Intra-Africa Migrations: Reimaging Borders and Migration Management 9780367550462, 9781003091721

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Intra-​Africa Migrations

This book discusses regional and continental integration in Africa by examining the management of migration across the continent. It examines borders and securitisation of migration and the challenges and opportunities that arise out of reconfigured continental demographics. The book offers insights on intra-​Africa migrations and highlights how intra-​continental migration creates socio-​economic and cultural borders. It explores how these borders, beyond the physical boundaries of states, including the Berlin Conference-​constructed borders, create cultural divides, challenges for economic integration and cross-​border security, and irregular migration patterns. While the movement of economic goods is valued for regional economic integration, the mobility of people is seen as a threat. This approach to migration contradicts the intentions of true integration and development, and triggers negative responses such as xenophobia that cannot be addressed by simply managing the physical border and allowing free movement. This book engages in a pivotal discussion of these issues, which are hitherto missing in African border studies, by demonstrating the ubiquity and overreaching influence of various kinds of borders on the African continent. With multidisciplinary contributions that provide an in-​ depth understanding of intra-​Africa migrations and strategies for enhanced migration management, this book will be a useful resource for scholars and students studying geography, politics, security studies, development studies, African studies and sociology. Inocent Moyo is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, South Africa. He researches borders, migration, development and regional integration, urban and cross border informal economies with a focus on Africa in general and the Southern Development Community, SADC, region specifically. Jussi P. Laine is an Associate Professor of multidisciplinary border studies at the University of Eastern Finland and holds the title of Docent of Human Geography from the University of Oulu, Finland. Currently, he also serves as the President of the Association for Borderlands Studies.

Christopher Changwe Nshimbi is Director and DST/​NRF (Department of Science and Technology/​National Research Foundation) Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria. His current research focuses on migration, borders, regional integration, the informal economy and water resources management.

Border Regions Series Series Editor: Doris Wastl-​Walter, University of Bern, Switzerland

In recent years, borders have taken on an immense significance. Throughout the world they have shifted, been constructed and dismantled, and become physical barriers between socio-​political ideologies. They may separate societies with very different cultures, histories, national identities or economic power, or divide people of the same ethnic or cultural identity. As manifestations of some of the world’s key political, economic, societal and cultural issues, borders and border regions have received much academic attention over the past decade. This valuable series publishes high quality research monographs and edited comparative volumes that deal with all aspects of border regions, both empirically and theoretically. It will appeal to scholars interested in border regions and geopolitical issues across the whole range of social sciences. Community, Change and Border Towns H. Pınar Şenoğuz Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities Edited by Anssi Paasi, Eeva-​Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen and Kaj Zimmerbauer African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration Edited by Inocent Moyo and Christopher Nshimbi Expanding Boundaries Borders, Mobilities and the Future of Europe-​Africa Relations Edited by Jussi P. Laine, Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi Intra-​Africa Migrations Reimaging Borders and Migration Management Edited by Inocent Moyo, Jussi P. Laine and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi For more information about this series, please visit:  www.routledge.com/​ Border-​Regions-​Series/​book-​series/​ASHSER-​1224

Intra-​Africa Migrations Reimaging Borders and Migration Management Edited by Inocent Moyo, Jussi P. Laine and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Inocent Moyo, Jussi P. Laine and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Inocent Moyo, Jussi P. Laine and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-​0-​367-​55046-​2  (hbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​003-​09172-​1  (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Newgen Publishing UK

To the future of well-​informed migration policies and inclusive integration in Africa

Contents

List of figures  List of contributors  List of abbreviations  Foreword  Acknowledgments 

xii xiii xvi xix xxi

PART ONE

Intra-​Africa migrations 

1

1 Intra-​Africa migrations: an introduction 

3

I N OC E N T MOYO, JU SSI P.  LA I N E A N D C H RI ST OP H E R C H A N G WE N SH I MBI

PART TWO

Intra and inter-​Africa migrations and implications 

15

2 Greener grass on the other side: the border as a facilitator of migration in West Africa 

17

AL LWE L L OS EA H U ME A K H I G BE

3 Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary to southern Europe in the twenty-​first century 

31

E F E T OB OR S TEPH A N I E EFFEVOTTU

4 Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths: an exploration of core drivers from the perspective and experiences of returnee migrants  S AMU E L K E H I N D E O K U NA D E

50

x Contents

5 Human mobility in the Southern African Development Community region: some best practices for migration management from the European Union 

70

MAN D I SA SU N SH I N E MELA N I E MA K H ATHINI, INOCE NT MOYO AN D C H RI S TO PH ER C H A N G WE N SH I MBI

PART THREE

African physical and symbolic borders and the migration question 

87

6 Precarity of borders and migration regimes in the Southern African region 

89

I N OC E N T M OYO A N D JU SSI P.  LA I N E

7 Stereotyping and regional integration in the East African community: challenges and opportunities 

106

PAT RI C I A  OU MA

8 The Maghreb and intra-​African migration: one challenge and different strategies 

126

SAI D SAD D I K I

9 Integration, borders and migration in West Africa: lessons from European Schengen Area 

140

E RN E ST T OO C H I  A N I C H E

PART FOUR

Migration governance in Africa: prospects, contests and controversies 

157

10 Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa: a comparative analysis of the Moroccan Algerian migration policies 

159

MOH AMMED O U H EMMO U

11 Regional integration in Africa and the welfare of intra-​African migrants  C H RI S TAL O.  SPEL

178

Contents  xi PART FIVE

Reimaging borders and migration management in Africa 

197

12 Reimaging borders and migration management in Africa 

199

I N OC E N T MOYO, C H R I STO PH ER C H A N G WE NS HIMB I AN D J U S SI P.  LA I N E

Index 

204

Figures

3 .1 Map of Nigeria  3.2 Map of Benin City  8.1 Maghreb region 

35 37 127

Contributors

Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe holds a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His research interests include borderlands and regional integration. Ernest Toochi Aniche earned BSc, MSc and PhD degrees from the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria with a bias in International Relations. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. His main fields of research interest include International Migration, Migration and Security Studies, Migration and Conflict Resolution, Migration and Peace Studies, Comparative Regionalism, and African Integration. Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu is a PhD candidate at the Department of History, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Her research interests lie in migration and development studies. Jussi P. Laine is an associate professor of multidisciplinary border studies at the Karelian Institute of the University of Eastern Finland and holds the title of Docent of Human Geography from the University of Oulu, Finland. He is the President of the Association for Borderlands Studies and currently also serves in the Steering Committee of the International Geographical Union’s Commission on Political Geography. By his background, Laine is a human geographer, yet in his approach to borders he combines influences also from international relations and geopolitics, political sociology, history, anthropology as well as psychology. Within border studies, he seeks to explore the multiscalar production of borders and bring a critical perspective on the relationship between state, territory, citizenship and identity construction. Most recently, Laine has published works focused on border mobility and tourism, the ethics of borders and bordering, bottom-up construction of borders and border making, as well as on ontological security. Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini holds a Master of Arts degree in geography from the University of Zululand. Her master’s research project

xiv  List of contributors focused on African migrant informal enterprises in the city of uMhlathuze. Mandisa’s areas of interest are in migration, regional integration, climate change and water resources management in the SADC region. With a multi-disciplinary background, she has worked on various projects over the years, in both the public and private sector. She is also a member of the Protect our Planet (POP) movement which is a global organisation. Inocent Moyo is a senior lecturer and Head of the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, South Africa. He researches borders, migration, development and regional integration, urban and cross border informal economies with a focus on Africa in general and the Southern Development Community (SADC) region specifically. Christopher Changwe Nshimbi is Director, Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn) and senior lecturer, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa. He researches migration, regional integration, the informal economy and water governance and sits on regional and international technical working groups on trade, labour and migration, social cohesion and water. Samuel Kehinde Okunde is a post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, South Africa. He is interested in thinking through ways in which social and ethnic cleavages in border communities could be used for economic integration and social cohesion in Africa. His fields of interest cut across borderland studies, peace and conflict studies, development studies, migration and refugee studies. Mohammed Ouhemmou is a researcher at Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco. He is currently working on his PhD thesis which evaluates Moroccan migration policy. His research focuses on public policy analysis, migration, international relations, and international education. He is particularly interested in research on the impact of the migration policies in the EU on the migration patterns in the southern side of the Mediterranean. Patricia Ouma is a PhD candidate at Leiden University researching on institutional balance in the proposed East African Confederation. She is also a member of the Executive Committee of the African International Economic Law Network. She holds an LLM in International Business Law from Catholic University of Lyon, France, and an LLB from the University of Nairobi. Patricia is also an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. Said Saddiki is currently a professor of international relations at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, Fez, Morocco. He served as professor at Al-Ain University of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE, from September 2012 to July 2019. He is the author of six books, including World of Walls: Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers (2017) and The State in a Changing World: Nation-State and New Global

List of contributors  xv Challenges (in Arabic) (2008). He has received a number of international awards and grants, including Fulbright Visiting Scholarship, Research Fellowship at the NATO Defense College in Rome and the Arab Prize in the Social Sciences and Humanities. He is currently interested in separation border barriers, foreign policy analysis, international migration, the Western Sahara dispute, nation-state, and inter-national universities’ rankings. Christal O. Spel holds a PhD in Social and Public Policy from the University of Helsinki, Finland. She is currently an African Catalyst Fellow of the Centre for African Studies, University of Edinburgh, UK. Her research interests are African migrants’ welfare, migrants entrepreneurship, African regional integration and informal sector development.

Abbreviations

AEC​ AMU​ ANAPEC​ AU​ AUBP​ BBC​ Benin City​ Bini​ BMIS​ CMR​ COSUDOW​ DLVP​ EASO​ ECOWAS​ EHAHT​ ETLS​ EU​ EUTF​ FAO​ FFP​ Free Movement Protocol​ GADEM​

GDP​ HRW​

African Economic Community Arab Maghreb Union. The National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (L’Agence Nationale de Promotion de l’Emploi et des Compétences). African  Union African Union Border Programme British Broadcasting Corporation The capital of Edo State An alternative name for the ethnic group Benin/​Edo Border Management Information System Central Mediterranean  Route Committee for the Support of Dignity of Women DV Visa lottery Programme European Asylum Support Office Economic Community of West African States Edo State Task Force on Human Trafficking ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme European  Union EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations Fragile State  Index 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services, Right to Residence and Right to Establishment The Antiracist Defense and Support Group for Foreigners and Migrants (Le Groupe Antiraciste de Défense et d’Accompagnement des Etrangers et Migrants). Gross Domestic Product Human Rights  Watch.

List of abbreviations  xvii I CAO​ ICMPD​

International Civil Aviation Organization International Centre for Migration Policy Development IDP​ Internally Displaced  People ILO​ International Labour Organization IOM​ International Organisation for Migration ITALO​ Slang for Nigerian irregular migration to southern European countries especially Italy IYAMIDR​ Initiative for Youth Awareness on Migration, Development and Reintegration KTN​ Kenya Television Network MADAM​ A woman who organises the trafficking. MEDAM​ Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration Naija​ Alternative word for Nigeria NAPTIP​ National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons NBC​ National Boundary Commission NCS​ Nigeria Customs Service NGO​ Non-​Governmental Organisation NIS​ Nigeria Immigration Service NTV​ Nation  TV OAU​ Organisation of African Unity OBA​ The King of the Benin in Edo state. OECD​ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OSBP​ One-​Stop Border  Posts OSGOF​ Office of the Surveyor-​General of the Federation POLISRIO​ Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-​Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro). RAMED​ Medical Assistance System (Regime d’Assistance Medicale). RECs​ Regional Economic Communities SADC​ South African Development Commission SADR​ Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. SAP​ Structural Adjustment Programme SIS​ Schengen Information  System SNAPAP​ National Independent Union for Public Administration Employees (Syndicat National Autonome des Personnels de l’Administration Publique). SWAC​ Sahel and West Africa Club TALOS/​ ITALIAN Women that returned from Italy in the 1990s MAMMA​

xviii  List of abbreviations UAE​ UEMOA​ UN DESA​ UN​ UNAI​ UNDP​ UNESCO​ NHCR​ U UNODC​ UNU-​CRIS​ S​ U USA​ VAPP​

United Arab Emirate French term for West African Economic and Monetary Union United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations United Nations Academic Impact United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies United States of America United State of America Violence Against Persons Prohibition

Foreword

I am very delighted to write the foreword to this edited book on Intra-​Africa Migrations:  Reimaging Borders and Migration Management. The editors have no doubt, carved a niche for themselves as far as Migration in Africa is concerned and I am convinced that this book is an addition to their wealth of contribution to knowledge in that field. The Pan-​African ideology has a pivotal goal of the integration of Africa and migration plays a major role in this process. Right from the era of the creation of Organisation of African Unity (OAU), up till the establishment of novel organisations like the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the idea of a united Africa has never been hidden by the drivers of this philosophy. However, the road to pan Africanism and its laudable goals have often been faced with hindrances at the “borders.” Consequently, borders have undoubtedly transformed from physical to other forms including economic, security, socio-​cultural and other emerging forms which inadvertently have enormous consequences on development. To address some of these challenges, there have been a plethora of policies at the global, regional and national levels in reaction to the various implications of migration. This book addresses a number of pertinent issues in migration especially within and around Africa. The book is also timely as some of the chapters have shed light on the challenges facing Pan-​Africanism in the era of a globalised world foremost among which include issues around securitisation, irregular migration, integration and development nexus. This book can also go for a compendium of migration issues around Africa as the chapters draw on diverse socio-​economic contexts across Africa; from the Maghreb to East Africa and from West Africa to Southern Africa presenting discourses that are germane to the understanding how to transform the myriad challenges posed by human mobility across Africa to opportunities to harness the enormous advantages presented by migration across the continent. It is no doubt that Africa cannot afford to be indifferent to the essential challenges posed by developments in border studies giving the extant development needs and volatile security nature of the continent. Suffice to say that one of the gains of globalisation is the opportunity to apply the ethos of global best practices in migration management in tackling the various

xx Foreword issues arising from increasing mobility in Africa. Hence, I find the chapter on Integration, Borders and Migration in West Africa: Lessons from European Schengen Area very apt in drawing lessons from the successes and challenges of the EU Schengen region. The chapters of this book are clearly written and reader-​friendly while the editorial is quite commendable. I  will therefore recommend the book to scholars, policy makers, researchers and others interested in understanding the dynamics of migration across Africa. Lanre Ikuteyijo, PhD Department of Sociology and Anthropology Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria 30 July 2020

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Acknowledgements

This book is a product of an International Conference on the EU-​Africa Migration Conundrum in a Changing Global Order, which was held at the University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, from 21–​22 November 2019. This conference provided a critical site for leading academics, policy makers, political observers, practitioners from civil society and EU representatives to discuss intra-​Africa migrations on one hand and how EU policies implicate on migration management and governance in Africa. We are grateful for the generous funding of the conference by the Jean Monnet activity within the ERASMUS+ programme Africa-​EU relations, migration, development and integration (587767-​EPP-​1-​2017-​1-​ZA-​EPPJMO-​PROJECT) together with the Joensuu University Foundation. Inocent Moyo (PhD), Jussi P. Laine (PhD) and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi (PhD) 30 July 2020

Part One

Intra-​Africa migrations

1  Intra-​Africa migrations An introduction Inocent Moyo, Jussi P. Laine and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

Introduction Intra-​African migration has long defined human mobility on the African continent. The long history of this reality goes back to pre-​and colonial times and extends into the 21st century (see e.g. Mlambo and Mpanza, 2019). Throughout these periods, people in Africa have engaged in circular and seasonal migration, and also migrated and settled permanently in new lands that supported life and sustained livelihoods. African migration has, however, also historically included forced migration within and out of the continent. One of the first notable forms of forced mass migration of Africans was outward (to places outside of Africa) and involved the pre-​colonial shipment of Africans to the Americas, in the Atlantic slave trade (see e.g. Mlambo and Mpanza, 2019; Ware, 2011; 2017). During the colonial period, Africans were forced to migrate within Africa to provide labour to/​in colonial economies (see e.g. Mlambo and Mpanza, 2019). For example, in the late 1800s Mozambicans migrated to seek employment on the South African farms in the Western Cape (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). In the 1860s and the 1880s, the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly and gold in the Witwatersrand, respectively, led to a significant number of migrants from Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, among others, to these diamond and gold mines (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2014; Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006; Wentzel, 2003). However, migration was not always towards South Africa, because mines in the then Southern Rhodesia (present-​day Zimbabwe) also attracted and recruited migrant workers from countries such as Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia (Crush et al., 2005). This shows that a complex mix of socio-​economic and political processes and developments, such as borders, state formation, entry and development of capitalism and conflict, have implicated on migration within the African continent in terms of influencing the volume and trajectory of migration. This is why in the post-​colonial period, voluntary and forced migration continues to occur in Africa. The factors behind the migration range from cultural and socioeconomic to wars and conflict and, increasingly, environmental and climate-​related changes (Mercandalli et al., 2019). Most of this migration of

4  Inocent Moyo et al. African people not only occurs within Africa, it is also generally concentrated within Africa’s major regions and mostly occurs between proximate states (Nshimbi, 2018). The tendency is that, first, people migrate domestically in their countries of birth and second, to proximate neighbouring countries on the continent (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). For example, more migration occurs within the region that makes up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the proximate countries there. The same holds for the other major regions in Africa such as the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and so on. Again, the major drivers of the migration are generally cultural and socioeconomic. It is also worth noting that, a significant number of migrants in Africa constitute people referred to as undocumented migrants (Nshimbi and Moyo, 2017). This is noteworthy because it has a bearing on the notion of borders, one of the themes discussed in this book. The migrants in question sometimes lack requisite travel documents for legal entry or to cross nation-​state borders into other countries on the continent. Consequently, they resort to remaining undocumented in their host countries. Apart from that, some of the people who are determined to migrate resort to using the services of migrant smugglers, to “jump” borders into their desired destinations within the continent (de Haas, 2007; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Adeniran, 2014; Moyo, 2020; Msoni, 2020; Nshimbi and Moyo, 2020). Historically, Africa has thriven on mobility, and it continues to do so today, despite the increased restrictions and border enforcement. This reality of intra-​ Africa migration debunks popular depictions of Africans as people who are desperately attempting to leave the continent in droves for, especially, Europe (see: Laine, Moyo and Nshimbi, 2020). Although Africa is commonly portrayed as a continent of mass exodus, a “continent on the move” (Flahaux and de Haas, 2016: 1), the reality is that most migration occurs within the African continent. Even in the case of refugees, about 5.6% of them actually migrate out of Africa and the rest remain on the continent (UNHCR, 2019). As Mbembe (2019: 16) has noted, we cannot confuse the external fears of a great exodus with the debate on Africa`s future and development. Against this backdrop, there is need for scholarship which critically engages with intra-​Africa migrations and in doing so addresses two main issues. The first is that of inter continental migration particularly to Europe, which appear to be either ignored or at least misunderstood or both. This has fuelled many misconceptions and myths about Africans flooding Europe and overwhelming it. In this book, we unsettle and trouble this misconception and misunderstanding by amplifying the fact that, most migration occurs on the African continent and in this lies the need for more attention for managing it for the development of the African continent. This leads to the second issue which this collective volume engages with: how intra-​Africa migrations should be governed and managed?

Intra-Africa migrations: an introduction  5 Such an analysis brings into sharp focus the issue of African borders, the securitisation of migration and the challenges, controversies, complexities and opportunities that better migration management policies within the context of regional and continental integration may bring on the African continent. In light of this, the objectives of the book are to highlight some of the trends and patterns of cross-​border migration within Africa, examine the management of migration on the continent bearing in mind borders and the securitisation of migration and debate the challenges and opportunities which lie ahead as a result of configuring and reconfiguring migration management on the continent. Arising out of these objectives are several themes, which are discussed in depth in the book volume.

Borders The role of borders and bordering processes is central to understanding how contemporary migrations and the mobilities they create are affecting our societies. Borders do not simply exist and thus controlled by nation-​states but are ceaselessly both contested and maintained by diverse processes and practices (Laine, 2016). They are “enacted, materialized and performed1 in a variety of ways” and these “performative aspects of borders” are carried by a multiplicity of actors (Johnson et al., 2011: 62), at different scales and locales (Laine, 2016; Moyo and Nshimbi, 2019; Moyo, 2020). The political function of borders remains strong, yet they also come with subtler socio-​ cultural implications (Laine and Casaglia, 2017). They “can have a very obvious presence and even where visually indistinct, they are typically the bearers of a wider symbolism” (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999: 595). Far from mere markers of sovereignty at the margins of nation-​states, borders have become inherent in various processes and institutions throughout society. By exploring the complexity and interplay of these diverse, often antagonistic, processes, we arrive at a multifarious understanding of borders as something very concrete and fixed, yet simultaneously also abstract and fluid (Brambilla et al., 2015; Laine, 2016). Borders divide and create dichotomies, yet they also establish dialectics with a sense of in-​betweenness (Konrad et al, 2019: 5). No matter where a border is placed in a region of indeterminateness, some post-​border outs that are actually in, and some post-​border ins that are actually out, will be evident (Rescher, 2007: 49–​50). The border, then, is fraught with contradictions about what is in and what is out, and this construct results in errors of omission and commission (Konrad et al., 2019: 5). Building on these notions, this volume seeks to illuminate the roles borders play in intra-​African migrations and the related integration and development endeavours from a holistic, multiscalar perspective. To do so, we shift our thinking from the mere place of border encounters to the spatialisation of the complex interactions that comprise the bordering act (Amilhat Szary, 2015: 41).

6  Inocent Moyo et al. Borders are offered here neither as a cause nor a solution, but rather as a looking glass to and as a laboratory of the socio-​economic, political, cultural and historical processes, which create and maintain sites of inclusion and exclusion. In the case of intra-​Africa migrations, this is an important issue to raise, because at the same time that there is an increase in migration on the African continent, there is a corresponding bulking up of borders as well as the tightening of migration policies. Considering that migration should be one of the pillars on which to build regional and continental integration founded on a Pan-​African identity and humanity, efficiently and effectively managing migration to meet these ideals becomes paramount.

Securitisation of migration and the impact of European Union (EU) externalisation of borders The securitisation of migration simply means that migration is regarded as an existential security threat to a nation-​state and thus deserving at least control and stopping at best (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013). For instance, the recent increase in the number of asylum seekers and migrants in Europe was constructed as a crisis, which threatened the European civilization (Rumelili, 2015) and thus necessitating the securitisation of borders so as to close off such migrants and refugees. The closing off and/​or securitisation of borders was based on the assumption that migration undermined “the securitisation of sovereignty by its very existence” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013: 188). This has also involved the externalisation of EU borders to Northern Africa (Strange and Martins, 2019). In this volume, the securitisation of migration and particularly leading to the externalisation of EU borders particularly in Morocco and Algeria is analysed through its potentionally xenophobic and racist implications as well as considering also the explicit consequences of migration governance. This is a major theme in this volume that is taken further also in other chapters to analyse the securitisation of migration in the African continent more broadly (against migrants from the African continent) and how this impacts on regional and continental integration. These discussions condense to the need for policies which manage migration by African states for African people than being sponsored by the EU to brutalise and “other,” other African migrants. It is posited that, such policies could also address irregular and undocumented migration.

Migration management, regional and continental integration in Africa Migration management can be defined as the utilisation of policies, strategies and programmes aimed at maximising the benefits of migration but at the same time minimising its negative impacts as well as responding to the human and other needs of migrants (The Berne Initiative, 2004). The implication of this is that migration management should of necessity be holistic,

Intra-Africa migrations: an introduction  7 in terms of considering the needs of people involved in migration at the same level as the economic and other benefits which they generate. With this in mind, this book discusses how effective and inclusive regional and continental integration could contribute to increased trade and economic development in Africa. This could reduce migration to and the EU`s externalisation of its borders into Africa, which is accompanied by pain, suffering and the reproduction of socio-​cultural and other borders on the continent. However, it is also noteworthy, especially concerning the former, that development may not necessarily end or lead to people stopping migrating to EU countries (de Haas, 2007). De Haas (2007) argues that this is a common myth and bases his argument on the point made earlier in this c­ hapter –​that the myth ignores the fact that most migration does not trend towards richer or global north countries from poorer ones, but occurs within Africa. In fact, the paradox for de Haas is that, increases in the level of development initially lead to higher levels of emigration. However, the regional and continental migration witnessed in Africa is also problematic in that it leads to the construction of socio-​economic and cultural borders, in which economic integration is valorised to the total invisibilisation of social and cultural integration. Consequently, regional and continental integration schemes appear to be concerned more with economic benefits and less with free human mobility and the needs and conditions of migrants. This is one of the focal points of discussion in this book volume. While regional and continental integration drives in Africa are in the making, which may have economic and political gains, the issue of policy which deals with the social protection of migrants receives little or no attention. A Pan-​ African ideology which deepens social protection of migrants is missing in the current regional and continental integration drives and this has left migrants vulnerable to xenophobia, abuse and exploitation. These are borders of another kind. This suggests that there is a gap in terms of the management of migration in relationship to social policy. It is both inadequate and simplistic to blame the Berlin borders for the failure of regional integration schemes in Africa. There are other socio-​cultural borders beyond the physical lines at the margins of nation states which continue to create the us versus them divide. And this militates against regional integration and effective regional migration policies in regions such as the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). This provides a site for cross border security challenges and irregular migration, among others – bringing to the fore borders, migration, geopolitical and security challenges. This volume seeks to contribute to the field of border studies in terms of illuminating that managing intra-​Africa migration is a complex issue, because there are physical as well as socio-​cultural and economic and other borders with which to contend. Pursuing regional economic integration means that the movement of economic factors from goods to capital is valued more than that of people. While there are no borders for goods and

8  Inocent Moyo et al. capital, there are for people and this is the context for the securitisation of migration in Africa. This argument needs to be amplified in African border studies. While it is true that African borders must be efficiently managed to enhance free human mobility and integration, it does not necessarily follow that there will be integration of people. Addressing physical borders and encouraging migration does not necessarily lead to integration and development. It may lead to xenophobia  –​another border which cannot be addressed by simply effectively managing the physical border and enhancing free movement. In an African setting, this discussion in border studies is missing and this book volume brings it to the fore –​by demonstrating the ubiquity and penetrating influence, if nothing else endurance of borders of different kinds.

Structure of the book The book is composed of 12 chapters, which are organised into five parts or sections. Part one is constituted of this chapter, which introduces the book volume by discussing key conceptual and theoretical issues around intra-​Africa migration management regimes. The chapter also discusses the key themes which guide this book, which are borders, migration management, securitisation of migration, cross border security, regional and continental migration. Part two is composed of four chapters (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively), which dwell on intra and inter-​African migrations and implications. In this regard Chapter 2 (Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe) highlights the importance of borders in facilitating migration in the West African region and the role that migration plays in socio-​economic development. Using Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, two migration hubs as case studies, the chapter analyses how West African migrants utilise the borders to access the greener grass within the region. In this regard, Allwell argues that, borders create the perception that just beyond them, opportunities abound that are much better than the reality in the migrant’s country of origin. Thus, the border is a catalyst of migration and a beacon of hope of “greener grass.” Thus, Allwell highlights the unique role of borders in catalysing economic migration within the West African region. For these reasons, Allwell advocates for better migration management policies. Chapter  3 (Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu) analyses the historical trajectories in the migration between the Nigerian city of Benin and Italy. Efetobor argues that, increased irregular migration from Nigeria to Italy calls for effective policy responses aimed at managing migration and thus reducing dangerous journeys by migrants, some of whom never reach the “Promised Land” of Italy. Chapter 4 (Samuel Kehinde Okunade) asserts that there is the emergence of a youth culture in Nigeria, in which the youth have left Nigeria for greener pastures, only to be disappointed, abused and in some cases killed. Samuel argues that, there is need for policies to address the dangerous attitude and culture among the youth –​that migration to other countries is

Intra-Africa migrations: an introduction  9 always the solution to their problems. Chapter 5 (Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini, Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi) argue that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region suffers from the lack of regional migration policies to effectively govern migration. Mandisa, Inocent and Chris posit that, perhaps, the SADC can learn from the more progressive experiences of the EU in terms of how best to manage migration. The third part of the book, composed of four chapters (Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9), whose theme is African physical and symbolic borders and the migration question, illuminates the coloniality and porosity of African borders (physical), but also the evolution of equally significant socio-​cultural and other borders (symbolic), which have implicated, if nothing else undermined both regional and continental integration. In this logic Chapter  6 (Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine) demonstrates how the strengthening of borders in the Southern African region engenders undocumented migration and that the attendant precarity does not augur well for regional and continental development and integration. Chapter  7 (Patricia Ouma) problematises the role of stereotyping in the implementation of integration laws and policies and on free movement of people in the East African Community (EAC). Patricia explores the historical emergence of stereotypes in the EAC, classifies them using the Stereotype Content Model and discusses their impact on the implementation of regional integration law and policy. In the final analysis she concludes that while the attainment of the goals of regional integration has been hampered by a lack of political will among the Partner States, a weak legal and institutional framework, and a lack of public participation, a less explored factor that directly affects integration in the region, and specifically free movement of people is stereotyping. This needs to be confronted so that regional integration in the EAC can materialise and thus give effect to the existing rules in the EAC around human mobility and regional integration. Chapter 8 (Said Saddiki) examines challenges and different strategies around managing migration in the Maghreb region. Said highlights the fact that the Maghreb has been for several decades a gateway for irregular migrants wishing to get to the northern shores of the Mediterranean from Sub-​Saharan Africa. However, currently, the Maghreb countries are no longer a waiting room for migrants, but also a place of permanent residence for thousands of migrants from Sub-​Saharan Africa based on many factors, but especially the great difficulty in reaching Europe. One of the great challenges facing the Maghreb countries is to include a large number of migrants in fragile and vulnerable local socio-​economic structures. Due to the lack of regional cooperation and the paralysis of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Maghreb governments have adopted different approaches to managing intra-​African migration. Some still focus more on security measures, others try to balance different internal needs and external pressures, and others take advanced strategies to regularise a significant number of sub-​Saharan and integrate them into local communities. The chapter shows that this lack of a coordinated

10  Inocent Moyo et al. approach to migration is problematic for effective migration management in the AMU. Chapter 9 (Ernest Toochi Aniche) argues that while the coloniality of African borders in general and specifically those in West Africa have a role to play in militating against regional integration, there are other symbolic borders which are equally significant in dividing people and thus undermining regional integration in West Africa. For these reasons, Earnest problematises the ethnic boundaries of socio-​political spaces of inclusion and exclusion that divide people into various socially and politically constructed categories. This chapter further problematises state’s sovereignty and interrogates the inability of integration in West Africa to deconstruct and reconstruct these colonial and ethnic borders and the Westphalian state system. This chapter also examines the implications of the failures of the enforcement of visa-​free or achievement of border-​free and borderless West Africa on migration in the sub-​region drawing some lessons from the successes and challenges of the EU Schengen Area. The fourth part of the book is constituted of two chapters (Chapters 10 and 11). Chapter 10 (Mohammed Ouhemmou) analyses the EU externalisation of its borders in countries like Morocco and Algeria. This collaboration between some African countries and the EU has led to the rise of harsh and abusive policies targeting black African migrants. Mohammed illuminates the point that the imposition of EU policies on Africa not only contributes to the increase in xenophobia, but also disrupts the orderly and safe management of migration. In the final analysis, Mohammed shows how compliance with the EU’s demands and hasty response to its security concerns are major obstacles that hinder safe human mobility within Africa and the Global South in general. Chapter 11 (Christal O. Spel) takes a social policy perspective by illuminating the disconnect between economic integration and the welfare of migrants on the African continent. Christal asserts that promoting or fast tracking neoliberal economic integration without the concomitant social protection of migrants undermines integration because it increases the vulnerability of migrants. Thus Chapter 11 takes political provision for African migrant welfare as one significant disjunction between the central principles of Pan-​Africanism as a foundational ideology for African regional integration, and a neoliberal economic fast track to regional integration and development. As a result, Christal argues that contemporary African migrants’ experience in African cities is increasingly being shaped by xenophobic attacks and other forms of vulnerability, especially at the informal level. Extraordinarily, in the same context of the abuse of some African migrants, giant economic steps are being taken for African regional integration. Thus, the chapter asserts that aspirations and anxieties are exacerbated at the state level spiralling the vulnerability of African migrants in host cities. On this basis, Christal advocates for regional responsibility for migrants’ welfare, from the perspective of efficient management and governance of migration. This effectively calls for

Intra-Africa migrations: an introduction  11 policies which enhance the welfare of migrants at the same time and level as economic integration. In the fifth part, whose focus is reimaging borders and migration management in Africa, Chapter 12 (Inocent Moyo, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi and Jussi P. Laine) concludes by amplifying the point that managing intra-​ Africa migration is a complex issue. This is precisely because of the need to contend with and confront both physical and symbolic borders. Inocent, Christopher and Jussi highlight the fact that improving cross border migration is not a panacea, because the increase in migration, which open borders may engender may lead to symbolic borders like xenophobia. Therefore, physical or economic integration does not always translate to social and/​or cultural integration. This is the site for robust policy development and this book is an attempt in the direction, such that Africa can achieve true, authentic and inclusive regional and continental integration.

Note 1 Italics in original.

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Part Two

Intra and inter-​Africa migrations and implications

2  Greener grass on the other side The border as a facilitator of migration in West Africa Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe

Introduction Migration is a feature of the international system. With the global migrant stock reaching 3.8 % of the world’s population in 2019, migrants are increasingly an important part of both destination and origin states (United Nations, 2019). Migration from the origin states could be a result of protracted conflict, climate change or economic considerations amongst others. While conflicts and climate change lead to the emergence of refugees and asylum seekers who migrate in order to seek international protection, the economic considerations of migrants have not been accorded the same form of legitimacy. Meanwhile, studies have established that migrants are often motivated by the economic gains that can accrue from the migratory process (Akanle, Fayehun, Adejare, Orobome, 2019; de Haas, 2005; Ikwuyatum, 2012). Such economic considerations pertain to the well-​being of the migrant as well as the dependants left behind in the states of origin. Therefore, migratory benefits are expected from the process especially the generation of remittances. In recent times, there has been an overwhelming emphasis on the migration from sub-​Saharan Africa to Europe, a consequence of the so-​called “Migration Crises” of 2015 (Whitaker, 2017; Laine, 2020). That period saw record numbers of sub-​Saharan migrants attempt to cross into southern Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. In reality, much of the migration in Africa occurs within the continent with migrants preferring to move to places that are more similar to their states of origin with outcomes they are more likely to control (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; Laine, 2020). Migration within West Africa has continued to increase in recent times. Considered as one of the world’s most mobile regions, the people maintain strong ties that make for frequent migration within the states (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The region also has a rich history of intense migration in the pre-​ colonial times that contributes to the current patterns. Trade, warfare, inter-​ marriages amongst others led to the emergence of powerful entities within the present-​day West African space including Oyo and Songhai Empires and the Asante Kingdom (Ikwuyatum, 2012). This chapter attributes the migration flows in the West African region to the nature and dynamics of the borders.

18  Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe The border denotes the extent of a state’s authority (Bauder, 2018). It marks a form of inclusion for people within the territory and exclusion of people outside it (Newman, 2006). Often instituted by state governments, it is created as a security construct intended to preserve the sanctity of the people within the state and ward off external threats. Intense care is taken to secure the border and prevent it from being breached. Thus, it features prominent security presence both physically as in most developing regions such as Africa and virtually through the use of technology in developed ones (Scorgie-​ Porter, 2015; Bauder, 2018). However, borders are increasingly considered to be a resource by border communities and other people who see it as a gateway to opportunities for economic, social and cultural relations (Foucher, 2019). Therefore, borders are not static as the boundary line but constantly evolving based on how people interact with them (Laine & Casaglia, 2017). This conception provides the basis on which people cross the border and create mutually beneficial trans-​border relationships. This chapter conceives the border as clearly distinct from the boundary. Thus, while the boundary refers to the exact point of the demarcation between two states, the border is used here to refer to other adjourning territories including the communities that straddle the boundary. In addition, the emphasis is on the land borders rather than sea or others. This is, as most migration in the region, occurs through the land borders which is more accessible and affordable to potential migrants. This chapter contends that the borders in West Africa are the drivers of migration for the purpose of accessing economic opportunities or the “greener grass.” In other words, West African borders continue to serve as instigators of migration. Greener grass, in this context, refers to the expectation of better forms of livelihood and opportunities associated with migration within the region. Seeing that the “grass” or economic opportunities across the border are more lucrative than what is obtainable in the present state, the migrant is motivated to traverse the borders and take advantage of them. In most cases, such migration corresponds to pre-​colonial migratory trends in the region. This is precisely because African and likewise West African nation-​ state borders are a creation of the Berlin conference of 1884–​5 (Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). Despite the attempts to consolidate and securitise these borders, potential migrants perceive these borders as blocking them from a brighter future or better life and this triggers cross border migration as people take necessary measures and cross borders. This chapter discusses the borders in relation to migration towards two migration hubs in West Africa –​Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. Both states are top migrant destinations by virtue of having some of the largest economies in the region, opportunities for migrants to feature prominently in their informal sectors as well as strong migratory ties with ethnic groups across the region (Gagnon & Khoudour-​Casteras, 2012). These two case studies are good sites to understand the concept of greener grass that is augmented by the borders in the region. In this sense, this chapter is an important contribution to the understanding of migration and borders in West Africa. It

Greener grass on the other side  19 challenges the notion that irregular migration can be countered simply by beefing up security at the borders or shutting it down completely. On the other hand, it also interrogates the perception that migratory networks are the main determinants of the decision for West African migrants to move across the region. This chapter argues instead that the borders facilitate rather than prevent migration in the region and in themselves are triggering factors for migrants to explore the region for opportunities that are not available within their state borders. To carry forward this argument, the chapter begins by introducing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and migration in the region. It proceeds to consider the pivotal role that the borders play in migration in the case studies and concludes by suggesting ways of improving migration management in West Africa.

ECOWAS and migration in West Africa The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional organisation of 15 states committed to ensuring mutual development and prosperity (Lar, 2009). ECOWAS has upheld a positive disposition to migration since its inception in 1975 (Kabbanji, 2017). The regional organisation endorses the position that migration is important in promoting the development of the member states within the region (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services, Right to Residence and Right to Establishment of 1979 is one regional instrument that buttresses this point (Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). The 1979 Protocol identified three phases (1980–​5) which the region would have to go through, so as to facilitate free mobility of community citizens. These were abolition of visas (1980–​5), freedom of residence (1985–​90) and establishment of businesses anywhere (1990–​5 to foster development (Adeniran, 2014). Thus, it set a target of meeting these goals within a total of 15 years with 5  years for each of the three stages. While this Protocol has in reality abolished visa and ensured free movement in the region, migrants have not been able to fully enjoy the rights to live in host member states and establish thriving businesses there (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration was launched in 2008 to chart a regional response to increasing migration (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The Common Approach to Migration identified the urgency needed to fight trans-​border crimes such as human trafficking by declaring in its third principle that “Combatting Human Trafficking and humanitarian assistance are moral imperatives of ECOWAS Member States” (ECOWAS Commission, 2008: 2). The regional body also pushed for the protection of victims of human trafficking to reintegrate them into their respective societies (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). Moreover, the Common Approach on Migration reaffirmed the community’s beliefs in migration as a tool for integration of West Africa. Therefore, ECOWAS asserted that the 1979 Protocol on Free Movement had played a critical role in the development of the region

20  Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). The Common Approach on Migration therefore sought to manage or regulate the spate of migration in the region so as to buttress the benefits and mitigate any drawback. Mobility in West Africa has been further aided by the introduction of the ECOWAS passport in 2000 (Adepoju, 2015). It was conceived as an attempt to create a uniform form of identification for community citizens (Adeniran, 2017). It is renewable for two years and is acceptable across all borders in the region. The use is not widespread as a number of states are yet to implement it (Kabbanji, 2017). Migration in West Africa undoubtedly has significant benefits to the region. One major benefit is the growth of the formal and informal trade sectors. Migrants move with their skills set and are able to contribute to the development of the host states and the region by extension (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; Ikwuyatum, 2012). The formal economy is bolstered by the diverse labour made available by the influx of migrants. This enhances the growth of the economic sectors with remarkable benefits. The cocoa industry in Côte d’Ivoire has attracted migrants from every part of the region to provide labour for the cultivation and processing of the crop leading to its emergence as the top cocoa producer in the world (Adeniran, 2014,2017; Adjami, 2016). Migrants are incorporated into the existing labour structure and provide diversity of thought and language, ideas and critical thinking required to reposition these industries (Woods, 2004). The informal economy has also benefitted from cheap labour migration required in construction, agriculture and trade amongst others (de Haas, 2005; Mitchell, 2012). However, the informal economy also features the exploitation of irregular migrants’ labour leading to lower pay and inadequate working conditions (Ikwuyatum, 2012, ICMPD & IOM, 2015; UNDP, 2019). Informal trade is a prominent economic activity in West Africa. It involves trade that is not registered by the authorities either because of the small scale of items traded or the desire to avoid tariffs (Ayimpam, 2015). It is a major source of income especially for people in the borderlands who have little employment opportunities to choose from (Asiwaju, 2017). Remittances is another prominent benefit of migration. While the migrant undertakes the actual movement along with the risks, the family members often raise the funds for such journeys and provide psychological and emotional support (Adeniran, 2017; Akanle et  al, 2019). The expected return on investment is the remittance the migrant is expected to provide after attaining the migratory goal (UNDP, 2019). They serve as forms of connection between the migrant in the host state and the family and the host state by extension (Akanle et al, 2019). These remittances reinforce the desire of the migrant to improve the circumstances of the family and prove that the migratory project has in fact “succeeded” (UNDP, 2019). Such remittances are then used by the families for personal projects, businesses and community development efforts thereby leading to the development of the home state (de Haas, 2005). Thus, migration in West Africa benefits both the host and home states and enhances regional development (Adeniran, 2014; Gagnon & Khoudour-​Casteras, 2012).

Greener grass on the other side  21 Migrants have however experienced various forms of hostility across the region. They are often blamed by local populations as the causes of economic downturns and the declining fortunes of the host states (Ikwuyatum, 2012; Gagnon & Khoudour-​Casteras, 2012). Such strategies of scapegoating the migrant have been adopted by several states in the region (Adepoju, 2015; Gagnon & Khoudour-​Casteras, 2012). The 1969 Aliens Compliance Act of Ghana was a response by the government to declining cocoa sales leading to the expulsion of various West Africans especially Nigerians (Whitaker, 2015; Ikwuyatum, 2012). The Nigerian oil boom in the 1970s attracted migrants but dipping oil prices led to wide-​ranging expulsions of mostly Ghanaians and other West Africans in the “Ghana-​Must-​Go” saga (Ikwuyatum, 2012; Adeniran, 2017). Likewise, Côte d’Ivoire, a long-​standing migrant destination in the region, saw politicians adopt anti-​migrant policies such as the Ivoirite policy1 in order to hold on to power in the face of economic collapse in the early 1990s (Mitchell, 2012; Whitaker, 2015). Moreover, migration within the region and indeed Africa is increasingly more feminised with a rising number of women involved in migration across the borders (Ikwuyatum, 2012; Aduloju, 2017; Adepoju, 2015). Most of these woman migrants are participants in the informal cross-​border trade (Aduloju, 2017). Although most women trade in small volumes, some have become large-​scale traders with thriving businesses (Ayimpam, 2015). Ikwuyatum (2012) and Aduloju (2017) note that the feminisation of migration reverses gender norms in the traditional African setting that situates the man as the provider in the home. However, women increasingly face sexual harassment from the border security officials (Aduloju, 2017; Adeleye, 2017; Ayimpam, 2015). In addition, women tend to make up most of the victims of human trafficking particularly for sexual exploitation in the region (Adeleye, 2017).

Borders and West African migration Borders are central to migration in West Africa. Mobility is shaped by the peculiar nature of borders and states within the region. The current border architecture is traced to the Berlin Conference of 1884–​5 that divided African territory among competing European powers (Foucher, 2019). At independence, African states decided to retain these borders as the extent of their territory to prevent chaos (Laine, 2020). However, these borders are not fixed lines but resources that people within the region utilise for different ends including trade, careers and cultural ties (Foucher, 2019). This section emphasises the crucial nature of borders to migration thus: First, the kinship and cultural ties of the people do not correlate with the existing international borders (Bauder, 2018). The West African borders are permeated by the ethnic groups that they divide. As is the case with other African states, these borders are colonial constructs created without any recourse to the existing cultural and ethnic relations on ground (Foucher, 2019; Bauder, 2018; Laine, 2020). The colonial period failed to foster strong

22  Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe national identities among the states that were created by the British and French. Instead, they employed the strategy of divide and rule pitting various ethnic groups against each other in order to hold on to power (Ikwuyatum, 2012). The borders therefore serve as a channel for access to other states with different systems and the likelihood of more opportunities. The people in the region particularly those who live around the border consider it to be resource that opens up greener grass to those who cross it. This withers down the state efforts to fortify the borders and use them as barriers to keep people apart. In fact, the intensified efforts at border fortification only serve to make the borders more lucrative to people looking to exploit the gains on the other side of it (Ayimpam, 2015). The fact that similar ethnic groups exist side by side across the borders such as the Hausa/​Fulani in Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria and the Yoruba in Nigeria, Benin and Togo also contribute to the perception of the border as a tool used to generate better livelihoods once crossed (Asiwaju, 2017). The diffusion of ethnicity across the borders means potential migrants are able to settle in with their kinsmen and access the greener grass existing on the other side. This ensures that the border is a resource that the groups of people can take advantage of (Foucher, 2019). In addition, the borders unwittingly mark off economically viable states from other ones thus serving as a pull factor for potential migrants from comparatively poorer states. Migration is sustained by the desire for development perceived to be located elsewhere (UNDP, 2019; de Haas, 2005). The borders exist to secure the interests of citizens within its borders. The government is only accountable to the citizenry within the territorial space marked by its borders. The extent of the government’s capacity results in the overall standard of living obtainable in a state which is comparable to that of neighbouring states. The West African region is one with significant disparities in state capacities as indicated by their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and their standards of living (Gagnon & Khoudour-​Casteras, 2012). Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are the three biggest economies in the region and are the destinations of several migrants in the region in search of opportunities in their raw material industries as well as informal trade (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014). Much of the emigration from relatively poorer states into the richer states is primarily for the purpose of work and career advancement (Mitchell, 2012; Whitaker, 2015). The migration towards these states is a function of the appeal that they hold to the migrants of a better life than what is obtainable at their places of origin. The borders help to accentuate the prospects of greener pastures and motivate the beginning of an individual’s migratory project (UNDP, 2019). In addition, the porosity of the borders contributes to the migratory trends within the region (Castle, de Haas & Miller, 2014; Gagnon & Khoudour-​ Casteras, 2012). After determining that the borders are not reflective of realities on the ground and that they set off various socio-​economic conditions in the region, the migrant is further inspired to set off on his migratory quest due to the porosity of the borders. The borders are inherently porous

Greener grass on the other side  23 in that several unofficial routes abound while the official ones are not properly managed by the security agencies (Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). Border security officials often demand for gratification before crossing of the borders even when the border crossers are properly documented (Aduloju, 2017). This phenomenon termed by Agbedahin (2014:1) as “border parasitism” refers to such behaviour of border security officials that sabotages the security of the state for their own self-​serving interests. The land borders of states in the region often cut through rough terrain that is difficult for security officials to manage. In addition, the several unofficial routes pass through the border communities avoiding the designated border points and are the preferred choice for migrants as the official borders feature several extortion and time wastage by border officials (Adeleye, 2017; Aduloju, 2017). Besides unofficial routes, porosity emerges as a result of the intensity of interactions of the border communities and migrants. The close-​ knit relations of the borderlands across the borders further weaken attempts at enhancing border security leading to the porosity (Asiwaju, 2017). This weakens the border effect even when the borders are heavily securitised. The porosity prevents the borders from becoming the barriers they were constructed to be. A consequence of the porosity is an increase in irregular migration where approved routes are not used to gain entry or exit into a state.

