Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy? 9789812305923

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INTERVENTION &CHANGE IN CAMBODIA

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (I SEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted issues and challenges of stability and security, economic develovment, and political and social change. The Institute's research programmes are Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board ofTrustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. An Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

INTERVENTION &CHANGE IN CAMBODIA TOWARDS DEMOCRACY?

SORPONG PEOU

SILKWORM BOOKS, Thailand INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, Singapore

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614

Internet e-mail: [email protected] World Wide Web: http:/ /www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html First published in Thailand in 2000 by Silkworm Books Suriwong Book Centre Building 54/1 Sridonchai Road Chiang Mai 50100, Thailand for distribution in Thailand, Myanmar, and Indochina All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opimons in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy ofthe Institute or its supporters. Cataloguing in Publication Data Sorpong Peou. Intervention and change in Cambodia : rewards democracy? (Indochina series, 0218-608X) 1. Cambodia--Politics and government--19752. Democracy--Cambodia--History. I. Title. IL Series. DS554.8 S71 2000 sls99-11966 ISBN 981-230-042-2 (hardcover, ISEAS, Singapore) ISBN 981-3055-39-1 (softcover, ISEAS, Singapore) ISSN 0218-608X ISBN 974-7551-29-7 (softcover, Silkworm Books, Thailand)

For the USA and Canada, a hardcover edition (ISBN 0-312-22717-5) is published by St. Martin's Press, New York. Tvpeser hv International Tvpeserrcrs Pte. Ltd. Printed in Singapore by !'rime Packaging Industries Pre. Ltd.

table of contents

list of maps and plates preface acknowledgments acronyms & abbreviations

!X X11

XIX XX!

introduction A Reflection on Major Theories of Democracy

Key Terms & Definitions Conventional Approaches to Democratization An Anti-Hegemonic Theory of Democratization: Concepts, Variables, Methodology, & Structure

1

3 10 18

part one democratic seed on thorny soil

1955-90

chapter I Anti-Democratic Political Systems

Prince Sihanouk's Paternalistic Authoritarianism, 1955-70 President Lon Nol's Republican Authoritarianism, 1970-75 Prime Minister Pol Pot's Revolutionary Totalitarianism,

1975-78 The PRK/SOC's Socialist Dictatorship, 1979-90 Conclusion

39

40 48 54 63 69

chapter 2 Unstable Hegemonic Power Structures

Sihanouk as the Least Vulnerable Hegemon

76 78

table ofcontents

vi

Lon Nol as a Vulnerable Hegemon The PRK/SOC Leadership as a Less Vulnerable Hegemon Pol Pot as the Most Vulnerable Hegemon Conclusion

88 93 101 106

chapter 3 Cold War "Competitive" Intervention

Pre-Independence Foreign Intervention External Interferences during Sihanouk's Years External Intervention during Lon Nol's Years in Power USSR & Vietnam: Building a Hegemonic Regime in Cambodia Foreign Intervention & the Third Indochina War Conclusion

116 117 122 127 132 145 153

part two unconsolidated democratic transition

1991-95 chapter 4 Towards an Unconsolidated Democratic Regime

Democratic Emergence: The Paris Agreements Towards a New Liberal Democratic System Unconsolidated Democracy Conclusion

165 166 176 191 200

chapter 5 Hurting Balance of Power Unachieved

A Trend towards a Hurting Balance Thwarted, 1991-93 The State's Joint Hegemonic Power Structure, 199 3-95 Societal Challenges to the State, 1991-95 Conclusion

207 208 215 227 242

chapter 6 Co-optative Intervention in Cambodia

Proactive International Intervention, 1990-91

247 248

table ofcontents

vii

UNTAC (1992-93): Not for a Hurting Balance The International Community & Intervention, 1993-95 Conclusion

256 264 278

part three

towards illiberal democracy 1996-future chapter 7 Democracy on Trial, 1996-98

The Years 1996-97: Moving Backwards Towards the 1998 Elections Hun Sen's Political Actions & New Political Agenda Conclusion chapter 8 Hun Sen's Rise to Greater Hegemonic Status, 1996-98

New Dangerous Political Realignments & the Coup Hun Sen's Military Superiority Fewer Social Challenges: Rebellion and Poverty Conclusion

289 290 310 319 330 336 337 347 356 368

chapter 9 The New "Co-optative Intervention", 1996-98

372

External Assistance for Hegemonic Power External Responses to Hun Sen's Ascendancy before the Coup External Intervention after the Coup Conclusion

373 381 385 403

conclusion Towards an Anti-Hegemonic Theory of Democratization

409

The Anti-Democratic Experience in Recent Cambodian History A Tentative Anti-Hegemonic Theory of Democratization Implications for Policy Action

410 415 426

viii

table ofcontents

appendices 1. Foreign Assistance to Cambodia 2. The Paris Agreements, 1991 3. The Cambodian Constitution 4. The Law on Political Parties 5. The Election Law

434 439 466 485 493

bibliography index the author

563 573

521

list of maps and plates

Maps

1. Map of Cambodia 2. Map of Indochina 3. Map ofThailand 4. Map of Phnom Penh

XXlV

115 231 235

Plates

Between pages 64 and 65 I. Angkor War: Cambodia's famous temple built in the 12th century 2. The Cambodian National Assembly in Phnom Penh 3. The Independence Monument in Phnom Penh 4. General Lon Nol 5. Prince Sirik Matak 6. General Lon Nol; In Tam, President of the National Assembly; and Cheng Heng, Head of State, who replaced Prince Norodom Sihanouk after the coup in 1970 7. Victims of the Pol Pot regime at the infamous Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh 8. Photographs of victims at the infamousTuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh 9. Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Princess Monique greeted by Indonesian President Suharto and the First Lady at the State Palace on arriving in Jakarta on 23 July 1988 for the First Jakarta Informal Meeting 10. KPNLF leader Son Sann praying with Buddhist monks for world peace and for the success ofJIM I, July 1988 11. Indonesian President Suharto at an informal discussion with Cambodian factional leaders at Merdeka Palace, July 1988

X

list of maps and plates

Between pages 256 and 257 12. UN Secretary-General Boutros Bourros-Ghali meeting with Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Head of Supreme National Council) during the former's visit to Cambodia in April1993, before the UN -organized elections in May of that year 13. General John Sanderson (Australia), UNTAC Force Commander 14. Yasushi Akashi Oapan), Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral 15. UN peacekeepers at the Government Palace in Phnom Penh during a medal presentation ceremony 16. Voters in Phnom Penh during the 1993 elections 17. King Norodom Sihanouk and the Queen taking part in the opening of a parliamentary session on 19 April 1995 18. King Norodom Sihanouk, the Queen, and parliamentary members outside the National Assembly building on 19 April 1995 19. Prince Norodom Sirivudh, half-brother of King Norodom Sihanouk and Secretary-General of Funcinpec, at his residence in June 1995 20. Son Soubert, son of BLDP leader Son Sann and Second ViceChairman of the National Assembly, in a meeting with a Vietnamese official visiting Cambodia from 12 to 16 August 1996 21. Chea Sim, leader of the CPP and President of the National Assembly, during a meeting with election experts from Canada, France, and the US on 30 August 1996 22. Loy Sim Chheang, prominent member ofFuncinpec and First ViceChairman of the National Assembly, during a visit to Svay Rieng Province on 10-11 February 1997 Between pages 320 and 321 23. Kern Sokha, BLDP member of parliament and Chairman of the National Assembly Commission for Human Rights, meeting with Ambassador Thomas Hammar berg, UN Representative for Human Rights to Cambodia, on 11 December 1996 24. Sam Rainsy, President of the Khmer Nation Party (later renamed Sam Rainsy Party), leading a demonstration against the Hun Senled Cambodian People's Party 2'5. Victims of a grenade attack on the Khmer Nation Party demonstra-

