Interpreting Ecclesiastes: Readers Old and New: Readers Old and New 9781575068633

Citation preview

Interpreting Ecclesiastes

C ritical S tudies

in the

H ebrew B ible

Edited by Anselm C. Hagedorn

Nathan MacDonald

Stuart Weeks

Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

University of Cambridge

Durham University

1.  A More Perfect Torah: At the Intersection of Philology and Hermeneutics in Deuteronomy and the Temple Scroll, by Bernard M. Levinson 2.  The Prophets of Israel, by Reinhard G. Kratz 3.  Interpreting Ecclesiastes: Readers Old and New, by Katharine J. Dell 4.  Judging Job: The Reader as Interpreter, Adjudicator, and Theologian, by F. Rachel Magdalene

Interpreting Ecclesiastes Readers Old and New

Katharine J. Dell

Winona Lake, Indiana Eisenbrauns 2013

© Copyright 2013 Eisenbrauns All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. www.eisenbrauns.com

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dell, Katharine J. (Katharine Julia), 1961– Interpreting Ecclesiastes : readers old and new / Katharine J. Dell.     pages cm. — (Critical studies in the Hebrew Bible ; number 3) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-57506-281-5 (alk. paper) 1.  Bible. Ecclesiastes—Criticism, interpretation, etc.  I.  Title. BS1475.52.D45 2013 223′.806—dc23 2013035540

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. ∞™

Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part 1.  Ancient Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1.  Ecclesiastes as Wisdom: Consulting Early Interpreters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Chapter 2.  Vanity, Human Beings, and the Created World: The Dualistic Method as Applied to Ecclesiastes . . . . 37 Part 2.  Modern Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 3.  The Cycle of Life in Ecclesiastes: An Ecological Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Chapter 4.  Animal Theology and the Direction of the ‫ רוח‬. 68 1.  Animal theology  68 2.  The life to come  71 3.  The human-animal relationship  74

Chapter 5.  A Liberationist or Postcolonial Reading?: Ecclesiastes as a Resistant Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Chapter 6.  Reject or Retrieve?: Feminist Readings of Ecclesiastes 7:23–29 . . . . . . . 84 1.  Feminist and Anti–feminist Appraisals  85 2.  Retrieving Ecclesiastes 7:23–29/8:1  90

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Ancient Interpreters  96 Modern Interpreters  97

Indexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Index of Authors (Old and New)  103 Index of Scripture  105

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Preface This book was written whilst I was a Visiting Fellow at Oriel College, Oxford for 18 months, and I am very grateful for the congeniality and hospitality of the Provost and Fellows of the College during that time. I am also glad to have participated in the Oxford Senior Seminar and used the libraries. Thanks also go to my PhD students Will Kynes and Brittany Melton who both acted as research assistants to me in the final stages of this project and to the Divinity Faculty in Cambridge who provided money to support such help. Thanks to Stuart Weeks for his insightful remarks on this manuscript and to him and the other editors of the Critical Studies in the Hebrew Bible series, Anselm Hagedorn and Nathan MacDonald, for accepting this book into the series. Thanks also to Jim Eisenbraun and his team for their work on this project. Finally, thanks go to my mother, Molly Dell, for her constant encouragement of my endeavours, to my husband, Douglas Hamilton, for helping with computer problems and being his usual supportive self, and to my son James for providing endless (and often welcome!) distractions. To them I dedicate this book. Katharine J. Dell Cambridge, November 2012

Abbreviations All abbreviations in this volume follow the SBL Handbook of Style.

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Introduction This volume seeks to explore “readerly” responses to the book of Ecclesiastes, old and new, past and present. The work of Paul Ricoeur in particular has highlighted the place of the “reader” of the text in the hermeneutical process.1 The famous hermeneutical circle of author, text, and reader has become a given in modern study of any text, biblical or otherwise.2 It is a circle of engagement that is fluid and has no fixed point. Every individual is a reader and is entitled to a readerly response, and yet individual readers need guidance from the collective. The collective might be a church or synagogue, giving authority and direction to interpretive choices. The collective might be a particular interest group—after all, the Bible has been used over the centuries to justify all kinds of movements, from emancipation to slavery. The collective might also be the scholarly community, past and present. For, arguably, it is not until we are trained in the ways of “reading” that we can truly explore the depths of our own individual reading. This is where past readers inform present ones and where collective “traditions” of reading become important. The last twenty-five years have seen a revolution in biblical studies in the area of “method” shifting away from a main interest in the author and authorial concerns, be they historical, literary, or theological, in the directions of both text and reader. Interest in the text as a “given,” in its final form and in its “canonical” impact has opened up new vistas of interpretive insight. Similarly, awareness of the sheer range and diversity of possible readings and responses to the text from both individuals and interest groups has also opened up fresh horizons. Diverse literary and cultural criticisms have arisen, many originating from the humanities and social sciences. However, it would be a mistake to think that the new questions that are being asked of a text are the only ones that are of interest, and thus, 1. Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics (ed. Don Ihde; Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974); Essays on Biblical Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980). 2.  An idea often attributed to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), see discussion in Anthony C. Thistleton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading (London: HarperCollins, 1992), 204–36. Thistleton also has an interesting chapter on Ricoeur, who developed the concept (344–78).

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2

Introduction

to play down the contributions of our predecessors. There is a tendency in present-day biblical studies to look back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the time when enlightened “objective” approaches gave us much of the solid ground of insight on which the newer methods build. This has both positive and negative aspects. The positive is that this is when key questions were asked (or asked again) and (sometimes) answered. A more negative aspect arose when that which came before was downgraded. Even though we live in a postmodern age, the postmodern is seen to build on the modern in common reaction to the premodern. As The Postmodern Bible puts it, “postmodernism foregrounds, heightens, and problematizes modernity’s enabling assumptions about reference, representation, method, and subjectivity . . . Both the postmodern and the modern share common cause in reaction to the grip of an uncritical premodern tradition.”3 The term “precritical” is widely used in reference to all that came before, and it tends to be seen as just that—“pre”-critical.4 Rather, it is important to see older approaches as the essential forerunners of what came later and as still able to inform interpretation today, perhaps taking up Barth’s call for a second “naiveté” that revives the openness to the text that characterizes precritical approaches.5 Part One of this volume thus attempts to see what is of value in early approaches for interpretation of key issues in the book of Ecclesiastes. This approach is linked to the second part of this book, which swivels the camera lens around to modern “advocacy” readings, inspired by different interest groups. What in turn do these kinds of interpretations bring to the examination of old scholarly problems? Still key are those debates of the heyday of biblical interpretation that give us the “agenda” of which problems to associate with a particular book. These were, however, both anticipated by older readers and not easily forgotten by newer ones—the whole interpretive process is therefore much more of a continuum than we might at first think. This point is made, indirectly, by John Barton when discussing the point that it is a mistake to think that newer interpretations are always superior ones. He writes, “The contrast between critical and pre-critical interpretation is flawed in suggesting that the difference 3.  The Bible and Culture Collective, The Postmodern Bible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 13. 4. John Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007), 189, suggests that “non-critical” is a better term than “pre-critical.” 5.  E.g. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (IV/2; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1955). This language was taken up by Paul Ricoeur in The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon, 1969) to refer to readings that might be made of texts “after criticism” that could never be the same as before the critical period but could attempt to regain something of their immediacy.

Introduction

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can be plotted on a timeline . . .”6 In fact, critical readings can be found at any point in time and may go back to precritical commentators. He cites the quest for inconsistencies that characterized early source-critical enquiry remarking that such factors were often understood precritically too—“Careful readers have always noted such things.”7 Barton goes further to stress that there is value in the older methods when he notes that precritical writers were interested in the historical events witnessed by the text and in their theological significance no less than in the relation of the text to the reader/believer (without the theoretical interest that characterizes the modern quest). Edification and instruction were simply the prime concerns when reading biblical texts from an essentially pragmatic standpoint.8 Part One presents some ancient interpretations of key issues in the book asking whether in fact new light is shed on well-known scholarly problems by revisiting their approaches and presuppositions, or whether such approaches turn out to be simply interesting products of the past but with little relevance to the present. Of course, the past is of interest for its own sake and relevance to us is arguably of small concern, except that in the process of rereading we cannot help but draw out our relationship to it. So in chapter 1, I look back at early debates in both Jewish and Christian circles about the canonicity of Ecclesiastes and find that this particular discussion in its consideration of issues such as contradiction within the book, authorial claims, and the place of the Epilogue anticipated much of what was to become important in later critical discussion of the book. More than this, though, the older debate sheds light on how we might evaluate the concerns of the book today and how we understand the canonization process, the significance of which has been recently highlighted by the huge influence of Child’s canonical method.9 In 6.  Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, 6. 7. Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, 11. In relation to Ecclesiastes, I think of examples of inconsistencies having been noted in the book by the Rabbis (see discussion in chapter 1). 8.  Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, 75. Barton goes on to discuss the point (78) that precritical interpreters understood the nature of “intention” as we might contextualize as “authorial intention” but only in the literal sense that words spoken by, say, Moses or God were seen as literally true and so interest focused on their intentions in saying such things. He discusses this in the context of arguing that critical scholarship itself is not simply characterized by an interest in intention. The fact that many precritical interpreters rejected the literal reading in favour of allegorical readings is noted by Barton (94) but seen as a layering of reading in that the literal reading was a surface one that gave way to a richer and deeper meaning with the allegorical. 9. Although Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, 152–55, holds that the canonical approach as pioneered by Brevard Childs in the 1970s was “not so new” in the light

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Introduction

chapter 2, I look at the often-downgraded precritical method of dualism and at its main proponents and opponents. I show again how the method highlighted certain issues that can illuminate a discussion of the meaning of “vanity” and of evaluation of the role of the created world in the book of Ecclesiastes. Past interpreters, individually or collectively (and both are represented here), can still speak to present concerns and exegesis if we unlock their insights in the right way. This reflects what Newsom terms the “postcritical” interest in “the intentional recovery and appropriation of pre-critical forms of interpretation. Whereas historical criticism largely rejected such hermeneutical methods as typology, allegory, and midrash as fanciful eisegesis, postcritical biblical studies argues that they are ways of producing knowledge that have their own legitimacy.”10 Part Two of this volume looks at some of the modern readerly approaches. These tend to be collective approaches taken by an interest group or “advocacy,” although, as we know well, groups are always made up of individuals who rarely agree all of the time. The focus here is on chosen texts from Ecclesiastes that are particularly illuminated by the methods in question. This also leads to questions about the approach itself and how it sheds fresh light on older scholarly problems and interpretations. I have chosen four “methods” from a potentially endless list of possibilities. The first is an ecological/environmental reading, an advocacy that has arisen in the last few decades in response to our deepening environmental crisis and concern. Readers are asking this question of the Bible—does it have anything to say to this ecological crisis? Is it to blame for past mistakes; and, can it help to set us onto the right paths of fruitful interpretation in a modern-day context? A close relative of an ecological reading or environmental approach is one concerned with another aspect of the natural world—animals. This has also sprung from an interest group that asks about the place and welfare of animals in the modern world and seeks to find a biblical underpinning for such questions. Whilst the book of Ecclesiastes is probably not the first place one might think of looking with such an angle in mind, it is my finding that there is some interesting insight to be had, which in turn sheds light on more traditional questions such as the nature of the “breath” of life given by God. Chapter 5 then turns attention to two similar ideological readings—liberationist and postcoloof a consideration of the overtly theological approaches of biblical scholars such as Walter Eichrodt and Gerhard von Rad in the 1960s who both wrote theologies of the OT and were themselves reacting against the arid landscape of historical criticism. 10.  Carol A. Newsom, “Ideological and Post-Critical Perspectives,” in Method Matters: Essays on the Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Honor of David L. Petersen (ed. Joel M. LeMon and Kent H. Richards; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 541–59 (551).

Introduction

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nial—shedding light on the complex nature of the Ecclesiastes text when it comes to a decisive view on issues such as the oppression of the poor and the violation of justice. The two advocacies are evaluated in reference to the contradictory theological stance of Ecclesiastes, a factor that has long been noted and continues to tease the interpreter. Chapter 6 takes us onto the ground of the feminist interpreter asking questions about the method and its character over the last few decades, but mainly looking at its contribution to the discussion of a key text in Ecclesiastes (7:23–8:1) and to the nature of the author of this book. Is there any truth in the accusation of misogyny made by both traditional scholarship and by some feminists? This chapter attempts to steer a path through variant readings of and approaches to this problem. Part Two then concerns a sampling of the newer approaches of modern biblical study and the light they shed on older issues, itself a by-product of the fresh insights they also bring to the text. Barton makes the point that a quest for the plain sense of the text must precede the “advocacy” reading, so that such reading is a two-stage process.11 Whilst this may not be ideal, the postmodern perception is that reading is so context-bound that such a division is not always perceived to be desirable or possible to those within the position being advocated. It is also true to say, though, as Barton indicates,12 that it is when the significance and application of a biblical text is drawn out that it tends to come alive in a way that dry criticism does not allow. This fresh view on traditional scholarly problems is what links the two parts of this book. Despite a training in critical analysis, the scholar seeking to illuminate a biblical text can learn both from our precritical biblical interpreters and from our ever-broadening modern scholarly field of reader-response approaches. The book of Ecclesiastes lends itself to many and varying interpretations, which adds to its richness. I take my starting point from John Barton’s use of Ecclesiastes in his book, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study, where he showed how different “traditional” literarycritical readings from the scholarly toolbox shed different light on issues in and interpretation of the book of Ecclesiastes.13 This study extends that attempt both farther back into the past and farther forward into the present. In some ways, the diversity of interpretation indicated by this study also increases the sense of the book’s elusiveness—somehow attempts to 11.  Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, 159–64. 12.  Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, 174. 13. John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (2nd ed.; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1996). Barton airs readings that go beyond redaction criticism, notably an existentialist reading (214–17).

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Introduction

pin down this author, his text, or how we might approach the text as readers all founder on the rocks of uncertainty. This approach highlights the fact that there is no one interpretation of any text. Furthermore, it is true to say that some texts are more elusive than others, and Ecclesiastes as a whole and certain texts within it appear to be in this category. Although, largely because of this elusiveness, richness, and contradictory flavour, this particular book provides an interesting opportunity to explore the hidden depths and ongoing challenges of biblical interpretation.

P art 1

Ancient Interpretations

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Chapter 1 Ecclesiastes as Wisdom: Consulting Early Interpreters As I indicated in the Introduction, there is a renewed interest in the way different generations have read texts, and in what that tells us about the presuppositions and methodologies of those who read them and about the continuing interpretation of the text itself. Far from dismissing such contributions as “precritical” it is my task in this chapter and the one that follows to reevaluate the contribution of key early interpreters of the book of Ecclesiastes. There is a difference in this evaluation in Jewish and Christian tradition. In Jewish tradition, the exegetical comments of ancient interpreters have continued to be read alongside the text and so have played an important role in shaping the way texts are read today. In the Christian exegetical tradition, the dominant feeling seems to be that later interpretations have superseded those of earlier commentators, the major contribution having come from critical scholarship of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Precritical scholarship and the methods that were employed were seen as offering little for objective analysis of texts. For example, the allegorical method that dominated the medieval period was widely felt to be a hermeneutic that led to radical distortions in interpretation of biblical texts. This is not a new feeling. Luther, writing on Ecclesiastes, labelled the contributions of his predecessors “miserable commentaries” and blamed them for perpetuating distortions which had concealed the “real meaning” of the book.1 Nowadays, whilst we would Author’s note:  This is a revised version of my article of the same name published in VT 44/3 (1994): 301–32. This article has been widely cited in the literature on Ecclesiastes, e.g. on pages 40–41 in Ruth Sandberg, “Qohelet and the Rabbis,” in The Words of the Wise are Like Goads: Engaging Qohelet in the 21st Century (ed. Mark J. Boda, Tremper Longman III, and Cristian G. Rata; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 37–54. 1. Martin Luther, “Notes on Ecclesiastes,” in Luther’s Works 15 (ed. J. Pelikan and H.  C. Oswald; trans. J. Pelikan; St. Louis: Concordia, 1972), 3–187; translation of “Annotationes in Ecclesiasten,” in Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe 20 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1898), 1–203.

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be unlikely to dismiss the work of our predecessors as “miserable commentaries,” nevertheless there is still a definite divide between pre- and postcritical scholarship. My aim here is to try to close that gap by looking at the methodologies or presuppositions of ancient commentators and at the issues with which they were concerned, and by asking if the older interpretations might illuminate current debate of issues in Ecclesiastes. It may be that the insights of ancient exegetes prove to be no more than interesting curiosities. However, has there been any continuity or homogeneity of interpretation that might illuminate our efforts today? If there is, is any weight to be given to precritical approaches or have any unified thoughts that we might find been merely the result of misinterpretation building upon misinterpretation? There is a trend in modern scholarship to regard Ecclesiastes, along with Job, as very much on the fringes of the main wisdom exercise.2 This is the literature of protest3 that dared to challenge the “easy optimism” of early proverbial wisdom.4 The author of Ecclesiastes is not just sceptical; he is pessimistic in the extreme, having given up the possibility of a meaningful relationship with God and advocated a resigned cynicism about life.5 If this is wisdom, it is wisdom at its limits. However, this radical book was toned down in the process of canonization. The usual argument put forward by scholars is that two factors secured for the book entry to the canon, a book which should, because of its sentiments, never have been there. The first factor is the misinterpretation of the book’s sentiments by those who canonized it. One view is that 2. E.g. Gerhard von Rad (Old Testament Theology [2 vols.; Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965]) speaks of Qoheleth having “pitched his camp . . . at the farthest frontier of Jahwism” (1:458). See Katharine J. Dell, “Ecclesiastes as Mainstream Wisdom (without Job),” in Wisdom Traditions in the Hebrew Bible and Beyond (ed. George J. Brooke and Pierre van Hecke; OtSt; Leiden: Brill, forthcoming), for a fresh discussion of why this glib alignment of Job and Ecclesiastes is ultimately unsatisfactory and why Job is a less obvious contender for the wisdom category. 3. Robert Davidson, The Courage to Doubt (London: SCM, 1983); and James L. Crenshaw, A Whirlpool of Torment (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984). 4.  I have been criticized for using the phrase “easy optimism” to refer to the proverbial viewpoint here; Peter T. H. Hatton, Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs: The Deep Waters of Counsel [SOTSMS; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 17–20, argues that the word “easy” denigrates the optimism. So maybe simply “optimism” would be better, although optimism does seem to come very naturally to the sages. 5.  E.g. John F. Priest, “Humanism, Skepticism and Pessimism in Israel,” JAAR 36 (1968): 311–26. This view has been widely challenged, notably by Eunny P. Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), who, to my mind, overemphasizes the enjoyment aspect of Qoheleth’s message to the detriment of a more balanced view, but whose book helps to highlight this key theme, building on R. Norman Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 23 (1982): 87–98, and others.

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this involved misinterpretation of the whole book because of the contradictions contained within it, whereby more pious sentiments are ranked alongside more pessimistic ones. So Robert Gordis writes, “Koheleth’s characteristic style helps to explain how the book managed to enter the Biblical canon. Matter of fact readers, unaware of his unconventional use of a religious vocabulary or his citation of proverbs for his own special purposes, would find the book replete with sound orthodox sentiments.”6 An alternative view is that the epilogue echoes traditional teaching about God, and therefore functioned to enable readers to find more orthodox sentiments in the book than might otherwise have been the case, a view espoused, for example, by Sybil Sheridan.7 The second factor that secured the book canonical status is thought to have been the attribution to Solomon. This had the effect of ranking the book alongside Proverbs and the Song of Songs. Gordis continues, “And all the more would they be predisposed to this conclusion by the fact that Koheleth, in the opening chapters, calls himself the son of David. His obvious purpose in doing so was to offer reflections on the value of wisdom and wealth, for both of which Solomon was famous. But this literary device stood Koheleth in good stead; it provided his book with the necessary aura of sanctity and antiquity for inclusion in Scripture.”8 Gordis surmises what the author might have thought at the prospect of canonization, “Koheleth would have been shocked, even amused, to learn that his note-book had been canonized as part of Holy Scripture. But the obscure instinct of his people was building more truly than it knew when it stamped his work as sacred.”9 In this chapter, I wish to challenge the above picture and argue that rather than simply accepting that these two factors are decisive in an evaluation of the canonization process, we need to examine the issues afresh. I shall argue for a different evaluation of the role of the contradictions in an assessment of the book and shall look again at the role of the epilogue in the formation of the book. Not only do these issues have a bearing on how we might perceive the canonization process, but, more significantly, they are important in a discussion of the classification of Ecclesiastes as a wisdom book, hence the title of this chapter. Ecclesiastes is regarded as wisdom at its limits in the way it provides a critique of the wisdom tradition and seems to remain outside the main 6. Robert Gordis, Poets, Prophets and Sages (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 350. 7. Sybil Sheridan, “The Five Megilloth,” in Creating the Old Testament (ed. Stephen Bigger; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 293–317. 8.  Gordis, Poets, Prophets and Sages, 350 fn. 5. 9.  Gordis, Poets, Prophets and Sages, 325.

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development of wisdom thought as it is expressed in books such as Ecclesiasticus (Ben Sira) and the Wisdom of Solomon.10 However, the book is still classified as wisdom by the majority of scholars.11 Brevard Childs notes, for example, that when one looks at the main body of the teachings of Ecclesiastes, “almost every topic within the traditional teachings of the sages is touched upon.”12 Whether the author of Ecclesiastes agrees with the tradition or not, the debate is firmly within the wisdom arena. As I have argued elsewhere,13 one can really only classify a book as “wisdom” if it contains the forms, content, and context of wisdom in considerable measure. According to these criteria, my finding is that the author of Ecclesiastes makes use predominantly of short wisdom forms, rather than drawing on a wider range of genres from other areas of Israelite thought. So, for example, we find in chapter 5 two pieces of instruction which contain numerous small wisdom genres such as the command, the comparative saying, the prohibition, the quotation of a proverb, a “better . . . than” saying, and a rhetorical question. These are followed by a passage of reflection in which three wisdom sayings are cited but with a “this is vanity” addition in verse 10b. These are in turn followed by two example stories from the author that contain his own perspective but are cast in a form employed by the wise. As a result, Ecclesiastes can be classified as mainline wisdom, even if it is predominantly providing a critique of the presuppositions of wisdom: “Ecclesiastes stands at the end of the biblical wisdom tradition and the author uses the characteristic forms and genres of that tradition in order to criticize it. The scepticism of the author of Ecclesiastes is often expressed in reflective passages which show up the weaknesses of wisdom by providing traditional material with a new context.”14 This kind of approach tends to concentrate on issues of authorial intention and the original context of wisdom. In this chapter, I wish to shift the emphasis away from this and 10.  I argue, however, in “Ecclesiastes as Mainstream Wisdom (without Job),” that it is the close connections with the book of Proverbs in particular on a literary level that should keep the book in this category. There has been a widespread questioning of the usefulness of the category “wisdom” in recent work, see Mark Sneed, “Is the ‘Wisdom Tradition’ a Tradition?” in CBQ 73 (2011): 50–71; Stuart Weeks, An Introduction to the Study of Wisdom Literature (London: T. & T. Clark, 2010). 11.  Another exception is Whybray, who questions this narrow classification of Ecclesiastes as a wisdom book, suggesting that it comes from a wider intellectual tradition; see his Ecclesiastes (OTG; Sheffield: JSOT, 1989); and The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament (BZAW 135, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974). 12. Brevard S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 587. 13.  Katharine J. Dell, The Book of Job as Sceptical Literature (BZAW 197; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991), 138–47. 14.  Dell, The Book of Job as Sceptical Literature, 147.

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ask how the book was perceived by those who first edited it and then read and interpreted it. What was the later wisdom context of the book? And what made it authoritative so that it was canonized? Into this discussion comes the nature of the contradictions in the book and the way they were interpreted, the role of the prologue and epilogue in the transmission of the book, the process of canonization, and the function and status of the Solomonic attribution. I shall therefore take these issues in turn referring at each stage to the presuppositions of early interpreters in order to test the method I have proposed above. Ecclesiastes has long been characterized as a book containing contradictions—this has allowed for very different evaluations of the message of the book. Amongst early Jewish interpreters there was awareness of contradiction—of opposite sentiments expressed in the text. It was noted for example that 8:14 and 9:1–2 assert that the righteous and wicked share the same fate whilst 2:26; 3:17; and 8:12–13 express confidence in God’s righteous judgement. Such contradiction was seen to be a problem in the light of the presupposition that the book was the work of one author, Solomon. So it was ingeniously overcome by the technique of “rethinking.” According to this method, first Solomon thought one thing, but later, upon reflection, he came to the opposite opinion. Thus in 2:20, “So I turned about and gave my heart up to despair over all the toil of my labours under the sun.” The Midrash Qoheleth says that on reflection, “I found that as others work for me I must also work for others.” Later Jewish exegesis began to introduce a more historical exegetical method. In a very modern vein, some passages were recognized as not Qoheleth’s own. So Rashbam comments on Ecclesiastes 1:2 that, “These two verses, ‘The words of Qoheleth,’ ‘vanity of vanities,’ were not said by Qoheleth but by the person who edited the words as they stand.”15 Others attempted to overcome the difficulty of contradictions by the theory of quotations— “that Solomon quotes the language of ignorant unbelievers to expose their folly” (the Zohar). I shall go on to discuss modern versions of this theory. In early Christian tradition, typified by Jerome16 who wrote a commentary on Ecclesiastes which had immense influence on medieval interpretation of the book, “inconvenient” passages were noted and could not 15. Sara Japhet and Robin Salters, eds., The Commentary of R. Samuel ben Meir, Rashbam, on Qoheleth (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985), 92. For an older edition, see Adolph Jellinek, Commentar zu Kohelet und dem Hohen Liede von R. Samuel ben Meïr (Leipzig: Schnauss, 1855). 16.  Jerome, “Commentarius in Ecclesiasten,” PL 23 (ed. Jacques-Paul Migne; Paris: Apud-Garnier, 1883), 1062–174.

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be glossed over. How did Jerome treat such passages? He sometimes put them into the mouths of sceptics and opponents to the truth, whom he introduces as speaking, e.g. 4:7, 8: “That, he says, is what an Epicurus would tell you, and so would Aristippus, the Cyrenaics [and the rest of the herds of philosophers].”17 But for him inconvenient passages were not simply those that had long been noted as contradictory; he also included those passages which did not easily conform to a christological or ecclesiological interpretation, these criteria being at the centre of his concern. As Sven Holm-Nielsen writes: “What seems in Ecclesiastes to be obstacles to a Christian or rather ecclesiastical dogmatism, is eliminated either spiritually by an eschatological and christological re-interpretation, or by assuming that the author was momentaneously inconsiderate, but corrected himself later, or, finally, by a clever exegetical trickiness. Thanks to Hieronymus Ecclesiastes became ‘kirchenfähig’.”18 Finally, Luther19 put contradictions into the mouths of Solomon’s political associates, regarding the whole as a dialogue between them and Solomon. In his exegesis of 1:1, he maintains that the text is comprised of short aphorisms spoken in public by Solomon, which are then compiled by his political advisors who listened to the king privately over dinner. This copes with the contradictions and enables Luther to construct his picture of Solomon’s Sitz im Leben when he compiled the book. When we move to scholarly perspectives on this issue in Ecclesiastes, we find that the presupposition of Solomonic authorship or dialogue with others has been replaced by the theory that Qoheleth was the author. We also find that, in the light of recent literary-critical study, we are more able to cope with the idea of deliberate tension or contradiction in the work of one author. However, despite these developments, some of the same theories reappear. Thus, Whybray surveys the contradictory ideas of Qoheleth on the value of wisdom, death, work, divine justice, wealth and the relationship between God and man, and is able to accept the tension as Qoheleth’s apologetic. He writes, 17.  Source of translation: Richard J. Goodrich and David J. D. Miller, eds. and trans., St Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes (ACW 66; New York: Newman, 2012), 103. 18. Sven Holm-Nielsen, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in Jewish and Christian Theology,” ASTI 10 (1975–76): 38–96. See Holm-Nielsen’s discussion of 3:18–21: whilst Jerome is well aware of the actual meaning, he relates the saying to a discussion of where people went after death before the coming of Christ, to a conclusion that the one difference between human and beast is verbal communication, to a discussion of the nature of the soul, and to a spiritual interpretation that relates a person’s fate to good and bad deeds (see 74–76). 19. Martin Luther, “Notes on Ecclesiastes.”

