems. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www.iir.com/riss/. Intelligence-Led. (2009). National criminal justice reference service. Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. Retrieved July 11, 2010, from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf. Lowenthal, M. (2009). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. McElreath, D., Quarles, C., Jensen, C., and Nations, R. (2010). Introduction to Homeland Security. Tulsa, OK: K & M Publishers, Inc. McGarrell, E. F., Freilich, J. D., and Chermak, S. (2007). Intelligence-led policing as a framework for responding to terrorism. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23, 142–158. Northrup, C. (2003). The American Economy: A Historical Encyclopedia, Vol. 2. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO Publishing, Inc. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2008). Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www.dni.gov/Vision_2015.pdf. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). Who We Are. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www. dni.gov/index.html. Oliver, W. (2007). Medicine looks back at intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence & Counter Intelligence, 20(3), 564–566. Richelson, J. (1999). The U.S. Intelligence Community, 4th edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Rossmo, K. (2000). Geographic Profiling. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Seah, M., Hsieh, M., and Weng, D. (2010). A case analysis of SEACOM: The role of indigenous leadership in implementing a business intelligence system. International Journal of Information Management, 30(4), 368–373. Select Committee on Intelligence. (2004). Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html. Shulsky, A., and Schmitt, G. (2002). Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Publishing, Inc. Smith, R. (2005). OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press. Sweet, K. (2006). Transportation and Cargo Security: Threats and Solutions, 1st edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Treverton, G. (2003). Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tucker, N. (2008). The cultural revolution in intelligence: Interim report. Washington Quarterly, 31(2), 47–61. U.S. Congress. (2001). Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2021). Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Retrieved from https:// www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis. Waltz, E. (2003). Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise. Norwood, MA: Artech House Publishing. Warde, I. (2007). The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror. Berkeley: University of California Press. Warner, M. (2007). Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence.’ Retrieved November 30, 2008, from www.cia. gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02. html#author1.

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Warner, M. (2009). Intelligence as risk shifting. In Gill, P., Marrin, S., and Pythian, M. (Eds.), Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates. New York: Routledge Publishing, pp. 16–32. Wheaton, K. J. (2011, May 20). Let’s kill the intelligence cycle. Sources and Methods. Retrieved December 24, 2011, from http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.com/2011/05/lets-kill-intelligence-cycle-original.html. Zegart, A. (2007). License to fail. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved November 30, 2008, from http://articles.latimes. com/2007/sep/23/opinion/op-zegart23.

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12 Protecting Our Nation’s Infrastructure Border and Transportation Security

We must secure nearly 7,500 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico, across which more than 500 million people, 130 million motor vehicles, and 2.5 million rail cars pass every year. We also patrol almost 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable waters, and 361 ports that see 8,000 foreign flag vessels, 9 million containers of cargo, and nearly 200 million cruise and ferry passengers every year. We have some 422 primary airports and another 124 commercial service airports that see 30,000 flights and 1.8 million passengers every day. There are approximately 110,000 miles of highway and 220,000 miles of rail track that cut across our nation, and 590,000 bridges dotting America’s biggest cities and smallest towns. That is just a thumbnail of the vast infrastructure that supports the largest and most efficient economy in the world—with more than $11 trillion in Gross Domestic Product. —Remarks by former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security James Loy at the National Cargo Security Council Annual Convention The objectives of this chapter are to: • Examine the basic border types: land, sea, air, and virtual; • Understand the general concepts of national sovereignty and border security; • Examine the dynamics around the current debate in the United States pertaining to the national borders; • Gain an overview of the critical issues facing the United States in the area of transportation; • Understand the impact of globalization as it relates to both transportation and border security; • Examine the historical evolution of border protection in the United States; and • Discuss the future of border protection and security for the nation.

12.1 Introduction Nation-states have always been concerned about the security of their borders and who may and may not cross those borders. In today’s world, driven by globalization, transportation 375

Figure 12.1 A border agent inspects a man-made tunnel along the Mexican-Arizona border. (Source: U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. Photo by Josh Denmark)

of people, goods, and services directly intersects with national sovereignty and border security. Protecting our borders from the illegal movement of weapons, drugs, contraband, and people while promoting lawful entry and exit is essential to homeland security and economic prosperity. For the United States, in the wake of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress decided that enhancing the security of the United States’ borders was a vitally important component of preventing future terrorist attacks. Before September 11, 2001, border security fell piecemeal under the mandate of many diverse federal departments, including, but not limited to, the Department of Justice (the Immigration and Naturalization Service), the Department of the Treasury (the Customs Service), the Department of Agriculture (the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service), and the Department of Transportation (the Coast Guard). Today, border security functional responsibilities are at their most vivid at the point at which goods or people are expected to cross borders.

12.2 Overview: Border and Transportation Security The U.S. exhibits four types of borders: 1) land, 2) sea, 3) air, and 4) virtual. The land borders of the U.S. represent its national boundaries with the nations of Mexico and Canada,

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through which pass many individuals, vehicles, and goods. The sea borders of the U.S. include the myriad of ports through which massive quantities of goods and people enter and depart the nation. The borders of the U.S. represent a line of demarcation that intangibly separates the U.S. from other nations. For example, a foreign traveler may enter the U.S. via an airline but must pass through a border that exists within the confines of an American international airport whose location may be deep inside the geographic expanse of the nation. This type of border is a virtual border. Securing the borders and transportation systems of American society is a critical concern of homeland security. The events of September 11, 2001, were demonstrative of the necessity of maintaining the integrity of aviation transportation and having good knowledge of the individuals who enter the U.S. Along the U.S.-Mexican border, the effects of drug wars impact American towns and citizens and interject their lethality among U.S. and Mexican citizens. Further, numerous tunnels exist that connect the U.S. with Mexico, through which pass illegal aliens, narcotics, and a myriad of other entities. During the twentieth century, Ted Kaczynski leveraged the logistics of the postal system to deliver his bombs to an unsuspecting audience. Each of these examples demonstrates some aspect of the American infrastructure that is characteristic of imperfect security. Further, these examples are indicative of the notion that threats may originate both externally and internally. The events of September 11, 2001, were externally perpetrated by the al-Qaeda organization, whose operatives entered America solely for the purpose of inflicting devastation and deadliness, to further the terrorist goals and agendas of the organization. Many border and transportation security improvements occurred after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The response to the 2001 attacks included the enactment of the Transportation Security Act of 2001, the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the passage of laws to strengthen border security. Such legislation included immigration policies with respect to the admission of foreign nationals and the strengthening of security within the maritime domain. The response also included the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its responsibilities of protecting American society and critical infrastructure against perilous threats. However, despite the best efforts of the government and commercial sectors, no guarantee exists that security breaches shall not occur in due time. Because of the gigantic quantities of goods, services, individuals, and vehicles that cross the American borders daily involving some form of transportation, the task of protecting American society is vast and challenging.

12.3 An Overview of Transportation Security Transportation security involves moving commerce and people safely and quickly. Each day, a myriad of goods and services are exchanged among global, national, regional, and local markets. Regardless of the economic systems that are advocated among nations, markets are the entities that manifest the exchanges of limited services and goods toward the satisfaction of unlimited human wants and needs over time. Given the proliferation of globalism during the preceding century, few of these markets facilitate exchanges in which goods and services are exclusively produced within any solitary nation. Instead, globalism interjects and integrates

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the provision of countless goods and services among destination markets that exist around the world, which are separate from their considered points of origin. According to the United Nations, “Industrialized countries, with 19% of the world’s population, account for 71% of global trade in goods and services, 58% of foreign direct investment, and 91% of all Internet users.”1 The U.S. conducts and participates in a significant amount of global and international trade. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the U.S. international trade deficit increased in 2018. Between 2017 and 2018, the deficit increased from $552.3 billion to $621.0 billion because imports increased more than exports. Regarding the U.S. gross domestic product, the goods and services deficit increased from 2.8% in 2017 to 3.0% percent in 2018. 2 Also, between 2017 and 2018, the goods deficit increased from $807.5 billion to $891.3 billion in 2018, and the services surplus increased from $255.2 billion to $270.2 billion. Other considerations of U.S. trade may be considered. The 2018 economic figures showed surpluses, in billions of dollars, with South and Central America ($41.5), Hong Kong ($31.1), the Netherlands ($24.8), Australia ($15.2), and Belgium ($14.2). Deficits were recorded, in billions of dollars, with China ($419.2), the European Union ($169.3), Mexico ($81.5), Germany ($68.3), Japan ($67.6), Ireland ($46.8), Italy ($31.6), Malaysia ($26.5), India ($21.3), OPEC ($21.2), Canada ($19.8), Thailand ($19.3), Switzerland ($18.9), South Korea ($17.9), France ($16.2), Taiwan ($15.5), Russia ($14.1), Indonesia ($12.6), and Saudi Arabia ($10.5).3 The deficit with China increased $43.6 billion to $419.2 billion in 2018.4 Exports decreased $9.6 billion to $120.3 billion, and imports increased $34.0 billion to $539.5 billion.5 The deficit with the European Union increased $17.9 billion to $169.3 billion in 2018.6 Exports increased $35.4 billion to $318.6 billion, and imports increased $53.3 billion to $487.9 billion.7 The surplus with South and Central America increased $7.3 billion to $41.5 billion in 2018. 8 Exports increased $13.6 billion to $163.8 billion, and imports increased $6.3 billion to $122.3 billion.9 These figures are demonstrative of a massive economic function, globally and internationally, through which goods and services are exchanged around the Earth. Given these observations, it is obvious that these global exchanges of goods and services, which cross national borders, must be facilitated through some mechanisms of transportation. During modern times, three intermediaries exist through which these exchanges occur: 1) air, 2) sea, and 3) land. Air transportation involves the use of both passenger and cargo airlines. Maritime transportation encompasses vessels that travel the world’s oceans and barges that traverse American rivers and waterways. Land transportation involves the myriad of trucks and delivery vehicles that travel along roadways and interstates and the networks of railways that connect the American infrastructure. Each of these intermediaries must function effectively and efficiently to facilitate their respective business and economic functions within modern society. Any impediments could interrupt the provision of services and goods in an array of settings. Because of just-in-time logistics, economic integration internationally and globally, the inability of some nations to produce the goods and services that are consumed within their economies, and the numerous economic dependencies that have resulted from globalization, it is imperative that these intermediaries be secured against the myriad of threats that endanger their operations.

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Because of globalism, the U.S. depends on other nations to supply many of the goods and services that are consumed within the American economy. Therefore, it is obvious that such goods and services must cross some form of national boundary (i.e., border) that separates America from its national neighbors and the remainder of the world. The penetrating of the U.S. border involves the use of each of the preceding intermediaries. Once goods cross the American borders, they must be disseminated among their destination markets. Therefore, questions and considerations of border and transportation securities are of paramount importance for the safety and protection of American society.

12.4 Historical Perspective: Aviation and Aerospace Security The uses of aviation and aerospace resources have long been associated with the notion of security. Within the U.S., some of the earliest uses of such entities were demonstrated during the Civil War. During this conflict, both the Union and Confederate militaries employed balloons for the purposes of reconnaissance. According to the United States Centennial of Flight Commission, these events represented the initial uses of balloons for reconnaissance purposes. Although the Union Army successfully completed the construction of a balloon, it was unused because “It escaped its tethers and was shot down to prevent it from falling into Confederate hands.”10 However, MacDonald wrote: “The union Army formed a balloon Corps of several gas balloons. The aerostats were kept inflated for weeks, and transported by rail, boat, or carried cross-country; trees obstructing their path were felled.”11 From the perspective of homeland security, the notions of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance continue to be salient resources through which modern intelligence efforts are implemented and accomplished. The concept of transporting and delivering aviation resources via waterborne vessels continues to be a significant aspect of naval aviation and intelligence functions that facilitate aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

12.5 Modern Perspective: Aviation and Aerospace Security Air carriers en route to the United States from a foreign country are required to submit passenger manifests before their arrival at a U.S. port of entry. While inspections are done on U.S. soil, such advance notification alerts the CBP inspectors to which travelers will need closer scrutiny. The manifest is transmitted electronically, via the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), which is integrated with the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), a component of the US-VISIT program.12 The attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the vulnerability of aviation security. The plot aboard Northwest Airlines (NWA) Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, was unsuccessful when passenger Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried and failed to detonate concealed explosives. Another failed plot occurred on October 28, 2010, when aircraft were used to conceal and ship explosive devices. These events highlight the fact that the terrorist threat is a global challenge, and ensuring aviation security is a shared responsibility.

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Although extensive efforts have been directed toward aviation passenger security, an additional area of major concern is cargo security among airlines. To highlight the crucial role of the private sector in this area, it is important to note that FedEx, UPS, DHL, and TNT together employ more than 1 million people around the world and own or operate more than 1,700 aircraft. Each of these companies has operations in more than 200 countries. In the last decade, air merchandise trade comprised almost 30% of U.S. exports by value, totaling approximately $390 billion, and almost 20% of U.S. imports by value, totaling more than $417 billion. Combined, that represented more than $800 billion of U.S.-international merchandise trade (Reeder, 2010). These figures were not inclusive of the passenger airlines that carry cargo within the cargo holds of their aircraft (e.g., Delta, American, etc.). Regardless, such quantities are demonstrative of the economic saliency and relevancy of cargo airlines. Any impeding of their services and functions has the potential of affecting the U.S., international, and global economies. In 1994, the Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) experienced the hijacking of one of its cargo airliners, Flight 705. This event represented the terrorizing of an aircraft crew by one of their fellow employees of the corporation. This situation is unique because it involves the hijacking of a cargo aircraft solely for suicidal reasons. Historically, passenger airliners were hijacked for a variety of reasons and were routed to a myriad of destinations. Such reasons included terrorist agendas; inciting political change; financial motivations; securing the release of various and sundry prisoners globally; or the unusual case of D.B. Cooper, in which the perpetrator parachuted from the aircraft, taking with him a large sum of money. The attacks of September 11, 2001, although tragic, were indicative of aviation threats posed by terrorist factions whose origins were external to American society. The case of FedEx Flight 705 was representative of a different threat whose potential lethality also could have drastically affected numerous aspects of American society. In the case of FedEx Flight 705, the threat represented an origin that was internal to American society. From the perspectives of homeland security and aviation, both events demonstrated that aviation threats exist that may be either external or internal to America and that such threats involve radically different motivations. Regardless, in both cases, the intent involved commandeering aircraft to perform devastating acts of lethality. The events of September 11, 2001, necessitated the cessation of all flights, other than military and emergency aircraft, over the United States. Because of this interruption in the air transportation system, cargo airlines were unable to deliver their payloads for a period of time. As a result, many businesses and government entities, which relied on just-in-time delivery supply chains, were impacted adversely. The agrarian sector also was impacted because of the inability to perform the aerial tasks of crop dusting. This restriction also applied to passenger airlines. Many travelers were delayed, and passenger airlines that also carried cargo goods within the cargo hold of their aircraft were unable to transport either their passengers or their cargo payloads. Although alternative forms of transportation and logistics were implemented, the economic, financial, and personal impacts of ceased aviation transportation impacted countless individuals and organizations. As an interesting note, the Armed Cargo Pilot Program was discontinued two days prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The accounts of FedEx Flight 705 and September 11, 2001, provided lessons that served to improve American security functions within the aviation sector. Because of the FedEx event, corporate security and airport security were enhanced. These changes are representative of localized 380

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improvements that may be made to bolster security. Because of the 2001 events, the entirety of American aviation was impacted through the passing of legislation and operational enhancements that improved aviation security. Although such improvements were controversial and incited much debate, their intent was to protect American society and its transportation infrastructure. During modern times, aviation security may be considered from the perspective of National Security Presidential Directive 47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16 (NSPD-47/ HSPD-16). This represents the national strategy of the U.S. regarding aviation security through which the coordinating and integrating of aviation security efforts across the government are optimized.13 A primary thrust of the strategy involves integration and cooperation between the public and private sectors towards coordinating efforts toward detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating threats to the air domain, reducing vulnerabilities, and minimizing the consequences of, and expediting the recovery from, attacks that might occur.14 Although this strategy expresses the foundational aspects of aviation security, it is supplemented by additional plans. Brief descriptions of these plans follow: Aviation Transportation System Security Plan—Uses a risk-based paradigm for “developing and implementing measures to reduce vulnerabilities within the aviation transportation system.”15 Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan—Establishes an array of “protocols to assure an effective and efficient United States Government response to air threats” that endanger national interests.16 Aviation Transportation System Recovery Plan—Expresses a variety of strategies regarding the “operational and economic effects” of an aviation domain attack, including measures to “enable the aviation transportation system and other affected critical government and private sector aviation-related elements to recover from such an attack as rapidly as possible.”17 Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan—Facilitates the coordination of “requirements, priorities, and implementation of national air surveillance resources” and the methods of sharing these resources with “appropriate stakeholders.”18 International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan—Expresses the “U.S. international activities to counter illicit acquisition and use by terrorists, other criminals, and other hostile individuals or groups of stand-off weapons systems” that represent the highest endangerments “to lawful civilian and military use of the air domain.”19 Domestic Outreach Plan—Facilitates the participation of stakeholders regarding the “implementation of the supporting plans and related aviation security policies” and expresses foundational “guidelines for outreach in the event of a threat to, or an attack on, the United States or another disruptive incident to the aviation transportation system.”20 International Outreach Plan—Represents a “comprehensive framework to solicit international support for an improved global aviation security network.”21 Individually, each plan has its own goals regarding the safety of American society and protecting the nation from the risks of harmful events. Collectively, these plans provide a robust approach to aviation security that accommodates a variety of risks and catastrophic events that must be acknowledged as potential endangerments to the American air domain. Their totality provides measures for the preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery phases of operations that may be necessary in the event of an aviation event leveraged against the United States. Implementing these plans cumulatively facilitates much cooperativeness between domestic and international entities and both government and private organizations through which Introduction to Homeland Security

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information is shared regarding any potential aviation threats. Regardless of the perspective, either cumulative or individual, these plans all share a common theme—deterring the chances of an attack against the United States, mitigating the effects of any incident that may occur, and facilitating a speedy recovery during the aftermath of any catastrophic incident.

12.6 Additional Commentary: Aircraft Hijacking The cases of September 11, 2001, and FedEx Flight 705 demonstrated two types of hijackings that served different purposes. The former was the result of radical Islamists, whose hijackings propagated terrorist agendas, whereas the latter was the result of a disgruntled employee whose dishonesty resulted in a failed hijacking endeavor. In both instances, an aspect of the intent of the hijackers was to leverage the aircraft itself as a weapon through which their respective goals could be accomplished. However, these two instances are not the only events of aircraft hijacking that have occurred since the beginning of modern flight. Hijacking events have occurred over approximately a half century and have affected a myriad of nations and societies. Among these hijackings are examples of both the internal threats and external threats that endanger America and its allies. These examples demonstrate a variety of motivations for hijacking aircraft: political, religious, economic, financial, revenge, etc. These examples are a testament to the modern necessities of attempting to ensure the integrity and safety of aviation environments through security embellishments and improvements, which affect the infrastructures of American flight. Because of the risk of hijacking, the necessity of security in aviation settings must be neither ignored nor discounted. Therefore, aviation environments must strive to ensure their safety and security through multiple methods. Sweet (2006) indicated that one potential method of bolstering aviation security involved a layered methodology. According to Sweet (2006), the different security measures that comprise the layered security effect with respect to the approach of countering hijacking are 1) enhanced cargo, baggage, and passenger screening; 2) perimeter security and terrorism watch list (i.e., no-fly list); 3) cockpit door enhancement; 4) flight deck officers (voluntary); and 5) air marshals (i.e., sky marshals).22 The category of enhanced cargo, baggage, and passenger screening provides a security mechanism through which contraband materials and individuals who pose potential threats may be discovered before boarding aircraft. This activity provides a tool through which potential weapons may be discovered and neutralized before any aircraft damage or criminal activity may occur. Various arguments are associated with this issue. Rudner (2008) considered passenger screening from the perspective of identity fraud and potential threat and indicated that such procedures and processes hampered the movement of potential terrorists across borders. Ackleson (2005) emphasized the importance of screening cargo and items for safety purposes but also noted the necessity of facilitating a strong level of unimpeded economic commerce that occurred through transportation networks. Given these considerations and perspectives, it may be concluded that airport screening provides a valid mechanism through which undesirable entities may be discovered, thereby dissipating potential catastrophes, and it also provides a perception of safety, real or imagined, within the minds of air travelers and air personnel. The categories of perimeter security and passenger watch lists (i.e., no-fly lists) also contribute to the potential of stronger security in air environments. Rudner (2008) indicated that such methods may identify individuals who may pose risk or represent danger. Martonosi and Barnett (2006) advocated such examinations as a method of improving the probability of identifying individuals who may pose serious threats. Given such arguments, it may be concluded 382

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that such examinations may deter and prevent criminal activity from occurring through the potential identification of individuals who are wanted by law enforcement or who represent a high risk to flight safety. Cockpit and flight crews are a component of aviation security and safety. Security of the cockpit area may occur through the use of weapons or strengthened doors to avoid any undesired cockpit access that may compromise the flight status of the aircraft. The category of cockpit door enhancement provides a safety mechanism that heightens the security of the cockpits and the safety of flight crews of aircrafts as a method of diminishing the impacts of hijackings and other criminal activities that may occur during takeoff, flight, or landing. The category of voluntary flight deck officer status provides the means through which armament may be provided to flight crew members as a safety and security attribute of air travel. Regardless of the method(s) selected, debate is associated with the use of weapons in such fragile and complex environments with respect to the damaging of equipment or interference with the operations of the aircraft.23 A category of air marshals (i.e., sky marshals) represents the presence of law enforcement along air routes and serves as a method through which the physical presence of a commissioned officer may address criminal situations that may arise during the course of travel. This program is commensurate with the writings of Gesell (1996) regarding the legality of the presence of armed law enforcement officers in aircraft environments. Through the use of such individuals, individuals may be detained, apprehended, and arrested prior to the landing of the aircraft as a method of countering dangerous situations. Based on the aforementioned discussions, it may be concluded that on-ground security is the dominant characteristic of airline safety and security. Based on the writings of Rudner (2008) and Martonosi and Barnett (2006), screening may identify undesirable entities during the initial accessing of airport environments, thereby preventing them from boarding aircraft as a method of avoiding danger. However, such screening is not the only consideration of airline security. Gesell (1996) emphasized the necessity of ensuring the security and safety of airport operations environments. For example, aircraft maintenance and review (e.g., pre-flight checks) must be performed to ensure the robustness and flight potential of the aircraft before terminal departure. Fuel areas must remain secure. Control towers, radar, and other electronic systems must be secure. Baggage areas and loading mechanisms must be secure as a method of avoiding dangerous items that may be carried in cargo hold environments. Although the safety and security of the aircraft environment must be considered during all phases of flight (departure, travel, and disembarking), such an environment is merely a subset of the overall superset of airport and aerospace operations. Given the greater quantity of threat risks posed by the overall superset of aviation operations environments, it may be concluded that on-ground security is the dominant characteristic of airline safety and security because it provides the opportunity to counter dangerous situations prior to the departing of aircraft and lends itself to the safety and security of the overall aerospace and aviation operations environment.

12.7 Historical Perspective: Maritime Security The concept of maritime security is not new. Maritime security has been an American concern since the creation of its original colonies and the founding of the U.S. During modern times, American maritime interests must be maintained and protected to ensure the effective, efficient functioning of commerce activities. They must also be maintained and protected to ensure the logistical flow of vessels and goods across the earth’s oceans. They must be Introduction to Homeland Security

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maintained and protected to guard against the potential of hostile entities that may seek to leverage political agendas against the U.S. and its allies. Further, given the modern dangers of terrorism and the influences of organized crime, they must be maintained and protected to guard against such hostile entities. As an example of a maritime environmental threat, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez along the shore in Prince William Sound, Alaska, in 1989 caused one of the worst maritime oil spills in American history. The economic and financial losses incurred because of the Exxon Valdez accident were tremendous. A variety of research studies examined the adverse impacts on the fishing industry, the sport fishing sector, tourism, recreation, and replacement costs. According to the EVOSTC (McElreath et al., 2014), the estimated value of “lost passive use” was $2.8 billion. The lessons learned from the incident were varied. Skinner and Reilly (1989) emphasized the notion that better preparedness could have improved the quality of the response in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness. Further, Skinner and Reilly (1989) indicated that better preventive measures were salient attributes of avoiding such catastrophic events. Further, because of the Exxon Valdez incident, numerous improvements regarding infrastructure were recommended, through which betterments among communications, logistics, environmental cleaning, and coordination occurred. With respect to the modern application of homeland security initiatives, the lessons learned from the Exxon Valdez are timeless and are clearly appropriate to the contemporary issues of the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster responses. The incident shows that human imperfections and human errors may cause disasters of massive proportions. Although technologies have changed over the preceding 20 years, human nature has remained unchanged. The potential for another incident comparable to the events of the grounding of and subsequent oil spillage from the Exxon Valdez, resulting from human imperfections, exists in modern maritime environments. Another timeless lesson involves nature itself. Although technologies changed during the decades that followed the Exxon Valdez incident, nature remains unchanged. Mountains still impede radio communications if electronic repeaters are not present to strengthen the transmissions and conveyances of radio signals. Stormy weather still necessitates the grounding of aircraft that may be necessary during response initiatives. Rough seas still may impede the provision of maritime assistance and supplies that are necessary during responses. Modern practitioners of homeland security must be aware of this lesson and its representative constraints of nature. During modern times, America must ensure that its maritime abilities to conduct global and international trades are unimpeded because of the current manifestations of economic integrations that exist between America and a myriad of nations. These relationships provide foreign products for consumption within the American economy and provide American products for consumption in other economies globally. Hence, given the historical growth of globalization, modern America has many partners—and is dependent on each of them as they depend commensurately on America to facilitate mutual economic benefits. Accidents happen. This notion is certainly appropriate for any field of endeavor—especially the disciplines and vocations of homeland security. Modern practitioners of homeland security must be prepared to implement quality disaster responses both effectively and efficiently. However, prevention is certainly a core component of both avoiding and mitigating the potential risks associated with a variety of accident scenarios. During modern times, American infrastructure must be committed to the prevention of accidents, thereby avoiding costly responses and impediments to the provision of resources that are necessary to economic functioning and national security. If accidents do happen, then homeland security practitioners 384

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must be prepared to render appropriate responses. Both preparedness and responsiveness must not only accommodate the logistics of a situation but also consider the characteristics of nature that may affect the disaster response.

12.8 Modern Perspective: Maritime Security More than 80% of the world’s trade, by volume, is conducted by ship, and 99% of overseas trade, by volume, enters or leaves the United States by ship. Such a vast transportation system can only be secured through the combined efforts of federal, state, and local governments and the contributions of private industry. The U.S. Coast Guard is the primary federal agency in securing the maritime transportation mode, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also shares much of this responsibility. The TSA’s Port and Intermodal Division is engaged in this unified national effort, primarily by providing expertise in credentialing as well as passenger and vehicle screening techniques and procedures (Port, n.d.). America boasts such government organizations regarding the protection and security of shipping, national coasts, and waterways, but external threats exist that may affect the provision of sea-borne goods and services. The Barbary pirates impeded international trade during the nineteenth century. Over two centuries later, the concepts and deeds of piracy continue to endanger maritime environments. During recent years, acts of sea piracy have gained notoriety among a myriad of national media outlets. According to the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs (BCA), Piracy at sea is a worldwide phenomenon which has affected not only the coasts of Africa, but also Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Yemen, Venezuela and the Caribbean. American citizens considering travel by sea should exercise caution when near and within these coastal areas. (International Maritime, 2011) During recent years, significant acts of piracy have occurred near the continent of South America, within the Gulf of Aden, within the regions of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, and near the continent of Africa. Although acts of piracy may occur anywhere, U.S. agencies and organizations perform a masterful job of ensuring the safety of American waters. However, regarding other nations, such protections are either limited or nonexistent. During 2018, incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea happened off the coasts of Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. Recent political and social tensions in Venezuela were catalysts for further instability that could result in increased acts of maritime crime. U.S. citizens sailing yachts in the region were warned to exercise heightened caution in or near Venezuelan waters.24 Incidents also occurred off the coast of Brazil. Piracy was also troublesome in the Middle East and Africa. Regional tensions increased the risk of maritime attacks against vessels operating in the Gulf of Oman, the North Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the Bab el Mandeb region.25 Piracy and armed robbery incidents occurred in the Strait of Malacca and Southeast Asia. Pirate attacks in Indonesia were typically attacks aimed at thefts from the vessels and differed from the more serious, violent attacks in the Gulf of Guinea and near Somalia.26 Indonesian government and maritime observers in Indonesia noted that pirate attacks in Indonesia were typically small-scale robberies, sometimes with the collusion of the ship’s crew, as opposed to large-scale vessel seizures.27 During 2017, there were at least 15 reported boardings, attacks, or kidnappings in the Sulu and Celebes Seas. All five kidnapping Introduction to Homeland Security

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incidents were reportedly linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a violent Islamic separatist group operating in the southern Philippines.28 Piracy is unconstrained by territorial waters. Maritime crime poses potential hazards worldwide. Two notable subsets of maritime crime are armed robbery at sea, occurring within a nation’s territorial sea, and piracy, which occurs in waters beyond the territorial sea. There have been incidents of armed robbery and piracy in the waters off Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Guinea. Maritime vessels and passengers should always exercise caution, especially when near and within areas with recent incidents of maritime crime. Piracy on the Pacific Ocean is a concern for America. Because the U.S. conducts a vast amount of trade with China, the Pacific Ocean is the primary route through which goods and vessels travel between the two nations. Any interruption of the maritime logistics system could impede the flow of goods that are consumed within the American economy. This concept is not exclusive to the American relationship with China. Instead, it is also applicable to any nation with which the U.S. manifests a logistical system of imports or exports. Therefore, the monitoring of sea lanes and vessels is a paramount consideration of maritime security. Monitoring the seaways involves sophisticated tracking systems. The Office of Law Enforcement of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) maintains a vessel monitoring system (VMS) that currently tracks over 5,900 small vessels with an anticipated expansion of another 2,500 vessels this calendar year. In addition, NOAA maintains law enforcement information on small vessels through its Law Enforcement Accessible Database System (LEADS), which tracks investigations, incidents, activities, and outreach. An additional resource is the International Chamber of Commerce, which also records acts of piracy on the Earth’s oceans. The preceding discussion considered the accident of the Exxon Valdez. Although the accident occurred over 20 years ago, accidents continue to impact American society. During 2010, another spillage of oil occurred that impacted America. This incident occurred on April 20, 2010, when a British Petroleum (BP) oil well exploded in the Gulf of Mexico and caused a continuous spillage to escape from an undersea oil well. This event “Easily eclipsed the Exxon Valdez as the biggest oil spill in U.S. history” (Chronology, 2010). Similar to the events and consequences of the Exxon Valdez, the Gulf of Mexico spillage adversely affected the environmental and economic facets of the region along the American coastline. The volume of the spillage manifested a “[r]ate of between 12,000 to 19,000 barrels a day—much higher than the initial estimate of 5,000 barrels a day” (Salazar-Winspear, 2010). Containment of the spillage was attempted multiple times and involved the application of “heavy drilling liquids” and “dubbed mud” within the “fractured wellhead to beat back the flow of oil, before sealing it with concrete” (Salazar-Winspear, 2010). The cause of the accident demonstrated a myriad of factors that contributed to the manifesting of the catastrophe. According to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon and Offshore Drilling (National, 2010), the accident occurred as a combination of the following characteristics of the problem domain: The well blew out because a number of separate risk factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to overwhelm the safeguards meant to prevent just such an event from happening. But most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure—a failure of management. Better management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to 386