list of maps and plates

xi

tion on 30 March 1997 26. Mr Chheng Phon, Chairman of the National Election Committee, at a ceremony on 1 July 1998 27. Kassie Neou, Vice-Chairman of the National Election Committee, at a meeting on 30 June 1998 28. At a ceremony for the presentation of donations from China to the National Election Committee on 1 July 1998. Seated at the table were Yang Ting Ai, Chinese Ambassador to Phnom Penh, and Uch Kim An, Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs 29. Yang Ting Ai, Chinese Ambassador to Phnom Penh, sitting next to Chheng Phon, National Election Committee Chairman, at the 1 July 1998 ceremony 30. Lakhan Mehrotra, UN Representative, shaking hands with Uch Kim An, Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, Gordon Langmuir, Canadian Ambassador, and Chheng Phon, National Election Committee Chairman, at the 1 July 1998 ceremony 31. Kassie Neou, National Election Committee Vice-Chairman; Masaki Saito, Japanese Ambassador to Phnom Penh; Chheng Phon, National Election Committee Chairman; and Uch Kim An, Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, at a ceremony for the presentation of]apanese assistance to the 1998 elections on 7 July 1998 32. A ballot box presented by the Japanese at the 7 July 1998 ceremony. Standing near the ballot box were Kassie Neou, National Election Committee Vice-Chairman; Masaki Saito, Japanese Ambassador to Phnom Penh; Chheng Phon, National Election Committee Chairman; and Uch Kim An, Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs 33. A meeting on the European Commission's support for the 1998 elections 34. A Son Sann party rally and election campaign in Phnom Penh on 22 July 1998 35. Posters of different political parties placed in and around Phnom Penh before the 1998 elections 36. A Funcinpec rally in Kampong Cham Province on 21 July 1998 37. A member of the Joint International Observer Group observes the casting of ballot on 27 July 1998 38. A voter casting her ballot on 27 July 1998

preface

This book examines Cambodia and the problems of and prospects for democratization - one aspect of the "triple transition", a term widely used in the post-Cold War era (the other two transitions are from war to peace, and from a centrally planned or socialist economy to a marketdriven or capitalist one). While the triple transition has often been treated as a simultaneous process, this book sheds light on how difficult it is to push the three transitions at one go. Without an effective change in the state-society power structure, the transitions from war to peace and from a command economy to a capitalist one run the risk of being thwarted. In war-torn states, power structures are shaped or even determined by material - especially military and economic - capabilities. This book does not simply seek to describe the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, however. My purpose is to "measure" and explain the impact of foreign intervention on Cambodia's state and societal structures, in so far as it perpetuates political authoritarianism or allows democratization to emerge and mature. Although I do not pretend to develop a general theory of democratization and to predict trends for Third World politics, I aim to develop a broader theoretical perspective on the transition from political authoritarianism to liberal democracy. I hope to shed some new light on why it is extraordinarily difficult for weak states to make this transition, and why external intervention towards democratization often seems to run into many difficulties. This study is important to current thinking on democratization in three respects. First, Cambodia is an excellent case study of the process of democratization, because attempts to establish democracy have not been as successful as one would have liked. From 1954 (after Cambodia gained its independence from France) to 1998, this Southeast Asian state has gone through a series of trials and tribulations. The seeds of

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xiii

liberal democracy briefly fell on Cambodian soil after World War II, but they soon died when Cambodia witnessed the emergence of paternalistic authoritarianism (1954-70), republican dictatorship (1970-75), revolutionary totalitarianism (1975-78), and socialist dictatorship (197991). Between 1993 and 1998, Cambodia's newfound democracy was continually tested and it remains unconsolidated. Second, Cambodia continues to command global attention. The UN has intervened in this state on an unprecedented scale. After four Cambodian factions had signed a peace agreement in Paris on 23 October 1991, they invited the UN to send a mission to Cambodia. The then-UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with the collective support of the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council, immediately set up a mission with an historic mandate: to create a neutral political environment in which the Cambodian signatories could compete in a free and fair election. The multifarious mission was made up of more than 20,000 personnel (of whom 15,000 were peacekeepers) and cost about US$2 billion. The operational significance of this mission (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia or UNTAC) was that it had six components: military, civil administration, human rights, elections, repatriation of refugees, and economic rehabilitation. Mter the elections, external actors stayed committed to the process of nation-rebuilding by providing Cambodia with enormous amounts of foreign aid (US$2,336,925,000 in the 1992-97 period, to be precise). However, Cambodia is far from democratic. The last five years have seen human rights abuses, grenade attacks on political opponents, coup attempts, and armed conflict. It was not until late 1998 that the armed rebellion ended. Third, although much has been written about Cambodia's tragic history, little attention has been given to theoretical issues correlating democratization with international intervention. Those who were critical of UNTAC tended to draw insights from the conventional wisdom that a country like Cambodia is unprepared for political pluralism. They base their analyses on one of these (pre-)conditions: political attitudes and behaviour, the level of economic development, institution-building, social structures and interactions among social groups, political institutions, the role of elites, and so on. Traditional theories have not seriously

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xiv

examined a correlation between external influences and the persistence of authoritarianism. Those who did pay attention to the role ofUNTAC and explain its impact on Cambodian politics tended to test the concepts of international peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Eminent Cambodia historian David Chandler offers us a sober reflection on the unpredictable nature of Cambodian politics when he asserts that "Cambodia has a large capacity to ambush prophets and 1 take historians by surprise". I think I know why. As shall be briefly discussed later, historians tend to describe political events in terms of who does what to whom, and then look for both a culprit and a "saviour" to rescue Cambodia from tragedy. What often happens is that as soon as a new leader emerges, he is turned into a "monster". Historical analysis unfortunately tends to centre largely on personality (Sihanouk's "hyperactivity" and "narcissism", Lon Nol's "phlegmatic personal style", and so on), individual intentions, political ideology, and cultural proclivity. This study seeks to moderate the following intellectual traditions: 1. Personality determines political dynamics and systems. 2. Ideology single-handedly drives the politics of violence. 3. Cambodian culture is violence-prone, anti-democratic, and politically irredeemable; culture is anti-rational. 4. Violence is the way to destroy evil-doers and to build strong states. 2 Instead, this study drives home the following points: 1. In weak states, the politics of survival matters most. In the absence of an overarching political authority capable of enjoying political legitimacy and justly regulating social behaviour, violence tends to serve as the means to achieve the end of security. 2. Personality, ideology, and culture are more or less by-products of other factors such as the political environment and can be changed or entrenched by change or continuity in power relations. 3. Cognitive change is difficult, if not impossible, especially when power relations among various socio-political forces remain asymmetrical. 4. External actors often contribute to the dynamics of power relations among socio-political forces within weak states.

preface

XV

5. The use of violence is often counter-productive, self-destructive, and ultimately anti-democratic. My theoretical approach has drawn criticism from some scholars. One legitimate concern is that Cambodian politics cannot be explained by a single, grand theory. In other words, any attempt to advance a general theory of democratization is bound to fail because it overlooks certain crucial variables explaining war-torn Third World political dynamics. Be that as it may, it is important that we make sense of a complex world of politics by establishing certain patterns, by testing them empirically, and by drawing some general conclusions. This intellectual effort enables us to avoid the pitfall of being driven by emotions or personal feelings; it helps us to become more objective. Because of the position I take in this study, I would like to make one clarification concerning my intentions. Writing on Cambodian politics has been a painful intellectual exercise for me. I have been labelled "strange", "irresponsible", "dishonest", "immoral", "propagandistic", and "hypocritical". Such characterizations often come from those who apparently see themselves as holding the "moral high ground" - those who hate evil. My critics are free to judge me as they please. I have no qualms with their declaring themselves "saints" and thinking me a "terrible sinner". My hope is that they will not go beyond the bounds of scholarship. But what often confuses me is that the "saints" who seek to avoid "sin'' have basically rejected my position against the use of violence as a way to accomplish political objectives. The one thing my critics can accuse me of is that I always speak against violence. I have never belonged to any political party, nor have I ever sought to defend a regime. My attitude towards violence is as simple as this: we ought to be careful, lest in fighting evil one becomes evil itself Events such as the National Hate Day (commemorated on 20 May in Cambodia; initiated by the government in the 1980s) is understandable. But take a second look at what government leaders had done during that decade and thereafter. It is worth stressing that I am a student of international relations/ comparative politics and do not claim to be an expert on Cambodia. My academic interest in this country has only grown out of my personal experiences living there until mid-1979, at which point I was in my