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The traditional beliefs of Judaism had to be “brought up to date” at certain points; and Qoheleth radically questioned their traditional formulation when he judged it necessary to do so. But in putting forth his ideas he was not intending to prepare a new generation of apostates; rather he was seeking to equip his pupils to be Jewish believers in a world where there were many religions and philosophies claiming to possess the truth: to provide them with the means to argue the case for Judaism. And at the same time, he was seeking truth for himself.20 This kind of viewpoint has much in common with the structuralist analyses that find themes being held together in tension, not only by content but also by form. So, for example, James A. Loader’s21 structuralist analysis of Ecclesiastes argues for antitheses, contrasts, and chiastic arrangements, which can be described as “polar structures.” Themes that contain opposites within them are discussed by Qoheleth, themes such as “toil and joy” (9:3–7), “talk and silence” (5:2–7), and “the worth and worthlessness of wisdom” (1:12–2:26); the shape of the passages heightens the contrast between these opposites. This construction is regarded as a deliberate technique by the author whose book cannot be understood properly without acknowledgement of it. The overarching polar structure of the book is seen to be the use of traditional wisdom forms in order to oppose traditional wisdom ideas. Barton writes when discussing such structuralist approaches: Traditional source or form-critical analyses of the work in which the inconsistency between different sayings serves as a criterion for postulating plurality of authorship or an original independence of the short units that compose the work, miss the point entirely. They make a problem of what is in reality the book’s deliberate design; for Qoheleth’s whole purpose is to proceed by self-contradiction and antithesis to his ultimate conclusion, a conclusion which is not so much sceptical as relativistic.22 Barton thus considers the structuralist approach to have drawn out a key element of the character of the text that was obscured by older approaches. Other scholars have not however been so prepared to acknowledge this tension between opposites. Rather, they prefer to explain the 20.  Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 94. 21.  James A. Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qoheleth (BZAW 152, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979). 22.  Barton, Reading the Old Testament, 130.

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contradictions and various ways of doing this can be seen. Literary-critical analysts, particularly at the turn of the century, posited considerable editorial and redactional work.23 Contradictions were thought to prove that more than one author had been at work. As Whybray writes in criticism of this trend: The theory of massive interpolations made in order to “correct” Qoheleth’s theology is hardly a reasonable one. It is true that the “suspect” verses are those which express pious or traditional beliefs which, at least at first sight, appear to contradict their more radical contexts: that God judges the wicked, or that life is essentially good, at any rate for the righteous. These are traditional “orthodox” beliefs which Qoheleth elsewhere questions or denies. But it must be asked what would have been the point of making such orthodox additions to a book of whose whole teaching one disapproved. If it was felt to be important to condemn Qoheleth’s teaching, it would surely have been better to suppress the book altogether, or, if that proved impossible, to write another book refuting his arguments.24 Another possibility is that the text contains hidden quotations which the author was citing deliberately in order to refute. This theory has been put forward by Gordis, who defines “quotations” in this context as “words which do not reflect the present sentiments of the author of the literary composition in which they are found, but have been introduced by the author to convey the standpoint of another person or situation.”25 Some quotations have a poetical form which stands out in a prose context and they resemble sayings in Proverbs (e.g. 1:15; 1:18). Others are used as a basis for Qoheleth’s own comment which follows, e.g. 2:14a, a proverb: “The wise man has his eyes in his head, but the fool walks in darkness,” which is followed by 2:14b from Qoheleth, “and yet I perceived that one fate comes to all of them.” The theory of later additions, whilst unpopular for its attempt to iron out contradictions, has a role in discerning a possible prologue and epilogue. The prologue would consist merely of 1:1–2, the epilogue of 12:9–14. In these sections, and in a brief addition in 7:27, 23.  E.g. K. Siegfried, Prediger und Hoheslied (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1898); George A. Barton, The Book of Ecclesiastes (ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908); Alan H. McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904); and Emmanuel Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste (Paris: Gabalda, 1912). 24.  Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 24–25. 25. Robert Gordis, Koheleth—the Man and His World (New York: Schocken, 1973), 95–108.

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Qoheleth is clearly referred to in the third person. These sections do not contain such contradictions, nor the same concerns, and as such they have tended to be devalued in appreciation of the whole. I want to argue that in fact they are crucial for our understanding of the ongoing interpretation of the book and for its classification as wisdom.

I I will begin at the end, with the Epilogue to the book.26 Ecclesiastes 12:9–14 is basically a section consisting of two verses of complimentary commentary on Qoheleth’s activity followed by some more general remarks. It is usually regarded as the framework that made the book “acceptable.” One might well ask: acceptable to whom and in relation to what? Emmanuel Podechard,27 in 1912, concluded that it was the work of a later “hasid” who attempted to ameliorate the earlier cynicism of Qoheleth. More recently, Roland E. Murphy found in these verses a “‘safe’ interpretation” by a later writer.28 Clearly the epilogue is the first commentary on the book and so reinterprets it in a different context. Childs puts this into canonical perspective. He writes, “From the canonical perspective the crucial issue focuses on determining the effect of the epilogue on the interpretation of the book . . . What guidelines are established for the community which now uses the book of Koheleth as authoritative scripture?”29 He goes on to note that the epilogue places Qoheleth firmly in the wisdom tradition. Verses 9 and 10 characterize his words as “wise” and place him in the wider context of a critical teaching role. Verses 11 and following set his work in the larger context of other wisdom teachers and characterize the role of wisdom collections in general. The source of all wisdom is seen to come from God and so legitimizes the book as divine wisdom, as opposed to other books which distract from legitimate writings. Verse 13 then puts the work into an even broader context, that of the Torah. “Fear God and keep his commandments” is the epitome of man’s duty, and so a link between wisdom and law, which is a new element in the wisdom tradition, is made in this epilogue. A link is also made between 26.  For a recent, influential view of the epilogue as the work of the “main author” who is citing past experience, see Michael V. Fox, “Frame Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qoheleth,” HUCA 48 (1977): 83–106. This has the effect of placing the emphasis on the final form, but it does not nullify the distinction between redactional layers as indicated by older scholarship. 27. Emmanuel Podechard, “La composition du livre de l’Ecclésiaste,” RB, Nouvelle Serie 9 (1912): 161–91. 28.  Roland E. Murphy, “Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth),” in JBC, 534–40 (540). 29.  Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, 585.

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human behaviour and God’s judgement in the final verses, which almost give the book an eschatological tone. This eschatological dimension may well represent a later concern with contrasting the wisdom of the world with that of God in the age of apocalyptic, showing how Ecclesiastes could again be given authority as part of a wider phenomenon.30 It has been suggested that the last three verses of the epilogue function as a conclusion to the whole Hagiographa,31 so that the words of the wise extend beyond Qoheleth to give the canonical key to Proverbs as well.32 This idea does not find much favour with Childs, who finds the evidence scarce (merely a parallel in language with Prov 1), and thinks that it weakens the critical impact of the epilogue on the reading of Qoheleth itself.33 But the idea is taken up more positively by Gerald H. Wilson.34 Like Childs, he argues that the epilogue is “a canonical statement appended in order to instruct the reader of faith how to read and understand Qoheleth.”35 He tries to reconstruct the possible context of the epilogue and argues that the section binds Qoheleth and Proverbs together, providing a canonical key to the interpretation of both and establishing their dual role as instruction literature. What finds emphasis in the epilogue, and is to be found in both Qoheleth and Proverbs, is the admonition to fear God and keep his commandments. He suggests that this is the proper context within which to understand and evaluate the wisdom exercise. He writes, “The common criticism that wisdom shows no concern with 30.  This verse could form an interesting part of the discussion of the links between wisdom and apocalyptic; cf. Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (London: SCM, 1972), 263–83. 31.  A suggestion made by Heinrich Graetz, Kohelet (Leipzig: Winter, 1871), 47–49. Herbert E. Ryle, The Canon of the Old Testament (London: Macmillan, 1892), noted that “it is in the Hagiographa that we find the greatest amount of variation in the arrangement of the books” (229). He shows in a chart how there is broad variation in arrangement from the second century BCE to the fifth century CE. However, Proverbs and Qoheleth are always found together, and this order was witnessed to in B. Baba Bathra 14b (which Schnayer Z. Leiman, The Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures [Hamden, CN: Arcon, 1976], dates to the second century bce). The inclusion of Qoheleth in the smaller division of the five megilloth is thought to be a later development. 32. For example, by Ferdinand Hitzig and Wilhelm Nowack, Der Prediger Salomo’s erklärt (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1833); Karl Budde, Alfred Bertholet, and Gerrit Wildeboer, eds., “Der Prediger,” in Die fünf Megillot (KHC 17; Freiburg: Mohr, 1898); and Barton, The Book of Ecclesiastes. 33.  Cf. Gerald T. Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” CBQ 39 (1977): 182–89, for a carefully argued case against this idea and for an assessment of the function of the book as an adaptive commentary on Qoheleth or a thematizing of the book—see discussion below. 34.  Gerald H. Wilson, “The Words of the Wise: The Intent and Significance of Qoheleth 12:9–14,” JBL 103 (1984): 175–92. 35.  Wilson, “The Words of the Wise,” 175.

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the Torah or Prophets does not apply to wisdom as redefined by this new canonical context. The canonical editor insists that the ‘words of the wise [men]’ cannot be rightly understood apart from the ‘commandments of God/YHWH’.”36 He takes up ideas about an implicit connection between Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy37 and points to the similar use of ‫מצוה‬/‫מצות‬ in the two. Wilson writes, “While it is clear in Prov 1–9 that miswâ/miswôt refers to the commandments of the hakam (or in some instances wisdom herself), the numerous parallels in the use of the term here and in Deuteronomy suggest to this author that there is a movement afoot to understand the wisdom statements as, in some sense, the very commandments of God.”38 Furthermore, he notes that in both Prov 1–9 and Deuteronomy the “commandments” are characterized as the source of life and both use the idea of binding the commandments on the body. He concludes that these correspondences reveal “a reevaluation and redefinition of wisdom in the light of Deuteronomic reflection.”39 He then makes a link between the commandments mentioned in the epilogue to Ecclesiastes and the Torah as represented by Deuteronomy, arguing that Eccl 12:13—the work of canonical editors—merely makes explicit the link already made implicitly between fearing God and keeping the commandments. He writes, “On the basis of this canonical statement, Proverbs–Qoheleth can no longer be read simply as practical advice on how to succeed in life, wisdom that could pass easily across national and religious boundaries. They are now inextricably bound up with the Torah or Israel’s God, YHWH—his commandments—and cannot be read apart from him.”40 It seems then that, as Childs maintains, the book has a role as wisdom for a broader audience and in connection with a broader corpus of wisdom literature. He writes, “Its authoritative role lies in its function within a larger context. The editorial shaping of the book did not consist of a heavyhanded reworking of the original sayings of Koheleth. His words are left basically in their original form without being blurred or softened. Instead, a new and larger context is provided in which the book is to be interpreted. . . . his sayings serve as a critical sapiential guide for the community 36.  Wilson, “The Words of the Wise,” 192. 37. For a discussion of the link between the wisdom literature and Deuteronomic thought and terminology, see Whybray, The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament, 87–89, 150–51. In Jewish tradition there was a link made between Ecclesiastes and the “men of Hezekiah.” B. Baba Bathra 15b records a tradition that Hezekiah had Hebrew literature put into writing and copies made of Isaiah, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, and Proverbs. There, reference to Hezekiah is probably based on Prov 25:1. 38.  Wilson, “The Words of the Wise,” 183. See his discussion of parallels, 183–89. 39.  Wilson, “The Words of the Wise,” 189. 40.  Wilson, “The Words of the Wise,” 192.

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when placed with other authoritative writings.”41 I do not think, however, that Childs pays adequate attention to the insight represented by Wilson,42 that there is a decisive connection made between wisdom and torah here. Whether or not Wilson is correct in linking Proverbs and Qoheleth in this way, he makes it clear that the emerging authority of wisdom was in connection with torah. That was how the book of Ecclesiastes and possibly other earlier wisdom as well was starting to be read, and I suggest that it was this link, more than any other, that made it authoritative when it came to canonization. If it enabled the book of Ecclesiastes to become canonical, then the epilogue is indeed a canonical statement. Let us approach this wisdom/torah link from another direction. It has long been noted that there is a thematic link between Ben Sira and Ecclesiastes. Gerald Sheppard notes that this link is especially clear in the epilogue to Ecclesiastes (12:13–14), which shows the same ideology as Ben Sira.43 He writes, “In Sirach, there is a conscious relationship between the tasks of wisdom and the authority of the Torah.”44 He holds that the parallelism of fearing God and obeying his commandments in Eccl 12:13–14 “represents a fairly sophisticated theological interpretation of sacred wisdom in relation to an authoritative Torah.”45 He writes: We must conclude that the redactor of Qoheleth 12:13–14 either knew of Sirach or shared fully in a similar, pervasive estimate of sacred wisdom. Moreover, this later formulation offers an interpretation of the relationship between biblical wisdom and the commandments of God in the Torah. The minimal effect redactionally is to place Qoheleth in the domain of wisdom which has itself become a developed theological construct already functioning as an interpretive idiom in the context of a nascent Scripture. In other words, Qoheleth has been thematized by the epilogue in order to include it fully within a “canon-conscious” definition of sacred wisdom . . .46 This idea of “canon consciousness” is described by Sheppard as follows: “Canon-conscious redactions are . . . alterations that find their function 41.  Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, 588. 42.  Wilson, “The Words of the Wise,” 175–92. 43.  Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary.” He finds an editorial device in Ben Sira 43:27 which resembles that in 12:13 and he relates the theme of restitution found in 12:14 to Ben Sira 17:6–15. He also finds the dual injunction in 12:13 (to fear God and observe his commandments ) in Ben Sira 1. 44.  Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” 187. 45.  Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” 187. 46.  Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” 187–88.

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in determining the interpretive context of a section within the larger body of recognized sacred traditions.”47 Sheppard holds that the epilogue “provides a rare glimpse into a comprehensive canon-conscious formulation of what the purpose of biblical wisdom is.”48 He links it with other sapientializing redactions such as Psalm 1, which, he holds, provides a redactional preface to the Psalter. He writes, “As in Qoh 12:13–14 the fear of God is again the Leitmotiv of wisdom, but significantly, it is also coupled to the reading of the Torah as a guide for discerning the two ways . . . In each .  .  . we find a similar theological view of wisdom at the dawn of canon-consciousness, a perspective that offers an inner biblical perception of wisdom with an important hermeneutical function for interpreting canonically non-wisdom traditions.”49 I find this a convincing argument for suggesting that the epilogue to Ecclesiastes functions to make a link between wisdom and torah and reflects an interpretation of Ecclesiastes as wisdom in a new sense that characterized the period of this redaction. I would suggest that chronologically the epilogue to Ecclesiastes came to be written before Ben Sira, and so represents a first stage in the development of this explicit wisdom/torah link. This would explain why Ecclesiastes is in the canon and Ben Sira is not, despite the fact that Ben Sira is more overtly torah-centred wisdom. In light of the epilogue, Ecclesiastes was therefore read to encourage people to keep the Torah, and this gave it an authority which led to canonization.

II At this point, it is edifying to turn to early interpreters of Ecclesiastes and at what they had to say about the canonical status of the book. The subject of the canonicity of Ecclesiastes was one of the controversies between the schools of Hillel and Shammai, but eventually the view of the Hillelites, that Qoheleth “defiles the hands ritually,” i.e. that it is canonical, prevailed. The point here is that all Scripture has to be unclean by the very nature of its holiness. If books are deemed not to be unclean, there is a problem with their canonicity. This question was raised of both Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs. The controversy is recorded in the M. Yadaim III:5, which I quote here: All the Holy Scriptures render the hands unclean. The Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes render the hands unclean. R. Judah says: 47.  Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” 188 fn. 19. 48.  Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” 189. 49.  Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary,” 189.

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Chapter 1 The Song of Songs renders the hands unclean, but about Ecclesiastes there is dissension. R. Jose says: Ecclesiastes does not render the hands unclean and about the Song of Songs there is dissension. R. Simeon says: Ecclesiastes is one of the things about which the School of Shammai adopted the more lenient, and the School of Hillel the more stringent ruling. R. Simeon b. Azzai said: I have heard a tradition from the seventy-two elders on the day when they made R. Eleazar b. Azariah head of the college [of Sages], that the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes both render the hands unclean. R. Akiba said: God forbid!—no man in Israel ever disputed about the Song of Songs [that he should say] that it does not render the hands unclean, for all the ages are not worth the day on which the Song of Songs was given to Israel; for all the Writings are holy, but the Song of Songs is the Holy of Holies. And if aught was in dispute the dispute was about Ecclesiastes alone. R. Johanan b. Joshua, the son of R. Akiba’s father-in-law, said: According to the words of Ben Azzai so did they dispute and so did they decide.50

In the Talmud, the same discussion is given. It is to be found in B. Megillah 7a, from which I quote here: R. Meir says that [the scroll of] Koheleth does not render the hands unclean, and that about the Song of Songs there is a difference of opinion. R. Jose says that the Song of Songs renders the hands unclean, and about Koheleth there is a difference of opinion. R. Simeon says that Koheleth is one of those matters in regard to which Beth Shammai were more lenient and Beth Hillel more stringent but Ruth and the Song of Songs and Esther [certainly] make the hands unclean!—Samuel concurred with R. Joshua. It has been taught: R. Simeon b. Menasia said: Koheleth does not render the hands unclean because it contains only the wisdom of Solomon. They said to him, Was this then all that he composed? Is it not stated elsewhere, And he spoke three thousand proverbs, and it further says, Add thou not unto his words? Why this further quotation?—In case you might object that he composed very much, and what it pleased him to write he wrote and what it did not please him he did not write. Therefore it says, Add thou not to his words.51 50. Translation: Herbert Danby, The Mishnah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), 781–82. 51. Translation: Isidore Epstein, ed., Babylonian Talmud, Seder Moʾed 4 (London: Soncino, 1938), 72.

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In another tract of the Talmud, in B. Shabbath 30b, it is recorded: Rab Judah, son of R. Samuel b. Shilath said in Rab’s name: The sages wished to hide the Book of Ecclesiastes, because its words are self-contradictory; yet why did they not hide it? Because its beginning is religious teaching [(lit.: words of the torah)] and its end is religious teaching. Its beginning is religious teaching, as it is written, What profit hath man of all his labour wherein he laboureth under the sun? And the School of R. Jannai commented: Under the sun he has none, but he has it [profit] before the sun. The end thereof is religious teaching, as it is written Let us hear the conclusion of the matter—fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole of man. What is meant by, for this is the whole of man?—Said R. Eleazar: The entire world was created only for the sake of this [type of] man. Simeon B. ʿAzzai—others state, Simeon B. Zoma—said: The entire world was created only to be a companion to this man. And how are its words self-contradictory?—It is written anger is better than play, but it is written I said of laughter, It is to be praised. It is written Then I commended joy; but it is written, and of joy [I said] What doeth it? There is no difficulty: anger is better than laughter, the anger which the Holy One, blessed be He, displays to the righteous in this world is better than the laughter which the Holy One, blessed be He, laughs with the wicked in this world. And I said of laughter, it is to be praised: that refers to the laughter which the Holy One, blessed be He, laughs with the righteous in the world to come. Then I commended joy. This refers to the joy of a precept. And of joy [I said] What doeth it: this refers to joy [which is] not in connection with a precept. This teaches you that the Divine Presence rests [upon] man neither through gloom, nor through sloth, nor through frivolity, nor through levity, nor through talk, nor through idle chatter, save through a matter of joy in connection with a precept, as it is said But now bring me a minstrel. And it came to pass, when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon him (2 Kings III. 15).52 It is often overlooked that during the canonization process, a process which probably took place over a considerable period of time and led to the gradual growth of a body of literature considered canonical, the book of Ecclesiastes was not only mentioned in connection with Solomonic wisdom but was interpreted in relation to the law. A number of 52.  Epstein, Babylonian Talmud, 135–36.

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reinterpretations of verses took place to make the book more orthodox in this regard. In the Midrash Rabbah Leviticus Emor 28:1, we find Eccl 1:3 cited as bearing on the interpretation of Lev 23:10. It is then commented: R. Benjamin b. Levi stated. The Sages wanted to store away the Book of Ecclesiastes, (ie suppress it and exclude it from the canon) for they found in it ideas that leaned towards heresy. They argued Was it right that Solomon should have said the following: Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth; and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth (ib XI, 9)? Moses said Go not about after your own heart and your own eyes (Num. XV, 39), but Solomon said Walk in the ways of thy heart, and in the sight of thine eyes! What then? Is all restraint to be removed? Is there neither justice nor judge? When, however, he said, But know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgement, (ib) they admitted that Solomon had spoken well. R. Samuel b. Nahmani stated: The Sages intended to store away the Book of Ecclesiastes because they found in it ideas that leaned towards heresy. They said Should Solomon have uttered the following: What profit hath man of all his labour? This might imply, might it not, that labour in the study of the Torah was also included? On the other hand, they argued, if he had said “of all labour” and left it at that, we might have thought that he meant to include also labour in the study of the Torah. However he does not say this, but “of all his labour” implying that it is in his own labour that man finds no profit but that he does find profit in the labour of studying Torah. R. Judah explained that “under the sun” he has no profit, but above the sun he has. R. Levi and our Rabbis discussed this. R. Levi said: In return for the utmost that men can do in this world in the performance of religious duties and good deeds, it is enough for them that the Holy One, blessed be He, causes the sun to shine for them; as it says The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down (ib I, 5). Our Rabbis said: In return for the utmost that the righteous achieve in this world in the performance of religious duties and good deeds it is enough for them that the Holy One, blessed be He, renews their countenance like the disc of the sun: as it says, But they that love Him be as the sun when he goeth forth in his strength (Judg. V, 31).53 In the Midrash Rabbah on Qoh 1:3, reference is again made to the heresy that man cannot profit from his work: 53.  Translation: Harry Freedman and Maurice Simon, eds., The Midrash 4: Leviticus (trans. Judah J. Slotki; London: Soncino, 1939), 358–59.

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R. Benjamin said: The Sages sought to suppress the book of Koheleth because they discovered therein words which savour of heresy. They declared: Behold all the wisdom of Solomon which he aims at teaching [in this Book] is WHAT PROFIT HATH MAN OF ALL HIS LABOUR? It is possible that the words may also be applied to man’s labour in the Torah. On reconsidering the matter they declared: He did not say “Of all labour” but OF ALL HIS LABOUR. In HIS LABOUR one should not labour, but one should toil in the labour of the Torah!54 Thus once it is interpreted that this refers to work outside that of the Torah—i.e. work done by man for his own benefit, the heresy disappears. The maxim about eating, drinking, and enjoying life is also dealt with in the Midrash by reference to the Torah. This has to do, it is said, with good deeds. So the Midrash Rabbah on Qoh 2:24 states: R. Tanhuman in the name of R. Nahman, the son of R. Samuel b. Nahman, and R. Menahma said (another version: R. Jeremiah and R. Meyasha said in the name of R. Samuel b. R. Isaac): All the references to eating and drinking in this Book signify Torah and good deeds. R. Jonah said: The most clear proof of them all is, a man hath no better thing under the sun than to eat, and drink, and to be merry, and that this should accompany him in his labour—amalo (Eccl 8:15). The last word should be read as ʿolamo (this world)—in this world; All the days of his life (Ib) alludes to the grave. Are there, then, food and drink in the grave which accompany a man to the grave? It must then mean Torah and good deeds. Rashi uses this distinction when he interprets Ecclesiastes. He interprets the question in 1:3—“What advantage is there?”—as referring to every labour for which a man gives up the study of the law. He later interprets 1:8 as referring to verse 3 so that if a man gives up study of the law to employ himself in idle things, he will find them wearisome and unattainable, and if he is occupied with sightseeing his eye will not be satisfied; and if he is occupied with the hearing of the ear, his ear will not be filled. On 1:9 Rashi comments that a man learns nothing new apart from the law, and in 1:10 things apart from the law are not new. Things are forgotten from former times and so are perceived to be new, but they are not really so. In 1:13 wisdom is equated with the law. This method of exegesis then meant 54.  Translation: Harry Freedman and Maurice Simon, eds., The Midrash 8: Ecclesiastes (trans. Abraham Cohen; London: Soncino, 1939), 71–72.

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that the book became undeniably canonical (in fact, that the early Rabbis had ever suggested otherwise became a source of embarrassment to later interpreters), and objections that had sprung from a more literal reading of the book were set aside.

III It is unlikely, therefore, that people were taken in by the more pious sentiments of the book, thinking that Ecclesiastes was orthodox wisdom. Rather, the whole canonization debate revolved around the fact that there were contradictions. This fact has been noted by recent scholars such as Michael Fox,55 who discusses the point that the contradictions themselves led the canonizers to think that the book was not inspired. But, like other scholars, he finds this overcome by observation of an orthodox framework provided by Qoh 1:3 and 12:13. He argues that for the Rabbis this “was sufficient to neutralize the book’s internal contradictions.” He looks at the way Eccl 1:3 was interpreted by the school of R. Yannai, asserting the futility of activities “under the sun,” that is mundane activities, but the value of matters “before the sun,” that is study of torah, for the Torah was created before the sun. He argues that the role of the epilogue was to mediate Qoheleth’s words to the reader—as B. Shab. 30b says, the book “ends with words of torah.” It can be clearly seen, in my view, that a main concern of the canonizers was harmonization with torah. The attempt to harmonize contradictions was entirely in connection with the Torah, not because of the desire to have a book that made a tidy theological unity. So 1:3 caused a discrepancy with the rabbinic view that study of torah was meaningful toil, and so it needed to be reinterpreted. Likewise, 11:9 was discussed in the light of Num 15:39—the Pentateuch or Torah was the scripture with real authority in the light of which other books were read. So, 3:13 (“eat, drink and take pleasure”) is interpreted as a metaphor for study of torah. There were also perceived to be links with Gen 1–11, e.g. Gen 3:19 at 12:7.56 If one considers the meaning of the word “canonical,” this approach, which makes the Torah the criterion for evaluating other material, is understandable. Shnayer. Z. Leiman defines “canonical” as “a book accepted by Jews as authoritative for religious practice and/or doctrine, and whose authority is binding upon the Jewish people for all 55. Michael V. Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions (Sheffield: Almond, 1989), 19. Reprinted and revised as A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). 56.  This link continues to be noted; see Charles C. Forman, “Koheleth’s Use of Genesis,” JSS 5 (1960): 256–63.