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properly evaluate, communicate, and address them. A blowout in deep water was not a statistical inevitability. According to Salazar-Winspear (2010), as part of the disaster response effort, the Obama administration terminated further drilling and exploration initiatives in the Gulf of Mexico, which included “suspending 33 deepwater exploratory wells being drilled in the Gulf.” This action affected the economic functions of a variety of organizations and individuals whose dependence on the oil industry facilitated their livelihoods. The economic impacts were also not constrained to the immediate region of the incident. Salazar-Winspear (2010) indicates that additional exploration and drilling restrictions were also implemented that suspended “[p]lanned exploration in two locations off the coast of Alaska” and oil facility lease sales near the coast of Virginia. The lessons of the Exxon Valdez encompass the facets of both human imperfections and nature that must be observed by members of the homeland security community. Humans are imperfect and are susceptible to errors and mistakes that cause accidents. Nature, through its innate characteristics of weather and geography, also must be considered with respect to incident preparedness and disaster responses. Similar lessons are learned from the Gulf of Mexico oil spillage disaster. According to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon and Offshore Drilling (National, 2010), these concepts are expressed as follows: Deepwater drilling provides the nation with essential supplies of oil and gas. At the same time, it is an inherently risky business given the enormous pressures and geologic uncertainties present in the formations where oil and gas are found—thousands of feet below the ocean floor. Notwithstanding those inherent risks, the accident of April 20 was avoidable. It resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean, and by government officials who, relying too much on industry’s assertions of the safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program of regulatory oversight that would have properly minimized the risks of deepwater drilling. It is now clear that both industry and government need to reassess and change business practices to minimize the risks of such drilling. Because of the recent occurrence of the event, it is currently impossible to know the full scope and magnitude of the effects of the disaster strategically. However, in the coming decades, a better realization and understanding of the effects and the consequences of the Gulf oil spillage will be known. However, current observations are commensurate with the lessons learned from the Exxon Valdez disaster: humans are imperfect, nature is challenging, and any economic activity is not without risk. Practitioners of homeland security must observe and affirm these lessons. Regarding the Gulf oil spillage, the rendering of decisions was imperative to providing an effective, efficient response. However, the rendering of decisions is also an important component of prevention. Based on the preceding excerpts, the disaster might have been prevented if better decisions and actions had occurred before the explosion. Petroleum is a natural resource. A large portion of the American transportation system is fueled by this natural resource. Ensuring the integrity, security, and safety of its current production mechanisms is a paramount aspect of homeland security because of the fuel dependencies that exist within the American economy. Therefore, preventive measures must be acknowledged as a salient consideration of preserving the integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency of obtaining and processing natural fuels. In the event that catastrophes occur, Introduction to Homeland Security

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responses must be quick, efficient, and effective, in accordance with any disaster plans that exist, federally or among the states. The Gulf incident also has another implication: market alternatives. Petroleum is a natural resource and is finite. Therefore, its quantities are limited. From a perspective of homeland security, this constraint impacts facets of both the economy and national security. Not only is petroleum the basis of producing fuels for the American transportation system (e.g., gasoline); it is also used to produce pharmaceutical, medical, plastic, and roadway paving products. Although the American economy depends on its availability, its limitation as a natural resource must be considered within the context of market alternatives (e.g., fuel cells, solar power, etc.) as a method of satisfying the demands of the American transportation system. Throughout history, various concepts and lessons are unchanging regarding their implications for homeland security. During the Jeffersonian period of the nineteenth century and during modern times, maritime piracies have affected American interests adversely. The Jefferson administration fought against the Barbary pirates, whereas modern presidents are concerned with the issues of piracy among the maritime regions of South America, within the Gulf of Aden, within the regions of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, and near the continent of Africa. The twentieth century witnessed the catastrophe of the Exxon Valdez, whereas the twenty-first century now witnesses the Gulf of Mexico disaster. Both incidents provided lessons regarding nature and the imperfections of humans. Within the context of homeland security, from a maritime perspective, both the set of historical examples and the set of modern examples provide much insight into the concepts of transportation and border security. American interests must not be impeded by hostile actors that attempt any forms of extortion toward the furtherance of their agendas. The infrastructure of the American economy must also be secure, and its safety and integrity must not be compromised. However, despite the best and highest attempts to protect American infrastructure and economic functions, accidents happen that necessitate disaster responses. When responses are implemented, their lessons must be observed to influence preparedness functions as a method of potentially avoiding future cataclysms or improving the quality of future disaster responses.

12.9 Historical Perspective: Mass Transit and Railway Security Historically, mass transit matured with the growth and the expansion of American society, especially the construction of the nation’s railroad system. Mass transit also changed in conjunction with the technological advancements that improved society over time. According to Schrag (2010), the origins of American mass transit were among the introductions of “[h] orse-drawn omnibuses and streetcars in Eastern cities” during the 1830s. Throughout the nineteenth century, American mass transit systems created and expanded rail services and subway systems. Although such technological advancements in transportation provided numerous benefits to society, their existence and use also presented a variety of risks. During 1866, the Reno gang successfully accomplished the “[f]irst robbery of a moving train in the U.S., making off with over $10,000 from an Ohio and Mississippi train in Jackson County, Indiana” (First, n.d.). Before the implementation of this “innovation in crime,” train robberies occurred “only on trains sitting at stations or freight yards” (First, n.d.). This tactic quickly expanded toward the American West, where the newly constructed transcontinental and regional railroads were attractive targets (First, n.d.). During this period, trains often ferried large cash reserves, making them attractive targets for thieves (First, n.d.). 388

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Such attacks prompted security improvements to the railway infrastructures. Railroad companies began to resist these attacks and fortified their box cars. During this period, security improvements included “[p]rotecting their trains’ valuables with large safes” and the employing of armed guards (First, n.d.). These security improvements increased the difficulties of train robbery and altered the risks and dangers associated with robbing trains (First, n.d.). Historically, such train robberies are indicative of the human greed that motivated acts of crime on railways. However, other dangers existed that threatened railway systems historically. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, numerous railway accidents occurred. One of these accidents caused the death of a notable figure in American history: Casey Jones. In 1900, a train collision occurred in Vaughn, Mississippi, which claimed the life of Jones (Gurner, 2006). Jones was employed with the Illinois Central Railroad (ICR) as an engineer (Gurner, 2006). During inclement weather, consisting of fog, Jones was the engineer aboard a passenger train, the Cannonball Express, when it collided with a stationary freight train in Vaughn (Gurner, 2006). Jones attempted to halt the forward movement of his train but was unsuccessful. Although his actions saved the lives of his passengers, Jones died in the incident (Gurner, 2006). These historical accounts are representative of two categories of threats that endangered American railways. First, railways were susceptible to attacks perpetrated by humans. Regardless of the motivations for such violence, susceptibilities existed among railways that were indicative of poor, if any, security features. Such attacks could impede the economic functioning of American society through the impeding of the transportation system and the thefts of cash reserves. Second, railways were susceptible to accidents. Regardless of the severity of the outcomes, accidents occurred that damaged the railway infrastructure and were lethal. Commensurate with the timelessness of the historical lessons learned from the maritime and aviation sectors, the American railway system also demonstrates lessons that are timeless. The lack of security in railway settings facilitated train robbery, allowing hostile entities to perpetrate their agendas against society. Because of absent security features, attacks against the railway system impeded the economic flows of goods and the functioning of the railway system. During modern times, railways are a sizeable component of the national transportation infrastructure. Therefore, railways must implement security features to bolster their integrity and quality of service. Railways must also ensure that the integrity and functions of their infrastructure are unimpeded and that they perform efficiently and effectively. Railway accidents were indicative of human error, mechanical failures, or inclement weather. Regardless of the cause, modern railway environments are susceptible to threats identical to those that existed during the nineteenth century. During modern times, equipment may malfunction, inclement weather may affect railway infrastructure, or human errors may cause severe accidents. Therefore, modern railway environments must consistently and continuously evaluate their infrastructures to maximize both security and safety attributes.

12.10 Modern Perspective: Mass Transit and Railway Security Within the U.S., approximately 6,000 mass transit systems serve about 15 million riders daily. (In comparison, the nation’s airlines carry about two million passengers per day.) The systems Introduction to Homeland Security

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include everything from small-town bus services to massive transit systems with integrated bus and rail service (Mass Transit, 2007). White (2007) indicated, There are roughly 140,000 miles of active track in the national freight rail network comprised of the Class Is and about 600 short line railroads; 23,000 miles of track used for rail passengers; 7,100 miles of urban rail transit systems; 165,000 miles of bus routes; and more than 4 million miles of interstate, national highway and other roads open to the trucking industry within America’s surface transportation system. The use of mass transit, combined with the limited security designed to detect or record criminal activity within the systems, make mass transit a prime target for threat groups. Given the vastness of the American mass transit infrastructure, it is impossible to completely and totally ensure its security. However, among segments of this system, security may be improved. Such improvements are not without challenges. Guerrero (2002) indicated that mass transit systems exhibited the characteristics of open systems in which security mechanisms were few because of the necessity of transporting large numbers of people quickly. Although the aviation industry has significantly improved its security mechanisms through the use of scanners, searches, and other methods, the remaining components of American mass transit do not demonstrate such tenacity. Examples of such openness include the ability of passengers to access and travel within buses, subways, and trains with few, if any, security mechanisms and restrictions. Further, such openness facilitates vulnerabilities because of the general inability to monitor or control who enters or departs the systems (Guerrero, 2002). The manifesting of such openness increases the attractiveness of mass transit systems as potential targets for damage or destruction. Additional target attractiveness is manifested because such systems exhibit the characteristics of “high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)” (Guerrero, 2002). The impracticalness of implementing security features is demonstrated through the high volume of passengers who rely on mass transit for transportation; the costs associated with developing, testing, and implementing security features; and the costs of securing the access points along routes (Guerrero, 2002). Obviously, the American mass transit system is susceptible to attacks. However, even if these systems manifested stringent security features, the risk of accidents, necessitating disaster responses, would persist. Such risks are unavoidable and have affected American mass transit during the preceding decades. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (Derailment, 1994), in 1993, the derailing of Amtrak Train 2, the Sunset Limited, traveling between Los Angeles, California, and Miami, Florida, occurred in Mobile, Alabama, when it collided with a displaced bridge. This accident caused the deaths of 47 people (42 passengers and 5 members of the train crew) and injured 103 passengers (Derailment, 1994). The implications of this accident must be acknowledged regarding the security, safety, and integrity of railways within the American mass transit system. This accident necessitated the improving of the mass transit infrastructure along American railways. It is impossible to completely eliminate the risk of accidents that may affect the railway system. Therefore, practitioners of homeland security must be mindful of the potential for such accidents along the myriad of railway networks that connect American cities. Although the 390

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Alabama tragedy occurred in conjunction with a passenger railroad carrier (i.e., Amtrak), freight railroad entities are susceptible to identical risks of accidents. Within the U.S., freight railroads represent a significant component of the transportation system that facilitates the functioning of the American economy. According to the American Association of Railroads (Economic, 2010), during the last decade, freight railroads employed approximately 184,000 personnel and generated approximately $265 billion annually in total economic activity that included direct, indirect, and induced effects. Freight railroads demonstrate greater fuel efficiency than roadway trucks. On an annual basis, U.S. railroads transited a ton of freight an average of 480 miles per gallon of fuel and were four times more fuel efficient than trucks (Economic, 2010). Given the preceding considerations regarding the limitations of petroleum fuels, this consideration is significant because of the contributions provided by railroads to the American economy. Further, according to the American Association of Railroads (Economic, 2010), a train carries the freight of 280 or more trucks, thereby reducing “highway gridlock, the maintenance costs of existing highways, and the pressure to build costly new highways.” This observation is also relevant given the necessity and costs of maintaining the American highway system. Based on data obtained from the American Association of Railroads (Economic, 2010), the following observations are demonstrative of the economic potency of the freight railway system: • The main freight of railroads is bulk cargo, such as coal, heavy equipment, and iron ore. • Annually, railroads transport approximately “1.7 million carloads of wheat, corn, soybeans, and other agricultural products, plus another 1.5 million carloads of animal feed, beer, birdseed, canned produce, corn syrup, flour, French fries, frozen chickens, sugar, wine, and countless other food products.” • Annually, the “2 million carloads of chemicals that America’s railroads carry” assist to clean American water, fertilize farms, package food, build cars and homes, protect health, and enhance well-being “in thousands of other ways.” • Approximately “half of America’s electricity is produced from coal, and railroads haul 70 percent of America’s coal.” Further, the amount of “electricity produced from rail-delivered coal is enough to meet the power needs of every home in America.” Therefore, because of contributions toward “keeping coal-based electricity affordable,” freight railroads “reduce the dependence on imported energy and save money.” • Annually, “America’s freight railroads carry 1.3 million carloads of lumber and paper products—including wood to build our homes, newsprint and magazine paper, and cardboard for packaging. Railroads also haul tens of thousands of carloads of recycled paper each year.” • “Intermodal service (moving shipping containers and truck trailers on rail cars) transports a huge variety of consumer goods, from electronics and greeting cards to clothing and furniture, as well as industrial and agricultural products. Approximately 60 percent of rail intermodal traffic consists of imports or exports, reflecting the vital role railroads play in international trade.” • Annually, freight railroads “deliver millions of new cars and trucks and many of the parts and accessories used to build them.” • “Railroads also carry millions of carloads of raw materials and industrial products that are critical to our way of life, including metallic ores (such as iron ore and bauxite for aluminum), steel and other metal products, petroleum, crushed stone and gravel, cement, scrap metal for recycling, and much more.” Introduction to Homeland Security

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The preceding facts are indicative of the notion that American railroads represent a mode of transportation that contributes to the satisfaction of the demand that exists for goods and services within the American economy. It is imperative that this system function effectively and efficiently without impediments. Any damage or destruction within this system could easily delay or prohibit the delivery of a myriad of products within the American economy. If this system was disrupted, the delivery of pharmaceutical products, fuels, and an array of other necessary products would be hampered. Therefore, practitioners of homeland security must be mindful of the importance and significance of the American railway system in terms of both consumer interests and national security. The railway system is a critical component of American transportation. The integrity of the railway system must be monitored and maintained to ensure it is functioning effectively and efficiently. American railways serve the purposes of transporting people and freight in urban and rural areas. Although it is susceptible to both incidents of accident and attack, some levels of security mechanisms exist within its infrastructure. However, these security features are less stringent than those of the aviation sector. During modern times, the events of September 11, 2001, drew attention to shortcomings in the aviation sector, thereby facilitating numerous security improvements to its infrastructure. However, the importance of the railway system is comparable to the importance of the aviation system: both are intermediaries for transporting people and freight. Given this realization, from a homeland security perspective, railway entities must be mindful of incident preparedness and must facilitate disaster recovery and response efforts. Following the events of September 11, 2001, numerous alterations occurred to improve railway security. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was tasked with aviation security after its creation, it was also tasked with protecting American ports, highways, and railways.29 In addition to the influences of government organizations, private railway entities also undertook the analyses of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) as a method of assessing and evaluating their operational vulnerabilities.30 Some of these activities, in conjunction with government regulations, also fostered the crafting of detailed railway operational maps that can be shared with emergency responders if an incident occurs.31 New tracking technologies were developed that locate the real-time positions of railway cars along railroad networks.32 Railway corporations forged collaborative agreements with emergency responders and provided access to railway cars for emergency responder training.33 Changes following the events of September 11, 2001, have affected and permeated all the states within the union. For instance, in Texas, specific attention is given to the routing of hazardous materials, bridge management, and tank car safety.34 Specifically, these changes incorporated the rerouting of hazardous materials along rail lines to diminish the risk of catastrophic incidents near populated areas.35 Texas also gives specific attention to inspecting railway operations and resources to ensure their integrity and the safety of society. Such inspections may identify “defects requiring repair within a specified time limit or serious defects requiring immediate repair or removal from service.”36 The economic, logistical, and strategic importance of railways must be acknowledged with respect to their contributions to critical national infrastructure. Given the vast quantities of people, materials, and resources that flow throughout railway networks, maintaining their performance is of paramount importance to the nation. Railways carry goods and people from ports to inland regions nationally. Conversely, they ferry goods and people from inland origins to seaside destinations. Railways are resources through which mass quantities of numerous goods, ranging from medicines to munitions, may be transferred and distributed throughout the nation. Because of the dangerousness of hazardous materials that may be 392

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lethal or severely damaging to human health and the ecosystem, railways are a resource for transporting these items through routes that may reduce the chances of endangering human life. Maintaining the integrity of the railway system is a significant goal of homeland security.

12.11 Container and Cargo Security Much of the recent U.S. maritime security efforts have focused on regulating cargo containers and large vessels at official ports of entry (POE). The U.S. maritime system consists of more than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals, with most ships calling at U.S. ports being foreign owned. Container ships have been the focus of much of the attention on seaport security due to the potential of terrorists infiltrating them. More than 12 million marine containers enter U.S. ports each year, and while all cargo information is analyzed by Customs and Border Protection officers for possible targeting for closer inspection, only a fraction are actually physically inspected. CBP works in tandem with the U.S. Coast Guard at sea ports of entry. Efforts such as the Coast Guard’s requirement that ships provide a 96-hour notice of arrival and CBP’s Container Security Initiative (CSI) program aid in preventing harmful things from getting to the United States (McElreath et al., 2014). Container and cargo container security initiatives address the threat to border security and global trade posed by the potential for terrorist use of a maritime container to deliver a weapon and to expand the border so that our ports will not be the first line of defense by proposing a security regime to ensure all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. CBP has stationed multidisciplinary teams of U.S. officers from both CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to work with our host foreign government counterparts. The three core elements of CSI are 1) the identification of high-risk containers. CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance information and strategic intelligence; 2) pre-screening and evaluating containers before they are shipped (i.e., containers are screened as early in the supply chain as is possible, generally at the port of departure); and 3) the use of technology to prescreen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade. This technology includes large-scale X-ray and gamma-ray machines and radiation detection devices. These notions of cargo security are vital to protecting American society from threats that may be present among the items that enter the nation through its airports and seaports. Given the advent and proliferation of globalism, the U.S. imports many goods and services from foreign nations and exhibits numerous dependencies regarding the importing of items externally. Figures 12.2a and b show the characteristics of U.S. international trade during the period between February 2018 and February 2020. As seen in this figure, the U.S. imports a tremendous quantity of items from other nations. Such items range from clothing and toys to petroleum and electronics. These items must reach American consumers throughout the nation. Therefore, maintaining the security of logistics systems and their cargoes is significantly important. Numerous methods of securing these systems and cargoes exist, ranging from the use of security guards at seaports and airports to implementing closed-circuit camera systems. Because this text is an introductory discussion of such topics within the context of homeland security, only a few concepts are introduced herein. Readers desiring a greater knowledge and understanding of these concepts are encouraged to consult texts in security management, transportation security, and border security. Introduction to Homeland Security

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Figures 12.2a and b Graphs showing U.S. international trade values as of April 2020. (Source: U.S. Census Bureau)

One method of securing cargoes and logistics systems involves the use of security guards at airport and seaport locations. These personnel may be either government or private employees. The TSA is tasked with protecting American transportation systems, thereby representing government resources that are dedicated to protecting logistics systems and their respective cargoes.37 Specifically, with “discretion,” the DHS mandates that motion detectors and patrolling security guards may be used as security methods.38 From the perspective of private entities, security companies such as Wackenhut may be used as security resources.39

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In both cases, the primary actor of security is the human. All personnel must undergo some form of background investigation.40 Various levels of personnel screenings must be consistent with the responsibilities of the position and situation.41 For candidates who are contemplated for positions necessitating high-security clearance, personnel interviews must complement screening and background investigations.42 Depending on the situation, one should “never use” any reference information that is provided by candidates.43 All providers of security personnel must be reviewed and evaluated to ensure that they are “legitimate service providers.”44 Another mechanism through which cargo and logistics system security is monitored involves the use of satellite technologies and systems. Within this type of security paradigm, both transmitters and wireless sensor devices are placed in cargo containers.45 These mechanisms perform data collection regarding container condition, security, humidity, internal temperature, and radiation.46 In some cases, they exhibit levels of sensitivity that allow them to determine whether a container was dropped by a crane.47 The collected data is transmitted to a processing center for analysis.48 The use of such systems contributes to reductions in thefts and tampering while simultaneously increasing supply chain efficiency.49 Such systems also reduce the chances of containers being used for terrorist purposes.50 Satellite systems are also used for tracking purposes. Through such tracking systems, the locations of vehicles and cargoes may be queried using real-time computer systems. Vehicles that are transporting cargoes may be tracked using satellite systems.51 If any service disruptions occur, then law enforcement entities may be notified and summoned.52 Such abilities are beneficial, especially regarding the transporting of hazardous materials.53 The use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology bolsters cargo and container security within logistics systems. After the events of September 11, 2001, the DHS embraced the use of RFID systems as a method of improving security at both the borders and entry ports of the United States.54 RFID technologies may be used for a variety of purposes, from the authentication and identification of individuals to the crafting of biometric types of passports.55 From the perspectives of cargoes and logistics systems, the use of RFID technology provides a means of identifying containers, acting as smart seals, and tracking items through logistics systems.56 Through the use of RFID materials, any breach of container security may be detected instantly.57 Certainly, awareness and prevention are relevant factors when considering container and cargo security within logistics systems. These considerations are aspects of the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The CSI is structured attempt to improve security with respect to the potential of terrorists using a maritime container to deliver weapons.58 It involves the deployment of multi-disciplinary teams to foreign locations for the purpose of examining high-risk cargo prior to its being stored within vessels whose destination is the United States.59 Within logistics systems, container and cargo security is not merely a consideration of ports of departure and ports of destination. Instead, security concerns permeate the entirety of the logistics system through which goods are transported to America from foreign nations. Security activities may commence in the factory settings where goods are produced and continue through the intermediary points of distribution, shipping, and transit to the exit points where they are finally distributed to consumers within American society. Figure 12.3 highlights these concerns of cargo and container security within logistics systems.

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American consumers enjoy the daily the benefits of safe and secure logistics systems in which cargoes and containers are protected. Such protection not only safeguards the goods that are destined to arrive in the United States but also protects society and national infrastructure from dangers ranging from terrorist activity to instances of theft and smuggling of contraband within supply chains. Although this chapter presents an introductory consideration of security methods that protect containers and cargoes within logistics systems, many more protective mechanisms exist domestically and internationally. In any case, the importance and relevancy of such protections must be neither discounted nor ignored. Without such protections, the chances of harm being levied against American society are much greater.

Figure 12.3 Security concerns throughout the logistics cycle. (Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Supply Chain Security, Container Security Programs Have Matured but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, February 2012)

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12.12 The Mexican Border and Violence The basic shape of the current U.S.-Mexican border was established in conflict more than 150 years ago and has been challenged ever since. Creation of the Texas Republic from Mexican territory by force of arms in 1836, its subsequent annexation by the United States in 1845, the 1846–1847 war with Mexico, and the resulting Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 collectively led to “More than half the territory of Mexico becoming one third of the territory of the United States” (Turbiville, 1999). Over the next 160 years, the relationship between the United States and Mexico would prove to be volatile. On February 24, 1913, fighting commenced along the border near Brownsville, Texas, and on March 2, Mexicans attacked U.S. troops along the border near Douglas, Arizona. Responding to the attack, in 1914, U.S. forces invaded Mexico and occupied Veracruz for over six months. In 1916, General John J. Pershing (1860–1948) was ordered by the President to lead a punitive expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Francisco “Poncho” Villa. In February 1917, once the relationship between the two nations improved, United States forces were withdrawn from Mexico, though minor clashes would continue until 1919. Efforts to establish security and stability along the U.S.-Mexican border are not exclusive issues for the United States. In December 2006, President Felipe Calderon of Mexico launched a sweeping initiative to crack down on the drug cartels that operate in that country and supply a great deal of the illegal drugs used throughout the U.S. The cartels are fighting back, leading to a dangerous uptick in violence on both sides of the border. Mexican drug trafficking organizations have battled it out with the Mexican government, the U.S. government, and each other, with violence escalating on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. According to a New York Times article, it is estimated that more than 70,000 people were killed in the nearly four years since President Felipe Calderón had begun his offensive against the Mexican drug organizations, with the gangs escalating fights over turf and dominance as the federal police and military tried to stamp them out. Of those, over 2,000 were local, state, or federal police officers, according to the Mexican Public Security Ministry (Mexican Drug, 2010). The majority of the weapons used in the violence in Mexico were obtained in the United States. According to National Public Radio, since 2006, more than 60,000 of the weapons used in Mexican crimes have been traced back to the United States (Grimaldi, 2011). Some U.S. officials who specialize in counter-narcotics worry that al-Qaeda will soon realize and exploit the porous nature of the Central American-U.S. corridor. They suggest that America’s border problems do not end at border cities like El Paso and Brownsville, Texas. They say border problem begins in Colombia and must be tackled in Guatemala, where it is easier to intercept the drugs and people before they make their way too far north. During the administration of President Ronald Regan, the United States declared a war on drugs. Since that time, billions of dollars have been directed toward combating the challenges presented by illicit drug trafficking, marketing, and use. Drug trafficking in the U.S. is fueled by the demand for the drugs by Americans. According to the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, approximately 20 million Americans use illicit drugs. Drug trafficking across the world exists as a $400 billion trade, with drug traffickers earning gross profit margins of an estimated 300%. In what some have termed as America’s Third World War, drug trafficking continues to expand, with networks including cross-border cooperation and international connections.

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This growth and increased organization result not only from an expanding consumer market but also from poverty. The upsurge in drug-related violence is traced to the end of 2006, when the government launched a frontal assault on the cartels by deploying tens of thousands of soldiers and federal police to take them on (Mexican Drug, 2010). The Mexican cartels have come to dominate global cocaine trafficking. Mexico also has become the world’s largest exporter of marijuana. Estimates of the revenue generated by the Mexican drug cartels range from $18 billion to $40 billion a year. They use their cash to bribe local public officials and purchase arsenals of military-style weapons (Beaubien, 2009). Latin American drug smugglers have used aircraft and surface and undersea assets to transport drugs to the United States. Between 2001 and 2007, the United States Coast Guard reported detecting 23 mini submarines attempting to transport drugs to the United States. After 2007, the production and use of the mini submarine surged, with over 60 encountered in 2008. Most of these vessels are small, but they have become increasingly sophisticated. Engines and exhaust systems are typically shielded to make their heat signatures nearly invisible to the infrared sensors used by United States and allied aircraft trying to find them. If encountered by law enforcement authorities, it is not uncommon to see the mini submarines scuttled. During 2009, United States law enforcement officials identified 230 cities, including Anchorage, Atlanta; Boston, Massachusetts; and Billings, Montana, where Mexican cartels and their affiliates maintained drug distribution network systems or supplied drugs to distributors, as a Justice Department report indicated. Although Justice Department officials indicated that the figure rose from 100 cities reported three years earlier, they concluded that this might have resulted from better data collection methods as well as the spread of the organizations. Nearly decade later, in 2018, the nation of Mexico and its border with the U.S. were still dangerous. During 2018, the Juarez, Mexico, police reported 1,259 homicides, which included 182 murders in August alone.60 Contrastingly, just across the border in El Paso, a total of 23 homicides were reported in the same period.61 Overall, in 2018, the nation of Mexico reported 33,341 murders.62 This quantity represented the highest count in more than 20 years.63

12.13 Human Trafficking In 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act into law, representing the beginning of a large-scale coordinated effort by the United States government to fight human trafficking. There are at least 12.3 million enslaved adults and children around the world at any given time. Of these, at least 1.39 million are victims of commercial sexual servitude, both internationally and within national borders. More than half (56%) of all forced labor victims have been women and girls. Human trafficking often occurs to enslave individuals to act as forced laborers. According to the U.S. Department of State (Major, 2008), slave traders take advantage of gaps in law enforcement to exploit vulnerable workers. Attributes that contribute to the enslaving of humans include unemployment, poverty, crime, discrimination, corruption, political conflict, and cultural acceptance of the practice (Major, 2008). Within this category is also the concept of bonded labor (i.e., debt bondage) in which a bond or debt is used to maintain human subjugation (Major, 2008). This activity is criminalized under U.S. laws and is included as a form of trafficking exploitation with respect to United Nations protocols (Major, 2008).

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According to the U.S. Department of State (Major, 2008), “Sex trafficking comprises a significant portion of overall trafficking and the majority of transnational modern-day slavery.” Many sex slaves are used to provide prostitution services. The act of prostitution is “[i]inherently harmful and dehumanizing, and fuels trafficking in persons” (Major, 2008). The government of the United States is opposed to acts of prostitution and any related activities, including pimping, pandering, or maintaining brothels as contributing to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons, and maintains that these activities should not be regulated as a legitimate form of work for any human being. Those who patronize the commercial sex industry form a demand which traffickers seek to satisfy. (Major, 2008) In many nations, children may be legally employed as laborers in accordance with existing laws. However, in many cases, children are implemented as slave laborers in a variety of national settings. According to the U.S. Department of State, “Any child who is subject to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, peonage, or slavery through the use of force, fraud, or coercion is a victim of trafficking in persons regardless of the location of that exploitation” (Major, 2008). Illegal child labor is also found among areas of conflict globally. This form of child enslavement may be perpetrated by “[g]overnment forces, paramilitary organizations, or rebel groups,” and the average age of child soldiers ranges between 15 and 18, with some being “as young as 7 or 8 years of age” (Major, 2008). Such considerations of human trafficking often cross national boundaries and are relevant aspects of American border security. According to the U.S. Department of State (Victims, 2006; Facts About, 2005; Victims, 2007), annually, between 600,000 and 800,000 individuals are trafficked across global international borders, and approximately 50% of these individuals are less than 18 years of age. With respect to the U.S. borders, the U.S. Department of State (Victims, 2006) estimates that between approximately 14,500 and 17,500 individuals are trafficked across the American border annually. Such numbers of trafficked humans are both disturbing and alarming. Because trafficking occurs clandestinely, there is little information regarding the identities of those who are trafficked or the entities that perpetrate the trafficking activities. Further, there is a relationship between human trafficking and terrorist organizations. According to Keefer (2006), “Terrorists use the transportation networks of smugglers and traffickers to move operatives.” This observation is salient because of the danger posed by terrorist organizations that desire American destruction. Therefore, homeland security practitioners much seriously consider human trafficking as a significant national security threat.

12.14 Transportation and Border Security Initiatives The concerns of U.S. transportation and border security are mission-critical aspects of ensuring the safety of American society. Therefore, many initiatives exist through which the risk of hostile entities who desire to enter the U.S. and impose devastation may be diminished. The goals and objectives of these initiatives differ vastly with respect to their intended functions over time. The following are summaries of the primary initiatives that currently contribute to the provision of American security.