xvi

prefoce

early twenties and left for Thailand, and later Canada. I have since devoted a large part of my life to helping myself better understand the incredible sufferings that the Cambodian people have undergone. This book has largely resulted from my general reflections on Cambodian politics. When I first contemplated writing this book, I felt a strong sense of despair, because seeking to understand Cambodian politics seemed an impossible task. And it is still a dreadful thought, knowing that I may have embarked on something too complex and too unmanageable. Only a few leading scholars such as David Chandler, Milton Osborne, Michael Vickery, Ben Kiernan, Serge Thion, and Steven Heder can truly be called Cambodia experts. Their works have truly enriched my intellectual thinking. I would like to end my remarks by assuring those who hate evil that I am with them on moral issues. The only difference between us is the question of how we should work to defeat the "evil" we all despise. I wrote this book not to convince my critics that they were wrong, or to prove which of us is more "righteous". The future of Cambodia is all that drove me to write this book. I argue that the use of violence to defeat "evil" is often counterproductive and self-defeating, and thereby run the risk of being accused of "moral spinelessness" - especially when using the word "forgiveness". Still, I stick to this principle because I feel it makes me more human and less self-righteous, and enables me to solve what I consider a "moral dilemma". A call for forgiveness does not exonerate wrongdoers, nor does it make the forgiver morally irresponsible. What it does do, however, is to enable adversaries to get out of the trap that condemns them into an "eternity" of violence. I could not agree more with what John Bolton, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs during the George Bush Administration, wrote: "Perhaps most destructive of true 'nation-building' in recent Cambodian situation is the idea of an international tribunal to try charges of genocide. To get the full cathartic benefit of war crime trials, a nation must be willing to take on the responsibility of judging its own. It may choose to opt for the amnesia of a general forgiveness of past crimes, but if the nation wants justice instead of amnesty, they should try the crimi2 nals themselves." The philosopher Hannah Arendt once said that for-

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xvii

giveness brings redemption to the inevitability of history; otherwise, humanity remains trapped in the "predicament of irreversibility". The tragedy of Cambodian history calls for a national awakening. Its people must stop putting the blame on one another, their blameworthy leaders, and outsiders to the extent that more violence becomes "justified". Knowing that state-making is a very bloody process may help us understand better the dilemmas political leaders in weak states 3 always have to face. The Cambodian people and their leaders should learn from and not repeat their tragic history, by nurturing the spirit of forgiveness. They must not look back revengefully at all the horrors that have afflicted them. As they prepare themselves for what lies ahead, Prime Minister Hun Sen should be given a chance to lead the nation. He should not, however, entertain any idea that he would rule the country for life. This book warns against any such wishful thinking. The 21st century will bring many great challenges to Cambodia, but I still have faith in the ability of the Cambodian people to overcome their tragic past and to rebuild their nation in such a way that peace and prosperity will endure. Sorpong Peou 15 January 1999 Singapore NOTES 1. D. Chandler, "The Tragedy of Cambodian History Revisited", SAIS Review 14, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1994): 89. 2. John Bolton, "Cambodia Will Test ASEAN's Maturity: Further U.N. Intervention Would Be Paternalistic and Useless", 13 October 1997 . 3. Although I argue in this book that accommodative rather than hegemonic politics is the way out for Cambodia, I am well aware that state-building is a bloody process. In weak and fragmented states, leaders are almost always tempted to use repressive violence as the way to build political communities. This approach is well recognized by leading social scientists. Charles Tilly is among them. As he has observed: "The building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor ... The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state-building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control

xviii

prefoce of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities ... Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of strong states." (See C. Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making", in The Formation ofNational States in Western Europe, p. 71.) For Tilly, state-making is the principal source of "organized violence". As he puts it: "Under the general heading of organized violence, the agents of states characteristically carry on four different activities: 1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force; 2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories; 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients; 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities- war making, state making and protection." (See C. Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", in Bringing the State Back In, p. 181.) Political scientist Joel S. Migdal even suggests that severe social dislocations are necessary conditions for building strong states, while world historical timing, military threat, an independent bureaucracy, and skilful leadership are sufficient conditions for the task. He remarks: "[Without] severe social dislocations and additional conducive conditions, it is unlikely that new strong states will emerge in the foreseeable future. New policies, management techniques, administrative tinkerings, more committed bureaucrats are all inadequate to change the structural relations between weak states and strong societies: the effect of society's fragmented social control in weakening the state and the effect of a weak state's politics and administration in reinforcing fragmented social control in society." (See J.S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, p. 277.) Migdal also provides some good insight into the politics of survival in Third World states: "It has been part of a praiseworthy informational-political campaign, led by Amnesty International, to lend a helping hand from outside the society to protect victims and potential victims. Academic literature, for the most part, has not gone beyond indictment of particular leaders and regimes." (Ibid., p. 214.)

acknowledgements

I wrote this book with a personal conviction, based on my long-term observations of Cambodian politics and the insights and inspirations I drew from those with whom I have interacted over the years. I would like to thank them. First of all, I would like to thank my good friend William Wood, who kindly helped edit the book at manuscript stage. Natarajan Nagarajan, who always came to my rescue when my computer ran into difficulties, deserves my sincere appreciation for his prompt responses to my calls. Colleagues at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (I SEAS) also made it possible for this book to be completed. They have kindly shown patience and friendship and this has made my academic life most enjoyable. My sincere thanks go to Professor Chan Heng Chee, former Director of the Institute, and Professor Chia Siow Yue, current Director, for their support during my four-year stay at ISEAS. Since 1992, I have visited Cambodia often (two to three times a year) and talked to hundreds of people. My interviewees, none of whom can be identified for various reasons, offered me valuable insights that helped me clarify my thinking on different complex issues. I share their hopes and despairs. To them I offer thanks and wish them well in all that they seek to accomplish. There are several other individuals whom I would like to thank. The five anonymous reviewers were critical but thoughtful, and generous in supplying me with interesting ideas and valuable guidance on how to strengthen my work. A number of other scholars who read parts of the manuscript made useful comments. Among them were Professor Joel Migdal of the University of Washington (USA), who read parts of the manuscript. Professor Ramses Amer of Uppsala University (Sweden) also provided critical comments. Many of my Cambodian friends were

XX

acknowledgements

among those who have kindly assisted me. I am particularly grateful to Bunleng Men for his help during my fieldwork in Cambodia in the last several years. Mrs. Ling LeBrun, Nina Roy, Kao Kim Hourn, and Nay Chhuon have also provided me with invaluable assistance. My gratitude also goes to the Canada-ASEAN Centre (Singapore). Ian Robertson, Executive Director of the Centre, was supportive of my research work in the first year at ISEAS. This gentleman has shown a keen interest in everything I have done. Also, Nancy Spence has been a most wonderful friend to me; she never failed to do her utmost to help me at every stage during my early stay in Singapore. I would also like to acknowledge that it was the Canada-ASEAN Centre that initially provided me with the research funding, without which this book would not even have started. I would like to pay tribute to those who have guided me gently and wisely. Among them are Professors David Dewitt, Paul Evans, Bernard Frolic (all of whom are at York University), and Professor WB. Moul (University ofWaterloo). Above all else, I would like to thank those who always stay in my heart. My beloved mother (Chea Vath) and god-mother (Evelyn Armstrong), my dearest brothers and sisters (Phyrun, Rathana, Sorpech, Sambath, Chola, Samba, and their spouses, Pech, Him Lun, Phyrun, Thydo, Peou), and my lovely nieces and nephews (Leakena, Vida, Vibol, Vimol, Vatanak, Anika, Brandon, and Alessandra) - most of whom have helped me by believing in me and taking pride in what I do (even when I fail). My brothers- and sisters-in-law (Michael, Ratha, Kongkea, and Sarna) have also always been quick to help me whenever I need their assistance. My dearest parents-in-law (Dr. and Mrs. Chek) deserve my deep gratitude for their faithful support and encouragement. My wife Chola has endured the most hardship, having to put up with me during my travelling and busy days. Her patience and love has made it possible for me to complete this book. I am most indebted to her. Above all, I thank God for teaching me to be mindful of my selfrighteous tendencies and to be aware of the "beam" in my own eye. Although I am grateful to everyone who had lent a helping hand, I would like to stress that I alone take full responsibility for the views I express in this book and for any factual inaccuracies or errors of judgment or interpretation that remain.