Navigating the greener grass in Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria Côte d’Ivoire is a prominent migrant destination in West Africa. This flows from its long-​standing reputation as a hospitable destination for migrants since its independence from France in 1960. It shares borders with Liberia and Guinea in the west, Ghana in the east, Mali and Burkina Faso in the north and the Atlantic Ocean in the south (Raji & Adebayo, 2009). It is one of the largest producers of cocoa in the world which has attracted migrants from across the region seeking to benefit from the cultivation of cocoa particularly in the informal economy (Woods, 2004; ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The economic potential is therefore a pull factor for the migrants from across West Africa including Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea amongst others (Raji & Adebayo, 2009; Ikwuyatum, 2012). The favourable migration policy also catered to the needs of the teeming migrant population by making them settle in comfortably into the society. The Ivorian government adopted an open-​ door policy that involved assimilating the migrants into the society. The principle of the “The land belongs to who can make it productive” of independent Côte d’Ivoire ensured that West African migrants moved to the southern part of the state to participate in the cocoa industry (Woods, 2004: 236; Whitaker, 2015: 279). Migrants who proved their worth were able to acquire Ivorian citizenship, purchase landed properties and vote in elections (Adeniran, 2014). However, declining cocoa sales and loss in popularity of the President Houphouët-​ Boigny’s political party led to the expulsion of migrants as well as xenophobic attacks in the 1990s. The Ivoirite policy was introduced

24  Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe to integrate migrants into the Ivorian society (Adjami, 2016). This hostile policy led to the expulsion of migrants and reduced immigration levels until the policy was scrapped (Adjami, 2016). Today, there are a large number of migrants especially from Burkina Faso who migrate to Côte d’Ivoire mostly for economic reasons to work in the agriculture and trade sectors (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; Kabbanji, 2017). The majority of migrants from Burkina Faso that move to Côte d’Ivoire desire the opportunities that the border provides (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Circular migration which seeks to take advantage of seasonal economic opportunities is the prominent feature of Burkinabe migration. Besides the economic opportunities, migration into Côte d’Ivoire is a result of long-​standing ethnic ties across borders. Abidjan and other large cities attract immigration due to the established migrant groups there. The Ejigbo community in Abidjan is one of such groups that has maintained cross-​ border ties with Nigeria, the state of origin generating immigration between both centres. As early as the middle of the twentieth century, there were already about 55,000 Nigerians of Ejigbo extraction living in Côte d’Ivoire (Adeniran, 2017). This community emerged in Abidjan due to the laissez-​ faire attitude of the French colonialists that allowed migration from British colonies. The French colonial economy in Côte d’Ivoire needed migrants to work in the cocoa industry and cheap labour was sourced from all over the region (Woods, 2004). Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire buttresses the greener grass depiction as the thriving cocoa industry is a pull factor that enables migrants from across the region to cross the borders to access it. The favourable pro-​migrant policy of the government also served as a catalyst of immigration into the state. Migrants who settled in Côte d’Ivoire were able to establish relations with their kinsmen on the other side and bring them over to benefit from the grass available. Thus, migrants whether from neighbouring Burkina Faso or Nigeria see the border as the only way to surmount their present deprivations and transit into a reality of abundance. The case of the Ejigbo community in Nigeria also depicts how the border is a central determinant of migration in the region. Based in Osun state, in south-​western Nigeria, the Ejigbo people began migrating to work in the cocoa industry in Cote d’Ivoire and gradually moved into other sectors including trade and other forms of agriculture (Adeniran, 2014). They became more established in the post-​colonial period due to the favourable government policy by the administration of President Félix Houphouët-​Boigny (Adeniran, 2017). The Ejigbo have well-​organised communities in specific provinces of Abidjan complete with their Yoruba traditional institutions. They maintain kinship ties with the Ejigbo community in Nigeria and encourage them to migrate to take advantage of the economic opportunities that abound in Côte d’Ivoire (Adeniran, 2014). The Ivorian capital is lucrative as it has better socio-​economic indicators such as steady power supply, good credit facilities and a more stable economic climate than what is obtainable in the poor rural community of Ejigbo in Nigeria (Adeniran, 2014). The border therefore

Greener grass on the other side  25 creates the differentials that spur migration of the Ejigbo people divided between Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire to access the so-​called greener pastures (Adeniran, 2014). Emigration from Ejigbo in Nigeria is a constant feature with transport companies plying weekly vehicles to and from Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. The fact that these companies ply these West African routes directly from the rural town of Ejigbo rather than the big city of Lagos as is often the case is a testament to the intensity of the immigration to Côte d’Ivoire. There is also strong return migration where elderly Ejigbo people in Côte d’Ivoire, having built a successful career, return to retire in their native town in Nigeria (Adeniran, 2017). The Ejigbo-​Yoruba people of Nigeria have sustained their migratory ties with Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire established since the early twentieth century leading to intense migration to this day despite the cultural and language differences. This further buttress the fact that migration is carried out to access the greener pastures that exist on the other side of the border (Raji & Adebayo, 2009).

Towards a better migration management in West Africa Migration is a critical part of the culture in the region with most of it occurring within Africa rather than outside it (Whitaker, 2017). With the regional body underscoring the importance of migration to its development as seen in principle two of the Common Approach on Migration, it is important to better manage migration to maximise the benefits (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). One way of ensuring this is through the adoption of better border management measures by member states. The borders within the region are still considered as barriers rather than bridges. Viewed most often as security constructs by states, the borders continue to stand in the way of effective management of migration within the region. This perception is exemplified by the closure of Nigeria’s land borders with its neighbours, Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon since August 2019. Nigeria defended its action as crucial to ensure food sufficiency and combat smuggling across the land borders (Nwozor & Oshewole, 2020). Up until June 2020, the borders are yet to be reopened, no doubt exacerbated by the novel Coronavirus-​COVID-​ 19 pandemic. Border security across the region has also been mismanaged by security officials who extort border users and create humiliating border crossing procedures including excessive delays and abuse of human rights (Aduloju, 2017; Adeniran, 2017). This chapter suggests that better management strategies such as one-​stop border posts (OSBPs) would enhance migration. One-​ Stop-​ Border-​ Posts (OSBPs) are border facilities jointly used by the two states managing the international border to improve security. OSBPs have often been discussed in line with the facilitation of trade while ignoring the potentials of managing migration (Muqayi & Manyeruke, 2015; Aduloju, 2017). An OSBP acts as a “one-​stop shop” for checks at the borders (Muqayi & Manyeruke,

26  Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe 2015). West African borders are notorious for the slow clearance procedures, language barriers and illegal checkpoints for extortion of border crossers. The OSBPs help to facilitate sharing of intelligence, resources and best practices which create a form of integrated border management. One-​Stop Border Posts create seamless crossing of the borders and reduce delays and incidences of extortion and harassment (Ikwuyatum, 2012). Although prominent in southern and eastern Africa, the idea of OSBPs is gradually becoming a reality in the western part of Africa despite its conception decades ago (Kabbanji, 2017). Two notable recent One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs) are the Seme-​Krake Border and the Noepe-​Akanu Border. Seme-​Krake border is one of the most important border posts in the sprawling Lagos-​Abidjan Corridor (Ikwuyatum, 2012; Aduloju, 2017). Situated between Nigeria and Benin, it accounts for most of the trade between both states and is a significant part of the overall trade volume of the region. Yet, crossing the border was a very chaotic process for a long time. Border facilities were of a very poor standard particularly on the Nigerian side of Seme (Adeleye, 2017). The border officials did not have sufficient communication facilities and had little modern gadgets to work with. There was also inadequate cooperation between border officials of both states due to language barriers and also poor capacity and facilities. The Seme-​Krake One-​Stop Border Post is a state-​of-​the-​art border facility constructed by both states with the help of the European Union and the Economic Community of West African States. Equipped with the latest security gadgets, border crossing procedures have been sped up eliminating the excessive delays that were the hallmark of the border. It is also much easier for the security officials of the respective states to collaborate with the location of their offices side-​by-​side in the same complex (Muqayi & Manyeruke, 2015). Sealing up of some of the known illegal routes around the Seme-​Krake border also encourages community citizens to migrate the right way-​across the border. A similar situation is found in the Noepe-​Akanu border between Ghana and Togo. Extortions at the borders are now much more reduced and the security officials from both states are better able to work together and share resources for enhanced security. Another measure to manage migration within the region is the promotion of safe migration processes by regional and national policymakers. Migration undoubtedly has major benefits but is also fraught with challenges. The migratory process has significantly increased due to the nature of borders in the region as well as the regulations put in place by ECOWAS concerning safe migration. There is however inadequate sensitisation on how migrants could move around safely within the region (Aduloju, 2017). Strikingly, this ignorance especially of the regulatory instruments has sometimes been found among border security officials who ought to enforce them (Agbedahin, 2014). There is the persisting notion that there is unrestricted migration across the borders without the need for carrying travel documents (Adeniran, 2014). Potential migrants are also deceived by criminal gangs who provide enticing tales of

Greener grass on the other side  27 non-​existent opportunities within the region only to end up trafficking these migrants (Adeleye, 2017). Besides, most migrants work within the informal economies of destination states where they are routinely abused and taken advantage of (Aduloju, 2017). Migrants are increasingly subjected to xenophobia in the destination states. Safe migration involves creating the national and regional structures to protect migrants from all forms of discrimination. Emphasis should be placed on integrating the migrants into their host states rather than their securitisation (Kabbanji, 2017; Gagnon & Khoudour-​Casteras, 2012). This includes creating favourable working conditions for migrants in destination states, and affording them the rights to access economic opportunities open to national citizens (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The migratory routes should also be clearly communicated to prevent migrants from utilising irregular routes and falling prey to dangers that pertain thereof (Blum, 2014; Adepoju, 2015). It is important to also promote cross-​border cooperation between security and local officials at the borders. Cooperation of border officials could help mitigate the realities of unsafe migration which often lie in and around the borders. Finally, there is the need to strengthen the implementation of regional instruments to foster better management of migration in the region. West Africa has some of the most advanced migration instruments on the African continent (Kabbanji, 2017). The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services facilitates migration while the 2008 Common Approach to Migration provides ways of managing it. Despite these noble intentions by the regional body, the reality is quite different on the ground (Adeniran, 2017; Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). Differing national policies counter the regional initiative that seeks to promote a borderless West Africa. Implementation is also hampered by the rivalries between the Anglophone and Francophone states which slow down the consensus on implementation of policies (Lar, 2009; Adepoju, 2015). Moreover, the integration goal of ECOWAS which has free movement of people at the heart of it is still considered to be an elitist agenda (Adeniran, 2017). There is a lack of ownership of the idea by peoples of the region which prevents integration from taking root due to the state-​ centric top-​down approach that is often used (Ikwuyatum, 2012). Implementation of these instruments could be improved by training the border officials to adhere strictly to the tenets prescribed in the instruments. In addition, regular oversight of migratory conditions especially at the land borders should be carried out to ensure that conditions at the ports of entry are geared towards facilitating border crossing rather than impeding it. Such oversight should include regional and national officials as well as members of the civil society to ensure accountability. Likewise, the border communities should be fully involved in activities to ensure the implementation of the regulations. The borders hold a unique position in migration and the people of the border communities should work together with the security officials to ensure the rights of migrants are upheld.

28  Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe

Conclusion This chapter has emphasised that the borders are at the heart of migration in West Africa. Migration has remained a constant feature of the peoples despite the changing periods. In the pre-​colonial period there were no borders to consider in the migration of various ethnic groups. The colonial period introduced borders which failed to stop the pre-​existing migratory trends due to the strong cross-​border ties of the ethnic groups. In contemporary times, the regional organisation –​the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played a pivotal role in promoting migration through its 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Rights of Residence and Right of Establishment and the 2008 Common Approach on Migration. Nevertheless, migration continues to be set back by the corruption of border officials, hostility against and expulsion of migrants as well as competing Anglophone and Francophone interests within the bloc. Using the case studies of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and Ejigbo, Nigeria, two major migration destinations in the region, the chapter illustrated how borders facilitate migration. First the borders do not reflect the kinship ties of the peoples. In Abidjan, the Ejigbo people originally from Nigeria continue to exploit their colonial-​era networks established in Abidjan to facilitate migration between both centres. Likewise, Burkinabe migrants from the early days of the cocoa industry in Côte d’Ivoire help to sustain immigration into the state. In addition, the borders create various socio-​economic conditions that inspire migration across the region. As the largest producer of cocoa in the world, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire holds the promise of a better life for immigrants. Similarly, the porosity of borders helps to perpetuate migration within the region. Several unofficial routes mean that migrants can easily navigate various states seeking greener pastures despite increased security measures. The recommendations of the adoption of the one-​ stop border posts, improved implementation of the regional instruments on migration as well as enforcement of safe migration practices flow from the increasing role played by borders in promoting migration in the region. Migration holds the prospects of enhanced integration and development of West Africa. This is particularly apt in the light of the ECOWAS Vision 2020 to create an “ECOWAS of Peoples and not of States” (Odigie, 2016: 4). Proper management of migration would reposition the region to make significant gains in the emerging continent-​wide integration schemes which are spearheaded by the African Union (AU).

Note 1 Ivoirite was a nationalist policy that sought to define a true indigene of Côte d’Ivoire thereby sparking discrimination of migrants.

Greener grass on the other side  29

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30  Allwell Oseahume Akhigbe International Centre for Migration Policy Development & International Organisation for Migration, (2015). A Survey on Migration Policies in West Africa. Vienna & Dakar: ICMPD & IOM. Laine J. & Casaglia A. (2017). Challenging Borders:  A Critical Perspective on the Relationship between State, Territory, Citizenship and Identity. Europa Regional 24, pp. 3–​7. Laine J.P. 2020. Reframing African Migration to Europe: An Alternative Narrative: In I. Moyo, I. C.C. Nshimbi and J.P. Laine (Eds.) Migration Conundrums, Regional Integration and Development: Africa-​Europe Relations in a Changing Global Order. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 1–​17. Lar T. J. (2009). Free Movement, Migration and Xenophobia in Ecowas: A Call For More Attention. In Conflict and Security Development Fellows 2007–​2008 (Eds.) Perspectives On West Africa’s Future. London: King's College. pp. 23–​28. Mitchell M.I. (2012). Migration, Citizenship and Autochthony:  Strategies and Challenges for State-​Building in Côte d’Ivoire. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 30 (2), pp. 267–​287. Muqayi S. & Manyeruke C. (2015). The Impact of the Chirundu One Stop Border Post in Addressing Border Protectionist Challenges. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. 6(6), pp. 11–​19. Newman D (2006). The Lines that Continue to Separate us: Borders in our Borderless World. Progress in Human Geography 30(2), pp. 1–​10. Nwozor A. & Oshewolo S. (2020). Nigeria’s Border Closure Drama:  the Critical Questions. The Roundtable:  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. DOI:10.1080/​00358533.2020.1715106. pp.  1–​2. Odigie B. (2016). The Institutionalisation of Mediation Support within the ECOWAS Commission. The African Centre for the Construction Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) Policy and Practice Brief 042, pp. 1–​7. Okunade S. K. and Ogunnubi O. (2018). A Schengen Agreement in Africa? African Agency and the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. Journal of Borderland Studies. DOI:10.1080/​08865655.2018.1530128. pp. 1–​20. Raji A.Y. & Adebayo P.F. (2009). Yoruba Traders in Côte d’Ivoire:  A Study of the role Migrant Settlers in the Process of Economic Relations in West Africa. African Research Review, 3 (2), pp. 134–​147. Scorgie-​Porter, L. (2015). State Borders in Africa. In S.V. Sevastianov, J. Laine and A.A. Kireev (Eds.) Introduction to Border Studies. Vladivostok:  Dalnouka. pp. 290–​298. United Nations (2019). The number of International Migrants reaches 272 Million, continuing an Upward Trend in all World Regions. Available at www.un.org/​ development/​desa/​en/​news/​population/​international-​migrant-​stock-​2019.html/​ Retrieved on 28 June 2020. United Nations Development Programme (2019). Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe. New York: UNDP. Woods D. (2004). Predatory Elites, Rents and Cocoa:  A Comparative Analysis of Ghana and Ivory Coast. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. 42 (2), pp. 224–​241. Whitaker B.E. (2015). Playing the Immigration Card: the Politics of Exclusion in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. 53 (3), pp. 274–​293. Whitaker B.E. (2017). Migration within Africa and Beyond. African Studies Review. 60 (2), pp. 209–​220.

3  Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary to southern Europe in the twenty-​first century Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu

Introduction Almost 89 per cent of international migrants in sub-​Saharan Africa originate from countries within the same region (United Nations 2019). In spite of this reality, there has been a steady increase in irregular migration from Africa to Europe within the last decade (Moyo 2017; Laine 2020a). It is within this context that there has been an upsurge in Nigerian irregular migration stemming from the determination of these migrants to pay any price necessary in their quest for a better life in Europe. The airwaves are constantly filled with daily news of irregular migrants drowning in their numbers in the Mediterranean Sea in their bid to cross into Europe. Despite the intervention measures taken by the local and international community both in the countries of origin and destination, irregular migration continues to be on the rise especially among Nigerians and the Bini people.1 This raises the questions: what factors have contributed to the increase in irregular migration in the twenty-​first century? Why do Nigerian young men and women continue to risk their lives to cross to Italy via the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea? There is a wealth of academic literature exploring irregular migratory patterns and flows from Africa and Nigeria to Europe (Falola and Afolabi 2007; Flahaux and de Haas 2016; Aiya 2018; Adeniyi 2019; Kari, Malasowe and Collins 2018; Ikuteyijo 2020). Some of these literatures provide a historical overview of irregular migration from Africa to Europe, tracing the irregularity in migration patterns to the 1990s (Adepoju 2007; de Haas 2008). They cite socio-​economic, political and cultural factors as some of the key drivers of irregular migration (Kari, Malasowe and Collins 2018; Ikuteyijo 2020). The central concern of this chapter therefore is to analyse the push–​pull factors responsible for the increase in Nigerian irregular migration to Italy in the twenty-​first century. The chapter is based on the context of Benin City, the capital of Edo state, in the Southern part of Nigeria. Benin City is chosen as the focus of the study because it is one of the most common departure points for Nigerian irregular migration to southern Europe (Malakooti 2016; Adeniyi 2019; IOM 2019).

32  Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu The data for the study was generated largely from secondary sources on irregular migration such as books, journal articles and official reports of national and international organisations. It also draws extensively from unstructured interviews and the researcher’s observation while commuting in commercial buses within Benin City and from unofficial conversations at hair salons in Benin City between December 2019 and January 2020. Unstructured interviews were also conducted with ten returnee migrants in Benin City to ascertain the reasons why they migrated via the irregular routes and why Italy was chosen as their destination country. After this introduction, the second section of the chapter concerns itself with the reasons for the upsurge of irregular migration in the twenty-​first century. The third section provides a brief overview of irregular migration trends in Nigeria before focusing on irregular migration within the context of Benin City. The fourth section discusses the push–​pull dynamics of irregular migration in Benin City and its implications on Nigeria–​EU relationship and the effect on the Nigerian state. The final section concludes and provides the recommendations of the chapter.

Reasons for the upsurge in irregular migration in the twenty-​first century Migration is a global phenomenon caused by the desire of migrants to move from their places of abode in search for better economic prospects. Since the beginning of history, migration has been used as an essential adaptation mechanism by humans to evade risks and access opportunities. According to UN DESA (2019), 3.5 per cent, that is almost 272 million individuals out of the world’s population of 7.7 billion, reside in counties other than where they were born, with Europe hosting the largest number of international migrants worldwide. This figure signifies an increase from the 153 million international migrants recorded at the beginning of the twentieth century (UN DESA 2019). Irregular migration can be defined as any movement that takes place outside the regulatory standards of the sending, transit or receiving country and can be used to refer to three groups of migrants: those who arrive in a clandestine fashion; those who arrive regularly and then overstay the period for which their visa/​permits are valid and asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected and who have not left the country as required (IOM 2018; Ikuteyijo 2020). This section argues that the increase in irregular migration in the twenty-​first century can be attributed to four major factors: globalisation; the Arab spring; immigration regulations and the African porous borders. The increased levels of international migration can be closely linked to the advent of globalisation in the twenty-​first century (Heisler 2008). Donato and Massey (2016) assert that irregular migration is an outcome of the second era of capital globalisation which emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century, with international market integration as its main feature. The globalisation processes in this era of capitalism and bilateral free trade agreements have created a world structure with an unequal distribution of

Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary  33 risks and opportunities (Kari, Malasowe and Collins 2018). Globalisation has led to vast increases in inequality in terms of poverty, security and violence within countries and regions (Collier 2013). In this new global world order, countries in the Global North benefitted more from the gains of the global economy while taking huge advantage of the economic resources and market of countries in the Global South. Arguably, this capitalist-​ driven global economy has also led to further deprivation of developing countries that are unable to handle the demand and firepower of multinational corporations in the Global North. This inequality helps to strengthen the view of migrants in the Global South that the Global North has viable economic opportunities that can be harnessed in the face of their dwindling socio-​economic conditions. International migration is therefore seen by Nigerian migrants as a way of lifting their families from a position of scarcity to that of surplus and to also secure a brighter future for their inter-​generational families. To achieve this, migrants are determined to do whatever it takes and pay whatever price necessary, including following the clandestine and dangerous irregular migratory routes and making arrangements with dubious migration tycoons, to better their lives and that of their dependants (Falola and Afolabi 2007). This has created transnational communities, families and relationships, thereby transforming migratory flow and creating conditions for increased human regular and irregular migration. Findings from unstructured interviews suggest that as a result of technological advancement and electronic communication, prospective migrants are able to get in contact with migrants in their intended countries of destination to better gain information on how to go about their migratory journey and get in touch with migration recruiters, tycoons and smugglers. Libya constitutes a major hub of south–​north migration, particularly for people migrating towards Italy. By the late 1990s, West Africans made up a more substantial part of migration to Libya. However, in the early 2000s, President Muammar Gaddafi partnered with the European Union (EU) in fighting irregular migration (Brachet 2018). Italy and Libya signed a bilateral agreement in July 2003 which was geared towards fighting irregular migration from Libya to Italy (Paoletti 2010). Italy also signed a Friendship Treaty with Libya in 2008 with the intention of financing border control. As a result of these treaties, the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) became a closed route for irregular migration until the collapse of the Gaddafi regime as a result of the Arab Spring (Friebel et al. 2018). The Arab Spring and the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 however marked the end of the “Friendship Treaty” between Libya and Italy. The security vacuum associated with this collapse opened up the CMR for irregular migration in a force greater than what had previously existed. Official statistics shows that the number of people crossing the CMR increased from 4,500 in 2010 to 64,300 in 2011 (Friebel et al. 2018). In October 2013, Italy was portrayed in international headlines when a boat sunk off its coasts, killing over 360 asylum seekers (Reitano, Adal and Shaw 2014). Thus, although Africa has a long history of migration

34  Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu to Europe, the Arab Spring and the associated instability across North Africa led to a tremendous escalation in the number of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. The creation of visa requirements for international travel in the 1990s, restrictive immigration policies, the securitisation of EU’s borders as well as the tightening of immigration conditions and/​ or regulations provide extremely limited possibilities for less skilled migrants to regularly cross into countries in the European Union (Houtum and Lacy 2020; Laine 2020b). The argument posited here is that, with no hope for provisional labour scheme or entry through family reunification, irregular migration became the only option available for potential less-​skilled migrants. In other words, immigration control mechanisms, restrictive foreign immigration and visa policies have helped in restricting Nigerians, particularly low-​skilled workers from regularly entering Italy and the European Union, thus pushing most of them to travel via the irregular boat route through the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea (Aiya 2018). The establishment of a Protocol that supports the free mobility of persons within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) zone has been at the heart of the regional integration policy in the region. To achieve this goal, the ECOWAS Member States adopted a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment. The freedom of movement is enshrined in the ECOWAS Protocol of 29 May 1979 on the Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment. This protocol allows ECOWAS persons (1)  to enter any ECOWAS state without a visa; 2)  to reside in any ECOWAS country up to 90  days; and (3) after 90 days, citizens can apply for a residence permit that is permanent and allows them to start businesses, seek employment and invest (ECOWAS 1999). Despite the existence of free movement agreement designed to reduce irregularity and facilitate migration, irregular migration remains dominant in West Africa. Even within ECOWAS free movement areas, it is not uncommon to involve smugglers in border crossing especially in situations where the migrants lack travel documents. A large majority of West Africans smuggled usually start their journey as regular migrants under the ECOWAS protocol of free movement and only infringe on immigration laws after leaving the ECOWAS zone (Lamptey 2013; Carling 2016). This is because most of West Africa’s international boundaries are characterised by high levels of porosity, making them easily traversed by human smugglers and traffickers. The existence of these extremely porous borders in West Africa also facilitates irregular movements amongst countries as many irregular immigrants can enter the country through numerous ways (Adeola and Oluyemi 2012; Reitano, Adal and Shaw 2014; Carling 2016). In this sense, the ECOWAS Protocol of free movement of West African citizens across the border has been misused by traffickers, smugglers, terrorists and other criminal organisations in carrying out their cross-​border criminalities.

Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary  35

A brief overview of irregular migration in Nigeria Migration has a long history in the African continent, playing a fundamental role in structural transformation in many African countries, communities and households. Furthermore, migration is used in most African households as a means of diversifying their sources of income and improving their source of livelihood (FAO 2017 cf. Laine 2020a). There are substantial irregular migration movements taking place within Africa (IOM-​OIM 2020). The regularity and number of arrivals to Italy from North Africa have however risen to record levels since 2000 (Reitano, Adal and Shaw 2014). IOM (2019) note that about 144,166 migrants arrived in Europe irregularly through the Mediterranean Sea, with over 2275 reported missing or dead. In 2019, a large majority of African-​born migrants residing outside the African region were residing in Europe (10.6 million), Asia (4.6 million) and Northern America (3.2 million) (IOM 2019). Nigeria is a country in West Africa (Figure 3.1) and is the most populous nation in Sub-​Saharan Africa with a population of over 206 million as at May 2020 (Worldometers 2020). Over the years, there have been a growing body of academic literature on Nigerian migration patterns (Adepoju 2007; de

Figure 3.1 Map of Nigeria. Source: Author.

36  Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu Haas 2008; Malakooti 2016; Adeniyi 2019; Kari, Malasowe and Collins 2018; Ikuteyijo 2020). This is largely because Nigeria plays a major role in African migration and has been actively involved in both intra-​African and international migration since the pre-​colonial era wherein migration was linked to warfare and slave trade. During the colonial period, Nigerians’ inter-​Africa migratory journey was largely driven by the pursuit for higher education and labour in the United Kingdom (IOM 2017b). In the post-​independence period, while a huge proportion of Nigerians still travelled abroad for higher education, an increasing number of them migrated abroad for economic reasons (IOM 2017b). During the 1970s, the oil boom and rising incomes also made Nigeria a destination country for West African labour migrants. However, the decrease in oil prices, economic decline and political repression led to a downturn in migratory flow to Nigeria (De Haas 2006; Adejumoke, Ikwuyatum and Abejide 2008; Mberu and Pongou 2010). Hence, in the post-​1980s, Nigeria experienced a reverse migration shift, changing itself from an immigration country to an emigration country as a large number of Nigerians emigrated to other African countries like Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, Botswana and South Africa (Adepoju 2000 cf. De Haas 2006: 4). Nigerians also migrated to other countries in the Global North such as United Kingdom, the United States of America, Spain, Italy etc. In the 1990s, Italy, Ireland and Spain became the dominant destination countries for most West African and Nigerian migrants. However, the increase in visa and immigration restriction policy in Europe and North America altered the regular migratory flow, driving low-​skilled Nigerian and African migrants to migrate via the irregular route through the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea (Black et al. 2004: 9). In Africa, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Nigeria are often seen as the central departure countries (Obi, Bartolini and D’Haese 2019). Furthermore, in recent times, Nigerians make up one of the largest population of migrants from Africa to countries in the Global North, including Italy and also acts as a source, transit and destination country especially when it comes to irregular migration, particularly human trafficking and smuggling (IOM 2017b). There are three main migratory paths that criss-​cross the Mediterranean Sea from Africa to Europe:  the Eastern Mediterranean (into Greece), the Western Mediterranean (into Spain) and the Central Mediterranean (into Malta and Italy) (Reitano, Adal and Shaw 2014). The overwhelming majority of these trafficked victims and irregular migrants make their journey through the overland routes from Edo state (particularly Benin City) and Delta state to Kano before they are smuggled to Agadez in Niger Republic or Algeria and through the Sahara Desert to Libya and to Italy via the Central Mediterranean route. Since 2014, over 600,000 African migrants have arrived in Italy via the dangerous Central Mediterranean route, with nearly 120,000 arrivals in 2017 (Kirwin and Anderson 2018; Adeniyi 2019).

Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary  37

Benin City and irregular migration From the preceding discussion, it is clear that a majority of Nigerian irregular migrants make their journey mainly from Benin City before they are smuggled to Agadez. This section interrogates irregular migration in Benin City and the push–​pull factors driving irregular migration in the state. Benin City (Figure 3.2) is often labelled as the corridor to Europe, because of the smuggling network that has become intertwined in the region (Aiya 2018; Adeniyi 2019; IOM 2019). The findings from unstructured interviews in Benin City reveal that there is a general belief in Nigeria that once one makes their way to Benin, they will surely find contact to get them to Europe or Libya because of the large smuggling industry in the region. Hence, potential migrants move from various parts of Nigeria to Benin before proceeding on their journey to Europe. This confirms the observation by Adeniyi (2019) that there is hardly any house in Benin City that does not have family members involved or associated with the rising wave of irregular migration in Europe either as traffickers or victims of trafficking. Over 50 per cent of all Nigerian migrants in Europe come from Benin City, which is the sixth largest city in Nigeria with a population of over one million people (Worldometers 2020). It should however be stated that

Figure 3.2 Map of Benin City. Source: Author.

38  Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu most of the migrants claiming Edo state as their place of origin are in fact not indigenes to the state but were only residents in the state as at the time of their transit from Nigeria. Some of them are Yorubas, Ibos, Itsekiris, Ijaws, Urhobos and Middle Belts and from other parts of Nigeria (Interview with Efosa, Benin City, 2020). Thus, Benin City acts as a transit point for irregular migrants within Nigeria. The Bini people have a long history of international relationship with the Europeans dating back to the pre-​colonial times. As early as 1472 AD , the Bini people has established contact with Portuguese missionaries and by the mid-​nineteenth century, they had already established trading and diplomatic relations with the Portuguese traders and ambassadors (Ediagbonya 2015). They were also the first set of people in Nigeria to experience western education, Christianity and even the western mode of dressing (Amzat 2020). Benin migratory journey to Europe dates back to the 1980s when Italian businesses were established in Edo State. During this period, some of these Italian traders got married to Bini women who moved back to Italy with their husbands where they began conducting businesses in the jewellery, textile and leader industry. Often legally, these groups of women brought other women from Edo State to Italy because of Italy’s high demand for low-​skilled labour in services and agriculture. The sinking oil prices towards the tail end of the 1980s led to the collapse of the Nigerian economy, bankrupting most of these businesswomen (De Haas 2008; Adeniyi 2019). Furthermore, most of the Nigerian women working in the agricultural sector in Europe lost their jobs to eastern European labourers and found themselves in financial difficulties, pushing them to seek prostitution as a way of making ends meet. This shift from legitimate businesses to prostitution however proved to be very rewarding as within a short space of time, they were able to make more than they did while picking tomatoes or buying and selling commodities. Thus, these early women migrants moved into the sex industry and began a chain of recruitment of family members and friends from home. This is largely because on their return to Nigeria in the 1990s with so much amassed wealth, these women called “talos”2 or “Italian mammas” became a point of reference for other families back home, a situation that researchers have termed as the “cumulative causation theory,” in which every prosperous migrant results in more people from their society wishing to migrate (Adeniyi 2019; Vermelun 2019). With their status as role models of success within their community, it became relatively easy for them to return to Benin City and its hinterlands to recruit young girls with the promise of a better life in Europe. The success stories from this “talos” coupled with the display of wealth through the purchase of large houses, big vehicles and lands helped to strengthen the outlook of migration (and its accompanying effects) as a strategy for livelihood for these migrants (Interview with Obehi, Benin City, 2020). In recent times, people from Edo state have become one of the most trafficked through destination in Nigeria. IOM (2019) reports that 94 per

Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary  39 cent of all Nigerian women trafficked to Europe for prostitution hail from Edo state, with endemic local government areas including, Ikpoba-​okha, Oredo, Egor, Etsako-​West, Ovia Southwest, Uhunmwonde, Ovia North-​East, Orhionmwon (Adeniyi 2019). Furthermore, findings from unstructured interview in Benin City suggest that Ikpoba Okha and Oredo are the major centres of the smuggling and trafficking industry and are also the melting ground for people seeking irregular movement to Europe (Interview with Osaretin, Benin City, 2020).

The push–​pull drivers of Bini irregular migration to Italy This section explores the causal factors promoting irregular migration to Europe particularly within the context of Benin City. All over the world, a person’s decision to embark on regular or irregular migration is often spurred by certain socio-​economic, political and environmental factors which have been grouped as the push and pull factors of migration. The push factors are those circumstances or factors that force people to leave their country of origin to other countries for temporary or permanent settlement (Aiya 2018). The push factors that spur irregular migration in Edo state include but are not limited to economic considerations, religious factors, the patriarchal structure of Benin society, family pressure to mention but a few (Interview with Osato, Benin City, 2020). Nigeria has one of the largest and fastest population growths but despite the economic growth and gains recorded in Nigeria, it has failed to translate to sustainable livelihoods for a majority of the population. A recent estimate by the United Nations shows that almost half of the population of Nigeria, constituting about eighty-​seven million people, are living below $1.90 per day (Ikuteyijo 2020). The rising rate of unemployment and the scarcity of sustainable jobs therefore constitute some of the major push factors driving people to migrate from Benin City to Europe. Youth unemployment in Nigeria is particularly high at 36.50 per cent in 2018 (Ikuteyijo 2020). Other economic conditions include low salaries, poverty, harsh economic reality, scarce employment opportunities, low per capital income in relation to their country of destination. A  large majority of the respondents assert that the need to enhance their wellbeing and improve their poor economic condition constitute one of the major push factors (Interview with Efe and Isoken, Benin City, 2020). A major socio-​cultural reason for the increase in irregular migration especially among women in Benin City is the patriarchal nature of the society in which women are regarded as being lesser than their male counterparts (Adeniyi 2019). They have fewer opportunities especially in terms of access to education, inheritance laws. They are also victims of certain traditions such as female genital mutilation, child marriages and widowhood rites. Migration is thus seen by most of these women as a way to escape their harsh social reality and make a name for themselves within the society (Interview with Osato,

40  Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu Benin City, 2020). Interviews in Benin City also revealed that remittances gotten from irregular migration have been used by some of these women migrants to build houses and acquire properties in their own right and have also begun to have a say in the decision-​making process in their households (Interview with Esohe, Benin City, 2020). This feeling of empowerment has further inspired other women to risk their life to migrate to Europe with the belief that life in Europe offers greater chances for them. Families play an active role as a push factor driving irregular migration from Benin City to Italy, including funding the journeys, organising rituals and prayers for protections, making connections with people smugglers as well as even convincing sceptical migrants of the benefits (Adeniyi 2019; Interview with Efosa, Benin City, 2020). Irrespective of whether migration has been a previous desire, family members are quick to point to the relative gains of the migratory project as a way to alleviate their financial woes. Parents particularly, in rural parts and increasingly urban parts of Benin, put pressure on their children especially female ones to migrate irregularly so as to meet family needs (Ogbuze 2019). Migration is seen as a family project wherein family members contributed their physical, spiritual and financial resource to ensure that their relatives make the journey to Europe. Findings also show that some parents even sell their houses and take loans to ensure that they have the financial resource to aid their children in their journey to Europe with the hope that when they get there, the remittances that they will receive will make up for the sacrifices that they made (Interview with Aigbokhai, Benin City, 2020). Social push factors also include limited access to education especially for women, discrimination, decline in family and cultural values, greed and the quest for quick wealth to boost family prestige and status, high level of illiteracy especially among the women due to the patriarchal nature of Edo/​Benin society, unrealistic dreams of an exciting life in Europe, misleading information and ignorance about the harsh reality of life for irregular migrants in Europe. Findings from respondents also reveal that a large percentage of migrants in Benin City particularly those in urban areas are aware of human trafficking but still embark on the journey because they see no opportunity for positive economic growth in Nigeria (Interview with Aigbokhai, Benin City, 2020). Fetishism and the traditional belief in witchcraft, deities, oath taking and charm constitute one of the major religious push factors driving irregular migration in Benin City. Findings reveal that after recruitment, most traffickers use juju rituals and charms to impose obedience and devotion from victims (Interview with Osaretin, Benin City, 2020). They suggest that traffickers use this religious tradition to maintain a strong psychological and spiritual hold on these victims and their families, threatening them with the death of their loved ones if they renege on the deal or reveal the identity of the traffickers to other people. The findings suggest that economic drivers surpass all other push factors especially within the context of Benin City. The pull factors on the other hand are factors elsewhere that attract migrants (Aiya 2018). They include the economic opportunities and labour

Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary  41 market situations available in countries of destination. For Bini people, one of the reasons why Italy is regarded as a destination of choice has to do with the presence of a large Nigerian network base. Most of the respondents assert that they chose Italy as their destination country because they have a strong kinship network of friends and family members who they feel can help them settle down easily when they arrive in Italy and also help them in finding suitable employment. One of the respondents, Aigbokhai, asserted that if he found his way to Italy, there was no way he would be stranded because he has many people in their neighbourhood that have gone before him so he will just “control3” them to make a way for him (Interview with Aigbokhai, Benin City, 2020). Another reason why Bini migrants prefer Italy and Southern Europe is because of Europe’s close proximity to the coast of North Africa. While making the decision to migrate irregularly, most migrants prefer starting from Italy because of its nearness to the Mediterranean Sea. Some of these migrants do not however regard Italy as their final destination but see it as a gateway in their search for greener pastures. According to the hairdresser (Favour) in a salon I visited in Benin, me I nor go like stay Italy o because people go just think say na ashawo4 I dey do for that side. If I fit don manage reach there, na for me to find my way go another cool country, na just say na Italy most of the control5 when I know dey so na there I go start from if I wan travel. (Interview with Favour, Benin City, 2020) The perceived availability of better jobs, the demand for cheap low-​skilled labour in the European service industry, better economic conditions in destination countries like Italy, improved standard of living, superior social system and infrastructure in terms of education, healthcare, well-​organised economic system, greater security and opportunity are also some of the pull factors driving Bini irregular migrants to Italy. The respondents saw good jobs, better salaries and better opportunities in life as the pulling factors stirring them towards Italy especially because of a lack of hope for a future in Nigeria (Interview with Obehi, Benin City, 2020). Other pull factors include the presence of a tolerant society, respect for human rights, women’s rights and human dignity etc. All of these push–​pull factors coupled with the success stories from other Nigerian/​Benin irregular migrants and the distorted information on the reality of life for irregular migrants have made Europe and Italy the country of destination for most of these irregular migrants.

Consequences of irregular migration International migrations have a significant impact on local livelihoods and international economies largely through remittances sent back home (Mercandalli and Nshimbi 2016; Moyo and Nicolau 2016; Mercandalli et al. 2017). When properly managed with appropriate policies, migration has the

42  Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu capacity to contribute positively to inclusive growth and sustainable development in both the countries of origin and destination. Nigeria is one of the top ten African countries receiving remittances from international migration (IOM 2019). Despite the positive benefits of migration, irregular migration has several negative implications on both the migrants and the countries of origin, transit and destination. For example, between January and December 2019, about 123,700 migrants and refugees arrived in Europe through the three Mediterranean Sea routes from North Africa and Turkey, with almost 1,336 people declared dead or missing at sea (UNHCR 2019). The activities of irregular migrants have also had negative consequences on the economy, human resource and capacity development (brain-​drain) of the country of origin especially due to the reduction in the youth population since they constitute the majority of those being trafficked. It has also impacted the mortality rate of the population due to the high rate of Nigerian population lost in sea or dead during trafficking. In February 2020, the EU Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms Virginie Battu-​Henriksson, stated that the European Union may impose tougher and restrictive visa implementation rules on Nigeria if the country fails to meet its standards or if Nigeria fails to cooperate in the readmission of deported Nigerian nationals from EU member states (Famuyiwa 2020). According to Battu-​Henriksson, Nigerians are among the top ten nationals staying irregularly in the EU. She also bemoaned that Nigeria has an active criminal network in Europe and is also the major non-​EU country of origin for victims of trafficking registered in the EU (Famuyiwa 2020). The activities of some irregular migrants can therefore lead to strained relationship with receiving countries which may affect the regularisation of visas for Nigerians in the EU and may also make it difficult for intending migrants to secure visa for legal entry into the EU.

Response mechanisms to irregular migration in Benin City As a result of the human development consequences of irregular migration, several legislative frameworks and policy measures have been put in place worldwide to curb irregular migratory flow. For example, four of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)-​SDG 5 on Gender Equality, 8 on Decent Work, 10 on Reduced Inequalities and SDG 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions are of particular relevance in the endeavour to prevent and combat all forms of irregular migration (Solomon and Sheldon 2019). To reduce the flow of forced migration and human trafficking, the Nigerian National Assembly enacted the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act in July 2003. The Nigerian Trafficking Act updated in 2005 established the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP) in 2005 to combat human trafficking. In 2015, the Nigerian government also enacted into law the Violence Against Persons Prohibition (VAPP) Act, 2015.

Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary  43 Edo State, particularly Benin City, has gained notoriety for irregular migration in Nigeria. Estimated data gathered from the IOM under the Joint Initiative of the EU-​IOM reveal that 50 per cent of returnee migrants from Europe under their initiative come from Edo State (Olukoya 2020). In Edo State, efforts to curb irregular migration have been made by individuals, the Edo state government, members of the civil society and international organisations such as the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), the Edo State Agency against Human Trafficking and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP). These efforts have included the support of policy measures, community-​based initiatives and the organisation of safe migration awareness campaigns to educate the public on the dangers of human trafficking and forced migratory practices (Obi, Bartolini and D’Haese 2019). The Nigerian and Edo state governments have also signed several anti-​ trafficking bills and laws with other countries. In 1999, Mrs Eki Igbinedion created the Idia Renaissance, as a centre for spreading awareness on the dangers of trafficking and providing rehabilitation for victims of trafficking. In 2017, the governor of Edo State, Godwin Obaseki, created the Edo State Task Force on Human Trafficking (ETAHT). Several non-​governmental organisations such as the Idia renaissance, the Initiative for Youth Awareness on Migration, Development and Reintegration (IYAMIDR) and the Committee for the Support of Dignity of Women (COSUDOW), CARITAS Nigeria have been supporting initiatives geared towards empowering returned migrants from Europe and Libya (Houttuin and Haaij 2018). COSUDOW, for example, is a non-​governmental organisation that provides shelter for women that have returned from prostitution in Europe or Libya especially those rejected by their families. In February 2019, the Edo State Government, Mr Godwin Obaseki, signed into law the Violence Against Persons Prohibition (VAPP) bill to address all forms of gender-​based violence and protect the vulnerable members of the society. The government and relevant stakeholders have also adopted different preventive measures against forced migration and human trafficking, including the use of sports, and the prosecution of syndicates by the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), and the interfaith network against human trafficking and sexual exploitation. International and local responses coordinated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in collaboration with the Nigerian government since 2017 have been repatriation of stranded migrants in Libya. The European Union has also tried to reduce the flow of irregular migration from Nigeria to Europe. For example, through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Nigeria received about 15.5  million Euros to reintegrate returned migrants (Houttuin and Haaij 2018). Despite the efforts and achievements of some of these organisations and some of the successes recorded, irregular migration flow is still prevalent in Nigeria and Benin City. Any suggestion for the eradication of human trafficking and forced migration must therefore consider the

44  Efetobor Stephanie Effevottu strengths and weaknesses of the existing policies and legislative frameworks in Edo State.

Conclusion and recommendations The purpose of the chapter was to analyse the causative factors triggering Nigerian young men and women to risk their lives to cross to Italy via the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea. The findings from the study reveal that a large percentage of African international migration occurs within the African continent. The chapter has also shown that irregular migration of Nigerians and the Bini people in particular to Italy is generally tied to their quest for survival, greener pastures and better lives for themselves and their families, which they feel is attainable once they make their way to Italy and Europe. In light of the difficult economic reality in Nigeria, irregular migration has become inescapable for most families. To lessen and help curb the upsurge of irregular migration in Nigeria, the chapter makes the following recommendations: The Nigerian government needs to be more responsible towards its citizens by creating empowerment opportunities for them. In the 1980s, Nigeria used to be a country that people come to in search of greener pastures but today, the reverse is the case as the lack of opportunities and limited employment continue to force young people to seek alternatives elsewhere. The Nigerian government should therefore make effort to address some of the key drivers of irregular migration such as youth unemployment and poverty by creating an enabling economic environment that young people will find attractive in terms of industrial development, job creation and employment opportunities. There should be an increase in information and awareness campaigns via various communication channels such as mass media, social media and informal gatherings to enlighten the public on the dangers of irregular migration and the reality of life for irregular migrants in countries of destination. Additionally, efforts at sensitising people on the dangers of irregular migration should begin from the family unit because the deep support from family members plays a major role in increasing irregular migration trend. For effective border management, the government should improve the capacity of border security agencies such as the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) by ensuring that they are adequately trained, motivated and provided with the necessary equipment that they need to carry out their mandate. There should also be collaboration between the various Nigerian border management agencies to ensure that they can work together to protect the border from internal and external threats. Border communities should also be included in the border management process because these communities usually possess better knowledge of the environment and people. Furthermore, there should be more coordinated and collaborated effort and partnership between the government,

Unravelling the Nigerian irregular migration quandary  45 non-​ governmental organisations and other members of the civil society committed to curbing irregular migration, particularly human trafficking and migrant smuggling in Edo State and Nigeria.

Notes 1 The term “Bini” is an alternative name for the ethnic group Benin/​Edo in present day Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria. Benin City is also the capital of Edo State. 2 The term “Talos/​Italian Mamma” is used to refer to women that returned from Italy in the 1990s. 3 Control in Nigerian slang means to contact or give someone a call. 4 Ashawo is another name for prostitution. 5 Control in this sense means contacts.