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generations. Furthermore such books are to be studied and expounded in private and in public.”57 There may have been objections as to the book’s inspired status until these contradictions could be ironed out, but there was never any question that the book was canonical. As Leiman writes, “If anything, the discussion concerning Ecclesiastes . . . implies that all were in agreement that it was already a canonical book in the early part of the first century CE; its inspired origin (or sacredness) was debated, not its canonicity.”58 So, the discussion of the contradictions took place in the light of assimilation with other OT passages, notably with the Torah, and the inspiration of the book was questioned on these grounds. It is usually assumed that opposition to canonization came from those who saw the contradictions as insurmountable. But an alternative proposal has been put forward by Robin B. Salters.59 He suggests that such opposition came from those who wanted to retain the contradictions in the face of their being lost in the attempt to assimilate the book to torah. Salters argues that these opposers were in fact truer exegetes since they refused to concede that the pious elements were of the essence of Qoheleth. He writes, “They were also aware that it was only by exegetical dishonesty that the book, already tampered with, could be taken to be anything other than the work of a sceptic.”60 If these opponents to canonization had had their way, of course, they might have been responsible for our losing Ecclesiastes from the canon. In that sense, one might say the orthodox reinterpretation did us a service. But at the same time, Salters argues, it did us a disservice. He writes, “It was a disaster for Qoheleth that the book came to be included in the Canon. Ever since the book’s admission to the Canon it has been interpreted more or less in the light of the arguments which were used to secure its place there. And as the opposition faded—as it must have done—the scholars resorted to further ways and means of extracting piety from the text.”61 This raises the question, was the purpose of those who challenged the “canonizers” simply to exclude Ecclesiastes or was it to challenge the exegetical principles on which the book was being included? It may be that they were more concerned about exegetical honesty than 57.  Leiman, The Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures, 14. 58.  Leiman, The Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures, 126. 59.  Robin B. Salters, “Qoheleth and the Canon,” ExpTim 86 (1974–75): 339–42. 60.  Salters, “Qoheleth and the Canon,” 342. 61.  Salters, “Qoheleth and the Canon,” 342. Morris Jastrow, A Gentle Cynic (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1919), 29, wrote in a similar vein, “The privilege of being included in a sacred collection turned out to be a misfortune for the book, for it led to its being totally misunderstood, or, rather, intentionally modified so as to conceal its real purport.” Thus his idea is that Qoheleth the sceptic was lost to the pious interpretations of the orthodox.

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whether or not the book was included, and from their orthodox standpoint exegetical honesty could not stretch as far as to include Ecclesiastes.

IV The other reason usually cited as influential in the canonization process is Solomonic authorship. We saw the link mentioned in the Talmud between Solomon’s wisdom and this book, and the problem of contradiction caused by it. In these terms the Solomonic attribution was awkward to explain. Is it therefore as crucial in the canonization process as scholars have argued? Solomonic authorship can hardly have been both the reason for canonization and a problem that early interpreters had to explain away. Certainly, if we look at the views of early interpreters of Ecclesiastes, the central importance of the Solomonic attribution would seem to be undoubted. Early Jewish concern with the book of Qoheleth was almost entirely based around Solomonic authorship—the particularly pressing questions were when and why Solomon wrote this book. The Midrashic view was that Solomon wrote it “to expose the emptiness and vanity of all worldly pursuits and carnal gratifications, and to show that the happiness of man consists in fearing God and obeying his commands.” According to the earliest Jewish traditions,62 Solomon wrote songs when he was young and joyful, he wrote proverbs and maxims in middle age, and when old and weary of life he described earthly pleasure as vain and empty. The concern of the Midrash Qoheleth was chiefly with the character of Solomon and with stories about his life. Reference is made to Solomon’s three names, Solomon meaning “peaceful” or “peacemaker,” Jedidiah, “loved by God,” and finally Qoheleth, “one who assembles.” The explanation of the word Qoheleth is deduced from 1 Kgs 8:1: Solomon assembled the elders of Israel. A story then arose to explain how Solomon, who in his old age was seduced by his foreign wives to idolatry, also became a preacher of righteousness. Christian D. Ginsburg wrote in his 1861 commentary on Qoheleth, “The elastic rules of interpretation, aided by an oriental imagination, soon contrived to deduce it from the text.”63 Ecclesiastes 1:12—“I, the Preacher, have been king over Israel in Jerusalem”—was taken to refer to Solomon and to his having been king but no longer being so. This led to the idea that there must have been a period in Solomon’s life when he 62.  Harry Freedman and Maurice Simon, eds., The Midrash 9: Song of Songs (trans. Maurice Simon; London: Soncino, 1939), 17. 63.  Christian D. Ginsburg, Coheleth, Commonly Called the Book of Ecclesiastes (London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1861), 33.

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was dethroned. Hence arose the legend that when Solomon, elated with riches and wisdom, departed from the ways of the Lord, he was dethroned by Ashmodai, the king of the demons, and expelled from Jerusalem as an example of the effects of sin. He went around the country mourning his guilt and, having thus confessed his sins and denounced the folly of attempting to find satisfaction in earthly pleasures, he was reinstated in his old age. So he died in possession of his kingdom and at peace with God and man. A variant seems also to have arisen which led to some discussion: Was Solomon restored to his throne after his atonement, or did a demon rule in his place and his name while Solomon walked begging from house to house? Gradually, the allegorization of the book became increasingly widespread in Jewish circles. It is related in the Talmud (B. Gittin 68b) that the fugitive Solomon came before the Sanhedrin, declaring that it was he who had been king over Israel. They tested the truthfulness of his assertion and found it to be correct. A variant of the legend about Solomon and Ashmodai, which again arises out of consideration of 1:12, is found in the Targum to that verse. This story became so popular that it gave rise to further elaborations. Solomon’s exile was said to have been three years. During this time he came into the country of Ammon, was met and taken up by the royal cook, whom he soon excelled, and succeeded, by the command of the king. Whilst in this position, the king’s daughter was enamoured of him. The king, grieved at it, drove them both away; they however married, and she, by finding the ring which Solomon lost, and which was the cause of Ashmodai being able to dethrone him, was the means of restoring him to his throne in Jerusalem. Being reinstated into his glorious possession, Solomon sent for his wife’s father, the king of the children of Ammon, and said to him, Why hast thou unlawfully destroyed two souls? Tremblingly he replied, Far be it from me! I have not killed them, I only expelled them into the desert, and know not what has become of them. Whereupon Solomon, of blessed memory, said, If thou shouldst see them, wilt thou be able to recognize them? Know then that I am the cook, and thy daughter is my wife. And Solomon sent for her, and she came and kissed her father’s hand, who went back to his land in exceeding great joy.64 The narrative, then, has a happy ending and ties up the loose ends of the embellished story. 64.  Ginsburg, Coheleth, 38. The Hebrew text of the midrash that he quotes is printed by Adolph Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrasch 2 (Leipzig: Nies, 1853), 86–87.

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Whilst it was the presupposition of these early interpreters that the author, Solomon, had composed the book during his reign, the Targumist saw that the book could not come from the time of Solomon. Rather than being based on critical foundations, this opinion was based on the idea that Solomon’s reign was a prosperous time, and not one in which such pessimistic sentiments would be found. The Targumist himself dated it to the time of the exile. But since he still thought that Solomon was the author, the Targumist was obliged to resort to the idea that Solomon was transported by the spirit of prophecy into the distant future, whose history he depicts. Hence 1:2 is paraphrased: The words of prophecy which Qoheleth, that is, the son of David the King, who was in Jerusalem, prophesied. When Solomon, the King of Israel, saw by the spirit of prophecy the kingdom of Rehoboam his son, that it will be divided with Jeroboam the son of Nebat, and that Jerusalem and the holy temple will be destroyed, and that the people of Israel will be carried away into captivity, he said, by His word, Vanity of vanities is this world, vanity of vanities is all for which I and my father David have laboured, all is vanity!

V Amongst early Christian exegetes, Gregory Thaumaturgus (210– 270  ce)65 was the first to write a simple paraphrase of Ecclesiastes. His aim was “to try to present Qoheleth as relevant to and consistent with the Christian tradition.”66 Gregory assumes Solomonic authorship, a tradition received from Jewish circles. As John Jarick writes, “For Gregory there was no question that the person of Solomon might be merely a literary disguise adopted for the early section of the book but soon dropped once its purpose had been served; the paraphrase has it that all which is to follow came from the very lips of Solomon himself.”67 The LXX translation of Qoheleth as Ecclesiastes (a derivative of εκκλησια) leads Gregory to understand the writer to have been speaking to the church. He is concerned to state that Ecclesiastes (i.e. Solomon) is speaking to the whole congregation of God, to a broader audience than just the Jewish audience. Gregory extends the titles of king and prophet to David as well as Solo65. Gregory Thaumaturgus, “A Metaphrase on the Book of Ecclesiastes,” ANF 6 (Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1886), 9–17. 66.  John Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes (Atlanta: Scholars, 1990), 9. 67. Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, 7.

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mon, but makes it clear that for wisdom Solomon was the most renowned. Regarding the book as prophetic gave the book a more religious authority for Gregory and allowed for a prophetic interpretation of certain passages, such as 12:1–7. He also made Solomon’s authority clear—on 1:12 Gregory wrote as if from the lips of Solomon: “Now in addressing the assembly, I am not saying these things thoughtlessly, but—since I have been entrusted with the kingdoms of the Hebrews in Jerusalem—it has all been fully considered by me.” Gregory occasionally adds a phrase such as “I believe” to denote Solomon’s opinion (e.g. on 1:10 and 1:16–17), perhaps to distinguish the sentiment from beliefs that might be held in his own day, or to respond to the questions posed in 1:9 (which Gregory formulates entirely in question form). This may be a hint of his awareness of contradictions in the text. Jerome uncritically takes over the Jewish tradition about Solomonic authorship and Jewish speculation on the three names: Solomon meaning “peaceful” or “peacemaker,” Jedidiah meaning “loved by God,” and Qoheleth meaning εκκλησιαστης (ecclesiastes) in Greek or concionator in Latin, i.e. “one who assembles the congregation.” Then he goes a stage further and sees the three attributes: “pacifus,” “dilectus,” and “Ecclesiastes” as referring to Christ. This he does by quoting passages from the NT such as John 14:27 (“Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you”) which provides the name of “pacifus” and Matt 3:17 (“This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased”), which proves “dilectus” to be Christ. “Ecclesiastes” is more difficult to establish, but is finally derived from the fact that Christ is the head of the church—the Christian church, the Jews and all nations. Furthermore, he attaches significance to the fact that the writer in 1:1 identifies himself as the “son of David, the king of Jerusalem.” Whilst Jerome assumes that Solomon is referred to, he argues that, according to a spiritual interpretation, Jesus too is the “son of David” whose teachings concerning the vanity of the world accord with Solomon’s book. Thus the book, interpreted spiritually, indicates the nature of the teachings of Jesus and proves that concealed references to Jesus abound in the OT. Medieval exegetes did not question Solomonic authorship. Nicholas of Lyra, for example, from the late thirteenth/early fourteenth century maintained that the purpose of Ecclesiastes is “that as mankind look for happiness in different directions,—wealth, pleasure, honour, knowledge etc.—Solomon, whose wisdom was formed in different ways, sets himself to shew that felicity consists in none of these, but in the fear of God.”68 Ginsburg notes that Lyra divides the book into two parts: 68.  Nicholas of Lyra, “Commentarius” (Scripturae Sacrae Cursus Completus 17; ed. Jacques-Paul Migne; Paris: Gabalda, 1839), 31–150.

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Chapter 1 In the first part (chap. 1:2–[6]:12), Solomon descants on the false sources of happiness; and in the second part (chap. 7:1–12:14), which has two sections, he treats upon true happiness, shewing that it consists objectively in God alone; formally (formaliter) in the clear vision and enjoyment of God in meritorious works; to which Solomon urges us, on to the end of chap.  11, and persuades us to promptitude in chap. 12.69

At the Reformation, a new image of the author, Solomon, is fashioned by the reformers. It is noted for the first time that Solomon does not draft the text of Ecclesiastes word for word. His ideas are recorded in the final form of the text, but its preparation is carried out by Solomon’s political associates. This was a first step in addressing the problem that Solomon did not appear to be the author of Ecclesiastes, although this was in fact presupposed by Luther. It was a century later that Hugo Grotius maintained that the book was written under Solomon’s name with no direct Solomonic influence. Luther shows a preoccupation with the character of Solomon. Whilst earlier interpreters such as Jerome had depicted Solomon as a solitary figure who advocates withdrawal from society, Luther’s Solomon is engaged in public conversation, which provides the basic material for the text. It is held that social contact with his political advisors enabled the text to be formed. Solomon is depicted as the dutiful king concerned with the affairs of the state and community. His daily civic difficulties are seen to be reflected in the discourse in Ecclesiastes. This contrasts with the rabbinic tradition in which Solomon is often depicted as deposed from his throne at the writing of Ecclesiastes and mourning his personal condition whilst exiled from his royal seat. Solomon is taken far more seriously as a historical personage than he was by Jerome and other earlier exegetes. Comparisons are often made with other prominent figures from the ancient world, but not with Jesus Christ. These comparisons are often made to highlight common difficulties in political and social life in the ancient world. For example, a comparison is made between Solomon and political figures such as Timon, Demosthenes, and Cicero. All are “prudent men” like Solomon and endeavour to help their citizens, yet no gratitude is received and their plans do not come to fruition. Solomon is interpreted strictly as a political figure who wrestles with difficult problems concerning life and society alongside others in the ancient world. Whilst he is engaging in his civic responsibility, difficult social and political issues come up 69.  Ginsburg, Coheleth, 111. In the opening line of this quotation, Ginsburg writes “(chap. 1:2–7:12),” but the latter citation seems to be erroneous.

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which are under discussion in the book of Ecclesiastes, as written up by his political advisors. Solomon is seen as a master of political thought and Luther gives him the title “doctor politicus” within the OT.

VI Clearly, then, for early interpreters, the nature and status of the book of Ecclesiastes was tied to Solomon. Furthermore, the classification of Ecclesiastes as a wisdom book is, for them, bound to this status. In the early Jewish circles in which the book became canonical, the attribution to Solomon was of paramount importance. The personage of Solomon was of great interest; and, the book of Ecclesiastes, as Solomon’s contribution to the meaning of existence in his old age, was therefore to be treated with due reverence. Early Christian interpreters took this attribution for granted, thus displaying their dependence upon their Jewish counterparts,70 and they also showed interest in the character of Solomon. Are we therefore to conclude from their emphasis that this was in fact the overriding factor for those who canonized the book? It was certainly mentioned at the time of canonization, but actually in connection with the harmonization of traditions about Solomon. We have seen how an alternative factor of harmonization with torah may have weighed just as heavily during the canonization process, if not more so. We need to entertain the possibility that in this case, the emphasis placed on Solomon by early interpreters may have led us down a false path. Further questions arise from the Solomonic attribution. I shall go on to ask how the process of the attribution might have come about and at what stage it was decisive in establishing the authority of the book. It is interesting that the author of Ecclesiastes does not use the name Solomon directly. If he had wanted to state specifically that Solomon was the author, he would presumably not have used the name Qoheleth. Of course we cannot be sure what the author’s intention was—but we might ask why he included the reference to the son of David or described himself as “king in Jerusalem.” Of course, it is possible by means of translation to assert that Qoheleth is calling himself “property owner in Jerusalem” rather than “king” and that it is mistranslation that has led to misinterpretation.71 However, this view has not been widely espoused by scholars. 70.  A question debated by Holm-Nielsen, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in Jewish and Christian Theology,” 78–82. Ginsburg, Coheleth, 102, makes the comment on Jerome that “In most instances this Rabbi of the Christian Church had nothing to do but to Christianise the allegories of the Rabbins of the Jewish church.” 71.  Harold L. Ginsberg, “The Structure and Contents of the Book of Koheleth,” in Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East (eds. M. Noth and D. W. Thomas; VTSup 3;

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Another possibility is that the book is pseudonymous. If this is the case it flouts the normal rules of pseudonymity by the retention of the name Qoheleth. Or, perhaps Qoheleth is not meant to be read as a proper name. Alternatively, the name Solomon may be an editorial gloss by those promoting Solomonic authorship? If so, they failed to gloss very successfully. Another alternative is a view put forward by Childs. He argues that to see the book as pseudonymous and as having acquired authoritative status from the start by ascription to Solomon leads to problems. He writes: It seems much more likely, therefore, to suppose that the picture of Koheleth as Solomon served another purpose. In its canonical form the identification assures the reader that the attack on wisdom which Ecclesiastes contains is not to be regarded as the personal idiosyncracy of a nameless teacher. Rather, by his speaking in the guise of Solomon, whose own history now formed part of the community’s common memory, his attack on wisdom was assigned an authoritative role as the final reflections of Solomon. As the source of Israel’s wisdom, his words serve as an official corrective from within the wisdom tradition itself. Once this point was made, the literary fiction of Solomon was dropped.72 Childs also argues that the name Qoheleth assigns him the role of teacher and airs the possibility that such a role was sufficiently primary to have prevented the removal of the name Qoheleth and an actual change to the name of Solomon. Childs goes on to argue that this author’s sayings are not simply a personal testimony and have no independent status. If they are unorthodox within the body of wisdom literature they are there as a “critical corrective.”73 Perhaps the editors were more open to the kind of role that the author himself defined—that of a critic of the wisdom tradition from the inside, throwing out a challenge that would enable the Leiden: Brill, 1955), 138–49, argues that ‫( מלך‬mlk) should be vocalized as molek meaning property holder and that mlk means “to own or gain possession of ” following Arabic mlk. He writes, “mlk quite certainly means not ‘to be king’ but ‘to own’ in 2:12b (‘for of what sort will be the man who will come after me, who will own all that I have already acquired’— reading ʿaharai . . . hammolek . . . ʾasiti), whose proper position is immediately after 2:11 . . . We therefore conclude that all Koheleth asserted in the original form of 1:12 was ‘I, Koheleth, was a property-owner in Jerusalem’” (148–49). In a footnote Ginsberg notes, “Where Koheleth boasts that he surpassed ‘all that were before me in Jerusalem’ he does not speak of kings (1:16; 2:7, 9), and when he does relate that he amassed ‘treasures (as) of kings’ (2:8) he does not say ‘other kings’ or ‘the other kings’ nor claim that he outdid kings” (149). See discussion also in Harold L. Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950), 9–10, 12–15. 72.  Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, 584. 73.  Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, 588.

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tradition to keep changing and to stay alive. Childs brings the ascription to Solomon into his argument against seeing Ecclesiastes as a personal, pessimistic testimony. He writes, “The point of using the literary fiction of Solomon, the eponymic father of Hebrew wisdom, is specifically to guard the normative status of this message against ascribing it to the individual quirks of its author.”74 Whether we fully agree with Childs or not, it can be seen that in some way the Solomonic attribution reinforced the wisdom status of Ecclesiastes for the benefit of early orthodox interpreters, probably including those who put together the canon. As Childs maintains, the important question to ask is, “What guidelines are established for the community which now uses the book of Koheleth as authoritative scripture?”75 We have also seen how the epilogue functioned to reinforce the wisdom nature of Ecclesiastes by both designating Qoheleth’s words as part of Israel’s wisdom (12:9) and relating the book to torah. Childs writes, “Few passages in the Old Testament reflect a more overt consciousness of the canon than does this epilogue.”76 This relates to the other concern during the canonization process of harmonization of Ecclesiastes with different parts of Scripture, notably with the authoritative Torah. To conclude, the original author may have perceived his work as wisdom—but he would have meant by “wisdom” something different from his orthodox editors and readers. This is something of which we can have no definite knowledge—we can only surmise. However, in my view the authority of Qoheleth’s work comes from its classification as orthodox wisdom from the time that the text itself was formed. By the time of canonization it became fully accepted as wisdom. However, even as early as the first editing of the text the concept of wisdom had changed. Whilst Ecclesiastes forms a protest from within wisdom, we can see from the books of Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon that wisdom took a very different direction. We have noted the links between Ben Sira and the epilogue of Ecclesiastes which mark the beginning of this change. By the time the orthodox of a later generation were considering the book, it was being judged by different standards of orthodoxy which related to harmonization with the Torah. The technique of quoting traditional wisdom employed by the author of Ecclesiastes was a saving grace for the attempts of the orthodox to salvage something from this sceptical work, but over-concentration on such parts led to an unequal evaluation of the 74.  Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, 588. 75.  Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, 585. 76.  Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, 585.

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whole. It may be that Solomonic authorship crept in as one way to avoid the problems of interpretation. Solomon was a symbol of the kind of wisdom found in the book of Proverbs, that of good, mainline, if simplistic, advice. In certain affinities Ecclesiastes shares with Proverbs, such as its use of proverbs, and even occasionally contradictory ones, a buttress for this tradition was found. Finally, to assess the efficacy of my method we may ask if consultation with early interpreters has made any difference to the argument here. On the basis of such consultation, I have been able to argue that contradiction was always an essential part of the nature of the book and did not go unrecognized by its early interpreters. By studying the concerns of the canonizers I have argued that whilst Solomon is mentioned in connection with the book, the authority that this provides is not the primary decisive factor. Rather, harmonization with the Torah was at the forefront of concern. It is also clear that the wisdom context too was there from the start, but the reasons for its classification and authority as a wisdom book shifted from the nature of the book itself to the Solomonic attribution. On the issue of the Solomonic attribution, the findings from early interpreters may be said to have led us to overemphasize this feature. Overemphasis on this perhaps shows how past concerns have tended to weigh too heavily on present conclusions, so that we might want to conclude on the efficacy of this method that it is a mixed blessing, and that sometimes misinterpretation does build upon misinterpretation. However, I think that the balance of evidence falls in favour of this approach being of value when considering issues relating to the text. The very fact that such issues were debated from earliest times and are still discussed today shows the continuity of interpretation that can be seen to exist between the past and the present despite the different methods and presuppositions of each generation.

Chapter 2 Vanity, Human Beings, and the Created World: The Dualistic Method as Applied to Ecclesiastes “Vanity of vanities, says the Qoheleth, vanity of vanities! All is vanity. What do people gain from all the toil at which they toil under the sun?” (Eccl 1:2–3). Scholarly debate has for many centuries raged over the interpretation of Qoheleth’s most characteristic phrase ‫‘ הבל הבלים‬vanity of vanities’. It is unclear precisely what Qoheleth meant by the phrase and various translations of ‫ הבל‬have been suggested.1 Closely bound up with the interpretation of ‫ הבל‬is consideration of exactly what is being referred to—at the centre of this discussion is the phrase ‫‘ תחת השמש‬under the sun’, which seems, if one takes these verses together, to delineate the scope of what “vanity” is, i.e. this earthly life,2 and consideration of what Qoheleth meant by “enjoyment.”3 Interpretations today tend to opt either for a negative or a positive evaluation of Qoheleth’s thought, but I shall suggest that, although on first sight the renunciation of the world seems a negative stance, it in fact went on to be interpreted more positively in a changing scholarly environment during the Middle Ages and up to the Reformation, and that in fact the term ‫ הבל‬holds the key to a more flexible meaning that helps us to escape from one-sided evaluations. In this chapter I wish primarily to examine the way early interpreters of the book of Ecclesiastes coped with Qoheleth’s characterization of activity “under the sun” as “vanity.” They did so by use of a method 1.  See below for the main suggestions for the translation of ‫הבל‬. It is clear that there is no one meaning of ‫ הבל‬in the book, despite its status as a kind of motto (with 34 occurrences). In this compound form in verse 2, in the superlative, an extreme of the sentiment is inferred. 2.  ‫‘ הכל‬all’ could refer to the world as a whole, or to the contents of the message, or to everything that people either say or do. However, in conjunction with “under the sun” it most likely refers in a more limited way to human earthly existence. 3.  As found in 2:24–26; 3:12–13, 22; 5:17–19; 7:14; 8:15; 9:7–10; 11:7–12:1 with the use of ‫ שמחה‬and ‫‘ שמה‬joy’ and other metaphors and idioms for joy such as eating, drinking, and being with one’s beloved.

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that is generally held in low esteem by modern interpreters—that of dualism.4 Dualism was a technique used by early interpreters of the book to overcome the seeming clash between the views of Qoheleth and accepted doctrines of their time. As the word “dual” suggests (from the Latin duo) it is an interpretation that works in binary fashion on two levels. HolmNielson5 writes of the efficacy of the dualistic method, “Whenever Koheleth inclines to unorthodoxy in his utterances about human life, orthodoxy can be saved by dualism.” The basic problem for early interpreters was that the characterization of life “under the sun” as “vanity” had to be reconciled with the perfect and good purposes of God. By means of the dualistic method, the expression “under the sun” was interpreted as “in this world.” Debate then concerned whether the “vanity” of this world meant the whole of the created order, including both humanity and the natural world, or just the activities of human beings. I shall argue that interpreters fell into these two camps. Some stressed the negative attitude of Qoheleth toward everything and reconciled this with the inherent value of everything from God by drawing a line between the heavenly and the earthly orders. They characterized the whole created order as wicked and the only positive elements as those mediated from the heavenly realm. Others wanted to stress the more positive elements within Qoheleth’s thought and emphasized the goodness of that same creation, which nevertheless humans made imperfect.6 These two stances will be seen to be represented in both Jewish and Christian tradition, the first chiefly represented by Rashi and Jerome and the second by Ibn Ezra, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Luther.

I In this section I shall consider the first of these dualistic methods— the making of a distinction between the heavenly and the earthly order, regarding the first as good and the second as evil, and the related idea that the only valuable human deeds were those mediated from heaven. We can find this distinction which was made between the activities of human beings “in this world,” i.e. for their own purposes, and those that relate to 4.  Although in the modern world of reader response, dualism is being recognized afresh as a valid type of “final form” reading with a recognizable agenda. 5.  Holm-Nielsen, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in Jewish and Christian Theology,” 80. He suggests that this (Platonic) dualism, although used in Jewish and Christian exegesis, most likely has its origins in Hellenism. 6.  In this view I am taking a different position to Holm-Nielsen who only sees the dualistic method as characterized by the first of these categories.

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the heavenly realm, i.e. for religious purposes, in the Midrash Qoheleth7. The expression “under the sun” was interpreted as in this world and for humanity’s sake, in contrast to work done for religious purposes “above the sun.” The tenth-century Jewish interpreter Saadia Gaon8 provides another example of this—“What Koheleth considers vanity has, according to Saadia, nothing to do with the work of the Creator-God, but is a purely human business, that is, it comprehends every human act that absorbs man completely without leaving room for such religious deeds as may be called work for the world to come, all that is above the sun.”9 Rashi’s commentary on Ecclesiastes provides many examples of this dualistic method.10 He refers to the whole of the created order rather than human activity alone. The created world as a totality is aligned with the wicked. For example, Rashi interprets Eccl 1:5 “and the sun rises” and verse 7 “all the rivers flow into the sea” as a comparison of the wicked to the sun, moon, and sea. Alternatively he sees “all the rivers” as referring to idolaters, fools who worship the waters believing there is something in them. The phrase “vanity of vanities” is also interpreted as referring to the creation effected in seven days. In 1:5–7 the ceaseless motion of the sun around the earth and of streams coming back to and going from the same place is related to the end of the wicked—as the sun always goes down, so the wicked too will always go down. As with the streams, the wicked go from and come back to an unholy place. This dualism brings in ideas about future judgement in the Messianic era. Rashi interprets Eccl 1:15, “What is crooked cannot be made straight,” as referring to the world to come, because in this life it is possible to improve oneself and correct one’s behaviour. He interprets “the crooked” as referring to the one who is perverted when alive who cannot correct himself when he is dead. The phrase “what is lacking” (‫ )חסרון‬he 7.  Freedman and Simon, The Midrash 8: Ecclesiastes, 71–72. 8.  Saadia ben Joseph, the Gaon, did not write a commentary on Ecclesiastes, but did write other Bible commentaries and works on the philosophy of religion from which a picture of his view of Qoheleth emerges. See discussion of his approach to Ecclesiastes in Georges Vajda, Deux commentaires Karaïtes sur l’Ecclésiaste (Études sur le Judaisme Médiéval 4; Leiden: Brill, 1971), part 1 entitled “L’Enseignement de L’Ecclésiaste vue par Saadia Gaon” (1–7). See also Samuel Rosenblatt, Saadia Gaon: The Book of Beliefs and Opinions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). 9.  Holm-Nielsen, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in Jewish and Christian Theology,” 83. 10.  Rashi, Commentary on Qoheleth in the Rabbinic Bible. This view from Rashi, expressed in an addendum, seems to be drawn from the Midrash Sifre on Deuteronomy in the interpretation of “Give ear, O heavens” (Deut 32:1). See Steven D. Fraade, From Tradition to Commentary: Torah and Its Interpretation in the Midrash Sifre to Deuteronomy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 136.

