Interpreting Historical Sequences Using Economic Models: War, Secession and Tranquility 9783030538538
This Palgrave Pivot presents theoretical models that explain common historical sequences, such as wars of secession, the
189 18 3MB
English Pages 126 [131] Year 2020
Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
2 The Neoclassical Approach
3 International Law and Secession
4 Economic Rent and Rent Seeking
5 Historical Sequences and Triggering Events
6 Conclusions
References
2 The Economic Model
1 A Simplified Union
2 Decision-Making in Region B
3 Region B’s Maximization Problem
4 The Union’s Side
5 The Union’s Maximization Problem
6 Conclusions
References
3 Intrastate Sequencing with Historical Examples
1 Introduction
2 Collapse of Empires
2.1 USSR and Eastern Europe
2.2 Yugoslavia’s Wars of Secession
3 History Without Costs
4 Conclusions
References
4 Drivers of Historical Sequences
1 Introduction
2 Dispute Cost and Persuasion Cost
3 Changes in Expected Economic Rents
4 Changes in Subjective Probabilities of Secession
5 Changes in the Subjective Rates of Discount
6 Changes in Returns if Region B Remains in the Union
7 More Examples of Internal Historical Sequences
8 Conclusions
References
5 International Sequencing with Historical Examples
1 Introduction
2 Three Main Sequences
3 Comparison with Other Models
3.1 The End of History?
3.2 Clash of Civilizations
4 Conclusions
References
6 Peacekeeping and Sequencing
1 Introduction
2 Peacekeeping Around the World
3 Understanding the Objectives of Peacekeeping
4 Peacekeeping: Fundamentals of Effectiveness
5 UN Peacekeeping
6 Other Peacekeeping Missions and Free Riding
7 To Free Ride or not?
8 Conclusions
References
7 Case Study: Secessionists Motives in the American Civil War
1 Introduction
2 Methodological Approach: A Secessionist’s Maximization Problem
3 Parameter Values
4 Empirical Results
5 Conclusions
References
8 Minimizing the Cost of Union: Fiscal Autonomy and the Case of Scotland
1 Introduction
2 Federalism
3 Democracy and Secessionist Forces
4 The Leviathan Hypothesis
5 The Case of the UK: Reforming the Financing of the Scottish Government
6 Taming the Leviathan: Fiscal Autonomy as a Game
6.1 Payoffs
7 Conclusions
References
9 Conclusions
Index
Preface
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
2 The Neoclassical Approach
3 International Law and Secession
4 Economic Rent and Rent Seeking
5 Historical Sequences and Triggering Events
6 Conclusions
References
2 The Economic Model
1 A Simplified Union
2 Decision-Making in Region B
3 Region B’s Maximization Problem
4 The Union’s Side
5 The Union’s Maximization Problem
6 Conclusions
References
3 Intrastate Sequencing with Historical Examples
1 Introduction
2 Collapse of Empires
2.1 USSR and Eastern Europe
2.2 Yugoslavia’s Wars of Secession
3 History Without Costs
4 Conclusions
References
4 Drivers of Historical Sequences
1 Introduction
2 Dispute Cost and Persuasion Cost
3 Changes in Expected Economic Rents
4 Changes in Subjective Probabilities of Secession
5 Changes in the Subjective Rates of Discount
6 Changes in Returns if Region B Remains in the Union
7 More Examples of Internal Historical Sequences
8 Conclusions
References
5 International Sequencing with Historical Examples
1 Introduction
2 Three Main Sequences
3 Comparison with Other Models
3.1 The End of History?
3.2 Clash of Civilizations
4 Conclusions
References
6 Peacekeeping and Sequencing
1 Introduction
2 Peacekeeping Around the World
3 Understanding the Objectives of Peacekeeping
4 Peacekeeping: Fundamentals of Effectiveness
5 UN Peacekeeping
6 Other Peacekeeping Missions and Free Riding
7 To Free Ride or not?
8 Conclusions
References
7 Case Study: Secessionists Motives in the American Civil War
1 Introduction
2 Methodological Approach: A Secessionist’s Maximization Problem
3 Parameter Values
4 Empirical Results
5 Conclusions
References
8 Minimizing the Cost of Union: Fiscal Autonomy and the Case of Scotland
1 Introduction
2 Federalism
3 Democracy and Secessionist Forces
4 The Leviathan Hypothesis
5 The Case of the UK: Reforming the Financing of the Scottish Government
6 Taming the Leviathan: Fiscal Autonomy as a Game
6.1 Payoffs
7 Conclusions
References
9 Conclusions
Index
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