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4  Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths An exploration of core drivers from the perspective and experiences of returnee migrants Samuel Kehinde Okunade Introduction Globally, the phenomenon of youth out migration has gained much attention due to the increase in the movement of young people across continents most especially from the Global South into the Global North. There is a wealth of literature on the phenomenon of youth out migration and its core drivers in Africa and in Nigeria precisely (Usher, 2005; Akinyemi and Ikuteyijo, 2009; Hammond, 2015; Ikuteyijo, 2020). These scholarly works have suggested that the drivers of this migration include war/​persecution and economic hardship, search for quality education, better infrastructure, social amenities and so on. In West Africa, Nigerians constitute the highest percentage of irregular migrants from the sub-​region who attempt to migrate to the Global North (Nwalutu, 2016; Ojeme, 2016; Ikuteyijo, 2020). A study by Ikuteyijo (2020) suggests that many Nigerian youths engaged in irregular migration because they thought that it was the only option through which they could access better life opportunities in other countries in the Global North. This study noted that many of such migrants were not always successful and hence the increase in the number of returnees in Nigeria. Literature has also shown that many migrants die in the Sahara Desert on their way to North Africa en route to Europe or drowned in the Mediterranean Sea (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2017 and 2020). In many North African countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, many migrants amongst which were Nigerian youths received ill-​treatment and lived in slave-​like conditions (De Haas, 2008; Hammond, 2015). InfoMigrants,1 an online platform which is accessible via different social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber, etc., provides information to migrants and intending migrants on the dangers and hassle involved in the various stages of irregular migration. So far, the platform consistently shares personal interviews on the experiences of various voluntary returnees from Europe as well as the plight of migrants in Europe. The stories of Issa who returned to Senegal in 20142 and Seny who returned in 20163 expressed their regret of leaving the abundance of their home country in search for a life that according to them does not exist in Europe for migrants. Again,

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  51 the experiences of some Nigerian returnees from Libya have been shared on the Internet and on various social media platforms.4 These stories reveal the horror and hardship migrants are subjected to en route the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean into Europe. Howbeit, these stories and the increase in the number of returnees do not seem to change the perception and resolve of many would-​be young irregular Nigerian migrants. As noted by Ikuteyijo (2020), if irregular migration is seen by these youths as the only means of survival and with the information available on the difficulties and hopeless situation that migrants face in the Sahara Desert, in Libya, on the Mediterranean and even in Europe, could it still be said that truly it has proven to be a means of survival as averred by the migrant returnees and intending migrants in Nigeria especially, when compared with the situation of the country? This therefore raises the question of what factors were exactly responsible for this drive when it was public knowledge that irregular migration to Europe was largely unsuccessful and/​or dangerous. It is in this light that this study aims to revisit the “push” factors and the experiences of the migrant returnees in relation to the current situation in Nigeria in a bid to understanding and identifying the underlying drivers for irregular migration among the Nigerian youths. Not until when the core factors are identified that pragmatic and workable ways of dissuading this emerging culture among the Nigerian youths can be proffered.

Research methodology A phenomenological research method was adopted utilising an instrumental case study research design, which targeted the population of Nigerian youth returnees from Libya. Twenty (20) returnees from Libya constituted the sample population in Benin City in Edo and Lagos States. These states were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, they were states that received a huge number of returnees from Libya and secondly, they were states I could easily access within the short period of time available for data collection. The respondents were within the age bracket of 27–​35 years and hail from states such as Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Delta and Edo. Out of the eight respondents interviewed in Lagos, six (6) were males while two (2) were females. In terms of educational qualification, five (5)  were university graduates, one (1)  a National Diploma Holder and two (2) university drop outs. In Benin City, out of the twelve (12) interviewed, eight (8) were males, and four (4) were females. According to their academic qualification, two (2) were University graduates, one (1) a Higher National Diploma holder, four (4) were holders of National Diploma (ND), two (2) were university drop outs and three (3) were School Leaving Certificate holders. According to the returnees, their journeys were facilitated by friends and family members who linked them up with migrant smugglers. For all of them, their journeys to Libya kicked off from Kano State in Nigeria and it lasted between 8–​15 days. This shows that this is an established route through which irregular migration takes place.

52  Samuel Kehinde Okunade The face-​to-​face structured interviews were conducted in December 2019 and each lasted up to an hour. Given the fact that deportation is considered a shameful experience in southwest Nigeria, returnees are reluctant to share their stories. To address this issue, snowball sampling was employed in Lagos State, with the participants assured of confidentiality and anonymity. In Edo State, I worked directly with a non-​governmental organisation (NGO), Patriotic Citizens Initiative (PCI), whose founder is a returnee who aims to rehabilitate others in the same situation. The interviews with the participants focused on the main reasons that prompted them to migrate and their experiences in the Sahara, in Libya, and during their various attempts to cross the Mediterranean. The participants granted informed consent and they were assured of their right to withdraw from the study at any point. Useful secondary sources of data included scholarly articles and books, and a documentary by Ross Kemp that provides first-​hand accounts of the plight of failed migrants trapped in Libya. The data were thematically analysed. Pseudonyms were assigned to the participants and their statements are paraphrased for clarity and cohesion.

Theoretical underpinning Irregular migration occurs outside the guiding rules of the origin, transit and destination countries. Migrants are classified as irregular on the basis of three reasons. First, are those who arrive undocumented and continue to stay illegally in a country, second, are those who gained entry into a country based on the valid visas that they hold which could be tourist or students visas and then overstay the validity of the visa, third, are asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected and have not exited the country as required by the law (Ikuteyijo, 2013). People found engaging in irregular migration are liable to various forms of punishments ranging from imprisonment to deportation (Ikuteyijo, 2013). The focus of this chapter is on the first category, involving migrants who embarked on a journey to Europe but never made it. However, they succeeded in entering many African States most especially Libya from where they were supposed to transit into Europe via the Mediterranean. As established in the discussion section, such irregular migrants spent a fortune in a bid to enter Europe indicating that irregular migration is more expensive with greater risk. The current move for securitisation and militarisation of the borders by various countries has worsened this scenario (Hammond, 2015; Ikuteyijo, 2020). And as a result, those involved in this act are always in search of ways to evade security agents for easy passage (Davitti and Ursu, 2018). This would sure cost more. This calls for a deeper study for a holistic analysis in identifying the core drivers of migration as against what is widely known. This is what this study aims to achieve most importantly within the Nigerian context.

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  53 Therefore, in a bid to identifying the core “push” factors responsible for irregular migration in Nigeria, three key theories were adopted. They are the “push–​pull” theory of migration, the state fragility theory and the anomie theory. While the “push–​pull” theory of migration assisted in highlighting the “push” factors as averred by migrant returnees as drivers for irregular migration, the state fragility theory holistically revealed the prevailing state of the Nigerian system that has given room for this drive in the youths and lastly, the anomie theory was adopted to explain the impact the current Nigeria’s state has made on the state of mind of an average Nigerian youth thus forming their opinion towards irregular migration. “Push–​pull” theory of migration attempts to draw on sociological principles aimed at formalising a migration theory that would detail the factors that could explain the migration flow between countries of origin and destination (Lee, 1966). The “push–​pull” migration theory posits that migration occurs because of the economic and socio-​political factors present in both the sending and destination countries (King, 2012; Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015). According to Aronowitz (2009) and King (2012), “push” factors are those factors that drive people out of their home countries, and such factors include abject poverty, high level of unemployment, political suppression, internal conflicts leading to widespread violence, and grave violations of human rights. Some of these factors resonated with the responses of the migrant returnees as shown in the succeeding section. But it is important to examine the full meaning of these factors using the lens of state fragility theory. State fragility theory helps explain the existing conditions in Nigeria which gives room for some of the “push” factors mentioned above. Proponents of the state fragility theory, Vallings and Moreto-​Torres (2005) and Kaplan (2014) note that its central assumptions are a weak and ineffective central government with little practical control over much of its territory; non-​ provision of public services; widespread corruption and criminality; and refugees and involuntary movement of populations (Cilliers and Cisk, 2013; Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD), 2014). Nigeria is one of the countries identified by the 2017 Fragile States Index as on high alert, using the indicators of demographic pressure; refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs); group grievances; human flight; uneven economic development; economic decline; state legitimacy; public services; human rights and the rule of law; security apparatus; factionalised elites and external intervention (FFP, 2017). Nigeria has experienced both military and civilian regimes with different policies and programmes. The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1985 did not only lead to a sharp decline in living conditions, but also triggered hatred for foreigners, especially Ghanaians, and increased migration of Nigerians (Adepoju, 2015; Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2018). Insecurity in the country and the government’s failure to tackle this menace has aggravated the situation. It has led to the displacement

54  Samuel Kehinde Okunade of people and humanitarian crises in the northeast region (Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2019). More importantly are the wide imbalances that exist within social institutions in Nigeria which could be a contributory factor to this drive among the youth. The disconnect between the family, the economy and the polity and high level of corruption among politicians are contributory factors (Dauda, 2017). This culture of greed has led to looting of public funds with impunity and the institutions responsible for probing such acts and prosecuting those found guilty are equally corrupt (Inokoba et al, 2011; Raimi, 2013; Aborisade and Fayemi, 2015; Punch, 2020). The corrupt stance of the public officials has therefore made the Nigerian state fail her citizens in terms of human development (Dauda, 2017). The government’s failure to provide basic infrastructure has taken its toll on the vast majority at the lowest level of society, therefore making them prone to deceit and falling victim to friends, family members and migrant smugglers who assure them of a better life as well as easy passage into Europe. To deepen the discourse further, anomie theory would assist in examining the impact of the fragility of the Nigerian state on the Nigerian youths generally and specifically as it concerns irregular migration. The anomie theory propounded by Robert K.  Merton was adopted to examine the conditions which the fragile nature of Nigeria has resulted into and to identify the factors leading to youth anti-​social behaviour (anomie) which could also be responsible for irregular migration in Nigeria. Merton posited that anomie or cultural breakdown occurs when strong emphasis is placed on success, particularly, monetary success without a corresponding emphasis on legally acceptable ways of achieving such goals (Merton 2010). This eventually leads to greed and the desire to acquire more. It tends to occur when the culture of a society pushes everyone to achieve lofty goals in a stratified environment where the proletariat has limited access to legitimate resources that guarantee success. The imbalances experienced between core social institutions such as the economy, the family and the polity play a significant role in generating anomie (Merton, 2010). While there is a dearth of literature on this subject in Nigeria, Alonge’s study in Ekiti state revealed that home background and the social value system contributed immensely to the youth’s involvement in social vices (Alonge, 2014) and the pursuit of monetary success by whatever means (Kehinde-​Awoyele and Jakayinoluwa, 2013) leading to a culture of greed. As noted earlier, corrupt politicians are left unchecked while they live an ostentatious life. Anti-​graft agencies saddled with the responsibility of checking them have been found to be corrupt themselves. So, what we have is a system that perhaps does not care about how monetary success is gotten. Igbanibo (2011) notes that rogues, fraudsters and criminals have been bestowed with chieftaincies and honorary awards in exchange for huge financial rewards in Nigeria without anyone questioning their sources of wealth. This situation has deteriorated to a point in which if one does not have money,

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  55 they are neither recognised in the society nor in the circle of friends. This has led to a drive for quick monetary gains which has pushed many youths into all forms of criminality such as cyber-​crime, kidnapping, fraud and armed robbery which are on the increase (Nwankwo and James, 2016; Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), 2020). It has also aroused the desires of many to emigrate through whichever means available to them with the belief that they would make quick money in Europe. As would be shown in the next section, this explains why many who are in the university drop out and discontinue the pursuit of a career for themselves, and those who are artisans are willing to dispose of their working tools at ridiculous prices just in a bid to raise money for such mission. In fact, some parents have also shown full support by selling their landed properties and at the very least, taking loans with interest so as to raise the needed funds for the journey to Europe via the Sahara Desert into Libya and across the Mediterranean. So, we could therefore say that irregular migration is one major way many Nigerian youths have decided to respond and adapt to the pursuit of monetary success by whatever means as noted by Kehinde-​Awoyele and Jakayinoluwa (2013). In the end, this migration does not always succeed, and this is the context within which this chapter explores the perspectives and lived experiences of Nigerian returnee irregular migrant youth.

Reasons for emigration and migrants’ experiences Nigerian returnees who decided to migrate via the Sahara Desert had many devastating stories to tell. This section examines their reasons for leaving Nigeria and their experiences from the start of their journeys to the point of entering Libya. The experiences of male and female migrants at the hands of Nigerian, Ghanaian and Libyan smugglers are investigated. It should be noted that the study participants recounted similar stories and only divergent experiences are cited for the purpose of discussion. It should also be noted that many of the respondents have low literacy levels; however, they were able to express themselves to the fullest. Push factors Returnees cited different reasons as “push” factors to take the risk to travel via Libya to Europe. These include poor economic conditions, influence from peers who had already made it to Europe, push and support from family, especially parents, convincing arguments on the part of agents and a state of insecurity. Economic reasons Firstly, many were pushed to take this decision due to the poor economic situation in the country. The average Nigerian currently lives below the poverty

56  Samuel Kehinde Okunade line (Ajodo-​Adebanjoko, 2014). Given the fact that many of the respondents were micro business owners, with a few studying at the same time, they found it difficult to meet their needs and those of their parents and siblings. According to Tunde who is a university graduate and ran a small mobile phone accessories shop, “I left because of poverty. My small business could not take care of my needs, my old parents and my new wife, so I thought the best thing to do was to leave for a better place so I can send money home” ( Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Tunde’s response resonates with those of others who were owners of small businesses such as hairdressing, fashion design, fabrication, interior decoration, trading, farming, fisheries, etc. and were not able to live comfortably on the proceeds of these ventures (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Those interviewed by Kemp in the Sahara also pointed to the poor economic situation in Nigeria. They noted that embarking on their journey was the sacrifice they had to make to enable their family to live a good life (Kemp, 2018). Pressure from peers and the desire to make more money In contrast, a few respondents in the same line of business stated that they lived well but wanted to migrate to Europe in order to earn more money. Some of the returnees who were small business owners, apprentices and university students noted that they left Nigeria to embark on a journey to Europe in the hopes of securing dream jobs that would pay well (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Many were influenced by friends who had succeeded in entering Europe and maintained contact via social media platforms. They were swept off their feet by the kind of lifestyle they could live in Europe. This was evident in the pictures they posted on Facebook and they encouraged their friends to join them. According to Rikewe, “I was told by my friend Aaron the good life he lives in Europe and how much I will be making in a month and how much I can send home monthly to start building a house for my mother. She is dead now because of the trouble I  put her through when I was in Libya” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Joy, an interior decorator, noted: “my friend in Italy told me to leave my business and come over to make good money. She always showed me her wardrobe with beautiful clothes and shoes whenever we do video chat. I was carried away” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). At this juncture, it is important to note that some female returnees revealed that women were trafficked for prostitution in Libya when they thought they were on their way to Europe. This is an interesting area that needs to be explored further. Push and support from family Support from parents and family members was a significant push factor for many of the returnees. In many communities and neighbourhoods, it was

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  57 a source of pride that their children would travel abroad, thus making it a kind of competition. For others it was a way of improving their siblings’ situation. Some also felt it was a form of investment. Tunde noted that, after school many of his colleagues received visas and are now scattered across the globe. According to him, his parents encouraged him to follow suit (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Chinwe commented: “As the first born with old parents it became my responsibility to take care of my younger ones. That was why I could not further my education and had to go start a small business. My father sold his only land so that I can travel to Europe to make plenty money that can take care of the family” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Saidat and others recounted how their family members assisted them in other ways. According to Saidat, “my brother in Ivory Coast called me to get ready to travel to Europe. After two weeks he sent a number to call. He told me he has paid for my journey and I should go meet the person in Kano. That was how the journey started. I  pity him because he paid all the money to the asma boys” ( Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Asked if she was angry with her brother she responded, “why will I be angry with a person that want good for me? It’s just bad that it ended like that” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). The role of human smugglers Returnees made their first moves through friends and family members by interacting with agents on how they would be assisted on their journey to Europe. These agents assured them of their quick and safe journey to Europe. Returnees were manipulated into paying large amounts. According to Ramota, she spent all her savings after working for a Chinese firm in Benin City for three years. “My agent told me that if I pay 600,000 naira, I will be the only person in the car and also given VIP treatment … In all I spent a million naira” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Another returnee revealed:  “I never heard of that route before. I  was deceived by someone who assured me of getting to Europe in two weeks. He gave me a number to call after meeting with him, I paid 500,000 naira for the journey” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Many returnees sold their tools and equipment to raise money to pay the agent and cash for the journey. According to Otega, “I was making good money before I  left, I  remember how I sold off my stuff cheap. It was a terrible mistake of my life” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Efe noted that he prepared for the journey without informing any of his family members except his wife. His wife insisted that he should inform them, but he declined. According to him, “I did not know the journey will end up like that. I wanted to get to Europe before I call any of my family member. Unfortunately, it did not work like that. I  had to call them in Libya for them to send me money several times when I was kidnapped by the Asma boys. I put my wife in a tough position before my family” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019).

58  Samuel Kehinde Okunade State of insecurity Many of the respondents no longer felt safe in Nigeria and cited Boko Haram insurgency in north-​eastern Nigeria as a major factor that motivated them to leave. This point is valid as a few northerners took the risk;5 however, it should be noted that the returnees interviewed in Nigeria were southerners. Migrants interviewed by Ross Kemp in the Sahara and Libya were also mostly southerners who claimed that Boko Haram had killed all their family members and burnt their houses, leaving them with no means of catering for their families (Kemp, 2018). There are several contradictions here. If all their family members were killed, who was left to support? Furthermore, the direct effect of the Boko Haram insurrection is being felt in north-​eastern Nigeria. By implication, southerners are not directly affected as they reside in the zones that northerners run to for protection. Ironically, the migrants were subjected to kidnapping, robbery and banditry during their journey to Libya, while in Libya and across the Mediterranean, the very crimes they claimed to have been escaping. The factors discussed above are the “push” factors that resonated in the responses of the returnees and as well conform to the “push” factors as identified by the “push–​pull” theory of migration. Factors such as the poor economic conditions which made survival difficult, the push and the support they got from family members and friends in terms of advice, monetary support and connection with smugglers, convincing utterances from migrant smugglers and the state of insecurity created by the Boko Haram insurgency were all contributing factors to the decision to embark on irregular migration. It is important to note that the major impact which the fragile nature of the Nigerian state and anomie have on the returnees, made them susceptible and a way of responding to the situation was to give in to the above-​mentioned “push” factors for irregular migration.

Experiences of migrants in Libya As against what returnees were told before starting the journey, returnees averred that it was not a pleasure ride all the way to Libya. Aside the fact that they were packed like luggage behind the Toyota Hilux (a brand of vehicle commonly used in conveying migrants through the Sahara Desert into the Maghreb region), they had to endure the long journey which lasted between 8 and 15 days as against 4–​6 days promised by the smugglers. Equally, they were exposed to various forms of hardship such as starvation, dehydration caused by lack of water and harsh weather condition in the Sahara Desert, extortion and dispossession of personal effects, torture on the part of the men and sexual abuse on the part of the women. With these inhumane acts, migrants were subjected to, not all who left Nigeria reached Libya alive. Many lost their lives in the Sahara Desert. For many of those who succeeded in getting to Libya, it was a life of chaos and regret as they had no peace and had to keep

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  59 running from one unknown place to another after their release from various detention camps and unsuccessful attempts to cross the Mediterranean. In short, what resonated in their responses was the fact that they were all treated as less than human. According to Racheal, after we entered Sabha, we were kidnapped and taken to prison from where our burger (the person in charge of their stay in Libya until the point of crossing) came to pay for us. After, the burger asked me to control money from home for my bail, my mum sent 300,000 naira and my burger said I should be ready for another crossing but I said no because I don’t want to go again. The man was angry with me and shouted at me. That night he took us for crossing. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) After several unsuccessful attempts to cross the Mediterranean, they were told they would be returned to Nigeria. The responses of many returnees depict that they were not willing to return to Nigeria in spite of the inhumane treatment they were subjected to by nature in the desert and by the smugglers beginning from when the journey started, while they were in the desert, and since they got to Libya. Several attempts had been made to cross the Mediterranean which were unsuccessful. In such attempts, many drowned and died and only a few were rescued to the seashore. Racheal recalled that, From there (the seashore), we were told that we will be returned to Nigeria and I said hey…me I cannot go back to that country oooo, I prefer to stay in Libya. I didn’t know that it was the asma boys (kidnappers) who took us from the seaside and they never want us to go back home because they wanted to make use of us to get money from the UN. Many people were dying in a camp of more than 4,000 people. Many women died during and following childbirth. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) James noted that: We spent two weeks in Sabha before they pushed us to Sabratha close to the sea. Overnight the policemen burst the camp and they arrested many people but some of us ran away. We started working and gathered money so we can go meet another pusher man (smuggler). One morning, I met a Libyan man who I went to work for. On our way back a vehicle blocked our vehicle. We started running, they shot at us, and we were both hit. My friend died. In the ghetto, a Libyan man took me to the seaside to go and treat my wound in Europe. Two days later policemen came and arrested all of us and I spent seven weeks in prison before I came back to Nigeria with the bullet wound. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019)

60  Samuel Kehinde Okunade According to Precious, on a Friday we arrived Libya (Sabratha). The following week on a Saturday, I was supposed to be on the boat, but they did not mention my name. I approached the pusher man and he said my burger has not paid for me. I called my burger, and he said he has paid, but he had not. He eventually paid the money and two weeks later there was another boat and we got to Libya, but told us to find our way. We were so weak that I had to rest. Then I start to run with a friend. A taxi was passing, and we stopped it. Before we knew it, the taxi man took us to the asma boys. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) Freeman recounted his ordeal: When I got to Libya, crossing was the biggest challenge. As a black guy you cannot move around freely. I spent six months in Libya before I was pushed (crossing the Mediterranean). I  was captured and taken to a trankee (hostage camp) run by the Arabo (Arab) people who tell you to get money from home. I stayed there for three months, during which time a guy was shot and they left his body in our room for two days. Some people had skin infections and they infected us. We were in the prison for another six months before we were deported. My mum died because of this problem. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) It was observed that a few of the returnees had chronic rashes all over their bodies, indicating the unwholesome conditions they were subjected to in the various camps. They were kept in overcrowded, poorly ventilated rooms, slept on bare floors, lacked ablution facilities and slept with the bodies of migrants shot by the asma boys. When Kemp (2018) visited one of the facilities in Tripoli, he found 490 migrants with only two toilets. Both sexes were subjected to various ordeals in the different camps. The males were beaten severely and constantly. According to Kemp (2018) one of the returnees said that “if we all open our bodies, you will see that these people have finished us. Is it bullet wounds? Is it gunshots? When we want to eat, they beat us, when we are going back inside after eating, they beat us. We were treated like slaves… No… it was more than slaves” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). According to Ohame, “you use what you have to get what you want. For us the men, if you don’t have money you will be beaten mercilessly, but for the girls, they sleep with them anyhow” (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). Virtually all the men stated that the women were subject to severe sexual abuse. Precious said: before we knew it they started touching our bombom, our breasts, saying all sort of words I started to shout I am pregnant, but they did not listen.

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  61 They took us to a house and dropped us inside the compound. At night fall, small boys with guns came, demanding sex. We had no choice. They did that every night for three days before they asked us to call our pusher man to come. My family sent me 200,000 naira, then another push. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) Many pregnant women lost their lives in the various camps. Kemp (2018) documented the horrific conditions in a women’s camp. A  Nigerian woman named Aisha was lying sick on the floor. She explained that she had given birth to a premature baby seven months before in the toilet without the help of medical personnel. She was assisted by her co-​migrants. In tears she said, “when I gave birth to my baby, my baby bled, was affected by diarrhoea, coughed, and died after one week. I can’t even walk anymore. I am dying” (Kemp, 2018). Such ill-​treatment was not only meted out by the Arabs, but by Nigerians and Ghanaians who run detention camps of their own and assist the Arabos in their various camps to coordinate the transfer of money from their victims’ home countries to Libya. Many Nigerian women also run brothels. According to Mirabel, while the Arab man was packing, his second in command who is a Ghanaian started doing balamiii (like an auction) for anyone who has 500,000… 700,000 naira as that is the only way we can leave the place. They locked those of us without money inside the building. The fence was very high. We escaped after some days and I was running with my friend and many others. They were shooting at us, but my friend and I took refuge in a small building. That night, we walked to the city. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) Lydia reported that: the Arab man then sold us to a Nigerian woman for 5,000 dinars (500,000 naira) to work as prostitutes. I had no choice. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) James stated: A Ghanaian came to bail me out with 900,000 naira and I was released and captured by Arabo people as well as some Nigerians and French-​ speaking people. Many of the camps are run by the Ghanaians with up to 50 people in the room. You stay there until your people at home are able to send money for your bail. (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019) One of the returnees noted that while they were in the detention camp, a Nigerian from the High Commission reported their complaints of ill

62  Samuel Kehinde Okunade treatment by the Libyans coordinating the camps to them and when he left, they were beaten to a pulp. He added that he and his colleagues were willing to strangle him and go to jail should he accompany them to Nigeria (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). This section examines the traumatising experience of the returnees while on the journey, in Libya and several attempts to cross the Mediterranean. Of course, the moment the journey started, migrants lost their basic right and had to just accept whatever situation they were presented with. They could no longer relate with the movers who had suddenly turned mean and behaved in like manner. It was noted by a respondent how a male was shut after requesting the driver to stop so they could attend to his girlfriend who was passing out. One important point to note is that despite the ill treatment received at various points, many were willing to endure the pain in the desert, and in Libya as they saw it as the sacrifice they had to pay until they would be lucky to cross the Mediterranean into Europe which is the “dream land.” It was more of a “mission of no return” for them. This was the experience of many returnees as they consistently fall into the hands of the asma boys who continually tortured them, sexually abused them and made them demand huge sum of money from their family members and loved ones back home in Nigeria. In the process, many lives were lost as they got to a point when they had exhausted every available option and had no one to send them money anymore from home.

Core “push” factors responsible for irregular migration in Nigeria From the foregoing, what core factors could then be deduced from the experiences of the migrant returnees to be the reasons for this culture among the Nigerian youth? Notably, the highly fragile nature of the Nigerian state makes it difficult for most Nigerians to live a decent life6. Public sector workers are not paid for months7 and unemployment rates are very high among the youth8. Many Nigerians have lost hope that the current regime will be any better than the previous one. Together, these factors have led to a situation where many have resorted to extorting money from parents and young people that are desperate to seek opportunities in Europe (Ikuteyijo, 2013). The study’s findings suggest that disinformation and greed are fuelling the massive irregular emigration of youth from Nigeria. Disinformation Many young people rely on information from friends and family members who have succeeded in entering Europe or who have close relatives who have succeeded but do not tell them what kind of life they live, the jobs that they do and the life that awaits those who intend to come. As Flahaux and De Haas (2016) put it, they are presented with information on the European “El Dorado” that awaits them. As noted in preceding section, the returnees

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  63 were already in a position where they were prone to accepting any offer which tends to take them out of their current situation and as such in their naivety, they fall for such push as identified earlier. While scholars and columnists have recounted the pain and agony of many Nigerians who have succeeded in leaving the shores of Nigeria, it would appear that these are ignored by Nigerian youth. A case in point is Joseph Ugboulo who narrated his ordeal abroad: It is so pathetic how Nigerians are being lumped together by foreign hosts as people without a future, and or direction. Here in South Korea, my fate is hanging, and I have no future. We are about seven Africans sharing an apartment that could barely accommodate three persons comfortably, and if you feel so disturbed, someone waiting would gladly take your position and you will be thrown out on the street. The conditions of many of us in South Korea aptly capture the pathetic condition back home in Nigeria as a good number of us would rather die than come back to Nigeria as a nobody. (Vanguard, 2014) Joseph’s sentiments resonate with those of some of the migrants interviewed by Kemp in the detention facilities in Libya. Migrants recalled in tears how they left their countries with the hopes of never returning, only to return home without nothing to fall back on (Kemp, 2018). The youth are also influenced by middlemen/​agents who promise them smooth transit to Europe and a better life when they reach their destination. As a result, they sell personal property to raise the funds demanded. This validates the assertion of Flahaux and De Haas (2016) on the role access to information and networks plays vis-​ à-​vis irregular migration and would continue to play. The government’s failure to properly serve its people, as well as the luxurious lives lived by politicians, encourages migration in search of a better life for themselves as well as their families back home as they hope to send remittances. Many parents have lost all hope and will even sell their property to enable their children to leave. Greed Many young migrants are pressured by friends, family members and society itself to seek greener pastures. Two major factors could explain this. The first is the mindset that success can only be achieved by leaving the country. Secondly, wealth accumulation by any means has become an acceptable norm, especially given politicians’ excesses and anti-​ corruption agencies’ failure to prosecute them. In their testimonies, to raise the needed funds for the journey, many who were artisans sold off their equipment, some individual and parents sold off their landed property, while others took a loan with interest putting them in perpetual debt (Interview with returnee migrant,

64  Samuel Kehinde Okunade 13 December 2019). Upon return to Nigeria, the returnees were stigmatised by both family members and society, especially because they did not return with money. Many said that they felt like returning immediately while others were ready to endure the treatment they received. According to Gloria, “their suffering is worsened by families who blamed them for the abuses, ostracized them, or complained that they returned without money.”9 If they are not reintegrated into society, returnees might feel inclined to make further efforts to leave the country. In addition, some migrants interviewed by Kemp in the Sahara Desert who were southerners claimed to have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. They noted that their properties have been destroyed by the insurgents and family members killed in the process and as such, they are left with no option than to leave for a greener pasture. This assertion is not true. Though, there were some returnees from the north, majority of the migrants are southerners (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019). This finding conforms with De Haas (2007)’s assertion which noted there tends to be an increase in migration in more developed spaces than in the poorly developed spaces. The southern region of Nigeria being more developed than the northern region, explains why it experiences a high level of migration. The two factors discussed as core “push” factors which are disinformation and greed have been identified to be the major underlying factors responsible for the drive in the Nigerian youths towards irregular migration. The fragile nature of the Nigerian state leading to anomie has facilitated the popularity of this phenomenon in Nigeria. Unfortunately it seems like this situation is far from ending based on the expressions from some of the returnees. Many of the males noted that they are still in touch with some of the smugglers and friends in Libya who keep persuading them to come over as the situation en route Libya and in Libya has improved. As for the ladies, they totally condemn the act; however, one of them noted that she has been in touch with a smuggler who promised her of a safe and smooth journey back to Libya. There is a danger in this as there is a tendency of them being pressured into this act again. Many factors could cause this. The returnees who still have a feeling that their mission has not been successful coupled with the rejection by the society as pointed out by Gloria, Loveth and others10 could come to a point in which they feel they have nothing to lose any more if they try a second time. This thus depicts irregular migration as an unending phenomenon in Nigeria.

Concluding remarks Through an examination of the experiences of returnee migrants from Libya, in various detention centres, and in the Sahara Desert, and the current state of affairs in Nigeria, this chapter explored the core factors responsible for

Irregular emigration of Nigeria youths  65 the massive migration of Nigerian youth with the desire of settling in Europe especially via the dangerous routes. The perceptions of the returnees indicate that they hold a mind-​set that they can only live a good life in Europe and as a result, travelling through the Sahara Desert is a sacrifice they have to pay to realise their dreams. This mind-​set was formed based on several factors which include push from the society, pressure from friends and family members, the desire to make more money and the role that migrant smugglers play. Therefore, it could be said that beyond the general push factors identified by various authors which all tends towards survival strategy, the accounts of young returnees from Libya show that disinformation and greed are the core factors responsible for their decision to embark on this journey. These factors emanate from both the fragile nature of the Nigerian state and which seems to be fast becoming a new accepted societal norm of wealth accumulation by any means if not curtailed. Surprisingly, this drive in the youth has suddenly changed what used to be the status quo i.e. the movement of Nigerian youth into neighbouring states for economic reasons. The fact that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement allows community citizens to move freely and reside in member states opens community citizens to opportunities for economic engagement and activities within the sub-​region but rather, the Nigerian youth prefer to take the risk of embarking on the dangerous journey clearly known to them. This chapter has demonstrated that the risks associated with irregular migration make the adventure worthless and as such irregular migration, especially among the youth, should be discouraged by all parties concerned. While the Nigerian economy is in a shamble, African states with viable economies where Nigerians migrate are beginning to witness a decline, which causes xenophobic tendencies towards fellow Africans that they once welcomed and lived with such as Libya. To address this situation, awareness programs should be intensified to educate the youth who are potential migrants across the country. Returnees could assist by sharing their stories. Organisations like the PCI are actively facilitating such interaction and the government needs to be part of this initiative. Secondly, it is high time African states fiercely resist the dominance of the superpowers and end the stranglehold of imperialism in Africa. The long existing system which allows the transfer of Africa’s wealth through the Illicit Financial Flows (IFF) by African leaders into the developed countries especially Europe should stop. All that is needed for this culture to stop is having leaders with strong political will, who would show commitment to such course. As noted in the Thabo Mbeki’s Report on addressing Illicit Financial Flows (IFF)11 in Africa, all parties and loopholes through which IFF is being carried out were identified. What is left is the cooperation of all parties involved such as African governments, US government agencies, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the secretariat of the United Nations, member states of the United States, the World Bank, to mention a few in curbing this

66  Samuel Kehinde Okunade menace. Doing so would assist the continent in achieving the desired development as her enormous human and natural resources could be put to full use within the continent. This would enable Africa to be a place where Africans can live and actualise their dreams thereby making intra-​African migration worthwhile. This chapter ends with the advice offered by one of the female returnees when she disembarked from the aircraft. According to her, one does not value the freedom that one enjoys in one’s own country until one loses it in another country far from home. She advised the youth to avoid irregular migration, feed on the little available to them and grow the micro businesses that they run. As for her, she was ready to go back to the farm and start small (Interview with returnee migrant, 13 December 2019).

Notes 1 www.infomigrants.net/​en/​ 2 www.infomigrants.net/​en/​post/​17043/​what-​i-​went-​to-​europe-​to-​find-​i-​already-​ had-​at-​home 3 www.infomigrants.net/​en/​post/​7012/​seny-​returns-​from-​italy-​to-​senegal-​to-​fight-​ migration 4 www.voanews.com/​africa/​nigerian-​migrants-​return-​libya-​tales-​horror 5 www.infomigrants.net/​en/​post/​19561/​returnees-​struggle-​to-​adjust-​to-​life-​in-​nigeria 6 https://​globalvoices.org/​2020/​01/​21/​nigeria-​a-​failed-​state-​reality-​or-​perception/​ 7 www.proshareng.com/ ​ n ews/ ​ S tate%20and%20Local%20Govts%20/​ S tate-​ Governments-​-​Another-​Cycle-​of-​Non-​Payment-​of-​Salaries-​to-​Begin-​Soon/​50369 8 https://​africacheck.org/​reports/​nigerias-​unemployment-​rate-​18-​8-​widely-​tweeted/​ 9 www.infomigrants.net/​en/​post/​19561/​returnees-​struggle-​to-​adjust-​to-​life-​in-​nigeria 10 www.infomigrants.net/​ e n/​ p ost/​ 7 345/​ n igerian-​ r eturnees-​ f ace-​ p overty-​ a nd-​ destitution-​back-​home 11 www.uneca.org/​sites/​default/​files/​PublicationFiles/​iff_​main_​report_​26feb_​en.pdf

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5  Human mobility in the Southern African Development Community region Some best practices for migration management from the European Union Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini, Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi

Introduction The African Union (AU) currently comprises of 55 member states,1 which make up the African continent. Its aim is to promote cohesion and unify the African people. From its inception, the guiding philosophy of the AU has been Pan-​Africanism, an ideology built on strengthening ties of solidarity among African people. Migration, particularly its management, is one of the ways through which the unification and integration of the African continent can be achieved. In this regard, the AU has two main policies, which are designed to inform the management of migration in Africa. These include the Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) and Action Plan (2018–​ 2030) and the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD). The MPFA was first adopted in 2006 and revised in 2018. It provides a framework which Regional Economic Communities (RECs)2 and AU member states should use to address migration. The ACPMD was adopted in 2006 too and it focuses on 11 priority migration-​related policy issues and recommendations for national, continental and international action (AU 2006a, b). In addition, there is now the AU Free Movement Protocol, which was signed in Rwanda in 2018. Initially 27 AU member countries had signed the AU Free Movement Protocol, and by June 2020, this number stood at 32 of the 55 AU member states and only four had ratified the protocol at the end of 2019 (African Union, 2019). The AU has also drawn a 50-​year plan for Africa’s development known as Agenda 2063, which has implications for migration in Africa. This can be seen from its overarching aim, which is to enhance existing continental developmental projects as well as to initiate new programmes that would ensure integration of the African continent and sustainable development. Other AU flagship initiatives which impact migration of African people within Africa and aim to enhance African integration include the African passport and

Human mobility in the SADC region  71 the Integrated High-​Speed Train Network, among others (African Union Commission, 2015a, b). The development of all these initiatives and policies by the AU recognises that borders are causing divisions between African states (World Bank, 2020), which hampers development. According to Goldin (2019), African states are developing at different rates, in terms of their infrastructure and institutional governance. These variations lead to inequality among them, which would benefit from integrating with neighbouring states. Regional integration would ensure the flow of trade in terms of goods, services, capital and people in a region (World Bank, 2020). Furthermore, as Mariano (2018) notes, free movement of people, especially for the purpose of labour within a region, has the potential to close skill gaps and increase productivity in work environments. In this way, free movement can benefit the economies of both sending and receiving countries. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2018), free movement of people contributes to improvements in infrastructure so as to create an efficient system. The AU has promoted this approach as part of the Agenda 2063 by introducing flagship programs such as the high-​speed train network. The evidence of infrastructure development can be noted in the East African Community (EAC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regions based on improved roads, networks and corridors. In short, the IOM sums up the advantages of free human mobility within Africa into six categories which are:  boosting intra-​Africa trade, commerce and tourism; facilitating labour mobility, intra-​African knowledge and skills transfer; promoting the Pan-​African identity, social integration and tourism; improving transborder infrastructure and shared development; fostering a comprehensive approach to boarder management and promoting rule of law, human rights and public health (IOM, 2018: 31). Free movement of people in the EU region, for example, has benefited people, states as well as promoted the development of the region. Freedom of movement has allowed citizens of the EU to move to, live in and in certain circumstances access the welfare systems of the EU countries to which they have moved. In fact, freedom of movement is one of the founding principles of the EU and was designed to support the economies of EU countries by providing a mobile work force (European Union, 2012). Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2013) note that the Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Convention frameworks facilitated the establishment of an institutional infrastructure that enhanced the free movement of people in the EU. The free movement promoted by the Schengen Agreement worked in such a way that it abolished border checks between member states within the EU, so as to allow for the free movement of people while maintaining border checks on the EU’s external borders. Besides removing internal border controls, the framework established by the Schengen Agreement further defined the procedures for issuing a uniform visa for the region, a single database for all members

72  Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini  et al. and the establishment of a link between the border officials (Schengen Visa Info, 2019). The EU has also witnessed associated physical infrastructural improvements, which have aided in human mobility across the region. The European Commission (2018) notes that the advanced transport network in Europe can be attributed to European integration. The advanced transport system has also enabled freedoms to be realised through the movement of people, services and goods. With that said, people are able to commute from their home to places of work which do not necessarily have to be in the same state. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD, 2019), a global index has ranked 24 European countries as having the best transport infrastructure in the world. This can be further attributed to the EUs interconnectedness which has enabled member states to improve their infrastructure through shared projects. Notable initiatives include high-​ speed trains which have reduced travel time between member countries, over 4.5 million km of paved roads, 212,500 km of railway lines and 41,000 km of navigable inland waterways (OECD, 2019: 35). The reduction in travel time has brought places closer together, and with that, less time spent travelling to the place of destination. This has also encouraged more people to travel to other states not just for work but for leisure. Because of this, the EU has seen a growth in internal human mobility (Migration Data Portal, 2020). Against this backdrop, this chapter analyses how migration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)3 region is managed in order to determine the extent to which the EU human mobility approach could provide transferrable best practices in terms of what the SADC region could do to confront its own borders and the migration question in Southern Africa. This is an important issue to discuss in this chapter because SADC is one of major RECs in Africa, whose integration and management of migration should finally lead to the goal of the AU. It has been argued that the extent to which any of the RECs that are recognised by the AU as building blocks for African integration progresses, that progress impacts African integration too (Nshimbi and Moyo, 2017; Moyo and Nshimbi, 2019). This is one reason why this chapter focuses on the SADC region and seeks to examine best practices and challenges that it can draw from the experiences in the EU. The other reason is that regional migration seems to be difficult to be actualised in the SADC region. This is partly because countries in the region such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia approach it from a security point of view and have fears that migrants threaten the peace, safety and culture in their territories. But these fears are unfounded (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Segatti and Landau, 2011). It is, therefore, necessary to examine how the EU has gone about addressing human mobility through regional integration and what practices can be drawn from the region. The next section provides the methods and framework which shape the chapter and discusses the role of RECs in an African context while situating the issue of the SADC and the EU as RECs in which migration is a reality.

Human mobility in the SADC region  73 This is followed by a brief discussion on the development of the EU’s regional integration, its integration and migration management policies in which some experiences with human mobility that could be transferred to the SADC region will be highlighted. Then, there is an analysis of SADC migration policies and some best practices the region could pick from the EU. The final part is the conclusion which recommends the need for better accountability regarding migration policies in the SADC, which could ensure that human mobility is realised in the region.

Methods and conceptual context for understanding migration management in regional economic communities in Africa One of the purposes of RECs, as far as the AU is concerned, is to facilitate regional economic integration between members of the individual regions, which should ultimately lead to the integration of the whole African continent. This is based on the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC)/​Abuja Treaty (Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 1991). Based on the Abuja Treaty, RECs should provide building blocks for the AEC, which should be established in 2028. One of the central issues around the establishment of the AEC is that of the free mobility of people on the African continent. The importance of migration in continental integration is highlighted in that, when AU member states signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement, in Kigali Rwanda in March 2018, the AU Free Movement Protocol was also signed in the same 10th Extraordinary Summit of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. But the importance of migration is also evident in the fact that the AU formulated the policies for managing migration and as tools for development discussed above, years before the AU Free Movement protocol. If RECs provide a foundation for the AEC in which free human mobility is central, it is therefore then possible to discuss how these RECs actually manage migration and the implications of that for continental integration. Hence this chapter examines migration management in the SADC, with the objective of assessing the extent to which the experiences of the EU in managing migration within that region could, if at all, provide useful practices. The chapter has made use of literature to gather data for the discourse on migration policies. This included regional treaties, protocols and policies as well as academic literature and reports on this theme. In analysing migration policies, it is further observed that regional migration might not be favoured by everyone. The questions that this chapter seeks to answer are as follows; to what extent is human mobility accepted and who has the right to free movement? What best practices regarding (the acceptance of) human mobility can the SADC region consider as best for transferring from the EU to Southern Africa? To assist in responding to these questions, a conceptual framework has aided in synthesising and structuring the debate of the study. Three concepts in this respect provide an essential guide to this chapter and

74  Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini  et al. these are regionalism, migration governance and free movement. The chapter begins by using the concept of regionalism to highlight the integration of member states between which migration is supposed to occur. It then uses migration governance to illustrate the various policies and plans that regional bodies have developed to manage that migration. And lastly to promote the concept of free movement as a tool in achieving regionalism. Regionalism is defined as “the formal cooperation and integration agreements by neighbouring countries which aim to foster collaboration for the benefit of the region” (Jiboku and Okeke-​Uzodike, 2016: 50). According to Söderbaum (2014) regionalism is driven by political ideals in the formation of regions and these often have a formal structure in the form of programmes or regional projects. Regionalism is manifested through the creation of organisations such as the EU, AU and the SADC regions (Söderbaum, 2014), which are discussed in this chapter. The concept of regionalism is therefore relevant to this contribution to the extent that it is utilised to illuminate the pan Africanism ideology, of which the SADC region is an essential part. Migration governance refers to “the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organisational structures and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States’ approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation” (International Organization for Migration, 2019:138). Based on this definition, the concept of migration governance refers to management tools such as policies and regulatory frameworks that regional bodies have developed. In the process, migration policies refer to a governments’ statements of what it intends to do (Bjerre et al., 2014). The chapter focuses on those policies which govern migration and the role they play in promoting or hindering free movement that leads to integration. It intends to follow up on the effectiveness of migration policies that regions, particularly the EU, have developed and how best the SADC can manage migration from best experiences that can be observed in the former. Free movement allows for the entry and residence into another member state that has agreed to the policy. Free movement in this chapter is also used interchangeably with human mobility, which covers various forms of movements by people within the context of migration. In its basic form this type of mobility is implemented through the relaxing of visa requirements that allow people to enter an agreeing state for certain periods of time with a specific purpose (European Commission, 2020). In this regard, the EU has been successful in implementing a visa policy which has allowed members of the EU and Schengen area free movement within the region. This provides a context for examining what has worked in regions like the EU, compared to the SADC in respect of facilitating the movement of people; and the best practices that SADC can observe in those RECs, with a view to implementing them in Southern Africa.

Human mobility in the SADC region  75

The EU: the developments of regional integration and internal migration The First and Second World Wars played a significant role in the formation of the European Community (Erdem, 2006). In an attempt to bring peace and work towards solidarity, the centuries-​old contest between France and Germany had to be brought to an end (Gerwarth, 2019), and regional integration provided a possible avenue through which this could be achieved. Regional integration in Europe unfolded in stages through various treaties and agreements between member states. It began in the early 1950s with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by six members at the Schuman Declaration (Bitzenis and Andronikidis, 2006; Erdem, 2006; de Areilza, 2009; Davulis and Šadžius, 2013). This paved the way for an economic community based on the free movement of workers, goods and services. The European Economic Community (EEC) was founded by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, in order to establish an economic unity based on what was happening in coal and steel. The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was also established by the Treaty of Rome and entered into force on the first of January 1958. In 1967, the Merger Treaty combined the three communities which were then known as the European Communities. At this stage, integration was tied to the economy which was also dependent on the members being at harmony with one another. Such a creation of the EU was stimulated both by political and economic reasons, with the promise of diminishing the prospects of war between member countries (Davulis and Šadžius, 2013). Over the years, the community witnessed phases of enlargements when new countries joined as members. The decision by EU member states to strengthen their ties, led to negotiations for a new treaty whose key features were determined at the EU Council in Maastricht in December 1991 (Council of the European Communities, 1992). This led to cooperation on common foreign and security policies, justice and home affairs and a monetary union. In addition, EU citizenship, which was an integral part of the Maastricht Treaty, resulted in the lifting of most internal border controls between EU member states and brought with it the right for all EU member states citizens to live and move freely within the EU (Council of the European Communities, 1992). Over the years, the EU enlarged its membership to 28 states, although this number has declined to 27 after Brexit. A series of international agreements established by the European Community over the years have formed the basis of what the EU stands for. In relation to human mobility, the EU has come up with treaties and protocols which have facilitated the integration of citizens in other EU member states. The gradual transition towards free movement within EU borders can be identified from the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957. In its goal towards unity, the treaty created a common market which then introduced the free movement of labour (European Union, 1957). At the time free movement based on the Treaty of Rome was only restricted to workers.