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translates “he who separated himself,” i.e. he who is separate from the righteous cannot be numbered when they have their reward. The major early Christian proponent of this kind of dualism is Jerome. Central to Jerome’s reading of Ecclesiastes11 is the view that the author’s attitude towards the present world is one of contempt and that the present world is valueless. Following Origen, he relates the books of Proverbs, Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes to the classical sciences, Proverbs relating to ethics, Song of Songs to theology, and Ecclesiastes to the physical sciences.12 So he sees Ecclesiastes as dealing with matters concerning the natural order and the physical world, but largely as they relate to human beings. Writing on 1:5–7, for example, he notes the dynamic character of natural events but sees them as metaphors of the human condition. When the author of Ecclesiastes talks of “vanity” he is referring to the natural world. In order to avoid the problem that aspersions are cast on the goodness of creation by seeing the natural world as “vanity,” he stresses that material nature is not being referred to here, rather the author’s personal perspective is revealed. The author does not question the goodness of the created world, but rather shows a personal preference for seeing it as “vanity” in comparison with the devotional piety that should be shown towards the all-important God. The created world, then, despite its goodness, is regarded by Jerome in a negative vein.13 Jerome interprets the verses on time in chapter 3 as a summary of world history and so uses this opportunity, as the Rabbis did, to discuss the significance of history. But he does not restrict himself to OT history, rather relating specific verses to events in the NT and beyond. He sees human events as being in a constant state of uncertainty, swinging between opposite poles of, for example, “birth” (selection of the nation Israel) and “death” (the exile). Each opposing couple within the catalogue of seasons is aligned with a particular event in biblical history, so that a “time to 11.  In a sense we have two readings of Ecclesiastes by Jerome, an earlier one in his own commentary and a second one in the Vulgate for which he was largely responsible. 12.  Origen, in The Song of Songs Commentary and Homilies (trans. R. P. Lawson; Westminster: Newman, 1957), spoke of the three books of Solomon which represented different stages in the spiritual life. Proverbs was for beginners and taught how to be virtuous in the world. Ecclesiastes taught humans to despise worldly things as vain and transitory. The Song of Songs, however, told of the love of God and represented his highest achievement. These three grades were likened to the schools of philosophy where students began with ethics (the moral), went on to physics (the natural), and thence to logic (the inspective). Ecclesiastes had to do with natural science—it discusses the things of nature and distinguishes between the vain and the essential. This formulation by Origen, which was more interested in the tradition than the text, was influential for later interpretations, especially medieval ones. 13.  “Accordingly, we too are similarly able to call the sky, the earth, the seas, and all things contained in this circle good in themselves; but compared to God these things are as nothing” (translation: Goodrich and Miller, St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 36).

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hate” is seen to have anticipated the crucifixion of Christ. This instability shows that the human condition is subject to unpredictable swings of fortune outside human control, so that all is vanity. In this world there is only injustice (3:16–17)—at a future time human beings will be judged fairly and, in the meantime, human beings must bear misfortune and contradiction with an eye always to the future time when God will rectify the situation and intervene in history. There is also the thought that humans may look forward to a future release from time and history in heaven—this idea springs from his exegesis of 3:21 where the spirit of man goes upward as that of the beast goes downward.14 So Jerome maintains that the author of Ecclesiastes advocates the contemptus mundi in the light of his anticipation of future divine judgement and a release from the temporal sphere. This means that this present historical realm is pro nihilo and to be held in contempt.15 This is true too of society—nothing endures, nothing in civilization has lasting value. Civic life involves endless toil and troublesome tasks that finally pass away into nothing. There is no permanent value in riches, honour or glory, as, notes Jerome, Jesus says in Luke 12:20. So civic life is of no lasting value and all human enterprises are destined ultimately towards nothingness (based initially on the question in 1:3, What “gain” from human labours?—with its expected answer “none”). Nor is civic life fair—there is a lack of social justice as the poor are oppressed. Death is to be preferred to this afflicted life. Just as the author of Ecclesiastes fluctuates at times between negative and positive evaluations, so Jerome’s commentary reflects this. In the early part of chapter 4 the author of Ecclesiastes takes a negative line towards society, but at 4:8 his argument changes and there is more positive talk about cooperation and fellowship, which are to be preferred to solitariness. Jerome tries to moderate the predominant negativity by talking of an ideal societal realm for which the author yearns—he mentions the realm of the heavenly Jerusalem when commenting on 4:2–3.16 After 4:8, however, Jerome returns to a more negative line. He concedes that concern for others in society is to be recommended, but he refuses to see the author as commending civic life, preferring to resort to the christological method of exegesis. When the author says that “two” are better than “one,” what he means by the other “one,” says Jerome, is none other than Jesus Christ: 14.  “So the sole difference between man and beasts is that the human’s spirit ascends to heaven, and the animal’s spirit descends into the ground and disintegrates with its body.” (Goodrich and Miller, St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 64) 15.  This is a view of history held in Jewish circles of the time. 16.  “For our souls, before they descend to these bodies, dwell in the upper regions and are blest for as long as they are kept among the celestial Jerusalem and the angelic choir.” (Goodrich and Miller, St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 66)

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“It is better for there to be two, side-by-side, than one, because it is better to have Christ living inside oneself than to be exposed alone to the traps of the adversary.”17 He employs the same method in 4:10 and 4:12, and in 9:13–16 concludes that it is Christ who helps people under threat from others in society who are swayed by the devil. Thus the author of Ecclesiastes becomes for Jerome an opponent of society, and he supports this by interpretations of passages such as 3:17: “I have come to hate life.” Jerome argues that the author does not find existence itself hateful, but rather the difference between life in society now and the future ideal existence beyond instils in the author a feeling of hatred. Thus Jerome balances the contempt of the author for present society with a preferred hope for departure from this life to heaven, as in his comment on Eccl 2:17.18 It is not only the civic arena that is criticized in this way, the natural world and world history also come under the contemptus mundi label. So Jerome develops a worldview for the author of Ecclesiastes that is consistent with itself and with his own interpretive principle of the contemptus mundi. The earthly realm is rejected and the heavenly one embraced. The book is thus interpreted in a way that Jerome believed made it thoroughly in line with church teaching and so useful for teaching. Jerome therefore establishes the place of Ecclesiastes in the exegetical tradition of the ancient church. Against his contemporary, Theodore of Mopsuestia,19 who questions the authority of Ecclesiastes and argues that it does not deserve a place in the biblical canon, Jerome maintains its authority. According to Theodore, not only Ecclesiastes but all the books of Solomon should be removed from Scripture because they contain human wisdom rather than divine truth.20 But Jerome translates the text to make it more accessible to his contemporaries, and then through his exegetical method brings Ecclesiastes into the fourth century. He makes it relevant to the faith and attitudes of the people of that time and so enables the text to be accepted 17.  Goodrich and Miller, St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 69. 18.  “Naturally, in comparison to paradise and the blessedness of that life, in which we will enjoy spiritual fruits and the delights of virtues, now it is as if we are in a holding pen for slaves in jail, and in a valley of tears, eating bread by the sweat of our brow.” (Goodrich and Miller, St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 52) 19.  Theodore of Mopsuestia, in the fifth century, wrote commentaries on the Old and New Testaments, only some of which survive, many of them fragmentary. He approved of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes amongst the sapiential books but rejected Job, Sirach, the Wisdom of Solomon, and the Song of Songs. He thought these books, and others from the Writings and historical books, the products of human wisdom rather than divinely inspired. Job was the work of a pagan Jew and the Song of Songs a vulgar song of love. See J.-M. Vosté, “L’Oeuvre Exégétique de Théodore de Mopsueste au IIe Concile de Constantinople,” RB 38 (1929): 542–54, notably 554. 20.  See discussion in Vosté, “L’Oeuvre Exégétique de Théodore de Mopsueste au IIe Concile de Constantinople.”

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into the exegetical tradition of the Western church. His exegesis influences many of his successors in the medieval period.21 Sometimes phrases are attributed to him; at other times dependence is clear without attribution. Amongst other early Christian interpreters Gregory of Nyssa (331– 396)22 is particularly influenced by this brand of dualism, but takes it to refer primarily to the dualism within humans between the body and the soul. In commenting on Eccl 1:9–11, Gregory begins with that which has been, which he took to refer to the original person made in the image and likeness of God. There is no remembrance of this state of happiness in which humanity was created. This is then contrasted with the present state of misery, which is a vain state, and with that which will be—the time of resurrection in which soul and body will be reunited and there will be no remembrance of the misery now suffered. He writes on 1:11, “for when our nature turned to sin, a forgetfulness of good things came upon us, but when we shall return to goodness, evils shall be buried in oblivion.”23

II Amongst early Jewish interpreters, Ibn Ezra,24 countering the views of his predecessors, wanted to assert, in accordance with Gen 1, that the works of God are good and that God cannot create that which is wholly evil. He admits that human beings are flawed but that is not because God’s works are not good but because they do not produce a good effect on all humans. This is due to the various dispositions of the recipients—the imperfection of the recipient is the cause of the evil. Astrology often accounts for differences in human nature. The devices of men are vanity; fear of God alone can make people happy and only the study of wisdom can give them that fear. Amongst early Christian interpreters, similar interpretive moves were made. So, Gregory Thaumaturgus (210–270),25 for example, with 21.  For example, Olympiodorus of Alexandria and Gregory of Sicily amongst Greek writers; and Alcuin whose Latin Commentaria super Ecclesiasten (Patrologia Latina 100; 665–772) enthuses about Jerome throughout. 22.  Gregory of Nyssa wrote numerous homilies on Ecclesiastes, but only eight are extant, covering the first three chapters of the book. See Stuart G. Hall, ed., Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on Ecclesiastes; an English version with supporting studies; proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (St. Andrews, 5–10 September, 1990) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990). 23.  Quotation from Gregory of Nyssa, Homily 1. Cited by Ginsburg, Coheleth, 101. 24.  Rabbi Abraham ben Meir Ibn Ezra (ca. 1092–1167) wrote numerous commentaries including on the Megilloth of which Qoheleth is a part. 25. Gregory Thaumaturgus, “A Metaphrase on the Book of Ecclesiastes.” I am, however, using the translation of , Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, here.

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reference to Eccl 1:2, distinguishes, by use of a wider range of Greek words to translate ‫( הבל‬e.g. ματαιοτης [most commonly used], κενος, and ανονετος), between human labour and the cycles of nature. He sees the former as vanity but not the latter, because he does not want to attribute to the Creator anything that might be called “vanity.” So in 1:2 it is human labour that is “vanity.” Another example is provided by 1:13 where Gregory departs from the idea that God has burdened human beings with “an evil task” (περισπασμος). Attributing the human plight to the Creator would not suit the orthodox, rather it is suggested that human beings have chosen their own distress: “They have given themselves over to transitory things.”26 So, Gregory makes a distinction between the affairs of men on earth and those that are heavenly. In commenting on Eccl 1:3, Gregory turns a rhetorical question posed by Qoheleth into a positive answer—there is no use in human striving because humans are striving for the transitory rather than the heavenly. He then offers an alternative—if one sees with the eyes of the soul rather than with an earthly eye one may escape this futility. The problem is that human beings are unwilling to lift themselves above futility and to discover truth. He takes the phrase “under the sun” to refer to “upon the earth.” Furthermore he spiritualizes Eccl 1:14 by paraphrasing it, “Everything down here is full of a strange, foul spirit.”27 On Eccl 1:4–7 Gregory sees the realms of humanity and nature first of all in comparative terms and then he contrasts them. So he writes, Human life is worn down day by day, and in the cycles of seasons and years, and the defined courses of the sun—there are people coming and people passing away. It is like the movement of torrents rushing with great commotion into the immense depths of the sea. The things created by God for the sake of the human race remain unchanged. For example, we come from dust and return to dust, while the earth itself goes on.28 In the first two sentences the comparison can be seen, and in the third Gregory moves on to a contrast. In the comparison, Gregory is following the original meaning of the author fairly closely but, as Jarick notes, he then “backs away from this unsettling formulation, and begins again. This 26. Gregory Thaumaturgus on Eccl 1:3. Quoted in Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, 9. 27. Gregory Thaumaturgus on Eccl 1:13. Quoted in Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, 21. 28. Gregory Thaumaturgus on Eccl 1:4. Quoted in Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, 10–11.

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time he will make it clear that there is a distinction between what God does on the one hand and what human beings do on the other hand.”29 The permanence and reliability of God contrasts with the ephemeral nature of human activity and God works on humanity’s behalf. Jarick notes that when Gregory is paraphrasing Eccl 1:5–7 he is deliberately brief— “But through such brevity the impression conveyed by Koheleth’s repetitiveness—namely the monotony of nature’s cycles, going around and around without achieving anything meaningful—is lost.”30 Gregory again offers a positive appraisal of these verses—rather than them being about the futility of the ceaseless cycles of nature, he sees their consistent order as contrasting with human beings. Gregory writes, “They do not force an overstepping of the mark, nor do they break the natural laws. It is only right that such things, which affect our lives, should be that way.”31 Again, when paraphrasing 1:9, Gregory takes the sentiment that there is nothing new, because what is done in the future has been done already in the past to refer to the activities of human beings alone. Writing on Eccl 1:8, Gregory considerably amends the meaning according to this comparison between humans and nature. Rather than human beings being unable to comment on the natural world, whether because of its pointlessness or because such knowledge is inaccessible to man, Gregory depicts human “words” as too numerous, spoken outside any limits (unlike nature, which has its carefully defined limits). They look with indiscriminate “human” eyes at what is going on rather than with the eyes of the soul. Nature provides an example to humans of how to live as God intends. This dualism leads Gregory to have a low opinion of the ability of human beings to do anything about their situation. So Qoheleth’s sentiment in 1:15 about accepting conditions as they are is changed into the need for people to recognize their fallen condition and their need for a Saviour. Luther is the greatest proponent of this second dualistic method. He claims to have found a new theme for the book of Ecclesiastes to counter the interpretations of earlier commentators. No longer is it contemptus mundi as proposed by Origen and then Jerome. This misrepresents the author’s intention entirely according to Luther. Luther decided in 1524, when he wrote an introduction to a new translation of the text of Ecclesiastes,32 that the theme “against the free will” properly defined the intention of the author. Since the human condition is deemed “vanity” 29.  Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, 11–12. 30.  Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, 13 31. Gregory Thaumaturgus on Eccl 1:7. Quoted in Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, 13. 32.  Prefatory remarks to the Deutsche Bibel.

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this suppresses the power of free will. This was related to his battle with Erasmus over this issue.33 Later, this theme drops out—by 1526 Luther was concerned to counter Jerome’s exegetical concerns and so a new title “Politica vel Oeconomia Salamonis” (The Politics and Economics of Solomon) emerges.34 Luther contends that the author principally intends to counsel his readers on how best to deal with the problems of the state or the family—i.e. on how to live most effectively in the societal realm amidst its many difficulties. He also finds this theme in Proverbs and the Song of Songs, the other Solomonic writings. His new interpretation of Ecclesiastes sanctions the civic responsibility of citizens and magistrates and confirms the involvement of God in society: for example, in Eccl 4:4 Luther finds the idea that in the face of manifold adversities a person ought not to retreat from society but ought to face its realities with confidence that God’s will is also involved. The reformers also made a decisive break with the medieval exegetical tradition, as represented by Bonaventure (see below), but without such a vociferous attack on any one of its expositors. The attack centred around the understanding of the word vanitas and the assessment of the natural world as well as human life under this heading. The reformers undermine this interpretive principle by a different assessment of vanitas. Luther found that his predecessors inappropriately define the term with reference to the created order. Luther reflects on what motives his predecessors might have had which led them to interpret the word in this way. He argues that they define vanitas in this way only in order to defend their own personal righteousness—human beings prefer to attribute vanitas to matters outside the self in order to safeguard their inner self from any threat to its sanctity. According to Luther, the self alone is within the province of vanitas in Ecclesiastes. The created realm should not be held as contemptible and vain. The word relates only to humans, in fact to the active component within the human personality—the heart—rather than to the physical human body. Whilst this is partly a dispute over linguistic usage, it is also a theological matter since it hinges upon one’s doctrine of creation. The tension of Ecclesiastes with Gen 1 and the goodness of creation had been noted by Bonaventure, who tried to say that the created realm was not vain altogether, only in part. This is overthrown by Luther and others who see the created realm only in terms of its unbounded goodness. So a much more positive doctrine of creation emerges, which the author of 33.  See E. Gordon Rupp, ed., Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969). 34.  These 27 lectures were delivered between July and November 1526, but not published until 1532 as Annotationes in Ecclesiasten.

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Ecclesiastes is seen in no way to dampen. Luther writes on the matter of enjoying life in the preface to his “Notes on Ecclesiastes”: There is nothing better for any man than to find enjoyment and make life pleasant for himself, to eat and drink and enjoy his toil, etc. He would be contradicting himself completely if he were to condemn these things themselves rather than the abuse of these things, which comes solely from the affections. Some foolish men have not understood this and have therefore taught absurd ideas about contempt for the world and flight from it, and they themselves have also done many absurd things. Thus in the Lives of the Fathers we read that there were some who did not even want to look at the sun (such men would deserve to have their eyes gouged out) and who for the sake of religion ate the filthiest of foods. The quality of such behaviour is clear enough from what has already been said. The proper contempt of the world is not that of the man who lives in solitude away from human society . . . but that of the man who lives his life in the midst of these things and yet is not carried away by his affection for them.35 Luther made a distinction between living above the world, i.e. eternal life in heaven, and living in the world “under the sun.” This enabled him to interpret 3:18, for example, with reference to what a human being sees under the sun. It is clear here that he interprets vanitas as vanity of the human heart which, rather than being quiet, creates unhappiness. That people have no profit from their labour (1:3) is not said of the labour itself, but of people’s thoughts and plans to make things work their way. The passage 3:1–11 makes it clear that everything has its fixed and ordained time in God’s plan, rather than humans being able to exercise their own free will. In the call to eat and drink, Luther saw the author calling humans to place their will under the will of God and receive the gifts God gives. Luther maintained, again in his preface, that: [T]he point and purpose of this book is to instruct us, so that with thanksgiving we may use the things that are present and the creatures of God that are generously given to us and conferred upon us by the blessing of God. This we are to do without anxiety about the things that are still in the future. The important thing is that we have a tranquil and quiet heart and a mind filled with joy, that is that we be content with the Word and work of God.36 35. Martin Luther, “Notes on Ecclesiastes,” 20:10–11. 36. Martin Luther, “Notes on Ecclesiastes,” 20:13.

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This scripture therefore supports Luther’s teaching that God’s will alone is decisive, that of humans is not free. Only when humans grasp that they do not have free will are they, in reality, free, because then they will not try to change what is ordained. They will see that to try to do so is vanity and a striving after wind. “What is crooked, cannot be made straight”—i.e. human beings cannot change the will of God. Far from escaping from the dualistic method, arguably one brand of dualism was replaced by another—a new spirit was breathed into the text at the Reformation, but the reformers still had an agenda that constrained human activity. The main difference lay in the evaluation of the physical world. Human beings on both schemes were seen as beyond redemption. Although Luther attacked the contemptus mundi doctrine of his predecessors and argued that all commentators had wrongly attributed this doctrine to the author of Ecclesiastes, hence providing a false starting point, he still advocated a certain contemptus in relation to human beings. Luther singles out Jerome by name as the one who most firmly established this interpretation, largely for the benefit of religious orders and monks, an interpretation not found in the book at all. He gives biblical authority to withdrawal from social life and responsibility, from politics and the family, towards monasticism. In fact Luther overstates Jerome’s position—Jerome does not advocate withdrawal from society or adherence to monasticism directly. In his advice to Blesilla, a young Roman woman whom he tried to persuade to lead a monastic life, he was commending following the author of Ecclesiastes in the way he regarded the present world as vain and contemptuous. For Jerome the created world is “pro nihilo” and his view of the social arena springs from that. Luther’s attack is more specifically on the monastic life and its accompanying withdrawal from social responsibility. He saw Jerome’s own ascetic lifestyle as having influenced his interpretation of the author’s purpose directly—an early identification of readerly hermeneutics! Luther, too, clearly had his own context and bias, and his rejection of contemptus mundi was largely based on his vision for human society. His emphasis, however, on human sin has been a lasting legacy.

III It is instructive to look at how this change of approach took place in the period between Jerome and Luther, first at hints of such an approach in the Rabbis, but second, more notably, in the work of Hugo of St. Victor and Bonaventure. Finally, a look at more overtly Christianized readings indicates the direction of the kind of emphasis achieved by the Reformation.

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Jewish Anticipations

It is interesting to compare the approaches of Rashi (as above) and Rashbam who, like Ibn Ezra, presupposes the view that everything in this world is seen to be made meaningless by death (Rashbam on 1:11; Ibn Ezra on 1:18).37 Rashbam, however, does not pursue such a disparaging line as Rashi concerning human inability to enjoy life. There is seen to be some comfort to be gained from enjoying life, from resigning oneself to providence and from taking further comfort in the thought of a future state which will rectify the present one. On 1:3 Rashbam advises eating, drinking, and rejoicing in this life. Death comes to all. He sees “under the sun” as being synonymous with “under heaven.” This emphasis on enjoying life is taken up in Jewish circles after Rashbam. For example, the text of Bechinoth Olam (Trial of the World) (1298–1370) asserts the utter vanity of all earthly pursuits and pleasures apart from a future life and judgement. Humanity is a prey to death, human pursuits are all vain and the only answer is to fear God and look forward to a future world. Jedaja Penini, its author, known in Christian circles as the Jewish Cicero, wrote, “I studied man, I carefully examined his nature and I found no imperfection in him, except that he is a prey to death.”38 He advises invoking wisdom, enjoying life in moderation and looking forward to the life to come. Hugo and Bonaventure

It is clear that Jerome’s commentary had a lasting influence. One long-standing influence was upon the development of ascetic and monastic ideas, which is natural since, as mentioned above, Jerome himself wrote his commentary in the specific context of trying to persuade Blesilla to lead a monastic life. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, born 333 or 340, for example, found in Ecclesiastes ample fuel for the life of celibacy and monasticism that he advocated in its deprecation of earthly pleasures. So Ambrose maintained that the purpose of the book was to emphasize the vanity of all enjoyment and to advocate an ascetic life devoted entirely to service of God.39 Even as interpreters were trying to move towards a more literal sense for interpreting the book, avoiding the excessive allegorization practiced by the church fathers, the negative overtones of the vanity theme tended to dominate. Hugo of St. Victor (1096–1140), for example, also addressing 37.  See discussion of Rashbam in Ginsburg, Coheleth, 45. 38.  Bechinoth Olam, paragraph 3. Cited by Ginsburg, Coheleth, 62. 39.  Ambrose in De Bono Mortis in particular (for example, 2:4 and 7:8 cite Ecclesiastes a number of times). See Sancti Ambrosii Opera (CSEL 32; Vindobonae: Temsky, 1896).

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a monastic audience, said of Qoheleth that “the design of this book is to persuade us to despise the world, by shewing us the vanity of all earthly things.”40 Hugo, in his concentration on the lessons to be learnt from the literal sense, ends up with a contemptus mundi approach very similar to that of Jerome.41 However, he rejects mystical and allegorical interpretations of the text, finding Qoheleth’s method of teaching straightforward and rationally argued. His principle was “Omnis scriptura secundum propriam interpretationem exposita,”42 a sound method which contrasted greatly with the interpretations of many of his contemporaries and predecessors. Smalley remarks of Hugo, “The author, he thinks, is less concerned to express mysteries than to teach contempt for worldly things by evident reason and plain persuasion.”43 The vain things are put by him into three categories, as cited by Ginsburg: things made for man, things made by man, and things made in man. In the first there is the vanity of mutability, in the second there is the vanity of curiosity, and in the third there is the vanity of mortality. The first vanity is natural and concerns the nature of worldly things—this opens up interest in metaphysics and in the natural order.44 The second is sinful because it is perverse and forward—this refers to willed human actions and the culpability of individuals. Finally, the third is penal and miserable—this refers to the human condition, notably the punishment of death under which human beings must live. Ginsburg writes, “The first is the occasion of sin, the second is sin and the third is the punishment of sin.”45 He argues that these vanities are based on the interpretation of Eccl 1:2–4 as suggestive of the author’s experience of life, and in relation to later sections of Ecclesiastes. He writes, “In chapter 1 verse 2 the vanity of mutability is maintained, which is discussed in the first part of the book (1:5–11); chapter 1, verse 3 mentions the vanity of curiosity, which is discussed in the second part (1:12–11:10) and chapter 1, verse 4 mentions the vanity of mortality, which is discussed in the third part of the book (chapter 12:1–14).”46 This scheme of the triplex vanitas is Hugo’s distinctive contribution. The first vanity is significant as it spawns a new interest in the following centuries in naturalistic exegesis, i.e. a positive 40.  Hugo of St. Victor, Homilies (PL 175; 113–256), here 113–15. Cited in Ginsburg, Coheleth, 107. 41.  Hugo omitted from his homilies on the text any mention of the exegetical study of Jerome, wishing to disassociate himself from his predecessor. 42.  “All scripture explained according to its proper translation.” 43.  Roland E. Murphy, ed., Medieval Exegesis of Wisdom Literature: Essays by B. Smalley (Atlanta: Scholars, 1986), 3. 44.  Already anticipated in Origen’s approach to Ecclesiastes. 45.  Ginsburg, Coheleth, 107. 46.  Ginsburg, Coheleth, 107.

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interest in nature and metaphysics, which starts to make an impact upon medieval biblical exegesis, and on the understanding of the word vanitas. This relates to the more positive view of the world seen above, but with an emphasis still on the depravity of the human condition. Jerome’s commentary is widely cited by those commentating on Ecclesiastes in the thirteenth century. Perhaps the most famous such commentator was Bonaventure, whose Ecclesiastes commentary is detailed and sound and was long remembered by his successors.47 Holm-Nielsen writes of Bonaventure, “All that appeared in earlier works on Ecclesiastes, back to Hieronymus, is here systematized logically and almost impenetrably.”48 Bonaventure follows more in the tradition of Hugo than of Jerome, although he does reproduce the prefatory comments of Jerome and provides a discussion of them for his readers, arguing that it is not so much contempt of the world that the author is advocating but contempt of the present. The author of Ecclesiastes, Bonaventure argues, is thus oriented towards the mystical life of the future time and the greater participation in divine reality that will then occur. So Bonaventure also maintains that “this book describes the vanity of earthly things, to teach thereby contempt for the world” but he propounds this view in a more speculative manner. On the designation “vanity” for the created order, Bonaventure responds that the creatures of God which God pronounced “very good” (Gen 1:31) are not called vain because they are lacking in goodness but because they are wanting in unchangeableness. Therefore, although everything is vanity, it has some reality and goodness. The problem is that the world yields no permanent support. God alone possesses intransmutable repose and true life and happiness can therefore only be found in him. Thus his emphasis is on the transience of life that renders it a shadow of the future life with God. Bonaventure’s exposition of Ecclesiastes, notes Smalley,49 became a “standard aid” in the study of the text soon after its preparation and is widely cited, often without explicit acknowledgement, during the succeeding centuries. Its renown superseded that of Jerome’s work. It was Bonaventure’s only OT commentary, written in 1251 as lectures for 47. Saint Bonaventure, Commentary on Ecclesiastes (translation and notes by Campion Murray and Robert J. Karris; Works of St Bonaventure V/7; New York: Franciscan Institute, St Bonaventure University, 2005). 48.  Holm-Nielsen, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in Jewish and Christian Theology,” 85. 49.  See the detailed discussion of Bonaventure’s approach to Ecclesiastes in Roland E. Murphy, ed., Medieval Exegesis of Wisdom Literature: Essays by B. Smalley, 39–46. Smalley particularly emphasizes Bonaventure’s debt to his immediate predecessors, e.g. Hugh of St. Cher, in the interpretation of the book.