acronyms & abbreviations

ADB- Asian Development Bank AFPFL- Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League AMM - ASEAN Ministerial Meeting ANFREL- Asian Network for Free Elections ASEAN -Association of Southeast Asian Nations BLDP- Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (KPNLF's Party) BLP - Buddhist Liberal Party CC- Constitutional Council CDC - Council for the Development of Cambodia CGM - Consultative Group Meeting CGDK- Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea CIA- Central Intelligence Agency CMAC- Cambodian Mine Action Centre CNAF - Cambodian National Armed Forces COM - Council of Ministers COMFREL- Commission of Free and Fair Elections CPK- Communist Party of Kampuchea CPP - Cambodian People's Party CPT- Communist Party ofThailand CRDB- Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board OK- Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) DNUM- Democratic National United Movement EOU- European Observation Unit ERC- Economic Rehabilitation Credit ERP- Emergency Rehabilitation Project ESAF -Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility EU -European Union

xxii

acronyms

& abbreviations

Funcinpec- National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia FUNK- United National Front of Kampuchea GOP- gross domestic product GNUNS- Government of National Union of National Salvation GSP - Generalized System of Preferences ICM- International Control Mechanism ICORC- International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia IFC - International Finance Corp IMF - International Monetary Fund JIM- Jakarta Informal Meeting JCACR- Joint Commission for Abnormal Conflict Resolution JIOG- Joint International Observer Group KNP - Khmer Nation Party NPKC- National Peacekeeping Council (Thailand) KPNLF - Khmer People's National Liberation Front KPRC - Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council KPRP - Khmer People's Revolutionary Party LOP- Liberal Democratic Party LSDP- Liberal Social Democratic Party MCRRC- Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia MFN- most-favoured nation MOl- Ministry oflnterior MPs - members of parliament NADK- National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) NBC - National Bank of Cambodia NEC - National Election Committee NGC- National Government of Cambodia NGOs- non-governmental organizations NLD - National League for Democracy NLF - National Liberation Front NUF -National United Front NVA- North Vietnamese Army ODA- overseas development assistance

acronyms & abbreviations

xxiii

P-5- Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council PAP- People's Action Party (Singapore) PAVN- People's Army ofVietnam PDK- Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) PIUs - Programme Implementation Units PMUs - Project Management Units PNGC- Provincial National Government of Cambodia PRA - People's Representative Assembly PRK- People's Republic of Kampuchea PRPK- People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea RAM - Reform the Armed Forces Movement RCAF - Royal Cambodian Armed Forces RNGC- Royal National Government of Cambodia SCM - Supreme Council of Magistracy SEATO - Southeast Asian Treaty Organization SNC- Supreme National Council (of Cambodia) SOC - State of Cambodia SLORC- State Law and Order Restoration Council STF - Systemic Transformation Facility UCD - Union of Cambodian Democrats UNAMIC- UN Advance Mission in Cambodia UNDP- United Nations Development Program UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNTAC- United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia YOU- Young Officers Union

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took a more aggressive stand. On 8 August, the CNAF concentrated its attention on Kampong Thorn, followed by military campaigns in Siem Reap on 11 August, and later in Banteay Meanchey. According to government sources, berween 18 and 20 August the CNAF mopped up the Khmer Rouge forces from 519, 320, and 450 divisions in Phnom Chhat and Phnom Tra regions in Banteay Meanchey. However, the government reported that between 23 and 29 August the Khmer Rouge launched 26 more attacks in Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Chhnang, and Kampong Cham Provinces. By the end of August 1993, the Khmer Rouge remained active. The CNAF did make some noticeable military progress. On 17 August, government troops advanced on Phnom Kulen in Preah Vihear and consolidated their position the following day. One day later, they also captured Phnom Chhat near the Thai-Cambodian border in Banteay Meanchey Province. But the government reported that during the fourth week of September, the military situation in Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, and Kampong Thorn was "marked by tension" as the Khmer Rouge "recently stepped up its military activities by landing a series of artillery and infantry attacks against CNAF positions". According to another report, during the period berween 20 and 26 September, the military 44 situation became "worse than the previous week" . Until the end of the year, military clashes berween the adversaries continued unabated. Berween 27 September and 3 October, the rebels committed 32 military actions in Siem Reap and Banteay Meanchey Provinces. By late October, military clashes also continued in Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and Kampong Cham Provinces. November and December brought more of the same. Perhaps the most dramatic military showdown that year was the beginning of the CNAF's offensive at Anlong Veng (one of the Khmer Rouge's major strongholds) in late December 1993. The government troops captured the area. The following year brought more escalation: "Military activity throughout the north and west has increased in the new year as the sides gear up for what could be some of the heaviest fighting since the Viet45 namese withdrawal in late 1989," according to Nate Thayer. But the CNAF's military victory in Anlong Veng did not last. On 24 February, the rebels recaptured their northern bases around Anlong Veng, destroying

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two government Soviet-made T-54 battle tanks. The counter-offensive also left more than 200 government troops dead; 500 were wounded; 6 tanks were destroyed. Having failed to keep Anlong Veng, the CNAF deflected the Khmer Rouge's attention by attacking the rebels' headquarters in Pailin, Battambang Province. In March 1994, 7,000 government troops attempted to seize Pailin. Ranariddh wasted no time announcing his troops' success. His analysis turned out to be wrong. It was a temporary success for Phnom Penh; the area did initially fall into the CNAF hands, resulting in 20,000 Khmer Rouge civilians and troops fleeing to Thailand. On 19 April, however, the rebels responded with a force of about 3,000 and recaptured Pailin. Meanwhile, the rebels began a series of sporadic attacks in other areas of Battambang Province. On 22 March 1994, a group of rebels launched an attack on Poi pet, followed by another just three hours later. The major highway linking Sisophon to Aranyaprathet in Thailand was closed down. Prime Minister Hun Sen, who publicly belittled his enemy, wondered how the rebels could have sufficient strength to attack Poipet. The Khmer Rouge rebels' onslaught in Battambang Province continued unabated. In late April 1994, they launched a new attack on Treng, about 40 kilometres west of Battambang City. Backed by battle tanks, they captured the area. They then rolled back government soldiers in the western part of Cambodia; they recaptured their Phnom Chhat base and advanced into other villages within 30 kilometres of a major district called Thmar Pouk. These successes were followed by another massive offensive - by the rebels - when they attempted to capture Battambang City. About 40,000 people fled their homes as they advanced up Route 10 and launched sporadic attacks, making it the heaviest confrontation in the province since 1989. Until the end of 1994, fighting in Battambang, Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Chhnang, and Kampot Provinces raged on. On 27 August, a group of 80 Khmer Rouge opened their attacks on 45 of 47 villages in Ek Phnom, Battambang. In Siem Reap Province, a series of offensives erupted. On 14 September, the rebels took over the main government positions. On the same day, a group of 250 rebels attacked Samrong district, 98 kilometres northwest of Siem Reap City. Govern-

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ment troops lost control. Two days later, 50 Khmer Rouge attacked Stoung district, 70 kilometres southeast ofSiem Reap City. The following day saw another attack, just 10 kilometres north of the City. More attacks followed. In November, the rebels burned 275 houses, schools, and hospitals. According to government sources, 200 Khmer Rouge troops (from four divisions- 519, 518, 980, and 912) were sent to cut off the link between Kralanh and Samrong districts along Route 68. They occupied two villages in the Rumdeng commune. In other provinces, Khmer Rouge attacks also broke out. In May, about 1,000 to 2,000 rebels took part in a major offensive in Banteay Meanchey Province. In Kampong Chhnang Province, they also launched new attacks on government forces. In September, they captured several communes and villages in the province; they even appointed their chiefs to run the 46 areas. The government admitted this in a secret report. By the end of 1994, Cambodia remained beleaguered as the adversaries battled with each other. Although the rebels became less militarily active in some areas, their major offensives appeared to be growing in intensiry. The only positive sign on the part of the government is that its troops succeeded in the southern part of Cambodia. In May, the CNAF began a mop-up operation in Sihanoukville. According to General Tuch Kim Sien, commander of the operation, three Khmer Rouge shelters were destroyed. In late August, thousands of government troops surrounded and captured the rebel stronghold at Phnom Your, Kampot Province. In December, after a fierce two-week military engagement north ofKampot (involving 1,800 government troops backed by tanks and armoured personnel carriers), the rebels were driven out. Despite their military defeats in some areas, the rebels were determined to bounce back. Battambang seems to be the province hit with the heaviest attacks by the rebels in 1995. In mid-January- the last days of the government's amnesry offer- around 2,000 rebels chose to launch a series of vicious "scorched-earth" attacks in Bavel, Banan, and Rattanak Mondul districts. About 2,400 houses were destroyed; more than 40,000 people were made homeless within 10 days. The attacks continued throughout February. The situation did not look promising as the rebels shelled, laid more mines on, and damaged roads and rail lines in villages in many provinces, such as Battambang, Siem Reap,