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12.14.1 Border Permeability The United States shares its national borders with Mexico and Canada. The U.S. also manifests virtual borders within its airports and seaports. Regardless of whether a border is tangible or intangible, entities may pass through American borders that may endanger the nation. During the time of the authorship of this textbook, the nation of Mexico is enduring a drug war in which numerous cartels are competing for illegal markets. Within Mexico, the presence of international terrorist organizations is manifested both openly and clandestinely. Although the nation of Canada appears to be peaceful, it also hosts a variety of terrorist organizations. In 2010, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Craig McKinley, recognized the dangers of the U.S.-Mexican border through observing, “The link between terrorism and drug cartels along the United States’ border with Mexico is increasingly clear,” because of the financial associations between drug cartels, other criminal organizations, and terrorist organizations (McElreath et al., 2014b). Examples of international terrorist entities operating in Mexico have included Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda (McElreath et al., 2014b). Each of these organizations demonstrates an anti-American bias and represents danger that must not be ignored. Similarly, the U.S.-Canadian border also presents a variety of dangers that must not be ignored. According to Leiken and Brooke (2006), “Canada is the most worrisome terrorist point of entry.” Although the U.S. and Canada enjoy a mutually peaceful relationship, there exist a variety of terrorist presences within Canada. According to the Anti-Defamation League, “Islamic extremists and their supporters from al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and Egyptian Islamic Jihad are among those suspected of operating in Canada.” (McElreath et al., 2014b) Further, an estimated 250,000 Tamils exist within Canada, and Toronto, boasting an estimated 200,000 Tamils, is the “[l]argest Tamil city outside of Sri Lanka” (McElreath et al., 2014b). According to the Anti-Defamation League, it is estimated that approximately 8,000 former Tamil Tigers are present within Canada (McElreath et al., 2014b).

12.14.2 Border Security: Immigration Border security is not an issue exclusively concerning the United States. The desire to seek opportunities and a better life has continually driven human movement from one area to another. It is estimated that between 400,000 and 1 million undocumented migrants try to clandestinely cross the rivers and deserts along the 2,000-mile (3,200-km) U.S.-Mexican border, with an estimated 350,000 per year entering successfully illegally. During 2005, over 1.2 million illegal aliens were apprehended by the Border Patrol. The U.S. government has employed a number of strategies and programs to make the nation’s borders more secure. The following actions are set in a framework that suggests types of possible policy actions: 1) pushing the border outward to intercept unwanted people or goods before they reach the United States; 2) hardening the border through the use of technology and the presence of more agents at the border; 3) making the border more accessible for legitimate trade and travel; 4) strengthening the border through more effective use of intelligence; and 5) multiplying effectiveness through the engagement of other actors in the enforcement effort, including engaging Canada, Mexico, state and local law enforcement resources, and the private sector (McElreath et al., 2014b).

12.14.3 Border Security: Searches According to Gesell (1996), with respect to the requirements regarding search and seizure, probable cause must be established before initiating any form of search followed by any 400

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subsequent seizure. Gesell indicates that any such searches must not be “unreasonable,” and the goal of searching is to determine and locate “incriminating evidence” (1996, p. 41). Further, to avoid violation of the “rights of the innocent,” the establishment of and adherence to “proper procedures” must be observed when searching and seizing any resulting evidence (Gesell, 1996, p. 41). Otherwise, if such procedures are not followed, evidence may be inadmissible regardless of its incriminating nature (Gesell, 1996). Further, the necessity and importance of search warrants must not be understated with respect to the concepts of search and seizure (Gesell, 1996). Based on the writings of Gesell (1996), it may be concluded that the requirements necessary for search and seizure represent a dichotomy concerning the rights, liberties, and freedoms of individuals and the potential of government power. Through the Fourth Amendment, citizens are protected against unreasonable search and seizure. Through the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement agencies are provided the authority and operational scope to conduct searches and seizures per the dictates of appropriate warrants. Therefore, a unique balance is provided that ensures the rights of the individual and establishes power and authority among law enforcement entities. According to McElreath et al. (2014b), the activities associated with border searching may transpire upon land entry from either the Canadian or Mexican border entry points; upon the dockage of a ship upon its arrival, provided it has visited a foreign port; and in the first airport where international flights land. Additional locations and timings include searches conducted at the virtual borders (e.g., international airports, etc.) that represent the “first practical detention point” after passing an established border or entry point (McElreath et al., 2014b). Searches conducted along these functional borders are equivalent to searches conducted along physical borders because of the impracticality associated with the routing of aircraft or sea vessels to established points of entry along physical borders (McElreath et al., 2014b). With respect to the border searches, three types are prevalent: 1) routine, 2) non-routine, and 3) extended. McElreath et al. (2014b) indicate that routine searches are not significantly invasive with respect to the privacy of the individual (e.g., searching purses, computers, etc.) but may necessitate the instigation of a non-routine search, depending on the establishment of reasonable suspicion. Non-routine searches demonstrate a greater privacy invasion of the individual (e.g., strip searching). Extended searches may transpire beyond both the physical and virtual borders provided that reasonable suspicion exists regarding “criminal activity,” reasonable knowledge and certainness that a type of border was passed, and characteristics of the subject of the search are unchanged (McElreath et al., 2014b). Further, based on the class discussions and the writings of McElreath et al. (2014b), it may be concluded that border searches demonstrate a pyramidal structure with respect to their conceptual design and complexity. The relationship among these entities ranges from a level of low complexity (e.g., routine) to a level of greater complexity (e.g., extended). Considerations of the Fourth Amendment must be examined from the perspective of border searches. The necessity of warrantless border search and seizure activities are valuable within the domain of homeland security. Because border searches contribute to the national security of the U.S., it may be concluded that such searches are a necessity, given the risks posed by traveling people and other entities entering the nation. Such searches protect against criminal entry, smuggling of weapons, disease, and other forms of undesirable paraphernalia. Given these thoughts, regardless of Fourth Amendment tenets, it may be concluded that border searches are imperative to ensure national security and to contribute to the greater benefit and overall good of American society. Introduction to Homeland Security

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12.14.4 Border Security: U.S.-Mexican Border Fence Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Duncan Hunter proposed building two parallel steel-and-wire fences running from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast. Hunter called for building a reinforced, two-layer 15-foot fence, separated by a 100-yard gap, along the entire length of the U.S. border with Mexico. It would include additional physical barriers, powerful lighting, and sensors to detect illegal border crossers. Some envision a wall or a fence. Others foresee a “virtual” fence of cameras, lighting, and sensors along the U.S.Mexican border (US/Mexico Border Fence, n.d.). As of 2013, approximately 750 miles of border fences have been completed. As border fences along the U.S.-Mexican border get stronger, smugglers are attempting to dodge increased security by tunneling and sailing their way into the United States; tunneling activity has increased 65% in the past two years, and a multi-agency team made over 800 sea-smuggling arrests in 2010, up from just 400 in 2009 (Tunnels, 2010).

12.14.5 Border Security: Aviation Surveillance and Reconnaissance The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has used UAVs to observe the U.S.-Mexican border since June 2004, along certain border sectors. The FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110–161) directed the DHS to explore the use of UAVs in the marine environment in addition to the border and appropriated $15 million for DHS’s UAV program, resulting in the modified “Guardian” Predator B UAV. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aerial assets are operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Air and Marine (A&M). CBP utilizes advanced technology to augment its U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents’ ability to patrol the border. The technologies used include, but are not limited to, sensors, light towers, mobile night vision scopes, remote video surveillance systems, directional listening devices, various database systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Haddal & Gertler, 2010).

12.15 Small Vessel Security Strategy The Small Vessel Security Strategy addresses the risk that small vessels might be used to smuggle terrorists or weapon of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States or might be used as either stand-off weapon platforms or means of a direct attack with a waterborne improvised explosive device (WBIED). This strategy also describes the small vessel community and the environment in which it operates. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime security efforts have focused primarily on large commercial vessels, cargoes, and crew. Efforts to address the small vessel environment have largely been limited to traditional safety and basic law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists; smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, or other contraband; and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs) (McElreath et al., 2014b).

12.16 Federal Flight Deck Officers Federal flight deck officers are trained by the Federal Air Marshal Service in the use of firearms, the use of force, legal issues, defensive tactics, the psychology of survival, and program 402

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standard operating procedures (Federal Flight, n.d.). Because of the events of September 11, 2001, the necessity of securing commercial aircraft was realized. As a result of the 2001 attacks, the FDO program was implemented as a voluntary program, supervised by U.S. sky marshals, to train air crews to employ defensive measures when necessary to ensure the safety and security of their airliners. Crew members are trained to “[u]se firearms to defend against an act of criminal violence or air piracy attempting to gain control of an aircraft” (Federal Flight, n.d.). Personnel who undergo this program may be pilots, flight engineers, or navigators assigned to the flight (Federal Flight, n.d.).

12.17 Terrorist Watch List and the No-Fly List The TSA is mandated by law to maintain a watch list of names of individuals who are suspected of posing a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety. The watch list was created in 1990 and was initially administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Later, it was administered by the Federal Aviation Administration until TSA finally assumed the administrative responsibility. Individuals whose names are on these lists are subjected to additional security measures, with a no-fly match requiring the individual to be detained and questioned by federal law enforcement and a selectees match requiring additional screening. Currently, P.L. 108–458 sets forth the procedures for appealing erroneous information or determinations made by TSA with respect to the aforementioned records (Seghetti et al., 2005).

12.18 Legislation Pertaining to Transportation and Border Security During the last 50 years, much legislation was drafted and passed that enhanced the security of U.S. ports, railways, airports, and borders. Sadly, much of this legislation resulted from catastrophic events that signaled the need for security improvements. Other legislation resulted from realizing the need for improvement without the manifestation of a precursory event. Regardless of the origin, much legislation exists that contributes to the security and safety of American society. What follows are short descriptions of the primary pieces of legislation that bolster the homeland security aspects of American society.

12.18.1 The Magnuson Act of 1950 The Magnuson Act of 1950 provides the USCG with the authority to ensure the protection and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities against sabotage or other subversive activities. It authorizes the USCG to establish security zones to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility and to safeguard the ports, harbors, territories, and waters of the United States.

12.18.2 Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 The United States Coast Guard is the lead agency for port security per the Maritime Security Act. According to the U.S. Coast Guard (Marine Safety, 1996), the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) is described as follows: The purpose of the PWSA (33 USC 1221 et seq.) is to increase navigation and vessel safety, to protect the marine environment, and to protect life, property, and structures Introduction to Homeland Security

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in, on, or immediately adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States. The PWSA does not provide for personnel screening programs or for emergency security powers, but does provide for the protection and “safe use” of the port and for protection against the degradation of the marine environment. It specifically provides for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of vessel traffic services (VTS), control of vessel movement, establishment of requirements for vessel operation, and other related port safety controls.

12.18.3 Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 According to the U.S. Coast Guard (Marine Safety, 1996), the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 is described as follows: The Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 amended the PWSA, and provides the Coast Guard with broader, more extensive, and explicitly stated authority. The Act addresses improvements in the supervision and control over all types of vessels, foreign and domestic, operating in the U.S. navigable waters, and in the safety of all tank vessels, foreign and domestic, which transport and transfer oil or other hazardous cargoes in U.S. ports. Additionally, the Act addresses improvements in the control and monitoring of vessels operating in offshore waters near our coastline, and vessel manning and pilot age standards. The Act also includes regulatory authority over areas not previously covered, such as participation with neighboring nations in coordinated vessel traffic systems in boundary waters, lightering operations in offshore areas, and discouraging activities such as tank wash dumping at sea in preparation for loading cargoes in U.S. ports. The Act now serves as the strongest authority for the Marine Safety and Security (MSS) Program, and is the basis for the navigation safety regulations and the Marine Safety Information System. (MSIS)

12.18.4 International Maritime and Port Security Act The International Maritime and Port Security Act amended the Ports and Waterways Safety Act by adding a new section: Port, Harbor, and Coastal Facility Security. This section authorizes the Secretary to carry out measures to prevent or respond to an act of terrorism against an individual, vessel, or public or commercial structure that is subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and located within or adjacent to the marine environment, or a vessel of the U.S. or an individual on board that vessel.

12.18.5 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) is designed to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from a terrorist attack. This Act directs initial and continuing assessments of maritime facilities and vessels that may be involved in a TSI. It requires vessels and port facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop security plans that may include passenger, vehicle, and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel identification procedures; access control measures; and/or the installation of surveillance equipment. Developed using risk-based methodology, the MTSA security regulations focus on those sectors of maritime industry that have a higher risk of involvement in a TSI, including various 404

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tank vessels, barges, large passenger vessels, cargo vessels, towing vessels, offshore oil and gas platforms, and port facilities that handle certain kinds of dangerous cargo or service vessels. The MTSA also required the establishment of committees in all the nation’s ports to coordinate the activities of all port stakeholders, including other federal, local, and state agencies; industry; and the boating public. These groups, called the Area Maritime Security Committees, are tasked with collaborating to develop plans to secure their ports so that the resources of an area can be best used to deter, prevent, and respond to terror threats.

12.18.6 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 In an effort to further the progress made through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was passed and became effective in October 2006. The SAFE Port Act created and codified new programs and initiatives and amended some of the original provisions of MTSA.

12.18.7 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 According to the U.S. Coast Guard (Marine Safety, 1996), the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is described as follows: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) amended the PWSA and imposes new requirements on the operation of oil tankers in the U.S.; addresses shortcomings in the navigation safety in Prince William Sound, Alaska; and enhances the Coast Guard’s authority to effectively regulate the conduct of oil tankers and merchant marine personnel in the U.S. OPA 90, section 4107, amended the PWSA’s vessel operating requirements broadening the Coast Guard’s authority so that they “. . . may construct, operate, maintain, improve or expand vessel traffic services.” . . . In addition, section 4107 requires mandatory participation for “appropriate vessels” which operate in a VTS area.

12.18.8 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) was enacted in 1996. Germain and Stevens (n.d.) provided a synopsis of the salient aspects of this legislation: It directly addresses border patrol and upgrades needed for border patrol enforcers, equipment, and the overall patrolling process. It also details an increase in interior enforcement and practices with regard to INS and investigators monitoring visa applications and visa abusers. Illegal activities were a central concern in this bill and penalties for racketeering, alien smuggling and the use or creation of fraudulent immigration-related documents are high on the priority list. Other crimes and immigration-related offenses committed by aliens and the consequences, including deportation, are addressed in the sections following. Employment programs and employment eligibility issues are incorporated into the bill, which includes sanctions threatened on employers and the regulation of unfair immigration-related employment practices. The title of the next section of IIRAIRA points to restrictions placed on alien benefits, which includes but is not limited to state and federally funded programs. Some miscellaneous provisions mentioned relate to medical services, pilot programs, and reporting. Alien residence (housing) and financial issues regarding the same are addressed including a plethora of miscellaneous Introduction to Homeland Security

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provisions. These further miscellaneous provisions are directed towards refugees, parolees, and the reform of asylum, while the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended under many different topics. Without belaboring the miscellaneous provisions, they covered visa processing, consular efficiency, as well as but not limited to schooling, religious (criminal-related) offenses, mail-order brides, H-2A nonimmigrant worker program, and other broadly ranging issues.

12.18.9 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) provides broad federal authority for security in all modes of transportation. The authorities of ATSA are delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to the Administrator of the TSA. The Administrator “shall be responsible for security in all modes of transportation,” including civil aviation security and all security responsibilities over other modes of transportation that are exercised by the Department of Transportation. The Administrator is given an array of specific authorities to carry out this broad responsibility.

12.18.10 Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act, this legislation creates a framework that enables members of the private sector to voluntarily submit sensitive information regarding the nation’s critical infrastructure/key resources to DHS with the assurance that the information, if it satisfies certain requirements, will be protected from public disclosure.

12.18.11 The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 This legislation includes a provision requiring the construction of security fencing along portions of the Southern border that have high rates of illegal border crossing. Additionally, DHS was required to conduct a study and report back to Congress on the use of physical barriers along the Northern border. An amendment was adopted during consideration on the floor that required the construction of an estimated $2.2 billion worth of fences along part of the Southern border. The Secretary of Homeland Security was required to provide for least two layers of reinforced fencing and the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors.

12.19 Chapter Comments and Summary The security of the U.S. has been a primary concern of American society since the founding of the nation. Throughout history, numerous examples exist that highlight the relevancy of maintaining a strong national power in the context of international and global societies. Historically, the security of American transportation and borders has encompassed three categories: 1) air, 2) sea, and 3) land. In addition, modern times also necessitate guarding the virtual borders. In modern times, the security of these categories remains a mission-critical function of the American government and among the citizenry of the United States. Given these notions, American society must be protected from threats that originate both externally and internally. The use of modern technologies embellishes the ability of government and commercial entities to contribute to such protection. However, despite the best 406

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efforts of the government and commercial sectors, no guarantee exists that security breaches shall not occur in due time. Because of the gigantic quantities of goods, services, individuals, and vehicles that cross the American borders daily, involving some form of transportation, the task of protecting American society is vast and challenging. Examples of external and internal threats have manifested within the aviation sector. The attacks of September 11, 2001, although tragic, were indicative of aviation threats posed by terrorist factions whose origins were external to American society. The case of FedEx Flight 705 is representative of a different threat, whose potential lethality also could have drastically affected numerous aspects of American society. In the case of FedEx Flight 705, the threat represented an origin that was internal to American society. From the perspectives of homeland security and aviation, both events demonstrate that aviation threats may be either external or internal to America and that such threats involve radically different motivations. Regardless, in both cases, the intent involved commandeering aircraft to perform devastating acts of lethality. Dangers also exist regarding the maritime and the railway sectors of American society. Historically, the Barbary pirates represented an external maritime threat. In modern times, maritime hijackings occur on the Earth’s oceans and continental coastlines. Human errors also endanger American interests. With respect to this category, the incident of the Exxon Valdez represents such an incident. Further, the constructs of the American transportation infrastructure are susceptible to mechanical faults and failures as well as natural conditions. The American economy depends on the monitoring and maintaining of its transportation systems. Such systems include the maritime sector, the aviation sector, rail systems, and mass transit systems that daily integrate their functions to provide transportation for humans and the goods that are consumed by Americans. Certainly, the transportation system is representative of the services that are consumed within the American economy. Therefore, its security is of paramount importance to homeland security practitioners. Homeland security also encompasses legislation and a variety of accompanying programs that complement the efforts to ensure America’s safety. Such legislation encompasses the three facets of the American transportation system: land, sea, and air. Various programs exist to bolster American security that include such activities as training air crews regarding defensive safety measures, the construction of border fences, and immigration policies and programs. Certainly, many other examples may be identified, and a subset of such programs is discussed within this chapter. Overall, the security of the national borders and the transportation system must not be compromised. Both entities are mission-critical aspects of national security and the continued existence of the United States. Hostile entities exist that seek to cross America’s national borders and either destroy or damage its infrastructure—including the transportation system. Although it is impossible to secure completely each and every facet of the transportation system, its security must be maximized. Striving to ensure that hostile entities do not penetrate American borders and impact the transportation system is a primary challenge and responsibility of the practitioners of homeland security.

12.20 Key Terms Airport Security Airway Border

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Maritime Maritime Security Land Border Logistics Logistics Security Piracy Port Security

Railway Railway Security Trafficking Transportation Transportation Security Virtual Border

12.21 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. This chapter introduced the notion of transportation security. Certainly, most travelers are well aware of the security mechanisms and protocols that exist when progressing through an airport. These resources are stringent. However, when traveling via railway, subway, buses, and so forth, there is less emphasis on examining passengers before they board. Why do you believe less emphasis exists? Write a brief essay that highlights the salient points of your response. 2. Trafficking organizations demonstrate a variety of routes across the national borders that represent methods of accessing the United States. These passages are useful logistics routes for smuggling and trafficking a variety of goods, ranging from illegal drugs to humans. Given this notion, do you believe it is possible for factions of organized crime to cooperate with terrorist entities to use these routes collaboratively? Why or why not? Write a brief essay that substantiates your opinion. 3. The use of airport security mechanisms has spawned a variety of disputes regarding the freedoms guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Do some research, and explore some lawsuits that have resulted from the use of airport security protocols and resources. Write a brief essay that reviews your findings. 4. A vast number of ships enter and leave U.S. harbors daily, carrying a variety of materials and people. Do some research, and explore the number of vessels that must be inspected before docking in U.S. ports. Given the contents of this chapter and your research, how is it possible to reduce the chances that harmful items and people enter the United States? Write a brief essay that highlights your response.

Notes

1. Vital Statistics. (2011). Vital Statistics. United Nations. Retrieved January 9, 2011, from www.un.org/ cyberschoolbus/briefing/globalization/index.htm. 2. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2018). 2018 Trade Gap Is $621.0 Billion. Retrieved from www.bea.gov/ news/blog/2019-03-06/2018-trade-gap-6210-billion. 3. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2018). U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2018. Retrieved from www.bea.gov/news/2019/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-December-2018. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. CFC. (2010). Balloons in the American Civil War. U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission. Retrieved January 9, 2011, from www.centennialofflight.gov. 11. MacDonald, J. (2009). The Historical Atlas of the Civil War. Edison, NJ: Chartwell Books Inc. 12. Seghetti, L. M., Lake, J., Robinson, W., and Lisa, M. (2005, March 29). Border and transportation security: Selected programs and challenges. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved January 7, 2011, from www.fas.org.

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13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Aviation Security Policy, National Security Presidential Directive 47 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/ hspd-16-aviation-security-policy. 14. Federation of American Scientists. (2007). National Strategy for Aviation Security, p. 2. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-47.pdf. 15. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2007). Aviation Transportation System Security Plan, p. i. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hspd16_transsystemsecurityplan.pdf. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Sweet, K. (2006). Transportation and Cargo Security: Threats and Solutions, 1st edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. 23. Tasers Take. (2004). Tasers Take Off—New Scientist. Retrieved August 9, 2009, from www.newscientist. com/article/mg18424730.500-tasers-take-off.html. 24. U.S. Department of State. (2018). Caribbean. Retrieved from https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/ international-travel/emergencies/internl-maritime-piracy-robbery.html. 25. U.S. Department of State. (2018). Africa and Middle East. Retrieved from https://travel.state.gov/content/ travel/en/international-travel/emergencies/internl-maritime-piracy-robbery.html. 26. U.S. Department of State. (2018). Southeast Asia. Retrieved from https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/ en/international-travel/emergencies/internl-maritime-piracy-robbery.html. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Rodriguez, B. (2011). Freight rail transportation in the post-9/11 era: Balancing safety and freedom in a corporate setting. Florida Coastal Law Review, 13(113), 119. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. State of Texas. (2013). Chapter 5—Rail Safety and Security. Retrieved from April 3, 2013, from http://ftp. dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/rail/plan/ch5.pdf. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 5. 37. Dempsey, J. (2011). Introduction to Private Security. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing. 38. Abbot, E., and Hetzel, O. (2010). Homeland Security and Emergency Management: A Legal Guide for State and Local Governments. Chicago: ABA Publishing, p. 137. 39. Maggio, E. (2011). Private Security in the 21st Century: Concepts and Applications. Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishing. 40. Brandman, B. (2007). The 7 deadly sins of logistics security. The NCLC Annual Conference. Retrieved from April 3, 2013, from www.nclcworld.com/pdf/Deadly%20Sins%20of%20Logistics%20Security%20 by%20Brandman.ppt.pdf. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Plunkett, J. (2009). Plunkett’s Transportation, Supply Chain, and Logistics Industry Almanac. Houston, TX: Plunkett Research, Ltd., p. 31. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Deans, P. C., and Karwan, K. (1994). Global Information Systems and Technology: Focus on the Organization and Its Functional Areas. Harrisburg, PA: The Idea Group, p. 339. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid.

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54. Hunt, V. D., Puglia, A., and Puglia, M. (2007). RFID: A Guide to Radio Frequency Identification. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Publishing, pp. 69–71. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Customs and Border Protection. (2013). CSI: Container Security Initiative. Retrieved April 4, 2013, from www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/. 59. Customs and Border Protection. (2013). Fact Sheet, p. 1. Retrieved from April 4, 2013, from www.cbp. gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_factsheet_2011.ctt/csi_factsheet_2011.pdf. 60. Jervis, R. (2019). As Trump Demands a Wall, Violence Returns to Texas Border in Ciudad Juarez. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/02/15/ciudad-juarez-mexico-el-paso-bordersecurity-donald-trump-violence/2878082002/. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid.

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Aviation Security Policy, National Security Presidential Directive 47 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from www.dhs.gov/ hspd-16-aviation-security-policy. US-Mexico Border Fence/Great Wall of Mexico Secure Fence. (n.d.). Retrieved January 7, 2011, from www. globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico-wall.htm. Victims. (2006). Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in persons report. U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Victims. (2007). Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report. U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Vital Statistics. (2011). Vital Statistics. United Nations. Retrieved January 9, 2011, from www.un.org/cyber schoolbus/briefing/globalization/index.htm. White, C. (2007). Guest viewpoint: Developing railroad security. Institute for Supply Management. Retrieved January 9, 2011, from www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cds-uploads/publications/pdf/Pub_ISM_ RailroadSecurity.pdf.

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13 International Emergency Management

The nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl 20 years ago this month, even more than my launch of perestroika, was perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later. —Mikhail Gorbachev

Figure 13.1 The destruction of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. This 1986 disaster occurred because of “a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel.”1 The incident “released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind.”2 As a result, “two Chernobyl plant workers died on the night of the accident, and a further 28 people died within a few weeks as a result of acute radiation poisoning.”3 Following the incident, the city was abandoned. The city of Chernobyl remains unoccupied, uninhabitable, and unlivable to this day. (Source: Idaho National Laboratories, Chernobyl: Just the Facts, retrieved April 7, 2020)

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The objectives of this chapter are to: • Identify some of the major emergency management events that have occurred on the international scene; • Discuss some of the major challenges facing international emergency management; • Discuss the role of NGOs in international disaster relief operations; • Discuss common attributes shared among international emergencies; and • Discuss the contributions of the United States to international emergencies.

13.1 Introduction International emergency management is as diverse as nations themselves. Typically, the more affluent nations, depending on the threats they feel they face, have proven more capable of responding to major events. Natural disasters, accidents, and man-made events that significantly impact a population occur around the globe. Some of these events, especially those that are more severe, often overwhelm local and even regional government response efforts. As one would expect, impoverished nations typically have a less-developed disaster response capability than nations that are more affluent. When the topic of international disaster management is broached, what typically comes to mind are the frail emergency management systems found in the developing world, rife with insufficient funding, poor training, corruption, and other obstacles. However, there are a great many highly successful emergency management systems found in the industrialized nations of the world and a handful in the developing world.4 Emergency management experts typically draw a distinction between humanitarian aid (man-made) and disaster relief (natural) operations. The difference usually lies in the degree of preparedness and response time involved. Humanitarian crises (such as the violence in Kosovo, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, and Rwanda) rarely happen at a moment’s notice or overnight and are usually monitored by the aid agencies in an attempt to give themselves time to prepare and alert the remainder of the international community when a catastrophe is about to happen. Natural disasters (such as in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Turkey), while slowly becoming more predictable, can still strike with little warning and rely more on the training, education, and preparedness of those in the actual disaster zone to hang on until the relevant concerned organizations and agencies can mobilize their resources. While this inevitably takes time, military forces are seen as a pool of prepared, disciplined, and available sources of assistance while the international aid community gears itself for action.

13.2 International Emergency Management: An Overview Disasters occur around the globe. The last several decades have witnessed disasters in Haiti, China, and New Zealand; earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan; the Bhopal chemical accident in India; and the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Russia. Every country has its own hazard profile and faces challenges to its population and infrastructure. As in the United States, all disasters are local in nature; that is, disasters have a primary point of impact, an area most affected, and

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a population that is most in need. In the international setting, the threat facing nations and regions are as diverse as the nations themselves. More impoverished nations often face starvation and disease, especially in times of civil unrest or major disaster. In these more impoverished nations, resources available for disaster relief support operations are typically lacking. The international community has a stake in emergency management. Specifically, these concerns involve vulnerability fluctuation and the evolution or demise of emergency management systems, as well as unique cultural, economic, and political characteristics.5 The countries most affected by natural and man-made disasters are usually developing or third-world countries. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 85% of all natural disasters occur in Asia. In 2009, Asia accounted for six out the ten disasters in the world. These countries frequently require international assistance because they lack the necessary resources and training to provide an adequate emergency response. Once a request is made for emergency assistance by the victimized country, the international community usually mobilizes their response teams according to the immediate need.

13.3 Historical Scope of the Challenge Disasters have impacted mankind since before recorded history. Some of these events were so severe that they became milestones in world history. In August 79 AD, the Italian volcano Mount Vesuvius erupted, blanketing the towns and of residents of Pompeii, Stabiae, and Herculaneum. This incident was not the first, nor would it be the last disaster to impact a population, and it is an example of a devastating natural disaster, even 2,000 years ago. In July 1201, an earthquake struck the Middle East in what is now Egypt and Syria. The earthquake, the deadliest in recorded history, is considered one of the ten worst natural disasters of all times. This disaster rocked the eastern Mediterranean and killed over 1.1 million people, destroying countless homes. Nearly every major city within the Near East felt the effects of this quake. Such incidents affect the socioeconomic, political, and environmental conditions in which people live. In 1769, in India, a great famine took over ten million people’s lives. This was nearly one third of the population of India at the time. The famine was caused by a shortfall in crops, followed by a severe drought. As populations were devastated by the deaths, many areas returned to jungle, further decreasing food supplies. This famine lasted until 1773.

13.4 Global and International Scope of the Challenge Internationally, the challenge is great. The world is so diverse and the threats that face the world’s population so wide ranging that the attempt to describe the scope of the challenge must be done in the most general of terms. Natural disasters, war, famine, and accidents place populations at risk. Internationally and globally, disasters share some common attributes. Some of the most important aspects of global and international disasters include: Emergency relief—Emergency relief consists of disaster management, rapid needs assessments, beneficiary targeting, distribution planning, and management.

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Shelter—Sheltering consists of needs assessment, program design implementation, and coordination in emergency and non-emergency setting; and planning for and provision of tarps, tents, iron sheeting, and simple construction. Command and control—Much of the command and control exercised during disaster operations is militaristic.6 This paradigm emphasizes the centralizing of authority, adhering to “procedure and protocol,” and adhering to “specification of plans.” 7 Coordination and Logistics—Coordinating resources involves the “set of methods used to manage interdependence between organizations” and establish cooperation among the responding entities and affected nations.8 Logistics considers the methods through which personnel and necessary resources are obtained and moved into the affected disaster area. Corruption—Corruption involves considerations of fraudulent uses of materials, funds, and so forth. Oversight and checks and balances must exist to ensure that corruption does not impede the relief, response, and recovery initiatives. Project Management—Numerous aspects of project management are relevant for disaster and emergency management. For instance, resources must be obtained and scheduled for implementation in due time; metrics must be collected and analyzed to determine levels of efficiency and effectiveness; planning must occur regarding every aspect of the response and recovery; emergency initiatives must be financed; and so forth.