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theological students at the University of Paris. Unlike former commentaries, its context is not the cloistered religious life, but a fresh perspective for students. He interprets Ecclesiastes with explicit concern for the metaphysical truths about the natural order (or res) that are disclosed within the text. He follows Hugo’s tripartite interpretation of vanitas and with only minimal variation he reproduces and expands upon Hugo’s tripartite scheme. He gives great praise to Hugo and it may well be that he considered his own exegetical effort to be a furtherance of Hugo’s only partial study of Ecclesiastes (which ended at 4:8 and was less rigorous and scholarly than Bonaventure’s). In particular he takes further Hugo’s first vanitas, the natural world—vanitas mutabilitatis. For Bonaventure this assumes a more specific content relative to ancient natural philosophy, notably Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, and hence assumes a more explicit metaphysical significance. More than a category that simply describes the mutable world order in contrast to eternity, the term is given more specific content relative to ancient natural philosophy and classical teachings about the nature of the world order. Bonaventure also picks up Hugo’s idea of finding the triplex vanitas in the entire text, although he does not base it on 1:2–4 but on the work as a whole. So he applies the primary category of vanitas mutabilitatis to 1:3–3:15 inclusive, the second category of vanitas culpae from 3:13–7:23, and the third, vanitas poenalitatis, from 7:24–12:7. It is in the exegesis of 1:3–3:15 that Bonaventure makes his most important contribution, by giving vanitas explicit metaphysical significance. In his interpretation of 1:5, for example, he finds support for the argument that vanitas is evidenced in the natural order from the ceaseless motion of the sun; on 1:6, the pattern of the wind discloses the mutability and vanity within the natural order. The relationship to Aristotle is brought out when Bonaventure claims that in his Meteorics Aristotle discussed the identical natural phenomenon, i.e. the motion of air or wind. A Christological Perspective

Another set of responses to the view of both the created world and humanity within it as “vanity” in a more negative sense, according to Jerome’s scheme, came from church fathers and others within the Christian church who adopted an overt christological interpretation. Jerome too favoured a “spiritual” interpretation of Ecclesiastes that pertained specifically to the personage of Jesus,50 but he combines that with a concern for the “literal sense” that prevents him from higher flights of Christianized 50.  For example, on Eccl 1:1 Jerome comments that whilst Solomon is literally the “son of David,” Jesus too, on a spiritual level, is “son of David . . . noster Ecclesiastes.”

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fancy. These commentators were influenced by Jerome’s Vulgate translation but sought to overcome the devaluation of the world and human life within it by a comparison with the Christian hope. As Holm-Nielsen writes: Through the Vulgate’s translation a new Koheleth, different from the original Old Testament Koheleth was created. By a Christian dualistic understanding, stressing the ethical and eschatological aspects, the original scripture was betrayed, and a text which, even in its seemingly controversial expressions, was in conformity with the orthodox ethical and theological conceptions was established. In a way Hieronymus was not responsible since he was only a follower of a tradition. But he became the one who confirmed it.51 There was some of this in Jerome himself, for example he explains the commendation of eating and drinking with reference to partaking of the Lord’s supper. An example is Philastrius, bishop of Brescia in around 380, who wrote a catalogue of heretics and heresies, and who rejected Jerome’s view that the book of Ecclesiastes encourages the rejection of earthly pleasure, regarding such a doctrine as contrary to the goodness and beneficence of the Creator. He presented the view of certain heretics that Ecclesiastes is to be rejected as canonical because it says that all is vanity and that everyone should eat, drink, and indulge in pleasure. In reply he objected that the description of the people of God as vain is only “in comparison with the future glory of believers in Christ.”52 He also interpreted the eating and drinking recommended by Qoheleth as referring to spiritual food, the sacrament of the Lord’s supper. Perhaps the most famous example is Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (b. 354), who finds Christian allegorical interpretations for many aspects of the book. Indeed he finds the whole purpose of the writing of the book as a Christian one. He writes, “Having discovered the vanity of this world, the wisest of men wrote the whole of this book for nothing else but that we might discern that life which is not vanity under the sun, but real under Him who made the sun.”53 He too interprets eating and drinking in reference to the Lord’s Supper. On 2:24 he comments: 51.  Holm-Nielsen, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in Jewish and Christian Theology,” 78. 52.  Philastrius, Bishop of Brescia. Cited in Ginsburg, Coheleth, 103. 53.  Augustine, De civitate Dei, 20:c 3. See Patrick G. Walsh, ed., De civitate Dei/Augustine (Oxford: Oxbow, 2005).

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Chapter 2 We cannot understand this better than as referring to the partaking of that table, which our Priest after the order of Melchizedeck has instituted for us in the New Testament. For this sacrifice succeeded all the Old Testament sacrifices which were only shadows of good things to come; as we hear our Saviour speaking prophetically in the fortieth Psalm, “Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire, but a body has thou prepared me.” For his body is offered and sacrificed now, instead of all other offerings and sacrifices. That Ecclesiastes cannot mean by eating and drinking, which he so often recommends, carnal pleasure, is sufficiently evident from the passage, where he says, “it is better to go into the house of mourning than to the house of feasting.54

There is an interesting use of contradictions in Qoheleth’s thought here by using one passage to counteract another. There is also use of a psalm perceived as the words of Christ. But for my argument here, these examples show an unease with interpreting Ecclesiastes purely on a human or worldly level, preferring to interpret it in reference to Christ or a future life. Eating and drinking is clearly related to God and to Jesus in this Christianized scheme, and yet, this is itself an interesting forerunner of interpretations from recent times that have sought to stress the positive aspect of Qoheleth’s thought, focusing on these very passages. The idea that true enjoyment comes from God and so gives true meaning to life is taken up in modern discussion, for example, most vociferously by Lee.55 However, there is a danger that an overemphasis on this aspect will displace the crucial balance between positive and negative that seems to characterize the book and makes the contradiction in Qoheleth’s thought start to fade.

IV It is easy to condemn the perpetrators of the dualistic method of being misguided in their interpretations that appear to denigrate humanity, society, and the created world, but a fresh look at their starting point may shed light on modern possibilities. It is clear that the interpretation of ‫הבל הבלים‬, which influenced these early interpreters, was chiefly an understanding of ephemerality and fleetingness rather than the range of meanings around pointlessness and absurdity that are often aired. Whilst this serviced a contemptus mundi, which sounds foreign to modern ears, I sug54.  Augustine, De civitate Dei, 17:c 20. 55.  Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric.

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gest that an appreciation of this interpretation of ‫ הבל‬may help us appreciate afresh the essential tension in the message of the book. Let us briefly pause to look at possible translations of ‫הבל‬. There are three main suggestions: a) breath; b) nothingness, illusion, delusion; or, c) a more abstract sense of transitoriness, futility (often used to deride idolatry).56 The Greek in the LXX is ματαιοτης meaning ‘vanity, foolishness, transitoriness’,57 and the Latin in the Vulgate, vanitas ‘futility, emptiness’. The Greek adds an ethical meaning to the word, whilst the Latin has given rise to the most common English translation of “vanity” which has in many ways led to a more negative connotation than the Hebrew expression demands. Arguably the Hebrew commends a more neutral translation. Ephemerality is a fact—stressing it is a form of realism rather than pessimism. It is a neutral rather than a negative term. Seow’s “beyond mortal grasp” is a useful neutral definition.58 Lee, unsurprisingly, interprets ‫ הבל‬in a positive way in keeping with his “joyful” reading of the book. Jerome decided, in relation to both Hebrew and Greek, that vanitas (1:2) in context means something perishable rather than something that is ethically worthless. Even in his seemingly more negative scheme he regards vanity as about fleetingness rather than worthlessness. Elias of Crete (c. 787) is an example of another interpreter who takes up the meaning of vanitas as ephemerality when he writes: Ecclesiastes advises us not to waste our admiration on any of the things here below, since all things in nature end in vanity; no remains are left of them when they go. Just as they who write upon the water, though they labour to form signs of letters upon the aqueous element, leave no impression behind, so is every earthly pleasure, for no sooner is the act over than the pleasure is gone, and leaves no trace behind.59 Another interpreter, Salonius, Bishop of Geneva (c. 440), in his interpretation of Eccl 1:2 asks how Ecclesiastes can say this when it is said in Genesis that the creation is good. The answer given is that the created order is good but compared to God it is nothing, because God is eternal and the 56.  The literature on this is vast. This discussion is had in every commentary ever written on Ecclesiastes and in a large corpus of articles. See Michael V. Fox, “The Meaning of hebel for Qohelet,” JBL 105/3 (1986): 409–27. 57.  Note Aquila’s use of Greek ατνις ‘breath, wind’. 58. Choon-Leong Seow, “Beyond Mortal Grasp: The Usage of hebel in Ecclesiastes,” ABR 48 (2000): 1–16. 59.  Elias of Crete, Opera Gregory Nazianzen (Paris: Gabalda, 1630), 575.

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creation is ephemeral, as proved by 2 Cor 4:18. Vanitas here is interpreted as mutability.

V In conclusion, the tendency of these past interpreters is to see “vanity of vanities” in Ecclesiastes as referring to ephemerality. Although it spawned a negative attitude to worldly matters on two different dualistic levels, it gradually moved from negative to positive, arguably too much so in some of the more Christianized readings. Study of these ancient interpreters ultimately helps us to appreciate the complexity and nuance of the author’s own message, which was arguably more neutral than interpreters on both positive and negative sides of the debate have allowed.

P art 2

Modern Interpretations There is an almost infinite number of different types of interpretation of texts. In this part I am giving only a sample of these to show how those who employ various approaches might interpret particular texts. This choice reflects my own interests as a reader of this book. This could have been a much longer volume with many more examples, but I believe this sample is sufficient to point the way towards developing an awareness of the weight of readerly presuppositions upon textual interpretation and opening the door to further examples of both readerly bias and readerly insight. My finding here is that different “readings” from different advocacy positions actually illuminate the meaning of particular texts within Ecclesiastes rather than necessarily the whole. It is often a weakness of such readings that, once acknowledged, they tend to be applied to the whole book. This often leads to a straining of interpretation as square pegs are attempted to be placed into round holes. So I have attempted to show in what follows how certain passages are particularly illuminated by particular methods or readings. I pursue first an ecological reading, followed by a related reading from animal theology. The first focuses on Eccl 1:3–11 and 11:3–5, and touches on 3:1–8, 12:1–7, and 3:18–21. It is 3:18–21 that is then taken up in the context of a discussion of the role of animal theology and the evaluation of the “breath” of life. Chapter 5 evaluates Eccl 4:1–3 and 5:8–9 in the context of either liberationist or postcolonial readings, and chapter 6 focuses on the infamous 7:23–8:1 in the context of feminist interpretation of texts.

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Chapter 3 The Cycle of Life in Ecclesiastes: An Ecological Reading The wisdom literature of the OT is often thought of as being the most anthropocentric part of the literature, with its emphasis on what can be known of life and its patterns from a human rather than a divine angle. Whilst mention of God may be more rare than in some of the more historical or liturgical sections of the OT, there is nonetheless an important divine dimension within this literature, “the fear of God” being the beginning of knowledge (Prov 1:7) and God being essentially portrayed as Creator.1 However, there is a third element that forms a triad of interrelationship and that is with the earth in the broadest sense—the created order, the natural world, animals and plants. In recent years, and largely through the efforts of the Earth Bible project2 and the ecological hermeneutics seminar,3 scholars have learnt to appreciate more fully this crucial nexus of God/humanity/earth. Work has been done within the wisdom literature that has brought to light the important place of imagery from the natural world, animal imagery,4 and the emphasis on creation.5 It has mainly, however, focused on Proverbs and Job, which are more fruitful texts than Ecclesiastes for such an emphasis. The book of Job, particularly in the poem on wisdom in chapter 28 and most notably in the animal-rich God speeches, has found a significant place in these discussions.6 The book Author’s note:  This chapter is a reworked version of an article of the same name in VT 59 (2009): 181–89. 1.  See discussion in Katharine J. Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapter 4. 2. Norman C. Habel, ed., The Earth Bible (5 vols.; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000–2). 3.  SBL Ecological Hermeneutics Section, which began in 2003 and is still ongoing. 4.  See Katharine J. Dell, “The Use of Animal Imagery in the Psalms and Wisdom Literature of Ancient Israel,” SJT 53/3 (2000): 275–91. 5.  See Leo G. Perdue, Wisdom and Creation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994). 6.  See Katharine J. Dell, “Plumbing the Depths of Earth: Job 28 and Deep Ecology,” in The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions (ed. Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst; The Earth Bible, Vol. 3; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001), 116–25.

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of Ecclesiastes has been touched upon from such an angle, notably by van Heerden, in the Earth Bible series.7 However, perhaps more than any of the other main wisdom books, Ecclesiastes has been seen as particularly anthropocentric, with a preoccupation with the meaning (or lack thereof) of human life, work, and death. The frequency of the use of “man” (‫)אדם‬ to refer to humankind in general is an indicator of this emphasis. And yet, as I shall argue in this chapter, “man” in Ecclesiastes should rightly be seen as part of a wider cycle of life in all its diversity overseen by the godhead. In this sense Ecclesiastes maintains the threefold interrelationship of divine, human, and earth that has been found to characterize other parts of the wisdom literature. The ecological approach is, I would argue, of value on two levels. It is an advocacy reading enabling texts to be read through a particular lens and thus applied to modern contexts. Even though the biblical authors were unlikely to have been aware of such issues, we can appreciate aspects of biblical texts that are particularly drawn out by this approach. Second, there is a contribution to the meaning of the text itself, because the emphasis has helped to put ideas such as God as Creator, the relationship of human beings to the land and the nature of the biblical interaction with the natural world to the forefront of concern. This means that a fresh evaluation of the importance of these factors in their original context is achieved. There are aspects of the original vision and import of the text that have arguably been overlooked and are drawn out by this approach. I have cited before8 a paradigm from “deep ecology” by Devall and Sessions which can be applied to biblical texts. The essential point is the triangle of God, nature, and humanity that provides a model for handling texts from an ecological angle. Three essential ecological principles are involved here: the first is the idea of nature’s complex interrelated processes and the interaction of human beings with these processes and with each other. In biblical studies the God dimension is also usefully brought into this picture in that religious texts witness to a three-way rather than a two-way interaction. The second is the principle of the well-being and flourishing of both human and non-human life in its richness and diversity. This includes a sense of awe at the wonders of the created world and a recognition of nature’s essential goodness. The third is the principle of the sustaining of life as an ongoing activity—God did not only create as a 7.  Willie van Heerden, “Ecclesiastes 3:16–22: An Ecojustice Reading, with Parallels from African Wisdom,” in The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions (ed. Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst; The Earth Bible, Vol. 3; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001), 155–67. 8. Katharine J. Dell, “Green Ideas in the Wisdom Tradition,” SJT 47/4 (1994), 423–51.

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once-for-all activity, but he also maintains and sustains all life. God is not a part of nature; rather God is separate from his created world but essentially integrated with it.9 I read Eccl 1:4–9, as discussed below, as an example of this first principle of interaction in that the passage gives us an insight into nature’s own complex interrelated processes in its description of the cycles of sun, moon and wind. The human comparison comes in verse 4 with the mention of human generations in contrast to the earth’s permanence. I read Eccl 3:18–21 as belonging to the second category with its awe at the processes of life and death, albeit in a cynical vein; see below and the next chapter. Reading Ecclesiastes from an ecological perspective is not a path that many commentators have taken. Part of the aim of this hermeneutic is to hear the voice of the earth in the text and draw out the emphasis on the non-human within its pages. Even within a seemingly anthropocentric book like Ecclesiastes I will argue that there are some fruitful findings to be made. I will also argue for a rather more positive reading than the recurrence of the “vanity” theme has suggested to scholars. Whilst I might not go so far as Whybray10 in calling Qoheleth, the author, a “preacher of joy,” I do believe that at times, and often when considering nature’s gifts, he has moments of optimism that contrast with his more pessimistic moments. I want to begin by considering a passage near the beginning of Ecclesiastes, in the prologue section. Scholars have debated whether this section is authentic to the main author, largely because of the second introduction in 1:12,11 and I will assume that it is. Whilst verses 1–3 of chapter 1 can be regarded as introductory, first presenting the speaker in his royal persona and launching the main vanity theme that will dominate the author’s perspective on life in verses 1–2, and then introducing the theme of human gain through work in verse 3,12 verses 4–7 form a distinct unit in that the subject matter deals with the earth in verse 4 and cyclical weather patterns in verses 5–7. These verses have been the subject of much scholarly discussion and hence need some unpacking, but it is my contention that this passage is central to an understanding of the author’s view of the created 9.  See fuller discussion with examples from the wisdom literature in Katharine J. Dell, “The Significance of the Wisdom Tradition in the Ecological Debate,” Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives (eds. David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, London: T. & T. Clark, 2010), 56–69. 10.  R. Norman Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 23 (1982): 87–98. 11.  Fox, “Frame Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qohelet.” 12. Verse 3 is arguably a bridging verse both linking up with the introduction and forming the opening of 1:3–11. The parallelism with verse 11 supports this view.

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world, in which human life has its context and that its placing in the prologue is deliberately designed to highlight that emphasis at the start of the book. It is then important to consider these verses within the wider unit of 1:3–11, as I will do. The text reads (in the nrsv translation): A generation goes and a generation comes, but the earth remains forever. 5 The sun rises and the sun goes down, and hurries to the place where it rises. 6 The wind blows to the south, and goes around to the north; round and round goes the wind and on its circuits the wind returns. 7 All streams run to the sea, but the sea is not full; to the place where the streams flow, there they continue to flow. 4

Verse 4 seems to set the tone for thinking that this passage is about generations (‫ )דור‬of human beings who come and go in comparison with the permanence of the earth (‫)הארץ‬. Fox has suggested that the reference to the earth is also to be taken in a human sense, i.e. “le monde,” referring to the permanence of human occupation of the earth.13 He is responding to an article by Ogden14 who states virtually the opposite, that in fact the “generations” are not simply human generations, but have a wider reference to all living beings and that the earth refers to the natural world. He argues that there is not a human/natural world contrast here, rather the permanence of the cycle of generation following generation is stressed in parallel with the stability of the earth. Wilson15 airs both suggestions and posits that it is in the very ambiguity of the reference that the key to this passage lies. If one takes Ogden’s line, this would take the human element not only out of this verse, but also out of its relativizing position in influencing our interpretation of the next verses. If it is simply a comment on the permanence of the earth and yet of cycles of life, human, plant and animal, within that permanence, then, in my view, it fits better with the verses to come. Verse 5 seems more straightforward with a description of the movement of the sun in a cycle of rising (‫ )זרח‬and going down (‫)בא‬. This reveals 13.  Michael V. Fox, “Qohelet 1:4,” JSOT 40 (1988): 109. 14. Graham Ogden, “The interpretation of ‫ דור‬in Ecclesiastes 1:4,” JSOT 34 (1986): 91–92. 15. Lindsay Wilson, “Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1:1–11: A Wisdom Technique?,” in Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom (ed. Antoon Schoors; BETL 136; Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 1998), 357–65.

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the worldview of the time, that the earth was flat and that during the night the sun is hidden, but nevertheless has to make its way back to the place of morning rising. It is the next verse that has proved more of a conundrum in relation to verse 5 in that it has been suggested that the reference is not to the wind as a separate entity in verse 6, but in fact it is a continuation of the description of the sun going around on its circuits. Japhet airs this point in her article, citing traditional Jewish exegesis.16 Whilst this is an interesting suggestion, I fail to be convinced by the reinterpretation of “wind” (‫ )רוח‬that it requires;17 I believe that the nrsv translation gets closer to the meaning of the original. “Round and round” (‫)סובב סבב‬ has been seen to denote pointless movement, but it can in fact be seen as purposeful movement from one axis to another. Again the circular motion returning (‫ )שב‬back to a place where it has been before is posited for the wind—it is a cyclical motion rather than a linear one. And then in verse 7 we encounter the reference to streams running into the sea, which has generated much discussion. The problem is in the second half of the verse and there are two main possibilities—either the sea is simply absorbing the streams as they continue to flow (as nrsv) or, as Min18 argues, the sense is cyclical in that the streams flow back to their source in order to flow again (cf. Job 36:27–28). This latter sense would seem to be more in keeping with the cyclical view pursued in the previous two verses, so Min translates “To the source from which the rivers come, there they flow to run again.”19 Moving on to consider the rest of the unit, in verse 8 there seems to be a gear change with the sentiment that all things (or words, ‫ )הדברים‬are 16. Sara Japhet, “‘Goes to the South and Turns to the North’ (Ecclesiastes 1:6): The Sources and History of the Exegetical Traditions,” JSQ 1 (1993/4), 289–322. Japhet appeals to Jewish exegesis as found in the Tosefta, the Palestinian Talmud, and the Babylonian Talmud (BT), which regards Eccl 1:5–6 as a definition of the path of the sun in the four directions of the compass (“round and round” [‫ ]סובב סבב‬and “goes” [‫ ]הולך‬being seen to refer to “the eastern and western horizons, along which it [the sun] sometimes goes and sometimes turns about” [BT]). 17.  Japhet, “‘Goes to the South and Turns to the North’,” 297–300, cites targumic reinterpretation of ‫ הרוח‬to mean “side.” 18. Y.-J. Min, “How Do the Rivers Flow? (Ecclesiastes 1:7),” BT 42/2 (1991): 226–31. 19.  Min notes that the particle ‫ׁש‬ ֶ can mean either “to which” or “from which,” each being equally possible. If it is taken to mean the former, both the phrase “to the place” (‫אֶל־‬ ‫)מקֹום‬ ְ and “there” (‫)ׁשם‬ ָ indicate “to the sea.” If the latter, both the phrase “to the place” and the adverb “there” indicate the source where the rivers began. He decides on the latter path in light of other concerns such as the parallelism of “the place” and “there” and the cyclical meaning of ‫ׁש ִבים‬ ָ ‫( ָל ָלכֶת‬see discussion in Min, “How Do the Rivers Flow? (Ecclesiastes 1:7),” 228). Min recognizes the problem that we know that waters do not flow backward from the sea to the water source, but posits that the author of Ecclesiastes may have understood evaporation of water into the air which then falls as rain at the source of the water (as propounded by Ibn Ezra in relation to this passage).

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meaningless—back to the human domain of expression. However, the reference to eye and ear, whilst naturally taken to refer to human body parts, could also be read more broadly in reference to animal eye and ear too. Is the sense here that seeing and hearing are not enough to provide satisfaction, or is there a note of wonder that there is so much to see and hear and by inference learn about (as with the mysterious cycles of nature in verses 5–7) that one is never satisfied? The former meaning would seem to follow from the “wearisome” (‫ )יגעים‬dictum in the first half of the verse, but if one takes the two halves of the verse as separate references, verse 8a to human communication and verse 8b to the eyes and ears of all living things, other possibilities open up. The juxtaposition of “wearisome” after the description of the cycles of the elements seems also to relativize them, indicating that there is something endless and indeed pointless about cycles. But verse 4 (“the earth remains forever”) suggests that it is in the context of permanence that they are to be understood—they are at the heart of the order that God has implanted in the world through nature. Cycles are the rhythm of nature, be it the cycle of life and death or the path of the sun, wind, and seas. Verse 9 expresses the thought that there is “nothing new under the sun” and this is in a sense an extension of the cycle idea—it is in the nature of cycles that the same things come around again even if the period of the cycle is quite a long time. Verse 10 continues that thought and there is no necessary reference to human activity specifically—the reference, as in verse 9, can incorporate human and non-human. It is only in verse 11 that the text returns to the human perspective with which the prologue began in verse 3 (a deliberate inclusio perhaps?). Although God is not specifically mentioned in this passage, there is a sense of the divine lingering behind the cycles of the natural world. This emphasis is brought out more clearly in 11:3–5, where there is another airing of the predictability of nature’s different moods. The text reads (nrsv): When clouds are full, they empty rain on the earth. Whether a tree falls to the south or to the north, in the place where the tree falls, there it will lie. 4 Whoever observes the wind will not sow; and whoever regards the clouds will not reap. 5 Just as you do not know how the breath comes to the bones in the mother’s womb, so you do not know the work of God, who makes everything. 3

It is a fact of the cycle of nature that clouds full of rain will empty onto the earth and it is also inevitable that a tree will fall in one direction or another

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and then it will stay put where it lies. It is also true that any savvy farmer will not sow and reap in wind and rain. It is also a fact that an embryo becomes an independent, living human being with the gulp of first breath. However, the emphasis here is slightly different to the former passage in that there is an element of all this that human beings do not know. Human beings assume that clouds will bring rain and yet no one can know the precise moment at which the cloud will burst and the rain fall. Further, no one knows which way a tree will fall even though it is certain that it will do so. Whilst knowledgeable farmers will most likely read the weather wisely, there seems to be an element here of over-conscientiousness that might lead the farmer to do nothing because of the uncertainty of the timing of the natural processes, and whilst there is a sense of wonder at the process of childbirth and the gift of life, there is an uncertainty about when and how that breath will come—and perhaps the verse also reflects the lack of knowledge about such processes of the time. It is all described as the work of God (‫ )האלהים‬and this is in a sense the climax of the passage—God knows the cycles of life and decides the time that they will come into effect. There is a dynamic here between the divine and the natural world, including humanity, in verse 5. The interaction between the three elements of God/humans and the earth is very clear in this passage. There is an echo of this passage and of 1:4–7 in 12:2 in the reference to “before the sun and the light and the moon and the stars are darkened and the clouds return with the rain.”20 Here it is in the context of the description of human old age which is itself in an inevitable cycle of youth to old age, but again it is interesting that even if these references are metaphorical and can be seen to have a double reference, they echo the previous emphasis on the cycle of life in the broader sense. There are also references in 12:5 to the almond tree (‫ )השקד‬and the grasshopper (‫—)החגב‬elements from the natural world are used to describe the colour of the hair and the dragging of the legs respectively, adding a richness to the description here in the use of this everyday imagery. This emphasis on God holding the key to the cycles of life and the time at which things occur is also found in the poem on time in 3:1–8. This poem has been seen to refer solely to human life and indeed most of the elements of it do so, but particularly the first verse (“a time to be born and a time to die”) could be seen to have a wider reference to the animal and plant world, and thus some interaction between human and non-human could be found in this poem. This leads us on to consider 20.  Cf. the contrast in the description of the sun darkening (at the end of life?), with light being sweet in 11:7 (a reference to youth?).

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whether animal imagery or wider imagery of gifts of the natural world plays any significant role in the book. Is it simply used for illustration of human activity? One might think that illustration of human activity was the main role of reference to a wider natural world. The description of planting vineyards, gardens and parks, fruit trees and pools to water the forest of growing trees in 2:4–6 is in the context of the Solomonic persona (in the royal autobiography section of 1:12–2:26) aiming to cheer himself up in a display of his wealth. The possession of herds and flocks too in verse 7 seems to have the same purpose. And yet it is interesting that such a planting of gardens has this cheering effect on humans—it shows again the essential interaction between humans and the world around them. The description suggests lushness and the giving of pleasure—the richness of what the natural world has to offer is emphasized here. This is echoed in 3:2, “a time to plant and a time to pluck up what is planted.” Although it is human activity that is of primary concern, it is the action of planting, and hence preserving the future environment, that is described as also a part of God’s “times.” Perhaps the most famous passage in Ecclesiastes that draws a contrast between human and animals is 3:18–21. The text reads (nrsv): 18 I said in my heart with regard to human beings that God is testing them to show that they are but animals. 19 For the fate of humans and of animals is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage over the animals, for all is vanity. 20 All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all turn to dust again. 21 Who knows whether the human spirit goes upward and the spirit of animals goes downward to the earth?