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Kampong Chhnang, and Kampong Speu. CPP Co-Minister oflnterior Sar Kheng once admitted that, in February alone, 122 Khmer Rouge attacks broke out, killing 13 government soldiers, 4 police officers, and 35 civilians, and wounding 35 government soldiers, 7 police officers, and 21 civilians. He admitted: "We are surprised by the increase in rebel activities since so many Khmer Rouge 47 have defected to the government" . The British Foreign Office also recognized that the security situation in Cambodia was now getting worse. What these military events seem to indicate is that the rebels appeared to alternate between heavy attacks and hit-and-run tactics- a new way to withstand the onslaught by the government armed forces. In March, their radio continued to urge government troops and the Cambodian people to intensify their struggle against the "Hun Sen48 Chea Sim-Ranariddh clique". On 12 April, just days before the Cambodian New Year, Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan called upon "the people to step up the war against the enemy'' - the "Vietnamese communists", their "Cambodian puppets"- and the "abject members" ofUNTAC. He urged all "combatants and Khmer compatriots" to wage 49 an arme d strugg1e t hrough a "guern·11 a an d peop1e's war". In late April, around 1,000 rebels fought their way along National Route 10 in northwestern Cambodia. Backed by heavy-calibre machine guns, artillery, and 13 Chinese-made T-57 tanks, they overran the CNAF's strategic base at Treng, 40 kilometres west ofBattambang City. About 25,000 villagers fled their homes, marking the first time since 1989 that civilians in the area were forced to evacuate. According to Phnom Penh, the attacks resulted in heavy casualties. Between 16 and 23 April alone, 36 clashes broke out in northern Preah Vihear, northwest Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, central Kampong Thorn, and southern Kampong Speu. Early in the second week of May, backed by 20 tanks and artillery, 1,000 government troops rolled back on the rebels. Beginning 8 May, they used two helicopters to bomb the Khmer Rouge stronghold of Pailin. They fired a Russian-made rocket launcher and used two helicopters to stop two Khmer Rouge tanks. More armed clashes continued in Banteay Meanchey Province after the rebels moved their artillery base to areas within seven kilometres south of Poipet. They continued shelling the CNAF's 12th division,

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which was guarding Route 5. In June, they launched a series of attacks in northwest Cambodia. Dong Aranh (one of many governmentcontrolled villages and positions along Route 5) was hard-hit by "an extremely well-planned attack''; they fired B-40 rocket launchers, killing six government soldiers, and six civilians; they also blew a large chunk out of the road and burned down 84 buildings. Four hundred families fled their homes. In mid-June, between 200 to 300 rebels attacked Poipet and blew up segments of Route 5 between Sisophon and Poipet. By late June, more than 20,000 villagers had left their homes along Route 5 fearing more attacks. At least 24 civilians had been killed, and 21 wounded. The rebels also burned down more than 150 houses. The Khmer Rouge also stepped up pressure on government troops by launching an offensive in northwestern Battambang. On 4 July, between 300 and 350 rebels captured the Treng base, 42 kilometres south of the provincial city. The next day, an additional 150 to 200 rebels joined the fight. Backed by seven tanks, 92 mm artillery, and anti-aircraft guns, around 500 rebels fought their way to within 20 kilometres of the provincial capital along Route 10. On the same day, about 200 rebels launched another attack on the CNAF's Division 12 headquarters in Nimitr and other government positions, killing five soldiers and injuring several others. The CNAF response to the attack failed. Backed by two T-55 tanks, government troops pushed back, but were forced to withdraw. About 160 of them strayed into Thailand; these were disarmed by a Thai border patrol and sent back into Cambodia. Khmer Rouge activities took place in other provinces as well. On 3 July, about 200 rebels captured a border checkpoint in the remote northern part of Preah Vihear. Eight segments of Route 4 between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville were blown up. By August, prospects for a political solution to the military conflict had died. When the rebels called for peace talks on 28 July, the government's response was that the time for negotiation had passed. Ranariddh stated that there was nothing to negotiate, despite the fact that a military stalemate persisted. It needs to be stressed that despite all this military activity, the Khmer Rouge's threat to the coalition government was nowhere near that, which was faced by either the Lon Nol or PRK/SOC regimes. Without Funcinpec, the KPNLF, and King Sihanouk on their side, the rebels

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were now fighting alone against both the CPP and their former allies, without any prospects of returning to power as they did in 1975. Socio-Economic Developments

The ongoing war took a large toll on the national economy. Antipersonnellandmines scattered across the country constituted a serious factor hindering land improvement and the expansion of agricultural output. Although nobody knew the exact number of mines that existed, estimates were placed at between 8 and 10 million. Others believed that the actual number could be as high as 13 million. If this was the case, then the mines buried underneath Cambodian would outnumber the 50 size of the population. One assessment has it that perhaps 100 million mines are already deployed world-wide; if this is indeed so, then the number of mines in Cambodia alone might account for one-tenth of this figure. This being the case, mine casualties were unacceptably heavy. By 1995, Cambodia had about 35,000 amputees. It was estimated that one of every 265 Cambodians lost one or more limbs because oflandmines, making Cambodia a place with the highest proportion of disabled inhabitants in the world. Roughly 300 people fell victim to landmines each month. News about mine-clearance, however, was not very heart51 ening. The mine-clearance process was extremely time-consuming. The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), for instance, employed about 1,800 local staff and 28 foreign advisers. Of the total 181,000 square kilometres, over 3,500 square kilometres had about 2,000 minefields. About 60 percent of the minefields could be used to build houses or farms. Between August and November 1993, the CMAC had cleared about 13 hectares of land. Only 254 land mines and 140 rounds of unexploded ordinance were found. According to the head of CMAC in Battambang, his teams would find one mine every ten metres. A platoon could dear only about 0.5 hectare each week. By mid-1995, the CMAC and other voluntary de-mining groups had marked only 47 square kilometres, of which only 13 square kilometres had been cleared. With the slow rate of progress compounded by the laying of more mines as the war dragged on, it would take many years, if not decades, to make Cambodia mine-free so that people could farm safely. Mines,

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as it was generally recognized, denied many Cambodians access to farmland. As one writer puts it: "In agricultural areas where mines deny civilians access to land, they are often the single most significant cause of impoverishment of the entire community.... Modern anti-personnel 52 mines ... will continue to bring misery for generations." The war also continued to create internally displaced people. Although the UN managed to repatriate about 350,000 Cambodian refugees, more refugees continued to be created. The fighting in April 1994 in Battambang and Banteay Meanchey Provinces created about 50,000 refugees. In 1993, 16,146 families (79,842 people) were displaced. By September 1994, there were about 10,000 refugees in Preah Vihear alone, representing one-ninth of the province's entire population (90,000). By year's end, the total number of internally displaced families was 28,442 5 (150,859 people). lThese people could not hope to lead normal, productive lives. But social conditions were better, nowhere dose to those in the 1970s now that the economy performed better. After it came to power in September 1993, the coalition government got off to a good start. It adopted a liberal economic policy to rejuvenate the war-shattered economy. As early as December 1993, Cambodia began to develop plans for rehabilitation and development of its economy. The Senior Minister responsible for this prepared a comprehensive programme aimed at reaching this goal. The strategy can be found in two major official publications - National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia (February 1994) and Implementing the National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia (February 1995). With regard to promoting macroeconomic stabilization and stability, the government set out to fight the state's rising inflation. The February 1994 economic plan states that the government aimed to maintain relative price stability with inflation down to below 10 percent and to 5 percent by the end of 1995. Fiscal policy was to be formulated with an attempt to eliminate the government deficit (US$150 million in 1994). Tax revenue to be collected had to be raised from 5 to about 9 percent ofGDP between 1993 and 1996. The current national budget deficit was brought down from 1.9 percent of GOP to 0.9 percent, with the budget deficit declining from 6.8 to 5.9 percent of GOP. This decline was due to a number of factors.