13.4.1 Natural Disasters Natural disasters come in many forms. In 1556, the Shaanxi Earthquake in China resulted in an estimated loss of over 800,000 people, over 50% of the population. In 1883, the eruption of Krakatoa in what was at the time the Dutch East Indies resulted in the death of between 36,000 and 120,000.9 In modern times, natural disasters are just as catastrophic. For instance, in 2004, the Asian coasts experienced a tsunami that resulted in the deaths of approximately 225,000 to 230,210 people.10

13.4.2 Accidents Major industrial accidents are not uncommon. This chapter opened with a reference to the Chernobyl incident in Ukraine. Chernobyl’s immediate consequences were severe—the accident destroyed the plant, killed 31 workers and firefighters, seriously injured nearly 300 workers, and released a great amount of radioactive material that severely contaminated a large area around the plant.11 This incident represents one of the most severe disasters of the twentieth century because of the extensiveness of the radiation. The city remains uninhabited to this day.

13.4.3 Pandemics Pandemics remain a great concern for many, including health-care and emergency management professionals. Medical advances in the last century have limited the potential for a widespread pandemic, but the potential for biological and pathological disasters is continuous. Pandemics occur during conditions involving the emergence of “a novel strain of a virus . . . that causes readily transmissible human illness for which most of the population lacks immunity.”12

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One of the most famous pandemics to strike was the bubonic plague or “Black Death,” which killed almost 33% of the entire population of Europe when it struck between 1347 and 1350. It also affected millions in Asia and North Africa. Scientists believe that the plague was a zoonotic disease caused by Yersinia pestis bacterium and spread because of poor hygiene and fleas carried by rats. At the end of World War I, the world was rocked by what became known as the 1918 pandemic, which lasted until the end of 1920. This was an unusually deadly influenza pandemic and was the first of the two pandemics involving H1N1 influenza virus, the second occurring in 2009. The 1918 flu pandemic infected an estimated 500 million people and ultimately was responsible for an estimated 50 to 100 million deaths, making it one of the deadliest natural disasters in human history. While modern medicines have somewhat ameliorated the devastating effects of many pandemics, they still have the potential of being catastrophic. In the United States, it is estimated that approximately “40% of the nation’s workforce—including personnel supporting our critical communications infrastructure—will be absent during the height of a pandemic.”13 In modern times, pandemics have the capacity to inflict mass fatalities. For instance, the death

Figure 13.2 Soldiers from Fort Riley, Kansas, ill with Spanish influenza in a hospital ward at Camp Funston, were just a few of the millions affected by the 1918 influenza pandemic. (Source: U.S. Army)

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toll associated with the 2009 H1N1 swine flu was revised recently, indicating that approximately “284,400 people actually died in the first year the virus was circulating around the world.”14 In December of 2019, the first cases of COVID-19 surfaced in Wuhan Province in China, leading to a global outbreak of epic proportions not seen since the 1918 pandemic. Many governments, including the United States, were slow to react, which led to a shortage of masks, personal protective equipment, and ventilators for first responders and healthcare professionals treating individuals infected in the outbreak. Where COVID-19 testing was quickly implemented, including drive-through facilities as in South Korea and Australia, the ability to identify who did and didn’t have the virus was helpful. Where testing capabilities or rollouts were slow, it created problems in resourcing and response (Figure 13.3). The outbreak necessitated widespread country and state lockdowns and stay-in-place orders. Such policies were intended to “flatten the curve,” lowering the overall number of cases but also prolonging the outbreak of cases in order to avoid overwhelming hospital beds, capabilities, and resources. South Korea’s response was seen as one of the most aggressive and successful as was China’s, though the number of cases and deaths is considered by some to have been underreported at the time.

Figure 13.3 A COVID-19 test kit. (Source: Shutterstock)

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13.4.4 Conflicts and Violence The twentieth century has often been described as the most violent century in history, plagued by multiple world wars, revolutions, and terrorism. According to Margesson,15 conflicts have continued throughout the world, in Kosovo (1999), Liberia (until 2003), Afghanistan (2002), pre-war Iraq (2003), Haiti (2004), and Darfur (since 2003). As a consequence of such conflicts, the international community has attempted to provide humanitarian aid to the refugees who have been displaced.

13.5 International Assistance The majority of the developing world’s residents lack the physical, economic, and social protections from disaster that wealthier countries enjoy. Earthquake- and hurricane-resistant building codes and land-use restrictions do not always exist or are not well enforced. Property, business, and crop insurance markets are less sophisticated and out of reach for many. International disaster response occurs when foreign governments, agencies, and organizations assist a society whose government and civil institutions cannot adequately address the humanitarian needs of its disaster-affected populations. Assistance includes immediate and longer-term efforts designed to save lives; alleviate suffering; maintain human dignity; and help people prevent, mitigate, prepare for, and respond to future crises.16

13.5.1 International Support Involving Other Nations International support may be in the form of a wide range of assistance. Medical aid and personnel, search and rescue, and food supplies are common aspects of international emergencies. One of the hallmarks of international emergency response is urban search and rescue (SAR). According to McEntire,17 search and rescue is defined as “response activities undertaken to find disaster victims and remove them from danger or confinement.” Moreover, Mullins claims the term “urban search and rescue” was first used in the United States by Metro-Dade Fire and Rescue for deployment domestically and internationally for natural or man-made disasters in which people had been trapped in collapsed buildings.18 In the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the governing body for all national SAR teams operating in the country. The SAR national concept originated in 1991, when urban search and rescue became a component of the federal response operation under the Federal Response Plan.19 Support function #9 of the Federal Response Plan of 1999 outlines the organizational structure of an urban search and rescue team as follows: • More than 5,000 individuals make up the national system. • There are 28 task forces sponsored by state and local emergency response organizations. • Each task force comprises 62 individuals organized into 31 positions. • The positions are organized into five functional teams (management, search, rescue, medical, and technical).

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Mullins further explains that SAR teams are divided into three categories: 1) first responders such as fire, police, and emergency medical services (EMS); 2) rescue technicians who are trained in the use of advanced rescue and search equipment, tunneling, shoring, etc.; and 3) task force management, command, and control. SAR is an extremely complex operation that demands a high degree of expertise to help mitigate a disastrous incident. Following a disaster, SAR operations are primarily engaged in the location and extraction of persons from collapsed buildings and structures, including the medical stabilization of victims in these locations. Moreover, SAR teams are trained to assess to control gas, electrical services, and hazardous materials and evaluate and stabilize damaged structures.20 Structural collapse is the most frequent cause of victims being trapped. This type of rescue operation requires a high degree of expertise and special equipment to carry out the extraction/rescue mission. The U.S. emergency management system is the most advanced and well funded in the world; U.S. SAR teams are totally self-sufficient for the first 72 hours of deployment. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) lists the composition of a typical U.S. SAR team as follows: 1. Each task force consists of two 31-person teams, four canines, and a comprehensive equipment cache. For every US&R task force there are 62 positions. To ensure that a full team can respond to an emergency, the task forces have at the ready more than 130 highly trained members. 2. A task force is really a partnership between local fire departments, law enforcement agencies, federal and local government agencies, and private companies. 3. A task force is totally self-sufficient for the first 72 hours of deployment. 4. The equipment cache used to support a task force weighs nearly 60,000 pounds and is worth approximately $1.4 million. Add the task force members to the cache, and you can completely fill a military-141 transport or two C-130 cargo aircraft. 5. US&R task force members work in four areas of specialization: search, to find victims trapped after a disaster; rescue, which includes safely digging victims out of tons of collapsed concrete and metal; technical, made up of structural specialists who make rescues safe for the searchers, who make rescues safe for the rescuers; and medical, which cares for the victims before and after a rescue. Currently, in the United States, there are 28 urban search and rescue teams. The two most preeminent are generally thought to be the Fairfax, Virginia, Fire Department and the Los Angeles County Fire Department. These two teams have represented the U.S. in numerous international SAR operations throughout the world. The Fairfax County international urban search and rescue resource is commonly referred to as Virginia Task Force 1 (VA-TF1). This SAR team has been recognized throughout the United States and the world as a premier leader in the provision of training in catastrophic event mitigation, readiness, and response and recovery techniques. When activated, the task force comprises 70 members, including firefighters and paramedics from the Fairfax County Fire Department (both career and volunteer) and highly trained civilians, including physicians, canine handlers, structural engineers, communications experts, and heavy rigging specialists. VA-TF1 was deployed during the response to both the 2010 Haitian earthquake and the 2011 earthquake off the coast of Tohoku, Japan, that impacted the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and devastated the surrounding area. These deployments of VA-TF1 represent the robustness of American urban SAR resources. Such deployments embellish the activities of mitigation, response, and recovery. They cooperate 420

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with USAID and other international organizations to support operations associated with a variety of calamities ranging from earthquakes to tsunamis. California Task Force 2 (CA-TF2) is a specialty-trained and equipped 70-person urban search and rescue team comprised mostly of members of the Los Angeles County Fire Department. The organizational structure is very similar to that of Virginia Task Force 1. The mission of CA-TF2 is to conduct around-the-clock search and rescue operations at domestic and international disasters, both natural and man-made. One of the most notable international SAR responses was to the catastrophic earthquake that occurred in Japan in 2011. CA-TF2 was deployed to Ofunato and Kamaishi, Japan, for a period of five days. California Task Force 2 is teamed up with Virginia Task Force 1 in providing the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance with humanitarian assistance in the form of search and rescue operations. Furthermore, both SAR teams are members of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (ISARAG), which is made up of urban search and rescue teams from around the world that work together to coordinate international USAR organizations, management, and standards. The U.S. government incurs all costs and expenses associated with an international urban search and rescue. For example, the CA-TF2 deployment to Japan cost approximately $1 million. The USAR deployments to Haiti for 16 days and a 12-day mission in New Zealand cost $4.8 million and $2.6 million, respectively.

13.5.2 International Support from Nongovernmental Organizations As part of the international response, the international community, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), set up refugee camps for those displaced individuals who are attempting to flee violence. This emergency humanitarian event requires aid such as food, shelter, medical supplies, water, and sanitation facilities and security for the refugee camps. When many inexperienced NGOs arrive on disaster scenes, they can complicate relief and recovery efforts by acting unilaterally or by producing poor-quality work.

13.5.3 International Military Assistance In the post–Cold War world, and to an unprecedented extent, forces operating under a United Nations (UN) mandate have become involved in a wide range of humanitarian tasks. These tasks have taken the following forms: protecting humanitarian relief workers, such as those representing international agencies and NGOs, from attacks by belligerents and generally from the danger of war; directly engaging in humanitarian action, including delivering relief supplies and reestablishing and maintaining essential services; and establishing designated safety zones where protection is intended for those displaced.21 The participation of East Asian militaries (Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea) in international disaster relief is a relatively new phenomenon having many implications that will shape the global landscape of the twenty-first century. International disaster relief operations present a challenge to a nation’s military. With each disaster are numerous challenges and needs that, in many ways, are specific to the region impacted and the nature of the event that caused the need for response. Military organizations can bring a multitude of assets quickly to an impacted area. Typically self-sustaining, the military adds value while limiting its impact on what may already be an overly strained region. Introduction to Homeland Security

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With regard to the United States, the U.S. State Department is authorized to work with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to identify and direct the use of military assets deployed for humanitarian disaster response (DR) missions overseas. This usually involves an array of special military assets and expertise in the communications, engineering, water production and purification, and medical support arenas, among other contributions. The U.S. military derives its statutory authority to respond to an international emergency for humanitarian assistance under Title 10 of the United States Code. Title 10 outlines the mission and the responsibilities of usually short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating human suffering. Humanitarian assistance DOD operations encompass short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating human suffering and are designed to supplement or complement the efforts of civil authorities that have primary responsibility to provide the relief. Once the DOD reviews the request for humanitarian assistance from the U.S. State Department, the Secretary of Defense may authorize the emergency operation by signing what is called a “third-party waiver” that authorizes U.S. military resources to be used in a non-military operation to assist a third party. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was established in October 2005 as an operational link to improve USAID’s coordination of humanitarian assistance with the U.S. military. In addition, the OMA is responsible for overseeing humanitarian assistance training exercises between the U.S. military and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). According to Margesson (2006), the OMA serves as the point of contact between the U.S. military and NGOs that are responsible for providing emergency assistance following a catastrophic disaster. The rationale for this is that it allows both the U.S. military and the NGOs to benefit from the other’s operational experience with regards to administration and delivery of humanitarian assistance.22 On December 26, 2004, an earthquake erupted beneath the Indian Ocean that registered 9.0 on the Richter scale. The epicenter of the earthquake was located near the west coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The earthquake-induced tsunami that resulted caused at least 155,000 fatalities, 500,000 injuries, and damages that exceeded $10 billion. Moreover, it is widely believed that approximately five million people were displaced. Following this catastrophic disaster, the U.S. military responded, dispatching ships, planes, and relief supplies to the region: A total of 15,000 U.S. soldiers and sailors were deployed as part of the 2004 tsunami response to work alongside OFDA in the affected region. More specifically, the U.S. military provided 26 ships, 82 aircraft and 51 helicopters to help deliver more than 24.5 tons of relief supplies and enable USAID and other disaster relief agencies to move muchneeded aid to inaccessible areas affected by the tsunami.23 American military involvement in international disasters is a tremendous resource from the humanitarian perspective. During the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti disaster, the following remarks were made to quash complaints regarding the presence of U.S. naval forces in the disaster area:24 Our carriers have three hospitals on board that can treat several hundred people; they are nuclear powered and can supply emergency electrical power to shore facilities; they have three cafeterias with the capacity to feed 3,000 people three meals a day, they can produce several thousand gallons of fresh water from sea water each day, and they carry half a dozen helicopters for use in transporting victims and injured to and from their flight deck. We have eleven such ships; how many does France have?25 422

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Figure 13.4 April 4, 2020. Army Major Sean Shirley, assigned to the 9th Hospital Center, holds a meet‑ ing with his staff in the Javits New York Medical Station intensive care unit bay in New York City. The facility, which has been operational and caring for non-COVID-19 patients since March 30, began providing medical care for patients with the virus on April 3. (Source: Department of Defense. Photo by Navy Chief Petty Officer Barry Riley)

The contributions of American forces in the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake were not unnoticed. Gratitude was expressed by Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa thusly: To all U.S. military members, on behalf of the people of Japan, I sincerely express my deep appreciation for the tremendous support provided by the U.S. military, the U.S. government, and the American people at a time of unprecedented crisis in Japan.26 And domestically, the U.S. mounted a concerted effort and response to help during the COVID19 epidemic (Figure 13.4). The U.S. military is capable of waging war most decisively and devastatingly with speed, surprise, and violence. However, during periods of international emergencies, it is also capable of providing many necessary resources during mitigation, response, and recovery initiatives. It supplements the efforts of responding organizations to render assistance to those in need and is capable of providing a variety of critical resources ranging from medical services to transportation.

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and facilitated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), led by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator. Among its many activities, OCHA provides the latest information on emergencies worldwide and launches international “consolidated appeals” to mobilize financing for the provision of emergency assistance in specific situations.27 Through the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), food is made available to those who might otherwise starve. Thanks to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), camps and other facilities are set up and maintained for those who have been forced to leave their homes. UN peacekeepers protect the delivery of that aid—whether provided by members of the UN system or such humanitarian bodies as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The World Health Organization (WHO) helps protect those displaced by natural and manmade disasters from the ravages of disease. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), with the aid of such bodies as the International Save the Children Alliance, provides education for children who have been uprooted by calamity. And when it is time to begin rebuilding, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is there to ensure that the recovery process has a firm and stable footing.28

13.6 The U.S. Response to an International Crisis The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disasters Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for leading and coordinating the U.S. government’s response to disasters overseas. The OFDA is an organization located within the U.S. State Department and is divided into three divisions: 1. The Disaster Response and Mitigation (DRM) division is responsible for coordinating with other organizations for the provision of relief supplies and humanitarian assistance. 2. The Operations Division (OPS) develops and manages logistical, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. OPS maintains readiness to respond to emergencies through several mechanisms, including managing several search and rescue teams, the ground operations team, disaster assistance response teams (DART), and the Washington response management teams. 3. The Program Support (PS) division provides programmatic and administrative support, including budget/financial services, procurement planning, contract/grant administration, general administrative support, and communications support for both USAID/OFDA Washington D.C. and its field offices.29 The USAID reports that in 2011, the OFDA responded to 67 disasters in 54 countries assisting tens of millions of disaster-affected individuals across the world. The United States has been extremely generous with humanitarian aid to those countries that have been victimized by a disaster. Margesson (2006) contends that the $3.83 billion humanitarian aid budget for fiscal year 2003 was the largest since the late 1970s and slightly higher than the $3.73 billion funding level for fiscal year 2005 (p. CRS-3). Figure 13.5 presents a typical example of USAID initiatives.

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Figure 13.5 A USAID initiative. A woman in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) administers a polio vaccine March 23 in Commune de Ndjili, Kinshasa.30 (Source: USAID/DRC. Photo by Alain Mukeba)

13.6.1 U.S. Emergency Response Protocol After the government of a disaster-stricken nation has requested assistance, the local U.S. embassy contacts the operations center of the U.S. State Department via a disaster declaration cable.31 However, according to U.S. law, the disaster request cable must fulfill the following three criteria before the U.S. can respond: 1. The disaster must be beyond the ability of the host nation to handle on its own. 2. The host nation must formally request U.S. assistance. 3. Such assistance must be in the strategic interests of the United States.32 Once the request is set in motion, OFDA dispatches regional and technical experts to assess the situation and identify any/all humanitarian needs. In the event of a large-scale disaster, OFDA can deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART). DARTs provide specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills that assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions in managing the U.S. government response to disasters.

13.7 Chapter Comments and Summary International disaster responses require the expertise of many specialized actors, including affected government entities, militaries, intergovernmental organizations (typically UN

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agencies), international and domestic NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and affected civilian populations. No single actor can undertake all facets of relief and recovery. Addressing survivors’ needs, which span health, nutrition, water and sanitation, emergency sheltering, and livelihood reconstruction, is of paramount importance during international emergencies. Any nation is susceptible to both natural and man-made disasters. Natural and man-made incidents may have equivalent consequences with respect to fatalities, economic and political impacts, and physical devastation. Historically, pandemics have resulted in the deaths of millions of people globally. The man-made Chernobyl nuclear incident resulted in the city remaining uninhabitable and unlivable during current times. Any nation may require the assistance of another nation or multiple nations at some point, depending upon the severity of an incident. This assistance may be rendered from government sources or nongovernmental organizations. An example of government involvement is military support, whereas an example of nongovernmental involvement is a charitable organization. International disasters have some commonness regardless of their location. Emergency initiatives must accommodate command and control, emergency relief, sheltering, coordination and logistics, corruption, and project management. Underlying these common characteristics is the notion of cooperation. Nations must cooperate to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency initiatives. The United States has a long history of assisting other nations during calamities of various types, scopes, and magnitudes. The U.S. military is a resource that facilitates logistics for emergency materials and resources and provides an array of emergency services. Another facet of U.S. emergency contributions involves USAID and its humanitarian programs. Certainly, the U.S. provides a variety of urban search and rescue resources. No one can predict with absolute certainty exactly when an international disaster will strike or its associated consequences. However, one thing is certain—international disasters will occur at some point in time. The international community must remain vigilant regarding preparedness to render assistance when necessary to embellish mitigation, response, and recovery initiatives.

13.8 Key Terms Command and Control Coordination and Logistics Corruption Emergency Relief International Assistance International Disaster International Politics Man-Made Disaster

Military Assistance Natural Disaster Pandemic Project Management Sheltering Urban Search and Rescue USAID U.S. Military

13.9 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. This chapter introduced the notion of international assistance and discussed a variety of organizations that are leveraged beneficially during international emergencies. Perform some

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research, and identify three additional nongovernmental organizations that may also be used during international emergencies. Write a brief essay that summarizes your findings. 2. This chapter introduced the notion of international assistance and discussed a variety of organizations that are leveraged beneficially during international emergencies. Perform some research, and identify three additional government organizations that may also be used during international emergencies. Write a brief essay that summarizes your findings. 3. This chapter introduced the notion of international assistance and discussed a variety of organizations that are leveraged beneficially during international emergencies. Perform some research, and identify three additional foreign government organizations that may also be used during international emergencies. Write a brief essay that summarizes your findings. 4. This chapter introduced the notion of international assistance and discussed a variety of organizations that are leveraged beneficially during international emergencies. Perform some research, and identify three additional foreign nongovernmental organizations that may also be used during international emergencies. Write a brief essay that summarizes your findings.

Notes

1. World Nuclear Association. (2013). Chernobyl Accident 1986. Retrieved June 16, 2013, from www.worldnuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident/#.Ub6S6thTpyE. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Coppola, D. The Importance of International Disaster Management in the Field of Emergency Management. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from http://training.fema.gov. 5. Coppola, D. (2007). Introduction to International Emergency Management. Butterworth-Heinemann. ISBN 13:978-0-7506-7982-4. 6. Cook, M., Noyes, J., and Masakowski, Y. (2007). Decision Making in Complex Environments. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. 7. Ibid. 8. Schultz, S. (2009). Disaster Relief Logistics: Benefits of and Impediments to Cooperation Between Humanitarian Organizations. Bern: Haupt-Berne Publishing, p. 64. 9. Vervaeck, A. (2011, October 6). Krakatau, Indonesia—Volcanic earthquakes are creating unrest in coastal villages. Earthquake Report. Retrieved May 5, 2013, from http://earthquake-report.com/2011/10/06/ krakatau-indonesia-volcanic-earthquakes-are-creating-ner/. 10. Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. (2013). Livescience. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from www. livescience.com/33316-top-10-deadliest-natural-disasters.html. 11. Post-Chernobyl Global Co-operation: 5 Years Later. (1991, March/April). International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA Newsbriefs, 6(2), 49. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www.iaea.org/newscenter/features/ chernobyl-15/cooperation.shtml. 12. Federal Communications Commission. (2013). Pandemics Information. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/pandemics-information. 13. Ibid. 14. Desai, K. (2012). Global H1N1 death toll may be 15 times higher than previously reported. CNN News. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/25/global-h1n1-death-toll-maybe-15-times-higher-than-previously-reported/. 15. Margesson, R. (2006). International crisis and disasters: U.S. Humanitarian assistance, budget trends, and issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Order Code RL33769., p. CRS-3. 16. International Disaster Response. Social Issue Report. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://rootcause.org/ documents/DR-Issue.pdf. 17. McEntire, D. (2009). Introduction to Homeland Security Understanding Terrorism with An Emergency Management Perspective. New York: Wiley Publishing, p. 233.

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18. Mullins, G. (2004, March). Urban search and rescue: Developing Australia’s capability. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 19(1). 19. Bullock, J., Haddow, G., Coppola, D., Ergin, E., Westerman, L., and Yeletaysi, S. (2006). Introduction to Homeland Security, 2nd edition. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann Publishers. 20. Robertson, F. (2007). Urban Search and Rescue Teams: What Size or Type Is Needed? Retrieved from www.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo4mo.pdf. 21. Roberts, A. (1997, January–April). Use of UN peacekeeping forces for humanitarian purposes. Refugee Participation Network, 23. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www.fmreview.org/RPN/23.pdf. 22. Margesson, R. (2006). International crisis and disasters: U.S. humanitarian assistance, budget trends, and issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Order Code RL33769. 23. Perry, C., and Travayiakis, M. (2008). The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process: How It Works and How It Could Work Better. Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. 24. Colon, A. (2010). Haitian Tragedy Should Transcend Politics and Naïveté. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from www.irishexaminerusa.com/mt/2010/01/19/haitian_tragedy_should_transce.html. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance. Global Issues. United Nations. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from www.un.org/en/globalissues/humanitarian/index.shtml. 28. Ibid. 29. Global Corps. (n.d.). The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance (OFDA). Retrieved from www.globalcorps. com/ofda.html. 30. USAID. (2013). What We Do. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from www.usaid.gov/what-we-do. 31. Perry, C., and Travayiakis, M. (2008). The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process How It Works and How It Could Work Better. Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. 32. Ibid.

References Bullock, J., Haddow, G., Coppola, D., Ergin, E., Westerman, L., and Yeletaysi, S. (2006). Introduction to Homeland Security, 2nd edition. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann Publishers. Cook, M., Noyes, J., and Masakowski, Y. (2007). Decision Making in Complex Environments. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. Coppola, D. (2006). Introduction to International Disaster Management. Burlington, MA: Butterworth Heinemann Publishers. Coppola, D. The Importance of International Disaster Management in the Field of Emergency Management. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from http://training.fema.gov. Federal Communications Commission. (2013). Pandemics Information. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from www. fcc.gov/encyclopedia/pandemics-information. Global Corps. (n.d.). The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance (OFDA). Retrieved from www.globalcorps.com/ofda.html. Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance. Global Issues. United Nations. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from www.un.org/en/globalissues/humanitarian/index.shtml. Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. (2013). Livescience. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from www.livescience. com/33316-top-10-deadliest-natural-disasters.html. International Disaster Response. Social Issue Report. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://rootcause.org/ documents/DR-Issue.pdf. Margesson, R. (2006). International crisis and disasters: U.S. Humanitarian assistance, budget trends, and issues for congress. Congressional Research Service. Order Code RL33769. McEntire, D. (2009). Introduction to Homeland Security Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency Management Perspective. New York: Wiley Publishing. Mullins, G. (2004, March). Urban search and rescue-developing Australia’s capability. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 19(1). Perry, C., and Travayiakis, M. (2008). The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process How It Works and How It Could Work Better. Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. Post-Chernobyl Global Co-operation: 5 Years Later. (1991, March/April). International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA Newsbriefs, 6(2), 49. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www.iaea.org/newscenter/features/chernobyl-15/ cooperation.shtml.

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Roberts, A. (1997, January–April). Use of UN peacekeeping forces for humanitarian purposes. Refugee Participation Network, 23. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from www.fmreview.org/RPN/23.pdf. Robertson, F. (2007). Urban Search and Rescue Teams: What Size or Type Is Needed? Retrieved from www.usfa. fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo4mo.pdf. Schultz, S. (2009). Disaster Relief Logistics: Benefits of and Impediments to Cooperation Between Humanitarian Organizations, Bern: Haupt-Berne Publishing, p. 64. USAID. (2013). What We Do. Retrieved June 17, 2013, from www.usaid.gov/what-we-do. Vervaeck, Armand. Krakatau, Indonesia—Volcanic earthquakes are creating unrest in coastal villages. (2011, October 6). Earthquake Report. Retrieved May 5, 2013, from http://earthquake-report.com/2011/10/06/ krakatau-indonesia-volcanic-earthquakes-are-creating-ner/.

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14 Globalization, Geopolitics, and Homeland Security

It has been said that arguing against globalization is like arguing against the laws of gravity. —Kofi Annan The world is interconnected, economically, socially, and politically; it is in the best interests of nations to build on their common interests and focus on shared security and prosperity. —David Hughes McElreath The objectives of this chapter are to: • Gain an understanding of globalization and its impact on the homeland security of the United States; • Examine the critical issues facing the nation as they relate to geopolitics and national security; • Understand the concept of national security policy; • Understand the geopolitical concerns involving American security; and • Understand the implications of globalization and national security.

14.1 Introduction The U.S. must craft national security policies that incorporate awareness of potential threats that could endanger its economic and financial relationships and functions. Because of the increase of globalism, the U.S. economy and national functioning manifest a myriad of dependencies with other nations around the world. Within its hemisphere, the U.S. enjoys especially close economic and financial relationships with both Canada and Mexico. Therefore, border security is a primary American concern.

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Figure 14.1 Satellite image of the Earth. (Source: NASA)

The current trends in globalization demonstrate a rapid acceleration of integrated economies. Advances in communication and transportation technology, combined with freemarket ideology, have given goods, services, and capital unprecedented mobility. The vast majority of countries want to open world markets to their goods and take advantage of abundant, cheap labor in other parts of the world. International financial institutions and regional trade agreements, designed to compel the reduction of tariffs, are common among the nations of the world. As a result, many nations witnessed the privatization of state enterprises and the relaxing of both environmental and labor standards. Transnational corporations have become some of the largest economic entities in the world, and their financial and economic performances surpass the financial and economic performances of many states. Their continuous push for liberalization has driven globalization while challenging environmental, health, and labor standards in many countries. The U.S. dollar serves as the standard unit of currency in international markets for many commodities; it is also

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the world’s foremost reserve currency. Given all this, it is evident that the U.S. manifests a strong global presence and influence. Although many people may consider international threats to arise solely from terrorism or rogue states such as North Korea, this notion is naïve. Both man-made and natural threats may arise from a variety of nations and groups that are external to the U.S. and North America. Globalism has increased American society’s integration with and dependency on foreign supply chains and logistics for goods and services. In the words of New York Times columnist Tom Friedman (2007), the world has become “flat.” Because of globalization, American society is affected by changes and actions throughout the world with increasing magnitude and complexity. Ensuring the security and safety of American society involves considerations of global contexts and geopolitics among nations. The opening of markets has produced a global supply chain in which raw materials and finished goods routinely travel between countries. This openness produces a record number of imports coming into the United States. In fact, so many goods travel through American ports that only a small percentage are ever examined by customs officials. As a result, experts agree that terrorists could exploit this weakness by introducing a weapon of mass destruction through a U.S. port that would easily avoid detection. Globalization, however, is both a social and economic phenomenon. Today, people move across borders as they never have before. Immigrants and visitors come into the U.S. in unprecedented numbers. While America has always prided itself on integrating newcomers into its “melting pot” society, the sheer number of new arrivals severely challenges homeland security and law enforcement officials. While the overwhelming majority of immigrants are law-abiding citizens seeking a better life, a myriad of foreign criminal organizations have also found their way into the U.S. (e.g., the case of Mara Salvatrucha). Moreover, many immigrants enter the U.S. illegally, generally through Mexico. Many officials are concerned that weak border security could be exploited by terrorists entering the U.S. undetected. Regardless of the perspectives of social or economic phenomena, globalism will increasingly affect American society. Electronic communications networks facilitate the financial aspects of economic resource allocations among nations. The modernizing of nations has the potential to offset traditional power balances among regions where the U.S. has global interests. Global dependencies continue to increase among nations, creating complex and intricate relationships internationally. In any case, the U.S. must understand the potential of globalism to affect homeland security policies.

