Interpreting Environments: Tradition, Deconstruction, Hermeneutics 9780292754973

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Interpreting

E n v i r o n m e n t s

Tradition, Deconstruction, Hermeneutics

Copyright © 199S by the University of Texas Press All rights reserved First edition, 1995 Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to Permissions, University of Texas Press, Box 7819, Austin, TX

78713-7819. © T h e paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. The following have generously given permission to use material from copyrighted sources: from M e m o r i e s , D r e a m s , Reflections

by C. Jung,

translation copyright © 1961, 1962, 1963, by Random House, Inc. Copyright renewed 1989, 1990, 1991, by Random House, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc. and HarperCollins Publishers Limited. From T h e m e s in A m e r i c a n P a i n t i n g by J. Gray Sweeney, 1977, reprinted by permission of J. Gray Sweeney.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mugerauer, Robert. Interpreting environments : traditions, deconstruction, hermeneutics / Robert Mugerauer. p.

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-292-75178-8 (permanent paper). — ISBN 0-292-75189-3 (pbk.) 1. Human ecology—Philosophy. 2. Landscape assessment— Methodology. 3. Human geography—Philosophy. 4. Human geography—Methodology. I. Title. GF21.M83

1996

304.2—dc20

95-8156

Dedication

T o L o u i s M a c k e y for his exegetical exercises. T o R i c h a r d Z a n e r for s h o w i n g h o w the professions h o l d r i c h clues to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the e m b o d i e d self i n the w o r l d . T o J . B . J a c k s o n for s h a r i n g his sense o f w o n d e r at the vernacular.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Contents

xi

Acknowledgments Introduction

1 Ttadltioiial A p p r o a c h e s Wittgensteins a n d J u n g s Lives, W o r k ,

XV

1 and Houses

Facing Uncertain Meanings and Traditions

2

Wittgenstein's Restlessness

3

Jung's Quest for Wholeness

15

Alternatives for Contemporary Existence

26

2

Deconstruction

29

P y r a m i d s as Posture a n d Strategy Deconstructing Pyramids

30

Egyptian Pyramids

31

French Nsoclassic Pyramids

36

Postmodern Pyramids

46

3

Hermeneutic Retrieval A m e r i c a n Nature as Paradise

57

A m e r i c a Religiously Understood

58

A Natural Paradise Already Given

61

Paradisepromised: Wilderness to Be Converted

79

Secular Echoes in Landscape Architecture and

89

Environmental Attitudes The Hidden and Disclosure

105

Postscript

117

Notes

127

Bibliography

159

Index

181

Illustrations

1.1.

Stonborough-Wittgenstein House from the south.

7

1.2.

Stonborough-Wittgenstein House: windows, glass

9

1.3.

Stonborough-Wittgenstein House: door handles

1.4.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1946.

14

1.5.

Bollingen: dwelling tower, central structure,

22

1.6.

Bollingen: courtyard, two towers, and loggia, 1935.

22

1.7.

Bollingen: completed, with upper story in center, 1955.

23

doors, columns. 10

designed by Wittgenstein.

and annex, 1927.

1.8.

Jung tending fire at Bollingen, 1949.

25

2.1.

The pyramids at Giza.

32

2.2.

Stone pyramid at Giza.

34

2.3.

J. B. Fischer von Erlach, E g y p t i a n P y r a m i d s (1725).

38

2.4.

Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e n o t a p h in t h e E g y p t i a n G e n r e

39

(c. 1785). Turenne

40

Turenne

41

2.5.

Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e n o t a p h to

2.6.

Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e n o t a p h to

2.7.

Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e m e t e r y E n t r a n c e b y

(c. 1785), plan. (c. 1785), section. 42

M o o n l i g h t (c. 1785). 2.8.

Etienne-Louis Boullée, F u n e r a r y M o n u m e n t

43

Characterizing the Genre of a Buried Architecture (c. 1785). 2.9.

Pyramids and pools in the middle of the

47

2.10.

I. M. Pei's Grand Louvre Pyramid.

48

2.11.

Arata Isozaki's skylights, Museum of Contemporary

52

2.12.

Arata Isozaki's skylights, Museum of Contemporary

Cour de Napoléon.

Art, Los Angeles. Art, Los Angeles.

viii

54

Illustrations

3.1.

Guillaume Le Testu, Terre

3.2.

William T. Ranney, D a n i e l Boone's

d e la F l o r i d e , from

60

C o s m o g r a p h i e u n i v e r s e l l e (1555). Kentucky

First

View

of

62

(1849).

3.3.

Thomas Cole, L a n d s c a p e w i t h Tree

3.4.

Thomas Cole, D a n i e l B o o n e a t His C a b i n a t t h e G r e a t O s a g e Lake

Trunks

(1828).

64 67

(1825-1826).

3.5.

Thomas Cole, H o m e in t h e Woods

3.6.

Frederic Edwin Church, To t h e M e m o r y o f Cole

3.7.

Frederic Edwin Church, N e w E n g l a n d S c e n e r y (1851).

70

3.8.

Frederic Edwin Church, T w i l i g h t in t h e W i l d e r n e s s

72

(1847).

68 (1848).

69

(1860). 3.9.

Frederic Edwin Church, H e a r t o f t h e A n d e s (1859).

72

3.10.

Albert Bierstadt, S u n s e t in Yosemite

74

3.11.

Albert Bierstadt, The O r e g o n Trail (1869).

3.12.

Thomas Moran, The M o u n t a i n o f t h e H o l y Cross

3.13.

Joshua Shaw, C o m i n g o f t h e W h i t e M a n (c. 1850).

81

3.14.

Emanuel Leutze, W e s t w a r d t h e Course

82

Takes 3.15.

Valley

(1868).

75 (1875).

of Empire

77

Its Way (1861).

John Gast, A m e r i c a n P r o g r e s s , or M a n i f e s t D e s t i n y

84

(1872). 3.16.

Thomas Rossiter, O p e n i n g of t h e W i l d e r n e s s

3.17.

Jasper Cropsey, A m e r i c a n H a r v e s t i n g , replica

85

(c. 1846-1850). 86

painted by the artist (1864; original, 1851). 87

3.18.

Edward Hicks, The R e s i d e n c e o f D a v i d T w i n i n g

3.19.

Jasper Cropsey, S t a r r u c c a Viaduct,

3.20.

Frederic Edwin Church, N i a g a r a (1857).

94

3.21.

Frederick Law Olmsted, D e s i g n M a p for M o u n t R o y a l ,

95

3.22.

The five friends in New Haven days, 1846.

3.23.

Nineteenth-century park as pleasure ground.

103

3.24.

Twentieth-century reform park.

104

3.25.

Luther Standing Bear, Black

111

in 1785 (c. 1845-1846). P e n n s y l v a n i a (1865).

88

M o n t r e a l (1877).

E a r t h , 1947-1948.

ix

Elk a t t h e C e n t e r o f t h e

97

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Acknowledgments

By

s u p p o r t i n g the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e o r y i n the c u r r i c u l u m a n d

research agenda o f the S c h o o l o f A r c h i t e c t u r e at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas at A u s t i n , D e a n H a l B o x h e l p e d to m a k e this w o r k possible. I w a n t to t h a n k also the f o l l o w i n g faculty m e m b e r s a n d scholars w h o p r o v i d e d honest c r i t i c i s m , valuable suggestions, a n d e n c o u r agement d u r i n g the m a n y

rewritings o f these essays: M i c h a e l

B e n e d i k t , R o b i n D o u g h t y , K e n Foote, R o d e r i c k L a w r e n c e , D a v i d Saile, D a v i d S e a m o n , A n n e V e r n e z - M o u d o n , A n d y V e r n o o y , a n d Fran V i o l i c h . Dr.

J . G r a y Sweeney, a colleague for over t w e n t y years, p r o v i d e d

a great a m o u n t o f substantive a n d collaborative material o n n i n e teenth-century A m e r i c a n landscape p a i n t i n g f r o m an entirely i n d e p e n d e n t project he was p u r s u i n g as senior fellow at the S m i t h s o n i a n I n s t i t u t i o n s N a t i o n a l M u s e u m o f A m e r i c a n A r t , c o n t i n u i n g o u r satisfying h a b i t o f w o r k i n g together o n m u t u a l interests. N o t surprisingly, i n the course o f w r i t i n g chapter 3, " H e r m e n e u t i c Retrieval: A m e r i c a n N a t u r e as Paradise," p a r t i c u l a r l y the parts o f sections 2 and

3 that p r o v i d e close explications o f landscape p a i n t i n g s , I often

w o u n d u p f o l l o w i n g his interpretations closely a n d occasionally used w o r d i n g f r o m his o u t - o f - p r i n t T h e m e s i n A m e r i c a n

Painting.

Because he graciously p r o p o s e d that I forgo the usual m e t h o d s o f a t t r i b u t i o n i n these cases, a r g u i n g that a j u m b l e o f q u o t a t i o n marks

xi

Interpreting

Environments

w o u l d be c o n f u s i n g a n d unnecessary, a n d because p u b l i s h i n g c o n ventions d o n o t easily a l l o w a w a y to indicate a c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n a s m a l l section o f a larger a n d diverse w o r k , he merits special recogn i t i o n as a c o n t r i b u t o r to these sections, t h o u g h he is n o t i n a n y w a y responsible

for their s h o r t c o m i n g s .

Material from

Themes i n

A m e r i c a n P a i n t i n g is used w i t h f u l l p e r m i s s i o n o f Professor Sweeney, its c o p y r i g h t holder. R i c h a r d E t l i n is to be acknowledged for his cheerful attitude to m y characterization o f his interpretation o f F r e n c h neoclassic p y r a m i d s as a n "establishment" p o s i t i o n a n d to m y subsequent d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f that interpretation i n the course o f chapter 2. I appreciate the f o l l o w i n g colleagues, w h o h e l p e d m e to o b t a i n illustrations: Rajesh G u l a t i , K e v i n K e i m , M a r t h a Leipziger-Pearce, J . G r a y Sweeney, D a n a N o r m a n , a n d A n d y Vernooy. Finally, I a m delighted to express appreciation for the t h o u g h t f u l help o f m y colleagues at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas Press.

xii

Interpreting

E n v i r o n m e n t s

Tradition, Deconstruction, Hermeneutics

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Introduction

A l t h o u g h we too often take for granted the b u i l t a n d n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t s i n w h i c h we live, we d o attend to t h e m w h e n they aggravate o r please, a n d at times we b e c o m e fascinated w i t h t h e m . W h e n g o i n g about o u r business a n d e n j o y i n g o u r leisure, a n d especially w h e n traveling, we encounter b u i l d i n g s a n d landscapes f r o m other times a n d places a n d w o n d e r , " H o w c o u l d they live l i k e that?" o r perhaps, " W h y don't w e d o things that way?" I n o u r c i v i c lives w e debate w h e t h e r n e i g h b o r h o o d s , p u b l i c places, cities, a n d w h o l e regions s h o u l d change, a n d i f so, how. A p p a r e n t l y , people disagree n o t o n l y about h o w things s h o u l d be b u t even about h o w they are (or were). S o m e o f us have f o u n d these issues so engaging that we have c h o sen careers i n e n v i r o n m e n t a l disciplines a n d professions, b u t nearly everyone spends some t i m e t r y i n g to figure o u t w h y e n v i r o n m e n t s are the w a y they are, h o w they m i g h t be otherwise, a n d w h a t difference it w o u l d m a k e i f they were. S u c h questions are b o t h i n h e r ently interesting a n d practically critical, because we are i n t r i g u e d b y the w o r l d s variety a n d because h i s t o r i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t s manifest o u r basic hopes a n d fears. A n s w e r i n g these questions requires us n o t o n l y to articulate w h a t we desire to achieve for ourselves a n d to leave for others b u t also to

SLSSCSS

the c u l t u r a l a n d p h y s i c a l barriers to these

goals. T h u s , the e n v i r o n m e n t stimulates i m a g i n a t i o n a n d critical

xv

Interpreting

Environments

analysis as w e p o n d e r o u r o w n a n d others' d a i l y routines, extraordin a r y experiences, a n d past a n d future ways o f l i v i n g — t h a t is, alternative visions o f the cosmos a n d orientations i n the w o r l d . Just beneath the surface o f these issues are c o m p l e x , contested theoretical questions about w h a t sorts o f m e a n i n g e n v i r o n m e n t s m i g h t have a n d practical questions about h o w w e m i g h t discover and

a p p l y such meanings. T o d a y these p r o b l e m s are especially press-

ing,

even c o n f u s i n g , because w e are i n the m i d s t o f pluralistic, skep-

tical, a n d radical challenges to the assumptions a n d approaches t r a d i t i o n a l l y used for e n v i r o n m e n t a l interpretation. T h e scope o f these challenges, t h e n , provides the p r i m a r y m o t i v e for this set o f essays: as a p h i l o s o p h e r w h o has m i g r a t e d to teaching and

research i n architecture, p l a n n i n g , geography, a n d A m e r i c a n

studies, I a m r e s p o n d i n g to colleagues a n d students f r o m a variety of e n v i r o n m e n t a l disciplines w h o w a n t to understand the fashionable—almost

m a n d a t o r y — C o n t i n e n t a l methodologies

deconstruction many

such

a n d hermeneutics.

A l t h o u g h keenly

s u c h as interested,

i n d i v i d u a l s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y are frustrated b y these

approaches' neglect o f the physical e n v i r o n m e n t a n d tired o f t r y i n g to adapt the strategies a n d v o c a b u l a r y o f literary interpretation for use i n discussing e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues. Researchers at a l l levels o f a c c o m p l i s h m e n t regularly ask, " W h y a n d h o w w o u l d deconstruct i o n be i m p o r t a n t to m y w o r k ? " ; " H e r m e n e u t i c s seems so vague a n d difficult; h o w w o u l d I use it?"; o r " H o w c a n I decide whether these approaches are preferable to t r a d i t i o n a l methodologies?" It is frustratingly h a r d for such i n d i v i d u a l s to master the theory a n d a p p l y it to the e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h o u t clear, sustained examples i n their o w n areas o f interest a n d expertise. T h i s b o o k is meant to remedy that situation b y p r o v i d i n g a k i n d o f h a n d b o o k o f t r a d i t i o n a l , d e c o n structive, a n d h e r m e n e u t i c interpretation. My

goal

is to s h o w

h o w traditional, deconstructive, a n d

h e r m e n e u t i c approaches go about i n t e r p r e t i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t , n o t to compare, evaluate, o r judge the alternatives o r to persuade readers o f the merits a n d deficiencies o f each. T h u s , i n each essay the p o s i t i o n that has the floor speaks w i t h its o w n voice a n d i n t e n t i o n . T h e r e is n o c u m u l a t i v e argument, n o overall thesis to be p r o v e n . M y o w n v i e w is absent—as i t is for m a n y a teacher. Readers c a n m a k e

xvi

Introduction

u p their o w n m i n d s about whether o r h o w to proceed w i t h these exceedingly dense approaches. S o m e readers—those w h o are already f a m i l i a r w i t h the a p p r o a c h es o r interested n o t i n m o r e t h e o r y b u t o n l y i n any differences that can be discerned i n p r a c t i c i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — c a n s k i p m o s t o f this i n t r o d u c t i o n . Perhaps a q u i c k glance at the final section, w h i c h p r o vides a guide to the b o o k s o r g a n i z a t i o n , m i g h t be useful. T h e reader can t h e n proceed to whatever chapter seems m o s t interesting o r relevant. O t h e r readers m a y prefer to have a k i n d o f p r i m e r o f the three c o n t e n d i n g approaches. C e r t a i n l y , a sense o f the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , o f the m a i n areas o f agreement a n d disagreement a m o n g the t r a d i t i o n , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d hermeneutics, w i l l m a k e the i m p o r t o f the different interpretations clearer. Because i n the three interpretive chapters I d o n o t pause to describe o r e x p l a i n the theories b e i n g a p p l i e d , readers w a n t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d the three approaches' m a i n features, their beliefs, strategies, a n d p o i n t s o f c o n t e n t i o n , c a n read t h r o u g h the i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e n m o v e o n either t h r o u g h the b o o k o r to whatever chapter seems to be the m o s t appropriate.

The Historical Context The

inaccessibility o f c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e o r y that e n v i r o n m e n t a l

researchers a n d professionals experience is due i n large part to the interpretative methodologies' d i f f u s i o n patterns a n d o v e r w h e l m i n g l y l i n g u i s t i c emphasis. I n the 1970s philosophers a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y t r a i n e d theorists began

a major shift away f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l

approaches

and formalism. T h i s revolutionary w o r k by

Heidegger,

Hans-Georg

Gadamer,

Michel

Foucault,

Martin Jacques

D e r r i d a , a n d others s o o n spread to the closely related fields o f literary t h e o r y a n d c r i t i c i s m a n d comparative literature because it p r i v ileged language a n d p r o v i d e d strategies for reading that offered a n almost entirely n e w w a y o f m a k i n g sense o u t o f t e x t s — a desirable prospect to experienced scholars w h o w a n t e d a fresh w a y to teach a n d to a l l w h o appreciated that these n e w approaches w o u l d let t h e m p r o d u c e n e w readings o f c a n o n i c a l texts a n d w o u l d require a n e w c o h o r t o f academic specialists. T h e m o v e m e n t further spread to other disciplines i n the h u m a n i t i e s a n d social sciences c o n c e r n e d

xvii

Interpreting

Environments

w i t h w r i t i n g culture, such as history, sociology, a n d anthropology, and

t h e n to area studies a n d , less successfully, art history.

1

D u r i n g the 1980s a second wave o f w o r k sought to b u i l d o n o r displace the first. P o s t m o d e r n i s m

a n d p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m arrived as at

least vaguely u n d e r s t o o d descriptors. Jean-Frangois L y o t a r d , Jean B a u d r i l l a r d , G i l l e s D e l e u z e a n d Felix G u a t t a r i , M i c h e l de C e r t e a u , L u c e Irigaray, a n d J u l i a K r i s t e v a developed the h i s t o r i c a l , psychological,

economic,

social, p o l i t i c a l ,

a n d gender

dimensions o f

processes a n d practices i n the p o s t m o d e r n post-subject/object era. In

response, Jûrgen H a b e r m a s a n d A l a s d a i r M a c l n t y r e argued,

respectively, o n b e h a l f o f the m o d e r n a n d classical t r a d i t i o n s . An did

2

unexpected a n d energizing w a r o f ideas was u n d e r way, b u t i t

n o t spread across a l l academic disciplines a n d professional prac-

tices u n i f o r m l y . O n l y after the l i n g u i s t i c a l l y based disciplines h a d substantially shifted d i d architecture, u r b a n p l a n n i n g , e n v i r o n m e n tal design, landscape studies, a n d c u l t u r a l geography gradually b e g i n to p u s h b e y o n d the d o m i n a n t emphasis o n language a n d textuality and

p i c k u p o n the relatively obscure redefinitions o f things, space,

and

the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t c o n t a i n e d i n the n e w approaches. E v e n

t h e n , however, the newer m e t h o d s o f the 1970s a n d 1980s were n o t i m m e d i a t e l y used, because m o r e f a m i l i a r varieties o f M a r x i s m a n d p h e n o m e n o l o g y already were b e i n g used to explicate space a n d b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t s . N a t u r a l l y , i n the hothouse that was n u r t u r i n g theory, the already p l a n t e d approaches b l o s s o m e d q u i c k l y a n d were the first to bear f r u i t for e n v i r o n m e n t a l research. T h e M a r x i s t - i n s p i r e d w o r k i n c l u d e d W a l t e r B e n j a m i n s analyses of

u r b a n life, cities, a n d streets that became easily available to

E n g l i s h speakers w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n o f R e f l e c t i o n s

i n 1978; his

famous, fragmentary Arcades Project was never finally finished b u t was p u b l i s h e d as a "reconstruction" i n 1989. H e n r i E v e r y d a y Life

Lefebvres

i n t h e M o d e r n W o r l d w a s translated i n 1971; that o u t -

o f - p r i n t w o r k has just been reissued a n d his P r o d u c t i o n

o f Space

m a d e available i n E n g l i s h . F r e d r i c J a m e s o n has especially i n f l u e n c e d architects a n d planners since the late 1980s; D a v i d H a r v e y a n d E d w a r d Soja b o t h p u b l i s h e d major w o r k s i n 1989 that develop poststructuralist interpretations o f c u l t u r a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d space; D e n i s Cosgrove a n d his colleagues p r o d u c e d several books at the e n d o f the 1980s. T h u s , a l t h o u g h M a r x i s t - c o n n e c t e d approaches to space,

xviii

Introduction

b u i l d i n g s , a n d landscapes have been present a l l a l o n g , the major i m p a c t o f these c u l t u r a l critiques a n d analyses o f p o s t m o d e r n i s m is just n o w b r o a d l y r i p p l i n g t h r o u g h the e n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d spatial disciplines.

3

S t r o n g advances also were m a d e i n the p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f place a n d e n v i r o n m e n t . C h r i s t i a n N o r b e r g - S c h u l z was a m o n g the first to o p e n a sphere for Heidegger's influence i n architecture a n d l a n d scape i n the late 1970s a n d early 1980s. K a r s t e n H a r r i e s , a p h i l o s o pher at Yale teaching a n d w r i t i n g about architecture, also m a d e a n early, s e m i n a l i m p a c t a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' s

impor-

tance for architecture. I n geography a n d b e h a v i o r a l - e n v i r o n m e n t a l research, A n n e B u t t i m e r , E d w a r d R e l p h , a n d D a v i d S e a m o n have m a d e valuable c o n t r i b u t i o n s a n d reached a w i d e audience for over a decade.

4

Paradoxically perhaps, their very success i n a d a p t i n g p h e -

n o m e n o l o g y to the s t u d y o f place, e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d d w e l l i n g l e d researchers to r e m a i n w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d n o t go o n to e x a m ine the m o r e radical approaches o f hermeneutics o r d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Today, even as the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a n d M a r x i s t - b a s e d interpretations become

accessible a n d the newer modes o f

thought

spread, the d i f f i c u l t y o f hermeneutics, d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d poststructuralist approaches remains a f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m for e n v i ronmental

professionals.

Heidegger's

thought,

for

example,

is

n o t o r i o u s l y opaque a n d nonlinear. E v e n m a n y professional p h i l o s o phers

say he

makes

no

sense. Heidegger's

followers,

such

as

G a d a m e r , are o n l y a b i t easier. M o v e m e n t s s u c h as Derrida's d e c o n s t r u c t i o n seem even m o r e arbitrary o r centripetal a n d d i s t u r b i n g l y skeptical, i f n o t c y n i c a l . A n d w i t h the very latest a n d exotic w o r k appearing as q u i c k l y as the p u b l i c a t i o n i n d u s t r y can p u t i t i n p r i n t , it seems i m p o s s i b l e to catch u p , m u c h less keep u p . F o r all this, at least the ideas are available: the p r i m a r y w o r k s are b e i n g translated a n d p u b l i s h e d a n d reliable secondary sources are b e g i n n i n g to a p p e a r — s o m e o f the latter even w r i t t e n b y e n v i r o n m e n t a l professionals, a l t h o u g h it is often o b v i o u s that they have their t h e o r y at second h a n d . T o present t h o r o u g h interpretations, I l i m i t m y s e l f to p r o v i d i n g a heuristic guide to the three major a p p r o a c h e s — t h e t r a d i t i o n , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d h e r m e n e u t i c s — b e c a u s e g i v i n g short examples o f all the p r o l i f e r a t i n g m e t h o d o l o g i c a l varieties w o u l d o n l y replicate

xix

Interpreting

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the current, c o n f u s i n g situation. T h e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n is further warranted because these three p o w e r f u l approaches p r o v i d e the f u n d a m e n t a l alternatives that the proliferating exotics elaborate.

5

E v e n i f the methodologies themselves are increasingly intelligible, however, i t still is n o t clear h o w they a p p l y to the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t rather t h a n to language, texts, a n d psychological-sociological practices. A l t h o u g h scholars are starting to w o r k o u t the possibilities o f these methodologies, especially i n graduate-level university research and

avant-garde journals such as A s s e m b l a g e a n d T h r e s h o l d , the avail-

able analysis o f b u i l d i n g s a n d landscapes is fragmentary, and

scattered,

sometimes superficial o r untrustworthy. A l l the activity has p r o -

d u c e d o n l y a few sustained analyses that j o i n theoretical mastery to professional f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t , especially w i t h regard to non-avant-garde w o r k .

6

Remarkably, sustained examples

a p p l y i n g the t w o most p o w e r f u l recent approaches, and

hermeneutics

d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , to the e n v i r o n m e n t are n o t available. W h e n asked h o w theory w o u l d change e n v i r o n m e n t a l interpre-

t a t i o n , c r i t i c i s m , a n d practice, practitioners o f hermeneutics a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i o n c a n p o i n t to o n l y a h a n d f u l o f p r i m a r y examples: Heidegger's overcited passages o n the G r e e k temple i n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t "

a n d o n the B l a c k Forest f a r m b u i l d i n g s a n d the

f o u r f o l d o f earth, heavens,

mortals, a n d divinities i n " B u i l d i n g

D w e l l i n g T h i n k i n g " a n d D e r r i d a s less w e l l k n o w n c o m m e n t s o n p y r a m i d s , his w o r k w i t h Peter E i s e n m a n o n a f o l l y for B e r n a r d Tschumi's Pare de l a V i l l e t t e i n Paris, o r his c o m m e n t s o n u n b u i l t deconstructive architectural designs.

7

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n , although n o t hermeneutics, additionally repels environmental researchers w i t h its view that texts a n d practices are finally infra-referential cultural artifacts w i t h o u t any ultimate extratextual reference to a n assumed "external reality." S u c h a hermetic v i s i o n , even i f it embraces the play o f all historically significant signifiers, does not obviously apply to buildings a n d mountainsides, w h i c h appear to be a "primary external reality," secondarily re-presented b y poems, diaries, paintings, a n d so o n . T h u s , insofar as hermeneutics a n d deconstruction b o t h focus o n "texts" a n d the latter argues something close to the position that all the w o r l d is "language-signifier," the e n v i r o n m e n tal disciplines are n o t immediately engaged.

xx

Introduction

The Three Alternatives T h e r e are historical a n d p r i n c i p l e d reasons for these three a p p r o a c h es h a v i n g developed as they have a n d c o m m a n d i n g the stage o f todays debates about w h a t texts a n d e n v i r o n m e n t s m e a n ,

what

interpretive w o r k is g o o d , a n d w h o w i l l succeed professionally. B o t h the h i s t o r y a n d the " l o g i c " o f the p r i n c i p l e d differences order the three approaches i n particular ways, a l t h o u g h I deliberately f o l l o w n o n e o f these i n arranging the chapters, to a v o i d tacitly agreeing w i t h any one o f the " m e t a t h i n k i n g s . "

The Tradition T r a d i t i o n a l W e s t e r n interpretation o f the arts a n d the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t has r e m a i n e d v i t a l because it focuses o n t w o basic r e l a t i o n ships that h u m a n l y p r o d u c e d w o r k s have to their natural a n d c u l t u r a l contexts. A s described i n time-tested metaphors, w h a t we m a k e a n d interpret is b o t h a " m i r r o r " a n d a " l a m p , " because it reflects the reality f r o m w h i c h it derives a n d creatively i l l u m i n a t e s that reality.

8

T h r o u g h o u t the variations o f twenty-five centuries o f explicit aesthetic a n d c r i t i c a l theory, the basic f o u n d a t i o n remains the same: w h a t we m a k e has m e a n i n g because o f its extrinsic relations. P l a t o analyzed a n d described metaphysical, epistemological, a n d ethical relationships i n terms o f hierarchy a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n . H e argued that w h a t is h u m a n l y fashioned re-presents ideal forms; o u r a b i l i t y to discern the differences between the timeless ideals a n d c h a n g i n g t e m p o r a l a n d spatial appearances initiates a circle, or u p w a r d spiral, o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , e n a b l i n g us to c o m e closer to excellence. A r i s t o t l e p u t the same idea i n terms o f principles o f intelligibility, or causes. H e h e l d that we c o u l d understand w h a t we m a k e { t e c h n e and p o e s i s ) i n terms o f the efficient source or h u m a n agent responsible for it, its f o r m , its materials, a n d its final goal or f u n c t i o n . B o t h theories i n v o l v e d the f r a m e w o r k that has been developed

since:

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a w o r k depends o n interpreting it i n the l i g h t o f its o r i g i n or creation, its forms, materials, a n d content, a n d its ethical and

intellectual i m p u l s e back to social, natural, a n d perhaps sacred

reality. In the E n l i g h t e n m e n t the concept o f representation was transf o r m e d , w i t h differing emphases, i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d o n

xxi

Interpreting

Environments

the C o n t i n e n t . D a v i d H u m e a n d E d m u n d B u r k e shifted a t t e n t i o n to a n a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l o r psychological correlation between objects a n d o u r private a n d social experiences.

made

H u m e spoke o f

meanings i n terms o f o u r sensory perceptions a n d o u r idiosyncratic and

shared customs o f association a n d j u d g m e n t . B u r k e analyzed

e n v i r o n m e n t a l responses to w h a t w e call the beautiful a n d s u b l i m e i n terms o f f u n d a m e n t a l emotions such as fear, pleasure, a n d love. I m m a n u e l K a n t , o n the other h a n d , i n analyzing the relation o f consciousness to sensory data i n generating coherent

experiences,

w o r k e d o u t the m a n n e r i n w h i c h e n v i r o n m e n t a l objects have m e a n ing

b y representing previously made c u l t u r a l forms a n d types.

A r c h i t e c t u r e , he argued, represents n o t naturally o c c u r r i n g forms b u t the h u m a n l y invented, w h i c h has n o precedent i n n a t u r e — doors, arches, temples, a n d so o n . G . W . E H e g e l m o v e d back to the metaphysical t r a d i t i o n i n arguing that m e a n i n g is generated precisely b y absolute M i n d (ultimate reality) historically m a n i f e s t i n g itself i n a n d t h r o u g h c u l t u r a l products. A r c h i t e c t u r e , broadly u n d e r stood, manifests the phases o f the u n i t y o f spiritual m e a n i n g a n d material forms i n such a w a y that the epochal changes o f w h a t w e b u i l d provide the means for us to become conscious o f the h i s t o r i cal u n f o l d i n g a n d progress o f the universe. O n the basis o f this correspondence, J . J . W i n c k e l m a n n w o r k e d o u t a m o r e detailed idea o f artistic styles as reflecting historical change a n d thus b e i n g the basis for o u r current theories o f art-historical periods. E v e n w i t h o u t a n elaboration o f these issues, i t is clear w h y such sophisticated interpretation depends

o n objective

correctness i n

regard to the f o r m a n d content, o r "material-symbolic" d i m e n s i o n s , o f the w o r k i n question. O n l y w h e n

"preinterpretive"—usually

t e c h n i c a l — s c h o l a r s h i p guarantees that we are certain about w h a t a t h i n g is (a previously lost o r i g i n a l , a derivative copy, the result o f c u l t u r a l diffusion across space, etc.) can we proceed to interpret the relation between the w o r k a n d its o r i g i n a l a n d historically developed context. N o t surprisingly, t r a d i t i o n a l interpretation cooperates w i t h disciplines such as archaeology, philology, historiography, intellectual history, material a n d technology studies, a n d historical restoration and

preservation. O n c e scholars k n o w w h a t they are analyzing, the f u n d a m e n t a l

interpretive move is to discern a n d w o r k o u t i n detail the ways i n

xxii

Introduction

w h i c h the w o r k m i r r o r s the d i m e n s i o n s that p r o d u c e d it. T h e m e a n i n g that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n seeks lies i n the c o n n e c t i o n s

between

the past o r present external c o n d i t i o n s o f existence a n d the w o r k s internal features o r characteristics. O f course, the w o r k m a y be seen as the p r o d u c t o f any o r m a n y o f the forces that generate things i n the w o r l d . N o r m a l l y this is very c o m p l i c a t e d ; n o t o n l y d o people p r o d u c e w o r k s , b u t they d o so i n response to a variety o f factors: external forces o f w h i c h they m a y o r m a y n o t be aware, personal needs a n d desires, the material a n d f o r m a l features o f the w o r k itself as it emerges (either m a n i f e s t i n g o r resisting the o r i g i n a l i m p e t u s o r suggesting n e w possibilities that were n o t expected), a n d their o w n c r i t i c i s m a n d that o f others. H e n c e , the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t can be seen either as the fairly a n o n y m o u s p r o d u c t o f the c u l t u r a l forces a n d practices i n effect at the t i m e o r as the result o f the deliberate a n d creative effort o f a particular creator o r even "genius" (or o f a s m a l l g r o u p o f c o l l a b o r a tors). A s psychiatry a n d p s y c h o l o g y have s h o w n us, the creator m a y shape the w o r k n o t o n l y a c c o r d i n g to self-conscious i n t e n t i o n s b u t also i n ways o f w h i c h she o r he is unaware (because o f the influence o f the personal o r collective u n c o n s c i o u s ) . Alternatively, a l l these d i m e n s i o n s m a y p l a y a part, i n d i z z y i n g i n t e r a c t i o n . T o f o l l o w the idea that artificial objects m i r r o r their contexts, insofar as i m p e r s o n a l e c o n o m i c , social, l i n g u i s t i c o r s y m b o l i c , historical, a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l d y n a m i c s o r personal factors shape w h a t we d o , the m e a n i n g o f a w o r k lies i n the ways i n w h i c h it represents its o r i g i n . W e w i l l be able to u n d e r s t a n d it insofar as we c a n f o l l o w its generation f r o m its source ( w h i c h we u n d e r s t a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d objectively) a n d e x p l a i n w h a t we find i n the w o r k i n terms o f that o r i g i n . M o v i n g i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n a l o n g this same l i n e o f representational relation, we can also use an artifact to l o o k back i n t o its o r i g i n . T h a t is, we can use w h a t has been m a d e to i n f o r m ourselves about the lost o r obscured w o r l d f r o m w h i c h it came. H i s t o r i a n s , anthropologists, sociologists, a n d c u l t u r a l a n d area studies analysts can learn about their subject matter (some d i m e n s i o n o f the personal o r c u l t u r a l realms) b y seeing h o w it was o r is reflected i n the w o r k s . H e r e , the w o r k s b e c o m e repositories o f m e a n i n g , w a i t i n g for the right i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to u n l o c k w h a t they have to reveal a b o u t the

xxiii

Interpreting

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times, places, a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f their births a n d their subsequent histories. In either case, it is interpreters' task a n d o p p o r t u n i t y to travel the r o a d o f representation, w o r k i n g o u t a n d e x p l i c i t l y d e m o n s t r a t i n g h o w a w o r k a n d its c o n t a i n i n g reality are related. It is the m u t u a l d y n a m i c between the external forces a n d internal features that is i m p o r t a n t a n d that enables us to use each o n e to understand the other. N a t u r a l l y , to be successful it is c r u c i a l to a v o i d merely speculating o r generalizing about w h a t m i g h t be plausible relations. Rather, it is necessary to find a n d display the objective correlation between the w o r k a n d its objective circumstances. T h e actual, h i s t o r i c a l , a n d causal relation is sought. T h e interpreter needs to p u t aside p e r s o n al prejudices a n d assumptions, to restrain s u p p o s i t i o n a n d u n f o u n d ed inference i n favor o f explicating a n d p r o v i n g the relations that o b t a i n . S o m e t h i n g very a k i n to the scientific m e t h o d applies here. T h e r e has to be a sensitivity to the details o f the p h e n o m e n o n itself and

a h y p o t h e t i c a l explanatory schema that can be p r o v e d , o r at

least disproved, to account adequately for the features o f the w o r k (or o f the contextual reality, i f the reading is p r o c e e d i n g i n the other direction). Essentially, i n a w a y that parallels what science does for natural p h e n o m e n a , interpretation provides a detailed, e m p i r i c a l exercise i n discovering a n d d e m o n s t r a t i n g (often i n d i r e c t a n d c o m plex) causal relationships between the h u m a n l y made w o r k a n d its contexts a n d origins. T h i s is possible n o t o n l y for what were self-conscious factors d u r ing

the creation o f the w o r k b u t also for unconscious o r structural

features that escaped the makers' attention o r understanding. Insofar as unconscious concerns a n d l i m i t a t i o n s shaped the w o r k , the causal connections need to be a n d e a n ^ p r o v e n b y psychological o r structural analyses o f the influence o f psychic life, religious a n d c u l t u r a l beliefs, e c o n o m i c a n d historical forces, typological a n d material c o n ventions, a n d so o n , o f w h i c h the creators m a y n o t have been focally

aware. T h u s , whether

the forces

that the w o r k reflects are

conscious o r unconscious, personal o r a n o n y m o u s , the m e a n i n g is f o u n d w h e n the interpretation demonstrates the c o n n e c t i o n , showing i n concrete detail the fact a n d m a n n e r o f the representation. T h e other d i m e n s i o n — t h e w o r k as i l l u m i n a t i n g the w o r l d —

xxiv

Introduction

involves n o t so m u c h h o w the w o r k tells us s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the reality that it necessarily m i r r o r s as the ways i n w h i c h the w o r k is a source o f o r i g i n a l insights i n t o reality. T h a t is, i n the classical a n d r o m a n t i c traditions, the w o r k is u n d e r s t o o d (respectively) as m a n i festing a n d creating n e w m e a n i n g . I n a m a n n e r parallel to the w a y that a d r a m a t i c personal experience, f r i e n d o r teacher, o r discursive text can instruct us, the w o r k shows us n e w d i m e n s i o n s o f o r possibilities i n the w o r l d . W e m i g h t learn a m o r a l about h u m a n life o r the nature o f o u r existence. W e m i g h t learn about w h a t c a n n o t be p u t i n t o direct language or other s y m b o l i c f o r m . F o r example, just as other people o r o u r o w n experiences m i g h t help us to see a n d u n d e r s t a n d love o r death, so too w o u l d the characteristics o f the hearth a n d marriage b e d o r the cemetery a n d m e m o r i a l d o this. B o t h intellectual a n d ethical interpretations o f w o r k s explore the m e a n i n g o f artifacts i n terms o f w h a t we m i g h t learn f r o m p o n d e r i n g o r i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m ourselves. T h u s , t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is a m o r e refined o r systematic version o f w h a t it is to be h o p e d that we all d o : examine the i m p o r t a n t w o r k s f r o m the past a n d present to seek insight i n t o ourselves, others, a n d the w o r l d about us. W o r k s are d e e m e d "classics" usually because they timelessly (or at least, for a l o n g t i m e a n d across cultures) shed l i g h t o n the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n a n d p r o v i d e i n s p i r a t i o n a n d c o n s o l a t i o n . W o r k s are j u d g e d i m p o r tant w h e n they p r o v i d e deeper a n d m o r e p r o f o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a n does m o s t o f w h a t we hear, read, a n d see. S u c h artworks a n d e n v i r o n m e n t s are w o r t h the interpretive effort because they pay us back b y e n l a r g i n g o u r m i n d s a n d characters. Methodologically,

e t h i c a l o r m o r a l c r i t i c i s m interprets

the

insights a n d h u m a n v i s i o n available i n b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t s b y m a k i n g e x p l i c i t w h a t j u d g m e n t s o r understandings m a y result f r o m the w o r k , b y a n a l y z i n g h o w the w o r k s p r o v i d e this resource so that we m a y m o r e f u l l y a n d easily benefit f r o m it, a n d b y e x p l i c i t l y l e a d i n g us to i m a g i n e a n d reflect o n w h a t "possible" w o r l d s m i g h t u n f o l d f r o m the e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e o r i s t a n d c r i t i c Y v o r W i n t e r s argues that an artistic w o r k " s h o u l d offer a means o f e n r i c h i n g one s awareness o f h u m a n experience a n d o f so r e n d e r i n g greater the p o s s i b i l i t y o f intelligence i n the course o f future a c t i o n ; a n d it s h o u l d offer l i k e wise a means o f i n d u c i n g certain m o r e o r less constant habits o f feeli n g , w h i c h s h o u l d render greater the p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n e s acting, i n a

xxv

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future s i t u a t i o n , i n accordance w i t h the findings o f o n e s i m p r o v e d intelligence." I n interpretation we are asked to explore the w o r k s 9

m e a n i n g that m i g h t m o d i f y o u r lives b y reflecting o n the assumed and

i m p l i e d modes o f life a n d courses of h u m a n a c t i o n a n d b y j u d g -

ing

the c o n d i t i o n s , responses,

result.

a n d responsibilities that

might

10

In the e n d , i t is easy to see w h y the historical a n d b i o g r a p h i c a l d i m e n s i o n s o f m e a n i n g are so vital for the t r a d i t i o n . Because w o r k s are p r o d u c e d b y o n e o r m o r e persons, it is necessary to m a k e the c o n n e c t i o n between

the w o r k s a n d their creators' successful o r

unsuccessful i n t e n t i o n s , the features o f the creators' i n d i v i d u a l o r collective unconscious that are manifest w i t h o u t the creators' having been aware o f t h e m , a n d the a u t o n o m o u s h i s t o r i c a l o r structural

features (material, technological, e c o n o m i c , social, s y m b o l i c ,

p o l i t i c a l , etc.) that either s u p p l e m e n t o r o v e r w h e l m the creators' distinctive c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Similarly, insofar as the w o r k i l l u m i n a t e s life either for its makers o r for its interpreters, its m e a n i n g lies i n the c o n n e c t i o n between it a n d o u r experiences. H i s t o r i c a l a n d b i o graphical analysis is i m p o r t a n t i n analyses a l o n g a n y o f these d i m e n sions. A f t e r a l l , the m e a n i n g o f the w o r k w i l l lie n o t just i n its internal f o r m a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n b u t i n its relation to past a n d present h u m a n life.

Hermeneutics W i t h i n the c o n t e m p o r a r y C o n t i n e n t a l t r a d i t i o n o f h e r m e n e u t i c s — the

theory

a n d practice

o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — M a r t i n Heidegger

(whose shift b e y o n d p h e n o m e n o l o g y to radical hermeneutics is o n l y n o w b e c o m i n g appreciated), and

11

H a n s - G e o r g Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur,

others attempt to p r o v i d e a n account o f h o w the h u m a n sci-

ences operate. H e r m e n e u t i c s aims n o t so m u c h to develop a n e w procedure as to clarify h o w u n d e r s t a n d i n g takes p l a c e .

12

It appears

radical a n d has shaken t r a d i t i o n a l approaches m a i n l y because it attempts to s h o w the l i m i t a t i o n s a n d even groundlessness o f w h a t has been taken for granted. T h e project looks different f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l scholarship because it focuses o n w h a t usually is taken as peripheral a n d c r i t i c a l l y brings to the f o r e g r o u n d what usually is h i d d e n o r transformed i n t e m p o r a l divergences.

xxvi

Introduction

H e r m e n e u t i c s p o i n t s o u t the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f scientific h i s t o r i o g r a p h y s goal: to transcendentally a n d objectively pass over i n t o another t i m e to u n d e r s t a n d an earlier s i t u a t i o n , text, o r object i n the same w a y that people o f the t i m e d i d . S u c h "objective

knowledge

w o u l d d e p e n d o n a s t a n d p o i n t above h i s t o r y f r o m w h i c h h i s t o r y itself can be l o o k e d u p o n , " a p o s i t i o n that finite h u m a n s c a n n o t obtain.

13

S t i l l , hermeneutics also involves a b e l i e f that shared u n d e r s t a n d i n g is possible, b o t h w i t h i n a n d across traditions. Interpretation is a matter neither o f finding the "one right i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " as the trad i t i o n contends, n o r o f c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to the interpreters l a n guage a n d w i t , where "everything is possible," as d e c o n s t r u c t i o n h o l d s , b u t o f finding the v a l i d criteria for p o l y s e m y w i t h i n the

fluid

variety o f possibilities. B e g i n n i n g w i t h o u r u n a v o i d a b l y finite a n d b o u n d e d s i t u a t i o n , G a d a m e r develops the ways i n w h i c h we c a n a n d d o achieve n o n a r b i t r a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g : r e m a i n i n g o p e n to the m e a n i n g o f another person, text, a n d so o n , to "what the other reall y is s a y i n g . "

14

A c c o r d i n g to hermeneutics, all u n d e r s t a n d i n g is i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , that is, contextual. M e a n i n g always is p r o d u c e d i n a specific t i m e and

culture, b y

finite

h u m a n s . Because the context c o n t i n u a l l y

changes, n o s i m p l e o r fixed t h i n g o r m e a n i n g ever is there w i t h o u t interpretation, a n d we also have the o b v i o u s p r o b l e m o f o u r relation to other contexts.

15

T h i s t e m p o r a l , c u l t u r a l context o f o u r lives a n d

meanings is called the " h o r i z o n " o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , because it is "the range o f v i s i o n that includes everything that can be seen f r o m a particular vantage p o i n t . "

1 6

T o be h u m a n is constantly to attempt to understand, that is, to interpret things, to project expectations, a n d to discover whether a n d h o w those expectations are fulfilled. Because we always a p p r o a c h things a n d texts f r o m w i t h i n the h o r i z o n s o f w h a t we are able to attend to, f r o m w i t h i n o u r t i m e a n d place, w i t h certain expectations about the existence a n d m a n n e r o f their meanings, u n d e r s t a n d i n g naturally has presuppositions. W e are prejudiced w h e n we listen to another person talk o r w h e n we p i c k u p a text; w h e n reading a letter f r o m h o m e , for example, we m i g h t start b y a s s u m i n g that it w i l l b r i n g us news c o n c e r n i n g s o m e t h i n g about w h i c h we care. W e p r o ceed f r o m the preparation to hear a n d understand.

xxvii

Interpreting

Environments

Heidegger made explicit the f u n c t i o n o f o u r expectations a n d assumptions b y d e v e l o p i n g the idea o f the forestructures o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n relation to what he called the " h e r m e n e u t i c a l c i r c l e . "

17

A c c o r d i n g to this latter concept, u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n y part o f o u r w o r l d depends o n a p r i o r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o r p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w h o l e , a n d a n y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w h o l e c a n proceed o n l y f r o m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of, o r projection f r o m , the parts. T h i s circle is n o t v i c i o u s , because we are already i n the m i d s t o f o u r life-worlds w i t h certain operative prejudgments. These are either fulfilled o r m o d i f i e d as we go o n , leading us to learn about a n d deal w i t h the w o r l d . O u r anticipatory ideas guide us so that we are n o t b l i n d ; at the same t i m e , b y b e c o m i n g conscious o f a n d c r i t i c i z i n g these forestructures we can check the t y r a n n y o f the h i d d e n .

18

N o r m a l l y , i n the process o f understanding, the hermeneutical circle expands concentrically.

19

I n interpreting p h e n o m e n a it is c r u -

cial to o p e n n e w m e a n i n g b y u n c o v e r i n g still-efficacious meanings f r o m the past that bear o n the present i n ways that have been c o n cealed b y naturally shifting intermediate horizons (that is, over time) o r b y partial a n d derivative meanings that have c o m e to act as blinders, restricting a n d m o n o p o l i z i n g o u r focus. In an influential exercise that is itself an example o f a h e r m e n e u tic

rereading that proceeds b y u n c o v e r i n g changed assumptions,

G a d a m e r reinterprets (retrieves) the m e a n i n g o f p r e j u d i c e i n the W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n a n d shows h o w historiography a n d other objective methodologies share, w i t h o u t a c k n o w l e d g m e n t o r awareness, a prejudice against prejudice. H e analyzes h o w the o r i g i n a l m e a n i n g of p r e j u d i c e

y

of w h i c h o u r current c u l t u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a d i m i n -

ished derivative, is that o f Heidegger's

"forejudgment."