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The government managed to raise domestic revenue to 9 percent of GDP, rather than the 7.2 percent initially forecast. Customs receipts, for instance, grew from about US$3 million per month before the elections to US$12 million per month. According to the government, Cambodia attracted a lot of investment from foreign companies, particularly since the promulgation of the Foreign Investment Law in August 1994, which offered easy terms to foreign companies interested in investing in Cambodia. Incentives included a 9 percent corporate income tax, tax holidays of up to eight years, full import duty exemptions, free repatriation of profits, no nationalization or price controls, land leases of up to 70 years, and no withholding tax on dividends. This is not to paint a rosy picture of the economy, which still had a long road to travel to reach full recovery. Negative indicators included persistent budget and trade deficits. Despite some positive news concerning national budgets, deficits continued to grow wider. In addition, Cambodia continued to run large trade deficits. Between 1992 and 1993, the trade deficit rose about US$16.8 million. In 1993, Cambodia's imports (US$479.3 million) exceeded its exports (US$283.6 million). In 1994, the trade deficit exceeded 12 percent of GDP as exports rose by only 38 percent to US$303 million while imports increased by 47 percent to US$594 million. Thus, the trade deficit continued to widen 4 from US$185 million in 1993 to US$291 million in 1994." The war also cost Cambodia greatly. The government continued to devote large amounts of money to defence and security. Official figures put defence spending in 1995 at US$85 million- an increase of about US$2.2 million from 1994. Nevertheless, the defence budget did come down in 1995 to 18.4 percent of the national budget of US$407 million. Then, the national budget was revised and increased to US$ 513.2 million. Defence took US$123.4 million. The budget for the Ministry 55 of Interior was pushed up from US$48 million to US$61.6 million. Altogether, the government officially spent about US$185 million on defence and security- almost one-third of the national budget. Although these official figures are unacceptably high by any international standard, the real security budget may never be known. Unofficial estimates suggest that military expenditure could have been as high

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as 40 to 50 percent of the national budget. In early 1994, a government official admitted having been "ordered to give the military a blank cheque". As part of the national budget, defence consumed "over and 56 above the 28 per cent of total government expenditure". According to Sam Rainsy, "the bulk of the Cambodian budget is being devoted to military expenditure, with nearly 50 per cent of the current expenditure allocated for defence and security''. Defence spending changed irrespective of the adopted budget. In the original budget law for 1994, 164 billion riels was allocated for defence. A revised budget law drawn up in September increased the amount to 204 billion riels; at year's end, military spending rose to 239 billion riels, without even considering military expenditure hidden under the cover of other ministries and institutions. That is, "the budget law for 1994 was not respected". Rainsy also warned that "unless action is taken, the same [was] likely to occur in 57 1995". As a result of the ongoing limited war, many socio-economic aspects of national development were neglected or generally overlooked. No real improvement in input availability to agriculture could be found. Productivity was held back by the limited availability of such things as farming technology, rice seed, fertilizer, and agricultural training. According to one Cambodian official, the Faculty of Agriculture received little or no consideration from the government. Most students came to school to learn about how to grow crops and raise animals, but they did not have textbooks or qualified instructors to teach them. Most of them were not even interested in learning how to farm. sx When drought hit Battambang in late 1994, the province had only two water pumping stations; provincial officials had to ask the government to activate water pumps in an effort to save 60,000 hectares of rice 9 fields damaged by drought. " In the national budget for 1994, agriculture represented only 7.8 percent (US$23.9 million), US$270,000 less than the previous year. In 1995, the budget for agriculture was increased to US$28.8 million (compared with US$123.4 million for defence and US$61.6 million for security). Clearly, agriculture was not a top priority. Although the government gave considerable attention to education, the budget for the education ministry was less than sufficient. The 1995 budget for education was up from the previous year- from US$43 ..3

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million in 1993 to US$44.9 million in 1994, and to US$49.7 million in 1995. By 1995, underpaid teachers could not afford to devote their attention to improving the quality of teaching. At the primary level, pupils had to pay a daily allowance (about 200 riels) to their teachers. On top of that, teachers were reported to have put some pressure on their students to buy cakes in the classroom. Consequently, some im60 poverished parents were forced to keep their children at home. Moreover, because of its dependence on foreign aid, which was temporary and unpredictable, schools faced numerous uncertainties. Overall, socio-economic developments in the 1993-96 period made some noticeable and commendable progress. The GDP showed healthy growth, rising by 3.9 percent in real terms in 1993, by 5.2 percent in 1994, and by 7.6 percent in 1995. While Cambodia remained one of the poorest countries in the world, its per capita income registered a steady if small increase from only US$130 in 1990 to US$287 in 1995. By 1995, two years into the life of the coalition government, Cambodia still faced ongoing challenges from below, but seemed to be succeeding in a number of areas. While still posing a violent threat to the state, the Khmer Rouge rebels were effectively contained. While the country was still poor, the state did not have to emerge from ashes as the Pol Pot or PRK/SOC regime had. In comparative terms, societal challenges to the state in this period were not as serious as those faced by the three regimes during the 1970-9 3 period. Conclusion

The persistence of anti-democratic behaviour during the 1991-95 period correlates with Cambodia's still unstable hegemonic power structure. The difficulty of holding free and fair elections cannot be explained unless the CPP domination from October 1991 to May 1993 is taken into account. While it remained a politico-military entity, the CGDK managed to force the PRK/SOC leadership to the negotiation table, which finally led to the Paris Agreements. The Paris Agreements partly prevented any possibility for the emergence of a hurting balance of power, however, as the CGDK had disintegrated into three separate and competing political parties, with the Khmer Rouge rebels becoming more

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and more isolated. Funcinpec and the BLDP then fell victim to the CPP's growing politico-military domination throughout the electoral process. Following the elections, the hegemonic power structure was maintained, as the four elected parties formed a coalition government, with the CPP and Funcinpec standing at the pinnacle of the power structure. What prevented the new leadership from steering the country back to the violently repressive authoritarianism, dictatorship, or totalitarianism of the past is associated partly with the less fragmentary nature of the state during the 1993-95 period and partly with a less violent society. The coalition government functioned better than previous regimes. The two Prime Ministers agreed on major policies. Ranariddh worked well with Hun Sen to the extent that he was even willing to silence or purge his own dissenting party members. Moreover, the state did not face a threat from Sihanouk and the rebels, as the Khmer Republic did. The King was also responsible for the idea of a coalition government between the two major parties. While he played a permissive and reactive role at the state level, his role in the process of national reconciliation between the government and the rebels was far from successful. What prevented the state from taking liberal democracy seriously, however, corresponded with the state still being hegemonic, internally unstable, and faced with ongoing social challenges. Furthermore, the power dynamics during the period under discussion were not independent of states outside Cambodia, as the next chapter will show.

NOTES 1. UN, "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Present Structures and Practices of Administration in Cambodia: 24 April-9 May 1990", p. 74. 2. UNDP, "Cambodia: Public Administration and Civil Service Reforms", mimeographed, p. 61. 3. Ibid., p. 60. 4. M. Leifer, "Obstacles to a Political Settlement in Indochina'', Pacific Affiirs 58, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 626-36. 5. G. Klintworth, Cambodia and Peacekeeping: 1990, pp. 5, 7.

