Into the unknown together: the DOD, NASA, and early spaceflight 9781585661404, 1-58566-140-6

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Into the Unknown Together The DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight

MARK ERICKSON Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 2005

Air University Library Cataloging Data Erickson, Mark, 1962Into the unknown together : the DOD, NASA and early spaceflight / Mark Erickson. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-140-6 1. Manned space flight—Government policy—United States—History. 2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration—History. 3. Astronautics, Military—Government policy—United States. 4. United States. Air Force—History. 5. United States. Dept. of Defense—History. I. Title. 629.45'009'73––dc22

Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the editor and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Air University Press 131 West Shumacher Avenue Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6615 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil

ii

To Becky, Anna, and Jessica You make it all worthwhile.

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Contents Chapter

1

2

3

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ii

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS . . . Ambling toward Sputnik . . . . . . NASA’s Predecessor Organization and the DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.......... ..........

1 3

.......... ..........

18 24

EISENHOWER ACT I: REACTION TO SPUTNIK AND THE BIRTH OF NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eisenhower Attempts to Calm the Nation . . . President’s Scientific Advisory Committee and Civil Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Johnson and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee . . . . . . . . . . . . The NACA Enters the Fray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The PSAC and “Introduction to Outer Space” . Balancing Civilian and Military Responsibilities in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .

31 32

.

41

. . .

46 51 53

. .

57 79

EISENHOWER ACT II: FORGING A NASA-DOD RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To Compete with the Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . Space for Peace? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Force Philosophy Made Little Headway . . . The NASA-DOD Relationship Phase I . . . . . . . ARPA’s Space Role Fades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amending the Space Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Civilian-Military Liaison Committee and the National Aeronautics and Space Council . . . Space Act Amendments Stymied . . . . . . . . . . The Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

93 93 102 109 111 119 120 121 123 126

CONTENTS

Chapter

4

5

6

Page

The NASA-DOD Relationship Phase II . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

127 136

MERCURY, DYNASOAR, AND THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE UNDER EISENHOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mercury’s Antecedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

149 149 185

KENNEDY, PRESTIGE, AND THE MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . Kennedy and the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . Kennedy, Space Policy, and Prestige . . . To the Moon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Did Kennedy’s Commitment Hold Firm? Kennedy, the Soviet Space Program, and a Joint Lunar Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

191 193 200 210 221

.... ....

227 240

NASA, DOD, MCNAMARA, AND THE AIR FORCE UNDER KENNEDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air Force “Campaign” to Usurp NASA Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DOD Directive 5160.32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Air Force’s Space Philosophy and Space Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The OSD’s Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . One Space Program, Not Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . The NASA-DOD Relationship: An Overview of Support, Coordination, and Rivalry . . . . . The NASA-DOD Relationship: Tension and Rivalry Specifically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The NASA-DOD Relationship: Coordination Specifically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The NASA-DOD Relationship: Support Specifically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Reciprocal: NASA’s Contributions to National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

263 263 274 277 281 294 296 302 309 314 322 326

CONTENTS

Chapter

7

8

9

10

Page

GEMINI, DYNASOAR, AND THE MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Project Gemini and the DOD . . . . . . . . . . Dynasoar in 1961–62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dynasoar and Gemini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The MOL Emerged as Dynasoar Expired . An Addendum: Reconnaissance Satellites and Space Policy in the Kennedy Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

337 337 351 357 361

... ...

378 385

... ...

395 395

...

402

...

415

...

421

JOHNSON’S PHILOSOPHY, SPACE POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY . . . . . . . Johnson, the Cold War, and Détente . . . . Johnson, Space Policy, Prestige, and Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuity in the Air Force and OSD Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuity in NASA-DOD Relations I: Overview and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . Continuity in NASA-DOD Relations II: Support and Tension/Rivalry . . . . . . . . . The Reciprocal: NASA’s Contribution to National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

...

425

... ... ...

438 443 444

APOLLO AND THE MOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preliminary and Background Information The Concept of the MOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Concept of the AAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Execution of the MOL and the AAP . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

455 455 463 479 489 514

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

525 538

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

541

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

547

vii

. . . . . .