W e see a transition i n this concept w i t h the d a w n o f the m o d e r n era a n d Descartes's w r i t i n g s . P r i o r to the Renaissance prejudgments were seen n o t as false b u t as the source a n d bearer o f a u t h o r i t y a n d dignity. O n e c o u l d live coherently a n d learn because o n e c o u l d assume that t r a d i t i o n provides access to t r u t h a n d positive connect i o n to reality. T h e m o d e r n critique o f a u t h o r i t y a n d t r a d i t i o n , h o w ever, t o o k acceptance o f preexistent a u t h o r i t y as opposite to the n e w l y desired certainty that was to be tested b y radical d o u b t a n d based o n n o f o u n d a t i o n except the self-conscious subject's clear a n d distinct ideas. T h e project for radically "objective,"

xxviii

self-founding

Introduction

k n o w l e d g e thus entailed that decisions o r j u d g m e n t s p r e v i o u s l y considered legitimate because g r o u n d e d i n tradition's a u t h o r i t y subsequently came to be seen as hasty o r loose. R e a s o n itself, as a seemi n g l y ahistorical process, was established as its o w n a n d the o n l y authority.

20

Subsequently, the r o m a n t i c s reversed the E n l i g h t e n m e n t s prejudice: the o r i g i n , the o r i g i n a l , became p r i v i l e g e d , a n d the ancient was taken to have greater i m p o r t t h a n the present o r future progress a n d perfection. T h e m o d e r n eras idea o f p r i m e v a l s t u p i d i t y was replaced b y the r o m a n t i c s ' idea o f p r i m e v a l w i s d o m , a n d progress was rejected i n favor o f the v i e w that c i v i l i z a t i o n is a loss o f m e a n i n g o r regress of mind. G a d a m e r p o w e r f u l l y shows h o w the same structure obtains i n b o t h cases w h i l e the p l a c e m e n t o f the elements is i n v e r t e d i n a k i n d o f m i r r o r i n g : i n b o t h cases a p r e j u d g m e n t is m a d e for o r against the p o w e r o f t r a d i t i o n , o f authority, based o n the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n to the " o r i g i n a l . " F o r the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , o n l y w h a t ahistorical reason shows to be possible o r i m p o s s i b l e , true o r false, c a n be u n d e r s t o o d i n history; for r o m a n t i c i s m , reason is replaced b y the w h o l e o f the past, so that the c o n t e m p o r a r y can be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y i n the l i g h t o f its relation to the past, that is, i n terms o f a universal a n d radical historicism.

21

T h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d r o m a n t i c i s m are alike i n

b r e a k i n g f r o m the older a s s u m p t i o n that m e a n i n g occurs w i t h i n a freely t a k e n o n , l i v i n g t r a d i t i o n where prejudgments p r o v i d e c o n t i n u i t y a n d the stable basis for validity. T h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d r o m a n t i c i s m differ i n their prejudice against prejudice b y a r g u i n g — p r e s u m i n g a change o f a c c e s s to m e a n i n g — a b o u t w h e t h e r w e have c o m e to see m o r e o r less i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the o r i g i n a l s i t u a t i o n .

22

G a d a m e r s p o i n t is that we need to remove the prejudice against prejudice, since we are i n a t r a d i t i o n w h e t h e r we l i k e i t o r n o t . T h e very i d e a — a n d t r a d i t i o n — o f a n objective, ahistorical k n o w l e d g e "belongs, i n fact, to h i s t o r i c a l reality itself," as does h i s t o r i c i s m .

23

G a d a m e r argues that h i s t o r i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l research c a n accept the p r e j u d g m e n t that t r a d i t i o n c a n operate w i t h a u t h o r i t y a n d d i g n i t y , a v o i d i n g the need to b e g i n each investigation w i t h radical d o u b t a n d stingy criteria for the evidence o f the senses. I n other w o r d s , w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h legitimate prejudices f r o m those to be overcome a n d thus a p p r o a c h b u i l t forms a n d cultures w i t h i n their t r a d i t i o n s a n d

xxix

Interpreting

Environments

contexts. B y a c k n o w l e d g i n g that we b e l o n g w i t h i n h i s t o r y a n d always stand w i t h i n some t r a d i t i o n , where a u t h o r i t y is recognized and

accepted i n a n act o f reason a n d freedom, n o t i n b l i n d o b e d i -

ence, we d o n o t frustrate u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t o p e n ourselves to i t .

24

In the case o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the b u i l t w o r l d s o f other peoples and

times, w e begin b y r e c o g n i z i n g that their traditions are sources

o f m e a n i n g , even i f those people are unaware o f it. T h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t people m a k e always goes b e y o n d the makers' deliberate i n t e n tions, because the makers are a c t i n g i n a m a n n e r that involves n o t o n l y w h a t they consciously i n t e n d to a c c o m p l i s h b u t also their taken-for-granted o r unconscious c u l t u r a l attitudes a n d responses to the w o r l d . People act a n d t h i n k i n the context o f their h i s t o r i c a l l y based i n s e r t i o n i n the w o r l d , w h i c h constitutes the historical reality of o u r lives m o r e t h a n d o o u r i n d i v i d u a l j u d g m e n t s .

25

O n e is little

c o n c e r n e d w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f the a u t h o r a n d focuses instead on

the m a n y d i m e n s i o n s o f a l i f e - w o r l d , such as shared assump-

tions, w h i c h necessarily r e m a i n u n s p o k e n a n d u n t h o u g h t for those w i t h i n the specific h o r i z o n o f t i m e a n d place. W h a t we d o always has m o r e meanings a n d i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a n w e i n t e n d o r even c a n understand ourselves. Because o f this o p e n polysemy, it is p o s s i b l e — e v e n i n e v i t a b l e — that others c a n find meanings i n texts a n d w o r k s n o t apparent at the t i m e they were made a n d can learn about shared concerns across t i m e a n d space i n ways that never c o u l d have been anticipated. H e n c e , hermeneutics rejects the attempt made b y E . D . H i r s c h , J r . , and

others to resuscitate the privilege o f the author's i n t e n t i o n .

26

Because o u r h o r i z o n is finite a n d c h a n g i n g a n d because surplus meanings are available, t e m p o r a l distance is n o t a separation o r g u l f to be b r i d g e d ; instead, it supplies the g r o u n d o f the process i n w h i c h the present is r o o t e d . T h r o u g h t i m e w e are connected to the c o n 27

cerns a n d problems that earlier people h a d . W e d o n o t seek the exact knowledge o f w h a t others t h o u g h t (to k n o w it as w e l l as o r better t h a n they themselves d i d ) , s o m e h o w o c c u p y i n g their context o n l y and

n o t o u r o w n . N o r d o w e stay merely w i t h i n o u r c u l t u r a l c o n -

text, alien f r o m a n y other. Rather, at times we manage to go b e y o n d the l i m i t e d historical context o f either s i t u a t i o n , a r r i v i n g at a w i d e n e d o r comprehensive context where we share s o m e t h i n g o f i m p o r t a n c e w i t h the other culture a n d m a y c o m e to a n e w u n d e r -

xxx

Introduction

s t a n d i n g o f the c u l t u r a l forms i n q u e s t i o n , a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g that m a y help us to deal w i t h o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o b l e m s . Precisely because past c o n d i t i o n s differ f r o m those o f the present, the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f those differences can be f r u i t f u l . I n t r a c i n g o u t the connections we o u g h t n o t t r y to c o m b i n e just a n y t h i n g w i t h preexistent, stable meanings; instead, differences between the past and

present a l l o w w h a t was h i t h e r t o a u t o n o m o u s to be n e w l y c o m -

b i n e d i n us, so that we c a n have a n e w experience o f m e a n i n g . Clearly, despite m i s c o n c e p t i o n s that suggest this, hermeneutics is n o t at all nostalgic, for it seeks n o t past meanings b u t n o v e l c o m b i nations o f past a n d present that c a n o c c u r o n l y i n us.

28

W h e n o u r spheres o f c o n c e r n a n d those o f others intersect, n e w possibilities o f m e a n i n g are o p e n e d . T h r o u g h the investigation o f the others' a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , o u r s i t u a t i o n m i g h t a l l o w us to see things i n previous w o r l d s that h a d been missed; t h r o u g h the b r o a d e n i n g o f o u r context, we m i g h t see m o r e possibilities for o u r situat i o n t h a n we w o u l d have i f we h a d r e m a i n e d i n o u r o r i g i n a l , narrower context. T h e other t r a d i t i o n a n d ours b e c o m e s i m u l t a n e ous. H e r e we arrive at a f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s . G a d a m e r h o l d s , t h e n , that u n d e r s t a n d i n g is always the f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s , where the past a n d present contexts c o m e together to m a k e s o m e t h i n g n e w o f l i v i n g value.

29

Heidegger's major c o n t r i b u t i o n to hermeneutics m a y lie i n his insistence that the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d things, texts a n d language, are n o t p r i m a r i l y epistemological p h e n o m e n a , as the m o d e r n age w o u l d have it, b u t o n t o l o g i c a l . H e argues that we p r e c o n c e p t u a l l y are i m m e r s e d i n a l i f e - w o r l d , that texts, p o l i t i c a l acts, a n d b u i l t things are the catalysts for the disclosure o f the w o r l d . H e n c e , w o r d s a n d things are n o t signs o f a prior, i n d e p e n d e n t l y existing reality, as the t r a d i t i o n h o l d s , n o r are they the endlessly self-circulating deferrals that d e c o n s t r u c t i o n admits. Rather, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n operates at the scene o f the disclosure o f o u r w o r l d s , so that hermeneutics is c o n cerned w i t h the recovery o f m e a n i n g i n the sense o f b e i n g the occas i o n w h e r e i n n e w m e a n i n g is experienced. A

case i n p o i n t is G a d a m e r s previously m e n t i o n e d retrieval o f

previous n o t i o n s o f prejudice, w h i c h enables us to see that m e a n i n g is n o t s o m e t h i n g that we c a n p r o d u c e as we w i l l b u t rather a d i m e n s i o n o f a n d event w i t h i n the shared h i s t o r i c a l realms i n w h i c h we

xxxi

Interpreting and

Environments

o u r interpretations belong. I n fact, w e b e l o n g i n o u r l i f e - w o r l d

p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h the processes o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e h u m a n sit30

u a t i o n consists largely i n acts o f interpretation that a l l o w us to b e l o n g w i t h i n o u r l i f e - w o r l d a n d to experience changes. Since w o r k s o f all s o r t s — b r i d g e s a n d texts a n d declarations o f i n d e p e n d e n c e — a r e w h a t b r i n g a w o r l d to stand, setting i t i n t o w o r k , the h e r m e n e u t i c question is about the modes i n w h i c h particular acts, events, a n d things are b o u n d u p i n the appearance a n d concealment o f historical w o r l d s . F o r hermeneutics, w o r l d denotes n o t the c o l l e c t i o n o f a l l entities b u t h o w we are disposed to a n d w i t h i n t h e m , that is, the historically disclosed m o d e o f m e a n i n g a n d life. A s we have seen, things d o n o t have a fixed, preassigned m e a n ing;

rather, the variable meanings o f a l l the d i m e n s i o n s (things,

texts, historical w o r l d s , h u m a n s ) occur o r are gathered s i m u l t a n e ously i n the event o f the l i f e - w o r l d . G i v e n the c o n t i n u a l , c o m p l e x , a n d p l u r a l generation o f o p e n e n d e d meanings, hermeneutics aims to be o p e n to the w a y the subject matter questions us ( o u r assumptions a n d views) a n d attempts to c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d what the w o r l d requires o f us as a n adequate, appropriate response for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n its historical u n f o l d i n g . T h u s , as the i m m e d i a t e goal o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — a n d here we see the h a l l m a r k o f h e r m e n e u t i c p r o c e d u r e — w e seek n o t to "create" m e a n ing

b u t to "remove hindrances so the event o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n

take place i n its fullness a n d the w o r k can speak to us w i t h t r u t h a n d power," that is, ontologically.

31

Deconstruction W h e t h e r because it is t o o n e w to be a developed t r a d i t i o n o r because it is so eccentric, d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is d o m i n a t e d b y o n e figure—Jacques traditional

D e r r i d a — i n a m a n n e r unparalleled b y either the

approach

or hermeneutics.

Hence,

e x p l a i n i n g the

a p p r o a c h substantially means e x p l a i n i n g D e r r i d a s theory a n d practice, a l t h o u g h others increasingly are u s i n g his strategies. D e r r i d a i n i t i a l l y accepts the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s a n d moves o f hermeneutics against the t r a d i t i o n , b u t he goes o n to p u s h t h e m to their extremes, eventually e m p l o y i n g t h e m against hermeneutics itself to o p e n u p a distinctively m o r e radical attitude. H i s essay "Restitutions o f the T r u t h i n P o i n t i n g [ p o i n t u r e ] " is s o m e t h i n g o f a t o u r de force against

xxxil

Introduction

the assumptions a n d practices o f b o t h hermeneutics a n d t r a d i t i o n a l scholarship.

H e r e D e r r i d a s i m u l t a n e o u s l y criticizes

Heidegger's

o n t o l o g i c a l e x p o s i t i o n o f a l i f e - w o r l d that s u p p o s e d l y is set i n t o w o r k b y the peasant's shoes p a i n t e d b y V a n G o g h a n d art h i s t o r i a n M e y e r Schapiro's scholarly i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d a t t r i b u t i o n i n regard to the shoes. (Schapiro, " w h o claims to h o l d the t r u t h o f the shoes [of the p i c t u r e ] , " argued i n correspondence w i t h H e i d e g g e r that the shoes actually are those o f the c i t y dweller, V a n G o g h h i m s e l f . )

32

A g r e e i n g w i t h hermeneutics, D e r r i d a opposes the t r a d i t i o n a l a s s u m p t i o n about

the i n d e p e n d e n t , objective

status o f things,

events, a n d meanings. H e wants to destroy the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f that we can transcend experience o r o u r texts to contact s o m e t h i n g " a u t o n o m o u s l y there." F o r example, he says that r e a d i n g " c a n n o t legitimately transgress the text t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g other t h a n it, t o w a r d a referent (a reality that is metaphysical, h i s t o r i c a l , psyc h o b i o g r a p h i c a l , etc.) o r t o w a r d a signified outside the text whose c o n t e n t c o u l d take place, c o u l d have taken place outside l a n guage."

33

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n h o l d s that there is n o objectively t r a n -

scendent reality, n o essences o f things, n o clear, stable, o r decidable identities. Because these things d o n o t exist, it is i m p o s s i b l e to have any direct i n t u i t i o n o f o r access to t h e m . T h i s rejects the m e t a p h o r i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o u r language a n d o f signs as transparent, as d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t i n g us to their referents. H e n c e , D e r r i d a consistently criticizes clarity a n d transparency, n o t to p r o m o t e obscurity, b u t to resist the idea that signs f u n c t i o n as "picture w i n d o w s , " to use N o r t h r o p F r y e s phrase.

34

I n rejecting b o t h the naive a n d t r a d i t i o n a l versions o f realism, D e r r i d a opposes the "unperceived o r unconfessed metaphysics" a n d epistemology that p r o v i d e the bases o f scientific o b j e c t i v i s m (that is, the m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w o f objective reality a n d its correlate v i e w that t r u t h is a correspondence between language a n d that reality). T h i s 35

p o s i t i o n appears i n m a n y variations, as the d e n i a l o f presence, i d e n tity, linear history, causality, a n d t r u t h . I n one o f his analyses o f M a l l a r m e s texts, D e r r i d a counters the t r a d i t i o n a l approach's develo p m e n t o f themes i n the attempt to w o r k o u t the t r u t h f u l correspondence o f a w o r k to the w o r l d a n d creator that it supposedly m i r r o r s : " W h a t we w i l l thus be c o n c e r n e d w i t h here is the very poss i b i l i t y o f t h e m a t i c c r i t i c i s m , seen as a n example o f m o d e r n c r i t i -

xxxiii

Interpreting

Environments

c i s m , at w o r k wherever one tries to determine a m e a n i n g t h r o u g h a text, to p r o n o u n c e a d e c i s i o n u p o n it, to decide that this o r that is a m e a n i n g a n d that it is m e a n i n g f u l , to say that this m e a n i n g is posed, posable, o r transposable as such: [what] have systematically been recognized [as such] b y m o d e r n c r i t i c i s m . . . c a n n o t i n fact be mastered as themes or m e a n i n g s . "

36

T h a t is, one m a y pursue o r trace

o u t themes w i t h i n the literary sign systems, b u t that does n o t a l l o w one to transcend the text or signs: If there is a textual system, a theme does not exist (...

"no—a present does not exist..."). Or if it d o e s

exist, it will always have been unreadable. This kind of nonexistence of the theme in the text, this way in which meaning is nonpresent, or

nonidentical, with

the

t e x t . . . [recognizes that variable meaning] already prevents a theme from being a theme, that is, a nuclear unit of meaning, posed there before the eye, present outside of its signifier and referring only to itself, in the last analysis.

37

B y thus rejecting the foundations that u n c r i t i c a l realism provides for t r a d i t i o n a l scholarship, D e r r i d a also opens the w a y for o p p o s i n g hermeneutics, w h i c h i n m a n y ways agrees w i t h m u c h o f d e c o n struction's

critique o f objectively

real, d e t e r m i n a t e

meaning.

D e r r i d a , however, goes o n to c o n t e n d n o t o n l y that there is n o objective m e a n i n g available outside language b u t also that the c u l t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l processes

c o n s t i t u t i n g a w o r l d as analyzed

by

hermeneutics d o n o t involve o n t o l o g i c a l events, o r shared w o r l d s , b u t instead a m o u n t to n o t h i n g other t h a n systems o f signs a n d absences. H e asserts that there are n o foundations or starting p o i n t s for

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a h i s t o r i c a l l y m e a n i n g f u l , c o m m o n realm, n o r

are there any conclusions or essential goals to be reached o r any objective, stable a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , such as retrieving o r i g i n a l m e a n ing to disclose n e w d i m e n s i o n s o f a w o r l d present today. " Y o u f i n d y o u r s e l f b e i n g i n d e f i n i t e l y referred to bottomless, endless c o n n e c tions a n d to the i n d e f i n i t e l y articulated regress o f the b e g i n n i n g , w h i c h is f o r b i d d e n a l o n g w i t h all archaeology,

xxxiv

eschatology,

or

Introduction

h e r m e n e u t i c teleology. A l l i n the same blow. ' T h e n e w t e x t w i t h o u t e n d o r b e g i n n i n g . . ."

38

D e r r i d a also disagrees w i t h hermeneutics c o n c e r n i n g the p l u r a l i ty o f m e a n i n g . H e r m e n e u t i c s characterizes the p l u r a l i s m o f m e a n ings as a freedom f r o m the t r a d i t i o n s p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h stable, u n i v o c a l , o r literal meanings; d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , however, finds n o t a p l u r a l i t y o f m e a n i n g b u t o n l y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d failure o f m e a n i n g . Instead o f discovering polysemy, finds

then,

deconstruction

n o m e a n i n g , since there always is the delay a n d deferral o f

m e a n i n g , w h i l e signs (inescapably) i n d e f i n i t e l y refer to one another. A l t h o u g h d e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d hermeneutics agree that there is a n endless h a p p e n i n g o r openness o f m e a n i n g (versus the t r a d i t i o n s v i e w that meanings become

fixed

o r objectified),

deconstruction

denies the h e r m e n e u t i c v i e w that m e a n i n g occurs w i t h i n h o r i z o n s , that is, w i t h i n the expectation o f transcendent m e a n i n g or a n t i c i p a t i o n o f coherence that constitute a n d proceed f r o m a shared t r a d i t i o n . D e r r i d a "repudiates the a s s u m p t i o n o f inevitable o r i e n t a t i o n towards m e a n i n g " since it depends o n endless d e p t h o f text o r inexhaustible m e a n i n g ; rather, "any specification o f m e a n i n g can o n l y f u n c t i o n as a self-defeating attempt to stabilize a n d restrain w h a t he terms the d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f the text. M e a n i n g is n o t retrieved f r o m apparent

unmeaning,

unmeaning."

but

rather consists

i n the

repression

of

39

D e r r i d a n o longer accepts the idea o f h o r i z o n s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , that is, o f a loosely b o u n d e d h i s t o r i c a l context i n w h i c h meanings are achieved a n d o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i s c o v e r i n g n e w meanings i n a live t r a d i t i o n o f fused h o r i z o n s that we share over t i m e . D e r r i d a says, " I f d i s s e m i n a t i o n , s e m i n a l differance,

c a n n o t be s u m m a r i z e d

i n t o a n exact c o n c e p t u a l tenor, it is because the force a n d the f o r m o f its d i s r u p t i o n explode the semantic h o r i z o n . "

40

H e thus opposes

the h e r m e n e u t i c "stress o n m u l t i p l e , or even i n f i n i t e meanings, [because it] still attempts to evade this r u p t u r e . "

41

Since d e c o n s t r u c t i o n holds that there is n o shared,

common

u n d e r s t a n d i n g (or w o r l d ) at the e n d o f o u r interpretations, D e r r i d a opposes metaphors o f a n d belief i n " d e p t h , " a n d "recovery," w h i c h m i s t a k e n l y perpetuate the ideas o f m e a n i n g a n d the p u r p o r t e d historical, o n t o l o g i c a l events o f revelation a n d concealment. Instead, he promotes a n d speaks i n terms o f "surface," "play," a n d " u n d e c i d a b i l -

xxxv

Interpreting ity."

Environments

D e r r i d a contends that the stabilization o f m e a n i n g that w e

achieve results o n l y f r o m the arbitrary preferences a n d i m p o s i t i o n s carried o u t b y regimes of power a n d ideology. T h e r e is n o fulfillment; at best, texts challenge the assumed w o r l d s o f interpreters. T h e r e is n o i n t u i t i v e self-presence o f subject a n d object p r i o r to the representation that occurs i n language, i n the signs o r traces that constitute the w o r l d . Rather, he contends, a l l that signifies o r is signified necessarily involves o r results f r o m processes o f m e d i a t i o n . T h e m e d i a t i o n that w e experience occurs v i a signs, whether i n their p r i m a r y f o r m as w o r d s a n d language o r i n other forms s u c h as d r a w ing.

T h e signs m o v e i n a flow o f repetition, c o n n e c t i n g the past to

the fixture a n d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y u n d e r m i n i n g the i m m e d i a c y o f the self-presencing. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the present (what is present a n d the e m p t y space between past a n d future) is, strictly speaking, a n i l l u sion. A l t h o u g h w e have the sign, a n d it is all that w e c a n actually have, the sign gives us n o t a n y transcendent a n d present other b u t o n l y absence. T h e other is given i n the sign, b u t i t is given as absent. How

else w o u l d the sign represent? T h e signified is precisely w h a t is

n o t there, is n o t anywhere; there is n o presence, n o t even elsewhere. A l t h o u g h the sign moves t o w a r d the "transcendent signified," i t is i m p o s s i b l e to c o m p l e t e the trajectory. We

find

o n l y traces o r differance

p r i o r to p o s i t i n g a n d p r e t e n d i n g

presence o r identity. A s D e r r i d a uses the t e r m , differance

( w i t h a n a)

indicates the inescapable difference between w h a t we have (i.e., the sign) a n d w h a t remains absent (i.e., the signified), between the i d e n tity o r i n d i s c e r n a b i l i t y that w e w i s h w e h a d a n d the n o n i d e n t i t y o r discernability that actually obtains. I n a further c o m p l e x i t y D e r r i d a notes that the c r u c i a l "verb 'to differ' [differer]

seems to differ f r o m

itself. O n the o n e h a n d , [as n o t e d ] , i t indicates difference as dist i n c t i o n , inequality, o r discernability; o n the other, i t expresses the i n t e r p o s i t i o n o f delay, the interval o f s p a c i n g a n d t e m p o r a l i z i n g that puts o f f u n t i l 'later' w h a t is presently d e n i e d , the possible that is presently impossible. Sometimes the different

a n d sometimes the

d e f e r r e d c o r r e s p o n d ( i n French) to the verb to differ.'"

42

T h e same

a m b i g u i t y is m a i n t a i n e d a n d cultivated i n the E n g l i s h transliterat i o n difference

w h e n used i n deconstructive theory a n d practice.

N e i t h e r self-identity n o r presence ever occurs, since i n the m e d i -

xxxvi

Introduction

a t i o n o f signs a n d representation, signs always t e m p o r a l l y delay a n d spatially remove the referent, g i v i n g us a gap a n d the absence o f w h a t is referred to rather t h a n any c o i n c i d e n c e . T h i s is u n a v o i d a b l e . It is i m p o s s i b l e to close o f f the differing a n d deferral.

T h e possi-

43

b i l i t y o f t r u t h , simultaneously, a m o u n t s to the p o s s i b i l i t y o f disappearance. F o r D e r r i d a , w h a t we take to be true is o n l y a fictive c o n s t r u c t i o n , a f a b r i c a t i o n p r o d u c e d b y differance, erator.

the p r i m a r y gen-

44

Because absence permeates

t i m e a n d space a n d because signs

mediate all o u r experience, r e p e t i t i o n a n d m e m o r y are v i t a l for us. T h e y attempt to fill i n the gap, the absence. A l t h o u g h they c a n n o t succeed, they are o u r o n l y resources, o u r o n l y strategies i n the m i d s t o f absence. W e have n o choice b u t to go o n . A s a result o f and i n the m i d s t o f the reign o f differance,

differance,

we a n d language c a n a n d

d o go o n b y suppressing absence a n d p o s i t i n g presence a n d i d e n t i ty. U s u a l l y unconsciously, we conceal the p r i m a l differance,

imple-

m e n t i n g o u r preferences w i t h i n that difference b y d e p l o y i n g o u r choices, p r i v i l e g i n g one d i m e n s i o n o f differance

over the other.

T h a t there is n o direct apprehension o f any signified" motivates

"transcendental

D e r r i d a to interpret drawings

i n terms

of

images o f blindness a n d the m e d i a t i n g paraphernalia we t r y to use to see. A n o t h e r example o f the unavoidable differance

o f identity,

presence, a n d t r u t h is f o u n d i n D e r r i d a s analysis o f "we" a n d "us" in M a r g i n s o f P h i l o s o p h y .

4 5

Heidegger, i n d e v e l o p i n g hermeneutics'

ontological-epistemological a s s u m p t i o n o f necessary p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , claims, i n effect, that " w e a l w a y s a l r e a d y c o n d u c t activities i n an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B e i n g . "

46

But who

are

our "we"?

D e r r i d a s strategy is to u n d o " h u m a n i s m a n d a certain t r u t h i n B e i n g " b y exposing b o t h o f t h e m as p r o d u c e d a n d i n d i s s o l u b l y tainted b y o u r arbitrary p r i v i l e g i n g o f certain g l o b a l , c u l t u r a l , a n d e t h n i c differences. "It a u t o m a t i c a l l y follows, t h e n , that this w e — however s i m p l e , discreet, a n d erased it m i g h t b e — i n s c r i b e s the socalled f o r m a l structure o f the q u e s t i o n o f B e i n g w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f metaphysics, a n d m o r e w i d e l y w i t h i n the I n d o - E u r o p e a n l i n guistic m i l i e u , to the p o s s i b i l i t y o f w h i c h the o r i g i n o f metaphysics is essentially l i n k e d . "

47

T h u s , for D e r r i d a , n o t h i n g is clear a n d d i s t i n c t or characterized b y u n t r o u b l e d identity. Sexual identity, t r u t h , b e i n g , presence, the

xxxvii

Interpreting

Environments

"author" a n d " w o r k o f art," a n d so o n are a l l fictions c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h i n language a n d differance.

T h i s is to say that insofar as w e set

o u t to determine w h a t w o m a n , t r u t h , I, o r whatever really is, we r u n u p against differance

that does n o t go away, except as w e ignore it.

S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , w h a t a n y t h i n g m i g h t b e i s u n d e c i d a b l e . W e belie, o r p r e t e n d to belie, u n d e c i d a b i l i t y b y s u p p l e m e n t i n g what is given, s u b s t i t u t i n g o r a d d i n g other views, interpretations, desires, a n d beliefs. T h i s again shows the b e d of language w i t h i n w h i c h w e labor: language, w i t h its thousands o f texts, provides the s u p p l e m e n t that we use to p u s h the undecidable i n t o b e i n g decided. It is i m p l i e d i n the schema o f alternatives, whether o f binaries o r the dialectic o f three, that the m e a n i n g a n d i d e n t i t y o f each t e r m m u s t be decidable, b u t they never are.

48

D e c o d i n g terms i n the w h i r l

o f texts shows that the "crucial experiment" does n o t exist a n d cann o t be construed. T o p r o v i d e a p r i m e example, D e r r i d a arrays a hist o r y o f w o m a n a n d t r u t h b y w a y o f a h i s t o r y o f an error.

49

Rereading

N i e t z s c h e , D e r r i d a elaborates h o w w o m a n is u n d e r s t o o d b o t h positively a n d negatively, as i d e n t i c a l w i t h a n d opposite to m a s c u l i n e t r u t h a n d u n t r u t h : " T h e question of w o m a n suspends the decidable o p p o s i t i o n o f true a n d n o n - t r u e a n d inaugurates the epochal realm of

q u o t a t i o n marks w h i c h is to be enforced for every

belonging

to t h e system

concept

o f philosophical decidability. T h e

h e r m e n e u t i c project w h i c h postulates a true sense o f the text is disqualified u n d e r this regime. R e a d i n g is freed f r o m the h o r i z o n o f the m e a n i n g o f t r u t h o f b e i n g , liberated f r o m the values o f the p r o d u c t s p r o d u c t i o n o r the presents presence."

50

N o t h i n g is decidable because everything remains w i t h i n the play o f signification, where signs refer o n l y to other signs w i t h i n the infinite system o f signs. T h e t r a d i t i o n a l W e s t e r n desire for a n d goal o f u n i v o c a l m e a n i n g is necessarily barren, except that i n its efforts at i n s e m i n a t i o n it engenders delirious illusions o f literal m e a n i n g a n d p h a n t o m s o f identity. A g a i n s t the h e r m e n e u t i c hope for polysemy, the profligate a n d desperate p r o d u c t i o n o f seed a m o u n t s o n l y to endless loss a n d spillage, never fruitful result: " D i s s e m i n a t i o n is the state o f perpetually u n f u l f i l l e d m e a n i n g that exists i n the absence o f all the signifieds."

51

I n d i s s e m i n a t i o n ! d i s s e m e n a t i o n seed falls o n l y to

barren g r o u n d . D e r r i d a projects a n image that c o m b i n e s the h i s t o r y o f the

xxxviii

Introduction

W e s t e r n project a n d the effective capture o f that h i s t o r y w i t h i n the infinite w e b o f infra-referential signs b y p l a y i n g w i t h Plato's s e m i n a l analogy o f the cave, i n v e r t i n g that image, t u r n i n g it inside o u t a n d on itself l i k e a M o b i u s strip. Imagine Plato's cave not simply overthrown by some philosophical movement but transformed in its entirety into a circumscribed area contained within another—an absolutely

other—structure,

an

incommensurably,

unpredictably more complicated machine. Imagine that mirrors would not be in the world, simply, included in the totality of all o n t a and their images, but that things "present," on the contrary, would be in them. Imagine that mirrors (shadows, reflections, phantasms,

etc.)

would no longer be c o m p r e h e n d e d within the structure of the ontology and myth of the cave—which also situates the screen and mirror—but would rather envelop it in its entirety, producing here or there a particular, extremely determinate effect.

52

T h e s e examples p r o v i d e a k e y to m u c h o f D e r r i d a s v i s i o n a n d deconstructive strategies: the w a y that we experience the necessary m e d i a t i o n t h r o u g h signs that u n d e r m i n e self-presencing a n d h a r b o r absence coincides, for d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , w i t h the necessary interpretive s t r a t e g y — w h a t is given is always given so as to u n d o itself. T h e search for certitude i n o u r c u l t u r a l undertakings undoes the very projects that set it i n t o m o t i o n . Silence a n d death are p r i m e e x a m ples o f the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y that projects us t o w a r d c o m p l e t i o n b u t w i n d s u p u n i t i n g us w i t h absence, u n d o i n g o u r project. In i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , speaking o f "differance,

53

"the " u n d e c i d a b l e , " a n d

" d i s s e m i n a t i o n " are ways o f saying a n d w o r k i n g o u t o u r s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n the system o f endlessly inter-/infra-referring sign systems that have n o outside. I n s u c h a universe (our universe, a c c o r d i n g to D e r r i d a ) , " T h e m e a n i n g o f m e a n i n g . . . is i n f i n i t e i m p l i c a t i o n , the indefinite referral o f signifier to signified. . . . [Its] force is a certain pure a n d i n f i n i t e e q u i v o c i t y w h i c h gives signified m e a n i n g

no

respite, n o rest, b u t engages it i n its o w n e c o n o m y so that it always signifies again a n d differs."

xxxix

54

" T h e r e is n o t h i n g before the text; there

Interpreting

Environments

is n o pretext that is n o t already a text":

55

There has never been anything but writing; there have never been anything but

supplements, substitutive

significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the

"real" supervening,

and

being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement, etc. And thus to infinity, for we have read, i n t h e t e x t that the absolute present [and] Nature, . . . have already escaped, have never existed; that what opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence.

56

W h e r e n o sign carries m e a n i n g i n itself, m e a n i n g occurs o n l y w i t h i n systems o f selection a n d arrangement, w h i c h a m o u n t s to p r i v i l e g i n g some possibilities a n d suppressing o r m a r g i n a l i z i n g o t h ers. W i t h n o t h i n g outside the realm o f signs, n o t h i n g outside o u r texts, the o n l y possible procedure is to expose the illusions o f the t r a d i t i o n a n d proceed positively by j o i n i n g i n the playful m o v e m e n t w i t h i n the u n f o l d i n g system o f fictions. O u r situation a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o i n c i d e as o u r o n l y n o n d e l u d e d prospect. Since all m e a n i n g is delayed a n d deferred a n d since everything is u n d e c i d a b l e , there is n o p o i n t i n seeking the c h i m e r a o f "objective" m e a n i n g , as t r a d i t i o n a l approaches d o , or shared polyvalent m e a n ings, as does hermeneutics. T h e theoretical interpretation o f o u r situ a t i o n provides the o n l y sane strategy: we need to learn to play b y l e a r n i n g to d i s r u p t a n d to m e l d intertextuality. T h a t is w h y D e r r i d a takes u p the p l a y o f texts a n d images o f representation a n d why, for example, i n treating the drawings o f the b l i n d f o l d e d i n relation to Plato s allegory o f the cave, he can speak o f h i m s e l f as "arbitrarily i n t e r r u p t i n g this i n f i n i t e l y e c h o i n g discourse."

57

J o i n i n g the play m u s t be d o n e b y i n t e r r u p t i n g because the d o m i n a n t W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n has d e l u d e d itself about its a c c o m p l i s h m e n t and

reality: we have to play along, b u t we can play along, h o l d i n g

our

o w n i n the textuality, o n l y insofar as we "deconstruct the ' i l l u -

s i o n or error' o f the present."

58

T h e project is to expose w h a t is

c l a i m e d to have presence, identity, a n d t r u t h , to d i s r u p t the exclusions that are i n force, that is, the privileges that are sincerely a n d

xl

Introduction

naively c l a i m e d to be legitimate. " T h e break w i t h this structure o f b e l o n g i n g can be a n n o u n c e d o n l y t h r o u g h a c e r t a i n o r g a n i z a t i o n , a certain s t r a t e g i c arrangement w h i c h , w i t h i n the field o f m e t a p h y s i cal o p p o s i t i o n , uses the strengths o f the field to t u r n its o w n stratagems against it, p r o d u c i n g a force o f d i s l o c a t i o n that spirals itself t h r o u g h o u t the entire system, Assuring it i n every d i r e c t i o n a n d thoroughly d e l i m i t i n g it." Of

59

course, this means that d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is u n a v o i d a b l y skepti-

cal a n d i r o n i c . M e a n i n g s are given a n d actions u n d e r t a k e n , for o t h erwise, life w o u l d n o t go o n . B u t the meanings a n d actions are n o t f o u n d e d i n any transcendent reality o r k n o w l e d g e ; the s i t u a t i o n is i r o n i c since i r o n y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y posits a n d undercuts w h a t

it

posits. W e can o n l y i n v e n t style a n d meanings as needed, " p r o d u c ing

the fictions we n e e d " even w h i l e b e l i e v i n g i n n o t h i n g . Not

60

surprisingly, D e r r i d a targets the W e s t e r n discourse a b o u t

representation a n d art as the site for his d i s r u p t i o n s a n d p r o d u c tions, since here the metaphysical a n d epistemological assumptions s w i r l about m o s t powerfully. H e is p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n s l i p p i n g i n t o the central texts already underway, Plato's a n d Kant's theories of representation a n d a r t — P l a t o ' s because it is the o r i g i n a l a n d master text i n a l o n g series a n d Kant's because he reposits for the m o d ern

era the d i s t i n c t i o n between art a n d reality that needs to be

u n d e r m i n e d . D e r r i d a criticizes the d i s t i n c t i o n a n d seeks to overt h r o w the supposed d i c h o t o m y o f either/or. D e r r i d a s deconstructions o f the g r a p h i c a n d visual arts illustrate this procedure. T h r o u g h o u t

his w r i t i n g s D e r r i d a critiques

the

ordered l i n e because the l i n e is the sign o f causality, history, i d e n t i ty, presence, linear l o g i c (discourse as d i s - c u r s u s , on

that is, as r u n n i n g

to a c o n c l u s i o n ) , a n d d r a w i n g . G r a p h i c s , whether generated b y

w r i t i n g o r d r a w i n g , are a major factor i n o u r technics o f c u l t u r a l i l l u s i o n a n d suppression.

61

" I f there is n o extratext, it is because the

g r a p h i c — g r a p h i c i t y i n g e n e r a l — h a s always already b e g u n , is always i m p l a n t e d i n p r i o r ' w r i t i n g . " A l t h o u g h the signs t r y to trace o u t 6 2

lines o f successful external c o n n e c t i o n , D e r r i d a wants to s h o w h o w they always centripetally fall back i n t o themselves. In

short, because we operate w i t h i n the texts a n d intertracings

that are always already i n effect, the linear assumptions o f t i m e , causality, identity, logic, a n d so o n , o n w h i c h the t r a d i t i o n depends,

xli

Interpreting

Environments

have to be given u p . It is just this arbitrary n o n f o u n d a t i o n that the t r a d i t i o n fails to recognize a n d that m u s t be b r o u g h t to the fore a n d erased b y d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . P h i l o s o p h y a n d the other disciplines d e p e n d o n this m o d e l o f linearity a n d are yet o b l i v i o u s to i t . " T h e e n i g m a t i c m o d e l o f the l i n e is thus the very t h i n g that p h i l o s o p h y c o u l d n o t see w h e n it h a d its eyes o p e n o n the i n t e r i o r o f its o w n history. T h i s n i g h t begins to l i g h t e n a little at the m o m e n t w h e n l i n e a r i t y — w h i c h is n o t loss o f absence b u t the repression o f p l u r i dimensional symbolic thought—relaxes

its oppression because i t

begins to sterilize the technical a n d scientific e c o n o m y that i t has l o n g favored."

63

G i v e n the project o f exposing the groundless foundations o f metaphysical theories a n d the signs/graphics o f representation, art, reality, presence, history, identity, a n d causality, it is n o t s u r p r i s i n g that D e r r i d a c o m b i n e s these elements i n his M e m o i r s o f t h e B l i n d . T h e very models o f lines that we c a n n o t see even as we l o o k at o u r selves a n d o u r h i s t o r y need exposure. Because w e need to b e c o m e skeptical, b l i n d n e s s — t h e loss o f direct p e r c e p t i o n a n d i n t u i t i o n — has its heuristic uses. It is o u r blindness that w e m u s t c o m e to see, w h i c h w e c a n d o b y d e c o n s t r u c t i n g d r a w i n g a n d the t r a d i t i o n o f representation, i n c l u d i n g the entire c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y o f e n v i r o n m e n tal

c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d interpretation, w i t h its successive failures o f

u n m e d i a t e d v i s i o n . T h u s b l i n d e d , i n the m i d s t o f the h i d d e n

dif-

f e r a n c e a n d forgotten tracings o n w h i c h w e d e p e n d , w e a n d o u r e n v i r o n m e n t s are e x p o s e d — o r need to be exposed.

The Book's Organization As n o t e d , the b o o k does n o t f o l l o w the usual procedure o f m o v i n g t h r o u g h arguments o r positions to arrive at a certain c o n c l u s i o n . It m o r e s i m p l y presents examples o f three very different ways o f interp r e t i n g three k i n d s o f e n v i r o n m e n t . Because there is n o i m p l i e d order o f best a n d worst, h o w s h o u l d I array t h e m i n a linear text that u n a v o i d a b l y presents s o m e t h i n g first a n d s o m e t h i n g last? G i v e n the historical development a n d p r i n c i p l e d differences a m o n g the theories, their arrangement c o u l d be other t h a n i t is. T h e basic explanat i o n for the present arrangement is that i t displays the d y n a m i c a m o n g these live, contested alternatives.

xlii

Introduction

I p u t the t r a d i t i o n first s i m p l y because it is the "base" f r o m w h i c h w e start a n d w i t h w h i c h the reader is l i k e l y to be the m o s t familiar, a n d because it is the " f o u n d a t i o n " that the other t w o theories reject or w o u l d replace. E v e n D e r r i d a notes that y o u have to have the trad i t i o n before y o u can m o v e o n .

6 4

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n comes next because it accepts the p o s i t i o n — t h e p o s i t i n g — o f the t r a d i t i o n a n d aims to u n d o it. T h e deconstructive interpretation proceeds b y first l a y i n g o u t t r a d i t i o n a l readings o f the e n v i r o n m e n t (by Sigfried G i e d i o n a n d R i c h a r d A . E t l i n ) o n l y to s h o w h o w that t r a d i t i o n undercuts itself. M o v i n g f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l scholarship to d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , we have a s m o o t h flow a n d , perhaps, accumulating understanding. H e r m e n e u t i c s appears i n the t h i r d chapter because it tries to steer a m i d d l e course between t r a d i t i o n a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . ( T h a t is n o t to say that it does or, even i f it d i d , that a m i d d l e course s o m e h o w is preferable to one o f the t w o extremes. T h i s issue is part o f w h a t is contested a m o n g the theories.) S t i l l , since the h e r m e n e u t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A m e r i c a n nature does p o s i t i o n itself between the t r a d i t i o n a l a n d the deconstructive readings, it makes sense for it to f o l l o w t h e m . I n a d d i t i o n , i n the postscript, I e x p l i c i t l y contrast the h e r m e n e u t i c example w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l a n d deconstructive readings. T h e reader is free to decide for h i m - o r herself. A g a i n , the order c o u l d be otherwise. H e r m e n e u t i c s p a r t l y claims to be m o r e radical t h a n d e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d yet also m o r e conservat i v e — m o r e o f a m i d d l e w a y a n d yet deeper. D e c o n s t r u c t i o n rejects d e p t h a n d is n o t impressed b y any p o s i t i o n c l a i m i n g to be close to t r a d i t i o n o r to retrieve it. A s for the t r a d i t i o n , it h o l d s that b o t h d e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d hermeneutics are extreme a n d m i s t a k e n i n rejecting objective m e a n i n g . E a c h a p p r o a c h w o u l d d r a w its o w n m a p o f the respective placements. T h e task here is m u c h s i m p l e r : to present the c o m p l e x interpretive terrain so that its t o p o g r a p h y remains i n t e l l i g i b l e a n d accessible a n d the readers' choices o f paths stay o p e n . A l t h o u g h it m i g h t be instructive to read the same e n v i r o n m e n t i n three different ways to m a k e a systematic c o m p a r i s o n , it also w o u l d be b o r i n g — a n d unnecessary, since the alternative a p p r o a c h es themselves often " u n r e a d " their rivals as part o f their o w n procedure, a n d because, a l o n g the way, I treat c o m p a r a b l e , alternative

xliii

Interpreting

Environments

w o r k s so that readers c a n f o l l o w the differences i f they w i s h . It bears saying that all three approaches c o u l d a n d d o a p p l y to a l l three sorts o f e n v i r o n m e n t e x a m i n e d i n this b o o k . It is n o d o u b t possible to argue that a particular m e t h o d fits a particular sort o f e n v i r o n m e n t best, b u t it seems to m e that the t r a d i t i o n , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d hermeneutics are p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to a p p l y t h r o u g h out.

S o , w h y n o t some

diversity, for fuller coverage o f the

e n v i r o n m e n t s that matter to us a n d for variety's sake? T h e chapters treat three different sorts, o r scales, o f e n v i r o n ments: houses, p u b l i c spaces a n d m o n u m e n t a l b u i l d i n g s , a n d the A m e r i c a n landscape. A l t h o u g h there is n o hard-and-fast reason to d i v i d e the e n v i r o n m e n t i n t o these three realms, d o i n g so gives us a n overall coverage o f the c u l t u r a l a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l subject matter. T h e result, I hope, is to stimulate us to t h i n k about the entire, c o m plex b u i l t w o r l d that we i n h a b i t . B o t h o r d i n a r i l y a n d i n the research literature, we discern, n o r m a l l y w i t h o u t devious o r subtle connections i n m i n d , the i m m e d i ate spheres

o f o u r private lives, the local, p u b l i c spaces a n d

m o n u m e n t a l b u i l d i n g s that provide a c i v i c realm, a n d the larger "natural" landscape that becomes c u l t u r a l l y shaped i n t o the sphere w i t h i n w h i c h o u r settlements are inserted a n d operate. T h e r e is thus a k i n d o f obvious progression of scales i f we w a n t to consider a range of

e n v i r o n m e n t s , a n d it makes sense to start b y c o n s i d e r i n g the

smallest, w h i c h perhaps w i l l be the easiest to manage. T o develop the e n v i r o n m e n t a l subject matter m o r e f u l l y a n d to p r o v i d e the o p p o r t u n i t y to raise a d d i t i o n a l questions, I consider a n increasingly broadened scope for the h u m a n realm o f these three e n v i r o n m e n t s , m o v i n g f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l over a lifespan, t h r o u g h groups that historically have defined themselves i n terms o f specific ideologies, to groups a t t e m p t i n g to develop a n e n d u r i n g n a t i o n a l " i d e n t i t y " over the course o f h u n d r e d s of years b y means o f c o m p l e x p o l i t i c a l a n d religious o r secular belief systems. I m a k e this

final

variation m o r e to complete the possibilities t h a n to suggest a n y correlation between

groups a n d e n v i r o n m e n t s , m u c h less

between

groups a n d interpretive approaches. A g a i n , it seems obvious a n d b e n i g n e n o u g h to begin w i t h the relation o f i n d i v i d u a l s to their houses a n d proceed first to particular groups i n p u b l i c spaces at specific places a n d times a n d t h e n to heterogeneous

xliv

groups o f

Introduction

people i n a landscape a t t e m p t i n g to become a n a t i o n across several centuries. I present these variations n o t to w o r k o u t systematically the three approaches across three scales o f b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t , w i t h three h u m a n scopes, b u t to e n r i c h o u r examples a n d experience o f t h i n k i n g w i t h o u t i n t r u d i n g o n the basic p r o b l e m , strategies, a n d o u t comes that characterize each i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h a t is, we c a n have the variations w i t h o u t o b s c u r i n g w h a t it is that makes the interpretations alternatives. C h a p t e r i , t h e n , moves back a n d f o r t h between b i o g r a p h i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l i n f o r m a t i o n o n the one h a n d a n d houses o n the other. T h i s is meant to p r o v i d e a baseline, a clear example o f the t r a d i t i o n a l a p p r o a c h . L u d w i g W i t t g e n s t e i n s a n d C a r l J u n g s life stories a n d their c u l t u r a l contexts are w o v e n together w i t h their theoretical views a n d the houses they designed a n d b u i l t a n d w i t h w h a t appear to be the basic alternatives for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a c t i o n i n the world.