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6. P. Wallensteen, "Peace-Making in Cambodia: An Analytical Framework", in The Cambodian Conflict 1979-1991: From Intervention to Resolution, p. 7. 7. G. Klintworth, Lambodia and Peacekeeping: 1990, p. 9. Nayan Chanda similarly points out that the end of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia may not necessarily end the war in Cambodia, but may instead increase the chance of civil war. SeeN. Chanda, "Civil War in Cambodia?", Foreign Policy 76 (Fall 1989): 26-43. 8. ]. Bhagwan, "Khmer Rouge: The Bone of Contention in Kampuchea", Strategic Analysis 12, no. 8 (November 1988): 893-903. 9. S. Than, "Cambodia 1990: Towards a Peaceful Solution", in Southeast Asian Af fairs 1991, pp. 83-104. 10. R. Amer, "Resolving the Cambodian Conflict", in The Cambodian Conflict 19791991: From Intervention to Resolution, p. 33. 11. F. Barru, "Kampuchea: The Search for a Political Solution Gathers Momentum", in Southeast Asian A./foirs 1989, pp. 171-84. 12. See J. Van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace", Asian Survey 31, no. 1 (January 1991): 94-102. See also Mya Than, "Rehabilitation and Economic Reconstruction in Cambodia'', Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 3 (December 1992): 269-86; and N. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987: Sihanoukon Center Stage", Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 105-15. A 1992 UNDP report indicates that in terms of life expectancy, income, and education, Cambodia ranked 136 out of 160 countries (UNDP, "Socio-Economic Consequences of the UNTAC Operation"). 13. F. Frost, The Peace Process in Cambodia: Issues and Prospects, p. 23. 14. N. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987: Sihanouk on Center Stage", Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 105-15. 15. Norodom S., "Liberer le Cambodge", Politique Internationale 31 (Printemps [Spring] 1986): 255-66. 16. G. Porter, "Towards a Kampuchean Peace Settlement: History and Dynamics of Sihanouk's Negotiations", Southeast Asian A.lfoirs 1988, pp. 123-32. 17. M. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate, p. 56. 18. Ieng Mouley conveyed to me that Son Sann had not communicated with him for some time. He had no real knowledge why his party leader did so. What was clear at the rime was that Ieng Mouley blamed Son Sann for the miscommunication (interview, May 1993). 19. Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia Containing His Proposed Implementation Plan for UNTAC, Including Administrative and Financial Aspects, UN Document, S/23613, 19 February 1992, in The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995, edited by the United Nations, p. 167.

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20. Ibid., p. 173. 21. Phnom Penh Radio of Cambodia Network, 9 July 1995; FBIS-EAS-95-132, 11 July 1995. 22. See M. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate, p. 64. See also F. Frost, The Peace Process in Cambodia: Issues and Prospects, pp. 21-22. 23. FBJS-EAS-93-107, 7 June 1993, pp. 31-32. 24. Newsweek, 4 October 1993, p. 25. 25. Straits Times, 28 December 1993, p. 7. 26. FBIS-EAS-93-185, 27 September 1993, p. 34. 27. Straits Times, 3 December 1993, p. G. 28. Phnom Penh Post, 17-30 June 1994, p. 3. 29. FBIS-EAS-94-1 04, 31 May 1994, p. 62. 30. Phnom Penh Post, 21 October-3 November 1994, p. 8. Sirivudh was also reported to have said: "We claim we are Royalists, but in general everything that the King has asked for has not been implemented or taken into consideration." It was recognized that the monarch's previously considerable influence in state affairs had been marginalized (Phnom Penh Post, 4-17 November 1994, p. 6). 31. Straits Times, 25 October 1994, p. 17. 32. FBIS-EAS-94-140, 21 July 1994, p. 33. 33. FBIS-EAS-93-122, 28 June 1993, p. 47; Straits Times, 28 June 1993, p. 5. 34. FBIS-EAS-94-087, 5 May 1994, p. 23. 35. Phnom Penh Post, 24 February-9 March 1995, p. 3. 36. J. Jeldres, "King Sihanouk and the Future of Cambodia", Australia and World Affairs 32 (Autumn 1997): 17-25. 37. The IMF Representative's Statement, Tokyo, 11-12 July 1996. This concern was widely shared by the donors. The Australian statement raised this point: "There has been considerable comment about the significant revenues being lost through poor forestry management. The amount I have heard mentioned appears to be in the order of the amount the Cambodian government is seeking for untied budget support from the international community in the public investment programme." It also said: "A strong tax system is needed to support not only the development process bur the very existence of the government and its basic services to the community." The German delegation also warned the Cambodian government: "If no decisive measures are taken in this field, and if considerable amounts of revenue continue to bypass the regular budget, it will be very difficult tor us to convince our authorities of the necessity to support Cambodia with German tax money." 38. Interviews, November 1996.

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39. "Law on the Outlawing of the 'Democratic Kampuchea' Group", 7 July 1994. 40. FBIS-EAS-94-132, 11 July 1992, pp. 54-55. 41. FBIS-EAS-94-140, 27 July 1994, p. 35. 42. FBIS-EAS-95-025, 7 February 1995, p. 47. 43. Phnom Penh Radio; FBIS-EAS-153, 11 August 1993, p. 37. Between 9 and 15 August, Phnom Penh claimed that Lhe Khmer Rouge attacked 36 times on its military positions, killing four CNAF combatants and wounding 51 others (FBISEAS-93-157, 17 August 1993, p. 40). 44. FBIS-EAS-93-188, 30 September 1993, p. 32. 45. Phnom Penh Post, 14-27 January 1994, p. 1. 46. Phnom Penh Post, 7-20 October 1994, p. 94. 47. Cambodia Daily, 3 March 1995, p. 8. 48. FBIS-EAS-95-060, 29 March 1995, p. 56. 49. Straits Times, 13 April 1995, p. 17. 50. Far Eastern Economic Review reported: "Cambodia has more landmines than people" (29 June 1995, p. 50). 51. See Phnom Penh Post, 21 October-23 November 1994, p. 6. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 June 1995, p. 51. 52. P. Davies and N. Dunlop, Wttr ofthe Mines: Cambodia, Landmines and the Impoverishment ofa Nation, p. 1. 53. Royal Government of Cambodia, "Cambodia's Country Report: Women, Key to National Reconstruction", p. 64. 54. EUI State Report, "Cambodia", 2nd quarter 1995, p. 15. According to another report, imports in 1994 were about US$643 million, up from US$471 million, while exports were about US$457. See Phnom Penh Post, 22 September-S October 1995, p. 2. The two reports, nonetheless, state that Cambodia's trade deficit in 1994 was about US$18 5 million. See Phnom Penh Post, 22 September-5 October 1995, p. 2. 55. Phnom Penh Post, 8-21 September 1995, p. 12. 56. Phnom Penh Post, 11-24 March 1994, p. 1. 57. "Note" by Sam Rainsy, "How International Aid Can Foster Development", FBISEAS-95-052, 17 March 1995, p. 57. 58. Interview, March 1995. 59. FBIS-EAS-94-232, 2 December 1994, p. 58. 60. Interviews, March and July 1995.

chapter 6

Co-optative Intervention in Cambodia

The failure to reach a hurting balance of power during the 1980s and the maintenance of a CPP-dominated hegemonic structure before and after the 1993 elections are both factors that help explain the Cambodian factions' subsequent failure to comply fully with the terms of the Paris Agreements and to work for democratic causes. External powers also played an important role in failing to dehegemonize the SOC. While in the first half of the 1980s, the SovietIndochinese alliance seemed to enjoy the upper hand in the strategic competition over Cambodia, and possibly Southeast Asia as a whole, the second half of the decade saw the extra-regional powers' emerging balance of strategic interests. The Soviet Union began to experience difficulties, resulting partly from its presence in Indochina. Subsequently, Vietnam started to feel the pinch after five years of occupation in Cambodia. Both Moscow and Hanoi faced growing problems at home. Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" on world politics and, in particular, his new attitude towards Southeast Asia dearly indicated the communist empire's increasingly inward-looking policy, driven partly by the growing contradictions within the communist system. The Soviets slowly lost their capability to maintain the status quo in Indochina, which had helped maintain the PRK/SOC leadership's hegemonic position. Meanwhile, the anti-Soviet/Vietnamese camp began strengthening the CGDK, thus contributing to the military development that eventually led to the Paris Agreements. This trend was not completed, however, as the former enemies of the Soviet Union and Indochina turned their attention away from the

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threat of global communism to the perceived threat of the Khmer Rouge. The weakening of the CGDK can only be fully understood if the international community's growing concern about the Khmer Rouge's potential return to power is taken into account. The allegation that the international community, especially the great powers, obstructed peace by including the Khmer Rouge in the UN peace plan has little truth. The major Western powers moved cautiously towards the PRK/SOC, working towards preventing the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. Throughout the electoral process, the UN failed to create a truly neutral political environment. The UN Security Council and UNTAC focused their attention more on the Khmer Rouge's defiance of the Paris Agreements than on the fact that the CPP enjoyed unfair advantages. While it is difficult to measure precisely the impact of external powers on the structural transformation during this period, foreign intervention from 1991 to 1995 may be termed "hegemonizing". External actors contributed to the "hegemonization" of Cambodia's state power structure, especially through their unwillingness or inability to rein in the CPP during the elections in May 1993. While this may be seen as a positive development as far as political stability is concerned, it made any prospect for political compromise difficult or lasting. Proactive International Intervention, 1990-91

Whether Washington and Beijing had a common strategy to undermine the SOC is debatable. There was definitely a balance of security interest between them vis-a-vis Southeast Asia, since they needed each other to contain Soviet expansion in the 1980s. ASEAN also benefited from a China in need of a stable region and Washington got Beijing's 1 assurance that it had renounced its hegemonism. The P-5's Collective Diplomacy

As noted, until the Paris Agreements in October 1991, Cambodia had never experienced a smooth transition towards liberal democracy. Numerous attempts at turning Cambodia away from authoritarian politics had been made, but they always ended in failure. In the end, the reign of terror under the totalitarian Pol Pot regime and the utter destruction that followed caught the world's attention.