14.2 Globalization Explained There is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of globalization. For example, economist Jagdish Bhagwati defines it as:1 [The] integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment . . . short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology. On the other hand, Held and McGrew define it as:2

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[T]he expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction. In order to better understand globalization, it is necessary to trace its history. In fact, the world started becoming globalized when the first explorers and merchants traveled beyond their own borders. In a very real sense, Marco Polo was a “globalist.” However, in the latter part of the twenty-first century, several factors emerged that would produce what we commonly term “globalization.” In the first place, the fall of the Soviet Union introduced capitalism into countries that heretofore had embraced socialism. The tensions that had existed between nations during the Cold War began to dissipate (although, in some cases, the splintering and reformation of national boundaries would not be peaceful; consider the case of Bosnia). As well, countries embracing capitalism signed free trade agreements, which reduced or eliminated tariffs and encouraged the flow of goods across national boundaries. However, globalization is more than merely an economic concept—it also includes the free flow of information. Beginning in the 1990s, the evolution of the internet and the installation of fiber optic cable permitted instantaneous communication throughout the world. This, of course, has had a large, positive impact on economies; it also has permitted the exchange of cultural, political, religious, and social ideas. Ironically, while the internet has brought many people closer to one another, it has also allowed individuals to join and form their own niche groups; in some cases, this has caused people to separate from their physical communities. For example, with regard to terrorism, Jensen notes:3 Social scientists have long realized the effects that groups can have on individuals. . . . [A]lthough this area has not been subjected to widespread empirical analysis, it is entirely likely that the Internet provides users with a “cybersense of group.” That is, by engaging in electronic chats and spending large amounts of time communicating via e-mail with others who maintain like interests, one may discover that one’s cybergroup exerts influences similar to those found in physical groups. In other words, spending 8 hours a day behind one’s computer in cyberspace communicating with fellow “cell members” may be psychologically similar to meeting with them on a regular basis. . . . In the opinion of some, technology may play a role in fostering growing ethnic and religious sentiment. In addition to disseminating information, recruiting members, and concentrating power, the emotional appeal of the messages may stir fervor through the social dynamics of the cybersense of group described above. Members of religious and ethnic groups can be united in cyberspace regardless of where they happen to reside. Therefore, although the Internet may make national boundaries less important, it may make ethnic and religious divisions more pronounced and more important to individuals. The current levels of globalization are unprecedented and represent a time of unprecedented global interaction. Throughout history, the stages of globalization encompassed a wide range of social, political, and economic changes. Revolutionary advancements in technology, science, industry, agriculture, and environmental and social issues contributed to the growth of globalization historically and continue to function as primary catalysts for the modern expansion of globalism.

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Globalization, then, is a double-edged sword—it can produce much good, but it can also facilitate discord. For example, in 2013, the U.S. recognized formally “the first Somali national government since 1991 when the Siad Barre dictatorship was overthrown and the country fell into a period of statelessness.”4 This event represents the first elections that occurred “on Somali soil” in over 20 years.5 However, in that same year, the U.S. continued to observe the distress in Mexico as a result of its bloody drug wars. As the 2012 year closed, approximately “60,000 people—possibly 100,000—had been killed in violence across Mexico,” and thousands of others “have disappeared.”6 Some claim that the opening of borders between the U.S. and Mexico as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has played some role in facilitating the delivery of drugs into America. The U.S. now contributes a variety of “drones and sniffer dogs, police trainers and intelligence agents to a country long suspicious of its powerful neighbor.”7 Overseas powers also have the capacity to affect American society. The nation of China is becoming increasingly modernized and continues to invest economically and financially in the U.S. This observation regarding the Chinese situation is an especially important consideration for U.S. security and future American generations. The Chinese own a significant amount of U.S. bond investment debt, thereby contributing vast amounts of money toward the financing of the U.S. government. According to Branigan and Stewart (2010), during latter 2009, the Chinese government signaled a diminishing faith in the potential of the U.S. economically and sold approximately $32 billion of its U.S. investments. This investment sale relinquished China’s position as the primary holder of U.S. debt globally. However, despite this sale, China retains $755.4 billion dollars of U.S. debt (Branigan & Stewart, 2010). Because the U.S. now relies on the financial investment of other nations as a method of financing its operations, any loss of faith in American economic potential may have strategic consequences for the U.S. over time. Such an inability to attract foreign investment would deny the U.S. access to capital that is necessary for the functioning of the nation. However, despite the Chinese sale of U.S. debt, nations continue to view the U.S. with some degree of confidence regarding long-term strategic investments. Such U.S. reliance on foreign investment is a strong example of economic and financial integration globally. Given the relationships that bind nations together, varying levels of interdependence have emerged. Therefore, the economic performance of the U.S. is critical to the successes of its investors regarding the eventual profitability of U.S. investment. This scenario is not the only consideration of interdependence that potentially poses security challenges. As a result, the economies of nations today are inexorably intertwined. If the U.S. economy suffers, so does China’s. The Middle East represents a special case with regard to globalization. Among the nations of the world, the growth of petroleum continues annually to support the needs and wants of emerging economies. Because petroleum is a finite resource for which demand increases annually, it presents a security challenge for the U.S. While petroleum conjures up thoughts of oil and gasoline for automobiles, it is also an ingredient in a variety of products that support American lifestyles, such as plastics and medical products. The dangers of U.S. dependency on international petroleum suppliers, including those of the Middle East, are concerning. The U.S. government is actively advocating the development of alternative fuels and fuel-processing systems, given the national security issues associated

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with finite petroleum supplies. Parthemore and Nagl (2010) indicate that “up to 77 percent of DOD’s massive energy needs—and most of the aircraft, ground vehicles, ships and weapons systems that DOD is purchasing today—depend on petroleum for fuel.” Strategically, this situation represents significant danger to the ability of the U.S. to defend itself and facilitate security functions. The preceding examples represent a mere subset of the global dynamics facing the world today. Many other situations also present potential security challenges. Garrett and Sherman (2006) warn against the dangers of transnational organized crime within the global economy. According to them, failed states, failing nations, and rogue states are attractive to criminal factions and organizations because of their poor economic conditions; many of these nations succumb to various degrees of chaos, violence, crime, and corruption. The characteristics of these nations include “terrorists and drug lords, seekers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), incubators of disease, nurturers of religious extremists, and demographic time bombs of growing numbers of unemployed youth” Garrett and Sherman (2006). As a method of diminishing the security risks of such detrimental environments, Garrett and Sherman (2006) advocate both “international cooperation in counterterrorism and non-proliferation” and “a broad and systematic international effort to help these states move from the category of the failing to the category of the succeeding.”

14.3 Ramifications of Globalization for Homeland Security Globalization has had an overall positive effect on the world and the America economies. However, it has also redefined the way in which the notion of “security” is conceptualized. What benefits America also benefits those who would harm the nation. The advent of globalization has shifted the balance of power in the world today. Although the U.S. enjoys the financial benefits of outsourcing services and purchasing cheap imports, the big winners have actually been the countries engaged in these activities. Many experts predict that the emerging superpowers in the world will be China and India. The economies and influences of these nations on the world stage are expected to continue to increase while those of the U.S. are expected to simultaneously decline (National Intelligence Council, 2004). China, for one, does not appear content to confine its growth only to the economic arena. It has also increased its military reach accordingly. For example, in 2008, the discovery of a secret Chinese nuclear submarine base raised concerns that China may attempt to challenge U.S. maritime dominance in the Pacific (Harding, 2008). China also poses a potential threat as an aggressor in the domain of cyber warfare. In 2012, China landed jet aircraft aboard its first aircraft carrier, signaling its increasing military capability and potential ability to project its naval power.8 Over time, Chinese military modernization may have the potential to offset power alignments within the Asian region. Another obvious concern in a world of ubiquitous communications and easy travel is the spread of dangerous technologies. Perhaps nothing worries homeland security officials more than the possibility that either a nuclear weapon or nuclear technology will fall into the wrong hands. When the Soviet Union dissolved, there was great concern that some of its nuclear arsenal would make its way to terrorist groups. This scenario was not an unreasonable worry because Soviet nuclear facilities were often poorly guarded during the period following the

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collapse of its economy. Further, those entrusted with the care of nuclear weapons were paid poorly, if at all. These observations led to speculation that someone might try to sell a nuclear weapon or nuclear material on the black market. In fact, al-Qaeda’s number-two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, claimed that the group has already purchased a number of “suitcase nukes” from disgruntled Russian scientists. However, Russia has officially denied this claim (Badkhen, 2004). A variety of nations possess nuclear technology and nuclear weaponry. Members of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, who are openly known to possess nuclear weapons, include the U.S., the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China. Other known nuclear powers include India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Each of these nations has detonated nuclear weapons. At the time of this authorship, the nation of Israel is classified as an undeclared nuclear weapons state. However, there is the threat of undesirable entities obtaining nuclear weaponry and nuclear technologies necessary for fashioning weapons. Perhaps a more likely and imminent threat concerns the continued development of nuclear technology on the part of nation-states. As of the writing of this book, Iran is suspected by many of being on the threshold of developing its own nuclear weapon. This would not only lead to the further destabilization of an already volatile Middle East; it would also raise the unpalatable possibility that such a weapon would fall into the hands of an Iranian terrorist surrogate (e.g., Hezbollah). The 9/11 attacks made it obvious that it is not just nation-states that have the ability to wreak havoc on the United States. Today, technology allows even little groups to act “big.” If the internet has been a blessing for the average citizen, it has proven to be a godsend for international and domestic terrorists and criminals because it allows them to spread their ideology and communicate with one another easily and cheaply. Individuals no longer need to meet physically to swap ideas and plan activities. Many, if not all, of these activities can occur in cyberspace. The internet also allows for the rapid dissemination of information of all types. Compared to other forms of deadly technology, information about developing nuclear weapons remains generally secure, at least for the present. However, such security is certainly not the case with chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. For example, documents seized in Afghanistan reveal that al-Qaeda possessed crude procedures for producing VX nerve agent, sarin, and mustard gas. Also, recipes for deadly substances like ricin and procedures for making radiological “dirty” bombs circulate freely on the internet (Stratfor, 2004). Instructions for making poisons and bombs are not the only advantage the internet offers terrorist groups. Today, a single individual has the ability to gather and analyze information in a way that only sophisticated intelligence agencies once could. Consider the numerous maps, satellite photos, and information about America’s critical infrastructure that currently appear online. The intelligence community recognizes the considerable value of this “open source” intelligence through the analyzing of such intelligence. Recently, the CIA opened its Open Source Center to gather and analyze the vast amount of information that gets released to the public daily (CIA, 2005). Ironically, it is not merely the information on the internet that has increased the vulnerability of America. Instead, it is the manifestation of the internet itself. The original concept for the internet was developed as far back as Russia’s launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. Worried

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Figure 14.2 —Anthrax letters from 2001. (Source: FBI)

about losing its technological dominance over the Soviet Union, the U.S. government opened the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in the late 1950s. One of ARPA’s projects was the development of a robust network of computers that could survive major losses to the underlying network. This system, dubbed the ARPANET, was the predecessor to today’s internet (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1981). The internet presents a variety of security challenges among the critical infrastructure of the nation. Many U.S. systems, such as those that control utilities and dams, are run through the internet. Hackers have already demonstrated the ability to break into these vulnerable systems, worrying officials who fear that terrorists or extortionists may do the same (Baschuk, n.d.). Within the globalized environment, another major concern is the occurrence of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” Such an event would represent an attack of epic proportions disabling major parts of the internet. Such an attack could have enormous ramifications for business, government, and the average citizen (Miller, 2007).

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Although advanced technologies and open borders benefit nations and terrorist groups, they also make America increasingly vulnerable to transnational criminal organizations. Both organized crime groups and individuals from as far away as Russia, Asia, Africa, and South America increasingly victimize U.S. citizens and companies. Also, the revolution in communications and technology has created whole new types of criminal activity. The primary example of such new forms of crime is identity theft. Currently, identity theft is the fastest growing crime in America. American law enforcement agencies have demonstrated an inability to stop this type of crime and to arrest perpetrators. Because many of these perpetrators operate with impunity beyond U.S. borders, it is difficult to locate, identify, and bring to justice such criminals. Today, because of the power they wield and the sophisticated tactics they can employ, some criminal organizations are even considered threats to American national security (FBI, 2005). A major theme of globalization is the increasing empowerment of even small groups. One may consider the case of al-Qaeda, a relatively small organization. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has been forced to respond to its activities the way it historically reacted to foreign enemy states. Technology and the unrestricted movement of personnel have proven to be force multipliers for al-Qaeda and have allowed it to wield a level of global influence that was unthinkable years ago. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing homeland security officials comes not from outside the organization but from inside. Those who study globalization note that, in a world of speedy computers and ever-changing cultural and social networks, it is the swift and flexible, and not the big, who usually survive. Many criminal and terrorist organizations understand this concept. They have “flattened” their organizational structures, thereby exploiting the power of the computer age. Not all agree that the U.S. government has completed a similar form of restructuring its agencies. For example, the Department of Homeland Security was created after the attacks of 9/11 to allow for better sharing of information and resources across agencies. Although the agency is beneficial, some critics contend that the creation of this agency produced a more bloated bureaucracy that is both slow and fundamentally incapable of keeping up with a rapidly evolving enemy (Paul, 2007).

14.4 Clash of Civilizations One scholar, Samuel Huntington, produced a provocative body of research that suggests the struggle of the future will not involve countries as much as it will involve cultures and religions. Huntington’s premise generates much debate. His commentary appears consistent with the current fight between the al-Qaeda movement and the West, and its tenets fit nicely with the realities of the globalized world. However, Huntington is not without critics, and his commentary has produced a variety of debates and discussions. Huntington calls his theory the “Clash of Civilizations.” He wrote it in response to a 1992 book, authored by former RAND Corporation social scientist Francis Fukuyama, titled The End of History and the Last Man. Fukuyama’s premise was that, with the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy had “triumphed” over all other forms of government and would forever reign as the final form of governance (Fukuyama, 1992). However, Huntington disagreed with the notions of Fukuyama. In a 1993 article in the journal Foreign Affairs, he declared:

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It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (Huntington, 1993, pp. 45–57) The rise of al-Qaeda in the 1990s and the attacks of 9/11 may indicate that Huntington was prescient in his analysis. However, not everyone agrees with this assessment. Some claim that Huntington has misidentified the cultures that exist in the world. Others argue that people may embrace many identities simultaneously (e.g., religious, national, ethnic) within a global society. Such differences may coexist or clash, even at the individual level. Finally, some question exists regarding whether conflict is inevitable. Basically, will different groups be forever consigned to fighting, or can some lasting peace emerge across cultures? Some views contrast with those of Huntington. Goel offers a different view involving religious ideology and extremism.9 According to Goel, the “fundamental conflict” that will define the twenty-first century will occur “between radical Islam and greater part of the rest of humanity.”10 Goel notes, “Militant Islamic anger is directed against Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Slavs and animists,” and offers the following list as an itemizing of the factions that military Islam wages war against during modern times:11 Roman Catholics in Mindanao in the Philippines Roman Catholics in Timor in Indonesia Confucians and Buddhists in Singapore and Malaysia Hindus in Bangladesh Hindus in Kashmir and within India itself Russian Orthodox Catholics in Chechnya Armenian Christians in Nagorno‑Karabakh Maronite Christians in Lebanon Jews in Israel and in all other parts of the world Animists and Christians in Sudan Ethiopian Orthodox Christians in Eritrea Greek Orthodox Catholics in Cyprus Slavs in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania Coptic Christians in Egypt Ibos in Nigeria Christians and Jews in the United States Moderate Islamic Regimes in Egypt, Jordan and Turkey Other perceptions of future challenges exist that are contrary to the paradigm of Huntington. Voll offers a perspective of modernity regarding contemplations of current global conflicts.12 According to Voll, current global tensions are conflicts unrelated to “clashes of civilizations.”13 Instead, they involve a consideration of “profound clashes of culture and life visions.”14 According to Voll, “Competition among different modes of modernity and efforts to define a distinctive

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modernity for specific societies are part of the foundation of the major conflicts visible around the world today.”15 Despite these contrasting viewpoints and criticisms, Huntington’s view has proven resilient. It provides those involved in homeland security with a theoretical template from which to consider the present and near-term future. Other paradigms will undoubtedly emerge, and they should be considered with equal seriousness. No human can predict the long-term future with certainty or accuracy. However, as globalism continues to increase over time, American preparedness must be mindful of the potential threats that endanger society.

14.5 Terrorism: A Backlash to Globalization? Whenever there is a rapid change in the social order, there are often groups or individuals who oppose such change. For example, during the early part of the nineteenth century, a group of British textile workers protested against changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution by destroying mechanized weaving looms. This group, dubbed the Luddites, felt their livelihoods were threatened by new technology. This form of human behavior is not confined to historical accounts of balking. Instead, human behavior expressed through acts of terror may be the modern equivalent of such balking. Similar to the anti-technology stance of the Luddites, much of modern terrorism can be seen as a response against globalization. Certainly, most terrorist groups embrace and readily use new technologies, such as the internet. However, many object to other aspects of globalization, particularly the increasing power of international business and the movement of people and cultures throughout the world. For example, during the 1990s, many militia groups spoke against the “New World Order” that they thought was secretly being installed. They believed

Figure 14.3 Transformation and globalism. (Source: U.S. Department of Defense)

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that the new order consisted of a one-world government along the lines of a dictatorship of the wealthy over all others, and they viewed globalized business as a particular enemy. Al-Qaeda can also be seen as having an anti-globalization agenda. Osama bin Laden was clear in his desire to remove representatives of foreign governments and non-Islamic leadership from Muslim lands and clear in his disdain for the “decadent” culture of the West. Instead, he favored a return to the “perfect” times of the seventh century when the Prophet Mohammed lived. Finally, environmental and anarchist groups direct much of their anger toward international business concerns. They envision and perceive such business entities to be polluters of the Earth and exploiters of poor and indigenous people. Americans can expect little relief from terrorism and other forms of pushback, at least in the near term. Because the threats of terrorism shall continue during future times, the U.S. and its allies must be prepared to address future incidents of terrorism.

14.6 Globalism: U.S. Security along the U.S.-Mexican Border During the period of the authorship of this textbook, some argue that the nation of Mexico is demonstrating the characteristics of a failing state. At the very least, the nation is experiencing a drug war that impacts commoners as well as the elite factions of its government and society. Corruption is rampant among Mexico’s law enforcement, military, judicial, and government entities. Among townships and municipalities, public officials continue to be murdered; their bodies mutilated; and their families terrorized, harassed, or killed. The violent impact of the Mexican drug trade cannot be ignored as massive amounts of illicit drugs and money are involved (Figure 14.4). According to the Los Angeles Times, over 28,228 individuals have perished since the instigation of the Mexican drug war in 2007 (Mexico Under, 2010). The kidnapping and murder of private citizens, vacationing foreigners, law enforcement officials, and government officials is unprecedented. The murder and beheading of public officials, grenade attacks against civilians, attacks against the clientele of Mexican drug rehabilitation centers, car-jackings and vehicle bombings, are not uncommon events facilitated by the drug cartels (Mexico Under, 2010). Discoveries of the clandestine graves of masses of victims whose deaths occurred in conjunction with bondage, torture, and dismemberment, also occur sporadically (Wilkinson, 2010). Hostilities related to the drug war have increasingly affected the U.S.-Mexican border and the U.S.-Mexican national relationship. During 2010, approximately 3,500 acres of the border territory, encompassing nearly 80 miles within the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge, were closed to U.S. citizens because of violence (Uptick, 2010). Both U.S. citizens and U.S. law enforcement officials became targets of this violence, and warnings were issued by U.S. Fish and Wildlife officials warning the American populace of the dangers posed by armed drug traffickers (Uptick, 2010). Such violence increasingly targets U.S. citizens both within Mexico and along the border. In March 2010, an American employed by the U.S. Consulate in Mexico and a rancher were murdered in the border city of Juarez (Border Violence, 2010). According to the Washington Times, by 2010, 79 U.S. citizens had been killed in Mexico; 23 of them were killed in Juarez (Border Violence, 2010). Violence extends in varying degrees across the entire length of the U.S.-Mexican border; many officials fear that this violence will increase over time and spill over into the United States. 442

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Figure 14.4 Bulk cash hubs and routes. (Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Crime Proceeds Study (2010))

Janet Napolitano, a former U.S. Homeland Security Secretary, admitted that “Mexican drug cartels pose a terrorist threat to the United States” (Napolitano, 2010). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) (Executive Summary, 2010) indicates that Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) “represent the single greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States” and are increasing their influence and distribution among outlets within the domestic U.S. In 2009, the DOJ reported that “midlevel and retail drug distribution in the United States was dominated by more than 900,000 criminally active gang members representing approximately 20,000 street gangs in more than 2,500 cities.” McCaffrey (2008, p. 4) indicates that “before the next eight years are past—the violent, warring collection of criminal drug cartels could overwhelm the institutions of the state and establish de facto control over broad regions of northern Mexico.” The seriousness and potential security threats associated with illegal aliens entering the U.S. are not unfounded. According to Hedgecock (2010), “Mexico announced it had arrested Jameel Nasr, the reputed Hezbollah leader in Latin America, at his home in Tijuana, a stone’s throw from the border separating that Mexican city and San Diego.” Hedgecock (2010) also indicates that “gang members” in “U.S. prisons” have “tattoos in Farsi (the national language of Iran),” that “Hezbollah agents are teaching the Mexican drug cartels the art of the car bomb,” and Introduction to Homeland Security

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that “other than Mexican” individuals are increasingly being discovered by the Border Patrol. Hedgecock (2010) indicates that “Nasr recently spent a month in Venezuela” and that “Iranian agents and Hezbollah members” train in Venezuela to “learn Spanish” and to learn methods of integrating themselves with “the waves of illegals crossing the border.” Within the context of globalization, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is one of mutual interdependence. Both nations are significant trading partners with each other, and their economies are interdependent. Both rely on each other to provide varying percentages of goods and services that are necessary for the continuance of their respective lifestyles and national infrastructures. However, the current drug crisis represents a threat both along the border and, increasingly, within American cities. For example, in 2013, the city of Chicago announced its new “Public Enemy Number One”:16 For the first time since Prohibition, Chicago has a new Public Enemy No. 1—a drug kingpin in Mexico deemed so menacing that he’s been assigned the famous label created for Al Capone. Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman was singled out for his role as leader of the powerful Sinaloa cartel, which supplies the bulk of narcotics sold in the city, according to the Chicago Crime Commission and the Drug Enforcement Administration. In addition to the threats from drugs and the possible smuggling of terrorists into the United States, Mexico represents another potential threat to the United States. Should the drug war spin sufficiently out of control to represent an existential threat to Mexico, that could present the possibility that a failed state would border the United States. The resultant chaos and economic distress that would ensue could pose a substantial challenge.

14.7 Globalism: U.S. Security along the U.S.-Canadian Border Defensively and militarily, the U.S. and Canada have long existed as strategic partners in a variety of mutual civilian and government initiatives. According to the U.S. Department of State, the mutual participation of U.S.-Canadian defense initiatives is “more extensive than with any other country” (Background Note, 2010). Based on the information presented by the U.S. Department of State, the closeness of this shared, defensive framework includes the following considerations: • The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, established in 1940, provides policy-level consultation on bilateral defense matters, and the United States and Canada share NATO mutual security commitments. • U.S. and Canadian military forces have cooperated since 1958 on continental air defense within the framework of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). • The military response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States both tested and strengthened military cooperation between the United States and Canada. • The new NORAD agreement that entered into force on May 12, 2006, added a maritime domain awareness component and is of indefinite duration, subject to periodic review. • Since 2002, Canada has participated in diplomatic, foreign assistance, and joint military actions in Afghanistan. Canadian Forces personnel are presently deployed in southern Afghanistan under a battle group based at Kandahar and as members of the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar. The Canadian Parliament has approved the extension of this mission in Kandahar through 2011. 444

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Figure 14.5 For those who travel frequently between the United States and Canada, a U.S. passport card can be issued, and that may be used along the US-Canadian border. (Source: U.S. Department of State)

Loucky, Alper, and Day (2008, p. 25) consider “cross-border regions,” such as the U.S. Pacific Northwest along the Canadian border, to be “central economic and environmental” entities. Hakam and Litan (2002, p. 8) consider border security from a post-9/11 perspective and indicate that “security cooperation [is] essential to sustain normal cross-border commerce, capital flows, and the movement of people.” From the perspective of terrorism, the U.S. border with Canada presents a variety of national security risks. According to Leiken and Brooke (2006, p. 513), “Canada is the most worrisome terrorist point of entry, and Al Qaeda training manuals advise agents to enter the U.S. through Canada.” According to them, Canada deserves “top priority among U.S. points of entry.” The Canadian perspective of border security differs from the U.S. perspective. According to Nicol (2005, p. 778),” the “greatest risk is not terrorism, but U.S. domination”; the U.S.-Canadian border demarks the “largest trade relationship in the world,” and national trading between the U.S. and Canada is “essentially three times more important to the Canadian economy than it is to the U.S. economy.” According to the U.S. Department of State (Background Note, 2010), the volume of trading between the U.S. and Canada represents a daily amount of approximately U.S. “$1.5 billion,” involving approximately 300,000 daily physical border crossings. Given this alternative perspective on security, lengthy or significant disruptions of economic activity would significantly impact the living standards and trade potential of both nations. The effects of impeded border trade are varied and impact both businesses and individuals. According to Vance (2008, p. 240), the effects of U.S. security measures after the events of September 11, 2001, instigated “negative externalities” economically through increased insurance premiums, higher shipment rates, reduced productivity, loss of profits, delayed cross-border shipments, inflated prices, pressure to invest in costly voluntary Introduction to Homeland Security

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compliance programs, and damaged commercial relationships between firms on the basis of their relative location with respect to the border. Although such externalities may have lessened during the subsequent years, the dangers associated with the slowing of commerce are viable threats to the economies of both nations. Therefore, considerations of border security must encompass the economic characteristics and functions of both nations. Regardless of the perspective, the U.S-Canadian border presents a variety of security challenges and potential threats that impact the national security paradigms of both nations. Although the economic and financial considerations of the U.S.-Canadian border are indicative of globalism, the movement of goods and services across the border are imperative to satisfy the respective human needs and wants of both nations. The U.S.-Canadian relationship is one of peace and provides a basis for mutual investments bilaterally over time. However, a myriad of potential threats may endanger the activities at the U.S.-Canadian border. Therefore, as a method of facilitating border security, both the U.S. and Canada must craft national security policies that accommodate the potential dangers of terrorism and the influences of organized crime while allowing for the effective and efficient carrying on of business; it is not an easy task.

14.8 Case Study: The Rise of a Theocratic Iran Although the United States and the Soviet Union competed for global power and influence during the Cold War, both nations made missteps. For the United States, policy decisions related to Southeast Asia, Central America, the Middle East, and Northern Africa, in some cases, proved to be disastrous. Fortunately for the United States, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union also fell short of its desired goals. In the effort to expand international influence, many nations found themselves drawn into the competition between the superpowers. Iran was one of those nations. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power as the Shah of Iran in classic Cold War style. In 1951, the Iranian people elected Mohammed Mosaddeq as the Prime Minister of Iran. His threat to nationalize the massive Iranian oil industry and his friendship with the Soviet Union concerned the U.S. and Britain. During 1953, with substantial assistance from the CIA, the popular Mosaddeq was deposed in a coup and Pahlavi, thereafter referred to as the Shah, became the leader of Iran. The Shah would prove a great friend to the U.S. He supported the modernization of his country, maintained cordial relations with the West, and was the first leader of a Muslim nation to recognize the state of Israel. However, these attributes did not endear him to many of his subjects. Further, the wealth in Iran was not evenly distributed. Those close to the Shah enjoyed great prosperity while most received little. In order to maintain control, the Shah employed a brutal secret police force called the SAVAK, which imprisoned and tortured several thousand political prisoners during his reign. By 1979, the people of Iran had suffered enough. The Shah was convinced to leave the country for his own safety. Suffering from cancer, he stayed for short periods of time in several different countries before succumbing to the disease in 1980 in the U.S. The fact that he had been strongly supported by the U.S. and was allowed to die there infuriated many Iranians. In his place, the people installed the Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini as the first Supreme Leader of Iran. Khomeini had served all his life as a religious leader. 446

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However, because of his opposition to the Shah, he had been exiled to Paris. Upon his triumphant return and appointment as leader, he declared Iran to be an Islamic Republic, with all facets of government guided by his very conservative Shi’a interpretation of Islam. Unlike the Shah, Khomeini was no friend of the U.S. In 1979, when several of his followers took over the U.S. embassy in Teheran and held its occupants hostage for 444 days, Khomeini at first did nothing. Later, he supported the captors of the hostages. The Ayatollah continued to rule Iran until his death in 1989. After he died, the country continued as a theocracy, with power primarily invested in Iran’s Shi’a leadership. Today finds Iran and the United States facing each other in a tense struggle that involves many issues, including weapons of mass destruction, global energy, sponsorship of global terrorism, and influence in the Middle East. For Iran, the United States, once a strong partner, is not the greatest challenge to their power in the region. With United States air and ground military forces located in Iran’s neighbors (Iraqi and Afghanistan) and strong naval forces off its coast in the Persian Gulf, the relationship between the two nations is difficult with no resolution in sight. Adding to the potential for escalation is the danger a nuclear Iran is believed to pose to its neighbors in the region, especially the strong American ally Israel.

14.9 Case Study: Mara Salvatrucha For many, the word “gang” conjures up an image of a group of disaffected young people engaged in criminality to gain identity, raise money, and acquire and maintain “turf.” However, many modern gangs are better described as true transnational criminal organizations. An example is the case of Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13, which the FBI describes as “one of the greatest threats to the safety and security of all Americans” (FBI, 2005). MS-13, which originated in Los Angeles during the 1980s, was started by El Salvadorian immigrants. Many of these individuals participated in or had been victimized by the country’s bloody civil war. Unusually violent, MS-13 members engage in drug distribution, murder, rape, prostitution, robbery, home invasions, immigration offenses, kidnapping, car-jacking/auto theft, and vandalism. They are also known for violently assaulting law enforcement officers. With an estimated 10,000 members currently located throughout the U.S. and an estimated 100,000 members worldwide, they are truly a transnational entity. Their members travel freely throughout the U.S, Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany. Their ability to travel freely, coupled with the level of fear and intimidation they bring to their communities, provides a difficult challenge for security officials. Recently, extensive international task forces have been developed to address the dangers posed by this organization. The U.S. is concerned because international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda may attempt to establish alliances with MS-13 to facilitate the movement of terrorists into the United States.

14.10 Globalization and Organized Crime Globalization certainly produced legal markets for innumerable goods and services flowing across national boundaries. Such products are traded and taxed in accordance with existing laws both domestically and internationally. However, globalism also has facilitated opportunities for illegal markets (i.e., black markets) to exist, ranging from drug smuggling and human trafficking to the producing and selling of counterfeit products. Such activities also provide opportunities for organized crime entities to increase their scope of operations. Through Introduction to Homeland Security

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such criminal organizations and their associated networks, numerous threats are posed to American society. Globalization contributes to the mellowing of relationships among nations through which the freedom of exchanges across borders increased since the ending of the Cold War. For example, Russian criminal organizations exploited the increased ease of international travel, the liberalization of emigration policies, the expansion of international trade, the spread of high technology communications systems and the under-regulation of international financial networks (via sophisticated money laundering techniques) to extend their criminal enterprises well beyond the borders of their own country.17 Although the Cold War ended, threats to American society still exist. Many other criminal organizations have exploited the diminishing of trade restrictions globally. Numerous criminal organizations leverage black markets through which financial resources are obtained and laundered to support a variety of crimes. Examples include migrant smuggling and human trafficking, cocaine trafficking through South America into North America, firearms trafficking, wildlife smuggling and trafficking, and a variety of others.18 Figure 14.6 depicts many of these dangers arising from the international and global activities of organized crime entities. Such activities cross U.S. borders via land, air, and sea modalities. Ensuring the safety and security of society is a daunting task given the immensity of criminal activity

Russian Federation West and Ukraine Central Europe SouthEast Europe Gulf area North Middle East Africa

United States of America

Mexico Caribbean Central America West Africa

Andean region Brazil

Central Asia Afghanistan India

China

Japan

Myanmar

Horn Central East of Africa Africa Africa DH of the congo

SouthEast Asia

Southern Africa

Heroin Cocaine Firearms

Smuggling of migrants Female trafficking victims (main sources) Counterfeit consumer goods

Counterfeit medicines Piracy off the Horn of Africa Wildlife

Timber Gold Cassiterite

Figure 14.6 Organized crime activities and network flows globally. (Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 2010. Reprinted with permission.)

