Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia: From Development Communication to Communication Development in Decentralized Indonesia 3658355328, 9783658355326

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Subekti Priyadharma

Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia From Development Communication to Communication Development in Decentralized Indonesia

Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia

Subekti Priyadharma

Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia From Development Communication to Communication Development in Decentralized Indonesia

Subekti Priyadharma Philosophy, Communication University of Erfurt Germany and Padjadjaran University Bandung, Indonesia Dissertation, Universität Erfurt, 2021 The work is based on the dissertation with the same title that was submitted to the University of Erfurt in 2020.

ISBN 978-3-658-35532-6 ISBN 978-3-658-35533-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Responsible Editor: Stefanie Eggert This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

To my wife Imung and my children Dharma, Naomi, and Kai without whom the study and this book wouldn’t have been completed.

Acknowledgements

Financial supports for this study were provided by grants from the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst/DAAD) through the programs Long-term Research Grants for Doctoral Studies (scholarship period: October 1st , 2013 – April 31, 2016; code number A/12/77706) and STIBET – Doktorandenförderung (funds from the Federal Foreign Office of Germany; scholarship period: October 1st , 2016 – December 31, 2016) as well as from the University of Erfurt through Stipendiums zum Abschluss der Promotion (scholarship period: May 1st , 2016 – September 30, 2016). The author would like to acknowledge the support by those organizations and express their gratitude. The author wishes to thank Prof. Dr. phil. habil. Kai Hafez (University of Erfurt) and Prof. Dr. phil. habil. Christoph Antweiler (University of Bonn) as the first and second supervisor respectively for their guidance and supervision throughout the research process and the writing of the dissertation.

vii

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Problem definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Structure of the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 5

2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Historical Account of Indonesian National Development (Communication): From the Authoritarian to a Democratic System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 The Old Order (Orde Lama): “Politics as the Commander” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 The New Order (Orde Baru): “Economy as the Commander” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Reformasi: Transition to Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Power Struggle Between Center-periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Decentralization Policy or Regional Autonomy . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Changes in National Development Policies . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Contextualizing Desa: Re-pluralization of Desa as a Means to Empower the Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Social and Cultural Marginalization of Desa . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Rural Internet in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Development Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Definitions of Development Communication . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Paradigms of Development (Communication) Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 8 13 21 23 23 27 34 42 44 57 57 57 61

ix

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Contents

3.1.2.1 The Dominant Paradigm and the Top-down Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2.2 The Opposing Paradigm: Reclaiming the Significance of the Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2.3 The Alternative Paradigm: Stimulating Active Participation from Bottom . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2.3.1 Participation and Empowerment as Integral parts of the Bottom-up Approach . . . . . . . 3.1.2.3.2 What do we know about Bottom-up Development? . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Positioning ICT in Development Practices: ICT4D as the Common term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3.1 ICT in Mass Media as “Diffuser” . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3.2 Technology of new Digital Media as “Enabler” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3.3 Technology as “Amplifier”: Rejecting Technology as the Savior of Development . . . . 3.2 The Public Sphere(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Structural Theory of Imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Communicational and Structural Relations of Center and Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Power Dimension in Center-periphery Relations . . . . . . . 3.4 Theoretical Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 67 71

78 84 91 92 96 99 102 109 109 115 119

4 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123

5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Grounded Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Participatory Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Degree of Participation and the Role of the Researcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Enter and Exit Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Data Analysis of Grounded Theory Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Coding Process 1: Open or Initial Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Coding process 2: Focused or Selective Coding (Theoretical Coding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Memo-writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Limitations of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

127 128 131 132 134 135 136 137 139 141

Contents

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5.5 Ethical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Methodological Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

142 144

6 Research Field, Subjects and Informants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Melung Village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Gerakan Desa Membangun (GDM) or Village Development Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 The Establishment and Principles of GDM . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 The Movement’s Signature: Internet, New ICTs and desa.id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 From the Bottom Upward: GDM as an Organic Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.4 Collectiveness and Network-Making as the Structure of the Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Informants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Khoerudin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Margino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Budi Satrio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 Jakarta Tisam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.5 Yossy Suparyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.6 Budiman Sudjatmiko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.7 Aris Kurniawan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.8 Lisa Lindawati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.9 Citra Lestari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.10 Taryono . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.11 Pak Kayim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.12 Sardi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.13 Syarifudin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.14 Sukirno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

147 147

7 Empirical Findings and Analysis Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Toward a Theory of Communication Development . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 The Six Cs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1.1 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1.2 Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1.3 Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1.4 Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1.5 Covariance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1.6 Contingent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

156 156 158 161 162 167 169 169 170 171 172 174 175 176 177 178 179 181 183 186 189 189 193 193 196 198 200 202 203

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Contents

7.1.2

Bottom-up Process of Communication Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2.1 On the Legitimation of Bottom-up Strategy: Why Bottom-up is Never Started from the Bottom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2.2 The Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Communication Empowerment as the Foundation of Communication Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 The Problem of Inherent Inequality in Empowerment: Is Empowerment the Appropriate Term? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 The Question of Collectivity: From Empowerment to Self-empowerment to Collective and Connective Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3 The Means and Goals of Communication Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.4 The Need for Literacy in Communication Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

204

205 212 297

299

303 305 311

8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

317

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

327

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

329

List of Figures

Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3 Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2 Figure 5.3 Figure 5.4 Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3

Habermas’s model of center-periphery (Habermas, 1996; illustration by author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Galtung’s center-periphery model (Galtung, 1971, p. 84) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Galtung’s model of feudal center-periphery structure (Galtung, 1971, p. 89) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Using SWOT analysis to discuss Melung’s potential to prepare a roadmap for an ecotourism village . . . . . . . . . . Theoretical memo of communication development: Definition and stages of communication development . . . . . Memo on “communication development” instead of “development communication” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Teenage girls playing with their smartphones at one of Melung’s internet hotspots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Junior high school students enthusiastically study computer technology in groups in the computer lab . . . . . . Elementary school children head home after a day of study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A member of the Family Welfare Development (PKK) women’s empowerment program weighs an infant at the Posyandu or Maternal and Child Health Services, which operates at the grassroots level. Both PKK and Posyandu are legacies of the New Order’s participatory development programs in health and family sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

110 111 112 134 140 141 143 149 150

151

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xiv

Figure 6.4

Figure 6.5 Figure 6.6

Figure 6.7

Figure 6.8

Figure 6.9 Figure 6.10

Figure 6.11 Figure 6.12 Figure 6.13 Figure 7.1

Figure 7.2 Figure 7.3

List of Figures

Internet network system within Melung Village. Four separated areas indicate the neighborhoods of Melung (Depok, Kaliputra, Melung, Selarendeng), while the arrows signify the transmission of internet signals from the former chief’s house (1) to other receivers/repeaters in the houses of village officials. However, one of them (8) who lived in the 4th neighborhood, received no transmission of internet signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A mattress seller stops to check his phone at one of the Internet accessible areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An Omni Wi-Fi antenna atop a bamboo pole at the house of a village official. Behind it is a satellite dish for TV transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet speed test in Melung using the village intra-network at house no. 5 at 5:40 p.m. on December 10, 2014. The test was conducted using www.speedtest.net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inside the CAP room: Women (housewives, farmers) and children using the service to develop their computer skills or surf the net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The homepage of Melung’s Village website . . . . . . . . . . . . . An informal meeting or “learning circle” of Melung’s former chief and initiator of GDM (second from right) along with village officials and three members of PNPM Support Facility (PSF; on the left) . . . . . . . . . . . . Memo about “undervalued knowledge” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sardi returning from a bamboo field. The bamboo would be used to build a kiosk in front of his home . . . . . . Approaching a Karang Taruna activist at the plantation for an impromptu interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An oversize poster of Melung’s 2018 budget allocation outside of the village office as a form of information transparency and accountability to the public . . . . . . . . . . . . The interface display of Melung’s Village website on the go.id platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An illustration of the contra-flow communication pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

152 153

154

154

155 160

163 181 183 184

206 217 220

List of Figures

Figure 7.4 Figure 7.5 Figure 7.6

Figure 7.7 Figure 7.8 Figure 7.9

Figure 7.10

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The interface display of Melung’s Village website under www.indonesiamembangun.id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Model of communication leap in communication development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Convergent communication pattern or the “bridging” process of communication development between center and periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A new networked structure of center-periphery relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Screenshot of an online article about Melung Village in KataData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Welcome banner at the northeast gate of Melung village, on its border with neighboring Ketenger village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The dynamic and fluctuating knowledge-based model of center-periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

246 248

253 257 260

262 292

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 6.1

The six economic corridors of MP3EI and their development tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mainstream or dominant versus alternative paradigm of development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Basic Features of Communication Modes according to Mefalopulos (2008, p. 24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Composition of informants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 73 77 168

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1

Introduction

1.1

Problem definition

This research explores bottom-up development practices initiated and organized by rural communities in the Indonesian periphery by placing “communication” at its core of analysis. The aim is to determine the extent that the use of internet and other digital Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has affected the theory and practice of development communication within the context of Indonesian rural development. Thus, “development communication” becomes the umbrella term from which this research departs. During the authoritarian New Order military regime, with Suharto at the helm during its 32-year-rule (1966–1998), development projects—and consequently development communication—were characterized by their top-down unilinearity. The situation periodically changed with the advent of the Reformasi1 (reform) era when Suharto stepped down from power. Implementation of the decentralization strategy in the 21st century is intended to strengthen the regions politically and economically and to equalize development outcomes between the center and the outlying parts of the archipelago. The political transition has brought changes in the development communication approach taken by the Indonesian central government, which subsequently has moved toward more participatory and interactive approaches.

1

Reformasi or reform (sometimes called “reformation”) is the era that commenced with the end of the 32-year authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998. The decision of Suharto to quit power followed widespread rioting after the shooting deaths of several students in Jakarta. Students had taken to the streets to protest human rights abuses amid catastrophic economic freefall.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_1

1

2

1

Introduction

Until 2014, the decentralization policy, known as otonomi daerah (regional autonomy), focused on strengthening the regencies and municipalities, both termed centers in the periphery in this research (cf. Galtung, 1971). However, after the Village Law (No. 6/2014) came into effect in 2015, the political position of the regencies weakened, particularly vis-à-vis villages as the latter gained more autonomy to arrange their development agenda, including managing their own budget and resources. The Village Law is in line with President Joko Widodo’s (to be referred to as Jokowi on second reference) declared development policy, focused on rebuilding Indonesia from its peripheries instead of from the center, in contrast to Suharto, who was accused of being Java- and Jakarta-centric.2 At this point, the periphery has found its significance in Indonesia’s development and political maps, reversing the situation of the New Order in which rural communities were depoliticized (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010; Case, 2010; Ward, 2010). The center-periphery power dynamic in Indonesia has caused many adjustments in the way rural communities and the central/regional (local) governments interact and communicate with each other, leading to the urgent need for center-periphery “communication development”. Rural empowerment is a further progression of Indonesia’s effort to strengthen regional autonomy that began with Reformasi. The Village Law’s intent is to accelerate Indonesian decentralization processes and to extend the distribution of power to reach villages, the lowest administrative unit in the Indonesian government hierarchy. A group of rural communities (Village Development Movement/GDM) has taken progressive steps to make themselves heard by the broader Indonesian public as a communicative effort to free themselves from the structural dependence on their centers.3 The communicative action (Habermas, 1984, 1987) of the villagers is intended to create balanced communication in the public sphere between center and periphery. As the mainstream public sphere has been dominated by the center through its economic and political capital (Habermas, 1991), the creation and use of alternative public spheres are crucial to counter the communication dominance of the central over the peripheries (Downey & Fenton, 2003; Fenton & Downey, 2003; 2

Nawacita: Visi, Misi, dan Program Aksi Jokowi dan Jusuf Kalla (Nine Priority Programs: Vision, mission, and action program of Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla; author’s translation), 2014. Retrieved on August 31, 2015 from http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_Jokowi-JK. pdf 3 The order of hierarchical power, which constitutes the “centers” within the Indonesian bureaucratic system from the most superior to the most inferior, are the central government, the province, the city/regency (Kota/Kabupaten), the district (Kecamatan), and finally the village/urban-village (Desa/Kelurahan).

1.1 Problem definition

3

Wimmer, 2007). It is in this context that the internet and other new digital ICTs play important roles for rural communities as a means of achieving the goals of communication development of the periphery. Rural ICT is considered to be the answer to bridging the digital divide between urban and rural areas. The lack of development in rural areas is the result of political marginalization in Indonesian development politics through rural depoliticization and isolation (see 2.2.4.). Internet technology is expected to overcome the communication isolation of rural communities through its ability to build networks and connectivity (Castells, 2009, 2011). In conjunction with this, Indonesia committed to fulfill the World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) agreement “to connect villages with ICTs and establish community access points”4 by 2015 within each participating country as a massive global digitalization project. The utilization of ICT in rural areas is deemed to accelerate development activity and guarantee equitable development between the Indonesian center and periphery. Internet support of rural ICT is also expected to accelerate human development projects in the villages because it offers access to an almost unlimited amount of information and knowledge, and overcomes the technical, economic and geographic restrictions that exist in traditional media, both print and electronic. Aside from serving consumers of information, digital technology also allows rural communities to maximize their potential as producers of information, which will fill alternative public spheres with authentic rural-related issues voiced directly from the bottom (voicing the voiceless), and not those reported by the mainstream media as representations of the dominant public sphere. Thus, rural ICT is expected to enable the communication empowerment of the rural community through public participation in a self-controlled and self-organized public sphere. Theoretically, decentralization indicates the will for transformation of the development communication pattern, from the instructional-top-down type to a more participatory-bottom-up development communication. The latter is noteworthy because it will bring about “social justice to all Indonesian people”, which is the fifth pillar of the Indonesian state ideology Pancasila. It is the antithesis of the New Order’s development communication policy, which preferred the former type of pattern. Bottom-up development communication is viewed as a means to stimulate the creation of genuine development ideas that are generated from the grassroots and 4

Geneva Plan of Action (Article 6). World Summit of the Information Society. Retrieved on May 23, 2014 from http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html

4

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Introduction

not dictated from above by the government. With this method, it is expected that plural and context-specific development goals are set while at the same time rejecting the New Order’s one-dimensional development perspective (see 3.1.2.3. on “multiplicity” and “another development”; Servaes, 1999; Servaes & Lie, 2013). However, to this date, studies that discuss both the internet and Indonesian civil society have not touched upon the dimension of center-periphery relations within the context of decentralization and development communication, let alone the problem of addressing the public sphere in the mix. For example, while Nugroho (2008a, 2010, 2011) does study the use of the internet for rural development, he sees it from the viewpoint of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). A range of studies from Lim (2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2013, 2018) discusses the internet and its role for Indonesian social movements and political activism, mainly in urban areas. Although Tremblay’s (2018) study brings community-based internet in Indonesia to the fore, she conducted the research in the sub-urban area of the kampung. Meanwhile, Lindawati (n.d., 2014), while using similar research subjects, focuses on the issues of rural citizen journalism practice and village self-dependence. This research aims to address this shortfall. It examines the extent that the Indonesian decentralization policy and use of new ICTs have effected changes in development communication theories and practices, as well as in relations between the center and the periphery, in which the communicative actions (Habermas, 1984, 1987) of center and periphery in various public spheres play a key role (Habermas, 1991, 1992). Periphery research, which is the study adopting the periphery’s perspective in center-periphery interactions and relations—in the context of domestic development politics—has rarely been used in recent decades. As a theoretical reasoning, this research relies heavily on the theses of Galtung (1971) and Habermas (1996) who also study the relations between centers and peripheries in regard to the structural imperialism and the public sphere respectively. By intentionally putting weight on “communication” in the analysis, this research aims to develop, modify and at the same time re-signify development communication theory by contextualizing it in the local conditions of rural communities in Indonesia today. For this study, Melung Village in Central Java province was chosen as the main research field due to its status as the so-called “internet village”. Data was collected from November 2014—February 2015 in five Indonesian municipalities and regencies: Purwokerto/Banyumas, Yogyakarta, Majalengka, Bandung and Jakarta.

1.2 Structure of the book

1.2

5

Structure of the book

Apart from the introductory (Chapter 1) and concluding (Chapter 8) chapters, this book is divided into three major parts: theoretical (Chapters 2–4), methodological (Chapter 5), and empirical (Chapters 6–7). The literature review presented in the next chapter (Chapter 2) reviews three important points that are the main subjects of this book, namely development and development communication, center-periphery relations and ICT for rural development. Therefore, development and development communication practices in Indonesia must be reviewed historically by dividing them into three important periods of Indonesian governance: The Old Order, the New Order and the reform period (2.1.). Furthermore, the center-periphery relationship in Indonesia (2.2.) will be discussed through using the decentralization policy as a starting point. Discussions about the role and position of villages in political, social and cultural settings in Indonesia must be placed in the context of central-regional relations and, at this point, the Village Law has an important role in changing the pattern of those relations. The literature review section will conclude with a discussion of current studies about rural internet development as well as about rural development plans in Indonesia, which are part of Indonesia’s Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D) project (2.3.). After the literature review, we will enter into the theory section (Chapter 3), which also raises three issues that are used as theoretical foundations, although not strictly due to the methodological choices, of this research. The first part of the theoretical framework reviews theories about development communication and their various paradigms and approaches, which form the theoretical umbrella for this research. This section also includes theoretical discussions on ICT4D because it is integrally part of the study and practice of development communication (3.1.). The second theory in this chapter is theories about the public sphere and counterpublic sphere, which are important to explain the phenomenon of public participation in the formation of public opinion, especially regarding development messages. This theory is beneficial in explaining the struggle of center and periphery to compete to win the dominance of discourse in the public sphere (3.2.). The third block of theory is derived from Galtung’s (1971) conception of the structure of imperialism, which includes discussion of center-periphery relation, both from the aspect of communication and power (3.3.). A theoretical matrix will be presented in the concluding section of this chapter to weave together the three theoretical blocks to produce an integrated theoretical framework for this research (3.4.).

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Introduction

After discussing the theory, Chapter 4 explains the purpose of this research, including raising the research questions. Meanwhile, in Chapter 5 we enter the methodological discussions that outline the reasons for selecting Grounded Theory (5.1.) and participatory observation (5.2.) as methods. The chapter also presents the process of data analysis (5.3.) along with other methodological considerations such as research limitations (5.4.), ethical issues (5.5.) and methodological reflection (5.6.). The empirical section (Chapter 6) begins by describing the subject and field of research, namely Melung Village (6.1.) and the rural movement GDM (6.2.), along with the key informants of this research (6.3.). In Chapter 7, we reach the core of this research, namely the findings and the analysis of research results. The chapter is divided into two major sub-chapters, regarding the process of bottom-up communication development (7.1.) and communication empowerment (7.2.). This book ends with a concluding chapter (Chapter 8), which in addition to linking the research objectives and questions with the research findings, also contains recommendations for future research.

2

Literature Review

This section will concentrate on three aspects: first, the politics of national development in Indonesia, especially its historical transformation from top-down to bottom-up development (communication) policy, or the combination of both; second, the tension between the central government and the regions that arose in the aftermath of the Reformasi, which is influenced by the implementation of decentralization policy. This part highlights the dynamics of rural development and the position of periphery in national development. Finally, this section discusses the development of rural internet and ICT policy within development discourse in Indonesia.

2.1

Historical Account of Indonesian National Development (Communication): From the Authoritarian to a Democratic System

Since independence in 1945, Indonesia has experienced three distinct government periods: The Old Order (1945–1966), the New Order (1966–1998) and the reform (1998–present). Changes in political leadership play a significant role in determining the direction of Indonesian development. The significant change in Indonesia’s development policy is seen from the shifting vision from centralized development policy in both early regimes (the Old and the New Order) to a more decentralized one in the reform era. Furthermore, the transformation of the Indonesian development communication policy is closely related to changes in the development policy. Consequently, both issues must be discussed side-by-side.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_2

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2.1.1

2

Literature Review

The Old Order (Orde Lama):“Politics as the Commander”

Throughout the Old Order, led by Sukarno as the president, Indonesia was considered to have insufficient capability to achieve successful economic development programs. The political instability that ensued shortly despite the declaration of independence in August 1945 is considered the cause of this incapability. At that time, Indonesia tried to assert its political identity and establish its influence in the world and among the Third World countries. However, the country’s primary objective was to defend its independence, both physically and diplomatically, from the recurring attacks of the imperialist forces of the Dutch and the allies. During the Revolutionary War, Indonesian fighters used rural areas as the basis to defend their freedom and launch counter-attacks. From the outset of the Indonesian struggle for independence, villages had a vital and active role and contributed greatly to the process of establishing the new nation of Indonesia (Adeng, Dahlan, & Imadudin, 2010; Wisnuwardana, 2009). After the cessation of the Revolutionary War, with recognition of Indonesia’s independence by the Netherlands in 1949, the nation faced difficulties managing the economy due to many threats of domestic disintegration through the emergence of many rebellions and separatist movements (Subkhan, 2014). Some of these arose due to the inequality of development between the Indonesian center (Java) and peripheries (outlying regions outside Java), such as the protest of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/Universal Struggle (PRRI/Permesta) in Sumatra and Sulawesi in the 1950s-1960s. Others were politically motivated, i.e., the rebellion of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Madiun (1948), the Islamic State (DI/TII; 1949–1962) and the RMS or the Republic of South Maluku (from 1950). Additionally, Indonesia endured periods of tension with foreign countries, including Malaysia (politics of confrontation; 1962–1966) and former colonial overlord the Netherlands (the Trikora war or the war to “liberate” West Irian/Papua; 1961–1962). During that time, the parliamentary/liberal democracy system (1945–1959) was unable to provide domestic political stability, crucial for a steady and successful campaign of national development. Due to disputes between the ruling parties in parliament, frequent cabinet failures and overhauls were common. Within nine years (1950–1959), there were seven cabinet reshuffles. The various conflicts inevitably caused political and economic instability within the country. Sukarno’s government, especially during the Guided Democracy period, placed “politik sebagai panglima” or “politics as the commander” (Mas’oed, 1989; cf. Robison & Hadiz, 2004), as its jargon to guide general national development. It shows that Indonesia focused its development policy

2.1 Historical Account of Indonesian National Development …

9

on politics over economic concerns. “Revolution” was both the paradigm and means to achieve development goals (Lutan & Hong, 2005, p. 436; Subkhan, 2014, p. 136). “Guided Economy” is the term used for Indonesia’s economic development policy in the Old Order era (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, pp. 45–46). It was directed inward and included protectionism of national interests and the nationalization of Dutch-held companies that remained long after the independence (Law No. 86/1958). On the other hand, Indonesia’s political orientation was distinctly outward-directed. At that time, Sukarno concentrated domestic power in himself through the National Front, which was based on three ideologies: nationalism, religion and communism (Nasakom). To the outside world, Sukarno showed his political leadership by building an alliance of The New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as well as organizing the Asia-Africa Summit or the Bandung Conference in 1955, effectively challenging the two biggest blocs of world power, i.e., the American and Soviet Union blocs, in the midst of the Cold War (Lutan & Hong, 2005). With such a strategy, he was able to bring Indonesia to the world’s political attention. Mass media were instrumentalized as a means to serve Sukarno’s ideology and political purposes. The establishment of state-owned television company TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia) was derived from his idea that press and politics are two intertwined elements in a revolutionary state. TVRI’s debut broadcast was of the 4th Asian Games in Jakarta in August 1962 with the task of “elevating the image of the nation …”1 . The press therefore functioned strategically as “a tool of the Revolution” (Hill & Sen, 2005, p. 18), to support Sukarno’s political views in fighting all sorts of colonialism, imperialism, feudalism and capitalism, with which Sukarno intended “to build the world anew”2 using the NEFO as its vehicle of change (cf. Lutan & Hong, 2005, p. 430). From its role as pers perjuangan or “press of political struggle” during the revolution, the press assumed a new role of shaping public opinion (Hill & Sen, 2005, p. 18). The coalition of the press and politics was formalized by Sukarno when his information minister announced The Ministerial Decision No. 29/SK/M/65 on ‘[t]he Basic Norms for Press Enterprises within the Context of the Promotion of the Indonesian Press’, in which it was determined “that all newspapers [must] affiliate formally with a political party, a ‘functional group’ or 1

Author’s translation. Retrieved on 11 December, 2017 from http://www.tvri.co.id/page/sej arah. 2 “To build the world anew” was Sukarno’s major address delivered before the 15th UN General Assembly session, Friday, 30 September 1960. (Djakarta: Dept. of Information, 1960)

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Literature Review

a mass organization” (Hill, 2011, p. 26; Hill & Sen, 2005, pp. 18 & 152). The formal coalition of political network and media network shows the network-making power (Castells, 2011) of Sukarno’s regime. RRI, the state-owned radio network, served as the diffuser of Sukarno’s political rhetoric as it was the only media (prior to the establishment of TVRI) commanding the largest audience coverage across the country (print media, by nature, needs longer distribution time). The media ecology during that time of course was not a fertile ground for a functional public sphere (Habermas, 1991), because although various media companies which represented different political views/parties guaranteed the external pluralism of the press, the internal pluralism, i.e., quasi the balanced proportion of diversity of opinions within a media company, of this was not in place.3 By the time Sukarno was forced to hand over power to General Suharto in 1966, the inflation rate had sky-rocketed to 653.3 percent (Special Unit for Bank Indonesia Museum, 2008, p. 14) and foreign debt was a staggering $2.7 billion (Lutan & Hong, 2005, p. 436). The government’s failure to control the economy was partly due to its massive yet inefficient expenditures for the confrontation politics (Mas’oed, 1989) and military operation in West Irian/Papua as well as the construction of grand “lighthouse projects” (e.g., the gold-adorned National Monument or Monas in Jakarta). The situation deteriorated with food shortages and the declining export rate. Prior to this, Sukarno had famously rejected further foreign assistance, declaring, “Go to hell with your aid!” after he withdrew Indonesia from the membership of the United Nations and, subsequently, of the IMF and the World Bank, in 1965.4 The prolonged economic and political crisis hindered the materialization of the Eight-Year Plan in the Outlines of National Plan of Development (Garisgaris Besar Pola Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berencana) that was issued in 1960 through the MPRS Decree (Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) No. II/1960. According to the outlines, compiled with reference to the Manipol/USDEK doctrine,5 Indonesia’s development aimed to realize Masyarakat Sosialis Indonesia or the Socialist Society of Indonesia (as stated in the 3

“Internal pluralism” and “external pluralism” are concepts derived from the German broadcasting system. They are inscribed in the 3rd Rundfunk-Urteil from 16 June, 1981. For further explanation see https://initiative-tageszeitung.de/lexikon/binnenpluralismus/ (last retrieval 03 March 2020). 4 See History of Indonesia: Politics and the Economy under Sukarno. Retrieved on 11 December 2017 from https://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/culture-columns/history-ofindonesia-politics-and-the-economy-under-sukarno/item5271. 5 Manipol/USDEK is the abbreviation of the Political Manifesto that is based on the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian

2.1 Historical Account of Indonesian National Development …

11

1963 Deklarasi Ekonomi (Dekon) or Economy Declaration). This form of society, envisioned by Sukarno, would be based on the state ideology Pancasila; it would be free from oppression or exploitation of humans by humans while realizing a self-sustained national economy and development of berdiri di atas kaki sendiri (standing on their own two feet or Berdikari). Simply put, it was meant to be independent from fluctuations of world markets. The Economy Declaration, which was a short-term economic policy, stated that Indonesia needed to use natural wealth as a development capital while “laying the foundations for industrialization” (point 6), which were all carried out through collaboration between the government and the people in the traditional Indonesian concept of gotong royong (mutual cooperation). Development capital, the Economy Declaration continued, not only consisted of material capital, but also experience capital and mental or psychological capital in terms of “spirit and patriotism” (point 20). In the Economy Declaration, the government was also aware that the effectiveness and efficiency of thinking and acting in government management were necessary to break the long chain of bureaucracy. For this reason, in relation to the broad geographic conditions of Indonesia, it was necessary to hold a “deconcentration in the matter of management … This does not mean sacrificing the centralized planning and last controlling [effort] in the hands of the central government” (point 24, emphasis in original). To implement the above policy, the MPRS Decree No. II/1960 stated that the press (referred to as “usaha penerangan” or information institution) functioned as “media for mobilizing the people and the revolutionary masses” (Article 2 Paragraph 7). At that time, direct interaction and communication with the masses at the grassroots level, popularly referred to as wong cilik, was mostly carried out by various organizational wings of the political party, especially the PKI through Lekra (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat or Institute for the People’s Culture). This method is known as turba (turun ke bawah or “reaching out to the people at the bottom echelon of society”) and was characterized by the everyman “4S”, i.e., Sama Makan (Equal Eating), Sama Tinggal (Equal Residence), Sama Bekerja Personality. It is the essence of President Sukarno’s Mandate on the celebration of Indonesian Proclamation of Independence on 17 August, 1959, entitled Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita (The Rediscovery Our Revolution). Manipol/USDEK became the direction of Sukarno’s regime during the Guided Democracy era (1959–1967) and was formalized through Presidential Decree No. 1/1960 concerning Outlines of State Policy and MPRS Decree No. I/1960 regarding the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia as Outlines of State Policy. Later, MPRS Decree No. XXXIV/1967, introduced when Sukarno was in political decline, yielded wide-ranging implications for changing the country’s political and economic direction as well as development policies in the New Order regime.

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Literature Review

(Equal Work), and Sama Diskusi (Equal Discussion) (cf. Kusni, 2005). In the New Order era, and in a more strategic and planned Development Communication framework, this method emerged as an effective way of conveying development messages from the government to the public. Guided Democracy required that the civil society became part and parcel of this National Front and thus a core element in supporting the national development programs, including the national security/defense affairs. Furthermore, the government realized the need for “equitable and planned rural democratic development …” (MPRS Decree No. II/1960 Article 4 Paragraph 6). Rural communities were specifically mentioned here as one of the entities that became “the basis for the implementation of the Universal National Development” (ibid.). Other groups of people from the grassroots who were mobilized as “funds and forces” for the national development were workers and peasants (Article 5). Together with fishermen, the Armed Forces, cooperatives, progressive private sector and the country’s economy units, they became the sources of strength for financing the development in the production sector (MPRS Decree No. VI/1965 Article 6). The Universal National Development also targeted mental/religious development in order to form a “national and character building”, which referred to the culture of gotong royong, musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) (MPRS Decree No. VI/1965 Article 24). As a working platform, national development referred to the Trisakti or the the three sacred doctrines, encompassing “independent in economy” (berdikari dalam ekonomi), “sovereign and free in politics” (berdaulat dan bebas dalam politik) and “having personality in culture” (berkepribadian dalam kebudayaan).6 However, the platform did not mean isolating Indonesia from the international community, or curtailing its role, but rather expanding international cooperation, especially between all newly independent countries. It rejected an excessive dependence on imperialism, and unequal and unfavourable cooperation. Sukarno stressed the importance of cooperation in building networks between countries in the world’s periphery at that time, namely the NEFO countries. The Non-Aligned Movement was an example of such cooperation, with its member countries exerting pressure on the imperialist and colonialist forces in the world’s center of power to “release” their former colonies from their satellite status. For instance, Sukarno was strongly opposed to the establishment of the State of Malaysia in 1963 because he considered it to be nothing more than a “puppet” of the British Empire that would prolong British imperialism in the region. 6

As stated by Sukarno in Nawaksara, his speech before the Fourth General Assembly of the MPRS on 22 June, 1966.

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The Sukarno model of political, economy and cultural development, which relied on the solidarity of the Indonesian people, did not proceed as it should. The failure was evident with the rejection of Nawaksara in 1966 and its supplementary report one year later by the MPRS which effectively sealed the end of Sukarno’s presidency. The MPRS Decree No. XXXIII/1967 stated that Sukarno’s power over the government would be formally disarmed and at the same time transferred to General Suharto as the Acting President. The transition of national leadership meant a marked change in the direction of Indonesian development. After 21 years, it also ushered in the advent of what would prove to be an even longer era in Indonesian political history: The New Order.

2.1.2

The New Order (Orde Baru):“Economy as the Commander”

The fundamental difference between the Old Order and the New Order in terms of national development policy is their orientation or focus of development. While in the Old Order era, the orientation of economic development was inwardlooking, which meant economic independence and import subsidies, the New Order era “corrected” the direction of development to be outward-looking, by opening the nation up to foreign investment (Foreign Investment Law or Penanaman Modal Asing (PMA) No. 1/1967) and through capitalistic pro-growth economic deregulation and liberalization (Mas’oed, 1989, pp. 59–126; Streeten, 1981, 1982). The transition of power in times of political and economic crises inevitably forced Suharto to guarantee political stability and national security in order to restore Indonesia’s economic conditions. High inflation and other social problems, such as low literacy and high poverty rates, had to be overcome. Above all, the new policy that defined Suharto’s leadership and proved significant for Indonesian development in the long run was his immediate willingness to open Indonesia to the outside world with the enactment of Foreign Investment Law, which became one of the main sources of state financing for national economic development. The Old Order experience showed that a focus on political matters was unable to overcome the crisis in the development sector. Therefore, Suharto steered his development approach towards economic development, which is the dominant paradigm. He took steps to stabilize the economy while at the same time stabilizing internal politics by removing Sukarno sympathizers from his cabinet and silencing all political opponents through means of strict bureaucracy and militaristic actions. Suharto systematically demonized all leftist movements, starting

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with the dissolving of the Indonesian Communist Party and the banning of the teaching and propagation of Communism/Marxism-Leninism, including via the press (MPRS Decree No. XXXII/1966). This effectively negated any public opposition toward the ruling government. To combat political instability due to the constant power struggles between political parties in a multiparty system during the previous era, Suharto simplified the composition of political parties. From 1974 until the New Order collapsed in 1998, the government fused the previously diverse political parties7 into only two political parties—the Islamist PPP and national-secularist PDI—and one functional group, state-sponsored Golkar, thereby making it easier for the government to maintain political stability and control the opposition (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 49). This policy successfully maintained Suharto’s dominance over his opposition for over 30 years and confirmed Golkar at the center of Indonesian politics while the other two political parties were contained at its periphery. The all-out support for economic development was shown by the replacement of Sukarno’s jargon “politics as commander” with “‘economy as commander’, which was created by public opinion makers who had previously been oppressed by the [Sukarno] regime” (Mas’oed, 1989, p. 62). The media was seen as a “partner” who had the role of helping the government in “accelerating development, either supporting the government or eschewing political debates, to which most papers complied or were banned” (Hill & Sen, 2005, p. 18). Lutan and Hong (2005) state, “[n]ational development policy was therefore shifted from a ‘revolution paradigm’ to a ‘national development paradigm’. The entire doctrine of revolution and all organizations related to the ideology were abolished. Soeharto’s administration tended to focus on restoring the nation’s economy rather than staging attention-getting international sports competitions [in relation to GANEFO]”8 (p. 436). During the New Order, Suharto invested heavily in modernization principles, where he concentrated on economic growth and the construction of physical infrastructures. Jakarta determined, in a top-down style of militaristic order, how development had to be implemented in all Indonesia’s provinces and regions. The generation of alternative development ideas from the bottom was not encouraged.

7

The first parliamentary election was held in 1955 and joined by 118 participants, which consisted of 36 political parties, 34 civic society organizations, and 48 individual contestants. See Pemilu Tahun 1955. Retrieved on 23 September, 2019 from https://www.kpud-balang ankab.go.id/pemilu-tahun-1955/ 8 The politically-laden Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) was initiated by Indonesia and held in 1963 in Jakarta.

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Development communication in this era was linear-instructional and top-down; from the government, which was centered on Suharto, to all levels of society in the regions and every corner of rural areas. Suharto maximized the use of media, whose operations were tightly controlled by the government, to spread and instill the modernism values. Development journalism operates this point, which is intended to support the government’s development program (Dilla, 2012; Hanitzsch, 2005). In practice, the success of the centralized development paradigm during the Suharto regime could only be experienced by people residing on the island of Java and, particularly, by those who lived in Jakarta and its vicinity. In the long term, this resulted in Javanization of Indonesian politics, including in development programs. The designation of Suharto as “the Father of Indonesian Development” (Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia; Mohsin, 2014; Rigg, 2003) can only be justified when development is viewed from the Java- and Jakartacentric development perspective. It only served to widen the gap in terms of economic progress between Jakarta and non-Jakarta and between Java and non-Java, with the peripheral regions in a state of neglect. The unilateral development communication model which predominated during this era strategically functioned as a propaganda tool and medium to achieve the government’s development goals. The two-step flow of communication, the magic bullet or the hypodermic needle communication theory and the early diffusion of innovations models were development communication theories used at that time. This made the practice and study of development communication in Indonesia, which began in the 1970s, lag approximately 10 to 20 years behind the practice and study of development communication elsewhere in the world at that time (Pramono, 2016). For example, in Latin America, scholars had already expressed critical examinations of the dominant paradigm of development communication (e.g., Freire’s “liberation” philosophy in 1970). Consequently, studies of development communication were accused of showing bias toward the regime’s interests. This resulted in the stagnancy of development communication studies in Indonesia. The large number of researche projects did not contribute qualitatively to the development of the science and the practice of communication development in Indonesia. In particular, rural development communication has been affected by this situation, which leads to the “theoretical gap” in this discipline (Pramono, 2016). This situation was not unexpected nor unanticipated by the Indonesian government, which actively repressed critical voices from the public, eliminated political opposition and was determined for its people to be depoliticized (cf. Aspinall & Fealy, 2010; Ward, 2010 in relation to “floating mass” in rural population; see 2.2.3.).