6 5

C h a p t e r 2 takes u p d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e t r a d i t i o n a l a c c o u n t a n d the supposed "reality" o f E g y p t i a n , F r e n c h neoclassic, a n d postm o d e r n p y r a m i d s , where the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t m i r r o r s c u l t u r a l b e l i e f systems a n d a k i n d o f i d e n t i t y a n d presence is achieved, is seen as an i l l u s i o n a n d failed f a b r i c a t i o n . B y s h o w i n g h o w b o t h the p y r a m i d s a n d their c u l t u r a l p r o j e c t s — p o s t u r e s — u n a v o i d a b l y themselves, d e c o n s t r u c t i o n seeks to u n m a s k a n d defer

undo

untenable

postures a n d adopt i n their place strategies that e x p l i c i t l y posit a r b i trary order. C h a p t e r 3 applies hermeneutics as practiced b y M i r c e a E l i a d e , H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r , a n d M a r t i n Heidegger. T h e hermeneutics o f A m e r i c a n nature n o n n o s t a l g i c a l l y aims to uncover disclosures that o c c u r r e d , a m o n g other places, i n n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

landscape

p a i n t i n g a n d landscape design. T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n shows h o w the o r i g i n a r i l y t w i n n e d religious meanings o f A m e r i c a n nature as a paradise given a n d as a negative wilderness to be overcome are n o w concealed a n d forgotten, a l t h o u g h i n their secularized t r a n s f o r m a tions they still operate i n o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f parks a n d wilderness a n d i n o u r attitudes to the use a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f l a n d . W i t h the recovery o f the t r a d i t i o n o f n o n - s e l f - w i l l f u l attitudes to the l a n d scape, n e w possible meanings m a y emerge i n the f u s i o n o f N a t i v e

xlv

Interpreting

Environments

A m e r i c a n a n d ecological t h i n k i n g . I h o p e that a l l the analyses help to m a k e the approaches' strategies a n d applications m o r e accessible a n d that they help the readers to w o r k o u t their o w n positions. I also h o p e that the e n v i r o n m e n t s discussed shine f o r t h as n e w l y p r o b l e m a t i c , as n o longer taken for granted o r forgotten. Insofar as that happens, the b o o k m i g h t s t i m ulate a n e w interest i n a n d zest for almost a l l the w o r l d a n d c h a l lenge us to a less s m u g a n d j u d g m e n t a l attitude, a n e w tolerance for and

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f differences. A t the same t i m e , i t is n o t l i k e l y that these c o n t e n d i n g a p p r o a c h -

es a n d praxes c a n i n a particular case be equally appropriate as responsible ways to c o n d u c t research a n d shape o u r increasingly shared e n v i r o n m e n t s o r that the interpretations they y i e l d c a n be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y "true." C h o i c e s w i l l be made, a n d the choices m a t ter. T h e b o o k aims, t h e n , n o t o n l y b e y o n d theory to the practice o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l interpretation b u t finally t o w a r d interpretation as the heart o f ways o f l i v i n g , where o u r choices a m o n g p o w e r f u l alternatives are b o u n d u p w i t h o u r future a n d the w o r l d s .

xlvl

1 Traditional Approaches Wittgenstein's and Jung s Lives, W o r k , and Houses

Facing Uncertain Meanings and Traditions Suppose we w a n t to become at h o m e w i t h ourselves, o u r families, a n d the w o r l d a r o u n d us. I n w h a t ways is it possible to develop o u r i n d i v i d u a l a n d social identities adequately a n d properly? I n w h a t ways is it possible to u n d e r s t a n d a n d b u i l d m e a n i n g f u l l y a n d v a l u ably? T h e p r o b l e m is especially pressing i n o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y situat i o n because o f o u r u n c e r t a i n t y about b o t h t r a d i t i o n a n d the future. O u r experience since at least the t u r n o f the c e n t u r y a n d t h r o u g h t w o w o r l d wars shows that science a n d technology, o u r history, p h i losophy, m y t h o l o g y , a n d d o m e s t i c a n d u r b a n e n v i r o n m e n t s , w h i c h c o n t i n u e to shape us, are as dangerous as they are p o w e r f u l , as f u l l o f i l l u s i o n as o f p r o m i s e . H o w t h e n to live w i t h i n o u r culture i n a m a n n e r that is neither bitter n o r nostalgic, neither d e l u d e d n o r unnecessarily impoverished? O n e w a y to approach an answer is to l o o k at exemplary i n d i v i d u als' personal lives, professional w o r k a n d theory, a n d the houses they b u i l t . F o r example, L u d w i g W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d C a r l G u s t a v J u n g b o t h p u r s u e d the p r o b l e m o f w h o we are a n d h o w we s h o u l d b u i l d , that is, o f h o w to become at h o m e ; w o r k e d a n d b u i l t as a "therapeutic" a n d analytic means to articulate the m e a n i n g o f language, symbols, thought, a n d existence; a n d arrived at a h a r d - w o n , yet p r o f o u n d s i m p l i c i t y a n d at houses that are m o n u m e n t s to w h o they were.

2

Traditional Approaches

T h e i r difference, however, as seen i n their personal lives, w o r k , a n d houses, is f u n d a m e n t a l . M o r e o v e r , a l t h o u g h each w o r k e d o u t a viable m o d e

o f b e c o m i n g at h o m e ,

the t w o

alternatives

may

e x h a u s t — o r at least r e p r e s e n t — o u r o n l y c o n t e m p o r a r y possibilities. W i t t g e n s t e i n strove to clear away the m i s l e a d i n g d i m e n s i o n s o f the past a n d to clarify affairs b y r e d u c i n g p r o b l e m s to their basics a n d t h e n objectively o r d e r i n g those f u n d a m e n t a l elements. T h e c o n g r u ent style u n c o m p r o m i s i n g l y faces c u l t u r a l a n d personal i l l u s i o n s a n d o u r confusions about m e a n i n g a n d value. It austerely accepts that there is n o final s o l u t i o n , n o rest. In contrast, J u n g w o r k e d to e n r i c h a n d manifest c o m p l e x i t y b y recovering layers o f m e a n i n g f r o m the past a n d a l l o w i n g c o n t r a d i c tions to become manifest. H e encouraged deep a n d obscure s y m b o l i s m to c o m e to consciousness a n d undergo t r a n s f o r m a t i o n so that its lessons can be integrated w i t h the "responsible" e m p i r i c a l consciousness.

S u c h t r a n s f o r m a t i o n helps to guide the

gradual

process o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n , w h i c h patiently moves t o w a r d a final u n i t y a n d peaceful wholeness.

Wittgenstein's Restlessness L u d w i g W i t t g e n s t e i n (1889-1951) r e m a i n e d restless a l l his life, m o v ing a m o n g strikingly d i f f e r e n t — i f not opposite—modes

o f exis-

tence, p u r s u i n g each one for a t i m e w i t h almost total p r e o c c u p a t i o n a n d i n an "excited state." H e s t u d i e d physics i n B e r l i n , aeronautical engineering i n M a n c h e s t e r , a n d , seized b y f u n d a m e n t a l issues, form a l l y t o o k u p p h i l o s o p h y at C a m b r i d g e . N e x t came a year o f s o l i tude i n N o r w a y . T h e f o l l o w i n g year, 1914, f o u n d h i m a v o l u n t e e r i n the A u s t r i a n army, deliberately seeking dangerous assignments a n d w o r k i n g t o w a r d positions nearer a n d nearer the front. A f t e r the war W i t t g e n s t e i n rejected his family's wealth, w h i c h he gave to his brother a n d sisters, a n d t o o k teacher t r a i n i n g i n V i e n n a , f o l l o w e d by a series o f assignments as a c o u n t r y schoolteacher ( i n Trattenbach,

a t i n y m o u n t a i n village,

and

then

Ottertal

and

P u c h b e r g at Schneeberg). H e next w o r k e d as a gardener's assistant at H i i t t e l d o r f a n d the s e m i n a r y at K l o s t e r n e u b e r g , u n t i l he b r o k e o f f to s p e n d t w o years b u i l d i n g a m a n s i o n for his sister G r e t l . T h e house c o m p l e t e d , he w e n t back alone to N o r w a y a n d thence to C a m b r i d g e

3

Interpreting

Environments

again, where he became a professor at T r i n i t y C o l l e g e after a n extrao r d i n a r y e x a m i n a t i o n . Since he h a d n o f o r m a l t e r m i n a l degree i n philosophy, he was questioned b y his e m i n e n t supporters, B e r t r a n d Russell a n d G . E . M o o r e , about his s e m i n a l w o r k , T r a c t a t u s L o g i c o Philosophicus,

w h i c h served as his thesis even t h o u g h i t h a d been

p u b l i s h e d eight years earlier. Thereafter W i t t g e n s t e i n p u r s u e d p h i l o s o p h y i n a b r i l l i a n t b u t anguished manner. In this varied a n d intense life's course, t w o constant features a n d patterns emerge: a very strong a n d even d r i v e n personality a n d a n apparently irresistible attraction to the contrary demands a n d claims o f the technological a n d the p h i l o s o p h i c a l (especially to p h i l o s o p h ical p r o b l e m s o f mathematics, logic, language,

a n d psychology).

Because o f the severity w i t h w h i c h these projects g r i p p e d h i m , the intense c o n c e n t r a t i o n he needed for each task at h a n d , a n d the disparate natures a n d requirements

o f the different

undertakings,

W i t t g e n s t e i n suffered a g o o d deal. H e was so t o r m e n t e d , for example, that he was unable to stop t h i n k i n g a n d fall asleep unless he first lost h i m s e l f i n a m o v i e . In

1

m a n y ways Wittgenstein's life became almost entirely his

w o r k , since the w o r k so p r e o c c u p i e d h i m . A l t h o u g h w o r k i n g — t h i n k i n g , w r i t i n g , teaching, a n d b u i l d i n g — d i d n o t relieve his agitat i o n i n the e n d , at least i t p r o v i d e d a realm for the exercise o f his b o t t l e d energy a n d resulted i n "products" satisfying e n o u g h to p r o v i d e a feeling o f c o n c l u s i o n , freeing h i m to m o v e o n to another task. Wittgenstein's p h i l o s o p h y reflects his restlessness a n d the severe, rigorous demands o f mathematics, logic, a n d technique. Indeed, his overall career is m a r k e d m o s t o b v i o u s l y b y his t w o major w o r k s . T h e T r a c t a t u s influenced significant movements i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f science a n d language (logical a t o m i s m a n d V i e n n a C i r c l e logical p o s i t i v i s m ) . A l t h o u g h these traditions c o n t i n u e d o n their o w n , b o t h were later rejected b y W i t t g e n s t e i n h i m s e l f i n his second

book,

Philosophical Investigations. The

T r a c t a t u s , i n its austere a n d s i m p l e style, aims at logical

clarification a n d shows that p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t is a n a c t i v i t y , n o t a b o d y o f knowledge o r set o f theories. T h a t is, p h i l o s o p h y clarifies 2

misunderstandings that result, for example, f r o m m i s t a k e n views o f language a n d f r o m conflations o f the sensical a n d nonsensical. W i t t g e n s t e i n believed that i t is easy to be m i s l e d b y false analogies

4

Traditional Approaches

and

images. C o n s e q u e n t l y , as the u n d o i n g o f specific k n o t s a n d

p r o b l e m s , p h i l o s o p h y is a k i n d o f analysis o r therapy o n language and

thought. At

3

the same t i m e , however, the T r a c t a t u s takes o n a strange k i n d

of objectivity, a textual a u t o n o m y enhanced b y the serial order o f its often e n i g m a t i c remarks. T h e w h o l e w o r k thus conveys the single image o f a c o n c e p t u a l w o r l d . F o r instance, i n d e a l i n g w i t h the c o m 4

plex relationships a m o n g l i n g u i s t i c statements, p r o p o s i t i o n s , a n d assertions, the T r a c t a t u s notes the " l o g i c a l space" i n w h i c h a p r o p o s i t i o n occurs: 3.4 A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents—by the existence of the proposition with a sense. 3.41 The propositional sign with logical coordinates— that is the logical place. 3.411 In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility: something can exist in it. 3.42 A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it. . . . (The

logical scaffolding surrounding a picture deter-

mines logical space. The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space.)

5

H e r e we see the t w i n n e d aspects: (a) a set o f remarks that have sense o n l y as used i n the context o r process o f c l a r i f y i n g a n d u n m a s k i n g a specific p r o b l e m a n d (b) a detached set o f sayings that strangely a n d p o w e r f u l l y stand o n their o w n a n d speak for t h e m selves.

6

W i t t g e n s t e i n s later w o r k is very different, albeit w i t h some s i m i larities. P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s has very little b y w a y o f l o g i c a l sequences o f ideas o r lines o f t h o u g h t s t r u n g o u t for readers to see and

follow. Rather, the b o o k is a c o m p o s i t e o f remarks, sayings,

5

Interpreting

Environments

observations, a n d notices. It has been c o m p a r e d to a travel diary, 7

where the order o f w h a t is said reflects the itinerary o f the j o u r n e y across the landscape, where partial views a n d m u l t i p l e sketches describe ( w i t h o u t explaining) the encountered features o f that l a n d scape. I f the T r a c t a t u s , t h e n , is a m a p p r o v i d i n g a single image o f a conceptual w o r l d , P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s is a n a l b u m o f varied landscapes a n d sketches. Consistent

8

w i t h the early v i e w

o f the

Tractatus,

the later

W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n t i n u e d to h o l d that p h i l o s o p h y helps to keep us f r o m b e i n g m i s l e d a n d is a n analytic therapy useful for u n d o i n g p r o b l e m s . D i f f e r i n g w i t h his earlier view, however, i n P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s W i t t g e n s t e i n emphasizes

r e m a i n i n g b o u n d to (or

r e t u r n i n g to) o r d i n a r y language as a means to a v o i d theory b u i l d i n g and

"creative" t h i n k i n g . T h i s m o v e enables us to stay d o w n to earth,

where w h a t is encountered is left alone a n d clearly s h o w n so that we can u n d e r s t a n d w h a t appears as p r o b l e m a t i c . A s a means to escape f r o m traps, b l i n d alleys, a n d confusions i n t h o u g h t a n d language, W i t t g e n s t e i n s remarks are to be used a n d then left b e h i n d . And

W i t t g e n s t e i n the architect? Between bouts o f (with) p h i l o s -

ophy, W i t t g e n s t e i n spent t w o intense years (1926-1928) d e s i g n i n g and

overseeing the b u i l d i n g o f his sister s residence, a n activity she

i n t e n d e d to be relief a n d therapy for his t o r m e n t e d state after W o r l d War

I . W i t t g e n s t e i n , a l t h o u g h n o t f o r m a l l y trained as a n architect,

had

a n engineering b a c k g r o u n d , as w e have seen, a n d i n the process

9

o f securing the necessary permits a n d d i r e c t i n g the b u i l d i n g o f the house—later

the B u l g a r i a n E m b a s s y M o n u m e n t a n d n o w again

accessible—he signed official d o c u m e n t s as "architect." F o r the t w o years that W i t t g e n s t e i n gave h i m s e l f entirely to the project (characteristic o f his w a y o f life), he a n d his sister agreed that the o n l y matters

n o t of

concern

were

time

and

money.

(Margarete

S t o n b o r o u g h - W i t t g e n s t e i n belonged to o n e o f the wealthiest f a m i lies i n V i e n n a . ) T h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h a n d c o n t r o l o f even the m i n u t e s t details, then, resulted f r o m W i t t g e n s t e i n s personality a n d d i s p o s i t i o n a n d f r o m his sister s resources a n d support. T h e site, at K u n d m a n n g a s s e 19, was a m i x t u r e o f the u n u s u a l a n d c o m m o n . T h e n e i g h b o r h o o d a n d s u r r o u n d i n g houses were s i m p l e and

a n y t h i n g b u t c o s m o p o l i t a n . T h e property itself, however, was

special: a 33,000-square-foot former h o r t i c u l t u r a l nursery set h i g h

6

Traditional Approaches

Figure 1.1. Stonborough-Wittgenstein House from the south.

above the street a n d therefore apart f r o m its i m m e d i a t e s u r r o u n d ings. T h e p r o p e r t y c o n t a i n e d an o l d house, as w e l l as a s m a l l garden a n d beautiful o l d trees.

10

Initially, i n the s p r i n g o f 1926, the architect P a u l E n g l e m a n n was c o m m i s s i o n e d to sketch the W i t t g e n s t e i n residence. I n the fall o f 1926 Margarete W i t t g e n s t e i n asked her brother to participate. H e s o o n t o o k over the project completely, largely as the result o f his strong personality a n d " u n c o m p r o m i s i n g d e m a n d s . " T h e sites b l e n d o f the o r d i n a r y a n d u n u s u a l is reiterated i n the contrast o f the mansion's exterior a n d interior. I n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the n e i g h b o r h o o d o f unprepossessing houses, the c u b i c exterior is n o t especially s t r i k i n g (see fig. 1.1). T h e m o d e r n exterior design, however, is somewhat strange i n that W i t t g e n s t e i n t h o u g h t very l i t tle o f m o s t m o d e r n a r c h i t e c t u r e — " t h o u g h he a d m i r e d , for example, v a n der N u l l a n d A d o l f L o o s , whose w o r k W i t t g e n s t e i n somewhat resembles."

11

House

W i t t g e n s t e i n felt alien f r o m the " m a i n cur-

rent o f E u r o p e a n a n d A m e r i c a n c i v i l i z a t i o n . . . manifest i n the industry, architecture, a n d m u s i c o f o u r t i m e " a n d w o u l d n o t accept "what nowadays passes for architecture,"

12

since, for example, " i n

m o d e r n architecture they don't k n o w i n w h a t style to design a b u i l d -

7

Interpreting ing."

1 3

Environments

I n a n y case, clearly the exterior is " o f its t i m e a n d place, o f its

c u l t u r e , " perhaps a n o v e r r i d i n g consideration since it a l l o w e d a n appearance consistent w i t h w h a t w e k n o w o f W i t t g e n s t e i n : he t o o k pains i n his style o f life to appear unpretentious a n d o r d i n a r y o n the outside, whether as a gardener o r boarder, a l t h o u g h he b u r n e d w i t h energy a n d excitement w i t h i n . C o n g r u e n t l y , the i n t e r i o r o f the house is a n y t h i n g b u t modest. A s m i g h t be expected, i n the w o r d s o f o n e architectural critic, the house "is u n i q u e i n the h i s t o r y o f 2 0 t h . c e n t u r y architecture"; w i t h i n , "everything is r e t h o u g h t . "

14

Several features are w o r t h special attention: the w i n d o w s , doors, floors, exposed technological fixtures (lighting, elevators, radiators), and

the overall spatial effect. T h e w i n d o w s a n d glass doors witness

W i t t g e n s t e i n s p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h p r o p o r t i o n a n d technical c o n t r o l , m a k i n g almost impossible demands o n materials a n d craftsmanship (see fig. 1.2). T h e w i n d o w s a n d doors exhibit the significance o f p r o p o r t i o n , a feature most i m p o r t a n t to W i t t g e n s t e i n , as c a n be gauged b y his later reaction ( i n 1930) to his rented quarters at C a m b r i d g e , "where he h a d chosen rooms at the t o p o f the staircase, . . . [and] altered the p r o p o r t i o n s o f the w i n d o w s b y using strips o f black paper."

W i t t g e n s t e i n c o m m e n t e d , "See what a difference it makes

15

to the appearance o f the r o o m w h e n the w i n d o w s have the right p r o p o r t i o n . Y o u t h i n k p h i l o s o p h y is difficult enough, b u t I can tell y o u it is n o t h i n g to the difficulty o f being a g o o d architect." prisingly, w h e n his sisters house was

finished,

16

N o t sur-

the one feature

W i t t g e n s t e i n was n o t satisfied w i t h a n d w a n t e d to change was a set o f three w i n d o w s o n the second floor. T h e glass doors a n d w i n d o w s were i n c r e d i b l y difficult to c o n struct because o f the size o f the glass panes a n d because the i r o n dividers between the panes have n o h o r i z o n t a l support. Indeed, so u n c o m p r o m i s i n g was W i t t g e n s t e i n that he rejected the first c o m pleted d o o r after w a i t i n g several m o n t h s for it. E v e n t u a l l y the negot i a t i n g engineer became hysterical, staying o n o n l y because o f the c o m m i s s i o n a n d his o w n professional standards. W i t t g e n s t e i n later c o n c e d e d that o f the eight firms he negotiated w i t h , o n l y the o n e w o u l d have been able to meet "what I h a d to d e m a n d " i n "precision and

objectivity."

17

I n a n even m o r e extreme d e m a n d , W i t t g e n s t e i n

insisted o n raising o n e r o o m s c e i l i n g 1¼ inches after i t was c o m p l e t e d a n d the house was ready for the final cleaning!

8

Traditional Approaches

Figure 1.2. Stonborough-Wittgenstein House: windows, glass doors, columns. T h e doors reflect the same p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h p r o p o r t i o n a n d detail, for example, i n the handles a n d locks designed i n d i v i d u a l l y b y W i t t g e n s t e i n . T h e material is i m p o r t a n t , since m e t a l p e r m i t s total c o n t r o l a n d , w i t h a clear lacquer covering, has a h i g h l y " f i n i s h e d " surface, b o t h features c o n t r i b u t i n g to the severe effect (see fig. 1.3). T h e cut a n d p o l i s h e d stone o f the floors f u n c t i o n s the same way. E s p e c i a l l y s t r i k i n g are the exposed elevator a n d l i g h t b u l b s . T h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l is s h o w n just as the l o g i c a l a n d o r d i n a r y modes o f l a n guage are i n W i t t g e n s t e i n s p h i l o s o p h y : f r a n k l y a c k n o w l e d g e d a n d let be. T h e l i g h t i n g is u n c o m p r o m i s i n g l y austere a n d

"honest"

about its appearance. T h e t w o s m a l l (originally) b l a c k cast-iron radiators tell the w h o l e

9

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 1.3. Stonborough-Wittgenstein House: door handles designed bv Wittgenstein.

story i n m i n i a t u r e . W i t t g e n s t e i n s efforts o n t h e m , f r o m design to i n i t i a l delivery, spanned a n entire year. Severe technical difficulties were m e t i n material selection a n d preparation: each o f the radiators is m a d e o f t w o parts that stand at precise right angles a n d meet i n the corner, w i t h a t i n y space between t h e m . T h e result was m a d e m o r e difficult because the radiators rest o n legs that h a d to fit exactly to p r o d u c e the precise spacing. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the elements h a d to be cast outside A u s t r i a a n d t h e n g r o u n d to meet the specifications to the m i l l i m e t e r . T h e final s y m m e t r y o f the t w o s m o o t h b l a c k objects across f r o m each other i n a s m a l l r o o m results i n a precise and

p r o p o r t i o n e d f o r m . T h e flawless s i m p l i c i t y a n d rigor are so

characteristic o f sculptural beauty that the radiators were entirely

10

Traditional Approaches

c o n g r u e n t w i t h (and, o n occasion, even served as bases for) the Chinese

artworks

that

were

a

prominent

W i t t g e n s t e i n s furnishings w h e n she l i v e d there.

aspect

of

Gretl

18

T h e overall spatial arrangement a n d effect are i n t i m a t e l y b o u n d w i t h the a x i a l - s y m m e t r i c a l l i g h t i n g . P l a c e m e n t a n d c o n n e c t i o n o f h o m o g e n e o u s , s y m m e t r i c a l spaces, each w i t h the same o r i e n t a t i o n a n d value, result i n a static order. A g a i n s t this h o m o g e n e i t y a n d its attendant

monotony,

W i t t g e n s t e i n counterbalances

irregularity" b y means

o f the subtle differences

a m o n g doors, w i n d o w s , a n d

fixtures

"significant

a n d variations

a n d the m o r e

noticeable

recessed c o l u m n heads. T h e architectural details f u n c t i o n as "phen o m e n a a k i n to language i n m u s i c o r a r c h i t e c t u r e . "

19

Finally, t h e n ,

the d o m i n a t i n g i m p r e s s i o n o f static s y m m e t r y has a p a i n s t a k i n g l y w o r k e d - o u t c o u n t e r p o i n t , a l t h o u g h that too is b r o u g h t w i t h i n the formal unity o f composition. A l t h o u g h evidently a fine setting for G r e t l a n d c o n g r u e n t w i t h her personality, w h i c h was also bent to a c o m b i n a t i o n o f the o r d i n a r y a n d u n u s u a l , the house appeared to their sister H e r m i n e , t h r o u g h its perfection a n d m o n u m e n t a l i t y , as a " d w e l l i n g place for the gods," n o t people, this "house t u r n e d l o g i c . " This

assessment

of

the

house

is

quite

20

compatible

with

Wittgenstein's v i e w o n architecture, the p o i n t o f w h i c h , he felt, is to be m o n u m e n t a l . "Architecture i m m o r t a l i z e s a n d glorifies

some-

t h i n g . H e n c e there can be n o architecture where there is n o t h i n g to glorify."

21

H e also h e l d that architecture is gesture: " R e m e m b e r the

i m p r e s s i o n one gets f r o m g o o d architecture, that it expresses a t h o u g h t . It makes one w a n t to r e s p o n d w i t h a gesture."

22

Evidently

architecture, l i k e language, is n o t s o m e t h i n g other t h a n , i n a d d i t i o n to, o r foreign f r o m t h o u g h t b u t is itself the vehicle o f t h o u g h t . what

was

the gesture

o f Wittgenstein House? W h a t

23

was

But the

thought? T h e answer has several d i m e n s i o n s . First, the house was a gesture s h o w i n g the c u l t u r e i n w h i c h it arose. W i t t g e n s t e i n was as severe a c u l t u r a l c r i t i c as he was a p h i l o s o p h e r o f language. "I once said, perhaps rightly: T h e earlier c u l t u r e w i l l b e c o m e a heap o f r u b b l e a n d finally a heap o f ashes, b u t spirits w i l l hover over the ashes."

24

Just as the l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m i s l e a d i n g ,

c o n f u s i n g , a n d nonsensical are to be cleared away, even m o r e so are the s h a m , p h o n y , a n d b a n k r u p t d i m e n s i o n s o f society.

11

Interpreting

Environments

A l t h o u g h W i t t g e n s t e i n does n o t speak o f the Bauhaus i n the available d o c u m e n t s , o b v i o u s l y his is the same response as that o f L o o s a n d the Bauhaus: the tangled w e b o f falsifying, p o s t u r i n g , a n d dangerous W e s t e r n " s y m b o l i s m " a n d propaganda h a d to be s t r i p p e d away a n d the n o longer v a l i d d i m e n s i o n s o f t r a d i t i o n r i g o r o u s l y e l i m i n a t e d . A s W i t t g e n s t e i n n o t e d , " T o d a y the difference between a g o o d a n d a p o o r architect is that the p o o r architect succumbs to every t e m p t a t i o n a n d the g o o d o n e resists i t . "

25

T h e resulting aus-

terity m u s t be accepted a n d left to stand, rather t h a n covered over i m m e d i a t e l y b y Active, falsely c o m f o r t i n g symbols a n d ideologies n e w l y i n v e n t e d to take the place o f the o l d . Stark honesty is better. W e see, t h e n , that W i t t g e n s t e i n H o u s e corresponds to L u d w i g W i t t g e n s t e i n s p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g , a n d b o t h cohere so that at least at o n e p o i n t , at o n e place a l o n g the way, W i t t g e n s t e i n a r t i c u lates s o m e t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g a u n i f i e d self. W i t t g e n s t e i n s l i f e l o n g intensity a n d u n c o m p r o m i s i n g personality are satisfied (partially, at least) b y the clarity a n d rigor that w e see carried o u t i n the reduct i o n , s i m p l i c i t y , a n d o r d e r i n g n o t o n l y o f sentences b u t also o f w i n dows a n d doors. T h e same precision a n d (attempted)

control

appears i n the logical sequence o f t h o u g h t a n d i n the m e t a l l i c doors and

w i n d o w s . W i t t g e n s t e i n sought p o l i s h e d ideas a n d architectural

elements alike. T h e austerity o f the s i m p l e , spare l o g i c a n d house leaves a final i m p r e s s i o n o f detachment. W i t h its objectified p r o p o r t i o n a n d the relation o f materials, the house has a stark, a u t o n o m o u s b e a u t y — n o t u n l i k e Z e n koans, w h i c h appear e n i g m a t i c a n d , simultaneously, carefully crafted to be exactly as they are: spare a n d precise. H e r e , again, p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t a n d b u i l d i n g c o i n c i d e . T h e 26

general effect o f the m a n s i o n — t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f h o m o g e n e o u s , c o n n e c t e d spaces, apparently value-neutral since n o d i r e c t i o n is favored o r o r i e n t a t i o n e m p h a s i z e d — i s o n e o f objectivity a n d selfc o n t a i n m e n t , a n appearance parallel to the single v i s i o n o f the T r a c t a t u s a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n s a u t o n o m o u s v i s i o n at the t i m e . A s the T r a c t a t u s lays o u t the logical space o f p r o p o s i t i o n s , W i t t g e n s t e i n H o u s e lays o u t the physical space o f W i t t g e n s t e i n s "statement." Finally, however, the house a n d T r a c t a t u s are merely milestones. A l t h o u g h w e occasionally p r o d u c e w h a t become detached objects and

ideas ( i n the f o r m o f a house o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l v o l u m e ) , p h i l o s -

12

Traditional Approaches

o p h y a n d architecture really are processes, a k i n to therapy that seeks intelligibility. T h i s congruence between W i t t g e n s t e i n s life o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d architecture, b o t h as activity, is witnessed b y remarks i n w h i c h he speaks o f one i n terms o f the other, remarks especially significant since his professional specialty was u n c o v e r i n g a n d c l a r i fying m i s l e a d i n g analogies.

27

I n 1930 he n o t e d that c i v i l i z a t i o n c o n -

structs, that progress "is o c c u p i e d w i t h b u i l d i n g a n ever m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d structure" a n d hence is c o n c e r n e d w i t h c l a r i t y o n l y as an i n s t r u m e n t . " F o r m e o n the contrary, clarity, p e r s p i c u i t y are v a l u able i n themselves. I a m n o t interested i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a b u i l d i n g , so m u c h as h a v i n g a perspicuous v i e w o f the f o u n d a t i o n s o f possible b u i l d i n g s . "

28

Later, i n speaking o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f unexpected views for the final use o f p h i l o s o p h y , W i t t g e n s t e i n remarks, e m p l o y i n g the same language that he uses i n the P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , that "a m a n w i l l be i m p r i s o n e d i n a r o o m w i t h a d o o r that's u n l o c k e d a n d opens inwards; as l o n g as it does n o t o c c u r to h i m to p u l l rather t h a n p u s h it."

29

A s p h i l o s o p h y a n d architecture i l l u m i n a t e each other, they also

b e l o n g to the activity a n d m o d e o f one's life. A c k n o w l e d g i n g the c o n j u n c t i o n , W i t t g e n s t e i n notes, " W o r k i n g i n p h i l o s o p h y . . . l i k e w o r k i n architecture i n m a n y respects . . . is really m o r e a w o r k i n g on

oneself. O n one's o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . O n one's w a y o f seeing

things. ( A n d w h a t one expects o f t h e m . ) "

30

P h i l o s o p h i c a l insights a n d remarks are to be used to solve a p r o b lem

a n d t h e n left b e h i n d as we m o v e o n . T h e W i t t g e n s t e i n v i l l a also

is to be left b e h i n d . L i k e the distressed culture it m o n u m e n t a l i z e s , the house disclosed that it l a c k e d w h a t it needed for a f u l l , satisfied l i f e — a goal all too i l l u s o r y n o t o n l y to W i t t g e n s t e i n b u t to c o n t e m p o r a r y society: " T h e delight I take i n m y thoughts is delight i n my

o w n strange life. Is this j o y o f l i v i n g ? "

31

I n 1940 W i t t g e n s t e i n

assessed matters thus: "the house I b u i l t for G r e t l is the p r o d u c t o f a sensitive ear a n d g o o d manners, an expression o f great u n d e r s t a n d i n g ^ a culture, etc.). B u t , p r i m o r d i a l l i f e , w i l d life s t r i v i n g to erupt i n t o the o p e n — t h a t is l a c k i n g . A n d so y o u c o u l d say it isn't h e a l t h y (cf. a 'hothouse' p l a n t ) . "

32

W i t t g e n s t e i n was restless precisely because, i n a d d i t i o n to b e i n g sensitive, m a n n e r e d , a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , he u l t i m a t e l y was b o u n d to a w i l d d i m e n s i o n o f existence. So W i t t g e n s t e i n m o v e d o n , back

13

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 1.4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Cambridge, 1946. Photograph by Dorothy Moore; reprinted by kind permission of Mr. Timothy Moore.

14

Traditional Approaches

to p h i l o s o p h y . T h e house, l i k e the T r a c t a t u s , was o n l y one p a r t i a l a n d t e m p o r a r y v i e w o f things. O f course, we s h o u l d n o t forget that the house was G r e t l s , n o t L u d w i g ' s , a n d that it suited her. W h e n W i t t g e n s t e i n m o v e d o n , w h a t h o m e d i d this restless personality occupy? N o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the barest o f rented r o o m s , where the interior, filled w i t h his b u r n i n g a n d t o r m e n t e d self, m a y have h a d a quality, l i k e V a n Gogh's r o o m s , that the verbal descript i o n alone fails to capture (see fig. 1.4): Wittgenstein's rooms in Whewell's Court were austerely furnished. There was no easy chair or reading lamp. There were no ornaments, paintings, or photographs. The walls were bare. In his living-room were two canvas chairs and a plain wooden chair, and in his bedroom a canvas cot. An old-fashioned iron heating stove was in the centre of the living-room. There were some flowers in a window box, and one or two flower pots in the room. There was a metal safe in which he kept his manuscripts, and a card table on which he did his writing. The rooms were always scrupulously clean.

33

Jung's Quest for Wholeness C a r l G u s t a v J u n g (1875-1961) was the first c h i l d i n the f a m i l y o f a " p o o r c o u n t r y parson" i n n o r t h e r n Switzerland; f r o m that r u r a l w o r l d he w e n t to g y m n a s i u m (high school) i n Basel, a s i t u a t i o n that y i e l d e d embarrassing encounters w i t h w e a l t h y classmates. A l t h o u g h he d e c i d e d that he w a n t e d to study science, i n those times he w o u l d n o t have been able to s u p p o r t h i m s e l f as, say, a zoologist, so he " c o m p r o m i s e d " b y p u r s u i n g a m e d i c a l career. H e c o m p l e t e d m e d ical s c h o o l a n d his e x a m i n a t i o n at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Basel a n d i n 1900 began psychiatric w o r k at B u r g h o l z l i , the m e n t a l h o s p i t a l o f C a n t o n Z u r i c h a n d the psychiatric c l i n i c o f Z u r i c h . H e finished his M.D.

dissertation i n 1902 a n d r e m a i n e d at the c l i n i c . Later he s t u d -

ied i n Paris, m a r r i e d (eventually h a v i n g five c h i l d r e n ) , began his correspondence w i t h F r e u d (in 1906), a n d i n 1909 m a d e his first t r i p to the U n i t e d S t a t e s — w i t h F r e u d . F r e u d p r o v i d e d J u n g w i t h professional s u p p o r t a n d referred to

15

Interpreting him

Environments

as the " c r o w n p r i n c e , " a l t h o u g h they eventually broke over p r o -

fessional differences. I n 1909 J u n g m o v e d to a house i n

Küsnacht

that he h e l p e d to design a n d focused o n private practice. Jung's remarkable series o f p u b l i c a t i o n s w o r k e d out his epochal ideas i n analytic psychiatry: the personal a n d collective unconscious, i n d i v i d u a t i o n , a n i m u s / a n i m a , persona (all b e g u n b y 1916), the "self" and

psychological types (by 1921), a n d archetypes a n d s y m b o l i s m

(1917-1918). I n 1922

he

purchased

property

i n the village

of

B o l l i n g e n , a n d i n 1923 the first tower was b u i l t there. J u n g w o r k e d and

l i v e d alternately i n Küsnacht a n d B o l l i n g e n u n t i l he d i e d . Jung's o w n l i f e l o n g j o u r n e y to selfhood was i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h his

psychological concerns a n d houses, b o t h i m a g i n a r y a n d concrete. A s a c h i l d he played at an o l d stone w a l l i n the f a m i l y garden, carr y i n g o u t little rituals (such as t e n d i n g fires) i n the "caves" f o r m e d b y the interstices o f the blocks. H e also secretly carved a little w o o d en figure o f a m a n that he kept w i t h a p a i n t e d stone o n a r o o f b e a m i n the f o r b i d d e n attic o f his house a n d attended w i t h c e r e m o n i a l acts (such as a d d i n g little scrolls o f w r i t i n g s ) . J u n g tells us that the secret c o m f o r t e d h i m , so that he "felt safe, a n d the t o r m e n t i n g sense o f b e i n g at odds" w i t h h i m s e l f disappeared.

34

A s J u n g grew u p house images played an i m p o r t a n t part i n his development. W h i l e a s c h o o l b o y he became aware o f t w o conflicting aspects o f his personality, w h i c h he labeled n u m b e r 1 a n d n u m ber 2: n u m b e r 1 (the m a i n personality) was scientifically e m p i r i c a l and

concretely oriented; n u m b e r 2 (a "shadow" personality)

was

i n t u i t i v e a n d i n c l i n e d to the h i s t o r i c a n d fantastic. Images o f houses w o u n d t h r o u g h b o t h d i m e n s i o n s . A t times he gave w a y to the n u m b e r 2 d i m e n s i o n i n systematic fantasy, reveries about an i s l a n d l i k e a h i l l o f rock, where " o n the r o c k s t o o d a well-fortified castle w i t h a tall keep, watchtower. T h i s was [his] h o u s e . "

35

I n contrast,

w h e n his n u m b e r 1 aspect later f o u n d s u c h "fantasy silly a n d r i d i c u l o u s , " he t u r n e d to b u i l d i n g a n d s t u d y i n g castles a n d fortified encampments. In

36

J u n g s l i f e l o n g struggle

to unite these t w o

contradictory

d i m e n s i o n s — w i t h the eventual u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the split was neither actual n o r peculiar to h i m s e l f b u t i n t r i n s i c to a d y n a m i c "played o u t i n every i n d i v i d u a l " — d r e a m s i n v o l v i n g houses a n d 37

b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t s played a persistent a n d decisive role. F o r exam-

16

Traditional Approaches

pie, consider one o f m a n y dreams closely related to his w o r k that J u n g h a d i n the second h a l f o f his life. I n 1928, i n association w i t h p a i n t i n g a m a n d a l a w i t h a g o l d e n castle i n the center, J u n g d r e a m e d o f b e i n g w i t h c o m p a n i o n s i n L i v e r p o o l , where they f o u n d a square o n a drizzly, foggy n i g h t . T h e square h a d a r o u n d p o o l i n the c e n ter, a n d i n the m i d d l e o f that was a s m a l l i s l a n d . A l t h o u g h the surr o u n d i n g s were obscured b y r a i n , s m o g , a n d s m o k e , the center was b r i g h t l y l i t , a n d i n it a single m a g n o l i a tree b l o s s o m e d . A p p a r e n t l y n o n e o f his c o m p a n i o n s saw the focal l i g h t a n d tree. J u n g c o m m e n t s , " T h i s d r e a m b r o u g h t w i t h it a sense o f finality. I saw that here the goal h a d been revealed. T h e center is the goal, a n d everything is directed t o w a r d that center. T h r o u g h this d r e a m I u n d e r s t o o d that the self is the p r i n c i p l e a n d archetype o f o r i e n t a t i o n a n d m e a n i n g . T h e r e i n lies its h e a l i n g f u n c t i o n . "

38

A f t e r this realiza-

t i o n J u n g gave u p d r a w i n g a n d p a i n t i n g mandalas, since the d r e a m e d center satisfied h i m b y g i v i n g "a total picture o f m y s i t u a t i o n . "

39

S i m i l a r l y , i n 1912 J u n g h a d c o n f r o n t e d the u n c o n s c i o u s (that is, the idea o f the unconscious) i n dreams. H e d r e a m e d o f his p r e v i ously m e n t i o n e d c h i l d h o o d projects o f b u i l d i n g little houses a n d castles o f bottles a n d stones w i t h m u d mortar, w h i c h h a d taken place w h e n he was ten o r eleven, some twenty-six years earlier. T h e dreams u n u s u a l e m o t i o n a l p o w e r m a d e J u n g realize that the a c t i v i ty was still i m p o r t a n t to h i m a n d that it posed the q u e s t i o n o f h o w to u n f o l d a creative life. O n l y after great resistance a n d w i t h h a r d w o n resignation d i d the established, esteemed psychiatrist resume w h a t appeared to h i m to be the o n l y a p p r o a c h to develop this i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n i n himself, again t a k i n g u p his c h i l d h o o d games o f b u i l d i n g . T h e reluctance is understandable, "for it was a p a i n f u l l y h u m i l i a t i n g experience to realize that there was n o t h i n g to be d o n e except p l a y c h i l d i s h games." J u n g explains: I began accumulating suitable stones, gathering them partly from the lake shore and partly from the water. And I started building: cottages, a castle, a whole village. The church was still missing, so I made a square building with a hexagonal drum on top of it, and a dome. . . .

17

Interpreting

Environments

I went on with my building game after the noon meal every day, whenever the weather permitted. As soon as I was through eating, I began playing, and continued to do so until the patients [of his private practice] arrived; and if I finished with my work early enough in the evening, I went back to building. In the course of this activity my thoughts clarified, and I was able to grasp the fantasies whose presence in myself I dimly felt. Naturally, I thought about the significance of what I was doing, and asked myself, "Now, really, what are you about? You are building a small town, and doing it as if it were a rite!" I had no answer to my question, only the inner certainty that I was on the way to discovering my own myth. For the building game was only a beginning. It released a stream of fantasies which I later carefully wrote down. This sort of thing has been consistent with me, and at any time in my later life when I came up against a blank wall, I painted a picture or hewed stone. Each such experience proved to be a r i t e d ' e n t r e e for the ideas and works that followed hard upon it.

40

Perhaps the best example o f a d r e a m o f a house as rite o f passage and

entrance is f o u n d i n one o f J u n g s dreams that F r e u d attempt-

ed to interpret d u r i n g their visit to the U n i t e d States a n d that, after F r e u d failed, l e d J u n g to the idea o f the "collective u n c o n s c i o u s . " I n the

d r e a m J u n g f o u n d h i m s e l f o n the second floor o f a house w i t h

a salon w e l l f u r n i s h e d a n d decorated i n the rococo style; g o i n g downstairs he f o u n d everything older, f r o m the fifteenth a n d sixteenth centuries, w i t h medieval f u r n i s h i n g a n d red b r i c k

floors.

E x p l o r i n g the house he came o n a heavy door, w h i c h o p e n e d to a stone stairway l e a d i n g to the cellar. D e s c e n d i n g further J u n g f o u n d h i m s e l f i n a beautifully vaulted r o o m that was very old,

with

walls d a t i n g f r o m R o m a n times a n d a floor o f stone slabs. I n o n e o f the slabs was a r i n g ; b y p u l l i n g o n it he lifted the stone slab beneath, again u n c o v e r i n g a "stairway o f n a r r o w steps l e a d i n g d o w n i n t o the depths." G o i n g d o w n J u n g finally entered a l o w cave cut i n t o the rock, where i n the dust he f o u n d bones, i n c l u d i n g t w o h u m a n

18

Traditional Approaches

skulls, a n d scattered pottery " l i k e the ruins o f a p r i m i t i v e c u l t u r e . " A l t h o u g h Freud's i n a b i l i t y to s h o w J u n g the m e a n i n g o f the d r e a m , despite a pretense to d o so, h e l p e d to c o n f i r m the differences that l e d to their break, the significant p o i n t here is Jung's o w n interpretation: "It was p l a i n to m e that the house represented a k i n d o f image o f the p s y c h e — t h a t is to say, o f m y t h e n state o f consciousness, w i t h h i t h e r t o u n c o n s c i o u s a d d i t i o n s . Consciousness was represented b y the salon. . . . T h e g r o u n d floor s t o o d for the first level o f the u n c o n s c i o u s , . . . the cave [for] a w o r l d w h i c h can scarcely be reached or i l l u m i n a t e d b y consciousness . . . that borders o n the life o f the a n i m a l s o u l . " T h e r o o m s signified past times a n d surpassed stages o f c o n sciousness, w h i c h J u n g later came to u n d e r s t a n d as archetypes: " M y d r e a m thus c o n s t i t u t e d a k i n d o f structural d i a g r a m o f the h u m a n psyche; it postulated s o m e t h i n g o f an altogether i m p e r s o n a l nature u n d e r l y i n g that psyche . . . T h e d r e a m became for m e a g u i d i n g image . . . [and] was m y first i n k l i n g o f a collective a p r i o r i beneath the present psyche."

41

H o u s e s , t h e n , were i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h Jung's self-realizat i o n a n d professional w o r k , b u t n o t o n l y i n d r e a m a n d image, i n c h i l d i s h c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e t w o houses where J u n g spent his a d u l t life clearly manifest his s e l f - i n d i v i d u a t i o n a n d represent his ideas a n d the t w o d i m e n s i o n s o f his personality. The

f a m i l y residence

Küsnacht,

a n d site o f Jung's private practice

at

just outside Z u r i c h , was designed b y J u n g i n c o l l a b o r a -

t i o n w i t h his c o u s i n , architect E r n s t Fiechter. Set o n the water's edge, it was designed i n the style o f the o l d farmhouses o f C a n t o n Zurich.

4 2

J u n g h a d a m o t t o carved above the d o o r : V O C A T U S A T Q U E

N O N VOCATUS D E U S A D E R I T ( " S u m m o n e d or not,

the

god

will

be

there"). T h e m o t t o is the answer that the D e l p h i c oracle gave to the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s w h o were p l a n n i n g a w a r w i t h A t h e n s . I n Jung's e x p l a n a t i o n , it says, "yes, the g o d w i l l be o n the spot, b u t i n w h a t f o r m a n d to w h a t purpose? I p u t the i n s c r i p t i o n there to r e m i n d m y patients a n d m y s e l f that 'the fear o f the L o r d is the b e g i n n i n g o f w i s dom'

(Psalms I I I : I O ) . "

43

In addition, while in England, Jung had

carved w o o d e n r e p r o d u c t i o n s o f the little w o o d e n m a n i k i n he h a d m a d e a n d h i d d e n i n the attic as a c h i l d ; he n o w h a d a larger version m a d e i n stone a n d placed i n the garden at

19

Küsnacht.

Interpreting

Environments

It is the house at B o l l i n g e n , however, that most m a g n i f i c e n t l y bodies f o r t h the p a t h o f Jung's i n d i v i d u a t i o n , specifically, "the p a t h b y w h i c h a person becomes a psychological ' i n d i v i d u a l , ' that is, a separate, i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t y o r w h o l e . "

44

I n Jung's words:

Gradually, t h r o u g h m y scientific w o r k , I w a s able to put my

fantasies a n d the contents of the u n c o n s c i o u s o n a

s o l i d f o o t i n g . W o r d s a n d paper, however, d i d not s e e m real e n o u g h to m e ; s o m e t h i n g m o r e w a s needed. I h a d to achieve a kind of representation in stone of m y innerm o s t t h o u g h t s a n d of the k n o w l e d g e I h a d a c q u i r e d . Or, to put it another way, I h a d to make a c o n f e s s i o n of faith in stone. That w a s the b e g i n n i n g of the "Tower," the house w h i c h I built for m y s e l f at B o l l i n g e n .

45

T h e site is near water o n the upper lake o f Z u r i c h i n the area o f St. M e i n r a d ; the p r o p e r t y was once c h u r c h l a n d , b e l o n g i n g to the old

monastery o f St. G a l l . ( T h e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h r e l i g i o n a n d the

dead is n o t accidental, a l t h o u g h it is b e y o n d m y scope here.)

46

Jung

b o u g h t the l a n d i n 1922 a n d b u i l t the house i n stages f r o m 1923 to 1935, after w h i c h he c o n t i n u e d to a d d stone carvings, sculptures, a n d paintings to the i n t e r i o r walls. T h e house at B o l l i n g e n p r i m a r i l y was Jung's private retreat, a l t h o u g h he d i d entertain visitors o n occasion, signaling their w e l c o m e b y l o w e r i n g the flag that i n d i c a t e d "solitude only." Initially J u n g h a d planned a primitive, hutlike dwelling, a r o u n d structure s u r r o u n d i n g a central hearth (connected w i t h the w h o l e ness o f the f a m i l y ) , w h i c h even domestic animals share i n some societies. S u c h a b u i l d i n g w o u l d have been t o o p r i m i t i v e , however, a n d thus destabilizing to Jung's o w n d i r e c t i o n a n d consciousness.