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that transcends national boundaries. Even the “most efficient of law enforcement agencies” are able to interdict fewer than approximately 20% of drug-related products.19 Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, the activities of organized crime represent a continuous danger to American society.

14.11 Chapter Comments and Summary The Cold War ended at an opportune time in history. Even as economic markets opened, new technologies such as the internet enabled a series of worldwide changes that have come to be known as “globalization.” In short, globalization represents the integration of national economies into an international economic entity that facilitates the rapid, easy movement of people, goods, cultures, and ideas. The concept of globalization is not new—international economic trade has existed for many centuries. However, global growth and expansion have accelerated drastically, given the advances and improvements of modern technologies and the dissolution of the bipolar world. While globalization is generally viewed as an economic construct, it produces many challenges for homeland security. The internet allows terrorist groups to communicate and share ideas (e.g., recipes for weapons of mass destruction) efficiently and effectively. It also facilitates growth among their organizations. Open borders provide opportunities for terrorists and criminals to travel internationally with little difficulty. The very concept of globalization has spurred the formation of new terrorist groups that object to international economies as well as the dispersion of people and cultures into previously closed societies. During the previous century, the U.S. was blessed with unprecedented economic growth and influence despite experiencing the Great Depression and other recessionary periods. The global influence of the U.S. has spawned a backlash that produces challenges for the nation and its allies. However, the integrity of the U.S. economic and financial systems must be protected to ensure the operational capacity and continuance of the nation and to supply its human needs and wants over time. Therefore, any crafting of national security strategy must be mindful of the importance of the U.S. economic and financial systems. The world continues to change. Future challenges to homeland security will come from a variety of sources, some of which are presently recognized. Examples include rogue states, transnational criminal organizations, natural disasters, terrorist groups, and others that have yet to emerge. Therefore, it is incumbent upon those entrusted with the protection of the American homeland to remain ever vigilant to the dynamic threats that endanger the nation and its interests. Otherwise, the nation is doomed to repeat the mistakes of its past.

14.12 Key Terms Globalization Transnational Corporations Flat World Free Flow of Information Cybersense of Group North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Alternative Fuels

Nuclear Proliferation Treaty ARPANET Cyber Pearl Harbor Clash of Civilizations North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) Mara Salvatrucha

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14.13 Thought and Discussion Questions 1. The primary consideration of economic theory involves the notion of satisfying the unlimited wants and needs of humans through the availability and distributing of scarce resources over time. Given the proliferation of globalization since the end of the Cold War, how do you believe U.S. foreign policy has impacted the national economy from a homeland security perspective? Write a brief essay that discusses this issue. 2. Some advocates of free trade staunchly believe that free trade agreements, such as NAFTA, CAFTA, etc., are good economically for the U.S., whereas others argue that such policies have undermined and weakened the American economy. Given these notions, write a brief essay that supports your position regarding the effects of globalization and free trade on the American economy. Please author this essay from the perspective of homeland security. 3. This chapter introduced arguments that conflict with Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations paradigm. Locate some recent materials that either support or refute Huntington’s paradigm. Write a brief essay that discusses your findings. 4. This chapter introduces some of the modalities that organized crime entities implement to leverage the attributes of globalism for illegal purposes. Do some research, and locate some items that consider the growth of criminal activity and logistics systems versus increases in globalism over time. Write a brief essay that summarizes your findings. In your essay, discuss some recommendations that you believe could be used to mitigate the effects of these criminal activities.

Notes

1. Bhagwati, J. (2004). In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3. 2. Held, D., and McGrew, A. (2007). Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 1. 3. Jensen, C. (2001). Beyond the tea leaves: Futures research and terrorism. American Behavioral Scientist, 44(6), 914–936, 922–924. 4. Somalia, a State Again. (2013). The Levin Institute. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.globalization 101.org/somalia-a-state-again/. 5. Ibid. 6. Tuckman, J. (2013). Mexico drug war continues to rage in region where president fired first salvo. The Guardian. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/30/mexicodrug-war-tierra-caliente-calderon. 7. Wilkinson, T., Fausset, R., and Bennett, B. (2012). U.S.-Mexico drug war partnership under Calderon broke new ground. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from http://articles.latimes. com/2012/nov/28/world/la-fg-us-mexico-drug-war-20121129. 8. China Lands J-15 jet on Liaoning Aircraft Carrier. (2012). BBC News. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20483716. 9. Goel, M. (2013). The Clash of Civilizations and Radicalism. University of West Florida. Retrieved February 5, 2013, from www.uwf.edu/lgoel/Clash_of_Civilizations_and_Radicalism.doc. 10. Ibid., p. 4. 11. Ibid. 12. Voll, J. (2013). The Impossibility of the Clash of Civilizations in a Globalized World. Georgetown University. Retrieved February 7, 2013, from http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/135378.html. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Tarm, M. (2013). Cartel kingpin Chicago’s new public enemy no. 1. USA Today. Retrieved May 3, 2013, from www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/14/chicago-cartel-public-enemy/1919117/. 17. Bagley, B. (2001). Globalization and Transnational Organized Crime: The Russian Mafia in Latin America and the Caribbean, pp. 2–3. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.as.miami.edu/internationalstudies/pdf/Bagley%20GLOBALIZATION%202.pdf.

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18. United Nations. (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.unodc. org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf. 19. Oliver, I. (2006). The cost of failure. Journal of Global Drug Policy, 4(2), 19–22.

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McCaffrey, B. (2008, December 29). Memorandum for Colonel Michael Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb. Retrieved August 16, 2009, from www.mccaffreyassociates.com/ pdfs/Mexico_AAR_-_December_2008.pdf. Mexico Under. (2010). Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep. Retrieved October 31, 2010, from http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-war. Miller, J. (2007). Feds Take ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’ Seriously. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.fcw.com/ print/13_17/news/102825-1.html. Napolitano. (2010). Napolitano to McCain: Yes, Mexican Cartels Pose Terror Threat to U.S. Retrieved 31, 2010, from www.cnsnews.com/news/article/75789. National Intelligence Council. (2004). Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project. Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council. Nicol, H. (2005). Resiliency or change? The contemporary Canada-U.S. border. Geopolitics, 10(4), 767–790. Oliver, I. (2006). The cost of failure. Journal of Global Drug Policy, 4(2), 19–22. Parthemore, C., and Nagl, J. (2010). Fueling the Future Force: Preparing the Department of Defense for a Post-Petroleum Era. Retrieved from https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/fueling-the-futureforce-preparing-the-department-of-defense-for-a-post-petroleum-era. Paul, R. (2007). Security, Washington-Style. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.lewrockwell.com/paul/ paul386.html. Somalia, a State Again. (2013). The Levin Institute. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.globalization101. org/somalia-a-state-again/. Stratfor. (2004). Al Qaeda and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from www.stratfor.com/al_qaeda_and_threat_chemical_and_biological_weapons. Tuckman, J. (2013). Mexico drug war continues to rage in region where president fired first salvo. The Guardian. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/30/mexico-drugwar-tierra-caliente-calderon. United Nations. (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.unodc.org/ documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf. Uptick. (2010). Uptick in Violence Forces Closing of Parkland Along Mexico Border to Americans. Retrieved October 31, 2010, from www.foxnews.com/us/2010/06/16/closes-park-land-mexico-border-americans/. Vance, A. (2008). Strategic responses by Canadian and U.S. exporters to increased U.S. border security measures: A firm-level analysis. Economic Development Quarterly, 22(3), 239–251. Voll, J. (2013). The Impossibility of the Clash of Civilizations in a Globalized World. Georgetown University. Retrieved February 7, 2013, from http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/135378.html. Wilkinson, T. (2010). Mexico Grave Yields 51 Bodies. Retrieved October 31, 2010, from http://articles.latimes. com/2010/jul/25/world/la-fg-mexico-bodies-20100725. Wilkinson, T., Fausset, R., and Bennett, B. (2012). U.S.-Mexico drug war partnership under Calderon broke new ground. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved February 6, 2013, from http://articles.latimes.com/2012/ nov/28/world/la-fg-us-mexico-drug-war-20121129.

452

Globalization, Geopolitics, and Security

Index

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate a figure and page numbers in bold indicate a table on the corresponding page. AARS (Army Amateur Radio Service) 201 Abdulazeez, Mohammad 341 Abdulmutallab, Umar Farouk 379 Abedi, Salman 323 Abizaid, John 50 abortion 268, 274, 284 – 286, 290, 295 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 386 Achille Lauro, seizure of 46 ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) 292, 294 – 295 Adams, John Quincy 27 “adapt, improvise, and overcome” paradigm 11 ADL (Anti-Defamation League) 293 – 294, 400 advanced imaging technology (AIT) 232 Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) 379 Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 438 aerospace security see aviation and aerospace security Afghanistan 419; al-Qaeda and 48, 439; Canadian forces in 444; earthquakes 60; Soviets in 39 – 41, 306, 358; Taliban 333, 335, 341; terrorism and extremism 320 – 321; U.S. military operations in 48, 231, 444 Africa, terrorism and extremism in 324 – 325 aftershocks 76 Aguilar, David 334 air border 375 Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan 381

air marshals 382 – 383 airport security 4, 380 air security 5, 10, 103 – 104, 126, 294; aviation and aerospace security 379 – 382; hijacking of airplanes 44 – 45, 305, 322, 333 – 334, 380, 382 – 383, 407 air transportation 378 airway see aviation and aerospace security AIT (advanced imaging technology) 232 Alaskan Earthquake (1964) 182 al-Assad, Bashar 321 al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr 303, 321, 342 Alexander II 311, 312 ALF (Animal Liberation Front) 269, 282, 285 – 288 Algerian independence, war for 316 – 319 al-Jazeera 339 Allbaugh, Joe M. 125 Alles, Randolph 134 all-hazards approach 219, 229; capabilities-based planning model 227 – 228; Citizen Corps and 190; Coast Guard and 196; concept 7, 8, 9, 17; FEMA and 123, 226; Fire Corps and 193; fusion centers 148; Homeland Security Presidential Directives 101, 183; as home security goal 101; Office of Health Affairs and 120; planning model 221, 228; state and local plans 290; threat assessment 230; vulnerability assessment 231 all reasonable hazards approach 6 al-Megrahi, Abdelbaset 46, 322 – 323

al-Qaeda 50, 116, 268, 295; in Africa 322; al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 321; anti-globalization agenda 442; bin Laden’s death 321; border permeability and 400; border security and 393; branding 320; in Canada 400; clash of civilizations 439 – 441; embassy attacks 48; financing of 334 – 335; force multipliers 439; ISIS compared 319; media use by 337; in Mexico 400; September 11 attacks 72, 334, 358, 361, 376, 379, 439; U.S.Canadian border 444; weapons 437 al-Shabaab 324, 400 alternative fuels 235 – 236, 435 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 437 American Association of Railroads 391 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 277, 292, 294 American Disaster Preparedness Foundation, Inc. 103 American Nazi Party 277 – 278 American Red Cross 123, 170, 177, 179, 181 – 182, 184, 218 American Revolution 9, 21, 22, 26, 137 AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia) 324 Amoss, Ulius Louis 283 anarchist 270, 288 – 289, 306, 310 – 312, 442 Anarchist International 312 anarchist movement 270, 310 – 311 Anheuser-Busch 170 Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 269, 286

Index

453

animal poaching 335 animal rights groups 274, 286 – 287, 290 Annan, Kofi 431 Ansar al Sharia 324 anthrax 154, 231, 438 anti-abortion 268, 273 – 274, 285, 290, 295 anti-choice 286 anti-colonialism 313 – 314, 316 Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 292 – 293, 400 Antifa 288 – 289 anti-fascists 272, 288 anti-government groups 273, 279 – 280, 282, 286, 290 Anti-Racist Action (ARA) group 289 anti-Semitism 274, 276, 280 – 281, 285, 292, 314 APIS (Advanced Passenger Information System) 379 AQIM 324 Arab Rebellion 314 Arab Spring 42 ARA (Anti-Racist Action) group 289 Armed Cargo Pilot Program 380 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 400 arms race 36, 38 Army Amateur Radio Service (AARS) 201 Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. 124, 182 Army Military Information Division 357 Army of God 285 – 286 ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) 438 art, homeland security perspective 7 Aryan Brotherhood 273, 279 Aryan Nations 268, 275, 278 – 279, 292 – 293 Asia, terrorism and extremism in 325 – 326 assassination 39; domestic terrorism 268 – 269, 270, 273, 285, 287, 295; international terrorism 303, 334, 400; Kennedy 38, 133; McKinley 28, 51, 131, 132, 270; political 306 – 307, 322; of terrorists 340 The Assassins 307 assessment 350, 369; consequence 229; risk management and 229 – 230; threat 218, 226, 230 – 231, 369, 443; vulnerability 231 assistance: FEMA 250; international 419 – 424; public assistance 251, 260, 261

454

Index

asymmetric warfare/conflict 24, 50, 52 Atlanta bombing 5 AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 324 Aum Shinrikyo 230, 326 AUXAIR 199 – 200 aviation and aerospace security 379 – 382; hijacking of airplanes 44 – 45, 305, 322, 333 – 334, 380, 382 – 383; historical perspective 379; modern perspective 379 – 382 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (2001) 406 Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan 381 aviation surveillance and reconnaissance 402 Aviation Transportation System Recovery Plan 381 Aviation Transportation System Security Plan 381 Baader-Meinhof group 331 Band of Mercy 287 banking system: cyberattacks on 106; money-laundering and 335 Barbary pirates 385, 388, 407 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 329 Basque separatist groups 324 Bastille, Storming of the 309 Batista, Fulgencio 327 – 328 BAU (behavioral analysis units) 365 Bay of Pigs 39, 329 Beam, Louis 283 Begin, Menachem 314 – 315, 316 behavioral analysis units (BAU) 365 Beirut bombings (1983) 44, 45, 220 Bellavita, Christopher 220 Beltway Sniper killings (2002) 268 Benghazi 324 Berman, Howard L. 228 Bhagwati, Jagdish 433 Bhopal chemical disaster (1984) 58, 67, 68, 414 Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (2012) 256 bin Laden, Osama 48, 303, 321, 326, 339, 342, 442 biological incidents 153 – 156 biological threats 105, 175 biometric data 362 bioterrorism 154 – 156, 231 BioWatch 105 Birnbaum, Nathan 314 The Birth of a Nation (film) 276 BJA (Bureau of Justice Assistance) 103

Black Guerilla Family 272 Black Hand 312 – 313 Black International 312 Black Liberation Army 271 – 272, 329 Black Panther Party 271, 282 Black Panthers 271 black separatists 274, 281, 290 Black September 324, 334 blizzards 80 Boko Haram 325 bombing, suicide 48, 52, 319 – 320, 323, 335 bonded labor 398 border: drug trade and 286; length of shared U.S. 58 Border Patrol 15, 97 – 98, 107, 127, 334, 400, 402 – 405, 444 border permeability 400 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (2005) 406 borders, types of 375 border security 107 – 109, 108 – 109, 375 – 408; aviation surveillance and reconnaissance 402; Coast Guard and 107 – 108, 130; fence, U.S.-Mexican 402; funding 103; future threats 366; globalization and 432; human trafficking 398 – 399; immigration 400; initiatives 399 – 402; legislation pertaining to 403 – 406; overview 376 – 377; searches 400 – 401; Small Vessel Security Strategy 402; U.S.-Canadian border 444 – 446, 445; U.S.-Mexican border 107 – 109, 128, 397, 400 – 402, 442 – 444, 443 Bosnia 312 – 313 Boston Marathon bombing (2013) 4 – 7, 12, 12, 57, 243, 341 BP oil spill see Deepwater Horizon (BP) oil spill (2010) Branch Davidian sect 284 BRICS acronym 42 British Union of Fascists 288 Brown, John 270 bubonic plague 417 Buckley, William 45 Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) 151 – 152 Bulk Cash Smuggling Center 128 Bullock, Jane 57 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) 103 Burke, Edmund 308 Burr, Aaron 270

Bush, George H. W. 48, 282, 290 Bush, George W. 110, 114, 169; Citizen Corps 190; on critical infrastructure 149; DHS creation 3, 15, 96 – 99, 109; FEMA and 123; HSPD-5 183, 290; HSPD-8 101; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) 359; performance assessment 228; surveillance and 294 business and commerce, homeland security perspective 9 – 10 Butler, Richard 278 BZPP (Buffer Zone Protection Program) 151 CACFP (child and adult care food program) 251 Caesar, Julius 306 calamity 14, 80, 106, 252, 254, 257, 260, 262, 264, 424; see also natural disasters Calderon, Felipe 397 Calderon, Phillipe 333 California landslides 83 California Task Force 2 (CA-TF2) 421 California wildfires 256, 258, 259 Canada: al-Qaeda in 400; U.S.-Canadian border 400, 444 – 446, 445 Canadian Security Intelligence Service 364 canine teams 232 CAP see Civil Air Patrol capabilities: of disaster response community 246; NRF core of response mission 250; preevent identification of 172; Target Capabilities List (TCL) 224, 224 – 228, 225 capabilities-based planning model 227 – 229 capitalism 52, 434 Capone, Al 364 – 365 cargo airlines 378 – 379 cargo security 393 – 396, 396; air transportation 378; logistics systems and 393 – 396, 396; screening 382 – 383, 393; tracking systems 395; transmitters and wireless sensors in containers 395 Caro Quintero, Rafael 45 Carter, Jimmy 124, 126, 183, 271, 273, 322 Castro, Fidel 271, 327 – 330, 328 Catechism of the Revolutionary, The 310 – 311

Catholic Charities 170 Caudle, Sharon 228 CBP see Customs and Border Protection CBRNE see chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive Center for Domestic Preparedness 217 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 155 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 60; creation of 33 – 34, 356 – 357, 370; definition of intelligence 350; Iranian coup 446; mission of 360; Open Source Center 437; spying on American Citizens 366 Cermak, Anton 270 certified emergency response team (CERT) 190 – 191 change, drivers of 367 Charleston church attack (2015) 5 chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE): Bhopal disaster 58, 66, 68, 415; incident 49, 153, 175 – 176; treat assessment 230 – 231 Chernobyl disaster (1986) 58, 67, 69, 86, 413, 414 – 416, 426 Chertoff, Michael 16, 99, 111, 112, 112, 226 – 227 Chesimard, Joanne 329, 329 – 330 Chicago Fire (1871) 65, 65 – 66, 80 child and adult care food program (CACFP) 251 child nutrition programs (CNPs) 251 children: child labor 399; child soldiers 399; food and shelter 251 China: Black Dragon Fire (1987) 81; communism 33, 36; droughts 73; as emerging superpower 436 – 437; list of terrorist organizations and terrorists 325 – 326; Nixon’s visit (1972) 39; Shaanxi Earthquake (1556) 416; U.S. debt 435 Christian Identity movement 281, 285 – 286 chronological, homeland security perspective 9 Churchill, Winston 35, 36 Church of Jesus Christ Christian 278 Church of the Creator 293 CIKR (Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources) 151 Citizen Corps 170, 191 – 193 Citizen Corps Councils 191 Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 121, 128

Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman 135 Civil Air Patrol (CAP) 171, 195 – 197, 212; homeland security role 196 – 197; overview 195 – 196 Civil Defense Agency/Civil Preparedness Agency 123 – 124 civil rights 28, 135, 227, 271, 276, 292 Civil War, U.S. 27, 51, 66, 158, 254, 268, 357, 379 Clash of Civilizations 439 – 440 classified materials, release of 105 Cleaver, Eldridge 272 Clinton, Bill 97, 124, 149, 273 Clinton, Hillary 133 CNE (Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement) 135 CNPs (child nutrition programs) 251 COADs (community VOADs) 174 coal mine fire of Centralia 60 Coastal Barrier Resources Act (1982) 256 Coast Guard, U.S. 26, 50; activities of 130 – 131; border security 107 – 108, 130; budget 107; within DHS 15, 96, 98, 108, 111, 117, 118, 121, 129 – 131; drug smugglers and 498; floods and 81; funding 108; Hurricane Maria and 8; intelligence and 121; law enforcement detachment (LEDET) teams 233; Loran-C 105; Magnuson Act (1950) 403; maritime security 385; Oil Pollution Act (1990) 405; oil spills and 7, 60, 68; origins of 26, 50, 129; overview of 129 – 131, 130 – 131; Port and Tanker Safety Act (1978) 404; Ports and Waterways Safety Act (1972) 404; Search and Rescue 199; U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (USCGA) 171, 198, 198 – 201, 212 Coast Guard Reserve 198 cocaine 131, 233, 332 – 333, 337, 398, 448, 448 cockpit security 383 Cohen, William 97 COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) 365 – 366 Cold War 34 – 41, 60; Antifa and 289; attempts to isolate the Soviet Union 37 – 38; Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and 195; containment 35 – 38; Cuba and 329; détente 35; glasnost

Index

455

41; intelligence and 358, 370; mutually assured destruction (MAD) 36 – 38; rollback 40; small wars and domino theory 38 – 39 collaboration: building relationships and consensus 184; within emergency management function 10 – 11; between fusion centers and EOCs 148; information management 248; NVOAD core principle 186; RISS 362; see also partnership(s) Collazo, Oscar 271 Colombia 329, 332 – 333 colonial independence 313 command and control: disaster response and recovery 247 – 248, 263; global and international disaster 416 commodities 337 common law court 279, 283 communication: disaster response and recovery 247, 263; emergency contact 252; in emergency management process 11; high-frequency (HF) radio communications, MARS and 201 – 202; information management 248 – 249; National Response Framework (NRF) and 174; NVOAD core principle 186 communism 28 – 33, 38 – 39, 42, 51, 270, 314; Cuba 328 – 329; domino theory 38, 51; Red Scare 270; spread of 314 community emergency response team (CERT) 222 community response 222 – 223 community VOADs (COADS) 174 complexity 9, 12, 42, 58, 60, 124, 147, 163, 314, 366, 401, 433 Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative 105 confusion 247 – 248 consequence assessments 232 Constitutionalists 282 consumer 354 – 356 container and cargo security 393 – 396, 396; logistics systems and 393 – 396, 396; transmitters and wireless sensors in 395 Container Security Initiative (CSI) 16, 99, 393, 395 containment 35 – 38 contingency 170, 175, 195, 201 – 202, 230, 236, 244, 247

456

Index

contingency planning 247 contract, insurance as 257 Cooper, D.B. 380 cooperation: NVOAD core principle 186; Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) 325; see also partnership(s) coordination 105, 109, 120 – 121, 136, 145 – 146; disaster response and recovery 247, 263; emergency operations centers (EOCs) 146; between fusion centers and EOCs 148; global and international disaster 415; Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) 148 – 149; incident command center 247; incident management 262; multi-agency 184, 262; NVOAD core principle 186; partnerships and 184 corruption 436; border security and 42, 107, 333, 400; foreign officials 42, 129, 442; human trafficking 398; international emergency management and 414, 416, 426; in Mexico 42, 107, 333, 442 cotton 152 counterfeiting 133 – 134 counterintelligence 351 – 352, 358 counterterrorism: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 334; by French in Algeria 317 – 317; Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) 325; Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 325 counterterrorism measures 318 covert operations 351, 358, 364 COVID-19 71, 104, 418, 418 – 419, 423, 423 creative, homeland security perspective 9 crime: electronic 133; financial 128, 133 – 134; hate crimes 5, 220, 269, 292, 394; transnational 13, 44, 50, 52, 364; see also organized crime criminal analysis 365, 369 Critical Infrastructure Information Act (2002) 406 critical national infrastructure 10; defined 149; identified 149; threats to 58 cryptoanalysis 365 CSI (Container Security Initiative) 16, 99, 393, 395

Cuban Missile Crisis 39, 329, 354 – 355 Cuban Revolution 327 – 330, 328 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 126 – 128, 127; accomplishments, daily 127; biometric database 362; Container Security Initiative (CSI) 493, 395; funding 107; intelligence and 121; maritime security 385; Office of Air and Marine (A&M) 402; strategic goals 127 Cyber Pearl Harbor 367 cyber security 49, 103 – 106, 114, 118 Cyber Security and Communications, Office of 117 cybersense of group 434 – 435 cyber terrorism 50, 340 – 341 cyber warfare 48, 50, 52, 436 cycle of crisis 220 cyclones 84 Czolgosz, Leon 270 Daesh see ISIS/ISIL Dakhlalla, Muhammad 338 The Dalles, Oregon 152 DART (disaster assistance response team) 424 data collection, intelligence 354 debt bondage 398 Deepwater Horizon (BP) oil spill (2010) 6, 6, 67, 68, 87, 197, 386 – 387 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 360 defense memoranda of understanding and agreements 205 – 206 defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) 204 Defensive Industrial Reserve 208 – 210 democracy 23 demographics, as driver of change 367 – 368 Department of Agriculture, U.S. (USDA): critical infrastructure protection 151; food inspection 155 Department of Defense (DOD): capabilities-based planning model 227; Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and 196; Civil Defense Agency/Civil Preparedness Agency 123 – 124; critical infrastructure protection 150; definition of intelligence 350; domestic preparedness and 96 – 97, 123 – 124; energy needs 436; housing of

unaccompanied children 128; humanitarian disaster response missions overseas 422; Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) 201 – 202; military in support of homeland security 49; organized crime 335; resources for emergency work 101, 172; technological security 105 – 106; terrorism definition 143, 305; third-party waiver 422 Department of Energy (DOE): critical infrastructure protection 151; Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 360 Department of Health and Human Services: critical infrastructure protection 151; Public Health 154 – 156 Department of Homeland Security (DHS): creation of 3 – 4, 14, 96, 98, 109, 137 – 138, 169, 183, 377, 439; critical infrastructure protection 151; description of 14 – 16; forerunners of 96 – 97; funding 103 – 109, 234 – 235; future of 137; goals 101; grant programs 109, 112, 368; history 96 – 99, 109 – 116; maturing and strengthening 233 – 234; mission of 14 – 15, 44, 96, 98, 111, 112, 171; operational objectives 15, 99; organizational structuring and components 96, 98, 111, 116 – 137, 119; organization of 15 – 16; partnerships and 169 – 172; performance optimization 235 – 236; planning model 227 – 229; planning scenarios 221 – 222, 224, 227, 230 – 231, 238; risk management framework 226, 229; seal 96; UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) program 402; vision 103 – 109; workforce 96, 98 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding and vision: border security and immigration 107 – 109; cyber security and technology R&D 105 – 106; safeguarding transportation system 104 – 105; supporting state activities 109 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) organizational structuring and components 96, 98, 111, 116 – 137, 119; advisory panels and committees 136 – 137;

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 128; Coast Guard 129 – 131, 130 – 131; Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 126 – 128, 127; Directorate for Management 120; Directorate for National Protection and Programs 117; Directorate for Science and Technology 117, 118 – 119; Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 123; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 123 – 126; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 122, 122; Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) 146 – 147; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 128 – 129; Office of Health Affairs 120 – 121; Office of Intelligence and Analysis 121, 148, 361, 368; Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 121; Office of Policy 120; Office of the Secretary 134 – 136; Secret Service 131 – 134, 132 – 134; Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 126 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 123 – 124, 182 Department of Justice (DOJ) 376; Black Liberation Army and 271; domestic terrorism and 289 – 290; funding 103; intelligence-led policing 362; as lead in prosecution 152; Mexican drug trafficking organizations 398, 443; NunnLugar-Domenici Program 97; Office of Justice Programs 103, 192; Red Scare and 270; USAonWatch 194; Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) 192 Department of State: Bureau of Consular Affairs 385; Bureau of Intelligence and Research 361; counterterrorism rewards program 340; humanitarian disaster response missions overseas 422; on human trafficking 399; trading between U.S. and Canada 444; U.S.-Canadian defense initiatives 444

Department of the Interior, critical infrastructure protection and 151 Department of the Treasury: critical infrastructure protection 151; Office of Intelligence and Analysis 361 Department of Transportation 104, 126 Desert Shield and Desert Storm 47 – 48 détente 39 deterrence 231 DHS see Department of Homeland Security DHS Strategic Plan 16, 95, 99 DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) 360 diplomacy: as instrument of national power 24; League of Nations 30 – 31, 34, 51; Secret Service protection and 133 Directorate for Management, DHS 120 Directorate for National Protection and Programs, DHS 117 Directorate for Science and Technology, DHS 117, 118 – 120 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 33, 354, 359, 366, 370 dirty bomb 231, 437 dirty tricks 366 disaster(s): challenge of 1; defined 262; federal actions and assistance in 100 – 101; international emergency management 414 – 426; local community responsibility 138; presidential declarations 100, 124; principal hazards 56 – 88; scope of 245 – 246, 263; urban 65 – 66; weather and climate disasters (2019) 59; when and where of strikes 13; year-todate U.S. billion-dollar events (1980–2019) 59; see also disaster preparedness; disaster response and recovery; natural disasters disaster assistance response team (DART) 424 disaster declarations 244, 259 – 261 disaster frameworks 249 – 250 disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs) 248 disaster mortuary teams (DMORTs) 248 disaster preparedness 217 – 239; community response 222 – 223; consequence assessments 232; ensuring resilience to

Index

457

disasters 233; federal response 223; funding 234 – 235; Homeland Security planning model 224, 224 – 226, 225; Hurricane Katrina case study 236 – 238, 237; maturing and strengthening security enterprise 233 – 234; natural disasters 219; planning challenges 227 – 229; planning strategies and operations 221 – 222; preventing extremism and terrorism and enhancing security 232 – 233; private and nonprofit sector 223 – 224; risk management and assessments 229 – 230; state response 223; Target Capabilities List (TCL) 224, 224 – 227, 225; terrorism and extremism 220 – 221; threat assessments 230 – 231; vulnerability assessments 231 disaster recovery see disaster response and recovery Disaster Relief Act (1974) 124 – 125, 183 Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) 233 disaster response and recovery 243 – 264; brief examination of 245 – 246; command and control 247 – 248, 263; considerations of 261 – 262; disaster frameworks 249 – 250; economics of 253 – 255; federal actions and assistance in 100 – 101, 124; federal actions and assistance in recovery 100 – 101; FEMA role in 249, 250 – 251; food and shelter 251; information management 248 – 249; insurance 255 – 259; international emergency management 414 – 426; partnerships and 168 – 172, 175, 177 – 178, 181, 183, 184, 185, 192, 204; planning 147; resource management and utilization 144 – 145; response community 246; stages of recovery 249; wholecommunity approach 171 – 172; see also Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) discipline of emergency management 11 displacement 303 – 304, 343 DMARTs (disaster medical assistance teams) 248