As I will discuss in the next chapter, this passage has traditionally been interpreted in a dualistic fashion, seen to assert the supremacy of human over animal.21 A test to show that human beings are “but animals” sounds disparaging of animals (perhaps a better translation would be “like the animals,” so niv) and although the statement is that in death they are the same, the question raised is whether the human spirit (or breath, ‫ )רוח‬goes up and the animal spirit down.22 In fact, whilst a contrast is drawn between 21.  Greek influence led to a soul/body dualism being read into this passage, in turn influenced by the use of πνευμα for certain instances of ‫ רוח‬in the LXX. 22.  Early Jewish writers interpreted Eccl 3:21 in relation to righteous and evil people. The spirit of man ascending was seen to refer to the righteous and that of the animal descend-

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human and animal here, the thrust of the passage is to state that these are matters which are beyond human ability to discover and, in any case, in the fact that all will die there is no difference—the cycle of birth and death is the same for all. All come from and return to dust in a cyclical pattern. Furthermore, the very fact of a rhetorical question in verse 20 suggests the answer “no one”—again this is the realm of God and remains a mystery. The essential interaction between the divine/human and natural worlds comes to the forefront again here. Interestingly, in Eccl 12:7, at the end of the poem on old age, which as was seen earlier reflects the cycle of human life and uses natural imagery, there is the comment (in verse 7) that “the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the breath returns to God who gave it.” Again there is the “returning” (‫ )שוב‬theme—of dust to earth (in death) and the spirit/breath (‫ )רוח‬to God (echoing 3:19–20), and the cycle of life comes around again. This rounds off the main section, accompanied by the vanity theme (forming an inclusio with 1:2), before the epilogue, which is arguably from another hand, begins.23 It has been seen then that an emphasis on the cycle of life as controlled by God but experienced by human beings and by the cycles in the natural world are an important theme of this short book. There is a positive aspect to the simple description of the interaction with the natural world that cheers the human spirit. There is a richness to the use of animal and plant imagery that shows the book to be grounded in the context of an appreciation of the gifts of the earth. The author displays an understanding of the cyclical character of life, from planetary elements, to the weather, to human life and death and there is an appreciation of the circularity of the process. The earth and its abundance can be appreciated afresh by each generation—there is a permanence about it that does not really change despite seeming to, and the Creator himself is behind the process, holding the key to the mystery of life itself. The ecological method here draws out aspects of the meaning of the text in both its original context and in the modern debate. The method is thus functioning on the two levels I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and the “reader-response” approach is able also to lend interpretive insight to fundamental theological concerns of the texts from its inception onwards. ing to refer to the wicked. This reading was clearly a product of taking 3:21 in the wider context of 3:16–21, where verses 16–17 concern a comparison between the righteous and the wicked. This is an interesting anthropomorphization of the animal element in the passage. 23.  There is general scholarly agreement about the secondary nature of the epilogue. See chapter 1 and discussions in Sheppard, “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary”; and Wilson, “The Words of the Wise: The Intent and Significance of Qoheleth 12:9–14.”

Chapter 4 Animal Theology and the Direction of the ‫רוח‬ I would like to develop two more points regarding the animal/human relationship in this chapter. The first is about method. Whilst concern for animals inevitably comes under the environmental/ecological heading, one could equally apply a method that centres on animal theology and is hence more a specialized “angle” on both ethical stances towards animals and the text itself. The second is consideration of the tension that emerges from the two texts, Eccl 3:18–21 and 12:7, placed in juxtaposition to one another, on the question of the life to come, be it for animals or human beings.

1.  Animal theology Renewed modern interest in Eccl 3:18–21 and 12:7 then may well emerge from an “animal” perspective. Animal theology has the agenda of equality between humans and the created world, especially sentient beings that feel pain. Questions are asked by proponents of this method1 such as: What price should we put on the life of an animal, especially in relation to our valuation of human life? Furthermore, to raise the question that Ecclesiastes also airs, is there any qualitative difference between the spirits of humans and animals? If so, where does this lead us from a moral angle in relation to our treatment of animals in life and if and when they suffer and die? To affirm the place of this “method within a method” is to draw out the subjective nature of the methodology issue, but also to flag up that a debate may take on a new importance in the light of a more nuanced and particular method. The question of the “equality” of animals with human beings and that of whether their “spirit” has the same fate takes on a new importance in this hermeneutic. There is in the wider wisdom literature, notably Job, the idea that animals may well have something to teach to humans, e.g. Job 12:7–9: “But ask the animals and they will teach you; the birds of the air, and they will tell you . . ..” Often animals witness to God and even describe his oth1.  For example, Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (London: SCM, 1994).

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erness, e.g. Job 38–40 in the description of wild animals outside human control but in God’s vision for his created world.2 This indicates that the animal world and the use of animal imagery is a keynote of this literature.3 I have already noted the small but significant use made of this imagery by the author of Ecclesiastes in the previous chapter. Animal theology has evolved a rather different stance from the ecological approach. Andrew Linzey puts it well in his book, Creatures of the Same God, when he writes, “Ecologists invariably look upon the system of predation as God-given and care more for the “whole” than they do for individual animals. Animal theologians, on the other hand, see “nature” as we now know it as incompatible with the good creation that God originally made.”4 That is to say that ecologists are happy to accept the world as it is—there may be much about it that involves suffering, including animal suffering, but that is an inevitable part of the state of affairs. Linzey argues, on the other hand, from a more overtly christocentric angle, that nature is “fallen” in the same way that humanity is, and that the ideal is the “liberation of creation itself and liberation of every being suffering oppression.”5 For Linzey, this conclusion leads directly to his ethical stance regarding the ideal of vegetarianism and his opposition to activities such as hunting animals for sport.6 Animal theology is more of an overtly Christian reading than the ecological and indeed in my view it is as much a version of Christian theology as an animal theology. It also has a strong element of moral outcome and recommended praxis, which is also true of the ecological in its call for concern for our planet. These emphases, however, tend to distract from the helpful fresh encounter with texts that such methods introduce—this is where John Barton’s7 call for a careful consideration of meaning before significance is perhaps a timely reminder. 2.  See Katharine J. Dell, “The Significance of the Wisdom Tradition in the Ecological Debate,” in Ecological Hermeneutics (ed. David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, London: T. & T. Clark, 2010), 56–69. 3.  See Tova Forti, Animal Imagery in the Book of Proverbs (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 4. Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God (Winchester: Winchester University Press, 2007), 49. 5. Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology, 72. The language of liberation appears here, but Linzey is critical of proponents of liberation theology such as Gustavo Gutiérrez (A Theology of Liberation [Maryknoll: Orbis, 1971]) and Leonardo Boff (Saint Francis: A Model for Human Liberation [New York: Crossroad, 1982]) who are purely concerned with human liberation and are hence too anthropocentric for his liking. 6.  See Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophical, Theological and Practical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). He makes some interesting comparisons between the vulnerability of animals and that of young children, and in so doing shows up the weakness of a number of arguments against poor treatment of animals, accusing their proponents of “adultism” as well as of humanocentric “speciesism.” 7. Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism.

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Before turning to 3:18–19, it is instructive to pause to consider animal imagery in Qoheleth of a more specific nature than offered by this more general comment about animals. When one starts to look there is quite a considerable amount of animal imagery in this book. It is found in the thought that “a living dog is better than a dead lion” in 9:4, in which the use of the imagery is purely illustrative of the point that life is better than death. There is some interest in the choice of animals—the dog was not highly valued in the society of the time, nor were dogs kept as pets, whilst the lion was regarded as a majestic beast that certainly had more significance than a dog. The inference is that a living lesser animal is better than a dead animal of more worth. In 9:7 there is mention of bread and wine, which although made by human hand from more basic products of the earth are still products of the natural world (cf. 10:19). The gladdening effects of wine is one of the author’s more positive sentiments in this book! In 9:12 fish and birds are mentioned in the context of an unexpected snare and a direct comparison with human beings being caught unawares is made. It is interesting, however, that examples from the animal world that was clearly within the author’s context are used. Being taken unawares links up with the themes about time and unpredictability already aired. In Eccl 10:1 dead flies are mentioned—they make the perfumer’s ointment smell bad. Not all interaction with animals—even dead ones—is positive! Eccl 10:8 and 11 mention the serpent; and 10:20 mentions a bird carrying gossip—again it is human interaction with such creatures that is emphasized here and indeed human control over animal activity, using them for their purposes. Turning to Eccl 3:18–21, there is little doubt that the primary interest of the author is in describing the human condition, but it is interesting that animals are referred to in this context as the key point of comparison. I have already noted that the usual “but animals” translation in verse 18 immediately leads the reader to downgrade the class. Huw Spanner, also in the context of animal theology, makes the point that the very word “animal” in the English language is often regarded as the opposite to “spiritual,”8 which is why there is sensitivity to calling human beings animals, suggesting humans do not have souls. He also stresses that the idea of a “soul” is a Platonic Greek concept, foreign to the Hebrew Bible, 8. Huw Spanner, “Tyrants, Stewards—or Just Kings?” in Animals on the Agenda (ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto; London: SCM, 1998), 216–24, points out that the Hebrew ‫‘ נפש‬creature’ has as a root meaning “breathe” and that the Greek ζωον ‘animal’ is related to ζωη ‘life’. The Latin anima ‘breath, spirit’ and animus ‘mind’ provide the derivation for “animal” in English. There is thus more of a link between animal and spirit in the ancient languages than comes across in English translation.

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distinct from the ‫ רוח‬or breath of life.9 Clearly the Hebrew Bible does not know of that precise distinction, and yet there is the idea that the ‫ רוח‬is somehow able to continue after death in our Ecclesiastes text. Ecclesiastes 3:19–20 reflects a debate about whether, after death, humans have a different fate from those of animals, stating that they both have the same “breath.” The author is concerned to deny the existence of such a distinction—his answer is that these are matters which are beyond human ability to discover. In verse 21 there is a more neutral stance in the form of a question—“Who knows?” The common fate of both humans and animals is death and no one knows what happens afterwards to the ‫רוח‬, life breath, commonly translated “spirit” (nrsv) of each. If the verse is not anthropomorphized in relation to righteous and wicked people (as was the tendency in traditional early Jewish interpretation) then it becomes a genuine question borne of lack of knowledge rather than a downgrading of the animal soul in relation to “the wicked.” Indeed the very idea of the lack of distinction between human beings and animals may have been employed here to counter those who did find some distinction (Sirach 40:11). The sentiment in verse 20 that “All go to one place” suggests again a common fate. Whether Sheol or death is meant or rather “the earth” is a matter for discussion. George Barton10 argued that “the earth” is meant, and that “the earth” is one great cemetery. Roland Murphy11 comments on this verse that the one place to which all go is specified by the “dust” (Eccl 6:6), although Qoheleth readily acknowledges the existence of Sheol (Eccl 9:10). Tremper Longman12 comments that by verse 20 the very idea of human rule over animals (as found for example in Ps 8:6–8) is also questioned.

2.  The life to come Does Qoheleth believe in a life to come? And what is the fate of humans and animals after death? As is characteristic of Qoheleth, there is some contradiction in his thought here and both positions—that he does and does not believe in an afterlife—have been advocated. Perhaps he 9.  Spanner, “Tyrants, Stewards—or Just Kings?,” 221, adds that it is the bodies of humans that make them human, not the breath of God that gives them life, something they share with every other animal. He writes, “When Adam first sees the woman he welcomes her not as a kindred spirit but as ‘bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh’ (2:23).” It is the case, however, that in Gen 2:7 a different Hebrew word for “breath” (‫ )נשמה‬is found. 10.  Barton, Ecclesiastes. 11.  Roland E. Murphy, Ecclesiastes (WBC 23A; Dallas: Word, 1992). 12. Tremper Longman, III, The Book of Ecclesiastes (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998).

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himself is providing a debate on the topic in the very contradiction. The main contradiction is between this passage and 12:7. In 3:19–21 animals and humans have the same fate, i.e. they all die. Humans are mortal like animals. The question, “Who knows?,” could refer to idle speculation of the time. Hengel writes, “In attacking the view that the Spirit of man ‘goes upwards’ (3:21) Koheleth takes up a view which had probably penetrated into Judaism from the Hellenistic world and had made room there for the first beginnings of a hope in eternal life”;13 although, it is interesting that Qoheleth makes the distinction at all. In 12:7 the “breath” returns to God, whilst in 3:19–21 the breath is part of the body that dies. “Breath” is a more literal translation of ‫ רוח‬here, as opposed to “spirit” in any soullike sense as it is frequently understood. Do we have here the beginnings of an afterlife concept in Ecclesiastes14 or actually a rejection of the idea? Christian interpreters of this passage have been heavily influenced by ideas of the spirit/soul, taking ‫ רוח‬in this broader sense and influenced by the πνευμα of the LXX. A further Greek influence is the soul/body dualism inherited from Plato—i.e. the idea of innate immortality (i.e. the soul is by its nature immortal). Hengel writes, “Both in Euripides and in Greek epitaphs there often appears the conception that after death the human soul mounts to its heavenly dwelling place, the aether, the seat of the gods.”15 Lohfink argues that the author of Ecclesiastes has been influenced by Euripides’ The Suppliants. He writes, “There was also to be read at that time a sentence in Euripides that whatever sprouts from the earth returns to the earth in death, whereas whatever proceeds from the aither (heavenly sphere) ascends to it again.”16 Lohfink’s view has not received widespread support, however. One important consequence of the Greek idea is that it does not require people who die to believe in God, keep the commandments, or do anything for them to have an ongoing spiritual life after their death. The soul or spirit exists as a separate entity from the body after death. In Hebrew thought, if there is some kind of continued existence after death it is only made possible by God’s decision. God is always perceived to be in control. It is God who judges, God who decides. Hengel notes that there is a firm belief in an afterlife by the time of Sir 40:11 and Dan 12:3, but it is doubted by Qoheleth. Hengel writes, 13. Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), 1:124. 14.  As argued by A. Maltby, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the After-Life,” EvQ 35 (1963): 34–44. 15.  Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1:124. 16. Norbert Lohfink, Qoheleth (CC; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 67. See Euripides, “The Suppliants” in Euripides with English Translation (Vol. 3; New York: Putnam, 1930).

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however, “It was easier for this view to be accepted because of earlier OT ideas that the impersonal breath of life breathed into men by God could be taken back again by him (Koh 12:7; Ps 90:3; 104:29f; Job 34:14).”17 Although Qoheleth may be on the verge of such ideas, he does not air them explicitly here. A common comparison of these passages is with Gen 2:7—“then the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being.” Although there are conceptual links of Eccl 3:19–20 with Gen 2:7, it is the contradictory Eccl 12:7 that, in my view, has more in common with it. In Eccl 12:7 a distinction is made between the “dust” that returns to the earth and the “breath” that returns to God, the same distinction found in Gen 2:7 (life breath). The author of Ecclesiastes remarks that both elements return to their source, a fact from which he derives no comfort. Ecclesiastes 3:20 has more direct links with Gen 3:19b—“you are dust and to dust you shall return”; cf. Job 10:9 in which both the beginning and end of life is referred to as “dust”; Job 34:15; Sir 40:11; Ps 104:29–30, and elsewhere in which all life is dependant on the ‫ רוח‬of God. The distinction between humans and animals aired in verses 18–19 has interesting parallels with Job 12:10, in which “all life” is contrasted with “human life,” and in Ps 49:12, 21 (13, 20), where mortals are likened to the animals that perish. The context of the passage is important. If we include verse 16, which concerns the righteous and the wicked, with verses 19–20, we might more readily see this as a moralistic tale, as early interpreters did. Maltby’s18 moral reading of this section, putting emphasis on a time of judgement, stresses verse 17 as suggesting an afterlife: “God will judge the righteous and the wicked, for he has appointed a time for every matter, and for every work.” But as Maltby acknowledges, passages such as 9:5, 10 suggest that “the dead know nothing” and “there is no work, or thought or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol.” Having said that, 8:11–13 and 11:9 suggest an eventual judgement for deeds done on earth possibly suggestive of an afterlife in which God is by no means impotent. Maltby writes, “Koheleth has a hard-won faith in a life beyond the grave born of moral necessity rather than intellectual conviction.”19 Tremper Longman also places the emphasis on the moral aspect of this wider unit when he writes of Qoheleth, “Whether belief in the afterlife was common or not, his questioning of it does not allow him to resolve the 17.  Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1:124. 18.  Maltby, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the After-Life.” 19.  Maltby, “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the After-Life,” 44.

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real issue of the passage—retribution. When will God set things right?”20 Perhaps there is some mileage here in seeing value in all living beings, all having the propensity for good or evil. Taken apart from verse 16 no moral judgement is actually evident in 3:19–20.

3.  The human-animal relationship Comments on the wider context of this passage also reveal a somewhat disparaging view of the worth of animals, fuelled by verse 18. Krüger comments, “If we follow the usual understanding of v. 18, however, God set human beings apart, so that they can ‘see’ (or in order to ‘show’ them) that they are animals.”21 He points out the alternative, which is that this passage echoes Gen 2:7, 18–19, which simply puts humans and animals on a level playing field as “living beings.” Krüger continues, “Whether the transitory nature of human beings (vv. 19–20) is the consequence of their not doing justice to their role, for which God set them apart (v. 18), or whether human beings were created from the beginning as transitory beings remains open here—as in the primeval story.”22 At the other end of the passage some scholars include verse 22 in the unit, e.g. Crenshaw argues that Qoheleth’s line is to seize the moment,23 but verse 22 is a reminder that no one can see beyond death—“for who can bring one to see what will take place afterwards?” (v. 22b). “Who knows?” is a rhetorical question expecting the answer “no one knows.” Certainty is impossible. Restraint is advocated where claims to knowledge are concerned. Shields argues that such speculation is a waste of time for Qoheleth—his injunction in verse 22 is to enjoy work instead!24 Perhaps that is a good note on which to end this debate. Clearly the conclusions reached here over the interpretation of these passages in Qoheleth have a direct impact on the way we regard animals in relationship with human beings, but also as they exist outside that relationship. Concern for their lives and about what happens to them at death is an essential element of “animal theology,” which feeds directly into our views about animal welfare. However, once again, the method sheds light 20.  Longman, The Book of Ecclesiastes, 129. 21. Thomas Krüger, Qoheleth: A Commentary (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), 92. 22.  Krüger, Qoheleth: A Commentary, 93. 23.  James L. Crenshaw, “The Expression ‫ מי יודע‬in the Hebrew Bible,” VT 36 (1986): 274–88. Reprinted in James L. Crenshaw, Urgent Advice and Probing Questions (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995), 279–91, especially 284–85. 24.  Martin A. Shields, The End of Wisdom: A Reappraisal of the Historical and Canonical Function of Ecclesiastes (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006).

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on the fuller meaning of the texts themselves and indicates how fruitful and lively the cross-fertilization of critical analysis with postmodern readings of texts can be. The text comes alive in ever fresh contexts and with ever new significance for the way in which people actually make their moral decisions and lead their lives.

Chapter 5 A Liberationist or Postcolonial Reading?: Ecclesiastes as a Resistant Text At first glance Ecclesiastes would seem to offer some thoughts on oppression, poverty and the violation of justice (notably in 4:1–3 and 5:8–9), which would naturally seem to speak to a liberationist hermeneutic that seeks to interpret texts by and for the poor and marginalized in society. At second glance the issue is a little more complicated. Like feminist criticism, liberation theology has matured over the last decade or so, and it has in many ways been absorbed under the wider heading of postcolonial or “developing world” readings of texts. Gooder makes the key point that liberation theology is an “ideological orientation” rather than a method of biblical interpretation.1 In this chapter I wish to explore this hermeneutical shift and look at salient texts from Ecclesiastes in the light of this “orientation.” Unlike prophetic texts and stories such as the Exodus, the wisdom literature is a rather less likely candidate for such treatment, and yet some work has already been done in this area, most famously by Gustavo Gutiérrez on Job2 and on Ecclesiastes most notably by Elsa Tamez.3 It is my opinion that Ecclesiastes is ripe for such exploration particularly in light of new developments in the postcolonialist methodology. Liberation theology had its roots in Latin America in the 1960s and its most famous proponent in Gustavo Gutiérrez, and there is no need to rehearse this again here.4 Although it arose out of a particular situation, it was soon seen to have global relevance, as in the work of Gutiérrez 1. Paula Gooder, Searching for Meaning: An Introduction to Interpreting the New Testament (London: SPCK, 2008), chapter 18. 2. Gustavo Gutiérrez, On Job: God-talk and the Suffering of the Innocent (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987). 3. Elsa Tamez, When the Horizons Close: Rereading Ecclesiastes (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2000). 4.  For a good overview of the topic see Leonardo Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987).

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himself, who claimed to speak on behalf of all the poor. One of the issues has always been that for a hermeneutic such as this to be fully authentic it needs to be done by those experiencing the situation or by localized, indigenous populations with their particular worldview, and yet it often takes a more scholarly group (who are usually middle class) to give it expression in an academic context. This contradiction is at the heart of this method.5 Liberationist views have been enriched and broadened in recent years by contributions from many third-world perspectives—from Africa and Asia in particular—and also by marginalized, disadvantaged groups and often victimized groups, including women. Here its link with feminist criticism, which has also moved in this direction, is clear, indeed both the expressions “hermeneutical circle” and “hermeneutics of suspicion” came from liberation theology,6 but are key terms in feminist hermeneutics (see next chapter). Liberation theology has always been more than a theory and has an important function in praxis—reading texts from a liberation perspective is designed to make a difference to poor and oppressed people by both acknowledging and challenging their perspectives. Indeed, Sugiratharajah criticizes liberation theology for actually failing to live up to this ideal when he writes, “Liberation hermeneutics has faded into a pale imitation of itself. Instead of being a new agenda in the ongoing work of God, liberation hermeneutics has ended up reflecting upon the theme of biblical liberation rather than being a liberative hermeneutics.”7 A preference for the poor is an unashamed assumption of liberation theology, and this preference is not just from the human perspective but seen to have its roots in God’s own preference, which springs from God’s universal love for all humankind. The context is also an overtly Christian, christocentric, Catholic, and church-community centred reading, although, according to Sugiratharajah,8 some indigenous readings from within Latin America were overtly anti-Christian and anti-biblical. However, that said, its aim is to use the Bible as a corrective to church practice and takes both Testaments together as a unified canon. More resistant readings of Scripture have tended to emerge unsurprisingly amongst marginalized or victimized 5. Rasiah S. Sugiratharajah, Voices from the Margin: The Bible in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter 7, identifies three stages of development of liberationist readings (205–6), which is then expanded later in the chapter. Interestingly, his second category of “grass roots community reading” is seen to have much in common with precritical methods of taking the text either literally, typologically or allegorically, depending on how it fits into their own experience (221). 6.  From Juan L. Segundo, Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll NY: Orbis, 1976) and José M. Bonino, Revolutionary Theology Comes of Age (London: SPCK, 1975), respectively. 7. Sugiratharajah, Voices from the Margin, 243. 8.  Sugiratharajah, Voices from the Margin, 222–23.

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groups.9 I will argue that there is an important link between this and Ecclesiastes, which proves a resistant text in liberationist terms. Another critical category—that of postcolonialism—has arisen in the last few years, pioneered by Edward Said in the 1970s,10 and it shares much in common with liberation theology, as it also represents minority voices in reaction to dominant ideologies. However, it is a broader category and has come to provide a significant critique of liberation hermeneutics. Sugiratharajah defines postcolonial criticism as, [A] textual and praxiological practice initially undertaken by people who were once part of the British, European and American Empires, but now have some sort of territorial freedom, while continuing to live with burdens from the past and enduring newer forms of economic and cultural neocolonialism. It was also undertaken by ethnic minorities who live in diaspora, namely British blacks and British Asians in England and racial minorities in the United States and Canada—African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans—who had been victims of old imperialism, who are now current victims of globalization and who have been continually kept away from and represented by the dominant First World Elements.11 Third-world criticism is an alternative term which picks up the contrast with the dominant “First-World” culture. In relation to biblical studies, postcolonial criticism is interested in the colonial contexts of biblical times12 but also in more recent colonial interest and concerns and their contestants. A key element is a rereading of texts from the postcolonial perspective, including liberationist and feminist approaches but going beyond them to include “postcolonial circumstances such as hybridity, fragmentation, deterritorialization, and hyphenated, double or multiple, identities.”13 Unlike liberation theology, which puts the Bible at the centre of its inspiration in the quest to undermine dominant certitudes of biblical scholarship, however, postcolonialism recognizes that the Bible is a twoedged sword—as “a site of struggle over its efficacy and meanings . . . both a safe and an unsafe text, and as both a familiar and a distant one.”14 Rather 9.  Sugiratharajah’s third category is of the situation-led agenda of the poor or marginalized themselves. 10. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978). 11.  Sugiratharajah, Voices from the Margin, 247. 12.  See in particular in biblical studies, Leo G. Perdue, The Sword and the Stylus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008). 13.  Sugiratharajah, Voices from the Margin, 253. 14.  Sugiratharajah, Voices from the Margin, 259.

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than seeking to use the Bible as an instrument of freedom, postcolonialists are more guarded as to the possibilities of the Bible’s use—it both creates problems and solves them. Sugiratharajah gives the example of the Exodus, seen as a liberating text by liberationists but with a very different perspective from those (historically, the Canaanites) at the receiving end of their displacement from the land. Acknowledgement of the binary nature of society as divided between rich and poor, capitalist and proletariat, male and female, white and black, dominant and dominated is common to both, but a postcolonial perspective could adopt either side and indeed does not take “sides” as such, despite its clear interest in the underdog. Furthermore, postcolonialist approaches are not overtly Christian or tied to any particular religious denomination or worldview. The oppressed are not only the economically poor but the disadvantaged in a plurality of contexts, whether it be in relation to class, gender, ethnicity, or sex—indeed its very plurality links it to that other “post,” postmodernism. There is still the problem of who is entitled to do such a reading—the academy can perhaps do little more than intelligently represent the view as spokespersons rather than state any experiential claim. Perhaps the more authentic readings still come from the grassroots level of experience, from those who have been the victims of some kind of marginalization or oppression. I have probably said enough about these different methods to indicate their similarities and differences.15 In my view Sugiratharajah overstates the opposition between the two approaches, and I would argue that postcolonial criticism is a natural extension of liberation approaches within a more pluralistic and less overtly Christian context. The concern of both with marginal and oppressed groups remains. Let us turn to key texts of Ecclesiastes that concern the poor and oppressed to see if they are illuminated by either or both of these approaches. A word should first be said about the author of Ecclesiastes, Qoheleth. He comes from an advantaged perspective—he is an educated man, he takes on the Solomonic persona, and he is described in the epilogue to the book as a teacher and sage. However, his message does not represent the dominant ideology but is often characterized as wisdom from the margins, a critique of the mainstream proverbial worldview. His thought contains demonstrable tensions that place one view against another often in a contradictory manner, and so he is by no means representative of the status quo.16 15.  For more critique of liberation theology, see Sugiratharajah, Voices from the Margin, chapter 8. 16.  Perdue argues in his chapter on Ecclesiastes in The Sword and the Stylus that whilst Ecclesiastes is against mainstream opinion, in the end it defines the new mainstream. I would

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Chapter 5 The key text from Ecclesiastes is probably 4:1–3: Again I saw all the oppressions that are practiced under the sun. Look, the tears of the oppressed—with no one to comfort them! On the side of their oppressors there was power—with no one to comfort them. And I thought the dead, who have already died, more fortunate than the living, who are still alive; but better than both is the one who has not yet been, and has not seen the evil deeds that are done under the sun. (nrsv)

Qoheleth shows an initial pity for the oppressed, that they have “no one to comfort them.” This fits in with other sentiments in the book, such as that “two are better than one” (Eccl. 4:9). This phrase, “no one to comfort them,” is then repeated in the next verse as if in refrain. It is a battle of the powerless against the powerful. The sentiment that there is no one to comfort the oppressed is perhaps surprising in its lack of reference to God, which stands in complete opposition to the liberationist argument that God is on the side of such people. When one looks at other biblical texts such as Lamentations and Job, God is the cause of oppression in violation of the usual idea that God will comfort the oppressed. Qoheleth could be thinking in human terms, as is consistent with his message, which tends to keep God at a distance, and yet this absence is surprising. Perhaps even more surprising, however, is what he goes on to say— that being either dead or unborn is better than living to see the “evil deeds” that are a fact of life on this earth. Seow argues that although Qoheleth bewails oppression in 4:1–3 he does not suggest any action to redress it, rather he states an impossible scenario, i.e. better to have died already or not be born, neither of which is an option for those of us living in the present time and reading his words! Krüger17 suggests that the reference is not to those who have never lived but to those who are as yet unborn and who might yet live in the future, some hope being held for an improvement of the situation. But this is perhaps too optimistic a reading. The overriding impression of this passage is one of starkness—Qoheleth does not mince his words about the reality of oppression and evil in this world. He could not be further from the prophets with their denunciation of oppression and attempts to change the situation, e.g. Amos 4:1; Jer 7:5–7; Ezek 22:29; Zech 7:9–20. not fully agree with this assessment myself, seeing Ecclesiastes as remaining essentially nonmainstream, though I wonder whether the language of “mainstream” is even appropriate. After all, who defines the “mainstream”`? 17.  Krüger, Qoheleth: A Commentary, 96.