47

Instead, the first structure, a l t h o u g h r o u n d , was "a regular two-story house." Substantially a n d s i m p l y b u i l t o f stone, it was a "maternal hearth" a n d a "suitable d w e l l i n g tower" (at the left o f fig. 1.5).

48

A l t h o u g h J u n g felt rejuvenated d u r i n g his stays at B o l l i n g e n , he also came to feel that s o m e t h i n g was l a c k i n g . S o , four years later, i n 1927, he a d d e d the large central structure, w i t h its towerlike annex (see fig. 1.5). T h e n , after f o u r m o r e years, the b u i l d i n g still seemed too p r i m i t i v e a n d i n c o m p l e t e , "so i n 1931 the tower-like annex was

20

Traditional Approaches

extended." J u n g said, " I w a n t e d a r o o m i n this tower where I c o u l d exist for m y s e l f a l o n e . "

49

T h e idea was to have a space for personal

w i t h d r a w a l , as I n d i a n houses d o for m e d i t a t i o n o r yoga. H e c o n t i n u e d , " I n m y r e t i r i n g r o o m I a m b y myself. I keep the k e y w i t h m e all the t i m e ; n o one else is a l l o w e d i n there except w i t h m y p e r m i s s i o n . I n the course o f the years I have d o n e p a i n t i n g s o n the walls, a n d so have expressed a l l those things w h i c h have carried m e o u t o f t i m e i n t o seclusion, o u t o f the present i n t o timelessness. T h u s the second tower became for m e a place o f s p i r i t u a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n . "

50

A desire t h e n arose i n J u n g for a larger, o p e n space where he c o u l d be c o n n e c t e d to the sky a n d nature. C o n s e q u e n t l y , again after four years, i n 1935 he fenced i n a p o r t i o n o f the l a n d b y b u i l d i n g a c o u r t y a r d a n d loggia b y the lake. T h u s , a f o u r t h element was a d d e d "that was separated f r o m the u n i t a r y threeness o f the house," m a k i n g the w h o l e q u a t e r n i t y i n four-year segments over the course o f twelve years (see fig. 1.6). Finally, i n the congruence between J u n g s self-realization a n d B o l l i n g e n Tower, after his wife's death i n 1955, w h e n he was eighty, J u n g m a d e the last a d d i t i o n (see fig. 1.7). H e tells us: To put it into the language of the Bollingen house, I suddenly realized that the

small central section

which

crouched so low, so hidden, was myself! I could no longer hide myself behind the "maternal" and "spiritual" towers. So, in that same year, I added an upper story to this section, which represents myself, or my ego-personality. Earlier, I would not have been able to do this; I would have regarded it as presumptuous

self-emphasis.

Now it signified an extension of consciousness achieved in old age. With that the building was complete.

51

L i f e at B o l l i n g e n was o f the simplest f o r m , establishing c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the timeless r h y t h m s o f nature a n d the heritage o f the s y m b o l i c past (see fig. 1.8). J u n g explains: There is nothing in the Tower that has not grown into its own form over the decades, nothing with which I am not linked. Here everything has its history. . . . I have done

21

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 1.5. Bollingen: dwelling tower, central structure, and annex, 1927. The estate of Carl Jung.

Figure 1.6. Bollingen: courtyard, two towers, and loggia, 1935. The estate of Carl Jung.

22

Traditional Approaches

Figure 1.7. Bollingen: completed, with upper story in center, 1955. The estate of Carl Jung.

23

Interpreting

Environments

without electricity, and tend the fireplace and stove myself. Evenings, I light the old lamps. There is no running water, and I pump water from the well. I chop the wood and cook the food. These simple acts make man simple; and how difficult it is to be simple!

52

As a help to w o r k o u t a n d enter the m e a n i n g o f his life a n d the tower, J u n g , w h o was reputed b y local craftsmen "to k n o w his stone," w o r k e d o n a series o f stone carvings. I n 1950, w h i l e b u i l d i n g the enclosing w a l l for the garden, J u n g encountered a square s t o n e — i n t e n d e d for a cornerstone, b u t entirely the w r o n g shape and

size as s h i p p e d f r o m q u a r r y — i n t o w h i c h he carved a L a t i n

alchemical verse ("Here stands the m e a n , u n c o m e l y stone, / ' T i s very cheap i n price! / T h e m o r e it is despised b y f o o l , / T h e m o r e l o v e d b y the wise"). O n the front face, i n the stone itself, he discerned a s m a l l circle, o r "eye," w h i c h he chiseled i n a n d to w h i c h he a d d e d a s m a l l h o m u n c u l u s a n d a G r e e k i n s c r i p t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the child's c o s m i c p l a y ( " T i m e is a c h i l d — p l a y i n g l i k e a c h i l d — p l a y i n g a b o a r d g a m e — t h e k i n g d o m o f the c h i l d . T h i s is Telesphoros, w h o roams t h r o u g h the d a r k regions o f this cosmos a n d glows l i k e a star o u t o f the depths. H e p o i n t s the w a y to the gates o f the s u n a n d to the l a n d o f dreams"). On

the t h i r d side, w h i c h faced the lake, he a d d e d m o r e L a t i n

alchemical i n s c r i p t i o n , i n w h i c h the "stone speaks for itself" ("I a m an o r p h a n , alone; nevertheless I a m f o u n d everywhere. I a m one, b u t o p p o s e d to m y s e l f " ) . J u n g says that he w a n t e d to chisel the phrase " L e c r i de M e r l i n " i n t o the back face (fourth side) o f the stone, b u t d i d n o t , because the stone's message r e m i n d e d h i m o f M e r l i n ' s life i n the forest: a c c o r d i n g to the legend, M e r l i n ' s cries are still heard, b u t n o one today can u n d e r s t a n d t h e m , a n d thus his story remains u n f i n i s h e d . T h e stone was placed outside the tower and

meant to e x p l a i n it: "It is a manifestation o f the occupant, b u t

one w h i c h remains i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e to others."

53

From the beginning I felt the Tower as in some way a place of maturation—a maternal womb or a maternal figure in which I could become what I was, what I am and will be. It gave me a feeling as if I were being reborn

24

Traditional Approaches

Figure 1.8. Jung tending fire at Bollingen, 1949. The estate of Carl Jung.

in stone. It is thus a concretization of the individuation process, a memorial a e r e p e r e n n i u s . . . . Unconsciously built at the time, only afterward did I see how all the parts fitted together and that a meaningful form had resulted: a symbol of psychic wholeness. . . .

At

Bollingen I am in the midst of my true life, I am most deeply myself.

25

54

Interpreting

Environments

In the Tower at Bollingen it is as if one lived in many centuries simultaneously. The place will outlive me, and in its location and style it points backward to things of long ago. There is very little about it to suggest the present. If a man of the sixteenth century were to move into the house, only the kerosene lamp and the matches would be new to him; otherwise he would know his way about without difficulty. . . . It is as if a silent, greater family, stretching down the centuries, were peopling the house. There I live in my second personality and see life in the round, as something forever coming into being and passing on.

55

T h e tower at B o l l i n g e n h e l p e d the unconscious a n d collective to emerge, t h e n , a n d c o m p l e m e n t e d the house at Küsnacht, w h i c h was the p r i m a r y scene o f consciousness a n d a c t i o n , exemplified i n the responsible treatment o f patients. Together the t w o houses strengthened each d i m e n s i o n o f J u n g s personality a n d made an o p e n i n g for the integration that they n o w m e m o r i a l i z e .

Alternatives for Contemporary Existence For all their differences, J u n g a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n paralleled each other surprisingly i n the w a y they b u i l t houses i n an effort to realize their identities. T h e i r houses, t h e n , are m o n u m e n t s to their alternative "archetypal" responses to the possibilities o f c o n t e m p o r a r y existence. B o t h felt d u a l a n d c o n f l i c t i n g forces o r attractions i n their personalities, especially between the e m p i r i c a l a n d concrete (Jung w i t h science a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n w i t h technology) a n d the historical and

theoretical (Jung w i t h his h u m a n e m y t h o l o g y a n d s y m b o l i s m

and

W i t t g e n s t e i n w i t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l remarks a n d fragmentary say-

ings). B o t h spent e n o r m o u s energy a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n b u i l d i n g and

t e n d i n g an intense, often p a i n f u l a n d distressing personal life b y

w o r k i n g out n e w styles o f analysis a n d therapy (in psychiatry a n d philosophy, respectively) a n d b y b u i l d i n g as a w a y to reconcile the self's d i m e n s i o n s a n d needs. F o r J u n g a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n , b u i l d i n g was the focus o f great care, exactitude, a n d i n v o l v e m e n t a n d an a i d to a significant relationship w i t h their f a m i l i a l a n d c u l t u r a l contexts.

26

Traditional Approaches

T h e i r b u i l d i n g s are m o n u m e n t s to their modes o f l i v i n g i n the face o f u n c e r t a i n m e a n i n g a n d t r a d i t i o n . W i t t g e n s t e i n H o u s e a n d B o l l i n g e n T o w e r each achieve a p o w e r f u l s i m p l i c i t y . B o t h are direct a n d sparing i n material a n d f o r m . W i t t g e n s t e i n s glass, m e t a l , p o l ished-stone flooring, exposed elevator a n d l i g h t b u l b s , a n d h o m o g e neous a n d s y m m e t r i c a l space all resulted f r o m a d e m a n d i n g c o n t r o l that enabled t h e m to " r e m a i n s t a n d i n g as themselves" i n the single v i s i o n o f the m o m e n t . Jung's r o u g h stone a n d plaster walls carved a n d p a i n t e d w i t h symbols, as w e l l as the heterogeneous a n d "direct i o n a l l y charged" elements a n d the absence o f any technology, even electricity a n d r u n n i n g water, m a d e an o p e n i n g for the gradual manifestation o f a n d i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h the timeless. Wittgenstein's house a n d life stand austere, as a clarified objectification; Jung's, as a r i c h , almost tangled p r i m a l mystery. Finally, for b o t h J u n g a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n , the c o m p l e t i o n o f the c r u c i a l house m a r k e d a n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , a c o n c l u s i o n . F o r J u n g , the achievement was the m a t u r e d emergence o f the second d i m e n s i o n o f his personality. B o l l i n g e n a n d the second, o r shadow, personality c o m p l e m e n t e d Küsnacht a n d the first personality. B u i l d i n g the house m a d e possible the c o m p l e t i o n o f his life's course a n d selfwholeness a n d also the arrival i n a timeless realm where he c o u l d d w e l l i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h ancestors, family, nature, a n d place. F o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , b u i l d i n g his sister's house was the c o m p l e t i o n o f a phase that o p e n e d to the next s w i n g , to p h i l o s o p h y a n d life i n a starkly bare r o o m . H i s a c t i o n was a stage i n the c o n t i n u i n g m o v e m e n t o f a restless, unsettled life. I n large measure, these t w o patterns o f l i v i n g b y b u i l d i n g for serene d w e l l i n g o r restless

movement

r e m a i n the best alternatives we have today. W i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n we are challenged to courageously face c u l ture's m i s l e a d i n g a n d falsifying elements a n d to advance clarity relentlessly. I n short, we starkly stay w i t h i n the o r d i n a r y a n d the h a r d surfaces o f the w a y things are, n o t i n m i s t y heights o r obscure depths. W i t t g e n s t e i n shows us that we can be at h o m e

while

r e m a i n i n g unsettled a n d that a house is a m o n u m e n t to the activity o f b u i l d i n g , w h i c h appears as a v i t a l part o f o u r sequences o f m o v e m e n t . W i t h J u n g we see the task o f i n t e g r a t i n g conscious u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a c t i o n w i t h the unclear, c o n f u s i n g , a n d d i s c o n c e r t i n g contents o f the u n c o n s c i o u s i n t o a totality o f the personality, that is,

27

Interpreting

Environments

i n t o the self. T h i s process requires a willingness to risk the depths o f the past, the unconscious, the n o n p e r s o n a l , a n d the nonsensical to find the p o s s i b i l i t y o f archetypal power a n d self-unity. J u n g shows a w a y to c o m e h o m e to one's o w n self, o u r life's goal, w h i c h also is the p a t h to the self's settling i n t o a n d d w e l l i n g w i t h i n the "timeless" past a n d a n e n d u r i n g s y m b o l i c cosmos. H e r e houses n o t o n l y c o n cretize the i n d i v i d u a t i o n process a n d its rites o f entrance b u t also, and

finally,

28

manifest a n d m e m o r i a l i z e that c o m p l e t i o n .

2 Deconstruction Pyramids as Posture and Strategy

The silence of prehistoric arcana and buried civilizations, the entombment of lost intentions and guarded secrets, and the illegibility of the lapidary inscription disclose the transcendental sense of death as what unites these things to the absolute privilege of intentionality in the very instance of its failure. —Derrida, H u s s e r l ' s O r i g i n o f G e o m e t r y 1

Deconstructing Pyramids T h e p y r a m i d s . W e scarcely notice the w a y we refer to o r t h i n k o f t h e m . T h a t the w o r d can stand alone, w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n , w i t nesses the power o f the n a m e a n d the b u i l t forms over m e m o r y a n d landscape. T h e

n a m e has n o need o f further specification o r

modifier. T h e reference is presupposed a n d secure: the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s . T h e r e are other p y r a m i d s too, o f course, those i n C e n t r a l A m e r i c a a n d , later i n the course o f W e s t e r n history, the p y r a m i d s o f F r e n c h neoclassicism a n d the p o s t m o d e r n era. These other a n d later p y r a m i d s , however, refer to the same g r o u n d i n g p r i n c i p l e s that the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s witness: the t r i u m p h o f life over death, the d o m inance o f eternal presence over the fleeting, w h i c h passes over i n t o

30

Deconstruction

absence, a sustained personal a n d c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y u n d e r l y i n g fractured differences, the r e a l m o f the gods a n d the i m m o r t a l s o u l e n d u r i n g b e y o n d n a t u r a l decay a n d h u m a n i m p o t e n c e . I n short, the p y r a m i d s refer to the p r i n c i p l e s o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y a n d reality that f o u n d W e s t e r n culture a n d lay d o w n its goals. So it seems. C o n s i d e r , however, a d o u b l e displacement. First, the b u i l t f o r m we k n o w as the p y r a m i d has for centuries displaced its antecedents a n d concealed

the

fictive

basis o f its strategies

to

achieve, o r stand for, a "timeless" presence a n d identity. S e c o n d , the discourse accepted as the o r t h o d o x i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has g r o u n d e d the c u l t u r a l m e a n i n g o f the p y r a m i d s i n the p r i v i l e g e d d i m e n s i o n s o r concepts o f presence, identity, a n d life precisely b y suppressing the correlates (absence, difference, a n d death, respectively). T h i s posture o f d o m i n a t i o n over one m e m b e r o f each p a i r attempts to erase the p r i m a l "difference," o r gap, at the heart o f the relations w i t h i n w h i c h we are situated. T h e i l l u s i o n o f mastery c a n n o t succeed. B o t h the p y r a m i d s as b u i l t forms a n d the o r t h o d o x discourse s u r r o u n d i n g t h e m ( w h i c h relates the o r i g i n a l f o u n d a t i o n a l acts a n d sustaini n g principles) u n d e r c u t themselves a n d disclose fissures that reveal w h a t is h i d d e n : the fictive web s p u n as the strategy a n d posture o f c u l t u r a l forms o f desire.

2

Egyptian Pyramids W e h o l d o n t o the m e a n i n g o f the p y r a m i d s , against t i m e a n d forgetfulness, t h r o u g h discourse (see fig. 2.1). A c c o r d i n g to the t r a d i t i o n a l a n d o r t h o d o x i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , for example as c o d i f i e d b y Sigfried G i e d i o n , the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s were the means for enteri n g i n t o eternity, the timeless r e a l m o f the gods a n d life after earthl y death. T h e p y r a m i d s , o f course, were part o f larger complexes, 3

where all the ceremonies a n d b u i l t elements (temples a n d t o m b s , courts a n d walkways, storehouses, paintings a n d reliefs, a n d utensils a n d stores, as w e l l as the p y r a m i d s themselves) were there for the sake o f the eternal c o n t i n u i t y o f the p h a r a o h s existence. A s part o f an intricate u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a seven-dimensional s o u l , the p y r a m i d complexes derived f r o m the nature a n d needs o f the p r i n c i p a l s o u l , the k a . T h e E g y p t i a n s believed that the s u n g o d , R a , was the sole source

31

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.1. The means to eternal presence, identity, and life. Pyramids at Giza.

32

Deconstruction

o f the k a , the v i t a l force o f life. T h i s c o s m i c , d i v i n e force was passed f r o m the s u n g o d to his s o n , the p h a r a o h . T h e s u n g o d was present i n the p h a r a o h , manifest i n the h u m a n realm; thus, the k i n g d o m was g r o u n d e d , t h r o u g h the p h a r a o h , i n the cosmos a n d w i t h the gods. T h e key to a u n i f i e d cosmos a n d to life for the k i n g d o m was the pharaoh's sustained p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o w e r e m a n a t i n g f r o m the g o d . T h e presence o f the v i t a l force e n s u r i n g c o n t i n u i t y o f life was partially a c c o m p l i s h e d a n d witnessed b y the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t , specifically, stone architecture. T h e final, or entire, f u n c t i o n o f the p y r a m i d s was to h o l d the p h a r a o h i n an eternal present. A c c o r d i n g l y , they were m a d e o f p o l ished stone, the m o s t indestructible substance for the d w e l l i n g o f the k a (see fig. 2.2). T h e y h a d closed chambers filled w i t h s y m b o l i c a n d actual means o f sustenance that radiated a b r i l l i a n t a n d p o w e r f u l beauty. T h e f o r m itself replicated the rays e m a n a t i n g f r o m the 4

s u n (the v i t a l force descending to earth). O r i g i n a l l y the capstones were covered w i t h g o l d , w h i c h w o u l d gather, convey, a n d celebrate the s u n s c o l o r a n d l i g h t , thus c o n n e c t i n g g o d , p h a r a o h , a n d l a n d , a c o n n e c t i o n focused b y the p y r a m i d s a l i g n m e n t to the c o s m i c q u a d rants. A s one o f the p y r a m i d texts prayed: " A t u m , so p u t t h i n e arms . . . about this p y r a m i d , as the arm(s) o f a k a , that the k a o f [the pharaoh] m a y be i n it e n d u r i n g for ever a n d ever."

5

T h u s , a series o f b i n a r y terms f o u n d e d the p y r a m i d s . T h e d o m i nant terms (eternal presence, life, sky, s u n , etc.) were m e a n t n o t o n l y to d o m i n a t e b u t also to d e n y a n d overcome

their mates

(absence, death, earth, a n d m o o n ) . A s texts, however,

the p y r a m i d s c o n t a i n elements

displacing

themselves, that is, u n d e r c u t t i n g the m e a n i n g that was so l o n g supposed.

6

E t e r n a l presence is n o t perdurable. T h e still u n i t y is frac-

t u r e d i n t o m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d succession. P y r a m i d s are f o u n d i n m a n y sites; p y r a m i d s are g r o u p e d together. T o note o n l y a few s u c h m u l tiplicities: Zoser's step p y r a m i d h a d six stages; there are the three p y r a m i d s o f Sneferu, f o l l o w e d b y C h e o p s a n d M y c e r i n u s s a n d the three p y r a m i d s o f G i z a , i n c l u d i n g C e p h r e n s . T h e i r m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d shared f o r m belie the timeless s i m u l t a n e i t y o f p h a r a o h a n d gods. T h e total b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t resulted f r o m successive pharaohs, w h o replaced one another n o t o n l y t h r o u g h o u t the course o f serial earthl y deaths b u t also i n their possession o f the s u n g o d s v i t a l force a n d ,

33

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.2. The most enduring material protects the pharaoh's ka. Stone pyramid at Giza.

34

Deconstruction

thus, earthly power. T h e pharaoh's life a n d c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h power, t h e n , were n o t eternally the same. F u r t h e r m o r e , the p y r a m i d s d i d n o t merely c o n t a i n the absent b o d y o f the dead p h a r a o h b u t also h i d it i n layers o f symbols a n d s y m b o l i c objects. Indeed, m u m m i f y i n g aims to preserve the b o d y for eternity. T h a t is, m u m m i f y i n g denies o r conceals the b o d y a n d person as dead, as m o r t a l , even t h o u g h o n l y a dead b o d y mummified.

A l t h o u g h the

pharaoh's

l i v i n g s o u l was

to

is

have

r e m a i n e d after his b o d i l y death, it appears o b v i o u s that he t r u l y was dead: his s o u l d i d n o t c o n t i n u e to d w e l l i n the p y r a m i d . T h u s , n e i ther the eternal present n o r everlasting life were able to d o m i n a t e a n d g r o u n d the p y r a m i d s a n d their m e a n i n g . E v e n pharaohs t h e m selves a c k n o w l e d g e d the lacuna. A l t h o u g h their o w n future everlasting life d e p e n d e d o n the reality o f these sacred forces a n d beliefs, o n occasion they were so b o l d as to desecrate their predecessors' p y r a m i d s o r t o m b s , s h o w i n g that the p o w e r actually d i d n o t h o l d .

7

Indeed, the p y r a m i d s as carefully f o r m e d to deal w i t h the absent (dead) p h a r a o h were i n s i n u a t e d i n t o a culture that pretended it c o u l d b u i l d so as to obliterate o r h i d e death a n d t i m e . T h e c u l t u r e o f the eternally present a n d e n d u r i n g life was n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a particular case of, a n d strategy i n regard to, death a n d absence, for i f the p h a r a o h were n o t dead a n d absent, there w o u l d be n o need o r m o t i v e for the p y r a m i d s . T h a t is, the p y r a m i d s testify to

the

pharaohs' absence a n d death a n d their o w n status as fictive strategy. Similarly, the gods also appeared as an absence never rendered present; they were a fiction derived f r o m a n d sustained b y the i m m e d i ate b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t o f p y r a m i d s . T h e e n d u r i n g E g y p t i a n stone gives n o h i n t or traces o f its construct i o n a n d n o w absent content. T h e scaffolding, earthworks, a n d laborers' dwellings that enabled the pyramids to be b u i l t have disappeared to let the generated f o r m persist w i t h o u t obvious source a n d hence w i t h out measure or opposite. T h e forms remain, useless after capstone a n d contents have been looted a n d the pharaoh's remains carried away. (In C e n t r a l A m e r i c a the failure o f p y r a m i d complexes to transcend is more obvious: not o n l y have the workers' huts been reabsorbed i n t o the j u n gle, but so have the pyramids themselves. A l t h o u g h they were more often sacred astronomical observatories than tombs, the A m e r i c a n pyramids' facing conceals o n l y rubble, not generative power.)

35

Interpreting

Environments

French Neoclassic Pyramids C e n t u r i e s later, w h e n the power o f the E g y p t i a n t r a d i t i o n a n d c u l ture h a d w a n e d , a n o t h e r — i n d e e d , a d o u b l e d — d i s p l a c e m e n t o f p y r a m i d s occurred. I n eighteenth-century France, as part o f a neoclassic v i s i o n a n d architecture o f death, p y r a m i d s again pretended to sustain presence a n d i d e n t i t y b u t d i d n o t . T h e F r e n c h p y r a m i d s simultaneously h a d t o b u t c o u l d n o t replace the E g y p t i a n . T h e y h a d to replace the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s because the ancient forms were n o longer

efficacious

i n g r o u n d i n g presence.

The

unquestionable

absence o f a n y guarantee o f a t r i u m p h a n t eternal presence needed to be overcome; the lack needed to be filled. T h u s , the F r e n c h trad i t i o n h a d to replace the E g y p t i a n to a l l o w a n y p o s s i b i l i t y o f presence a n d i d e n t i t y i n the eighteenth century. A t the same t i m e , b y the very means it e m p l o y e d to displace the E g y p t i a n , the F r e n c h tradition

necessarily

undercut

required to overcome

itself: the posture

a n d techniques

the E g y p t i a n i m m u t a b i l i t y u n a v o i d a b l y

depended for a n y power o n that very source. I n discrediting the E g y p t i a n t r a d i t i o n , the F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n also u n a v o i d a b l y n u l l i f i e d itself. T h u s , the F r e n c h p y r a m i d s dislocated n o t o n l y the earlier syst e m they w o u l d replace b u t , simultaneously, their o n l y f o u n d a t i o n and

hope for success. T h e F r e n c h p y r a m i d appeared as part o f the gesture t h r o u g h

w h i c h presence a n d i d e n t i t y a n n o u n c e their t r i u m p h over absence and

fracture, that is, as the denial a n d conquest o f death p r o c l a i m e d

i n cemeteries a n d b y m o n u m e n t s . T h i s p h e n o m e n o n i n eighteenthcentury France m a y best be focused i n the architecture o f E t i e n n e Louis

Boullée

a n d i n the parallel c u l t u r a l discourse o n death as

narrated, for example, b y R i c h a r d E t l i n . Perhaps better t h a n a n y o f 8

his contemporaries, especially i n his drawings p u b l i s h e d f r o m 1782 to 1799, Boullée c o m p l e t e d the a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the E g y p t i a n pyram i d s a n d their m e a n i n g to develop for the sake o f the l i v i n g a n e w f o r m for the cities o f the dead. I n the project o f delineating the neoclassic v i s i o n o f life's v i c t o r y over death, Boullée a n d his colleagues d r e w o n a n d fused the t w o p r i n c i p a l manifestations a n d u n d e r l y i n g traditions o f the sublime: the s u b l i m i t y o f nature, whereby we can experience the timeless, a n d the example o f great i n d i v i d u a l s , w h i c h i n c o m m e m o r a t i o n allows an i n t i m a t i o n o f i m m o r t a l i t y .

9

A c c o r d i n g to this concept o f the s u b l i m e , the i m m e n s i t y a n d

36

Deconstruction

o v e r w h e l m i n g features o f nature can i n d u c e an experience where the m i n d is l e d to b e h o l d d i v i n i t y . A t base this was a d e v e l o p m e n t o f the t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n idea that creation bears witness to its creator, b u t i n the m o d e r n age the creator was n o longer u n d e r s t o o d as w h o l l y other t h a n the created, as he h a d been i n the t r a d i t i o n o f negative theology. Rather, d i v i n i t y was h e l d to be present i n nature itself. I n the F r e n c h p a n t h e i s m c o n n e c t e d w i t h this concept o f the s u b l i m e , nature was seen as the appearance o f the timeless.

10

D e a t h , t h e n , was also seen i n terms o f n a t u r a l forces,

where

nature s o v e r w h e l m i n g grandeur w o u l d m o v e the s o u l to a r e l a t i o n ship w i t h the d i v i n e a n d eternal l i f e . T h e idea was w o r k e d o u t i n 11

the F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n o f the cemetery as E g y p t i a n wasteland, where the fascinating forms o f the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s i n the desert were artistically a n d architecturally represented a n d reinterpreted d u r i n g the first h a l f o f the eighteenth century. J . B . Fischer v o n E r l a c h h a d d r a w n t h e m i n his E g y p t i a n P y r a m i d s a n d T h e b a n P y r a m i d s (1721; see fig. 2.3). H i s renderings were adapted, i n t u r n , b y J e r o m e C h a r l e s B e l l i c a r d i n C a p r i c c i o (1752) a n d H u b e r t R o b e r t w i t h his C a p r i c c i o (1760). O v e r the forty-year course o f these representations, the p y r a m i d s a n d their s u r r o u n d i n g landscapes

became

increasingly s u b l i m e . T h e i n i t i a l interpretations, w h i c h strongly dist o r t e d the p y r a m i d s a c c o r d i n g to the p r e v a i l i n g c u l t u r a l c o n v e n tions, gave w a y to s y m b o l i c renderings that d e f o r m e d the p y r a m i d s i n t o shapes e v o k i n g m o u n t a i n majesty, lost i n d r a m a t i c clouds. T h e p y r a m i d s m e r g e d w i t h the n a t u r a l l y s u b l i m e a n d , b y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h natures timelessness, b e s p o k e — i f n o t quite p r o m i s e d — a n endurance b e y o n d death. In a d d i t i o n , there was a c o m p a n i o n p h e n o m e n o n b e a r i n g o n the interpretation o f death a n d o u r alternative strategies to deal w i t h it. By the eighteenth c e n t u r y a F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n existed w h e r e i n cemeteries were u n d e r s t o o d as m e m e n t o m o r i meant to s h o w the p u b l i c the f o l l y o f h u m a n v a n i t y .

12

F o r instance, the cemetery o f the H o l y

Innocents i n Paris, b y e x p o s i n g the remains o f the m a n y i n d i v i d u als b u r i e d there, was i n t e n d e d to p r o v i d e an occasion for m o r a l reflection a n d e d u c a t i o n . G r a d u a l l y the desire to reorganize h u m a n activity p h y s i c a l l y a n d to clarify that p h y s i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o v i d e d a m o t i v e for n e w designs o f cemeteries.

13

A l o n g s i d e the c o n c e r n for

health a n d sanitation, w h i c h v i g o r o u s l y emerged as means to dis-

37

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.3. J . B. Fischer von Erlach, E g y p t i a n P y r a m i d s . From E n t w u r f f e i n e r h i s t o r i s c h e n a r c h i t e c t u r , 1725.

c r i m i n a t e clean f r o m p o l l u t e d e n v i r o n m e n t s , appeared the c o n c u r rent desire to separate the m o r a l l y pure f r o m the c o r r u p t — t h e basis for cemetery design as i t was seen b y B l o n d e l a n d L e d o u x .

14

D u r i n g this process o f n e w design a n d m e a n i n g for F r e n c h cemeteries, the concept o f m o n u m e n t a l i t y also changed. T h e earlier trad i t i o n o f the cemetery as m o r a l lesson against v a n i t y was radically transformed b y the h u m a n i s t t r a d i t i o n o f i n s p i r a t i o n ( w h i c h is desire for i m m o r t a l i t y ) : the spur to p r o p e r c o n d u c t became e m u l a t i o n o f great achievement. T h e great deeds o f heroes were to be presented

to m e m o r y

by monuments

i n cemeteries.

Indeed, the

t r i u m p h o f lasting fame over death a n d v i r t u e over vice transcended the cemetery, so that i n the 1740s the F r e n c h began to "envisage the entire c i t y as a n appropriate subject for i n s t i l l i n g v i r t u e . "

15

H e r e , t o o , the p y r a m i d s were used as m o n u m e n t s to celebrate the illustrious dead, the heroes w h o m people s h o u l d imitate i n the course

of becoming

good

citizens.

Dufourny,

for

example,

e m p l o y e d a p y r a m i d a l central chapel i n his C e n o t a p h t o H e n r y

I V

(project o f 1778), thus "associating c o m m e m o r a t i o n w i t h t r i u m p h

38

Deconstruction

Figure 2.4. Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e n o t a p h in t h e E g y p t i a n G e n r e , c. 1785. HA 55, no. 26. Bibliotheque N a t i o n a l Paris.

in

the n e w cemetery" a n d s h o w i n g h o w s u b l i m e architecture is

appropriate, as B l o n d e l advocated, "to the sepulchers o f great m e n and

i n general to all m o n u m e n t s raised to r e m i n d o u r citizens o f

great deeds, the remarkable exploits, a n d the value o f o u r princes, heroes, a n d great generals."

16

As previously n o t e d , E t i e n n e - L o u i s Boullée fused these t w o trad i t i o n s o f the s u b l i m e : " O n the one h a n d , Boullée s p y r a m i d s are cenotaphs to personal greatness; o n the other, they are i n c a r n a t i o n s o f nature itself. T h e t w o themes are c o m b i n e d i n the great m a n , w h o is considered to have reached a status c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the grandeur o f d i v i n i t y . " Boullée

17

d r e w o n these traditions o f the cemetery as E g y p t i a n

wasteland a n d the concept o f m o n u m e n t a l i t y , b u t he w e n t o n to develop a n e w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d unity. T h e heart o f his v i s i o n was his b e l i e f that death is seasonal a n d that the p y r a m i d is a n image o f i m m o r t a l i t y b y w a y o f the s u b l i m e . H e r e , c o n t r a r y to the c o m m o n view, Boullée d i d n o t see the seasons as a cyclical course o f b i r t h , g r o w t h , decline, a n d death; rather, he saw a f u n d a m e n t a l seasonal o p p o s i t i o n : w i n t e r was the t i m e o f blackness a n d death, c o n t r a r y to life.

18

Boullée

u n d e r s t o o d the p y r a m i d as expressing nature's timeless-

ness. O f course, this was the age o f renewed v i g o r i n m a t h e m a t i c s ,

39

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.5. Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e n o t a p h to T u r e n n e , c. 1785, plan. HA 57, no. 23. Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

and

a l o n g w i t h interest i n pure m a t h e m a t i c a l forms came interest i n

p h e n o m e n a s u c h as crystalline forms i n minerals. " I n this w o r k , Boullée

m a y have f o u n d a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f his o w n c o n v i c t i o n that

perfect

geometries

were the u n d e r l y i n g forms

o f a universal

order. . . . I n his C e n o t a p h i n t h e E g y p t i a n G e n r e , Boullée j o i n e d the idea o f a r e t u r n to the b o s o m o f the earth t h r o u g h death w i t h the image o f this same n a t u r a n a t u r a n s r i s i n g o u t o f fertile chaos as a pure crystalline f o r m " (see fig. 2.4).

19

In a series o f major projects Boullée set o u t h o w the p y r a m i d a n d its associated symbols suggest "a return i n death to the fertile center of the w o r l d i n order to j o i n the i m m e n s i t y o f the cosmos, w h i c h is identified w i t h D i v i n i t y . " T h u s , i n his C e n o t a p h t o T u r e n n e (c. 1785), 20

a project for a cemetery i n Paris, his p l a n shows h o w he s u r r o u n d e d the p y r a m i d w i t h a n ossuary, w h i c h mediated, as a frame, the u n i o n o f nature a n d p y r a m i d a n d set the p y r a m i d as the site o f the u n i t y achieved (as a n expectation m e t w h e n the visitor m o v e d to the center) (see fig. 2.5). In

the cenotaph itself Boullée c o m p l e t e d the h u m a n i s t i c idea,

w h i c h h a d been d e v e l o p i n g since the e n d o f the seventeenth c e n t u ry, that death c a n be overcome b y h u m a n deeds (see fig. 2.6). T h e fame o f heroes, e n d u r i n g i n the m o n u m e n t s a n d memories o f c i t i zens a n d e m u l a t e d b y the latter, w o u l d be a t r i u m p h o f i m m o r t a l i ty.

21

F o r g o i n g the established specific imagery, Boullée assimilated

" T u r e n n e s valor to a m o r e universal f o r m that c o u l d also e m b o d y the spirit o f nature.

Boullées

p y r a m i d , as Jean S t a r o b i n s k i has

observed a n d as the section shows, rises as a p u i s s a n c e , a v i t a l force. T h e p y r a m i d is nature incarnate, timeless, c h t h o n i c , p r i m i t i v e , fertile, a n d c r y s t a l l i n e . "

22

O f course, as o n e o f the most venerable m o n u m e n t s k n o w n , "the

40

Deconstruction

Figure 2.6. Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e n o t a p h to T u r e n n e , c. 1785, section. HA 57, no. 14. Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris.

p y r a m i d seemed to Boullée to f u r n i s h an ideal 'image o f i m m u t a b i l ity.'"

23

T h e idea o f i m m o r t a l i t y achieved b y n o b l e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t

was especially forceful w h e n the c o s m i c order was experienced b y the hero. F o r example, it was believed that i n reasoning o u t the l a w of gravity, N e w t o n h a d entered i n t o u n i o n w i t h the deepest order and

therefore w i t h the mystery o f nature, as i n other ways h a d

explorers w h o d i e d i n the course o f u n l o c k i n g nature's

secrets.

H e n c e , their lavish m o n u m e n t s witnessed the c o m m e m o r a t i o n o f their c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h nature a n d i m m o r t a l i t y . T h e emphasis o n experience i n the e n c o u n t e r w i t h the s u b l i m e and

the eternal was carried over i n architectural forms that a l l o w e d

the c i t i z e n to participate i n , o r at least catch a h i n t of, s u c h n o b l e deeds a n d c o s m i c grandeur. T h i s was a c c o m p l i s h e d , for instance, b y e m p h a s i z i n g sequential m o v e m e n t over simultaneous visual grasp, as i n the " h o r i z o n t a l o r t e m p o r a l progression f r o m the ossuary at the p e r i p h e r y to the p y r a m i d at the center" at the Paris cemetery. Boullée's its

24

Both

C e m e t e r y E n t r a n c e b y M o o n l i g h t (c. 1785; see fig. 2.7), w i t h

d a z z l i n g triangle o f l i g h t at the heart o f the p y r a m i d , a n d its

inversion, F u n e r a r y M o n u m e n t C h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e G e n r e o f a B u r i e d

41

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.7. Etienne-Louis Boullée, C e m e t e r y E n t r a n c e b y M o o n l i g h t , c. 1785. HA 55, no. 27. Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris.

A r c h i t e c t u r e (c. 1785; see fig. 2.8), w i t h its darkened triangular center, were designed i n a m a n n e r that "presented a n i n t i m a t i o n o f i m m o r t a l i t y at the i n i t i a l p o i n t o f entry a l o n g the axes to the central pyramid."

25

T h u s , i n the F r e n c h neoclassic architecture o f death, a n d especially as f o r m e d b y Boullée, w e find the t r i u m p h o f the d o m i n a n t m e m b e r o f each pair: i m m o r t a l i t y over death, the timeless over the t e m p o r a l , nature over i n d i v i d u a l c o r r u p t i o n , great deeds over the shameful (as i n the cases o f p r o p r i e t y over unseemly behavior o r respect over disrespect for social mores), a n d reason over unreason (as w i t h Newton's penetration o f natures order). Consistently, even rigorously, the age o f rationality sought to constitute a culture w h e r e i n the m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d f o r m a l were displayed i n the order o f social space a n d i n the behavior a n d manners o f the p o p u l a t i o n . O f course, architecture a n d the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t n o t o n l y s u p p o r t e d this v i s i o n o f presence a n d i d e n t i t y b u t constructed it. As

n o t e d , the use o f p y r a m i d s i n the eighteenth c e n t u r y a r c h i -

tecturally to posit i m m o r t a l i t y over death depended o n the successful a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the E g y p t i a n t r a d i t i o n a n d the displacement o f the o r i g i n a l meanings a n d beliefs. F o r the Egyptians, the p y r a m i d s were i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the timeless because the p y r a m i d s j o i n e d the p h a r a o h a n d gods, thus o v e r c o m i n g natures changes a n d death. Inversely, for the F r e n c h , nature p u s h e d itself f o r w a r d as timeless presence, i m a g e d i n the f o r m o f the p y r a m i d . Whereas nature h a d been a n absence o f eternity for the Egyptians, w i t h the F r e n c h rever-

42

Deconstruction

Figure 2.8. Etienne-Louis Boullée, F u n e r a r y M o n u m e n t

Characterizing

t h e G e n r e o f a B u r i e d A r c h i t e c t u r e , c. 1785. HA 55, no. 29. Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris.

sal it t o o k over as the manifestation o f the presence o f timelessness. T h e p r i m a l l y d i v i n e , as opposite a n d transcendent to the n a t u r a l , gave w a y to d i v i n i t y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h (and i n c o r p o r a t e d into) the natural t h r o u g h the s u b l i m e . Similarly, whereas for the E g y p t i a n s the deeds that c o u l d confer e n d u r i n g life were entirely restricted to the gods a n d p h a r a o h (thus e x c l u d i n g the rest o f the k i n g d o m a n d g i v i n g the p h a r a o h p o w e r over i t ) , for the F r e n c h h u m a n i s t s the glorious achievements c o n ferring i m m o r t a l i t y were those o f m o r t a l heroes a n d were o p e n to e m u l a t i o n b y the general citizenry. H u m a n reason a n d a c t i o n t o o k the place f o r m e r l y reserved for d i v i n i t y . In

a d d i t i o n to i n s t i t u t i n g these g r o u n d i n g displacements,

the

F r e n c h asserted their p o w e r over the E g y p t i a n i n a n u m b e r o f other ways. T h e mathematics o f r a t i o n a l i s m replaced nature's order a n d seemed to e x p l a i n it fully. T h u s , the r a t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p y r a m i d as a pure f o r m or concept destroyed the p y r a m i d u n d e r s t o o d as a measure or element i n E g y p t i a n sacred geometry. T h e n , too, there is the o v e r w h e l m i n g fact that the F r e n c h a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f p y r a m i d s resulted f r o m conquest, the b y - p r o d u c t o f the t r i u m p h o f reason, w h i c h carried away the forms a n d artifacts (such as obelisks) o f E g y p t to W e s t e r n p u b l i c spaces a n d m u s e u m s — t h e arena for disp l a y i n g the p o w e r o f vectorial visual o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d presentation.

26

I n b o t h cases the spectacle o f the w i l l f u l , h i s t o r i c a l use a n d

m a n i p u l a t i o n o f the E g y p t i a n e n v i r o n m e n t a n d concepts b y the

43

Interpreting

Environments

E n l i g h t e n m e n t F r e n c h , w h i c h a i m e d to establish the latter s i d e n t i ty a n d i m m o r t a l i t y , makes clear the emptiness o f the E g y p t i a n c l a i m to the same t r i u m p h . T h e F r e n c h asserted i m m o r t a l i t y (presence a n d identity) for o r d i n a r y h u m a n s b y d i s p l a c i n g the o r i g i n a l gods a n d p h a r a o h , a n act achieved b y o v e r t u r n i n g the pharaohs' a n d gods' claims to superiority over natural a n d h u m a n change a n d i m p o t e n c e . T h e Egyptians did

n o t achieve eternal life o r transcendent i m m o r t a l i t y b u t suc-

c u m b e d to time's flow i n the forms o f c h a n g i n g power a n d c o r r u p t i o n o f s h a m concepts. W h a t h a d postured as presence became absent. T h e suppressed a n d invisible c o u n t e r p o i n t , however,

indicates

the flaw i n the F r e n c h project a n d posture: what comes to c l a i m presence w h e n it deposes i n t o absence w h a t h a d been present was itself i n i t i a l l y absent a n d has n o other g r o u n d . T h a t is, there is n o possible f o u n d a t i o n for a c l a i m to i m m o r t a l i t y , because s u c h a claim's o n l y power w o u l d derive f r o m the o r i g i n a l forms a n d c o n cepts that i t takes over; b u t for those o r i g i n a l forms a n d concepts to have a sustained power, they w o u l d have to retain their presence a n d i d e n t i t y — p r e c i s e l y that c o n d i t i o n that cannot o b t a i n once they have been rendered absent a n d different

f r o m their p u r p o r t e d

nature b y their F r e n c h usurpers. How

c o u l d the pyramids have facilitated F r e n c h access to t i m e -

lessness w h e n their very appearance i n F r e n c h f o r m witnessed the failure o f the o r i g i n a l E g y p t i a n gods, pharaohs, a n d people to m a i n tain the p r i m a l integrity a n d desired effect t h r o u g h these forms? T o v a n q u i s h i m m o r t a l i t y t h r o u g h architecture the F r e n c h used the pyramid,

w h i c h was possible because they displaced the E g y p t i a n system

o f m e a n i n g . A t the same time, however, the F r e n c h c o u l d make genuine use o f the pyramids o n l y i f the pyramids retained their appearance as i m m u t a b l e — a l t h o u g h the pyramids c o u l d n o t be i m m u t a b l e unless they, along w i t h the E g y p t i a n gods a n d pharaohs, retained their o r i g i n a l i d e n t i t y a n d c o n t i n u a l l y manifested their eternal presence i n the later F r e n c h social a n d natural w o r l d , that is, unless they successfully resisted a n y F r e n c h a p p r o p r i a t i o n . I f such were the case, o f course, it w o u l d have precluded the F r e n c h inversion a n d replacem e n t o f E g y p t i a n d i v i n i t y a n d sacred power, the inversion necessary for the F r e n c h a p p r o p r i a t i o n a n d d o m i n a t i o n i n the first place.

44

Deconstruction

T h e F r e n c h attempt for d o m i n i o n d e p e n d e d o n the p o w e r o f the culture a n d b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t it necessarily subverted; insofar as the attempt succeeded, it subverted the basis for a n y sustained p o w e r o f i m m u t a b i l i t y that i n h e r e d i n the p y r a m i d s , thus b e c o m i n g i m p o tent itself. T h e r e was n o t r i u m p h , o n l y irresolvable d o u b l e displacem e n t , as the F r e n c h inverted the E g y p t i a n system a n d also thereby their o w n f o u n d a t i o n , i n a self-contradiction a n d self-displacement. It is l i k e a t t e m p t i n g to clear a b u i l d i n g site w i t h fire a n d r e b u i l d i n g , u s i n g the s t i l l - s m o l d e r i n g l u m b e r , i n the same place w h i l e the fire rages o n , c o n s u m i n g a n y n e w b u i l d i n g . T h i s d o u b l e b i n d appears to have h i d d e n itself at the t i m e : " T h e a n t i q u i t y o f the p y r a m i d m a d e it a p r i m e candidate for a m o n u m e n t to convey the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the m e r i t o r i o u s dead; . . . as the a r c h i tect S o b r y w o u l d express it, i n the p y r a m i d , ' i m m o r t a l i t y . . . is visible a n d p a l p a b l e . ' "

27

Nonetheless, the very p r o o f cited b y

the

A c a d e m i e Royale d ' A r c h i t e c t u r e i n 1865 as d e m o n s t r a t i n g the w o r thiness a n d venerable age o f the p y r a m i d s is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a n d exactly the evidence that indicates that the p y r a m i d s h a d b e c o m e mere traces o f lost identity, w i t h o u t w o r t h a n d power: the "absence o f hieroglyphs a n d s i t u a t i o n o n a sandy p l a i n . "

28

Just as h a d h a p p e n e d i n E g y p t , the s i t u a t i o n i n eighteenth-cent u r y France u n d e r c u t i t s e l f T h e architectural e n v i r o n m e n t s actually d i s c l o s e d t h e

fracture

i n the supposed appearances o f presence a n d

identity, as seen i n the d i s p l a c i n g inversions at w o r k here. C o n s i d e r the flaws that h i s t o r i c a l change makes obvious, betraying the h i d d e n differences usually concealed i n the m o r e subtle a n d p o w e r f u l struggle o f alternative concepts. T h e pretense that heroic deeds are o b v i ous a n d endure c o n t a i n e d the seeds o f its o w n o v e r t u r n i n g . Indeed, the h u m a n i s t i c idea o f e m u l a t i n g glorious deeds was itself a displacement that inverted the t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n m o r a l : the idea o f m e m e n t o m o r i was that the v a n i t y o f h u m a n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s w o u l d be clarified i n the face o f death, whereas the n e w m o n u m e n tality raised w h a t h a d been suppressed (vanity) over its f o r m e r master concept ( h u m i l i t y ) . So v a n i t y paraded as the key to i m m o r t a l i t y . H o w c o u l d the achievements h o n o r e d for the sake o f a d o m i n a n t class's desire for a m o r e proper order expect to endure i n h u m a n a d m i r a t i o n , m u c h less for eternity? S u c h views are passing, d i s p u t ed, a n d c o r r u p t e d . N o t surprisingly, t h e n , this F r e n c h v i s i o n o f

45

Interpreting

Environments

i m m o r t a l i t y t h r o u g h nature a n d m o n u m e n t itself soon dissolved, b e i n g d i m i n i s h e d a n d assimilated b y 1800 t h r o u g h the concepts o f health a n d the picturesque (for example, i n the cemetery as p i c turesque landscape garden). T o d a y that F r e n c h use o f pyramids appears an affected

attempt

to c l a i m more than is possible: their failure to achieve i m m o r t a l i t y i n u n i o n w i t h timeless nature is obvious i n the decay o f E u r o p e a n corpses (an even greater decay than that o f the older, m u m m i f i e d pharaoh), a n d the p y r a m i d f o r m itself, clearly neither derived f r o m nor

symbolically attached to a present transcendent

realm a n d

divine vital force, was instead the p r o d u c t o f self-conscious h u m a n artistic a n d m o r a l efforts. If the p r i m a l gods c o u l d n o t give us i m m o r t a l i t y , h o w are we to confer it o n ourselves? Surely we cannot d o so b y c o n q u e r i n g earlier cultures a n d carrying away the m e a n i n g o f their discourse a n d b u i l t environment. W e find a lesson i n the silent, a n d so far ignored, c o m p a n i o n o f the pyramids at G i z a . Since the " S p h i n x records the m o m e n t o f closest identity between g o d a n d pharaoh: between the invisible a n d v i s i b l e , "

29

the p o p u l a r tale o f N a p o l e o n s artillery

destroying the nose o f the S p h i n x d u r i n g practice turns o u t to be a tale o f the F r e n c h s p i t i n g their o w n face.