458

Index

DMORTs (disaster mortuary teams) 248 DNDO (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office) 123 DNI (Director of National Intelligence) 33, 354, 359 – 360, 366, 370 DOD see Department of Defense DOE see Department of Energy DOJ see Department of Justice dollar, U.S. 432 domestic extremism 267 – 295; concept defined 268 – 270; hate groups 268, 273 – 274, 282, 292 – 293; history 270 – 273; law enforcement agencies battling 289 – 292; nongovernmental agencies battling 292 – 295; radical left 286 – 289; radical right 274 – 286; threat groups 273 – 274; white supremacy groups 273 – 275, 277 – 280, 283, 285, 290, 293, 366 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 123 Domestic Outreach Plan 381 domestic terrorism, agencies battling: American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 294 – 295; Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 293 – 294; federal 289 – 290; law enforcement 289 – 292; nongovernmental 292 – 295; Southern Poverty Law Center 292 – 293; state, local, and tribal 290 – 292 domino theory 38, 52 Donavan, William J. 51, 358 donors 184 Downing, Michael P. 290 doxxing 289 DRF (Disaster Relief Fund) 233 droughts 23, 60, 73 – 74, 74, 253, 415 drug cartels 129, 286, 336, 397 – 398, 400, 442 – 443 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 60 – 61; global mission 61; Office of National Security Intelligence 361 drug trafficking 107, 114, 365; Coast Guard and 26; cocaine 131, 233, 332 – 333, 337, 398, 448, 448; Colombia 332 – 333; funding international terrorism and extremism 334; Mexico 43, 286, 327, 333, 397 – 398, 443; Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) 135

drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) 129, 286, 327, 333, 397, 443 drug war, Mexican 42, 333, 377, 400, 435, 442, 444 DSCA (defense support to civil authorities) 204 Dulles, John Foster 40 dust storms 82 – 83, 82 Earth, satellite image of 432 Earth First 274, 287 Earth Liberation Front (ELF) 269, 286 – 288 earthquakes 60, 75 – 77; aftershocks 76; causes of 75; Fukushima Daiichi disaster 69, 420; international disaster and 415 – 416, 419 – 423; lack of warnings 13; New Madrid Earthquakes (1811–1812) 61, 76; San Francisco earthquake and fire 63, 63; tsunamis and 69, 74 – 75, 422; U.S. west coast hazards 78 Eastern Turkistan Information Center (ETIC) 325 – 326 Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 325 – 326 Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) 325 – 326 ecological groups 274, 286 – 288 economic, homeland security perspective 9 economic integration, globalization and 433, 435 – 436 economic intelligence 352 economic power 25 economics of response and recovery 253 – 255 eco-terrorism 269 – 270, 283, 286 – 288, 340 Egyptian Islamic Jihad 400 Eisenhower, Dwight 38 electronic crimes 133 elephant poaching 335 ELF (Earth Liberation Front) 269, 286 – 288 embassies, attacks on U.S. 47, 52 EMC (emergency management cycle) 249, 261 emergency 60 – 61; declaration, advance 261; defined 262; presidential declarations 100, 260 emergency contact 252 emergency management: collaboration within 10 – 11;

components of 262; defined 262; discipline 11; function and operations 143 – 163; international 414 – 426; as key element in homeland security 10 – 11; objectives of 10; partnerships 167 – 213, 263; perspectives on 145; process of 10 – 11; reasons for 5 – 7; responsibility of 11 Emergency Management Assistance Compact 223 emergency management cycle (EMC) 249, 261 Emergency Management Institute (EMI) 175, 192 emergency operations centers (EOCs) 146, 173 – 174, 246 – 247, 368 emergency relief, in global and international disaster 415 emergency response cycle 169 emergency shelter 251 emergency support coordinators (ESCs) 174 emergency support functions (ESF) 146 – 147, 162, 173 – 174 emerging threats 50; identified by DNI 366, 367 EMI (Emergency Management Institute) 175, 192 Emwazi, Mohammed 339 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama) 439 – 440 Entebbe rescue mission (1976) 324 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), critical infrastructure protection and 151 EOCs see emergency operations centers epidemics 70 – 71 EPP (Paraguayan People’s Army) 327 equipment, partnerships and 174 – 176 ESCs (emergency support coordinators) 174 ESF see emergency support functions ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) 329 ETIC (Eastern Turkistan Information Center) 325 – 326 ETIM (Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement) 325 – 326 ETLO (Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization) 325 – 326 Europe: impact of immigration from Middle East 322; terrorism and extremism in 322 – 324

European Union, terrorism definition by 305 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 324 event response 4, 172, 246 – 248, 263; flexible 8 E-Verify 107 explosive and incendiary devices 231 extortion 323, 332 – 333, 340, 388, 438 extremism 5; characteristics of acts 305 – 306; disaster preparedness 220 – 221; domestic 267 – 295; historical perspective 306 – 319; international terrorism and extremism 303 – 344; operations against international 341 – 342; preventing 232 – 232; understanding 305 – 306 extremist movements, leaders of 319 extremists 5, 14, 50, 114, 400, 436; domestic 268, 273 – 274, 279, 287, 290, 293; homegrown violent 290; international 2, 303, 319 – 320, 327, 337 – 338, 342; September 11, 2001 attacks 2; suicide bombing 47, 51, 319 – 320, 323, 335; see also extremism; specific individuals and groups Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989) 67 – 68, 87, 384, 386 – 388, 407 facial recognition software 362 faith-based organizations 177, 181, 188 – 190 FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional) 272 false trade, invoicing 336 famine 253, 415 Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) 45 – 46 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 329, 332, 335, 337 Faulkner, William 1 Fawkes, Guy 309 – 310 FBI see Federal Bureau of Investigation FCO (federal coordinating officer) 249 FDA (Food and Drug Administration) 155 FDRC (federal disaster recovery coordinator) 249 Fedayeen 307 federal air marshal 232

Federal Air Marshal Service 402 – 403 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 33, 60; behavioral analysis units (BAU) 365; COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) 365 – 366; counterintelligence 351, 358; domestic terrorism and 268 – 269, 271, 286 – 287, 289 – 290; Joint Terrorism Task Force ( JTTF) 153, 154, 291, 334; National Security Bureau 361; Next Generation Identification biometric program 362; protection function 366; terrorism definition 305; terrorism investigation 152 – 155; Terrorist Screening Center 362 federal coordinating officer (FCO) 249 Federal Disaster Assistance Administration 123 – 124, 182 federal disaster recovery coordinator (FDRC) 249 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 123 – 126; American Red Cross and 181; debate on presence within DHS 137 – 138, 226 – 227; disassembly of programs and operations 125; disaster declarations 244; disaster response and recovery 249 – 251; Emergency Management Institute (EMI) 175, 192; ensuring resilience to disasters 233; establishment of 123 – 124; forerunners to 123 – 124; grant funding 179, 251; Heritage Emergency National Task Force 173; Homeland Security Act and 100; Hurricane Katrina and 64, 64 – 66, 112, 137 – 138; Individual and Community Preparedness Division 191; as lead agency in federal disaster response 100 – 101; mission 125; National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) 183; National Exercise Division 177; partnerships and 173; preliminary damage assessment (PDA) 260; public assistance 251; search and rescue (SAR) 419 – 420; training 175 – 176; types of assistance offered 125; virtual tabletop exercises (VTTX)

Index

459

176; voluntary agency liaisons (VALs) 178; WMD Defense Act and 98; workforce 123, 125 Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) Flight 380, hijacking of 379 – 382, 407 Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP) 249 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 122, 122 Federal Protective Service 117 Federal Response Plan 419 FEMA see Federal Emergency Management Agency Ferdinand, Archduke 306, 313, 313 fertilizer plant explosion (2013) 4 – 5 financial crimes 129, 133 – 134 financial intelligence 352 Fink, Steven 220 FIOP (Federal Interagency Operational Plan) 249 Fire Corps 193 fire insurance 256 – 258 fire-related disasters 4 fires 80 – 81; coal mine fire of Centralia 60; Great Chicago Fire (1871) 65, 65 – 66; improvements in reducing threat of 145; Peshtigo Fire (1871) 80; San Francisco earthquake and fire 63, 63; Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire (1911) 67; wildfires 8, 80, 256 – 257, 256 First Amendment 274, 277, 282 first responders 14, 15; casualties 223; challenges for 245 – 246; Chernobyl 67; FEMA and 123; natural disasters 218; preparedness 101; September 11, 2001 attacks 85 – 86; training 175 FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) 363 FISA Amendments Act 294 – 295 FLA (National Liberation Front) 316 – 318, 317 flat world 433 FLETC (Federal Law Enforcement Training Center) 122, 122 flexibility, partnerships and 185 flexible event response 8 flight deck officers 382 – 383, 402 – 403 FLN (National Liberation Army) 327, 329 Flood Control Act 124 Flood Disaster Act (1973) 256

460

Index

flood insurance 256 Flood Insurance Reform Act (2004) 256 flood maps 233 floods 81, 81; Hurricane Florence 256, 257 – 258; Hurricane Harvey (2017) 159, 159; Johnstown flood (1889) 66, 66; Mississippi River Flood (1927) 81; Ohio River Flood (1913) 81, 124 Florida sinkholes 83, 83 FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) 45 – 46 FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) 295 Foley, James 334 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN 424 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 155 food and shelter 251 food inspection 155 food supply chain, protection of 152 forced labor 398 force multiplier 42, 168 – 169, 199, 205, 439 Foreign Corruption Investigations Group 129 foreign intelligence services 363 – 364, 364 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 363 Foresman, George 167 Forrest, Nathan Bedford 275, 275 Fort Bragg 253 Fort Hood shootings (2009) 341 Fortier, Michael 285 Four Ds of emergency management process 11 – 12 Fourth Amendment 401 France: Algeria and 316 – 319, 318; Indochina and 316 – 317; reign of terror 308; terrorism definition 305 freedom fighters 310 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 295 free flow of information 434 French Revolution 308, 309 Friedman, Tom 433 fringe groups 268, 277 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) 271 Fugate, W. Craig 125 – 126 Fukushima Daiichi disaster 67, 69, 420 Fukuyama, Francis 439

funding: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 103 – 109; disaster preparedness 234 – 235; of international terrorism and extremism 305, 334 – 337; logistics of 336 – 337 fusion centers 148 – 149, 291, 362, 368, 370 Gaddafi, Muammar 322 Gallant Phoenix 359 Galveston Hurricane (1900) 62, 62 – 63, 84, 85, 182, 262 gangs 279, 364, 447 gaps and needs 178 George III 23 German, Mike 285 German Red Army 319 German Revolutionary Cells 324 Germany: Hitler and 24, 31 – 32, 324; Munich Olympics 324, 334; terrorism and extremism in modern era 323 – 324 GIA (Armed Islamic Group) 400 Gingrich, Newt 97 glasnost 41 globalization 431 – 449; clash of civilizations 439 – 441; as driver of change 367; economic integration 433, 435 – 436; explained 433 – 436; homeland security ramifications of 436 – 439; Iran (case study) 446 – 447; Mara Salvatrucha (case study) 447; organized crime 447 – 449, 448; overview 431 – 433; terrorism as a backlash to 441 – 442; trade 377 – 378; transformation and 441; U.S. security along U.S.Canadian border 444 – 446, 455; U.S. security along U.S.Mexican border 442 – 444, 443 Global War on Terror 48, 52 – 53, 339 Gorbachev, Mikhail 41 – 42, 41, 413 grants: FEMA 179, 251; predisaster mitigation 233 Great Chicago Fire (1871) 65, 65 – 66, 80 Great Depression 28, 32, 51, 449 Greenpeace 274 Griffith, D.W. 276 gross domestic product, U.S. 378 guerrilla warfare/tactics 50, 288, 314, 316 – 317, 327 – 333 Guevara, Ernesto “Che” 328, 328, 330 Gunpowder Plot (1605) 309, 322

Guy Fawkes mask 310, 310 Guzman, Abimael 332 Guzman, Joaquin “El Chapo” 444 Habash, George 338 Habitat for Humanity 179 hackers 106, 342, 438 Haddow, George 57 Haga, Michael William 282 hailstorms 82 Haiti disasters 127, 202, 414, 421 – 422 Hamas 400 Hammerskin Nation 281 Hampton, Fred 271 Harper’s Ferry, Virginia 270 Hart-Rudman Commission 98, 137 Hasan, Nidal 341 hate crimes 4, 219, 268, 292, 294 hate groups 268, 282, 292 – 293 hawala system 336 Haymarket bombing (1886) 270 hazard: defined 261; natural 13 – 15, 64, 73, 75, 86, 98 – 99, 111, 124, 227, 261; principal hazards 58 – 88, 57 – 58; severity rating 261; types of 261 hazardous materials, train wrecks and 86 HAZMAT 203 Health Affairs, DHS Office of 120 – 121 Hearst, Patty 273 heat waves 74 – 75, 75 – 76 Heritage Emergency National Task Force 173 Hezbollah 45, 108, 335, 337, 400, 437, 443 – 444 high-frequency (HF) radio communications, MARS and 201 – 202 hijacking of airplanes 44 – 45, 48, 52, 72, 305, 322, 333 – 334, 380, 382 – 383 Hill, Paul 286 history: aviation and aerospace security 379; Coast Guard and 129 – 131; Cold War 34 – 41; complexity of the modern world 41 – 43; Desert Shield and Desert Storm 47 – 48; domestic terrorism 270 – 273; early conflicts 27; early twentieth century 27 – 32; emerging new world 43 – 44; emerging threats 50; federal disaster relief 61; foundations of national security 26 – 27; of globalization 433 – 435; Global

War on Terror 48, 51 – 52; intelligence and national security 33 – 34; intelligence community, U.S. 356 – 359, 370; international emergency management 414 – 415; international terrorism and extremism 44 – 50, 306 – 319; of major incidents 61 – 72; maritime security 26 – 27, 50, 383 – 385; mass transit and railway security 388 – 390; military in support of homeland security 48 – 49; Monroe Doctrine 27, 28, 51; reflection on 22; September 11, shock and impact of 48; World War I 29 – 31, 51 Hitler, Adolf 24, 31 – 32, 288, 324 Ho Chi Minh 317, 318 homegrown violent extremist 290 homeland security: as a discipline 145; expense of 103; function and operations 143 – 163; function of intelligence in 364 – 365; globalization, ramifications of 436 – 439; goals 101; partnerships 167 – 213; perspectives on 6 – 10, 145; reasons for 5 – 6; role of intelligence 349 – 371 Homeland Security Act (2002) 3, 96, 100, 150, 183, 234, 406 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) 177 Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) 121, 148 Homeland Security Management System 102 Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) 148 – 149 Homeland Security Presidential Directives 102 – 103; HSPD-5 102, 183, 203, 290; HSPD-7 149, 151; HSPD-8 101 – 102, 183; HSPD-16 381 Homeland Security Science and Technology Enhancement Act (2006) 176 homeless 251 Hoover, J. Edgar 33 hostages 46, 321 – 322, 324, 334, 339, 447 housing 251 housing assistance 261 HSBC 336

HSEEP (Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program) 177 HSIN (Homeland Security Information Network) 121, 148 HSOC (Homeland Security Operations Center) 148 – 149 HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development) 123 – 124, 182 humanitarian organizations/ assistance 178, 185, 189, 196, 201 – 202 human trafficking 128, 286, 334, 398 – 399, 447 – 448 Hunter, Duncan 402 hurricane(s) 84; British losses from (1780s) 9; table of prominent U.S. 85; warnings 13 Hurricane Agnes (1972) 182 Hurricane Andrew (1992) 85, 255 Hurricane Betsy (1965) 182 Hurricane Camille (1969) 85, 177, 182, 219, 236 – 237 Hurricane Carla (1962) 124, 182 Hurricane Florence (2018) 253, 256, 257 – 258 Hurricane Harvey (2017) 159 – 160, 159 Hurricane Isaac (2013) 81, 81 Hurricane Joaquin (2015) 243 Hurricane Katrina (2005) 14, 16, 85, 98, 144; case study 236 – 238, 237; changes in response community fueled by 246; Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and 197; as cyclone storm 83; Department of Defense resources and 49; DHS and 98; economic consequences of 254 – 255; FEMA and 64, 64 – 65, 111, 137 – 138, 226 – 227; illnesses from 86; military resources 204; Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 64 – 65, 112; satellite image of 2; U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (USCGA) and 201; Walmart response 187 – 188; warnings and evacuations 13 Hurricane Maria (2017) 8, 58, 180, 186 Hurricane Matthew (2016) 202, 206 Hurricane Rita (2005) 101 Hurricane Watch Net 202 Hussein, Saddam 359 Hutchinson, Asa 180

Index

461

IACP (International Association of Chiefs of Police) 190, 361 – 362 IAEM (International Association of Emergency Managers) 175, 190 IBIS (Interagency Border Inspection System) 379 ICP (incident/emergency operations command post) 246 identity theft 439 Idi Amin Dada 324 IED see improvised explosive device IHP (Individuals and Households Program) 261 illegal immigration 16, 60, 99, 101, 295, 368, 405 – 406 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (1996) 405 – 406 illnesses, after natural disasters 86 immigration 107; Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (2005) 406; border security 400; Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 128; globalization and 432; illegal 16, 60, 99, 101, 295, 333, 368, 405 – 406; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (1996) 405 – 406 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 128 – 129; container and cargo security 393; intelligence and 121 impact analysis 218 improvised explosive device (IED) 104, 118, 163, 221, 333; vehicle-borne 231; waterborne 402 incident/emergency operations command post (ICP) 246 Incident Management Division, USCGA 199 incident management systems 247 incidents 5, 9 – 12, 14, 17; aftermath of 85 – 86; history of major 61 – 72 individuals, homeland security and 10 Individuals and Households Program (IHP) 261 industrial accidents 66 – 69; Chernobyl disaster (1986) 59, 66 – 67, 69; Deepwater Horizon oil spill (2010) 5, 6, 59 – 60, 67, 68; Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989)

462

Index

67; Fukushima Daiichi disaster 67, 69, 420; international emergency management 416 – 417; Texas City explosion (1947) 67; Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire (1911) 67; Union Carbide in Bhopal, India (1984) 59, 66, 68, 416 Industrial Revolution 441 influenza 21, 221, 417, 417 – 418 information: conceptual differentiation between intelligence and 350 – 351; free flow of 434; globalization and 434; Regional Intelligence Sharing System (RISS) 369 – 370; see also intelligence informational power 24 information management, disaster response and recovery 248 – 249 information security 163 infrastructure: defined 149; homeland security perspective 9; percentage privately owned 180; technological, protection of 105 – 106; see also critical national infrastructure Infrastructure Protection, Office of 117 “in place” sheltering 252 instruments of national power 23 – 25; diplomacy 24; economic 24 – 25; information 24; military 25 insurance 255 – 258 integration 184 intelligence 351; abuses 363, 366; American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 292; Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 292; challenges for the new century 366 – 368, 367; collecting signals 363; conceptual differentiation between information and 350 – 351; counterintelligence 350 – 351, 358; covert operations 350, 358, 364; definitions of 350 – 352; drivers of change 367; economic 352; failures 350, 358 – 359; financial 352; foreign intelligence services 363 – 364, 364; function of homeland security 364 – 365; fusion centers 148, 362, 368; gathering versus privacy 365 – 366; legal guidelines pertaining to 362 – 363; military 353; overview as related to

homeland security 152 – 156; political 352 – 353; processes, products, and organizations 353; Regional Intelligence Sharing System (RISS) 362; role in homeland security 349 – 371; service perspective 352; Southern Poverty Law Center 281; state and local efforts 109, 361 – 362 intelligence agencies 359 – 361, 360 Intelligence and Analysis, DHS Office of 121 intelligence briefing 349 intelligence community: history of U.S. 356 – 359, 370; modern U.S. 359 – 361, 360 intelligence cycle 353 – 356, 355, 370 intelligence-led policy 361 – 362 intelligence partnership 368 – 369 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) 359 intelligence report 292, 294 intentional hazard 261 Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) 379 international assistance 419 – 424; international military assistance 421 – 423; international support involving other nations 419 – 421; from nongovernment organizations 421; United Nations relief support 423 – 424 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 192, 361 – 362 International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) 175, 190 International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 361 International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan 381 International Chamber of Commerce 386 international disaster 419 – 426 international emergency management 413 – 426; accidents 416 – 417; conflicts and violence 419; global and international scope of the challenge 415 – 419; historical scope of challenge 415; international assistance 419 – 424; natural disasters 416; overview 415; pandemics 416 – 418, 417 – 418; U.S. response to international crisis 424 – 425

International Maritime and Port Security Act 404 international military assistance 421 – 423 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 424 International Outreach Plan 381 International Red Cross and Red Crescent 424, 426 International Save the Children Alliance 424 International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (ISARAG) 421 international terrorism and extremism 3, 303 – 344; Africa 324 – 325; Asia 325 – 326; Central and South America 327 – 334; cyber terrorism 340 – 341; Europe 322 – 324; funding 305, 334 – 337; as greatest current threat 50; historical perspective 306 – 319; history 44 – 51; media and web use 337 – 339; Middle East and Afghanistan 321 – 322; in modern era 319 – 320; narco-terrorism 337; operations against 341 – 342; outside the U.S. 44; overview 303 – 304; response strategies 340; in twenty-first century 341; understanding and defining 305 – 306 internet, globalization and 437 – 438 Interstate Photo System 362 IOM (International Organization for Migration) 424 Iran 322, 446 – 447 Iraq: al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 321; Desert Shield and Desert Storm 47 – 48; ISIS 321; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 350 Irgun 314 – 315 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 308, 322 – 323, 334 – 335, 337, 341 “Iron Curtain” speech 35 ISARAG (International Search and Rescue Advisory Group) 421 ISIS/ISIL 42, 321, 334, 338, 340 – 342, 359 Islam, radical 440 Islamic Jihad 44 – 45, 400 Islamic State see ISIS/ISIL isolationism 28, 30, 32, 51 Israel: Entebbe rescue mission (1976) 324; establishment of state of 315; intelligence agencies of 364; Munich Olympics murders (1972) 324

Israeli-Palestinian conflict 39 Italian Red Brigades 319 Ivins, Bruce 231 Japan, terrorism and extremism in 326 Jarboe, James 269 JCO (joint field office) 249 Jenkins, William O., Jr. 226 jihad 321 – 322, 326 – 327 John Birch Society 282 Johnson, Jeb 113 Johnson, Lyndon 39 Johnstown flood (1889) 66, 66 joint field office ( JCO) 249 Joint Terrorism Task Force ( JTTF) 153, 154, 291, 334 Jones, Casey 389 Kaczynski, Ted 5, 377 Kathmandu Earthquake (2015) 202 Keenan v. Aryan Nations 292 Kelly, John F. 114, 115 Kennedy, John F. 133, 355 Kenya, terrorism 324 Khomeini, Ayatollah 446 – 447 kidnapping 44 – 45, 51, 320 – 321, 323, 332 – 335, 337, 340, 447; by Abu Sayyaf Group 386; Mexican drug war and 442; of Patty Hearst 273; for ransom 273, 325, 332, 335; of terrorists 340 King David Hotel, bombing of (1946) 314 – 315, 315 Kissinger, Henry 39 Kitazawa, Toshimi 423 Klinghoffer, Leon 46, 52 Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) 288 – 289 Korean war 37 Koresh, David 284 Kosovo Liberation Army 335, 337 Krakatau, eruption of 79, 416 Ku Klux Klan 131, 268, 275 – 278, 276, 283, 292 – 293 Kurdistan’s Working Party 335, 337 land border 376 landslides 83 land transportation 378 Las Vegas massacre (2017) 57 Latin America, terrorism and extremism in 327 – 334 law enforcement: air security 382 – 383; Anti-Defamation League (ADL) relationships with 294; criminal analysis 365; Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center (FLETC) 122, 122; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 128 – 129; intelligence and 152 – 156; for intelligence collection 363; intelligence-led policy 361 – 362; in prevention mission area 152 – 156; as primarily a state and local function 362; Regional Intelligence Sharing System (RISS) 369 – 370 Law Enforcement Accessible Database System (LEADS) 386 law enforcement detachment (LEDET) teams 233 Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 361 leaderless resistance 283, 285, 287 – 288 League of Nations 30, 34, 51 legislation, pertaining to transportation and border security 403 – 406; Aviation and Transportation Security Act (2001) 406; Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (2005) 406; Critical Infrastructure Information Act (2002) 406; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (1996) 405 – 406; International Maritime and Port Security Act 404; Magnuson Act (1950) 403; Maritime Transportation Security Act (2002) 404 – 405; Oil Pollution Act (1990) 405; Port and Tanker Safety Act (1978) 404; Ports and Waterways Safety Act (1972) 403 – 404; Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (2006) 405 LEPC (local emergency planning committees) 202 – 203 liberty-versus-privacy arguments 294 – 295 liberty-versus-security arguments 294 Libya 322 lifestyle, homeland security perspective 9 Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) 39 limnic eruptions 85 Little Shell Pembina Movement 293 local emergency planning committees (LEPC) 202 – 203 local homeland security activities: agencies battling domestic

Index

463

terrorism 290 – 293; challenges for responders 227 – 228; community response 222 – 223; disaster mitigation measures 218; emergency operations centers (EOCs) 173 – 174; intelligence efforts 361 – 362; Medical Reserve Corps units 195; nongovernment organizations (NGOs) 179 Local Official All-Hazards Preparedness Executive Handbook 230 Lockerbie bombing see Pan Am Flight 103 logistics: container and cargo security and 395 – 396, 396; global and international disaster 415 logistics security 156 London subway bombing (2005) 339 lone wolf 72, 267, 270, 283 – 285, 288, 338 long-term plans 156 long-term strategic process 160 long war 50, 52 Los Angeles Times building, bombing of 270 Louisville, Mississippi 244 Louis XVI 308 low-level conflict 49, 314 Luddites 441 MACC (multi-agency coordination center) 146 Macedonia v. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 292 macroeconomics of disasters 254 Macy, John 124 MAD (mutually assured destruction) 36 – 38 Magnuson Act (1950) 403 major disaster, presidential declarations and 100, 260 Malvo, Lee 268 management, homeland security perspective 9 manifest destiny 26 man-made incident/event 4 – 7, 9 – 10, 13, 14, 17, 22 – 23, 52, 57, 58, 60, 65, 85 – 87, 95, 100, 101, 112, 124, 137, 152, 168, 172, 182, 196, 218, 221, 227, 229 – 231, 248, 262, 414 – 415, 419, 421, 426, 433; see also specific events Mansfield v. Church of the Creator 293 Maoism 332

464

Index

Mao Tse-tung 272, 316, 330, 332 map of the United States 22 Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) 364, 447 Mariel boatlift 329 Marighella, Carlos 316, 330 – 331 Marine Safety and Security (MSS) Program 404 Marine Safety Information System 404 Maritime Administration, U.S. 171 maritime security 129 – 132, 383 – 388; historical perspective 26 – 27, 50, 383 – 384; modern perspective 383 – 388; see also Coast Guard, U.S. maritime transportation 378 Maritime Transportation Security Act (2002) 404 – 405 MARS (Military Auxiliary Radio System) 201 – 202 Marshall Plan 33, 35 martyrdom 307, 319 mass transit security 388 – 393; historical perspective 388 – 389; modern perspective 389 – 393 Mateen, Omar 341 mathematical analysis 369 May 19th Communist Organization 271 McCarthy, John 180 McElreath, David Hughes 168, 431 McKinley, Craig 400 McKinley, William 28, 51, 131, 132, 270 McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act 251 McVeigh, Timothy 5, 13, 42, 72, 72, 220, 278, 285 media, use by terrorists 337 – 339 Medical Reserve Corps 194, 194 – 195 Memphis, yellow fever epidemics 70 Merchant Marine 171 methyl isocyanate exposure 68 Mexico: border security 43, 107 – 108, 128 – 129, 442 – 444, 443; corruption in 43, 107, 333, 442; drug trafficking 43, 286, 327, 333, 397 – 398, 443; drug war 43, 333, 376, 400, 435, 442, 444; murders in 398; organized crime 43, 107, 286, 333, 336; violence in 43, 333, 397 – 398, 435, 442 Michaels, Aaron 281 microeconomics of disasters 254 Middle East: Arab Spring 43; conflicts 39, 51; Desert Shield and Desert Storm 47 – 48;

earthquake (1201) 415; globalization 436; impact of immigration into Europe 322; terrorism and extremism 321 – 322 military: international military assistance 421 – 423; see also military resources Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) 201 – 202 military intelligence 353 Military Intelligence 5 (MI-5) 363, 364 Military Intelligence 6 (MI-6) 363 military power 25 military resources: defense memoranda of understanding and agreements 205 – 208; Defensive Industrial Reserve 208 – 210; federal regulations related to use of 205 – 211; international, national, and state 204 – 206; purchasing requirements 208; U.S. government contracts and foreign awards 210 – 211 Militia Act (1903) 280 militia movement 280 Mill, John Stuart 253 Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Marighella) 316, 330 mission: CIA 358; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 14 – 14, 43, 111, 112, 171; DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 368; emerging missions 367; FBI 366; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 125; of intelligence agencies 360 – 361; NSA 358 mission areas 112, 114, 149, 150, 152 – 153, 163, 175, 224, 224 – 225, 225, 227, 232, 238, 250 Mississippi River Flood (1927) 81 Mississippi State Guard 207 Mitchell, Andrew 103 mitigate 5, 58, 86 – 88, 106, 116, 125, 182, 223, 227, 248, 262, 419 – 420 mitigation 87; in emergency management cycle (EMC) 261; measurement and assessment of evolving risk environment 219; pre-disaster grants 233 mitigation strategies 217 – 218 Molly Maguires 270 money, moving and transiting of 336

money couriers 336 money laundering 25, 128, 305, 335, 448 money services businesses 336 – 337 Monroe, James 27, 51 Monroe Doctrine 27, 28, 71; Roosevelt Corollary 28, 29, 51 Mosaddeq, Mohammed 446 Mosley, Oswald 288 Mossad 364 Mountbatten, Louis 323 Mount Pelee, eruption of 79 Mount St. Helens, eruption of 79 Mount Tambora, eruption of 79 Mount Vesuvius, eruption of 79, 253 – 254, 415 MSS (Marine Safety and Security) Program 404 Muhammad, Khalid Abdul 281 Muhammed, John 268 Mujahedeen 41, 48, 358 multi-agency coordination 185, 262 multi-agency coordination center (MACC) 146 Munich Agreement 32 Munich Olympics 324, 334 Murrah Federal Building 42, 43, 67, 72, 220, 231, 285 Mussolini, Benito 29, 32 mutually assured destruction (MAD) 35 – 38 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 435 Napolitano, Janet 16, 99, 111, 113, 235, 443 narco-terrorism 50, 286, 332, 337 narcotics smuggling/trafficking 49, 129 – 130 Narodna Odbrana 312 – 313 Narodnaya Volya 311 NASA Black Marble system 253 NASA Disasters Mapping Portal 252 NASA Disasters Program 252 – 253 Nasr, Jameel 443 – 444 National Alliance 278 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) 362, 370 National Cyber Security Division 105 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 105 National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) 183, 249 – 250 National Fire Academy 103 National Fire Protection Association 176 National Flood Insurance Act (1968) 124, 183, 256