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In a sense he is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, just realistic. He accepts rich and poor as inevitable categories of people and his ultimate advice to both would probably be to enjoy life in the present as much as possible. His only suggestion is a broad attitude of mind rather than any more specific and detailed solution. For the oppressed, they simply have to bear oppression—there is no call by Qoheleth to try to change the situation. He would probably advocate that even if one group of oppressed were to emerge from their oppression, they would simply be replaced by another (linking up with his idea of cycles). Unlike the prophets or Job, striving and anger are absent from his sentiments about oppression. Although his preference for either being dead or unborn could be seen as pessimistic, it is a keynote of the message of this author to look at everything in the light of the finality of death—death relativizes everything for him, it even could be seen here as a positive point that death or non-being takes oppression away. Another key passage is 5:8–9: If you see in a province the oppression of the poor and the violation of justice and right, do not be amazed at the matter; for the high official is watched by a higher, and there are yet higher ones over them. But all things considered, this is an advantage for a land: a king for a plowed field. (nrsv) This is a notoriously difficult passage (especially verse 9), and so the sense of it is disputed. Again Qoheleth seems to be stating the unsurprising fact and reality of the oppression of the poor and the violation of justice. It is an everyday occurrence. Perhaps the main issue here is whether the sense is that the hierarchy that Qoheleth describes is a positive or a negative thing. Does he mean that it is good that there are levels of officials, the ultimate head of whom is the king and that in some way this might alleviate oppression and injustice? Or does he rather mean that endless levels of bureaucracy do nothing to alleviate these things, but in general a king is a good thing? I tend to prefer to read this as a comment on trees of useless hierarchy, which makes sense in the context of the call not to be surprised/ alarmed at the system in itself—another realistic statement that simply sees this situation as a fact of life. But, as Krüger18 states, there are clearly two ways of reading this text—either evils are eliminated within the system or the system produces those evils. Reading Ecclesiastes within a wisdom context, Qoheleth’s approach is of itself unsurprising. Much of proverbial wisdom simply intends to 18.  Krüger, Qoheleth: A Commentary, 113–14.

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comment on situations in the light of experience rather than to seek to change them. Job is perhaps a misfit in this category in its proclamation of Job’s outrage against the retribution system, and yet the friends, the proponents of the system, are themselves bound by conservative ideas. However, oppression does appear as a wisdom theme from Proverbs—Prov 14:31 in particular makes a value statement about oppression, “Those who oppress the poor insult their Maker” (cf. Prov 22:16; 28:5). It is interesting that God is brought into the picture here, just at the point where Qoheleth’s remarks in the two passages above are noticeable for God’s absence. However, in Eccl 3:16 Qoheleth cites the idea that oppressors will be punished as wicked, as part of what looks like a quotation of a traditional sentiment. Other passages from Ecclesiastes might be brought in to support his attitude towards oppression—in 2:4–11 slaves, both male and female, are assumed as part of a kingly entourage; in 2:20–23 Qoheleth speaks of slavish toil without enjoyment of the fruits of one’s labour; in 5:13–17 riches are a mixed blessing but loss of them leads to “much vexation”; in 6:2, 7–9 wealth and honour are not enjoyed by those who have them; in 8:3–4 the word of the king is power, whether used for good or ill; in 8:14 the innocent suffer whilst the wicked prosper; and in 9:17 a “shouting ruler” is depicted, albeit as a bad thing in contrast to quiet words of wisdom. In liberationist terms, Qoheleth seems to offer little to a worldview that seeks to offer some kind of positive response to the cries of the poor and oppressed. Elsa Tamez, in her book When the Horizons Close, suggests that Eccl 3:1–8, the poem on time, should be read in the light of other texts such as 4:1–3 and 5:8–9. She writes, “Qoheleth’s confident affirmation that everything has its time and its hour is a utopian phrase that orders real life in the midst of slavish toil. When the limits of the human condition are recognized, then hope can be re-organized.”19 She finds hope in the idea of the divine time, that God directs these times and so has an involvement in all aspects of human life. Others have read this poem as indicating God’s knowledge of time but also the lack of any imparting of that knowledge to human beings, so that for human beings things that happen seem random and meaningless. I would agree that even if this is a poem about predestination, as some have argued, that does not help to change human situations, which may or may not be fixed by God but cannot be changed by human beings. There is a sense of the helplessness of human beings to do anything about these “times”—this fits in with Qoheleth’s realism about situations that essentially never change—such as 19.  Tamez, When the Horizons Close, 77.

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the fact of oppression. I would suggest that rather than being a liberating text on this level, the very bluntness and realism of Ecclesiastes make it a resistant text for liberation. There is no inspiring release from the situation and no explicit recourse to God as comforter. Rather there is the call to face up to one’s situation in its harsh reality. This is where postcolonial terminology might prove more appropriate when unpacking Ecclesiastes than liberationist. Qoheleth does not speak to a situation that might be changed, but rather to one that is fixed and constantly recycled. There will always be oppression and there is no real way out of that, even by recourse to God. Certainly, God is committed to punishment of the “wicked,” but the oppressed and the wicked are not necessarily in the same category, nor are the poor and the wicked. Qoheleth does not take sides—ultimately a king is a good thing despite the levels of useless bureaucrats that he oversees. He is as realistic about power as he is about powerlessness. His book could be read in the postcolonial context of either group—by the dominant Eurocentric former colonizer or the poverty-ridden formerly colonized—and both would probably come to the same conclusion that life should be enjoyed in the present, whoever you are, and that nothing can ultimately be changed. The postcolonial approach opens up more options in relation to interpretation without the need to find liberating thoughts in this wisdom book’s pages. The Bible is indeed a two-edged sword and sometimes what is found in its pages is at best contradiction and at worst unguarded realism.

Chapter 6 Reject or Retrieve?: Feminist Readings of Ecclesiastes 7:23–29 Feminist interpretation of texts has moved a long way from its earliest stages to a greater maturity in recent years. Early feminist interpreters were highly suspicious of a patriarchal/androcentric text and sought to indict the male biblical authors for the ways in which women were marginalized, misrepresented, and written out of the text. Others were keen, from the first, to bring out the positive material and good role models for women within the biblical canon. It did not take the former group long to find the already notorious, seemingly misogynistic passage in the book of Ecclesiastes, notably 7:23–29, especially verses 25–28 and within that in particular 7:26a—“I found more bitter than death the woman who is a trap” (nrsv) and 7:28b—“One man among a thousand I found, but a woman among all these I have not found” (nrsv). These verses and the wider passage, which provides their context, and its interpretation are the subject of this chapter. I shall look first at a feminist appraisal of this passage1 and contrast it with an anti-feminist one. I shall then look at the passage itself, noting the views of a wider group of commentators. It is clear that one can choose to reject the author as a misogynist, and that in turn is dependent upon how the passage is understood (itself a knotty problem), or put such misogyny down to his cultural context, removing the blame explicitly from him. Or one can attempt to retrieve the passage by either retranslation or reinterpretation.2 The danger with this is that in the attempt to retrieve the 1.  Feminist interpretation is not of course restricted to women but includes feministminded men, e.g. Eric S. Christianson, “Qoheleth the ‘Old Boy’ and Qoheleth the ‘New Man’: Misogynism, the Womb and a Paradox in Ecclesiastes” in Wisdom and Psalms (ed. Athalya Brenner; FCB: Series 2, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), 109–36. 2.  When I gave this chapter as a paper to the Society of Old Testament Studies, Winter 2013, Cheryl Exum made the point to me that she hoped that these were not the only two options available to feminist interpreters. I responded that neither would I wish to limit interpretation in this binary way, but that when a text is particularly difficult such as this one it tends to polarize opinion to these two opposites. In some ways such polarization harks

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text, its actual intended meaning gets distorted. Then there is the further issue that even if one successfully retrieves it for a modern audience, there have been thousands of years of non-retrieval, so that one needs to have regard for the past effect that reading this passage has had. This is where the views of precritical interpreters become of interest too. The pendulum of opinion of Qoheleth on this issue has swung to and fro—is it only now that feminist study has heightened awareness of the tension?

1.  Feminist and Anti–feminist Appraisals Jennifer Koosed’s work3 sums up well the differing attitudes of the feminist position when she first rejects this passage but then attempts to retrieve it. In her book, (Per)mutations of Qohelet: Reading the Body in the Book, Koosed identifies her first response to this passage (Eccl 7:26–29) as “the resisting reader” (as opposed to the “assenting” one). In her claim that this passage is misogynistic and against all womankind, Koosed rejects arguments that this is not the case on the grounds that they “smack of apologetic” and that “These scholars protest too much.”4 In fact, “these scholars” are not coming from a feminist perspective but are offering alternatives based on the interpretation of the text that are arguably removed from this kind of feminist “protest.”5 Koosed argues that Qoheleth has deliberately intensified the Woman Folly figure of Proverbs to project the criticism of her to all women. She contends that the personification of wisdom as a woman is “avoided altogether” by Qoheleth (which is arguably untrue, see below) and indeed that all the positive portrayals of women from Proverbs are absent in Qoheleth. She does not find Eccl 9:9 on the pleasure to be had with “the wife whom you love” a mitigating statement—misogynists can still love their wives! She writes, “To read this verse as a direct contradiction of 7:26–29 is to make misogyny and love antithetical, a proposition refuted by any critical look at the history of the relationships between men and women. An androcentric and misogynist worldview simply does not make love of one’s wife (or mother, sister, daughter) impossible. If this were true, either misogyny or marriage back to the early days of feminist interpretation mentioned at the outset and more recent approaches can generally be seen as more nuanced. I still think that it is a helpful characterization of this particular passage and so retain its use here. 3. Jennifer L. Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet: Reading the Body in the Book (LHBOTS 429; New York: T. & T. Clark, 2006). 4.  Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet, 79. 5.  The only overtly “anti-feminist” interpretation that I have found is that of the conservative scholar, Duane A. Garrett, “Ecclesiastes 7:25–28 and the Feminist Hermeneutic,” CTR 2 (1988): 309–21 (see discussion below).

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would have failed a long time ago.”6 Koosed notes that in 7:28 men do not fare much better than women in that only one man in a thousand is “found” (she takes this to mean “found to be wise”)—but one man is better than none and this would appeal to the male audience being addressed by the clearly male author whose interest in men shines through the text. Koosed concludes that “this text is unredeemable”,7 but then one turns the page and she says, “Do I really mean that?” Using an interesting style she then tries to redeem the condemned text. She writes, “The feminist reader that I have employed mirrors the one-dimensional woman of the text. She suppresses other readings in order to argue her one point. She also invests the text with an androcentric and misogynist core, and then reads from there.”8 This kind of methodological introspection is fascinating—Koosed shows her awareness of the limitations of her method and opens up the possibility of numerous readings. This approach is very much a keynote of modern feminist study, which looks at the text from many varied and culturally conditioned points of view. She notes the instability of the core meaning of the text and its language system. She writes, “the reading above suppresses the instability of the text, and the inherent undecidability of language.”9 This comment suggests, however, that the interpretations that she had cited as “protesting too much” were not based on careful linguistic analysis, which is not the case. However, at this stage she points out anomalies in the unamended Hebrew text, one of which is the often noted ‫( קהלת אמרה‬Eccl 7:27) which is usually emended to ‫הקהלת אמר‬, which leads her to remark that “the gender of Qohelet slips.”10 Can this be seen as a “burst of the feminine,”11 as she terms it? On the basis of what might be seen as slightly flimsy evidence, she makes the claim that “Qohelet is more invested and entangled in the feminine than the condemnation of 6.  Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet, 81. 7. Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet, 81. 8. Athalya Brenner, “Wise and Counselling Women in Ancient Israel: Literary and Historical Ideals of the Personified ḥokmâ,” in A Feminist Companion to Wisdom Literature (ed. Athalya Brenner, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 50–66, especially 59–61, takes for granted the point that Qoheleth’s worldview is “androcentric”—here is a male (“M voice,” in her terminology) speaking to a male audience. The leap from androcentricism to misogyny is not to be assumed. However, on looking at the evidence, Brenner recognizes the “misogynistic impact” of 7:26 and 29 in particular, even if they are quotations on the author’s part. Brenner also notes that in this passage and more widely in Qoheleth, woman is object rather than subject (cf. 9:9; 2:8c). She also interprets 3:2–8 as a male love poem, possibly addressed to women. 9.  Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet, 83. 10.  Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet, 83. 11.  Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet, 83.

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women in 7:26–29 first suggests.”12 Is this enough to retrieve him? She goes on to describe a “transvestite Qohelet” which does seem a long shot, but attempts to get across the idea of both masculine and feminine in a text in which the borders are at times murky,13 and Qoheleth’s own personal tension between desire for and fear of women. It is interesting that finally Koosed brings the analysis down to an attitude of the author, which is a common explanation in the scholarship. Indeed this is the emphasis of Ellen Davis in her brief (non-feminist) commentary—she describes “an embittering romantic relationship” that led to Qoheleth not finding a life partner as responsible for 7:23–29, the personal nature of which “distinguishes it from misogyny.”14 Her interpretation has the effect of making one feel sorry for the lonely Qoheleth—but is not this too easy a retrieval of the text without attention to its complexities? What is particularly interesting about Koosed’s work is the way that she swings the pendulum of feminist interpretation between rejection (or “resistance”) and retrieval (at which stage she acknowledges the complexities of the language of the passage). This pendulum of opinion is what I am keen to explore in this chapter. This pendulum is indicated by Eric Christianson in his exploration of this passage, along with 2:8, 7:26, and 9:9, and of “more peripheral and implicit ‘female language’”15 in passages concerned with the womb. He is concerned primarily with the “perception” of Qoheleth’s attitude to women, and his paper concerns the sheer variety of opinion that has been put forward in the scholarship on Qoheleth’s women texts, which he carefully reviews. He sees the answers to exegetical problems raised by these texts as in many ways “determined by whom we would like Qoheleth to be”16 and so we end up with “interpretive paradox(es)” that may be ultimately irreconcilable. His work highlights the subjective nature of interpretation from the “reader” side of the hermeneutical circle. His discussion of 9:9 illustrates this clearly—those who see the reference to “a woman” as one’s “wife” view Qoheleth as a traditionalist and this passage as an antidote to 7:25–29, whilst if one translates “Enjoy life with a woman whom you love” (given that the definite article is missing for ʾiššâ) the sense is different and the readerly perception of Qoheleth moves from 12.  Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet, 83–84. 13.  Cf. Eccl 7:23, which she translates, “I will be wise, but she was far from me,” indicating woman wisdom instead of the usual translation “it.” 14.  Ellen F. Davis, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs (Westminster Bible Companion; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 205. 15.  Christianson, “Qoheleth the ‘Old Boy’,” 126. 16.  Christianson, “Qoheleth the ‘Old Boy’,” 109.

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traditionalist to libertine. Christianson notes that even basic assumptions such as whether Qoheleth was a bachelor or a married man, information that we can only infer and are not actually told, seem to impact interpretations. He makes the point that despite many efforts to retrieve, the “general tone” of Qoheleth’s words still “succeed in offending a feminist sensibility.”17 It is clear, as with Koosed’s book, that feminist interpretation has, at the very least, exposed the readerly tension between rejection and retrieval. Christianson cites Reed,18 who argues that it is the very irregularity and eccentricity of Qoheleth’s discourse that speaks to the feminist agenda in a postmodern world. Ironically, the misogynist becomes the potential feminist. This highlights the “old boy/new man” dichotomy that Christianson wishes to highlight—the perception of some that Ecclesiastes is a traditionalist versus the “new man” who has been retrieved from the “plain sense” that his text has conveyed. That “plain sense” is debatable, but can be seen to be the sense that has been perpetuated in Bible translations and exegesis over the centuries.19 As Fontaine remarks when looking at the way 7:25–29 was exploited by those who wished to justify the persecution of witchcraft in the fifteenth-century Malleus Maleficarum, “we cannot ignore the very real, negative effects on the lives of actual women that the ‘plain sense’ of this text, read over the centuries created.”20 Interest in the way the text has been read in the past is another facet of feminist interpretation—not only has the approach exposed different readerly perceptions in modern scholarship, but this tension is found in like manner in the tradition, from rabbinic reinterpretation, to patristic allegorization, to medieval persecution and so on. The pendulum between rejection and retrieval continues to swing. Are we right, however, to see the truth of Qoheleth’s statements, with Christianson, in such subjective terms, depending on one’s readerly stance? A somewhat anti-feminist view is expounded by Garrett21 who is concerned to exonerate Qoheleth by interpreting his remarks very much in line with an intertext—that of Genesis 3:16. In a sense he retrieves more than he rejects, but his retrieval has a rather different agenda—that of reasserting biblical authority. He thus retrieves Qoheleth from the feminist 17.  Christianson, “Qoheleth the ‘Old Boy’,” 133. 18. Esther D. Reed, “Whither Postmodernism and Feminist Theology?,” Feminist Theology 6 (1994): 15–29. 19. Cf. Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism. 20. Carole Fontaine, “‘Many Devices’ (Qoheleth 7:23–8:1): Qoheleth, Misogyny and the Malleus Maleficarum,” in A Feminist Companion to Wisdom and Psalms (ed. Athalya Brenner and Carole Fontaine; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1988), 137–168, here 168. 21.  Garrett, “Ecclesiastes 7:25–28 and the Feminist Hermeneutic,” 313.

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charge of misogyny.22 He rejects many of the commentators’ “retrieving” ideas, such as interpreting the woman of verse 26 in light of Woman Folly (see below) or arguing that Qoheleth is thinking specifically of unsavoury women such as prostitutes. Rather he claims that “the woman whose heart is a trap to a man can very well be his wife.”23 Garrett maintains, however, that no commentator would see this passage as asserting the superiority of men and so feminists have no right to say that men have used these texts to feel superior to or suppress women. He writes, “If no such bias is found in traditional Christian hermeneutics, it begs the question of whether a ‘feminist (or any other) reading’ is not ad hoc and innately construed to skew the natural meaning of a text.”24 Garrett uses three main arguments here—first, that the author was influenced by Genesis 3 and not only the temptation of, but also the punishment of, Eve in his judgement of women, second, that this is a personal presentation, and third, that it was written by a man in a man’s world. Garrett argues that in verse 26 Qoheleth is simply citing a truism from male experience, both personal and beyond, that women can give men grief—and that is often the wife! This is backed up by the punishment of Eve, that her husband will rule over her (Gen 3:16)—i.e. because of sin, domestic life will be a battleground, with women trying to use cunning to trap their husbands and men often cruel and oppressive to their wives. This is the reality, according to Garrett, that Qoheleth is trying to describe from a male perspective.25 The remark about finding “one man in a thousand” is also thought by Garrett to reflect the common male experience of finding one good male friend but not a satisfactory spouse. Furthermore it was addressed to other professional men, a context where women would have been absent—hence they are not addressed. Garrett, in trying to express a possible woman’s side of complaint, is trying too hard in my view. Indeed his whole article has a rather patronizing feel. He claims that this is a “strict interpretation of the text . . . that sin has made the marriage relationship into a bed of misery for a man but that he can escape the grief caused by an evil wife through the fear of God.”26 Garrett’s article, written in 1988, has a rather dated feel in the way that it characterizes the 22.  He cites Leonard J. Swidler, Biblical Affirmations of Woman (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1979), who concludes that “all women have been reduced to essential evil” (128) in Qoheleth’s thought, itself a rather extreme view, especially given the fact that Swidler identifies himself as a feminist (11)! 23.  Garrett, “Ecclesiastes 7:25–28 and the Feminist Hermeneutic,” 313. 24.  Garrett, “Ecclesiastes 7:25–28 and the Feminist Hermeneutic,” 313. 25.  Garrett, “Ecclesiastes 7:25–28 and the Feminist Hermeneutic,” 318, also tries to reconstruct a female “version” of Qoheleth’s words here. 26.  Garrett, “Ecclesiastes 7:25–28 and the Feminist Hermeneutic,” 320.

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feminist approach, which has moved on since he wrote. He maintains the same view in his more recent commentary (1993), however.27 He characterizes the feminist approach as rejectionist and claims that his approach is very distinct from that. He retrieves Qoheleth from the accusation of misogyny and backs up the sentiments as “true” but within the confines of the author’s historical context, which just happened to exclude women. The idea of retrieving Qoheleth by imagining that it might have been very different if a female audience had been addressed—and by even providing a women’s version—seems to me to go beyond what the text is telling us. If we are simply trying to understand what Qoheleth meant by these words, it does not work to say that he might have said something “nicer” to women had the context been different. Clearly we need to look more closely at the text and its interpretation and at the scholars who have tried to elucidate its meaning. Whilst their agenda has been and continues to be varied, and whilst one cannot say that many modern male interpreters have an overtly feminist agenda, neither can one say that they are unaware of the problems of the tone of this text in today’s world. Most interpreters of today experience discomfort with Qoheleth’s sentiments as taken at face value and some of their attempts at reinterpretation may be seen as forms of retrieval, to use feminist language. I place myself within this debate as a woman, but first and foremost as a scholar with an awareness of the feminist agenda. I expect Koosed, Brenner, and others would position themselves in the same way.

2.  Retrieving Ecclesiastes 7:23–29/8:1 One of the continued debates concerns where to begin and end the section of Qoheleth’s book that contains these “difficult” verses. Some begin at verse 25, others at verse 23; some end with 7:29, others with 8:1. There is a thematic cohesion to the section at its outer definition, i.e. from 7:23–8:1 which I would argue for, but 8:1 also intersects with the material following it and so is probably to be regarded as a separate “key verse” linking the two sections. Of course, one could argue that there does not even need to be thematic cohesion within a section, however, in this case the wider context of the verses is, in my view, significant. The theme of the quest for wisdom seems to provide the context of this section. In verse 23 the author describes his testing by wisdom (harking back perhaps to the Solomonic “autobiography” section in 1:12–2:11). The author describes 27.  Duane A. Garrett, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs (NAC; Nashville, TN: Broadman, 1993). Ecclesiastes commentary, 253–345.

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his desire to be wise but his failure in the attempt, for “being wise” is a far more complex feat than the author feels able to achieve. Verse 24 backs up this sentiment of wisdom being “far off” and “deep” and this recalls the language of remoteness and hidden things (including wisdom) found in Job 28. In verse 25 we find the catchword “know,” which along with “find” in verse 24 are two verbs that recur in this passage, adding cohesion to it. In verse 25 Qoheleth describes the endless search for knowledge and wisdom and that sense that human beings like to know “the sum of things,” that life makes some kind of overall sense. He cites at the end of verse 25 a familiar theme from Proverbs, that of folly/foolishness— “wickedness is folly and that foolishness is madness.” Indeed this quest for wisdom has a familiar ring from earlier parts of the wisdom tradition (cf. Job 28; Prov 1). This wisdom context then prepares us for verse 26, the first of the contentious verses. It is a common explanation in the commentaries to take the woman “who is a trap” to refer to Woman Folly in Proverbs. She is described as the path to death (Prov 7:27), and the language of snares and nets is reminiscent of her stalking (Prov 6:21), lying in wait (Prov 7:12), and ensnaring as a hunter traps a bird (Prov 7:22–23). The reference is furthermore to “the woman.” Qoheleth is describing a personal reaction to her, that he “found more bitter than death” this woman, but he is expressing a common reaction to her (and there are many other negatives types of women in the proverbial literature, such as the contentious wife (Prov 21:9, 19; 25:24; 27:15). Of course personal experience could lie behind this, and in one sense all writing is based on personal experience, but it is a shaky argument for any author given the lack of evidence.28 This wisdom literature is itself experiential literature and so it is hard to know where the boundaries lie. Indeed, Qoheleth appeals directly to personal experience more than most and his “voice” is heard strongly in the book—even if it is in fact his voice in dialogue with other opinions. But to reduce his sentiments to personal prejudice seems not to give interpretation of his book a full airing. In the following verse “the teacher” gives us a taste of the personal nature of his quest, but it is a quest that others have taken and its paths are the well-trodden ones of wisdom. Again in verse 27 he stresses the idea of the “sum,” adding it all up together to form a picture. Experiential knowledge may be piecemeal (as in proverbial wisdom) but the idea—and this 28.  This reminds me of attempts to personalize the book of Job—do the great descriptions of the natural world reflect the Job poet’s personal experience, as some older scholars maintained? See Robert Gordis, The Book of God and Man: A Study of Job (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

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lies behind Proverbs too (especially expressed in Prov 1–9)—is to find patterns that interlink and in some way form a structured way of viewing and understanding the world. Whilst tension may exist, it has to be structured tension,29 in that it needs to be noted and inwardly digested. This “sum of things” is what is really elusive—Qoheleth has turned it over and over in his mind but life does not add up. Then we have the sentiment about “one man among a thousand I found but a woman among all these I have not found.” His “sum” has found one “human being” among a thousand (‫ אדם‬is used, not ‫)איש‬, but not a woman. The enigma here is what he means by this statement. A number of commentators have noted that one in a thousand is not a good ratio for finding this person, be they male or female. But the lack of finding a woman is what seems to distinguish the two sexes here in a negative fashion and refer to all women as a class. What is not really clear is what the author is actually looking for: is it one “wise” man/woman that is being looked for (so Koosed30) or does it refer to a life partner or even simply a friend? Again we are back to personal experience—does it mean that Qoheleth found a male friend but was unable to form relationships with women? In my view the sense harks back to a context in wider wisdom, and in the book of Proverbs in particular, that dominates the section. If this is the case, however, there is still the problem that this does not appear to be the same “the woman” as in verse 26—although some have seen a continued reference to Woman Folly here. Could it be Woman Wisdom that Qoheleth has not found (see Krüger31)? And yet it would be odd to contrast not finding her (the object of his quest) with finding a male. I find the argument that she lies implicitly behind this passage both in the language of the quest and in terms of being unreachable quite convincing, disagreeing with Koosed here. This passage then might be a continued reference to the elusiveness of woman wisdom. If we translate ‫ אדם‬as “human being” then he might be making a contrast not between man and woman but between finding a human among a thousand but not that elusive Woman Wisdom.32 The one thing he has found, though, in verse 29.  Hatton, Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs, helpfully draws out tensions in the proverbial material that bring the book of Proverbs into closer alignment with Ecclesiastes, which has long been characterized by tension. 30.  Koosed, (Per)mutations of Qohelet. 31.  Krüger, Qoheleth: A Commentary, following others. 32.  Other suggestions include Roland Murphy’s view, in Ecclesiastes, 76–77, that the “One man in a thousand” of verse 28 could be a quotation of a “finding” that Qoheleth rejects, unlike his acceptance of other findings in the passage. There is certainly wordplay with “find/found” in the passage and in some ways this suggestion is attractive. Another is that at least part of this verse is a later addition (so Choon-Leong Seow, Ecclesiastes (AB 18C,

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29 is that human beings are schemers and are not as “straightforward” as they were first made. This has suggested to scholars that the reference in verse 28 is to the fact that women are more scheming than men, and yet Qoheleth is not misogynistic in that last verse—rather it is “human beings” again that are not straightforward—presumably if they were, this author would feel able to “read” them more easily. This can again be seen as a reference to the elusiveness of finding wisdom on both divine and human levels—human beings are scheming, human emotions and actions are complex—the sum is still very difficult to untangle. Finally in 8:1 there seems to be a conclusion to the wisdom theme, praising the wise man and promoting wisdom. In one sense it is rather in opposition to the sentiment of the previous passage, and yet it both rounds off the wisdom theme and introduces a new tone that will lead us into chapter 8. It is a Janus-like verse that looks both backwards and forwards. It is interesting that the Babylonian Talmud made a link of this passage from Ecclesiastes with Prov 18:22, “He who finds a wife finds a good thing, and obtains favour from the Lord.” The purpose was to find a contrary authoritative statement from Solomon’s pen. In a sense this maintains the tension found not only within the passage but arguably across the wisdom corpus. Perhaps this method from an early interpreter points the way forward for a cross-comparison and important link with Proverbs. I have argued elsewhere for a particularly close connection between these two books and this may be the case throughout the book of Ecclesiastes.33 But the link particularly illuminates this passage, which begins with a test “by wisdom,” a theme which then dominates. “Far off” and “deep” in verse 24 echo language used in wisdom literature, not just in Job 28, the hymn to wisdom, but also in Proverbs where wisdom is “deep” (Prov 18:4; 20:5) and where the harlot is also described as a “deep pit” (Prov 22:14; 23:27). The language of knowing and searching and finding dominates Proverbs (notably Prov 1–9) alongside the language of acquisition and making known, as here. References to folly and foolishness link up with a dominant theme in Proverbs and with Woman Folly (Prov 5:1–6; 7:6–23; 9:13–18). I agree with those who interpret verse 26 to refer to Woman New York: Doubleday, 1997), 274, who sees v 28b as a “marginal gloss that had been inadvertently incorporated into the body of the text”), but that always seems a bit of a last resort in a problematic text. The “says the Teacher” in verse 27 could be an insertion, since it is strange for Qoheleth suddenly to refer to himself in the third person, but otherwise criteria for secondary additions are lacking in this section in my view. 33.  See chapter 1 and, in more depth, Dell, “Ecclesiastes as Mainstream Wisdom (without Job),” forthcoming.