Postmodern Pyramids In their recent manifestations i n I. M . Peis project for the L o u v r e and

A r a t a Isozaki's M u s e u m o f C o n t e m p o r a r y A r t i n L o s Angeles,

pyramids appear as "postmodern quotations." Pei s glazed p y r a m i d , w h i c h is based o n the p r o p o r t i o n s at G i z a , is sited i n the m i d d l e o f the C o u r de N a p o l e o n at the L o u v r e (see fig. 2.9). T h e p y r a m i d , w h i c h is s u r r o u n d e d b y three smaller pyram i d s a n d seven pools, provides ground-level access to the s u r r o u n d ing

b u i l d i n g s . T h e glazed surface, according to the architects early

announcements, " w o u l d reflect the skies o f Paris b y day a n d be l i t like a vast lantern at n i g h t . "

30

T r a d i t i o n a l methods o f interpretation w o u l d evaluate the p r o j e c t — c o n t r o v e r s i a l , at the l e a s t — a c c o r d i n g to categories such as historical context, f o r m a l relation to s u r r o u n d i n g architecture, o r the creativity o f the architect. N o d o u b t "creative," these pyramids

46

Deconstruction

Figure 2.9. Pyramids and pools in the middle of the Cour de Napoleon. I. M. Pei, Grand Louvre Pyramid, 1985-1989.

either display the genius o f their designer i n the v i c i n i t y o f one o f the major collections o f W e s t e r n art o r s h o w the egotism o f one w h o w o u l d c o m p a r e his w o r k w i t h that o f the masters. F o r m a l l y the p y r a m i d s appear to shatter the s y m m e t r y a n d u n i t y o f their context, resulting i n conflict a n d tension rather t h a n h a r m o n y a n d r e s o l u t i o n o f rich complexity. create

polysemy,

31

A l t h o u g h the f u s i o n o f disparate elements c a n

as i n metaphor,

the mere j u x t a p o s i t i o n

here

appears to be a b a d joke. I f we recall the deeper f o u n d a t i o n s o f F r e n c h art a n d architecture, however, specifically the m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d geometrical basis

of

great w o r k s , whether i n D a v i d o r C e z a n n e , Pei's p y r a m i d m a y be seen as m o r e m e a n i n g f u l . T h e p u r i t y o f p y r a m i d , cylinder, sphere, a n d square c o u l d be said to be the c o m m o n basis for "classic" F r e n c h art, o f whatever p e r i o d a n d style. M o r e o v e r , s u c h pure forms have l i n k e d F r e n c h art to its o r i g i n i n a n t i q u i t y (see fig. 2.10). Peis project m a y evoke that heritage, t o o — a p p r o p r i a t e for the L o u v r e , where the focus is o n the great classical t r a d i t i o n . T h u s , to m a k e sense, even at a f o r m a l level, the p y r a m i d s w o u l d have to f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the F r e n c h heritage a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f

47

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.10. The pure form of the pyramid and the heritage of "classical" French art? I. M. Pei, Grand Louvre Pyramid, 1985-1989.

f o r m , so that the n e w project is g r o u n d e d i n the past. T h e projects i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y w o u l d be a matter o f precisely the displacements a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i o n previously considered. T o t r a n s f o r m the issue i n t o the terms I have been u s i n g , one w o u l d say that the creative d i m e n s i o n is a struggle for presence a n d i m m o r t a l i t y . Simultaneously, the historical a n d f o r m a l d i m e n s i o n s c o n t e n d for presence a n d identity.

48

Deconstruction

I n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Pei's p y r a m i d f u n c t i o n s n o t merely as a historical q u o t a t i o n o f classic t r a d i t i o n a n d p y r a m i d a l f o r m b u t as the active assertion o f presence a n d i d e n t i t y at the expense o f the preceding tradition. T h e M i t t e r r a n d g o v e r n m e n t , b y c o m m i s s i o n i n g a change i n the L o u v r e that appears to fracture its h i s t o r i c a l repose a n d aesthetic wholeness, is a t t e m p t i n g to assert that w h a t matters is n o t the c o n servation o f masterpieces f r o m the past, whose physical c o n d i t i o n a n d meanings deteriorate despite o u r best techniques o f preservat i o n . Rather, w h a t matters is the c o n t i n u o u s , present creativity that is the F r e n c h artistic a n d c u l t u r a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . T h e L o u v r e , t h e n , is n o t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l D o r i a n G r a y b u t witnesses F r e n c h i d e n tity as a creative p o w e r actively present. T h e b o l d p y r a m i d , b u i l t over the c l a m o r o f conservatives w h o w o u l d retain the past a n d freeze its forms, achieves the active p r i o r i t y o f the p r o p e r — d e s i r e d — c o n t r a d i c t o r y d i m e n s i o n s : presence o f c o n t e m p o r a r y creative p o w e r a n d c u l t u r e versus absence as they recede i n t o the past; the i d e n t i t y o f the current regime a n d art as creative a n d c u l t u r a l l y potent versus the difference o f mere caretaki n g as measured against o r i g i n a l creativity; a n d the assertion o f the life o f the L o u v r e as the scene o f art i n France o p p o s e d to the death that haunts m u s e u m s as m a u s o l e u m s o f past genius. Pei's project, t h e n , a l t h o u g h this does n o t at all i m p l y conscious i n t e n t i o n o n his part, is a strategy to assert a n d attain i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y a n d power. T h e p y r a m i d is n o t so m u c h a f o r m a l , aesthetic object o r w o r t h y museu m piece as an act. O f course, the act o f Pei's p y r a m i d s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y dislocates earlier F r e n c h uses o f p y r a m i d s . T h e p y r a m i d o f the M i t t e r r a n d government

asserts

i t s e l f as

a

monument

of

great i n d i v i d u a l s

( M i t t e r r a n d , P e i , a n d others) a n d current F r e n c h culture, to be a d m i r e d a n d e m u l a t e d , a n d also as c o n f e r r i n g a sort o f c u l t u r a l immortality instance,

on

that

t h e m . Nevertheless, the

eighteenth-century

that

posture

shows,

for

neoclassic a r c h i t e c t u r a l

m e m o r i a l s designed b y Boullée, D u f o u r n y , a n d others

32

fail to sus-

tain their supposed earlier a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . T h e i r m e a n i n g as access to s u b l i m e nature a n d thus timeless d i v i n i t y is n o longer operative. T h e i r t e s t i m o n y to the t r i u m p h o f almost forgotten i n d i v i d u a l s over death is n o t credible. I f the neoclassic v i s i o n o f architecture a n d

49

Interpreting

Environments

death really h a d the m e a n i n g it p u r p o r t e d to have, it w o u l d still be p o w e r f u l . O b v i o u s l y , i t is n o t . Therefore, repetition is required. A s the F r e n c h earlier h a d a p p r o priated the antique a n d classical to assert their presence a n d i d e n t i ty, n o w the ritual m u s t be repeated. A s L o u i s X I V , for example, asserted his a n d France's presence, identity, a n d life i n r e b u i l d i n g the L o u v r e s Petite G a l e r i e ( c o n t i n u i n g the process o f reconstructing the L o u v r e b e g u n b y Charles V i n the thirteenth century); as N a p o l e o n asserted i t i n his d a y w i t h p o w e r over past empires a n d the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s a n d the S p h i n x themselves; as Boullée, Jacques Rousseau, B l o n d e l , a n d L e d o u x h a d at the e n d o f the eighteenth c e n t u r y w i t h their architecture o f death; so d o M i t t e r r a n d a n d Pei today. In asserting c u l t u r a l presence a n d their i m m o r t a l i t y as patrons and

creators o f art, the M i t t e r r a n d government a n d Pei c o n f i r m the

c o n c e p t i o n o f i m m o r t a l i t y as "lasting artistic a n d c u l t u r a l reputat i o n " a n d again g r o u n d the L o u v r e as m o n u m e n t a l m u s e u m , where the n e w w o r k joins the display a n d c o m m e m o r a t i o n o f earlier w o r k s , artists, a n d patrons. H e r e is the c o m p l e t i o n o f a t u r n b e g u n b y F r e n c h neoclassic architecture. O r i g i n a l l y , for the Egyptians a n d o r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n i t y alike, i m m o r t a l i t y meant p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the timeless realm o f divinity. Later, w i t h Boullée a n d his colleagues, i t partially i n d i c a t e d that same earlier m e a n i n g t h r o u g h the s u b l i m i t y o f nature, b u t the concept also diverged, since i n a f f i r m i n g i n s p i r a t i o n to glorious deeds, the eighteenth-century F r e n c h finally u n d e r s t o o d timelessness as c o m m e m o r a t i o n that lasts i n citizens' m i n d s . It seems natural that, as the belief i n d i v i n i t y gave w a y to faith i n rationality, i m m o r t a l i t y w o u l d c o m e to m e a n " r e m a i n i n g everlasting, as present i n h u m a n consciousness." T h e force a n d m e a n i n g o f Pei's p y r a m i d s therefore give n o h i n t o f support for lost a n d b a n k r u p t ideas such as eternal presence w i t h divinity. I n this regard the L o u v r e is the perfect site for Pei's p y r a m i d s . E a r l i e r the scene o f assertion o f the S u n K i n g ' s p o w e r ( L o u i s XIV

identified h i m s e l f w i t h the s u n as s y m b o l o f the presence o f

d i v i n e right i n the t r a d i t i o n o f the p h a r a o h e m p o w e r e d b y his s u n g o d , R a ) , n o w it is the site for the c l a i m o f current p o w e r a n d i d e n tity that is a c c o m p l i s h e d b y b u i l d i n g over, a n d thereby i n c o r p o r a t ing, t r a d i t i o n . Needless to say, the actions m a d e possible b y Pei's act o f design-

50

Deconstruction

i n g the p y r a m i d are m o r e m u n d a n e t h a n those i n the E g y p t i a n (or neoclassic) era. Pei's p y r a m i d provides g r o u n d - l e v e l access to the facilities, a n d whereas the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s h i d the pharaoh's b o d y to a l l o w for his " u n d e r g r o u n d " eternal life, Pei's p y r a m i d (or really, the p u b l i c reaction to a n d focus o n it, w h i c h distracts us) conceals Pei's larger architectural task: e x p a n d i n g the u n d e r g r o u n d p a r k i n g facilities a n d p r o m o t i n g t o u r i s m . A s D e r r i d a w o u l d have it, it is a case o f the p i t reasserted over the p y r a m i d .

3 3

A r c h i t e c t u r a l l y a n d epistemologically, presence a n d i m m o r t a l i t y are again affirmed as d o m i n a n t over absence a n d death, b u t n o w this assertion occurs t h r o u g h n e w concepts covertly u s u r p i n g the d e f i n i t i o n o f the o r i g i n a l ones; that is, the mastery depends o n the i n v e r s i o n o f the t r a d i t i o n a l meanings.

O r i g i n a l l y presence

and

i m m o r t a l i t y meant the d o m i n a n c e o f d e i t y over beings, o f life i n the o t h e r w o r l d over life i n this w o r l d , o f the u n b r o k e n succession o f timeless meanings a n d forms i n the b u i l t e n v i r o n m e n t over c o n stant change a n d i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a r i a t i o n . U n d e r s t o o d as the disp l a c e m e n t o f the earlier t r a d i t i o n a l architecture o f eternal presence b y c o n t i n u o u s reaffirmation o f t e m p o r a l presence, Pei's p y r a m i d s have their m e a n i n g as part o f o u r posture a n d strategy for today's power. W e have, t h e n , a w a y to interpret Pei's gloss o n his p y r a m i d , as n o t e d b y an architectural reporter: " H e described it, rather e n i g matically, as h a v i n g a n architectural presence w h i l e b e i n g less t h a n architecture."

34

Finally, A r a t a Isozaki's

new

Museum of Contemporary Art

( M O C A ) near d o w n t o w n L o s Angeles also appropriates the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s . I n the final scheme for the red sandstone project, p y r a m i d a l skylights are p o s i t i o n e d over some o f the galleries. O n one w i n g there are t w o rows o f f o u r p y r a m i d a l skylights; o n the other, three p y r a m i d s , t w o s m a l l ones (the same size as the eight o n the other w i n g ) before a large one, e v o k i n g G i z a (see fig. 2.11). Together w i t h the other disparate b u i l d i n g elements (notably, a barrel-vaulted entrance a n d s u n k e n c o u r t ) , the m u s e u m as a w h o l e is a n interesting

candidate

for

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to

the

reigning

architectural theories. F o r example, one largely sympathetic review sees the p y r a m i d s a n d b u i l d i n g forms practically (technically a n d p r u d e n t l y ) a n d judges that they are a decent s o l u t i o n to arbitrary a n d p o o r site a n d d e v e l o p m e n t restrictions. S i m i l a r l y , the museum's

51

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.11. Pyramidal skylights over galleries. Arata Isozaki, Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles, 1981-1986.

six

successive

schemes are

seen

through

Venturis

influential

C o m p l e x i t y a n d C o n t r a d i c t i o n i n A r c h i t e c t u r e as d e v e l o p i n g f r o m an i n i t i a l attitude o f repose t o w a r d c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d a p o s t m o d e r n style.

35

It is m o r e t h a n i r o n i c that Isozaki introduces p y r a m i d s i n t o the design at the p o i n t where it moves o u t o f repose a n d i n t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n : E g y p t i a n sacred f o r m a n d repose displaced, i n d e e d . N o t surprisingly, the n o t i o n s o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d repose d o n o t enable an adequate interpretation o f the p y r a m i d s , m u c h less o f the p a l m trees o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d to l i n e the street outside. F o r example, the previously c i t e d c r i t i c wonders whether the j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f p y r a m i d a n d p a l m trees is a j o k e .

36

O f course, p o s t m o d e r n architecture

is f u l l o f w i t , b u t there is m o r e g o i n g o n here. I n one w a y the project shows the d i s s o l u t i o n o f the p y r a m i d a n d architectural f o r m , f r o m reflecting c u l t u r a l l y a n c h o r e d a n d validated d i m e n s i o n s w i t h generative a n d n o r m a t i v e p o w e r to participati n g i n a stock o f "equally m e a n i n g f u l " a n d " h o m o g e n e o u s l y v a l u e d "

52

Deconstruction

design resources.

37

L o s Angeles is the p a r a d i g m a t i c site o f s u c h

u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e c i t y has its character a n d c h a r m precisely as the locus for the casual a n d h u m o r o u s , albeit sophisticated, b l e n d i n g o f exotic forms a n d styles, especially " t r o p i c a l " ones. T h e M u s e u m o f C o n t e m p o r a r y Art's p y r a m i d s are right at h o m e w i t h the city's trad i t i o n o f " E g y p t i a n " restaurants, theaters, a n d stores.

38

T h u s , Isozaki

i n d e e d has "gone native" (a c o m m e n t made, b u t n o t developed, b y a reviewer). It can be said that just this c o n t e m p o r a r y attitude, b y its h u m o r a n d casual enjoyment, makes a c o m f o r t a b l e place for o u r presence a n d i d e n t i t y b y d i s l o c a t i n g w h a t appear as p o m p o u s a n d stuffy attitudes a n d architectural forms o f h i g h culture (e.g., the L o u v r e ) . W i t h its p y r a m i d s M O C A is just right to house art i n L o s Angeles a n d assert p o w e r a n d the purpose o f art today. F u r t h e r m o r e , b y presenting the sandstone b u i l d i n g , p y r a m i d s , and p a l m trees together, the project does n o t so m u c h allude to the E g y p t i a n desert a n d the F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n o f cemetery interpreted as E g y p t i a n desert (surely the latter c o n n e c t i o n w o u l d n o t at all have been i n t e n d e d b y Isozaki) as "give t h e m the p a l m . " T h e E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s , s t r i k i n g l y preserved even w h i l e b e i n g w o r n away a n d covered b y the desert sand, n o longer display the p o w e r f u l life o f a civi l i z a t i o n f o r m e d to be a n oasis o f eternal life. I n the

French

neoclassic adaptations the p y r a m i d is already a n E g y p t i a n wasteland bespeaking o n l y death; a c c o r d i n g to the culture o f the s u b l i m e , life is affirmed o n l y i n nature's fertile b u t i m p e r s o n a l

timelessness.

T o d a y the p y r a m i d s are a p p r o p r i a t e d b y M O C A , w h i c h celebrates L o s Angeles as a present, v i b r a n t , a n d extravagant "desert c u l t u r e " a n d as n o w b e i n g w h a t the E g y p t i a n w o r l d once was b u t is n o m o r e . A final displacement. T h e M u s e u m o f C o n t e m p o r a r y Art's p y r a m i d s are skylights that, copper glazed, w i l l reflect their s u r r o u n d ings. Isozaki's a n d Pei's p y r a m i d s are the same, t h e n , i n d e a l i n g w i t h l i g h t as a natural p h e n o m e n o n : these p y r a m i d s let i n d a y l i g h t so that we can see, let l i g h t shine o u t at n i g h t , a n d , m i r r o r i n g , reflect the c i t y a n d sky a r o u n d t h e m . Pei's a n d Isozaki's p o s t m o d e r n p y r a m i d s , i n their relation to l i g h t a n d life, are altogether opposite to the t r a d i t i o n a l E g y p t i a n (and neoclassic) p y r a m i d s (see fig. 2.12). R e c a l l that the p y r a m i d s o f E g y p t gathered a n d h e l d the d i v i n e force o f life, w h i c h emanated f r o m the s u n g o d , R a , to his s o n , the p h a r a o h , a n d thus to the k i n g d o m , as d i d the rays o f the s u n .

53

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 2.12. Museum of Contemporary Art's pyramids deal with natural light. Arata Isozaki, Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles, 1981-1986.

A c c o r d i n g l y , l i g h t h a d c o s m i c significance for the Egyptians.

Of

course, ordinary, profane sunlight also m a d e people sweat a n d crops grow, b u t the soul l i v e d , plants grew, a n d people s a w — t h a t is, l i g h t was e f f i c a c i o u s — o n l y because it first o f all was sacred power. T h e p y r a m i d s focused a n d reflected such sacred l i g h t f r o m their g o l d capstones a n d closed o u t profane, o r d i n a r y l i g h t f r o m their p e r m a n e n t l y d a r k e n e d i n t e r i o r passages a n d chambers. Inside the sealed p y r a m i d the p h a r a o h s k a r e m a i n e d i n u n i o n w i t h the s u n g o d a n d m o v e d about, c o n t i n u i n g his a c t i o n i n his eternal d w e l l i n g .

39

In a w a y opposite to this c o n c e p t i o n , Pei's p y r a m i d at the L o u v r e and

Isozaki's at M O C A deal w i t h l i g h t as a f u l l y natural p h e n o m e n o n .

W h a t else w o u l d i t be for c o n t e m p o r a r y architecture? L i g h t is m o d ulated a n d dispersed for use a n d treated as a design element because o f its properties i n regard to s h a d o w a n d range o f saturation. A s the m u s e u m s ' p y r a m i d s a l l o w l i g h t to enter i n t o the b u i l d i n g s , as they reflect the cities' skies, a n d as they let l i g h t shine out, they e x t i n -

54

Deconstruction

guish the m e a n i n g o f the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s a n d their supposed g r o u n d i n sacred l i g h t . A s n o t e d , the p h a r a o h s p y r a m i d kept n a t u r a l l i g h t o u t a n d o p e n e d a site w i t h i n for d i v i n e l y emanated l i g h t , w h i c h enabled the p h a r a o h s k a to live i n the p o w e r o f a r i c h l y s y m b o l i c w o r l d , h o u s e d i n chambers full o f beautiful objects whose sacred forms a n d m e a n i n g h a d been given b y the gods. Pei's a n d Isozaki's p y r a m i d s let i n h u m a n l y c o n t r o l l e d s u n l i g h t so that w e can enjoy the c o l o r f u l objects we have m a d e a n d collected for ourselves. T h e E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s s y m b o l i c a l l y reflected the v i t a l force that the g o l d capstones p h y s i c a l l y reflected; that is, they s h o w e d n o t the p y r a m i d s ' profane s u r r o u n d i n g s b u t the sacred cosmos. T h e p y r a m i d s i n Paris a n d L o s Angeles reflect the s u r r o u n d i n g h u m a n a n d natural e n v i r o n m e n t , the city's lights a n d passing weather. N o physical l i g h t emanated f r o m the E g y p t i a n p y r a m i d s , b u t because the p h a r a o h l i v e d eternally w i t h i n , he c o n t i n u e d to disperse to the k i n g d o m the v i t a l force that he alone possessed as the gift f r o m the s u n g o d . Pei's p y r a m i d a l " l a n t e r n , " i n contrast, shows o u r power. E v e n w h e n the s u n is gone, w e generate l i g h t to i l l u m i n a t e w h a t w e have created a n d thus p r o v i d e for o u r o w n culture a n d w a y o f life. T h e n e w p y r a m i d s also have reversed the m e a n i n g o f life. T h e p y r a m i d was o r i g i n a l l y the scene o f life a n d presence because it was the place o f sacred life, reserved for the gods a n d their sons, the pharaohs. A c c o r d i n g l y it was located i n the desert w i t h i n a n e c r o p olis, a c i t y o f the dead (those w i t h eternal life i n earthly death), physically separate f r o m a n d inaccessible to o r d i n a r y c o m m u n a l life. Today, however, death a n d eternal life i n a n o t h e r w o r l d are b a n i s h e d b y the processes o f earthly life. G o d s a n d pharaohs are replaced b y participants i n d e m o c r a t i c societies. T h e p y r a m i d s h e l p to establish o u r secular presence a n d i d e n t i t y a n d b e l o n g w i t h i n the c i t y o f the living. I n the e n d the displacement o f the earlier meanings o f the same forms b y these p o s t m o d e r n inversions accomplishes for us w h a t earlier realms a t t e m p t e d to d o i n their t i m e . A l t h o u g h the succession o f forms a n d meanings shows the f u t i l i t y o f expecting final success, m u c h less the experience o f any eternal presence, the p y r a m i d s p r o vide a tactical device b y w h i c h we c a n maneuver, t r y i n g to establish a n d m a i n t a i n o u r i d e n t i t y a n d presence as part o f a c i t y o f the l i v -

55

Interpreting ing.

Environments

W h e r e better to celebrate the t r i u m p h a n d l i m i t a t i o n s o f o u r

lives a n d the power, posture, a n d w i t o f the free p l a y o f o u r art a n d architecture t h a n i n the center o f the C o u r de N a p o l e o n o r d o w n t o w n L o s Angeles? H o w better t h a n w i t h displaced pyramids?

56

3 Hermeneutic Retrieval American Nature as Paradise

America Religiously Understood T h e starting p o i n t o f this chapter is a general c l a i m : o r i g i n a l l y the American

understanding

o f nature was

substantially

religious,

w h i c h means that attendant practices operated a c c o r d i n g to a theol o g i c a l l y i n f o r m e d e c o n o m y a n d p o l i t i c s . W h a t we n o w take to be 1

matters o f science (for example, the wilderness as interpreted b y geology or physical geography a n d , perhaps, b y materialist c u l t u r a l geography, insofar as nature is m o d i f i e d b y h u m a n s ) o r i g i n a l l y were u n d e r s t o o d b y means o f w h a t h i s t o r i a n o f r e l i g i o n M i r c e a E l i a d e calls

" m y t h i c a l geography."

2

Specifically,

from

the

beginning,

A m e r i c a was u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f an earthly paradise. T h i s tra3

d i t i o n has its source i n Genesis, where the s e c o n d creation story (2:8-17) describes the G a r d e n o f E d e n . And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in E'den; and there he put the man whom he had formed. And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil. And a river went out of E'den to water the garden; and from thence it was parted, and became into four heads. (Gen. 2:8-10)

58

Hermeneutic Retrieval

And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of E'den to dress it and keep it. (Gen.

2:15)

T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A m e r i c a b y w a y o f S c r i p t u r e was f u n d a m e n t a l : C o l u m b u s , a c c o r d i n g to his B o o k o f P r o p h e c i e s , believed that he h a d discovered the G a r d e n o f E d e n a n d thus h a d enabled a significant advance i n the c o n v e r s i o n o f the w o r l d a n d its consequent e n d . H e wrote, " G o d m a d e m e the messenger o f the n e w heaven a n d the n e w earth o f w h i c h he spoke i n the apocalypse o f Saint J o h n , . . . a n d H e s h o w e d m e the spot to find i t . "

4

T h i s was n o t an i d i o s y n c r a t i c attitude t o w a r d the N e w W o r l d , regardless o f h o w accurately it explains C o l u m b u s ' s place i n the scheme o f events. T h r o u g h o u t the

fifteenth

a n d sixteenth c e n t u r y

people believed that the t i m e h a d c o m e to renew the C h r i s t i a n w o r l d a n d that this renewal was to be the r e t u r n to the earthly paradise or the b e g i n n i n g o f a n e w era o f sacred history. T h a t is, 5

A m e r i c a was to be the scene where the C h u r c h w o u l d c o m p l e t e its w o r k a n d Christ's second c o m i n g w o u l d occur.

6

P r o c e e d i n g f r o m the E n g l i s h R e f o r m a t i o n , the c o l o n i z a t i o n o f A m e r i c a elaborated s u c h a sacred history, w h i c h progressed i n the m o v e m e n t west; the u n f o l d i n g s p i r i t u a l d r a m a was seen as f u l f i l l i n g the t y p o l o g y o f America's m i s s i o n . T h u s , i n the seventeenth c e n t u 7

ry it was c o m m o n to t h i n k o f the sun's course i n terms o f a s p i r i t u al journey, so that one c o u l d f o l l o w the p a t h to paradise i n the west (for example, as T h o m a s B u r n e t a n d B i s h o p Berkeley d i d ) . U l r i c h 8

H u g w a l d p r o p h e s i e d that i n this n e w era h u m a n i t y w o u l d r e t u r n "to C h r i s t , to N a t u r e , to Paradise."

9

T h e early maps o f A m e r i c a d u r i n g this p e r i o d concretely located the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the a n t i c i p a t e d G a r d e n o f E d e n : G u i l l a u m e L e Testu's p e n , i n k , a n d watercolor m a p

Terre

d e l a F l o r i d e , which

appeared i n his m a n u s c r i p t atlas C o s m o g r a p h i e U n i v e r s e l l e (1555), shows the east coast as p a r k l a n d w i t h game (see fig. 3.1). A n d H i s t o r i a e C a n a d e n s i s (1664) depicts Indians easily gathering seabirds, r e i n f o r c i n g the v i e w that A m e r i c a was p o p u l a t e d w i t h partridges too big

to fly a n d turkeys as fat as l a m b s .

10

Indeed, f r o m early descrip-

tions b y G i o v a n n i d a Verrazzano, W i l l i a m W o o d , a n d others, it appears that a l o n g the s o u t h e r n coast o f N e w E n g l a n d , f r o m the Saco R i v e r i n M a i n e all the w a y to the H u d s o n , the w o o d s were

59

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 3.1. Guillaume Le Testu, Terre

de la F l o r i d e , from the manu-

script atlas C o s m o g r a p h i e u n i v e r s e l l e , 1555. Manuscript pen and ink and watercolor, 35 cm x 48 cm. Ministère de la Défense—Service Historique de I'Armée de Terre, Vincennes.

60

Hermeneutic Retrieval

r e m a r k a b l y o p e n , almost p a r k l i k e at times. I n 1614 J o h n S m i t h spoke o f N e w E n g l a n d as a n E d e n : "heaven a n d earth never agreed better to frame a place for m a n s h a b i t a t i o n . . . we c h a n c e d o n a lande, even as G o d m a d e i t . "

1 1

T h i s attitude still appeared i n 1737

w i t h the i l l u s t r a t i o n o f W i l l i a m Byrd's p r o p o s e d t o w n s h i p s e n t i t l e d Eden i n Virginia. A s a t o p i c , however, an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A m e r i c a a l i g n e d w i t h C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t is vast a n d m a y seem t e m p o r a l l y distant. E v e n granted that we c a n start o u r investigation w i t h a n A m e r i c a u n d e r s t o o d religiously f r o m its very b e g i n n i n g , we still have the l o n g passage to today, where s u c h a n idea seems q u a i n t at best, i f n o t totally anachronistic. T o focus o u r study a n d concentrate o n the t r a n s i t i o n , we c a n ask h o w s u c h a religious t r a d i t i o n was interpreted a n d used b y n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y painters to elaborate a p a r a d i g m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f A m e r i c a n nature a n d , hence, the landscape (an o r i g i n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g that has changed i n t o that w h i c h prevails today). T w o m a i n lines o f d e v e l o p m e n t derived

from

Genesis

and

w i l l c o n c e r n us here,

specifically

from

its t w o

both

creation

accounts, t w o traditions that are u n i f i e d i n the source f r o m w h i c h they s p r i n g .

12

A Natural Paradise Already Given T h e i n i t i a l p r o b l e m i n the A m e r i c a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d evaluation o f the landscape was that it d i d n o t appear as landscape. T h a t is, it d i d n o t qualify as landscape a c c o r d i n g to the r e i g n i n g E u r o p e a n c o n v e n t i o n s o f the cultivated-natural, w h i c h were associated w i t h previous periods o f c i v i l i z a t i o n . Because A m e r i c a was so u n l i k e E u r o p e a n d w i t h o u t a history, i t was difficult n o t m e r e l y to p a i n t b u t even to perceive. T h e p r o b l e m a n d difficulties m a y be clearer i f we m a k e a leap to consider the s o l u t i o n first. I n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the religious trad i t i o n o f nature as paradise, A m e r i c a becomes an agrarian paradise. H e r e , the farmer is l i k e n e d to the n e w A d a m . G e o r g e W a s h i n g t o n writes

to

Lafayette:

"Americans

should

be

employed

in

the . . . agreeable a m u s e m e n t o f f u l f i l l i n g the first a n d great c o m m a n d m e n t — I n c r e a s e a n d M u l t i p l y : as the encouragement to w h i c h we have o p e n e d the fertile plains o f the O h i o to the poor, the needy

61

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 3.2. William T. Ranney, D a n i e l Boone's 1849.

First

View

of

Kentucky,

Oil on canvas, 36" x 53 / ". Courtesy of the Anschutz Collection, 1

2

Denver.

and

the oppressed o f the E a r t h ; anyone . . . m a y repair thither a n d

a b o u n d , as i n the l a n d o f p r o m i s e , w i t h m i l k a n d h o n e y . " The

13

image is captured i n W i l l i a m R a n n e y s p a i n t i n g

Daniel

B o o n e ' s F i r s t V i e w o f K e n t u c k y (1849; see fig. 3.2), w h i c h was based o n a passage i n T i m o t h y F l i n t s p o p u l a r b i o g r a p h y o f B o o n e : They stood on the summit of Cumberland mountain. What a scene opened before them! A feeling of the sublime is inspired in every bosom susceptible of it, by a view from any p o i n t . . . . They remarked with astonishment the tall, straight trees, shading the exuberant soil, wholly clear from any other underbrush than the rich canebrakes, the image of verdure and luxuriance, or tall grass and c l o v e r . . . . This wilderness blossoms as the rose, and these desolate places are as the garden of God.

62

14

Hermeneutic Retrieval

F r o m a stagelike p r o m o n t o r y R a n n e y s figures gesture t o w a r d the " p r o m i s e d l a n d " a n d appear entranced w i t h dreams o f the future, an effect underscored c o m p o s i t i o n a l l y b y the m o v e m e n t f r o m r i g h t to left, t o w a r d the west, source o f the w a r m , b e c k o n i n g l i g h t . T h e q u e s t i o n becomes, t h e n , h o w d i d this stereotype emerge? How

d i d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f an agrarian paradise get w o r k e d o u t

i n n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y landscape painting? W e can f o l l o w the g r o w i n g r e c o g n i t i o n b e g i n n i n g i n the 1820s b y a t t e n d i n g to the w o r k s o f T h o m a s C o l e , w h o was a m o n g the first f u l l y to delineate the wilderness as a desirable subject for p a i n t i n g ; that is, C o l e u n d e r s t o o d wilderness as a subject matter e n d o w e d w i t h religious a n d m o r a l significance a n d hence as a p r o f o u n d s y m bol

o f the n e w n a t i o n . T h e entire course o f C o l e s w o r k developed 15

this interpretive u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It is n o t s u r p r i s i n g that the assumptions i n C o l e s early w o r k are largely E u r o p e a n . F o r example, i n his I t a l i a n S c e n e r y (1833) we see the result o f the idea that to be a landscape at a l l , nature m u s t be c u l tivated: landscape is h u m a n l y i m p r o v e d nature, as m o d i f i e d a n d i m a g i n e d a c c o r d i n g to classical conventions. T h e terrain i n this p a i n t i n g is laden w i t h the heritage of W e s t e r n culture: r u i n s bespeaking the ancient past are represented b y the aqueduct a n d f o r t i f i c a t i o n i n the m i d d l e g r o u n d a n d temple i n f o r e g r o u n d ; there is the p i c turesque v i e w o f trees, lake, hills, m o u n t a i n , a n d pacific sky d e r i v e d f r o m m o d e r n attitudes t o w a r d scenery a n d "view"; a n d the entire scene evokes the c o m p l e x pastoral t r a d i t i o n o f celebration a n d m e d i t a t i o n i n the h u m a n i z e d landscape steeped i n religious m e m o r y . A n o t h e r , related set o f E u r o p e a n c o n v e n t i o n s also plays a part i n C o l e s b a c k g r o u n d , namely, those c o n v e n t i o n s b o u n d u p w i t h the t r a d i t i o n o f the s u b l i m e , i n w h i c h nature is so o v e r w h e l m i n g , so astonishing, that the i n d i v i d u a l c a n n o t b u t see a n d reflect o n G o d . A

classic example is Turner's p a i n t i n g Valley

Avalanche,

of Aosta: Snowstorm,

a n d I n u n d a t i o n (1836), w h i c h depicts the three

awe-

i n s p i r i n g p h e n o m e n a o c c u r r i n g simultaneously. Because G o d created the earth, for us to see it i n its f u l l grandeur is to lose ourselves and

to catch a glimpse o f h i m . T h e s u b l i m e , t h e n , draws f r o m the

lesson o f the B o o k o f J o b , w h i c h climaxes, after E l i h u s h y m n to God

( " H e spreads o u t the m i s t , w r a p p i n g it about h i m , a n d covers

the tops o f the m o u n t a i n s . H e gathers u p the l i g h t n i n g i n his h a n d s "

63

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 3.3. Thomas Cole, L a n d s c a p e w i t h Tree

Trunks,

1828. Oil on

canvas, 26½" x 32½". Museum of Art, Rhode Island School of Design, Walter H. Kimball Fund.

[Job 36:31-32]), w i t h the d e s c r i p t i o n o f theophany, e v o k i n g the p o w e r o f the A l m i g h t y , before w h o m J o b finally bows d o w n . A s early as 1828, i n L a n d s c a p e w i t h Tree

T r u n k s (see fig. 3.3), C o l e

endows the A m e r i c a n landscape w i t h features o f the s u b l i m e : the m o u n t a i n s , clouds, trees, a n d water evoke the great a n d s u b l i m e i n nature a n d o p e n the spectator to a c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f the deity. T h i s is clear f r o m at least four c r u c i a l elements: the distant l i g h t contrasts w i t h the passing s t o r m , e m b o d y i n g o r m a n i f e s t i n g the aesthetics o f the s u b l i m e ; the m o n o l i t h i c m o u n t a i n appears as a focal s y m b o l o f theological

monotheism;

anthropomorphic

trees h e i g h t e n

the

d r a m a ; a cross, w i t h its deliberate C h r i s t i a n associations, appears at

64

Hermeneutic Retrieval

the t i p o f a tree. W h a t is a m a z i n g is that a l t h o u g h C o l e u n d e r standably relies o n E u r o p e a n c o n c e p t u a l , f o r m a l , a n d c o m p o s i t i o n al conventions i n this p a i n t i n g , he nonetheless takes a major step b e y o n d t h e m . H e depicts a scene that is a d i s t i n c t l y A m e r i c a n wilderness a n d endows it w i t h m o r a l a n d religious s y m b o l i s m . T h u s , i n this p a i n t i n g we see Cole's first key move: to u n d e r s t a n d A m e r i c a n nature b y w a y o f the C h r i s t i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f nature as creation a n d , as a lasting s y m b o l a n d manifestation o f G o d . C o l e h i m s e l f uses this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n his E s s a y o n A m e r i c a n S c e n e r y : But in gazing at the pure creations of the Almighty, [one] feels

a

calm

religious

tone

mind. . . . There are those who

steal

through

regret that with

his the

improvements of cultivation the sublimity of the wilderness should pass away: for those scenes of solitude from which the hand of nature has never been lifted, affect the mind with a more deep toned emotion than aught which the hands of man has touched. Amid them the consequent associations are of God the creator— they are his undefiled works, and the mind is cast into contemplation of eternal t h i n g s . . . . Look at the heavens when the thunder shower has passed, and the

sun

stoops below the western mountain—then the low purple clouds hang in festoons around the steeps—in the higher heaven are

crimson bands interwoven with

feathers of gold, fur for the wings of angels; and still above is spread that interminable field of ether whose color is too beautiful to have a name.

16

In a masterful synthesis, t h e n , C o l e c o m b i n e d the s u b l i m e v i e w o f nature w i t h a specific religious a n d historical v i s i o n , as is further detailed i n his w r i t i n g s , especially the p o e m " T h e C r o s s , " his letters, and

the E s s a y o n A m e r i c a n S c e n e r y (1835), as weU as m

lifetime o f

paintings w i t h e x p l i c i t l y C h r i s t i a n subject matter,sau c h as the series o f five m o n u m e n t a l paintings (each 64 i n . x 9 6 in.) e n t i t l e d T h e C r o s s a n d t h e W o r l d (1846-1847; n o w lost). F r o m the r e m a i n i n g studies for that series, s u c h as T h e V i s i o n : S t u d y f o r C r o s s a n d W o r l d and

P i l g r i m o f t h e C r o s s a t t h e E n d o f h i s J o u r n e y (1847), we learn

65

Interpreting

Environments

b e y o n d d o u b t that, for C o l e , l i g h t a n d the cross (as w e l l as c l o u d angels) were e m b o d i m e n t s o f G o d s g l o r y a n d thus revealed his d i v i n i t y i n the landscape. E v e n m o r e to the p o i n t , perhaps, is to compare L a n d s c a p e Tree from

with

T r u n k s w i t h another w o r k p a i n t e d at the same t i m e , E x p u l s i o n theGarden o fEden

(1827-1828). T h e s t r i k i n g a n d u n u s u a l

a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c , storm-blasted trees a n d the m o u n t a i n s w i t h associations to d i v i n i t y are c o m m o n to b o t h . ( N o t incidentally, the latter w o r k belongs w i t h a recently rediscovered c o m p a n i o n p a i n t i n g , The Garden of E d e n ) M o r e i m p o r t a n t , a l t h o u g h they are n o t f o r m a l l y a pair, these w o r k s s h o w t w o o f the c r u c i a l stages o f the story closest to the C h r i s t i a n m i n d i n A m e r i c a : after the C r e a t i o n a n d m e d i a t e d b y the C r u c i f i x i o n a n d R e d e m p t i o n , we have the e x p u l s i o n f r o m the G a r d e n o f E d e n a n d the p r o m i s e d second c o m i n g o f paradise. T h u s , where brute wilderness w o u l d be the fallen state o f nature, the p u n i s h m e n t after O r i g i n a l S i n a n d the e x p u l s i o n f r o m the garden, we see as m o r e s t r i k i n g its contrast w i t h A m e r i c a n nature portrayed as blessed wilderness, that is, where wilderness b o l d l y is interpreted as paradise regained. C o l e moves another step further w h e n he inserts a h u m a n i n t o the scene o f natural wilderness i n D a n i e l B o o n e a n d H i s C a b i n a t G r e a t O s a g e L a k e (1825-1826; see fig. 3.4). H i s portrait o f D a n i e l B o o n e reveals the h u n t e r juxtaposed before the wilderness, the latter such a n impenetrable tangle as to preclude settlement, m a k i n g clear C o l e s belief that h u m a n k i n d s h o u l d n o t exploit the w i l d e r ness. A s c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the v i s i o n o f wilderness as a natural place e x c l u d i n g Europeans, a n d C o l e s deliberation c o n c e r n i n g a n y m o v e b e y o n d that state, i t is i m p o r t a n t to note the d r a m a t i c change i n the final version o f this p a i n t i n g : i n a p r e l i m i n a r y d r a w i n g for the w o r k the figure was n o t B o o n e b u t a N a t i v e A m e r i c a n , the indigenous inhabitant. T h e final shift, o r really the radical c o m p l e t i o n a n d disclosure o f the u n d e r l y i n g a n d u n i f y i n g seminal u n d e r s t a n d i n g , was twenty years later i n H o m e i n t h e Woods p a i n t i n g we discover

a sanctified

finished

(1847; see fig. 3.5). I n this

image

o f rural life, w i t h a

c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the blessed life o f the p i o n e e r — i f such a person is v i r t u o u s i n this a b u n d a n t l a n d . T h e r e is little evidence o f agricul17

66

Hermeneutic Retrieval

Figure 3.4. Thomas Cole, D a n i e l B o o n e a t His C a b i n a t t h e G r e a t O s a g e Lake,

1 8 2 5 - 1 8 2 6 . Oil on canvas, 38" x 42½". Mead Art Museum,

Amherst College, Massachusetts. Museum Purchase.

ture o r crops because h u m a n k i n d is n o t c o n d e m n e d to t o i l a n d sweat i n a fallen state. Rather, the p i o n e e r i n a n e w E d e n lives effortlessly f r o m the b o u n t y o f the wilderness, w i t h o u t w o r k o r h a r d s h i p . In the p a i n t i n g we see his r e t u r n f r o m fishing, greeted b y his f a m i ly before an a m a z i n g l y prosperous c a b i n . Further, the i c o n o g r a p h y makes clear a religious m e a n i n g : the trellis/cross o n the side o f the house denotes the C h r i s t i a n life o f the pioneers, as d o the three trees b e h i n d the c a b i n a n d the m o n o l i t h i c m o u n t a i n s i n the d i s t a n c e .

18

O v e r the pregnant scene, a clear sky presides, o f w h i c h C o l e w r o t e , "the pure blue sky is the highest s u b l i m e . T h e r e is the

67

illim-

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 3.5. Thomas Cole, H o m e in t h e Woods,

1847. Oil on canvas,

44" x 66". Reynolda House Museum of American Art, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

itable. . . . T h e r e w e l o o k to the u n c u r t a i n e d , s o l e m n the eternal, the i n f i n i t e — t o w a r d the a l m i g h t y . "

serene—into

19

C o l e justifies the final f o r m o f the v i s i o n h e l d i n H o m e i n t h e Woods

as follows: " I have a l l u d e d to w i l d a n d u n c u l t i v a t e d scenery,

b u t the cultivated m u s t n o t be forgotten, oft it is still m o r e i m p o r tant to m a n i n his social c a p a c i t y . . . , it encompasses o u r homes, and,

t h o u g h d e v o i d o f the stern s u b l i m i t y o f the w i l d , its quieter

spirit tenderly i n t o o u r bosoms

intermingles w i t h a t h o u s a n d

domestic affections a n d heart t o u c h i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s — h u m a n hands have w r o u g h t , a n d h u m a n deed h a l l o w e d a l l a r o u n d . " crucially, H o m e i n t h e Woods

20

Again, and

shows n o t t o i l a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n b u t har-

m o n y a n d natural b o u n t y i n the l a n d given to A m e r i c a n s . C o l e s development o f the wilderness theme f r o m 1827 to 1847 w o r k s o u t the interpretation o f the A m e r i c a n landscape first as a g l o r i o u s l y pristine natural paradise, next as the natural site c o n t a i n -

68

Hermeneutic Retrieval

Figure 3.6. Frederic Edwin Church, To t h e M e m o r y o f C o l e , 1848. Oil on canvas, 32" x 497½". Des Moines Women's Club—Hoyt Sherman Place, Des Moines, Iowa.

ing

h u m a n s , a n d finally as the n a t u r a l d w e l l i n g place that shows

itself as the i n h a b i t e d G a r d e n o f E d e n . T h e final version i n n o w a y lessens or replaces the earlier t w o ; i n d e e d , it completes t h e m a n d brings f o r t h the sustaining v i s i o n , that is, the religious u n d e r s t a n d ing u n d e r l y i n g the p r o b l e m a n d s o l u t i o n . H o w , t h e n , does the interp r e t a t i o n o f A m e r i c a develop? A s a g r a d u a l m e d i t a t i o n o n t h e s e c o n d c r e a t i o n a c c o u n t i n Genesis.

C o l e succeeds i n a d e l i n e a t i o n that

belongs w i t h the earlier religious u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f A m e r i c a n nature as paradise. T h a t b o t h the m a n t l e o f Cole's prestige a n d the i m p o r t a n c e o f Christianity's

historical and

allegorical

interpretations

of

the

A m e r i c a n landscape were o f central i m p o r t a n c e to c o n t e m p o r a r y artists is c o n f i r m e d b y a c r u c i a l p a i n t i n g b y Cole's student Frederic E d w i n C h u r c h , o n l y recently relocated. I n 1848, i m m e d i a t e l y after Cole's unexpected death, C h u r c h p r o d u c e d To t h e M e m o r y o f C o l e , a b o l d w o r k that fuses overt s y m b o l i s m a n d nature (see fig. 3.6).

21

In

the f o r e g r o u n d o f the p a i n t i n g a cross festooned w i t h roses a n d vines "re-presents" the central image o f Cole's C r o s s i n t h e W i l d e r n e s s

69

Interpreting

Environments

Figure 3.7. Frederic Edwin Church, N e w E n g l a n d Scenery,

1851. Oil on

canvas, 36" x 53". George Walter Vincent Smith Collection, George Walter Vincent Smith Art Museum, Springfield, Massachusetts.

(1845). C h u r c h identifies w i t h C o l e b o t h b y a p p r o p r i a t i n g the cross m o t i f a n d — i n a m o v e that already is somewhat retrograde i n the l i g h t o f the naturalistic trends o f m i d n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y — b y insistently m a k i n g explicit w h a t was q u i e t l y present i n Cole's H o m e i n t h e Woods.

( C h u r c h reaffirms the shared religious u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n

A p o t h e o s i s t o T h o m a s C o l e [c. 1868], i n w h i c h a cross appears i n the sky to b e c k o n the t w o figures as p i l g r i m s o n a h o l y path.) A l t h o u g h the gifted C h u r c h o b v i o u s l y w a n t e d to acknowledge and

operate w i t h i n the sphere that C o l e h a d delineated for l a n d -

scape p a i n t i n g , he also transformed w h a t he " i n h e r i t e d , " participating

i n the development o f naturalistic images that yet r e m a i n e d

deeply m o r a l a n d h e u r i s t i c .