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However, the application of communication theories within the dominant paradigm, which strategically combined mediated, including with wayang (puppet) performance (Antlöv, 1995), with direct or face-to-face communication during the Suharto period, actually contributed greatly to the success of government-initiated development projects. The projects operated in economy, politics, health, security and defense, as well as the education sector through programs such as electrification (cf. Mohsin, 2014), family planning, increasing agricultural production, building cooperatives and communication infrastructures, and transmigration9 (Colle, 2008, p. 99). Extension agents, particularly in the agricultural sector, and juru penerang (literally translated as “a person who clarifies/explains”) or communication officers played an important role as intermediaries in the government-citizen top-down communication process (Karsidi, 2001; Waskita, 2005). Entering the Sixth Repelita (the Indonesian acronym for Five-Year Development Plan) and the Second 25 Year Long-term Development strategy in 1993/1994, Indonesia was said to have entered the “take-off” phase, referring to Rostow’s conceptualization about the stages of modernization in The Stages of Economic Growth. This was symbolically marked by the first ceremonial trial flight of the locally made N250 aircraft in 1995. The flight was considered indicative of Indonesia’s preparedness to enter “technological maturity”, the next stage of independent industrialization, as stated in MPR Decree No. II/MPR/1993. The shift toward structured and planned “national development paradigm” made the state, with Suharto at the center of this vortex, all-controlling of economic decisions, giving the market little room to operate according to its nature as in the liberal economic model. The term pembangunan (development) was deliberately defined as kemajuan (progress or growth), whose planning and guidance came from the center, in this case Suharto himself and his economic advisers (Rigg, 2003, pp. 52–53). At first glance, this is akin to the “developmental state” model, where the state is predominantly stronger than the private sector and the people and commands full grip over the direction of its development agenda. The strong state is usually, but not always, personified in its government leaders. The referral for developmental states were usually East Asian countries, such as South Korea and Japan, as well as Taiwan and Singapore, which have experienced the so-called “The East Asian Miracle” (Hayashi, 2010; Rigg, 2003). 9

See Hasil Pembangunan dalam Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Pertama or Development Results of the First Long-Term Development in Repelita VI, Book I, Chapter 2 (pp. 77–122) published by the Indonesian National Development Agency. Retrieved on 20 February, 2019 from http://bappenas.go.id/index.php/download_file/view/8704/6307/

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Leftwich (1995) defined developmental states as those “whose policies have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the center to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives” (p. 401). He elaborated on the mutual relationship between development and politics to conclude that in a developmental state, “political purposes and institutional structures (especially their bureaucracies) have been developmentally-driven, while their developmental objectives have been politically-driven” (Leftwich, 2008, p. 12). However, it has been argued that Indonesia under Suharto was not considered entirely a developmental state due to differences in national and cultural context at that time (Rigg, 2003, p. 11). Leftwich (2008) and Hayashi (2010) cited Indonesia as part of the “second-tier” of developmental states (along with Thailand and Malaysia), which could be identified from its “crony capitalism” (Hayashi, 2010) operated under a “military authoritarian” government. Meanwhile, Robison and Hadiz (2004) categorized Indonesia as an “integralist state” with “authoritarian rule”, which promoted “state capitalism” (p. 46) and ran a system of “administrative patrimonialism”, “where power is located in the hands of a class of office-holders who are the main beneficiaries of rent extraction from a disorganised business class” (p. 42). More specifically, Feith (1980) dubbed Suharto’s New Order as a “repressive-developmentalist” state “which built its modernizing mission on an underpinning of backward-looking conservatism” (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010, p. 5). Consequently, the New Order era was evaluated by its developmental works and defined as the “era of development”. People associated Indonesia’s development with Suharto due to his central role in determining the direction of national development policy. It was with this patrimonialistic character that Suharto exploited a patronage culture that centered around himself (Mohsin, 2014; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). To remedy the devastated economy of mid-1960s Indonesia, Suharto laid down the Three Principles of Development (Doktrin Trilogi Pembangunan), i.e., restoring and guaranteeing national stability, increasing economic growth and equitable development and its results (Hadi & Kasuma, 2012; Mohsin, 2014; Subkhan, 2014). To implement equitable development and overcome economic disparities between groups in society, the government referred to the Eight Paths of Equality (Delapan Jalur Pemerataan) as the guidelines (Mohsin, 2014). MPRS Decree No. XXIII/1966 concerning Renewal of Economic, Financial and Development Platform Policies (Pembaharuan Kebijaksanaan Landasan Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Pembangunan) stated clearly that foreign politics was to be downplayed and economic development take precedence on the national priority scale (Article 11). This resulted in the discontinuation of prestigious lighthouses projects that were

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unproductive and absorbed the state budget (Articles 27 & 28). However, Indonesia decided to remain in the Non-Aligned Movement with a free and active foreign policy, and eschewed the megaphone strategy (e.g., confrontation politics) of the past. The decree above also stated that economic stabilization and rehabilitation were short-term programs, with economic development the long-term goal. As a consequence of the changing economic strategies from inward-looking to outward-looking (Streeten, 1982, p. 162), the MPR also stipulated that for the purposes of implementing these programs, Indonesia would open its doors to foreign investment. It soon returned to being a member of international economic institutions such as the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) (Articles 60–65). To facilitate aid schemes and loans, as well as to restructure foreign debt needed for national development funds, a special creditor group called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) was created (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 50). The importance of national stability for the successful implementation of national development was once again stated in the MPR Decree No. IV/1973: “… national stability facilitates national development and national development strengthens national stability” (Arah Pembangunan Jangka Panjang: Direction for the Long-Term Development, Point 4). As mentioned above, to serve this purpose the press was functioned as an organ of the information delivery system of the government to ensure national stability. The New Order argued that the media needed to be fostered to ensure it became a free but responsible and constructive press to further national development goals (ibid., Points 30–31). This is known as “development journalism”, which was commonly found in less developed and developing countries (Hanitzsch, 2005). Development journalism was often criticized because it was prone to exploitation by the state as an underhanded means to limit real freedom of the press (Gunaratne, 1999 cited in Hanitzsch, 2005, p. 495). Some critics lamented the biased media coverage in the interests of the government and the tendency to become the tool of state propaganda. In practical terms, press freedom was strictly limited as every media institution had to follow the communication stipulations determined by the government. Any violation (e.g., criticizing state policies or reporting cases, such as corruption, involving state actors) would be accused of being a threat to national stability, with the threat of the revocation of the respective media’s publishing license (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers or SIUPP). This happened to Tempo, Detik and Editor, which were banned by the Information Department in 1994. In total, Suharto banned more than 50 publications during his rule because the operations of the

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offending media were not in line with his policies (Hill & Sen, 2005; Kakiailatu, 2007). The government’s tight grip on media also applied to the broadcasting industry (television and radio). Limitation of broadcast coverage forced radio stations to broadcast locally. Only state-owned radio RRI was allowed to broadcast nationally. Private radio stations were not allowed to produce news and were required to relay news broadcasts from RRI. Through this mechanism, the central government could deliver top-down development messages, which were produced centrally from Jakarta to be disseminated throughout the country. Prior to the advancement and proliferation of television technology, the Suharto government realized that radio was “the state’s primary and most centralized medium for mobilising public opinion” (Hill & Sen, 2005, p. 21), which was important for legitimizing decisions on development policy. As a result of this one-way communication pattern, it was almost impossible to have critical and rational public participation to counter the government’s development messages in the public sphere of the national mass media (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990; Habermas, 1991). The formal public sphere was clearly controlled and dominated by the political system and government agents. The opportunities for forming counterpublic spheres only existed at the local level. Decentralization gave way to the establishment of local-level community radio stations. However, other than RRI, they were barred from building networks. Local radio stations were limited to broadcasting in their locality. Disconnecting channels of communication among the peripheries showed the politics of divide et impera, a strategy to perpetuate the feudal structure of Indonesian government system by preventing the regions from uniting and arranging network power through communication and power retained in the central hegemony (cf. Castells, 2009, 2011; Galtung, 1971). On the other hand, local broadcasting, which capitalized on a shared language and pertinent issues, did gain a loyal audience that perpetuated local culture. In the long run, this practice led to the construction of communal identity, conforming to the social function of radio broadcasting as described by Hill and Sen (2005). Some broadcasters deliberately violated the rules regarding permitted broadcast programs, such as “live broadcasts” and “talkback programs”. Surprisingly, the (military) regional authorities allowed these practices because radio could be a “regular source for understanding depths of local sensitivities over particular issues” (Hill & Sen, 2005, p 24). This illustrated the form of direct local participation in public communication in a local public sphere. If the issues touched upon were controversial and could attract the attention of national print media, there was a greater possibility for local issues from the periphery to penetrate in

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the public sphere at the national level and potentially have more impact on the formation of a more influential public opinion (ibid., p. 23). The New Order regime considered television a powerful instrument for its propaganda. When the regime assumed power in the second half of the 1960s, state-owned TVRI was the lone TV station in existence. Spearheading the government’s control over public broadcasting was the Ministry of Information, which as an information apparatus succeeded in translating and executing Suharto’s desire to control the flow of public information in the interest of the government. In the absence of competition from other private television stations until 1989, TVRI monopolized Indonesia’s airwaves. In the 1980s, TVRI’s hegemony was challenged by at least three developments: (1) the presence of video recorders, (2) spill-over broadcasts from neighboring countries and (3) the popularity of the satellite dish, which enabled people to access foreign news broadcasts, such as CNN, NBC and BBC (Hill and Sen, 2005). This situation was a dilemma for the government, because on the one hand, by using the satellite for information dissemination, the government was able to reach more people in Indonesia’s vast territory. On the other, the same technology could “eliminate” national boundaries, with the public gaining access to images and cultural products from foreign sources. People were exposed to foreign information and hence information with a foreign perspective, bypassing the regime’s widespread censorship machinery (ibid., p. 25). This was a “cultural war” that Suharto, with his strong Javanese cultural roots, wanted to avoid. The next challenge to the government communication hegemony of civil society via the airwaves came from within the country. The rapid development of ICT and the huge audience were too appealing to be ignored by the private sector. In 1989, the Indonesian television industry began to be privatized. Suharto was sure to keep this close to home: his children and their cronies were given the freedom to establish five private television stations. The new broadcasters were intended to reclaim the audience domestically from the hands of foreign broadcasters, while maintaining “national culture” (ibid., p. 26). In the mid-1990s, the media industry faced its final challenge that came from a completely different form of ICT: the internet. The emergence of internet technology in Indonesia had a significant impact on the circulation of sensitive information, mostly related to politics, Suharto and Orde Baru, which was otherwise strongly censored for public consumption. Studies from Lim (2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b), Winters (2002) and Nugroho and Syarief (2012) show that student activists in the second half of the decade made use of the internet to distribute information about rampant corruption in the New Order, which otherwise would

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have been banned as subversive. The internet was also used as a tool to mobilize the masses. They collaborated with foreign-based activists and were able to exploit the loose, almost non-existent government censorship of the new media. The military did not seem to understand how to respond or what could be done to control this type of media, whose process of content producing was anything but centralized. The above studies also reveal how online sources became alternative references for the mainstream media, which then saw a momentum to repackage the information and deliver it to the greater public. As a result, the mainstream media were prodded to deliver quality information and bold news coverage about current political affairs. The works of the press contributed to the weakening of government’s control over the flow of public information. Use of the internet by student activists in Indonesia is one of the earliest concrete examples of how new media had a special role during the protest in order to overthrow a regime, long before the world was stunned by the “Arab Spring” and “Facebook revolution”, in which social media was cited as a determining factor in their success. A major reason for the fall of Suharto in 1998, something previously unimaginable, was due to him losing his stranglehold on the flow of public information circulating in society. Along with the collapse of the New Order, the Long-term Development Program was discontinued toward the end of Repelita VI. All this progress led the way to increased public participation in many areas of public life. The use of the internet and social media in particular has given citizens greater opportunities to take part in public discussions and thus contributed to the constitution of many alternative or counterpublics. This marked the increasing significance of the periphery, which was fueled by public participation in various forms of counterpublics.

2.1.3

Reformasi: Transition to Democracy

The transition of power from Suharto to his vice president, B. J. Habibie, in 1998 was followed by decentralization of power from the center to the peripheries. Habibie, a technocrat who studied in the then West Germany, introduced a succession of laws that gave the regions (the provinces and the cities/regencies) more political and economic autonomy. The political transformation changed the central and regional power structure during the reform. The source of power that was centralized in Jakarta—both in the Old and in the New Order era—began to be slowly distributed to the peripheries. At first, power was distributed to the cities/regencies through the Law on Regional Administration (Law No. 32 and

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33/2004, and Law No. 23/2014), then extended to the villages through the Village Law (Law No. 6/2014) (cf. David, 2012; Holzhacker, Wittek, & Woltjer, 2016). However, these laws did not necessarily weaken the center. The central government retained a pivotal role in determining the direction of national development policy. Other changes at the societal level have been marked by the strengthening of civil society in political participation. The provisions that guarantee basic human rights, for example, have been added to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (Articles 28—31), which has been amended four times since the reform began. Indonesia has also seen rapid developments in terms of freedom of the press (Law 40/1999), freedom of expression before the public, and freedom to associate and assemble (1945 Constitution, 4th Amendment Article 28). The multiparty system, the emergence of new mass media institutions, which were, on paper, autonomous from government control, and the establishment of many civic society organizations, indicated the expansion of individual and group freedom in Indonesia since the collapse of the New Order. Even with all its shortcomings taken into account, power has not been only decentralized from the central government (center) to the regional governments (periphery) within the Indonesian bureaucratic system, but also deconcentrated from the state (center) to the civil society in general (periphery) (cf. Habermas, 1996). Furthermore, aware of the importance of press freedom to support the sustainability of a democratic country, Habibie, through his information minister, abolished the policy that obliged media companies to obtain press publication licenses from the government. The new policy on media publication had an impact on the booming of print and electronic media industries at the time, including the online media industry (referred to as the dotcom bubble). Habibie freed media reporting from censorship and was open to criticism. (Anwar, 2010; Kakiailatu, 2007). Subsequently, the Broadcasting Law (No. 32/2002) regulates that all broadcasting matters must be under a newly established institution, independent from government intervention, called the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI). The Broadcasting Law also determined the status change of TVRI and RRI to become Public Broadcasting Institutions, which are “independent, neutral, noncommercial and function to provide services for the public interest” (Article 14 Paragraph 1). In keeping with the spirit of reform, the law set out to ensure that TVRI and RRI no longer act as the government’s mouthpiece delivering biased, propaganda-laden information in the interests of the government. According to Habibie, this pattern of constitutionalist transformation was “accelerated

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evolution”, to differentiate it with a “revolutionary change … [that would have discarded] the entire system inherited from the New Order” (Anwar, 2010, p. 100). In a 17-month span from Suharto’s resignation (May 1998 until October 1999), the government issued 410 new laws and regulations within the framework of accelerated evolution which became the foundation for a comprehensive change in various facets of public life (Anwar, 2010). Some of the new laws touched upon the issue of Regional Autonomy (Law No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999) and were enacted to address the problem of development inequality between the center and the regions (peripheries) during the New Order period, where the resource-rich peripheries were nevertheless often neglected in economic growth in favor of the national interest. Habibie’s educational and work background in the federal state system of Germany contributed to his pro-decentralization policies. He often referred to Germany’s Länder system when he needed to explain his regional autonomy policy. To transform Indonesia, Habibie argued, the regions had to be strengthened. Therefore, the extension of the regional autonomy policy became one of the key national policies to build a democratic, just and balanced Indonesia (Anwar, 2010). President Jokowi, the current national leader, continues the idea of the strong periphery for the sustainability of Indonesian development, embracing a development policy that prioritizes the building of the outlying region. This policy, termed “asymmetric decentralization”, shows Jokowi’s commitment to combat development inequality between the center and the peripheries (see further in 2.2.2.)

2.2

The Power Struggle Between Center-periphery

2.2.1

Decentralization Policy or Regional Autonomy

The vision of regional autonomy and decentralization/deconcentration dates back to the formation of the Republic of Indonesia through Law No. 1/1945, Law No. 22/1948, and subsequently Law No. 1/1957, as well as through laws concerning village governance. In the 1963 Economy Declaration, Sukarno stressed that because of Indonesia’s geographical characteristics and the vision of Indonesian socialism, “the leadership concentration (management) in the center in Jakarta would not produce the desired results. This means that … [Indonesia] must hold a deconcentration in management by not sacrificing … [it] as an economic and political entity” (Point 24, emphasis in original). These laws mean

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that the regions (the provinces, regencies, cities or villages) were presented with a considerable amount of autonomy. However, the situation changed when Law No. 18/1965 concerning regional governance was issued during the era of Guided Democracy, in which Sukarno concentrated all kinds of management power in his hands (Novianto, Sutrisno, Hermawan, Nurjaman, & Suprihartini, 2015; Sagala, 2016). The New Order, despite its centralized policy, did not completely abandon the principle of Regional Autonomy. In the beginning, the central government realized that to achieve synergistic regional development and harmonious relations between the center and the peripheries and also to maintain political stability, the “real and responsible Regional Autonomy” (Point 2 of MPR Decree No. IV/1973 concerning the Government Apparatus) must be maintained. The Law No. 5/1979 concerning village governance also provides a more specific explanation of village status and authority in the perspective of the New Order. In application, however, the law weakened regional political power against the center; it further strengthened the centralization policy under the banner of seeking “political stability” and “economic development”. The role of the regions, particularly in the development sector, was reduced to only having administrative functions, which perpetuated a hierarchical structure of governance where all state regulations were determined by Jakarta. The reform has brought about changes in the regional autonomy policy. The amended constitution10 consists of the recognition of regional autonomy and respect for customary law community units (kesatuan-kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat) and their traditional rights (Article 18B), which affects the regulations on development planning and regional government. Consequently, the Law No. 25/1999 was replaced by several subsequent laws governing the implementation of regional autonomy and government. Currently, Law No. 23/2014 concerning the regional government is applied. It is complemented by Law No. 6/2014 concerning village issues (the Village Law), which gives the rural community greater autonomy to manage their resources and determine their development policy. According to the World Bank, the Indonesian decentralization process is recognized as devolution, “which is defined as a transfer of authority through which the central government moves responsibility and certain functions to quasi-autonomous units of local governments that are beyond its direct control” (Muttaqin, Duijn, Heyse, & Wittek, 2016, p. 84). Therefore, the degree of authority transfer, in the context of central-periphery relations, can vary from one region to another by considering the “privileges”, “diversity” and “specificity” of 10

The 1945 Constitution has been amended four times between 1999–2002.

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a region. For example, this is the case for the provinces of Aceh, Papua, West Papua, Yogyakarta and the capital city of Jakarta, which bear special autonomy status mostly because of their history and specificity. The 2004 Regional Autonomy Law changed the local political power landscape at the Indonesian periphery. Local power became concentrated in the hands of the regents and mayors because the law stipulated that regional heads are to be directly elected by the people of the respective area and not by the local parliament or the President as previously applied. From the political point of view, this was a positive transformation because it increases local participation in the process of democracy. It is now much more difficult for the local legislature to impeach a local leader, who bears stronger legitimacy because direct election means stronger representation of the people. On the other hand, decentralization has raised concerns regarding the synchronicity of local development policy with the national approach, if the local rulers have different ideas of development that are different from the Long-Term National Development Plan. One negative consequence from the shifting of power to local leaders has been the rise of smaller yet authoritative political dynasties at the local level, which are built around family members and cronies of certain political groups. Hence, the power struggle between local leaders at the periphery and national leaders in the center and between political actors (in the center/periphery) and the general civil society are unavoidable. In 2014, the national legislature approved the Regional Government Law to overcome the turmoil in local politics described above. This new law, which contained new rules on regional autonomy, was designed to pursue more effective and efficient governance in peripheries. However, there was a price that must be paid for this change. The Law “ignores the will of autonomy and prioritizes the spirit of efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of regional government … here, the character of decentralization covered with regional autonomy has been replaced by centralization covered with deconcentration” (Yusdianto, 2015, p. 487). The 2014 Regional Government Law was intended to respond to negative consequences of “wild” regional autonomy in the previous version of the law. The new regulations took over some of the powers in several governmental affairs (e.g., mining, secondary education and forestry) from city/regency-level government and reverted it to the provincial government. With this, the authority of governors was strengthened in terms of guidance and supervision of cities and regencies within their provincial area (Law No. 23/2014 Article 8 Paragraph 2) and in terms of public services and development policy. Previously, provincial governments were only accorded coordination, integration, synchronization,

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and synergy function of development-related policies between cities and regencies (Law No. 25/2004 Article 33 Paragraph 4). Yusdianto (2015) called this new system “shadow centralization” (p. 487). Effectiveness and efficiency are harmless terms an sich but could imply negative implications that are susceptible to abuse by leaders to exercise their power over their subordinates. On the basis of effectiveness and efficiency, the government will have reason to reduce citizen participation in the formulation of public policies and override regional specificity and diversity. The decline of grassroots political participation could have negative implications for local innovation. For example, it can directly reduce the amount of local development ideas/perspectives/initiatives, which are typical in each region. Yusdianto (ibid.) warns that the Indonesian unitary system lacks the capability to manage specific local issues, such as local wisdom, thus “shadow centralization” can only mean the weakening power of the periphery. These two words—“effective” and “efficient”—contain negative connotations. In principal, they can refer to the flexible meaning of “stability”, which during the New Order period functioned as the ultimate excuse—or the “trump card”—for Suharto’s government to repress anyone who opposed him. A “threat to national security” and “potential disruption to national development” were normally the reasons used as the legitimation for such repressive tactics. In his analysis, Yusdianto (ibid.) argues that the 2014 Regional Government Law inherently bears inconsistencies with Article 18 Paragraph 5 of the Constitution, wherein it is stated that the regional government must carry out the broadest form of autonomy. Meanwhile, the 2014 Regional Government Law Article 9 actually required uniformity in the division of authority between the central, provincial and city/regency governments. The constellation of power relations between the center and the local regions shifted once again when the government imposed Village Law (No. 6/2014). This law specifically regulates how villages should manage their areas and residents. This was pioneering legislation in providing villages extensive autonomy to manage their budget for the development and improvement of the rural community. Rural communities are expected to be strengthened and empowered. Politically, however, this means further weakening of municipalities and regencies, and even provinces, vis a vis rural communities. Along with the freedom of budgeting that has been given to each village, which can amount up to 1 billion rupiah11 per village per year, it is expected that the development process in the peripheral regions can be accelerated by starting it from themselves, which lies 11

Ca. 62.744 Euro per June 2020 (exchange rate: e 1 = Rp 15.962)

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at the very bottom of Indonesian government administrative structure. However, Novianto et al. (2015) reminds that the capacity of local officers in planning and managing the funds needs to be improved. Furthermore, the improvement of local capacity can strengthen democratization at the village level.

2.2.2

Changes in National Development Policies

The abrupt handover of national leadership from Suharto to Habibie in May 1998, following violent protests and riots, resulted in discontinuation of the Second Long-Term National Development project (1993–2018). In November 1998, the MPR issued a new decree (No. X/1998), which entasked Habibie to implement the Principles of Development Reform for the Salvation and Normalization of National Life (Pokok-Pokok Reformasi Pembangunan dalam Rangka Penyelamatan dan Normalisasi Kehidupan Nasional). These principles were only designed as a stopgap until 1999, ahead of the first post-New Order democratic elections, which ended the short-term Habibie presidency. Following the election, the Outlines of State Policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara/GBHN, 1999–2004), which was a general direction produced by the MPR for the government to carry out its functions, underwent a pronounced shift. The previous function of the GBHN in providing direction on “national development” was changed to the state’s guidelines on “state administration”. Another significant alteration in the new GBHN was its goal to “realize a democratic life” (MPR Decree No. IV/1999), whereas previously it concentrated on the realization of national development objectives. In effect, this means that in the early years of the reform period, the state focused more on building its democratic institutions (after a long period of authoritarianism) over pursuing development outcomes. After the new presidential election system was introduced in 2004, with the president and vice-president directly elected by Indonesian voters, the GBHN was replaced by a set of new development schemes in 2004. These are the 20-year National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN) and the five-year National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), which referred to the National Development Planning System (SPPN) as stipulated in Law No. 25/2004. Regional governments are required to prepare their regional development plans in the form of Regional RPJP and Regional RPJM, which must refer to those national development schemes. In practice, however, the preparation and implementation of the above development plans have been problematic. Subkhan (2014) reviewed how the post-reform direct elections system of the national leaders (president and vice-president) and

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local (governors, mayors, regents and their deputies) has affected the synchronization of development agenda between the center and local government(s). The strengthened position of the Indonesian regions in self-designing their development scheme due to decentralization has led to regional heads having conflicting development policies, even contradictory, with the national development policies prepared by the president. The integration of the national development agenda has been difficult. This is a side-effect of decentralization because the president has lost significant clout over the regions in directing development activities. To some degree, decentralization has dissolved the vertical leadership of the center. This can happen because due to the direct elections system, the regional heads are directly responsible to the constituents in his/her local area and therefore do not feel the need to follow the president’s instructions. The authority invested in the executive to design its own development program has meant that each president focused on different development sectors. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as the first directly elected president of Indonesia (ruling for two consecutive periods spanning 2004 to 2014), outlined the Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development (MP3EI) in 2011, which was a long-term economic development agenda. Intended to run until 2025, it was designed to be an integral part of the National Development Planning System (the Long-Term Development Plan of 2005–2025 and the Medium-Term Development Plan of 2010–2014). MP3EI projects that Indonesia would become a developed country with high economic growth (8.0 to 9.0 percent) and a low inflation rate of around 3.0 percent by the end of the long-term.12 It was an ambitious economic development plan indeed considering Indonesia had just emerged from the debilitating monetary crisis that brought an end to the New Order. As a strategic step to achieve its goals, MP3EI divided the largest islands in Indonesia into six economic corridors (Table 2.1), which were sorted according to each region’s potential and advantages, while assigning certain functions in economic development to each island. Under the banner of “Indonesia Incorporated” (MP3EI, 2011), this liberal and highly pro-growth development policy encouraged privatization in all sectors in order to accelerate economic development without submitting to other aspects of development, such as regional diversity and environmental aspects. Indeed, when SBY’s term expired in 2014 when three years into this program, much criticism

12 Appendix of Presidential Regulation or Peraturan Presiden No. 32/2011 concerning MP3EI 2011–2025.

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Table 2.1 The six economic corridors of MP3EI and their development tasks Economic corridor

Strategic role for economic development

Sumatra

Center for Production and Processing of Natural Resources and Nation’s Energy Reserves

Java

Driver for National Industry and Service Provision

Kalimantan

Center for Production and Processing of National Mining and Energy Reserves

Sulawesi

Center for Production and Processing of National Agricultural, Plantation, Fishery, Oil & Gas and Mining

Bali & Nusa Tenggara

Gateway for Tourism and National Food Support

Papua & the Maluku Islands

Center for Development of Food, Fisheries, Energy and National Mining

(MP3EI, 2011, pp. 46–47)

emerged regarding the negative impact of the MP3EI that naturally reflected topdown development practices within the paradigm of modernization. Among its perceived shortcomings were: • Inconsistency of central and regional development policies • Environmental problems at new centers of growth that resulted in ecological imbalances • Land conflicts with local communities; violation of rights of the local communities, especially those of indigenous people • Legitimation of capitalism: The accumulation of capital by groups of large companies through the PPP schemes, especially in terms of exploitation of natural resources and eliminating the role of local/domestic MSMEs, which did not provide great benefits to the community. • Employment problems • Privatization of strategic economic sectors • Forcing designated islands to carry out certain economic corridor functions that were incompatible with the characteristics of the areas and their inhabitants (e.g., food security centers were set outside Java, even though Java was considered the most fitting area for this role) • The dominance of Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan in some MP3EI programs (cf. Setiawan, 2014)13 13

See also Evaluasi Pelaksanaan MP3EI: Pengaruh MP3EI terhadap Mata Pencaharian dan Hak-hak Dasar Masyarakat (The Evaluation of the Implementation of MP3EI: Effects of

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In response to the criticism, the government revised the Master Plan by establishing Presidential Regulation No. 48/2014, which amended the MP3EI. The new regulation states that from its enactment onward, the MP3EI would “support the four pillars of Indonesia’s development, namely Pro Growth, Pro Poor, Pro Jobs, and Pro Environment, [where] the eco green principle as a whole [was] introduced and applied to every program launched in MP3EI” (Setiawan, 2014, para. 10). However, many questions remained, such as whether the revision would have a relevant impact on the sustainability of the MP3EI with the election of a new president to be held the same year. Indeed, the new president, Jokowi, decided not to use the MP3EI terminology for political reasons, even though he held the same enthusiasm for development and would continue the previous administration’s development programs where he deemed relevant.14 Instead of the MP3EI, the national development plan and the general government agenda during Jokowi’s term will follow the so-called “Nawacita”, which means the Nine Priority Programs. Conceptually, Nawacita is a refreshment of national development agenda because it revitalizes the spirit of Pancasila and Trisakti or three sacred pillars (sovereign in politics, self-reliance in economy, and personality in culture), as stated by Soekarno in the 60s (see 2.1.1). The challenge is however to synchronize the will for self-reliance and sovereignty with the demand for economic growth, which requires the state to cooperate with foreign countries and organizations. As a buzzword, Nawacita has been very popular in people’s ear because of its communicative and catchy terms used as the name of the programs, such as Poros Maritim Dunia (The World’s Maritime Axis) in Nawacita Point 1 and Revolusi Mental (Mental Revolution) in Nawacita Point 8, which focus to improve the quality of education and to revolutionize the national character. In the process, the state requires that the citizens submit to the so-called “techno-ideology”, which can be translated as an obligation to possess technological knowledge and skills in the educational sector. However, the most relevant point of Nawacita to this research was Nawacita Point 3. It needs the most attention because of its development idea called “asymmetric decentralization”. Asymmetric decentralization is Jokowi’s vision of a MP3EI on Community Livelihoods and Basic Rights). A Focus Group Discussion organized and facilitated by a CSO Perkumpulan Prakarsa on January 16, 2014. Retrieved on January 5, 2018 from http://theprakarsa.org/new/ck_uploads/files/201401%20FGD%20JAKARTA.pdf 14 See CNN Indonesia’s article on infrastructure programs: Jokowi Ganti Istilah MP3EI Karena Berbau Politis (Jokowi Changes the Term ‘MP3EI’ because It’s Politically-Nuanced). Retrieved on January 5, 2018 from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/201412181 32635-92-19063/jokowi-ganti-istilah-mp3ei-karena-berbau-politis

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development, which starts from the periphery for the equalization of development by focusing on the strengthening of Indonesian outlying regions. It emphasizes on (1) the 3T areas: terdepan (frontier area), terluar (outermost area), and tertinggal (“left-behind/backward” or underdeveloped areas); (2) rural areas; and (3) eastern Indonesia. The general goal of asymmetric decentralization is to eradicate poverty in these peripheral regions (cf. RPJMN Book I Section 6.3.) and to tackle the problem of development inequality between the center and the peripheries. For the rural areas, the central government is committed to execute the implementation of the Village Law by previously issuing its derivative rules and regulations as the guides to the technical implementation of the law. To ensure the realization of this commitment, a special ministry is established, namely the Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Areas, and Transmigration (Kementerian Desa, Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal dan Transmigrasi; henceforth and for conciseness, it will be referred as the Village Ministry throughout this book). A review by UNDP (2015) finds that Nawacita convergences conceptually with the Medium-Term Development Plan 2015–2019 (Book I Chapter 6: National Development Agenda) and the SDGs, especially its Goal 1, whose mission is to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere” (UNDP, 2015, p. 8). It includes, viewed from the perspective of this research, “communication poverty”. Communication poverty looks at the imbalances between centers and peripheries of the rights over communication resources, i.e to access, to utilize, to own, and to control them. Further, this research sees that the mission to end “communication inequalities” is also part of Goal 10 of the SDGs, in which (economic, political, and social) “inequalit[ies] within and among countries” (ibid.) are subjects to be reduced, so that “… enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decisionmaking in global international economic and financial institutions …”15 can be ensured. Within the framework of Nawacita, the development of ICT corresponds with MP3EI (2011) in several aspects, particularly in the Strengthening of National Connectivity to Achieve Development Balance. In the Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN Book II Chapter 9), concerning the Provision of Facilities & Infrastructure, President Jokowi plans to strengthen the development of ICT infrastructure, logistics and land, sea and air transportation between regions to facilitate the distribution of goods in order to reduce the overall cost of basic

15

Goal 10 Targets of SDGs. Retrieved on November 16, 2018 from http://www.undp.org/con tent/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-10-reduced-inequalities/targets/

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goods (pp. 9–18). Several problems concerning ICT that have hampered national competitiveness are outlined in this document (pp. 9–25—9–27), i.e.: 1. Unequal access to information throughout Indonesia (digital divide); 2. The limited competitive communication and information infrastructure, especially broadband access; 3. High prices for broadband connections; 4. Underdeveloped national broadband ecosystem; 5. Sub-optimal management of radio frequency spectrum; 6. High level of cyber crime; 7. Unproductive use of ICTs; and 8. Segregated communication and informatics system of government agencies. To overcome the above problems, the President has tried to build telecommunication infrastructure in rural areas, national borders, outermost islands and other non-commercial areas (asymmetric decentralization). This policy encourages the availability of communication and information services for citizens who are otherwise marginalized and neglected by the Java-centric development vision. In the same document, Jokowi termed this approach “Keseimbangan Pembangunan” or “Development Balance” (ibid., pp. 9–38). Meanwhile, in MP3EI (2011), the development of national connectivity was associated with international economic connectivity, both intra-and inter-region and envisioned as “Locally Integrated, Globally Connected” (ibid., p. 33). (Detailed discussion of the development agenda in the ICT sector in Indonesian rural areas is found in section 2.3.) Jokowi’s development vision has also come under scrutiny. Critics argue that the strong infrastructure development policy is fostering a new patronage system that harks back to the New Order. For example, Eve Warburton, a researcher from the Australian National University (ANU), labeled Jokowi’s typical patronage as a “new developmentalism”, which revives the narrative of developmentalism that was primed during the New Order (Patria & Heriyanto, 2016). New developmentalism encompasses “a narrow form of economic progress in infrastructure, deregulation and de-bureaucratization” (ibid.) with a strong, as Warburton put it, “statist-nationalist ideology”. Statist due to its consistent approach of “state intervention” for accelerating development and nationalist for its orientation towards “national building” (ibid.). Interestingly, the President has not embraced the title of “Father of Development” (traditionally used for Suharto) or other venerating titles. Rather, he praised Minister of Public Works and Public Housing Basuki

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Hadimuljono as the “Father of Indonesian Infrastructure” for his success in developing the 3T areas.16 Presumably, the current development vision differs with those of the two previous regimes, where political and economic orientations competed to lead inwardly or outwardly. Meanwhile, Reformasi sees that in the current era of openness, development in all fields must be implemented in a balanced manner through cooperation with various parties both at home and abroad. It is clear that both the 2015–2019 Medium-Term Development Plan and the MP3EI lay excessive emphasis on infrastructure development in overcoming national connectivity issues. Data shows that the increase in Human Development Index in the 2002–2012 period was not significant (only 11 percent) when compared to the increase in the number of Indonesian internet users within the same period, which was 1,300 percent (RPJMN Book II, pp. 9–26). Drawing from this data, Indonesia needs to pay attention to the UNDP’s recommendations (2015), which suggest that the government has to employ a participatory development mechanism, involving all stakeholders (civil society, private sector, and donor institutions) in order to empower the people in conjunction with the ongoing infrastructure development process. Community empowerment programs have actually been part of the government’s program since the beginning of the reform. Responding to the economic crisis that ran rife in Asia in 1997/1998, with a poverty rate that doubled to 49 million people, the new Indonesian government, supported by the World Bank, launched the District Development Program (Program Pengembangan Kecamatan or PPK) and the Urban Poverty Reduction Program (Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Perkotaan or P2KP). As those programs were considered successful at that time, the government decided to upgrade them to the National Community Empowerment Program (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri or PNPM Mandiri) in 2007. PNPM was organized under the guidance of the Ministry of Home Affairs and financed from the State’s National Budget, Regional Budget, and foreign loan/grants, all of which were managed by the World Bank and assisted (financially and technically) by the PNPM Support Facility (PSF).17 The PPK was eventually developed into Rural PNPM, while the P2KP became

16

See Jokowi Puji Menteri Basuki: Beliau ini Bapak Infrastruktur Indonesia (Jokowi Praises Minister Basuki: He is the Father of Indonesian Infrastructure). An article of merdeka.com (December 16, 2017). Retrieved on January 09, 2018 from https://www.merdeka.com/perist iwa/jokowi-puji-menteri-basuki-beliau-ini-bapak-infrastruktur-indonesia.html 17 See PNPM Support Facility (PSF). Retrieved on November 20, 2018 from http://psflibrary. org/catalog/repository/final_PSF-Brochure%20V3_english1.pdf

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Urban PNPM.18 These two programs were the lifeblood of PNPM Mandiri, which was characteristically community-driven (see Bebbington, Dharmawan, Fahmi, & Guggenheim, 2004) through participatory methods and directly targeted poverty pockets in rural and urban areas. In practice, this concept was expected to strengthen the “sodality” of local communities based on “mechanical solidarity” among its inhabitants (Agusta, 2014). The managed funds of PNPM went directly to people in need through a standardized mechanism. During 16 years of operation, PNPM Mandiri, which adhered to the principles of decentralization, transparency and sustainability, claimed to have successfully reduced poverty from 25 percent to 11.4 percent within the period 1998–2013 (Roza et al., 2014). However, the enactment of the Village Law No. 6/2014 led to the discontinuation of PNPM Mandiri, the largest empowerment program by funding and scope ever implemented in Indonesia. The Village Law stipulates that each village will receive allocation of funds from the State’s National and Regional Budget. As the state cannot double-fund both the PNPM and the Village Law from the same pocket, it was necessary to end PNPM Mandiri to usher in the new era of village development and empowerment scheme as stated in the Village Law.19

2.2.3

Contextualizing Desa: Re-pluralization of Desa as a Means to Empower the Periphery

The status and function of villages have long been the subject of Indonesian politics. The government has been aware of the political potential of the village community due to its substantial population size demographically. The 2010 census data shows that 50.2 percent of the Indonesian population live in rural areas. Due to massive urbanization, there has been a decreasing trend in the rural population.20 The large rural population can mean a political resource. This is one 18

See Community-Driven Development in Indonesia. Retrieved on January 16, 2018 from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/brief/community-driven-develo pment-in-indonesia 19 See http://www.tnp2k.go.id/en/programmes/programmes/dprogram-national-programmefor-community-empowerment-pnpm-mandiri/ and http://pnpm-support.org/ (Retrieved on April 20, 2016) 20 Central Bureau of Statistics (2014): Persentase Penduduk Daerah Perkotaan menurut Provinsi, 2010–2035. Retrieved on January 10, 2018 from https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/ 2014/02/18/1276/persentase-penduduk-daerah-perkotaan-menurut-provinsi-2010-2035. html

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of the many reasons why the rural issue has been politicized. However, every government regime has a different political approach to village affairs. During the Old Order, the village was recognized in the original 1945 Constitution in the Elucidation of Article 18 and in Law No. 1/1957 as the lowest legal community unit (volksgemeenschappen) and that would administer inwardly with diverse forms, naming and customary law. Every village had the right to manage its own affairs. In Java, for example, the legal community unit was called Desa, but it differs in other areas; among the Tapanuli of North Sumatra, it was called Kuria/Huta, in West Sumatra’s Minangkabau the Nagari, in Aceh Gampong, and in Palembang the Dusun or Marga. Because of their distinct history, these legal community units were accorded a place in the regional government structure. Nevertheless, the village community remained the subject of retooling in accordance with the “law of revolution”. It was under the control of the central government as a political tool to achieve the country’s common goals within the framework of the Planned National Development Pattern (Pola Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berencana) and the Political Manifesto (see the Law No. 19/1965 concerning Desapraja). Even though the rights of origin, privilege and diversity of the villages were recognized by the state, they were conditioned to follow a single development path, i.e., together with other elements of society, to become part of “funds and forces” of the country to build the Socialist Society of Indonesia (see 2.1.1.). Rural communities on the Indonesian periphery were shaped politically by the center (state) to become a revolutionary mass, which therefore determined their political fate. This situation positioned them as a marginal political object that was exploited by major political forces, namely political parties and Sukarno himself who controlled the central government. The change in national leadership to Suharto did not alter the political fate of the village. This was due to the strong patrimonial character of his government, supported by the military of his own background. From a political point of view, the status of the village worsened, because it was the beginning of the “depoliticization of the village”. Through the Law No. 5/1979 concerning village government, the status of the village was reduced to only a “legal community unit that has the lowest government organization directly under the head of district (Camat)” (Article 1 Letter a). In other words, it removed the status of “self-governing community” of the village and only ascribed to it its “local self-government function” (see the Elucidation of Law No. 6/2014 concerning Village). Thus, the state no longer recognized the rights of origin, privileges and diversity of the village community that had existed before the establishment of the state. There would be no more Nagari, Gampong or Kuria.

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The New Order, with its dominant Javanese culture, standardized the naming of this lowest legal community unit as Desa (village). This uniformity did not only apply to the name, but also to the village structure, in which the structure of the Javanese village became the only standard officially (javanization). The structure applied to all villages throughout Indonesia (Mohsin, 2014). Practically, this policy made the village structure into “miniature replicas of the central government, enforcing decrees and policies determined from above” (Antlöv, 2003, p. 196). The structural position of the village in the government hierarchy, which was under the control of the district administration, also means that the village was dependent financially on its superior. This unfortunate situation forced rural communities to become unreliant on self-resources in terms of supporting their own sufficiency (Agusta, 2007, p. 142). During the New Order period, the political fate of the village was still determined by the center. The status of the village was further reduced to part of the government organization, thus an extension of the central government at the lowest level. Village chiefs, even though they were directly elected by their citizens, were responsible to the head of district, and not to the village population. There was the Village Consultative Body (LMD or Lembaga Musyawarah Desa) within the village government structure to which a village chief was obliged to give an account of his work (Article 10 Paragraph 2 Letter b). However, Law 5/1979 regulated that the head and secretary of the LMD had to be the village chief and village secretary respectively, seemingly undermining the regulatory function of the body (Article 17 Paragraph 2 and 3). The LMD could not function as an institution that oversaw and controlled the work of village officials because it was part and parcel of them. In practice, there was no check and balances process. The New Order’s intention in doing this was to control each of the villages through the simplification of village category and structure (Agusta, 2007). It denied the village community any real say in what happened in their administration. On the pretext of assuring stability for national security, the New Order succeeded in defusing the revolutionary power of the village community that had been nurtured under the previous regime. Community participation was contained and formalized with the encouragement to channel “positive”, “constructive” and “responsible” opinions through formal institutions such as LMD, people’s representative institutions and the media; all of these were “supervised” by the government (the MPR Decree No IV/1973 Part POLITICS, Point 3). For example, through the policy of Normalization of Campus Life/Student Coordination Board (NKK/BKK), any political expression was prohibited from student activities. Violation of this regulation could mean the revocation of student status

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(expulsion). Higher education institutions also became the object of government pressure to ensure conformity.21 In this period, the village’s rights, authority and obligations focused on administration, development and community affairs, with political issues cast aside. The village depoliticization process led to the embracing of the term “the floating mass” (massa mengambang), meaning that villagers were forced to take a passive role in politics or even forbidden to respond to the most practical political issues (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010; Case, 2010; Ward, 2010). The passivity of the village community was particularly evident given the fact that it was positioned as an object of the government’s development programs. For example, under the modernization parole, the central government determined the types of technology to be adopted in the village and by the villagers, such as electricity, newspapers, radio and television (Antlöv, 2003; Dilla, 2012; Mohsin, 2014). In fact, by relying on Kantian Humanism, the government dispatched students, as representatives of the educated class with modern knowledge, to teach or direct (tutelage) village communities in order for them to become more humanistic (Agusta, 2007, p. 139– 140). Campus programs such as the Student Community Service (Kuliah Kerja Nyata) was part of this approach (Antlöv, 2003). Student community services are still obligatory in several Indonesian universities. Based on the above philosophy, the government believed it was entitled to “discipline” the rural communities and oversee how they functioned. Via top-down development planning (e.g., Presidential Instruction Programme for Less Developed Villages; Rigg, 2003, p. 53), the villagers were seen as the “others” who were not privy to the planning and decision-making processes (Agusta, 2007). This disciplinary process was “guarded” by military officials who were deliberately integrated in village communities through the ABRI masuk desa (literally, “military entering the village”) program (Antlöv, 2003). The military assisted in the implementation of infrastructure development projects and at the same time carried out territorial supervision and controlling functions. From the program’s inception in 1980, a Bintara Pembina Desa (Babinsa) has been assigned to virtually every village. The advent of Reformasi was presumed to minimize the role of the military in civil and political affairs. However, Jokowi’s administration has not completely abandoned the “military-in-the-villages” program. Many consider it revitalized through the Integration of the Army for Village Development (Tentara Manunggal 21

See Daoed Joesoef, Kontroversi NKK/BKK, dan Beda Pendapatnya dengan Soeharto (Daoed Joesoef, controversy of NKK/BKK, and his difference of opinion with Suharto). Retrieved on January 13, 2018 from http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/08/15330701/ daoed.joesoef.kontroversi.nkk.bkk.dan.beda.pendapatnya.dengan.soeharto.