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Folly, in the way it takes up the language of bitterness, traps, snares, and nets as echoed in the description of that woman in Proverbs. I tend towards the suggestion that the woman whom Qoheleth has not found is Woman Wisdom and that he is referring to the ultimate elusive nature of Wisdom. It is hard then to know whom the “one man among a thousand” refers to—but taking ʾādām as human being may simply refer to the paucity of wise people in the vicinity. “One man in a thousand” could have the sense “virtually no one” here. I find it hard to believe that Qoheleth would be referring to his own wife or to personal experience of women here—in 9:9 perhaps, but not here. I thus see the Woman Wisdom/Woman Folly theme as providing the main context for an understanding of this passage, on an authorial as well as a readerly level. In conclusion, I have sought to retrieve this passage from some of the more difficult interpretations of it and to retrieve Qoheleth from the charge of misogyny. It is not only an informed choice, but it is based on a close study of the text and of the scholarly options on offer.34 I have sought to explore the range and variety of feminist hermeneutical interpretations and, if one can conclude anything, it is that they tend to draw out tensions rather than seek harmony. In that sense my own reading which seeks to be more harmonious is maybe not truly feminist! 34.  In the final stages of completing this book my attention was drawn to the article by Doug Ingram, “Riddled with Ambiguity”: Ecclesiastes 7:23–8:1 as an Example” in The Words of the Wise are Like Goads (ed. Mark J. Boda, Tremper Longman, III, and Cristian G. Rata; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns), 221–42, who covers much of the same ground. He argues that the passage is “riddled with ambiguity and uncertainty and requires readers’ active involvement in solving the riddles that this ambiguity creates in order to make sense of the text” (240). He is, interestingly, placing the quest for a meaning onto the readerly side of the interpretive coin, stressing even more than I have the subjectivity of the hermeneutical process.

Conclusion I have tried to illustrate in this short monograph how readerly perspectives old and new illuminate debates over meaning and often shape those meanings. One could enumerate many more examples, but this is a starter for an almost endless main course in that there will always be new perspectives and new insights into an ever-present text. I showed in part 1 how some of the methodological moves made by ancient interpreters still shed real light on the meaning of texts today, even though those interpreters were not so methodologically self-aware as we are. Chapter 1 showed how recurrent questions of the canonization of Ecclesiastes and of authorship, Solomonic or otherwise, are illuminated by ancient debates from early Jewish and Christian sources. Chapter 2 showed how an understanding of the vanity theme and the place of human beings within the created order are illuminated by a particular look at the method of dualism in contrast with the overturning of such views by the Reformers. In part 2 I tried to show that although the method, and awareness of it, is a first priority when reading texts, there is a real sense in which the reading makes a difference to the more objective evaluation of texts. Key texts in Ecclesiastes were particularly illuminated by the discussions in each chapter and by the interpretive method chosen, which showed that not all texts are illuminated by the same method and that different approaches shed light on different parts of the book. This goes against the idea that one “reading” will solve all problems and shows how a wider awareness of different methodologies is ultimately necessary when seeking to understand texts. In reality, then, these two “parts” of mine are two sides of a coin— those readers who did not reflect overtly on their method but just interpreted as they considered fit can still shed light on interpretive issues to do with books such as Ecclesiastes (and of course that approach could be extended throughout the canon) and those readers who do such reflection and are sometimes criticized for an overt subjectivity that is in opposition to objective analysis can also bring valuable insights into the “objective” camp often on a detailed level that sheds light on key passages. Ecclesiastes is a book that continues to fascinate—past and present interpreters have wrestled with the book’s anomalies and this process will no doubt continue. 95

Bibliography Ancient Interpreters Alcuin. Commentaria super Ecclesiasten. Pages 665–772 of Patrologia latina 100. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. 217 vols. Paris, 1844–64. Ambrose. Sancti Ambrosii Opera. Corpus scripturum ecclesiasticorum latinorum 32. Vindobonae: Temsky, 1896. Walsh, Patrick G., ed. De civitate Dei/Augustine. Oxford: Oxbow, 2005. Saint Bonaventure. Commentary on Ecclesiastes. Translation and notes by Campion Murray and Robert J. Karris. Works of St Bonaventure V/7; New York: Franciscan Institute, St Bonaventure University, 2005. Danby, Herbert. The Mishnah. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933. Elias of Crete. Opera Gregory Nazianzen. Paris: Gabalda, 1630. Epstein, Isidore, ed. Babylonian Talmud, Seder Moʾed 4. London: Soncino, 1938. Euripides. “The Suppliants,” in Euripides with English Translation. Vol. 3. New York: Putnam, 1930. Freedman, Harry, and Maurice Simon, eds. The Midrash 4: Leviticus. Translated by Judah J. Slotki. London: Soncino, 1939. ________. The Midrash 8: Ecclesiastes. Translated by Abraham Cohen. London: Soncino, 1939. ________. The Midrash 9: Song of Songs I.10. Translated by Maurice Simon. London: Soncino, 1939. Gregory Thaumaturgus. “A Metaphrase on the Book of Ecclesiastes.” Pages 9–17 of Ante-Nicene Fathers 6. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1886. Hall, Stuart G., ed. Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on Ecclesiastes; an English version with supporting studies; proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (St. Andrews, 5–10 September, 1990). Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990. Hugo of St. Victor. Homilies. Pages 113–256 in Patrologia latina 175. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. 217 vols. Paris, 1844–64. Jarick, John. Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes. Atlanta: Scholars, 1990. Jellinek, Adolph. Bet ha-Midrasch 2. Leipzig: Nies, 1853. ________. Commentar zu Kohelet und dem Hohen Liede von R. Samuel ben Meïr. Leipzig: Schnauss, 1855. Jerome. “Commentarius in Ecclesiasten.” Pages 1062–174 in Patrologia latina 23. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. Paris: Apud-Garnier, 1883.

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________. St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes. Translated and edited with a commentary by Richard J. Goodrich and David J. D. Miller. New York: Newman, 2012. Luther, Martin. “Notes on Ecclesiastes.” Pages 3–187 of Luther’s Works 15. St.  Louis: Concordia, 1972. Translation of “Annotationes in Ecclesiasten.” Pages 1–203 of Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe 20. Weimar: Böhlau, 1898. Nicholas of Lyra. “Commentarius.” Pages 31–150 of Sacra scriptura cursus completus 17. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. Paris: Gabalda, 1839. Origen. The Song of Songs Commentary and Homilies. Translated by R. P. Lawson. Ancient Christian Writers 26. Westminster: Newman, 1957. Vajda, Georges. “L’Enseignement de l’Ecclésiaste vue par Saadia Gaon.” Pages 1–7 in Deux commentaires Karaïtes sur L’Ecclésiaste. Études sur le Judaisme Médiéval 4. Leiden: Brill, 1971.

Modern Interpreters Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics, IV/2. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1955. Barton, George A. The Book of Ecclesiastes. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908. Barton, John. Reading the Old Testament. 2nd ed. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1996. ________. The Nature of Biblical Criticism. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2007. Bible and Culture Collective. The Postmodern Bible. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Boff, Leonardo. Saint Francis: A Model for Human Liberation. New York: Crossroad, 1982. ________. Introducing Liberation Theology. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987. Bonino, José Míguez. Revolutionary Theology Comes of Age. London: SPCK, 1975. Brenner, Athalya. “Wise and Counselling Women in Ancient Israel: Literary and Historical Ideals of the Personified ḥokmâ.” Pages 50–66 in A Feminist Companion to Wisdom Literature. Edited by Athalya Brenner. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995. Budde, Karl, Alfred Bertholet, and Gerrit Wildeboer. “Der Prediger.” In Die fünf Megillot. Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament 17. Freiburg: Mohr, 1898. Childs, Brevard S. Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979. Christianson, Eric S. “Qoheleth the ‘Old Boy’ and Qoheleth the ‘New Man’: Misogynism, the Womb and a Paradox in Ecclesiastes.” Pages 109–36 in Wisdom and Psalms. Edited by Athalya Brenner. Feminist Companion to the Bible, Series 2. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998. Crenshaw, James L. A Whirlpool of Torment. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984.

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________. “The Expression ‫ מי יודע‬in the Hebrew Bible.” Vetus Testamentum 36 (1986): 274–88. Reprinted as pages 271–91 in James L. Crenshaw, Urgent Advice and Probing Questions. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. Davidson, Robert. The Courage to Doubt. London: SCM, 1983. Davis, Ellen F. “Ecclesiastes.” Pages 159–228 in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs. Westminster Bible Companion. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2000. Dell, Katharine J. The Book of Job as Sceptical Literature. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 197. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991. ________. “Green Ideas in the Wisdom Tradition.” Scottish Journal of Theology 47/4 (1994): 423–51. ________. “The Use of Animal Imagery in the Psalms and Wisdom Literature of Ancient Israel.” Scottish Journal of Theology 53/3 (2000): 275–91. ________. “Plumbing the Depths of Earth: Job 28 and Deep Ecology.” Pages 116–25 of The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions. The Earth Bible Vol. 3. Edited by Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001. ________. The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ________. “The Significance of the Wisdom Tradition in the Ecological Debate.” Pages 56–69 in Ecological Hermeneutics. Edited by David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou. London: T. & T. Clark, 2010. ________. “Ecclesiastes as Mainstream Wisdom (without Job).” In Wisdom Traditions in the Hebrew Bible and Beyond. Edited by George J. Brooke and Pierre Van Hecke. Oudtestamentische Studien. Leiden: Brill, forthcoming. Fontaine, Carole. “‘Many Devices’ (Qoheleth 7:23–8:1): Qoheleth, Misogyny and the Malleus Maleficarum.” Pages 137–68 in A Feminist Companion to Wisdom and Psalms. Edited by Athalya Brenner and Carole Fontaine. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1988. Forman, Charles C. “Koheleth’s Use of Genesis.” Journal of Semitic Studies 5 (1960): 256–63. Forti, Tova. Animal Imagery in the Book of Proverbs. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Fox, Michael V. “Frame Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qohelet.” Hebrew Union College Annual 48 (1977): 83–106. ________. “The Meaning of hebel for Qohelet.” Journal of Biblical Literature 105/3 (1986): 409–27. ________. “Qohelet 1:4.” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 40 (1988): 109. ________. Qohelet and His Contradictions. Sheffield: Almond, 1989. ________. A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999.

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Fraade, Steven. From Tradition to Commentary: Torah and Its Interpretation in the Midrash Sifre to Deuteronomy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. Garrett, Duane A. “Ecclesiastes 7:25–28 and the Feminist Hermeneutic.” Criswell Theological Review 2 (1988): 309–21. ________. “Ecclesiastes.” Pages 253–345 of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs. New American Commentary. Nashville, TN: Broadman, 1993. Ginsberg, Harold L. Studies in Koheleth. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950. ________. “The Structure and Contents of the Book of Koheleth.” Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 3 (1955): 138–49. Ginsburg, Christian D. Coheleth: Commonly Called the Book of Ecclesiastes. London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1861. Gooder, Paula. Searching for Meaning: An Introduction to Interpreting the New Testament. London: SPCK, 2008. Gordis, Robert. Poets, Prophets and Sages. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971. ________. Koheleth—the Man and His World. New York: Schocken, 1973. ________. The Book of God and Man: A Study of Job. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. Graetz, Heinrich. Kohelet. Leipzig: Winter, 1871. Gutiérrez, Gustavo. A Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1971. ________. On Job: God-talk and the Suffering of the Innocent. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987. Habel, Norman C., ed. The Earth Bible. 5 vols. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000–2. Hatton, Peter T. H. Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs: The Deep Waters of Counsel. Society for Old Testament Studies Monograph Series. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. van Heerden, Willie., “Ecclesiastes 3:16–22: An Ecojustice Reading, with parallels from African Wisdom.” Pages 155–67 of The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions. The Earth Bible, Vol. 3. Edited by Norman C. Habel. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001. Hengel, Martin. Judaism and Hellenism. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974. Hitzig, Ferdinand and Wilhelm Nowack. Der Prediger Salomo’s erklärt. Leipzig: Weidmann, 1833. Holm-Nielsen, Sven. “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in Jewish and Christian Theology.” Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute 10 (1975–6): 38–96. Ingram, Doug. “‘Riddled with Ambiguity’: Ecclesiastes 7:23–8:1 as an Example.” Pages 221–42 in The Words of the Wise are Like Goads: Engaging Qohelet in the 21st Century. Edited by Mark J. Boda, Tremper Longman, III, and Cristian G. Rata. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013. Japhet, Sara and Robin Salters, eds. The Commentary of R. Samuel ben Meir, Rashbam, on Qoheleth. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985.

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Japhet, Sara. “‘Goes to the South and Turns to the North’ (Ecclesiastes 1:6): The Sources and History of the Exegetical Traditions.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 1 (1993/4): 289–322. Jastrow, Morris. A Gentle Cynic. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1919. Koosed, Jennifer L. (Per)mutations of Qohelet: Reading the Body in the Book. Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 429. New York: T. & T. Clark, 2006. Krüger, Thomas. Qoheleth: A Commentary. Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004. Lee, Eunny P. The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qoheleth’s Theological Rhetoric. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005. Leiman, Shnayer Z. The Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures. Hamden, CN: Arcon, 1976. Linzey, Andrew. Animal Theology. London: SCM, 1994. ________. Creatures of the Same God. Winchester: Winchester University Press, 2007. ________. Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophical, Theological and Practical Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Loader, J. A. Polar Structures in the Book of Qoheleth. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 152. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979. Lohfink, Norbert. Qoheleth. Continental Commentaries. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003. Longman, Tremper, III. The Book of Ecclesiastes. New International Commentary on the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998. Maltby, Arthur. “The Book of Ecclesiastes and the After-Life.” Evangelical Quarterly 35 (1963): 34–44. McNeile, Alan H. An Introduction to Ecclesiastes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904. Min, Y-J. “How Do the Rivers Flow? (Ecclesiastes 1:7).” The Bible Translator 42/2 (1991): 226–31. Murphy, Roland E. “Ecclesiastes (Qoheleth).” Pages 1:534–40 in the Jerome Bible Commentary. 2 vols. Edited by Raymond Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer, and Roland E. Murphy. London: Prentice Hall, 1968. ________, ed. Medieval Exegesis of Wisdom Literature: Essays by B. Smalley. Atlanta: Scholars, 1986. ________. Ecclesiastes. Word Biblical Commentary 23A. Dallas, TX: Word, 1992. Newsom, Carol A. “Ideological and Post-critical Perspectives.” Pages 541–59 in Method Matters: Essays on the Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Honor of David L. Petersen. Edited by Joel M. LeMon and Kent H. Richards. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009. Ogden, Graham. “The Interpretation of ‫ דור‬in Ecclesiastes 1:4.” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 34 (1986): 91–92. Perdue, Leo G. The Sword and the Stylus. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008. ________. Wisdom and Creation. Nashville: Abingdon, 1994. Podechard, Emmanuel. L’Ecclésiaste. Paris: Gabalda, 1912.

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________. “La composition du livre de l’Ecclésiaste.” Revue Biblique. Nouvelle Serie 9 (1912): 161–91. Priest, John F. “Humanism, Skepticism and Pessimism in Israel.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 36 (1968): 311–26. von Rad, Gerhard. Old Testament Theology. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965. ________. Wisdom in Israel. London: SCM, 1972. Reed, Esther D. “Whither Postmodernism and Feminist Theology?” Feminist Theology 6 (1994): 15–29. Ricoeur, Paul. The Symbolism of Evil. Boston: Beacon, 1969. ________. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Edited by Don Ihde. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974. ________. Essays on Biblical Interpretation. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980. Rosenblatt, Samuel. Saadia Gaon: The Book of Beliefs and Opinions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. Rupp, E. Gordon, ed. Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969. Ryle, Herbert E. The Canon of the Old Testament. London: Macmillan, 1892. Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon, 1978. Salters, Robin B. “Qoheleth and the Canon.” Expository Times 86 (1974–75): 339–42. Sandberg, Ruth. “Qohelet and the Rabbis.” Pages 37–54 in The Words of the Wise are Like Goads: Engaging Qohelet in the 21st Century. Edited by Mark J. Boda, Tremper Longman, III, and Cristian G. Rata. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013. Segundo, Juan L. Liberation of Theology. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1976. Seow, Choon-Leong. “Beyond Mortal Grasp: The Usage of hebel in Ecclesiastes.” Australian Biblical Review 48 (2000): 1–16. ________. Ecclesiastes. Anchor Bible 18C. New York: Doubleday, 1997. Sheppard, Gerald T. “The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary.” CBQ 39 (1977): 182–89. Sheridan, Sybil. “The Five Megilloth.” Pages 293–317 in Creating the Old Testament. Edited by Stephen Bigger. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Shields, Martin A. The End of Wisdom: A Reappraisal of the Historical and Canonical Function of Ecclesiastes. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006. Siegfried, K. Prediger und Hoheslied. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1898. Sneed, Mark. “Is the ‘Wisdom Tradition’ a Tradition?” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 73 (2011): 50–71. Spanner, Huw. “Tyrants, Stewards – or Just Kings?” Pages 216–224 in Animals on the Agenda. Edited by Andrew Linzey and D. Yamamoto. London: SCM, 1998. Sugiratharajah, Rasiah S. Voices from the Margin: The Bible in the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Swidler, Leonard J. Biblical Affirmations of Woman. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1979.

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Tamez, Elsa. When the Horizons Close: Rereading Ecclesiastes. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2000. Thistleton, Anthony C. New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading. London: HarperCollins, 1992. Vosté, J.–M. “L’Oeuvre Exégétique de Théodore de Mopsueste au IIe Concile de Constantinople.” Revue Biblique 38 (1929): 542–54. Weeks, Stuart. An Introduction to the Study of Wisdom Literature. London: T. & T. Clark, 2010. Whybray, R. Norman. “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy.” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 23 (1982): 87–98. ________. Ecclesiastes. Old Testament Guide. Sheffield: Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Press, 1989. ________. The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament. BZAW 135. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974. Wilson, Gerald H. “The Words of the Wise: The Intent and Significance of Qoheleth 12:9–14.” Journal of Biblical Literature 103 (1984): 175–92. Wilson, Lindsay. “Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1:1–11: A Wisdom Technique?” Pages 357–65 in Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom. Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 136. Edited by A. Schoors. Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 1998.

Index of Authors (Old and New) Alcuin 43 Ambrose 49 Augustine  53, 54 Barth, K.  2 Barton, J.  2, 3, 5, 15, 16, 18, 69, 71, 88 Bertholet, A.  18 Boff, L.  69, 76 Bonaventure  46, 48, 51, 52 Brenner, A.  84, 86, 88, 90 Budde, K.  18 Childs, B. S.  3, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 34, 35 Christianson, E. S.  84, 87, 88 Crenshaw, J. L.  74 Davidson, R.  10 Davis, E. F.  87 Dell, K. J.  10, 12, 59, 60, 61, 69, 93 Eichrodt, W.  4 Elias of Crete  55 Euripides 72 Fontaine, C.  88 Forman, C. C.  26 Forti, T.  69 Fox, M. V.  17, 26, 55, 61, 62 Fraade, S. D.  39

Garrett, D. A.  85, 88, 89, 90 Ginsberg, H. L.  33 Ginsburg, C. D.  28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 43, 49, 50, 53 Gooder, P.  76 Gordis, R.  11, 16, 91 Graetz, H.  18 Gregory of Nyssa  43 Gregory of Sicily  43 Gregory Thaumaturgus  30, 38, 43, 44, 45 Gutiérrez, G.  69, 76 Habel, N. C.  59, 60 Hatton, P. T. H.  10, 92 Heerden, W. van  60 Hengel, M.  72, 73 Hitzig, F.  18 Holm-Nielsen, S.  14, 33, 38, 39, 51, 53 Hugo of St. Victor  48, 49, 50 Ibn Ezra, A.  38, 43, 49 Ingram, D.  94 Japhet, S.  13, 63 Jarick, J.  30, 43, 44, 45 Jastrow, M.  27 Jerome  13, 14, 31, 32, 33, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55

103

104

Index of Authors (Old and New)

Koosed, J. L.  85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92 Krüger, T.  74, 80, 81, 92 Lee, E. P.  10, 54, 55 Leiman, S. Z.  18, 26, 27 Linzey, A.  68, 69, 70 Loader, J. A.  15 Lohfink, N.  72 Longman, T., III  71, 73, 74 Luther, M.  9, 14, 32, 33, 38, 45, 46, 47, 48

Rosenblatt, S.  39 Rupp, E. G.  46 Ryle, H. E.  18

Newsom, C. A.  4 Nicholas of Lyra  31 Nowack, W.  18

Saadia Gaon  39 Said, E.  78 Salonius 55 Salters, R.  13, 27 Sandberg, R.  9 Segundo J. L.  77 Seow, Choon-Leong  55 Sheppard, G. T.  18, 20, 21, 67 Sheridan, S.  11 Shields, M. A.  74 Siegfried, K.  16 Smalley, B.  50, 51 Sneed, M.  12 Spanner, H.  70, 71 Sugiratharajah, R. S.  77, 78, 79 Swidler, L. J.  89

Ogden, G.  62 Olympiodorus of Alexandria  43 Origen  40, 45, 50

Tamez, E.  76, 82 Theodore of Mopsuestia  42 Thistleton, A.  1

Perdue, L. G.  59, 78, 79 Philastrius 53 Podechard, E.  16, 17 Priest, J. F.  10

Vajda, G.  39 Vosté, J.–M.  42

Maltby, A.  72, 73 McNeile, A. H.  16 Min, Y.-J.  63 Murphy, R. E.  17, 71, 92

Rad, G. von  4, 10, 18 Rashbam  13, 49 Rashi  25, 38, 39, 49 Reed, E. D.  88 Ricoeur, P.  1, 2

Weeks, S  12 Whybray, R. N.  10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 61 Wildeboer, G.  18 Wilson, G. H.  18, 19, 20 Wilson, L.  62, 67

Index of Scripture Old Testament Genesis 1  43, 46 1–11 26 1:31 51 2:7  71, 73, 74 2:18–19 74 2:23 71 3 89 3:16  88, 89 3:19 26 3:19b 73 Leviticus 23:10 24 28:1 24 Numbers 15:39  24, 26 Deuteronomy 32:1 39 Judges 5:31 24 1 Kings 8:1 28 2 Kings 3:15 23 Job 10:9 73

Job (cont.) 12:7–9 68 12:10 73 28  59, 91, 93 34:14 73 34:15 73 36:27–28 63 38–40 69 Psalms 1 21 8:6–8 71 49:12 73 49:21 73 90:3 73 104:29 73 104:29–30 73 Proverbs 1  18, 91 1–9  19, 92, 93 1:7 59 5:1–6 93 6:21 91 7:12 91 7:22–23 91 7:27 91 14:31 82 18:4 93 18:22 93 20:5 93 21:9 91 22:14 93

105

Proverbs (cont.) 23:27 93 25:1 19 25:24 91 27:15 91 Ecclesiastes 1:1  14, 16, 31, 52 1:1–2 61 1:1–3 61 1:2  13, 30, 44, 52, 55, 67 1:2–3 37 1:2–4 50 1:2–6:12 32 1:3  24, 25, 26, 41, 44, 47, 49, 52, 61, 64 1:3–11  57, 62 1:4  44, 62, 64 1:4–7  44, 61, 65 1:4–9 61 1:5  39, 52, 62, 63, 65 1:5–6 63 1:5–7  39, 40, 45, 61, 64 1:5–11 50 1:6  52, 63 1:7  45, 63 1:8  25, 45, 63, 64 1:9  25, 31, 45, 64 1:9–11 43

106 Ecclesiastes (cont.) 1:10  25, 31, 64 1:11  43, 49, 64 1:12  15, 28, 29, 31, 34, 50, 61, 90 1:12–2:26 66 1:13  25, 44 1:14 44 1:15  16, 39, 45 1:16  31, 34 1:18  16, 49 2:4 49 2:4–6 66 2:7 34 2:8  34, 86, 87 2:11  34, 90 2:12 34 2:14 16 2:17 42 2:20 13 2:24  25, 37, 53 2:26  13, 15 3:1 47 3:1–8  57, 65, 82 3:2  66, 86 3:12–13 37 3:13  26, 52 3:15 52 3:16 74 3:16–17 41 3:16–21 67 3:17  13, 42 3:18  47, 74 3:18–19 70 3:18–21  14, 57, 61, 66, 68, 70 3:19–20  67, 71, 73, 74 3:19–21 72 3:20  67, 71, 73 3:21  41, 66, 67, 71, 72 3:22 74 4:1–3 80

Index of Scripture Ecclesiastes (cont.) 4:1–3  57, 76, 80, 82 4:2–3 41 4:4 46 4:7 14 4:8  41, 52 4:9 80 4:10 42 4:12 42 5:2–7 15 5:8–9 81 5:8–9  57, 76, 82 5:17–19 37 6 5 6:6 71 7:1–12:14 32 7:6–23 93 7:8 49 7:14 37 7:23  52, 87, 90 7:23–8  88, 94 7:23–8:1  5, 57 7:23–29  84, 87, 90 7:24 52 7:25–28  85, 88, 89 7:25–29  87, 88 7:26  86, 87 7:26a 84 7:26–29  85, 87 7:27  16, 86 7:28 86 7:28a 84 7:29 90 8:1  88, 90, 93, 94 8:11–13 73 8:12–13 13 8:14 13 8:15  25, 37 9:1–2 13 9:3–7 15 9:4 70 9:5 73 9:7 70 9:7–10 37

Ecclesiastes (cont.) 9:9  85, 86, 87, 94 9:10  71, 73 9:12 70 9:13–16 42 9:13–18 93 10:1 70 10:8 70 10:11 70 10:19 70 10:20 70 11:3–5  57, 64 11:7  37, 65 11:9  24, 26, 73 11:10 50 12:1 37 12:1–7  31, 57 12:1–14 50 12:2 65 12:5 65 12:7  26, 52, 67, 68, 72, 73 12:9 35 12:9–14  16, 17, 18, 67 12:13  19, 20, 21, 26 12:13–14 20 12:14 20 Jeremiah 7:5–7 80 Ezekiel 22:29 80 Daniel 12:3 72 Amos 4:1 80 Zechariah 7:9–20 80

Index of Scripture

107

Apocrypha Ben Sira 1 20 17:6–15 20 43:27 20

Sirach 34:15 73 40:11  71, 72

New Testament Matthew 3:17 31 Luke 12:20 41

John 14:27 31

2 Corinthians 4:18 56