22

In another early p a i n t i n g , N e w E n g l a n d S c e n e r y (18 51), also p a i n t ed u n d e r the influence o f Cole's example, C h u r c h transposes Cole's

70

Hermeneutic Retrieval

pioneer h o m e i n the wilderness to a later phase o f the A m e r i c a n i n h a b i t a t i o n o f nature. W h e r e a s Cole's H o m e i n t h e W o o d s m i g h t be c o n c e i v e d o f as representing a state o f p r i m i t i v e arcadian bliss, C h u r c h ' s N e w E n g l a n d S c e n e r y represents a f u l l y developed a g r i c u l tural paradise, the core o f a soon-to-be c o n s u m m a t e d c i v i l i z a t i o n . N e w E n g l a n d S c e n e r y is i l l u m i n a t e d b y the w a r m g l o w o f aftern o o n l i g h t (see fig. 3.7). I n this s t u d y C h u r c h rehearses a l l the c o m p o s i t i o n a l elements o f the C l a u d i a n t r a d i t i o n , t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e m i n t o characteristically N o r t h A m e r i c a n wagons, cabins, m i l l s , v i l lages, a n d attendant d o m e s t i c animals. W h i l e the eye is absorbed i n detailed vignettes o f t r a n q u i l a n d c o m f o r t a b l e c o u n t r y life, a covered w a g o n heads west to develop the frontier. Patches o f cleared l a n d are b o u n d e d b y the vast p o t e n t i a l o f the y e t - u n c l a i m e d w i l d e r ness; the w a g o n is b e c k o n e d b y a series o f openings t h r o u g h w o o d s and

m o u n t a i n valleys, presided over b y majestic trees, m o u n t a i n s ,

and

clouds. T h e entire scene has a tone o f ease a n d w e l c o m e . T h e

y o u t h f u l C h u r c h has i m a g i n a t i v e l y synthesized all the characteristic features o f the agrarian m y t h a n d E u r o p e a n t r a d i t i o n i n t o a n ideal landscape o f extensive p r o p o r t i o n s . C h u r c h ' s masterful T w i l i g h t i n t h e W i l d e r n e s s (i860) echoes Cole's v i s i o n — a settler's c a b i n was i n a study b u t o m i t t e d f r o m the

final

w o r k — e v e n as it clearly moves b e y o n d it. H e r e we have a major step, d e e p e n i n g the v i s i o n t h r o u g h gradually e l i m i n a t i n g references to c i v i l i z a t i o n a n d creating a u n i q u e l y A m e r i c a n image o f w i l d nature. T h a t is, once the f u n d a m e n t a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A m e r i c a n nature as paradise for i n h a b i t a t i o n is established, the E u r o p e a n c o n ventions c a n be transcended altogether a n d thus e l i m i n a t e d . I n a d d i t i o n , once it is u n d e r s t o o d that the w i l d is the A m e r i c a n G a r d e n o f E d e n , it can be p a i n t e d m o r e s u b t l y a n d indirectly, w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t l y i n s i s t i n g o n h u m a n figures. W i t h the n e w m y t h o l o g y i n place, the e x p l i c i t narrative can, i f desired, be o m i t t e d i n favor o f a m o r e " s y m b o l i c " treatment. C r u c i a l l y , the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n be presented i n a seemingly naturalistic fashion precisely because the p e r c e p t i o n o f this revelation o f nature as paradise was self-evident to those i n i t i a t e d at the t i m e a n d thus i n t e r n a l i z e d . It is able to disappear as the " u n s p o k e n . " In

T w i l i g h t i n t h e W i l d e r n e s s C h u r c h t r a n s f o r m e d the c o n v e n -

t i o n a l stereotypes o f wilderness p a i n t i n g a n d created an o r i g i n a l

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Interpreting

Environments

Figure 3.8. Frederic Edwin Church, American, 1826-1900. T w i l i g h t in t h e W i l d e r n e s s , 1860. Oil on canvas, 40" x 64". The Cleveland Museum of Art, Mr. and Mrs. William H. Marlatt Fund, 65.223.

Figure 3.9. Frederic Edwin Church, H e a r t o f t h e A n d e s , 1859. Oil on canvas, 66 " x 119¼". The Metropolitan Museum of Art, bequest of 1/8

Margaret E. Dows, 1909.

72

Hermeneutic Retrieval

image o f the N e w W o r l d ' s archetypal wilderness t h r o u g h his d e l i n eation o f l i g h t , clouds, m o u n t a i n s , water, a n d trees (see fig. 3.8). H e r e o n l y the p r i m e v a l experience o f nature endures. T h e

sky's

seething reds a n d c o o l blues a n d the chorus o f angel-like c l o u d s a n n o u n c e the g l o r y o f G o d ' s presence for the n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y C h r i s t i a n spectator. T h e awesome t r u t h o f nature's d i v i n i t y i n A m e r i c a is manifested, r e n e w i n g the p r o m i s e o f the N e w W o r l d that God

h a d offered as A m e r i c a .

2 3

C h u r c h further transforms this fervent v i s i o n , n o w i n a n a t i o n a l istic d i r e c t i o n , i n O u r B a n n e r i n t h e S k y ( i 8 6 0 ) . H e r e the v i s i o n is expanded dramatically, b e y o n d the frontier to the pathless w i l d e r ness. W e find n o sign o f h u m a n p e n e t r a t i o n , o n l y a single b i r d , even as a d i v i n e l i g h t blesses the entire landscape i n the f o r m o f a U . S . flag g l o w i n g i n the heavens at d a w n . C h u r c h ' s definitive image o f n a t u r a l d i v i n i t y i n T w i l i g h t i n t h e Wilderness

was

complemented

by

South American

landscapes,

w h i c h also were interpreted i n terms o f religious v i s i o n a n d w h i c h m a d e clear that b o t h continents c o m p r i s e d the N e w W o r l d as natu r a l paradise. I n C h u r c h ' s H e a r t o f t h e A n d e s (1859; see fig. 3.9), w h i c h c o m b i n e s the d i v i n e a n d the n a t u r a l , we find a keynote i n the w h i t e wayfarer c r o s s — a g a i n the cross i n the w i l d e r n e s s — t h a t focuses the m e a n i n g for us: paradise regained t h r o u g h the m e d i a t i o n o f the R e d e m p t i o n . E d e n is p r o m i s e d as again possible, even actual. A s c o n t e m p o r a r y reviews m a k e clear, viewers saw the p a i n t i n g as d e p i c t i n g a "Paradise" a n d a n " E d e n . " M o r e o v e r , i n 1862 C h u r c h rendered C o t o p a x i , a p r i m a l earthscape that clearly is geography v i e w e d t h r o u g h Genesis. T h e earth freshly appears before us; the n e w l y risen s u n discloses an edenic j u n g l e i n this image o f c o s m i c h i s t o r y w r i t t e n i n the landscape. Lest it be t h o u g h t that d e p i c t i n g the A m e r i c a n landscape as the manifestation o f the d i v i n e is merely i d i o s y n c r a t i c to C o l e a n d his a d m i r i n g disciple C h u r c h , a n d n o t the definitive a r t i c u l a t i o n o f a c u l t u r a l l y shared v i s i o n , consider one o f C h u r c h ' s rivals, A l b e r t Bierstadt. Indeed, s u c h was the i m p a c t o f C h u r c h ' s w o r k

that

Bierstadt, once t h o u g h t to be largely indifferent to religious matters, nonetheless

attempted

to

emulate

Church's

Twilight

i nthe

W i l d e r n e s s . T h i s is a decisive p o i n t for the d i f f u s i o n o f the v i s i o n , since the w o r k o f b o t h Bierstadt a n d C h u r c h was

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Figure 3.10. Albert Bierstadt S u n s e t in Yosemite

Valley,

1868.

Oil on canvas, 35½" x 51½". Haggin Collection, The Haggin Museum, Stockton, California.

influential t h r o u g h p o p u l a r e x h i b i t i o n s a n d w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d etchings based o n their major paintings. A

series o f Bierstadt s w o r k s indicates the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the

theme. T h e c u l m i n a t i n g w o r k , S u n s e t i n Y o s e m i t e

Valley

(1868),

derives its p o w e r f r o m the a s t o n i s h i n g contrast o f l i g h t a n d darkness. O n the left m o u n t a i n towers rise l i k e cathedrals; o n the right w e find E l C a p i t a n , whose s h a d o w intersects the river below, d r a m a t i c a l l y f o r m i n g a cross o n the valley floor, a cross i n a n d o f the landscape. T h e scene is presided over b y clouds above E l C a p i t a n f o r m e d i n t o angel shapes

(see fig. 3.10). G o d s s u b l i m e p o w e r

emanates f r o m the sky as majestic l i g h t p r e s i d i n g over a d e c i d e d l y paradisiacal valley. T h e c o n n e c t i o n to the second creation account, clearly conveyed b y the intensity o f the sunset a n d the awesome g o l d e n - t o n e d reflection i n the clouds, was a l l t o o obvious to c o n t e m p o r a r y viewers. A s o n e w r i t e r p u t i t , the w o r k shows the l a n d scape as a "great natural t e m p l e o f s u b l i m i t y . " T h e n t o o , Yosemite itself often was seen as a n example o f a natural paradise. Bierstadt

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Figure 3.11. Albert Bierstadt The Oregon Trail, 1869. Oil on canvas, 31" x 49". The Butler Institute of American Art, Youngstown, Ohio.

first visited Yosemite i n 1863 with the writer Fritz Hugo Ludlow, whose account, which appeared i n Atlantic Monthly and later i n a book, makes the interpretation explicit. O f their expectations, for example, he says, "If report was true, we were going to the original site of the Garden of Eden." 24

Bierstadt builds on this dramatic work i n the quieter, but no less glorious, second version of The Oregon Trail (1869), which assumes the accomplishment of Sunset in Yosemite Valley (and thus of Church's Twilight in the Wilderness) and symbolically moves within the shared understanding. In The Oregon Trail the landscape again opens for human life (see fig. 3.11). In the foreground we find settlers entering the blessed land i n an image of economic order. A t right, i n the middle distance, settlers peacefully share the spacious valley with Native Americans, while in the far distance the majestic goal beckons. The whole is bathed in warm, golden light and promises easy movement along the dominant diagonal compositional axis. The human place i n the garden is granted and held open

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by divine grace; the dramatic, palpable quality of light, especially the rays that halo the sun, expresses the belief in G o d s approval by means of the contemporary convention. In short, wilderness is shown to be both the uniquely American characteristic and the bearer of meaning since it is given as an earthly paradise, that is, as a physical and moral dwelling place. Furthermore, the articulation of nature as paradise is worked out and cultivated across a range of images, with, at one pole, the symbolic, "purely natural" wilderness infused with the significance of the divine and, at the other pole, the explicitly edenic garden landscape humanly inhabited. A final phase testifying to the widespread acceptance of the vision of divinity in the landscape is exemplified in an event, symbolically prepared for and almost anticipated, that consummates the vision. The dramatic discovery of the M o u n t of the H o l y Cross, that is, of a cross of snow and ice on the face of a mountain, was made by explorer Ferdinand V. Haydens expedition to western Colorado in 1873, whose company included photographer William H . Jackson. Jacksons images of the mountain are among the classic images of the American West, and his photograph of the phenomenon was distinguished with a medal in the 1876 Centennial Art Exhibition in Philadelphia. Here, no longer generated only in the vision of artistic imagination for an initiated audience but naturally presented for the perception of all, both those inclined to see landscape through religious interpretation and those not so disposed, the American landscape itself witnesses the same fusion: American nature and symbol of divine grace. The phenomenon was celebrated by Thomas Moran in his famous painting The Mountain of the Holy Cross (1875; see fig. 3.12) and then by Longfellow, who hung a print of the painting beside a portrait of his deceased wife and wrote the poem "The Cross of Snow." A n article in the Illustrated Christian Weeklyof1875 described Moran's painting: "Suddenly the artist glances upward, and beholds a vision exceedingly dramatic and beautiful. He is amazed, he is transfixed. There set in the dark rock, held high among the clouds, he beholds the long straight cross, perfect, spotless, white, grand in dimension, at once the sublimest thing in nature and the emblem of heaven." 25

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Figure 3.12. Thomas Moran, The Mountain of the Holy Cross, 1875. Oil on canvas, 82 " x 64 ". Gene Autry Western Heritage Museum, 3/4"

Los Angeles.

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At this point we find the climax of understanding American nature in terms of Genesis's second creation account. O n the one hand, the interpretation is widely known and accepted; on the other, it is about to wane. Indeed, what follows is not so much anticlimatic as almost silent, so quietly and quickly does the once daring and powerful vision fade. The rise of secular materialism and science, dominant in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, helped to end this religious tradition. The work of geologist Clarence King in Yosemite, for example, displaced any but the secular materialist, scientific manner of seeing the natural environment. King held that nature does not bear any such meaning as the previously mentioned painters believed, contending that such interpretations need to be cleared away in favor of seeing the physical earth as a product of "evolutionary" forces. King, who certainly was not without a sense of wonder and beauty, does more than capture differences in climate and atmospheric effect when he contrasts the view of Yosemite's E l Capitan on October 5, 1864, to the same view in June: Now all that [sublimity] has gone. The shattered fronts of walls stand out sharp and terrible, sweeping down in broken crag and cliff to a valley whereon the shadow of autumnal death has left its solemnity. There is no longer an air of beauty. In this cold, naked strength, one has crowded on him the geological record of mountain work, of granite plateau suddenly rent asunder, of the slow, imperfect manner in which Nature has vainly striven to smooth her rough work and bury the ruins with thousands of years accumulation of soil and debris. 26

King quite consciously led the life of the scientific individual; even the formal structure of his writings rhetorically moves the reader to accept the scientific view since, although occasionally allowing himself to lapse into an imaginative sympathy with "mythic" and aesthetic perceptions, in the end King regains the "saving" clarity of the scientist. In his judgment the archaic thought or mythmaking of primitive peoples and many artists (which, he believes, still "smoulders in all of us"), and the attendant "burden of a hundred dark and

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gloomy superstitions," obscures natural, material reality: "The varying hues which mood and emotion forever pass before his own mental vision mask with their illusive mystery the simple realities of nature, until mountains and their bold, natural facts are lost behind the cloudy poetry of the [artist]." In contrast, K i n g champions modern scientific thought, for example, in "realizing fully the geological history and hard, materialistic reality of M o u n t Whitney, its mineral nature, its chemistry": "as the [symbolic gaunt, gray old Indian] trudged a w a y . . . I could but feel the liberating power of modern culture, which unfetters us from the more than iron bands of self-made myths. M y mood vanished with the savage, and I saw the great peak only as it really i s — a splendid mass of granite 14,887 feet high, ice-chiselled and storm-tinted; a great monolith left standing amid the ruins of a bygone geological empire." By the end of the century, then, as a public view, the landscape of divinity and a great part of midcentury understanding of natural paradise was replaced. 27

Paradise Promised: Wilderness to Be Converted O f course, the nineteenth-century religious interpretation of the landscape was more complex than the preceding account indicates. Indeed, the story is incomplete without recognition of the dynamic generated by the tension between the interpretation of nature as paradise and an alternative, more powerful interpretation drawn from the same religious and biblical tradition. In dramatic contrast to the interpretation of American wilderness and the subsequently inhabited landscape as a natural Garden of Eden was the even more commonly understood, well-documented interpretation o f American wilderness as opposite to paradise. 28

Here, although America also was understood as the promised site of a second paradise, paradise was held to be wild nature cultivated and subjugated. That is, in the alternative view, natural wilderness is a wasteland or desert, and only the transformation and conquest of that barrenness can generate the second paradise, or heaven on earth. This interpretation derives from the other, culturally dominant account of creation, which does not speak of paradise and which appears first in Genesis.

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In this account, after creating the heavens and the earth, G o d specifically elaborates the place and role of humans in, but distinct from, the "natural" world. As the King James version of the Bible renders it, "And G o d blessed them, and G o d said unto them, 'Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth'" (Gen. 1:28). 29

The early settlers took this text most seriously in their understanding of America as a desert to be overcome and, like the O l d Testament's exodus from Egypt, as a trial before passage to the promised land, the promised paradise on earth. The Puritans, for example, saw the American wilderness in the light of the expulsion from paradise. Hence, against the O l d and New Testament background, William Bradford, embarking from the Mayflower, encountered what he described as a "hideous and desolate wilderness." 30

As a consequence American nature came to be seen in relation to the idea of work. As humans were expelled from paradise and given the religious task of recovering, with the aid of Christ, a place before God, so too the new "paradise on earth" would be produced by work. The destruction of the wilderness was the first step toward building the new kingdom, an idea that is elaborated by Jonathan Edwards in the first half of the eighteenth century. In short, the task in both its religious and civic dimensions was to control and cultivate the wild and to make nature into paradise in America. Although the sublime signifies God's blessing, the interpretation from Gen. 1:28 calls for exertion of the spirit. Nature is to be the scene of our conquest and transformation. This understanding of American landscape according to the first Genesis account and the consequent moral mandate for work developed into the idea of progress. 31

American nineteenth-century painting played just as major a role in the elaboration of this religious view as it did for its opposite. The dawn of the new age, discussed by Eliade and others, was definitively portrayed by Joshua Shaw in his Coming of the White Man (c. 1850; see fig. 3.13). The scenario that unfolds here is clearly the interpretation of the European-American Christian as Adam. The new Adam arrives by way of a glorious light, that is, with divine sanction, before which the Native Americans fall back, awestruck, over-

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Figure 3.13. Joshua Shaw, Coming of the White Man, c. 1850. Oil on canvas, 25" x 36". Carl Shaefer Dentzel, Northridge, California.

come by the light and power. Here we find the counterpart to the expulsion from paradise: the course is now reversed in the new arrival at the second opportunity for earthly paradise. Since it faces us, requiring our moral effort and material change, the wilderness provides both the clarifying challenge that defines our task and the means whereby that task can be accomplished. Thus, the natural doubly beckons and gives way. Emanuel Leutze represents the scenario for the continent i n his Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way (1861; see fig. 3.14). The work was a national icon of progress painted on the eve of the C i v i l War i n the capitol at Washington, D . C . We find our prospect melodramatically displayed as a sun-drenched promised land. Henry T. Tuckerman, the "American Vasari," described the painting i n 1867: An emigrant party, travel-stained and weary, who for long weeks have toiled in the face of interminable difficulties over the vast plains on the hither side of the Rocky Mountains, have reached, near sundown, the

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Figure 3.14. Emanuel Leutze, Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way, 1861. Oil on canvas, 337 " x 43 ". National Museum of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, bequest of Sara Carr Upton. 1/4

3/8

point whence the waters flow in the direction they themselves are going, and from which they catch the first glimpse of the vast Pacific slope—their land of promise. El Dorado, indeed; for the earth and sky and mountain peaks are bathed in the golden glow of the setting sun. 32

The meaning is further glossed i n the typological construction of the central figures as the " H o l y Family" and i n the border, where we find Daniel Boone and Captain Clark framing a view of Californias Golden Gate, the physical goal of the march. Leutze paints a vision of manifest destiny like that which W i l l i a m

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G i l p i n ardently extolled in midnineteenth century in a rapture of nationalistic energy: The untransacted destiny of the American people is to subdue the continent—to rush over this vast field to the Pacific Ocean—to animate the many hundred millions of its people, and to cheer them upward . . . to establish a new order in human affairs . . . to regenerate superannuated nations—to change darkness into l i g h t . . . to teach old nations a new civilization—to confirm the destiny of the human race—to carry the career of mankind to its culminating point—to cause stagnant people to be reborn—to perfect science . . . to unite the world in a social family—to absolve the curse that weighs down humanity, and to shed blessings round the world! Divine task! Immortal mission! Let us tread fast and joyfully the open trail before us! Let every American heart open wide for patriotism to grow undiminished, and confide with religious faith in the sublime and prodigious destiny of his well-loved country. 33

It was in America, as G i l p i n put it, that the preeminently divine gifts "had been vouchsafed to the American people by G o d through nature"** H e said, "I discern . . . a new power, the people occupied in the wilderness, engaged at once in extracting from its recesses the omnipotent element of gold coin; and disbursing it immediately for the industrial conquest of the world." 35

American Progress, or Manifest Destiny (1872; see fig. 3.15), by John Gast portrays just this preoccupation. The figure of progress presides over and guides the phases of our movement from east to west, not incidentally carrying a Schoolbook in her right hand and a telegraph wire in her left. Before her storm clouds retreat toward the Rocky Mountains, while below her a stagecoach, pony express rider, transcontinental railroads, and even New Yorks Brooklyn Bridge are glimpsed. A l l the phases of subordinating the earth are represented. The sublimity of nature lies, in this interpretation, not in the wilderness itself but in the scene as promise. Converting wilderness into paradise requires physically subjugating nature. For that task

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Figure 3.15. John Gast, American Progress, or Manifest Destiny, 1872. Oil on board, 121 " x 161 ". Gene Autry Western Heritage Museum, Los Angeles. 1/8

1/8

machinery is needed, especially machinery for communication and transportation, and hence we find the divinely sublime augmented with the machine. The technological sublime emerges, as described i n 1829: "The rudest inhabitant of our f o r e s t . . . is struck with the sublime power and self-moving majesty of a steamboat;— [he] lingers on shore where it passes—and follows its rapid, and almost magic course with silent admiration. The steam-engine i n five years has enabled us to anticipate a state of things, which, in the ordinary course of events, it would have required a century to have produced." 36

37

Artists enthusiastically portrayed the technological conquest of wilderness during midcentury. For example, in Thomas Rossiter s Opening of the Wilderness (c. 1846-1850) a newly constructed railroad depot is inserted into the virgin wilderness with, in the middle of the scene, powerful railway engines fired up, lights aglow, smoke streaking into the sky (see fig. 3.16). The same meaning is explicit in

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Figure 3.16. Thomas Rossiter, Opening of the Wilderness, c.1846-1850. Oil on canvas, 17 x 32 ". Bequest of Martha C. Karolik for the M. & M. Karolik Collection of American Paintings, 1815-1868. Courtesy, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. 3/4

1/2

the title of an 1842 book, The Paradise within Reach of All Men, by Power of Nature and Machinery. Jasper Cropsey's popular American Harvesting (1864; see fig. 3.17) presents the story of the movement of the nations chosen people: i n the foreground are the stumps resulting from the work of the recent past; i n the midground we find the beauty of success, accomplished at present; beyond, in the distance, the land yet to be cultivated, which awaits as future. The comparison with Cole's Home in the Woods is telling. Cropsey, undoubtedly aware of Coles painting, attempted to surpass h i m , carrying the bliss of Cole s farmer to consummation. But the deeper story is found i n the subtle difference between the works. Whereas Cole showed little evidence of agricultural labor or the passage of time, with his pioneer family living directly from the bounty of the natural garden, i n Cropsey's version the passage of time through the three spatial and temporal zones (past, present, and future labor) provides the framework for the spacious barn and house, the village with church steeple, and ships of commerce. Although the central image is one of contained fertile paradise, that paradise obviously has been carved out of nature by human effort, for example, by the harvest of grain portrayed i n the 38

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Figure 3.17. Jasper Cropsey, American Harvesting, replica painted by the artist, 1864 (original, 1851). Oil on canvas, 35 " x 52 ". Indiana University Art Museum, Bloomington. Gift of Mrs. Nicholas H. Noyes. 1/2

3/4

center of the painting. Although soon to be secularized almost beyond recognition i n the materialist, economic interpretation of progress, the religious motivation underlying the progress depicted here is not yet obscured. Plainly, American Harvesting remains in the tradition of depicting our mastery of the wild and, although subtler than earlier works, does not depart from the common dream found in the folk tradition, for example, as embodied i n Edward Hicks's Residence of David Twining in 1785 (c. 1845-1846; see fig. 3.18). Hicks s painting, in fact, portrays the farm where some sixty years earlier he had lived as an adopted orphan. While M r . Hicks presides over the farm and its activity, M r s . Hicks reads the Bible with young Edward. Success through control of the environment is a constant of this vision of mastery: Hicks shows the success of the mathematical-technological culture even in this "naïve" portrait of the rural

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Figure 3.18. Edward Hicks, The Residence of David Twining in 1785, c. 1845-1846. Oil on canvas, 26" x 29 ". The Carnegie Museum of Art, Pittsburgh. Howard N. Eavenson Memorial Fund, for the Howard N. Eavenson Americana Collection. 1/2

ideal and the results of industry. Here we find the achievement of prosperity promised i n the Bible, wrought through action and depicted i n the parallel bands of fence and furrow that compose the space. Again, space is made into home. Indeed, so secure was the idea of progress through work that the natural world was often depicted as complicit. In the Moll Map of North America (1715) an amazing detail of the view of Niagara Falls shows "the Industry of the Beaver of Canada i n making Dams to stop the Course of a Rivulet, i n order to form a great Lake, about which they built their Habitations," wherein beaver work i n orderly lines that would inspire any European rationalist. In extending the idea nearly a century later, Cropsey updates the 39

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Figure 3.19. Jasper Cropsey, Starrucca Viaduct Pennsylvania, 1865. Oil on canvas, 22 /8 x 36 /8". The Toledo Museum of Art. Purchased with funds from the Florence Scott Libbey Bequest in memory of her father, Maurice A. Scott. 1

n

3

success of domestication by technology. For example, in Starrucca Viaduct, Pennsylvania (1865; seefig.3.19), he celebrates the prosperity achieved i n the Susquehanna Valley i n northeastern Pennsylvania. Indeed, he portrays what appears to be a harmony i n wilderness transcended or cultivated, that is, in what has become a landscape. From the pulpitlike rock i n the foreground the spectators admire the scene of a densely settled agrarian landscape showing i n great detail men working in harmony i n a beneficent nature. Farmers plough their fields, workers repair an old wooden bridge, and smoke rises from the prosperous village. This desired transformation of wild nature into cultivated paradise is depicted in the rich autumnal colors of fulfillment and harvest and is shown to be accomplished by the material progress of train bridge and village; it exemplifies Cropsey s quotation, some time earlier, of the psalmist s statement that "the heavens declare the glory of G o d and the firmament his handiwork" (Ps. 19:1). The religious interpretation of American nature as a paradise to be wrestled by work from the wilderness came to an end as abrupt40

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ly as its alternative. In this case, however, it was not that the idea of paradise was forgotten because a vision of the Garden of Eden fell into oblivion before the march of secular, material science. The interpretation of American nature as the promised paradise to be achieved through the transformation of wilderness fell into obscurity in the course of the myths success. That is, the success of technological progress itself displaced its own foundation: religious understanding gave way to material accomplishment. American nature was no longer a scene for a religiously understood mission because the radically secular view, which at first depended on and was fed by a religious understanding, gained enough power and became so taken for granted as the assumption of regular activity that it surpassed its source and thus overlooked it. Regardless of the details of the eclipse, by the time the frontier had fallen into settlement, the religious understanding had played out, absorbed into and then dissipated into secular beliefs in progress. What had been a landscape of religious mission disappeared into the secular landscape, so physically understood that the frontier itself became thought of as the kind of phenomenon that could officially be declared closed by the superintendent of the census—an amazing transformation of meaning, to which we do not give a second thought because it now seems so obvious to us.

Secular Echoes in Landscape Architecture and Environmental Attitudes Precisely because the secular economic and political understanding of America as destined for settlement and endless progress is the more familiar and even taken-for-granted account, we need to keep in mind the original religious motive. What by now may appear to be an uncontroversial justification for material progress conceals its origin and power by that appearance. That is, the religious interpretation of nature, substantially accomplished by artists, becomes so powerful, so widely shared, that it finally becomes invisible, so taken for granted that it ceases to be focally operative. In the end it dissolves in the achievement of its goal, its own success. Against this dominating vision it is even more surprising that the alternative vision of Cole, Church, and Bierstadt should have

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flowered. That the American landscape generally was seen in religious terms seems odd to us now, so lost is the understanding and tradition. H o w more deeply lost is the subtler, inner struggle between two traditions, both derived from Genesis. Nonetheless, the accomplishment and alternatives, even i f forgotten, remain with us, perhaps more powerful than ever because they operate as hidden directives. Consider what we assume about disputes in the territory and practice of environmental interpretation: we worry about whether the approach of conservation or stewardship should prevail; we take it as obvious that notions of development as represented, say, by the views of conservationists and developers are wildly opposite. Actually, in these cases we face once again an old dilemma. Is wilderness or what now seems natural a last fragment of a garden of Eden, which we should let be, preserve, and try to enjoy as it is, or is it raw material for the work of civilization, which will domesticate and transform nature into a garden? In the first case we are called on to change our dominant view and transform ourselves so as to be worthy to enter the natural paradise or garden given to us. We would try to overcome the attitude that our action should be based on self-confidence and personal desires, for that attitude earlier led to our expulsion from paradise and now would destroy our second chance. In the second case we are challenged to complete the mastery and transformation of the natural into the cultivated paradise, which is the goal of our work and requires the mature acceptance of our responsibility for our redemption in conjunction with what is given to us. In either case, although with our little knowing it, we are guided by the alternative interpretations already developed in the nineteenth century with considerable sophistication. If we fail to take into account these origins of our unconsidered attitudes and approaches—long since radically secularized—we cannot, then, think or act as responsibly as we might. Indeed, our currently assumed attitudes remain confused as long as we are oblivious to both their real differences and the way in which they are unified as variations on a theme (as the two accounts in Genesis differ yet belong together in our complex religious tradition). Recovering and attending to this forgotten origin of our interpretation is crucial for critical self-understanding and for responsible action in the landscape.

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In addition to helping to clarify our own current positions by disclosing hidden meanings and assumptions as outlined above, recovering the original interpretations would have other practical consequences. First, it could contribute, from an overlooked source, to the current questions about the origins of our Western environmental attitudes. For example, although there is considerable debate about the extent to which Christianity lies behind ecology, little attention has been paid to the way in which art history contributes to the issue. Perhaps a better way to put it is that we have not drawn, all at once, what we know in theory and history of landscape, ecology, art history, and history of religion and culture into a focal and integrated environmental interpretation. 41

Second, recovering the complex religious interpretation of the American landscape in the nineteenth century—especially since that interpretation grounded the understanding not only of our American landscape but also of the meaning of American nature and the United States itself—calls for reconsidering the history of American landscape architecture. N o one would deny that the development of an American landscape architecture tradition, for example, in our gardens and parks, is partially a consequence of European events and attitudes, such as English "romantic" gardens. Nevertheless, the struggle to develop a uniquely worthy—and inherently religious—view of our own land, which was a finally successful motive for nineteenth-century landscape painting, also involved a broader struggle to overcome European conventions, as well as a complex set of historical assumptions. The unique accomplishments, then, of American painters and the development of American perceptions beyond European conventions surely need to be taken in account in understanding our own development and unique landscape. As a simple example, since England never was understood as a second paradise, whereas America was, an American park (the outcome of the tangled interpretation of landscape as garden of Eden and site of material transformation, all somehow secularized) cannot mean the same as an English park that might appear to be similar. In short, i f we take seriously that we have developed an indigenous understanding of American landscape, partially generated by nineteenth-century landscape painters, then that tradition should no 42

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longer be overlooked by the theory and history of landscape architecture, which say little or nothing of the fundamental religious understanding as a generative force. That the contemporary landscape echoes our earlier religious understanding is almost entirely obscured. Yet current attitudes toward parks and gardens—indeed, the meaning and function of urban open space today and the principles of design and p l a n n i n g — are derived from that tradition. At the least, our understanding of earlier landscape architects and the history and vocabulary of landscape architecture would need to be rethought and, likely, revised. The connection (and remaining influence) may be seen in a figure whose work and writings we continue to use in contemporary theory and design, although in adapting Frederick Law Olmsted (1822-1903), we largely are unaware of the complexity of what he said and what his landscapes meant. To cite one issue: where in the spectrum of this tradition (within the poles of secular and material vs. religious interpretation and of European vs. uniquely American conventions) was Olmsted operating in the development of the nineteenth-century urban landscape? Even in the best scholarship, the question is too little asked or, when noted, not really worked out. 43

In fact, Olmsted is a figure at the turning point in our shifting interpretations of the American landscape. H e participated in all three of the previously presented traditions: he understood nature as an earthly paradise given by its creator; he saw nature as the site for our moral industry that would be rewarded by the fruits of the promised garden; and he passed out of any deeply religious understanding of nature to help to develop the scientific approach to environmental planning and human well-being. Although it is something of a commonplace that our national parks, especially Yellowstone and Niagara Falls, were established partially through the influence of the paintings of artists such as Church, Bierstadt, and Moran ("the father of parks"), the relation between the theme of natural divinity in their attitudes and work and its appearance in Olmsted's largely is overlooked. Nonetheless, Olmsted's efforts to preserve Yosemite and Niagara Falls in a state as close as possible to the natural seem to have been grounded in the interpretation of nature as a divinely given paradise contrasted with 44

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the work of humans. Indeed, it was Church himself who, in 1869, first called the destruction of the scenery of Niagara Falls to Olmsted s attention, influencing Olmsted to help establish a reservation there (architect Henry H . Richards was also one of the petitioners). Since Church (as well as his contemporaries) had represented Niagara Falls as a sign of the biblical deluge and as a symbol to America of G o d s promise, Olmsted would have been aware of the connotations of the project. 45

As we have seen, a shared "prejudice" of the time was that what had been prefigured in the O l d World and O l d Testament was brought to fulfillment in the New World. So accepted was the convention that the visitors who flocked to Niagara Falls after the Erie Canal opened in 1826 not only saw the place in utilitarian terms or with the amateurs keen interest in natural history but frequently experienced the religious sublime. The pilgrimage to the falls not uncommonly led to rapture. For Harriet Beecher Stowe, the falls evoked images from the Book of Revelation. Another woman's letter testified, "The roar of the waters agitated me. . . . I cannot sooth down my heart—it is kindled by deep works of the invisible. . . . A great voice seems to be calling on me. . . . I have felt a spell on my soul as i f Deity stood visible there . . . I felt the moral influence of the scene acting on my spiritual nature, and while lingering at the summit alone, offered a simple prayer." 46

Church's Niagara (1857) participates in this horizon of meaning, immediately engaging viewers, who on looking at the painting, which has no foreground, find themselves as i f suspended directly over the water, almost at the brink of the falls (see fig. 3.20). In Churchs dramatic presentation the water powerfully and majestically falling over the full horseshoe (seen from the Canadian side), for all its immediacy, yet occurs under nonthreatening skies. Heavens and earth are united by a rainbow that dynamically arches from the sky in the upper left of the painting down into the precipice in the center. Surely here we have an image of a landscape where G o d confers his blessing on Americans. Since this Niagara, one of his several treatments of the subject, "was the picture that made Church the most famous painter in America," Olmsted would certainly have known both the painting 47

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Figure 3.20. Frederic Edwin Church, Niagara, 1857. Oil on canvas, 42 x 90 ". (107.95 cm x 229.87 cm). In the collection of the Corcoran Gallery of Art, Museum Purchase, Gallery Fund, Washington, D.C. 1/2

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and its religious interpretation. In this context, when Olmsted advocated a plan "to preserve and develop a particular character of natural scenery on a great scale avoiding as much as possible all manifestation of art, human labor, or human purposes," the argument implicitly, but obviously, drew on the spiritual foundation of the understanding of the landscape and advocated that basis as a dimension of what became the national parks. 48

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Olmsted s awareness of the tradition underlying Church's work (or "natural paradise as given," as I have called it i n this chapter) is apparent from Olmsted's personal history and writings. Indeed, Olmsted's fluency i n the basic edenic idiom continues throughout his life. For instance, i n 1866 he described the goal for the campus at Berkeley, approvingly quoting Lord Bacon, who three hundred years ago, sagaciously observed: "God Almighty first planted a garden, and, indeed, it is the purest of human pleasures; it is the greatest of refreshment to the spirits of man, without which buildings and palaces are but gross handiworks: and a man shall ever see that when ages grow to civility and elegance, men come to build stately sooner than to garden finely—as if gardening were the greater perfection." 50

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Figure 3.21. Frederick Law Olmsted, Design Map for Mount Royal, Montreal, 1877. Courtesy: National Park Service, Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site.

Later i n this report Olmsted elaborated the point that such a garden is the scene of the promised paradise and thus the site for our mandated moral work: "[It is] certain that i f [townspeople] fail to secure fresh air in abundance, pleasant natural scenery, trees, flowers, birds, and, in short, all the essential advantages of a rural residence, they will possess but a meager share of the reward which Providence offers in this world to the exercise of prudence, economy, and wise forecast." 51

Similarly, he advocated in clearly religious rhetoric drawn from the second Genesis account that "wild gardening" should be protected in Mount Royal Park i n Montreal (see fig. 3.21): I will go further, and tell you that if you cannot afford to keep a single man so employed [as a gardener], there are hundreds of little places on the mountain within which, if you can but persuade yourselves to regard them as sacred places and save them from sacrilegious hands and feet, the original Garden of Eden will delight your eyes with little pictures within greater pictures of indescribable loveliness. And remember that it is the lilies of the field, not the lilies of the garden we are bid consider.

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That Olmsted should write this way as late as 1881 leaves little doubt that it was a mature consideration. Still, such overt rhetoric seems to have been exceptional. By and large Olmsted operated within the more dominant tradition where American land was understood as the scene for our work in transforming wilderness into a moral world (following the first account in Genesis). Even more important, and showing the rhetorical client- and user-oriented functions such religious language finally served in the last part of the nineteenth century, Olmsted, like many of his urban contemporaries, rejected fundamentalism and organized religion for rational, secularized doctrines and their democratic social ethic. Olmsted s background and circle of acquaintances further clarify how he and other early landscape architects were aware of and connected to the reigning religious understanding, even as they moved away from it. Olmsted was intensely exposed, although apparently in rather forced circumstances, to orthodox religious instruction from age six to twelve, while he was in the care of six successive ministers at one fundamentalist boarding school after another. 53

As a young man he participated in a "period of religious seriousness among [his] friends in New Haven during the early months of 1846." A t the time he not only taught Sunday School but thought through his religious position in discussions and in a series of letters with friends, especially Charles Loring Brace, who introduced him to the doctrines of Congregational minister Dr. Horace Bushnell. Olmsted's and Brace's friendship developed initially between 1842 and 1845, when Brace shared rooms with Olmsted's brother, John H u l l , at Yale. Olmsted later accompanied his brother and Brace on their 1850 walking tour in England. 54

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Writing to Brace in 1846 (and mentioning the daguerreotypes of themselves that the "five friends" had made; see fig. 3.22), Olmsted discusses the theology of Bushnell and William Ellery Channing, on one occasion noting that he will complete a letter in progress "whenever I happen to feel in a Metaphysico Theologo humour." In fact, he discussed religion, social reform, and aesthetic ideas with Bushnell himself on at least one occasion (Bushnell lived next to Olmsted's parents in Hartford from 1836 to 1841, and Olmsted's father joined his church in 1848). 56

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Figure 3.22. The five friends in New Haven days, 1846. Back row, left to right: Charles Trask, Frederick Kingsbury, John Hull Olmsted; front row: Charles Loring Brace, Frederick Law Olmsted. Courtesy: National Park Service, Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site.

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W i t h Bushnell we have a specific case that confirms the explicit union of nineteenth-century attitudes to the landscape and city planning with self-conscious biblical interpretation. The Reverend Bushnell instantiates the unity: author of a major nineteenth-century essay on city planning, " C i t y Plans," he was also, as author of works such as Nature and the Supernatural, as Together Constituting the One System of God, one of the most influential Protestant theologians and biblical interpreters of his time. His interpretation according to the Bible and Christian symbolism remained within the tradition of hermeneutics I elaborated in the introduction; at the same time it was part of the midnineteenth-century transition from religious to secular and aesthetic views and social reforms. 57

In developing his radical theories of religious language and symbolism, Bushnell explicitly took up the issue of nature, deity, and Scripture. Although he held that the world is a source of inspiration bringing us into the presence of divinity, he also argued that transcendent reality is not transmitted only by nature or just anywhere; rather, nature is seen through culturally developed religious language and symbolism. That is, Bushnell stressed the "perceptive and aesthetic dimensions of faith." 58

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As to social reform and the environment, Bushnell argued for restoring nature to the cities, actually laid out a park for Hartford, and called for professional urban planners. In "City Plans" he wrote that the welfare of a city and its inhabitants "depends, to a considerable degree, on the right arrangement and due multiplication of vacant spaces" and "the providing and right location of a sufficient park, or parks," which would provide "breathing places." It is little wonder that Brace, when he founded the Children's A i d Society in New York, placed slum orphans in rural homes and Olmsted, moving in the complementary direction, worked to bring nature into the city, although the religious motive and force of the connection would soon be forgotten by others. 60

To refocus all this: after growing up amid these religious figures and after maturely considering the ideas, Olmsted certainly understood and was fluent in the dominant theological interpretations of nature. Because he could not reconcile his religious views with required practices and belief systems, however, after the intense year of 1846 he chose not to make a profession of faith or join a church. 61

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N o r was Olmsted unusual in this regard. His friend Brace, who had gone on to become a divinity student, also "found that his purely theological interests were waning and hoped that his travels [in 1850] would help h i m prepare for a career of Christian service in social work." Thus, as an adult Olmsted belonged to a group of liberal Protestant leaders and their influential disciples who were in the forefront of the movement from formal religion to secular doctrine and social responsibility, especially urban reform. Clearly identified with established social, economic, and political power in the N e w York area, they operated with an idealism based on BushnelPs organicist thought and on "radical Protestant theology as expounded by the Unitarian minister W i l l i a m Ellery Channing and by his followers, [minister Henry Whitney] Bellows and [newspaper editor W i l l i a m Cullen] Bryan." 62

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O f course, Olmsted, Brace, and their colleagues operated at the end of the tradition I have examined, when divine providence was interpreted as progress. That is, at heart, for Olmsteds circle, the landscape no longer recalls G o d through his creation as it did in the primary sacred tradition: even religiously based civic ethics and humanitarian goals are at a far remove from sacred disclosure. N o w American nature is seen as a means to human well-being in the context of manifest destiny. As Albert Fein observes, the New England church and common were replaced not so much by urban Gothic cathedrals as by parks. Olmsted actively and creatively participated in the development of landscape and parks as a part of the movement to create a homogeneous and harmonious national urban society. As one of the group, Parke G o d w i n , held, "Providence" had specified "this continent, and the people, for a homogeneous civilization." Olmsted displays the same religiously couched assumptions and language in explaining the benefits of parks: 64

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Consider that the New York Park and the Brooklyn Park are the only places in those associated cities where, in this eighteenth hundred and seventieth year after Christ, you will find a body of Christians coming together, and with an evident glee in the prospect of coming together,

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all classes largely represented, with a common purpose, not at all intellectual, competitive with none, disposing to jealousy and spiritual or intellectual pride toward none, each individual adding by his mere presence to the pleasure of all others, all helping to the greater happiness of each. 67

Central Park, for example, according to Olmsted, "exercise [s] a distinctly harmonizing and refining influence upon [even] the most unfortunate and most lawless classes of the city." In his view urban parks and gardens operate as sites for humanitarian improvements and the development of a unified, democratic civic realm. 68

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At this point, despite supporting the value of natural scenery in national parks, Olmsted and others, by and large, no longer envisioned the natural as wilderness but viewed it as the obviously cultivated. In one way this natural, "rural" open space was the same as the domesticated spaces that landscape painters such as Cropsey delineated as subjugated and cultivated. At the same time, Olmsted had come to hold that the countryside, with its abysmal conditions, was a failure and that the future lay in the urban environment. This change in attitude was part of a cultural shift in which the idea of an agrarian society was giving way to the rise of the cities. Olmsted and his colleagues sought to fuse the best characteristics of both realms. In their union these two opposites would be transformed into complements: the derelict and disadvantaged countryside was to be replaced by the cities with their amenities; the cities would be reformed and made well by planning and open space. The antiurban force would be assimilated into the city, so that the city, brought to its full health and potential, could "witness to mans spiritual destiny," as William Ellery Channing put it. 70

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The strategy, then, was for nature (cultivated "rural" open space) to be brought into towns, so that each's virtues would cure the others vices. For example, the benefits of the natural, such as fresh air and a mixture of rest and exercise, provide the antidote to the city's ills. That is why Olmsted specified that parks were to be built to hide the city and, as its counterbalance, to soothe us with their healthy environment. For all these religious dimensions, however, even in their civic

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manifestations, Olmsted does not remain within a deeply religious interpretation of the landscape, because he passes over to advocate and develop the secular scientific approach to the environment and progress in confluence with social Darwinism—although not without differences and not as materialistically as Clarence K i n g . Indeed, this is how we best know him, in the forefront of the scientific approach that was displacing the old religious visions. His stance clearly was not a simple matter of personal indifference to religious orthodoxy but the result of his convictions and of his contributions to the science of environmental planning. H e was not concerned with traditions religious goal of paradise either on earth or in heaven; rather, he strove toward humanitarian reform through scientific planning and design of the urban environment (and to a much lesser extent, national parkland). 73

Parks and other urban open spaces, for Olmsted, were to be designed to promote social well-being: health, decency, vigor, civil moral tone, sensibility to the beautiful, trade, and prosperity—all humane goals of environmental and social planning. In short, Olmsted represents landscape architecture and planning at a transition point. H e participated in both traditions of the religious mind. W i t h Frederic Edwin Church he was able to advocate letting nature be, "naturally" (for example, in national parks), without human improvement. W i t h the heirs of dominant Protestantism, such as Horace Bushneil—who, despite increasingly developing liberal moral and civic progress and its humane rewards, still believed in religious responsibility to work to improve the world morally—his planning and the design of urban parks were intended to improve the city and landscape. Ultimately he moved beyond these two strands of the old religious traditions and on to the secular scientific approach to the environment and the planning and design of urban open space as we know it today. Because of this complexity and transition, Olmsted himself needs to be better understood. H e was not ultimately an advocate of the older sacred understanding of the landscape. H e was a very skilled politician and environmental planner. A t times his use of religious language and symbolism seems to result from calculated professional strategy. Olmsted the masterfully deft politician surely referred to the Garden of Eden and Genesis in the plan for the Berkeley cam-

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pus because the chairman of the committee at Berkeley was the Reverend S. H . Willey. Nonetheless, fully understanding Olmsted requires at least understanding how the diverse strands of thought and language functioned in his life and work. The previously given sketch of his participation in the several dimensions of this tradition and in the transition from it is only a first step toward recovering what his work means and what we can learn from his continued use of religious rhetoric late in life. To step back to our larger concern with environmental interpretation—since the original sacred interpretations of landscape passed over, hidden, into secular, civic planning and environments—the issue does not really focus on Olmsted. He is only an interesting and pivotal figure. In addition to having individual importance and influence, Olmsted is symbolically significant: he represents and presents to us today a substantial set of issues yet to be resolved in our environmental interpretation. His work indicates how the lost sacred understanding of landscape is important for understanding current scholarly and design issues. N o matter what pragmatic context is noted in his writing, the rhetoric and fundamental environmental principles unmistakably echo an edenic social-religious harmony. Hence, the issue remains of whether the development of American parks, for example, can finally be understood without thinking through their place in the secularized religious interpretation of American landscape—especially i f we wish to recover and preserve what appears to be a unique landscape tradition. The hermeneutic of the landscape complements traditional histories of the landscape by partially disclosing the "hidden" dynamic behind the emergence of the American environment. The story of our existing parks, even when told in so sophisticated and astute a work as Galen Cranz's Politics of Park Design, is incomplete and depends for its deeper interpretation on the landscape's concealed origin in religious attitudes and their subsequent transformation into a secular political and civic view. Cranz's analysis convincingly begins with the idea of the park as a "pleasure ground" and goes on to account for the contrary "reform park" and the later forms of "recreational facility" and "the openspace system" (see fig. 3.23). The pleasure ground, which offers a respite from the city because of the soothing and restorative power 74

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Figure 3.23. Nineteenth-century park as pleasure ground. Boating on the lagoon, Lincoln Park, Chicago, 1890. Chicago Historical Society (ICHi-03420).