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Membangun Desa or TMMD), with the aim to accelerate development activities in rural areas, especially in the 3T regions and in disaster-affected areas as part of government’s assistance commitment in the outlying regions. Tellingly, reflecting the experience of the ABRI masuk desa program, which often led to conflicts with the local residents, TTMD has raised suspicions among many elements of civil society. This is mostly due to concerns about land conflicts between the army and the villagers and the unfair distribution of profits as the result of land management in the region. Tirto.id, a quality online news outlet, dubbed TTMD as “ABRI Masuk Desa Vol. 2”22 . The presence of the army in Indonesian villages during the New Order was intended to maintain village compliance with the directions from the top. In this case, compliance was demonstrated by the loyalty of the village chief to Golkar, then part of Suharto’s political machinery (today known as Golkar Party). As the patron and opinion influencer in the village, the chief organized his forcibly politically passive residents to choose Golkar in the general election as a form of gratitude to the government/Golkar/Suharto for various development projects executed in their village (Mohsin, 2014). This political strategy was known as “monoloyalty” (monoloyalitas) and it applied to all state apparatus in the country (Aspinall & Fealy, 2010, p. 5; Hadiz, 2010). Rural development politics were therefore paradoxical. On the one hand, Suharto “politicized” development, with village chiefs required to balance dual roles, namely as political and government development agents in the village, who were required to show unquestioning support for the government’s national political and development agenda. Development played an important role in Suharto’s political agenda, hence his title as ‘the Father of Indonesian Development’. On the other hand, it signified the issue of “development” was not a subject that should or could be questioned and was off-limits for political debate in the public sphere. In other words, Suharto “depoliticized” development (Subkhan, 2014, p. 137). The village community was strategically marginalized by the authorities for political gains. Rigg (2003) describes the ironic situation of many marginal communities in modern societies, in which “their marginality is driven by their inclusion in development, not by their exclusion from it” (p. 184). Naturally, the villagers were the ones who suffered the most by this policy, because on one side, as the socalled “floating mass”, they were depoliticized. Their political rights were denied them and they were dismissed as a collection of people who were incapable of 22

See Pemerintahan Jokowi Jalankan Program Mirip ABRI Masuk Desa (Jokowi’s government runs similar program to ABRI enters village). Retrieved on January 16, 2018 from https://tirto.id/pemerintahan-jokowi-jalankan-program-mirip-abri-masuk-desa-ckpr

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taking care of their own lot in life and therefore treated as objects of development. Conversely, their “depolitical” position was a political asset for Suharto’s regime. In a nutshell, both the Old and the New Order followed one-dimensional development ideas that failed to acknowledge the village community in its authentic form. Although their vision of development was oppositional to one another— with one preferring political development and another prioritizing economic development—both were characterized by the single-path development. Indonesia’s development agenda in both eras was determined from the top. Sukarno chose the path toward an envisioned Socialist Society of Indonesia, while Suharto drove Indonesia toward modernization. The plurality of Indonesian villages has begun to be recognized again by the state since the reform. Various new laws and regulations,23 which mention the status of Indonesian villages, explicitly reiterate that a “desa or identified by another name, hereinafter referred to as desa [village], is a legal community unit that has territorial boundaries, which are authorized to regulate and manage the interests of its local community, based on local origins and customs, which are recognized and respected in the system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia” (Law No. 32/2004, Article 1 No. 12; emphasis added). In fact, in the currently extant Law No. 23/2014 concerning regional government and Law No. 6/2014 on village affairs, the phrase “Desa Adat” (customary village) is explicitly added as an acknowledgment of the legal community unit that still has (and may continue to maintain) its own authentic social institutions, government norms and customary law insofar as it does not threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the state and does not conflict with the provisions and regulations of the Republic of Indonesia (see Law No. 6/2014, Article 97). The law also adds the phrase “based on community initiatives” (ibid., Article 1 Paragraph 1), which proves that the village community holds the right and is accorded the autonomy to self-regulate its own people and environment. It also shows the support of the state for rural participation in the management of daily social and economic activity, including in the context of rural development. In the new Village Law (No. 6/2014), the direct election system of village chiefs is retained, although chiefs and village officials are prohibited from becoming administrators of political parties, due to potential loss of neutrality. This is explicitly stated in Articles 29 and 51. Village chiefs are no longer responsible to the head of district (Camat), but only obliged to report their management of

23

For example, in the laws concerning Regional Government and Villages, i.e. the Law No. 22/1999, Law No. 32/2004, and Government Regulation No. 72/2005

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village governance to the regent/mayor and to provide a written report on government administration to the Village Consultative Body (BPD) annually. The BPD itself, as the institution that replaced the LMD (see above), is responsible for conducting legislative functions to oversee the chief’s work and other tasks such as compiling village regulations together with the chief. This is a role that the LMD did not carry out. The positions of chairperson and secretary of the BPD are not held by the village chief or the secretary of the village as was the case under LMD. They are also not allowed to hold other public posts. In addition to being banned from being political party administrators, BPD members are prohibited from acting as the contractor of any village project but they are entitled to receive allowances from the village budget (ibid., Articles 55, 62 and 64). This democratic village governance structure is believed to strengthen the whole community because it enables checks and balances on the performance of the village administration. Economically, each village will be strengthened as it will receive annual fund allocations from two sources, i.e., the Village Funds Allocation (Alokasi Dana Desa or ADD) from the Regional Budget and the Village Funds (Dana Desa or DD) from the National Budget. To maximize in full the use of the budget and to manage existing village assets, villages are encouraged to form Village Owned Enterprises (Badan Usaha Milik Desa or BUMDes) and they can cooperate with other villages and/or third parties (eg.: Civil Society Organizations or CSOs) to increase their economic competitiveness. Through such cooperations, inter-village or village-CSOs networks can be created, which will strengthen the solidarity among Indonesian villages and Indonesian civil society. By forming these alliances, they can increase their power to fight against the injustices they have experienced thus far due to the domination of the center, namely when the villages were forced to be economically dependent on their supra-structures and when inter-village cooperation had to follow strict directions issued by top-level officials in the region (i.e., the district head, regent, mayor, governor; see Law No. 5/1979, Article 32 Paragraph 1). As a result, rural communities were politically isolated from one another. Other progressive changes reflected in the new Village Law are the provisions regarding the role of village members in observing and monitoring village development. Here, the inhabitants have the rights to participate directly in development programs and are allowed to express their aspirations and opinions about village governance and community development. They are also given the right to request and obtain information from village officials about these matters. Similarly, village officials are obliged to deliver information regarding their policies

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and activities that touch upon public matters through various communication services/channels (Articles 68 and 82 of the Village Law). Here, the use of various kinds of ICT becomes important as it can facilitate the management of village information systems. Indeed, Article 86 of the Village Law stipulates that all Indonesian villages have the right to information access through the so-called Village Information System (VIS) (Paragraph 1), which is developed by the Central or Regional Government (Paragraph 2) and includes hardware and software facilities, networks, as well as human resources (Paragraph 3). VIS should be accessible by the rural community and other stakeholders (Paragraph 5). Its online service should provide information that is open to the public as an adaptation of the Public Information Disclosure Act (No. 14/2008). Problematically, Article 86 implies that the obligation to develop VIS lies in the hands of the supra-villages (Central and Regional Government). This leaves the rural community only the right to manage and run VIS. This provision indicates that the rural community is only positioned as the recipient of VIS and forced to use the version of VIS as developed by the supra-village. This certainly undermines the village self-reliance envisioned in the new Village Law. Nevertheless, there is no provision that prohibits a village from developing its own VIS. In practice, village and supra-village are competing to legitimize their own version of VIS. Currently, there are various forms of VIS that operate within the village environment. The VIS problem aside, the new Village Law lists a number of changes regarding the status, function, rights and authority of the Indonesian village. The changes indicate encouraging developments in Indonesia’s democratization in the post-authoritarian period. Recognition of the plurality of village forms in Indonesia is a signal of respect for rural communities across the archipelago as sovereign units, whose unique history and origins must be taken into account. This vision is considered a project for village transformation, through which the government tries to place the rural community as the subject of development and thus becomes an active participant in development programs. Further, the villagers must be able to determine their own development agenda and manage their resources better. To achieve this vision, the enhancement of local capacity is crucial because without the empowerment of local people, periphery will not have a strong position when negotiating with the center.

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Social and Cultural Marginalization of Desa

The imbalanced Indonesian media system can be one factor contributing to the marginalization of desa in Indonesia. The peripheral position of Indonesian villages within the public sphere can be attributed to their minimal representation in the mass media. National mainstream media, mostly located in Jakarta (Lim, 2012; Nugroho, Putri, & Laksmi, 2012), have little interest in producing stories about rural communities that position them as a news subject (many media simply relegate them to an “archipelago” round-up). Considering that most Indonesian media institutions are owned and controlled by people who hold important political positions, the orientation of media operations is inclined towards the fulfillment of their economic and political goals, centrally located in Jakarta and Java. Public discourses are dominated by the center’s interest. Hence, the villagers do not have direct access to the mass mediated public sphere as they are not ranked as part of the center. When people in the grassroots turn to community media to tackle the hegemony of the mainstream media, they face a range of difficulties, starting from financial and technical difficulties to content producing and problems in broadcast coverage. The scale and reach of community media is limited and it minimizes the impact of their messages (Maryani, 2011). As a result, rural communities are increasingly marginalized, both in social and cultural terms, because they are not engaged in the public communication processes within the general public sphere. Moreover, the poor condition of telecommunication infrastructures in the countryside makes the chasm of rural marginalization even deeper (see below). In a networked society, where the ownership, control and utilization of information and knowledge constitute huge social, cultural, political and economic capitals, the inability of an individual or a group of people to connect to a larger communication network can lead to structural marginalization of those people within the social system (cf. Castells, 2009, p. 25). This is partly influenced by the lack of network supporting infrastructure. Historically, as described in the previous section, Indonesian rural communities have suffered from this type of “structural marginalization”. Grassroots initiatives from Indonesian villages, which make use of digital communication technologies, can be the start for the community to escape from this imbalanced structure. Rural communities also bear the negative connotations of being clumped as “traditional”, especially when juxtaposed with urban society. The city is considered a vibrant hub of innovation and celebration of urban modernity, contrasted with the rigidity of tradition that is synonymous with being old-fashioned and backward. The city is the place where technology flourishes, while in the villages

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“stagnation” is a term which reflects the general daily life of the local inhabitants (cf. Assche & Hornidge, 2015, p. 28). A village that does not conform to these definitions would be rated “unnatural” or “unusual” because it is not congruent with the prescribed narratives of the “traditional village” and “modern city” (cf. Tremblay, 2018). The communication behavior of Indonesian people, especially those influenced by traditional Javanese culture, is reflected in a vertical communication structure. It is attributed to the hierarchical character of Javanese and Sundanese, two languages of the island of Java with the largest number of speakers. With different “high” and “low” forms to communicate across social classes, the languages perpetuate the feudal structure of the Javanese and also West Javan (Sundanese) societies. The Dutch colonial administration seized on these social divisions to control the people and land, especially during the 19th century. It made overtures to the priyayi (aristocrats) by providing them with a measure of power as regents; in return for their services, they gained access to political and economic resources— e.g., by earning income from the colonial government or owning plantations, cultivated by villagers—and modern education. During the colonial era, the only Indonesians afforded a Dutch-style education and the necessary tutoring in Dutch were children of nobility and high-ranking officials (cf. Elson, 2009, p. 98; Pranowo, 2011, p. 193; Yulianti, 2013). Villagers were uneducated beasts of burden for the colonial power and its abettors. The vertical relationship between members of society from different social strata produced a patrimonial society, with community or religious leaders, traditional elders and public figures assuming the power of leadership to move the masses and influence public opinion. Its legacy permeated the fledgling nation of Indonesia’s political structure, particularly during the New Order regime as the politics of centralization bolstered Suharto’s absolute power in a latter-day repeat of feudalistic rule (cf. Oetama, 2008; Retnowati, 2010, p. 39; H. Setiawan, 2003, pp. 82–83). Even after the advent of the reform and the return to a multiparty political system, feudalistic tendencies persist. To date, the majority of Indonesian political parties are characterized by their client-patron system. Almost every political party has its own political figure, whose political attitude/decisions determine the policy of the party. As a consequence, political parties in Indonesia are not fragmented based on the party ideology, but based on the principle of personhood (Yuda, 2010, p. 123). The overpowering influence of Javanese culture in the general landscape of Indonesian social, political and cultural life has led Indonesians to subconsciously internalize this feudal character in almost all aspects of their lives.

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Despite decentralization, the structure of Indonesian government continues to reflect feudalism, in which bureaucratically the lower administrative unit is within the control and supervision of the higher institutions. Instead of abolishing feudalism, the partially implemented regional autonomy in a unitary state like Indonesia—differentiated from a federal state where the regions have greater autonomy—has only served to institute feudal forces to the regions. It is in this context of center-periphery relations that the position of Indonesian villages and the lives of their people is studied. Because of the central position of a personage in the social life of the Indonesian people, the role of village chief is significant in determining how and in which direction a village will develop. Feudalism does not allow village communities to construct and develop their own identity and build close horizontal relationships with their rural peers. A feudal system forces rural communities to isolate themselves from one another. The introduction of internet-based ICTs in rural areas has opened up opportunities for new connections to be established regardless of geographical position and bureaucratic situation of the villages. This is one of many objectives of this study, i.e., to see how far the feudal relations of center-periphery have been changed and affected by the use of new ICTs in the Indonesian villages (Galtung, 1971).

2.3

Rural Internet in Indonesia

In 2014, more than half of the Indonesian population (from an estimated 251,160,124 total population) lived in urban areas with Java being the most populous island.24 Despite urbanization, almost two thirds of Indonesian citizens who were categorized as “poor” (from the total of 28.55 million) were found in rural areas (Central Bureau of Statistics, September 2013).25 Although Java comprises only around 7 percent of the nation’s land mass, 57 percent of Indonesians lived on this island (Gamino, 2012). Internet penetration was 28 percent in 2015 and most internet connections are accessed from the cities. The World Bank (2005) reported that in the early period of reform the digital urban-rural gap in Indonesia was still very high. In particular in rural locations that are poor and isolated, human development is still hampered by the difficulty of access to ICT and other communication facilities. The development of (digital) 24

Global Digital Statistics 2014. Retrieved on May 23, 2014 from http://de.slideshare.net/ wearesocialsg/social-digital-mobile-around-the-world-january-2014 25 Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). Retrieved on May 23, 2014 from http:// www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1%20&daftar=1&id_subyek=23¬ab=1

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telecommunications is still concentrated in central areas (Jakarta/Java) as a result of past centralized politics. The World Bank recommends that the Indonesian government “systematically address[es] the inadequate access to telecommunications and information services for the thousands of underserved villages in Indonesia” (2005, p. ii), including through the establishment/strengthening of an independent regulatory body that regulates network (inter)connectivity for more transparent and accountable digital development. With 79 million users, Indonesia is home to the fourth largest number of Facebook users in the world (Kemkominfo, 2015). Many Indonesians connect to the internet through mobile phones, borne out by the high rate of mobile penetration (121 percent). It signifies the prolonged Indonesian digital boom since the late 1990s. However, internet broadband penetration is “only” 41 percent (Kemp, 2015), attesting to Indonesia’s lack of landline telecommunication infrastructures (Lim, 2018). The problem of rural ICT in Indonesia is not only about weak infrastructure, but also regulatory issues that do not prioritize ICT development in the countryside (political will), neglect of the private sector in the provision of telecommunications services in rural areas (due to non-profitable markets and the dominance of state-owned companies in this sector), high connectivity costs, weak local capacity building, digital literacy, rural education, promotion of SMEs and agricultural research and extensions. Another factor is the gender gap, with women underrepresented and less empowered than men (The World Bank, 2005). In addressing these issues, the government advocates building rural multimedia telecenters which serve as hubs to improve the digital connectivity of the community, with the spillover impact to increase human development. The target of this policy is the provision of adequate public access to communication services for all citizens in 2015. Apparently, Indonesia already has many—maybe too many—initiatives to establish community access centers to ICT in the form of telecenters. Many ministries and institutions have established their own telecenters, such as the Community Tele-Service Center (BIM) of the Indonesian Information and Communication Society (MASTEL), Community Learning Centers developed by the Ministry of National Education, the Microsoft-sponsored Community Technology Learning Centers (CTLCs), and the District Internet Service Centers (PLIK) of the Ministry of Communication and Information. The Ministry of National Education has also introduced ICT centers in schools in the regencies. Despite these efforts, the telecenters are not connected to each other, an oversight that underscores the deficiencies in ICT development planning in Indonesia.

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Although each public access center has a different name, they adhere to an almost template-like structural pattern: a “one-stop” digital center, usually consisting of the provision of public telephone, fax (Wartel/Warung Telepon) and internet services (Warnet/Warung Internet/Internet Café). Almost all villagelevel telecenters are grant funded, which causes further problems regarding the sustainability of these programs when the grant period expires (The World Bank, 2005). The second problem that may arise from initiatives like this is the digital development model which is oriented towards tele-“center”. The high-dependence on the center (“center-centric”) carries great risk in the failure of the entire project structure when the center collapses due to an unsustained program. Telecenters do not necessarily strengthen the periphery (particularly disadvantaged communities; e.g., women and elderly farmers/rural laborers) because all their activities are concentrated at the “center”. This holds true for other initiatives which are center-oriented. Lim (2018) provides an interesting perspective by stating that, “information and communication networks are urban” (p. 164). She uses the term “cyber-urban space” to refer to telecenters such as Warnet. Providing free Wi-Fi in public places, for example, is part of a cultural strategy to realize the idea of a “smart city”. If so, is the same strategy that is implemented in the village adequate as part of a plan to realize the idea of this “smart village”? If village development is again implemented with an orientation to the city, it follows that it is actually strengthening the center-centric development paradigm instead of bolstering these outlying areas. Similarly, Tremblay’s study (2018) of a Yogyakarta sub-urban community, dubbed Kampoeng Cyber due to exceptional internet provision in the small neighborhood, found that “internet kampungs are neighborhoods that define themselves according to their comparatively high concentration of “always on” internet access, thus aligning their ambitions with the central government’s ICT4D visions” (pp. 99). Again, this proves that it is this center-centric vision that subconsciously underlies the rural/periphery’s internet development agenda. Tremblay continues, “internet kampungs appear to align equally with the international development discourse known as Community-Driven Development (CDD), which champions the empowerment of small-scale communities to participate directly in their own socioeconomic improvement” (ibid.). Apparently, besides community-driven, such a local initiative is also “technology-driven” in the sense that it is the “format” of technology, which drives changes, not the “content” within the technology itself (McLuhan, 1964). Noting experiences about urban access points, Lim (2018) warns that the infrastructure of access can “reflect the existing inequalities and social divisions that

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already permeate the physical urban geography” (p. 167). It accentuates socioeconomic disparities between the haves and the have-nots in cities or between center and periphery in the center. This contradicts the idea of the democratization of access that is intrinsically brought by the internet in the first place as the “technology of freedom”. It is therefore a serious concern whether the same negative outcome will appear at the village level (i.e., between center and periphery in the periphery) concurrent with establishment of rural telecenters. Nevertheless, studies by Lindawati (n.d., 2014) found that new media can also be used to reduce inequality in rural communities through the practice of rural citizen journalism and taking control of internet-based rural information and communication channels (village websites). In doing so, rural communities can increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis various stakeholders who are concerned with rural issues (Lindawati, 2014). In addition, the utilization of a self-developed village administration system such as Sistem Mitra Desa (Village Partnership System) can also contribute positively to rural empowerment as it is a means for social learning and can even boost village self-dependence (Lindawati, n.d.). Other actors who can help reduce inequality between center and periphery are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). Nugroho (2008a) emphasizes the importance of using the internet strategically to support CSO work in Indonesia in terms of “mobilizing support, organising actions like protests and demonstrations, campaigning for advocacy programmes, informing the general public about the development agenda, serving as a research and publication tool, expanding networks, building public opinion” (p. 97). For this reason, two things need to be improved, namely providing more access to the internet and increasing CSO capacity building to be able to use the internet strategically. In another study Nugroho (2010) stresses that: rural sector reform is not only about building rural communities through agricultural and rural development in the grand political economy scenario as largely envisaged by the government. Rather, it is about reclaiming farmers’ and rural communities’ social, political and economic rights to determine their own life; it concerns elevating standards of living in rural areas; it involves protection of the rural environment; and it invokes rural sector sustainability – objectives which are commonly shared among Indonesian NGOs, particularly those who work in the rural sector. (Nugroho, 2010, p. 111)

The above explanation leads him to distinguish interpretations of rural reform from the sides of the government and NGOs, in which the first interpretes

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it as “development”, while the latter as “empowerment”; the first views rural communities as objects of development and the latter as subjects of it (ibid.). According to Nugroho (2008b), there are several issues demanding attention in relation to NGOs internet appropriation for rural sector reform. First, the internet is needed in addition to being a tool for building the critical ability of NGOs’ toward rural development policies and practices by engaging themselves with various civic groups, it also influences NGOs’ internal management and can expand organizational perspectives as well as stretching organizational networks at national and global levels. However, Nugroho also notes that while rural NGOs recognize the importance of the internet for their social work, “such an appropriation is not always the first priority. It is not because that NGOs do not understand the importance of technology, but because technological use is secondary, or less compelling, to the real engagement with rural communities” (ibid., p. 15). This emphasizes that the discourse about the center-periphery development gap does not always prioritize the alleviation of the digital divide, but more importantly its offline direct interaction with the beneficiaries to empower and involve them in participatory development projects. The government’s stance, as previously mentioned, is alignment with the peripheral regions through asymmetric decentralization or “building from the periphery and the outer regions” to overcome urban-rural development gap. This policy confirms the President’s critical position on development policies that so far have been Java- and/or Jakartacentric. The manifestation of this new development policy includes giving greater development attention to rural communities through the implementation of the 2014 Village Law, thus giving the villagers more power to set need-based development goals for themselves and encouraging village self-determination. To respond to the “knowledge revolution” (The World Bank, 2005), President Jokowi has instructed his administration to continue the construction of internetsupporting telecommunications infrastructures in rural areas, which is in line with the agenda of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).26 Many analysts see such development schemes as a chance for developing/poor countries to “leapfrog” the phase of modernization and industrialization, gaining sufficient knowledge to compete with more developed countries in order to acclimatize to— as Bell (1999) constructs it—the post-industrial society. This imagery of society 26

WSIS was organized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and had been held twice as of the writing of this report; first in Geneva in 2003 and two years later in Tunis. Since then, the participating countries have gathered annually in Geneva to follow up on the summit’s results.

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would mark the early phase of the so-called knowledge-based information economy/society (see among others Evers & Gerke, 2005; Gigler, 2015; Hafez, 2007; Houston & Jackson, 2009; Kleine, 2013; Mefalopulos, 2008; OECD, 2009). Kofi Annan, the late UN secretary-general, emphasized this paradox of benefits and drawbacks: The new information and communications technologies are among the driving forces of globalization. They are bringing people together, and bringing decision makers unprecedented new tools for development. At the same time, however, the gap between information “haves” and “have-nots” is widening, and there is a real danger that the world’s poor will be excluded from the emerging knowledge-based global economy […] Indeed, information technologies can give developing countries the chance to leapfrog some of the long and painful stages of development that other countries had to go through. (Kofi Annan, 2006)27

Gigler (2015) criticizes the digital divide approach for overemphasizing the role of technology in addressing development problems, contending, “issues related to the access to ICTs play a secondary role and no direct relationship exists between improved access to ICTs and enhanced well-being” (p. 4). Instead, he believes the focus should be on the issue of the “‘capability divide”, which centers on poor communities’s capability to “own, shape, and enact technology based on their own worldviews and derive real economic, social, and political benefits from the use of ICTs” (ibid.). This is congruent with Nugroho’s (2008b) statement above. By focusing on the capability divide, Gigler (2015) introduces the term “informational capability”, which is the individuals’ “ability to access, process, and act on information facilitated through the use of new technologies” (p. 3) This “person-centered development” sees the communities not as mere “beneficiaries” of development, but as “active citizens” who have “the capacity and creativity to define their own development priorities, goals and vision for the future” (ibid.). However, it is within this “leapfrogging” vision that Jokowi’s asymmetric decentralization operates. Through telecommunications infrastructure procurement in Indonesia’s outer regions, it is expected that rural digital development can be accelerated and the digital gap between center and periphery can be reduced. Another reason is the symbolic meaning. The internet represents modernity (Lim, 2018) and the availability of digital infrastructure in every corner of the Indonesian regions signifies the prestige gained by the modern state of Indonesia, seeking to cement its status as part of the G-20 developed nations. Tremblay’s 27

“Kofi Annan’s IT challenge to Silicon Valley” (December 13, 2006). Retrieved on August 31, 2015 from http://www.cnet.com/news/kofi-annans-it-challenge-to-silicon-valley/

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(2018) study confirms this; the provision of internet in Kampoeng Cyber is more valuable because of its symbolic quality rather than material aspect of technological development. In other words, the story of how Kampoeng Cyber reportedly balanced its cultural and technological needs is what holds value for residents who seek to align their grassroots development objectives with broader neoliberal discourses of community-based ICT4D. In spreading that story through the media, or in interviews with academics, Kampoeng Cyber residents captured the attention of government development practitioners and corporate sponsors who benefitted, either politically or economically, from encouraging communities to self-develop. (ibid., p. 100)

Perhaps because kerukunan (social harmony) is one of the most important values of the Javanese culture, the symbolic power of internet appropriation by the community in Kampoeng Cyber lies in their ability to harmonize tradition with technology, which are two terms that are usually viewed in opposition to one another because the first represents the traditional and the latter signifies the modern way of life (Tremblay, 2018). Tremblay (2018), Nugroho (2008b, 2010) and Gigler (2015) all argue for the downplaying of technology as the material infrastructure of development, but uphold the mental infrastructure of it, which is a basic requirement for a society if it decides to leapfrog some stages of development. From the above explanation, it is clear that there are two contradictory positions regarding the role of ICTs in development. “Some believe that information and communication technologies (ICT) can be mechanisms enabling developing countries to ‘leapfrog’ stages of development. Others see the emerging global information infrastructure as contributing to even wider economic divergence between developing and industrialized countries” (Narasaiah, 2007, p. 17; cf. Clarke, Wylie, & Zomer, 2013). Despite these oppositional views, the United Nations strongly supports the idea of using new ICTs for development, which is shown by its decision to back up the WSIS Agenda. According to the Geneva Plan of Action, all participating countries—including Indonesia—pledged “to connect villages with ICTs and establish community access points”.28 The government, through its Ministry of Communication and Information (Kemkominfo), has taken steps to combat the digital divide and knowledge gap between center and periphery, urban and rural areas, as well as between western and eastern parts of Indonesia. Until 2009, the ministry had provided the 28

Geneva Plan of Action (Article 6). World Summit of the Information Society. Retrieved on May 23, 2014 from http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html

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public with internet access services through Community Access Points (CAP), Mobile-CAP (MCAP) and Information Society telecentres (Warung Masyarakat Informasi).29 Further, as part of Universal Service Obligation (USO), the government had established 5,956 PLIK (the District Internet Service Centers), 1,857 MPLIK (Mobile-PLIK), and another 1,222 PLIK in productive centers by December 2013.30 Unfortunately, the project was not sustained. In 2014, the legislature decided to suspend the program due to corruption allegations and mismanagement, even though the government had involved the private sector in managing this initiative to increase the effectiveness of program execution.31 Correspondingly, the central government runs a substitutional program for the development of telecommunications infrastructure in the periphery, such as Desa Broadband (Broadband Village). Other programs that are endorsed by the ITU under the corridor of WSIS Action Lines are Desa Berdering (Ringing Villages, referring to telephones) and Desa Pinter (Smart Village). While Desa Berdering tried to equip all 72,000 villages with telephone lines by 2010, Desa Pinter “(is) a program to increase quality and quantity of communication services for telecenters with more phone lines and equipped with information (Internet) access capability by 2025. The basic principle … (is) to provide communications access for all villages.”32 So far, we have seen a plethora of development programs that are mainly designed from the top by the central government in order to empower the poor and marginalized in the periphery. This strategy, which is known as the top-down approach, has long been criticized by scholars and practitioners alike (see Melkote, 2003 on the “alternative paradigm”) as well as by local people themselves who feel that they are treated as the object of development. Despite the growing criticism, it is widely known that new ICTs (digital technologies, new media, social media, and the internet in general) have enormous 29

See Strategic Plan of the Ministry for Communication and Informatics (Renstra Kemkominfo) 2010–2014, p. 9–10. Retrieved on August 31, 2015 from http://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/ default/files/Renstra-Kominfo-2010-2014-1.pdf 30 Siaran Pers Tentang Laporan Akhir Tahun 2013 Kementerian Kominfo. Retrieved on August 26, 2015 from http://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/3702/Siaran+Pers+ No.+100-PIH-KOMINFO-12-2013+tentang+Laporan+Akhir+Tahun+2013+Kementerian+ Kominfo+/0/siaran_pers#.Vd45Gfmqqko 31 See report from Tempo (August 26, 2013). Retrieved on August 31, 2015 from http://www. tempo.co/read/news/2013/08/26/078507575/Kasus-MPLIK-Kepala-BP3TI-Diperiksa-Jaksa 32 Program I: “Program Desa Berdering (DB) 2010”. Providing Telephone Access to all Villages by 2010. Retrieved on August 31, 2010 from http://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/stockt aking/projects/Project/Details?projectId=1142329345

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democratic potential, especially when it comes to strengthening the periphery. Vendramin and Valenduc (1998) state that “many local IT projects is to believe that advanced communications technologies are going to strengthen decentralization, even that they could place central and outlying regions on an equal footing” (Vendramin & Valenduc, 1998; cf. May, 2002; Meyer, 2001; Wimmer, 2007). Another characteristic of new media that distinguishes it from the “old media” (print and electronic) is its potential to transform consumers to become producers of media content. Active participation of the locals in reporting what is happening in their neighborhood can be a sign of community’s self-empowerment. Citizen journalism is one way for voices from the grassroots to be heard in the public sphere. It also indicates the bottom-up mechanism of (self-)development in terms of communication activity as it can be functioned as an alternative source of information or even a countering action against the flow of messages from the mainstream media (top-down). However, one needs to question the sustainability of such an initiative because as Mannion (1996) says, “(t)he desired end result of the bottom-up approach is to ensure the sustainable development of rural areas with respect to population, economy, and development structures.” Fortunately, community empowerment is one of many objectives of the Ministry of Communication and Information in the development sector. For example, included in the “informatics empowerment” program is the support from the ministry for the establishment of Relawan TIK (ICT Volunteer) on December 9, 2008. The ICT Volunteer is a CSO engaged in education and development of knowledge and skills in ICT for common citizens. The volunteers are active in many Indonesian regencies and villages and they oversee as well as assist in the implementation of the government’s development programs such as (M)CAP in collaboration with local ICT-activists. Another ICT-based community empowerment program is Festival Desa TIK, abbreviated as DesTIKa (ICT Village Festival), which is a collaborative project between rural activists/ICT volunteers, village officials and the government both at the central and regional level. DesTIKa is treated as a communication forum for sharing of experience and collective learning between rural communities and the government to improve the effectiveness of village empowerment programs. DesTIKa has been held annually since its founding on August 29–30, 2013 in Melung. At the festival, the village of Melung received an award from the Ministry of Communication and Information in the form of a CAP in recognition of it taking the leading role in the ICT-based rural participatory and empowerment program (Kemkominfo, 2015, pp. 147–151; see 1.1.). In the 2015 Indonesia ICT White Paper, the Ministry of Communication and Information published data on ICT development and informatics empowerment

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in Indonesia. For instance, the data shows that the number of registrations of the internet domain of “.id” (excluding the “go.id” and “mil.id” which are prepared only for the websites of the government and military respectively) has increased 39.5 percent from 2012 to 2015. As of December 2015, the total number of registered “.id” domain, including “desa.id” as the domain reserved specifically for village websites, is 153,006 (Kemkominfo, 2015, p. 66). The focus of the Ministry of Communication and Information in the 2015– 2019 Strategic Plan is the development of the telecommunications sector, internet governance, and digitalization of television broadcasting (ibid., p. 106). The Strategic Plan is part of Indonesia Digital Roadmap (Direktorat Pemberdayaan Informatika, 2012, pp. 5–6), in which four phases of Indonesia’s ICT development program (planned until 2020) is described: 1. “Indonesia Connected” (2010–2012): The provision of telephone access in all villages and internet access in all regencies. 2. “Indonesia Informative” (2012–2014): The interconnection of all provincial capitals with fiber optics, broadband access and the improvement of eService (e.g., e-Health, e-Education, etc.) in all regencies/cities to realize the information society. 3. “Indonesia Broadband” (2014–2018): The increase of broadband connections above 5 MB, the enhancement of the competitiveness of the nation and the support for innovative industries to realize the knowledge society. 4. “Indonesia Digital” (2018–2020): The implementation of e-Government in all regencies/cities toward realization of a competitive Indonesian civil society. The above roadmap evidences the government’s ambition to connect all Indonesian villages with the internet and to equip them with digital infrastructures. This Internet masuk desa (internet goes to the village) program is conceptually similar to many top-down rural development programs of the past—particularly during the New Order—such as listrik masuk desa (electricity), koran masuk desa (newspapers) and TV masuk desa (television). Unfortunately, those programs set the rural community as the recipient—and thus as the object—of development, allocating it minimal participation in the development process. However, the Indonesia Digital Roadmap can be interpreted as Indonesia’s strategy to catch up with other more developed countries in terms of economic progress due to the breakdown of Suharto’s modernization project at the take-off phase (see 2.1.2.). By leapfrogging directly into the digital-based information economy, it is expected that Indonesia will finally move towards the formation of its information society.

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Micro, Small and Medium (SME) Rural Enterprise Development is a sector that needs attention to boost the rural economy with policies that support rural ICT development. Unfortunately, rural SMEs are rarely a topic of conversation, either because of a lack of data and/or due to the focus on urban SMEs. It also shows the low support of the government in this sector. From the above development pattern in the ICT sector, there appears to be a deliberate attempt to link poverty alleviation efforts in the Indonesian periphery with development of digital infrastructure and asymmetric decentralization policy. It is a hypothesis which Jütting et al. (2005) are critical of because they do not see any clear linkage and evidence that decentralization can have a significant effect on poverty reduction. Nasution (2016) also arrives at the same conclusion in his research, in which he depicts the failure of both the symmetric and asymmetric decentralization system in the provinces of Papua and West Nusa Tenggara. The World Bank’s ICTs for Rural Development report in Indonesia (2005) notes several factors that cause rural ICT, such as telecenters, to be unsuccessful, including the high cost relative to income of dial-up service in rural areas, the dearth of local language content and the lack of awareness and facilitation in the use of internet content and services. Those factors severely limit internet access demand, particularly in poor and isolated regions. It remains to be seen whether Jokowi’s rural internet policy will have a positive effect on the general livelihood of the local people or whether it will have unexpected side-effects. This requires political commitment at the highest levels from both the national and local authorities because decentralization means that the sustainability of such programs also depends on local budgetary allocations. At the village level, approval is also needed from local-traditional leaders, and this is problematic, because internet technology that offers privacy, freedom, autonomy and openness may challenge existing power relations that seek to maintain prevailing moral standards, values and culture (Lim, 2018). Friction may arise between the older generation who have long been at the center of traditionalfeudal village power and the younger generation who are traditionally isolated at the periphery of rural decision-making mechanisms. With the help of new communication technology, the young generation will probably form a kind of counterpublic (Downey & Fenton, 2003) which is structurally opposed to the dominant public in the village. This fits in with Fraser’s (1992) concept of “subaltern counterpublics” which stands in parallel with the dominant public (see below). By optimizing the network-making power of the internet (Castells, 2011), marginalized groups in the village (periphery in periphery; Galtung, 1971) can have greater opportunities to build communication power (Castells, 2009) among themselves, which will break down the old-feudal

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communication system. The success of ICT is illustrated by Lim (2018) as determined by network effects, where the impact will be felt only if the network gets bigger so that it increases its interconnectivity. Therefore, the issue of rural ICT development can be viewed not only from a political and legal perspective, but also from a social and cultural one.

3

Theoretical Framework

The first and the second part of this section (3.1.) describe diverse definitions of development communication and its paradigms, which are closely related to the paradigms of development. The third part discusses the role of ICT—in the form of traditional media, digital media, and communications technology in general— in development practices. Section 3.2. elaborates the theories of the public sphere, with which the findings of this research are analyzed. Next, because this research puts emphasis on the relations between center and periphery in political-economy and socio-cultural context, it is necessary to shed light on the models of centerperiphery relations, which concentrates on the dimensions of communication and power. Both will rely on Galtung’s (1971) structural theory of imperialism (3.3.). The last section (3.4.) serves the theoretical matrix used for this research to again justify the use of the selected theories.

3.1

Development Communication

3.1.1

Definitions of Development Communication

The field of development communication started to develop theoretically during the “development” period around the end of 1950s, particularly after works by Daniel Lerner (The Passing of Traditional Society, 1958), Everett M. Rogers (Social Change in Rural Society, 1960 and The Diffusion of Innovations, 1962) and Wilbur Schramm (Mass Media and National Development, 1964). These scholars are hailed as pioneers in the field of development communication as well as mass communication. However, the practice of development communication itself

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_3

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can be traced back to shortly after the end of World War II, i.e., when the United States began its European Recovery Program (ERP)—the Marshall Plan—to rebuild Europe. There is specific terminology in the academic literature that refers to the practice of “development communication” (McPhail, 2009; Mefalopulos, 2008; Mody, 2003). Oft-used terms (most notably by the United Nations bodies) including “Communication for Development” or C4D (UNDP, 2009; UNDP et al., 2011; UNICEF1 ) and “Development Support Communication” (DSC).2 DSC emphasizes the communication process and strategy that are designed to support development projects and considered as an integral part of them. Theoretically, the DSC model can be employed by those who implement top-down communication strategies, e.g., technology or knowledge transfer to farmers in rural development projects (push strategy). Alternatively, DSC can also be practiced to support bottom-up communication approach, which encourages local participation (pull strategy) (Unwin, 2009, pp. 62–63). However, practically speaking, this model often ends up in “a top-down and supply-led framework concerned with using communication to convey particular messages, rather than encouraging dynamic communication so that people might have a greater understanding of particular development-related issues” (ibid., p. 63; cf. Sonderling, 1997). Meanwhile, “communication for social change” highlights the goals of development for social change, whereas “participatory communication” and “communication for empowerment” (Melkote, 2003) are the two latest and currently more popular approaches in development communication, which center the local community at the heart of the development project. Although many works suggest that scholars and practitioners use the terms interchangeably, some prominent international organizations working in this field are consistent in their use of the terms, whether it is “development communication” or “communication for development” (see Mefalopulos, 2008, p. 33; Ngugi, 1996). For example, the World Bank opts for development communication and gives following definition: Development communication is the integration of strategic communication in development projects. Strategic communication is a powerful tool that can improve the chances of success of development projects. It strives for behavior change not just information dissemination, education or awareness-raising. While the latter are necessary

1

Retrieved on December 12, 2013 from http://www.unicef.org/cbsc/ Retrieved on December 12, 2013 from ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4338e/y4338e00. pdf 2

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ingredients of communication, they are not sufficient for getting people to change long-established practices or behaviors.3

Communicatively speaking, the above definition sounds too linear and one-way or top-down, from the sender (development planner or project holder, e.g., government officials, donor agencies, international organizations such as the UN and its organs) to the recipients (local community who needs to be “developed” or “empowered”, e.g., local farmers, street children, women or other disadvantaged people at the grassroots level). However, the World Bank through its Development Communication Division offers another definition of development communication that signifies understanding towards a new trend of participatory development communication approach. Development communication, according to this new definition, is considered: an interdisciplinary field based on empirical research that helps to build consensus while it facilitates the sharing of knowledge to achieve positive change in development initiatives. It is not only about effective dissemination of information but also about using empirical research and two-way communication among stakeholders. (Mefalopulos, 2008, p. 8; emphasis added)

The highlighted keywords reflect the goals (positive changes, consensus), process (sharing of knowledge) and transformation of paradigm in development communication from one-way communication (dissemination of information, transfer of knowledge or of technology) to a more interactive two-way communication. Similarly, McPhail (2009) highlights that the process of development communication aims for “positive social change”. He also underlines the importance of every kind of medium used as tools of communication for delivery of development communication messages. He stresses: development communication is the process of intervening in a systematic or strategic manner with either the media (print, radio, telephony, video, and the Internet), or education (training, literacy, schooling) for the purpose of positive social change. The change could be economic, personal, as in spiritual, social, cultural, or political. (McPhail, 2009, p. 3; emphasis added)

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It is important to note from the above definitions that development communication always aims for social change. However, what kind of change it targets depends on which development communication paradigm is used. Nowadays, practitioners in the development sector often use the term “Communication for Development” (C4D). In reference to the UN resolution No. 51/172 (issued in the 1996 General Assembly), C4D is formally defined as follows: “Communication for development stresses the need to support two-way communication systems that enabled dialogue and that allow communities to speak out, express their aspirations and concerns and participate in the decisions that relate to their development” (UNDP, 2009, p. 5). Likewise, other United Nations bodies such as UNICEF and FAO favor C4D over other terms to describe the communication approach they choose in their development projects. The UNICEF interprets C4D as follows: C4D involves understanding people, their beliefs and values, the social and cultural norms that shape their lives. It involves engaging communities and listening to adults and children as they identify problems, propose solutions and act upon them. Communication for development is seen as a two-way process for sharing ideas and knowledge using a range of communication tools and approaches that empower individuals and communities to take actions to improve their lives.4

Meanwhile, the First World Congress on Communication for Development (WCCD), held in Rome in 2006, defines C4D or ComDev as follows: A social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools and methods. It is about seeking change at different levels including listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and learning for sustained and meaningful change. It is not public relations or corporate communication. (Mefalopulos, 2008, p. 8; cf. UNDP, 2009, pp. 5–6)

Whether it is “development communication” or “communication for development”, the terms underline at least three important points: a) There is an indication for a transformation from one-way to two-way development communication approach, which is more egalitarian and dialogueoriented. The more interactive two-way communication approach is located within the participatory and empowerment perspective.

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b) Whether it is the linear one-way or the interactive two-way development communication approach, both use a range of communication tools and media; be it institutionalized media or media used for interpersonal communication. c) All development communication projects aim for some degree of “change” (economically, culturally, politically, socially) in the “targeted” society or community. In practice, however, there is no profound difference between the two terminologies. Nonetheless, conceptually “development communication” has a longer history and therefore encompasses a broader dimension in the discussion about “communication” within development studies and practices. The building blocks of development communication studies involve for example theories of mass communication, interpersonal and group communication, as well as political communication. Due to this reason, the term development communication will be used more frequently in this report to retain its original form.