76  Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini  et al. According to the European Union (1957), the treaty gave rights to citizens of any state to work in any of the member states of the EU. The Treaty of Rome spearheaded migration through the free movement policy. It created a common market based on what was known as the four freedoms; the free movement of goods, people, services and capital within its six member states (Deacon et al., 2013; Nita, 2013). It set out goals which the members agreed to work towards. The signatories agreed to unite the people of Europe, improve the living and working conditions of its citizens, reduce the social and economic differences between the community’s various regions, establish a common trade policy and share the resources of the states in order to strengthen peace and liberty. This further strengthened relations which enabled for a transition into a mobile community. Chapter one of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union makes provision for European workers to migrate to member states of the EU, with Articles 45 to 55 specifying the provision for the rights and freedoms on the free movement of the workers within the region. Besides ensuring the freedom of movement for workers within the Union, Article 45 also provides for the workers not to be discriminated against based on their nationality. The Article further provides for workers to accept employment in other EU states and be able to move freely within the territory for the purpose of employment. Furthermore, workers can live in the territory during employment and also remain there even after the completion of employment (European Union, 2012). This provision has made it possible for EU citizens to relocate to other EU member states for the sake of work. Countries which experience underemployment and an aging population benefit from such rules as they are able to hire younger people from other countries in the region to join their workforce. Thus, free movement has allowed people to work across Europe, filling employment gaps in certain countries which struggled with labour shortages. Most importantly for migration within the EU, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union through the Directive 2004/​ 38/​ EC introduced the concept of EU citizenship (Council of the European Communities, 1992). This was a fundamentally important improvement on the Treaty of Rome, as it established the freedom of movement and residence for persons in the EU and thus gave EU citizens the right to live in any EU country (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). It was a step in the right direction as far as migration was concerned because it meant that citizens could now freely enter and dwell in other member states of the region. The Schengen Agreement of 1985 led some European countries to abolish their frontiers in order to allow for free movement in a Europe without borders (Schengen Visa Info, 2019). The agreement influenced the gradual removal of border checks within the EU. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam integrated the Schengen Convention of 1990 into the EU framework, further reinforcing free movement of persons in the EU (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013; Apap and Carrera, 2004). However, all countries cooperating in Schengen are not parties to the Schengen area. This is either because they

Human mobility in the SADC region  77 do not wish to eliminate border controls or because they do not yet fulfil the required conditions for the application of the Schengen acquis. Nonetheless, the Schengen Convention of 1990 allowed citizens to move across the region without the need for visa and passport checks (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). This has contributed to free movement within the region, without stringent restrictions. However, intra-​ EU migration has been affected by many other aspects. A  study by Rojas-​Romagosa and Bollen (2018) shows that, while free human mobility is significant it can only account for under 30% of migration. There are other factors in the EU, which determine migration such as differences in wages, as well as geographical distance and cultural and linguistic differences (Rojas-​Romagosa and Bollen, 2018). The point we are making here is that, free human mobility does not always equal increased migration as there are other intervening factors. According to Glennie and Pennington (2014) as well as Ruhs (2017), before EU enlargement in 2004, the principle of free movement for EU workers was remarkably stable and largely unchallenged by individual EU member states. The politics of free movement began to change after 2004 when eight low-​ income countries known as the A8 in Eastern Europe plus Cyprus and Malta joined the EU and the old EU member states experienced significant immigration from the joining states. A  united region which had been successful in its regionalism ideology began to experience signs of resistance from its citizens. This stress came after the global economic crisis in 2008 (EU 2020), in which many people felt that the European integration was to blame for the challenges that member states were facing (Ross, 2011). The stress increased after the economic decline in 2014 when many member states began to call for an urgent reform of the policy of free movement of EU workers. The argument was that there are unequal benefits in the welfare system between states. For example, Britain believed that it had exceptional welfare benefits which is why they were experienced a higher immigration rate (Ruhs, 2017). In recent years, the EU has been at the forefront of migration discourses in that the region is experiencing internal conflict. According to Mortera-​ Martinez and Odendahl (2017) Britain and the EU viewed EU migration differently. Social discomfort blamed on immigrants by some people in Britain has caused conflict especially with the conservative population who have not accepted migrants. Britain viewed the EU free movement rules as toxic, but many in Europe consider them a core achievement of the EU. Although Britain is no longer part of the EU, it is used here to demonstrate that some EU countries even in the past have not always been united on matters of managing human mobility. To this can be added the fact that, there has been evident internal bordering recently within the EU. This is in the form of some countries introducing border checks. Notwithstanding, the EU’s approach to and management of its internal migration (within the EU) is discussed in this part to the extent of the objectives of this chapter as stated in the preceding section. The way in which free movement and regional integration have evolved and generally been conducted and accomplished in the EU could

78  Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini  et al. provide some practices that the SADC region can observe and apply to and in ways that would suit Southern Africa. Likewise, the SADC could also learn from the mistakes which the EU has made so that it develops better regional migration policies and approaches.

Migration policies in the SADC region According to SADC (2012), the SADC evolved from the Southern African Development Co-​ordinating Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1980 in Lusaka. SADCC was formed to strengthen political cooperation within the region and to forge relations which would in turn decrease reliance on the then apartheid South Africa. The SADCC comprised of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland (now Eswatini), Zambia and Zimbabwe. With the end of apartheid, SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992 when the Heads of state signed the Declaration and Treaty of SADC into effect. The treaty set out to enhance economic development and reduce poverty in the region. The objective was to reinforce regional integration by means of democratic principles and focusing on developmental needs of the region (SADC, 2012). In this respect, the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992) promotes policies aimed at eliminating obstacles to the free movement of people within the region and this is why the 2005 Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in SADC was formulated (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). But, studies show that the prospect of complete abolition of border controls on people’s movements within SADC does not sit well with some SADC member states. Oucho and Crush (2001) in particular argue that some states see free movement as a threat to their sovereignty. Additionally, Maunganidze and Formica (2018) posit that states choose to securitise migration by implementing strict migration policies and visa requirements. This has made it difficult for states to agree to the free movement protocol in the region. The other point that studies advance for this state of affairs in the SADC region is that the economic inequalities between the states were such that the region was not yet ready for free movement of people (SADC, 2017; Williams and Carr, 2006). In the final analysis the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People has not yet been enforced because less than two thirds (i.e., Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland  –​now Eswatini –​and Zambia) of the SADC member states have ratified it (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2014: 56). What this means is that SADC does not have a regional framework addressing free movement like the EU discussed in the preceding section. Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2016) note that, as a result of this, SADC member states manage migration individually and the states continue to enter into bilateral agreements relating to labour migration with one another. Elsewhere, Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014) argue that this state of affairs effectively represents a parallel albeit informal framework of governing labour migration in Southern Africa and is bilaterally managed by South

Human mobility in the SADC region  79 Africa. This diminishes prospects of ratifying the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People in the SADC as some find this option more desirable.

Transferable best practices It is evident that the EU is not perfect, its successful history in terms of integration has also been met with challenges. Since the beginning of the union, the region has been faced with numerous shortfalls, but these notwithstanding, the SADC could borrow some best applicable practices. It should however be treated with caution that the policies of developed regions may not be easily and successfully implemented in the less developed regions. This chapter brings to the fore discourses around free movement with the aim that the SADC could achieve such human mobility in the quest of integrating the region. The first issue which the SADC could extract from the EU in order to integrate the region, is the gradual implementation of the free moment of labour. The SADC region could start by removing work permit requirements for SADC labour migrants. This could be done so as to allow workers to move freely in the SADC region. The second step could involve visa free entry. According to Maunganidze and Formica (2018), most SADC states have adopted a visa free approach. However, this is not uniform throughout the region. For instance, Angola, Comoros, DRC and Madagascar require visas prior to travelling while people travelling from Comoros, Madagascar and Tanzania receive visas on arrival in most countries. In any case the SADC free visa is only for 90 days in a year and this is only strictly observed by some and not all member states, which effectively means that there is limited mobility in the region. If SADC citizens exhausted the 90 days (where member states observe it) as indicated in this part, it essentially means that they cannot travel to the respective countries in any given year (Moyo, 2020). In this case only those with work permits and therefore skilled are the only ones who may enjoy mobility in the region. This category of people (skilled) constitutes a small proportion of the population of people in the SADC. The net effect of which is that free movement becomes a privilege for the skilled and/​or educated, who are not the majority. In the case of the SADC, migration management between two states seems to be the preferred option (Oucho and Crush, 2001). States in the region have relied more on bilateral agreements which is not good for regional integration as states do not see the need to forge uniform agreements with all members. This hinders attempts towards uniting the region through human mobility. Rather than securitising the region’s internal borders and dividing the region through bilateral agreements, the EUs approach can be borrowed. In this regard, enabling visa free entry may be beneficial for migration management of the region. Although recently, there have been rebordering and reestablishment of internal border checks within the EU, particularly in the wake of the COVID-​19 pandemic and as worrisome as this is, it should not reduce the value of the EU regional approach to migration all the same. And this

80  Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini  et al. regional approach to migration, even with its own problems, is completely absent in the SADC. It can only be hoped that this (current EU rebordering) will not degenerate into state-​centric and inward looking migration policies which are antithetical to the ideals of the EU on the score of human mobility. Therefore, we suppose that the recent rebordering in the EU demonstrates a temporary challenge, which should not prevent us from seeing the best practices, even if they were tainted by the current pressure. While on the subject of visa free entry, other regions on the African continent itself such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) are said to have the most advanced and best migration regimes in Africa partly because they have regional passports (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013, 2014). SADC states too could use the current bilateral agreements which relate to visa requirements to prepare for the introduction of visa free entry throughout the SADC region. In order to achieve this, states can integrate the agreements into a policy that would be used and agreed upon by all member states. Those that agree with the visa free policy can adopt it and start allowing citizens to travel to any member state. Since the bilateral agreements are already in action, the adoption of visa free entry can be achieved by all members of the SADC region (Nshimbi et al, 2017). Furthermore, there is no will among member states to accept free movement as part of regional integration. The fact that states are still sceptical to such an idea shows that there is not much trust in the regional governance system. The reason for this could be that states have joined the SADC for different reasons and do not have a common goal. Over the years, members have attempted to form mutual agreements when it comes to free movement in the region. However, Oucho and Crush (2001) note that conflicting interests by member states have resulted in a halt on the free human mobility processes. The region has been at headlock when it comes to accepting the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People. The opposition to the protocol is engaged between migrant-​receiving countries and migrant-​sending countries, where the former fears that there might be mass influx of migrants upon the implementation of the protocol. South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have been at the forefront of this disapproval which has made progressing free movement difficult. Nita (2013) notes that the essence of free movement of people is based on the rights to reside, work and relocate with family in the new destination. It is primarily for this reason that countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia are not willing to accept the concept of open borders (Oucho and Crush, 2001). It may be viable for the region to conduct further research on the benefits of free movement for each member state. Free movement in the EU was accepted by all member states and further attracted other states because of the benefits that it provided. Such an approach may eventually lead to the attainment of SADC citizenship as achieved by the EU.

Human mobility in the SADC region  81

Conclusion The EU provides some adaptable examples of how regional integration and the removal of internal barriers to free movement of people can assist states in achieving free human mobility. The SADC has not been able to realise its visions set out in the Declaration and Treaty of SADC in terms of progressive elimination of the obstacles against free movement of people. The shortfall of most policies within the SADC region has been that they are not legally binding making it impossible to enforce as law. Further to this, there has been a reluctance by many member states to commit themselves to the free movement of people throughout the region. It seems that countries are more comfortable with allowing the movement of skilled people and so to answer the question posed in this chapter, free movement seems to benefit those in the formal sectors. There are still stringent policies that prevent the movement of people within the region. This chapter recommends that member states need to have a common understanding when it comes to migration policies, in terms of implementing ratifications and policies. In order to achieve this, member states need to have political will which will ensure the desired outcomes of the region. This should involve a gradual approach to human mobility, ensuring that all member states implement migration policies which have been agreed upon and for all members to uphold the vision of the AU as a continental body of which the SADC is a part.

Notes 1 Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-​Bissau. Kenya, the Kingdom of Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Kingdom of Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 2 There are eight RECs that are recognised by the AU for achieving its aims of strengthening ties in Africa and uniting the continent. These are, Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-​ Saharan States (CEN-​ SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The focus of this chapter is the SADC. 3 Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

82  Mandisa Sunshine Melanie Makhathini  et al.

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Human mobility in the SADC region  85 Oucho, J. O.& Crush, J., 2001. Contra Free Movement: South Africa and the SADC Migration Protocols. Africa Today, 48(3), pp. 139–​158. Papagianni, G., 2014. EU migration policy. In: R. Gropas & A. Triandafyllidou, eds. European Immigration: A Sourcebook. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, pp. 377–​388. Pettinger, T., 2017. Free movement of labour –​advantages.[Online] Available at: www. economicshelp.org/​blog/​1386/​economics/​free-​movement-​of-​labour/​[Accessed 21 June 2020]. Republic of Turkey, 2020. History of the EU. [Online] Available at: www.ab.gov.tr/​105_​ en.html[Accessed 21 April 2020]. Rojas-​Romagosa, H and Bollen, J. (2018) Estimating migration changes from the EU’s free movement of people principle.[Online] Available at:  https://​voxeu. org/​article/​impact-​eu-​s-​free-​movement-​people-​principle-​migration [Accessed 15 July 2020]. Ross, G., 2011. The European Union and Its Crises: through the Eyes of the Brussels Elite, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ruhs, M., 2017. Free Movement in the European Union:  National Institutions vs Common Policies?. International Migration, 55, pp. 22–​38. SADC, 2005. Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, Gaberone: Southern African Development Community. SADC, 2012. Southern African Development Community:  Towards a common future.[Online] Available at: www.sadc.int/​about-​sadc/​overview/​history-​and-​treaty/​ [Accessed 05 June 2020]. SADC, 2016. Draft labour migration action plan 2016–​2019, SADC. SADC, 2017. Summary of the SADC Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015–​2020, Gaborone: SADC. Schengen Visa Info, 2019. Schengen Agreement. [Online] Available at:  www. schengenvisainfo.com/​schengen-​agreement/​[Accessed 21 April 2020]. Segatti, A. and Landau, L. B. (Eds.). 2011. Contemporary Migration to South Africa: A Regional Development Issue. Washington DC:  The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/​The World Bank. Söderbaum, F., 2014. Regionalism. [Online] Available at: www.researchgate.net/​publication/​260228052[Accessed 15 May2020]. Taran, P., 2015. Free movement, labour mobility, regional integration and development: Keys to Africa moving in the 21st century, Kigali: Global Migration Policy Associates. The Independent in Analysis, 2016. Immigrants’ descendants aided Zim’s development. [Online] Available at:  www.theindependent.co.zw/​2016/​05/​20/​immigrants-​ descendants-​aided-​zims-​development/​[Accessed 14 April 2020]. United Nations, 2018. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the African Union. [Online] Available at: www.un.org[Accessed 28 August 2018]. Urso, G. & Hakami, A., 2018. Regional Migration Governance in Africa:  AU and RECs, Luxembourg: European Union. Wallace, H., Pollack, M.  A. &Young, A. R., 2015. Policy-​Making in the European Union. Sixth ed. USA: Oxford University Press. Williams, V.&Carr, L., 2006. The Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC Implications for State Parties: Migration Policy Brief No. 18. World Bank, 2020. Regional Integration. [Online] Available at:  www.worldbank.org/​ en/​topic/​regional-​integration/​overview [Accessed 14 April 2020].

Part Three

African physical and symbolic borders and the migration question

6  Precarity of borders and migration regimes in the Southern African region Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine

Introduction The Southern African region is part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), but specifically refers to those countries which are located on the southernmost part of the SADC. These countries generally include Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A  number of states in the Southern African region continue to treat migration primarily as a security issue. This defies the historical fact of well-​established patterns of migration which can be traced to well before the colonial period (Crush et al, 2005). This effectively means that the securitisation of both borders and migration disrupts long-​ term historical migration patterns and in this respect presents a short-​term thinking/​fix which militates against development. The securitisation of migration and related border(ing) policies aim at filtering and sorting the people crossing them, granting admission selectively to those migrants considered as welcome and wanted (Laine, 2018a). For example, in South Africa, skilled migrants are preferred at the expense of those without the skills (see e.g. Peberdy, 2009). Likewise, Botswana also prefers a strong anti-​immigration approach (see e.g. Campell and Oucho, 2003; Moyo, 2017a, b). To this can be added the case of Namibia. Based on these developments, we argue that the preference of skilled migrants over those who are not (a generally selective migration approach) is an essential element or characteristic and/​or example of constructing individual countries as gated communities based on social ordering and classification of people. The social ordering effect of gated communities is that those who are denied admission suffer the precarity of both the physical and symbolic borders. Building on these notions, this chapter argues that the construction of countries as gated communities in the Southern African region militates against the ideal of free human mobility and by extension does not augur well for the regional integration drive and Pan-​African identity which is the ultimate target as immortalised in the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992). For these reasons, the chapter amplifies the need for a regional migration management approach, which would engender free human mobility in

90  Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine the SADC, unlike the current nationalistic and inward-​looking approaches which entrench gated communities. This chapter advocates the understanding of mobility, as an ability and a human right and not privilege, which has fallen victim to the current political retrenchment and nationalist agendas. Mobility is an important factor in the stigmatisation of specific people and places (Stjernborg, Tesfahuney, and Wretstrand, 2015), yet also mobility in itself has become considered increasingly as something threatening. As mobility, such as migration, is in essence about transcending borders, the role of border has become commonly emphasised and their stricter enforcement offered as a solution to the perceived, external, threat. Borders, according to this reading, serve to protect national societies from external “ills” while maintaining conditions for their economic sustainability and resilience. In tandem with the securitising discourses that stigmatise mobility and migration, political pressure has increased for more formidable and militarised borders in order to defend national cultures, even at the risk of reducing cross-​border mobility for everyday citizens and curtailing democratic rights (Jones, 2016). Borders do, however, also reflect ethical questions of considerable importance (Laine, 2018b), which need to be also taken into account and balanced against the mere control functions of borders. The insights on which this chapter is built are based on a thorough review of authentic secondary sources of migration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. This was complemented by a qualitative in-​depth interview study of migrants from SADC countries. These interviews were conducted between December 2014 and March 2015 on the borders between South Africa and Zimbabwe at Beitbridge and between March and August 2018 at the Botswana and Zimbabwe border at Ramokgwebana. After this introduction is an analysis of the background of the chapter. The next section discusses the theoretical framework for this chapter by invoking the notion of gated communities so as to communicate the securitisation and selectivity of migration in many African and Southern African countries. Although the concept of the securitisation of migration is discussed in this section, it is treated in depth in the following part. There is then an analysis of the notion of the precarity of the Southern African borders and how this implicates on free human mobility. This leads to the second last section, which advocates for a supranational response to the migration question. We conclude that countries in the Southern African region need to adopt a migration management approach which is transcendental to the extent of submitting the management of migration to the SADC and not individual nation states.

Background and context Migration in the Southern African region has a long history, especially that of labour migration. For example, the South African migrant labour system started at the turn of the nineteenth century (Richmond, 1994; Crush et al, 2005; 2006; Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013, 2014, 2016). In this regard,

Precarity of borders and migration regimes  91 Peberdy (1998, 2009) has provided a comprehensive historical analysis of the evolution of the South African immigration policy, in which she distinguishes three separate phases: 1910–​1948, 1948–​1994 and post 1994. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were various Immigration Acts which were enacted so as to regulate immigration into South Africa and these included the 1913 Immigrants Regulation Act, the 1930 Immigration Quota Act and the 1937 Aliens Control Act, which provided a base to subsequent immigration laws, such as the Aliens Registration Act of 1939 (Peberdy, 1998). But, the important thing to note is that immigration policy in South Africa up to the 1940s was a racist and selective affair, because “immigration was a ‘white issue’… immigrants were by definition white… the government distinguished between desirable and undesirable whites in formulating its policies” (Peberdy and Crush, 1998: 29). This essentially meant that black people were excluded in the immigration policy because they were treated as temporary sojourners who would go back to the rural areas (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). In 1948 the National Party came to power in South Africa and this resulted in the amendment of immigration laws and policies to align with the apartheid regime (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). As a result, between 1948 and 1994, many amendments were made to the previous immigration laws in an attempt to strengthen the government control of immigration. Examples of this include the 1972 Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulations Act, the Aliens Amendment Act of 1978 and the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act of 1984 (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). Although there was a relaxation of immigration laws in the form of the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activity (Act 87 of 1986), the Aliens Control Act 96 (Act 96 of 1991) the racist provisions were still entrenched (Peberdy, 1998; Peberdy and Crush, 1998). These permeated into post-​apartheid South Africa immigration laws until the Immigration Act of 2002 (Act 13 of 2002) was passed (Crush et al, 2006). This was based on the need to limit migration into the country (Crush and McDonald, 2001; Crush et al, 2006). But the Immigration Act of 2002 (Act 13 of 2002, Sections 26 and 27) as amended by Immigration Act of 2004 (Act 19 of 2004) and came into operation in July 2005 is considered a break from the apartheid immigration laws (Crush et al, 2006). Notwithstanding, a review of Immigration Acts and Amendment Bills between 2007 and 2014 by Moyo (2017) suggests that the South African state, while making the commitment to the efficient processing of permits to foreigners, seems at the same time to be tightening conditions on the same. In other words, migration is seen as a security issue leading to selective migration and the securitisation of migration (Landau, 2012; Moyo, 2017a, b, 2020a). Likewise, other Southern African countries like Botswana, Namibia also treat migration in a similar manner (Campbell, 2010). We position the present contribution in this context and argue that the continued selectivity of migration regimes in the region, which highlights the securitisation of migration, is antithetical to the goals of free human mobility. Instead it results in the creation of gated communities, which entrench and strengthen borders, which in turn

92  Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine engenders irregular migrations and the attendant problems. This does not auger well for a region and continent which is moving towards regional and continental integration respectively. The latter should be built on the foundation of the former. This is because The African Union through the Abuja Treaty aims for continental integration to be set up through an African Economic Community [AEC] (Treaty Establishing African Economic Community, 1991). This should be attained through regional economic communities (RECs), which should provide a foundation. There are eight RECs across Africa which should provide this foundation.1 However, the specific discussion in this chapter is on Southern African Community Development Region (SADC), which is made up of a 16 member states.2 The SADC was formed as a result of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992) and it seeks regional integration through formal regional institutions (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992). These formal institutions suggest that the SADC follows neoclassical integration theory, like that of Balassa (1961), which posits four stages in the integration process. These stages are first, the formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), followed by a Customs Union (CU). In the third stage there is the formation of a Common Market (CM) and the fourth stage involves the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At this stage, supranational institutions govern economic policies. In line with regional integration theory, the 2001 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) was developed as a roadmap for the regional integration project (SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, 2001). This roadmap envisaged an FTA by 2008, a CU by 2010, a CM by 2015, an EMU in 2016 and an economic union by 2018. However, this was revised in 2015 to the current Revised RISDP 2015–​2020 whose priority areas are trade and economic liberalisation, regional infrastructure and services, development for regional integration, sustainable food security, social and human development and other cross-​cutting issues, like sustainable development and HIV AIDS (Revised SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan [RISDP] (2015)). Overall, regional integration in the SADC should lead to among others free movement of people goods and capital and the establishment of an economic community. This is why the 2005 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC seeks the implementation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992, Article 10.3) around free movement of people in the region. This is aptly captured in the declaration “to strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region” (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992: 5). This suggests the need for migration management in the SADC region which transcends a nation state, if the ideal of free human mobility in the region can be achieved. Therefore, the argument for a migration management approach in the SADC, which is supranational in character and content, is informed by this context. Indeed, the ideal of a supranational approach to migration

Precarity of borders and migration regimes  93 management has been amplified by the COVID-​19 pandemic, which has demonstrated the need for SADC states to adopt regional approaches to regional problems including migration, than individualised and inward-​ looking responses (Moyo, 2020b).

Gated communities as social ordering The concept of gated community is applied in this chapter as analytical lens through which to scrutinise the increased processes of the securitisation of borders in the Southern African region and the implication this has on the precarity of the unwanted migrants. A  gated community is an enclosed or securitised area constructed to enhance the safety of people in towns and cities. The development of gated communities in many towns and cities in the world is predicated on increasing levels of crime and insecurity (actual or perceived). But, it is not all people in urban areas who get to live in these gated communities, but those with financial means to protect and fortify themselves (Landman, 2004). While it tends to be the wealthy who hold the power to insulate themselves, the consequences of these actions tend to fall heavily on those who lack the money and influence to navigate around them (Laine, 2018b), enforcing in so doing the demarcation between the protected and the unprotected. As such, a gated community amplifies the innate human desire to own and protect one’s property and physical space, which would be difficult –​if not impossible –​unless understood as distinct and separate. They are telling for they expose matters of personal insecurity and provide evidence on the psychological comfort walls can create –​for some. Security threats do not, however, exist objectively but are rather an outcome of an inter-​subjective ideational social construction (Laine, 2020). In addition to aims of enforcing privacy and safety, the construction of gated communities can be considered as a strategy of purifying space and keeping out the unwanted elements (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). Their creation cannot be taken simply as an attempt to close off spaces, but rather as filtering and sorting the people according to those perceived as welcome and desirable, and those who are unwanted and undesirable (Laine, 2018a: 232; Koca, 2019: 186). Gated communities can, thus, be seen a concrete manifestation of social ordering and the related process of selecting and sorting out people in terms of their belongingness; that is, not only in terms of who is admitted in but also who is considered to belong there, and who is not. New members, are sought after if they are “attractive enough to upgrade welfare on the internal market, whereas others are preferably stopped at the gates” van Houtum and Pijpers (2007: 304). The gates of a community are, however, seldom watertight. In addition to those migrants who are allowed to enter, another “group of people –​while unidentified and largely invisible, still often considerable in size –​slips through its cracks. Sometimes they slip through with the help of human traffickers, and in others with the help of legal rent-​seekers. Thus, such people find their way

94  Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine through the maze –​often to become the ones who clean and cater to the homes inside the community, sustaining the easy living, the life with “no alarms and no surprises” of its inhabitants” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 304–​305). Both of these groups of migrants demonstrate the precarity of the border in terms of enforcing the rules of the gated community, which yields migrants with a marginal existence through manual and menial jobs to keep members of the gated communities comfortable and happy (Moyo, 2020a). This raises the question of how this co-​exists with the drive for regional and continental integration in the Southern African region specifically and African continent generally, in which free human mobility is the ideal.

Securitisation of borders and migration At the core of border and migration securitisation is the need to thwart security threats facing a nation state (Mabee, 2007; Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013). In the context of the SADC region, borders are securitised by post-​colonial states in the form of policies and other deterrent actions e.g. to stop migrants from crossing borders so as to impede the threat of the actual and/​or perceived influx of migrants and refugees. Concerning post-​colonial states and borders, it should be understood that the colonial era brought with it the Westphalian nation state in Africa. What is noteworthy is that in pre-​colonial Africa, neither borders nor identities were defined in terms of allegiances to precise territories, but rather to rulers and religions and tribes, for example. In Africa, the subordination of people to a Westphalian nation state is a legacy of the extraordinary impact of colonialism and its consolidation. While borders did exist in Africa before the colonial era, they were not static lines but fluctuating zones of various widths, which often served more as points of contact for cultural and political groups to coexist (Ajala, 1983: 179) instead of lines of separation and delimitation. Where they existed, borders were always porous and permeable (Mbembe, 2019) as to allow mobility and trade. In short, the concept of the territorial delimitation of political control –​statehood –​was a European import (McEwen, 1971: 8). Because they were generally “culturally alien” to Africa (Engelbert, Tarango and Carter, 2002: 1095), these imposed borders have played a mainly deconstructive role in perpetuating conflict (Silberfein and Conteh, 2006). As rigid Berlin borders were –​and remain –​alien to Africa, their enforcement both in the colonial and post-​colonial era in the form of the current securitisation of borders and migration can be seen as a maintenance of the alienation once imposed by colonisers. This is problematic because it militates against efforts to re-​integrate all the people into one regional community, such as the SADC, which is the subject of the present contribution. For example, the South African state, although professing a Pan African identity and admitting some African migrants on the basis of their skills and economic potential to the country, there is the underlying exclusivist desire against the same migrants (see e.g. Peberdy 2009). A good example in this case is the White Paper

Precarity of borders and migration regimes  95 on International Migration for South Africa (2017). It identified eight areas through which the South African immigration policy reform would enhance free movement of people and by these means become compatible with regional and continental integration schemes on the African continent. The eight areas are; “management of admissions and departures, residency and naturalisation, international migrants with skills and capital, ties with South African expatriates, international migration within the African context, asylum seekers and refugees, the integration process for international migrants, and enforcement” (White Paper on International Migration, 2017: vi). The White Paper promises to reform immigration policy so as to “facilitate cross-​border movement for African citizens and provide a legal route for South African Development Community (SADC) economic migrants” (White Paper on International Migration, 2017: vi). However, a deeper analysis shows its provisions to be essentially selective. The White Paper, for example, proposes to replace permanent residency with long-​ term visas and also revoking the natural connection between residence and citizenship, and to aspire to “to attract and retain international migrants with critical skills and capital to invest in the country” (Ibid.: 25). At the same time, the White Paper proposes to establish refugee processing centres at South African borders, which has been described as the equivalent of refugee detention centres (see Moyo 2020a). These examples of the proposals in the White Paper suggest a conscious move towards strengthening South African borders in form of policies and other deterrent actions, which make its borders increasingly unevenly transparent. The criteria that are used for bordering therein are indicative of what the inside is envisioned to be consisting of and to become. Through the emphasis on skilled migration, South Africa appears as a gated community in construction based on need, into which those who are considered useful are admitted while those who are not are denied entry. A review of the immigration policies of other SADC countries, such as Botswana and Namibia, appears to follow the same template. This, based on Botswana Immigration Act of 2011 (Act No. 3 of 2011) (Republic of Botswana, 2011) and the Namibia Immigration Control Act of 1993 (Act No 7 of 1993) (Republic of Namibia, 1993), which appear to place stringent conditions on the requirements for people intending to migrate to these countries. To the list can be added Zimbabwe based on its Immigration Regulations, 1998 as amended by the 2005 Immigration Amendment Regulations (Republic of Zimbabwe, 1998). Taken together, this suggests that the issue of free human mobility in the SADC region is not seriously promoted by the nation states. If this was not the case, there would be a reduction of efforts to securitise migration, instead of doubling of the same.

The precarity of the border Past research has shown that despite the various deterrent practices and policies of gated communities, many find their way in one way or another.

96  Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine Once a wall is erected, there will soon be people trying to cross it (Laine, 2020). The higher the wall –​be it of concrete or paper –​the higher the stakes. Interview data collected on the nature and dynamics of irregular migration by Zimbabwean migrants at the Beitbridge border between South Africa and Zimbabwe in 2014 and 2015 validate this point. As a result of the securitisation of migration and the accompanying stringent South African immigration regimes, many Zimbabwean migrants had resorted to human smuggling and other forms of irregular migration so as to cross the border to South Africa (Interview with Zimbabwean migrant, Musina, 4 March 2015). These involved swimming across the crocodile infected Limpopo River in which some people either drowned or were eaten by crocodiles. In addition to this, there are heart-​wrenching stories of women who were raped by criminal gangs, who ambushed irregular migrants on the South Africa-​Zimbabwe border. To this can be added those people who were either killed by criminals or left to die as a result of exhaustion from long walks in the bush (see e.g. Araia 2009; Moyo, 2018, 2020). This is because after crossing the Limpopo River, undocumented migrants were required to walk for several kilometres in the bush (to hide from detection by the South African army and police) and those who could not walk or became sick or tired were left to die. Those who survived made it to South Africa, but the irregular migration flows to South Africa from Zimbabwe for example led, however, also to the creation of other socio-​cultural borders leading to the vulnerability of the migrants to exploitation and abuse (Jinah, 2012; Nyandoro, 2016; Moyo, 2020a). But in this chapter we emphasise the fact that the migrants were undocumented resulted in them working on some construction sites, shops and farms in the South African Province of Limpopo, the employers of which did not always treat migrants with dignity and respect, because of their immigration status (Interview with Zimbabwean migrant farm workers, Musina, 5 January 2015). The point is that their lack of immigration documents created a site for symbolic borders and discrimination. They were desperate migrants who did not belong and were thus easy to exploit. This shows the articulation of socio-​cultural borders by South African employers beyond the physical border which the migrants had crossed at undesignated points as explained in the preceding part. The migration regimes in the Southern African region which treat migration as a security threat leading to the securitisation of migration and the creation of gated communities, aptly illuminate the precarity of the border. Many migrants and refugees were denied entry at these gated communities, with the result that they resorted to human smuggling and other irregular forms of migration (Interview with Zimbabwean migrant, Musina, 4 March 2015) –​a phenomenon which has been established in other parts of the world (see e.g. Ferrer-​Gallardo, 2010; McCall, 2015; Cuttitta, 2017; Moreno-​Lax, 2018). The undocumented status of such migrants made them vulnerable to exploitation and other forms of exclusion and bordering. This raises the question of how this co-​exists with regionalism and a Pan African identity

Precarity of borders and migration regimes  97 which the SADC region and the African continent are pursuing. The related issue of how this migration question in the SADC needs to and could be tackled arises and is discussed in the following section.

The SADC borders and the lingering migration question The aim here is not to ignore the longue durée of colonialism, but rather to problematise it. In doing so, there is the recognition that, undeniably, the Berlin borders of 1884–​85 continue to structure the way that SADC and other African countries approach migration management issues. The countries continue to uphold the erstwhile colonisers’ fictional territorial sovereignties of African nation states. Nonetheless, the reality is that these borders are not respected (see e.g. Moyo 2016). The defiance of borders by migrants, at once, urges governmental authorities to implement new border control measures, including more walls and fences. By challenging the power of states and their borders, however, the migrants themselves have at the same time gained power and, thus, also found their way from the margins into the heart of politics. In short, the management of human mobility appears as the key issue of the twenty-​first century (Mbembe, 2019). Borders are continually transformed, de-​and re-​constructed by various actors and have only been able to divert (rather than stop) population movements (Laine, 2016). The conflict between “regulating agencies”–​border patrols, visa officers, etc. and migrating individuals –​forces states to implement new control measures and even build concrete border walls and fences (Sirkeci, 2009:  12). Indeed, as the “conflict model of migration” developed by Sirkeci eloquently puts it, the bordering practices and the transnational space, in which these practices operate, are “constantly transformed by conflicts and migrations” (Sirkeci, 2009:  8). For him, the continuous conflict between the regulating and migrating human agency forces changes in migration regulations, such as tightening admission rules and regulations. In response to these changes, migrating human agencies in turn change their strategies, mechanisms, routes and pathways of international migration (Sirkeci, 2009: 11). Limiting migration and cross-​border mobility may well decrease legal, but it may also increase irregular, migration (Laine, 2018b). This creates a vicious cycle, which only feeds itself (van Houtum and Bueno Lacy, 2017). The more movement is restricted, the more crossing becomes illegal. As border control becomes more sophisticated, so do the efforts to circumvent them. This tug of war between states and non-​state actors, in which the former attempts to tame the latter in a Procrustean style, underlines apparent futility in trying to prevent people from striving for what they consider as the best for them and advancing their own goals. As long as there will be borders, there will also be people attempting to cross them. The migration management efforts might gain a better rate of return should the attention be moved from the mere preventive actions to finding ways to allow higher share of migrants to

98  Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine cross-​border legally; that is, strive towards a model for mobility which allows changing migration patterns to be managed in a way that ends discrimination on the basis of birth and takes ethical considerations into account (Laine, 2018b: 301). Beyond how SADC borders are contested by many actors, such as irregular migrants and how states deploy counter measures to fortify borders, our interest is on the need for African states, those in the Southern Africa region specifically, to take a deep introspection vis-​à-​vis the migration of its citizens. The gated communities and the securitisation of migration described in the preceding parts point to the precarity of the border in the Southern African region. The divisive and categorical borders and borderings, eloquently captured in the concepts of marginality, precarity and liminality of migrants and refugees (Mutlu and Leite, 2012; Brambilla et al, 2015; Ferrer-​ Gallardo, Albet-​Mas and Espiñeira, 2015; Vega-​Duran, 2016; Moyo, 2020), are not evident only on the Mediterranean Sea, but also within Africa as well. That is, there are heavy restrictions on migration within the African continent by African citizens against African citizens and this points to many countries as gated communities, in terms of restricting migration. For instance, the 2019 Visa Openness Report shows that 25% of Africans did not require visas from fellow Africans, 26% granted visas on arrival and 39% offered eVisas (Africa Visa Openness Report, 2019). In practical terms this means that there is limited free human mobility in Africa. This can be shown by the fact that in 2018 a Nigerian passport holder needed visas to 38 out of the 55 nation states in Africa (Madowo, 2018). However, even in those regions which offered visas, free cross border migration was not really a reality. For instance, the SADC offered a 90-​day visa in a year to citizens in the region. But the 90-​day visa was inadequate to cater for the cross-​border needs of people. When the 90-​day visa was exhausted it meant that people in the region were left with no choice but to resort to irregular forms of migration described in this chapter. The reason they engaged in this form of migration is because of the selectivity of migration which preferred the skilled over the unskilled people (who failed to access other long-​term residence visas which are effects of the restrictions of a gated community) (Moyo, 2018, 2020a). It would thus be rather misleading to state that in a region such as SADC free human mobility has materialised. The reality is that there is the securitised and selective migration which all creates some gated communities on the gates and walls of which there is precarity, uncertainty and death. Whereas much of the attention has been focused on the Mediterranean Sea and the migrants struggling to cross over to the EU, the situation undocumented migrants have to endure within the Southern African region gained much less attention. Still, the conditions migrants have to endure ranging from engaging the services of human smugglers to swimming across crocodile-​infected rivers, rape and exploitation are comparable the Mediterranean Sea. To further illustrate this fact, we refer to the earlier example in which undocumented Zimbabwean

Precarity of borders and migration regimes  99 migrants swam across the crocodile-​infested Limpopo River and in this, some of whom drowned and/​or were eaten by crocodiles. Further, the example of the province of Limpopo, South Africa provides an illustrative example on how also in the Southern African region borders and the gated communities which they demarcate, create apparent spaces of oblivion for undocumented migrants. The rhetoric, common in many African countries –​even those in the SADC, which blame the EU’s deterrent border and migration policies for their discriminatory nature and dramatic human cost, is justifiable, but has at the same time also drawn the attention away from the management of their own borders and the increasingly restrictive migration regimes put in place against fellow African migrants. It is particularly noteworthy that in many cases, the internal African migration and mobility is more restricted than that from outside the continent to Africa. For example, South Africa has restricted visa-​free entry from many other African states, while most Europeans can access the country without visas. The aspiration for state sovereignty has done “untold damage to Africa’s destiny in the world” (Mbembe, 2017) and continues to trump the aspirational rhetoric of a pan-​African unity. The argument presented herein posits that the Southern African region would benefit from the unfettered movement of people within the region, which could take the form of elevating migration management to supranational regional institutions, to which individual countries must submit and respond to in implementing migration policies  –​in keeping with the spirit and letter of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992) and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (1991). Thus, the proposal is opposed to the current case in which individual countries manage migration outside of the SADC regional instruments and institutions. In invoking the supranational approach to the management of migration, the SADC can draw inspiration from the European Schengen Area approach to and management of migration, although the European ­example –​currently under serious internal pressures –​should not be used as a ready-​made model. While the recent crises have made many to doubt the future and functionality of the Schengen Area, it has nevertheless provided a major stepping stone in the process of European integration and unity by harmonising migration policies, creating uniform visa regime as well as synchronising external border control and management approaches. While direct comparisons between the two regions should be avoided and the fundamental differences in the respective political economies and the historical settings acknowledged, in designing its regional architecture for managing migration lessons learned from the Schengen area  –​both the success stories and mistakes made  –​could be of use. While transplanting a model created for a particular setting and context to a different one would be futile, the heuristic approach of the Schengen Area can be utilised to formulate a SADC regional migration management regime which is informed by the

100  Inocent Moyo and Jussi P. Laine history and aspiration of the African people. After all, the SADC region and African continent are currently involved in integration schemes and in pursuit of these, dealing with migration is central.

Conclusion The securitisation of migration has made many African countries appear as gated communities. This chapter has sought to explain these developments from the perspective of the Southern African region, the countries of which are involved in the SADC regional integration project. Despite the symbolic rhetoric for the greater unity, the same countries are, however paradoxically busy securitising and fortifying their borders even against the very people with whom they claim to seek to integrate and collaborate more closely. While access to the African continent remains largely unobstructed for Europeans in particular, increasingly stringent internal bordering within the continent is evidently hampering rational movements and development within the continent. This suggests that the role of migration and mobility for the African unity and development is neither properly understood nor efficiently managed for the benefit of people on the African continent. Rather than closing borders and regressing into state-​centric thinking, there would be an apparent need to rethink and reimage the management of migration beyond the confines of a nation state. The SADC region needs to faithfully implement the principles of the Declaration and Treaty of SADC (1992) and its accompanying SADC Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005). This necessarily means that SADC countries must trade in their sovereignty and submit the management of migration to supranational institutions in the SADC. This would allow the countries to confront the Berlin borders, enhance human mobility and contribute to regional and continental integration. The migratory pressures within the African continent are only rising and closing state spaces seems as an ineffective end-​of-​the-​pipe solution to the faced challenge. Africa thrives on mobility, and therein lies perhaps its greatest development potential. The short-​sighted quick-​fixes may thus come with a severe long-​term cost that will only hamper the development of the continent. The other concerns stem from the very selective nature of the implemented policies, whereby a greater share of migrants has become defined as “illegal” or unwanted. This means that more migrants are forced into precarious positions and taking higher risks. While the human drama on the Mediterranean Sea can by no means be understated and the EU’s actions in managing migration approved, it is however important not to allow this to overshadow the similar developments elsewhere. While criticising the EU for its policies, many African states are at the same time implementing increasingly discriminatory policies of their own. This systematically assaults the Pan African identity and African humanity immortalised in many documents such as the Abuja Treaty and many founding treaties of RECs in Africa.

Precarity of borders and migration regimes  101

Notes 1 The eight RECs are Community of Sahel-​Saharan States (CEN-​SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). 2 The SADC states are Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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7  Stereotyping and regional integration in the East African community Challenges and opportunities Patricia Ouma

Introduction Borders exist for a number of practical reasons and serve as reference points on which important political, social and economic decisions and activities take place. They may be seen as bringing in positive administrative effects when viewed against their practical nature. Conversely, borders may produce negative outcomes against migrants, such as xenophobia, abuse and exploitation. This is because they are “markers of difference” whose practices convey who is welcome and who is not, thus reinforcing discrimination (Laine 2020). Regional integration espouses the elimination of borders so that the states involved may reap specified economic, political and social benefits. However, in their continued efforts to increase cooperation through the elimination of physical borders, African states have not confronted cultural and socio-​ economic borders that exist on account of various historical and political encounters that have shaped their interactions. This has posed a threat to the desired outcomes of integration. Therefore, this chapter problematises the role of stereotyping in the implementation of integration laws and policies in the East African Community (hereafter the Community), specifically on the free movement of people, and development of practical solutions that foster regional reconciliation and inform migration management, thus giving effect to the existing rules. The chapter focuses on Tanzania –​Kenya relations, but draws insights from other Partner States’ experiences where necessary. The focus on the two countries is informed by the indisputable and documented tensions between the two, and the fact that the issue of stereotyping is more readily discernible from recorded events analysed in this chapter involving the two. Their turbulent relationship has had notable effects on the realisation and pace of regional integration for the Community as a whole. To do so, the chapter begins by contextualising the Community by providing a brief background and introducing some of the challenges it faces. It then explores the historical emergence of stereotyping in the Community, attempts to classify the identified stereotypes using the Stereotype Content Model and finally discusses its impact on the implementation of regional

Stereotyping and regional integration  107 integration law and policy. The chapter focuses on cultural explanations on the emergence of stereotypes, keeping in mind that there are several contributing reasons as to why stereotypes exist.

Context The Community has the longest history of regional cooperation in sub-​ Saharan Africa, and its model of regional integration has been emulated by other African regional blocs (Oucho 2013). In spite of the accolades, it is faced with several challenges with respect to implementation of intra-​ Community migration policies. Socio-​cultural borders that have crept up over time and been amplified by stereotyping have militated against the ambitious goals of East African integration. The Community is a regional intergovernmental organisation composed of six member states referred to as Partner States. The founding states, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, reunited to form the Community in 1999 after the fall of its predecessor in 1977. They were later joined by Rwanda and Burundi in 2007, and South Sudan, the newest member, in 2016 (East African Community 2020). The Community finds its legal basis in the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (hereafter the Treaty) signed on 30 November 1999. Several pieces of legislation have emerged from this time to regulate the activities of the Community in the form of Protocols and acts, while regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions arguably shape its pursuits. The main aim of the Community is to widen and deepen cooperation among the Partner States in economic, social and political spheres for their mutual benefit (East African Community 2020). The Community has so far formally achieved its first three first pillars of integration, starting with the establishment of a customs union in 2005, followed by a common market in 2010, and a monetary union in 2013, through the signing and ratification of the relevant protocols. The next goal is to ease into a political federation using an intermediate step of political confederation (East African Community 2017). In an overall effort to integrate these economic, social and political spheres, the Community, through its Common Market Protocol, envisages free movement of goods and factors of production. This includes free movement of people within the territories of the Partner States. The attainment of the objectives of regional integration has been hampered by a lack of political will among the Partner States, a weak legal and institutional framework, and a lack of public participation (East African Community 2020). Even though it is true that goods originating from the Partner States generally enjoy tariff-​ free treatment, the same liberal approach is not always observed in the case of other factors of production. Stereotyping, though less explored, is a glaring and powerful factor in the integration efforts of the Community, and directly affects the actualisation of the Common Market Protocol.

108  Patricia Ouma Various documented and undocumented experiences reveal some hesitation towards free movement of people on the part of Partner States’ leaders who, by legal and political design, guide the process of integration. This attitude of caution has been seen to trickle down to society, and manifests in an unwillingness to integrate socially and politically due to the mistrust created by largely unhelpful and inaccurate rhetoric. Inasmuch as the discourse may be partly justifiable, a lot of it derives from an oversimplification of historical events and interactions, and these stereotypes have proved difficult to shake off. It is not uncommon to hear around the Community that “everyone is corrupt in Kenya, even grandmothers” (Wrong 2014). It has been said that Rwandans are obedient (Kanuma 2019), and that Tanzanians are polite but slow (The New Times 2012). A lot of these characterisations are made in gest, but become less humorous when they creep into and frustrate the actualisation of regional integration goals, and particularly, free movement, labour, establishment and residence rights. The Community’s six states are highly diverse in their constituent ethnicities, colonial histories, political challenges, cultures, languages, religions, traditions, economic inclinations and belief systems. So many other stereotypes exist within these singular groupings. It is therefore rather incongruous that these stereotypes be used to provide any basis for action or inaction. They likely emerged or were fuelled by singular and sometimes misunderstood historical, political and social experiences, and continue to be relied on by nationals of the different Partner States when making critical decisions. Certain factors such as Kenya’s historical dominance as a source of resentment, and Tanzania’s previous fixation on socialism (Oucho 2013: 106) continue to play an important role in the nature of interactions seen today in the Community. Another factor that has hampered regional integration, and specifically, labour migration, is the lack of inward-​looking policies on intraregional trade and mobility of factors of production, opting instead for outward-​looking policies (Oucho 2013: 114). Kenya’s competitive advantage within the Community, a position enjoyed since the colonial period due to favourable market policies, strategic benefits of the port in Mombasa and a promising tourism industry (Ordu 2019) has been a point of contention with regards to equitable sharing of the benefits of integration (Gordon 1987:  92). The emergence of the “Coalition of the Willing”1 has elicited mixed reactions. On the one hand, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have propelled the integration agenda, while on the other hand, Kenya may be perceived as using Tanzania’s reluctance towards deeper integration as a propaganda weapon (Tayari 2013). It is incidents such as these that have led to several instances of discrimination and exclusion as a result of damaging narratives of past events that have been weaponised and continue to defeat the implementation of regional laws and policies, with the most ostensible culprits being Kenya and Tanzania. It is becoming increasingly clear that even with all the legislation, policies and integration programmes developed by the Community, implementation and enforcement continue to

Stereotyping and regional integration  109 be a challenge. While these regulations can and should be refined to be more succinct, the Community may still run into the same problem that it is trying to fix. It is therefore prudent to look into the impact of stereotyping in East African integration as one of the underlying problems causing a rift among the Partner States.