of nature, gave way to the goals of forming civic character and unity as part of the zealous moralistic reform and progressive attitudes that came to dominate by the early 1900s. The natural, which Olmsted and others once understood as the opposite of the city and antidote to its ills, by the turn of the century became an instrument of the city. The park and garden became the spaces for works of moral vigor and education especially as heterogeneous and nonEnglish-speaking immigrants were ordered, kept out of trouble, and "Americanized" (see fig. 3.24). Hence, as Cranz argues, parks became an instrument of discipline designed to organize and routinize social attitudes and beliefs. These basic forms and their historical dynamic need to be questioned within the horizon sketched out here. Todays efforts to understand and design appropriate open spaces have much to learn from the nineteenth century if we critically inquire into (1) how the unstructured enjoyment of the pleasure ground (itself entirely con-

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Figure 3.24. Twentieth-century reform park. Settlement kindergarten class at Davis Square Park, Chicago. Chicago Historical Society (ICHi03380).

structed and not at all "naturally given," though it may so appear) derives from the prior interpretation of the garden as a paradise already given for Americans to enter and delight in and (2) how the reform park (appearing as more built than natural) results from interpreting nature as the site for the transformation of our land and our lives through moral effort. (Or perhaps, although it is a less likely account, through Olmsted and his colleagues, the dominant American ideology already had eliminated the first tradition and had selected the second so that nature was seen as the cultivated and the scene of formation of civic character, regardless of whether in a more relaxed or more disciplined manner.) In either case, from Olmsted on, American parks have retained their origin in nature understood through paradise, since American designers inevitably implemented, opposed, and unconsciously adapted his principles and since his circles beliefs and work—perhaps unintentionally— led to the moral reform and progressive attitudes that dominated

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when the reform park replaced the pleasure ground. For those interested more in design than in scholarship, the issue remains important. As Galen Cranz observes, "I soon learned that I needed to understand the ultimate purpose of parks in order to design . . . playgrounds." If we do not understand how and why our parks and open spaces are what they are, i f we do not understand the meanings of the elements, or wholes, or the place of landscape in the urban context, design will adapt the past unthoughtfully, uncritically, and eclectically. That is, new design will operate without adequately understanding its own uniquely American tradition, vocabulary, and possibilities—and continue to be an unwitting instrument in our own cultural displacement. 75

The Hidden and Disclosure Nature as paradise is understood here entirely in terms of Christian eschatology (although other religions such as Judaism and Islam share some of the same concepts). We might say that this was known all along, even i f we forgot it for a while. That is, it was known at the time and now may be recovered, which is all to the good for historical reasons. But is that adequate to fulfill the claim that hermeneutics recovers deep meanings truly hidden? What was so hidden if everyone once knew it and we now know it again? In the first place, calling a relation to our attention through patient and detailed historical research does not mean that we now understand it. The meaning of the twinned O l d Testament roots, as interpreted by Catholic and Protestant theology, is profound i f we begin to think it through, a task that goes far beyond merely noticing, and that will take some time. W i t h i n this recovery we find that the twinned attitudes from Genesis vie with each other without being able to resolve themselves into a settled view. This internal dynamic needs to inform reflections on the religious origins of American attitudes to nature and, today, to ecological perspectives. A revisionary hermeneutics has only begun to recover our uniquely American landscape tradition. Second, this theological interpretation has guided all other interpretations of nature, translating them into its own terms, overtaking and consuming them. Ubiquitously known and used during the 76

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nineteenth century, its power obscured all other alternatives. It can be objected that the other alternatives, such as the views of native peoples, were acknowledged, not ignored, but that was not so in any significant sense. Indigenous peoples' truths were denied from the start as they were assimilated through the Christian master terms. The ontotheological basis of both Christian traditions derived from Genesis interprets G o d as creator and the natural world as his creation. This is not a general idea but a specific way of interpreting reality derived from Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. Nature is the set of beings that derives its existence from the original and continued outpouring of Being, where Being is understood as G o d or as a primary manifestation of G o d according to natural theology. 77

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Thus, acknowledging native peoples' views of nature amounted to taking their "parallel" accounts as "creation" myths, myths that were judged and understood in the light of the master creation story in Genesis and of the concepts and categories of two millennia of theology. The native accounts could be understood as childish, defective, or ignorant because they did not really see who G o d , as the creator or as ultimate being, was or how he brought about and sustained creation. Whatever in these native accounts did not fit into the master terms of creator and creatures could be dismissed or attributed to stubbornness in not accepting the true version. 79

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As a variation, the Native Americans' attitudes to nature as some sort of living whole were translated straightforwardly as pantheism, a "well-understood" ontotheological phenomenon. Judged metaphysically this indigenous version misunderstood or confused the difference between beings and being and so was philosophically incorrect. Theologically it erred in confusing the created with creator and accordingly was heresy. Thus, the apparently obvious revelation of the American landscape as God's graceful blessing obliterated all other traditions of interpretation and possible ways of life. The latter could not possibly have conveyed their own truths because they were not allowed to speak in their own voices. The indigenous traditions referred to, however, were not at all homogeneous or unified (in 1492 there were more than four hundred languages and ways of life in what became the United States and Canada), yet our very way of referring to native peoples assumes that somehow they were fundamentally the same. Their apparent

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identity was constituted by default since each group was different from and deficient in regard to the master principles established by the Christian theological account and the conquerors' identity. Because the alternative accounts that specific tribes and languages offered were judged to be inconsequential compared to "the truth," all secondary differences among the former were erased and deemed inconsequential. Here we also glimpse a third level of what was hidden by the nineteenth-century understanding. In this tradition, as we have seen, nature appears as landscape, as something viewed. Although how nature came to be seen as a landscape by Western culture is a long story in itself, the essential features of this process involve the ontological and epistemological opposition of subject and object. Insofar as a subject is understood as consciousness, standing over and against the natural object, the natural can manifest itself as something that comes into view. Nature as viewed during a sightseeing tour, through a Claude glass, or in poetic or artistic representations is a landscape. The entire aesthetics of nature develops its categories to explain the different ways that landscape shows itself, as sublime, picturesque, beautiful, and so on. 81

This view of nature as landscape is also at base a metaphysical, representational view. It initially is possible because G o d is understood as omniscient, as the all-seeing being who views creation and then evaluates it. During and after the Creation God's complementary act was to stand back to size up the propriety and harmony of the world in terms of what he had willed: "And G o d saw everything that H e had made, and behold, it was very good." Since G o d is the creator par excellence, and since we are made in his image and likeness, we exhibit our own natures, our own participation in divinity, insofar as we too are creative. Thus the soul and inspiration have long been part of the Neoplatonic interpretation of artistic creativity, a tradition later modified in the modern secular era. In all these theories nature is nothing in itself. It is something only insofar as it is the created. To the religious understanding it is significant only insofar as it reflects its divine origin or as, represented and operated on in human imitation of divine act, it is transformed and completed by the hand of the artist or our pragmatic technologies. Here nature is always a sign or counter in the larger 82

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play of divine creation and human re-creation, of divine presentation to us and our re-presentation to ourselves and to G o d , who is always watching and receiving our prayers and offerings. Nature really appears as a mirror, reflecting the acts and interactions of G o d and his human companions. As the mirroring symbol in the middle, nature shows each to the other. Nature symbolizes G o d and his grace to his chosen people. Hence nature, which appears as the rainbow and as Niagara Falls, must be interpreted through the O l d Testament. Alternatively, nature symbolizes our increased self-awareness and acceptance of ourselves as blessed by G o d and as needing to act as he wills, a symbolism delineated and shared by the artist so that we all can come to self-understanding and appropriate national action. Nature presented to us as landscape shows—represents—God to us. Nature represented in our paintings, poems, and environmental works symbolizes to ourselves, and back to G o d , our comprehension and willingness to accept our essential relation and mission. Nonetheless, all versions of nature as landscape—whatever the differences among Plato, Plotinus, medieval theology, Renaissance Neoplatonism, Catholic missionary views in the New World governed by France and Spain, Puritan attitudes to wilderness in New England, nineteenth-century pietism, and the secularized scientific heritage—are part of the same ontotheological (that is, metaphysical and representational) system. Nature as symbol is a kind of coin that can pay various debts or play in various games. N o matter what the various transformations are, however, it has its meaning only in terms of the master system and is "paid off" only in terms of what the system ultimately values (blessing, salvation, participation with God, truth, etc.). Because of the appearance of nature as landscape in the Western theological tradition, an even deeper obliteration occurs than that in which the dominant creation story hides alternative indigenous views. Here, nature as created necessarily appears as landscape, that is, as the material medium between G o d and humans, where the spiritual nature of the latter two is all that matters. Nature is insignificant as material (compared with divinity and our soul, that special spark of the divine that is treasured because it defines our essence). Material nature is valuable only as the symbolic counter

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that allows transactions between G o d and his chosen American people. Thus, in this cultural context, the possibility of nature as something in itself is fully obscured. Since nature is given as a symbolic object in the midst of a representational ontological-epistemological chain, any inherent meaning is out of the question. It never could be disclosed, never could come into appearance. O f course, from our contemporary vantage point we can see that nature, as physical, is something in itself, at least to an extent, and more so for materialism than for humanism. That dimension manifests itself, however, only when science wrests it from previous religious interpretation. Nature can be seen as fully material only when it is divested of its spiritual horizon. The struggle we saw at the end of the story of natural divinity is nothing less than the conquest of the sacred by profane science, the process wherein nature disappears as symbol, that is, as the place of the interaction of G o d and soul. W h e n this old view passes away, it is supposed that nature can be seen in itself. In appearing as a purely material object to scientific, technological human subjects, however, what we call reality still remains metaphysical. The spiritual dimension has been removed, but the fundamental metaphysical structure remains. Subjects are no longer religiously understood, but secularized will, consciousness, and judgment remain the essential traits of humans. Objects are no longer understood as creation and sacred symbols but are secularized as the merely physical raw material for human projects. Consequently, nature is still defined in terms of its potential for being operated on by its masters and is valued only in terms of our aesthetic, social, and economic desires. It is difficult even to think of what an alternative might be. What would nature possibly mean, understood as something in itself, i f not the object of our positive knowledge and technology? A n example, irrelevant here except that it is nonmetaphysical, is the early Greek physis that later became natura in Latin and eventually what we call "nature." Physis is the self-generating and ever-coming, the energy of coming forth out of hiddenness and abiding, which goes on in bewildering, incredibly powerful ways that overwhelm and challenge humans to try to gain some localized mastery. Mastery, however, is never possible, because considered on a macrolevel scale 83

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we are an altogether insignificant part of physis's upheavals, and on a microlevel scale, as mortal, we come forth only for the briefest moment. Even in this inadequately short sketch it becomes clear that the word nature is unnecessary here, an inappropriate translation after the fact that misses a large part of the meaning said with physis. To return to my American example: nature might have been talked and thought about in a way other than as landscape or as a parallel metaphysical concept. For example, Luther Standing Bear, explaining the difference between the newcomers and his people, said of his world, "Earth was bountiful and we were surrounded with the blessing of the Great Mystery," an image depicted in his watercolor Black Elk at the Center of the Earth (1947-1948; see fig. 3.25). Note how hard it is, even here, to resist mentally translating this saying into the ontotheological tradition, that is, to free ourselves from immediately and unself-consciously reading and understanding "Great Mystery" as " G o d " through Judeo-Christian theology. English words fail here. Black Elk said, "Wingeds, the two-leggeds, and the four-leggeds, are really the gift of Wakan-Tanka. They are wakan and should be treated as such." Although Luther Standing Bear and Black Elk seem to be saying something roughly congruent and that appears pregnant with implications for understanding and acting in the world, we certainly cannot presume that the two say the same thing. Therefore, it is an unjustified leap to think "blessing of the Great Mystery" alongside "gift of Wakan-Tanka"

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Those learned in indigenous languages tell us that wakan roughly means "the sacred power that permeates all natural forms and movements." There appears to be a cluster or family of words that say what we can provisionally think of as a power that vivifies things, where the individual things have little existence except while the power moves in and through them. Archaic Lakotah says "s'kan, taku skanskan: something-in-movement, spiritual vitality." Navaho says "ali'l; power; special, extraordinary power." Z u n i says "milf; Iroquois, "orentda"; Algonquian, "manito"; Shoshone, "pokunf"; Hidatsa, "xupa"; Athabascan, "coen"; Crow, "maxpe"; Pawnee, "Tirawa" (a more personalized form, as is the Dakotah/Lakotah Wakan-Tanka). Suppose we can hear the subtlest hint of how these words say that 86

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Figure 3.25. Surrounded with the blessing of the Great Mystery. Luther Standing Bear, Black Elk at the Center of the Earth, 1947-1948. Watercolor on paper. Negative no. 337964. Courtesy, Department of Library Services, American Museum of Natural History.

what we understand as beings, objects, and events bear meaning and value insofar as they are given by and disclose a primal force. H o w could we begin to interpret the way in which any one of these groups experienced the force that comes and goes across the world and in which humans participate for a short time? What would the mystery that gives and grants, the mystery that is beheld on the earth and i n the heavens, have disclosed within the worlds i n and through which it occurred before it withdrew? It would be absurd to pretend that any but a handful of scholars might understand such sayings or possibilities. We neither speak these indigenous languages nor participate i n the living cultures where such words name the mode of the coming to be and passing away of local worlds. Nevertheless, we can at least ponder how s'kans'kan, wakan, and hundreds of other words and phenomena as interpreted by indigenous peoples would have been part of the disclosure of "nature" as inherently and nonmetaphysically meaningful. A n y attempt to

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translate such given words and occurrences into representational terms destroys the very subject matter. Such a move would collapse the project of interpretation in an instant, as happened with the anthropological conceptualization of mana. Here we can only note the remote possibility that a hermeneutics might recover indigenous peoples' realms in their own terms, although that seems very difficult and unlikely. O f course, such an insight, if retrievable, not only would be of the greatest historical importance but would be a kind of earthquake into the future, shaking up and informing at least our meager attempts at an appropriate ecology, i f not a once again spiritual attitude toward the earth, heavens, and all life. 90

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Apparently the alternatives to the religious, metaphysical interpretations of the nineteenth century were nominally acknowledged, although actually destroyed in translation and assimilation into the dominating system and thus finally hidden. The revelation of natural divinity was so fully a matter of metaphysical concepts (such as "language," "symbol," "spiritual subjects," and "material objects") that the complementary nonmetaphysical disclosures of mystery or power that might have appeared as inherently valuable were simultaneously obscured—as the sun necessarily obscures its shadow from itself. A final concealment discloses itself here. 92

The nineteenth-century intellectuals, scientists, and artists who worked with tenacious success to disclose the world as they did, by articulating natural divinity and thereby shaping cultural understanding and practices, could not possibly think that theirs was but one passing manifestation of earth, sky, divinity, and humans, as Heidegger shows it to be. N o r does this observation claim any superior insight from the vantage point of anthropological relativism, which holds that different groups naturally see things, even nature, in different ways. That would be to reduce the accomplishment of the world s appearing as natural divinity to merely one of many arbitrary, more or less interesting perspectives. That also would relegate the possible, subsequently obliterated alternatives, such as those of indigenous peoples, to appearing as so many points of view. This would be nothing more than yet another metaphysical, representational account still operating in terms of subjective consciousness and perception (even i f for cultural groups instead of for individuals). In short, it lapses back into an even more derivative and inad-

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equate conceptual scheme. Rather, the hermeneutic point is that the manifestation of divinity in nature is a genuine accomplishment in the unfolding of earth, heavens, and humans, that is, a specific phase in the primal endowment of the world. This primal gift does appear in specific historical configurations, which, as we have seen, in their mode of disclosure are simultaneous with modes that necessarily are hidden. Nevertheless, even i f the most astute thinkers and artists of the nineteenth century saw the character of what they were helping to bring about, they could not have been aware of that to which they were oblivious—how, in principle or in fact, could they have been? Furthermore, they could not have seen that, beyond the revelation and concealment happening in their lives and times, the manner in which the world happens (the primal way in which divinities, humans, heavens, and earth are meted out into existence and in relation with one another) itself hides the original event of this granting of world, the still-coming, primal granting-gathering of dimensions of world ("Ereignis," Heidegger often calls it). 93

They could not have understood the G o d of the O l d and New Testaments as a configuration of this giving, since they saw h i m as the creator of all creation, as the giver of all gifts, as prior to and independent of time and space. They could not have seen nature as one configuration of sky and heavens, since they saw it as creation, that is, as already formed and as already given to humans in the specific manner recounted in Genesis. H o w could they possibly have seen that in their own disclosed world, nature itself was something else more deeply hidden and only partially revealed, and even then revealed only in a way that forsook its own inherent nature? Since they positively participated in the disclosure of nature as divine symbol and site for human moral action (common to both versions of Genesis), they could not see that this manifestation of nature deforms it in its subjugation to representational concepts, where it can appear as having meaning only as a symbol and value, only as a counter between the spiritual action of G o d and his blessed American faithful. Given that this concept was so enslaved and deformed, any other dimensions of earth and heavens that might have appeared—any portrayals of nature as other than landscape—were unimaginable

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not only because theological and artistic sensitivity and perception could not fully articulate them but also because the hidden mystery could not possibly occur to the imagination of these people in this time and place. To put it, not entirely appropriately, in the anthropomorphic terms of the O l d Testament, it is as if the earth and heavens of America (itself yet another concept) were as the Israelites held in captivity: as long as they were captive they could not come into their own, destined nature; they could not come to fulfillment while in the hands and cultural constructs of their captors. Strangely, however, this exile from their own lands and essence also was a necessary part of their coming into their proper place. What are the possibilities for a captive who appears to his captor as nothing in himself, as merely a body or object to be disposed of according to the will of his master, with no hope of escape? Such a one might resist and struggle before being overpowered. H e might resignedly go along and be considered a collaborator or prostitute. He might become a kind of curiosity, to be shown off to visitors and tourists. So too with the earth and heavens. Under the reign of natural divinity they appeared as objects to be seen, used, enjoyed, and beguiled or forced to appear in artistic and technological projects. What could happen except that earth and heavens would appear as nature, as representational symbol and object? While bound up and seen only according to these concepts, as not possibly intelligible in terms other than "nature," "nature as landscape," or "the landscape of natural divinity"—all of which are versions of one and the same event—earth and heavens could not come to their own nature as inherently valuable and meaningful, yet still with a profound relation to humans and, perhaps, to divinity. Where earth and heavens could occur as the effect of the Judeo-Christian G o d or, alternatively, as the merely physical evolution of materiality, they could not come into their proper essence according to a yet more primal measure, in a giving and taking where earth and heavens are gathered and scattered. Such an occurrence likely would disclose earth and heavens in a mode that we might approximate by the names holy or mystery—if we could say and think them nonmetaphysically. There currently is a good deal of talk about the earth as a total, self-sustaining ecosystem, the so-called Gaia hypothesis. This shows 94

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our urge to account for nature in some sort of spiritual manner, in terms of a kind of wholeness to which we can belong and from and toward which we can responsibly act. O f course, to see the earth this way is substantially (although perhaps in a new phase) to translate it into the conceptual apparatus of systems logic and process philosophy. To say this is not to discount the movement but to describe it as still within philosophical and scientific representational thinking. Perhaps here we catch a glimpse of the next epoch of the manifestation of what was nature, a hint of the next historical era. In any case, however, such systemic thinking, even if it would achieve a posthumanistic, postanthropological attitude to the earth and its life, perhaps bringing about some new good, still would not attain the nonmetaphysical realm that hermeneutics seeks. Given the yearning for something beyond the metaphysical tradition of human domination over nature that has been sanctioned by the authority initially derived from G o d and now held by science, deep ecology not surprisingly emerges and seeks to find its way, partially by using Heidegger's thought. What will work out here remains to be seen. 95

In any case, the nonmetaphysical opening up of earth and heavens has not yet been given. What ultimately was hidden from the nineteenth century by the disclosure of natural divinity and what still is hidden from us today by the modes of appearance of our own technological world is this event of earth and heavens as mystery, an event that may or may not yet occur and thus a realm in which we may or may not be able to dwell. 96

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Postscript

As noted i n the introduction, the issues surrounding the new theories and practices of interpretation are interesting and important. Fierce intellectual and cultural feuds are underway, the outcome of which will affect our culturally sanctioned ways of understanding the world and the range of individual differences tolerated by research funding and i n publishing contracts and relevant to the success and abridgment of careers. The stakes are too high to remain uninformed or without a position. We all must participate in the decisions about social assumptions and attitudes and about the possibilities for academic and applied professional work. This task obviously calls for additional attention to the difficult theories themselves. Ultimately, however, each of us must attempt to apply the alternatives i n his or her own areas of interest. To provide initial help i n that project, i n chapter I, I presented Wittgensteins and Jung's views as paradigms of the major possibilities and choices: respectively, to move on by sweeping away misleading past assumptions and connotations i n a process that never will be completed or to recover and transform complex, deep symbolic meanings i n a manner appropriate to our new modes of building and living. In chapter 2,1 deconstructed not only pyramids but the "official" readings of pyramids by such scholars as Giedion and Etlin. That is, I intentionally opened up a site to which readers may 1

2

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return i f they wish. They can reread Giedion and Etlin and more fully compare these traditional approaches with the newly proposed deconstruction. Similarly, the hermeneutic interpretation of American nature in chapter 3 is meant to be an example with multiple agendas. It is intended to show how hermeneutic retrieval would proceed and also to challenge pointedly the traditional and deconstructive methods. If readers choose to pursue the issues, beyond understanding what hermeneutics would do, they can work through the other contested readings of American nature. So, as a final example or pointer, and nothing more than that, what follows—written from the perspective of hermeneutics, since that is where I left off—is an outline of how readers might continue thinking through hermeneutics versus deconstruction versus traditional approaches. Hermeneutics assumes a specific attitude toward phenomena, an attitude that Heidegger, Gadamer, and others developed to return attention to the ordinary world and everyday life. Unlike deconstruction, hermeneutic investigation does not produce a new kind of work or different-looking designs and plans. Hermeneutics is not likely to be turned into a new style or to shift attention to the exotic. Rather, as Heidegger insisted, we need to reflect on what is nearest, on what is so close that we do not see or think it. It is so near that it does not occur to us to attend to it, nor would it be easy to do so, since it may be the means by which anything else, everything else, is given to us at all. Thus, what is nearest of all hides itself as the invisible context within which the focally given appears. That is why Heidegger worked so hard to recover the meaning of what was close by: beings, language, things, and Being. 3

Each person and group needs to try to discover, to listen to and see, what is nearest and hidden. For contemporary Americans the phenomena appropriate for hermeneutics include things such as the landscape around us. O u r landscape is so close that we rarely notice it, because we instead perceive objects, events, and ourselves in it. Our landscape is ordinary. We live in it, photograph it, build subdivisions on it, and vow to save its mountain streams from pollution. To do a hermeneutics of the American landscape means, as we have begun to understand, to retrieve past meanings effaced by time and forgetfulness and obscured by historical shifts and changes

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through which we act and see differently than we had before. Hermeneutics attempts to peer into and through such erasures and disclose what was unthought by tracing phenomena back to their original meanings, back to the source that still comes to us and informs our culture and possibilities today. What had been taken for granted might be newly known and, in turn, transform and enrich our experiences and actions. It will be objected, of course, that the American landscape is far from ignored. It is the focus of popular attention in constant media coverage of environmental issues and ecological debates. It is the theme of numerous artistic and scholarly projects. It is precisely here, however, that we can see why hermeneutics is appropriate. Insofar as nature is seen as an object or problem to be dealt with by way of the latest technology or, subjectively, in terms of artistic "creativity," we still are within the metaphysical sphere. The continuing grasp of modernity is obvious all around us: the soft-focus, all but pastel marketing images generated by chemical companies present their creators as friends of the earth; subdivisions promise "Lake-Hills Meadows" or "River-Cloud Place"; lawn mower advertisements trim up our public face; nostalgic paintings of Native Americans in wilderness settings sell for thousands of dollars; and New Age crystals promise to bring cosmic harmony. A l l these promote, depend on, and in their own ways obscure the deep and originary meaning of our landscape. Have we learned nothing from Wittgenstein, Jung, Derrida, Gadamer, Eliade, and Heidegger, who all argue that we must strip away the illusion that we know what is about us, that what is here is obvious and unproblematic? Other options remain, however. A direct comparison of hermeneutics with deconstruction, critical theory, and traditional scholarship can be nicely made by considering the recent trajectories of scholars pushing the critical investigation of the social, cultural, economic, and ideological context of nineteenth-century American painting. In the most controversial and extreme case, the posture of American art and the landscape of democracy have been partially deconstructed in the widely reviewed 1991 traveling exhibition and catalogue The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820-1920. Here, although deconstructive theory (strangely) is not mentioned, the grounding assumptions and traditional 4

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readings are rejected in inversions that bring the previously marginalized to the fore. The subsequent 1994 exhibition Thomas Cole: Landscape into History and the book of the same title shift from deconstruction to utilize the tactics of critical theory and cultural studies and are perhaps more likely permanently to change the course of the interpretation of Cole and American painting generally. William H . Truettner sets the tone by skewering traditional scholarship and its guiding metaphor: 5

Scholars and collectors in the 1930s believed [Cole's] landscapes more or less truthfully represented nature. These same landscapes might also convey strong personal feelings, but they corresponded to what the artist had felt when observing a particular scene. Despite occasional distortions, Cole provided what was then called a window on the past—the look, the spirit, the unadorned beauty of the American wilderness in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In addition, Cole seemed to provide that window without a lot of artistic fuss. The style of his landscapes, scholars argued, was nature's own—simple, direct, the product of a democratic culture in which academic art had in many instances emerged from folk art. 6

In contrast, the exhibition and catalogue are meant to demonstrate that "scholars no longer need to focus on how Cole reproduced the look of wild nature, but on how he used both landscapes and history paintings as inventions to address the complex relationship between society and nature during his own era." 7

The shift away from considering painting as a traditional, objective representation or as a source of deeper, hermeneutic meaning, it is argued, can be accomplished by viewing Cole in the light of the divided society of the Jacksonian era and its "struggle with complex social, political, and cultural issues—the rise of Jacksonian democracy, economic expansion, and the early phases of industrialization." Specifically, Alan Wallachs essay "Thomas Cole: Landscape and 8

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the Course of Empire" considers the tensions between artist and patron during the beginning stages of the market for landscape paintings in America and then as the interests and aesthetic preferences of an aristocratic elite yielded to those of a bourgeois or middle-class elite. Although the artist participates in the patrons competition for status, he or she also serves their interests by helping to accomplish and legitimize the commodification and consumption of the landscape. Wallach writes, "To depict a nature new to Art' constituted an act of appropriation. Nature had to be seized, tamed, brought under the dominion of artistic law." 9

10

In a parallel analysis, "The Advantages of Genius and Virtue: Thomas Coles Influence, 1848-58," J . Gray Sweeney probes the "artistic and social agendas" that are served as Cole s influences and critical reception are played out. The rivalry for visibility, reputation, and sales is crucial, he argues, to understanding how Frederic Edwin Church, Asher B. Durand, Jasper F. Cropsey, Sanford R. Gifford, John F. Kensett, and many others deployed themselves in relation to Coles influence and toward their critics and patrons. In any case, the consideration of status, power, and money at least implies that both traditional and conservative hermeneutic interpretations are too simple and economically and ideologically naïve. 11

To make a final comparison, consider part of the Columbian Quincentenary, the exhibition and catalogue Columbus of the Woods: Daniel Boone and the Typology of Manifest Destiny, in which J . Gray Sweeney revises the conventional views of Daniel Boone in the light of an analysis of cultural and ideological drives to power. Sweeney holds that the artistic representations of Boone are linked to contending agendas for motivating and justifying expansion: the image of Boone is successively constituted so as to legitimize early land appropriation and speculation; to warn against the dangers of egalitarian tendencies and the ambitions of the lower classes; to "realistically" portray the actions of common individuals as being in the service of civilization; to symbolize heroic, divinely ordained empire building; and to indicate prophecy fulfilled as the lands of the Far West were assumed. Obviously, these sources interpreting the landscape and painting allow direct comparison with chapter I's traditional, biographicalcultural approach and with chapter 3 s hermeneutics. The socioeco12

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nomic disassemblies using deconstruction and critical theory, although deft at taking the cultural forms apart, do not posit objective, "real" meanings, as the tradition holds, nor do they seek to fuse horizons or positively recover lost or hidden meanings, as does hermeneutics. Readers interested i n pursuing deconstruction and related approaches such as critical theory and varieties of postmodernism and poststructuralism can explore the booming literature that is reinterpreting the environment. Critical social theory and versions of late Marxism and post-Marxism, perhaps at their best in the work of scholars such as Denis Cosgrove, examine in detail how the landscape is a cultural construct. In his Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape and The Iconography of Landscape, Cosgrove and his colleagues explore landscape iconography within a broad social and economic context, especially analyzing how material appropriation of the land occurs by way of technical practices such as land surveys and reclamation, in painting and mapping, and i n philosophical and literary discourse. Other geographers and cultural theorists blend these theories and postmodernism to analyze the U.S. urban scene. Edward W. Soja and Michael Dear focus on Los Angeles, respectively, i n Postmodern Geographies and "Taking Los Angeles Seriously: Time and Space i n the Postmodern City"; Manuel Castells explores the technological urban landscape i n The Informational City. 13

14

Poststructural, rather than deconstructive, forays into the scene are undertaken by major French theorists: Baudrillard records two volumes of fracturing snapshots of his experiences traveling across the United States, and Lyotard imaginatively reappropriates and applies the sublime. This approach to landscape as manufactured and utilized within systems of social and economic control (class struggle) and ideology also is variously developed i n A n n Berminghams Landscape and Ideology, Patricia Limericks Legacy of Conquest, Alexander Wilsons Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez, John D . Dorst's Written Suburb, Sharon Zukin's Landscapes of Power, Randall H . McGuire and Robert Paynter s Archaeology of Inequality, Stephen Greenblatt s Marvelous Possessions, and W. J . T Mitchells Landscape and Power. 15

16

M y main point, of course, is that all of us need to continue ques-

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tioning the approaches and most importantly, through them, the subject matter. Although hermeneutics and deconstruction are more "newsworthy" at the moment, because they are battling about whether there is any meaning beyond the release that comes from the disassembly of oppressive, uncritically held constructions, those who trust a commonsensical understanding of objective "facts" and causality continue to develop traditional scholarship. Recent historical analyses in cultural geography such as those found in the essays in Michael Conzen's edited collection The Making of the American Landscape convey an appreciation of the diversity and complexity behind the heterogeneous aspects of the American landscape. Such work is more than correct; it largely succeeds in its ambitious goal: "The book aims at an unabashedly evolutionary interpretation of the American Landscape." Parallel investigation is undertaken for literature in David Wyatt's The Fall into Eden and for visual documents by Anne Hyde in An American Vision. Surprisingly, the traditional approach has not yet mustered a full theoretical (as opposed to a defensive political) response to the challenges from deconstruction and other poststructuralist positions. Surely it will rise to the occasion. 17

18

To keep the question open and the outcome moving along, from the hermeneutic point of view it would be argued that, at the moment at least, this mainstream work still tends to see the landscape through unquestioned rationalistic concepts, for example, by way of diffusion of forms or styles that materially represent cultural norms and patterns. As Conzen claims, the landscape indeed is thought in terms of one continuous evolutionary lineage. Heidegger would counter that this work, although helpful and correct in its results, nonetheless remains within the conventions of metaphysical representation and thus cannot question, much less break through, undo, and recover, the layers of meaning to which it itself contributes. As Foucault would argue, the traditional approach overlooks the flux of discontinuities—the very stuff of which our rich cultural world is made. From the position of hermeneutics and deconstruction (remember, the tradition would have a rebuttal), a striking example of the limitation of unquestionably first-rate scholarship can be found in the examination of the so-called Hudson River school of painters in 19

20

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relation to the American landscape. Recently this phenomenon has been named, even definitively fixed, with the term luminism i n , for instance, American Light: The Luminist Movement, edited by John Wilmerding in 1986, and Barbara Novaks Nature and Culture. Although these interpretations do establish categorical identities and differences, they nonetheless founder by virtue of their own achievement. The definition of luminism was useful in locating and promoting an aspect of American landscape painting, but it has not been genuinely believed or taken up, even though it now informs the canon of studies. As Derrida and others would point out, it has posed as a new authoritative structure, not adequately self-critical about its own fictive character or its purpose within art history and cultural revaluation. 21

At the same time, luminism as a formal category has no authentic historical foundation. The term did not come into use until after the period to which it is retroactively applied. Although such a backward insertion could be part of either a deconstructive tactic to undercut the historical accumulation of validity or a hermeneutic experience through a retrieval of what was previously concealed, that certainly is not what these traditional scholars intend. Again we see the straightforward methodology of modern scholarship: classify and arrange according to formal elements, concepts, and categories and then look for and describe apparently unproblematic causes and diffusion patterns. This work, no matter how meticulous, no matter how widely adopted by the discipline, does not clear away its own apparatus and assumptions to recover its own origin in a historically hidden source. Another approach may be necessary i f we are to understand the landscape in a vital manner, experiencing new, "surplus" meaning by fusing our context, "prejudices," and concerns with earlier ones. To retrieve something of the still-vital source that came as both disclosed and hidden in the constitution of the nineteenth-century landscape and world, a self-critical, even radical environmental hermeneutics might be required. A hermeneutics of midnineteenthcentury traditions of iconography and style would be a first step in discovering what landscape paintings and projects, with their emblematic and typological symbolism, have to show us today

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about possible attitudes toward nature and responsible, appropriate courses of environmental action. Despite all our changes, we still react against and within the complex of meanings that nineteenth-century artists wove in connection with nature, when they helped to build our current home out of the American wilderness. Their views, in fact, are in many respects more sophisticated than those of todays scholars who operate—without knowing i t — w i t h the last in the chain of modernity's derivative, abstract concepts such as "objective homogeneous space" and "subjective artistic representation" and thus typically believe that "painters convert space, which has neither cultural nor personal associations, into familiar places." That is why the aim of chapter 3 was to begin to work out a fundamental understanding of the American landscape by attending to the way in which artists interpreted it in their paintings during the nineteenth century and how these interpretations continue to bear on us. 22

This postscript s prodding to "take on" the other two approaches in regard to subject matter that really counts is written in the voice of hermeneutics because that is how chapter 3 speaks. The other two approaches would speak differently in making their own presentations. To encourage readers to listen to all three, I have acknowledged their spokespersons. We can imagine them waiting in the wings, wanting equal attention from the readers as the debate goes o n — w e l l beyond the realm that we have shared through this book. I hope that readers will listen to all these other voices, and will add their own, in thinking through phenomena such as our houses, public buildings and spaces, and the landscape, and in deciding on the worth of all three alternative modes of environmental interpretation.

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Notes

Introduction 1. The following comments on diffusion patterns apply only to the environmental disciplines. Heidegger's most widely read work in the environmental disciplines has been the collection of essays translated by Albert Hofstadter as Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), which includes "The Origin of the Work of Art/' "Building Dwelling Thinking," "The Thing," and " . . . Poetically Man Dwells." On The Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz and Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), also has been influential, as, of course, has Being and Time, trans. John Robinson and John Macquarrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). The two works of Gadamer with the biggest impact are Truth and Method, trans. G. Barden and J . Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1975; the revised edition and new translation by Joel Weinsheimer and David G. Marshall [New York: Continuum, 1989] is a substantial improvement), and Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David Linge (Berkeley: University of California, 1976). Foucault became well known through such volumes as Madness and Civilization, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage, 1967); The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. Alan Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972); The Order of Things, trans. Alan Sheridan Smith (New York: Random House, 1973); and Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage, 1979). Derrida became

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a general influence when Gayatri Spivak's translation of Of Grammatology appeared (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), followed by a flood of work published by the University of Chicago Press, including Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); and Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 2. Although new ideas usually first appear in conference presentations and journal articles, widespread readership by members of other disciplines normally occurs when articles are included in collections. The following are some readily available books presenting the new methodologies. François Lyotard's Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), appeared in 1984, as did Driftworks, trans. Roger McKeon et al. (New York: Semiotext(e)). Baudrillard's Mirror of Production, trans. Mark Poster (St. Louis: Telos), was published in English in 1975 but became more popular and widely distributed in the 1980s after the appearance of works such as Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), and America, trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 1988). Although both Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari—like most of these theorists—had established philosophical careers before their postmodern popularity, they became widely read through books such as A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). De Certeau published The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Randall (Berkeley: University of California Press), in 1984 and Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), in 1989. Luce Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), first came out in 1985; Julia Kristeva's work in The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi and trans. Léon Roudica, Séan Handy, et al. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), appeared in 1987. Among the many works by Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair Maclntyre, see Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1971), and The Theory of Communicative Action, 2

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vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984,1987); Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) and Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 3. Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz and trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schoken, 1978). Benjamin's unfinished project, Das Passagen Werk (The Arcades project, 1982), ed. Rolf Tiedemann, is vol. 4 of his Gesammelte Schriften, ed. R. Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhausen 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972- ). The project came to the attention of a wider English-speaking audience in 1989 with the work of Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989). Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1971); Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Fredric Jameson, "Architecture and the Critique of Ideology," in The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 2:35-60. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (New York: Verso, 1989). Denis E. Cosgrove, Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1984); Denis E. Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds., The Iconography of Landscape (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 4. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1979); NorbergSchulz, "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture," Perspecta 20 (1983): 61-68; Norberg-Schulz, The Concept of Dwelling: On the Way to Figurative Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1985). Karsten Harries, "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture," Perspecta 20 (1983): 9-20, and "Space, Place, and Ethos: Reflections on the Ethical Function of Architecture," Artibus et Historiae 9 (1984): 159-165. Anne Buttimer's "Home, Reach, and Sense of Place," in The Human Experience of Space and Place, ed. A. Buttimer and D. Seamon (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 166-187, was widely circulated (the entire volume edited by Buttimer and Seamon was widely influential); David Seamon, A Geography of

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the Lifeworld (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Seamon and Robert Mugerauer, Dwelling, Place and Environment (Dordrecht, Holland: Nijhoff, 1985; reprint, New York: Columbia University Press, Morningstar Editions, 1989). Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 1976) and Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography (London: Croom Helm, 1981). 5. For example, phenomenology can be seen as a basic component of, and variation on, hermeneutics, or it can be taken as the continuation of the realist tradition that stretches from Aristotle, through Aquinas, to Brentano. I have written extensively about the relation of phenomenology to hermeneutics elsewhere: Mugerauer, "Phenomenology and Vernacular Architecture" in Encyclopedia of World Vernacular Architecture, ed. Paul Oliver, 4 vols. (London: Blackwell, forthcoming), and "Phenomenology and the Environmental Disciplines," in the University of Texas Community and Regional Planning Program Working Paper Series (Austin: University of Texas, 1992). As noted previously, abundant examples of the phenomenology of the built environment are available. See, in addition to the works cited in note 4, my "Architecture as Properly Useful Opening," in Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought, ed. Charles Scott and R. Dallery (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1992), 215-226; Mugerauer, "Toward a Phenomenology of Hot and Humid Climates," in Architecture in Hot and Humid Climates, ed. Wayne Attoe, forthcoming; and Mugerauer, "Toward an Architectural Vocabulary: The Porch as Between," in Dwelling, Seeing, and Designing: Toward a Phenomenological Ecology, ed. David Seamon (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, 1992), 215-226. 6. Here I refer to works that take up and use a specifically deconstructive or hermeneutic approach to the built environment. In addition to consulting scattered articles in Assemblage and Threshold, see especially Mark Taylor's "Architecture of Pyramids," Assemblage 5 (Feb. 1988): 17-27, and "Deadlines: Approaching an Architecture," Threshold 4 (Spring 1988): 20-27, although the former is more textually oriented than the latter. Denis Hollier's Against Architecture: The Writings of George Bataille (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989) is similarly textual in emphasis and not as direct for architects as the title might indicate. Two of the most promising publications are Peter Jukes's A Shout in The Street: An Excursion into the Modern City (Berkeley: University of

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Notes to Introduction California Press, 1991) and Dennis Crow's introduction to the collection he edited entitled Philosophical Streets (Washington, D.C.: Maisonneuve, 1990), 1-26. Paul Virilio covers architecture and the city in Lost Dimension (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991 ), but the work is more a creative, poststructural rereading than a disciplined heuristic deconstruction. More explicitly deconstructive are Michael Benedikt, Deconstructing the Kimbell (New York: SITES/Lumen, 1991); Bonnie Bridges and Robert Mugerauer, "Recasting the Body Politic: Deconstructing the Athenian Agora," in Bodies: Image, Writing, Technology, ed. Juliet MacCannell and Laura Zakarin (Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press, forthcoming); Robert Mugerauer, "Post-Structuralist Planning Theory," University of Texas Community and Regional Planning Program Working Paper Series (Austin: University of Texas, 1991). Hermeneutics is used in Mugerauer, "The Post-Structuralist Sublime: From Heterotopia to Dwelling?" a talk presented in Jan. 1991 at the University of Minnesota School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture, where it was videotaped, and in Feb. 1992 at the University of Washington. 7. Heidegger discusses the Greek temple in "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought, 17-87. His discussion of the farmhouse as gathering the fourfold realm occurs in "Building Dwelling Thinking," which appears in the same volume, 154-161. Derrida's initial forays into architecture were relatively obscure, as with his interview in Domus 671 (April 1986): 17-24. Work in book form was more available, such as "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology," in Margins of Philosophy, 69-108. Lately his comments appear frequently in architectural publications, for instance, "In Discussion with Christopher Norris," in Deconstruction: The Omnibus Volume (New York: Rizzoli, 1989), 71-75; "Why Peter Eisenman Writes Such Good Books," Threshold 4 (Spring, 1988): 99-105; and the exchange of letters with Eisenman published in Assemblage 12 (1990): Derrida's "A Letter to Peter Eisenman," 7-13, and Eisenman's "Post/El Cards: A Reply to Jacques Derrida," 14-17. The record of the six sessions between Eisenman and his design group and Derrida on the "chora" project will appear shortly in Jeffrey Kipnis, Choral Work (London: Architectural Association, forthcoming). 8. Given the vast literature of twenty-five hundred years of theory, I despair to provide a bibliography for traditional interpretation. Among

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the most useful secondary sources are John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946); Titus Burckhardt, Sacred Art in East and West, trans. Lord Northbourne (Bedford, England: Perennial, 1967); Amos Rapoport, House Form and Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955); Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism (New York: Scribner's, 1962); Yvor Winters, In Defense of Reason (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1947); and The Function of Criticism (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1957). Of course, the basic sources, as noted, remain those of Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and so on, which can be found through any standard reference work in aesthetics. 9. Winters, In Defense of Reason, 29. 10. Winters, The Function of Criticism, 26; Winters, In Defense of Reason, 17. 11. The major rereadings of Heidegger as more radical than generally has been appreciated are given by Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, trans. Christine Marie Gros (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); Gerald Bruns, Heidegger's Estrangements: Language, Truth, and Poetry in the Later Writings (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989). 12. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 263. The best secondary source on Gadamer's work is Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985). It is important to note, in addition to the influential works of Gadamer cited in note 1 (which are the main source of the version of hermeneutics presented here), the work of Paul Ricoeur, especially The Conflict of Interpretations, trans. Willis Domingo, et al. (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1974), and Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. John B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); an especially useful secondary source is Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1971). 13. Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 178. Palmer's book remains one

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Notes to Introduction of the most useful secondary sources on hermeneutics, especially in regard to the background in intellectual history. 14. This paragraph draws its ideas from several sources. In order, they are Gadamer, Truth and Method, 375; Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics, 225; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 238. 15. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 121. 16. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 265. 17. Heidegger, Being and Time, 194-195; Gadamer, Truth and Method, 258-262; Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 9, 18-42; and Gadamer's little-known but very accessible and useful "On the Circle of Understanding," in Hermeneutics vs. Science? Three German Views, ed. John M. Connolly and Thomas Keutner (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 68-78. 18. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 239. 19. Ibid., 259. 20. Ibid., 240-242. 21. Ibid., 244. 22. Ibid., 249. 23. Ibid., 246. 24. Ibid., 248. 25. Ibid., 245. 26. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Gadamer, Truth and Method, 264, 337; Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics, 156-157. 27. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 264. 28. Ibid., 253. 29. Ibid., 273. 30. Palmer, Hermeneutics, 180. 31. Ibid., 121. 32. Derrida, "Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing [pointure]," in The Truth of Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 255-382; quotation on 274. 33. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158. 34. Northrop Frye, "Second Essay: Ethical Criticism: Theory of Symbols," in Anatomy of Criticism (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 71-128. Frye's seminal analysis of the five phases of the verbal symbol, in which the centripetal and centrifugal forces of words play out, remains an important key to understanding today's debates.

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Specifically, the debate between traditional and deconstructive theory carries on the question of whether the final force of symbols is outward or inward. 35. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 61. 36. Derrida, Disseminations, 245-246. 37. Ibid., 250. 38. Ibid., 333-334. 39. Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory (New York: Verso, 1987), 12-13. 40. Derrida, Positions, 45. 41. Dews, Logics of Disintegration, 13; Derrida, Positions, 45. 42. Derrida, "Differance," in Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 129. 43. Dews, Logics of Disintegration, 11. 44. Derrida, Spurs, 57, 67; Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 151-152, 155-156. 45. Derrida, Margins, 123-126. 46. Ibid., 124. 47. Ibid., 125. 48. Derrida, Spurs, 97. 49. Ibid., 87-97. 50. Ibid., 107; compare with Derrida, Dissemination, 25. 51. Richard Harland, Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism (New York: Methuen, 1987), 135. 52. Derrida, Dissemination, 324. 53. Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. (Stony Brook, N.Y: Nicholas Hays, 1978), 88. 54. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 25. 55. Derrida, Dissemination, 328. 56. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 159. 57. Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 15. 58. Derrida, Dissemination, 324. 59. Derrida, Writing and Difference, 20. 60. Derrida, Spurs, 57; Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 156. 61. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 86. 62. Derrida, Dissemination, 328.

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63. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 86. 64. "What I call the erasure of concepts ought to mark the places of that future meditation. For example, the value of the transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased" (Derrida, Of Grammatology, 61). 65. On Wittgenstein and Jung presenting the two basic options for today, see the first and last sections of chapter 1. The arguments of the tradition and hermeneutics for the existence of deep meaning obviously correspond to versions of what Jung holds. In addition, it should be noted that though attention usually is focused on the relation of Derrida to the nineteenth-century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, which certainly is appropriate, Derrida also moves in Wittgenstein's steps, a realization that recent scholarship finally is beginning to take up; see Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). There has been an increasing interest in construing Wittgenstein's practices of removing misleading and dangerous elements of thinking and writing as "protodeconstructivist." One of the first treatments was Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), and a recent one is Newton Garver and Seung-Chong Lee, Derrida and Wittgenstein (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).

Chapter 1: Traditional Approaches 1. Noted by Norman Malcolm in Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) and M. O'C. Drury in "Conversations with Wittgenstein," in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981). 2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). 3. See O. K. Bouwsma, Philosophical Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), and Timothy Binkley, Wittgenstein's Language (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1970), 178 (this work also has been published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, in 1973 with the same title; page numbers here refer to the dissertation). For example, Wittgenstein said, "A picture held us captive. And we could not get out-

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side it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexplicably" (Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscomb [New York: Macmillan, 1965], §115). Wittgenstein, then, also held that we can learn from our errors and mistakes—an interesting point of comparison with Freud. 4. Binkley, Wittgenstein's Language, 181. 5. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, sections 3.4-3.42. 6. Binkley, Wittgenstein's Language, 47. 7. Ibid., 14-15. 8. Ibid., 181. Wittgenstein's topological analogies, metaphors, and mappings are explored by Robert J . Ackerman in Wittgenstein's City (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), although he does not cite Binkley's work, which was published by Nijhoff fifteen years earlier. 9. Bernhard Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Documentation (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 11. In addition to Leitner's pioneering work on the subject, an interesting book has recently appeared: Paul Wijdeveld's Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) appears to be a thorough documentation of the villa project, wonderfully illustrated. Another invaluable source is Michael Nedo and Michele Ranchetti, eds., Wittgenstein—Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983). 10. Hermine Wittgenstein, "My Brother Ludwig," trans. Bernhard Leitner, reprinted in Rhees, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 6. 11. C. H. von Wright, "A Biographical Sketch," in Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 10-11. In fact, later, speaking of van der Null's difficulty in a bad architectural and cultural period, Wittgenstein proposed resisting the architectural "common currency": "Don't take comparability, but rather incomparability, as a matter of course" (Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. C. H. von Wright and trans. Peter Winch [Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), entry of 1947-1948, 74e. 12. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, entry of 1930, 6e. 13. Ibid., entry of 1936, 145e. Compare with Adolf Loos's views on the "removal of the surplus" in architecture and life; see Loos, Spoken into the Void: Collected Essays 1897-1900, trans. Jane 0. Newman and John H. Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), and Benedetto Gravagnuolo, ed., Adolf Loos: Theory and Works (New York: Rizzoli, 1988).