3.1.2

Paradigms of Development (Communication) Studies

The evolution of development communication approaches cannot be separated from the transformation of approaches in development practices. They are therefore related to each other and which approach is taken can influence the outcome of a development project. It was not a coincidence that the successes (and failures) of development program implementation in the early years post-World War II were influenced by the works from communication scholars such as Schramm, Paul Lazarsfeld, David K. Berlo and Rogers. It is the reason “communication” is in brackets in the heading of this section because the implementation of certain development policies is often supported by the same communication paradigm integrated in that process, and vice versa: the selection of a communication approach can influence the process of decision-making and goal-setting for determining development policy and eventually the course of development itself, which in the end, affects the outcome of a development program. In this section, a wide range of development communication concepts and theories that contribute to the evolution of development practices will be discussed. Naturally, it will enrich the study of development and development communication. In general, approaches in development study and development communication can be categorized into two big paradigms: the dominant and

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the alternative paradigm. The dominant paradigm refers to the concept of “modernization”, while the alternative paradigm is more plural in its approach and goal-setting and consists of several methods that are critical to modernist ideas. It is worth noting that scholars in the field of development studies categorize development paradigms differently. For instance, Servaes (1986, 1999, 2000, 2008b) and Servaes and Malikhao (2008, 2016) differentiate it in three approaches: the “modernist” approach, the “dependency” approach and the “multiplicity” or “anotherness” model of development. The dependency approach offers a specific explanation to development communication problems from the system perspective, which is relevant to this research. Hence, this section will accommodate this, besides addressing the dominant and alternative paradigm. Melkote (2003), on the other hand, divides development into four perspectives. Besides the modernization perspective, i.e., the dominant paradigm, he categorizes the critical perspective, the liberation perspective and the empowerment perspective within the alternative paradigm of development. The critical perspective is basically contra-modernization. It “challenge[s] economic and cultural expansionism and imperialism of modernization” (ibid., p. 130) in to-be-‘developed’ countries. It shares some premises with the dependency approach and the liberation perspective. Likewise, the multiplicity model implies empowerment and participatory perspective in its approach. Rigg (2003, p. 328), drawing from Hart (2001, p. 650), distinguishes development into four types: (1) “Big D” development (D) is where rich countries transfer their expertise, technologies and funds to poor countries after the end of World War II in order to stimulate economic progress. (2) “Little d” development (d) is what Rigg (2003, p. 328) generally calls “the historical progress of capitalism.” (3) “Superscript” development (Dd ) refers to developmental states in the Asian region with a strong commanding power in leading and directing development projects. (4) “Subscript” development (Dd ) denotes what is usually known as “alternative development”, in which CSOs and NGOs as well as local communities play a major role in organizing and designing development agenda to promote social change. Nonetheless, Mefalopulos (2008) argues that most development programs are carried out under the banner of participatory approach, which, unlike the modernization and dependency explanation, neither have a “unified paradigm” (ibid.,

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p. 51) nor conceptualized by their proponents as a grand theory. Depending on the project objectives, there is a growing tendency, however, for current practitioners in development communication to use a combination of both (the dominant and the alternative) approaches. It is sometimes called the “communication multitrack approach” (Mefalopulos, 2008, p. 68).

3.1.2.1 The Dominant Paradigm and the Top-down Approach The dominant paradigm does not in actuality signify the type of development communication that predominates development projects. Instead, it is the paradigm that once was prominent and mostly followed by Third World countries in the early decades of the world’s development agenda after World War II. Most writers in development studies recognize that this is the first model that dominated development discourse at that time. Although development policies that refer to the dominant paradigm practically occur in the 20th century, especially after the approval of the Marshall Plan, but historically and philosophically, this paradigm can be traced back to the Enlightenment era that led to the Industrial Revolution. According to the dominant paradigm, development means “a type of social change in which new ideas are introduced into a social system in order to produce higher per capita incomes and levels of living through more modern production methods and improved social organization” (Rogers, 1969, p. 18). This paradigm emphasizes that the only way for poor and underdeveloped countries can improve their standard of living is by following the steps of the more developed and industrialized (Western) countries, i.e., by shifting away from the traditional way of living to the modern one, as formulated by various scholars such as Walt W. Rostow in The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960). The dominant paradigm in development discourse is closely related to the concept of “modernization”. The goal is to pursue economic growth in order to produce higher per capita income in which modern production methods are implemented through modern bureaucracy and the “rule of law”. It is pertinent to mention Weber’s (1930/2001) work on “the Protestant ethic” that explains the call for capitalism and the push for wealth accumulation. This perspective has influenced the way that people think they should live their life. The end of development is economic progress with objective indicators such as the figures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Income (GNI) (cf. Assche & Hornidge, 2015, pp. 79–81). The phrase “new ideas are introduced” in Rogers’s formulation of development definition above reflects the type of development communication approach in the dominant paradigm, which is top-down, one-way, and linear, in order to spark “positive change”’. For this to happen, poor nations need to adjust their economic

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system so that they can establish the “right” conditions for a free market economy to proceed, namely removing all “structural barriers” that could potentially make their economic activity inefficient. Usually, the decision to remove the structural barrier will be followed by deregulation, liberalization policy, reducing tariffs and taxes, as well as cutting social subsidies (Klein, 2007). This policy is in line with the so-called “Washington Consensus”, which prescribes 10 market-based economic policy to be implemented in developing/poor countries (Rigg, 2003, p. 10 cf.). The decision to favor economic growth over other aspects of development still lies in the hands of the state. Hence, some degree of state intervention is needed to maintain the stabilization of this system. The degree of state intervention varies in different countries. Some states are powerful enough to accumulate power to guide the direction of their economic policy for development, thus giving way to the establishment of a “Developmental State”. Others choose to let the market work on its own mechanism, as in the United States, where liberal democracy is the norm. Somewhere in between is the European model of the welfare state, which tries to find a balance between the force of the market economy and social justice. Within the dominant paradigm, the word “modern” is often framed in opposition to “traditional”, with the latter in general pictured as a way of life that people should abandon because it signifies the past (and, therefore, outdated). Advocates of this paradigm believe that modern norms and values need to be applied globally so that poorer countries in the Third World can prosper economically. It is also within this context that they understand the meaning of “globalization” (Unwin, 2009, pp. 15–16). On a critical note, the pursuit of growth that forces the state to focus on macro economy instead of micro economy means leaving many people living on the outskirts of the economic and political center in despair. In a modern society, those people belong to the majority and are characterized by the lack of competitive capability and the minimum economic resources due to the imbalanced social and political structure within the free market economy. In general, they include the urban and rural poor, powerless women and children, i.e., the losing party of the “competition”, who must endure their peripheral position within the capitalistic power system. Borrowing the slogan used by the activists from the Occupy Wall Street Movement, who are “anti-globalization”, these people are the 99 percent, who are economically and politically dominated by the 1 percent of small elites. According to the dominant paradigm, for the 99 percent or the “middle-topoor majority” to come out of poverty, they need to follow the path of the small elites. In following the path, the modernists believe that little by little the wealth

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accumulated by the small elites will start to “trickle down” to the poor who will eventually taste the “fruit of modernism”, i.e., better living standards. This is the world view from the modernist perspective. In fact, rich countries (the West, acting as donor countries) and international organizations responsible for overcoming the world’s poverty problems, e.g., the UN, IMF and the World Bank for that matter, prescribe poor countries particular economic policies and structural adjustment steps they need to adopt. Regardless of cultural differences, the solution for development problems is economic growth. Citing Mefalopulos (2008, p. 7), this reflects the “one-size-fits-all” development doctrine, or a “monodevelopment” vision. A slightly different perspective is the “structuralist economics” model of development that, while still oriented toward economic growth, chooses to focus first and foremost on “further improvement in education, infrastructure improvement, growing local business in a more protected environment, studying foreign models of business, innovation and possible roles of government to spur the economy” (Assche & Hornidge, 2015, p. 82), before implementing the principles of Western capitalist mode of development. The dominant paradigm is characterized by one-way communication process, which theoretically flows from the Western to the Eastern, the northern to the southern, developed to developing/less developed, modern to traditional, industrial to agrarian, rich to poor, urban to rural societies and/or countries. The dichotomy serves as a strategy to stress that one pole is better than the other; the former is the source while the latter is the recipient of development communication messages and therefore should follow the recipe of the more advanced society, i.e., the West. It has borne the brunt of criticism because it does not pursue a “development” mission in its natural sense, instead it tends to imply “Westernization” (cf. Alatas, 2006). This is a development process that non-Western nations are reluctant to follow because it affirms the belief of the West’s “superiority” over the rest of the world and disrespects local ideas of development. Hence, the dominant paradigm is often accused for being ethno- and eurocentric (Alatas, 2006; Rigg, 2003, pp. 47–49; Servaes, 2000, p. 26). The fact that most leading development theorists are of Western descent—Lerner, Rostow, Schramm, to name a few—has only strengthened those allegations of a slanted perspective (Rogers, 1976). Communication theories that are often associated with this paradigm and best illustrate its communication process are classical ones such as the “magic bullet theory” or “hypodermic needle” model, Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) “two-step flow” model of communication or Rogers’s (1962) first edition of “diffusion of innovations”. Other mass communication theories such as “agenda setting” (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) are

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frequently used to explain the role of media in influencing people’s behavior. Those theories and models of communication conceptualize the recipient as a passive object of development. Following this paradigm, Western society is perceived to have more knowledge and information about development issues than other societies living particularly in “Third World” countries; a categorization that is demeaning for the global East/South. Accordingly, Schramm (1964) believes that “we [the West] must share information, we must share it widely […] for development to occur.” By transferring “new” knowledge, in which mass media play a crucial role, at the same time they transfer Western values. The objective is behavioral change from traditional mode of living towards a more modern one, which—seen from the lens of the Westerners—is perceived as a sign of “progress”. This one-dimensional interpretation of development reflects an approach in communication that is vertical, top-down, one-way and linear. Communication is strategic and the emphasis is on the effect of communication rather than, for example, on meaning-making or participatory process of communication. In this context, mass media acts as “agent of change” that disseminates information and knowledge5 to the audience in developing or poorer regions. From this perspective, communication is merely seen as a means of development or as Melkote (2003, p. 130) says, as an “organizational delivery system” or an instrument of strategic communication. Likewise, in the social marketing and entertainment-education approach, the media is treated as tools of marketing to promote the values to be cultivated in the local community where the development project is located (see ibid., pp. 135–136). Furthermore, the top-down character of communication in this perspective can be evaluated from Rogers’s (2003, p. 131) opinion about the role of communication, namely to transfer “technological innovations from development agencies to their clients” and it is done by stimulating change in the society through modernization. Indeed, technology and technological innovation is one of the determinant factors in Rostow’s (1960) modernization formula so that a society can “take-off” to the next stage of development (economic growth), i.e “technological maturity”. The continuity of innovation of technology is one of the main prerequisites for a country to become an advanced industrial country. Historically speaking, industrialization has always been marked by technological advances, i.e., mechanical

5

The debate over the difference between ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ in the field of development communication and especially in ICT4D can be found in Unwin (2009, pp. 19–25).

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technology, electronic technology and currently digital technology. All of these advances could not have occurred without technological innovation. Assche and Hornidge (2015, p. 90) even put innovation (and transition management) as a separate category from the classical modernist development paradigm. This is because, initially, innovation did not seem to be the answer to development problems in Third World countries, but rather in Western countries, particularly in the early 1980s when innovation was considered to be the solution to boost the economy. The high tech-based Silicon Valley entrepreneurial and business model is one example of how innovation works. Many developed countries are trying to emulate such a business model that has led to the emergence of many startup companies which are built with innovative management structures. Here, the state adjusts its policy and intervenes to some extent in determining its industrial and economic policies. Assche and Hornidge (2015) describe this as follows, “[i]f a government has a comprehensive perspective on innovation, how to promote it, which kind of innovation, how to link them, how to bring them to implementation, to business, how to support those businesses, then one can say they have a transition management approach” (p. 91). The dominant paradigm is therefore characterized by the strong position of the state in the center of development-related decision-making processes.

3.1.2.2 The Opposing Paradigm: Reclaiming the Significance of the Periphery Apart from the innovation perspective as explained above, which is basically more of an enrichment or variation of the conventional modernist model (economic policy prescribed from external sources, opening the market as wide as possible, free economic competition, etc.) another paradigm that is born as a critique and reaction to modernization ideas is the dependency model of development. The pioneers of this group (Paul A. Baran, 1957; Ferando E. Cardoso, 1972; Andre G. Frank, 1966, to name a few) argue that inequality between the developed countries and those they call “underdeveloped” is caused by the structure of power relations between them and not because one country performs better/worse than the other (for example in terms of managing their economic resources). The dependistas—as the proponents of this paradigm are called—reject the modernization idea. They contend that “underdevelopment” in Third World countries is caused by poverty in those regions and that an economic solution is the only answer to overcome them. Dependency theory does not agree with the “individual-blame logic”, which suggests that underdevelopment is the result of the inability of people to adjust to the “modern” system. Instead of blaming the

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“victim”, the theory argues, the problem lays on the world system that confines individuals and underdeveloped countries to perform without restrictions due to their asymmetric relations with developed countries as a result of colonialism. This is popularly known as “system-blame logic” (cf. Rogers, 1976, pp. 113–114). According to the dependistas, the formula of development provided by the West, which is oriented toward economic growth, will not result in the advancement of the economy. Instead, it increases the degree of dependency of underdeveloped countries on developed countries. They argue, these policies are designed to preserve the domination-subordination relationship between the core (wealthy) countries and the peripheral (poor) countries for the benefit of the former. Dependency theory suggests that the transfer of ideas, information, technology and even the transfer of knowledge does not relate directly with development, but they all smooth the internalization of Western ideology, which will help to maintain the domination of the center over the periphery. For example, center-periphery relation in terms of trade is made in such a way that the periphery remains oriented towards the export of raw materials to be processed by multinational center companies, which in turn will produce finished products. Although, the location for manufacturing of these goods can be in the periphery due to cheap labor. Ironically, the finished products will be imported by and marketed in the peripheral countries at a price multiple times more expensive compared to the price of the raw material they export to the core countries. According to dependency theory, the periphery will continue to be conditioned to depend on the center for attaining finished goods and positioned as the consumer, while the center dominates the periphery for sending raw materials and positioning itself as the producer (Assche & Hornidge, 2015, p. 83; cf. Galtung, 1971). As a counter to the dominant paradigm, dependency theory is justifiable, because in order to dominate, one needs another party placed in a subordinate position. “Development”, as defined by the dominant paradigm, ignores other social dimensions that must also be considered in a development program, such as the guarantee of human rights, environment preservation, and community empowerment. The focus on economic growth will prove costly because the development model prescribed by core countries will result in economic and social imbalances between members of society. To tackle this issue, peripheral nations need to detach themselves from the networks of power relation with the center and design their own autonomous development agenda (cf. Assche & Hornidge, 2015, p. 83). For instance, the forming of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War era is an effort of some underdeveloped countries and nations that chose to distance themselves from both the Western and the Eastern Bloc.

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Furthermore, Wallerstein (2000, p. 267) criticizes the imbalance of the world system, in which he argues: We can think of this long transition as one enormous political struggle between two large camps: the camp of all those who wish to retain the privileges of the existing inegalitarian system, albeit in different forms, perhaps vastly different forms; and the camp of all those who would like to see the creation of a new historical system that will be significantly more democratic and egalitarian.

According to the dependency theory, power relations and geopolitical structure between the world’s center and peripheries are conditioned by the post-colonial legacy that determines the global system. In A Structural Theory of Imperialism, Galtung (1971) points out that this hegemonial structure is maintained by both center and periphery in a feudal system. To be precise, he points to what he calls the “Center in Center” (Cc) and the “Center in Periphery” (Cp),6 which deliberately sustain their power relationships because they share the same political and economic interests. In another explanation, Galtung takes a different approach from that of the dependency theory, derived from the Marxist perspective. Galtung argues that the social position of a person, whether he/she belongs to the center or the periphery, is based on statistical division, rather than on class division (Korhonen, 1990). Further, statistical division is the cause of economic inequality between center and periphery and this disagrees with the “individual-blame logic”. Imbalances not only occur between the center and the peripheral countries, but also within the countries themselves regardless of their geopolitical position, i.e., between the 1 percent wealthy small elites and the 99 percent middle-topoor majority, and between the privileged and the disadvantaged (e.g., elderly, women and children). This is not the kind of globalization that people celebrate. It is rather a “myth” (Hafez, 2007), in which, along with new innovations in ICTs, new forms of ecopolitical and sociocultural marginalization and exploitation of those who live in the periphery are produced and reproduced. The already established “transatlantic” (Europe-North America) network of knowledge will become even stronger than the “transpacific” (Asia-Latin America/US) and “transindian” (Asia-Africa) because the industrial countries have better telecommunication infrastructures, which will ease knowledge exchange among them and consequently widen the North-South information/knowledge gap and digital divide (ibid.).

6

Other two categories are the Periphery in the Center (Pc) and the Periphery in the Periphery (Pp) (see Galtung, 1971).

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A thought for consideration: Should developing countries invest in the digitalization project in order to catch up or leapfrog developed countries and be part of the center? If the answer is yes, as suggested by Kofi Annan, where do they receive the funds from? From core countries and global international organizations such as the World Bank? If this is the case, would it not create a new dependency of the periphery on the center? Hafez (2000, 2001) stresses the importance of considering the quality rather than the quantity of digital infrastructure development in developing countries. A focus on supporting certain actors who have the capability to amplify the potential of new media for community development may be better because they have a greater multiplier effect than providing one-size-fits-all technology that is not appropriate for everyone. Hafez (ibid.) also reminds that developing nations could capitalize on their “demographic bonus” as countries such as India and Indonesia have younger populations who are more adaptive to technological changes in the future, thus making them better equipped to adopt new technological innovations. Some scholars claim that societal transformation into the era of network-based information society, as reviewed by Castells (2009, 2010, 2011, 2015), provides an optimistic picture of a global society. However, Hafez (2007) criticizes that even with its global potential, national and local elements and situations remain the factors that determine the extent to which globalization can be legitimized according to its terms. For example, in China and Indonesia politically and culturally induced censorship policy in varying degrees affects the liberal use of the internet and limits its potential in building free information flow, public networks and the democratic public sphere. Thus, one should be critical in defining globalization in modernization terms; the two terms are not to be juxtaposed (ibid.). The preservation of the relationship structure between countries in the world does not only correlate with economic inequality, but also with communication inequality. By taking advantage of the doctrine of the “free flow of information”, which is substantially similar to that of the “free market”, developed countries in the center can and have already exploited this “freedom” by delivering an abundance of information and media products to poor countries in the periphery. In other words, the same old one-way communication from center to periphery. The “free flow” model of information is duplicated within each country, especially in the periphery. The media industry, which is based in large cities, dominates the media content with news and cultural programs that are centerbiased and these consequently create the marginalization of media products from the periphery (small towns and rural areas).

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The imbalance of information and communication flow was addressed and criticized by developing countries in a series of UNESCO forums in the late 1970s and early 1980s which became the starting point of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Their demands, as outlined in the MacBride Report in 1980, are clear: a more balanced media and cultural products as well as information and communication exchange between North-South, West-East and Center-Periphery so that each party receives a more authentic understanding of each other. This agreement is conceptualized as a departure from the customary orientalist vision of the East (or, in general, of the “others”) (cf. Hafez, 2007, pp. 27–29, 143–144; Mefalopulos, 2008, p. 6). Data on world internet usage shows the large gap between transatlantic transpacific internet data exchange, let alone between US/Europe and Africa (Hafez, 2007, p. 101). It confirms that information flow is still controlled by developed countries who are the major powerhouses in industry, technology and economy. The availability of internet access in Third World countries has not been able to challenge the domination of information production from the Western hemisphere. Furthermore, as described by Hafez (ibid.), the degree of connectivity within the center and the peripheral countries is larger rather than between those countries. This raises the question about the role of the internet in global communication: is the internet promoting international communication and overcoming communication gaps between countries in the world or is it instead strengthening the communication at the local and regional level (Hafez, 2007, p. 102). The imbalances, as described above, ultimately give way to the birth of the alternative view on development, which provides alternative answers for Third World countries to escape from the problem of dependency. At the same time, it lays the foundation for a more genuine development, which is in line with the needs and interests of each country. The following section will discuss the alternative paradigm of development along with its various approaches.

3.1.2.3 The Alternative Paradigm: Stimulating Active Participation from Bottom The alternative paradigm is influenced by many perspectives and approaches in development and communication discourses. Alongside the dependency theory that has been described above, it is colored mainly by the leftist vision that manifested in the critical perspective (Foucault, 1980), liberation theology (Freire, 1970), capabilities approach (Sen, 1999) and participatory and empowerment approach (see Melkote, 2003; Mody, 2003; cf. Servaes, 1999; Servaes & Lie, 2013).

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The critical perspective is principally contra-modernization. It “challenge[s] economic and cultural expansionism and imperialism of modernization” (Melkote, 2003, p. 130) in to-be-“develop” countries. The liberation idea comes from Brazilian educator and scholar Paulo Freire (1970), who is best known for his concept on critical pedagogy and liberation theology, in which he expresses his thoughts on “personal and communal liberation from oppression” (Melkote, 2003, p. 130). Freire coined the term “conscientization” (in Portuguese: conscientização) to refer to “critical consciousnesses”, i.e., “the process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social reality through reflection and action.”7 To liberate individuals and communities from oppression, empowerment is the key, which will free them from “false consciousness”, the term often used by Marxist sociologists. In a more radical view, the liberation idea and the critical perspective can turn into post-developmentalist thinking that lean on post-colonialism theories. It abandons the concept of development in its entirety due to its flaws and bias toward Western ideals, choosing to deconstruct and build the concept anew. However, post-developmentalism also acknowledges that authenticity is almost unlikely to occur as society always evolves from past experiences, and that includes colonialism. Thus, “[d]evelopment paths will always incorporate local and external elements, ideas, forms of organizations, people, and the next step will always be shaped by a previous hybrid state” (Assche & Hornidge, 2015, p. 109; cf. Rigg, 2003, pp. 37–39). Meanwhile, empowerment perspective centers “power inequalities” and “power structure” within the practice of development. According to Rowlands (1997), empowerment can be defined at different levels: individual, organization, and community. At the community level, “empowerment is the process of increasing control by groups over consequences that are important to their members and to others in the broader community” (Fawcett, Seekins, Whang, Muiu, & Balcazar, 1984, p. 146; emphasis in original; see further explanation below). If the dominant paradigm sees development for its economical end, on the contrary, the alternative paradigm defines “development as a process that should provide people with access to appropriate and sustainable opportunities to improve their lives and lives of others in their communities” (Melkote, 2003, p. 137). In 1976, Rogers acknowledged his mistake in defining development when he stressed previously the need for “higher per capita income” (Rogers, 1969, p. 18; see 3.1.2.1. above). His view changed to include the importance of “social

7

http://www.freire.org/component/easytagcloud/%20conscientization (retrieved on December 9, 2013).

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advancement”, “equality” and “freedom” in development practices. In his later definition, he considers development as a widely participatory process of social change in a society, intended to bring about both social and material advancement (including greater equality, freedom and other valued qualities) for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment. (Rogers, 1976/2006, p. 117)

Note that he highlights the process of (local) participation in pursuing development “advancement” through which a different set of development goals can be formulated by different nations. Table 3.1 shows the head-to-head differences between the dominant and the alternative paradigm of development as composed by Rigg (2003, p. 46). Table 3.1 Mainstream or dominant versus alternative paradigm of development

The freedom of people to decide what kind of development they want to pursue is at the heart of Sen’s (1999) conceptualization about development, what he terms the “capabilities approach”. By criticizing modernization and industrialization premises, he lays the foundation of development in the crucial aspect of human freedom in which he argues that development is “a process of expanding

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the real freedom that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999, p. 3) in order to “to lead the kind of lives they value — and have reason to value” (ibid., p. 18). For instance, what the economist sometimes sees as “deprivation” may not be so from the perspective of poor people. They prioritize other subjects such as self-respect, stability, employment status, dependency, female-headed households, the type of house they have, food security and vulnerability over economic matters (Rigg, 2003, p. 146). Kleine (2013) takes the view of Sen’s capabilities approach in her account. It stresses the process rather than the result of development, where people and their choices are put at front and center of development processes. She sees development as an open-ended process, which will lead to pluralism of development paths that differ from one country to another. In addition, Kleine (ibid.) approaches development from the system perspective, in which she argues that “the way the capabilities approach seeks to link the personal, social, economic and political spheres, and recognizes people themselves as key actors in the development process, requires a systemic understanding of the different elements in this process” (ibid., p. 4). It is obvious that the most important characteristic of the alternative paradigm is its rejection of modernization recipes as the only solution to development problems. It does not adhere to economic goals of development. Instead, it offers various measurements as development indicators of a nation. Sen (1999), for instance, centers development on human capabilities rather than on a single economic measurement. The Indian, recipient of the 1998 Nobel Prize in economic sciences, worked closely with Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq to develop the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990 that measures health (live expectancy index/long and healthy life), education (education index/knowledge), and income (income index/decent standard of living) levels of a country and treats them as development indicators. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) eventually adopted this people-centered index and has since issued an annual Human Development Report to rank countries based on those three key dimensions. In 2018, Norway, Switzerland and Ireland were the three countries that ranked at the top of the Human Development Report8 , although they only rank at 28th , 20th and 31th respectively in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 2018 World Development Indicator (WDI) list released by the World Bank9 (cf. 8

Human Development Index (HDI). Retrieved on June 19, 2020 from http://hdr.undp.org/en/ data 9 World Bank’s GDP ranking 2019. Retrieved on August 16, 2017 from http://databank.wor ldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf

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Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 47–48). In the same year, Germany ranked 4th both in HDI and GDP, showing its strength in the overall development measurement, while Indonesia was at 16th place in GDP and 111th for HDI, pointing to the huge imbalance in the national development priorities (ibid.). Another alternative measurement is the Bhutan-inspired Gross National Happiness Index (GNHI)10 . It is “a multidimensional measure and it is linked with a set of policy and program screening tools so that it has practical applications … The pursuit of happiness is collective, though it can be experienced deeply personally. Different people can be happy in spite of their disparate circumstances and the options for diversity must be wide” (Ura, Alkire, Zangmo & Wangdi, 2012, p. 1). The existence of GNHI proves that different countries can aim for different development objectives according to their needs and desires. Bhutan’s experience then inspired the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network to publish the World Happiness Report in 2012 during a UN High Level Meeting chaired by Bhutan’s Prime Minister Jigme Thinley. The report has been issued annually ever since. Instead of a single economic indicator, the World Happiness Report uses six key indicators to measure happiness levels of a country, i.e., freedom, generosity, health, social support, income and trustworthy governance.11 The alternative schemes of development support the idea of sustainable development, stressing that development is a “process” rather than an “end”. Consequently, the alternative paradigm discards the label of “developed” and “developing” countries. There is no end to development, hence “all countries are still developing,” stresses Kleine (2013, p. 22). Although different countries may have separate priorities in their development goals, Servaes (1999) believes that “[t]he common starting point here is the examination of the changes from bottom-up, from the self-development of the local community” (p. 50; cf. Servaes & Lie, 2013, p. 11). He refers to “multiplicity” or “another development” framework which highlights “cultural identity, empowerment and multidimensionality” (Servaes, 1999, p. 50) and that it operates within participatory model of development communication (ibid., pp. 53–93; Servaes & Lie, 2013, p. 11). In his “another development” concept, Servaes (1999)—inspired by the Swedish Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the German Green political movement—assumes that there should not be only one model of development. Every society has the potential and freedom to produce and follow their own development agenda. The outcome of 10

Further information about Bhutan’s GNHI can be found at http://www.grossnationalhappi ness.com/ (retrieved on September 2, 2017). 11 Further information on Word Happiness Report can be found at http://worldhappiness.rep ort/ (retrieved on September 2, 2017).

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this approach is a variety of development models which is only applicable in specific contexts and not easy to replicate, hence “multiplicity” (Servaes & Malikhao, 2002). Although according to this paradigm “there is no universal path to development” (ibid., p. 11; emphasis in original), Servaes and Malikhao define at least six principles on which another development must be based: basic needs, endogenous, self-reliance, ecology, participative democracy and structural changes (ibid.). To materialize the idea of sustainable development within the alternative paradigm, the United Nations set 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2016 (as the successor of Millenium Development Goals), which function as the formal yet non-binding objectives for UN Member States in an effort to address world’s development issues without risking the lives of future generations. The roles are shared not only by developing and poor countries but also by rich countries as SDGs cover most of the world’s problems ranging from poverty to gender equality, from climate change to health, education, peace and justice issues as well as economic problems (cf. Kates, Parris, & Leiserowitz, 2005; Sachs, 2012).12 By now, it has become commonly understood that the world has moved towards a more inclusive development agenda, rather than concentrating only on economic matters. Rigg (2003) stated that “notions of community development, empowerment, sustainability and participatory development were... leaving the radical ghetto where they had been nurtured and were being incorporated into mainstream thinking” (p. 45). For this reason, it is perhaps irrelevant to distinguish between the dominant and alternative paradigm nowadays, as the alternative has become mainstream and guides the world’s development programs. Social inclusion is the keyword in alternative development by which development agencies shift their communication method from diffusion-mechanisticmonologic to participatory-organic-dialogic-oriented communication (Servaes, 2000, p. 27, 2008a, p. 201). It promotes a two-way, egalitarian and horizontal communication process (cf. Mefalopulos, 2008, pp. 22–25; see Table 3.2). Even if the communication is vertical, it should support the practice of a bottomup communication process rather than top-down, i.e., from the grassroots in the periphery to the political elites and the policymakers in the center, in order to stimulate public initiatives and incorporate civil society in the development process. Rigg (2003) coined the term of subscripted Dd development to refer to alternative development that emphasizes the important “role of NGOs and community organizations in promoting change” (p. 328).

12

See http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ for further information about Sustainable Development Agenda. Retrieved on August 16, 2017.

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Table 3.2 Basic Features of Communication Modes according to Mefalopulos (2008, p. 24)

Citizens are expected to take roles as active participants in development communication and position themselves as subjects of development. Here, communication is not viewed as an “organizational delivery system” (Melkote, 2003) for transferring messages, but as an interactive process for achieving mutual understanding between those who are involved in the development process. Accordingly, communicative action requires that all parties recognize each other’s uniqueness and cultural background because communication is “inseparable from culture and society” (ibid., p. 130). Recognizing each other’s cultural background and not clumping them in the same pot of development beneficiaries means recognizing their identity. Knowing each other’s identity is one of the key factors of a successful development communication campaign. Another important point within this perspective is the issue of local “ownership”. Access to information is considered insufficient to give opportunities to the local people to improve their lives if there is a lack of community ownership of the communication process (Evers & Gerke, 2005; Gumucio-Dagron, 2003). Gumucio-Dagron (2003) criticizes the proliferation of telecenters and other similar ICT-oriented initiatives that do not give solutions to specific needs of the targeted community nor integrates it in the process, but concentrate more on providing connectivity to underdeveloped countries, without ascertaining if basic needs such as clean water, sanitation and electricity are already fulfilled. Community ownership and participation are therefore crucial for the sustainability of the development program.

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Yet what is meant by “participation” and “empowerment” in bottom-up development communication? How can it be significant for the periphery? The next part of this report will concentrate on the bottom-up approach in development communication within the context of another development. This approach tries to seek alternative solutions for rural problems in the periphery, in which the problem-solving process should start from the local community, hence bottomup. This approach is often interrelated with the concept of both empowerment and (local) participation. Thus, it is unavoidable that in the effort to define the bottom-up approach one must integrate those central terms in the discussion.

3.1.2.3.1 Participation and Empowerment as Integral parts of the Bottom-up Approach Development communication within the bottom-up perspective is communication practice where civil society is given the freedom to articulate their development ideas to the public through numerous communication channels. Its goal is to influence political decision-making at the local, regional, national or even international level. In the process, people can communicate their interests and opinions in various levels of the public sphere to which they have access. Hence, the success of the bottom-up strategy is determined by active participation of both organized and unorganized citizens, who take the role as the subjects of development. Seen from the actor perspective, participation in public activity can be differentiated by its creator, whether it is initiated from the top (such as in general elections or referendums) or from the bottom (i.e., public demonstrations, public events, petitions, campaigns, etc.) (cf. Voss, 2014b). Norbert Kersting (2014) introduces the terms “invited space” and “invented space”, in which the former relates to institutionalized participation that is held routinely and originated in formal political system, while the latter is organized by the citizen outside the formal institutional system and often held sporadically contingent on the issue at hand. Nonetheless, the participatory communication approach, which has arisen as a critique for the one-way development communication approach, is not always identical with the alternative paradigm of development. Recently, development practices within the dominant paradigm have also used the participatory method. Melkote (2003, p. 138) refers to it as the “participation-as-a-means” approach as opposed to “participation-as-an-end” approach. While both emphasize active participation of local citizens in the development process, he criticizes the participatory approach in the dominant paradigm (as a means), because he believes it is “old wine in new bottles” (ibid.). He argues that “the outcome of participation process in most cases has not been true empowerment of the people, but the

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attainment of some indicator of development as articulated in the modernization paradigm” (ibid.). From his statement one can conclude that the objective of a participatory approach must be the “empowerment” of the local community. The use of participation as a method without empowering those who participate in the activity would mean manipulating the locals for pursuing objective criteria for which they have no reason to value, because they would still be positioned as the “object” of development. Without empowerment, they would not be given the authority to decide what kind of development they want to achieve. This is the reason why the “[c]ommon features of this [participatory] perspective are the emphasis on people, the endogenous vision of development, and the attention power and rights issues” (Mefalopulos, 2008, p. 51). Participation can be spontaneous or organized by NGOs or CSOs (Nugroho, 2006, 2010; Steffens, 2014). Rucht (2014) and Lim (2006a, 2013) study the role of the internet in mass mobilization and its meaning for offline protest, particularly whether it influences political outcome. Voss (2014a) also includes people’s involvement in a political party or its wing organizations as one of the forms of political engagement. In her research, she examines the changes of form of political participation with the growing prevalence of people using the internet to set up e-petitions in order to mobilize mass support. The internet, via social media, opens up new possibilities for more bottom-up initiatives to be established. However, due to the internet’s characteristic as a “pull medium”, Voss acknowledges traditional mass media remains a powerful medium for reaching public awareness for online campaigns. Therefore, the combination of online and offline media campaigns, or campaigns in a “hybrid space” (Castells, 2015), is important for successful grassroots campaigns (Voss, 2014a, pp. 158–159). Kaase (1992) gives the definition of participation that emphasizes the role of civil society to influence political decisions. He sees participation as “Tätigkeiten, die Bürger freiwillig mit dem Ziel unternehmen, Entscheidungen auf den verschiedenen Ebenen des politischen Systems zu beeinflussen” (Kaase, 1992, p. 682; emphasis added). Meanwhile, Cook and Morgan (1971) stipulate two requirements in order for participative democracy to take place: decentralization of decision making and direct involvement of the “amateurs” in that decision-making process. However, one needs to take into account the capabilities of the amateurs to make a quality decision, or else the local community will not have a meaningful outcome out of the process of decentralized decision-making. Direct participation alone is not enough for a bottom-up campaign to be successful. When local people are incapable or do not feel that they are equipped with those capabilities or skills to contribute in the decision-making process, the common solution in the development discourse is: they must be made capable.

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It is in other words: empowerment, which is embedded in the bottom-up development communication approach. If this is the case, then the concept of the bottom-up approach itself is problematic. On the one hand, seen from the alternative paradigm, there is the need to recognize local value and local involvement in the development process, but on the other hand, development experts—and often the local people themselves—acknowledge that rural inhabitants need to be empowered first in order to make the system works. Additionally, empowerment is normally facilitated by external agents, which would mean, theoretically, introducing the locals to new ideas and values even before they are able to articulate and transmit their own ideas to the “top” (the government or the public at large) about the kind of development they want to follow. It leads us to question the validity of the bottom-up premise: is there a genuine development approach that starts from “bottom”? Within the empowerment perspective itself, the concept of power inequalities and power structure or power control are often put at the center of discussion. Melkote (2003) argues, in the execution of development projects, particularly one that uses a participatory approach, people must ensure that all parties have the rights to “think, express oneself, belong to a group, be recognized as a person, be appreciated and respected, have some say in crucial decision process” (Melkote, 2003, p. 138). Here we see that within the participatory approach, empowerment can be considered a “process” as well as an “end” to a development program. Through empowerment, it is expected that all participants will realize their positions and roles in the development process and more generally within the society. Empowered people will strive to achieve freedom and to use that freedom to make independent decisions regarding their lives, in the present and future. Indeed, liberation or freedom (from oppression) is one of the goals of development in the estimation of Freire (1970) and Sen (1999). However, instead of using the word empowerment, Freire emphasizes “conscientization” or “critical consciousness”. Other scholars, such as Friedmann (1992) choose the term “autonomy” in describing empowerment. According to him, “[the] empowerment approach, which is fundamental to an alternative development, places the emphasis on autonomy in the decision-making of territorially organized communities, local self-reliance (but not autarchy), direct (participatory) democracy, and experiential social learning” (Friedmann, 1992, p. vii). Freedom, independence, liberation, autonomy and sovereignty are terms that are often linked to alternative development. They imply a continuing power struggle between “the disempowered poor against the existing hegemonic powers” (ibid., p. 8). Agusta (2007) criticizes the Kantian humanism perspective on the concept of empowerment. The critic is primarily aimed at examples when humanism was

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interpreted as empowering the “Others”. According to Kant, as cited by Agusta (ibid.), maturity is a sign of humanism; those who are mature are humanists. Citing Said and Derrida, Agusta (ibid.) contends that what is meant by humanism in this narrative is actually Western society (which considers itself as a mature society). Consequently, a Western humanist views himself as having a duty (in the context of Kantian deontological ethics) to empower others through capacity building. This is interpreted as tutelage by Westerners (who feel more humanistic) to develop the capacity of people in the East or South within the frame of Western version of development. This narrative raises the North/South and West/East dichotomy, in which one party feels more civilized, humanist, mature and empowered than the others and, condescendingly, views the other party as uncivilized, less-humanist, immature and disempowered so that they must be “disciplined” through what currently known as “development”, reminiscing the old colonial viewpoint of “civilizing the unwashed masses”, which often thought as “the white man’s burden”. Unfortunately, this is the kind of asymmetrical and one-way development planning and practice, covered in the modernization narrative, which legitimates the West/North to dictate the East/South of the direction of development they should take. In the context of national development, the criticism of Kant’s humanism can also be directed at the linear development program planned by the central government, which must be carried out thoroughly by all elements of society in the peripheral regions. The center, seen as more advanced, mature and civilized than the periphery, is considered as having the duty and legitimacy to develop the regions in accordance with the development paradigm adopted by the center. The issue is now, who should empower whom? The state certainly has the power, but does it have the right to do so? How far should the state intervene in the development process? In relation to this, Arvind Virmani (2002) offers a paradoxical statement, in which he believes that the government should on one side deregulate everything that hinders innovation and industry, but also insisting that it has the responsibility of “empowering the poor so that they have equal rights (and responsibilities) with other citizens” (p. 226). He stresses the importance of education and once again the role of the government in that process: The government must ensure that all its citizens are literate and all children attain some basic level of education, which we currently define as primary/elementary level. Education not only empowers the public but also ensures that they are employed and can do productive jobs that open up, and this helps sustain economic growth over the long term. (Ibid., p. 229)

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Supporting that argument, Friedman (1992) highlights that, unlike the doctrinal beliefs about alternative development, “the state continues to be a major player … without the state’s collaboration, the lot of the poor cannot be significantly improved. Local empowering action requires a strong state” (p. 7). Consequently, one cannot avoid political action if one wants to employ alternative development. On the contrary, political empowerment must be addressed along with social empowerment. The goal is to remove “structural constraints that help to keep the poor poor” (ibid.). As far as ICT4D is concerned, Virmani (2002) argues that technology has a distinct role in community empowerment. Again, he highlights that the use of ICTs in villages should be free from financial obligation to the community. Access to information is an important element of empowerment. The poor and their well-wishers just have the right to information about expenditures that are routinely justified in their name. The Internet and Internet telephony can play a role in breaking the informational isolation in rural areas. Excessive taxation, in the form of revenue sharing and charges for surplus (free) spectrum hinder such a development. (Ibid., p. 229)

In contrast, scholars such as Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron (2003) and Marianne T. Hill (2003) stress that “access” to information and the decision-making process do not necessarily grant local communities equity in power relations. It requires more than that. Gumucio-Dagron (2003) lists five factors that must be taken into account for the sustainability of ICT4D projects: community ownership, local content, appropriate technology, language and culture pertinence and convergence and networking. Meanwhile, Hill (2003) puts emphasis on the person’s soft skills that people need to focus on, for it will benefit the locals in the long term. She reiterates, “it involves the empowerment of individuals through their self-organization and through increasing their self-determination in all areas of activity” (ibid., p. 122). Empowerment is complex. It is both “extensive”, involving many resources and areas to be improved, and “intensive” in the sense of its continuity and sustainability. Empowerment should be designed as a long-term project and not as one-off or hit-and-run activity. In a broader discourse, White (2004) hints that empowerment should be seen as a movement of minority groups and vulnerable people to attain universal human rights for information and communication that will abolish the clientelistic and paternalistic practice of development. Hill (2003), who puts empowerment within the frame of democratization, warns that it “involves the creation of new knowledge and values, in effect a

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paradigm shift, that brings about the meaningful empowerment of groups relegated to subordinate positions” (p. 123; emphasis added). Furthermore, as power relations between stakeholders (government bodies, local citizens, civic organizations and private sectors) change during the empowering process, resistance and protest could emerge from those whose power has been removed (ibid.). A rather strong separation of empowerment from the classical definition of development is hinted at by Nugroho (2010), who studied the use of the internet by Indonesian NGOs in sustainable rural development. In his estimation, empowerment “includes encouragement, skills development, opportunities and access, and focuses on eliminating the future dependency of the individuals to help them attain their goals. Instead of development, empowerment has become the call for most NGOs working in rural issues” (ibid., p. 93). For that reason, the people can either self-empower or allow themselves to be assisted by external power sources (ibid.). An interesting point here is the notion of “self-empowering”. Nugroho (2010) asserts that rural NGOs deploy an approach of “the networking of movement for rural empowerment” (p. 93–94). Friedman (1992, p. 22) also stresses the need of “outside help” to support all kinds of initiatives. By cooperating with external actors, local people can have a better network with government agencies and other organizations. From this point of view, it seems that networking is one answer to self-empowerment, even though elaboration is needed on the question of how it operates and whether communication technology enhances empowerment outcomes or slows it down. Departing from the dichotomy of transmission and participatory models of development communication, Melkote and Steeves (2001, 2015) suggest a third approach, which brings communication to the fore of empowerment’s conceptualization. Communication is prominent not due to its “transmission value”, but because of its “organizational value” in empowering poor and marginalized communities (Melkote & Steeves, 2001, p. 327). Concentrating on collective empowerment rather than individual empowerment, they developed the so-called communitarian theory that is heavily influenced by liberation theology, feminist ideas and environmentally-oriented perspectives, as well as Participatory Action Research (PAR). It focuses on emancipatory communication process that will empower disadvantaged and neglected people who are situated in the periphery of political, ideological and economic power by giving more access to formal decision-making processes in order to enable them to express their interests and opinions without fear of oppression from the dominant powers (ibid., p. 36; cf. Unwin, 2009, p. 63). The emphasis of Melkote and Steeves (2001) on local knowledge and culture signifies their alignment with grassroots movements against the hegemony

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of power exercised by political elites who have the legitimacy to determine development policy and decisions. Drawing from Habermas’s communicative action theory (1984, 1987), people can question the validity of government arguments by challenging them in an open discursive space, which based on purposiverational arguments. By engaging in egalitarian communication within the public sphere, poor and marginalized people at the bottom of the political hierarchy can hopefully empower themselves and consequently escape the confinement of the dominant political system (cf. Unwin, 2009, p. 63). It is, of course, a Habermasian “ideal speech situation” which will assert local people’s autonomy over the state. Empowerment itself is understood “as the process by which individuals, organizations, and communities gain control and mastery over social and economic conditions … over democratic participation in their communities … and over their stories” (Melkote & Steeves, 2015, p. 34). Here, communication and empowerment are seen as ways of eradicating “power inequities in societies between and among individuals, groups and organizations” (ibid.). To put it succinctly, “participation”, “empowerment” and “communication” are interlinked concepts particularly within the bottom-up development communication approach. It is unlikely to achieve development goals within the alternative paradigm with the absence of one of those concepts. The next section will deal with the meanings of the bottom-up approach in development communication, in which empowerment and participation, along with other concepts, will be discussed further.