The community objectives: a vocation at risk In order to understand why the management of stereotypes in the Community would have far-​reaching effects, the nature of the objectives at stake must be addressed. The Community’s objectives have undergone a number of ideological shifts since the early to mid-​1900s, when the region was still under colonial order. The indiscretion used in carving out boundaries and bestowing within them national identities provided a foundation on which current stereotypes could develop. The objective of cooperation during this period was not based on altruistic inclinations to fulfil African reunification, so much as to secure efficiency in imperialist endeavours (Franck 1968: 28). A so-​called new objective was conceived during the transition to independence of the East African states. The leading figures of independence in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya perceived the integration of East Africa as a calling. Even though at odds about the ends which the calling was to achieve, it was clear that the fight for independence would be better accomplished as a unit. Julius Nyerere, who was later to be installed to the presidency of Tanzania, proposed the East African Federation driven by African nationalism, anti-​ colonialism and Pan-​Africanism, and even demanded the freedom of the territories as one political unit (Franck 1968: 13). In any event, Tanganyika was the first to attain independence in 1961, and after agreement among the governments of the other three territories (also negotiating their independence), the East African High Commission, composed of the colonial Governors, was reorganised into the East African Common Services Organisation (Otieno-​Odek 2018:  20). Uganda went on to attain her independence in 1962, followed by Kenya and Zanzibar in 1963. The opportune moment arrived for the new Heads of State to actualise their aspirations of unity, and rise against the artificial boundaries drawn up by their predecessors, but this never came to be. It turned out that for Kenya, the idea of federation was simply a ruse to hasten independence, while Uganda espoused a methodological federalism (Franck 1968: 7, 32). It is only Tanzania that desired federalism as an ideal no matter the dire economic consequences for which it was most at risk (Franck 1968: 24). The region’s unique history of cooperation, shared resources and a brotherhood likely to emerge after a shared struggle made it probable that the three heads would once again come to the negotiating table. This became possible with the signing of the Treaty for East African Cooperation in 1967, establishing the East African Community. The main objective of the pursuit was economic integration, with a view to strengthening and regulating the

110  Patricia Ouma industrial and commercial relations of the region to facilitate “accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities…”2. A common market and monetary union with a parity currency was established, and it ran smoothly in the first three years of its creation (Sempebwa 2015: 21). Tensions began to creep in as a result of political divergences among the three Heads of State, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere being a socialist, and Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta a conservative pragmatist (Arnold 2015). The 1971 military coup in Uganda of Milton Obote’s government by the unpredictable Idi Amin only served to sour relations further, with Tanzania refusing to recognise the newly formed government (Arnold 2015). The fall of the Community was later attributed to a lack of strong political will, poor participation of the private sector and civil society in co-​operation activities, and the continued disproportionate sharing of benefits of the Community among the Partner States and lack of adequate policies to address the same.3 The mediation agreement of 1984 for the division of Community assets promised a gateway for future cooperation. This led to the signing of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community in 1999, which is currently in force. It draws heavily from the previous treaty objectives, however, aspiring not only for economic integration but also political integration among the Partner States. The objective of the Community is to develop policies and programmes that increase cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields for their mutual benefit, through the creation of a customs union, common market, monetary union and political federation. The current grouping, much like its disbanded predecessor, is founded on developmental and economic underpinnings to be pursued through market liberalisation, with the additional express requirement for political cooperation as expressed in article five of the Treaty. Free movement of factors of production is guaranteed by the Common Market Protocol.4 Its specific objective under article four is to accelerate the Partner States’ economic growth and development through ensuring the free movement of goods, persons and labour, the rights of establishment and residence, and the free movement of services and capital. Article three provides an important underlying principle that Partner States must observe: the non-​discrimination of nationals of fellow Partner States on grounds of nationality. The Partner States, through the Common Market Protocol, have agreed to ease cross-​border movement of people, remove restrictions on movement of labour and rights of residence and establishment as well as those on the movement of services and service suppliers. Significant strides have been taken by those Partner States who are willing or able to give effect to the Community’s main objective of widening and deepening the region’s cooperation through adopting gradually progressive immigration and border management measures. Tanzania, for one, has slashed residence and work permit fees for East Africans by more than half (Andae & Otuki 2016), while Kenya and Rwanda waived work permit fees altogether (East African Legislative

Stereotyping and regional integration  111 Assembly). Additionally, in 2013, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda agreed to use national identity cards as travel documents within their mutual borders (Ugirashebuja et al. 2017: 108). In the same breath, Tanzania has been known to expel Kenyans from its territory in frenzied fashion in the name of a clampdown on illegal foreigners, with Kenya threatening to deal similar blows (Marindany 2017). The evolution of objectives of the Community from the time of its (mis) conception to the present has been intriguing; from a fundamental clash of objectives, to a conservative and functional mission, and finally to cautious ambition. All in all, the integration of people, whether as an ideal with its origins in Pan-​Africanism, or as a means of ensuring the functionality of the common market, has been a constant in all approaches. It is evident that there is legislation in place to guide the integration process. However, challenges to implementation and enforcement persist due to the contributions of the bittersweet relationship enjoyed by Kenya and Tanzania. The two Partner States’ behaviour towards one another is important because of the politically driven model of East African integration. As mentioned, the Heads of State in the Community, sitting as the Summit, determine the general direction of Community initiatives.5 Due to its wide powers and a voting system that relies on consensus, the progress of integration heavily depends on good diplomatic relations among the Partner States. A clear example of this is when President Nyerere of Tanzania refused to sit at a table with Idi Amin after the 1971 coup in Uganda, which had grave consequences on the Community. Kenya and Tanzania’s squabbles therefore pose a risk to the Community’s integration efforts.

Stereotypes: a conceptual guide The tumultuous relations that arose during and after the course of East African independence, specifically between Kenya and Tanzania, are informative in respect of the perceptions and stereotypes that have raised an attitude of mistrust and resultant discrimination within the Community. It is necessary to identify these stereotypes and understand their overall effects to be able to begin to find recourse to the rampant discrimination that characterises Kenya–​Tanzania relations. This research hypothesises that certain negative stereotypes emerged or were at least greatly charged by political encounters that occurred during and after the struggle for independence. These systematically seeped into the daily lives of ordinary citizens of both countries, and have continued to influence decisions and relations between them. Schneider defines stereotypes as “qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people” (2005: 24). They are often based on insufficient information and can be rogue generalisations sometimes used aggressively by prejudiced people (Schneider 2005:  20). They may be used intentionally as well as unintentionally as a result of unconscious prejudice (Mamadouh 2017). Prejudices constitute the emotional dimension (Fiske

112  Patricia Ouma 1998) and tend to limit experiences by denying a person important information (Schneider, 2005: 27). Discrimination accounts for the behavioural component (Fiske 1998), and is the “unjustified use of category information in making decisions about others (Schneider 2005: 29).” Though not always the case, beliefs may give rise to affective reactions, which may in turn dictate behaviour (Schneider 2005: 29). Stereotypes are functional in the sense that they attempt to “mak[e]‌ sense of the rest of the world through simplification, classification, labelling, othering…” (Mamadouh 2017). Walter Lippmann noted that these generalisations may at times be useful: There is economy in this. For the attempt to see all things freshly and in detail, rather than as types and generalities, is exhausting, and among busy affairs practically out of the question … But modern life is hurried and multifarious, above all physical distance separates men who are often in vital contact with each other, such as employer and employee, official and voter. There is neither time nor opportunity for intimate acquaintance. Instead we notice a trait which marks a well-​known type, and fill in the rest of the picture by means of the stereotypes we carry about in our heads. (Schneider 2005: 9) Bordalo et al.’s model attributes the following characteristics to stereotypes (Bordalo et al. 2016: 1757): a. Stereotypes amplify systematic differences (even very small ones) between groups. b. Stereotypes are context-​dependent, meaning that the assessment of a given group depends on the group to which it is being compared. c. Stereotypes distort reactions to information, in the sense that people under-​react when faced with information inconsistent with stereotypes. A wide range of adjectives may be used to attribute qualities to specific groups of people. In Europe for example the Dutch have been described as stingy while the Greek have been termed spendthrift (Charlemagne 2020). All Africans are poor (Kelland & Sanchez 2018). Indians are spiritual (Forrest 2010). Sierp and Karner suggest that metonymy as discussed by Georg Lakoff (1987) may be the cause of such generalisations (Sierp & Karner 2017). It involves using a particular person or a subcategory of people to represent the entire group so as to make inferences or judgments (Sierp & Karner 2017). Singular events and individual traits become the epitome of entire national groups (Sierp & Karner 2017). The substantial reduction of information brought about by such simplifications allow for straight-​forward views, whether positive or negative, of social situations (Helnrich & Stahl 2015: 111). Negative stereotypes are problematic because they are deployed to

Stereotyping and regional integration  113 justify and naturalise prejudice and discrimination (Mamadouh 2017). While prejudice refers to attitude and remains unseen, discrimination is observable and involves “behaviours designed to reject or otherwise harm people from a particular group, simply on the basis of their group membership (Schneider, 2005: 293).” Stereotype content includes information about such things as appearance, likely or unlikely behaviour, mannerisms, motivations, desires and assigned roles (Schneider 2005:  537). The Stereotype Content Model provides that prevalent stereotypes tend to form around two dimensions: warmth and competence (Fiske et al. 2002: 878). The warmth dimension relates to trustworthiness and friendliness, so that one is able to gauge intent (Fiske 2018: 67). The competence dimension speaks to capability and assertiveness, and is important because one can judge if the other can enact that intent (Fiske 2018: 67). The different combinations under the two dimensions result in unique prejudices and subsequent behaviour. The Stereotype Content Model makes the following inferences (Fiske et al. 2002: 879–​880): Groups can be viewed along four combinations:  warm and competent, warm and incompetent, cold and competent, and cold and incompetent. a. High warmth and high competence groups are usually society’s defaults or reference groups. They evoke emotions of pride and admiration to people in their in-​groups or their allies. Because they do not compete among themselves and have cultural hegemony, they are considered warm. Some examples include citizens and people in the dominant religion. b. High warmth and low competence groups elicit ambivalent emotions of pity or sympathy, for as long as their status remains lower. This mixed stereotype justifies subordination. They are believed to have no intent to harm society, and even if they did, their ability to do so is limited. Examples include the elderly, people with disabilities and young children. c. Low warmth and high competence groups also evoke ambivalent emotions of envy and resentful admiration. They are seen “as being concerned only with furthering their own goals,” which justifies taking action against them. Examples include rich people, technical experts and non-​traditional or career women. d. Low warmth and low competence groups elicit emotions of disgust and contempt. They are seen as parasitic, and rejected because of their apparent negative intent toward society and apparent inability to succeed on their own. They include homeless people, refugees and drug addicts. Using this model, it is possible to analyse and make sense of the relationship that has developed over the years between Kenya and Tanzania, and in turn explain and predict its effects on the free movement of people in the Community, and thus the overall integration of the region.

114  Patricia Ouma

The emergence of stereotypes and East African integration: Kenya versus Tanzania The events that have given rise to or reinforced the stereotypic notions held by the two countries can be explained against three backdrops: the effects of East African colonial administration, the political ideologies possessed by the countries after independence and actions taken with respect to regional cooperation. Tanzania and Kenya’s relationship of “cooperation and suspicion” was evident even during the colonial period, when Tanzania (and Uganda) raised complaints that the benefits of cooperation were only enjoyed by Kenya (Gordon 1987: 92). This happened purely as a result of British administrative convenience, which included building a railway line in Mombasa, running into the interior and passing through the fertile agricultural lands occupied by white settlers (Franck 1968: 9). This access led to a relatively quick expansion of the economy, leading Kenya to become the economic powerhouse of the region. From then on, it would seem that any attempts to redirect investment and industry to Tanzania and Uganda were hampered by external factors outside the larger control of any economic regulation agreements such as the Kampala Agreement of 1994 and the Treaty for East African Cooperation of 1967. In addition, besides emerging the strongest agricultural economy in the region, Kenya’s ambitious education system produced highly educated and skilled people (Oucho et al. 2013: 32). Kenya’s trait as to economic deftness is therefore drawn from a case of historical convenience rather than what is portrayed as an intrinsic national quality, should such a thing naturally exist. It may be correct to conclude, however, that on the competence dimension, Kenyans are viewed as having high competence. Tanzanians, on the other hand, may be viewed as having low competence, again based on past events such as the protectionist measures the country has had to adopt in response to a less competitive inherited economic environment, and socialist ideological solutions whose goals did not favour individual profit over the community. The situation is exacerbated by the implications of the phrase “Coalition of the Willing,” which has been used to portray Tanzania as the thorn in the foot of East African integration, again speaking to its protectionism. With regard to political ideology, both Kenya and Tanzania responded relatively similarly to the colonial structures they had been left with, though there were fundamental differences to their approaches to, interpretation and application of socialism. Kenya ascribed to socialism as illustrated in a government document entitled “African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya” (Khapoya & Agyeman-​Duah 1985: 20). Tanzania went several steps further, with Nyerere refining the ideology and conceiving Ujamaa (family hood) calling for communal cooperation (Khapoya & Agyeman-​ Duah 1985: 20). Khapoya and Agyeman-​Duah describe that: A strict code for party and government leaders was adopted. Party structures were decentralized somewhat and set into motion to implement

Stereotyping and regional integration  115 ujamaa, and various campaigns were inaugurated exhorting Tanzanians to work hard, to produce more food, to be self-​reliant, and to be politically conscious, socialist men and women. (1985: 20) Tanzania was also insistent that self-​reliance was the only way to succeed after independence and rise above any threats of neo-​colonialism (Gordon 1987:  89). More evidence of Tanzania’s morally driven code can be found in its unwavering support for the revolutionary struggle for independence in Southern Africa (Khapoya & Agyeman-​Duah 1985: 20), and its military involvement in Uganda to unseat Idi Amin (Gordon 1987: 96). Perceived by many as having great personal appeal, integrity and charisma (Khapoya & Agyeman-​Duah 1985: 24), it is clear that the then-​President Nyerere was driven by a principled approach in conducting government affairs –​from spurring African unity through a push for East African Federation, to the development of a unique African socialism, to an insistence on self-​reliance at a hefty price, and his intervention in other countries’ plights at huge cost to his own economy and regional relations. This may have led Tanzania to be perceived as justice-​seeking, honest to a fault and incapable of wrongdoing, to the point that Kenyan leaders at times overestimated their ability over their Tanzanian counterparts (Gordon 1987: 94). Kenyan leaders were known to publicly ridicule Nyerere’s Ujamaa, claiming that “Kenya was feeding Tanzania and that, without the Kenyans, Tanzanians would be starving” (Khapoya & Agyeman-​ Duah 1985: 27). These choices, even though Tanzania has long changed its leadership and policies, could cast upon Tanzanian citizens the quality of high warmth. Their perceived irreproachability may be taken as a weakness to Kenyans, meaning that they may be viewed as non-​threatening. Kenya attempted to subscribe to some form of socialism, but could not practically achieve this as it had been the seat of capitalist colonial power. Pro-​Western forces eventually prevailed amid internal political battles with left-​leaning individuals (Branch 2011). Its development strategy took a capitalist course of “free enterprise, dedicated to attracting multinational firms through considerable economic concessions” (Khapoya & Agyeman-​Duah 1985: 24). Indeed, a series of military agreements were signed in 1980 with respect to giving the US access to naval facilities and air force bases in Mombasa and in the interior of the country (Khapoya & Agyeman-​Duah 1985: 25). It would not be difficult to imagine Nyerere’s disapproval of this Western interference as all these actions are vociferously inconsistent with his guiding motto of self-​reliance. Because stereotypic warmth plays on perceived cooperativeness and competitiveness, which includes a group’s perceived values (Fiske 2018: 68), it is correct to infer that in light of the value conflict exhibited in the past between the two countries, Kenya is viewed as possessing low warmth. Additionally, stereotypes around perceived intelligence in the region have been closely linked to the Swahili language and its prominence in individual societies in Kenya and Tanzania. After its independence in 1964, Tanzania

116  Patricia Ouma elected to have Swahili as the country’s national language and the primary language of instruction in primary schools (Iruoma 2017). In February 2015, the then-​President Jakaya Kikwete adopted Swahili as the language of instruction for both primary and secondary schools (Iruoma 2017), solidifying its importance as the preferential language in Tanzania. Conversely, in Kenya, public attitude towards Swahili has been considerably negative, especially among the youth, who view it as a language typically used by uneducated people (Mukhwana 2014). As noted by Mungai, “middle and upper middle-​class children in Kenya, for example, are socialised to speak Kiswahili specifically to domestic workers, drivers and gardeners included and are less likely to speak the language among themselves” (Mungai 2011). This worrying perception, that people who speak Swahili (without adequate knowledge of English) are uneducated and poor, may have contributed to the stereotype that Tanzanians, who are majority-​Swahili speakers, are generally uneducated and therefore incompetent. The third context revolves around the relationship experienced between the two countries in the setting of regional cooperation. These events reinforce the stereotype combinations discussed. As already explained, the somewhat justifiable protectionism displayed by Tanzania against Kenya’s stronger economy may have led to some perceived incompetence by Kenyans towards Tanzanians. Some of the protectionist measures would be lifted during the “good times” but quickly re-​imposed when relations began to sour again. Gordon asserts that “the Amin coup was the decisive event in the downfall of the EAC, [but] the immediate cause of its breakup in 1977 was failed brinkmanship by both Kenya and Tanzania” (1987: 93). In the beginning of 1977, Kenya purported to use equipment from the shared East African Airways to set up its own national airway, believing that Tanzania would not retaliate (Gordon 1987:  93). The unilateral action by Kenya served to buttress the already perceived low warmth stereotype that had been developing against it over the years. Indeed, in 1978, Nyerere referred to Kenya as a “man-​eat-​man society,” to which Jomo Kenyatta retorted that Tanzania was a “man-​eat-​ nothing society” (Kanyabwoya 2015). On the other hand, Kenya’s expectation of Tanzanian acquiescence proves the latter’s perceived high warmth. Tanzania, however, hit back by closing the border between itself and Kenya, and as a result, Kenya’s access to other markets such as Zambia was fatally restricted (Gordon 1987: 93). This reaction by Tanzania is interesting in that it demonstrates the immutability or, at least, the intractability of stereotypes (Schneider 2005: 379). Tanzania has engaged in several acts of injurious retaliation or outright protectionism and yet the warm stereotype endures because of the underreaction that stereotypes provoke. Another source of tension between the two was Kenya’s continued trade with Uganda despite Idi Amin’s corrupt and authoritarian proclivities. During this period, Kenya continued to supply oil to Uganda from its refinery in Mombasa (Gordon 1987: 93). This may have given momentum to Kenya’s severe profit-​seeking perception and thus cold stereotype. Nyerere’s and thus Tanzania’s belief

Stereotyping and regional integration  117 (factoring in metonymy) in principled actions also stands out here, speaking to its high warmth stereotype. In summary, an inference may be drawn that Kenya fits within the mixed stereotype of low warmth-​high competence, while Tanzania can be said to fall within the directly opposite high warmth-​low competence mixed stereotype. This, according to the Stereotype Content Model, would therefore evoke from Tanzanians emotions deriving from envious prejudice such as envy and resentment towards their Kenyan contemporaries, while Kenyans would hold a paternalistic prejudice, evoking emotions such as pity and sympathy.

Testing the stereotype content model in East African integration Having conceptualised stereotypes, and attempted to analyse historical incidents that may have given rise to them or built momentum on their uptake, it is necessary to understand how these stereotypes affect regional integration, and specifically the free movement of people. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Partner States have agreed to ease restrictions on free movement, establishment and residence rights under the Common Market Protocol. This is a crucial step in the attainment of political federation, which has been gaining traction over the years as exemplified by the Heads of State’s “fast-​ tracking mood” (Oucho 2013: 107). The protocol and annexes, which elaborate in greater detail the rights and freedoms to be exercised, direct the Partner States in the following way. Articles nine to sixteen, and annexes one to five provide that citizens of Partner States may enter visa-​free and move freely within the Community, and should not be faced with discrimination on grounds of nationality. Workers are also permitted to move freely, and Partner States are required to adhere to the non-​ discrimination requirement in relation to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work including applying and accepting employment offers. Nationals of Partner States are also guaranteed the right of establishment and residence in each other’s territories, and Partner States are required to remove the relevant restrictions and to refrain from introducing new ones. With respect to free movement of services, the Partner States have agreed to progressively remove existing restrictions and, again, to refrain from introducing new ones. The lasting effects of stereotypes are evident from the consistent economic and political wars between the two countries. One such observation can be made with respect to the denial of a work permit by Tanzanian authorities to Sylvia Mulinge, a Kenyan citizen. On 28 September 2018, Vodacom Tanzania, the country’s largest telecommunications company, released a press statement stating that Ms Sylvia Mulinge had been denied a work permit by the Labour Commissioner of the Republic of Tanzania to work as the company’s managing director (The Citizen 2018). This press release followed almost five months of unresolved work permit issues that had effectively blocked Ms Mulinge from operating in Tanzania (The Citizen 2018).

118  Patricia Ouma While the Labour Commissioner did not publicly disclose the reasons for its decision, media reports suggested that the authority believed that there were Tanzanians who were qualified for the job (The Citizen 2018). It was widely assumed that the said action by the Tanzanian authorities continued to exemplify the strained relationship between Kenya and Tanzania (Bonyo 2018) despite the existence of the Common Market Protocol which expressly prohibits this kind of discrimination on grounds of nationality. The protocol’s fail-​safe, found in Article 10 (9), states that the national laws and administrative procedures of a Partner State will not apply in a case like this “where the principal aim or effect is to deny citizens of other Partner States the employment that has been offered.” Even this may be caught in the same trap of implementation failure if stereotypes persist. The Stereotype Content Model prediction with respect to the cold-​ competent stereotype may be said to be at work here. These actions reveal the perceived threat posed by Kenyans and the lack of trust for them, i.e. low warmth, as well as their ability to carry out the perceived threat. Underlying feelings of resentment and envy could therefore account for the discrimination displayed by Tanzanian authorities, in the full glare of the law prohibiting it. At a basic level, it is evident that stereotypes militate against integration in the Community. Ms Mulinge, being Kenyan, represented the cold, profit-​seeking, low morality, high competence perceptions generally held by Tanzanians towards Kenyans, driving the authorities to deny the issuance of her work permit. The likely consequence of these discriminative actions may be that Kenyans who wish to exercise their free movement rights are discouraged from migrating to Tanzania, in spite of the accommodations offered under the Common Market Protocol. The stereotypes displayed between the two countries thus become a socio-​ cultural and economic border, which the current migration management mechanisms fail to look into, creating long-​ lasting impediments to regional integration. In January 2018, the Kenyan media reported that scores of Kenyan nationals living and working in Tanzania, some of whom had acquired Tanzanian citizenship, were targeted, declared prohibited immigrants and deported, leading to loss of jobs, property and separation from their kin (Nandiemo 2018). Some students recounted how Tanzanians consider them thieves, and as a result, they were prone to public humiliation because Tanzanian police officers would mishandle them for no apparent reason (Nandiemo 2018). In the same vein, in August 2018, Kenyan traders organised a protest at the Kenya–​Tanzania border at Namanga, where they alleged harassment by Tanzanian immigration officials who perceived them as taking employment opportunities away from Tanzanian nationals (Business Daily 2018). It has also been reported that Kenyan companies with operations in Tanzania face difficulties in the Tanzanian market mainly imposed by authorities through discriminative fees and licences (Mburu 2020). Some banks have stated that they may have to consider mergers or acquisitions in order to stay afloat (Mburu 2020).

Stereotyping and regional integration  119 These measures go against the express guarantees in the Common Market Protocol committing all Partner States to uphold free movement of people, labour and services, freedom of establishment and freedom of residence. The measures also affirm Tanzanians’ perception of Kenyans as being cold and competent, with the negative straits of perceived corruption and lack of principles even being attached to Kenyan students. These unfavourable stereotypes are used to justify the flagrant discrimination demonstrated as a result of emotions emanating from envious prejudice. Striking sentiments have been raised by ordinary Kenyans on social media platforms in the wake of the trade wars between Kenya and Tanzania that reveal the pressing status of East African cohesion. Tanzania’s multiple (unlawful) trade tariffs on Kenyan goods, and Kenya’s occasional retaliation (Karashani 2019), have been heavily debated on Twitter. The said tariffs resulted in an online protest in January 2019 where Kenyans, via the hashtag “FairTradeKe,” shared their views on Tanzania’s restrictive policies, and regional integration more generally (Okoth 2019). One Kenyan tweeted, “We should build a wall along the border with Tanzania! …Promote trade and manufacturing within. #fairTradeKe,” (Okoth 2019). Other reflections similarly urged the Government of Kenya to take such recourse. This “Build the Wall” rhetoric, which bears resemblance with similar sentiments famously used by President Donald Trump of the US, is essentially a call for the creation of a physical manifestation of the deepening social and cultural divide between Kenya and Tanzania which perpetuates an unhelpful “You versus Us” mentality. Therefore, just as the “Build the Wall” political slogan has reportedly strained US–​Mexico relations (BBC 2019), the said sentiment poses a threat to the cohesion necessary for successful inter-​East African migration. Moreover, in June 2019, the Kenyan media reported on an undated video where a popular Kenyan Member of Parliament issued a 24-​hour ultimatum to foreign traders including Tanzanians, who, in his opinion, were taking away job opportunities for the Kenyan locals (NTV Kenya 2019). In the said video, he warned that if the foreign traders did not vacate their shops, they would face forceful evictions (NTV Kenya 2019). These two incidents do not necessarily support Kenya’s perceptions of Tanzania according to the Stereotype Content Model. It is, however, important to note the contexts in which these incidents take place. The sentiments expressed in the social media rants were in response to what was perceived as Tanzania’s protectionism and, going by the historical analysis and application of the model, Tanzania’s incompetence. The second incident involving a call for the expulsion of all “foreign workers” is limited in its effect on the model’s results because the outburst was in respect of specific small-​scale businesses rather than the economy as a whole, and targeted other foreign workers including those from Uganda and China. It is also doubtful that the parliamentarian in question was aware of the intricacies of regional law or any law for that matter (KTN News 2019). As regards Kenya’s actions towards Tanzanians, there is not much reported on acts that would overtly infer paternalistic prejudice. Perhaps that in itself

120  Patricia Ouma upholds the stereotype that Tanzanians fall within the high warmth –​low competence category, as there is no significant evidence showing that Kenyans feel that Tanzanians pose a significant threat which they are likely to see through. Paternalistic stereotypes portray out-​groups that are neither inclined nor capable of harming members of the in-​group (Fiske et  al. 2002:  879). In fact, in 2017, the Kenyan government, through the Ministry of Health, had no qualms putting out a request to the Tanzanian government for 500 doctors to be employed in Kenya to help revive the medical sector (Wamuswa & Thiongo 2017). The plans, however, collapsed due to the failure of the two countries to finalise on the agreement, and possibly because the move was part of a ploy by the Kenyan government to avoid signing a collective bargaining agreement with striking Kenyan doctors (Wamuswa & Thiongo 2017). The Community is often lauded as the most advanced and ambitious regional bloc in Africa (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2018). This may be true because other regional arrangements on the continent tend to have relatively modest goals, whose achievement may not require the kind of unity espoused by the East African Treaty whose ultimate goal is to form a political federation. It may indeed be several steps ahead of its regional counterparts in terms of free movement of goods and factors of production, but against the backdrop of its advanced objectives, it is, in fact, lagging behind. In the grand scheme of (African) things, the Community’s larger-​than-​life objectives and ensuing laws and policies on migration are derailed by smaller implicit factors such as stereotypes. From the encounters above, it seems impractical to have robust laws on the rights involving free movement of people, when there are latent perceptions that openly obscure any desires the two countries may have to be associated with one another. These perceptions need to be managed before any kind of regulation can be effective. While migration management in East Africa to a large extent addresses the elimination of physical borders to achieve the desired level on unification, less has been done to tackle the symbolic borders that exist as a result of complex historical encounters. The illustrations above illuminate an urgent need to create migration policies that dissect socio-​ cultural borders just as much (if not more) as they serve physical borders.

Conclusion Manuel Castells, speaking of European integration, urged the importance of settling cultural and political dimensions essential to the unification of a region (2000). He stated that “the fate of Europe will ultimately depend … on solving historical puzzles posed by … the shift from the nation-​state to the network state” (Castells 2000). This theme equally applies to East African integration, which has also had its share of prolonged historical complexities. The fulfilment of the objectives of the Community is dependent on the will of the nationals of each Partner State; from the very top of the leadership to the last cross-​border trader. The Community has gone through a number of

Stereotyping and regional integration  121 upheavals and even total disintegration due to rising tensions exacerbated by stereotypes that tend to oversimplify situations. Even if accurate, they provide little room for change, thus imposing abstract straightjackets (Schneider 2005: 22). Indeed, the Community’s accomplishments are belittled by political positions that focus on national generalisations. These stereotypes have been deployed by prejudiced people to justify discrimination against the nationals of the two Partner States, and have, on a number of occasions, derailed the course East African integration. Nationals from either state are thus limited in their interactions, making it prohibitive to exercise the free movement, labour, establishment and residence rights guaranteed by the Treaty and the Common Market Protocol. It is important to remember that stereotypes are good or bad depending on the group holding the belief. In the same way, Kenya’s perceived economic assertiveness may generally be seen as a good thing to third parties who may view it as good work ethic and the right attitude for success. However, those with different economic approaches may be confounded by the other’s organisation of priorities. The evaluative nature of stereotypes is extremely fleeting. In fact, stereotypes are considered to be good or bad because of the politics of interpersonal behaviour rather than the contents of the stereotypes themselves (Schneider 2005:  22). It would make better sense, therefore, to objectively focus on the contents themselves and see how they align and can be used to achieve the goal at hand. It has been demonstrated how stereotypical traits such as “man-​eat-​man” and “man-​eat-​nothing” societies that pit populations against each other, and are perpetuated by trusted leaders, are imminently fatal to regional integration. It will certainly do the Community well if those in power limit their use of divisive rhetoric, especially in periods of heightened tensions which draw enough attention to advance stereotypes. The media also has a crucial role to play when reporting events. It creates an imagined national community, and has the power to define who is in and who is out, thus creating invisible borders (Laine 2019: 34). As media has the power to set the agenda and tone, it should highlight the positive aspects of both Kenyans and Tanzanians. Several developments take place that stand as evidence against negative national stereotypes. Rather than focus on negative traits, it is important that the media also provide enough space for any new information that has the potential to change either country’s most distinctive perceived negative qualities. To help eradicate these invisible borders, Laine (2019) suggests that the media should limit the persistent circulation of materials that feature “overly patriotic undertones” and give more holistic perspectives. This point has been amplified by Moyo and Nshimbi (2020) in the case of the South African media which has erected symbolic borders between citizens and migrants from African countries. The authors posit that the same media can play a role in obliterating this divide and thus forge unity, integration and a Pan-​African identity. Most importantly, it is critical that nationals of each Partner State understand the processes that have led to the current state of affairs. It is important

122  Patricia Ouma that the education systems in each of the countries place emphasis on the learning of the histories of all Partner States so as to enable them understand how societies work, and identify similarities and reasons for various divergences. This may provide a sturdier foundation for basing decisions off of rather than misunderstood stereotypes. Laine (2020) elaborates on the idea that nationalism seeks unification and homogeneity through drawing boundaries between natives and aliens. Appreciating that the boundaries within the Community were not drawn on any such basis would remove the false sense of nationalism currently used as the justification for “othering”. Anything short of these modest recommendations would ensure that the most useful qualities possessed by Kenyan and Tanzanian citizens would be overlooked based on widely misconceived prejudgments. There is no question then, that the Community would not be able to reap the full advantage of regional integration.

Notes 1 The “Coalition of the Willing” is the common name given to the Tripartite Initiative for Fast-​tracking East African Integration, which entailed fast-​tracking certain elements of implementation of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, to the exclusion of Tanzania and Burundi, which were seen as dragging their feet in the integration process (see Kamanga 2018). 2 Treaty for East African Cooperation, 1967, Art 2 (1). 3 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999, Preamble. 4 Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, 1999. 5 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 1999, art 11(1).

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8  The Maghreb and intra-​African migration One challenge and different strategies Said Saddiki

Introduction The Maghreb has been for several decades a gateway for irregular migrants wishing to get to the northern shores of the Mediterranean. Today, the Maghreb countries are no longer a waiting room for those migrants but also a place of permanent residence for thousands of Africans for various reasons, especially the great difficulty in reaching Europe. There are many reasons that make the Maghreb a destination for an increasing number of irregular migrants. In addition to its geographical proximity to Europe, the Maghreb has strong historic and cultural religious ties with Sahel and West African countries, which are the main source of African migrants living in the Maghreb. Although there are some Maghreb investors in sub-​Saharan countries, the relation between the two African regions in terms of migration is one-​way: from sub-​Saharan Africa to the Maghreb. Although there are various overland routes used by sub-​Saharan African migrants to reach the Maghreb as a last destination or only as a transit point to cross to Europe, Niger, Mali and Senegal remain the key transit points for West African migrants. For migrants from Central Africa and the Horn of Africa, they enter Libya directly across its borders with Sudan or Chad. The migration journey is not easy, and may take weeks or even months. Sometimes, migrants might be kidnapped, robbed, tortured and some of them abandoned to die in the desert before reaching their destination. For the purposes of this chapter, the Maghreb refers to five countries of the north-​western region of the African continent:  Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya (Figure  8.1). Towards the end of the Cold War, Maghreb states founded the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989. The AMU aimed at strengthening the relations between the Maghreb states and peoples, pursuing common policies, and gradually achieving the freedom of movement of people, services, goods and capital in the Maghreb region. After a few years, it practically stopped working because of political and security differences between Morocco and Algeria, especially on the Western Sahara issue and the continued closure of the land border between the two countries since 1994. Indeed, the AMU has been dormant since 1995. Accordingly, it has no role today in managing intra-​African migration in the Maghreb region.

The Maghreb and intra-African migration  127

Figure 8.1 Maghreb region.

For the present purposes intra-​Africa migration is generally used to refer to the response by AMU to migration from outside the region, that is, migrants from sub-​ Saharan Africa. Although nationals of most of the Maghreb countries can travel freely across the region without visa requirements, this presents a very small percentage of African migration in the region. In general, Maghreb migrants prefer to move to Europe rather than to circulate in the region. Therefore, currently migration within AMU does not pose a challenge to the Maghreb countries. One of the great challenges facing the Maghreb countries is to include a large number of migrants from outside the region (sub-​Saharan Africa) in fragile and vulnerable local socio-​economic structures. Moreover, the governments of the Maghreb countries face various pressures and competing interests and demands: pressure of the EU to tighten border security, domestic constituencies’ preoccupations, the duty to respect rights of migrants and African governments’ demands.

128  Said Saddiki Due to the lack of regional cooperation and the paralysis of the AMU, Maghreb governments have adopted different approaches to managing intra-​ African migration. Some still focus more on security measures, others try to balance different internal needs and external pressures and others take advanced strategies to regularise a significant number of sub-​Saharan and integrate them into local communities. The chapter shows how each Maghreb country manages the intra-​African migration, with a focus on sub-​Saharan African migration, and addresses the main mechanisms by which they implement their migration policies.

Different and inconsistent migration policies Although recently the Maghreb countries adopted many laws and initiatives dealing with migration, almost all of them lack clear and comprehensive policies.

Morocco: an advanced and pragmatic migration policy At the beginning of the twenty-​first century, Morocco began to adopt a reactive policy on the issue of migration at the legal and institutional level, and also to engage actively in regional cooperation in managing irregular migration. Morocco is the first country in the Maghreb to adopt a comprehensive and specific migration law in 2003 (Kingdom of Morocco 2003). This law falls within both Morocco’s attempts to control the new waves of migration and to respond to the dialogue in which it has engaged with the Europeans (Mrabet 2017:  115). In 2017, Morocco announced a new vision of managing intra-​African migration aimed at regularising the legal situation of thousands of sub-​Saharan African migrants who were able to obtain a residence permit. This policy represents an important shift in approach to the management of irregular migration compared to the rest of the Maghreb. The key ideas of this new vision were derived from the King Mohamed VI speech to the 5th African Union-​European Union Summit on 29 November 2017, in which he defined the road map of Morocco’s African view of migration and urged African states to consolidate their efforts in a “full-​fledged Agenda” to “speak with one African voice” on the migration issue. Also, he stressed that migration and the population movement have been always a key determinant of African-​European relations. This new policy is based on the principle of shared responsibility between concerned parties  –​migrant-​emitting, transit and destination countries –​that should coordinate their efforts in managing migration flows. The cornerstone of this policy is to regularise the situation of irregular migrants and enable them and their families to benefit from public services such as education and health, as well as access to the labour market. The regularisation of the legal status of thousands of African Migrants and refugees does not necessarily imply their integration into the local socio-​economic life.

The Maghreb and intra-African migration  129 Morocco may succeed in the regularisation process, but it will face many difficulties in the integration process, which requires significant economic and institutional capabilities. Additionally, this new migration policy towards the sub-​Saharan migrants serves Morocco’s new foreign policy agenda, as it is an important component of its African strategy (Saddiki 2018). This strategy aims to increase Morocco’s presence and influence in the continent through various means, including soft power (Malka 2018: 16). Meanwhile, it should be noted that Morocco reaffirms in the constitution of 2011 its commitment to strengthen cooperation and solidarity relations with African peoples and countries, mainly sub-​Saharan and Sahel countries.

Algeria: a security-​based and reluctant migration policy The management of intra-​African migration in Algeria is still overshadowed by security and criminal concerns. Algeria’s migration policy has been influenced by different security challenges faced during recent three decades. The sub-​ Saharan migrants have been seen by the Algerian authorities as security issue. On 7 July 2017, Ahmed Ouyahia, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s cabinet chief, described irregular migration as chaos and source of criminality and drugs (Human Rights Watch 2017). In the same sense, Abdelkader Messahel, former foreign affairs minister, stated on 11 July 2017 that sub-​Saharan migrants represented a threat to national security and engaged in human trafficking (France24 2017). In 2008, the Algerian government passed a new law concerning the entry, movement and residence of foreigners in Algeria, which was primarily designed to manage sub-​Saharan migration. This law criminalises irregular migration and gives more power to regional and local authorities to deport irregular migrants. In addition to security concerns, the non-​inclusive culture is among the main factors that make Algeria reluctant to adopt an advanced policy in settling the status of irregular sub-​Saharan migrants. In 2017, the government tried to adopt a new migration law aimed at regularising the situation of some irregular migrants but this initiative has been faced by an anti-​African migration campaign (Abderrahim 2019:  16). Although Algeria acceded to the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families (CRMW) on 21 April2005, national laws need a lot of amendment in order to comply with international standards regarding the management of irregular migration. Sub-​Saharan asylum seekers are not better off than irregular migrants. While Algeria has adopted all international refugee conventions, sub-​ Saharan refugees can be arrested along with irregular migrants (Chena 2016: 107; Bureau 2019: 12). Therefore, the main goal of the current Algerian’s migration policy is not to manage the situation of irregular sub-​Saharan migrants and integrate them in the local society, but to reduce their number and prevent those trying to enter the country. Algeria’s migration policy is less cooperative with the European policies compared to other Maghreb countries. Algeria’s relationship with the European Union is marred

130  Said Saddiki by distrust, so there is no serious dialogue between the two parties in managing irregular migration. Algeria’s reluctance to cooperate with the EU can be explained its sensitivity to external interference, which stems from its colonial history (Abderrahim 2019).

Tunisia: a hybrid and incomplete migration policy Before the 2011 revolution, Tunisia pursued a tight security policy against irregular migration. European countries used the former Tunisian regime as a useful guard to control their Mediterranean borders and externalise the migration issue (Geisser 2009: 4). One of the decisions that best illustrates the dominance of the security approach in managing the migration issue in that period is the conclusion of a readmission agreement between Tunisia and Italy on 28 January2009 (Geisser 2019: 5). On the other hand, the Benali regime sought from this close cooperation with the Europeans to persuade them to grant Tunisia the “advanced status” with the EU (Cassarion 2018: 302), which provided a high-​level political cooperation and preferential trade terms. After the 2011 Tunisia revolution, which was accompanied by an atmosphere of openness and freedom, new hopes have arisen for improving the treatment of migrants and the governance of the migration and asylum in Tunisia. One of the most important steps in this regard is the adoption of the new Tunisian constitution on 26 January 2016, which guarantees the right to political asylum and the prohibition of extradition of persons who have been granted political asylum (Article 26). However, the fragile political transition and the difficult economic situation, Tunisia has faced since the Arab Spring uprising, have not helped it to adopt a clear and integrated migration policy. The Tunisian labour law remains a major obstacle to the integration of migrants, as it is implicitly based on the principle of “national preference” (Geisser 2019: 140). As a result, thousands of African migrants work irregularly and do not benefit from social security and medical insurance. In the absence of a comprehensive legal framework on migration in Tunisia, the backbone of the current Tunisian migration policy is mainly based on outcomes of the dialogue between the Tunisian governments and the European countries concerned.

Mauritania: a preliminary and outsourced migration policy Since its independence, the borders of Mauritania have for many decades been open to African citizens and irregular migration to Mauritania has not been regarded as a clandestine act. Mauritania had not determined land border ports of entry until May 2011. Despite Mauritania’s long experience with different forms of migration (immigration, emigration, circulation, transit migration), it has not yet formulated a clear national migration policy. Mauritania has ratified most of the international instruments guaranteeing the rights of migrants and refugees and passed some separate laws indirectly

The Maghreb and intra-African migration  131 related to migration issue, but they have no significant effect and do not constitute an integrated migration policy. Therefore, there is no policy to systematically integrate African migrants into local economic and social life. Most of the actions carried out by the Mauritanian authorities are the implementation of its commitments to European countries, especially Spain and France. In other words, the important effort of the Mauritanian authorities is to prevent irregular migrants from using its lands as a transit point to move to Europe. Mauritania is today a field for implementing the EU policy of externalisation of migration and asylum control. Recently, the Mauritania government has begun to intensify its cooperation with international actors interested in migration and asylum, including UNHCR and IOM. Mauritania may be able to manage irregular migration within certain limits, but it would face difficulties in developing an effective and integrated migration policy even if it received a significant support from international actors. Because such policy will always be affected by Mauritania’s requirements to European countries and weak economic and institutional capabilities

Libya: no migration policy, only scattered measures Unlike other Maghreb countries, Libya has always been a destination for African migrant workers since the 1970s with the increase in oil revenues. In 2000s, Libya has also become a transit country for an increasing number of migrants from Africa and Asia seeking to enter Europe. Before the 2011 revolution, documented migrant workers constituted 11 per cent of Libyan population (Aghazarm, Quesada and Tishler 2012: 18). The Gaddafi regime had been using the migration issue selectively in foreign policy to enhance its relations with African countries, as well as to pressure Europeans (Squires 2010). In 2009, Italy struck a bargain with Libya to prevent irregular migrants, most of whom were from sub-​Saharan Africa, to reach the other side of the Mediterranean (Tinti and Reitano 2017: 91). Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya has been plagued by civil war and political division. The International Organization of Migration (IOM) estimates that more than 790,000 migrant workers fled violence in Libya during the 2011 crisis (Aghazarm, Quesada and Tishler 2012: 5). Other regular migrant workers, after the overthrow of the old regime, found themselves in an irregular situation, subjected to persecution, torture and arbitrary detention. Organised crime networks, such as those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, have proliferated. As for the sub-​Saharan refugees, their situation is still uncomfortable. Libya lacks the legal framework that regulates asylum and has not yet joined the 1951 Refugee Convention. In the absence of a unified central authority that can exercise full and effective control over the entire Libyan territory and is able to monitor its border and migrant detention centres, it is not possible to talk about the existence of a migration policy in Libya. Today there is a mixture of “scattered” measures in the field of migration that find their sources in various old laws and also

132  Said Saddiki in agreements and memoranda that the Tripoli government made with some international actors, especially Italy, the IOM and the High Commissioner for Refugees.

Maghreb migration policy mechanisms The Maghreb states, like other regions facing various waves of migration, are trying to tackle this phenomenon with different mechanisms: legal, security and regional cooperation.