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World powers had envisioned the need to steer Cambodia away from armed conflict. Thus, in the early 1990s when the Permanent Members of the Security Council (P-5) got down to business and began mapping out a strategy to end the conflict, they negotiated on the modalities of international intervention. At the end of their sixth meeting, 2 in August 1990, they agreed on a framework for a political settlement. The great powers then decided that it was time for the Cambodians to determine their political future through free and fair elections something they had never before enjoyed. In light of Cambodia's tragic past, the P-5 were prepared to do their part. They agreed to disengage from the state and were of one accord regarding the need to begin the process of national reconciliation among the warring Cambodian factions by getting them to abandon the military option- which led nowhere - and to agree on liberal democracy. The UN intervention proposed by the P-5 was not primarily based on a legalistic concept of justice, but rather on a pragmatic approach towards assuring that all Cambodian factions would play a legitimate role in the democratic process. In their framework, the five great powers "called on the Cambodian parties to the conflict to commit themselves to this process and to form the Supreme National Council as soon as 3 possible". The P-5 intended that the Cambodian adversaries would not only accept the rules of the political game, but also abide by them. To this end, the Cambodian parties were called to "exercise maximum selfrestraint". Not unmindful of history, however, the great powers promised to reconvene the Paris conference (including all Cambodian factions and other interested parties) to discuss the establishment of a comprehensive settlement, and "to draw a detailed plan of implementation 4 in accord with [the P-5's] Framework". The P-5 Framework appeared to give attention to the electoral process- and not as much to the outcome. If the Cambodian factions were to agree on the Framework, the UN would do its part to help facilitate elections. The process would involve five major confidence-building aspects: (a) transitional arrangements regarding the administration of Cambodia during the pre-election period; (b) military arrangements during the transitional period; (c) elections under UN auspices; (d) human rights protection; and (e) international guarantees.

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As Cambodia's transitional authority, the UN would work to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections. To achieve this political objective, the factions' administrative agencies, bodies, and offices- which could exert influence upon the outcome of the elections - would be placed under direct UN control. Furthermore, the UN role would not be purely civilian. In the framework, the term "enhanced United Nations role" was used. The UN mission would be supported by a military component whose mission would be to carry out the various peacekeeping aspects of the comprehensive settlement. First, it was to verify the withdrawal from Cambodia of all categories of foreign forces, advisers and military personnel and their weapons, ammunition, and equipment, and their nonreturn to the state. Second, it was to serve as liaison with neighbouring governments over any developments in or near their territory, which could endangerthe implementation of the Agreements. Third, it was to monitor the cessation of outside military assistance to Cambodian parties. Fourth, it was to locate and confiscate caches of weapons and military supplies. Fifth, it was to undertake training programmes in mine clearance and a mine programme among the Cambodian people." While the UN mission would be there to organize elections and turn the battlefield into a ballot-box, its ultimate aim was to help rebuild Cambodia as a sovereign state and to reintegrate it into the community of states. Section 5 of the framework states: "The aim of the provisions of this section should be to: safeguard the independent and neutral status of Cambodia; prevent foreign aggression against Cambo6 dia or interference in the affairs of that state. " According to the P-5 Framework, both an independent Cambodia and other foreign signatories would agree to conduct their foreign policies on the basis of international law and treaties. Cambodia would have to adopt a neutral policy. Moreover, the foreign signatories would be obliged to call on other states to recognize and respect Cambodia in every way: its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability, neutrality, and national unity. The Paris Agreements contained a "Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia''. This was not mentioned in the P-5 proposal. Put in a broader context, the Agreements were inspired by the liberal view that economic underdevelopment was part of the root-

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cause of domestic conflict. The terms and principles of the Agreements were basically discussed in UN Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali's An Agenda for Peace, where he offers a definitive role for the UN. In his own words, "There is an obvious connection between democratic practices- such as the rule oflaw and transparency of decision-making -and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order." To resolve conflict of a domestic nature "will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental 7 freedom, to promote sustainable economic and social development". As part of the comprehensive Agreements, the aim of rehabilitating and reconstructing Cambodia was mentioned in Part IV with reference to "the advancement of the Cambodian nation and people". Although the Agreements do not state clearly or specifically what UNTAC would do during the transitional period, it seems that the mission was to get involved in the process of rehabilitation. In this process, aid would be necessary, and international efforts had to be compatible with Cambodia's socio-economic conditions. Fact-finding missions would be sent to the state. The basis upon which rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts rested was that they would benefit "all areas of Cambodia, espe8 cially the more disadvantaged, and reach all levels of society". It would be misleading to suggest that UNTAC was given the task of turning the Cambodian economy around. To a large extent, the mission's rehabilitation would be limited to addressing immediate needs, with special attention to "food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of Cambodia's existing basic infrastructure and public utilities". This was the initial phase, preparing the groundwork for medium- and long-term reconstruction plans. Thus, reconstruction would be in the hands of the newly elected government and the Cambodians after the elections. The Agreements further point out that the international community would establish a consultative body called the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) to assist in the reconstruction phase. In light of the Paris Agreements, it is safe to conclude that UNTAC would give top priority to the process of national reconciliation via democratic accommodation through the creation of a neutral political environment. It was the P-5's pressure that resulted in the factional com pro-

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mise on turning the battlefield into a ballot-box under a neutralizing UN force (and not on substantial external economic incentives) that got the process of democratization started in the first place. The Plan to Weaken the SOC?

The allegation that the UN plan was designed to weaken the SOC/CPP regime and to pave the way for the Khmer Rouge's return to power is nonsensical. The P-5 agreement was in fact motivated by the need to "ensure the non-return to the policies and practices of the past", and to instill a respect for human rights that had never existed in Cambodia.'! One could, of course, argue that these provisions existed only on paper and had no effect on the electoral process. This argument ignores many signs of the rebels' growing weakness, however. First, and on the level of intention, the P-5 Framework de-legitimized 10 the CGDK and legitimized the SOC. The principal purpose of the P5 was to create a neutral political environment for free and fair elections. This meant that the Cambodian signatories were permitted to compete in the UN-organized election on an equal footing. The Khmer Rouge was not in principle given the freedom to fight its way back to power by means of violence; the leadership would have to compete for votes in the ballot-box. No serious observers believed that the faction would have a chance to win many votes; because of its past crimes, its leaders would not be elected and would therefore be further de-legitimized. The Framework also signalled the end of China's provision of military 11 and diplomatic support for the faction. Second, before the P-5 representatives met to discuss the Cambodia crisis in early 1990, many external powers such as Vietnam, members of ASEAN, Britain, Japan, and the US had concurred on the need to neu12 tralize the Khmer Rouge, politically and militarily. This concurrence was partly reflected in the P-5 Framework, which does not refer to the CGDK as a single political entity or a united political party to compete with the SOC. The Framework in fact mentions the warring factions as "all parties". Thus, the three CGDK resistance parties - the Khmer Rouge, Funcinpec, and the KPNLF- were to compete with one another and separately with the SOC in a ballot-box. The subsequent result, as noted earlier, gave political advantage to the SOC leadership,

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when the Supreme National Council (SNC) was established on 17 September 1990. Thirdly, by the time the P-5 had reached their agreement, more and more external actors (states and NGOs alike) had begun leaning towards the SOC due to distrust of the Khmer Rouge- France, the US, and Russia in particular. Russia was the PRK/SOC's natural ally. French President Fran