3.1.2.3.2 What do we know about Bottom-up Development? More direct exposure of the bottom-up approach in development can be found in Mannion (1996), Lund and Sutinen (2010) and Fraser et al. (2006). Mannion (1996) boldly expresses three aspects for which every bottom-up rural development practice should aim: “partnership” (networking), “participation” and “capacity building” (empowerment) of all stakeholders. Following this approach, all parties involved in development projects should be treated as equal partners. The government should not act as “power-brokers”, instead, it should share decision-making power with other parties, notably with local people, whom it serves. This applies also for local community leaders, sectoral agencies and business sectors. Hence, it needs re-learning of a new attitude from all stakeholders in order to bring new dynamism to rural development. This re-learning process should empower people, through which they will enhance their knowledge, change their attitude, and gain new skills. During this process, Mannion (1996) underlines “that the greater the depth of involvement, ownership and control by local communities the higher the level of innovativeness in the projects implemented to tackle the

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development problems of the area in question” (par. 17). This argument is in line with that of Gumucio-Dagron (2003) who stresses the importance of “community ownership”. In a long term, full participation of local people is particularly vital “to avoid institutionalizing a system of ‘devolved patronage’” (Mannion, 1996, par. 13; emphasis in original), due to the high possibility of domination of a few people (e.g., village authorities, members of NGOs) who have personal interest without considering the need of the rest of the local population. If this is the case, there would be no enhancement of local capacity and the development project would not sustain. This is against the principle of bottom-up approach, because “(t)he desired end result of the bottom-up approach is to ensure the sustainable development of rural areas with respect to population, economy and development structures” (Mannion, 1996, par. 4). Another unique characteristic of the bottomup development model is its focus on “area-based” development in contrast to “sectoral-based” development. Despite the fact that most bottom-up projects concentrate in local areas where the project is located, public funding goes mostly to those of sectoral-based projects (e.g., IT, health, education, women and children). For rural development to be successful and sustained, it is necessary to find the right balance between these two models (Mannion, 1996, par. 17 & 23–26). While Mannion (1996) defines bottom-up in a greater development concept scope, Lund and Sutinen (2010) offer a more specific description of it in contextualizing the ICT4D project through the development of ICT education curriculum at the undergraduate level at Tumaini University in Tanzania. The so-called “contextualized” bottom-up IT program “starts by identifying communities that are ready to participate in a process to use technology to transform their own strengths to new levels by designing appropriate technologies with experts of technology and design” (Lund & Sutinen, 2010, p. 526). This model complements the more traditional top-down ICT4D approach, which “transfers technology in a hierarchical way to actual users... (and) starts from a readily available technology...” (ibid.). Due to their emphasis in technological design, Lund and Sutinen (2010) realize that their approach demands more technical skills of the participants rather than social competence, which would be the case for the traditional ICT4D approach. Perhaps this is the reason why they prefer to use the term “IT” instead of “ICT” in the entire article and leave out the communication aspect in their conception of bottom-up approach. Lund and Sutinen (2010) explain further: The ultimate goal of the bottom-up approach for ICT4D is to make all the stakeholders – the students and the problem owners – creators of IT, not just its users … the most important issue in development work . . . (is) to provide training for people to become

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In Lund and Sutinen’s model, the implementation of bottom-up strategy involves three stages: (1) the identification and elaboration of local problems (contextualization), (2) the designing of an appropriate IT solution by students—supervised by international experts—throughout IT courses based on the identified problems (problem-oriented approach), and (3) the introduction of IT solution as business initiative through business incubator (commercialization). The commercialization aspect deserves special attention in this model. Lund and Sutinen’s framework postulates that most local problems, for example agricultural problems in rural areas, can be resolved by developing high-tech products (e.g., specific agricultural technology and application), which can be commercialized through business incubators, in which IT developers are brought together with potential investors who could provide support for product development and the establishment of start-up companies. Therefore, the functionality of IT is ultimately to trigger and enhance economic activity at the local level. More precisely, the crucial role of the business incubator shows that business is the answer to solve local problems as it stimulates the emergence of new initiatives. It is expected that this novel IT curriculum will increase interest in computer science among high school students, especially those who come from rural areas. Hence, specific knowledge gained by the students would enable them to secure better job opportunities because they are equipped with wider skill profiles, which otherwise would not be realized had the ICT4D been implemented using the old top-down manner (non-contextualized). Based on Lund and Sutinen’s contextualized IT model, the “true” bottom-up approach can only be materialized through situated IT education and intervention of external actors, be it the students of the IT program, the experts or business agencies. Additionally, although Lund and Sutinen (2010) do mention “training” as a way to ensure local people to become self-sufficient and self-sustaining once the initiative is started, it is unclear how it should be done and whether this training will empower the entire community or single out only a small group of people who have the interest and knowledge in IT and are ready to participate in the project. Mannion (1996) expresses this concern above. The fact that Lund and Sutinen (2010) point out the commercialization of IT in their model emphasizes the business orientation of their bottom-up approach. It is an approach that can be problematic for poor rural communities whose purchasing

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power is minimal and who face—besides economic problems—more complex social problems. It is also not really defined in this model which party has the authority to make decisions on whether an IT solution will definitely be implemented in the local community and by them. Although they mention that the training program is developed in “close collaboration with local stakeholders” (ibid., p. 526) and that “[t]he local people are invited to work with IT students” (ibid., p. 529), particularly during the identification of local problem and the development of relevant technology, the role of the local people in the decision-making process throughout the development process is questionable. Along the course of the program running, Lund and Sutinen (2010) indicate, that “(o)n a regular basis, a roundtable of major national decision makers and stakeholders meet with international scientific experts to decide upon any further measures to be taken” (p. 529), without mentioning local people in that process as the potential beneficiaries and the future user of the to-be-introduced technology. It is exactly at this point on which Fraser and his colleagues (2006) work to minimize the gap between local people’s participation and development-related decision-making process. The problem of development policy is not only in its approach, but also in its indicators used to measure the success and functionality of a development project. Although the economy indicator is paramount in the dominant paradigm, other indicators within the alternative paradigm, such as the Human Development Index or Gross National Happiness Index (GNHI), have complemented the development measurement. In addition to those indicators, Fraser et al. (2006) try to involve the local community to contribute in the participatory process “to identify indicators to monitor progress towards sustainable development and environmental management goals” (p. 114). By examining three different cases in Western Canada, Botswana and Guernsey, UK, Fraser et al. (2006) recognize that many top-down development approaches have failed to address local problems. The solution is not to move away from top-down and implement the opposite bottom-up approach right away, they contend. They found that the best way to resolve the problem is to integrate the “participatory bottom-up” with the “conventional top-down” system and “find win-win solutions within political and economic constraints” (Fraser et al., 2006, p. 124). This suggestion indicates that equal partnership with all stakeholders is particularly essential for the effectiveness of the project. This is due to the fact that, “despite the push for community participation in sustainable development initiative, development research and projects remain constrained by the need for quantifiable and ‘objectively verifiable indicators’ that allow regions to be compared” (ibid., p. 115). Those indicators are particularly essential for governments as

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well as for national and international donor organizations. However, it is unsurprising that such standardized indicators are meaningless once implemented to evaluate the quality of development at the local level. Hence, active participation from the local community is crucial to co-determine development indicators that are relevant to their community, even though a unique and contextualized data set would be generated as a result of the localized decision-making process (ibid.). This approach is compatible with what Servaes (1999) meant by “multiplicity”, in which it refers to the absence of the “one-size-fits-all” development recipe. Despite its time- and resource-consuming nature, this whole process will benefit the community in the long term, because it implies educational role through community empowerment (Fraser et al., 2006). People should make their own choices and “[b]y sharing and evaluating the community’s knowledge in focus groups, and providing feedback from empirical testing of indicators, each individual’s knowledge increased” (ibid., p. 124). Nonetheless, Fraser et al. (2006) continues, once participatory communication process reaches its final phase, where local indicators are determined, they need to directly take part in decisionmaking sessions together with local or national authorities and stakeholders in order to ensure that they make justifiable decision, which results in appropriate and relevant policy for all parties. According to Rogers (1976), this framework is called “self-development”. Community self-development means that “some type of small group at the local level … takes primary responsibility (1) for deciding exactly what type of development is most needed in their village or neighborhood; (2) for planning how to achieve this development goal; and (3) for obtaining whatever government or nongovernment resources may be necessary, and (4) for carrying out their own development activities.” (p. 121) Because the nature of self-development promotes decentralization of planning, decision-making and execution of development activities, it offers flexibility in the determination of which actions are to be taken in regards to solving local problems rather than following specific government’s directions as in the traditional topdown mode of development communication. Hence, self-development makes local people less dependent on the government. Rogers (1976) exemplifies several cases in villages of Tanzania, China and Korea, where self-development took place in the 1960s and 1970s to tackle the problems of public health, food/agriculture and family-planning. After situating the problem and discussing in local forums and groups about various ways of possible problem-solving mechanisms they had received from mass media and other information sources, the communities eventually decided for themselves which activities were necessary. It was done with minimum assistance from government agencies.

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In the self-development approach, mass communication is neither imperativedirective nor persuasive. Instead, it is more “permissive” and “supportive” in answering local requests. Information technology in the form of mass media is not a strategic instrument for government officials or donor agencies to channel development messages in order to change the behavior of the masses. Rather, “the mass media may be used to feed local groups with information of a background nature about their expressed needs and to disseminate innovations that may meet certain of these needs” (ibid., p. 121). Mass communication also functions to circulate news about self-development achievements of some local groups, which could inspire other groups in other areas to achieve similar or even better results of self-development activities by learning from the experiences of the others. The same principle applies for new digital information technology, which can be used for need-based information seeking and for putting up information online about local initiatives of some self-development activities so that the information can have a global reach. In summation, self-development emphasizes and requires full involvement of local people throughout the course of development management, particularly at the decision-making stage. In practice, the process of involving local people in the decision-making process is not as simple as it is thought. For example, Indonesia has experienced some problems in the implementation of Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT or Presidential Instruction Programme for Less Developed Villages) at the local level since it is launched in 1994 until the New Order collapsed. Collaborating with several NGOs, the government’s efforts to shift from the top-down development model to a more participatory model by encouraging the villages to self-identify their problems, design their own development programs and eventually implement them, encountered obstacles in the field. Patriarchal culture and the dominance of local elites, which denied the participation of women and ordinary villagers in meetings and decision-making processes, proved that in a hierarchical social structure, a pure bottom-up development program, which counts on the community’s self-reliance, is problematic (Rigg, 1997, pp. 116–117). Excluding some members of the community in some stages of the development process is not proper empowerment, instead it will revive the classical “participation” versus “representation” problem as narrated by Assche and Hornidge (2015, pp. 95–101). If people hand in their rights to participate to a few representatives, one may question the validity of “self-empowering”, which requires the active role of the local people in the development process. Meanwhile, representation means that the locals are passively waiting for their representative to do something on behalf of them. Rigg (2003) warns us about this in which he says, “… it should not be assumed that in the process the ‘invisible’ poor will necessarily

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become visible … If the very poorest (or ultra-poor) are excluded from village meetings and not regarded as true and full community members, then their voices will not be heard. They may well remain invisible even to survey teams ostensibly adopting a people-oriented approach …” (p. 146). In the participatory process, communication is crucial to persuade local inhabitants to engage themselves in two-way dialogical development communication. However, good communication skill is not enough to ensure full participation of the locals in the dialogue (cf. Coldevin, 2008, pp. 238–239 for further explanation on the Typology of Participation). Rather, Mefalopulos (2008, p. 26) emphasizes the need to integrate communication specialists who possess the know-what and know-how of communication approach in various development contexts. In dialogue, the goal is not to win an argument, but together to fully understand the problem from different perspectives and come out with the best proposal to solve that problem, in which everybody takes her part to express her opinion. It is different somewhat from discussion, in which people would see which argument wins or loses. In a real dialogue, no party should be left behind during the whole process. People empower themselves by engaging communicatively in the dialogue. Enlisting voices from the bottom through the participatory method is a way to minimize bias in the development agenda. At the international level, the bottomup development conceptualizations which come from the Third World countries in the global periphery are needed to balance the more top-down development agenda which is designed from the center (i.e., the Western nations) and the accusation it contains bias towards modernization. Alatas (2006) and Rigg (2003) problematize this in which they criticize the orientalist vision of the Westerners about Southeast Asia and call for “indigenization” of knowledge that promotes local scholars into the global academic community. From this perspective, local intellectuals are requested to develop their own narratives in conceptualizing and theorizing the social world according to their historical experiences, customs, and intellectual traditions. In so doing, they will free themselves from the domination of the Western narratives, cultures and philosophies. In relation to this, Friedman (1992) reiterates that the objective of an alternative development is to humanize a system that has shut them out, and to accomplish this through forms of everyday resistance and political struggle that insist on the rights of the excluded population as human beings, as citizens, and as persons intent on realizing their loving and creative powers within. Its central objective is their inclusion in a restructured system that does not make them redundant. (p. 13)

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Based on the above discussion, we can draw several conclusions: (1) there is no bottom-up process without empowerment and participation of local citizens, (2) as paradoxical as it seems, the bottom-up development process does not always have to start from the bottom, i.e., from the grassroots. Instead, any party can have the initiative or the idea for a project (“invited” and “invented” space), but the implementation of that initiative must involve local people in order for the bottom-up process to be legitimized, (3) all parties should engage themselves in the decision-making process, in which the decision-making power shared equally (decentralization of power) among them, and (4) all participants must prepare to accept and internalize new attitudes where they see themselves as equal partners and not abusing their power to each other.

3.1.3

Positioning ICT in Development Practices: ICT4D as the Common term

Discussion of development communication, both as a theory and practice, cannot be separated from the issues around ICT, whether it is in the form of print, electronic and digital media, as well as personalized media technology that enhances interpersonal communication activities such as mobile telephones. Then comes the “communication revolution” with the introduction of computer technology and the internet, which has revolutionized how we process and store data. Internet and digital technology also are transforming our thinking about how we perceive information as capital. Each form of media technology has its own modalities that shape how development communication messages are disseminated. The different characteristics of media technology also influence the form of relationship between development actors and beneficiaries of development programs. The use of ICT as a tool to facilitate the attainment of development goals is commonly known as ICT4D. ICTs encompass “all technologies that enable the handling of information and facilitate different forms of communication among human actors, between human beings and electronic systems, and among electronic systems” (Hamelink, 1997, p. 3). While “ICT can refer to any technology serving the purpose of gathering, processing, and disseminating information, or supporting the process of communication” (Kleine, 2013, p. 5), ICT4D is about “how information and communication technologies (ICTs) can be used to help poor and marginalized people and communities make a difference to their lives” (Unwin, 2009, p. 1). Embedded in ICT4D is the problematic meaning of “development” which was elaborated previously. Hence, how and to which direction ICT4D is discussed is determined by how “development” is defined, i.e., whether

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it contributes to the change in terms of economic performance, local participation in the development process or community empowerment. There are at least three roles of ICT that can be identified within development discourse. First, the role of ICT in mass media as the “diffuser” of development messages. Second, technology can act as an “enabler” of social change. Third, ICT takes the role of “amplifier” of human capabilities, in which humans are considered as the main drive of social change, and plays down the role of technology in development. This chapter will examine in more detail those three roles of (media) technology in development.

3.1.3.1 ICT in Mass Media as “Diffuser” Since the period that Lerner (1958), Rogers (1962) and Schramm (1964) published their books about the modernist paradigm of development communication, within which the important role of mass media was promoted, a distinct perspective has developed. This perspective considers that social change toward a modern society is only possible if the center (Western countries, donor agencies, governments in beneficiary countries) disseminates development messages through mass communication techniques to periphery (poor or developing countries, Third World countries, civil society in beneficiary countries). ICT, such as used by mass media, is seen as having a strong influence on the changing of people’s behavior. Here, the media functions as a “diffuser” of development prescriptions. Communication flow operates unidirectionally in one-to-many fashion, originating from one dominant source and directed to a passive mass audience where the opportunity for feedback to the message’s sender is very small or even completely closed. According to Lerner (1958), the recipes of development mean, in other words, modernization, which is not much different from Westernization. He stresses that secular values and Western rationality must be adopted by those who want to “progress”. Through this adoption process, people will develop a new personality, i.e., modern personality, which means losing their old traditional values. Mass media, such as radio and television, play a crucial role in this process because they represent different realities from other parts of the world which can broaden the horizons of the audience. Lerner (ibid.) calls this function of media the “mobility multiplier”. By engaging with the media, basically meaning consuming media products, people can foster “empathy” toward others by positioning themselves in their shoes. Empathy, along with urbanization, literacy and media participation, are the important indicators of modern society, which consists of individuals who have internalized a “mobile personality” to be able to adjust to the ever-changing modern environment.

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In line with Lerner (ibid.), Schramm (1964) argues that effective communication through mass communication could bring about economic development and social change. Mass media is therefore the driving factor for national development in poor and developing countries around the world. Schramm, who was entasked by UNESCO to conduct a study for the development of mass media of communication in the early 1960s, was concerned by the lack of free and adequate information that hindered developing countries to grow. Hence, the development of communication systems is said to be the cornerstone to establish a well-informed society that will be the impetus for social change. To highlight the determining aspect of mass media, Schramm (ibid.) says, “the mass media are agents of social change. The specific kind of social change they are expected to help accomplish is the transition to new customs and practices and, in some cases, to different social relationships. Behind such changes in behavior must necessarily lie substantial changes in attitudes, beliefs, skills and social norms” (p. 16). The focus on communication effect in Schramm’s theory of mass communication indicates the persuasive potential that mass media has. Schramm’s main talking points when it comes to the role of ICT for national development are the diffusion of messages about development issues to local communities and the widening access to information through mass media. In 1979, in a document prepared for the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, Schramm revised his view on development as he recognized the difficulties in reaching standardized development goals due to local preferences. Reflexively, he started to acknowledge that in different communities, different development goals and methods to reach specific development goals existed. He also acknowledged, “the problem of integrating mass media with local activity” (Schramm, 1979, p. 1) and suggested a greater focus on a “local strategy” for development, in which two-way and horizontal communication should be promoted. In this case, local people become the new center who determine development planning and strategy (ibid., p. 9). Additionally, national mass media (“big media”) should be localized; Schramm (ibid.) recommended the incorporation of local media (“little media”) into the development strategy as well as the optimization of other communication media such as radio, wall/blackboard newspapers, posters and even dance performances. However, regardless of the change in development strategy, there is not much of a difference in the role and the function of the media for development because they retain their traditional functions “to inform, teach and please …” (ibid., p. 8). The only change in media strategy is the emphasis on local activity. Schramm remarks, “… it becomes all the more important for those traditional functions of news, culture, and education to continue, for if local activity can be stimulated then more people will

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learn to read, and more will acquire radios, and the experience of local leadership and responsibility will inevitable expand frames of attention beyond the village” (ibid.). Mass media as the “diffuser” of development-related information is one topic that is also explained by Rogers (2003) in Diffusion of Innovation. “Mass media channels are usually the most rapid and efficient means of informing an audience of potential adopters about the existence of an innovation—that is, to create awareness-knowledge” (ibid., p. 18). Knowledge is the first step in Rogers’s innovation-decision process. For innovators and early adopters, mass media are essential as a source of information about new ideas as their exposure to media is very high. However, at the later stages of the innovation-decision process, particularly at the persuasion and decision stage, interpersonal communication is more effective in changing people’s attitudes to adopt new innovation. In promoting and disseminating information about the government’s development agenda, journalists in developing countries sometimes practice what is known as “development journalism”. This type of journalistic practice “draws from the normative conviction that the news should contribute to the process of national development in less-developed countries …” (Hanitzsch, 2005, p. 495). This is another example of the role of mass media as the “diffuser” of information. In Indonesia, especially during the New Order, where modernization was the norm in virtually all facets of citizenry, mass media was utilized by the government to ensure the functionality of development journalistic practices. Acting as the mouthpiece of the government, the Department of Information (now: the Ministry of Communication and Information) was the responsible institution for controlling the flow of information and ensuring that development-related messages were channeled via mass media to send home the desired message to the public. Media programs such as Koran Masuk Desa (lit.: “newspapers enter the village” or newspapers attaining wider distribution in rural areas), Siaran Pedesaan (rural broadcasting) on RRI and television program Dari Desa ke Desa (from village to village) on TVRI were “development programs, which were conducted by the government unilaterally, in unison, and uniformly” (Dilla, 2012, p. 6, author’s translation). They were customized to facilitate development journalism and to back the government’s development campaign. They were intended to “promote, disseminate, persuade, support, and convince citizen of various development programs, their implementation or impact (benefit), which are already, being or will be conducted for the wider public, especially in rural areas” (ibid., author’s translation). This is a direct implementation of the role that Lerner (1958) argues that mass media takes to instill modern mentality, i.e., Western values, to poor and

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developing societies by picturing them the reality of the Western world, thereby “educating” them how to live in the modern world. Western values can be disseminated through various media programs such as entertainment, from which comes the term “edutainment”, or journalistic reportings. Thus, the media has a diffuser function as an instrument that is strategically used to disseminate knowledge and change the attitude and behavior of targeted people in development activities. However, the abovementioned mechanistic approach of mass media (Dilla, 2012) has been criticized because of its communication effect-gap (Rogers, 1976). Critics contend that the effect of media messages only applies to those of upper socioeconomic status and with access to mass media. Generally, they are more literate than the poor majority in their community. As a consequence, the media are often considered as an obstacle to development rather than advocate of it. This reality pushes development agents to move beyond the classical model of communication, such as the hypodermic needle theory, to an approach that utilizes more interpersonal communication channels, for example the two-step communication model. The approaches are complemented by other more traditional and cultural communication expressions, such as folk performances or group meetings. The diffusion model has proven effective, for example, at times of agricultural development (to prepare a local community to adopt modern agricultural technology) and for family planning projects (to control population growth by adopting contraceptives) in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Rogers, 1976, Dilla, 2012). Development reporting, which is news coverage policy that supports the achievement of a government’s development agenda, is part of the development process, not mere reporting of development activity per se. As a result, development journalism is often “exploited by authoritarian rulers to legitimize restrictions on press freedom” (Hanitzsch, 2005, p. 495) and is even accused of being a vehicle for propaganda and to maintain the status quo. Consequently, development journalism is nicknamed sarcastically by Western journalists as “government say-so journalism” (Ogan, 1982, p. 3). The use of ICTs as a one-way communication channel to disseminate information from the government in the center to its citizens at the periphery applies to new media as well. The internet indeed offers the formation of new types of publics, namely ones which actively pull and (re)produce information from the net and communicate vertically with government sources at the center, while at the same time forming horizontal networks with other communities at the peripheries. They are structurally different from the media audience, which is by definition passive and characteristically fed with information that is pushed from above. However, the mass-mediated public sphere remains the main space where

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development messages are expected to have the greatest effect on citizens’ behavior change. This is because traditional media still have the highest penetration compared to the internet. In Indonesia, television is consumed by 96 percent of the population, compared to internet penetration of 44 percent, according to data from Nielsen Consumer Media View in 2017.13 Nonetheless, the internet, which is hailed for its democratic potential—due to its interactive communication character and decentralized, user-generated content—does not always guarantee that reciprocal and egalitarian communication between center and periphery will take place. Research conducted by Steyaert (2002b, p. 201, cited in Gigler, 2015) in the Flanders region of Belgium “shows that local governments primarily use the internet as a one-way communication stream, to reach citizens as customers and neglect its interactive possibilities, which could empower citizens to exercise their rights and responsibilities better” (p. 13). However, with rapid development of internet connection in both urban and rural areas, it remains to be seen whether government officials will still use this new medium unilaterally or welcome the effort of citizens, particularly those neglected ones, to open a new communication path by engaging actively and interacting intensely with them via online media. The internet enables common citizens to exercise their communicative potential and express their interest to the wider public so that the possibility that their interest is going to be taken into account by the government will be even wider. If center and periphery are in congruence with each other regarding the path of development, it will stimulate “harmony of interest” (Galtung, 1971) between the two, which will ease the implementation of development programs. This brings us to the second role of ICT in development agenda, i.e., as “enabler”.

3.1.3.2 Technology of new Digital Media as “Enabler” The state of public knowledge is one of the factors that determines the success or failure of a development program in a nation. Communication and the delivery of information certainly play important roles in the production and dissemination of knowledge, as we have discussed above. As a consequence, innovation in ICT and its adoption in development communication projects will also influence the level of success in achieving development goals. This situation is the seeds for the transformation of society into a form of post-industrial society (Bell, 1999), where information has a high value and becomes one of the main capitals that can 13

‘Penetrasi Media Televisi Masih yang Tertinggi’ (Television Penetration Still the Highest). Retrieved on February 21, 2020 from https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2017/07/27/ penetrasi-televisi-masih-yang-tertinggi.

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move the wheels of economy of a country. This type of society is now popularly known as an information society or, as Castells (1997, 2010) puts it, the network society. Unwin (2009), however, distinguishes information from knowledge. According to him, “information” is considered as “processed raw facts or ‘data’. ‘Knowledge’, in turn, can then be understood as a form of processed ‘information’ that is used for particular purpose […] In this sense, knowledge is information that has been incorporated into human understanding based on experience and context” (Unwin, 2009, p. 21). Another feature that differentiates knowledge from information is the way the terms are treated. While information is perceived as “a commodity to be bought and sold” (ibid., p. 60), knowledge, on the other hand, is “a global common good” (ibid.) that should be shared. The new term “knowledge and communication technologies for development” (KCT4D) is proposed in order to enhance the knowledge of disadvantaged people, who have limited resources to access information with the help of communication technologies (ibid.). Ironically, as much as there is a desire to support knowledge “sharing” rather than knowledge “trading”, there is growing tendency that in contemporary capitalist society, “ICTs seem to be increasing the commoditization of knowledge” (ibid., p. 22), which can be bought and sold “in the form of exchangeable, and codifiable information” (UNESCO, 2005, p. 22). Therefore, while the term KCT4D is yet to be popularized, the terms ICT and ICT4D will still be used generally in this report to denote the interaction of technology with both information and knowledge. Although there are differences in how information and knowledge are perceived in development practices, technology, especially digital communication technology, can be seen as an “enabler” that facilitates the ability of people to seek and process information as well as to share knowledge, which can be transformed into economic capital and sources of livelihood. In the past, only those who have access to mass communication technology can produce and disseminate information in a one-to-many fashion. Nowadays, anyone has the chance to produce and publish information as long as they master ICT, which transforms the communication pattern to many-to-many. The opportunity is there because the production and delivery process of information have been freed from the total domination of mass media. This factor strengthens the assumption that the deterministic power of traditional mass media to drive people’s mind and behavior is weakening. Technology that is perceived as the enabler requires users to actively produce messages and content, i.e., communication products. In such a development model, the agency holds the central position. Development study often calls

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it “people-centered development”. Dilla (2012, p. 111) distinguishes peoplecentered development from other development models that target economic growth and the fulfillment of basic needs. In people-centered development, the government takes the role of facilitator, with the duty to provide a conducive environment that enables citizens to release and utilize their potential to develop and better themselves and their communities. Clarke, Wylie and Zomer (2013) are more critical in looking at the role of ICTs in poverty alleviation, especially in urban areas. Within the context of MDGs, they argue that “at one pole of this debate are those who see ICTs as enabling rapid growth and citizen empowerment; at the other pole are those who warn that ‘technical fixes’ cannot overcome the historic and structural causes of poverty” (ibid., p. 1). Afemann (2000) also critically queries the role of new ICTs, particularly the internet, in the effort to achieve social and economic advances in developing countries. He has concerns about commercialization, monopolization and the concentration (of ownership, of information flow, etc.) of business in the field of information. He is also wary that development projects on ICT infrastructure in developing and poor countries that promote liberalization will only lead to “telecommunications being developed for wealthy urban business and not for the rural poor” (ibid., p. 9). Critics of ICT4D also include Granqvist (2005), who states that “if and how citizens of marginalized communities should use ICTs are decisions that have to be made by these people themselves” (ibid. p. 296). ICT4D is not a certainty as long as local people do not agree to the involvement of it in development. Indeed, technology alone should not be seen as a magic wand for whomever lays their hands on it. It needs someone skilled to utilize it: a “magician”. And magicians need magic skills to do magic tricks. Technology used in magic shows only enables the magicians to perform the tricks. Likewise, the use of technology, especially digital media technology which can reach so many people in a short period of time, needs to be “activated” by sufficient knowledge, capabilities and media literacy of its users so that the technology in question will work in accordance with its functions. This is a chicken and egg paradox, in which people are required to have proper technological knowledge, with which they use the technology to gain and accumulate knowledge. The question is: which one should be acquired first? Knowledge about technology or technology for gaining knowledge? Either way, one thing is certain, new ICTs enable people to exercise the freedom of expression and to articulate their opinion and interests to the public. Nonetheless, technology is not a sure-fire panacea. It is not the solution for all development problems. It does not determine how and which form an individual, a community or a society will be transformed into, unlike the assumption of

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many scholars in the technological determinism school of thought (cf. Servaes & Hoyng, 2015). A rather softer hypothesis regarding technology intervention in development suggests that technology may only serve as the “amplifier” of people’s abilities. This is discussed in the following chapter.

3.1.3.3 Technology as “Amplifier”: Rejecting Technology as the Savior of Development There has been much criticism leveled at the claims of technological determinism. Development projects such as One Laptop Per Child in Peru (Toyama, 2015) and PLIK or MPLIK in Indonesia (Kemkominfo, 2014, pp. 60–61; see 2.3.) show that such external intervention for ICT procurements, whether government-led or organized by donor institutions, takes for granted what technology could actually offer for solving development problems and overlooks the real problem in the field. This model often ends up with the technology being used for other activities (for example, in the case of computer and internet facilities, they are used mostly for gaming or consuming inappropriate content, such as pornography) or simply being abandoned due to lack of maintenance or proper technical knowledge. Oreglia (2013) describes from her ethnographic research in rural China that the farmers did not make use of ICT for their information sharing due to deeply ingrained cultural constraints within the community. The Chinese government’s “informatization” projects through ICT for rural economic improvements faced with the fact that better income was not a priority for the farmers. “Moreover, the rich and layered local knowledge built within the community is mostly based on oral exchanges and face-to-face encounters, and often relies on family ties and clan networks to evaluate the trustworthiness of communication” (ibid., p. 166). This led to a situation where farmers put aside their devices because they were not really needed in farming activities for information gathering and sharing. ICT’s presence was not relevant for the farmers and the project outcome was not on target. The same can be said for the use of social media in social movements across the world. For example, the “Arab Spring”, which many credited for its massive use of social media under the banner of “Facebook Revolution”, was not as successful as many people thought. The outcomes of grassroots movements are varied for different countries in the Middle East. Social media might be responsible to some extent in Egypt and Tunisia for overthrowing the regimes. But the same package cannot be imitated in other countries. For example, it failed in changing the political system in Saudi Arabia. In this case, Toyama (2015) does not buy the Facebook revolution rhetoric (or of any other social networking platforms). Rather, it is the human capacities (the ability/inability of the activists and

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the government officials to maximize the use of ICTs for their political goals) and other social forces that are significant to determine the outcome of the movements (Castells, 2015; Toyama, 2015). Relying too much on technology for social change while neglecting human capacity is ill-advised. It is a conceptual battle between the “instrumentalists”, who see technology as neutral and merely a helpful tool for development, and “determinists”, who believe that technology is a powerful force that causes the change itself (Carr, 2011, p. 46). Another reason might be due to “technology gaps” (Streeten, 1982) among the users themselves. Streeten (1982) reveals, “technology gaps” can occur due to two possible reasons: the existence of “communication gap”, i.e., communication failures in transferring prevailing technologies or because of “suitability gaps”, namely technology owned and used by the community does not fit the demands of the current condition. Nevertheless, the premise of technology determinism and the promise of technology solutions have pushed many Third World countries to adopt policies for maximizing the role of technology in development. As a consequence, to overcome the problem of the digital divide within and among these countries, development programs are designed to target the improvement of technology infrastructures, especially new ICTs in impoverished, neglected and remote areas. The procurement of ICT infrastructure is thought to be the solution to information access problems for the residents in these regions, with which people expect that the knowledge gap between the information “haves” and “have-nots” will reduce. Real evidence from the field shows a contrasting reality to this premise and promise of technology for development. In the education sector, for instance, improved access to advanced and the latest ICTs does not necessarily mean better education results. Computer and internet access in school is only secondary when it comes to improving the PISA test results. Excessive use of computers “tends to be associated with significantly poorer student performance” (OECD, 2015, p. 16). The primary factor for obtaining better learning skills for children is ensuring equity in education and realizing the vital role of teachers as “active agents for change, not just in implementing technological innovations, but in designing them too” (ibid., p. 4). It is only when teachers possess sufficient knowledge in teaching that they can count on technology to make their teaching methods more influential. “In the end, technology can amplify great teaching, but great technology cannot replace poor teaching” (ibid., p. 17). This is the reason ICT-based development projects cannot be multiplied as such and implemented in various communities as “packaged intervention” (Toyama, 2015), for their basic knowledge and skills to start with are different from one another.

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According to this perspective, technology is seen as the “amplifier” of human capabilities, rather than as a “determiner” of social change. “Technology’s primary effect is to amplify human forces” (Toyama, 2015, p. 29, l. 699; emphasis in original), concludes Toyama (2015) while explaining his “Law of Amplification”. Therefore, human development is not something that should be ruled out at the cost of the advancement of ICT. In contrast, people-centered development must be prioritized so that the beneficiaries can optimize the use of existing technologies in relation to their needs. Chong and Mendoza (2011) insist, [i]nitiatives to narrow the digital divide, like providing rural telephony and internet service, are also extremely relevant … However, people with low levels of education are still at a disadvantage and unlikely to reap the full benefits of new technologies, including broader access to knowledge and information. The poor may face special constraints in accessing ICTs and using them for their specific needs. ICTs are not a magic wand that put dreams of wealth and progress in everyone’s hands. Improving the skills of the population and the quality and level of physical infrastructure are crucial to make these dreams come true. (p. 272)

Gigler (2015) holds to a similar argument by reiterating that “[b]y placing communities’s assets and capabilities at the center, [he] … examine[s] the catalytic role of ICTs in expanding the human capabilities of marginalized groups” (p. 4). Similarly, Carr (2011) states that “[e]very technology is an expression of human will … [through which] we seek to expand our power and control over our circumstances … [and] supplement or amplify our native capacities” (p. 44). In social movements, using new media strategically means that the citizens and activists in the periphery can reach the mass communication public sphere and influence the public agenda, and in turn affect the construction of public opinion without having to establish direct contact with the media in the center. Tweets, Facebook statuses, blog and vlog posts which are presented in controversial formats (Habermas, 1996) are fodder for mainstream media, which will amplify the scale of actions of the protesters, “be it for better or worse” (Castells, 2015, p. 124). Enhancing human capacity and technology literacy are necessary to prevent the technology’s control over the people, as the technological determinists believe. In the current information age (Castells, 2010), it is an accepted reality that digital technology has shaped many aspects of societal life. Carr (2011, 2014) describes how computers and the internet have changed the way people think and process information. He also shows evidence that people are being automated by digital technologies nowadays. Against this backdrop, he reminds us that computers are

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only programs made by humans. It is people who should control technology, not vice versa. “People are mindful; computers are mindless.” (2014, p. 11.) Perceiving technology as the “amplifier” does not mean denying the role of technology in the development agenda or community empowerment. This vision does not make us Luddites who are turning our backs on machinery or technology. Technology can be useful, if it is strategically placed as an integral part of a comprehensive human-centered development program. Intermediaries, e.g., agricultural extensions in agricultural development projects or health assistants as development agents, are also important players in development. They possess sufficient knowledge and capabilities to maximize the use of new ICTs for their activities while introducing them to local communities. Throughout the process, local communities should be fully involved so they become familiar with the presence and the use of ICT in their lives. Intermediaries also bring new networks with them with which they can provide links to the world outside the local circles (Richardson, 2007; The World Bank, 2005, pp. 40–41). If this is done properly, the poor and marginalized will gradually gain benefits from the use of ICT for development.

3.2

The Public Sphere(s)

In the German language, Öffentlichkeit or public sphere refers to everything about the public or “public affairs”. Public affairs mean all that is not private, which the public in general has the right to discuss in public or öffentlich. Public affairs also imply the principle of openness or matters that are not covert. Theoretically, all information about public affairs can and shall be accessed by anyone without restriction. If an issue becomes public matter, the state has an obligation to take it into consideration and it becomes an object of public discussion, out of which some kind of public policy will be generated. Public discussions take place in the public sphere. Sometimes the term public sphere is associated with the formation of public opinion and public opinion regarding the opinion of the majority of the citizens. In fact, public opinion is a synthesis of a variety of articulations of citizen opinions produced through an intermediary process, in which mass media plays a significant role in the construction of both public sphere and public opinion (cf. Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990; Negt & Kluge, 1993). The formation of public opinion in the public sphere is carried out through the deliberative process of open discussions based on rational arguments. The type of communication in the public sphere is horizontal communication where

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elements of society equitably express their opinions and interests without worrying about co-optation, coercion or domination by either party. The goal of open dialogue in the public sphere is intersubjectivity or rational consensus on public affairs that are being discussed, which will be a reference for the state to formulate public policies that have an impact on the wider community (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1991). This is Habermas’s view in ideal communication or speech situations, wherein a normative public sphere allows all to question the validity of utterance as well as, consequently, of public policies by making critical and rational arguments. In Habermas’s descriptive-normative approach, the public sphere is conceptualized as a discursive space of rational-critical debate that can be equally accessed by all citizens through which public opinion is formed (Habermas, 1991). In his earlier conceptualization of the public sphere, he referred to the bourgeois public sphere, thus neglecting the communicative dynamics at the grassroots level. He then revised his theory in the 1990s to recognize the existence of the proletarian/plebeian public sphere, which is more inclusive, non-discriminative and characterized by horizontal communication and by the use of alternative media (Habermas, 1992, 1996; Lim & Kann, 2008)). It is believed that this “proletarian” public space will sustain public deliberation and has the potential to counter the dominance of mass-mediated public sphere, which is considered constituted under the influence of both the capital and the state (Downey & Fenton, 2003, p. 187). Habermas clarifies such recognition as follows: only after reading Mikhail Bakhtin’s great book Rabelais and His World have my eyes become really opened to the inner dynamics of a plebeian culture. The culture of the common people apparently was by no means only a backdrop, that is, a passive echo of the dominant culture; it was also the periodically recurring violent revolt of a counterproject to the hierarchical world of domination, with its official celebrations and everyday disciplines. (Habermas, 1992, p. 427)

The emergence of this kind of alternative public sphere was influenced by the growth of new social movements that, no longer identified by their political ideology, were based on issues, such as the environmental preservation, feminist and human rights movements. Because of their resistance characteristics, this kind of public movements, which manifested their objectives in open public spaces, was often called “counterpublicity” or “counterpublic sphere” (Downey & Fenton, 2003). In contrast to Habermas who uses the term “plebeian”, Negt and Kluge (1993) prefer “proletarian counterpublic sphere” to denote this type of public sphere. In addition, they also conceptualize another type of public sphere: the “public sphere of production” (Produktionsöffentlichkeiten). This includes private

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mass media, which, they argue, work in the area of “consciousness industry”. Therefore, in their conceptualization, the public sphere cannot be interpreted in a singular term, instead must always be conceived in its plural form, i.e., as “aggregation of phenomena that have quite different characteristics and origins” (Miriam Hansen in the Foreword of Negt & Kluge, 1993, p. xxix). Negt and Kluge (1993) not only view the bourgeois public sphere as a divergent arena from the proletarian and the production public sphere, but they argue that the dominant public sphere is an obstacle that blocks proletarians from their own social experience and from the arena in which they can articulate their own interests (“Blockierungszusammenhang”; see Wimmer, 2007, p. 176). At this point, more accessible public spheres are relevant for those who are in a subordinate position. When they are able to convey their opinion and interest in those alternative public spheres, they will at the same time strengthen and empower themselves communicatively. The communication capability of marginalized people will increase along with the level of their participation in the discursive process in the public spheres. A similar conceptualization of the counterpublic sphere is outlined by Fraser (1992). She calls this alternative public sphere, which exists in stratified society, “subaltern counterpublics”, namely “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs” (p. 123). Furthermore, they can use the counterpublic sphere to push their personal agenda into the discursive arena strengthened by rational arguments so that it can be accepted as a common concern that must be considered by the public. Fraser (1994) exemplifies the issue of domestic violence which was once considered a private “household” issue. Eventually, after feminists formed a subaltern counterpublic, in which their opinions and concerns were articulated, it became accepted as an issue that must be taken into consideration by the public and the state. The state, in turn, is obliged to translate it into public policies to overcome and prevent domestic violence in the future. In criticizing Habermas, she points to this as a post-bourgeois conception of the public sphere. At present, along with the rapid development of new ICTs, the internet, considered as an alternative medium with different kinds of production and distribution systems compared to those of conventional mass media, has made it easier for marginalized groups to establish independent “virtual counter-public spheres”. New ICTs enable those on the periphery of political and media power to express their opinions and interests without having to rely on mainstream media production systems.