Legal mechanisms The legal framework is the backbone of the migration policy. This framework finds its source in national legislation and international obligations of the Maghreb states. The lack of comprehensive and coherent policies is also reflected in the diversity of the legal framework. In Morocco, a law concerning the entry and residence of foreigners and irregular emigration and immigration was enacted in 2003 to unify the national legislation on migration. This law was passed in an international context characterised by the fight against terrorism, so it was affected by security concerns. The 2003 law determines the conditions of access to the national territory and the conditions of regularisation of irregular situations and establishes two residence permits:  the registration card and the residence card. Given that the security and political conditions have changed, and also taking into account the development of the Moroccan legal framework, this law needs to be revised in order to be consistent with both the constitution of 2011 and Morocco’s National Migration and Asylum Strategy of 2013 (Elmorchid and Hourmat-​Alla 2018: 240). The constitution of 2011 states in Article 30 that foreigners enjoy the fundamental freedoms recognised to Moroccan citizens and foreign residents can participate in local elections. In 2017, Morocco started regularising thousands of sub-​Saharan African migrants who were able to obtain a residence permit. This regularisation concerned six categories: foreigners married to Moroccan nationals, foreign spouses of other foreigners who were legally resident in Morocco, children born from the two above-​mentioned cases, foreigners with effective employment contracts, foreigners with five years of continuous residence in Morocco and foreigners with chronic diseases. In Algeria, the entry, movement and residence of foreigners in the country are regulated by the Law 08-​ 11 issued on 25 June 2008. In accordance with the Palermo Protocol, Algeria amended, on 25 February2009, the penal code to add some crimes for irregular entry into and departure from the national territory, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. With these two laws, Algeria tightens the sanctions against those involved in irregular migration, as well as irregular migrants themselves, whether nationals or foreigners (Bartolomeo, Jaulin and Perrin 2010:  6). Although Algeria acceded to the CRMW on 21 April 2005, it has not yet been applied. Even if migrants have a

The Maghreb and intra-African migration  133 work permit, they cannot yet enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights granted by the convention (Kerdoun 2009:  49). Moreover, jobs in public sector are reserved for nationals, with the exception of employment contracts in education. Algerian national laws, like other Maghreb countries, need to be amended to comply with international standards regarding the management of irregular migration. In short, Algeria lacks a comprehensive legal framework for migration and asylum. Even if, current laws include some provisions regulating some aspects of migration, especially entry and residency in the country, but they do not include mechanisms to integrate migrants, most of them from sub-​Sahara Africa. In post-​revolution Tunisia, many laws related to the migration issue inherited from the previous regime, which were overshadowed by security and criminal concerns, are still applying. Furthermore, Tunisia is the only Maghreb country that has not yet adopted the CRMW and still lacks a national law of asylum, although the constitution of 2014 guarantees the right of political asylum (article 26). There are three laws that form the backbone of the legal framework of migration in Tunisia: the 2004 Law on passports and travel documents, the 1968 Law 68-​07 on foreign nationals and the 1968 Decree 198 regulating the entry and stay of foreign nationals in Tunisia. The continued application of the old laws, which were adopted in different security and political contexts, shows the weakness of legal regulation of migration in post-​revolution Tunisia. Therefore, these laws do not help African migrants to settle safely in Tunisia, as they restrict their movement and subject them to penalties. These laws were passed primarily to fight irregular migration and punish those who violate the rules of entry, exit and residence in the country, and not to regulate migration. The content of Tunisia’s current legal framework on migration contradicts the goals of the 2011 revolution, so it is expected that in the coming years, if Tunisia achieves political stability and significant economic growth, it should change fundamentally migration legal system. This legal reform is important not only to bring national law into conformity with international standards but also to improve Tunisia’s relations and influence in sub-​Saharan Africa. In Mauritania, partial laws, directly and indirectly related to migration, have been enacted since the mid-​1960s, including Decree 64.169 of 15 December 1964, on migration in Mauritania; Law 65.046 of 23 February 1965, on criminal provisions relating to the migration system; Decree 74.092 of 19 April 1974, on condition of employment of foreign labour and work permit; and the 2004 Labour code. Also, Mauritania has ratified the main international instruments concerning migration, including the CRMW and the fundamental International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions (El Yessa 2009). With regard to asylum, Mauritian has not yet adopted a national law of asylum. However, in 2005, the Mauritanian authorities issued the Decree 2005–​022 that lays down the conditions for the implementation of international conventions relating to refugees (Mauritania 2005). In general, Mauritanian law is more generous to migrants than other Maghreb laws. It does not place upon foreigners’ significant restrictions to

134  Said Saddiki work. For example, the 2004 Labour Code requires only a work permit, while the migration law requires only a legal entry to be able to work in the country. Mauritania’s law grants the same rights for migrant workers as for nationals. Migrants are protected by the provisions of Decree 74.092 of 19 April 1974, which sets the conditions for the employment of foreigners (El Yessa 2008: 7). Despite this great tolerance of Mauritanian legislation with African migrants, it remains outdated and incomplete. Even if, in future, Mauritania makes an advanced and comprehensive legal system, its economic situation will not allow it to truly integrate African migrants. The successful integration of migrants requires not only a legal framework, but also advanced economic and institutional capabilities. In Libya, the bulk of the current legal framework of migration was adopted under the previous regime. As the European Commission reported in 2014, Libya’s legal and regulatory framework on migration is poor, fragmented and not harmonised (European Commission 2014). Libyan Law tightens penalties for irregular migration and considers it as a crime. For example, Law no. 19 of 2010 on Combating Irregular Migration stipulates in Article 6 that: “illegal migrants will be placed in detention and condemned to forced labour in jail or a fine of 1000 Libyan dinars and be expelled from the Libyan territory after serving sentence.” After the 2011 revolution, the legal status of migrants and refugees has worsened due to the collapse of state institutions and the absence of an adequate legal system protecting their rights. Although the existing laws include important rights for migrants, they are not respected due to police ignorance of the law and also because of the weakness of Libyan institutional framework (European Commission 2014). Additionally, Sub-​Saharan migrants cannot benefit from refugee status in Libya because it is not party to the 1951 Convention (IOM 2017: 1) and also because Libyan law does not distinguish between asylum seekers and irregular migrants.

Security mechanisms The first thing governments usually do to counter irregular migration is to strengthen the control of their borders and try to prevent migrants from entering the country. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have fortified important parts of their borders by building fences and sand walls, and digging trenches. Preventing sub-​Saharan migrants from entering the country is the essential goal of the fence erected by Morocco in 2014 along its northeast border with Algeria. The Morocco–​Algeria border has been for a long time the main entry of sub-​Saharan migrants living in Morocco. The Western Sahara wall, even if it was established for military reasons in the mid-​1970s, today is playing an important goal in preventing or at least reducing irregular migrants (Saddiki 2012: 207). In addition to the sophisticated fences built by Spain along the borders of the two enclaves Ceuta and Melilla since 1993, Morocco built its fence on the border of Melilla to prevent irregular migrants from entering the Spanish-​controlled town. At the beginning of 2013, Algeria dug trenches on

The Maghreb and intra-African migration  135 its western border with Morocco and, in the subsequent year, made its borders with five neighbouring countries, including Morocco, as military zones. These barriers were intended to fight terrorist threats, but they undoubtedly made the movement of irregular migrants across the border difficult and dangerous. On the Tunisian–​Libyan border, Tunisia built in 2015 a 220 km double border barrier consisting of water trenches and a sand wall to counter the infiltration of armed groups from Libya into Tunisia. To strengthen the border control system, the Maghreb countries have adapted existing institutions or created new ones to confront transnational security challenges, including irregular migration. In 2003, Morocco created the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The primary function of this government agency is to monitor borders and combat irregular emigration and immigration (Lahlou 2015: 105). In the same year, a National Observatory on Migration was set up to centralise information related to migration, conduct research on migration flows and propose concrete measures on managing this issue (Lahlou 2015: 241). In May 2014, Algeria transferred land border management with six neighbouring states from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of National Defense (Saddiki 2020: 109). To strengthen border control, Algeria established the Directorate of Border and Migration Police as one of the five specialised departments of the Directorate General of National Security, to monitor border ports of entry and exit, and cross border movement of persons. In Mauritania, the Ministry of the Interior created in 2010 the General Road Safety Group, headed by the National Guard, in charge of combating trafficking and irregular migration (Salem 2011:  7). In Libya, the Ministry of Interior established the Directorate of Combating Illegal Migration in 2014, whose main functions include managing migration, combating irregular migration, and operating migrant detention centres (El Zaidy 2019:  6). However, the turbulent security and political situations in Libya do not allow this institution to carry out its tasks effectively. In all Maghreb countries, the Ministry of the Interior remains the primary organ entrusted with managing intra-​African migration. Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice, have only a secondary role. Because of the large territory of some Maghreb countries, long porous borders (Algeria, Mauritania and Libya) and weak capacities, most Maghreb countries, especially Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia, resort to seeking external support to manage irregular migration and control different forms of cross-​border movement.

Regional cooperation The regional cooperation is among the key mechanisms by which the Maghreb countries mange intra-​African irregular migration. This regional cooperation can be seen at three levels of action:  Euro-​Mediterranean,

136  Said Saddiki Maghreb-​sub-​Saharan and intra-​Maghreb. At the Euro-​Mediterranean level, the Maghreb has always been one of the main priorities of the EU’s migration policy. According to the IOM, more than 2.5 million migrants had irregularly reached Europe from the southern Mediterranean Sea since the 1970s until September 2017 (IOM 2017: 9). That is why the EU constantly strives to involve the Maghreb countries in its policies aimed at preventing irregular migration. The Maghreb countries always take part in Euro-​Mediterranean partnership and cooperation processes in managing migration, including: the Euro-​ African Migration and Development Dialogue (the Rabat Process), the EU-​Africa Dialogue, the Euro-​Mediterranean Partnership, the 5+5 Dialogue and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). This cooperation with Europeans can take different forms. The dialogue can be multilateral with the EU or bilateral between one of the Maghreb countries and the concerned EU member, especially Spain, France and Italy. The dialogue between the EU and the Maghreb countries on migration started at the beginning of 1990s, with the 1990 Western Mediterranean Forum (known also as the 5+5 Dialogue). The Forum includes the five Maghreb states (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya) and five member states of the EU (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta). In 2002, a significant shift in terms of relationship between the EU and third countries took place. At the Seville Summit on 22 June 2002, the European Council urged that future cooperation and association agreements between the EU and third countries should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of irregular migration (European Commission 2002). In other words, the European Union has begun to use its relations and aid to the Maghreb countries as a means of pressure to engage them more actively to guard the southern European borders and prevent irregular migration. Despite the important progress in the relations between the two sides on migration, there are still some contentious issues, especially the readmission of third country nationals, the majority of whom are from sub-​Saharan Africa. At the Maghreb-​Sub-​Saharan level, they are some forums of dialogue and coordination on migration, in which the EU is playing a leading role. The Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) Dialogue, which was established in 2003 and the Euro-​African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process), which was established in 2006 are among those forums that comprise Maghreb and some Sub-​Saharan countries under the auspices of the EU. All these initiatives focus more on preventing irregular migration and addressing its effects, rather than fighting the root causes. In addition to these multilateral forums, each Maghreb country has bilateral conventions with sub-​Saharan countries in managing migration flows. Some Maghreb countries provide “preferential” treatment for nationals of some sub-​Saharan African countries. For example, Mauritania has many agreements with African countries that allow their citizens to enter the territory of Mauritania

The Maghreb and intra-African migration  137 with only national identity card, especially citizens of the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Ould Salek 2008). Also, Algeria allows Malian nationals to enter the country without a visa. On the other hand, cooperation with sub-​Saharan Africa provides an opportunity for the Maghreb countries to enhance their influence on the African continent. At the intra-​ Maghreb level, there is almost no cooperation on intra-​ African migration, except for what is associated with protecting borders and encountering some security challenges. The Maghreb sub-​system inherited from the Cold War, which is marked in particular by the Algerian-​Moroccan competition and the question of Western Sahara, obstructs cooperation on the management of migration and other irregular cross-​border movements. The Arab Maghreb Union, which was created in 1989 to boost regional co-​ operation, has stopped working since the early 1990s.

Conclusion Compared to other African regions, the Maghreb is distinguished by its specific socio-​ economic, demographic and cultural composition, and its proximity to Europe. The geographical location of the Maghreb is the main factor attracting sub-​Saharan African migrants to go to the Maghreb. The Maghreb, as a region of emigration, immigration and transit migration, faces various challenges in managing these various waves of migration in response to internal needs and international requirements. As intra-​African migration has become a constant social, economic and security phenomenon in the Maghreb, the countries of the region need comprehensive and long-​term policies to effectively manage the issue. Moreover, given that intra-​African migration in the Maghreb is linked to different regions: Africa, Europe and the Mediterranean, it requires an inclusive strategy engaging all parties concerned, including sub-​Saharan countries. The current Maghreb regional subsystem, which has been shaped by different political and historical factors, especially the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria for regional influence, prevents the Maghreb countries from cooperating to manage intra-​African migration and other cross-​ border issues. The absence of this regional cooperation not only has security implications, but also exacerbates the suffering of migrants.

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9  Integration, borders and migration in West Africa Lessons from European Schengen Area Ernest Toochi Aniche

Introduction Intra-​regional migration is not new in West Africa. Long before colonialism, people had been migrating and settling within West Africa and even beyond. European colonialism only created “artificial” African boundaries. No doubt various kingdoms guarded and protected their territories against invaders often leading to war of conquest and annexation. But the partitioning of Africa at the 1884/​5 Berlin Conference failed to preserve the original territories of these ethnic kingdoms thereby dismembering people from their kith and kin. In 1963, under the obligation imposed by the international law principle, uti possidetis juris, states in Africa including West Africa agreed to maintain the status quo ante of the colonial borders (wa Mutua 1995; Ndlovu-​Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013). But due to the “coloniality” and porosity of these colonial boundaries, most people have continued to migrate undocumented and unhindered to visit their kinsmen. As such, West Africa is one of the regions most travelled (Adepoju 2009; Aniche and Moyo 2019; Aniche 2020 a&b). However, regular migrants from West African states have encountered numerous challenges when migrating within the sub-​ region. Thus, despite the ratification of 1979 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment or Article 59 of the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty by member countries, both documented and undocumented migrants continue to face numerous challenges within the sub-​region. Some of these challenges include border closure, strict border checks, expulsion, xenophobic attacks, business restrictions and employment restrictions (Austin 2010; de Melo and Tsikata 2014; Bensassi, Jarreau and Mitaritonna 2019; Aniche 2020a). Therefore, ECOWAS member states have not been able to fully implement the visa-​free migration and thus integration (Adepoju 2016). The prevailing argument in the extant literature attributes this failure of integration in West Africa to colonial borders (Nnoli 1985; Greer 1992; Deng 1997; Mistry 2000; Page and Bilal 2001; Ikome 2012; Aniche and Ukaegbu 2016; Ali, Fjeldstad, Jiang and Shifa 2018). The narrative that African

Integration, borders and migration in West Africa  141 borders were recreated and externally imposed by colonial masters, and thus, not coterminous with ethnic borders is also well documented in the literature (Adepoju 2009). Thus, geo-​physically, two major conflicting borders persist in Africa –​colonial and ethnic borders. This chapter is however an attempt to depart from the above line of argument by problematising not just the colonial borders but also the ethnic boundaries of socio-​psychological, socio-​cultural, socio-​linguistic, socio-​economic, socio-​political and socio-​historical spaces of inclusion and exclusion that divide people into various socially constructed categories that in turn draws physical and imaginary lines between “we” and “they” or “us” against “them.” In effect, the chapter problematises state’s sovereignty and interrogates the inability of integration in West Africa to deconstruct and reconstruct these colonial and ethnic borders and the Westphalian state system in more than 44 years of the establishment of ECOWAS. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to examine the implications of the failures of enforcement of visa-​free or achievement of border-​free and borderless West Africa on migration in the sub-​region drawing some lessons from the successes and challenges of the EU Schengen Area. In order to achieve the afore-​mentioned objective, the rest of this chapter is divided into five major sections. The next section problematises West African borders. The section following it interrogates integration, visa-​free and border-​free migration as well as border-​less West African proposals while the section after that comparatively draws some lessons from the successes and challenges of EU Schengen area. Finally, the subsequent section emphasises the need to rethink integration, migration and borders in West Africa while the last section concluded by discussing the main finding, and further identifies possible policy options. The study is essentially a desktop study, and relies on secondary data to achieve its objective. It is therefore descriptive, analytical and qualitative.

Problematising West African borders Borders can enclose, relate, facilitate and divide, and as well enhance or impede movements. This is why the traditional state-​centric perspective of borders defined states by their territories and respective historical borders which also serve as symbolic and mental representations of statehood to citizen and non-​ citizen alike (Paasi 1998; Anderson and O’Dowd 1999; Newman 2003; Laine 2015). The state-​centric approach to border studies is anchored on traditional geopolitical and functional approaches. This approach is so narrow that it limits conceptualisation and delineation of borders to mere geophysical and geopolitical spaces of inclusion and exclusion. But the neo-​Kantian functionalist variant of state-​centred perspective conceived borders as functions of historical evolution and events that exhibited essential and necessary characteristics for the consolidation of the state (Parker and Adler-​Nissen 2012; Paasi 2009; Laine 2017).

142  Ernest Toochi Aniche From the state-​centric perspective, state borders are sometimes used interchangeably with boundaries or frontiers suggesting that marginal parts, fringe areas or peripheral regions of states that separate, divide, partition or demarcate them from one another. State borders are geopolitical borders (Paasi 2009; Parker and Adler-​Nissen 2012). The geopolitical borders are perhaps reflected in the fact that the modern state borders are still largely shaped by the outcome of the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 on inviolability of borders and sovereignty of states in the then Europe (Croxton 1999). The Treaty thus emphasised the relevance and indispensability of territory as one of the essential features of the post-​Westphalian modern state system (Schmidt 2011). Thus, nation-​states are inevitably defined by their respective borders as geographical borders which continue to function as physical manifestations of state power. Following from the above state-​centred perspective, West African borders are the dividing lines between West African states and between states in West Africa and non-​West African states. Perhaps, what can be distilled from this definition is that there are internal West African borders between West African states and external West African borders between states in West Africa and other states that are not in West African region. The predominant view among African scholars of the state-​centric perspective is that African borders are generally artificial because the borders were externally imposed by European powers when in faraway Berlin they partitioned Africa according to their spheres of influence rather than to be coterminous with ethno-​ linguistic boundaries (Asiwaju 1993; Adepoju 2009; Coplan 2010; Mechlinski 2010; Zeller 2010). But all borders are artificial including ethnic borders (Agnew 2008). Even from the state-​centred perspective, borders are legally and politically created. In the case of the ethnic borders, the boundaries of ethnic homelands are products of wars of conquest and territorial expansion. The territorial boundaries are not fixed, stable or naturally drawn. The migratory tendencies of ethnic groups also contribute to the artificiality, changing or unstable character of ethnic boundaries. This is the reason why border disputes between bordering ethnic groups are common (Williams 2006; Konrad 2015). Nonetheless, the borders created by that infamous Berlin Conference of 1885 (during the European scramble for control over the people and resources of Africa) can be simply referred to as colonial borders. These colonial boundaries which were externally imposed on Africa by European colonisers are not coterminous with ethnic boundaries. This is because the continent was partitioned without any regard for the social, linguistic and cultural realities of the indigenous people and as a result, some ethnic groups like Bono and Nzema (Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana), Ewe (Ghana and Togo), Yoruba (Benin and Nigeria), Hausa (Niger, Mali and Nigeria), Kroos, Mende and Vais (Liberia and Sierra Leone), Soninké (Mali, Mauritania and Senegal), Kanuri (Chad, Cameroun and Nigeria), Efik (Cameroun and Nigeria),

Integration, borders and migration in West Africa  143 among others, were divided and found themselves in different countries (Adepoju 2003). Consequently, colonial borders encouraged undocumented or irregular migration across West African borders such that between 1975 and 1982, Nigeria had received an estimated two to three million undocumented migrants, mainly from Ghana, Togo and Benin (Adepoju 2009; Aniche and Moyo 2019). Thus, political boundaries rarely match ethnic, linguistic and cultural boundaries. In Africa, 42 per cent of the total length of land boundaries were drawn by parallels, meridians and equidistant lines, while 37 per cent of the land boundaries were imposed on Africa by British and French colonial powers (Asiwaju 1993). The percentage could be even much higher in West Africa (Zeller 2013). This means that the major difference between the Westphalian division of Europe in 1648 and Berlin partition of Africa is not that the latter is not coterminous with ethno-​linguistic boundaries but the fact that while the former was internally constructed, the latter was externally imposed. In other words, while Europeans were parties to the Westphalia negotiations that redrew the European borders, Africans were not involved in the Berlin Conference that partitioned Africa (Adepoju 2009; Zeller 2013). In 1963, West African states resolved in accordance with international law principle, uti possidetis juris to retain the colonial borders (Umozurike 2005). Despite political and legal constraints posed by uti possidetis juris, there have been efforts in the recent times to redraw these colonial borders through gradual shift from visa-​free West Africa to border-​free and borderless West Africa, and most times through irredentism (Asiwaju 1993; Adepoju 2015; Nshimbi, Moyo  and Oloruntoba 2018). Generally, postmodern, constructivist, critical and poststructuralist perspectives believe that borders are socially constructed and thus are conceived as relational, not given (Kolossov 2005; Johnson et al. 2011; Agnew 2008). Just like the state-​centric perspective, they argue that there are no natural borders anywhere. These views essentially challenge, deconstruct and problematise state-​centred perspective of borders (Brunet-​Jailly 2005; Rumford 2012). The Marxian or critical approach to border studies has depicted borders as exploitative elements of capitalist accumulation and the associated character of state and territorial control (Coplan 2010; Salter 2012; Konrad 2015; Laine and Casaglia 2017). For postmodernists, constructivists and poststructuralists, borders are not only the business of state in that there are more other borders than simply those of states. Borders are not given, but are made, remade and unmade. Thus borders are no longer seen merely as territorial lines at a certain place in space but as symbols of processes of social binding and exclusion that are both constructed or produced in society. Borders are therefore seen as products of both social and political negotiation of space. In other words, physical borders are not created only by tradition, wars, agreements and high politics but also constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed by other cultural, economic, political and social activities (Rumford 2012; Haselsberger

144  Ernest Toochi Aniche 2014; Laine 2017). Therefore, postmodernist, constructivist and poststructuralist conceptualisation of borders transcends physical, geographical, territorial or political spaces of state-​centric approach to border studies. These approaches recognise the social spaces as essential components of psycho-​ social, socio-​ cultural, socio-​ linguistic, socio-​ economic and socio-​ political borders. Postmodernists, constructivists and poststructuralists have posited that borders are complex social constructions in terms of sociocultural contention and the exercise of socio-​political and cultural power, as well as manifestations of irrational rationalities, fear, exclusion or paranoia (Agnew 2008; Laine 2016). Borders acquire double meaning as state (or political) boundaries and as symbolic social and cultural lines of inclusion and difference, material and imagined, tangible and intangible, visible and invisible, physical and social. The implication is that there is multiplicity of borders given the fact that there are borders in every sphere such as socio-​psychological borders, socio-​cultural borders, socio-​linguistic borders, historical borders and ethnic borders. Therefore, borders continue to matter beyond the realm of the political discourse such as in the realms of imagination, memory, identity and the ontological notions of self (Kolossov 2005; Laine 2017). Borders generally divide people into various categories as well as drawing physical and imaginary lines between “we” and “they.” It triggers discriminating tendencies or anti-​immigrant propensities. Geopolitical borders divide people into different geographical, territorial or physical spaces as citizens and foreigners or nationals and aliens. Socio-​cultural, socio-​linguistic and socio-​historical borders separate people into both physical and social spaces as indigenes and strangers, aborigines and settlers, natives and migrants, freeborn and slaves, faithful and infidels. Some good examples of these are religious, racial, ethnic and communal borders. Socio-​economic and socio-​ political borders split people into different social spaces of classes of people as rich and poor, “haves” and “have-​nots,” rulers and subjects, nobles and commoners, elites and masses, ruling and ruled. Sometimes, these manifest in residential demarcations or bifurcations such as reserved and slum, exclusive and ghetto, urban and rural, urban and suburb. Socio-​psychological or psycho-​social borders divide people into several social spaces as love and hate, philia and phobia, like and dislike, friends and foes, aligns and enemies (Agnew 2008; Rumford 2012; Aniche 2020b). This chapter essentially adopts a postmodernist, constructivist and poststructuralist conceptualisation of borders which transcends physical, geographical, territorial or political spaces of state-​centric approach to border studies. These are therefore broader approaches to border studies than the state-​centric approach. Such a conceptualisation problematises the state-​centric approach to border studies in West Africa which conceptualises borders narrowly as mere geophysical and geopolitical spaces. In doing so, it recognises the social spaces as essential components of psycho-​social, socio-​cultural, socio-​ linguistic, socio-​historical, socio-​economic and socio-​political borders.

Integration, borders and migration in West Africa  145

Interrogating integration, visa-​free and border-​free migration in West Africa The two main strategic frameworks regulating migration in West Africa or facilitating visa-​free movement in West Africa are the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment and the 1998 ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol. The 1979 ECOWAS Protocol stipulates the right of Community citizens to enter, reside and establish businesses in member states. It was meant to be implemented over a transitional period of 15 years in three phases (1980–​95). The Phase I (1980–​5) provides the right of Community citizens to entry and stay in ECOWAS member states for maximum of 90 days without visa. The Phase II (1986–​90) regulates Community citizens’ right of residence on Community territory to seek and take up paid employment. The Phase III (1990–​5) emphasises the right of Community citizens to establish businesses or engage in economic activities in other ECOWAS member states (Adeniran 2014; Adepoju 2015; Devillard, Bacchi and Noack 2015). Whilst the first phase was meant to facilitate visa-​free West Africa ahead of African Economic Community (AEC) 2020 target, the second and third phases were intended to achieve border-​free and borderless West Africa in line with proposed 2020 AEC target.1 The first phase of the Protocol remains a shining example in Africa. It is the most implemented among the three phases of ECOWAS Protocol because the two other phases are still poorly implemented. Some of ECOWAS landmark achievements in the visa-​free regime include improvement on ease of doing business in some member countries; dismantling border posts and checkpoints on international highways between Nigeria and Benin; removal of all customs road barriers by some members; adoption of ECOWAS passport to replace national passports in circulation over a transitional period of ten years; boosting transport and telecommunication links between member states through trans-​coastal and trans-​Sahelian road network; closer collaboration and information sharing between the police and internal security agents of member states and elimination of rigid border formalities and modernisation of border procedures through the use of passport scanning machines (Adepoju 2002; Devillard, Bacchi and Noack 2015; Aniche 2020c). Despite the fact ECOWAS remains best example of visa-​ free regime among the African Union (AU) Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the prospect of shifting from visa-​free to border-​free and borderless West Africa remains dim as the policy framework for implementing the Protocol is still underdeveloped. ECOWAS efforts towards creating a borderless sub-​ region have been confronted by various challenges and inconsistencies which include the multiplicity of economic groupings and sub-​groupings, overlapping membership, lack of political will, prioritisation of national interest over regional concerns, economic recession, difficulties in meeting financial obligations, political instability, inter-​ state border disputes and conflicts,

146  Ernest Toochi Aniche insecurity, neo-​colonial ties, external interference, currency inconvertibility, language barriers, cumbersome border procedures, excessive securitisation of borders, expulsion of nationals of member states by member states and delay in doing business. All these have retarded progress in ratification and implementation of Protocols (Adepoju 2003; Devillard, Bacchi and Noack 2015). Other constraints and challenges of enforcing visa-​free, border-​free and borderless regimes in West Africa include lack of harmonisation and standardisation of travel documents (like international passports, travel certificates and identity cards); high costs of travel documents; lack of common visa requirements regime; lack of harmonised migration policy; incompatibility of national migration policies with the 2008 ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration; discrimination against nationals of member states in national legal and labour codes in the various member states and lack of standard border management information system (BMIS) software readability by some member states (Adeniran 2014; Adepoju 2016). Another regulatory framework for facilitating visa-​ free migration or freedom of movement in West Africa is the 1998 ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol. The 1998 ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol provides that all transhumance livestock shall be allowed free passage across the borders of all member states (not at night) both at the points of exit and entry provided that they have the ECOWAS International Transhumance Certificate. But domestic laws in some member states remain in contradiction with these Protocols. Even as ECOWAS is working to address these impediments, these rights are still hindered by harassment at border crossing points, lack of information among citizens, lack of access to ECOWAS travel documents and inadequate border management (Adepoju, Boulton and Levin 2007; Devillard, Bacchi and Noack 2015). The fact that ECOWAS visa-​free regime requires Community citizens to present travel documents (like ECOWAS international passport and ECOWAS International Transhumance Certificate) at the point of entry of internal borders of member countries creates undocumented migrants. The rising number of undocumented West African migrants in ECOWAS member states was due to huge cost of procuring and renewing ECOWAS international passport. This is worsened by the fact that ECOWAS requires International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliance and biometric capabilities in the new definition of its intraregional travel document as specified in a December 2014 decision. Also, due to the “coloniality” of these borders, the local people freely visit their kith and kin without knowing that they are crossing international borders. The enormous security challenges in West Africa sub-​region have been attributed to the increasing rate of undocumented migration of Community citizens in ECOWAS member countries. The resultant effects of this include anti-​migrant policies, border closure and securitisation in blatant breach of ECOWAS Protocols. For instance, the 2019 border closure by the Nigerian government has elicited a retaliatory measure by Ghanaian authorities with

Integration, borders and migration in West Africa  147 the recent clamped down on Nigerian businesses and locking of Nigerian shops. Nigerian borders have previously been closed in 1985, 1996 and 2003 in clear violation of the Protocols. Thus, the inability of ECOWAS to deconstruct and reconstruct colonial borders through visa-​free, border-​free or borderless regime has created undocumented migration of Community citizens across West African borders. The attribution of insecurity to undocumented migration in the sub-​region has in turn resulted in the migration-​insecurity nexus. As a result, the ECOWAS-​free movement of persons and goods suffers serious setbacks. No wonder, the intra-​regional trade remains low in the sub-​region.

Lessons from European Schengen Area ECOWAS has a lot to learn from EU Schengen experiences. The successes and challenges of the Schengen Area serve as vital lessons for West Africa because they have a lot in common. But it is pertinent to reiterate that while European Schengen borders were a creation of 1648 Westphalian Treaty, West African borders were a colonial creation resulting from 1884–​5 Berlin partitioning of Africa among European powers. Comparatively, therefore, ECOWAS visa-​free West Africa is older than EU Schengen Area even as ECOWAS and EU took different trajectories. West Africa has more than 15,000 square kilometres of internal or mutual borders now separating 15 ECOWAS countries2 comprising an area of 5,114,162 square kilometres (1,974,589 square miles) with an estimated population of over 400  million people (Ercan, Geriavenko, Mancini and Otabil 2016). Its 6,000 kilometre coastal arc stretches from the upper reaches of Angola in South-​West Africa to the lower reaches of Western Sahara to the north and in the south by the Atlantic Ocean (Musah 2009). The European Schengen Area, comprising 26 countries (22 out of 28 EU members), has a population of over 400 million people and an area of 4,312,099 square kilometres (1,664,911 square miles) stretching from the Arctic to the shores of the Mediterranean.3 The external borders of the Schengen area are over 50,000 square kilometres (80 per cent sea and 20 per cent land) and include hundreds of airports and maritime ports, as well as land border crossing points. About 1.9 million people commute to work across European borders each day, and in some regions these people constitute up to a third of the workforce in 2014. There are over 1.25 billion crossings of Schengen borders in a year, and 57 million of these crossings are due to transport of goods by road, with a value of €2.8 trillion each year (Popa 2016; Colombeau 2017; Piechowicz 2017; Wihlborg 2017; European Commission 2018). Consequently, about 16 million residents (or 3.2 per cent of the EU population) were born in another EU member state in 2010 (Ritzen, Kahanec and Haas 2017). The Schengen Area comprises states that have officially abolished all passport and all other types of border controls at their mutual borders. The area mostly functions as a single jurisdiction for international travel purposes,

148  Ernest Toochi Aniche with a common visa insurance policy, common visa regime; harmonised migration policy; harmonised external border controls, and uniform external border management strategy (Bassols and Correa 2017; Wihlborg 2017). To ensure security within the border-​free area, there are Schengen Information System (SIS), cross-​border surveillance, increased police cooperation, police cooperation centres, joint police teams, cross border hot pursuit and collective internal security funding (European Commission 2018). However, both ECOWAS and EU have not been able to achieve a borderless plan. But while ECOWAS has been able to achieve visa-​free West Africa, the EU has been able to attain visa-​free and border-​free in Schengen Area. Some of the achievements of the EU Schengen Area include close official border posts at the mutual borders and removing all forms of border checks; increased cross border labour movements and greater free movement of persons and goods; boosting intra-​EU trade and tourism. Yet a number of legal and bureaucratic constraints to frontier workers remain. Some of these legal and administrative obstacles include non-​harmonised social security and tax systems (Wihlborg 2017). Thus despite these achievements, the EU Schengen Area began to suffer setbacks following the 2011 migrant and 2015 so called refugee crises and security concerns.4 The 2011 refugee crisis resulted in diplomatic impasse between Italy and France because the former allowed a large number of North African nationals to enter through their external borders during the Arab Spring. France responded by setting up unilateral border controls in their mutual borders with Italy. This led to the introduction of Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) which provided for the basis under which temporary internal border controls can be maintained for more than six months and maximum of two years (Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk and Carrera 2015; Carrera 2019). Subsequently, some member countries began to invoke various Articles of 2006 SBC to justify introduction of some forms of internal border checks (Guild et  al. 2016). For example, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Malta, Norway and Sweden began to introduce temporary but prolonged internal border controls in 2015 due to the so called refugee crisis and terrorist attacks. Some countries like Austria, Hungary and Slovenia took more extreme measures by erecting fences in internal and external Schengen borders. The June 23, 2016 Brexit referendum underlined the profound damage that the temporary loss of control at external borders had done to the legitimacy of the EU and Schengen initiative. This was coupled with the security concerns that several members of the terrorist cell had previously moved freely throughout Europe owing to severe systemic failures in Greek external border controls (Bossong and Etzold 2018; Carrera 2019; Aniche 2020d). These challenges coincided with the rise of populist politicians and far-​right political parties who seized the opportunity to champion massive anti-​immigrant campaign. As a result, some European Schengen states began to canvass for the reintroduction of border checks and prolongation of border controls, and construction of fences in their internal borders.5 Currently, there

Integration, borders and migration in West Africa  149 are still five EU Schengen members conducting systematic internal border controls (Carrera 2019). These security challenges shook the very foundation of Schengen Agreement and threaten its essence. Indeed, West Africa has a lot of lessons to learn from the experiences of EU Schengen area. In doing so, ECOWAS must transcend not just the current visa-​free regime but also the border-​free and borderless aspirations. The EU never really achieved the borderless regime, it was only able to attain border-​free region prior to 2011 and 2015 migration and security crises. A  new or modern Europe without borders never truly exists. There is therefore need to clarify and differentiate between the two. A  border-​free region is achieved whenever a region of states dismantles all border posts and abolishes all forms of border checks or controls at their internal (or intra-​regional) borders, and set up harmonised external (or extra-​ regional border) controls (European Commission 2018). Thus, free border movement of citizens of member states and common visa and harmonised migration policies against nationals of non-​member do not render the region borderless. A borderless region is a much deeper concept. It has to do with the sovereignty of member states. It must cost the member states their sovereignty. In other words, the member states of the region must sacrifice their sovereignty over their territories. By losing their sovereignty, the geophysical and geopolitical borders between member states cease to be international borders. By so doing, the Westphalian state system or nation-​state gives way to regional supranationalism or a new state system called region-​state. It is this new state system without geophysical and geopolitical internal borders that West Africa must aspire to transcend (Aniche 2020a). But there is also need to distinguish between visa-​free and border-​free regions. Even as the two guarantee free movement of persons and goods but the latter facilitate freer movement of persons and goods. Whilst, borderless region ensures the freest movement of persons and goods when compared with visa-​ free and border-​ free regions (Aniche 2020c). Visa-​ free region obtains when citizens of member states cross mutual borders for a given maximum number of days without encumbrances of visa requirement at the official border posts. This regime thus requires border checks for travel documents like international passport and national identification card. It is this documentation as well as maximum number of stays that creates undocumented migration of nationals of member states in member states leading to migration-​conflict nexus. This is the level which West Africa has been able to attain. This is the level at which ECOWAS is currently confronted with enormous challenges (Adeniran 2014). To change the narratives, there is need to rethink integration, migration and borders in West Africa.

Towards rethinking integration, migration and borders in West Africa As noted earlier, the inability to deconstruct and reconstruct colonial borders through visa-​free, border-​free or borderless regime has created undocumented

150  Ernest Toochi Aniche migration of Community citizens across West African borders. To change the narratives, there is need to rethink integration, migration and borders in West Africa. To rethink integration, migration and borders in West Africa, the colonial borders must be deconstructed and reconstructed. There is nothing sacrosanct about these colonial borders despite uti possidetis juris. To be sure, colonial borders were illegally created by the European powers in faraway Berlin. The Conference convoked by the then German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, unlawfully created the colonial borders in West Africa (Coleman 1958). The treaties of friendship, pacification and protection which the European powers presented at the Conference as proof of people’s consent and as evidence of sphere of influence were fraudulently procured. Most of the treaties were signed under duress by African kings and chiefs through. Those who refused to sign were either deposed or killed. Some of the deposed kings were forced into exile. The colonial authorities and spheres of influence over West African territories were mainly established through conquest, occupation, annexation, cessation and proclamation. These methods used by most of the European powers to acquire West African territories are now obsolete and unacceptable in modern international law (Umozurike 2005). The point being made is that the purported treaties under which West Africa was partitioned among European powers according to their spheres of influence were fraudulently procured. Therefore, based on the international law principle, ex injuria jus non oritur, West Africans should not be bound by 1884/​5 Berlin Treaty because they were not party to it. This shows that the borders were externally imposed on West Africans; therefore, there is sufficient legal basis to revoke uti possidetis juris and recreate the borders. This provides the recipe for a more radical approach to integration in West Africa. The onus is therefore on West Africa states to dismantle these colonial borders towards creating a border-​free and borderless West Africa. ECOWAS member states must sacrifice their sovereignty over their territories for the geophysical and geopolitical borders between member states to cease to be international borders if they must dismantle these geophysical and geopolitical borders which divide West Africans into different geographical, territorial or physical spaces as citizens and foreigners or nationals and aliens. By so doing, the current Westphalian state system or nation-​state will give way to regional supranationalism or a new state system called region-​state. It is this new state system without internal or mutual borders that West Africa must aspire to transcend if they want to deconstruct the colonial borders and eliminate undocumented migration of West Africans in the sub-​region. But this approach as radical as it may appear may not address security challenges and centrifugal forces of sub-​nationalism in West Africa. To address disintegrative nationalism, the national question and security challenges in the sub-​region, West Africa must go beyond dismantling the state-​centric geo-​physical and geopolitical borders. There should be genuine efforts at deconstructing ethnic boundaries of socio-​ psychological, socio-​ cultural,

Integration, borders and migration in West Africa  151 socio-​linguistic, socio-​historical and socio-​political spaces of inclusion and exclusion that divide West Africans into various socially constructed categories that in turn draws physical and imaginary lines between “us” against “them” as indigenes and strangers, aborigines and settlers, natives and migrants, freeborn and slaves, faithful and infidels. This is very essential in forging sub-​ regional integration, unity, prosperity and development in the sub-​region. But this need not be immediate. It should rather be long-​term than short-​term. This will entail jettisoning the current neo-​functional strategy and adopting post-​neo-​functional approach to regional integration in West Africa (Aniche 2016). While the EU proceeded from economic integration to political integration through neo-​functionalism, West Africa should gradually transform from regional security cooperation to regional economic and political integration through post-​ nationalism given the enormous security challenges confronting the sub-​region. In other words, post-​neo-​functionalism advocates initial cooperation and integration in security sector of the sub-​region (Aniche 2020a). This should be followed by the subsequent and gradual phase of integration on economic and political spheres after many years of nation-​building, national integration and national development through neo-​nationalism or a combination of political and economic nationalism. It should be driven by the people or private sector rather than the government or the public sector through humanism. Thus, post-​neo-​functionalism is a hybrid of neo-​nationalism, post-​nationalism and humanism (Aniche 2020c).

Conclusion The chapter noted that colonial borders have become a problem that must be deconstructed. It is the colonial borders that create undocumented migration in West Africa. The attribution of insecurity to undocumented migration in the sub-​region has in turn resulted in the migration–​insecurity nexus. The chapter argued that the international law principle, uti possidetis juris, should no longer be a constraint in deconstructing and reconstructing West African borders. It emphasised that just like colonial borders, state’s sovereignty is a problem impeding integration in West Africa. This is because West Africa without borders cannot be achieved without sacrificing state’s sovereignty and authority over their territories. The chapter therefore concluded that the inability of ECOWAS to deconstruct and reconstruct colonial borders through visa-​ free, border-​ free or borderless regime has created undocumented migration of Community citizens across West African borders. These geophysical and geopolitical borders have divided West Africans into different geographical, territorial or physical spaces as citizens and foreigners or nationals and aliens. The chapter also noted that deconstructing the colonial borders without unmaking ethnic boundaries will still split West Africans into various socially constructed categories that in turn draws physical and imaginary lines between “we”

152  Ernest Toochi Aniche and “they” as indigenes and strangers, aborigines and settlers, natives and migrants, freeborn and slaves, faithful and infidels. In order to change the narratives, the chapter suggests a number of recommendations or policy options. One, West African states must through ECOWAS deconstruct and reconstruct the colonial borders so as to eliminate undocumented migration of West Africans in West Africa. Two, as a corollary to the above, West African states must be willing to sacrifice their sovereignty over their territories so as to create a West Africa without borders or borderless West Africa. Three, ECOWAS should deconstruct ethnic boundaries of socio-​psychological, socio-​cultural, socio-​linguistic, socio-​historical and socio-​political spaces of inclusion and exclusion so as to achieve an enduring regional supranationalism, unity, prosperity and development. Fourthly and lastly, West Africa should embrace the post-​neo-​functional strategy for regional integration.

Notes 1 One of the proposed AEC 2020 targets was visa-​free Africa which was factored in the First Phase of ECOWAS Protocol while the other of the proposed AEC 2020 targets was border-​free and border-​less Africa which was captured by the Second and Third Phases of ECOWAS Protocol, respectively. 2 The 15 ECOWAS member states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,

Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 3 Currently, the Schengen area consists of 26 European countries (of which 22 are EU states): Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden, along with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 4 Migration or refugee humanitarian crisis is a situation of big influx of persons seeking international protection or unexpected migratory flow (see Guild et al. 2016). 5 In September 2015, Hungary started installing a barbed-​ wire fence on internal Schengen border with Slovenia but stopped in November 2015. Hungary built fence on the external Schengen border with Serbia and Schengen accession country Croatia and even planned to extend the fence to Romania. Slovenia built a fence on her borders with Croatia (see Guild et al. 2016; Bossong and Etzold 2018).

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Part Four

Migration governance in Africa: prospects, contests and controversies

10  Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa A comparative analysis of the Moroccan Algerian migration policies Mohammed Ouhemmou

Introduction Since January to mid-​April 2020, more than 20,000 migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea towards the EU. More specifically 6,129 crossed from Morocco towards Spain (UNHCR 2020). Although many North African countries adopt a discourse of Pan-​ African solidarity and South-​ South cooperation, their actual practices and approach to migration are shaped by larger geopolitical considerations related to the EU border externalisation policies. The approaches adopted by these countries are also shaped by border disputes as well as political rivalry between regimes as it is the case of Morocco and Algeria. In Morocco, the management of Sub-​Saharan migrant inflows is shaped mostly by Morocco’s rivalry with Algeria, and disagreement over border management. The EU, which seeks to externalise its borders and use Morocco and Algeria as a buffer zone to block the inflow of irregular migrants from Africa, also plays a significant role in shaping the migration policies of Morocco and Algeria (Laube, 2019). In responding to these considerations, Morocco’s migration policy went through two significant transformations. From the early 2000s, until 2013 Morocco approached migration as a security issue. Irregular migration was criminalised through law N 02-​03. Migrants were often rounded up from the streets of cities like Rabat and Casablanca, and displaced towards the Algerian borders. Pressure on Morocco’s border with the EU was reduced by displacing migrants towards the Algerian borders (GADEM, 2018). This period was marked by serious abuses against migrants (MSF, 2013); and the rise of racism and discrimination against migrants (Mason, 2013). However, given the international criticism these practices have generated, and Morocco’s rising interest in re-​joining the African Union, in 2013 the country adopted a new policy. Algeria’s migration policy is also shaped by the same factors as the Moroccan policy. However, Algeria has maintained a consistent securitised approach to migration. Since the adoption of law No 08-​11(2008) the practices of the security forces as well as the official discourse have consistently addressed immigrants as a risk to the national security, linking migrants

160  Mohammed Ouhemmou with crime and drug smuggling, therefore moving the issue of migration from the domain of human rights into the domain of security. The denial of access to basic services renders the migrants as vulnerable victims of security forces, local criminal groups and unscrupulous smuggling networks. The absence of paths towards regularisation also blocks any paths towards socioeconomic mobility. Morocco and Algeria are both members of African Union (AU); therefore, their migration policies are expected to reflect the AU’s position with regards to migration. However, as the chapter shows, the migration policies in Morocco and Algeria are largely shaped by the European Union which generously funds border control and anti-​migration policies, and therefore turning these North African states into a buffer zone between Africa and Europe without actually taking direct responsibility for the casualties that take place while implementing these anti-​migration polices. The Euro-​African Dialogue on Migration and Development, which involved series of high level ministerial conferences starting from the 2006 Rabat action plan, to 2018 Marrakech program was expected to help promote and share good practices in migration management and help states develop national migration systems that facilitate settlement and protect migrants. Instead, these frameworks have mostly steered financial resources that were used to enhance border control measures and enhance anti-​migration legal framework which only increased the vulnerability of migrants. In addition, both Morocco and Algeria are members of Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which automatically entails free movement between the two countries. However, political rivalry, border disputes did not only block mobility within North Africa, but have also severely impacted mobility from Sub-​Saharan Africa towards the EU. This chapter explores how intra-​ African border disputes disrupt intra-​African migration, increase migrant vulnerability and victimisation and prevent the development of comprehensive migration frameworks. Given that border disputes and securitisation are not uniquely restricted to Morocco and Algeria, and given the difficulties of adopting a common African approach to migration, this chapter posits that it is important to think of intra-​African migration at more local levels, and develop small scale and national migration policies.

Border securitisation and migration management practices in Morocco and Algeria Regional security problems including terrorism and smuggling have represented an important factor behind the increasing securitisation of the Moroccan–​Algerian borders. However, the management of migrant inflows and the political rivalry between Morocco and Algeria are the most significant causes of the border securitisation. The closing of these borders in 1994 was a result of the lack of trust and collaboration between the two countries with regards to border management (Lounnas & Messari, 2018). The tension

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  161 and competition to be the region’s leader has further complicated the situation and limited the possibilities of coordinating and developing a comprehensive and humane border control policy (Larramendi, 2018). Since independence the relationship between Morocco and Algeria has been characterised by tension and conflict. The absence of clearly defined borders between the two countries has caused border disputes that evolved in 1963 into a full-​blown war between the Algerian and Moroccan Army, also known as the Sand War (Farsoun & Paul, 1976). In 1975 Algerian strategy shifted from direct confrontation with Morocco to proxy-​ war by supporting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-​Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISRIO) during Western Sahara War. By November 1982, Morocco had to withdraw its membership from the OAU after the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was admitted as a full member. Morocco considered that admitting the SADR was a violation of the OAU charter. Moroccan official referred to the SADR as a fictitious entity that enjoys no international recognition or sovereignty (MWN, 2012), while the then Zaire’s Foreign Minister, Umba Di Lutete, described it as ‘‘a ghost state’’ that should not be part of the OAU (May, 1984). However, the most significant rapture in the Moroccan–​Algerian relations took place only in 1994 after a terrorist attack in Marrakech, which led to the murder of two Spanish tourists. Moroccan officials accused the Algerian intelligence services of supporting the attack in order to instil violence and instability in Morocco (Mezyn, 2010). Directly after the attack, King Hassan II called on the government to enforce visa requirements on Algerian citizens wishing to visit Morocco. A similar decision was taken by the Algerian authorities in response; therefore, the borders or at least the official land crossings remained closed ever since. The closure of the Moroccan–​Algerian borders since 1994 has had a significant impact on economic development in the two states and also on regional integration projects such as Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The closure of the official border crossing points has also had a significant impact on border communities (Gallien & Herbert, 2018). The securitisation of the borders has increased the importance of smuggling networks. Both in Morocco and in Algeria, border regions are far from the metropolis and its development plans, hence smuggling represents a lifeline for the local economy. Price difference in various products such as oil, food, cigarettes, alcohol, cloths is significant. For instance, in Algeria gasoline is heavily subsided; consequently, it is six times cheaper than in Morocco. In Algeria, the price of one litter of gasoline is approximately 0.35 dollars (3.38 MAD) but in Morocco it costs 1.08, dollars (10.34 MAD) (Hekking, 2019). Such price difference increases smuggling activities and reduces the cost of living in the often poor border communities and also provides substantial employment opportunities. However, it is also a great challenge for national development. It is estimated that Algeria alone loses 1.3 billion dollars in tax revenues because of smuggling of subsided goods such as fuel towards Morocco (Boukhars, 2019).