National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 256 National Flood Insurance Reform Act (1994) 256 National Fugitive Operations Program 16, 99 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 361 National Guard 172, 182, 248; border security and 60; creation of 280; dual role of 204; federal and state missions 49; Hurricane Katrina and 64, 254; military in support of homeland security 48 – 49; state control 204, 205, 291 National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) proposal 97 National Homeland Security Strategy 222, 224 National Incident Management System (NIMS) 9, 183, 250 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 151; risk management framework 151; Security and Resilience Challenge 161 national instruments of power 342 National Intelligence Council (NIC) 366 national intelligence estimate (NIE) 359 National Intelligence Program (NIP) 34 nationalism 30, 310, 314; anticolonialism 314 – 319; rise of ethnic 314 nationalist groups 270 – 271, 304, 317 National Liberation Army (FLN) 329 – 330 National Liberation Front (FLA) 316 – 318, 317 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 386 National Operations Center (NOC) 121 National Preparedness Guidelines 229 – 230 National Protection and Programs, Directorate for 117 National Reconnaissance Office 361 National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) 148, 173 – 174, 178 National Response Framework (NRF) 146, 173, 181, 203, 222, 224, 227, 232; core capabilities of response mission 250; disaster response and recovery

249 – 250; emergency support functions (ESF) 173 – 174; partnerships and 173; primary tenets 250 National Response Plan 183 national school lunch program (NSLP) 251 National Security Agency (NSA) 358, 361 National Security Council (NSC) National Security Decision Directive 75 40 National Security Presidential Directive 47 (NSPD-47) 381 National Socialist Movement 293 National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP) 278 National Strategy for Homeland Security 14, 98, 101 – 102 National Targeting Center 334 National Terrorism Task Force 153 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 390 – 391 National Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster (NVOAD) 185 – 187, 189, 213 – 214 National Volunteer Fire Council 193 National Youth Alliance 278 Nation of Islam 274 Nations, Robert 243 nation-state 106, 303, 308, 319, 342, 375, 437 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 38 natural disasters 4, 6, 9, 14, 17, 22, 52, 145, 170; aftermath of 85 – 86; critical infrastructure and 151; defined 73; Department of Homeland Security and 96 – 102, 111, 117, 123 – 124, 137; disaster preparedness 219 – 220; Galveston Hurricane (1900) 62, 62 – 63; globalization and 433, 449; history of major incidents 61 – 65; home security goals and 101; Hurricane Katrina 63 – 65, 64; international efforts and 59; international emergency management 414 – 415, 416, 418 – 419, 421, 424, 426; local government response 153; Medical Reserve Corps 194, 196, 205; New Madrid Earthquakes 61; NGOs and 181, 183; partnerships and 168, 170 – 172, 184, 194, 196, 205, 281; preparedness and

Index

465

mitigation strategies 218 – 222, 226 – 227, 229 – 230, 236 – 238; principle hazards 57, 59 – 65; response and recovery 11, 182, 243, 248, 250, 256, 261 – 262, 280; San Francisco earthquake and fire 63, 63; today’s challenges 72 – 85; weather and climate disasters (2019) 58; year-to-date U.S. billion-dollar events (1980–2019) 58; see also specific events natural event 5, 12, 14, 17, 23, 58, 60, 171; see also natural disasters; natural incident natural hazard 14 – 16, 64, 73, 76, 87, 98 – 99, 111, 124, 227, 261 natural incident 5, 9 – 10, 13, 21, 172; see also natural disasters; natural event Naturalization Act (1970) 126 natural threat 6, 12, 17, 23, 58, 73, 95, 433 Naval Intelligence, Office of 357 Navy, United States 26, 51, 61 Nazism 277 – 279, 288 – 289, 294, 324 NBPP (New Black Panther Party) 274, 281 – 282, 293 NCISP (National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan) 362, 370 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) 105 NDRF (National Disaster Recovery Framework) 183, 249 – 250 near-term plans 156, 159 – 161 near-term tactical process 161 Nechaev, Sergey 311 Neighborhood Watch 191, 193 – 194 neo-Nazi groups 273, 277 – 279 Nepal 334 New Black Panther Party (NBPP) 274, 281 – 282, 293 New Madrid Earthquakes (1811–1812) 61, 77 Newton, Huey 271 – 272 New York Police Department, intelligence capabilities of 362 Next Generation Identification biometric program 362 NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program) 256 NGOs see nongovernment organizations NHSA (National Homeland Security Agency) proposal 97 NIC (National Intelligence Council) 366 Nicaragua 329

466

Index

Nichols, Terry 285 NIE (national intelligence estimate) 359 Nielsen, Kirstjen Michele 114, 115 Nigeria, Boko Haram and 325 NIMS (National Incident Management System) 9, 183, 250 9/11 Commission 228, 349, 359, 370 NIP (National Intelligence Program) 34 NIPP see National Infrastructure Protection Plan Nixon, Richard 39 NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 386 NOC (National Operations Center) 121 no-fly list 403 non-combatants 320 nongovernment organizations (NGOs) 172; framework for 182 – 183; international assistance 421; partnerships 178 – 185; role of 181 – 182 non-nation actors 303 non-state actors 41, 48, 314 NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) 444 normalcy 171, 262 – 263 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 444 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 435 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 38 NRCC (National Response Coordination Center) 148, 173 – 174, 178 NRF see National Response Framework NSA (National Security Agency) 358, 361 NSLP (national school lunch program) 251 NSWPP (National Socialist White People’s Party) 278 NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) 390 – 391 nuclear detection 123, 232 nuclear disaster: Chernobyl disaster (1986) 59, 66 – 67, 69, 86, 413, 413 – 414, 416, 426; Fukushima Daiichi disaster 67, 69, 416; Three Mile Island 124 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty 437 nuclear threat 231 nuclear weapons 36 – 37, 39, 116, 231, 359 – 360, 436 – 437

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program 97 – 98 NVOAD (National Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster) 185 – 187, 189, 213 Obama, Barack 16, 99, 111, 114, 133, 156, 273, 321, 329, 387 Oberstar, James 138 observation, intelligence and 351, 353, 370 Occupy Wall Street movement 289 OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), UN 424 Odinism 274 ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence) 359, 370 OFDA (Office of Foreign Disasters Assistance), USAID 424 – 425, 425 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN 424 Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) 135 Office of Foreign Disasters Assistance (OFDA), USAID 424 – 425, 425 Office of Health Affairs, DHS 120 – 121 Office of Homeland Security 3, 14, 98, 109, 125, 291 Office of Intelligence and Analysis, DHS 121, 148, 361, 368 Office of Justice Programs 103, 192 Office of Military Affairs (OMA) 422 Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, DHS 121 Office of Policy, DHS 120 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 33, 51, 357 – 358, 370 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 359, 370 Office of the Secretary, DHS 134 – 136 Ohio River Flood (1913) 81, 124 Oil Pollution Act (1990) 405 oil spill: Deepwater Horizon, BP (Gulf Coast 2010) 6, 6, 13, 59 – 60, 67, 68, 87, 197, 386 – 388; Exxon Valdez (1989) 67, 87, 384, 386 – 388, 407 Oklahoma City bombing 5, 13, 42, 43, 72, 220, 278, 285 OMA (Office of Military Affairs) 422 operational plans 157 operational process 163 Operation Community Shield 16, 99 Operation Gallant Phoenix 359

organizational structure see Department of Homeland Security (DHS) organizational structuring and components organized crime 335; Asian terrorism and 326; Cuba and 327; globalization and 447 – 449, 448; maritime security and 384; Mexico and 43, 107, 286, 333, 336; moneylaundering 335 – 336; South America and 327; targeting technological infrastructure 106; terrorist groups linked to 335; transnational 25, 436, 439; U.S-Canadian border and 446 organ trafficking 335 OSS (Office of Strategic Services) 33, 51, 357 – 358, 370 Oswald, Lee Harvey 133 Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah 446 Pakistani terrorists 334 – 335 Palestine, after WWII 314 – 315 Palestinian terrorists 46 Palmer raids 270 Pan Am Flight 103 46, 46, 52, 322 pandemics 12, 42, 52, 70, 101, 104, 153, 175, 221, 304, 417 – 418, 416 – 418, 426 Paraguay 327 Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) 327 partnership(s) 167 – 213; building and sustaining 172; challenges of building response 171 – 172; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 169 – 172; emergency support functions (ESF) 173 – 174; importance of 168, 168; intelligence 368 – 369; key organizations 185 – 204; military resources 204 – 211, 206; nongovernment organizations (NGOs) 178 – 185; overview of 169 – 171; planning, training, and equipment 174 – 176; public-private 152; scope of work 173 – 174; wholecommunity approach 171 – 172 Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) 334 partnership organizations 185 – 204; certified emergency response team (CERT) 190 – 191; Citizen Corps 170, 191 – 193; Civil Air Patrol (CAP) 195 – 197, 212; faith-based organizations 177, 181, 188 – 190; Fire Corps 193; local emergency planning

committees (LEPC) 202 – 203; Medical Reserve Corps 194, 194 – 195; Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) 201 – 202; National Neighborhood Watch 193 – 194; National Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster (NVOAD) 177 – 178, 185 – 187; private business and industry 187 – 188; private sector organizations (PSOs) 203, 204; U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (USCGA) 198, 198 – 201, 212 passenger screening 382 – 383 Patriot Act (2001) 133, 149, 363 Patriot groups 282 – 283 Patriot movement 280 PDA (preliminary damage assessment) 260 PDDs (Presidential Decision Directives) 153 – 154 Pearl Harbor, attack on 33, 51, 357, 370 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 274 People’s Will 311 periods, strategic, near-term, and operations 156 – 160 Pershing, John J. 397 Peshtigo Fire (1871) 80 petroleum 387 – 388 PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) 324, 334, 338 phantom cell 283 Philippines, terrorism and extremism in 326 philosophy, homeland security perspective 7 Pierce, William 278, 278 piracy at sea 385 – 386, 388 Pisacane, Carlo 311 plan(s): DHS Strategic Plan 15, 95, 99; long-term 156; Marshall Plan 33, 35; near-term 156, 159 – 160; operational 156; strategic 157 – 159; tactical 156, 159 – 160 planning: challenges 227 – 229; disaster response and recovery 245; intelligence and 354; Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, DHS 121; partnerships and 174 – 176; response 147; risk assessment 172; risk management strategies and 226; strategic 239; strategies and operations 221 – 222

planning scenarios 221 – 222, 224, 227, 230 – 231, 238 policing, intelligence-led 361 – 362 policy: homeland security perspective 9; Office of Policy, DHS 120 political assassination 306, 313, 313, 317, 332 political intelligence 352 – 353 Pompeii 253 – 254, 415 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 324, 334, 338 Port and Tanker Safety Act (1978) 404 Ports and Waterways Safety Act (1972) 403 – 404 port security 199, 228, 403 – 404 Posen, Barry R. 229 Posse Comitatus 273, 279, 285 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 64 – 65, 112, 137, 227 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 86 PREACT (Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism) 325 preliminary damage assessment (PDA) 260 preparedness 5, 6 – 7, 9, 11 – 12, 14, 16 – 17; all-hazards 101 – 102; as continuous process 261; DHS mission areas 112; disaster response and recovery 261; Homeland Security planning model 224, 224 – 226, 225; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 102; Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program 97 – 98; partnerships and 172; see also disaster preparedness presidential campaigns 233 Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) 153 – 154, 363 presidential declarations 100, 124, 259 prevention, defined 261 – 262 Prevent mission area of homeland security 112, 149, 152 – 153, 163, 224, 225, 227, 238 Princip, Gavrilo 313 prison gangs 279, 443 privacy: intelligence gathering versus 365 – 366; liberty-versusprivacy arguments 294 – 295 private business and industry, as partnership organizations 187 – 188

Index

467

private sector organizations (PSOs) 178, 203, 204 procedure, concepts of 160 – 163 process: concepts of 160 – 163; defined 160; intelligence 353 – 356, 355; long-term strategic 160; near-term tactical 161; operational 163 prodromal cycle 220, 220, 239 product, intelligence 353 professionalism 185 profiling 365 project management, global and international disaster 416 pro-life groups 274, 285 Propaganda of Deed, The 310 – 311 prostitution 399 protection 3, 12, 14 Protect mission area of homeland security 112, 149, 152 – 153, 163, 224, 225, 227, 238 protest, legitimate 268 proxy wars 38, 41, 50 PSOs (private sector organizations) 178 PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) 86 public assistance 251, 260, 261 Public Health 153 – 155 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act (2002) 154 – 155 Puerto Rican Nationalist Party 270 – 271 pyro-terrorism 269 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 160, 162 quantitative analysis 369 racial-religious groups 274 racist skinheads 281 radical Islam 440 radical left 286 – 289 radical right 274 – 286 radio frequency identification (RFID) technology 395 radiological dispersal device (RDD) 231 radiological/nuclear detection systems 233 radio operators, amateur 201 – 202 railroads: economic potency of freight railway system 391 – 392; see also railway security railway security 388 – 393; historical perspective 388 – 389; modern perspective 389 – 393 ransom 273, 325, 332, 334

468

Index

ransomware 340 Rap Back system 362 rape 334, 447 Rasmussen, Nicholas 321 RCC (regional coordination centers) 173 RDD (radiological dispersal device) 231 Reagan, Ronald 2, 26, 40 – 41, 40 – 41, 243, 322 Reconstruction Finance Corporation 124 recover 4, 5, 12, 14 recovery 60, 62, 145 – 147, 151, 156, 157, 163; components of 262; economics of 253 – 255; federal actions and assistance in disaster 100 – 101; time requirement 262 – 263; see also disaster response and recovery Recovery mission area of homeland security 112, 163, 175, 224, 235, 227, 238 recovery support functions (RSFs) 249 – 250 Red Army Faction 44 Red Brigades 44, 47 Red Cross see American Red Cross Red Scare 270 Refugee Resettlement, Office of 128 regional coordination centers (RCC) 173 Regional Intelligence Sharing System (RISS) 362, 369 – 370 regional terrorism and extremism: Africa 324 – 325; Asia 325 – 326; Central and South America 327 – 334; Europe 322 – 324; Middle East and Afghanistan 321 – 322 religious terrorism 309 Reno, Janet 98 resilience to disasters 233, 243, 246 resource management and utilization 144 – 145 resources: military 204 – 211, 206; partnerships and 168; private sector 147; response 147 responders: local 222 – 223; overview of 14, 16 – 17; partnerships and 172; posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 86; training 172, 175; see also first responders response 2 – 5, 6, 10 – 12, 14 – 17, 60 – 62, 147; components of 262; economics of 253 – 255; emergency response cycle 169; federal actions and assistance

in disaster 100 – 101; locallevel operational coordination 146 – 147; partnerships as key element in 168; priorities 244; private sector and 147; robustness of responsiveness 233; tiered approach 147; see also disaster response and recovery; response partnerships; response plan; response process response community 4, 97, 98, 137, 164, 168, 204, 219, 229, 238, 246 Response mission area of homeland security 112, 163, 175, 224, 235, 227, 238, 250 response partnerships 170, 175; building and sustaining 172; challenges of building 171 – 172 response plan 245 response process 262 Revenue Marine Service 26, 27, 51, 129 Revolutionary Action Movement 272 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 329, 332 – 333, 335, 337 Revolutionary War 356 RFID (radio frequency identification) technology 395 ricin 156 RICO (Racketeering and Corrupt Organization) Act 292 Ridge, Tom 3, 15, 99, 109, 110 right-wing patriot militia groups 273 – 274 Rios, Filiberto Ojeda 272 risk 100, 103 – 104, 106, 109, 117; assessment 172, 226, 226, 229 – 230, 238 – 239; hazards and 261; insurance and 255 – 258; NIPP risk management framework 151 risk assessment 229 – 230; planning and 172, 238 – 239; threat assessment 226, 226 risk management 229 – 230, 238; framework 151, 226, 229; threat assessment 226, 226 Risk Management and Analysis, Office of 117 RISS (Regional Intelligence Sharing System) 362 RISS ATIX 369 Rivera, Oscar Lopez 273 Rockwell, George Lincoln 277 – 278 Roe v. Wade 285 rogue states 367, 433, 436, 449 rollback, Cold War and 40 – 41

Roof, Dylann Storm 5 Roosevelt, Franklin 32 – 33, 51, 124, 130, 270, 357 Roosevelt, Theodore 25, 28 – 29, 29 – 30, 51 RSFs (recovery support functions) 249 – 250 Rudolph, Eric 5, 7, 284, 284 – 285, 286 Russia: assassination of Tsar Alexander II 311; criminal organizations 448; nuclear weapons 437; see also U.S.S.R. Russian Socialist Revolutionaries 310 SAFE port Act (2006) 405 safety, overview of domestic 60 – 61 salmonella 155 Salvation Army 170, 179, 181 – 182, 183, 184 Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 259 San Francisco earthquake and fire 63, 63 SAR (search and rescue) 419 – 420 sarin 230, 437 satellite systems, tracking use and 395 school breakfast programs (SBP) 251 school food authorities (SFAs) 251 science, homeland security perspective 7 Science and Technology, Directorate for 117, 118, 120 screening: cargo 382 – 383, 393; passenger 382 – 383 SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) 271 sea border 377 Seale, Bobby 282 sea piracy 385 – 386, 388 search and rescue (SAR) 419 – 420 searches, border security and 400 – 401 SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) 38 Second Amendment 282 Secret Service 131 – 134, 132 – 134, 271; information technology 233; presidential campaigns 233 security 3 – 5, 7, 16, 95; libertyversus-security arguments 294; overview of domestic 60 – 61 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (2006) 405 security guards 393 – 394 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 327, 332, 335, 337

Sendic, Raul 331 SEOCs (state emergency operations centers) 173 – 174 separatist: Basque separatist groups 324; black separatists 281 – 282; defined 281 September 11, 2001 attacks 5 – 6, 9, 16, 72; airport security 4, 9; al-Qaeda and 72, 334, 358, 370, 377, 439; border security and 376 – 377, 380 – 381, 392; British citizens, death of 323; changes in response community fueled by 246; DHS creation and 3, 96, 98, 137; DHS mission and 15; first responders 85 – 86; illnesses related to 85 – 86; intelligence failure 152, 350, 358; Medical Reserve Corps founding and 194; shock and impact of 48, 59; World Trade Center reconstruction and recovery 157 – 158 severation 285 sex trafficking 399 SFAs (school food authorities) 251 SFSP (summer food service program) 251 Shaikh, Safiyya 323 Shakur, Assata 272 Shea, Michael 217 shelter: emergency 251; global and international disaster 415 sheltering “in place” 252 Shelton, Robert M. 277 Sheridan, Philip 66 Shin Bet 364 Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) 327, 332, 335, 337 Sicarri 307 SICs (special interest countries) 334 signals intelligence 363 sinkholes 83 – 84, 83 skinheads 281, 289 sky marshals 382 – 383, 403 SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army) 271, 273, 331 slave trade 398 SLTTGCC (State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council) 290 – 291 Small Vessel Security Strategy 402 small wars 28, 35, 38, 50, 52 Smithsonian Institution 173 smuggling 128 – 129 social media, terrorist use of 338 society 3, 6, 8 – 10, 17 Soleimani, Qasem 303, 322, 342 Somalia 324, 435

South America, terrorism and extremism in 327, 331 – 333 South America’s Triple Frontier 327 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 38 Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) 277, 281 – 282, 292 – 293 sovereign citizens 279, 279 – 280 Soviet Union see U.S.S.R. Spain, terrorism and extremism in 324 special interest countries (SICs) 334 special-interest groups, as threat groups 274 spies 312, 351, 357, 364 SPLC (Southern Poverty Law Center) 277, 281 – 282, 292 – 293 spying 295, 356 – 357, 370 Stafford Act 101, 259 – 260 stakeholders: information management 248 – 249; in response and recovery efforts 182, 184 standardization 146 – 147 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC) 290 – 291 State Defense Forces (State Guard) 205, 207, 207, 223, 280 state emergency operations centers (SEOCs) 173 – 174 state homeland security activities 109, 111; agencies battling domestic terrorism 290 – 292; challenges for responders 227 – 228; disaster declarations 260 – 261; disaster response and support 146 – 147; emergency operations centers (EOCs) 146; emergency support functions (ESF) 146 – 147; fusion centers 148, 368; intelligence efforts 361 – 362; National Guard control 204, 205, 291; Office of Homeland Security 291; Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster (VOAD) 178 Stethem, Robert Dean 45, 52 Stimson, Henry 356 strategic plans 156 – 157, 239 strategic process, long-term 160 strategy: containment 35 – 38; homeland security perspective 9; long-term strategic process 160; rollback 39 – 40; vital national interests 23 – 24 Straub, Butch 103 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 271

Index

469

suicide bombers 48, 52, 319 – 320, 323, 335 summer food service program (SFSP) 251 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, SARA (1986) 203 Super Storm Sandy (2012) 5, 49, 60, 144 supply chain: container/cargo security 393, 395 – 396, 396; food 151 – 152; global 433; just-in-time delivery 380; partnerships 173 supremacy groups 274 – 286; black separatists 281 – 282; Ku Klux Klan 131, 268, 275 – 278, 276, 283, 292 – 293; militia movement 280; neo-Nazi and Aryan movement 277 – 279; Patriot groups 282 – 283; racist skinheads 281; sovereign citizens 279, 279 – 280 Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) 271, 273, 331 Syria 321 tabletop exercises 176 tactical plans 156, 159 – 160 tactical process, near-term 161 tactics: of extremists and terrorists 319; guerrilla 288, 314, 316; suicide bombing 47, 51, 319 – 320, 323, 335; terrorism as tactic 304; terrorist 16, 44, 48, 50, 52; World War I 29 Taking Back America (Haga) 282 Taliban 335, 337, 341 Tamils 400 Tanweer, Shehzad 339 Target Capabilities List (TCL) 224, 224 – 228, 225 target-hardening 151 tariffs 126 technological hazard 261 technological infrastructure, protection of 105 – 107 technological security 105 – 106 technology 44; drivers of change 367; globalization and 434 – 435; response equipment and 175 – 176 terrorism 304; characteristics of acts 305 – 306; deaths from (2000–2013) 320; definitions 269, 303, 305; DHS mission and 3, 14 – 15; disaster preparedness 220 – 221; domestic extremism 267 – 295;

470

Index

emergency management and 10; emerging threats 50; fluidity of 16; goals of 12; historical perspective 306 – 319; history of major incidents 70 – 71; home security goals and 101; international terrorism and extremism 303 – 344; operations against international 341 – 342; origin of term 308; preventing 232 – 233; understanding 305 – 306; as warfare mode 304 terrorist bombings 44 – 46, 45 terrorist groups, links between 320 Terry, Belaunde 337 Texas City explosion (1947) 67 theocracy, Iran as 447 – 448 Thompson, Bennie G. 228 Thornberry, Mac 97 threat assessment 218, 226, 226, 230 – 231 threats: aftermath of incidents 85 – 86; diversity of 11 – 12; emerging threats identified by DNI 366, 367; history of major incidents 61 – 72; principal hazards 57 – 88, 58 – 59; today’s challenges 73 – 85 Three Mile Island 124 Thugs or Thugees 307 – 308 title 10 of U.S. Code 205 – 211 tornadoes 80, 244 Torrejon bomb attack (1984) 45 Toussaint Rouge 316 tracking systems, cargo 395 trade: air cargo security 380; container and cargo security 393 – 396, 396; maritime 385; surpluses and deficits 377 – 378; transportation security and 377 – 378; U.S. international values (as of April 2020) 394 trade deficit, U.S. 378, 394 Trading with the Enemy Act 336 trafficking: organ 335; sex 398 – 399; weapons 332; see also drug trafficking train accidents 388 – 389 training: by Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 294; community emergency response team (CERT) 222; Emergency Management Institute (EMI) 175, 192; partnerships and 174 – 177; of responders 172, 175; types of exercises 176; the workforce 161 train robbery 389

train wreck 86 transnational corporations 432 transnational crime 12, 44, 50, 52 transparency 41, 135, 226 transportation security 375 – 408; aviation and aerospace security 379 – 383; container and cargo security 393 – 396; initiatives 399 – 402; legislation pertaining to 403 – 406; maritime security 383 – 388; mass transit and railway security 388 – 393; overview 376 – 379 Transportation Security Act (2001) 386 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 104 – 105, 106, 121, 126, 377; mass transit and railway security 392; Port and Intermodal Division 385; security guards 394; watch list 403 transportation security officer (TSO) 232 transportation systems, safeguarding 104 – 105, 104 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 325 treason 270, 280, 286 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 397 Treaty of Versailles 30 – 31, 51 Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire (1911) 67 tribal government: agencies battling domestic terrorism 290 – 292; disaster declarations 260 – 261 Truman, Harry 33, 35, 37, 37, 96, 138, 196, 271, 358 Trump, Donald 114, 134 TSA see Transportation Security Administration TSCTP (Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership) 325 TSO (transportation security officer) 232 tsunamis 75 – 76; Alaska 76, 77; Asian coast (2004) 416; creation of 77; international disaster and 414 – 415, 421 – 422; Japanese shoreline (2011) 69, 70 Tunisia 324 tunnels 108, 376, 377, 402 Tupamaros of Uruguay 331 The Turner Diaries 278, 285 Twitter 338 Typhoon Bopha (2012) 60 tyrannicide 306

UAS (unmanned aircraft system), Predator B 109, 109 UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) 402 Unabomber 5, 268 uncertainty 3 – 4, 10, 17, 247, 255, 320, 396 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 424 United Kingdom: Gunpowder Plot (1605) 309; intelligence agencies of 363; Irish Republican Army (IRA) and 308, 322 – 323, 334 – 335, 341; Islamic terrorists 323; Palestine and 314 – 315; terrorism definition 305; terrorism in modern era 322 – 323 United Nations 30, 51, 282; disaster relief support 421, 423 – 424; formation of 34; Korean conflict 37 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 424 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 424 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 335, 337 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century 97 United States Conference of Mayors (USCM) 229 – 230 United States Military 361, 422 – 423 United States Power Squadron 171 United Way 179 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 402 unmanned aircraft system (UAS), Predator B 109, 109 Urban Area Security Initiative 231 urban disasters 65 – 66 urban guerrilla 330 – 331 urban search and rescue 419 – 420 urban terrorism 316 – 317 Uruguay, Tupamaros of 331 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 421 – 422, 424, 425 U.S.-Canadian border 400, 444 – 446, 445 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (USCGA) 171, 198, 198 – 201, 212; aviation component (AUXAIR) 199 – 200; Incident Management Division 199; organizational structuring 200 – 201

U.S.-Mexican border: aviation surveillance and reconnaissance 402; border security 107 – 108, 128 – 129, 376, 397 – 398, 442 – 444, 443; CBP and 128; fence 405; ICE and 129; tunnels 107 – 108, 376, 376 – 377, 402 U.S. military, international assistance from 422 – 423 USAonWatch 194 USCM (United States Conference of Mayors) 229 – 230 USDA see Department of Agriculture, U.S. USS Cole, attack on 47, 47 – 48, 52 U.S.S.R.: Afghanistan and 39, 41, 306, 358; Chernobyl disaster (1986) 58, 67, 69, 86, 413, 414 – 416, 426; Cold War 34 – 41; post WWII 32 – 33 US-VISIT program 118, 379 Uyghurs 326 VALs (voluntary agency liaisons) 178 vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) 231 vessel monitoring system (VMS) 386 V for Vendetta (film) 310 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (2000) 398 Viet-Minh 317 Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and 317, 318 Vietnam War 38 – 39, 273, 317, 366 Villa, Francisco “Poncho” 397 violence: in Mexico 42, 333, 397 – 398, 435, 442; Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and 327, 332; terrorism and extremism 304 – 306; urban terrorism and 330 VIPS (Volunteers in Police Service) 192 Virginia Task Force 1 (VA-TF1) 420 – 421 virtual border 377, 400 virtual tabletop exercises (VTTX) 176 visual intermodal prevention and response (VIPR) 104 Vital Connections exercises 202 vital national interests: described 24; instruments of national power and 24 – 25 VMS (vessel monitoring system) 389 volcanoes 79, 79 voluntary agency liaisons (VALs) 178

Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster (VOAD) 11, 174, 177 – 178 volunteers 170 – 172, 175, 177, 184 – 185; see also specific activities; specific organizations Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) 192 VTTX (virtual tabletop exercises) 176 vulnerabilities 218 – 219, 226, 245, 246, 304 vulnerability assessments 231 Wachovia 336 Waco siege 283 Waiting for the Guerilla (Sendic) 331 Walmart, Hurricane Katrina response and 187 – 188 war: long 50, 52; small wars 27, 35, 38 – 39, 50 – 51 warfare: asymmetric 24, 50, 52; cyberwarfare 47, 50, 52, 436; guerrilla 50, 316 – 317, 327 – 333; information 24; terrorism as mode of 304 warnings 13, 17 War of 1812 26 War Powers Act 171 Warsaw Pact 38 Washington, George 32 – 33, 356, 357 watch list 382 – 383, 403 waterborne improvised explosive device (WBIED) 402 weapons of mass destruction (WMD): biological 155; border security and 368; Cold War and 38; DHS Office of Health Affairs 120 – 121; emerging threats 50; FEMA and first responder training 125; intelligence 350, 359; Iraq and 359; Small Vessel Security Strategy 402; threat assessment 230 weapons smuggling/trafficking 129, 332 Weather Underground Organization (WUO) 271, 331 Weaver, Randy 283 – 284 web, use by terrorists 337 – 338 West Berlin, blockade of 35 whirlpools 84 White Aryan Resistance 274 white supremacy groups 273 – 275, 277 – 280, 283, 285, 290, 293, 366 WHO (World Health Organization) 424 whole-community approach 4, 17; engagement 187; faith-

Index

471

based organizations 189 – 190; partnerships and 171 – 172, 175 Wikileaks 105 wildfires 8, 80, 256, 258, 259 Wilson, Woodrow 31, 30 – 31, 51, 306 Witt, James L. 124, 167 WMD see weapons of mass destruction WMD Defense Act 97 – 98, 137 Wolf, Chad F. 114 – 115 Worden, Amy 189 workforce, training of 161, 163 World Church of the Creator 274 World Food Program 424 World Health Organization (WHO) 424

472

Index

World Trade Center: attack (1993) 47, 52, 70 – 71, 137, 220, 231; reconstruction and recovery 157 – 158; Twin Towers 158, 157 – 158 World Union of Free Enterprise national Socialists (WUFENS) 277 World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) 325 – 326 World War I 28 – 32, 51, 316, 417 World War II 24, 31 – 33, 51, 158, 358, 365, 370; American Nazi movement 277; anticolonialism, terrorism, and extremism after 313 – 319; Antifa and 288 – 289; Civil Air Patrol (CAP) 195 – 196; Irgun

and 314; U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary (USCGA) 199; War Powers Act 171 WUO (Weather Underground Organization) 271 X-ray scanners 294 Year Two Thousand (Y2K) phenomenon 280 yellow fever 70 – 71, 71 Young, Jaelyn 338 Zangara, Giuseppe 270 Zealots of Judea 307 Zionism 314 – 315 Zodiac Killer 365