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However, although that potential exists, Gerhards and Schäfer (2009) do not support the popular opinion which states that new ICTs, especially the internet, are the better public spheres than the conventional one whose function is carried out by mass media. According to the results of their research, the internet public sphere is actually more biased and one-sided than print media. This can occur because of the structural preconditions of the internet itself, namely their dependency on technical operation of search engines, which “advantages established actors, while making it more difficult for smaller actors and their arguments to appear in a relevant manner” (ibid., p. 13). With such characteristics, the internet experiences obstacles to execute its functions, especially the validation and articulation functions (see below). Instead of functioning optimally, the internet can potentially be dysfunctional in terms of supporting the practice of deliberative democracy in the public sphere. The challenge now is to find ways to exploit new media as alternative media whose access is liberally owned by the people (as long as they have the infrastructure) to effectively carry out online activism for the benefit of those who are marginalized and positioned in the periphery. With their efforts in these “invented” public spheres (see Kersting, 2014 on the differences between “invited” and “invented” space), coupled with controversial presentation strategies, marginalized groups will have the opportunity to bring their agenda into the political system at the center. “Controversial presentation” strategy is highlighted by Habermas (1996) as one way for those in the periphery to gain the center’s attention. Only through their controversial presentation in the media do such topics reach the larger public and subsequently gain a place on the “public agenda.” Sometimes the support of sensational actions, mass protests, and incessant campaigning is required before an issue can make its way via the surprising election of marginal candidates or radical parties, expanded platforms of “established” parties, important court decisions and so on, into the core of the political system and there receive formal consideration. (p. 381; emphasis added)

Meanwhile, by referring to Habermas, Gerhards and Neidhardt (1990) describe the functions of the public sphere, which they think apply in modern society. The public sphere, which is seen as an arena of contestation of public opinions and interests, contains at least three functions (and also dysfunctions). According to them, the public sphere is a process of intermediation between political systems and civil society that can be evaluated through input-throughput-output mechanisms. The three intermediary functions of the public sphere are:

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• Selective/transparency (input) function: The public sphere has a role to select or determine issues or public affairs, which are relevant to be brought into public discussion. • Validation function (throughput): Here, the selected information will be processed and validated through communicative mechanisms (and journalistic practices). Its truth claims are questioned through rational deliberative-argumentative processes. Public sphere sorts out which issues (communication objects) will be lifted (gate keeping) and how they will be interpreted and given framing. • Articulation function (output): The output of this deliberative process is the synthesis in the form of public opinion, which can be a reference for politicians and state actors to formulate public policies (political agendas) and become an orientation for the public agenda (agenda setting). Another formulation of the public sphere’s function is expressed by NoelleNeumann (1974) who sees it as a “quasi-statistical organ”, with which the public can orient itself in the context of socio-political life. Somewhat related to this conceptualization, Negt and Kluge (1993) mentions the public sphere as “the organization of collective experience” which “realizes itself only in people’s minds, in a dimension of their consciousness” (p. 2). In Noelle-Neumann’s (ibid.) “integration model” of the public sphere (as a match for the “elitist model”), the public will apprehend which political opinions or orientations are dominant in a society at certain times and which are not; which are “safe” to be publicly expressed and which one is not by observing the dynamics of discourse in the public sphere. Those who disagree with the dominant opinion will be forced to keep silent from all forms of public expression because of the threat of social isolation. NoelleNeumann (1974) calls this phenomenon “fear of isolation”. Often, the number of those who are silent is more than those who speak (silent majority), but because the small number of voices (small elites) dominates the public sphere, they can determine the formation of public opinion that will affect the whole communication constellation of a society. Therefore, the public sphere also has a latent function of social control. In modern society, mass media is a form of institutionalized public sphere. This is critical for the functioning of the public sphere, because the media is (still) deemed as the strong institution to stimulate public debate. However, because the media networks in Indonesia are subject to exploitation by the political networks (dysfunction of the public sphere), disadvantaged citizens need alternative spaces in which they can be mediated directly with the political system to counter the hegemony of the mainstream public sphere.

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The mass communication public sphere in Indonesia tends to be bourgeois in character (see below), which degrades the existence of other, more independent public spheres. It is this kind of public that is criticized by Negt and Kluge (1993), which triggers the occurrence of proletarian counterpublics. Miriam Hansen in her Foreword to Negt and Kluge’s publication (1993) states that the bourgeois public sphere works with a “mechanism of exclusion: the exclusion of substantial social groups, such as workers, women, servants, as well as vital social issues, such as the material conditions of production and reproduction, including sexuality and childrearing—the exclusion of any different that cannot be assimilated, rationalized, and subsumed” (pp. xxvii-xxviii). Further, by emphasizing gender inequality in the liberal public sphere, Fraser (1992), who refers to revisionist historiographies, also argues in similar fashion by saying that “the official public sphere rested on, indeed was importantly constituted by, a number of significant exclusions” (p. 113). In Indonesia, this exclusion mechanism is possible due to the unbalanced media structure. Looking at the existing data, the mainstream mediated public sphere is still dominated by the private media industry, most of which are concentrated in the capital Jakarta. Lim (2012), in The League of Thirteen, groups major media players in the Indonesian media industry into 13 media groups. Of the 13 big players, only two groups are not headquartered in Jakarta: the Jawa Pos Group (Surabaya) and the Bali Pos Group (Bali). Meanwhile, there is only one public television (TVRI) and one public radio broadcaster (RRI) that operate nationally. Therefore, in the current Indonesian media system, the majority of the Indonesian landscape outside Java and Bali are still not represented in a balanced manner by the mainstream media. Heychael and Wibowo (2014) examined 20 news programs in 10 Indonesian private national television stations. They reveal the imbalance of the number and duration of news coverage for local and national news, which leads to favoritism for the Jabodetabek area (p. 12).14 Political and economic decentralization in Indonesia, as already described in the previous chapters, are not followed by communication and information decentralization. Communication inequality in Indonesia is compounded by the fact that political actors have also controlled the national mass media industry. The 10 Jakarta-based national private television stations are under the auspices of five holding companies: Media Group (owner of Metro TV), MNC Group (RCTI, MNCTV and Global TV), EMTEK Group (SCTV and Indosiar), Bakrie & Brothers/Visi Media Asia (TV One and ANTV) and Trans Corpora (Para) Group 14

Jabodetabek is the greater Jakarta metropolitan area that includes the capital and Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi.

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(Trans TV and Trans7). Four of the five media tycoons have been active in Indonesian politics either as chairman of a political party or served as a minister or chair of a committee in Jokowi’s administration (as of the time of data collection). Due to the “colonization” of the media system by political networks described above, the dominant public sphere in Indonesia, which in modern era has found its place in the mainstream media, has been dominated by those who are close to the media production system, in this case the politicians affiliated with the owners of media capital. This situation is criticized by Habermas when he detects the practice of vertical communication in the public sphere (Downey & Fenton, 2003; Habermas, 1991). The consequence is the declining quality of media content because of biased and unbalanced reporting. Internal pluralism which is expected to be a code of ethics for each media in each of its reports is difficult to be practiced by market-oriented media, which would have conflicts of interest with their owners. Meanwhile, external pluralism, in which a variety of media in a whole media system provides a variety of perspectives, is also questionable due to high cross ownership among media institutions, which leads to the concentration of media ownership in a small number of media holding companies that control the entire media (market) system. This constellation not only threatens the diversity of ownership, but also the diversity of content, which can lead to the manipulation of public opinion (see Heychael & Thaniago, 2013). The concentration of ownership of national private media in the hands of politicians presents a propensity to deliver biased messages that advocate the interest of media owners and their political connections. Heychael and Dhona (2014) in their research Television Independence Ahead of the 2014 General Election confirmed these concerns. They mention that the media has become the “funnel of the owner’s political interest”. This slanted news coverage is harmful for the public, as it tends to frame the owner or his political coalition in positive tones while reporting their political opponents negatively (cf. Heychael, 2014a, 2014b). Marginalized civil society needs to find alternative strategies so that their opinions and interests can be seen as relevant, thereby attracting media attention. The representation of opinions and interests of all groups in society in the public sphere is crucial in the construction process of a valid public opinion. The role of public opinion is critical in the process of public policy decision-making taken by politicians and the government at the center, which will have an impact on the lives of civil society as a whole. The failed attempt to implement the network broadcasting system as stated in the Broadcasting Law No. 3/2002 underscores the fruitless effort to decentralize the Indonesian media system. Additionally, the Public Broadcasting Institution (Lembaga Penyiaran Publik) represented by TVRI and RRI has not been able to

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fight the dominance of profit-oriented Private Broadcasting Institutions (Lembaga Penyiaran Swasta), which adhere to the market economy system.

3.3

Structural Theory of Imperialism

This section relies on the Galtung’s (1971) Structural Theory of Imperialism which functions as an integrative platform to discuss communication problems in the context of rural development in Indonesia. Despite the phrase, this section does not discuss the concept of imperialism per se, but instead focuses on the center-periphery relation that is contextualized in internal conditions in Indonesia by focusing on two dimensions, namely on the communication structure which is directly affected by the relation structure of the center-periphery and on the dimension of power.

3.3.1

Communicational and Structural Relations of Center and Periphery

In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas (1996) structures civil society within the context of the center-periphery relations into three layers: the center, the innerperiphery, and the outer-periphery. The public sphere, which is a communicative space with intermediary function, is located between the political system at the center and civil society at the peripheries. According to Habermas (1996, pp. 354–355), the political center is the whole system of government and its bureaucracy, the legislative system, the judiciary system, as well as political parties and all their organs. Meanwhile, “quasi-state institutions” such as foundations, universities, social security systems, school systems, form the inner-periphery and the outer-periphery, consists of organizations of civil society, communities, interest groups, private organizations and other unorganized elements of civil society (see Figure 3.1). Other public organizations such as NGOs are located between the inner- and outer-periphery. This is because there are NGOs whose operations are close to the government and public institutions (e.g., the Indonesian Corruption Watch) and there are also NGOs working for the strengthening or empowering of civil society at the grassroots level, such as advocacy groups. Galtung (1971), in his analysis of imperialism, offers another conceptualization of center-periphery relations. He divides center and periphery into several

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Polical Center Inner-periphery: Quasi-state instuons Outer-periphery: (Un)organized civil society

Figure 3.1 Habermas’s model of center-periphery (Habermas, 1996; illustration by author)

levels: center and periphery in center nations (Cc and Pc) and center and periphery in periphery nations (Cp and Pp). According to him, “the world consists of Center and Periphery nations; and each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery” (Galtung, 1971, p. 81). Within these relations, “harmony of interest” can occur between the two centers (between Cc and Cp), while “disharmony of interest” can happen between center and periphery in both countries (between Cc and Pc and between Cp and Pp) and between the peripheries in center and periphery countries (between Pc and Pp) (Figure 3.2). Galtung concludes that “the basic idea, absolutely fundamental for the whole theory to be developed, is that there is more disharmony in the Periphery nation than in the Center nation” (Galtung, 1971, p. 84; emphasis in original). Further, based on this unequal central-periphery relations structure, he also argues that “there is disharmony of interest between the Center nation as a whole and the Periphery nation as a whole” (ibid.). The unequal structure of relations reflects what Galtung (1971) meant by “feudal center-periphery structure” (Figure 3.3). In the model, he explains how inequality between the world’s center and periphery countries occurs and how this condition is sustained and even strengthened under the banner of imperialism. The former is caused by the principle of “vertical interaction relation”, whereas the latter is maintained and reinforced by the principle of “feudal interaction structure”. These two principles form Galtung’s conception of “asymmetrical

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Figure 3.2 Galtung’s center-periphery model15 (Galtung, 1971, p. 84)

mechanisms of imperialism” (ibid., p. 85). Furthermore, asymmetrical mechanisms of imperialism affect the communication structure between center and periphery, in which periphery countries are discriminated against and cannot perform their communicative potentials fully due to the feudal structure and political isolation. Perhaps the most important feature of the above models is the “rules of interaction” between center and periphery. These rules explain why the center-periphery structure of relations can be so feudal and asymmetrical. Below are the four center-periphery rules of interaction (ibid.): (1) (2) (3) (4)

15

interaction between center and periphery is vertical interaction between periphery and periphery is missing multilateral interaction involving all three is missing interaction with the outside world is monopolized by the center, with two implications:

Original title to the figure is “the structure of imperialism”.

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Figure 3.3 Galtung’s model of feudal center-periphery structure (Galtung, 1971, p. 89)

(a) Periphery interaction with other center nations is missing (b) Center as well as periphery interaction with periphery nations belonging to other center nations is missing. The rules lead to the isolation of peripheries from each other. In addition, periphery nations are only allowed to have vertical communication with their superior and depend on the center institution above them. Galtung’s imperialism theory provides different explanatory dimensions of theories about center-periphery relations, compared to, for instance, the dependency model. This is because the latter has interactive-communicative dimension and describes that center-periphery hierarchy consists of several levels, instead of only binary comparison between center and periphery. This explanation fits in with the hierarchy of the government and

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social system, which are tiered from the center in urban Jakarta to the rural communities across Indonesia.16 Galtung (1964) distinguishes the center and periphery of the world’s nations from center and periphery model, which is based on social structure. In the latter model, instead of center in center (Cc) and periphery in periphery (Pp), Galtung (1964) uses two other terms although they refer to things that have more or less the same positional meaning, namely “decision-making nucleus” (DN), which hints at Cc, and “extreme periphery” (EP) instead of Pp. Korhonen (1990) describes Galtung’s categorization of society based on the center-periphery hierarchy as follows: In the middle there is the decision-making nucleus (DN), a usual ingredient in behavioural political studies; a still point that is not studied, but around which attitudes are flaming and political behavior is happening. Around that nucleus there is the center (C), surrounded by the periphery (P), which in turn is surrounded by the extreme periphery (EP), an additional concept Galtung decided to use because even inside the periphery there is a division between those having something to do with national politics, and those who, in a practical sense, are completely outside of politics. (Korhonen, 1990, p. 65)

Galtung (1964) uses the nine-point scale from 0 to 8 as the “index of social position” (p. 217) to determine whether a person’s position is in the center or in the periphery according to his/her social attributes. Every social attribute that is considered representing the center (male, age between 30–59, well-educated and salaried, as well as living in an urban area and having a good occupation) gets one point, while conditions that reflect the periphery do not get any score, meaning they are less beneficial. The aggregate of this score, which reflects the person’s social status, determines in which circle he/she is placed based on the center-periphery model of society. For example, a 15-year-old female farmer in Papua who is an elementary school graduate would be categorized in the “extreme periphery”: female, young, with a basic education, living in a far-flung region and working in agriculture. However, that does not mean she is relegated to the EP 16 In the Indonesian language, the terms pusat (center) and daerah (region) are often used in the context of government’s structure or to refer to community groups in general. These binary terms bear a strong political meaning, where the center always refers to (the city or the people of) Jakarta or the government at the national level, which is located in Jakarta, while the region refers to everything that non-Jakarta-based, both at the province, city/regency, or at the village level. To refer to the provincial government for example, people often say the “center of government in the region” (means in the periphery). This corresponds with Galtung’s center in periphery concept.

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position all her life. Her social position may change, for example, if she moves to a city (or Java/Jakarta), goes back to school or eventually becomes a white-collar worker. Unlike the static model of feudal center-periphery, which is intended to maintain asymmetric relations between center and periphery, the center-periphery model of society has a dynamic character. Everyone has the opportunity to move from the periphery position and establish him/herself as part of the center “community”, as long as his/her social condition changes and, conversely, anyone can fall into a periphery position if they lose their social capital to maintain their central position. Galtung’s concept of center-periphery can be transferred to the Indonesian decentralization policy as follows: at the center in the periphery are regional governments at the province and/or the city/regency level along with the dynamics of their local media system; while urban civil society is the periphery in the center. Rural communities in the regions can be interpreted as the periphery in periphery (or EP) while the central government along with national media corporations in Jakarta as the center in center (or DN). People within the center circle will find it easier to access the public communication system, and to dominate everyday discourse in the public sphere. Conversely, those who live in the peripheries are the social groups who are marginalized by this center-biased public communication system (cf. Korhonen, 1990, pp. 67–72). Galtung’s feudal center-periphery model reflects the structure of centerregional relations, especially during the New Order. Under Suharto, the freedom of the village to interact with other villages was restricted. The “floating mass” policy depoliticized rural communities and isolated them from each other politically. Their position was degraded to become the object of government power in their respective region (Cp). Communication performance between center and periphery was reduced to mainly fulfill its bureaucratic function. This condition suits Galtung’s rules of interaction, which support “asymmetrical mechanism of state imperialism” towards its people. Along with the social transformation and political transition of Reformasi, the structure of relations between center and periphery has undergone a series of changes due to the weakening of state power and the strengthening of civil society toward the end of 1990s. Agusta (2007) explains that “the social context of [Indonesian] development [from that time on] is in the form of citizen position which is more and more equal to the position of the state” (p. 136, author’s translation), which can be seen from “the ability of citizens to be independent by not interacting with government officials” (ibid.). With the consolidation of old and new powers in post-reform at the current time, it remains to be seen, however, how

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far the communication pattern between center and periphery has changed due to decentralization and the massive use of new ICTs.

3.3.2

Power Dimension in Center-periphery Relations

It is inevitable that the term “power” is explored if one intends to talk about empowerment. Pekka Korhonen, in The Geometry of Power: Johan Galtung’s Conception of Power (1990), dedicates a full chapter to reviewing the concept of power through discussion of a number of expert opinions about the definitions of power. Hobbes, among them, views power as resources that are not possessed by others. These resources are used to achieve future goals. The possession (presence) and non-possession (absence) of resources can lead to disputes between people, because every resource is limited in its nature (Korhonen, 1990, p. 55). Another definition comes from Parsons who states that “[power is] the capacity of the society to attain its system goals, i.e., collective goals” (Parsons in ibid.). These two definitions differ only at the actor level. While Hobbes refers to individuals, Parsons points to a collective entity, a society. Other experts whose perspective of power comes from the standpoint of the individual include Morgenthau (1948 in Korhonen, 1990), who defines power as “… man’s control over the minds and actions of other men” (p. 56) and Merton (1947 in ibid.), who emphasizes that power is “observed and predictable capacity of imposing one’s own will in a social action, even against the resistance of others taking part in that action” (ibid.). Merton’s emphasis on words such as “observed” and “predictable” indicates that power is something tangible and external of an individual. This shows the empirical character of power. Examples of this type of power are social status within society or public position that has the power to impose one’s own will over others. This corresponds with Hobbes’s definition of power, which sees it as resources (e.g., public position, social status, wealth, weaponry, as well as information, technology and personal network) rather than as a person’s internal strength. In line with Merton, C. Wright Mills (1956 in Korhonen, 1990) re-emphasizes that power has a coercive nature. “By the powerful we mean … those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it.” (ibid., p. 57) This coercive power, according to Mills, is held by the power elites only, i.e., “those who occupy the command posts … the top, an inner circle, [who is] being unified and powerful, [who controls] the bottom [who is] being fragmented and impotent” (ibid., pp. 57–58). Likewise, Robert A. Dahl (1963 in Korhonen, 1990) argues

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that “… an actor’s power is closely correlated with his position in an official of semi-official hierarchy” (p. 59). In a patrimonial and feudal society, power is absolute. It is a mental feature and an integral part of a person’s body because of his/her status as a leader who controls everything, with which he/she has the power to govern and influence others who submit to them. Such a conception of power runs the risk of integrating public and private affairs into an absolute system of power. This can result in abuse of power carried out by leaders who are chosen by their people through democratic elections, but in practice run a system of government that is feudal and patrimonial. An offshoot of the decentralization policy in Indonesia is the emergence of political dynasties both at the national and local levels. Regional (local) autonomy gives rise to “local kings” who rule as governor or regent/mayor and it establishes political oligarchs (Holzhacker et al., 2016). Political power seems to be the resource that is passed down to generations or among relatives of the political dynasty (cf. Susanti, 2017). In the long run, one can (mis)interpret that power is something that is given and naturally embedded in the ruling family’s blood or member of the center circle of the dynasty. If this happens, power can be defined as the resources intrinsic to the ruling class, even pinned to their newborn offspring, and is no longer a capital that needs to be fought for. Thus, is power internal or external to a person? Galtung (Korhonen, 1990) himself experiences a shift in the understanding of power. “Previously power was a dynamic thing to be used, a sort of ability; now power begins to mean positions in a hierarchy.” (Korhonen, 1990, p. 45; emphasis in original) If we look to it closer, this static/dynamic variance of the concept of power is consistent with Galtung’s conceptualization of center-periphery relations, i.e., between his static “model of feudal center-periphery structure” and dynamic “model of center-periphery of society”. Galtung finally gives a fairly normative definition of power: “The power of a system is its influence potential, i.e., its potential to induce its will on other systems.” (Galtung, 1964 in Korhonen, 1990, p. 60) Important in this definition is Galtung’s diction on “system”, and not, for example, on individual or community. A system consists of many components that influence each other in an inputthroughput-output process. This means that for this system of power to function in accordance with its program, system stability is needed. To safeguard a stable system in a structural-functionalist line of thought means limiting excessive interference from outside the system. The system must be able to restore itself and maintain the (hierarchical) structure within it even if there is any input that

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is beyond the capacity of the system. In other words, this definition is resistant to change and tends to maintain the status quo of the steady structure of society. The above definition clarifies why Galtung’s feudal center-periphery model is static. This model reflects the structure of Indonesian society, in particular the New Order, where Suharto prioritized political stability for the advancement of economic performance. All forms of resistance mean the stimulus for system change and they were suppressed by the military regime. With this system, he could maintain the status quo for 32 years. Galtung’s definition also indicates the relational concept of power, meaning that one system affects another system. This conceptualization is also found in the work of Foucault (1980), who relates the possession of power with the possession of knowledge, which is exercised within a network of social relationships. Pertaining to this, Rowlands (1997, p. 13) differentiates four forms of (relational) power: (a) (b) (c) (d)

power power power power

over (controlling power) to (generates new possibilities without domination) with (collective power, power created by group process) from within (spiritual strength that inspires and energizes others)

Referring to Rowlands (ibid.), Melkote and Steeves (2015) single out “power over” which refers to someone who is influential and determines formal decisionmaking processes. They are the elites who have superior positions in the power hierarchy, rule over inferior individuals, groups or communities who are positioned at the margins of power. These marginalized people can only change their fate if there is a change in power inequities between those in the center and in the periphery of power. There are many challenges to changing the constellation of power, especially against formal power status, which is legitimized by law. In a feudal structure of power, people who are in a subordinate position bear almost no chance to overthrow the superiority of their leaders, unless they build channels of solidarity to interact and communicate horizontally with people who hold the same fate and agree with them to achieve common goals (see Galtung’s “rules of interaction” in 3.2.). In other words, they need to establish a network between them so that they can create the “power with”, with the aim of forming counterpower againts the dominance of the “power over” of their superior. Manuel Castells, in A Network Theory of Power (2011; see also 2009 & 2015) essentially conceptualizes power (and counterpower) relations within the framework of network society. Under a network society, which is characterized heavily by online and digital technologies,

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there are four sources of power that can be found and exercised in the network. Here are Castells’ own words on the description of the four sources of power: 1. Networking Power: the power of the actors and organizations included in the networks that constitute the core of the global network society over human collectives and individuals who are not included in these global networks. 2. Network Power: the power resulting from the standards required to coordinate social interaction in the networks. In this case, power is exercised not by exclusion from the networks but by the imposition of the rules of inclusion. 3. Networked Power: the power of social actors over other social actors in the network. The forms and processes of networked power are specific to each network. 4. Network-making Power: the power to program specific networks according to the interests and values of the programmers, and the power to switch different networks following the strategic alliances between the dominant actors of various networks. (Castells, 2011, p. 773)

Network-making power is probably the most relevant one for this research. People who hold the power to program and reprogram the networks are called programmers, while switchers are those who connect networks and have the ability to combine different power sources by switching networks and form strategic cooperation (ibid. p. 776; ibid., 2009, p. 45; ibid., 2015, p. 8–9, 17). In a society, whose institutions and norms are asymmetrically structured by those who control power sources (the dominants) over those in a subordinate position, whose role is to serve the interests and values of those in the upper position, counterpower is likely to occur from and within the civil society. Counterpower aims to reprogram power relations within and among networks. It shall install alternative goals into the networks and turn the networks’ functions to assist the interests and values of the marginalized networks by disrupting and interrupting existing switches and finally replace it with “networks of resistance and social change” (ibid., 2015, p. 9; see ibid., 2011, p. 773). The use of both mass communication and mass self-communication (internetbased communication characterized by horizontal digital communication networks) is decisive in the operation of power and counterpower. In order to seize power from the dominants, counterpower can also forcefully switch the nodes between strategic networks, for example, “between the political networks and the media networks to produce and diffuse specific political-ideological discourses.

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119

Or the relationship between religious networks and political networks to advance a religious agenda in a secular society” (ibid., 2011, p. 777). The relations between political networks and media networks are common in many countries, whose media system allows cross ownership between political parties and media institutions. This results in biased media reports and partisan journalism. Most national media networks in Indonesia are owned by politicians or by those who close to political power (Armando, 2014; Lim, 2012; cf. Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Thus, when media networks are controlled by a handful of the political elites who dominate communication channels, citizens at the grassroots level need to find ways through which they can exercise their communication activities autonomously. The internet and wireless communication networks, with their characteristic of decentralized message production and pluralistic form of information, provide the opportunity for marginalized groups within the society to overcome this communication barrier. They can “subvert the practice of communication as usual by occupying the medium and creating the message” (Castells, 2015, p. 9). This is the task of each individual who collectively organizes an action in the form of social movement to reprogram the dominant networks by producing new values and norms into the networks around which the people live. Nevertheless, the occupation of cyberspace by autonomously-produced bottom-up messages does not guarantee that the reprogramming of networks and switching of connective points will be successful. It also needs the co-occupation of public space, preferably in urban areas, to make the movement more visible to the wider public and therefore attract more interest. This hybrid occupation, both on the internet and in the physical public spaces, characterizes civic social movements around the world in the so-called era of network society, where the ownership and management of information capital distinguish the haves and the have nots (Castells, 2015; cf. Castells, 2010). In doing so, power will be redistributed from the elites to the people at the bottom of society. This is thought to be the essence of democracy where empowerment is seen as part of democratization projects.

3.4

Theoretical Matrix

This research problematizes theories and practices of development communication, which does not place communication in the center of development analysis and activities, let alone as the goal of development itself. Unwin (2009) does try to link Habermas’s theory of communicative action (1984, 1987) into the ICT4D discourse, within which this research is contextualized, but that view is still sidelined in this discipline. Habermas’s communicative action has never been

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a reference for development activities in Indonesia, both theoretically and practically. At the very least, communication has taken its role at the later stages of development activity, i.e., as strategic communication in the implementation phase. This means communication is either defined by development paradigms it follows or instrumentalized for the sake of “development” (Communication for Development/CfD) or for supporting development programs (Development Support Communication/DSC). Within this research, communication is not only defined as the process of transmitting messages from sender to receiver, but also as a signification system where symbols are exchanged. The former views that the sender has full control over the management of the communication of the message, where the success of the communication process is determined when the receiver interprets the message as intended by the sender. Meanwhile, the latter sees that communication happens when the reader (receiver) of the text (message) interprets communication signals. Because the meaning of the message is influenced by the social system and culture in which the reader is located, then in this second perspective, there is no such thing as a communication failure or communication effectiveness. According to this perspective—usually studied in the realm of semiotics—the control of communication is in the hands of the reader, not the sender (Fiske, 1990). Communication, both in classical development communication theories, such as in the dominant paradigm that refers to modernization, as well as in the alternative development paradigm, which emphasizes the participatory approach and the empowerment framework, is constantly treated as an instrument to achieve noncommunicative development goals. With modernization as the process as well as the goal of development, classical communication theories such as the magic bullet theory, two-step flow of communication and the agenda setting that conceptually promote one-way communication process and place the media as an artillery to influence human mind, attitude, and behaviour, see the recipient as a passive party in a communication activity. In contrast, within the participatory approach, the recipient is encouraged to play an active role in formulating development goals they uphold and are relevant to their local conditions/problems. The above background lays the foundation of the theoretical framework of this study, which departs from three theoretical sets: first, development (communication) theories, which are divided into three paradigms: the dominant paradigm (modernization), which highlights the domination of the center, the paradigm that emphasizes the significance of periphery in the world’s system (dependency), and the alternative paradigm, which encourages the participation and empowerment of the public from below.

3.4 Theoretical Matrix

121

Second, this research relies on Habermas’s (1991) conceptualization of the public sphere and other scholars who refer to him to develop concepts about counterpublic spheres (e.g., Downey & Fenton, 2003; Fraser, 1992; Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990), besides Habermas himself (1992). The “public sphere” is used to analyze how public opinion about development issues is constructed. The public sphere is susceptible to be dominated by the bourgeois who control the center (the political and mass communication system), so the conception of goals and the direction of development are often formulated vertically and one-sidedly by the dominant groups with elitist motives. Against this backdrop, there is the need for neglected people on the periphery (rural community, urban poor, women, elderly, religious and ethnic minorities, etc.) to build their own public spheres that are structurally horizontal and more egalitarian as a counterpoint to the mainstream public sphere and means to build networks of solidarity. These alternative publics are developing themselves and increasingly possible with the availability of online-based communication media whose structures of production, distribution and consumption of messages are decentralized and independent of the bourgeois mass communication system. From this point of view, the public sphere(s) might only be understood as a plural subject. Thus, theories in this field of study also review the function and dysfunction of public spheres in relation to the intermediary arena where the publics can articulate their opinions and interests. The point of debate is how periphery utilizes the internet as a new communication technology that empowers and liberates them communicatively to provide a balance of power to the constellations in public spheres that are usually dominated by the center. The constructions and processes of public opinion formation may change due to opposition and challenges from the grassroots, particularly the rural community. Third, because this research highlights the center-periphery axis as the basis of analysis in looking at development communication problems in Indonesia, the theories about the center-periphery relation must be reviewed and used. This study considers Galtung’s (1971) conception of center-periphery to be representative of the research problems. Therefore, Galtung’s Structural Theory of Imperialism (ibid.) functions as an integrative platform, where center-periphery relations are elaborated. This section discusses two dimensions in center-periphery relations, namely the communication and structural dimensions, where various models of center-periphery structures are reviewed; and the power dimension, which discusses how people utilize their resources to change their sociopolitical status from periphery to center (so as to facilitate them in achieving their goals). The three theoretical sets above are deemed capable to analyze the phenomenon of development communication in Indonesia in this digital era. This research

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is of the view that the massive use of new digital communication media at the grassroots level in rural communities not only contributes to changes in the theory and practice of development communication, but also leads to a transformation towards “communication development” between center and periphery and, more precisely, from periphery to center (bottom-up).

4

Research Objectives

This research aims to revitalize the field of development communication that was once popular in Indonesia during the New Order because of its development projects that led to Indonesia’s modernization. After the reform, this discipline has not been not properly studied. Decentralization policy has caused confusion among government bodies and development actors in coordinating development programs, especially because regional autonomy, and the Village Law have given the local governments and the rural community more authority to determine local development goals and policies, which are sometimes inconsistent with the national development priorities. Despite the inconsistency, with the application of the internet and other new forms of communication platforms, people can now participate in development activities by communicating their development ideas to the wider public and this can stir debate in the public sphere. During the New Order, which adhered to the modernist ideas of development, the public sphere did not fulfil its function as a melting pot for public’s arguments and reasons, which people can rationally challenge to finally bring about consensus on an issue. With a strong centralized government and media system, the mediated public sphere as well as the communication system was controlled and dominated by the government. The communication patterns applied to achieve the success of the modernization project mostly relied on top-down and one-way communication; from the government (sender/center) to the people (receiver/periphery); from the central government (center) to the local government (periphery); and in turn from the local government (center in periphery) to the people in its region and in rural areas (periphery in periphery). All this changed when the reform movement brought a wind of political decentralization. Local governments, the rural community and also the civil society in general, who have been empowered by this political change, have more freedom to subjectively interpret not only messages about development that they receive, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_4

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but the metatexts of ‘development’ itself. The periphery can now also control “communication” as the reader of the text, who gives meaning to the received signals. This awards the periphery a significant role in the development process. Supported by the massive spread and use of new digital/interactive media and ICTs, (online) bottom-up communication patterns become normality and this adds to the dynamics of development discourse in the public sphere (Habermas, 1991). Both center and periphery fight for their arguments in the public sphere in order to determine the formation of public opinion and influence political decisionmaking processes for their favor. Theoretically, this signifies positive development toward liberal democracy in Indonesia and can have constructive socioeconomic impact for the country because only through reasonable public discourses can the interests of the periphery be taken into account by policy makers and attract the attention of the media which will circulate the issues at hand to the general society. This is precisely the reason why online bottom-up communication process even more important because in a controlled public sphere, periphery would not have the slightest chance to voice their interest and opinion publicly. This also reflects the power struggle between center and periphery in the public sphere amid Indonesia’s decentralization. Thus, online publicity is worthwhile for study to gain more understanding of the current dynamics of post-Reformasi Indonesian sociopolitical networks, in which the civil society is becoming more vibrant, critical and communicative than ever. Nonetheless, conflict does not always have to be seen as regression. A critical and discursive public sphere within which nearly all members of society are allowed to participate can synthesize opinions into a new societal consensus for the solution of the inconsistency problem in the Indonesian development agenda. Public digital participatory culture is thus a topic that needs to be explored in this research. “Development”, along with “ICT” and the “internet” are texts whose meanings are not determined by the center anymore. Media and internet technology not only function as channels that diffuse development messages, but they are—borrowing McLuhan’s (1964)—the “message” itself that bears great influence on how people interpret development messages, enable people to utilize their resources or even amplify their capabilities and potential. It means that differences about development do not only have the potential to cause friction and tension between the Indonesian centers and the peripheries, but also changes in their relations and structures, which otherwise have been hierarchical and bureaucratical. As the power structure between center (urban/government) and periphery (rural/civil society) shifts, the social and political position of rural community

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Research Objectives

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needs to be relocated against the backdrop of “digitalization” and “internetization” (Passaris, 2017) of everything. We cannot point out a village just by its location in the geographical-map anymore, but we need to start redefining it by its communicative potential in the online-map of networks. Digital connectivity and digital divide can be determinant factors for structural changes in centerperiphery relations between the central/local government and the rural community or within government institutions and the rural community itself, which adds to the complexity of urban-rural societal transformation. Drawing from the above explanation, the focus of this study is on the consequences of the utilization of new ICTs in the field of rural development. Hence, the main research question for this study is as follows: How does the practice of bottom-up development communication by rural communities in Indonesia, which is supported by the use of the internet and other new ICTs, shape the theories of development communication, alter the public sphere as well as contribute to the formation of distinctive alternative public spheres, and change the constellation of center-periphery structures of relations? The revitalization of development communication theory that is formed around the ecosystem of new media can improve the planning and execution of development projects in Indonesia. The capability to understand how new media works should help both the government at all levels and the civil society at large to find a common ground where all parties can reach win-win-solutions to development problems without neglecting people’s chance at the lowest level of society to participate and implement what has been decided by themselves in the process. Out of such consensus, an improved development policy, preferably with an inclusive and context-sensitive character, is naturally desired. This study takes the perspective of the rural populace in the Indonesian periphery who successfully exploit the potential of new ICTs for their own cause and see it as a chance to set up genuine development goals, lay out new initiatives for their communities and by doing so they bring alternatives to development discourses. Accordingly, development goals that are shaped by active public participation can be very plural, nuanced by local preferences and circumstances. This research aims to portray rural participatory culture in articulating, communicating and circulating information about local initiatives among the broader public and to show to the local community that their participation, in any kind, can lead to the empowerment of the whole community.

5

Methodology

As explained above, one of the goals of this research is to discover a new form of theoretical approach to development issues, in which “communication” is the point of departure. In the Introduction, I argue that communication has not been placed in a central position in development communication studies so far, especially those practiced and taught in Indonesia, rather it is instrumentalized as a supporting system for achieving from atop predetermined development goals. As the boundary between producers and consumers of communication is getting more blurred due to new forms of ICT, the role of development communication actors has changed. Government institutions and donor agencies who were once so authoritative to govern and determine what development messages to produce, how to deliver these messages, and who should consume them, are challenged by the rising power of civil society, who, by utilizing new media, produces their own messages while at the same time showing their act of resistance. To explore further the new communication process/pattern carried out by these actors, this research operates within the qualitative research paradigm with Grounded Theory and participant observation as the methods. The choice of more than one method is also intended to fulfill what Denzin (1970) calls “methodological triangulation”, which is used in this research to avoid “personalistic biases that stem from single methodologies” (Denzin, 1970, p. 300). Thus, the dual methodological choice of this research can be justified as an effort to secure data accuracy and trustworthiness (cf. Flick, 2008). Data collection was conducted within the period of November 2014 – February 2015.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_5

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5.1

5

Methodology

Grounded Theory

Grounded Theory is employed in this research because it is deemed the fitting method to achieve the specific theoretical goals as described thoroughly in the previous chapter. According to Glaser (1978, p. 93), “[t]he goal of grounded theory is to generate a theory that accounts for a pattern of behavior which is relevant and problematic for those involved … The generation of theory occurs around a core category.” Inductively, this research helps the theoretical generation of ‘communication development’ (7.1) and ‘communication empowerment’ (7.2), which reshape the conceptualization of development communication. Both concepts, as the terms suggest, emphasize ‘communication’ as the core element of development activity. They put communication as the subject of development rather than using communication for reaching development goals in other sectors such as economy, politics, health, or education. The academic community in development and communication studies can learn from this research that communication capability of a community is too a component of development that is both to be developed and empowered. This perspective of development communication is rarely found in the current stream of development communication studies. Until now, development communication studies borrow established concepts from the social science deep-rooted in the Western society (see 3.1), which are then implemented deductively in Indonesia. All too often the positivistic paradigm, which runs the risk of having confirmation bias, supports the hypothesis of technological determinism in development. On the contrary, critics of those studies have not succeeded in offering genuine alternative strategies to solve development problems in Indonesia. Following Charmaz (2010, 2014), this research offers a more constructivist perspective to examine development practices that start from the bottom and are initiated by the community itself without being driven extensively by any theoretical predispositions. Inductive and constructivist studies in the field of development communication are scarce when this research starts. This study, which is theoretically and methodologically bottom-up is intended to overcome this epistemological shortcoming. Despite the inductive nature, this research does not completely abandon theory as the analytical tool to examine the case at hand. However, the role of theory in this study is not deterministic as to direct the course of the research itself. It does not limit the researcher from taking into consideration every phenomenon outside of the reach of the established theories. At the beginning of the research phase, the theories, as described in Chapter 3, did not enter into fixed a framework. They were evaluated, adjusted and integrated into the research process toward the final

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stage of data analysis, during which I needed to be sensitive to these existing theories (Glaser, 1978). Here, theory functioned as a reference during the coding process. Charmaz (2000) refers to this phase as the “integration of the theoretical framework” (p. 511). Therefore, theory did not determine the formation of constructs and categories as well as concepts, which emerged during the coding process. Categories did not appear deductively from theory, but inductively from data. Although they were authentically developed from the bottom, they did not completely occur in vacuum. Beside as a reference, theory served to explain in which theoretical block this research is located (cf. ibid.). For example, the theoretical block of the “public sphere” turns out to be helpful to explain that new media in the study of development communication is regarded as an alternative space that can be utilized by development activists in the construction of communication development (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(d)). The same argument applies to the theoretical block about center and periphery relations. It helps to explain the village and supra-village positions within the context of state-civil society power relations (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(a)). The consequence of such an approach is the tendency to shift the focus of the research as the work progresses. For instance, the initial design of this research did not include the analysis of center-periphery relations nor the generation of communication development and communication empowerment. The first version of the research design is loosely intended to evaluate the impact of internet-driven bottom-up development initiative on the Indonesian rural communities. However, the empirical data gathered from this research have rerouted the research focus to some core categories that have proven to be significant for this research. The shift actually adds the weight of communication elements into the analysis and makes the research more relevant and positive. Despite the changes, the bottom-up development process as the starting point of this research is still adhered to, because that approach reflects the authenticity of development practice of a community. As a complementary data collection method, this study uses participatory observation and hence relies on the Grounded Theory Method as described by Charmaz (2014). It is a moderate version of grounded theory that combines field research in a particular site for observation and semi-structured qualitative interviews, which suits Charmaz’s definition of “grounded theory ethnography” (ibid., p. 38). According to her, “[g]rounded theory ethnography gives priority to the studied phenomenon or process—rather than to a description of a setting. Thus, from the beginnings of their fieldwork, grounded theory ethnographers study what is happening in the setting and make a conceptual rendering of these actions” (ibid.). This study aims to portray what is happening in Melung by observing its members’ activities, taking field notes, and at the same time tries to analyze their

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Methodology

actions by asking questions in order “to understand members’ taken-for-granted assumptions and rules” (ibid., p. 35). The sites of research and the research subject, i.e., Melung Village and the GDM (Gerakan Desa Membangun/Village Development Movement), were chosen purposely (see further in Chapter 6). The search for the key informants progressed through two pathways: the natural way, by which the informants were met in daily encounters during the stay (e.g., social workers, farmers), and snowball sampling, where I was given recommendations about the next appropriate interviewees (e.g., village officers, public servants, national parliament members, scholars). All interviews were guided by a list of questions (see Appendix 1) and recorded (see interview transcriptions in Appendix 2 in ESM). In most cases, this list of questions was not visible to the interviewees to avoid distractions from the purpose of the meeting. The interview style was akin to a casual conversation to stimulate openness and receptiveness. All questions were open for the interviewee’s interpretation and not asked in the same sequence. With this focused but not rigid format, questions were subject to adjustment depending on the situation, the development of the interview process and the research progress. Keywords, field notes and memos were stored in the physical and digital version. Non-verbal responses of the interviewees or general impressions about the research site were also included in the field notes. Memos contained the theoretical as well as the methodological thought. During the four-month-long field research period, 182 audio files, 143 diary pages (see Research Diary in Appendix 3 in ESM), field notes, pictures, videos and other secondary documentations such as research reports, the village’s profile, and development plans were collected. Nonetheless, not all audio files were treated as ‘interviews’. The majority of the recorded files were daily conversations with the local inhabitants. During those conversations, relevant-to-research subjects were often discussed spontaneously and recorded immediately, because taking handwritten notes during every conversation would have greatly disrupted the flow of the conversation. Note-taking could also lead to awkwardness during the conversation. It could eventually undermine the trust of the local people toward me as an outsider. It is important to keep in mind that as a guest, I had to build close relationships with the villagers and not give the impression that I was merely there “to get the data” from them without a willingness “to know and understand” them better. Remembering the content of each conversation and then taking notes afterwards was not always the best strategy, because usually too many things were discussed in flexible time frames, although sometimes this method was taken when necessary. Therefore, audio recording was the best solution for securing the data.