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14. Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 11. 15. O'C. Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein/' 121. 16. Ibid. 17. Letter of 1928 to M. Weber and Co., quoted in Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 124. 18. Hermine Wittgenstein, quoted in Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 7-8. 19. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1932-1934, 34e. 20. Hermine Wittgenstein, quoted in Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 23. 21. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1947-1948, 69e. This view seems to differ from Loos's. See Loos, Spoken into the Void, and Gravagnuolo, Adolf Loos: Theory and Works. 22. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1932-1934, 22e. 23. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §329. 24. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1930, 3e. 25. Ibid. 26. C. H. von Wright was perhaps the first to draw a connection between Wittgenstein's philosophy and architecture, although he overlooks the dynamic of Wittgenstein's philosophy as activity and therapeutic remark: "The building [Wittgenstein House] is the work down to the smallest detail and is highly characteristic of its creator. It is free from all decoration and marked by a severe exactitude in measure and proportion. Its beauty is of the same simple and static kind that belongs to the sentences of the Tractatus" (quoted in Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 10-11). 27. Binkley, Wittgenstein's Language, 169 ff. 28. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1930, 7e. 29. Ibid., 1942, 42e. 30. Ibid., 1931, 16e. 31. Ibid., 1931, 22e. 32. Ibid., 1940, 38e; Wittgenstein notes Soren Kierkegaard on the "hothouse plant" analogy. 33. Hermine Wittgenstein, commenting on a painting of her brother, notes that "Ludwig's face appears to me in reality as being . . . gaunt and flat, his curly hair striving upwards much more and literally resembling flames, which seem to suit the intensity of his character" (quoted in Rhees, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 10).

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34. C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ed. Aniela Jaffé (New York: Pantheon, 1973), 20-23. Although I had not read the essay at the time that I completed the first drafts of this essay, I must acknowledge that Clare Cooper seminally influenced behavior and environment research by introducing Jungian issues of the relation of house and self-identity in "The House as Symbol of Self," in Designing for Human Behavior: Architecture and the Behavioral Sciences, ed. Jon Lang, et al. (Stroudsburg, Pa.: Dowden, Hutchinson, & Ross, 1974). 35. Jung, Memories, 81. 36. Ibid., 82. 37. Ibid., 45, 57, 88-89, 234. 38. Ibid., 197-198. 39. Ibid., 199; for another example, see 213. 40. Ibid., 174-175. 41. Ibid., 160-165. In an interesting parallel to Jung's insight into the unfinished nature and unfolding relations among dreams, the psyche, and the image of the house, Wittgenstein appreciated the incremental and developmental character of language, thought, and life. Wittgenstein uses a strikingly similar figure: "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from previous periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses" (Philosophical Investigations, §18). 42. Jung, Memories, 134 ff. 43. Ibid., 138-139. 44. C. G. Jung, The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, vol. 9, pt. 1, of his Collected Works, 2d ed., ed. R. F. C. Hull, 20 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967-1979), 275; cf. paragraph 266 in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, vol. 7 of Collected Works. 45. Jung, Memories, 223. 46. Ibid., 225, 237. 47. Compare Jung's insight during a trip to Africa, related in Memories, 272-273. 48. Jung, Memories, 224. 49. Ibid. 50.Ibid. 51. Ibid., 225. 52. Ibid., 225-226.

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53. Ibid., 225-229. 54. Ibid., 225. 55. Ibid., 237; cf. 225.

Chapter 2: Deconstruction 1. Derrida, Husserl's Origin of Geometry, 88. Derrida regularly uses the pyramid to think the difference between difference and différance, absence and presence, life and death. In treating the difference between speaking and writing and the silence and the voiced, he discusses the e in difference and the a in (the neologism) différance: "[Difference] is put forward by a silent mark, by a tacit monument, or, one might say, by a pyramid—keeping in mind not only the capital form of the printed letter but also that passage from Hegel's Encyclopedia where he compares the body of the sign to an Egyptian pyramid. The a of différance, therefore, is not heard; it remains silent, secret, and discreet, like a tomb" ("Différance," in Speech and Phenomena [Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1973], 132). 2. On difference, displacement, and deconstruction, see the discussion of Jacques Derrida in the introduction; see also Northrop Frye, "Theory of Symbols," in Anatomy of Criticism, especially 106. On the pyramid as sign and symbol for the thing itself, and the pyramid as text, see Derrida's reference to Hegel in "The Pit and the Pyramid" and the Derrida interview in Domus. To undertake a deconstruction of the "official" or orthodox discourse that attempts to ground the pyramids is not to deny the power of this discourse, much less to question its "correctness" or scholarly achievement. On the contrary, its correctness and accomplishment are presupposed and accepted; it is precisely as determinative and authoritative that such discourse achieves the desired posture and carries out the necessary fictive strategies, which it simultaneously conceals by its very correctness and authority. Taking Sigfried Giedion's and Richard Etlin's accounts as cultural codifications (of the Egyptian and French neoclassic pyramids, respectively) is not to dispute or find fault with them but to accept and dislocate them in an attempt to disclose the posturing of the phenomena and of the sanctioning discourse and, thus, the deeper, concealed operations at work.

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3. See Sigfried Giedion, The Eternal Present: The Beginnings of Art (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1962); Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: World, 1968), e.g. section 43; H. Frankfurt, Kingship and the Gods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). 4. See Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid." 5. Utterance 600, trans. F. Mercer, quoted in Giedion, The Eternal Present, 275. 6. See Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid." 7. Alternatively, perhaps the pharaohs had so interiorized the belief in their identity with the sun god and in their own immortality and power that they saw the rest of the earthly realm as merely passing away, with nothing, not even predecessors' tombs, standing outside their own identity and presence. Here the "desecration" or reuse of materials would be a deeper incorporation into and assertion of their own presence. 8. The basic, straightforward account of the historical development of the French neoclassic tradition, which is used throughout and deconstructed in this essay, is taken from Richard A. Etlin, The Architecture of Death: The Transformation of the Cemetery in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984). 9. On the sublime, see J . Gray Sweeney, Themes in American Painting (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Grand Rapids Art Museum, 1977), and chapter 3 of this book. 10. Hence the orthodox Catholic interpretation of Masonic belief as a "naturalistic religion." See note 24 on Masonry. 11. Etlin, The Architecture of Death, 108. 12. Ibid., 3. 13. On the organization of space and society at that time, also see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things and Discipline and Punish. 14. Etlin, The Architecture of Death, 17 ff. 15. Ibid., 62. 16. Ibid., 51, 55. 17. Ibid., 125. 18. The sublime and the seasons of life were popular themes for poetry and painting; see, for example, the later series by Thomas Cole, The Voyage of Life, explicated by J . Gray Sweeney in Themes In

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American Painting and in Natural Divinity, a research project for the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of American Art. 19. Etlin, The Architecture of Death, 128. 20. Ibid., 146. 21. Ibid., 119. 22. Pace ka. Ibid., 128. 23. Ibid., 125. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. Etlin also notes that the triangle was a special, sacred symbol of the elements for the Freemasons, who also took the radiant triangle as a symbol of Jehovah, the great architect of the universe (ibid.). 26. See Foucault, The Order of Things and Discipline and Punish; Robert Mugerauer, "The Historical Dynamic of the American Landscape," paper presented to Council of Educators in Landscape Architecture, University of Illinois at Urbana, Sept. 1985; Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of Place (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1994). 27. Etlin, The Architecture of Death, 125. 28. Ibid. 29. Giedion, The Eternal Present, 72. 30. Architect's International 179, no. 7 (Feb. 15, 1984): 38. 31. This would bear out the influence of the "counterformal" aesthetic as developed by Robert Venturi in Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture, The Museum of Modern Art Papers on Architecture no. 1 (New York: Doubleday, 1966). 32. See Etlin, The Architecture of Death; Jacques François Blondel, L'Architecture française (1752-56), ed. Louis Savot (Geneva: Minkoff, 1973). 33. See Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid." 34. Architect's International 179, no. 7 (Feb. 15, 1984): 38. 35. John Pastier, "Isozaki's Design for MOCA," Arts and Architecture 2, no. 1 (1983): 31-34. 36. Ibid., 35. 37. See Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, ed. and trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); Robert Mugerauer, "From Technology to Dwelling," in Interpretations on Behalf of Place, 67-76. 38. See Richard Marx, "Egyptian Architecture in Los Angeles," Los Angeles Times, Sunday supplement, May 10, 1977.

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39. Giedion, The Eternal Present; Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion; Frankfurt, Kingship and the Gods.

Chapter 3: Hermeneutical Retrieval 1. For the theoretical foundation of this analysis, from a Heideggerian approach, see Robert Mugerauer, "Language and the Emergence of Environment," in Dwelling, Place and Environment ed. Seamon and Mugerauer, 51-70, and Reiner Schurmann's radical philosophical analysis of "historical economies" in Heidegger on Being and Acting. On Mircea Eliade's approach to an environmental hermeneutics, see Robert Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of Place, chap. 4, 52-64. A large part of this chapter is compatible with Gadamer's traditional approach. The art-historical interpretation implicitly closest to Gadamer's conservative hermeneutic probably is Robert Rosenblum's Modern Painting and the Northern Romantic Tradition: Friedrich to Rothko (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). A less conservative use of hermeneutics and Gadamer, closer to the approach of the last section of this chapter, is found in J. Gray Sweeney, The Columbus of the Woods: Daniel Boone and the Typology of Manifest Destiny (St. Louis: Washington University Gallery of Art, 1992), which I discuss in the postscript. This chapter is especially concerned with the artistic use of natural and biblical typology to delineate a vision of nature's divinity. For treatment of the general issue, see Ursula Brumm, American Thought and Religious Typology, trans. John Hoaglund (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970); on typology in American rhetoric and literature, see Philip F. Gura, The Wisdom of Words: Language, Theology, and Literature in the New England Renaissance (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1981), and Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) and Typology and Early American Literature (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1971); on typology and the visual arts, see James Collins Moore, The Storm and the Harvest (Ph.D. diss., University of Indiana, 1974), and J. Gray Sweeney, Natural Divinity, unpublished project done as part of a Smithsonian Institute senior fellowship, 1984-1985. For a list of the basic monographs on the individual artists

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treated here, see the bibliographies in Barbara Novak, Nature and Culture: American Landscape and Painting, 1825-1875 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Joseph D. Keiner II and Michael J . Tammenga, The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Picturesque (St. Louis: Washington University, 1984); and David C. Huntington, Art and the Excited Spirit: America in the Romantic Period (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Art, 1972). 2. Mircea Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia: Mythical Geography and Eschatology," in The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 88-111. On the background of the idea of America as paradise, also see Charles L. Sanford, The Quest for Paradise (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969); George H. Williams, Wilderness and Paradise in Christian Thought: From the Garden of Eden and the Sinai Desert to the American Frontier (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). 3. Because the Aramaic word meaning "garden" is translated by the Greek word meaning "paradise" in the Greek version of the Bible, paradise became a traditional equivalent of Garden of Eden. The contemporary English of the Jerusalem Bible translates Gen. 2:15 as "Yahweh God took the man and settled him in the garden of Eden to cultivate and take care of it." 4. Quoted in Sanford, The Quest for Paradise, 40. 5. Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia," 91. 6. Ibid., 93. 7. Ibid., 91. On American typology and sacred history, especially its secularization in the idea of progress during the eighteenth century, see Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad, chap. 4, "The Typology of America's Mission," 93-130; William Clebsch, From Sacred to Profane America: The Role of Religion in American History (New York: Harper and Row, 1968). On Protestant theology, hermeneutics, and religious thought, see Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Jerry Wayne Brown, The Rise of Biblical Criticism in America (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1969); James West Davidson, The Logic of Millennial Thought: Eighteenth-Century New England (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). On the theory of secular typological interpretation, see Louis H. Mackey, "Notes toward a Definition of Philosophy," Franciscan

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Studies 33, no. 11 (1973): 262-272, especially sect. 3; Northrop Frye, "Levels of Meaning in Literature,'' Kenyon Review (Spring 1950): 246-262. 8. Sanford, Quest for Paradise, 52 ff., and George H. Williams, Wilderness and Paradise, 65 ff. 9. Quoted in Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia," 93. 10. Sanford, Quest for Paradise, 111. For the maps, see Seymour I. Schwantz and Ralph E. Ehrenberg, The Mapping of America (New York: Abrams, 1980), 49, 60. 11. William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 25 ff.; Smith is quoted in Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia," 94. 12. Of course, there are other important cultural interpretations of nature, such as the picturesque and arcadian. I omit those here for the practical matter of length and because (1) these are themselves variations on the two (Genesis) archetypes, (2) they are incorporated into a more powerful tradition of the "sublime," and (3) the arcadian itself is secularized from Roman religion. Also, it is crucial to keep in mind this essay's focus and specific use and treatment of landscape painting, lest either the central thesis or the significance of the paintings become exaggerated. The claim here is that a religious understanding, rooted in Genesis, originally was a dynamic factor in the nineteenth-century interpretation of American nature, although that has long been forgotten. The claim is not that the two creation accounts in Genesis were the only, or even dominant, factors in the religious views of the time or even that the entire religious sensibility was all that mattered in the nineteenth century, which would be nonsense. Nor do I suggest that recovering the influence of the two Genesis accounts is, by itself, adequate to interpret fully any of the paintings considered here. On the issue of nineteenth-century painting in its religious context, see J. Gray Sweeney, "The Advantages of Genius and Virtue: Thomas Cole's Influence, 1848-1858," in Thomas Cole: Landscape into History, ed. William Truettner and Alan Wallach (Washington, D.C.: National Museum of Art, Smithsonian Institution, 1994), 113-135. Where the second and third sections of this chapter provide close explications of the paintings, they agree with J . Gray Sweeney's interpretations and at times use the text of his Themes in American Painting.

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He graciously has allowed the use of this material from his out-of-print work without the tangle of quotation marks that would substantially impede the reader. 13. Quoted in Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American Land as Symbol and Myth (New York: Vintage, 1950), 236. See also R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), and Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia," 100-101. 14. Francis S. Grubar, William Ranney (Washington, D.C.: The Corcoran Gallery of Art, 1962), 32. 15. An interesting analysis of the "taste for landscape paintings" enabling the careers of Cole and his colleagues that focuses on economic, political, and class relationships has just been provided by Alan Wallach, "Thomas Cole: Landscape and the Course of Empire," in Thomas Cole, ed. Truettner and Wallach, 23-112. 16. Quoted in John W. McCoubrey, ed., American Art, 1700-1960 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 102. 17. This hermeneutic of the religious principle behind the phenomenon, of course, would be considered hopelessly simple and retrograde from the viewpoint of deconstruction and critical theory. For instance, the recent analyses by Truettner, Wallach, and Sweeney in Thomas Cole (which I discuss in the postscript) require a more critical exposure of the ideological, political, and economic dimensions. 18. On the religious significance of the trees and mountains, see J . Gray Sweeney, "The Nude of Landscape Painting: Emblematic Personification in the Art of the Hudson River School," in Smithsonian Studies in American Art 3, no. 4 (Fall 1989): 43-65. 19. Letter of Cole, 1846, quoted in Louis Legrand Noble, The Life and Works of Thomas Cole, ed. Elliot S. Verseil (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 82. 20. Essay on American Scenery, in McCoubrey, American Art, 98-109. 21. See the new work on this topic by J . Gray Sweeney, "'Endowed with Rare Genius': Frederic Edwin Church's To the Memory of Cole," Smithsonian Studies in American Art 2, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 45-72, and "The Advantages of Genius," especially 114-118. 22. On Church's "inheritance" from Cole and the use he makes of the landscape and symbolism, and on the influence of Cole's work and rep-

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utation during the decade after his death, see Wallach's "Thomas Cole,'' and Sweeney's "The Advantages of Genius." 23. Twilight in the Wilderness also needs to be interpreted in terms of apocalypse and the Civil War. See, for example, David Huntington's observation that the work shows "the supreme moment in cosmic time. [It] was the natural apocalypse" (The Landscapes of Frederic Edwin Church: Vision of an American Era [New York: Braziller, 1966], 82). 24. Fitz Hugh Ludlow, "Seven Weeks in the Great Yo-semite," Atlantic Monthly, June 1864, 740. 25. W. H. Holmes, "The Mountain of the Holy Cross," Illustrated Christian Weekly May 1, 1875, 209. 26. Clarence King, Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevadas (New York: Scribner's, 1902 [1872]), 223. 27. Ibid., 364-365. Compare 114, 156, 173, 220-221, 227 ff., 237, 293, and 363. 28. See the familiar studies by Roderick Nash, Wilderness and American Mind (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), now available in a new, expanded edition; Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (New York: Norton, 1959). 29. Although I found it too late to make use of it, Jeremy Cohen's interesting analysis of the course of Gen. 1:28 from antiquity through the Reformation is a welcome and valuable contribution to the background of this topic: "Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It": The Ancient and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). 30. Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia," 94; Sanford, Quest for Paradise, 87; Williams, Wilderness and Paradise, 108. The apparent mandate in Gen. 1:28 for overcoming and controlling nature may be clearer to the contemporary reader in the more recent translation of the Jerusalem Bible: "God blessed them, saying to them, 'Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth and conquer it. Be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven and all living animals on the earth.'" 31. Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia"; Arthur A. Ekirch, The Idea of Progress in America, 1815-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944); Franco Ferrarotti, The Myth of Inevitable Progress (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1985).

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32. Henry T. Tuckerman, Book of the Artists: American Artist Life Comprising Biographical and Critical Sketches of American Artists (New York: James E. Carr, 1967 [1867]), 421. 33. William Gilpin, The Mission of the North American People, Geographical, Social, and Political, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1873), 124. 34. Ibid., 28. 35. Ibid., 8. 36. See Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932); and Perry Miller, Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956). 37. Quoted in Marx, Machine in the Garden, 181. 38. Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia," 99. 39. Schwartz and Ehrenberg, Mapping of America, 138, 144. 40. Kynaston McShine, ed., The Natural Paradise: Painting in America, 1800-1950 (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1976), 87. 41. For example, consider the controversy generated by Lynn White's essay "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis" and the responses of John Macquarrie, James Barr, and others. White's essay is reprinted in Ecology and Religion in History, ed. David Spring and Ellen Spring (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 15-31, as are many of the responses. 42. The hermeneutically disclosed grounds for understanding American landscape and parks as more indigenous than often is realized complements the similar argument that Galen Cranz makes on quite different grounds and with other interests. She focuses on the antiurban character of parks and on the American contribution to the picturesque; see Cranz, The Politics of Park Design: A History of Urban Parks in America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), 3 and 260n38; Dieter Hennebo, Geschichte der deutschen Gartenkunst (Hamburg: Alfred Hoffman, Broschek Verlag, 1963). 43. See, for example, Albert Fein, "The American City: The Ideal and the Real," in The Rise of an American Architecture, ed. Edgar Kaufmann (New York: Praeger, 1970), 51-114; Fein, Frederick Law Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition (New York: Braziller, 1972); and Fein, Landscape into Cityscape: Frederick Law Olmsted's Plans for a Greater

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New York City (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967). Fein is an exception in that he raises the issue (although he does not pursue the background to understand more deeply the nineteenth-century cultural phenomena). The more typical approach to which I am referring is found in S. B. Sutton, Civilizing American Cities (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971). Sutton dismisses even Olmsted's "talk of social, moral, and physical benefits of parkland" in favor of factors of formal implications for design (17). How much more forgotten, then, is the dynamic behind this rhetoric and congruent planning principles; with Sutton we have good scholarship in presenting Olmsted's writings but a case of displacement from the meaning of our tradition just when interested designers and planners are eager to learn about it. 44. See Lee Clark Mitchell, Witnesses to a Vanishing America: The Nineteenth-Century Response (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), chap. 2, especially 50 ff.; Roderick Nash, "The American Invention of National Parks," American Quarterly 22 (Fall 1970): 726-735; Paul Herman Buck, The Evolution of the National Park System of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946); Thurman Wilkins, Thomas Moran: Artist of the Mountains (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966). 45. Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, 42. 46. Paul Shepard, Man in the Landscape: A Historic View of the Esthetics of Nature (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), 179; on Niagara Falls specifically, also see 141-146, 149-150, 175-176. On the general European and American spiritual response to wilderness, see Shepard's chapter 5, "The Virgin Dream," especially 188. 47. Franklin Kelly, et al., Frederic Edwin Church (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1989), 50. 48. A letter of Olmsted to William Dorsheimer, May 30, 1886, quoted in Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, plate 31; compare Olmsted on Yosemite: "The first point to be kept in mind then is the preservation and maintenance as exactly as possible of the natural scenery" ("The Yellowstone Valley and the Maripose Big Trees: A Preliminary Report," in Landscape Architecture 43 [October 1952 (1865)]: 22). On Niagara understood biblically as the symbol of God's covenant and, consequently, nature's beneficence, see Huntington, The Landscapes of Frederic Edwin Church, 71; Sweeney, Themes in American Painting, 51.

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49. Olmsted's family governess wrote about her spiritual experience in nature (the park): "Mr. Olmsted took me to the Sequoias this afternoon. The road lies up a steep ascent covered with beautiful pines and firs and after a ride of five miles through this woodland we suddenly came upon the majestic trunk of a Sequoia. The great beauty of these forest kings is as striking as their size. The bark is a rich golden brown, and immensely thick It is formed into regular carvings like the Gothic ornaments of a cathedral yet no artificial architecture ever impressed me as much as the grand and simple outlines of these wonderful creations" ("American War Letters," July 22, 1864, quoted in Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, 39). 50. Frederick Law Olmsted, "Report upon a Projected Improvement of the Estate of the College of California, at Berkeley, near Oakland" (San Francisco: Towne and Bacon, 1866), quoted in Sutton, Civilizing American Cities, 270-271. 51. Sutton, Civilizing American Cities, 273. 52. Frederick Law Olmsted, Mount Royal (New York: Putnam, 1881), quoted in Sutton, Civilizing American Cities, 212 (my emphasis). 53. Sutton, Civilizing American Cities, 2. For biographical information, see Charles Capen McLaughlin and Charles E. Beveridge, eds., The Formative Years: 1822-1852, vol. 1 of The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted, 3 vols., ed. Charles Capen McLaughlin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Irving D. Fisher, Frederick Law Olmsted and the City Planning Movement in the United States (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1986); Albert Fein, "Frederick Law Olmsted: His Development as a Theorist and Designer of the American City" (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1969). 54. McLaughlin and Beveridge, The Formative Years, 235; also see the letters from this period in the same volume, for example, concerning teaching Sunday school, 242-244. 55. Ibid., 216-217. 56. Olmsted, letter to Brace, July 30, 1846, in McLaughlin and Beveridge, The Formative Years, 263; also see the letters discussing Channing and Bushnell, ibid., 230-232 and 240-242. On Brace introducing Olmsted to Bushnell's serious writing, see 68. On family relations with Bushnell, see 226. The famous image of the "Five Friends" made in New Haven in 1846 includes Frederick Law Olmsted, Charles Loring

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Brace, John Hull Olmsted, Charles Trask (who also studied for the ministry after graduating from Yale), and Frederick Kingsbury. 57. Horace Bushnell, "City Plans," in Work and Plan; or Literary Varieties (New York, 1864), 308-336; Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, as together Constituting the One System of God (New York: Scribner's, 1858). Bushnell's other major theological works include: Building Eras in Religion (New York: Scribner's, 1881); Christ in Theology (Hartford, Conn.: Brown and Parsons, 1851); God in Christ (Hartford, Conn., Brown and Parsons, 1849). On Brace and the Children's Aid Society as a response to Bushnell's ideas, see James L. Machor, Pastoral Cities: Urban Ideals and the Symbolic Landscape of America (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1987), 254. 58. Bushnell, God in Christ, 30-33. On Bushnell's theology, biblical interpretation, and influence, see Philip Gura, The Wisdom of Words, especially 51-71; H. Shelton Smith, ed., Horace Bushnell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); Barbara Cross, Horace Bushnell: Minister to a Changing America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 59. Philip Gura, The Wisdom of Words, 67. 60. Bushnell, "City Plans," 333, 336; quoted in Machor, Pastoral Cities, 146-147. 61. McLaughlin and Beveridge, The Formative Years, 8. See also 226-227 and the corresponding letters. 62. Ibid., 336-337, and the corresponding letters. 63. Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, 8-9; cf. 19. 64. See, for example, the argument in Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad. 65. Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, 55. 66. Parke Godwin, "Future of the Republic," manuscript, 51, BryanGodwin Papers, quoted in Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, 19. Also see Charles Loring Brace, Home-Life in Germany (New York, 1856), 251; Horace Bushnell, The Principles of National Greatness (New Haven, Conn., 1837), 14; and Bushnell, "City Plans," 308-336. 67. Frederick Law Olmsted, "Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns," American Social Science Association (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside, 1870), quoted in Sutton, Civilizing American Cities, 75. 68. Sutton, Civilizing American Cities, 96.

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69. Hence, as Galen Cranz points out, religious services and the differences they manifested generally were forbidden in parks in the name of moral-civic homogeneity; see The Politics of Park Design, 23. 70. This raises the issue of the relation of urban parks to national parks, specifically in regard to whether the latter are subsumed under civic vision or remain apart, although less fundamentally important. 71. Olmsted approvingly quotes a woman who decries the benefits of country living: "If I were offered a deed of the best farm that I ever saw, on condition of going back to the country to live, I would not take it. I would rather face starvation in town" (quoted in "Public Parks," in Sutton, Civilizing American Cities, 58). 72. Quoted in Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, 54. 73. On the relation of Olmsted to Asa Gray, Herbert Spencer, and Lester F. Warren, see Fein, Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, 47 ff. and 53-55. 74. Cranz's Politics of Park Design is a major source of insight on these issues in relation to the ideologies of pleasure and reform-control. 75. Cranz, Politics of Park Design, vii. 76. For example, the issue is important in the current debate concerning the relation of Christianity to the exploitation of the New World and, as is increasingly realized, to what is a much more complex heritage that may also involve the roots for a spiritual ecology. See Spring and Spring, Ecology and Religion in History, John Carmody, Ecology and Religion: Toward a New Christian Theology of Nature (New York: Paulist, 1983); John Hart, The Spirit of the Earth: A Theology of the Land (New York: Paulist, 1984); Beiden C. Lane, Landscapes of the Sacred: Geography and Narrative in American Spirituality (New York: Paulist, 1988) ; Matthew Fox, Creation Spirituality (New York: Harper and Row, 1989) . See also Anne Primavesi, From Apocalypse to Genesis: Ecology, Feminism, and Christianity (Tunbridge Wells, England: Burns and Oats, 1991); Ian Bradly, God Is Green (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1990) ; Lawrence E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 77. See Martin Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 42-74, and The Piety of Thinking: Essays

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by Martin Heidegger, trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976). 78. In traditional analyses, since God's essence and existence, in principle, cannot differ, he is understood as the uniquely "self-sustaining act of being." See, for example, James F. Anderson, Natural Theology: The Metaphysics of God (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1961). 79. There is a huge and growing literature on the topic, some of it derived from reinterpretations such as Heidegger's and some from more traditional historical approaches. See, for instance, Dale Van Every, The Disinherited: The Lost Birthright of the American Indian (New York: Avalon, 1966); Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New York: Knopf, 1978); Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating and Empire Building (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Jamake Highwater, The Primal Mind: Vision and Reality in Indian America (New York: New American Library, 1981); J . Donald Hughs, American Indian Ecology (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1983); Calvin Martin, ed., The American Indian and the Problem of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 80. An especially crucial ontological issue derived from the metaphysics of humans as made in God's image and likeness (as specified in Genesis), with all other creatures except angels placed lower than humans on the great chain of being. Thus, the debates as to what rights and powers extended to non-Europeans and about whether Native Americans (and blacks) were human or nonhuman (and thus subhuman) were foundationally instances of the question about metaphysical classification. The "problem of recognition" and the need for a system of classification that resulted when attempts to use European language to describe the New World foundered are hermeneutically decoded by Anthony Pagdem in his nonphilosophical work The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Pagdem treats the context of natural law and the Aristotelian concept of the "natural slave" as they affected European intellectuals, theologians, jurists, politicians, and missionaries. 81. On the meaning of the term landscape see J . B. Jackson, "The Word Itself," in Discovering the Vernacular Landscape (New Haven,

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Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 1-55, and "The Vernacular Landscape," in Landscape Meanings and Values, ed. Edmund C. Penning-Rowsell and David Lowenthal (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 65-77; Edward Relph, Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Paul Shepard, Man in the Landscape; Mugerauer, "Language and the Emergence of the Environment," in Dwelling, Place and Environment, ed. Seamon and Mugerauer; Cosgrove, Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape. For further details of the intellectual history of "landscape" and "nature," especially in relation to modern philosophy and science, see Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1987); Hal Foster, ed., Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay, 1988); Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1980); D. G. Charlton, New Images of the Natural in France: A Study in European Cultural History 1750-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon, 1983). 82. Gen. 1:12,18, 21, 25, and 31. See also Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956), 44-59. 83. Heidegger's ground-breaking interpretation of physis is first worked out at length in An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday, 1961), chapter 4. Good commentaries are J . L. Metha, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (Hew York: Harper and Row, 1971), and George Seidel, Martin Heidegger and the PreSocratics: An Introduction to His Thought (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964). 84. Luther Standing Bear, Land of the Spotted Eagle (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), 38. 85. Black Elk, The Sacred Pipe, ed. Joseph Epes Brown (New York: Penguin, 1973), 13-14. See also Hughs, American Indian Ecology, 18-19. 86. On the meaning of wakan, see Chunksa Yuha and James E. Ricketson, "Glossary of Lakotah Words," in Ruth Beebe Hill, Hanta Yo (New York: Warner, 1979), 1093-1109. 87.Ibid. 88. On the Navaho word, see Gladys A. Reichard, Navaho Religion: A Study of Symbolism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

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1950), especially 507-508, where she cites her unpublished field investigations of the "male shooting chant holy and evil." Fr. Berard Haile, Origin Legend of the Navaho Flintway (Chicago: University of Chicago Publications in Anthropology, 1943), 13, 162. 89. On the listed words, see Jamake Highwater, The Primal Mind, 82-83; Hughs, American Indian Ecology, 18-19; Yuha and Ricketson, "Glossary of Lakotah Words." 90. On the anthropological debacle concerning mana, proceeding from the debate of Marrett, Tylor, and others, see Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, where he also compares mana to wakan, orenda, oki, and the West Indian zemi and Bambuti (African pygmy) megbe. 91. John D. Caputo makes an interesting parallel point in using Derrida to broaden Heidegger's rejection of humanism as the measure by arguing that releasement "ought to be openness to all life, not just human l i f e . . . . Letting life be [Gelassenheit] extends across the spectrum of living things in a generalized Gelassenheit {Radical Hermeneutics, 309). 92. The analysis of this final concealment has benefited from John D. Caputo's treatment of the disclosure and concealment of being that happened for and with Aquinas; see his Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982) and Radical Hermeneutics. 93. Heidegger's understanding of Ereignis (the epochal-historical development of the world) in regard to the unfolding essence of the technological era and environmental interpretation is worked out at length in my Interpretations on Behalf of Place, chaps. 6 through 8, 93-150. 94. Gerald L. Bruns gives an especially thoughtful reminder of the importance of concealment and scattering, which tend to be ignored even by Heidegger's readers, in his Heidegger's Estrangements: Language, Truth and Poetry in the Later Writings (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989). 95. On deep ecology see Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City, Nev.: Peregine Smith, 1985), and the philosophically sophisticated work of David Rothenberg, such as Is It Painful to Think: Conversations with Arne Naess (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) and Hand's End: Technology and the Limits of Nature (Berkeley: University of California

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Press, 1993). An interesting philosophical hermeneutics appears in Max Oelschlager's book The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991). Among the many works emerging concerning the relation of Heidegger and ecology, see Michael Haar, The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1993); Ladelle McWhorter, ed., Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Kirksville, Mo.: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1992); and Bruce V. Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995). 96. Heidegger takes up the topic of releasement toward things [Gelassenheit] and openness to the mystery at the same time in "Memorial Address," in Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 54-57. The issue is developed in my Interpretations on Behalf of Place, part 2.

Postscript 1. For the discussion of Wittgenstein and Jung as presenting the two major options that we have today, see chap. 1, the first and last sections. 2. S. Giedion, The Eternal Present; Etlin, The Architecture of Death. 3. On the "near" see Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking and also "Dialogue on Language," in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz and Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 1-54. 4. William H. Truettner, ed., The West as America (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991). 5. Truettner and Wallach, Thomas Cole. 6. Ibid., 137-138. 7. Ibid., 155. 8. Ibid., 8. 9. Wallach, "Thomas Cole," 23-112. 10. Ibid., 51. 11. Sweeney, "The Advantages of Genius," 113-135. 12. Sweeney, The Columbus of the Woods. 13. Cosgrove, Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape; Cosgrove and Daniels, The Iconography of Landscape; for this description see the abstract to "The Geometry of Landscape: Practical and Speculative Arts

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in Sixteenth-Century Venetian Land Territories/' in The Iconography of Landscape, 254-276. 14. Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies; Michael Dear, "Taking Los Angeles Seriously: Time and Space in the Postmodern City," Architecture California, August 1991, 36-42; Manuel Castells, The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process (Cambridge, England: Blackwell, 1989). 15. Jean Baudrillard, America and Cool Memories, trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 1990); Jean-François Lyotard, "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde," "Scapeland," and "Newman: The Instant," in The Lyotard Reader, ed. Andrew Benjamin, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 196-211, 212-219, 240-249, and The Postmodern Condition. See Mugerauer, "The Post-Structuralist Sublime: From Heterotopia to Dwelling?" a videotaped lecture presented to the Department of Landscape Architecture at the University of Minnesota, January 1991, and at the University of Washington, February 1993. 16. Ann Bermingham, Landscape and Ideology: The English Rustic Tradition 1740-1860 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Patricia Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: Norton, 1987); Alexander Wilson, The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez (Cambridge, England: Blackwell, 1992); John D. Dorst, The Written Suburb: An American Site, An Ethnographic Dilemma (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); Sharon Zukin, Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Randall H. McGuire and Robert Paynter, eds., The Archaeology of Inequality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Stephen Greenblatt, in Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), inventively examines how Europeans represented and appropriated the lands of other peoples through colonial manipulation of representational discourse and interpretive acts and concepts; W. J . T. Mitchell, ed., Landscape and Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 17. Michael P. Conzen, ed., The Making of the American Landscape (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 18. David Wyatt, The Fall into Eden: Landscape and Imagination in California (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Anne Hyde, An American Vision: Far Western Landscapes and National Culture

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1820-1920 (New York: New York University Press, 1990). The use of paintings and the visual arts by, for example, cultural geographers displays a range of familiarity and success with the complex and historical attitudes toward nature and the works of art. See, for example, the interesting but not complete methods and views of David Lowenthal, "English Landscape Tastes," Geographical Review 55 (1965): 186-222, and "American Scene," in Geographic Perspectives on America's Past, ed. David Ward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 17-32; Denis E. Cosgrove, "John Ruskin and the Geographical Imagination," Geographical Review 69, no. 1 (January 1972): 43-62; Ronald Rees, "Landscape in Art," in Dimensions of Human Geography, ed. Karl W. Butzer, et al., University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper 186 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), 48-68; James Vance, "California and the Search for the Ideal," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 62 (Jan. 1972): 185-210. Especially fruitful are Kevin Starr's Americans and the California Dream 1850-1915 (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Peregrine Smith, 1973) and Inventing the Dream: California through the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 19. See Heidegger's comments on scholarship throughout What Is Called Thinking? trans. J . Glenn Gray and Fred D. Wieck (New York: Harper and Row, 1968). 20. Michel Foucault works on discontinuities throughout his corpus, for example, in History of Sexuality vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978); on the explicit point see Dews, Logics of Disintegration, 109. 21. John Wilmerding, ed., American Light: The Luminist Movement (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1986); Novak, Nature and Culture. 22. Rees, "Landscape in Art," 186. Of course, at a metalevel, the very ideas of place and value-neutral space are constructed within the context of cultural interpretations, such as those of Cartesian and Newtonian science and epistemology. See, for instance, Max Jammer, Concepts of Space: The History of Theories of Space in Physics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).

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180

Index

absence, xxxvi, xxxviii, 30-31 analogies, false, 4,13,135n3,136n8 See also metaphor anthropology, xviii, 112 Aristotle, xxi art history, xviii, 123-124 See also individual artist's names Baudrillard, Jean, xviii, 128n2 Benedikt, Michael, xi, 131 n6 Benjamin, Walter, xviii, 129n3 Bierstadt, Albert, 73-75 binary pairs, xxxviii, 192 civilized/natural, 53-56 divine/natural, 42-43 earth/sky, 33 gods/mortals, 43, 50 immortality/mortality, 42, 48, 50, 55 life/death, 33, 43, 53-54 night/day, 46 presence/absence, 33,49

181

reason/unreason, 42 sun/moon, 33 vanity/humility, 45-46 Binkley, Timothy, 136n8 biography. See intention, author's; meaning, biographical Black Elk, 110 blindness, xxxvii-xlii Blondel, 38-39 Boone, Daniel, 62-63, 66-67,121, 142n1 Boullée, Etienne-Louis, 36,39-43 Box, Hal, xi Brace, Charles Loring, 96-98 Bruns, Gerald, 132n11 Burke, Edmund, xxii Bushnell, Horace, 96-98,101 Buttimer, Anne, xix, 129n4 cabin, 66-67, 71 Caputo, John, 132n11,154n92 cemeteries, 37-43 See also pyramids

Interpreting

Environments

cenotaphs, 38-43 Channing, William Ellery, 99,100 Church, Frederic Edwin, 69-73, 92-94, 101, 121 classical. See tradition, classical Cole, Thomas, 63-69, 69-70, 85, 120 Cooper, Clare, 138n34 Cosgrove, Denis, xviii, 122,129n3 Cranz, Galen, 102-103,105,147n42 creation effort of, xxiii and the sublime, 36-37, 65-66 criticism ethical, xxv literary, xvii, xxxiii-xxxiv modern thematic, xxiii-xxiv moral, xxv critique, xviii-xix Cropsey, Jasper, 85-88,121 Crow, Dennis, 131 n6 death, xxxix, 30, 33, 36-46 de Certeau, Michel, xviii, 128n2 deconstruction, xxxii-xliii, 29-56, 119-123,130n6 Deleuze, Gilles, xviii, 128n2 Derrida, Jacques, xvii, xx, xxxii-xlii, 127-128n1, 131n7 différance, xxxv-xxxvii, xlii, 139n1 displacements, of presence and identity, 31-56 doubt, xxvii drawing. See graphics dreams, 16-19, 91,147n41,151n76, 154-155n95 Dufourny, 38

182

Eden. See paradise Eisenman, Peter, xx, 131n7 Eliade, Mircea xlv, 58 Enlightenment, xxi-xxii, xxviii-xxix eternity, and presence, 30-35 Etlin, Richard, 36,117-118 finite, the, xxvii, xxx See also binary pairs; horizon Fischer von Erlach, J. B., 37-38 Folz, Bruce, 155n95 Foucault, Michel, xvii, 127n1 Freud, Sigmund, 15-16 Frye, Northrop, xxxiii, 133n34 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, xvii, xxvi, xxviii-xxxi, xlv, 118, 127n1,132n12,142n1 Gaia hypothesis, 114-115 Gast, John, 83-84 Giedion, Sigfried, 31,117-118 Gilpin, William, 82-83 Goetzmann, William H., 167 graphics, xxxvii, xli-xlii Guattari, Félix, xviii, 128n2 Guillaume Le Testu, 59 Habermas, Jürgen, xviii, 128-129n2 Harries, Karsten, xix, 129n4 Harvey, David, xviii, 129n3 Hegel, G. F. W., xxii Heidegger, Martin, xvii, xix, xx, xxvi, xxxi-xxxii, xlv, 112, 113, 115, 118, 127n1, 131n7,132n11 hermeneutic circle, xxviii hermeneutics, xxvi-xxxii, xliii, 57-115, 118-119,123,142n1

Index

héros, 41 Hicks, Edward, 85-87 hidden, the, xxvi, xxviii, 105-115, 118 Hirsch, E. D., Jr., xxx historicism, xxix historiography, xxii hermeneutics versus, xxvii-xxviii history, xviii America without, 61 and meaning of works, xxiii-xxiv, xxx sacred, 59-61 See also time honesty and Bauhaus, 12 in technical matters, 9 versus false comfort, 12 versus sham, xl-xli, 119,124 horizon changing, xxvii finite, xxvii, xxx fusion of, xxxi rejected by deconstruction, xxxii-xlii, xxxv, xxxvii-xxxviii, 121-122 and understanding, xxvii house, xlv, 2-3 and dreams, 16-19,138n41 and identity, 3-28 Jung's, 15-28 Wittgenstein's, 3-15, 26, 28 Hume, David, xxii identity not decidable, xxxviii, xxxix not stable, xxxvi-xxxvii

183

timeless, 31-35 wish to develop, 2 immortality as presence in human consciousness, 50 versus death, 42, 48, 50 individuation, 20 See also Jung intention author's, xxiii-xxiv, xxvi limitations of, xxx See also meaning, biographicalmeaning; origin interpretation. See deconstruction; hermeneutics; preinterpretation; tradition Irigary, Luce, xviii, 128n2 Isozaki, Arata, 46, 51-56 Jameson, Fredric, xviii Jukes, Peter, 130n3 Jung, Carl G., xlv, 2, 15-28, 117 Kant, Immanuel, xxii, xli King, Clarence, 78-79, 101 knowledge. See meaning; understanding Kristeva, Julia, xviii, 128n2 landscape architecture, 91, 99-105 and convention, 61-65 nature as, xlv, 120 language ordinary, 6 privileging of, xvii See also texts; writing culture Ledoux, 38

Interpreting

Environments

Lefebvre, Henri, xviii, 129n3 Leitner, Bernhard, 136n9 Leutze, Emanuel, 81-83 lifeworld, xxviii, xxxi Derrida against, xxxiv line. See graphics Loos, Adolf, 7,136n13 Los Angeles, 51-56 Louvre, 46-51 Lyotard, Jean-François, xviii, 122, 128n2 Maclntyre, Alasdair, xviii, 129n2 maps, 59-61, 87 marxism, xviii-xix, 122 See also critique mathematics forms in French art and architecture, 39 and order, 39 rationalistic, 43 sacred geometries, 31-36,43 meaning biographical, xxvi, 1-28 delay of, xxxv denials of, xxxiii-xlii depth of, xxv, xxxv, xliii, 3, 15-28,117,120, 135n65 and experience, xxvi human, xxiii-xxvi mode of, xxxl-xxxii multiple, xxvii, xxxv new possible, xxv, xxxi non-identical, xxxvi non-present, xxxiv objective, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvii, xxxiii-xlii and origin, xxi, xxiii

184

retrieval of, xxiii, xxvii-xxxi, 118 scientific, xxiv stable, xxxi, xxxv surplus, xl, 124-125 undecidable, xxxviii-xl univocal, xxxv, xxxviii See also historiography; honesty; metaphor; representation mediation, xxxvi metaphors, 106 of depth-surface, xxxv-xxxvi of lamp, xxv of mirror, xxi, xxiii, xxxix, 108 of window, 120 Wittgenstein's, 136n8 See also analogies, false method of moral criticism, xxv of scholarship, 124 of science, xxii-xxiv Also see deconstruction; hermeneutics; meaning; tradition monuments. See cemeteries; cenotaphs; museums; pyramids Moran, Thomas, 76-77,192 mountains in American painting, 63, 64, 71, 73, 74, 76-79, 82 pyramids as, 33-34 museums, 46-56 myth, xxxix Native American, xlv-xlvi, 66, 75, 80-81,106-107,110-112, 152n79

Index Nedo, Michael 139n9 Norberg-Schulz, Christian, xix, 129n4 nostalgia, rejection of, xxxi, xlv, 2 Olmsted, Frederick Law, 92-102 origin, and meaning, xxi, xxüi, xxviii-xxix, xxxiv Palmer, Richard, 132-133n13 paradise, xlv, 5&-88, 91,105,143n3 Pei, I. M., 46-51, 53 phenomenology, xviii, xix, 130n5 philosophy as activity, 12-13 as analytic therapy, 3-15 and architecture, 13,137n26 and traditional interpretation, xxi-xxvi Plato, xxi, xxxix, xli, 108 postmodernism, xviii poststructuralism, xviii, 122,131 n6 practices cultural, xviii psychological, xx preconceptual, xxxi See also lifeworld preinterpretation in hermeneutics, xxvii-xxviii in tradition, xxii See also hermeneutica I circle prejudice as forejudgment, xxviii-xxix legitimate, xxvi, xxix set aside, xxiv presence eternal presence for Egyptians, 30-35

185

French neoclassical, 36-46 opposed by deconstruction, xxxvi postmodern, 47-56 progress, xxix, 81-84, 89 psychology, xxi pyramids, xlv, 30-56 Derrida on, 139n1 Egyptian, 30-35 French neoclassical, 36-46 postmodern, 46-56 Ranney, William T., 62-63 Relph, Edward, xix, 130n3 repetition, xxxvi representation and identity, xxxvi-xxxvii as objective correlation, xxiv, xxxiii, xli-xlii and traditional theory, xxi-xxii See also metaphors, mirror retrieval, of meaning, xxiii, xxviii-xxxi Ricoeur, Paul, xxvi, 132n12 romantic. See tradition, romantic Rossiter, Thomas, 84-85 Rothenberg, David, 154-155n95 Schapiro, Meyer, xxxiii Schürmann, Reiner, 132n11 Seamon, David, xix, 129-130n4 Shaw, Joshua, 80-81 sociology, xviii Soja, Edward, xviii, 122, 129n3 Standing Bear, Luther, 110 stone, 9, 24-25, 33-35 sublime and Burke, xxii

Interpreting

Environments

and French eighteenth century, 36-43, 50 natural, 63-88 and seasons of life, 140-141 n18 technological, 85-86 sun and Louis XIV, 50-51 as ordinary phenomena, 53-56 and pharaohs, 31-35, 55 and Ra, sun god, 31-32, 54 Sweeney, J. Gray, 121,142n1, 144-145n12 texts and built environment, xx endless, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxix-xl historical context of, xvii-xx making sense of, xvii theory, primer of, xvi-xvii Also see deconstruction; hermeneutics; tradition time as basis for connection, xxx-xxxi and deferring, xxxv Also see finite; history timeless presence and identity, 31-35 timeless past, 28 tradition classical, xxi, xxviii romantic, xxviii-xxix

186

theory of, xxi-xxvi, xlii-xliii, 1-28, 117-118, 123, 124, 139n2 as unavoidable, xxix Truettner, William H., 120 typology, 17, 59,142n1, 143n7 understanding clarified by hermeneutics, xxvi-xxxii as contextual, xxvii as interpretation, xxvii and misunderstanding, 4-5 non-arbitrary, xxvii Also seeforestructure; meaning; origin Van Gogh, Vincent, xxxiii, 15 Virilio, Paul, 131 n3 Wallach, Alan, 120-121 Wijdeveld, Paul, 139n9 wilderness, xlv, 58, 66, 70-71, 73, 76, 79-83, 90 Winckelmann, J. J., xxii Winters, Yvor, xxv-xxvi, 132nn8-10 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, xlv, 2-15, 117, 135n65 world in hermeneutics, xxxi-xxxii rejected by deconstruction, xxxiv-xxxv writing culture,