CONTENTS

Page

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

655

Illustrations PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

255

Tables 1

Research and development funding for ballistic missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

General-space budgetary trends for the Eisenhower administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

Long-term figures for military personnel assigned to NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

133

Military space expenditures proposed Space Plan of 1962 compared to DOD’s budgeting baseline for space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

281

The 1961 situation from the Air Force perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

290

Annual number of military officers assigned to NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

316

A breakdown of DOD support for Project Mercury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

322

NASA and military space budgets for the years shown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

406

9

NASA employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

406

10

Federal expenditures for actual FY 67 budgets and expected amounts for FY 68 and FY 69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

413

11

Unreimbursed expenses for Gemini support . . .

428

12

Apollo support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

438

2 3 4

5 6 7 8

viii

About the Author

Lt Col Mark Erickson was born and raised on a small farm south of Ogden, Iowa. After graduating from Ogden Community High School, he earned his bachelor’s degree from Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, in 1985. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force in 1987, his first assignment as a space and missile officer was to Comiso Air Station (AS), Italy, to serve as a launch control officer with the ground launched cruise missile system. He then served in the same capacity with the Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB) from 1988 to 1992 while simultaneously earning his master of arts in history from Central Missouri State University. After his first tour as an instructor of history at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, Colonel Erickson completed a doctorate in history at George Washington University before serving at Woomera AS, Australia, as a space warning officer. He returned to USAFA as an assistant professor of history in 1999 and then attended Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, starting in 2001. He was a staff officer and executive officer at US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, from 2002 through 2004 and the chief of safety at the 91st Space Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota, from 2004 to 2005. In the summer of 2005, he took command of the 326th Training Squadron (Basic Military Training), Lackland AFB, Texas. Colonel Erickson is married to Rebecca (Kessler) Erickson and has twin daughters Anna and Jessica.

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Chapter 1

Necessary Preconditions Between the 4 October 1957 launching by the Soviet Union of the first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik I, and the successful American landing and return from the moon in July 1969, the United States sponsored five human-spaceflight programs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) started and completed Projects Mercury and Gemini while its Project Apollo would land on the moon five times before December 1972.1 Meanwhile, different administrations cancelled the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Project Dynasoar in December 1963 and its successor the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) in June 1969.2 Therefore, the US Air Force (USAF), as the agency directly responsible for both programs, failed in its attempts to evaluate and use humans in space for military purposes. This book examines the NASA-DOD relationship, with a special focus on these human-spaceflight projects, and the larger context in which this relationship existed. By examining the geopolitical, domestic political, and bureaucratic environments in which decisions concerning these projects were made, the relationships between America’s first five humanspaceflight projects will become clear. The author examines the NASA-DOD relationship in human-spaceflight programs by looking at three issues. First, what was the attitude of presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson toward the use of space exploration as a tool to secure international prestige and national pride as part of the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union? While a complete examination of each president’s Cold War policies and general beliefs is outside the scope of this work, it is necessary to touch upon the highlights of Eisenhower’s, Kennedy’s, and Johnson’s fundamental perspectives on the Soviet Union and the Cold War. More important, however, is to examine what each man specifically believed concerning the role space exploration was to play in the geopolitical struggle with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1

NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS

(USSR), by analyzing each president’s pronouncements on such topics as space for peaceful pursuits, human spaceflight, and space for prestige purposes. Each president’s specific actions in the field of space policy, human-spaceflight projects, and cooperation with the USSR in space will also be a key piece of the puzzle. In essence, Eisenhower was not at all keen on such a construct; he did not believe the United States should race to the moon in search of prestige. Kennedy believed and reoriented American space policy toward the moon. Johnson continued this lunar landing goal but refused to expand American space policy beyond it as he grappled with the demands of Vietnam and the Great Society. Second, what institutional relationship existed between NASA and the DOD—the level of support, coordination, and rivalry during each president’s term(s)? What specific instances and programs illustrate these dynamics? What role did individual personalities play in this interaction? How did NASA achieve greater independence by lessening its reliance on the DOD over these 12 years? Equally important to the NASADOD relationship was the relationship within the DOD between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Air Force. A level of tension far in excess of any that may have existed between NASA and the DOD resulted from the conflict between Kennedy’s and Johnson’s secretary of defense (SECDEF) Robert S. McNamara’s reluctance to authorize and fund DOD human-spaceflight projects and the Air Force’s conclusion that these very programs were necessary to guarantee national security. The third examination will focus on the actual projects themselves: Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Dynasoar, and MOL. What was each designed to accomplish and why? Under Eisenhower, Dynasoar and Mercury achieved their initial momentum. The DOD offered critical support for Mercury, but Mercury’s capabilities did not seriously endanger the existence of Dynasoar. In Kennedy’s administration, the Gemini program was born and matured to the point where McNamara came to view Dynasoar as largely redundant and canceled it in December 1963, a few days after Kennedy’s death, and simultaneously initiated MOL. Under Johnson, MOL and Apollo matured, and while MOL main2

NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS

tained a tenuous hold on life as a reconnaissance platform, newly inaugurated president Richard M. Nixon cancelled it shortly after taking office. Therefore, before the decade ended and before the actual lunar landing in July 1969, the Air Force saw both its human-spaceflight projects canceled. Neither project failed due to NASA’s urging, rather, there was a complex mixture of financial, political, international, and institutional factors that eventually led to their demise. The October 1957 launch of the Sputnik I “officially” opened the space age. After World War II, the military services of the United States had begun thinking about, and had even taken tentative steps toward, military operations in space; however, contextual factors limited concrete developments. The United States did initiate separate civilian and military reconnaissance satellite programs, which then proceeded at a relatively leisurely pace before October 1957; both were limited by appropriations far below the level of the ballistic missile program. Nevertheless, they had laid the groundwork to support a dramatically expanded post-Sputnik space program for both the military and civilian arenas. In the end it became clear that the quest for reliable reconnaissance of the Soviet Union was the fundamental driving force behind Eisenhower’s space programs and policy. This chapter discusses the salient developments in space policy during that leisurely period before October 1957.

Ambling toward Sputnik The idea that international prestige could be enhanced by space exploration did not appear until the Cold War was in full bloom. Before that, the three significant pioneers in the field of astronautics thought space travel necessary to satisfy the human urge to explore and glean scientific knowledge. Russian Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky (1857–1935) is credited with the idea of liquid-fueled rockets and the design of reaction-rocket engines. In a 1929 essay, “Cosmic Rocket Trains,” Tsiolkovsky proposed the idea of linking rockets together and then sequentially firing them—a concept known today as rocket stages.3 Robert H. Goddard (1882–1945) was on the American vanguard of astronautical thinking and went beyond Tsiolkovsky and actually fab3

NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS

ricated, experimented with, and launched rockets. His first successful rocket flight on 16 March 1926 flew for 2.5 seconds, rose to 41 feet, and traveled 64 miles per hour (mph). By the time of his death, near the end of World War II and while working for the US Navy, his rockets had reached speeds of 700 mph and an altitude of 15 miles.4 Hermann J. Oberth (1894–1989), a German, was the final pioneering thinker in space exploration and foresaw a complex mix of scientific knowledge, commercial potential, and military applications.5 Yet none of these gentlemen foresaw space exploration as a tool for enhancing national prestige in the Cold War’s very competitive geopolitical environment. World War II had cemented the incipient link between space technology and military applications. The atomic bomb and the ballistic missile were the two most important technological innovations of that war and were soon integrated to form a weapons system, which made possible the emergence of the space age— the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It was a rocket from Russia’s first-generation R-7 ICBM that carried Sputnik I to orbit on 4 October 1957. Explorer I, America’s first satellite, was likewise carried to orbit in January 1958 by a modified Army Jupiter—an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM).6 As the Cold War hardened near the time of these initial satellite launches, prestige-oriented competition made its entry. This followed the post–World War II decade that was not enthusiastic about the development of missiles, satellites, and space technology. The Air Force’s reconnaissance satellite was not approved until March 1955, and its budget was limited to $3 million in 1956. Research and development (R&D) funds for ballistic missiles are shown in table 1 and were the necessary precursor for any space program.7 Table 1. Research and development funding for ballistic missiles Year Funding ($ million)

Prior to 1953

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958