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The recordings were played again at the end of the day and all relevant information, including field note jottings such as the general interview situation and background information, were moved into the research diary and stored in digital form. This information was important to provide the context for the data and also functioned as a cross-reference to interpret other data as well. However, because these recordings were not counted as interviews, they were neither transcribed nor coded. After reexamination, it was decided that the total of 14 actual interviews with key informants would be deducted from 182 audio files. The rest of the files were used as contextual information for all the research materials related to the situation at that moment. Relevant information from the remaining recordings were jotted down in the research diary. The 14 actual interviews are the primary data for this research and as such they were consequently transcribed and coded. The interviews were conducted and transcribed in the Indonesian language, but some sections that are used for text-referencing in this report were translated into English by myself. The codes are all in English in order to ease the readers to understand and retrace the analysis process as it determines the reliability and validity of this research. The analysis part of this research follows Charmaz’s (2014, p. 113) two phase coding: the initial and focused coding, which is explained in detail in 5.3.

5.2

Participatory Observation

A secondary data collection method, which completes the grounded theory procedure, is participatory observation. To obtain relevant data about rural development, a careful approach to the local community is needed in order to build mutual trust between the researcher who is from outside the local social system and the local residents. For this reason, the researcher should reside for a period within the studied environment and build relationships with them while observing their social life from within the community and becoming part of that environment. It is in this context that participatory observation was used. For the observation, an observation protocol was prepared and a research diary served for detailed daily records and impromptu analysis on relevant events and significant notes that the researcher perceived on a daily basis. The research diary was also used to compare the informant statements with information from direct observation so that data cross-checking or triangulation of methods could be done immediately.

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Photos, videos and other supporting documents (e.g., demographic information, media reports, annual village reports) were collected as supporting and secondary data. They were also used as materials for preparing interview questions and to support the interpretation of the informants’ responses as well as to provide context of the data. Participation in the community’s daily activities, in village events and meetings was a way to develop intimate relationships and trust with the community. This is an important element in ethnography as a means of securing research-related information without sacrificing the objectivity of the researcher who has specific epistemological objectives.

5.2.1

Degree of Participation and the Role of the Researcher

In the study of rural development, with qualitative participatory approach as the method, there are at least two commonly used approaches, namely Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Schönhuth (2002) explains that RRA deals with “rasche, handlungsorientierte Einschätzung von lokalem Wissen, Bedürfnissen und Potentialen, ... Konfliktlösungsstrategien oder die Untersuchung von spezifischen Problemen …” (p. 37; emphasis added). In obtaining data about local knowledge, RRA always puts the perspective of the local community as the main focus. Semi-structured interviews and supporting documents such as maps and drawings produced together with members of the research team can be used as data sources. The data will be analyzed by taking into account the interests of the local community and also their development planning and activities. To some extent, the involvement of the local people in the analysis process is also possible. Knowledge obtained from the results of this analysis is not objective knowledge, but accumulative knowledge from a variety of perspectives while prioritizing the point of view of the local community, so that in the end a complete description of the phenomenon under investigation is formed. However, the RRA does not require the researcher to stay long in the field. One to two weeks is deemed an acceptable time period to conduct RRA research (Schönhuth, 2002). Meanwhile, PRA demands a more intense relationship with the local community during the research process. Local residents are treated as “partners” in researching and analyzing obtained data. External experts act as consultants for the local people and assist them to solve their problems. Experts should not order or direct the locals to make certain problem-solving decisions. Instead, they must learn together and exchange knowledge with the local residents and entrust them

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to make their own decisions. The participatory in PRA has an empowerment element for the local community who must release their dependency from outside assistance (Schönhuth, 2002). In PRA, exchange of roles, i.e., local community becomes the local expert, is a distinguishing characteristic. Schönhuth (2002) defines PRA as follows: Man könnte PRA definieren als einen Weg, lokalen (städtischen und ländlichen) Gruppen zu ermöglichen, ihre Lebensbedingungen in einem gemeinsamen Prozess zu analysieren, dessen Ergebnisse miteinander zu diskutieren und Aktivitäten mit oder ohne Hilfestellung von außen zu planen. Die externen Fachkräfte stoßen diesen Prozess nur noch an und begleiten und unterstützen ihn in dem Maße, wie dies von den Gruppen gewünscht wird und wie es von ihrem eigenen Verhandlungsspielraum her vertretbar ist. Auftretende Interessenkonflikte müssen dabei offengelegt und ausgehandelt werden. (p. 38)

This research places the participation of the researcher between the RRA-PRA spectrum. The two-month research stay period within the local community and the engagement in local activities were meant to exchange knowledge between myself as the researcher and the villagers who possessed the local knowledge. Exemplary events related to knowledge exchange were workshops or training, in which I was often asked to be the facilitator in village meetings, and community small group discussions (for example, see Figure 5.1). Such activities were well documented in the research diary, as illustrated in the following entry: “I feel my presence is increasingly taken into account and I’m increasingly trusted by the village officials in their activities. In the context of participatory method, this is a positive sign. I will use this opportunity to get involved and get to know them more and more” (Research Diary, p. 38). In the research diary, a summary of the researcher’s participation in each event was described. Often, the reflection was connected to methodological aspects of the research. Below is one example of a reflection excerpted from the research diary: ROLE/REFLECTION: Next, I’m asked by Mr. Budi (Satrio) to provide speaking skills/public speaking training to the farmers, so that they have the ability to explain about agriculture they currently work on to guests. For example, when there were guests of children from PAUD (early childhood education) yesterday, the farmers were having difficulty in giving explanations about their current activity. I’ve agreed to the request. With this request, I feel that this shows an increase in the level of trust of the village apparatus towards me, which I need to ease the data collecting process over the next days. (Research Diary, p. 64)

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Figure 5.1 Using SWOT analysis to discuss Melung’s potential to prepare a roadmap for an ecotourism village

It needs to be reiterated that my involvement as a facilitator in the community’s activities was a method in itself to become closer to the data. The end goal was information acquisition and while there were certain emotions developing between myself and the community I observed, the autonomy of my knowledge interest was not disturbed by my close relationships with them. Overt participatory observation gave me some degree of freedom to maneuver within the community. The method released the interaction awkwardness in dealing with the local residents, thus making it easier for me to collect data.

5.2.2

Enter and Exit Strategy

The first contact with Melung Village was made before the doctoral study officially began. On September 24, 2013, an initial visit to Melung was conducted as an assessment of research possibilities, while at the same time initial contact with

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Melung residents and village officials was being developed. The reception was organized by two village officials, who gave me background information about the village and its internet project. Accompanied by them, I took a short village tour to gain an initial understanding of life in Melung. After the initial visit, we maintained contact, mainly via social media; they eventually became two of the key figures for this research. When the definite schedule for data collection finally was determined one year later, the contact with the two officials was reestablished in order to clarify several technical matters concerning transportation to the research site and accommodation once there. They had prepared a room in the family’s home of another village official, who was an active member of the village movement GDM. This smooth entry situation into the village also aided my becoming part of Melung and the GDM community, which has helped me to get closer to the data. My accommodation was one of the connecting points where internet transmitters had been installed to provide WiFi and relay internet signals (see Figure 6.4). The presence of an internet signal at the host’s house, albeit low speed (see Figure 6.7), was a technical privilege that enabled me to communicate with the “outside world”. A traditional saying among the Sundanese, the second largest ethnic group in Indonesia after the Javanese, and the ethnicity of this researcher, is “datang katingali tarang, undur katingali punduk” (literally translated: “show your forehead as you come, show your back as you go”). Essentially, it means people must behave appropriately to each situation, especially in bidding a farewell that is as polite and respectful as their arrival. After two months, in honor of the Melung community, I bid a proper farewell with the entire host family and Melung residents, particularly those who I had the most interaction. A small present was given to each as a token of thanks.

5.3

Data Analysis of Grounded Theory Method

The coding work began with the transcription file from the interview with Khoerudin using qualitative data analysis software. The next coding sequence was based on the answers and coding results from the previous interview partner. After each coding session, an assessment was made which determined whether the next coding would follow sequential order or other mechanisms such as saliency so that it would create a continuous coding unit. For example, during the interview session with Suparyo—a village activist –, he often alluded to legal aspects of Indonesian development. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to prioritize the analysis of the interview transcript of Sudjatmiko, a member of the

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national legislature who drafted the Village Bill, and Kurniawan, a staff member at the Ministry of Communication and Information who was responsible for new ICT projects in the Indonesian regions, rather than coding the transcription, whose interview was conducted after the interview session with Suparyo. This method was proven effective as I arrived faster at the focused/selective coding stage and it allowed me to discover and develop core categories more effectively. At this stage, the analytical process entered theoretical coding (Glaser, 1978, pp. 55–82; see 5.3.2). In addition, this technique helped to overcome shortcomings in terms of the classical theoretical sampling as suggested in the Grounded Theory (Glaser, 1978, pp. 36–54; Charmaz, 2014, p. 150). However, theoretical sampling, i.e., looking for the next source based on previous data analysis, was not completely abandoned. In practice, the interview partners were chosen based on the recommendations and immediate analysis at the site by assessing the data at hand, even though the coding process was yet to be carried out. I argue that the selection of interview partners was already part of the theoretical sampling. Open coding was not applied to the research diary, which functioned as a comparative document for the transcriptions or the emerging codes that were being analyzed (see constant comparison from Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Corbin & Strauss, 2015). The significance of the constant comparing process increased, especially at the focused or selective coding stage because the data from the interviews was always compared with the notes in the research diary. This meant they were complemented with the context of the codes while at the same time enriching the dimensions and properties of the respective codes or categories.

5.3.1

Coding Process 1: Open or Initial Coding

Open or initial coding requires open-mindedness. Words, lines, segments and even paragraphs should be coded openly. In this phase, it is necessary to put aside existing concepts and theories from the literature and prefer inductive codes and categories, which emerge from the data (Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this research, it was a likelihood that codes would emerge in conversation with the interview partners. In that case, insights were written down in the memo. Codes could even be expressed explicitly by the interviewees as in the case of “in vivo” codes. Double or even triple coding was possible. It means, the same interview passage was ascribed with several codes. For example, the following line: “How to

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empower ourselves through joint conversation, round discussion, something like that and it takes time” (Khoerudin, interview, par. 49) was listed with two codes: “self-empowering” and “learning circle”. New categories emerged as a result of constant comparisons either between codes or between codes and data. For instance, “communication development” stood as a new category, whereas it was previously grouped under the “defining development communication” sub-category. It was due to the emergence of new codes, which related to communication development during the open coding. The relevance of communication development was increasing, with its status then elevated as a stand-alone category. In total, 937 codes were applied to the entire data in the open coding session with 1,716 times code occurrences (see all the codes in Appendix 2 in ESM).

5.3.2

Coding process 2: Focused or Selective Coding (Theoretical Coding)

The next analytical stage after the initial/open coding is the focused coding (Charmaz, 2014) or selective coding (Glaser, 1978). Focused coding concentrates on “the most significant or frequent initial codes to sort, synthesize, integrate, and organize large amounts of data” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 113). This can be reached by focusing on key codes and core categories that appear to be significant. Computerassisted qualitative data analysis software enables researchers to sort out the most frequent codes and retrieve interview passages that the codes represent. Constant comparing initial codes with data and/or with the research diary is helpful in this phase, because it consists of additional and contextual information that is not verbally articulated by the interviewees. As a result, codes can be reduced, reformulated, renamed, or refined (Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Longer codes during the initial coding can and should be shortened. It is also possible that this process includes the regrouping of codes or categories if it is deemed necessary. A proper execution of focused coding can alter the research focus. The research focus or research question may change significantly because in this phase new categories are starting to appear, which could redirect the original research aims. The outcome of focused coding can lead to the “discovery of new theory”, which begins with the establishment of core categories (see Böhm, 2009). This process is also called “theoretical coding” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 55–82), which is done by referencing to Glaser’s coding families (ibid., pp. 73–82).

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This research takes into consideration Glaser’s critique over Strauss and Corbin’s “coding paradigm” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; see Charmaz, 2014; Urquhart, 2013), which is considered overly prescriptive and deterministic. Consequently, this research does not follow Strauss and Corbin’s version of “axial coding”. Instead, it refers to Glaser’s coding families (1978), namely “The Six C’s”: Causes, Context, Contingencies, Consequences, Covariances, and Conditions (p. 74) because they offer flexibility to the researcher in interpreting the data (see 7.1.1). Nevertheless, the leaning on Glaser’s coding families does not mean that the codes and categories did not emerge from the data. On the contrary, the conceptual development of “communication development” (7.1) and “communication empowerment” (7.2) were based on inductive categories that are discovered in the data. Grounded Theory, especially which is developed by Glaser (1978), requires researchers to develop their own methodology led by their own thinking processes supported by—but not necessarily—the coding families. Thus, this study inherits a dual methodological character, i.e., a semi-deductive analytical scheme, because it uses Glaser’s coding families and an inductive one, due to its emerging codes and categories that are grounded in the data. The core category of “communication development” itself originated from the “insights” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 251) during the reflection session and preliminary analysis to the interview with Khoerudin (6.3.1) and Tisam (6.3.4). The insights were immediately recorded in the theoretical memo (see 5.3.3) and developed further particularly during the expert interview session with Lindawati (6.3.8). From thereon, the structure of analysis has been centered around the core category. The theoretical memo about communication development began to be nurtured under the code of “communication development” which becomes the main axis of this research. In the memo, the definition of communication development started to be developed as well. Likewise, the stages of communication development and their relevant concepts were noted in the memo. During the focused coding, all appearing codes were integrated into the core category. Glaser (1978) calls this technique “delimitation”, which means that “only variables that are related to the core will be included in the theory” (p. 93). He also suggests a focus on one core variable, even if more than one core variable is found in the analysis. Other variables considered relevant (key codes) and too valuable to be ignored or to be separated in other writings had to be integrated in the selected core category. In this research, communication development and communication empowerment were two emerging concepts at the core of the analysis. However, following Glaser’s suggestion, communication empowerment has been integrated in the conceptual construction of communication development,

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which was treated as the “to-be-elaborated new theory”. Thus, communication empowerment is part of communication development.

5.3.3

Memo-writing

According to Glaser (1978), writing a theoretical memo is “the bedrock of theory generation” (p. 83). He emphasizes that: [i]f the analyst skips this stage by going directly from coding to sorting or to writing–he is not doing grounded theory. Memos are the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding. Memos lead, naturally to abstraction or ideation. Memoing is a constant process that begins when first coding data, and continues through reading memos or literature, sorting and writing papers or monograph to the very end. Memo-writing continually captures the “frontier of the analyst’s thinking” as he goes through either his data, codes, sorts or writes. (Ibid.; emphasis in original)

In this research, there were in total 253 memos that were pinned to the entire research materials (codes, categories, interview transcripts, research diary, etc.). The majority were theoretical; others were methodological and general memos with no categorization. The main memo, which was the backbone of the analytical step, was pinned at the code of “communication development”. That memo started with a narrative effort to define communication development. Glaser’s 6 C’s was also already included in the main memo because this coding family explained the scope of communication development. In this phase, the “theoretical sorting” of memos, which helps “to put the fractured data back together” (Glaser, 1978, p. 116) was implemented and resulted in a “theoretical outline” (ibid.; Böhm, 2009). It then became the basis for writing the new theory. This can be seen in Figure 5.2, in which the stages of communication development (from “bottom-up initiatives” to their “consequences”) are outlined firstly in Bahasa Indonesia. Communication development as a term appeared during the coding process of one interview passage of Melung Village’s chief, from which a problem to development communication was detected. Following this discovery, the insight was immediately noted in the memo (Figure 5.3), in which the jostling for position between the authorities of Banyumas Regency and Melung Village officers—represented by Satrio—was described. This memo was associated with the bottom-up or top-down development communication complexity and therefore fell under that category, i.e., “top down/bottom-up”. At the later analytical stage,

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Figure 5.2 Theoretical memo of communication development: Definition and stages of communication development

when the concept of communication development began to develop, the title of the memo was changed to “From DevComm to CommDev”, on which this research eventually laid its theoretical underpinning. In this memo, the communication problem with the government authorities, particularly with the regent authority, was highlighted. The problem could lie on the “underdeveloped” communication process between the parties, and not essentially on the approach or model of development communication used in a development program, i.e., whether it was top-down or bottom-up. Therefore, instead of debating who should have the initiative for development communication, the reflective question was whether it would be better if people concentrated more on developing the communication with each other, hence, communication development (CommDev) instead of development communication (DevComm). At the end of the memo, a reference to the research diary was given, in which this matter was discussed further (pagination can be altered as the field research progresses). The theoretical memo also discusses the emerging concepts, which are intended to be developed by constantly comparing them with the other codes or

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Figure 5.3 Memo on “communication development” instead of “development communication”

secondary documents. Examples of emerging concepts are “bridging” and “selfempowerment”. While bridging found its way to become a separate category, self-empowerment must be compared first with other codes such as self-reliance (keswadayaan) and independence/autonomy (kemandirian), which were expressed by Lindawati; she thought that all the terms had different meanings. The terms were then linked to other variables such as bottom-up campaign, center-periphery relations, regional autonomy and literacy, which boiled down to communication empowerment as an umbrella term for various concepts regarding empowerment. The discussion about self-empowerment in the memo became crucial in the build up of the new theory and it turned out to be an important element of communication empowerment.

5.4

Limitations of the Research

The data in this study was collected from November 2014 until February 2015 when the bill for the Village Law No. 6/2014 had just been passed by parliament and was set to be implemented in the following year (January 2015). Therefore, the field research was not able to capture the long-term impact of the law on rural development and ICT uses in rural areas. However, the issue of the new Village

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Law had been circulating in the public sphere for some time and this research has captured the dynamics of the discourse, particularly at (but not exclusive to) the grassroots level, i.e., among the village activists, government officials, politicians and the academic community. Other limitations relate to the methodological choice. The selection of specific field research locations, i.e., in Melung Village, Banyumas Regency, as well as of specific village movement (GDM) leads to the fact that this research is not representative of the whole village situation in Indonesia in relation to their response to technological and political changes in rural development. Data collection from other rural areas would complement this study so that the construction of communication development theory can be strengthened. The selection of data collecting methods, namely interviews within the framework of Grounded Theory and participatory observation within the framework of Rapid Rural Appraisal, also has weaknesses. Melung’s social structure and system are not captured because the ethnographic method was not fully implemented, but only complementary to the Grounded Theory. To gain more comprehensive mapping, a longer stay in the field is needed. A longer field research is necessary to observe the sustainability of the ICT-based rural development program. A more quantitative method, such as surveys, is recommended for further research to determine and evaluate Melung residents’ reception to and acceptance of internet-based development programs in their village. A survey of ownership and use of new media are also needed to assess the extent to which these new technologies are adopted in rural daily life, and this includes the examination of the social transformation that is resulted from that adoption. Finally, the above research limitations mean that the theory or theses which are generated from this research need to be tested for their generalization in a study with larger research sampling. However, as a substantive theory, which refers to the empirical area of the study, communication development operates within the field of rural ICT4D associated with the politics of decentralization in Indonesia. As a formal theory, which operates in the conceptual area, communication development can enrich the theoretical underpinnings about development communication, the public sphere and center-periphery relations (cf. Glaser, 1978, p. 144).

5.5

Ethical Issues

As a person from outside the community, my residence there for only research purposes was problematic. On the one hand, the local people, as human beings

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with unique values and culture, deserve respect. On the other hand, specific research goals had to be attained within a limited time. A degree of pragmaticism was needed to resolve this situation. In relation to the informed consent of my interlocutors, I introduced myself in different ways. To the interviewees, I revealed my status as a lecturer from my home university, Padjadjaran University (Unpad), from the outset of contact, but did not immediately introduce myself as a doctoral student from a university in Germany. This served to minimize the personal distance of status and education, and to find commonalities with the informants. It was only when an interview was in process and I felt trust and a rapport had developed between us –normally seen from the interactiveness of our communication—I would casually mention my studies in Germany.

Figure 5.4 Teenage girls playing with their smartphones at one of Melung’s internet hotspots

To residents I met daily at coffee stalls, grocery stores or rice fields (see Figure 5.4), I did not divulge my status as a doctoral student in Germany. This was simply to ensure that we felt a common bond as Indonesians, without the

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potential perception that I was “flaunting” my education at a “fancy” European institution and engendering feelings of inferiority among them. Considering the huge gap between the modern urban European community and rural traditional Indonesian community, there was a concern that the local residents would feel intimidated and withdraw from conversations. The communication between us would have been hampered, if not undermined completely, affecting the accuracy and authenticity of their statements. After a month of residence, I was officially introduced by the village chief at a community meeting session in the village hall. Guests consisted of village officials and representatives of all village bodies. During that session, the chief revealed my identity as a doctoral student from a German university. I then introduced myself and conveyed the intention and purpose of my presence in Melung and intended duration of my stay. I also requested the help and cooperation from all the parties so that I could achieve my goals. Therefore, my participation and observation activities at Melung were not covert. The formal introduction and the acceptance of the residents indicated that my presence and purpose was informed and justified to all. The anonymization of informants’s identity seemed inevitable at this point. However, anonymity is an “unachieveable goal” (Van den Hoonaard, 2003, p. 141) or even “impossible” (Walford, 2005, p. 83) to ensure, particularly in ethnographic and qualitative research. In ethnographic works, as in this study, where the researcher lives and engages in a relatively small, tight-knit village community where everyone is well acquainted, all forms of personal references, even if their names are replaced with numbers, will still be identifiable. Saunders et al. (2015) refers to this as “small population” (p. 619) problem. This research retains the attribution of identity of the informants apart from the reasons above, because it wants to maintain “the value and integrity of the data” (Saunders et al., 2015, p. 617). It does not falsify the results; on the contrary, it has enabled the correlation of findings and identification of patterns (Van den Hoonaard, 2003) during the data analysis.

5.6

Methodological Reflections

This section centers on the reflection of data collection and data analysis. During observation, determining the role of the researcher within the observed community was problematic. Occasionally, there was a desire to criticize many things that seemed to be incorrect. For example, when a development project was thought to be wrongly planned, a critic would either perfect the project design or seek to

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influence the objectivity of the researcher in viewing the phenomenon. In order to secure research objectivity, such criticism must not be expressed publicly. Instead, it was usually addressed later in follow-up interview sessions for clarification. Lack of knowledge of the local language also hindered me in my attempts to get closer to the local population. As a member of the Sundanese ethnic group of West Java, I do not speak the Javanese language fluently, even though Indonesians will be familiar with many Javanese words (which also has many regional variations, including in the Banyumas area). This could have resulted in an incomplete understanding of the situation; to remedy this, I asked people to tell the story again in Indonesian. As mentioned in 5.2.1., the active participation of the researcher in local events can affect their objectivity. There was the risk that my presence and involvement in the community’s daily activities could affect the naturality of behavior of the informants and observed people. As a result, the data could have been misleading and flawed. I was well aware of this risk and a solution to overcome this problem was to follow Giesecke’s (2007) suggestion within the field of cultural comparative research. This requires becoming involved in dialogue as a way to explain to each other the position of each communication participant so that any emerging doubts could be clarified. Theory-laden critiques were applied later in the data analysis phase to complete the triadic analysis (Giesecke, 2007). Another method to ensure data objectivity was by constantly comparing and cross-checking data from various methods (data triangulation, Denzin, 1970) so that irregularities within the data in case of data manipulation could be detected. During the data analysis sessions, as stated by Corbin and Strauss (2015), researchers need to take a moment to reflect back on “who we are and how we are shaped and changed by the research” (p. 102). As noted in 5.1., the Grounded Theory method has brought this research to find a new direction in formulating research questions and objectives. Reflectively, I think the “discovery” of communication development as a substantive theory has confirmed that the use of Grounded Theory as a methodological set is reasonable. The last reflection point relates to the transcription process. The appointment of an external assistant to transcribe two interview recordings has been proven problematic. An Indonesian postgraduate student (majoring in Psychology) was hired to speed up the transcription process. However, the end product of his transcriptional work was inaccurate due to his lack of understanding of the context of the theme and/or the interview situation. Some terms, particularly typical to development studies and fieldwork, were not interpreted correctly. This could have been a fatal error because a few errors in the transcription would significantly alter a

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statement’s meaning. For example, “block grants” was transcribed as “bloggram”, with “block” translated as “blog” or “blogger” (Lestari, interview, par. 20). More importantly, transcription errors could have led to analytical errors. For instance, the passage “the point is, everything must be decided with [by] the community and must be done with [by] them” (Lestari, interview, par. 14) was transcribed by the assistant as follows: “the point is, everything must be focused on the community and must be done with them”. This statement from Lestari was her answer to the question about a development model. The crucial difference from those two sentences that could have influenced the analysis result is that the first sentence places the community as an active subject of development, while the second sees them as passive objects. The next error was the inaccuracy in transcribing specific terms, which could negatively impact the theory building substantially. For example, the term “innovation” (Lestari, interview, par. 22) was transcribed as “intervention” and ‘transparency’ (Lestari, interview, par. 24) was translated as “information”. The next transcribing error relates to the failure in detecting a correct adverb that could have resulted in the opposite meaning of the whole utterance and contradicted all the assumptions that had been built. The original transcription reads: “So it focused on women who became heads of the family, for example widows or those who were already married but had to take care of their families and all kinds”. After reexamination, the same sentence should actually read: “So it focused on women who became heads of the family, for example widows or those who were not married but had to take care of their families and all kinds” (Lestari, interview, par. 74). Here we can see that “already” and “not” are opposites in meaning. Due to these errors, inconsistencies of data were detected during constant comparison. To resolve this problem, the whole transcribing process was repeated by myself for the two interviews (some errors were also found in the transcription of Lindawati) and the services of the external transcriber discontinued.

6

Research Field, Subjects and Informants

Ethnographic work of this research was conducted mainly in Melung Village, while the interviews took place in the village and several cities, i.e., Purwokerto, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta. Additional non-participatory short observation was also conducted in Majalengka, West Java, for comparison. Besides Melung and its residents, this research also takes the rural movement GDM as its research subject. Finally, this section will describe the background information of each person interviewed and the meeting/interview process with them, which is important to understand the dynamics surrounding each interview situation.

6.1

Melung Village

Melung is a fairly remote village, situated astride a highland in the valley of Mount Slamet in Banyumas Regency, Central Java. The distance to the nearest big city, Purwokerto, the capital city of Banyumas Regency, is 18 km with good road access. As of September 2015, it had 2,161 inhabitants. However, the education level was considerably low. Virtually half of the population only completed elementary school (44.6 percent), 20.6 percent were dropouts or had not finished elementary school, while 14.5 percent had yet to attend elementary school. The percentage of those who were attending or had graduated from junior or senior

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_6

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high school was 19.8 percent (Figure 6.1), while only 11 village members (0.5 percent) were attending higher education.1 According to Khoerudin (interview, par. 41–43), Melung was categorized as a Less Developed Village or poor village during the New Order. Geographically, Melung is located in the north-easternmost portion of Kedungbanteng district center, to which Melung administratively belongs. The distance to Kedungbanteng is eight kilometers. The low level of Melung population’s education correlated with its low economic level. Among the causes of the problem was that parents expected their children who had graduated from elementary school to help work in the fields or other agricultural tasks, or marry at a young age (interview with Pak Kayim, par. 200). This explains why the number of children who continued their education to secondary school was low. This is a vicious circle of education and economic problems. Besides economic reasons, parents rejected or failed to understand the notion that education would improve their family’s standard of living. However, Khoerudin (interview, par. 41–43) explained the establishment of the village’s own junior high school in 2006 has at least increased the degree of education of residents. Previously, elementary school (Sekolah Dasar/SD) graduates who wanted to continue their study had to travel to junior high schools (Sekolah Menengah Pertama/SMP) located outside the village, namely in Baturaden located five kilometers away and with limited transportation (Figure 6.2). Furthermore, at the point of data collection, there was no senior high school (Sekolah Menengah Atas/SMA) building at Melung, so children still had to go to school outside the village if they wanted to continue their education.2 Traditionally, Melung is an agricultural village. Villagers work mostly as farmers (11.4 percent), farm workers/hired hands (7.9 percent), and day laborers (12 percent). While housewives numbered up to 16.9 percent, students or school-age children amounted to 17.1 percent of the total population. A relatively small number of inhabitants were self-employed (4. 4 percent) with an unemployment rate (including those who were not able to work) of 23. 4 percent. There was one midwife/health care worker for the whole village (Figure 6.3). Meanwhile, there were seven people employed as teachers (0. 3 percent).3 A village official told me 1

Melung’s statistics. Retrieved on September 2, 2015 from http://melung.desa.id/statistikpenduduk/ 2 Indonesia’s basic education consists of a 6-year elementary school period, 3-year junior high school and another three years of study at senior high school. Attendance of (and graduation from) the 12-year basic education is compulsory to continue on to higher education. 3 Melung’s statistics. Retrieved on September 2, 2015 from http://melung.desa.id/statistikpenduduk/

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Figure 6.1 Junior high school students enthusiastically study computer technology in groups in the computer lab

that service from the state electricity service began in 1994. Villagers handled the distribution and installation of electricity poles (gotong royong) by pulling them in a cart on the hilly terrain. The road was unpaved and rocky at the time; roads were first paved in 2007, on the initiative of the then village chief, a year before internet service commenced. The choice of Melung as the research subject and location is based on the fact that this village is dubbed the “Internet village” among Indonesian rural communities. Although perhaps atypical of the general picture of the nation’s villages, it fits this reseach’s problematization because it reflects the intersection between old and new, traditional and modern or even the post-modern way of life, where the agricultural economy finds its transition into or converges with the informational economy, consciously leaving the industrial phase behind. This research can capture the village’s social change within this transformation process. The process illustrates both the “leapfrogging” stage of development as envisioned by Kofi

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Figure 6.2 Elementary school children head home after a day of study

Annan as well as Jokowi’s plan to build from the periphery, integrating the rural community in the development project towards the information society. Melung is amongst the first villages in Indonesia to maximize the use of new ICTs in its daily activities, whether for social use or for work. As such, it can be seen as a model village for the inception of the Indonesian rural development digital project. In that sense, it is typical for internet-supported villages in the general long-term plan of Indonesian development. Both the government and the rural community can learn from the successes and failures of its internet project so that it will contribute positively to the sustainability and continuity of Indonesian rural ICT program. Melung’s internet village was pinpointed by nine WLAN transmitters, which were installed in three out of four neighborhoods (dusun/RW) that occupied a 1.320-hectare surface area (Figure 6.4). Not all areas of the village were covered by the Wi-Fi signal because one internet hotspot could only cover an area of approximately 250 meters. The idea to establish internet hotspots in the village came from the former village chief in 2008. It was set as a free public network,

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Figure 6.3 A member of the Family Welfare Development (PKK) women’s empowerment program weighs an infant at the Posyandu or Maternal and Child Health Services, which operates at the grassroots level. Both PKK and Posyandu are legacies of the New Order’s participatory development programs in health and family sectors

requiring a password to access it that was available from the village authority. Landline telephone service was only available in the third neighborhood (also named Melung). However, most of the village area was already covered by mobile telephone reception (Figure 6.5). Figure 6.4 illustrates how the Wi-Fi signals were transmitted and relayed to other areas of the village. A total of eight internet transmitters or hotspots were installed. Five of them were installed at the homes of village officials (No. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7), one at the house of the former village chief (No. 1) who was the initiator of the project, and one at the village office (No. 4). Another transmitter (No. 9)

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3 2

1

4

Figure 6.4 Internet network system within Melung Village. Four separated areas indicate the neighborhoods of Melung (Depok, Kaliputra, Melung, Selarendeng), while the arrows signify the transmission of internet signals from the former chief’s house (1) to other receivers/repeaters in the houses of village officials. However, one of them (8) who lived in the 4th neighborhood, received no transmission of internet signal

was placed later at the house of one village activist, who was a member of Pager Gunung Farmer Organization.4 The first transmitter functioned as the server and belonged to the former chief. The third neighborhood, in which he lived, was the only neighborhood in the village where landline telephone network was available. Hence, internet service was only offered only in this neighborhood. Telkom Flexi and Speedy, both owned by the state telecommunication company Telkom, were the only internet service providers available in the area. He subscribed to the latter after migrating from the former in 2009. The signal was then transmitted to other receivers (No. 2, 3, 7), which in turn relayed the signal to other receivers in the neighborhood using Omni wireless internet antennas (Figure 6.6).

4

Pager Gunung was an organization in Melung, whose name was used by the village authority for applying grants to the Ministry of Communication and Information in 2013. Melung was finally granted with a CAP along with four other Indonesian villages.

6.1 Melung Village

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Figure 6.5 A mattress seller stops to check his phone at one of the Internet accessible areas

The whole signal chains created an intra-network of internet connections for public use. Unfortunately, the fourth neighborhood, indicated by No. 8 in Figure 6.4, could not receive Wi-Fi signals from the network. The main reason was topographical because the neighborhood is situated among hills which blocked the internet signal from the other transmitters. One transmitter was not integrated in this network anymore. It was located at the elementary and junior high school that are located in one area. According to teachers, the reason was because they needed a more stable internet connection for managerial purposes and teaching activity. They chose to have their own (closed) internet connection using their own modem and financed from the school budget for its installment and monthly payment. Shared network meant shared bandwidth and according to the teachers the connection would have been very slow had they remained in the village intra-network (Figure 6.7). Given that there was no landline telephone available at the school, they subscribed to a mobile broadband service provider.

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Figure 6.6 An Omni Wi-Fi antenna atop a bamboo pole at the house of a village official. Behind it is a satellite dish for TV transmission

Figure 6.7 Internet speed test in Melung using the village intra-network at house no. 5 at 5:40 p.m. on December 10, 2014. The test was conducted using www.speedtest.net

At the moment of data collection, such a rural initiative was a novelty among Indonesian rural communities, hence the nickname of “internet village”. Melung’s

6.1 Melung Village

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presence in the online world is represented by its official website under the domain of desa.id,5 Wikipedia page,6 Twitter account7 and Facebook page.8 In 2013, Melung was one of five villages awarded the distinction of Community Access Point (CAP) by the Ministry of Communication and Information due to the success of the initiative. The presentation was held at the ICT Village Festival (DesTIKa), held in the village. It was provided with eight PCs, a digital camera, an LCD projector and a light white projector screen. These PCs were installed in the CAP room near the village hall and village office, adjacent to the early childhood education (PAUD) center, and could be used by the villagers for free (Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.8 Inside the CAP room: Women (housewives, farmers) and children using the service to develop their computer skills or surf the net

5

www.melung.desa.id https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melung,_Kedung_Banteng,_Banyumas 7 https://twitter.com/desamelung 8 https://www.facebook.com/desamelung 6

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The village’s story has attracted the mainstream media—electronic9 , print10 and online11 —to report on its unique characteristics. The general narrative in the positive news coverage mainly revolved around the story of a fairly remote village with virtually no fixed line telephone network, which was able to utilize new ICTs and establish an internet village network for the good of its people.

6.2

Gerakan Desa Membangun (GDM) or Village Development Movement

6.2.1

The Establishment and Principles of GDM

To challenge top-down rural development practices and one-way development communication process, i.e., from the central government in Jakarta to the villages in the peripheries, a group of rural activists together with local leaders from five Indonesian villages met in Melung on December 24, 2011. They agreed to form a rural development movement, which they named Gerakan Desa Membangun (GDM) or Village Development Movement. GDM is a bottom-up rural initiative whose activities are characterized by the use of the internet and new ICTs. Its stance regarding development is as follows: rural communities should not be driven by the central government in dictating how they should develop their own village. Villagers must actively engage in the development processes of their own surroundings and not passively receive whatever development program is imposed upon them by the authorities. Instead of being the object, they must strive to become the subject of development itself, because they believe that they are the basis of the nation and have the right to decide how they build their own community (keyword: “Development as Freedom”, Sen, 1999).

9

Video report by SCTV channel on January 26, 2014. Retrieved on August 27, 2015 from http://news.liputan6.com/read/810152/video-budi-satrio-ubah-desa-tertinggaljadi-melek-internet 10 Dari Desa Membangun Negara (“Building the State from the Village”, Kompas print media, November 28, 2014). Retrieved on August 27, 2015 from http://print.kompas.com/baca/KOM PAS_ART0000000000000000010225601 11 E.g., Melung Desa Internet di Lereng Gunung Slamet (“Melung, the Internet Village on the Hillside of Mount Slamet”). Retrieved on August 27, 2015 from http://katadata.co.id/foto/ 2014/08/02/melung-desa-internet-di-lereng-gunung-slamet

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GDM sees development from the perspective of “the villagers who build the state”, instead of the “state, which builds the villages”,12 which explains the rough translation of GDM, namely “the movement of the village, which builds”. However, it seems fair to express some skepticism about this claim because it remains to be proven whether GDM’s version of rural development has been purely undertaken without the intervention of the government from atop or other external parties. Stegbauer (2001) warns that online big group communication has different group/communication structure from the offline, in which interaction does exist yet with minimal solidarity, diverse opinion groups occur, and which consists of many layers or participation. This would fuel skepticism that assumes that an ideal bottom-up communication could never exist. In its website, GDM described itself as a collective initiative of villages to manage village resources and good governance. This movement is born as a critique of village development practices that tend to apply a top-down approach rather than bottom-up. As a result, the village will only be seen as an object, rather than as a subject of development. A village has not been given the authority to manage its resources in its territory. ... (To reach the goals), its strategy is to demonstrate achievements and good practice management of the village, both administrative, public service, and development programs management. In other words, GDM becomes a network of inter-village for the economic, political, social, cultural and technological sovereignty.13 (Author’s translation)

Derived from the self-description above, this movement fights for the following principles:14 1. 2. 3. 4.

12

Good, clean, accountable and transparent village governance Excellent and non-discriminatory public services Use of appropriate and open technology (open-source) Management of sustainable village resources based on community collective wisdom

See GDM’s webpage at www.desamembangun.id. Retrieved on September 24, 2013. GDM: About Us. Retrieved on September 2, 2015 from www.desamembangun.or.id (author’s translation). 14 GDM Principles. Retrieved on June 4, 2018 from http://desamembangun.id/kami/ (author’s translation). 13

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5. Advocating pro-village regulations 6. Encouraging protection for vulnerable, weak and marginalized communities These principles are compiled by the initiators of the movement, coordinated by Budi Satrio (6.3.3.). They are the key figures of the movement who decide the programs and working mechanism of the movement. Among them are Yossy Suparyo (6.3.5.) and his activist network in Banyumas Regency, which mostly has a background in IT. They are assisted by parliament member Budiman Sudjatmiko (6.3.6.) and the Ministry of Communication and Information via its staff Aris Kurniawan (6.3.7.), who guarantee their activities are aboveboard; this is an important validation of the movement. This original core network of the movement is the inner circle of GDM, whose opinions are influential for the programming and operation of the movement. At the time of data collection, GDM has 268 village members across Indonesia, with Ciamis Regency in West Java contributing the most members with 91 villages, followed by Banyumas Regency with 48 village members.15

6.2.2

The Movement’s Signature: Internet, New ICTs and desa.id

The focus on ICT (the 3rd principle) has become GDM’s signature and specialization, which distinguishes it from other village development movements. Taryono (6.3.10.) reveals there are three technology-related characteristics of GDM. First, GDM has introduced the technology of new media into the village ecosystem. Second, the strategy of “mainstreaming rural issues” (see 7.1.2.2.(1)(c)), which centers on the village as the subject of news reporting in mainstream media. To achieve this goal, the rural community has to transform itself from media consumers into media content producers. New media become crucial in this effort as an instrument for channeling the village’s interests into a higher level of public sphere, namely the public sphere of mass communication, which is dominated by elite interests in urban areas (see 7.1.2.2(4)(d)). Lastly, GDM involves many ICT activists who organize themselves in various communities at both the local and national levels; they include BlankOn Banyumas, Blogger Nusantara, Relawan TIK or ICT Volunteers in each region, and university students majoring in IT (interview with Taryono, par. 76; with Khoerudin, par. 33).