162  Mohammed Ouhemmou In addition to the economic impact of smuggling, there are also security issues. Morocco has always raised concerns over smuggling of drugs, namely Psychotropic drugs such as amphetamine pills from Algeria. The inflow of this strong type of drugs is claimed to be the reason behind a series of brutal and violent crimes in Morocco. For example, in 2015 a person under the influence amphetamine pills attacked a group of German tourist in Fes (Hekking, 2019). Given that both the Moroccan and Algerian official attitudes are shaped by suspicions and historical grievances, the Moroccan media has always accused Algerian security forces of colluding with drug smuggling networks while the Algerian media has accused Morocco of facilitating the smuggling of Moroccan cannabis into Algeria (Kasraoui, 2020). Consequently, since 2001, both Morocco and Algeria have launched a series of military operations to crackdown on local smuggling networks. The Arab Spring and the collapse of Gadhafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 bolstered weapons smuggling networks in the region. It was predicated that terrorist groups would take advantage of the political and security vacuum in Libya to further consolidate their military power across the region. After the 2011, states of the region have initiated a wave of border securitisation of a historical scale. In the past ten years, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have built thousands of kilometres of fences, dug hundreds of kilometres of trenches and deployed thousands of military personnel across their borders (Hanlon & Herbert, 2015). In 2013 Morocco started building a 450 km long barbed wire fence across its borders with Algeria. One year later, Algeria responded by digging a series of deep trenches in parallel with the Moroccan fences especially in the region of Bin Lajra (Euro-​Med-​right, 2015). In fact, Algeria made another contribution to the securitisation race by adding more security check points across the Moroccan borders. More recently, in 2018 Algeria deployed approximately 80,000 military personnel across its borders with Tunisia, Mali and Niger (Ashaq-​Al-​Awsat, 2018). Given the importance of smuggling to local communities, border control operations are sometimes met with resistance by the locals; gun fights in the Moroccan–​Algerian borders are frequent. In 2012 three Algerian border guards were killed in an ambush set by smugglers near Tlemcen (Hanlon & Herbert, 2015). In fact, the excessively violent enforcement of border control measures has led to deaths among smugglers which further increased the frequency of protests and riots. In November 2017, a mass protest broke out in a border town called Bni Drar after a smuggler was killed by border guards (Gallien & Herbert, 2018). The deaths and casualties among the local population could lead into protests and unrest. The securitisation of borders has also increased the sense of injustice among local populations in border regions. For instance, many families which previously lived on smuggling fuel from Algeria have organised mass protest and sit-​ins, blocked national roads and clashed with local security forces (Boukhars, 2019). The militarisation of the Moroccan–​Algerian borders has also led to the death of tens of Sub-​ Saharan migrants in the past years. Many of these migrants died because

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  163 they fell into anti-​migrant trenches that the Moroccan and Algerian armies have installed. However, deaths among migrants often go unnoticed and unreported except by few underfunded local Non-​Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (AlarmPhone, 2017). The inflow of migrants from Sub-​Saharan Africa has also represented a common challenge for both Morocco and Algeria. However, the two countries have rarely coordinated in their fight against migration. In fact, the two countries have radically different approaches to migration; although they share a common negative attitude towards Sub-​Saharan migrants. Morocco’s approach to migration has always been pragmatic. Since the early 2000s until 2013 it has extensively collaborated with the EU to block the inflow of Sub-​ Saharan migrants. It has collaborated with the EU on its border externalisation policies and has progressively militarised the borders with the EU as well as Algeria to curb the inflow of Sub-​Saharan migrants into the EU (Tyszler, 2019). In 2003, Morocco adopted Law 02-​03 to criminalise irregular migration. New border control measures were enforced across the Western Mediterranean. High-​speed patrol boats and helicopters were used to intercept irregular migrants (Drent, Homan & Zandee, 2004). Morocco’s border control management capacities were also upgraded thanks to EU funding. For instance, in 2001, the EU contributed €370,682 towards anti-​illegal immigration operations. Later, the EU started another operation with an initial budget of €1,139,680 to help Morocco develop its border control infrastructure and identity check platforms. It is estimated that between 2001 and 2010, the EU has allocated approximately €74.6  million to Morocco in the context of border security (Statewatch, 2019). However, blocking the Western Mediterranean migration route has led to the increasing numbers of Sub-​ Saharan migrants in Morocco. But, in 2013 Morocco shifted its national strategy on migration. In brief, Morocco has shifted from securitised policies on migration into a national strategy that promotes the integration of migrants. On the other hand, Algeria has been consistent in its confrontational approach towards migration. Since 2008 it has made no major policy reform and continues to address migration mainly through Law N 08-​11 of 2008 relative to entry and stay of foreigners and Law N 09-​01 of 2009 which introduced stricter sanction on migration-​related “crimes.” In addition, the official discourse continues to highlight migration as a security risk and migrants as burden on the national economy (Amnesty, 2018).

The Moroccan migration policy: historical transformations In the past 20 years, Morocco’s management of migrant inflows and its migration policy in general has witnessed two significant transformations. Since the early 2000 until 2013, Morocco has responded to the inflow of Sub-​Saharan migrants strictly in terms of security measures. Prior to 2013, Morocco’s approach to migrants focused mainly on securitising its borders, displacing migrants from coastal cities near the borders with Spain (GADEM, 2018),

164  Mohammed Ouhemmou and limiting or sometimes denying migrants access to basic services such as health, education and housing. In addition, Morocco also sought to reverse the inflow of Sub-​ Saharan migrants by pushing them back to Algeria. Migrants were rounded up in border cities like Oujda, then deported towards the Algerian borders and pushed to cross to the opposite side. On the other side, the Algerian authorities arrest migrants crossing from the Moroccan side and push them back towards Morocco. One migrant interviewed by a human rights group has described the situation by stating that They abandoned us in the desert, we really didn’t know where we were (…). We continued on, we walked, the weakest ones stopped. We walked toward Algeria but the Algerians threatened us, they had their guns ready to shoot. This is a soccer match that’s being played between Morocco and Algeria and we are the ball. (GADEM, 2010: p18) The practice of pushing migrants towards each and exchanging blames over abuses against migrants has persisted from the 2000s until 2013 when Morocco restricted its borders with Algeria and adopted a national migration strategy. In addition to securing its borders with Algeria, Morocco sought to limit the inflow of Sub-​Saharan migrants by criminalising irregular migration though Law 02-​03. Directly after the adoption of the law in 2003, hundreds of migrants were prosecuted for criminal charges related to irregular migration, such as illegal entry or illegal exit of the national territory. For instance, in 2004 approximately 15, 228 people were charged for migration-​related crimes. The number of arrests also increased since the adoption of law 02-​03 especially in border cities like Oujda and Nador. After law 02-​03 was adopted, the number of migrants arrested jumped to 7,146 in 2003, then to 12,140 in 2005 (CCHD, 2005). Despite the deplorable situation of migrants in the Moroccan–​Algerian border, it was Morocco’s borders with the EU, and its treatment of migrants attempting to cross towards Ceuta and Melilla that attracted much of the international attention. For Sub-​Saharan migrants, the borders separating Morocco and its occupied cities of Ceuta and Melilla were the most appropriate path to the EU. Using sea routs towards Spain is often risky and requires paying substantial amounts to smuggling networks, but jumping the fences separating Morocco from Ceuta and Melilla does not require any payments. Consequently, Sub-​Saharan migrants have continuously pushed their way to the EU by climbing the barbed wire fences separating the Moroccan and Spanish sides. However, the killing of five migrants by the border security forces in early October 2005 attracted attention to the violations committed against Sub-​ Saharan migrants at Europe’s borders. More importantly, it attracted attention to the deplorable situation of migrants in the country, their limited access to basic services such as health and the rise of racism and xenophobia. The securitisation of migration, the summary arrest and

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  165 deportation campaigns against Sub-​Saharan migrants provided a context where racist and xenophobic sentiments thrived. Migration was criminalised, and migrants were portrayed by the public media as a threat to the national security. The official discourse was that the country is in a state of war against “illegal” migration. In a similar regard, the Moroccan media has negatively portrayed Sub-​ Sarina migrants. Migrants were very frequently associated with diseases such as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), crime, prostitution and drug trafficking. Therefore, headlines such as “Regiments of prostitutes spread HIV in the streets of Morocco” (Al Massae, 2012); “Black grasshoppers invade northern Morocco” (Ashama, 2005)  were a common feature of the media representation of Sub-​Saharan migrants prior to 2013. In a similar vein, discourse and practices adopted by the general public towards Sub-​ Saharan Migrants were also discriminatory. For example, a study conducted by the Moroccan Association for Research on Migration has revealed that 27 per cent think that the Moroccans consider Sub-​Saharans as inferior, and 29 per cent of Moroccans perceive them as a menace (AMERM, 2008). Testimonies collected by a leading NGO such GADEM also consolidates this point. Hence, one Sub-​Saharan interviewee states that; “Five minutes after our departure [in a collective taxi], in the conversation of the women, I heard the word aâzi [a racial slur] they were saying that there is too many -​blacks in Morocco while waiting to move to Europe […] I heard all the most disapproving qualifiers about black people. One of the women was talking about those who lived for a fortnight in one room, that they were dirty and ate anything. The intervention of one of the passengers seated against me, a soldier in the Moroccan army in his thirties, not only shocked me, but deeply injured me. He called black people as sarakazites [“cockroaches” in Arabic]. (GADEM, 2010: p 7) In fact, discriminatory language in the excerpt above is not adopted only towards Sub-​Saharan migrants. Moroccans with dark skin are also victims of discrimination. They are viewed as descendants of slaves, and therefore socially inferior (El-​Hamel, 2013). Despite the official denial, there are significant levels of racism towards Sub-​Saharan migrants in North Africa (King, 2019). However, it is the practices and discourse of public officials that fuel these sentiments. The fact that irregular migrants are portrayed in the official discourse as criminals provides a context of fear and xenophobia. However, 2013 has marked a mile stone for Sub-​Saharan migrants in Morocco. On 11 November 2013, Morocco initiated an operation to regularise foreigners who were “irregularly” residing in the country. During this phase approximately 25,000 migrants were regularised. The majority of regularised migrants were from Senegal (24 per cent), followed by Syrian (19 per cent), Nigeria (nine per cent) and finally Ivory-​Coast (eight per cent) (Malka, 2018).

166  Mohammed Ouhemmou In late 2014, the country adopted its National Strategy for Migration and Asylum, and later in 2016 a second regularisation phase was announced. The migrants whose application was approved were granted a residence permit which allows them free movement, access to education, work and health service. As far as the health care is concerned, access to the public health care system is guaranteed for all citizens and foreigners regardless of their legal status. Consequently, public hospitals are required to provide services to all migrants. In addition to access to basic health services, the migrants are also guaranteed free access to various government-​funded programs such as programs related to maternal-​child care, and programs on fights against malaria and tuberculosis. Moroccan officials have also promised to integrate Sub-​Saharan migrants within the state-​funded health insurance, which is called Regime d’Assistance Medicale (RAMED), and which reserved for low-​income Moroccans (Bendra, 2019). However, local NGOs offer most of the health services to migrants given the precarious conditions of the public health system. In fact, one major characteristic of the Moroccan national integration strategy is its extensive integration of civil society through various cooperation schemes. Concerning access to education, the curricular No13-​487 adopted in 2013 by the Ministry of National Education has historically ended all legal and administrative obstacles that previously hindered Sub-​Saharan children from accessing the Moroccan educational system. All Sub-​Saharan children have since 2013 become able to access the Moroccan public educational system free of charge (Ouhemmou, 2018). The access of Sub-​Saharan migrants to the job market has also been facilitated since 2014. Currently, The National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC) is offering Sub-​Saharan migrants in search of jobs services in terms of orientation, skills assessment and self-​development to facilitate their integration in the job market (Naimi, 2019). However, the adoption of the new national strategy on migration does not in any way indicate that Morocco has become a utopian land for Sub-​Saharan migrants. The effect of anti-​migrant discourse and practices that the county adopted since 2000s continues to linger and shape the way Sub-​Saharan migrants are perceived by Moroccans. Therefore, despite the regularisation, racist attacks against Sub-​Saharan migrants in the country continue to occur although at an extremely limited frequency. For instance, on 24 November 2017, large scale and extremely violent clashes between Moroccans and Sub-​ Saharan migrants escalated near the bus station of Casablanca. According to local news sources, the Moroccan security forces imposed a siege on the camp in order to relocate the migrants towards the south of the country. However, during the siege, migrants were denied basic services such as access bus station toilets. The tension inside the camp involved into clashes with Moroccans citizens who came to back the security forces (Zaki, 2017). The racist motivations of the attack against the migrant camp by local mobs were tuned

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  167 down. Instead, they were pained as criminal violence. The national media has uncritically adopted the narrative of the official authorities and neglected the reports of independent NGOs.

Algeria’s consistent approach to migration Algeria’s approach to migration has always been consistent. It has addressed the inflow of Sub-​Saharan migrants strictly in terms of security measures. In this regard, Algeria has responded to the inflow of Sub-​Saharan migrations in terms of border securitisation, detention and deportation. In addition, the country’s migration legal framework does not facilitate migrants’ access to basic services and renders them victim to criminal networks. Moreover, the fact that the country does not have a national policy on migration means that any paths towards integration and consequently upwards socio-​economic mobility is practically inexistent. The situation of Sub-​Saharan migration in Algeria is extremely problematic. First, there are no official or recent statistics about the number of Sub-​Saharan migrants in the country. Some sources estimate that they are approximately 32,000, while others estimate that only in the South of Algeria there are 50,000 (EMHRN, 2013). Other sources estimate their number to range between 60,000 and 85,000. The lack of official statistics is related first to the perception among public officials that migration is a security issue. Consequently, priority is given to security operations that can reduce the number of migrants over data collection operations that can help develop appropriate integration policies. Consequently, since 2000s, Algeria has launched series of summary arrest campaigns to lower the presence of Sub-​ Saharan migrants in the country, especially on border towns such as Maghnia and Tamnrast (EMHRN, 2013). The securitisation of the Moroccan borders in 2013 blocked the outflow of migrants towards Morocco and led to a significantly rapid increase in the numbers of Sub-​Saharan migrants in Algeria. Consequently, deportation campaigns against Sub-​Saharan migrants in Algeria have radically increased in scale, numbers and frequency. It is estimated that in 2013 Algeria deported over 41,000 Sub-​Saharan migrants. More recently, Algeria’s Interior Minister Noureddine Bedoui stated that the country has only between 2016 and 2018 repatriated more than 27,000 Sub-​Saharan migrants. The so called repatriation operations are often initiated by random and large scale summary arrest campaigns where the security forces simply roundup Sub-​Saharan migrants from streets and construction sites. Given the militarisation of the Moroccan borders, the migrants are pushed towards the borders with Mali or Niger in inhuman conditions. According to HRW (2019) the migrants are pushed towards the border with Mali or Niger without food or water and forced to walk dozens of kilometres in the desert (HRW, 2019). The Algerian summary arrest and collective expulsion campaigns have certain characteristics some of which are also common in the Moroccan

168  Mohammed Ouhemmou campaigns. First, these campaigns target  all migrants regardless of their gender, age, of legal status. In many cases minors, and even unaccompanied minors, are put into buses, and pushed towards the borders with Niger (Komon, 2016). In fact, in 2018 Algeria pushed more than 13,000 Sub-​ Saharan migrants which included pregnant women and children into its borders with Niger. The migrants are left without water or supplies in the middle of the desert where they start their “walk or die” journey (Hinnant, 2018). As a matter fact, the one single criterion that the security forces rely on while picking people from streets and work places is the skin colour. Therefore, many activists often describe the Algerian collective expulsion campaigns as racially motivated. According to the Director of the North Africa research unit at Amnesty International, “there is no justification for the campaign of arresting and forcibly deporting hundreds of people based on the colour of their skin back to their countries of origin –​this is a blatant case of stereotypical racist targeting” (Amnesty, 2017: p1). Migrants’ access to basic services such as health, education and housing is extremely limited. According to the Algerian law, citizens renting houses to an irregular are subject to a fine between 5,000 and 20,000 dinars (EMHRN, 2013). Consequently, the living conditions of Sub-​ Saharan migrants in Algeria are extremely precarious. Migrants do not have access to any basic services such as health care and are prevented from housing, they mostly live in the forests and valleys surrounding cities. On the promising side, Law No 08-​11 which was initially adopted to criminalise Sub-​Saharan migration, does also offer some guarantees to migrants. The law prevents expelling individuals who have entered the country irregularly or whose visa has been expired without notifying than and offering a period between 48 and 15 to leave the national territory. However, despite the legal protection that local law offers and which prevents summary and improvised explosion, the Algerian security forces often conduct their deportation campaigns without any form of judicial oversight. In addition to the abuses and injuries that the security forces inflict on migrants while enforcing border control measures, there are other dozens of abuses against migrants which are racially motivated. According to the Euro-​ Med Righ (2015) in early October 2015, an irregular migrant from Cameroon was a victim of a gang rape in the greater Oran area. After going to the hospital, the migrant was denied service on the ground that she was irregular. The following day she went to the police station to file a complaint. However, the police in turn refused to register her complaint considering that she does not possess an official document from the health authorities attesting to her claim. The case of the Cameroonian migrants, which is far from being one single isolated incident as the authorities often claim, has become known only after the trade union (SNAPAP) adopted the case. Various human rights activists have noted that a significant majority of violent and racist attacks against migrants go unreported because of the reluctance of the official authorities to actively seek the protection of migrants. According to SNAPAP

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  169 “the automatic response of systematically refusing to allow Sub-​Saharan migrants to lodge complaints, due to their vulnerable administrative status, has encouraged crime and murders of this population” (Euro-​Med-​Right, 2015: p 3). Migrants are not only the victims to security forces and local criminal groups; they are also victims to politicians who adopt populist and racist discourse to make political gains. For instance, in Mid July 2017, the Director of the Cabinet of the Presidency in Algeria Ahmed Ouyahya defended the deportation campaigns that the Algerian security forces launched against Sub-​Saharan migrants by stating that “these people entered the country illegally … and they reside illegally. [they are involved in] crime and drugs. […] We are not saying to the government, throw these people into the sea, but we are in the process of legalizing their presence so that the Algerian citizen is not harmed” (Awassim, 2017). The statement of Ahmed Ouyahya who is also one of the most influential figures in the country sparked intense criticism of local and international human rights organisation. For instance, Amnesty international described the statement as “shocking and disgraceful” (Badaoui, 2017). It also called on Algeria to adopt refugee laws and anti-​ racism regulations instead of criminalising irregular migration (NAP, 2016). The organisation has clearly stated that “there can be no justification for rounding up and forcibly deporting hundreds of people based on the colour of their skin or their assumed country of origin –​a blatant case of mass racial profiling” (Amnesty, 2017). The racist attitudes that are held against Sub-​Saharan migrants in Algeria do offer a background for the statement of Ahmed Ouyahya. However, the internal power struggle between the Army, intelligence and the economic oligarchy to impose the successor of Boutaflika also plays a significant part (Ghanem-​Yazbeck, 2018). The results of the 2017 elections, and the 2016 constitutional reforms, and internal power struggle show that both prominent figures within the presidency (Estrada, 2017), and the prime minister’s office were engaging in war and using migrants as fuel. Prior to the statement of Ouyahya, Abdel Majeed Taboun the current president, who was then the prime minster, stated that “we would not deport them but would work to organize their presence by preparing a national card to count their number, a step that would enable them to access to the world of work in legal ways” (Boudhane, 2017). Consequently, the statement of Ouyahya was viewed as populist move to scapegoat migrants in the face of economic difficulties, increase of youth employment and decrease of oil prices. The statement of Ouyahya coincided with large social media campaigns entitled “no Africans in Algeria” and which called on the authorities to expel all “Africans” from Algeria and accused them of committing crimes such as murders and rape. The general public attitude in Algeria often highlights the big numbers of Sub-​Saharan migrants as a major concern. However, there are various indicators showing that the backlash against migrants is not about their increasing numbers, nor it is about the liability they represent to the national

170  Mohammed Ouhemmou economy. It is rather the result of the official discourse that portrays immigrants as drug dealers and job thieves. According to the Algerian national Agency for Employment, between 2001 and 2007, the Algerian authorities granted approximately 80, 000 work permits for foreign nationals, the majority of whom are Chinese. In fact, 41 per cent of the Algerian foreign workforce comes from China (Bartolomeo et  al., 2010). The Chinese workforce in Algeria represents the largest Chinese population in Africa. However, there has been no backlash against Chinese workers as has been the case with Sub-​ Saharan migrants (AFDB, 2020). One major reason for this is that Algerian officials categorised the Chinese as conducting mid and high level skill jobs that the country requires. However, the official data indicates that Chinese immigrants are mostly participating in low skilled jobs as in the case of construction sector. However, given the strategic relations between China and Algeria (Pairault, 2015), Chinese migrants are not used as scapegoats to justify youth unemployment. Algerian officials often highlight Chinese migrants as a national asset, and not as job thieves, their path towards regularisation is facilitated. In other words, the Algerian approach to migration is focused on politics and not policy.

Migration policies: the need for local integration schemes The data on African migration indicates that contrary to the general perception, the most significant part of African migration takes place within the continent. For instance, 84 per cent of migration movements in West Africa take place within the region itself and not towards the EU (Devillard et al., 2015). In fact, the region itself has very significant immigration hubs. The Cote d’Ivoire alone hosts 2,350,024 West African migrants, while Nigeria host 48,453 refugees (Arhin-​Sam, 2019) and 1.1  million migrants (IOM, 2009). However, the mismanagement of migrant inflows and the lack of effective migration policies renders migrants to be victims of discrimination and limits their upward socioeconomic mobility prospects. As far as North Africa is concerned, anti-​immigrant sentiments and racism are a significant factor that affects the lives of migrants and particularly Sub-​Saharans. However, there is also an increasing awareness of the importance of developing anti-​ racism legislations. For instance, Tunisia has in late October 2018 adopted Law No 11/​2018 which criminalises racist and hate speech (Law N 2018-​05). In Morocco, an anti-​racism bill has been in discussion since 2016, but has not yet translated into a law (Alquds, 2018). In Algeria there is a significant legislative vacuum with regards to anti-​racism. However, the current president Abdelmadjid Tebboune has called on the parliament to draft a law to combat racism and “regionalism” in the country (Echorouk, 2020). However, given the history of Algeria it is not clear whether the law actually seeks to protect minorities or rather curb and suppress the Amazigh protest movement which according to the discourse of the regime is racist and threatens the national harmony.

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  171 Migration policies also play a significant role in protecting the rights of migrants and guaranteeing their access to basic services such as health care and education. In this respect the countries of North Africa have performed differently. Some countries have already developed national migration and integration strategies as it is the case with Morocco. Tunisia is still at an early stage of its policy development cycle. Algeria, on the other hand, continues to view migration purely as a security issue. Consequently, developing an integration strategy in Algeria is hard to achieve in the foreseeable future. In fact, the decreasing oil prices, economic stagnation and increase of youth unemployment are likely to further increase anti-​immigrant sentiments and provide legitimacy to the detention and deportation campaigns the security forces continue to launch. Countries of origin often express dismay about the abusive practices adopted by North African transit countries and their mistreatment of migrants. For instance, in 2017, the Guinea recalled its ambassador in Algiers to protest against Algeria’s anti-​migrant and discriminatory policies (ECRE, 2018). Similarly, in 2018, the Minister of Interior of Niger criticised Algeria for deporting West African migrants and called on Algeria to cease their deportations (Kuiper, 2018). However, even countries of origin are underperforming with regards to the management of migration. Since the early 2000s, many African states including Guinea have witnessed series of mass violent attacks against immigrants and refugees. For instance, in late 2000s the Guinean capital witnessed a week-​long series of attacks against migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries such as Liberia and Sierra-​Leon (Onoma, 2013). One of the major factors behind the recurrent anti-​migrant attacks in many African states is the absence of a vision regarding the issue of migration. Many African states do not have neither anti-​racism legislations, nor national immigration formworks. For instance, Mali which has a diaspora of approximately one million, many of which are residing in Africa. More specifically, 56.6 per cent of Malian emigrants reside in the Ivory Coast. The Malian Government has continuously been in favour of free circulation within African states, and especially within the ECOAWS member states. However, with the exception of Law N 04-​058 (2004) related to entry, stay of foreigners and other international protocols such as the Palermo Protocols, Mali does not have a national migration Policy, nor comprehensive legal framework addressing migration issues (Bartolomeo et al., 2010). Moreover, the absence of an anti-​human tracking legal framework makes transit migrants passing through Mali extremely vulnerable to human trafficking networks. For instance, it is estimated that 20,000 Nigerian girls are victims of sex trafficking in Mali (US-​State-​Department, 2020). In the past decades there have been various efforts to develop a comprehensive migration policy strategy for Africa. For instance, the 1961 OAU Convention sets various mechanisms on the protection of refugees in Africa. Similarly, the Abuja Treaty of 1991 sought to establish mechanisms that

172  Mohammed Ouhemmou can facilitate progressive regional integration and coordination with regards to various issues including migration (Adaawen, 2010). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which evolved as a regional economic and political union in May 1975 represents a more practical attempt to facilitate African integration and intra-​African mobility. Hence, article 59 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty clearly highlights freedom of movement of the citizens of the community (Adaawen, 2010). Most recently, the AU Free Movement of Persons Protocol (2018) (ILO, 2020) also came to envision a common African approach to migration. However, it is extremely difficult to talk about a common African approach to migration. In fact, many countries especially in North Africa have appalling conflicts of interest. For instance, Morocco has on 24 February 2017 applied to be a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Fabiani, 2018) which indicates an acceptance of the principle of free movement. However, Morocco is at the same time accepting funds from the EU with regard to collaboration on the fight against migration and reparation of Sub-​Saharan migrants. The intensification of detention and deportation campaigns against Sub-​Saharan migrants in 2018 coincided with the EU pledging 148 million euros to Morocco to further enhance its border security and combat human trafficking (European-​Commission, 2018). However, despite the recent shift in Morocco’s approach to migration, Moroccan national strategy has guaranteed the basic rights of thousands of Sub-​Saharan migrants and facilitated their access to health, housing, education and job, paving their way towards upward socio-​economic mobility. In other words, given the difficulties to develop a common African approach with regard to migration considering border conflicts, political rivalry and conflicts of interests, it is important to develop national migration policies that promote integration where it matters the most, at the local level.

Conclusion Morocco and Algeria represent key transit countries for African migration towards the EU. Although the official discourse in these countries promotes African integration and solidarity, the migration policies of these countries are shaped first by their relation with EU which generously funds border militarisation and securitisation operations which further increase the split between North Africa and the rest of the continent. Given that the EU is not directly involved in securitising these borders, its responsibility over the deaths and injuries that take place while implementing these policies is diluted (Hertog, 2017). Political rivalry between Morocco and Algeria also plays a significant role in securitising the Moroccan–​Algerian borders which also prevents operational coordination in the management of migrant inflow. The securitisation of migration and the portrayal of migration as a security risk contributes to the rise of racist and discriminatory discourse as well as practices.

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  173 Algeria has for long maintained the efforts to project itself as the “regional leader” in various policy areas. In this respect, it announced in 2013 that it has cancelled approximately 902 million US Dollar debts owed by African states. However, as far as the management of migration is concerned, the country shows limited concerns over its image. Consequently, it has maintained a highly securitised approach to the management of migration despite the appeals of its neighbours. On the one hand, Morocco’s approach to migration has in the past 20  years witnessed a significant shift from purely securitised practices into a policy that promotes integration.. The shift into the new humanitarian migration policy cannot be naively viewed as being motivated by the concern over the predicament of migrants. The new shift was equally motivated by increasing international criticism from Western media. In addition, images and stories of the mistreatment of Sub-​Saharan migrants near the Moroccan-​ Spanish borders have also represented an obstacle to Morocco’s reviving desire to re-​join the African Union. However, what the Moroccan experience demonstrates is that regardless of the political considerations that shape governments’ attitude towards migration, local integration polices guarantee basic rights of migrants. In the final analysis, it is highly recommended that the mobility partnership which the transit countries such as Morocco sign with EU should be revised and re-​envisioned with regards to the obligations that belonging to the AU requires. The decision of the EU Court of Justice to exclude agricultural goods produced in the Western Saharan from the EU–​Moroccan trade agreement in 2016 has shown that Morocco cannot completely rely on the EU to curb the inflow of African migrants in return for favourable economic deals or political support with regards to the Sahara issue. Given the difficulty to imagine a unified African approach to migration, it is also important to construct local and national migration policies that guarantee basic rights for migrants.

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174  Mohammed Ouhemmou Amnesty, 2017. Algeria: Mass Racial profiling used to Deport more than 2,000 Sub-​ Saharan Migrants. ‫ من المهاجرين‬2,000 ‫استهداف نمطي عنصري جماعي لترحيل أكثر من‬ :‫الجزائر‬ ‫القادمين من دول جنوب الصحراء‬. [Online] Available at: www.amnesty.org/​ar/​latest/​news/​ 2017/​10/​algeria-​mass-​racial-​profiling-​used-​to-​deport-​more-​than-​2000-​sub-​ saharan-​migrants/​[Accessed 12 April 2020]. Amnesty, 2018. Forced to Leave: Stories of Injustice against Migrants in Algeria, s.l.: Amnesty International. Law 50-​18 (2018). 23 ‫ مؤرخ في‬2018 ‫ لسنة‬50 ‫قانـون أساسي عدد‬ ‫ يتعلق بالقضاء على جميع أشكال التمييز العنصري‬2018 ‫أكتوبر‬.. [Online] Available at: www.legis�lation.tn/​detailtexte/​Loi-​num-​2018-​50-​du-​23-​10-​2018-​jort-​2018-​086_​_​2018 086000501 Arhin-​Sam, K., 2019. The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria, Ludwigs: Arnold-​Bergstraesser-​Institut für kulturwissenschaftliche Forschung. Ashaq-​Al-​Awsat, 2018. Diplomat:  Algeria Deployed 80,000 Troops on Borders with Mali, Libya. [Online] Available at:  https://​aawsat.com/​english/​home/​article/​ 1307506/​diplomat-​algeria-​deployed-​80000-​troops-​borders-​mali-​libya [Accessed 15 April 2020]. Awassim, 2017. ً ‫تصريحات عنصرية ضد المهاجرين األفارقة في الجزائر تثير امتعاضا‬. [Online] Available at: http://​awassim.ma/​19383.html [Accessed 05 March 2020]. Badaoui, A., 2017. ‫منظمة العفو الدولية تؤكد “ أن تصريحات احمد اويحيى صادمة ومخزية في حق المهاجرين‬ ‫األفارقة‬.” [Online] Available at: www.bladionline.com/​2017/​07/​10/​​-‫​ الدولية‬-‫​ العفو‬‫​ا‬-‫​تصريحات‬-‫​أن‬-‫تؤكد‬/​[Accessed 20 March 2020]. Bartolomeo, A., Fakhoury, T. & Perrin, D., 2010. CARIM –​Migration Profile: Mali, s.l.: Rober Scguman Center for Advances Studies. Bartolomeo, A., Jualia, T. & Perrrin, D., 2010. Migration Profile: Algeria, s.l.: CARIM. Bendra, I., 2019. Sub-​Saharan Migrants’ Life Circumstances under the New Moroccan migration Policy., s.l.: Institute of Development Policy University of Antwerp.. Boudhane, Y., 2017. ‫ دعوات لنبذ العنصرية تجاه المهاجرين األفارقة‬..‫الجزائر‬. [Online] Available at: https://​www.aljazeera.net/​news/​reportsandinterviews/​2017/​7/​11/​​-‫​ دعوات‬-‫الجزائر‬ ‫​ األفارقة‬-‫​ المهاجرين‬-‫​ تجاه‬-‫​ العنصرية‬-‫لنبذ‬https://​www.aljazeera.net/​news/​reportsand interviews/​2017/​7/​11/​‫​األفارقة‬-‫​المهاجرين‬-‫​تجاه‬-‫​العنصرية‬-‫​لنبذ‬-‫​دعوات‬-‫[ الجزائر‬Accessed 15 April 2020]. Boukhars, A., 2019. Barriers Versus Smugglers: Algeria and Morocco’s Battle for Border Security, s.l.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. CCHD, 2005. ‫تقرير خاص بتقصي الحقائق حول االحدات المرتبطة بالهجرة غير القانونية‬, Rabat: CCDH. Devillard, A., Bacchi, A. & Noack, M., 2015. A Survey on Migration Policies in West Africa. Dakar: ICMDP; IOM. Drent, M., Homan, K., & Zandee, D. (2004). Civil-​Military Capacities for European Security. Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Echorouk, 2020. ‫تبون يأمر بإعداد قانون يجرم العنصرية والجهوية‬. [Online] Available at: www. echoroukonline.com/​‫​و‬-‫​العنصرية‬-‫​يجرم‬-‫​قانون‬-‫​بإعداد‬-‫​يأمر‬- /​[Accessed 20 march 2020]. ECRE, 2018. Algeria:  mass deportations of African migrants. [Online] Available at: www.ecre.org/​algeria-​mass-​deportations-​of-​african-​migrants/​ [Accessed 10 April 2020]. El-​Hamel, C., 2013. Black Morocco:  a History of Slavery, Race, and Islam. 1 ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. EMHRN, 2013. Crossing the Uncrossable Borders: Mission Report on the Vulnerability of Sub-​ Saharan Migrants and Refugees at the Algerian-​ Moroccan Border, Copenhagen: Euro-​Mediterranean Human Rights Network.

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  175 Estrada, A. M., 2017. Algeria on the Road towards the End of the Bouteflika Presidency. In:  S. Florensa, ed. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2018. Girona:  European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), pp. 191–​193. Euro-​Med-​right, 2015. Far from Prying Eyes, A  Trap for Migrants and Refugees: Militarisation of the Border between Algeria and Morocco, s.l.: EuroMed Rights. European-​Commision, 2018. Western Mediterranean Route:  EU reinforces support to Morocco. [Online] Available at:  https://​ec.europa.eu/​commission/​presscorner/​ detail/​en/​IP_​18_​6705 Fabiani, R., 2018. Morocco’s Difficult Path to ECOWAS Membership, s.l.:  Carnegie Endowment. Farsoun, K. & Paul, J., 1976. War in the Sahara: 1963, s.l.: Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. (MERIP). GADEM, 2010. The Human Rights of Sub-​Saharan Migrants in Morocco , Rabat: GADEM. GADEM, 2018. Couts et Blessuers:  Rapport sur les opérations des forces de l’ordre menées dans le nord du Maroc entre juillet et septembre 2018, Rabat: GADEM. Gallien, M. & Herbert, M., 2018. The Risks of Hardened Borders in North Africa, s.l.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ghanem-​Yazbeck, D., 2018. Limiting Change Though Change: The Key to the Algerian Regime’s Longevity, Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hanlon, Q. & Herbert, M., 2015. Border Security Challenges in the Grande Magreb, Washington: United States Institute of Peace. HCP, 2009. Les résidents étrangers au Maroc Profil Demgraphique et Socio-​Economic, Rabar: s.n. Hekking, M., 2019. Morocco’s Black Markets. MoroccoWoldNews, 14 July, pp. Retrieved from www.moroccoworldnews.com/​2019/​07/​278132/​morocco-​black-​marketsdrug-​trafficking-​algeria/​. Hertog, L. d. (2017). Study EU and German External Migration Policies: The Case of Morocco. Rabat: Heinrich böll stiftung. Hinnant, L., 2018. Walk or Die: Algeria Strands 13,000 Migrants in the Sahara. [Online] Available at:  https://​apnews.com/​9ca5592217aa4acd836b9ee091ebfc20/​Walk-​or-​ die:-​Algeria-​strands-​13,000-​migrants-​in-​the-​Sahara [Accessed 10 April 2020]. HRW, 2019. Algeria: Inhumane Treatment of Migrants, Pregnant Women, Children, Asylum Seekers Among Thousand Expelled. [Online] Available at: www.hrw.org/​ news/​2018/​06/​28/​algeria-​inhumane-​treatment-​migrants [Accessed 10 March 2020]. ILO, 2020. The AU Free Movement of Persons Protocol, s.l.: ILO. IOM, 2009. Migration in Nigeria: A Country Profile 2009, s.l.: IOM. Kasraoui, S., 2020. Morocco Arrests Moroccan, Algerian Nationals for Drug Trafficking. [Online] Available at:  www.moroccoworldnews.com/​2020/​02/​292965/​ morocco-​arrests-​moroccan-​algerian-​nationals-​for-​drug-​trafficking/​ [Accessed 10 March 2020]. King, S., 2019. Black Arabs and African migrants:  between slavery and racism in North Africa. The Journal of North African Studies, October, pp. 30–​45. Komon, J.-​ P., 2016. Algeria:  Over 1,000 Immigrants Rounded up for deportation. [Online] Available at: www.cameroon-​tribune.cm/​article.html/​3316/​en.html/​article-​ CT [Accessed 12 March 2020].

176  Mohammed Ouhemmou Kuiper, M., 2018. Migrant Expulsions from Algeria Have Not Stopped. [Online] Available at:  www.moroccoworldnews.com/​2018/​07/​250718/​migrant-​expulsions-​ algeria-​human-​rights/​ [Accessed 20 January 2020]. Larramendi, M., 2018. Doomed regionalism in a redrawn Maghreb? The changing shape of the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco in the post-​2011 era. The Journal of North African Studies, pp. 1–​26. Laube, L., 2019. The Relational Dimension of Externalizing Border Control: Selective Visa Policies in Migration and Border Diplomacy. Comparative Migration Studies, pp.  7–​29. Lounnas, D. & Messari, N., 2018. Algerian–​ Morccan Relation and their Impact on the maghrebi Regional System, s.l.:  Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture. Malka, H., 2018. Destination Maghreb: Changing Migration Pattern in North Africa, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mason, P., 2013. Morocco accused of human rights breaches over migrants. [Online] Available at: www.bbc.com/​news/​business-​23959892 May, C. D., 1984. Morocco Quits O.A.U Over Polisario. [En ligne] Available at: www. nytimes.com/​1984/​11/​13/​world/​morocco-​quits-​oau-​over-​polisario.html [Accès le 14 May 2020]. Mezyan, M., 2010. ‫ سياسات عربية‬.‫ الجوار الصعب‬:‫المغرب والجزائر‬, Volume 12, pp. 21–​40. MSF, 2013. Violence, Vulnerability and Migration:  Trapped at the Gates of Europe A  report on the situation of Sub-​ Saharan migrants in an irregular situation in Morocco, s.l.: s.n. Naimi, A., 2019. L’ANAPEC veut «institutionnaliser» l’approche humanitaire pour les migrants. [Online] Available at: https://​leseco.ma/​l-​anapec-​veut-​institutionnaliser-​l-​ approche-​humanitaire-​pour-​les-​migrants/​ [Accessed 12 April 2020]. MWN, 2012. The Motives of Moroccos Withdrawal from OAU Still Valid. [En ligne] Available at:  www.moroccoworldnews.com/​2012/​11/​67526/​motives-​of-​moroccos-​ withdrawal-​from-​oau-​still-​valid-​fm/​ [Accessed on 10 May 2020]. NAP, 2016. Algeria Slammed over State Racism against Sub-​ Saharans. [Online] Available at:  http://​northafricapost.com/​15606-​algeria-​slammed-​state-​racism-​sub-​ saharans.html [Accessed 10 March 2020]. Onoma, A.  K., 2013. Anti-​Refugee Violence and African Politics. 1 ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ouhemmou, M., 2018. Moroccan Migration Policy: Education as a Tool to Promote the Integration of Sub-​ Saharan Migrants. In:  Socio-​ Economic Challenges in Morocco: Migration, Education, and Employment -​Perspectives from the Region and Europe. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relation, pp. 69–​79. Pairault, T., 2015. China’s economic presence in Algeria. s.l.: Hall Open Archive*. Statewatch, 2019. Aid, Border Security and EU-​Morocco Cooperation on Migration Control, s.l.: Statewatch. Tyszler, E., 2019. From controlling mobilities to control over women’s bodies:  gendered effects of EU border externalization in Morocco. Comparative Migration Studies, pp. 7–​25. UNHCR, 2020. Mediterranean Situation. [Online] Available at:  https://​data2.unhcr. org/​en/​situations/​mediterranean [Accessed 20 April 2020]. US-​State-​Department, 2020. 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report:  Mali, Washington: US-​State-​Department.

Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa  177 Werenfels, I., 2018. Migration Strategist Morocco Fortress Algeria. In: Profiteers of Migration? Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management. s.l.: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, pp. 22–​42. Zaki, K., 2017. ‫القصة الكاملة للمواجهات التي اندلعت بين مهاجرين أفارقة وسكان درب الكبير بالبيضاء‬. [Online] Available at: www.archive.aljarida24.ma/​p/​societe/​252054/​ [Accessed 20 March 2020.

11  Regional integration in Africa and the welfare of intra-​African migrants Christal O. Spel

Introduction The central thread in this chapter is the interaction of Africa regional integration and migration and its unintended consequences for African migrants’ vulnerability and national social policy. It argues that without a strong institution that substantively caters to the wellbeing of Africa migrants, African regional integration foments violent xenophobia and political hostility against the migrants. Realisation of the need for, and efforts for African regional integration date to the 1950s when African countries started gaining their independence from colonisation, predating even the Organization for Africa Unity (OAU) (Nkrumah 1963). Under the institutional arrangement of the OAU, established in 1963, African leaders collectively strategised to counter imperialism in the continent and set every country free from colonisation. The decades 1965–​1995 saw a political quest for African integration pursued through a focus on economic integration and countering neo-​imperialism with the ideology of Pan-​Africanism that emphasises unity and belongingness of the African people. The integration efforts were mostly state-​centric, whipping up political and ideological fervour that called for unity of Africa. Kwame Nkrumah’s “Africa Unite” with the aphorism “Unite or Perish” (Nkrumah 1963) is an example of the political fervour and ideological commitment to integration. However, while the continent was eventually rid of colonisation, it was still dismal in economic and social performances. The political preference for developmental regionalism (Sloan 1971:  142) as the pathway to economic and social advancement failed to produce the expected results. Several authors have highlighted reasons why developmental regionalism performed poorly in Africa; for instance, Asante (1997) noted that weak political will of state governments, inadequate institutional mechanisms and lack of financial resources combined to derail the quest for regional development. Mistry (2000: 554) scorned those efforts of regional development as “…visceral rather than rational, more rhetorical than real…” He emphasised the disparity in the economic base, industrial development and human and social capital of African countries, arguing that “African notions of economic integration have not been grounded in the day-​to-​day practical realities

Regional integration in Africa  179 of the continent’s economic or political life.” His argument highlights the weakness of the “groundwork” of the macroeconomic and social analysis that supported the emancipatory vision and efforts of regional integration in the earlier decades. During those decades, interests in Africa migration were low, although lower for intra-​Africa migration than intercontinental migration. Concerns about migration in Africa were centred around issues of internal migration, focusing on rural–​urban migration, even as a paucity of data on intra-​ Africa migration made it a grey area (Gould 1974; Todaro 1969; Mabogunje 1972). Issues of migration only showed up in regional integration efforts through the Regional Economic Community (RECs) programs, with general-​ level attention to the movement of labour and persons within sub-​regions represented by the RECs (Mabogunje 1972; Ohadike 1969). Despite the low attention to migration issues on the platform of regional integration, social and political responses to the presence of African migrants were assuming a more complex and, at times, dire nature in host countries. For instance, in Eastern Africa, in the 1960s, hostile tensions were rife in Uganda over the presence of foreign workers, the majority of whom were Kenyans (Gould 1974). Also, there were instances of the expulsion of African non-​nationals, especially in West Africa, such as the expulsion of non-​nationals (mostly Nigerians) from Ghana as a result of the Aliens Compliance Order of November 1969. Likewise and as a result of economic recession and increasing unemployment, in1983 Nigeria responded with the expulsion of African non-​nationals, giving them two weeks, later extended to four weeks to leave the country. An estimated number of 1.5million African migrants were affected, including Nigeriens, Cameroonians, Beninoise and Ghanaians (Adepoju 1984). The struggle for economic opportunities between non-​ nationals and citizens, dwindling national resources, spiralling unemployment, combined to instigate the expulsions (Mabogunje 1972; Gould 1974). In many instances, African non-​nationals were victims of discriminations and hostility at the host nation. Despite the strong message of Pan-​Africanism and unity in the continent, political barriers to mobility were enacted as independent states isolated and “otherised” African migrants and adopted policies that emphasised national boundaries and protection for citizens. Thus, the vulnerability of African migrants dates back to the 1960s, ostensibly the decade of the height of regional integration fervour and Pan-​African ideology. Frantz Fanon’s (2001) essay on Nationalism highlights such economic tensions and argues that economic competition will be a permanent challenge to African Unity, and one of the crucial challenges to the struggle for belonging. The second wave of regional integration moved from a state-​ centric approach to market fundamentalism, induced by the externally imposed structural adjustment programmes and global preference for economic and political liberalism (Mistry 2000). During the 1960s, the fragmented struggle for an ideological response to imperialism and colonisation coalesced in the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, established by

180  Christal O. Spel the leaders of 30 independent African states. The central goal of the OAU was to fight colonisation and promote unity and solidarity amongst African countries. Still struggling with finding a productive space in the global economy and jumpstarting development in the continent, the process to transition the OAU to the African Union (AU) was initiated with the Sirte Declaration in September 1999. From 1963 (OAU) to 1999 (AU), the continental economic, social and political goals of development and ideological emancipation were articulated and engaged by two primary instruments: the Abuja Treaty and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), amongst a host of others. Both instruments assumed an African self-​reliant approach to development with an emphasis on social and economic development. However, the desired economic and social development failed to materialise, setting the stage for the shift to a more market-​ oriented approach to regional development (Mistry 2000; Asante 1997). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) emerged from that context as the regional pathway to social and economic development in Africa –​for Africa’s renaissance. However, Africanist academics received NEPAD with strong critical reviews. Critics raised issues with the framing of NEPAD within the Eurocentric development theories, which posited Western European and North American countries’ development ideologies as superior (Matthews 2004). That implied the backwardness of Africa, which would benefit as a result of better integration to the global economy. This approach to regional development assumes a global economic system that is not inherently detrimental to the “development” of Africa (Manzo 1991). Today, the regional approach to Africa’s development continues to follow the framing of market fundamentalism, integration to the global economic system and the pursuit of a Western-​styled development. Those (market fundamentalism and Western-​styled development) are in vital regional-​development strategies and projects such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The ideological linkage that connects the NEPAD context of the 1980s to the twenty-​first century AfCFTA context is liberalism across decades. Several Africanists have criticised the economic and political assumptions that form the core of neoliberalism, even as it remains the international-​ approved path to a developed Africa (Gathii 2011). For instance, Samir Amin’s (1990) argument of de-​linking calls for a rejection of the value logic of the global system and passively integrating it. Nabudere (2002) also highlights the exploitative and unequal system within the global economy. The central disagreement with this neoliberal approach to regional development lies at the assumptions about economic activities and the role of the social and political actors that facilitate it. For example, one of those assumptions is that of the “market man” (Slater 1993: 97), the individual with the sole purpose of maximising profit for self and averse to the notion of public goods. That is a model of people as consumers that prioritises selfish desires. Also, the state is cast as a facilitator of the market, with an aversion to interference in market

Regional integration in Africa  181 dynamics (Mahjoub 1990)  –​a refrain that the market will make all things right, but in real life, things are not so good.

Regional integration: the vision and the programs The contemporary pursuit of Africa regional development is fitted with front wheels of free trade agreements and back wheels of open migration, racing on the tracks of neoliberalism. The African Union (AU) identifies five critical categories of integration necessary for a successful regional development, which includes infrastructure, financial, macroeconomic and productive integration, including free movement of people (Regional Integration Index 2016). The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS (Economic Organization of West African States), SADC (Southern African Development Community) and EAC (East Africa Community) have contributed immensely to progress made over these critical categories. However, each of those categories is not unconnected to trade. Trade remains the central glue holding all other categories together based on the premise that improved and increased trade will lead to economic development. In this context of regional development through trade, the notion of open mobility is conceived as a facilitator of trade and other economic activities. In that vein, the efforts to manage regional migration are focused on reaping its benefits, without necessarily giving adequate attention to its socio-​economic consequences for the migrants and the host society. Several authors have emphasised that Africans have always moved within the continent (Vigneswaran and Quirk 2015; Bakewell and de Haas 2007; Adepoju 1995; Sudarkasa 1975). The contemporary focus on open mobility as one of the regional development goals and as a means of regional integration misses the crucial socio-​economic issues that accompany migration. In the same light, the issues of inequality and poverty are not contained by political boundaries. However, they can be experienced across borders by the same individuals that are politically transmuted from being citizens to becoming migrants. The opening of borders does not change the identification or social responsibility embodied in the system of governance. The socio-​economic vulnerability that people suffer because of their migrant status, and the socio-​economic responsibility that host states are expected to bear for vulnerable migrants are side-​lined or ignored. Theoretically, integrating countries negotiate the re-​distributing of lopsided economic benefits of regional integration to weaker countries (Venables 2003), but the mobility (emigration) of citizens cannot be strictly controlled, and free movement makes it more so (emigration and immigration). The migration will tend to create a situation where weaker countries send low and middle-​skilled migrants (the socio-​economic categories that are often subjected to strict immigration controls) to more influential countries. Nevertheless, whatever economic benefits accrue to all countries in the integration relationship, will

182  Christal O. Spel expectedly be utilised for citizens’ welfare. So, without a targeted provision for migrants in the host countries, the vulnerability of the migrants remains, and may even exacerbate if citizens become anxious to protect increasing wealth, as in the case with some European countries. To achieve its goals of open migration, the AU has favoured the development of policy frameworks to guide states in their management of immigration. Two key policy frameworks define the AU comprehensive approach to migration in Africa: The Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) and the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD). The Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa was adopted in 2018. It builds on the Migration Policy Framework for Africa that was adopted in 2006 by incorporating the AU priorities such as the Agenda 2063, and international migration management standards. The MPFA “… provides Member States and RECs with comprehensive policy guidelines and principles to assist them in the formulation and implementation of their own national and regional migration policies in accordance with their priorities and resources” on nine thematic issues. They are Migration governance, Labour Migration and Education, Diaspora engagement, Border governance, Irregular migration, Forced displacement, Internal migration, Migration and trade and Other cross-​cutting issues such as poverty and research (Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–​30) 2018:  10). The MPFA approach seeks to “resolve the root cause of migration” by mitigating and eradicating the social issues that affect African migrants in host countries. That approach implies that if social issues are resolved in the home countries of the migrants, migrations will be curtailed and hence more manageable. The ACPMD is a more elaborative framework as it raises 11 policy areas with recommendations for national, continental and international actions. For instance, it introduced issues of remittances, brain drain, gender, good governance and international cooperation amongst others as identified priority areas. Nevertheless, it did not depart from the approach that treats African migration as mainly a problematic exception that needs to be “alleviated” at the point of departure. More so, the guidelines, rules and stipulations in the frameworks are prescriptive, in line with a technocratic and bureaucratic approach to migration governance, a reflection of the “inputs” from international partners and donors. The problem is the gap between the provided guidance and support and the reasons for or the diagnostics of the challenge. For example, the challenges of belongingness, violent xenophobia, destruction of the businesses and lives of African migrants are met with recommendations to national governments to respect migrants’ rights. The inadequacy of “recommendations” and “support” in the face of visceral violence and hostility, targeting African migrants, and audacious anti-​African migrants’ comments from political leaders is self-​revealing at the micro level but camouflaged at the policy level. Hence, the frameworks are not elaborative on how recommendations will be achieved at the state level; instead, the frameworks are well-​articulated listings of objectives and goals.

Regional integration in Africa  183 It is not surprising that the impact of the regional frameworks on migrants’ vulnerabilities at the micro-​level is inadequate or non-​existent. Similarly, the political mechanism to monitor, evaluate and reinforce state compliance with the framework of African migration is also inadequate (Achiume and Landau 2015). Other policy instruments and declarations developed by the AU are the Ouagadougou 2004 AU’s Plan of Action on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation. The Plan of Action calls for the “Development of an appropriate framework for integration and harmonisation of economic and social policies” and “Targeting and empowering vulnerable groups such as…refugees, migrants….” Also, there is the 2012 AU’s Plan of Action on boosting Intra African Trade, and, the Declaration on Migration adopted by the twenty-​fifth AU commission in June 2015. Targeting the mobility of labour in the continent are the intra-​Africa Talent Mobility Partnership Programme (TMP), and, the Joint Labour Migration Governance Programme (JLMP). The TMP is a voluntary initiative that seeks to facilitate the mobility of professional labour between participating countries in the West, East and South of Africa. Hence, TMP targets the private sector, with aims to boost competitiveness and economic growth. The JLMP is a 4-​year initiative that is co-​sponsored by the African Union Commission (AUC), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The program was endorsed in Windhoek, Namibia in April 2014 and adopted by the AU Heads of State in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2015. The program was initiated to facilitate the implementation of AU Agenda 2063 and the AUC Strategic Plan 2014–​2017. Consistent with Articles six and seventy-​one of the Abuja Treaty, the ultimate objective of the JLMP is to promote free movement and exchange of labour within the continent, with two specific expected key outcomes –​to strengthen the effective governance of labour migration in Africa and to promote decent work for regional integration and inclusive development. The deliverables under the aim of decent work for regional integration and inclusive development paid specific attention to the extension of social security to migrants. However, the JLMP brief is silent on the critical distinction between skilled labour and unskilled labour and the social security needs of migrants that are active in the informal sector. The AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons signed in Rwanda in 2018 contains 11 provisions targeted at labour migration and mobility in the continent. Although countries have been quite slow in ratifying the Protocol, especially when compared with the speed that same countries ratified the AfCFTA. Notwithstanding the foot-​dragging, the Protocol elaborated in stages, the pathway to achieving free movement of persons in Africa. Article 19 of the Protocol addresses the issue of migrant welfare through directions for portability of social security benefits. It reads that “States Parties shall, through bilateral, regional or continental arrangements, facilitate the portability of social security benefits to nationals of another Member State residing

184  Christal O. Spel or established in that Member State” (Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relation to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, 2018:  12). Guidelines for the coordination and harmonisation of the implementation of the Protocol are outlined in Article 26, and it generally locates that responsibility at States Parties, both at the national and sub-​regional levels. The states ultimately bear the responsibilities for a safe and secure migration experience for African migrants. That makes the political will of state governments central to the implementation of protocols and the continental vision of safe and open migration. Still, that also becomes the biggest challenge in the African context, as the states (especially the bigger ones, such as South Africa) are more interested in the economic opportunities in regional integration and cooperation than in the human and social support. The speedy ratification of the AfCFTA is an indication of where the political will of African states favours. In that vein, the regional reliance on legal documents to promote immigration management practices and policies that respect migrants’ rights do not provide an adequate response to the socio-​ economic and political factors that create and sustain migrants’ vulnerability or xenophobia in host countries (Achiume and Landau 2015). Furthermore, the reference of Article 12 of the Protocol of Free Movement of Persons to the portability of social security, intended as a provision for migrant welfare, can only be seen as disconnected from reality in the African context. In the context of developing countries with weak economies, weak social welfare institutions, the “fear” of “portability of vulnerability” that contributes to political hostility cannot be adequately or concretely assuaged by guidelines on the portability of social security. That applies whether that “fear” is irrational, misrepresentative, a political gimmick or not, as political hostility influences citizens’ actions and solidarity, which could create and sustain migrants’ vulnerability in host countries, irrespective of regulations. The conception of African migrants’ wellbeing connects to universal principles of equality and non-​discrimination. Articles one and two of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” and “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind.” The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights prohibits any form of discrimination. It guarantees all rights, including rights to work, to just and favourable conditions of work, to trade union freedoms, to social security, to an adequate standard of living, health and education. Besides, the African Charter (Banjul Charter) also sets human rights standards for the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa and legalised African leaders’ commitment to international accountability on human rights. The comprehensiveness of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the African Charter on Human rights raises questions on implementation and accountability at the state level. Notwithstanding, it presents a strong background to build policy and administrative capacity

Regional integration in Africa  185 towards a just and fair society and a sound policy framework to protect the weak and vulnerable. Hence, it concretises the responsibilities clearly if the ACPMD and the MPFA framework are implemented at the state level. However, at the national level, there are challenges in the form of costs, political will, weak institutional capacity and legal limbo in the definition of beneficiaries and obligations that are not addressed by the regional institution (Access to Socio-​Economic Rights for Non-​Nationals in the Southern African Development Community 2012; The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation 2014). Furthermore, studies have established the involvement of agents of the state in stirring xenophobic sentiments and attacks on African migrants in popular migration hubs such as South Africa. More so, issues of belonging, economic competition between citizens and migrants, social bottlenecks in accessing essential services such as health, amongst others, cannot be resolved with just emphasising human rights (Achiume 2014; Vigneswaran et al. 2010b; Whitehouse 2012). The fact is, at the national level, rights converts to “costs” for the government, but the United Nations argues that “A State that is constrained by a lack of resources still has a duty to ‘take steps,’ including steps to protect the most disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalized groups in society” (United Nations Human Rights 2014: 33). From the perspective of the socio-​economic conditions of citizens in African host countries, in a context of open migration, there are questions about the extent and scope of that “duty to take steps”. In Africa, one of the sharp criticisms of applying international laws to national context is that it jeopardises the relevance of context and weakens local participation. More so, international laws also assume a “top-​down” authorisation. These criticisms are louder in global jurisdiction cases, such as those involving the International Criminal Court as an example (Tosa 2018). Between the criticisms and arguments for a global approach to rights (Lacroix and Pranchere 2016), and specifically migrants’ rights (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), the case for international migrants’ rights retains spotlight due to the recent global migration crisis. For Africa, the migration crisis takes the form of deaths in the Mediterranean sea, migrant (Africans) slave markets in Northern Africa, and wanton destruction of African migrants’ lives and property in the Southern part of Africa. From that perspective, the regional frameworks and policies for the management of migration at the state level could assume a “top-​down” structure, even as they symbolise joint agreement from African states. Thus, states’ response to regional frameworks cannot be taken for granted; instead, it is expectedly complex. In December 2018, most UN member states adopted the Global Compacts for Migration and Refugees. The Global Compacts for Migration (GCM)1 and Refugees emphasises the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status. African countries responded to the GCM with a collective voice under the Common Africa Position (CAP), which reflects its concerns and importantly sets a reference for future national and continental discourses on migration management. The

186  Christal O. Spel CAP is relevant in the African context as a representation of a united front; it also provides another supra-​legal platform for both sending and hosting countries to collaborate in crafting solutions to migration challenges. This type of theoretical protection of migrants’ rights has failed to improve the everyday experience of the migrants. Such supra policy and legal instruments only act to solicit states’ acknowledgement and pledge to protect migrant rights humanely. The core issues of monitoring and the implementation of these rights and other ideals, as stipulated by regional frameworks, policy instruments and the GCM are, however, missing in migration documents. The real socio-​political challenge of implementing migrants’ rights is mostly explored in social policy documents and literature, where migrants’ rights are broken down to specific social services and opportunities, often as competitors of citizens’ and political interests. Therefore, although the acknowledgement of and pledge to protect migrants and manage migration in a humane and just way is a crucial base, African migrants continue to suffer persecution, abuse and targeted violence in host countries irrespective of the CAP, GCM, MPFA and ACMPD. Effective implementation of such programs and policy frameworks will require the political will of states but also the translation of such policies to real benefits for the states (Abebe 2018). Alternatively, but outside the scope of this paper, a clear elaboration of the connection between the social policies and migration policies of a state will provide a better socio-​political understanding of migrants’ wellbeing in the host country. That is, if state governments have a clear understanding of how immigrants affect or not, their social services and labour markets and vice versa, there may be less political spewing of unfounded rhetoric about migrants, better social knowledge and more efficient policy response to immigration. One needs to go beyond the prescriptions of the policy frameworks and programs targeting immigrants’ wellbeing and rights at the host countries to ask the question in what political, social and economic context can such programs and policies flourish? The problem cannot be about implementation per se; the theoretical background of such “intervention” is flawed. Indeed, Thandika Mkandawire’s (2001: 289) argument about developmental states in Africa is relevant here. Mkandawire argued that: States whose capacity to pursue any national project is denied at one level (theoretical or diagnostic) are exhorted, at the prescriptive level, to assume roles that are, ex definicione, beyond their capacity, character or political will. Such states are urged to “delink”, to reduce themselves, to stabilize the economy, to privatise the economy, to engage in “good governance”, to democratise themselves and society, to create an “enabling environment” for the private sector (to make provisions for migrant wellbeing and migrants rights2) etc. In other words, to do what they cannot do … what we have then is the pessimism of the diagnosis and the optimism of the prescription.

Regional integration in Africa  187 The plethora of policy “guidelines” served to state governments, even in cases where the governments are part of the “design team” are not reflected by the general (citizens) experience of human rights, labour access, social welfare and responsible policing in their countries. Also, the analytical attention to the intraregional variation in state capacity, governance responsiveness to citizens’ needs and vulnerability, becomes relevant in this case.

African migration: host and migrant vulnerability Theoretical arguments on the welfare state and immigration in the developed North are relevant for understanding the dilemma of migrant inclusion vs exclusion in the context of open migration and regional integration. Immigrant wellbeing in the host country is anchored on their access to labour or economic activities and social services (Eugster 2018). The policies that regulate that access are called inclusive or exclusion policies, and they are influenced by existing welfare policies for citizens and the immigration policies of the country. Arguments on welfare chauvinism3 emphasise that the nature of the welfare state determines the type of migrant inclusion/​exclusion policies it adopts (Banting 2000; Geddes 2003). For example, Social democratic and Corporatist welfare regimes are likely to apply external exclusions to strictly keep undesired migrants out while providing inclusive policies that fully integrate migrants across categories. Liberal welfare regimes tend to adopt policies of internal exclusion and more relaxed admission criteria for migrants. However, findings from Boräng’s (2015) study of welfare states and forced migration contradict the common assertion of a destructive relationship between the welfare state and immigration. Boräng’s analysis shows that comprehensive welfare states have positive effects on the admission of displaced people. African states are disadvantaged and neglected in that argument as their development of welfare institution for citizens is mostly very weak or non-​ existent. Citizens’ vulnerability is catered for substantially by International Non-​Governmental Organisation (INGOs), international funds for specific programs, such as social protection or cash transfer programs. Also, quite crucially, African states are compelled and guided towards adopting neoliberal economic strategies by their international donors, which promote lesser government intervention, hence reduced social spending. That, combined with other macroeconomic factors, combine to leave the development of the welfare state in Africa lagging far behind. Hence, if social services are unavailable for citizens, how substantive can migrants’ rights be? On the one hand, the social and political response to that question has been the increasing tendency to blow up anti-​immigration rhetoric from the developed North and blame migrants for socio-​economic ills in the society. That translates to a more hostile socio-​political context for migrants that only aggravates conditions that exacerbate migrants’ vulnerability.

188  Christal O. Spel On the other hand, the discourse of flexible citizenship and inclusion (Nyamnjoh 2007) tend to reiterate the rights of migrants and the inclusion of migrants without equal attention, or at the very least, empirical consideration for the capability of states and the (non-​existent) privileges of citizens. Is it not evident that if migrants gain political inclusion to citizens “privileges” that are in reality devoid of substantive care, their vulnerability is not resolved, just transformed? Alternatively, if rights are granted by courts and ratified by states, it remains hollow and ineffective because of the quality or lack of quality of states’ capability to take concrete actions. The point is the gap between the reality or broader context of migrant vulnerability, the theorisation of wellbeing and the prescriptive policies. Also, the political culture of appropriating the policies, strategies and approaches from the developed West as the sacred solution to all challenges in their states increases that gap. The fact that it is called the same name does not mean that it is the same. In other words, context is not only relevant, but it is the key. It is the single critical factor to the conceptualisation of the problem, its scope, its impact, the victims and the other many dynamic options for the solution. The interest in the vulnerability of migrants should include an in-​depth examination of the context of wellbeing in the continent. The context just does not refer to the abstraction of geographical location, but also the minute details. The dis-​similarities between the welfare context of the developed North and developing African countries are lost in the cacophony of socio-​political outrage against migrants as the sole reason for socio-​economic failures of the host government. Still, it also appears lost to the actors and stakeholders that emphasise human (migrants) rights responsibilities without consideration, at the very least for state capacity and ability. Borjas (1999) study of the USA supports the economic hypothesis and shows that foreigners immigrate more to states with generous social transfer and utilise social programs more than citizens. He, therefore, argues that migrants disproportionally rely on social welfare benefits, which increases social expenditure and pressurises welfare states. Indeed, several leaders in South Africa, as an example of a popular migration destination in Africa, repeat similar ideas that African migrants move to South Africa to avail themselves of social services and national resources. However, Ratha et al.’s (2011) study of leveraging African migration for development shows that African migrants are attracted to states with economic infrastructures. Infrastructures are needed for the many diverse entrepreneurial ventures of African migrants. Hence, one can argue, and as multiple micro studies have supported, those migrants are highly active in micro-​entrepreneurship in popular destination countries (Nshimbi and Moyo 2018; Moyo 2014). So, they are valuable as job-​ creators and contributors to the economy. However, the contribution of African migrants is more nuanced, as is their socio-​economic burden on the host state. For instance, Naudé, Siegel and Marchand’s (2015) review of the literature on migration, development and entrepreneurship highlights the militating effects of discriminatory

Regional integration in Africa  189 barriers on migrant participation in entrepreneurship. They thus argue that the notion of the entrepreneurial migrant is not strongly supported empirically. More recently, Nowrasteh and Orr’s (2018) study of the USA shows that foreigners are generally less likely to consume welfare benefits, and it costs states less to provide welfare for them. Other studies (Razin and Wahba 2015; Boeri 2009) in Europe show that immigrants are overrepresented in schemes for education and non-​contributory support and fewer in welfare schemes related to sickness, unemployment insurance and pensions. To understand African migrants’ contribution to the host African state will demand more focused, comparative and multi-​level studies of African migration. Similarly, to understand African migrants’ vulnerability, the context of their wellbeing is essential. Furthermore, state capacity to protect migrants’ social and economic rights and create the context for their wellbeing needs to be understood both in fiscal terms and political currency or incentives. Rod Alence’s (2004) discussion of political institutions and developmental governance in sub-​Saharan Africa contributes insights to the relevance and link of political incentives to political behaviour in cases where a particular response is expected of government. Alence and Mkanwadire’s arguments highlight the relevance of emphasising real-​life situations at the government level rather than on “dressing up” the prescriptive lists of how governments should behave. In this case, the question, what is in it for the government if migrants’ rights are respected and protected, will produce a different political response in the context of local election vs a context of significant donor funding. The challenge then is how these intricacies can be incorporated in the conception of African migrants’ wellbeing in Africa and how they will alter the existing instruments that seek to create a conducive political context for the realisation of African migrants. From the migrants’ perspective, various forms of abuse and vulnerability are suffered by African migrants in Africa (The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation 2014; Shimeles 2010; Marr 2012). Though vulnerability and abuse cases from forced migration, such as refugees and asylum seekers’ experiences in host countries, are more highlighted. But, in-​depth qualitative studies and the emerging concept of mixed migration have called attention to the similarities in the experiences of migrants and the cross-​cutting nature of socio-​economic and political factors that impact their choices (Setting up a Road Map for Mixed Migration West and Northern Africa 2019; Access to Socio-​Economic Rights for Non-​Nationals in the Southern African Development Community 2012). Attention has been drawn to challenges in access to education, health, housing and employment opportunities, amongst others. Even in cases where some policies and laws guarantee access to specific categories of migrants, access at the user level is obstructed by citizens or even agents of the state such as the police (Vigneswaran et al. 2010a; Access to Socio-​Economic Rights for Non-​Nationals in the Southern African Development Community 2012). At times the socio-​economic vulnerabilities of migrants are reflections of vulnerabilities suffered by citizens

190  Christal O. Spel of the host countries, creating hostilities, competition and informal barriers to available services. The attitude of political leaders towards immigration from the continent also impacts the social and economic context of the migrants, and often the hostility to migrants’ access is also replicated across countries. For instance, young African refugees in Zimbabwe are reported to be “stuck” in camps as the law does not allow them to seek employment, and lack of funding makes further education impossible (Access to Socio-​ Economic Rights for Non-​Nationals in the Southern African Development Community 2012). While in South Africa, Zimbabwean refugees are reported to face social obstructions in accessing employment opportunities, amongst other challenges (Crush et al. 2017). These findings are relevant for African states in the context of a future of open borders. The state and its citizens often present the cost of hosting migrants as the reason for exclusionary policies and practices. Studies have shown that migrants’ use of social services is quite nuanced, and they are less likely to depend on social welfare. Nevertheless, there are costs associated with migrants’ hosting, which is the economic point that posits a clash between the welfare state and immigration. The outcome for the country’s welfare–​ immigration relationship is dependent on several factors that contextualise the developed North’s findings. For instance, the African context of a large informal sector, and migrants’ participation in entrepreneurship, will suggest a modified relationship between migrants and the state social services. In the same vein, a context of weak institutions, neoliberal economic policies, and unemployment will suggest a different experience and strategies for the state. African regional integration thus raises existential questions on the substantive social and economic rights of African migrants. The shortcoming is that a regional institutional answer to that puzzle is missing. Notwithstanding the innovativeness of African regional institutions, their role in providing for African migrants’ wellbeing is passive in migration documents.

Conclusion This chapter argues that the regional approach and instruments for protecting African migrants’ welfare at host countries do not adequately tackle the socio-​ political causes of migrant vulnerability. That argument faults the institutional dependence on state governments’ voluntary will to implement migrant protecting regulations. Furthermore, the economic context in host countries undermines the effectiveness of existing protections. More so, the absence of substantive regional contribution to the state weakens the regional institution’s role as an overseeing agent drastically. Indeed, the continued experience of vulnerability and insecurity by the migrants reiterates the gap in migrant protection. The neoliberal approach to development reproduces inequality and poverty even as it generates financial growth and economic success in countries where it operates. That raises logical concerns about the centrality of trade in the

Regional integration in Africa  191 AfCFTA and the African Protocol for Free Movement, which embodies the contemporary regional strategies for integration and development. Indeed, facilitating trade and economic activities in a politically bordered region logically demands less restricted mobility between countries. However, to manage migration as mainly a facilitator of economic activities is not enough. There are social consequences and gaps from unrestricted mobility that are left unattended by an economic focus. Those social consequences have contributed to angst against migrants in host countries, and state governments and politicians misrepresent them for political gains. The same state governments are expected to ratify regional protocols that protect and guarantee migrants’ rights. The irony in the political context of African migrants’ vulnerability and desired wellbeing indicates the void between a technocratic and a bottom-​up approach to problem-​ solving. Alternatively, it is a regional version of what Michael Neocosmos (2008) referred to as the politics of fear and the fear of politics, a situation devoid of accountability and responsibility. The African historical experience of relying on state governments’ voluntary will to take expected action for the “good of all” has not been good, for example, the failure to implement the Lagos Plan of Action. Alence’s (ibid.) argument about political incentives and political behaviour of leaders gives relevant insight into the form of institutional context that can give rise to the protection of migrants’ rights. Generally, achieving a political alignment between economic benefits and political security for state government and migrants’ rights’ protection. To achieve such alignment, an in-​depth understanding of the social, political and economic context of migrant vulnerability in the host country is a starting point that will highlight critical nuances. That raises the need for comparative studies on African migrants’ wellbeing in Africa. Regional responsibility for the economic cost of migrants’ welfare becomes the endpoint in the context of significant economic disparity between states. In between, migrants’ daily welfare can be achieved by regular interaction between regional and national institutions with sectoral responsibility for identified needs, such as health. The emphasis is on regular interaction rather than dependence on rules and regulations. The factors responsible for migrants’ vulnerability are dynamic and fluid, contrary to the framing of rules and regulations. For instance, African migrants’ needs for health services at the host country is understood at the regional level through a country or sub-​regional analysis of available health services, migrants’ flow, migrants’ contribution to the health sector, and available alternatives. Over time, institutional learning from regular interaction will benefit regional and national approaches to migrant welfare. There cannot be a quick fix that was put together in an air-​conditioned office. The human costs of migration within the continent cannot be glossed over with naïve optimism and political rhetoric. Neither should African migrants’ potential to contribute to economic development be emphasised without equal attention to the broader socio-​political context that facilitates

192  Christal O. Spel and sustains migrants’ productivity. Instead, dedicated resources for regional institutional learning, engagement, and intervention should be pursued. The existing regional migration frameworks do not make provisions for a more active regional participation that concretely improve African migrants’ experiences in Africa. As an active facilitator of mobility within the continent, the regional body bears responsibilities to support states to protect migrants’ wellbeing substantively; for instance, regional responsibility for the financial burden of care, including restitution in property destruction cases, or compensation in cases of unlawful death of migrants, from a regional fund contributed by state governments and linked to regional trade profits. The chapter calls for a more dynamic and grounded approach to migrant welfare, prioritising engagement with state, targeted challenges and substantive supra-​ responsibility, rather than a blanket state-​centric solution.

Notes 1 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), The Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, www.un.org/​en/​ga/​search/​view_​doc.asp?symbol=A/​ RES/​73/​195. 2 Added by the author. 3 Welfare chauvinism refers to the preservation of the welfare state during times of immigration influx and economic downturn. It emphasises internal or external exclusion as policy options to preserve the state viability.

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Part Five

Reimaging borders and migration management in Africa

12  Reimaging borders and migration management in Africa Inocent Moyo, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi and Jussi P. Laine

Discussions in this book volume have suggested that the trends and patterns of intra-​Africa migrations dismiss as a populist charade and or misinformation, and if anything else, a myth that there are more Africans migrating to and overwhelming Europe, suggesting that there is more migration within than without Africa (also Laine et  al., 2020). This volume has shown that dealing with migration within Africa suggests many serious gaps and in some cases, problems or challenges around how the phenomenon is managed. On the one hand Berlin borders continue to influence, implicate and complicate how African countries manage migration and on the other hand, there are symbolic borders which manifest at many levels such as the social, political and cultural, among others. This is further complicated by the involvement of the European Union (EU) in the way that the African Union (AU) in general and individual African countries respond to migration. Taken together, this demonstrates that responding to migration is complex and necessarily requires nuanced responses which address the needs of the people at the local level. These are issues on which we provide concluding remarks in the following parts.

Borders and inter-​Africa migrations This volume has addressed both physical and socio-​ cultural borders in Africa, and investigated how they have been influenced by and also in turn implicated on migration and its governance and management. The physical borders in Africa, the authors in the first part of the volume suggest, provide a resource which has triggered people to engage in cross border migration. This is precisely because borders separate countries with different levels of effective and dysfunctional political administrations and economic development, which has provided the impetus for people to migrate (Dobler 2016). A case in point is that people in Africa tend to migrate from poor to those countries which are perceived to be economically advanced. This highlights the reality that the desire to access more economic opportunities leads to increased migration within the West African region. The borders create the perception that just beyond them opportunities abound that are much better

200  Inocent Moyo et al. than the reality in the migrant’s country of origin. Thus, borders function as catalysts of migration and a beacon of hope of “greener grass” on the other side. This is aptly captured by the case of Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire which are migration hubs in West Africa based on that they are more economically developed. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire, which is a top cocoa producer, has attracted many migrants from many countries in the West African region. As a result, migrants from neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso or Nigeria perceive the border as a resource, crossing which, by any means possible to Côte d’Ivoire would address their unfavourable economic circumstances at home. This perception of the border has also extended beyond the West African region in which migrants from Nigeria, for example, have continued to migrate to southern European countries. This is despite the fact that many European borders have become increasingly securitised with lethal effects, which contrary to the aims of reducing what has become framed as unwanted migration flows, has put the European values and norms to the test (Moyo 2020; Laine et al. 2020). In the Southern African region, the border also catalysed the cross border migration of people for the same reasons in which the people defied different types of borders and immigration controls. The important issue which comes to the fore in this respect is that there is no amount of border securitisation either in Africa or anywhere else in the world, which would stop migration, including that which is irregular. This is the reason why African countries must individually and collectively within the auspices of regional economic communities (RECs) operationalise the principles of free human mobility beyond a tokenistic level. Indeed, many RECs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have regional instruments to govern migration but these have not effectively taken off, with the result that sovereign referenced migration management regimes prevail. As we have highlighted in this book, these inward-​looking approaches to managing migration can neither stop irregular migration nor lead to efficient management of migration.

Migration, symbolic borders and integration in Africa Beyond the physical borders, which divide African countries, the issue of socio-​cultural borders still lingers. This is linked to migration because the cross border movement of people leads to virulent xenophobic sentiments, which in some instances graduate to violent and fatal attacks against people from other African countries. Many examples of this abound, such as the expulsion of migrants from other African countries from Nigeria in the 1980s and even before (see e.g. Adepoju 2009; Adeniran 2014; Aniche and Moyo 2019). In South Africa, this is a common phenomenon in which migrants from other African countries are targeted as they are accused of a plethora of problems ranging from taking away jobs from citizens to

Reimaging borders and migration management  201 stealing their women (see e.g. Moyo 2017). In East Africa this is also evident and is aptly illuminated by the stereotyping of people from particular countries in the region and in West Africa there is the “us” versus “them” divide. In East Africa, stereotyping has effectively militated against regional integration because it has led to the propagation of divisive rhetoric. In North African countries like Algeria and Morocco, the treatment of migrants from Sub-​Saharan Africa essentially transmits an anti-​Black and xenophobia vibe (see Chapters 9 and 10). This has been exacerbated by the European Union (EU) border eternalisation programme, in which countries like Morocco have been funded by the EU to intercept migrants from Sub-​Saharan Africa. In this sense, the EU funds North African countries to arrest and detain fellow Sub-​ Saharan migrants which has had negative impacts on the unity of African people and also interfered with the management of migration by African countries without pressure from the EU. Indeed, the response to migration from Africa by the EU has shown its inability to address the situation in all its complexity (Laine et al. 2021). The complexity of migration suggests the need to break away from the dominant migration–​security nexus because there are opportunities for development and cohesion in welcoming migrants as valuable resources than constructing them as a threat which must be kept in Africa (Laine et al. 2020). Of course, there is the question of the agency of African countries in terms of accepting EU interference or being willing partners in these programmes. While this is accepted, it should be remembered that most African countries are pressured by some EU countries into implementing these border externalisation programmes. Thus, while the extent to which African countries agree to the EU programmes may be debatable, what is certain is that, the result is that migration is managed to meet the needs of the EU and the impact of such on Africa and its people is least important in this respect. The outcome is that there is the European management of migration in Africa and its divisive consequences and not the management of migration by African countries to meet the needs of African people. This is why issues of the social security of migrants are not seriously considered in Africa, but the adoption of Eurocentric polices which valorise neoliberal economic policies (see Chapter 11) and seek to prevent people in Africa from migrating to Europe. Thus, political provision for African migrants’ welfare illustrates one significant disjunction between the central principles of Pan-​Africanism as a foundational ideology for African regional integration, and a neoliberal economic fast track to regional integration and development that lacks a human face. As a result, contemporary African migrants’ experiences in many African countries are increasingly shaped by xenophobic attacks on and other forms of abuse of African migrants by fellow Africans in host countries, especially at the informal level. In the same context of the abuse of some African migrants, giant economic steps towards the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC), the signing of the agreement for the establishment of the

202  Inocent Moyo et al. African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), in March 2018 in Rwanda, of which is telling, are being taken for African regional integration. This means that the aspirations and anxieties are exacerbated at the state level spiralling the vulnerability of African migrants in host countries. This essentially means that, from a migration perspective, Africa is faced with two challenges. First is that of the efficient management of migration as discussed in the preceding and second, that of confronting symbolic borders and in the process forge a Pan-​African identity. It appears futile to have free movement of people who cannot establish themselves in other countries if they would either be uprooted by xenophobic backlashes or killed by the same. In this lies the call for African governments to surrender their sovereignties for a Pan-​African citizenry. After all, African countries through the African Union (AU) are targeting an African Economic Community by 2028 and a united Africa by 2063. The suggestion in the forgoing is thus made within this context. African governments and the AU must of necessity understand that the borders which they are securitising so as to promote nationalism were not drawn for that purpose. They were drawn by European colonisers in faraway Berlin in 1884–​85 to divide Africa and meet the needs of the coloniser. It is therefore high time that African countries become sensitive to this history and recognise that, while it may be impossible to obliterate the physical, territorial borders, it is possible to deconstruct symbolic borders by espousing a Pan-​ African identity and managing the physical borders by taking into account the needs of African people, which concretely means promoting free human mobility.

Reimaging borders and migration management in Africa Contributions in this book volume and discussions in the preceding sections suggest that borders and the related issue of migration are lingering matters in Africa. African countries and particularly the AU and RECs should promote a Pan-African identity. This can be done by implementing a basic education curriculum which draws open attention to and problematises the fact that the borders which African countries are so proud to securitise and protect in the name of nationalism and sovereignty were not designed for that goal. European colonisers wanted to divide and rule Africa which they succeeded in doing. But, long after the erstwhile colonisers departed to the Empire the technology of the border in dividing African countries is still effective. In many parts of Africa, borders remain as a source of tension, the AlgerianMoroccan border conflict being an illustrative example, which militate against deeper regional integration as the individual states seek to further fortify their borders and promote disparate migration relations and governance. From a migration point of view, countries in North Africa are not only disunited among themselves but also tend to perceive migration from the Sub-Saharan Africa disapprovingly. This is problematic, because there is nothing nationalistic about the borders which were imposed by European colonisers. The

Reimaging borders and migration management  203 point being made here is that, the borders which were drawn by European colonizers were meant to divide and rule Africans and it is worrying that this division is zealously followed by some North African countries to first engender division amongst themselves and second promote a xenophobic vibe and construct migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa as a black threat which needed to be fenced off. The understanding of this point is the start of a long journey towards reimaging borders and migration management in Africa. Managing intra-​Africa migration is a complex issue, because there are physical as well as socio-​cultural and economic borders with which to contend. While it is true that African borders must be efficiently managed to enhance free human mobility and integration, it does not necessarily follow that there will be integration of people. Addressing physical borders and encouraging migration does not necessarily lead to integration and development. It may lead to xenophobia –​another border-​related problem which cannot be addressed by simply effectively managing the physical border and enhancing free movement. Notwithstanding, there is need for proactive strategies by African states towards the regulation and management of migration for inclusive development, regional and continental integration.

References Adeniran, A.I. (2014). Migration and Regional Integration in West Africa:  A Borderless ECOWAS. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Adepoju, A. (2009). Migration management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration. In M. Tremolieres (Ed.) Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives. Paris: OECD. Aniche, E.T. and Moyo, I. (2019). African Union (AU) and Migration: Implications for Human Trafficking in Africa. Enugu:  AfriHeritage Research Working Paper 2019/​006. Dobler, G. (2016). The green, the grey and the blue: A typology of cross-​border trade in Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 54(1), 145–​169. Laine, J. P. (2020). Ambiguous bordering practices at the EU’s edges. In:  A. Bissonnette and É. Vallet, eds., Borders and Border Walls: In-​Security, Symbolism, Vulnerabilities. London: Routledge, pp. 69–​87. Laine J. P., Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi. 2021. Introduction: Migration and border politics amidst the Europe-​ Africa relations. In Jussi P. Laine, Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi (Eds.), Expanding Boundaries: Borders, Mobilities and the future of Europe-​Africa relations. Moyo, I. 2017. African Immigrant Traders in Johannesburg Inner City:  A Deconstruction of the Threatening Other: London: Palgrave Macmillan. Moyo, I. 2020. On Borders and the Liminality of Undocumented Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa, Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 18:1, 60–​74.

Index

Abidjan 24, 28 Abuja Treaty 180 AfCFTA 180, 190 Africa 3–​6, 140–​3, 199, 200–​2 African 140, 142 African borders 140–​2 African boundaries 140 African Common Position for Migration and Development (ACPMD) 70, 185 African Continental Free Trade Area 73 African Union (AU) 70, 145, 199 African Union-​European Union Summit 128 agenda 2063 70, 71, 183 Algeria 126, 129–​30, 132–​7, 159–​64, 167–​73 AMU see Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) Angola 147 anomie theory 53, 54 anti-​immigrant  144 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 126–​8, 137 Arab Spring 33 asylum 130–​3; seekers 129, 134 Atlantic Ocean 147 AU see African Union (AU) AU Free Movement Protocol 70, 73 Banjul Charter 184 Benin 142–​3, 145 Berlin 140, 142–​3, 147, 150; borders 94, 199; conference 18, 21, 140, 142 bilateral agreements 78–​80 Bini People 31, 38 Bismarck, Otto von 150 borderless 141, 143, 145–​7, 149–​52 borders 1, 5–​8, 34, 89, 90, 140–​4, 147–​52, 199–​202; border-​free 141, 143, 145–​51; closure 140; disputes:159–​61;

Mediterranean 130; security 127; studies 143–​4 Botswana 90 boundaries 140, 142–​3, 150–​2 Brexit 148 British 143 Cameroun 142 CARITAS Nigeria 43 Chad 142 citizen 141, 145–​6, 149–​51 colonial 140–​1, 143, 147, 149–​51; borders 140–​1, 143, 147, 149–​51; boundaries 140; masters 141; powers 143 colonialism 140 coloniality 140 Committee for the Support of Dignity of Women (COSUDOW) 43 Common African Position (CAP) 185–​6 Common Market Protocol 107, 110, 117–​19, 121 communal borders 144 constitution 129–​30, 132–​3 constructivist 143–​4 continent 142 continental body 81 control system 135 core drivers 50, 52 Cote d’Ivoire 18–​28, 142 critical 143 CRMW 126, 132–​3 cultural 143–​4 cultural boundaries 143 Declaration and Treaty of SADC 78, 81 de-​linking  180 deportation 164, 167–​9, 171, 172 detention 167, 171, 172

Index  205 development 151 discrimination: behavioural component 111–​13; on grounds of nationality 117–​19, 121 disinformation 62, 64, 65, 54 documented 140 East African integration 107, 117, 119, 122 economic 143, 151; integration 151; nationalism 151 ECOWAS Protocol 18–​28, 34, 140–​1, 145–​52 ECOWAS Revised Treaty 140 Edo State Task Force on Human Trafficking (ETAHT) 43 Ejigbo 24, 28 emergence of stereotypes 114–​17 emigration see migration entrepreneurship 188, 190 equality 184 equidistant lines 143 ethnic 141, 143–​4, 150; borders 141–​2, 144; boundaries 141–​2, 150–​2; groups 142; homelands 142 ethno-​linguistic boundaries  142–​3 Europe 4–​6, 51, 52, 55–​7, 59, 62, 63, 65–​8, 126–​31, 134, 136, 137, 142, 149, 199, 200 European Union (EU) 6, 7, 70, 76, 99–​100, 128–​31, 136, 141, 147–​9, 159, 160, 163, 164, 170, 172, 173; enlargement 77; free movement 77 European 140, 142–​3, 147–​50; borders 143, 147; colonialism 140; Commission 134, 136; Community 75; Economic Community 75; powers 147, 150; scramble 142; Union 199, 200, 201 exclusion 141, 143–​4, 151–​2 external border 149 externalisation of borders 7 extradition 130 extra-​regional border  149 fetishism 40 Frantz, Fanon 179 free movement 71, 73–​81, 140, 145; of people 107–​8, 117–​20; of persons 76, 78 French 143 frontiers 142

functional 141 functionalist 141 gated communities 93 geographical 142, 144, 151; borders 142 geophysical 141, 144, 149–​51 geopolitical 141–​2, 149–​51; borders 142, 149–​51 ghana 142–​3 Global Compact for Migration (GCM) 185–​6 globalisation 32–​3 Global North 50 Global South 50 grass 17–​28 greed 54, 62–​5 historical 141, 144; historical borders 141, 144 humanism 151 human mobility 70, 71–​5, 77, 79–​80 human smuggler 57 ICAO 146 imaginary 144, 151 immigration: control 33, 42; policy 91; see also migration inclusion 141–​4, 151–​2 inclusive development 201, 202 Initiative for Youth Awareness on Migration, Development and Reintegration (IYAMIDR) 43 integration 140–​1, 145, 149–​52, 178–​9, 181; in Africa 200 intending migrants 51, 52 inter-​Africa migrations  199 internal borders 148–​9 international 140, 143, 149–​50; international borders 149 International Law 140, 143, 150–​1 intra-​Africa migration 3, 4, 7–​9 intra-​African migration 126, 128, 129, 135, 137 intra-​regional 140, 149; borders 149 irredentism 143 irregular 143 irregular migrants 126, 128–​9, 131–​2, 134–​5 irregular migration 31, 52–​5, 58, 62, 63, 64–​7, 143, 159, 163, 164; 169; drivers 31; migration, upsurge 31–​3; routes 36; push-​pull drivers 39–​41 Italian mamas 38

206 Index Joint Labour Migration Program (JLMP) 183 King Mohamed VI 128 Kwame, Nkrumah 178 Lagos Plan of Action 180 land 143; boundaries 143 legal framework 130–​4 Liberia 142 Libya 50–​2, 55–​66, 68, 126, 131, 134–​6 Limpopo River 96 linguistic 143 Leone, Sierra 142 Maastricht Treaty 75 Maghreb 126–​9, 131–​3, 153–​7 Mali 126, 137, 142 management 135 Marxian 143 Mauritania 126, 130–​1, 133–​6, 142 Mediterranean 50–​52, 58–​60, 62, 67, 68, 147 Mediterranean Sea 98, 100 Meridian 143 migrant 140, 146, 148; returnees 51, 53, 62; see also migration migration 126–​41, 143, 145–​52; governance 74; hotspots 39; law 128, 129, 134; management 6, 25; management in Africa 202; policy 128–​32, 136, 148–​9, 159, 160, 170–​2; regimes 94–​6 Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) 70, 182, 185 migration theory 53 migratory 142 Mkandawire Thandika 186, 189 mobile community 76 modern 141 Morocco 126–​9, 132, 134–​7, 159–​67, 170–​3 movement 50, 53, 65, 66, 68, 141 Namibia 93 National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) 43 nationalism 151 202 nation-​state 142, 149–​50 neo-​colonial  146 neo-​functional  151 neo-​functionalism  151 neo-​Kantian  141

neoliberal 190 neo-​nationalism  151 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 180 Niger 126, 142 Nigeria 18–​28, 50–​69, 142–​3, 145 OAU 178–​80 One Stop Border Post 26, 28 open borders 190 pan-​African identity 201, 202 pan-​Africanism  178–​9 pan Africanism ideology 74 pan-​African unity  95, 96 partition 140, 143, 150 physical 143–​4, 151; borders 143 plan of action 182–​3, 190 policy 148–​9 political 143–​4, 151; boundaries 143–​4; culture 188; integration 151; spaces 144 porosity 140 porous 135 postmodern 143 postmodernist 143–​4 post-​nationalism  151 post-​neo-​functional  151–​2 post-​neo-​functionalism  151 poststructuralist 143–​4 post-​Westphalian  142 power 142–​4, 147, 150 precarity of borders 95 prejudice and discrimination 111–​13 protecting 137, 126, 130, 134–​7 protocol 140, 146 psycho-​social  144 push factors 51, 53, 55, 58, 62, 64, 65 racial 144 racism 159, 164, 165, 170 readmission 130, 136 RECs see Regional Economic Communities (RECs) refugees 128–​34, 148 region 140, 142, 149 regional 149–​52; cooperation 128, 132, 135, 137; integration 71, 73, 75, 77–​81, 106–​8, 121–​2, 151–​2; integration in Africa 5–​8; migration management approach 98, 99; security 151; supranationalism 149–​50, 152

Index  207 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 70, 72–​4, 81, 145, 179, 181 regionalism 74, 77 region-​state  149 regular 140; migrants 140 regularisation 129, 132 regulatory frameworks 74 reimaging borders 202 religious 144 remittances 17, 20, 40–​1

Stereotype Content Model 113, 117–​20 stereotypes 106, 109, 111, 201, 202 sub-​region 140–​1, 146–​7, 150–​1 sub-​Saharan: Africa 126, 127, 131, 133, 136, 137; countries 126, 136, 137; migrants 129, 134, 162–​70, 172, 173 supranationalism 149–​50, 152 survival 51, 58, 65, 67 sustainable development goals 42 symbolic borders 200 AEC 145

SADC citizenship 80 Sahara 147 Sahara Desert 50, 51, 55, 58, 64, 65, 67 Sahel 126, 129 Schengen 140–​1, 147–​9; agreement 71, 76, 149; area 140–​1, 147, 149; borders 148; states 148 scramble 142 securitisation of migration 6, 94, 98 security: 151, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 167, 171, 172; cooperation 151 Senegal 126, 142 smuggling network 37–​8 social 143–​4; construction 144; media 50, 51, 56; ordering 93 society 143 socio-​cultural 141, 144, 150, 152 socio-​economic 127, 128, 137, 141, 144 socio-​historical 141, 144, 151–​2 socio-​linguistic 141, 144, 151–​2 socio-​political 141, 144, 151–​2 socio-​psychological 141, 144, 150, 152 South Africa 96, 96, 99 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 70, 72, 81 Southern African region 93, 99, 100 Southern European 136 sovereignty 141–​2, 149–​52, 201 space 140, 143–​4 state 51–​3, 65–​9, 141–​3, 145, 147, 149–​50; borders 142; boundaries 144; centred 141, 143; centric 141–​4, 150; fragility theory 53; power 142; system 142, 149–​50

territorial 144, 151 territories 141, 150–​2 Togo 142–​3 trafficking industry 39 trans-​Sahelian  145 treaty 140, 142, 147, 150 Treaty of Rome 75, 76 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 76 undocumented 98, 99, 140, 143, 146–​7, 149–​52; migrants 140; migration 147, 149–​52 Uti possidetis juris 140, 143, 150–​1 violence against persons prohibition (VAPP) bill 43 Visa 149; free 140–​1, 143, 145–​9, 151; free migration 140 welfare 187–​9 West 140–​52 West Africa 18–​28, 140–​52; borders 141–​3, 147, 150–​1 Western Sahara 126, 134, 136, 137, 139 Westphalia 141–​3, 149–​50; treaty 142, 147 xenophobic 140 youth out migration 50 Zimbabwe 90, 93, 99, 100; migrants 98, 99