15

See http://desamembangun.or.id/anggota/. Retrieved on September 3, 2015

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Based on Taryono’s account, GDM deliberately utilizes new digital technology as “amplifiers” so that the effects of development efforts carried out by development activities in the village can be accelerated, especially in terms of disseminating information to the outside world. GDM believes that the voices of the village have to be articulated in a more massive manner to the wider public. The internet plays an important role here because it is the most suitable platform to carry out this mission, which they call desa bersuara or the “voicing village” (see 7.1.2.2 (1)(c)). The community of ICT activists, with whom GDM collaborates, functions as information diffusers as well as village facilitators for the migration of their Village Information System to an open-source operating system. It was observed that in the process of migration, the villagers were actively involved in the development of the system, which was contextualized according to each village’s specific purpose (BlankOn Banyumas is the initiator of “Banyumas Goes Open Source” or Bagoes). The IT community has also supported the villages IT Literacy campaign, which is known as Desa Melek IT or “IT literate village”. This cross-initiative collaboration boiled down to an idea to develop a typical village communication media platform, where the villages would have total control over the process of information production and distribution, while at the same time affirming village identity in the public sphere. It was eventually decided that the platform should be in the form of a village website, which would be registered under the Third Level Domain desa.id. Under regulations, the government websites are set under the Second Level Domain (SLD) go.id. According to Minister of Communication and Information Regulation No. 28/2006, “desa” is not recognized in the organizational structure of the government. Hence, it is not allowed to use the go.id domain. Consequently, at least until the end of 2012, there was no clause regulating the official domain for the village’s websites. Desa cannot not use the generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD) “.org” either since it is not a civil organization but a formal institution, which has executive power and is fully recognized in the state’s law. In response, the village communities of GDM proposed to form a distinct domain name under the Third Level Domain, which they named desa.id (Figure 6.9). They retained the term desa as they wanted to represent their local identity in the online world. Accordingly, they decided to maintain the Indonesian translation of village, i.e., desa, as the domain name, instead of its English translation, for example “vil.id”, which is derived from the word “village” (Suparyo, interview,

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par. 277, 290 & 600).16 After a long struggle, the proposal was approved by the Indonesian Internet Domain Name Administrator (PANDI) on May 1, 2013.17 Nonetheless, it was not the only domain recognized for village websites. This was because there was still no regulation that ensured a certain domain was the lone official domain name used for village websites. Consequently, any party could campaign (or force) its own initiative to be the legitimate one, and that included the government, both at the central or the local/regional level.

Figure 6.9 The homepage of Melung’s Village website18

Curiously, the Banyumas Regency through its Telematics Division of the Department of Communication and Informatics insisted that all villages in its area should set up their websites under the domain name of go.id. The instruction was immediately rejected by both Melung Village authority and the GDM because it was considered to have violated the law and disrespected the village’s initiative of desa.id. To settle the dispute, the central government finally issued a 16

See https://pandi.or.id/en/blog/id-tld-domain-name-forum. Retrieved on March 27, 2016. See http://desa.web.id/desaid/ for the history of “desa.id”. Retrieved on March 27, 2016. 18 Retrieved from https://www.melung.desa.id/ on January 18, 2019

17

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161

new regulation, i.e., the Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information No./2015 that took over the management of desa.id from the hands of the villages while at the same time acknowledged it to become one of the state’s domains equivalent to go.id and mil.id. This was an important achievement of GDM because the recognition signified the recognition of village sovereignty by the state in the virtual realm. Since the issuance of the ministry’s regulation, the registration and management of desa.id has been served by the government domain Registrar, namely through www.domain.go.id.19 The formal recognition of desa.id as the official domain of the village website has expanded and accelerated the impact of ICT-based campaigns on village empowerment. The passion for bottom-up development has spread rapidly through cyberspace. Consequently, many new volunteers and other initiatives have joined the movement, including thousands of ICT Volunteers, who were formed and have been coordinated by the Ministry of Communication and Information. The ICT Village Festival (DesTIKa), which was first held in Melung, has become an annual event with the “DesTIKa desa.id Award” presented to villages or village chiefs who are considered to have attained significant progress in utilizing ICT for the development of their villages. In addition to the award, #1000webdesa campaign was launched. The campaign supported villages, which up to that point did not have an official village website, to set up their websites under desa.id for free. During the period 2013–2014, the number of villages which registered their websites using desa.id domain doubled to more than 2,000. The number of the registrants has been increasing ever since, despite its still small percentage when compared to the total number of villages in Indonesia at more than 72,000.20

6.2.3

From the Bottom Upward: GDM as an Organic Movement

The most distinguishing characteristic of GDM from other rural development and empowerment movements was arguably its development paradigm. Rural communities, in the eyes of GDM, should be active agents of development. They have to place themselves as the subjects of development, who build and empower themselves collectively. According to the ideal vision of GDM, Indonesia as a state has existed because of the collective actions and consent of the village communities. The burden and the responsibility to develop the state is in the hands of the 19 20

See https://desa.web.id/domain/. Retrieved on June 6, 2018. Ibid.

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villages and not the other way around. It shifts the authority of development in the periphery to the people at the bottom of society. Based on this view, the approach promoted by GDM was the bottom-up development approach, namely a development perspective that originated from the periphery. It rejected passive top-down development practices that were considered as minimizing the creative space of the villagers to arrange their own development plans and were designed context-specifically in accordance with each village’s needs and characteristics. As a form of resistance, GDM was the “voice of the voiceless” (Suparyo, interview, par. 62), becoming an articulative space for village interests when they were confronted with power holders who were superior to them. Nonetheless, despite its resistance nature, GDM claimed its work mechanism was non-confrontative. GDM’s bottom-up development was an organic approach because it was initiated by the villagers themselves. This is the significant different with another rural movement in Malinau Regency, North Kalimantan, which shares its same name albeit with a different acronym, i.e., GERDEMA. Although having the same concept in terms of village position and roles in development, GERDEMA was initiated by the Malinau regent, i.e., the government. Thus, GERDEMA was not categorized as an organic village movement because it was not purely bottom-up, particularly regarding its establishment (cf. Maksoel, 2014). In addition, GERDEMA did not connect itself with other village movements and so not network-oriented, unlike GDM that has interweaved village networks throughout Indonesia.

6.2.4

Collectiveness and Network-Making as the Structure of the Movement

GDM can be identified through two types of collectivities, namely the “collectivity of village” and “collectivity of movement”. Village collectivity refers to the “shared identity” of Indonesian rural communities forged from the “shared problems” they encounter in their daily lives. Through the process of cocommunicating, those problems were shared and discussed frequently in dialogue forums. As a result, they came up with “shared ideas”, which they termed “natural initiative” (Suparyo, interview, par. 381; see 7.1.2.1.). Over time, this original initiative evolved into many collective initiatives. Since then, sets of collective initiatives or problems have been shared via continuous, informal meetings known as “learning circles”. Out of these processes “collective conclusions” (Suparyo,

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163

interview, par. 200) were reached, which led to the founding of GDM in 2011 (Figure 6.10).

Figure 6.10 An informal meeting or “learning circle” of Melung’s former chief and initiator of GDM (second from right) along with village officials and three members of PNPM Support Facility (PSF; on the left)

Movement collectivity was assessed by the similarity of specific objectives of GDM’s collective actions. These objectives referred to the principles of GDM as described above. GDM did not lay its foundation on formal organizational structure, instead it was fueled by the motivations of its members. The movement’s structure was therefore flexible and fluid. GDM held firm on the principle of equality among its members and its counterparts (interview with Taryono, par. 49, 78, & 83; Margino, par. 139). This was the reason GDM claimed to be leaderless, although there were several influential individuals who were notably outspoken within the movement (Khoerudin, interview, par. 79–83 & 138).

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The absence of a formal organizational structure in GDM resulted in a fluid and flexible recruitment process into the movement’s network. There was no standardized process for an individual or a village to proceed to gain entry to or become involved in the movement’s network. GDM followed an open membership system because it styled itself as a joint movement. It was sufficient for an interested party to follow a common paradigm and vision of rural development if (s)he wanted to join the movement, which thus constructed the collective identity of the movement (interview with Taryono, par. 49). It has been claimed that GDM was not exclusive. It followed an inclusive principle and was open to cooperate with other grassroots initiatives. With the maximum use of ICT, it opened opportunities to create an even bigger movement’s network. However, in order for this network to function and be sustained, Sudjatmiko (interview, par. 29) noted that a deliberative process should follow. This means that rational dialogue and communicative action among its members are the central elements of the movement’s working mechanism. As an outcome of people participating in the deliberative collective actions, i.e., exchanging local problems and solutions as well as local and expert knowledge, a shared knowledge has gradually emerged. Participation in this process was mainly communicative (Habermas, 1984, 1987) through the means of dialogue, series of workshops and learning circles. This mechanism equalled “self-empowerment”, which brought them toward “self-reliance” (see 7.2.). Over the years, the movement transformed into a major network of inter-local and intersectoral networks of villagers, activists, experts, politicians, public servants, etc., in which knowledge and power are distributed. Influential villages and/or individuals took the roles of nodes, serving to connect one network to another, and building networks of knowledge and power. The nodes were the “information highway” of the movement, whose effectiveness in the network was enhanced by the use of new internet-based digital technology (interview with Suparyo, par. 441). They had the advantage of mastering information because of their cosmopolitan nature, meaning that they were a group of people who engaged in frequent travel and made the most contacts with many parties within and outside the movement (interview with Taryono, par. 49). A “rhizome”, a concept coined by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), perhaps illustrates best the network system of GDM, which was described as non-hierarchical and non-linear but multi-directional (cf. Funke, 2014; Kuronen & Huhtinen, 2017). Such a rhizome pertains to “a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 21). Borrowing Gregory Bateson’s word “plateau” when he describes Balinese society, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) depict a rhizome as made of

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plateaus, which means “a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end” (p. 22). These characteristics reflect the open-ended and flexible nature of GDM. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Kuronen and Huhtinen (2017) perfectly summarize the principles of rhizome as follows: [T]he first principle of the rhizome is that any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and must be. There is no demand for a hierarchy, and matter or information does not need to flow vertically through the formal structure. The second is heterogeneity. This means that the traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature. The resonances can develop between disparate lines, and a plane of consistency can be constructed across difference. The third principle is multiplicity, and the fourth is rupture. A rhizome may be broken, or shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines. (p. 53)

In a rhizomatic network, each component has equal opportunity to produce and distribute information and share knowledge on the network, regardless of its status within the network. This is in accordance with GDM’s principle of equality stated above. Curiously, in terms of the possession of information and knowledge, GDM actually follows the opposite mechanism. The inter-village and inter-organization networks of GDM worked not because they were equally informed nor had equal knowledge. The communication wheel of this network continued to spin precisely because it was driven by asymmetrical information and knowledge possession about information technology, rural development, village governance and villagerelated regulations. They were also unequal in terms of knowledge about rural issues within or between their villages. Sharing of information and of knowledge has become the engine of the network so that the members of the movement were kept informed about the latest rural issues. For instance, they include about information technology, capacity building, tasks and functions of the village apparatuses, government regulations about village matters and how the rural community should respond to it, rural development, public service in rural areas, and sharing about specific problems in each village and how to solve those problems (Khoerudin, interview, par. 63, 128; Margino, par. 75, 149). This includes sharing of local knowledge or local wisdom, although Sudjatmiko (interview, par. 19) did not agree with the binary oppositional meaning of “local” or “global” (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(g)), among rural communities or between the rural community and the academic community, i.e., between members of different publics. Sudjatmiko exemplified the exchange of knowledge about natural resource management, environmental preservation and

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earthquake-resistant local building architecture, which would be effective with the optimal use of ICT, even for those who did not have access to it. Taryono (interview, par. 35) related how a village chief in a neighboring village would share information about events in the “outside world” related to the village at community gatherings or in the mosque after prayer times simply because he was one of the few residents who could access the internet via the broadband connection in the village office. This adheres to the classical illustration of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s two-step flow of communication model, in which an intermediary or an opinion leader is needed between the media and the masses (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). The model also applied to the communication flow from the villagers, where they verbally gave feedback or shared completely new stories to the chief or other village officers who would then write the narratives and post them online—a kind of “citizen journalism/media”—so that the testimonials could circulate widely in the network (interview with Taryono, par. 35). Through continuous dialogue-oriented communication of its participants, this mechanism has continued to thrive and eventually emerged as one of the movement’s characteristics. Along with the growing activities of the movement, during which they made extensive contacts with various people, thereby expanding the rhizome, more and more third parties wanted to cooperate with GDM and provide assistance. However, they were hampered by the form of the movement, which was not registered as a formal organization. In order to facilitate these cooperations, a foundation was established in which the influential individuals in GDM –mostly the village heads—took the role as the elder members, and the village activists who acted as the network’s nodes became its administrators. The foundation was named “Gedhe”, which stood for Gerakan Desa or the “Village Movement”. Gedhe would also accommodate the volunteers who had used to work freelance in GDM so that they would have permanent jobs (interview with Suparyo, par. 441). Gedhe’s work focus mirrored that of GDM, which was on “community empowerment work in rural areas in strengthening village resource governance, entrepreneurship and the rural economy, strengthening strategic areas, and strengthening the creative community. In addition, Gedhe … [was] concerned with the innovation and development of information and communication technology (ICT) to encourage social change.”21 In short, Gedhe was the “formal dress” of GDM, which was administered by the same group of people.

21

Sekilas Gedhe (Gedhe at a glance). Retrieved on June 6, 2018 from https://www.gedhe.or. id/kami/ (author’s translation).

6.3 The Informants

6.3

167

The Informants

The following are brief profiles of each of the 14 resource persons who consented to be interviewed and whose interview data was treated as the primary data for this study. In addition, how contact was made with the respective informant and the general situation for each interview is also described to provide an overview. The sequence of introductions is based on the sequence of interview transcriptions, not the chronological sequence of them. The informants were chosen based on a combination of three criteria. First, this study raises the issue of center and periphery relations on several levels, namely center in center, periphery in center, center in periphery and periphery in periphery (Galtung, 1971). The chosen resource persons must represent these categories, both from the government elements and civil society, especially the rural residents, with the greatest composition for the category of periphery in periphery (Pp) (Table 6.1). Of the 14 informants, eight people represent Pp (informants no. 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 12, 13, and 14), namely those who were part of the rural community (not part of the central or regional government or part of any political system). Two people are clearly part of center in center or Cc, i.e., informant no. 6 and 7, because they were part of the political system (Habermas, 1996); more precisely they were members of the national parliament and the central government respectively. Three people represent center in periphery (Cp), because apart from being government employees in the regency (informants no. 4 and 10), also because one of them was academician (informant no. 8), which according to Habermas (1996) are located in the inner-periphery (quasi-state institution). Finally, one informant worked for an NGO dealing with rural development, which is thus at a crossroads between inner- and outer-periphery (Habermas, 1996; see 3.3.1.). Referring to Galtung (1971; Korhonen, 1990), this last informant could be categorized in several categories. She could be Pc (periphery in the center), because despite her status as a social worker, she worked in the main office in Jakarta, which was close to the center of power and important decision makers. Alternatively, she could be Cp, as she was close to the rural community during her work and was part of civil society, well-educated, still of a productive age, had a good income, worked in an urban area in the capital and was categorized as a white-collar worker. Such characteristics refer to the center in Galtung’s index of social position (Galtung, 1964). Second, because this study is constructivist in nature and seeks to raise the voices from below, the selection of the first informants started from the main actors in the field, namely at the grassroots level or in Melung itself. The three

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Table 6.1 Composition of informants Category

Informant number

Occupation

Center in center (Cc)

6

National parliament member

7

Ministry employee

Periphery in Center (Pc) or Cp

9

NGO worker

Center in periphery (Cp)

4

Regional government employee

8

University lecturer

10

Regional government employee

1

Village chief

2

Village official/farmer

3

Former village chief/GDM initiator

5

GDM initiator & coordinator

11

Village official

12

Chairman of the Village Consultative Body (BPD)

13

Chairman of Melung’s youth organization

14

Chairman of Melung’s farmer organization

Periphery in periphery (Pp)

initial informants were Melung residents who either represented the community formally (the village chief, informant no. 1) or were the main actors of the initiatives relating to rural internet development or the GDM (informants no. 2 and 3). Third, after the first three interviews went through the initial analysis process during the field research, the selection of the next informants subsequently followed the snowball method based on theoretical sampling, which was resulted from the initial analysis.

6.3 The Informants

6.3.1

169

Khoerudin

At the time of data collection, Khoerudin was the village chief having replaced Satrio (6.3.3.) in 2013. During Satrio’s tenure Khoerudin was his staff. At Khoerudin’s house (No. 6 in Figure 6.4), which was adjacent to the village mosque, stood a Wi-Fi transmitter about 10 meters high. Originally from Cilacap, Central Java, a regency located some 50 kilometers southwest of Banyumas, he is a longtime village resident due to his marriage to a Melung villager. Notably, he is one of the few residents who attended university (he has a bachelor’s degree in social sciences). My interview with him at his residence began with small talk. We discussed the condition of the Village Hall, then undergoing renovation; I thanked him for his permission for me to conduct research and for agreeing to be interviewed. He emphasized his appreciation of my decision to conduct my doctoral research there. He believed it would benefit the village community and upon completion the results would be shared with residents to enhance their knowledge. He returned several times to a question about the legal approval for my research stay, to which I replied that I was in possession of a confirmation letter from the institution of higher learning where I worked (Unpad). Eventually, I also divulged that the dissertation was to be submitted to the University of Erfurt in Germany. He accepted this fact and voiced no objection. Throughout my stay in Melung, Khoerudin’s attitude towards me was open and he was very helpful in providing and assisting my various needs, such as giving me key access to the CAP room and inviting me to various activities held in the village as well as arranging meetings with other villagers, so that I could participate in many village events.

6.3.2

Margino

Margino was one of my key informants, besides Satrio and Suparyo (6.3.5). He, along with his GDM colleague Timbul –another key member in Melung—received me upon my initial visit to Melung a year before the field research began. They welcomed me with open arms, encouraging me to conduct my research in the village and offering to help me find accommodation. Margino was a passionate GDM activist and one of Satrio’s loyal collaborators. In the village government structure, he was Melung’s treasurer besides also being the administrator and editor of the Melung website. Margino was a productive article writer. He penned most of the writings on the website. Apart from being

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an activist and village official, he was also a farmer. I found him farming in his field on the afternoon of our interview appointment. on November 4, 2014. His house (No. 3 in Figure 6.4), like Khoerudin’s, was one of the locations where internet transmitters were installed. As a key informant, Margino recommended to me many other relevant sources and personally introduced me to them. He escorted me to Rumah Desa Indonesia (RDI) or the House of Indonesian Village in Purwokerto, which was the secretariat of GDM and the place where GDM activists usually gathered for discussion. I met with many GDM members from various backgrounds at the building. Margino also introduced me to Suparyo and brought me to his house for the interview to be conducted. Through Margino, the snowball and theoretical sampling became possible. In addition to my official interview with him, Margino provided me with considerable behind-the-scenes information that complemented or explained information or data from other sources to create a complete picture of the phenomenon being investigated. This kind of contextual information was instantly written down in the field notes and consequently in the research diary.

6.3.3

Budi Satrio

Satrio served as Melung’s chief for two consecutive periods before he was succeeded by Khoerudin in 2013. Like Khoerudin, he is not a native of the village; he hails from Jakarta but had majored in animal husbandry at Jenderal Soedirman University. He previously worked as a manager at a cattle farm in Melung. Although the livestock business closed, he was nominated by villagers as the chief because of his education and smarts; university graduates are rare in Melung and higher education is considered a luxury (see 6.1.). In developing Melung, Satrio relied on his NGO networks, especially those that focused on ICT4D. Satrio was one of the founding members of GDM. According to one informant, his development ideas, which could be considered as a breakthrough for the rural community, were at first opposed by other village chiefs in the surrounding villages simply because they held a different development mindset. Despite bringing many changes, a gap between Satrio’s development ideals and that of others existed (Research Diary, p. 2). The interview was conducted on the early evening of November 5, 2014. Also present were Margino, who had arranged the meeting with Satrio, and Sulastri, my host mother who was also a village official and GDM activist. The interview, lasting more than three hours, was conducted in a relaxed conversational way.

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Once or twice in the middle of the interview, Margino took photos of our group and posted them on Twitter. He tagged Satrio and me with the caption that read “@BudiRagiel [Satrio] @pa_ibek [me] chatting about technology at @desamelung”22 . The posting was retweeted several times and favorited by a number of accounts. I instantly gained new followers, the majority of which, I gleaned later from their profiles, were GDM activists. Among them was the official GDM account (@desamembangun). Satrio also tweeted about the meeting, with a photo and the caption “Chatting with @pa_ibek”.23 He had 1,734 followers at the time: I considered his tweet to be an important “endorsement” of my presence because he was a central figure in GDM and village activism. Methodically, the presence of Margino and Sulastri during the interview might affect Satrio’s answers, because both were part of Melung’s village apparatus. I could not control the situation, so I refrained from broaching sensitive questions, especially about the village administration and development plans currently under the control of Khoerudin. I planned to meet Satrio again to clarify those matters. I did meet him regularly during my stay, including shortly before I left Melung, when I had the opportunity to interview him again at his residence. The last interview was not digitally recorded but I jotted down important things in the field notes.

6.3.4

Jakarta Tisam

The interview with Tisam was conducted on December 17, 2014, at the Office of Transportation and Communication and Information, Banyumas Regency, Purwokerto. Tisam was recommended by Satrio about a week before the interview, along with several other potential contacts and their phone numbers (Research Diary, p. 68). On December 15, 2014, I phoned Tisam, introduced myself and requested an interview. We agreed to meet two days later on the morning of December 17. Tisam’s selection as a resource person was based on statements that I received from Satrio, Margino and Timbul. They told me about a bureaucrat in the regency

22

The original tweet in Bahasa Indonesia was “@BudiRagiel @pa_ibek ngobrol tentang teknologi di @desamelung” (author’s translation). 23 The original tweet in Bahasa Indonesia was “Ngobrol bareng dengan @pa_ibek” (author’s translation).

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who opposed the rural initiative, which Melung and GDM had started. The interview with Tisam was intended to clarify his stance about rural development and activism (Research Diary, p. 78). Although Tisam worked in the Communication and Information section, his background was not this field. He was an alumnus of a college of public administration, who did not specifically pursue one particular field. In general, he was receptive to me. Nevertheless, his reactions to my questions, from gestures and non-verbal communication, indicated his disagreement with many activities that Satrio and GDM activists were doing in relation to rural development. The form of the interview itself was semi-structured (see the list of questions in the Research Diary, p. 80), which in practice was interspersed with many impromptu questions to flesh out his answers. On occasion, these additional questions were not particularly pertinent to the research topic, but were useful to maintain the flow of the conversation, for example about his college location, which turned out to be in the same area with mine. Finding this common ground was a means to answer further research-related questions.

6.3.5

Yossy Suparyo

Although GDM had no appointed formal leader, Suparyo was regarded as the coordinator and one of its opinion leaders. Along with Satrio and other village heads, he was an important actor in the establishment of GDM and it was through him that GDM was then characterized by its IT-based initiatives. Our interview was held at his residence in Purwokerto on December 28, 2014. Margino introduced us and was present during the interview. Although Margino occasionally volunteered comments during the interview, his presence had a minimal effect on the quality of my interview with Suparyo. Because the interview was conducted in his private house, we were able to talk casually without time constraints. In fact, it lasted almost five hours, by far the longest of all the interviews. Suparyo also showed me his small library of books that was further proof he was the brains behind GDM. Suparyo’s educational, personal and professional backgrounds clearly influenced him to become an activist and initiator of an ICT-based village movement. He held two bachelor degrees from two universities in Yogyakarta, in mechanical and informatics engineering. Through quoting Karl Mannheim: “something [someone] acts because of its [his/her] traditional knowledge base”, he acknowledged that his contact with rural affairs has been framed by technology because that was “his traditional knowledge base” (Suparyo, interview, par. 481–489). The

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strong influence of his educational background on his activism was illustrated as follows, “perhaps if I were an artist, an art student, maybe GDM would’ve been run into art. And I grew up with people who shared the same hobbies” (Suparyo, interview, par. 491). His statement explains why GDM elected to promote ICT for rural development; it is because his “traditional knowledge” is based on informatics engineering. From a poor family in a rural area of Cilacap Regency, Suparyo received a scholarship to study in Yogyakarta. The first university graduate from his village, he became a role model in terms of education both for his siblings and for other families in his village (interview with Suparyo par. 493, 496, 500). He had long experience in activism, from involvement in farmer empowerment movements in his village to student activism in Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII). Through PMII he became acquainted with Marwan Jafar, then minister of village, development of disadvantaged areas and transmigration (2014–2016), who was the chair of PMII Yogyakarta from 1995 to 1996. It was from his personal relationships and closeness with many people that his networks were formed, facilitating political communication and lobbying of the movement with the “elites”. His close ties with many national political figures in the center, such as Marwan Jafar, would support movement agendas in the future. This factor, namely the establishment and maintenance of private channels with the center, allowed bottom-up communication development to flourish even though it was hindered by structural obstacles on the way (explored further in 7.1.2). If Suparyo acquired his knowledge in natural sciences from the formal bench of university lectures, most of his knowledge in social and political sciences was self-taught. Suparyo acknowledged, the combination of these two schools of sciences had formed the nature of his activism toward social engineering, which was primarily ICT-based. This type of activism was previously practiced in Combine Resource Institution (CRI), a Yogyakarta-based NGO where he worked for five years before returning to Banyumas and setting up GDM. At CRI he began supporting the creation of websites for villages and also their information system applications. When forming GDM, Suparyo concealed the background details of his student activism to the public, including to his friends in GDM, to avoid the assumption that his movement was politically motivated (PMII was often associated with a political party).. He wanted GDM to be free from practical political activities and to avoid it becoming funneled in certain political directions or politicized by certain political groups (interview with Suparyo, par. 508–510). This

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position led to his decision to “deradicalize” social movements by taking a nonconfrontational approach (interview with Suparyo, par. 133, 169–171; Taryono, par. 83; Sudjatmiko, par. 33).

6.3.6

Budiman Sudjatmiko

Sudjatmiko is a national political figure who at the time of data collection was a member of the House of Representatives in Commission II (in charge of domestic government, regional autonomy, state apparatus and agrarian issues) from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), which was led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of founding president Sukarno. Sudjatmiko’s name was mentioned by eight of the informants I talked with as well as other village activists I met in various other locations (Banyumas, Majalengka, Jakarta and Bandung). Interviewing Sudjatmiko was crucial in the effort to complete the data and develop the concept of bottom-up communication development. Sudjatmiko’s constituents were from the electoral districts of Banyumas and Cilacap, so that in the context of this research he represented the center but had strong emotional ties with the peripheral rural community. Notably, he was also the deputy chairperson of the Special Committee for the Village Law Bill,24 and the Main Trustee in the National Leadership Council of Parade Nusantara (Persatuan Rakyat Desa or the United Rural People), an organization of rural communities driven mainly by village officials. Sudjatmiko’s history in Indonesian politics is long and complicated. During Suharto’s reign, he was an outspoken anti-New Order activist who campaigned to overthrow Suharto’s dictatorship through public demonstrations and the establishment of the People’s Democratic Party (PRD or Partai Rakyat Demokratik) in 1996, of which he was its first chairman. The New Order sought to brand PRD a Marxist-leaning party, the regime’s go-to “bogeyman” after the 1965 abortive “coup” as a means to crush all opposition, although in fact its ideology was progressive social democrat. When the New Order officially ended in May 1998, Sudjatmiko was serving a 13-year sentence prison after being accused of involvement in the riots at the Indonesian Democratic Party headquarters in Jakarta on July 27, 1996. He eventually was granted amnesty on December 10, 1999 by then president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) so he only served 3.5 years in prison. 24

DPR RI Tetapkan Pimpinan Pansus RUU Pemerintahan Daerah dan RUU Desa (The Parliament Sets the Chairpersons of the Special Committees for the Regional Government Bill and Village Bill; author’s translation). Retrieved on June 25, 2018 from http://www.dpr. go.id/berita/detail/id/3708

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Upon his release, he decided not to continue his studies at the School of Economics, Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta, opting instead to obtain degrees in Political Science and International Relations (Master’s) from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London and the University of Cambridge, Britain, respectively.25 The first meeting with Sudjatmiko took place during the third GDM anniversary celebration on December 24, 2014, at Srowot Village, Kalibagor District, Banyumas. Sudjatmiko was present as a speaker in his capacity as a figure who promoted IT-based rural development. At the end of his presentation, I approached him and requested time for an interview. Although he was set to return to Jakarta immediately, he offered to do an interview in January 2015. I followed up on the offer by contacting him via Twitter and we agreed to meet on January 11, 2015, at his office in the Parliament Building (see Research Diary, pp. 98–99). However, he requested that it be pushed back a day due to scheduling conflicts. When I arrived at his office in the building, several other guests were waiting as well. When he arrived, he took phone calls while inviting them to express their requests and fielding their enquiries. However, there was only the legislator and two of his assistants during my interview with him (the door remained open during our discussion, and guests in the other room would have been able to overhear it). Due to the limited time caused by his busy schedule, I immediately asked straightforward questions, without the “feeling out” small talk of usual interviews. During the interview, Sudjatmiko occasionally glanced at his guests in the next room and at his assistants, which I took to be a reminder that our time was limited. After about 30 minutes of uninterrupted conversation, Sudjatmiko expressed regrets that we would have to conclude our meeting. I was satisfied with the interview because the core questions were asked and he responded to them promptly (see Research Diary, pp. 118–120).

6.3.7

Aris Kurniawan

Kurniawan was an employee of the Ministry of Communication and Information who was an active member of GDM. In the GDM Whatsapp Group, which I was 25

Information about Sudjatmiko’s profile was gathered online from the website of the General Elections Commission (KPU) http://dct.kpu.go.id/images/dokumen/DPR/3308/04/04.pdf, an independent citizen-managed website about the parliament member http://wikidpr.org/ang gota/5403631742b53eac2f8ef73f, and his personal website http://www.budimansudjatmiko. net/. All retrieved on June 25, 2018.

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invited to join, Kurniawan actively provided information from the ministry and news. Like Sudjatmiko, Kurniawan’s name often appeared when I talked with the village activists both in Melung and in other villages as well. They often mentioned his name when asked about representatives of the central government who had concerns about ICT issues in rural areas. I obtained his contact number during a conversation with Satrio (see Research Diary, p. 140). Kurniawan was the section head for the IT Implementation Model for Rural Communities in the Directorate General of Information Applications (Dirjen Aptika), Directorate of Information Empowerment. He held a master’s degree in Communication Science from The Hague University in the Netherlands. When we met, he recognized the names of some of my Unpad colleagues as fellow alumni from his university in the Netherlands. Small talk about shared experiences helped to “break the ice”, and he was increasingly open in his interaction with me. The interview was held on the morning of February 4, 2015, at his office in Jakarta. He welcomed me warmly and we began the interview. Two members of his staff were present as well, and they occasionally added information. Sometimes Kurniawan instructed them to record what kind of data I needed and to send it to me, for instance the ICT Whitepaper Indonesia, which was promptly emailed to me. After the interview ended, he introduced me to several of his other colleagues in his office, with whom I had a chance to talk informally about research-related topics. From them, I received valuable input regarding ICT4D and about the steps taken by the ministry in ICT-driven development in order to realize the desired Information Society. In all, I spent about 2.5 hours with Kurniawan and his staff.

6.3.8

Lisa Lindawati

Information about Lindawati was obtained upon my initial visit to the House of Indonesian Village (RDI) on December 13, 2014. Lindawati was a lecturer at the Department of Communication and Media, UGM, Yogyakarta and an expert in development communication. She had conducted numerous studies in Melung since 2012 and also about GDM, one of which was for her master’s thesis. She had published several scientific articles about GDM and its Village Information System as well as about their citizen journalism practices. Before our meeting in Yogyakarta on January 2, 2015, I requested she send me her articles to allow me to gain a deeper understanding of her thoughts. The interview was conducted based on the review of her writings, which had been

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analyzed and cross-checked with my own empirical findings prior to the meeting. The two pieces of writing she sent me were entitled ‘Village Voiced, Village Empowered’, an article about citizen journalism for empowerment, and ‘Development Communication and Village Self-Dependence’, which discussed the use of technology in building the Village Information System by encouraging villagers to participate communicatively so that they could be more self-reliant. The conversation with Lindawati proved to be decisive because it became the crucial point for the emergence of communication development theory. It was the first time I broached the fundamental differences between development communication and communication development with an interviewee, after previously only writing them down in the memo. I sought her opinions and feedback about the concept of communication development due to her scholarly background and experience (Lindawati, interview, par. 106; Research Diary, p. 115). There was a telling point of agreement regarding the current status of development communication studies in Indonesia. She said Indonesian scholars had long abandoned the discipline of development communication because it was considered a relic of the past and synonymous with the scientific products of the New Order agenda. In her own department, she said, she was often the subject of cynical comments regarding her decision to study development communication because of the belief it was outdated. We realized during the interview that we shared a common vision to revitalize this field of study pertaining to the current development of ICTs. Following on from the interview with Lindawati, the code “communication development” eventually occupied an increasingly central position in data analysis, and its status upgraded to become the core category, around which the coding activities were then concentrated particularly at the focused/selective coding stage.

6.3.9

Citra Lestari

As a development and community empowerment program that practiced the “community-driven development” (CDD) method where “everything has to be decided with the community and must be done with them” (Lestari, interview, par. 14), the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM) point of view was compatible with communication development, which is developed in this research. Therefore, it was necessary to obtain data from one of the PNPM representatives about their development works in the Indonesian villages.

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Lestari was a resource person deemed able to explain PNPM’s communication programs in rural areas because of her position as the head of Media and Communication at the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), with its duty to “assist the Government of Indonesia (GoI) in providing effective leadership and management of Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM)”.26 However, with the discontinuation of PNPM at the end 2014 due to the enactment of the Village Law, at the time of the interview she no longer worked at PSF. The facility itself was supported by a number of states and organizations including Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union. Staff of PSF were hired by the World Bank but composed largely of Indonesians.27 Lestari was well known by most of GDM’s key activists I talked with, most notably due to PSF’s role in the organization and execution of the 2013 ICT Village Festival in Melung. I was also acquainted with her because we attended the same university during our undergraduate studies. We retained personal contact subsequently and we agreed to meet in Jakarta for an interview. The interview itself was held on the morning of January 12, 2015 (as noted previously, I interviewed Sudjatmiko later in the day). Lestari’s interview ran smoothly. She successfully explained several key issues in village development, such as “elite capture” and the principles of “transparency and accountability” (see 7.1.2.1.), which enriched the theoretical building of communication development.

6.3.10 Taryono After interviewing Tisam who showed a resistant attitude toward GDM, it was necessary to gain a balanced view from the side of the regency government for grassroots initiatives. I decided to interview other bureaucrats from the same agency as Tisam and was advised to meet Taryono, an employee at the Communication and Information Agency of Banyumas Regency. There were reportedly contrasting opinions among the two men. I was told that Taryono’s assessment of village initiatives was positive. Preliminary information about Tisam’s and Taryono’s general attitudes toward initiatives in Melung and GDM helped me to anticipate their reactions and attitudes toward me and the questions I posed. On Monday, December 22, 2014, I went to the location of the interview at the Regional Personnel Agency (Badan Kepegawaian Daerah or BKD) of Banyumas 26

PNPM Support Facility. Retrieved on June 30, 2018 from http://psflibrary.org/catalog/rep ository/final_PSF-Brochure%20V3_english1.pdf 27 Ibid.

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Regency in Purwokerto. Taryono had recently completed his Master’s in Public Administration at UGM, Yogyakarta and at that time he was seconded at the BKD while his employment status was determined (he could be returned to his previous position, or reassigned). His Master’s thesis was on ICT-based movements and village community training and their impacts on the development of village self-reliance. GDM was the subject of the study. Taryono decided that the paradigm of “the building village” (GDM) was an antithesis of “building the village” paradigm, which ultimately bore a large impact on the sustainability of the movement. He concluded that it could bring the rural community to a state of self-reliance (Taryono, interview, par. 12–14). I gained a positive impression from this interview. Taryono was welcoming and enthusiastic in discussing his thesis. To assist my research, he provided information regarding the characteristics of GDM seen from the perspective of a well-educated bureaucrat. Taryono knew Tisam from his duties and from his time in Melung. In contrast to Tisam, as a bureaucrat, Taryono had been involved with movement activities due to his research in Melung. It could be one factor why he was emotionally attached with Melung and GDM (see Research Diary, p. 87).

6.3.11 Pak Kayim In Bahasa Indonesia, “Pak” stands for “Bapak” which means “father” or “Mr./Sir” as a polite form of address in everyday interaction with an older or more senior males. Among the informants, I reserve the use of “Pak” in Kayim’s case because “Kayim” was not his real name, but designated to him because of his role and duties in the village. The term Kayim is rooted in Qoyyim, an Arabic term referring to a person who is a caretaker in some way or another. In other Indonesian regions, the term Lebe is often used for someone with more or less the same roles and tasks. In rural communities, the Kayim usually takes care of people’s welfare affairs, including the management of social aid or support, inventory of socially weak people, registration and management of marriages, divorces and deaths, as well as the arrangement of religious activities. Pak Kayim said during the interview that it was his duty to help others in cases of marriages and deceased residents (Pak Kayim, interview, par. 181–186). The interview was conducted at his house on December 27, 2014. It was a quite large house for a village official such as Kayim, even though it was a semipermanent structure and some parts of the floor were untiled (I later gathered that

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part of the plot was inherited). Adjacent to his residence was a small communal prayer house and an open space for children to study recitation of the Quran, with Pak Kayim the instructor. That means he has considerable status as both a village official and a religious figure in the community. I witnessed him serving as the imam and delivering the sermon for one Friday prayer (Research Diary, p. 103). Pak Kayim was the only member of the village apparatus with a low level of computer skills due to an erratic educational background. He stated that his village duties did not require computer skills, and he did not feel the need to become computer proficient. He was already a long-serving village official. Satrio had recruited him to work in village administration in 2002, at the beginning of his tenure as village chief. He self-deprecatingly called himself “a fool” and “stupid” (“I feel like I’m indeed stupid”; interview, par. 82) compared to his colleagues in the village administration. I assumed his statement was related to the interview topic, which was about new technology and he underrated his knowledge about it although he did not mention “technology” explicitly. It turned out to be because he considered himself a tech illiterate. Pak Kayim’s statement of being a “stupid” person when faced with new technology gave insight to this reseach, which I noted in the memo (Figure 6.11). The statement featured an important aspect about the position of knowledge and its status after it was confronted with new technologies, especially those based on digital technology. Here I asked myself reflectively and explored further the “undervalued knowledge” or the “stratification of knowledge” in the community a result of the arrival of the new technology (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(g)). It is important to note that Pak Kayim often replied in Javanese, despite my question being in Indonesian. As I am not a native speaker of Javanese, I had to ask him to clarify what was meant. The exceptions were when his use of Javanese was irrelevant to the research topic and there was no need to interrupt him. As the afternoon approached, many elementary school children arrived for their Quranic studies in the next room. They became quite raucous as they shouted and joked, and it disturbed our interview. I decided to conclude the interview as it was becoming difficult to hear him speak, and I believed I had sufficient information. He also needed to teach despite him saying that we could just ignore the children’s rough-housing (Research Diary, pp. 105–106).

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Figure 6.11 Memo about “undervalued knowledge”

6.3.12 Sardi Sardi was chairman of the Village Consultative Body (BPD), which carried out legislative tasks. It was important to interview him to gain the perspective of the “other side” of village governance. Sardi was in his first year serving as BPD’s chairman, beginning when Khoerudin assumed the position of village chief. Sardi had worked as a laborer in tin mining in Bangka Island, Sumatra, for 12 years

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(2000–2012). This extended absence meant he had not kept up with a range of village initiatives, both with the construction of the internet network and the establishment of GDM, which were led by former village chief Satrio. Sardi had no experience leading an organization. His formal education was limited to elementary school.28 In the interview, he stated he was coaxed by Melung community leaders to accept the BPD chairmanship. He said he eventually gave in to their prodding because he wanted to gain experience and learn organization tasks by doing them directly. When asked why the number of BPD members had to be odd, as defined in Paragraph (1), Article 58, of the 2014 Village Law, he admitted to having no knowledge of it. This showed his lack of knowledge of village governance when, as the chair of a village body, he was expected to be aware of its basic rules. Sardi’s main occupation was a farmer. In semi-frustration, he complained that many residents who were farmers or farm workers were too tired to attend the nightly computer training organized by the village authority in the CAP room because they were too tired from working in the fields during the day (Figure 6.12). The same would happen, he continued, if the training was held during the day; in fact, he said it would be worse because people were in the fields (interview, par. 180–182). It was a delicate situation for the village authorities who wanted to improve their residents’s knowledge and skills about new digital technology. Sardi confessed to little knowledge of ICT. He did not use the internet nor own a smartphone. His phone was a standard feature cell phone, which he used daily mainly for making/receiving calls and sending/receiving SMS. In contrast, he said his children were accustomed to using the internet and smartphones, in addition to accessing social media and buying and selling mobile phones through Facebook (interview, par. 110–114). The interview with Sardi was conducted on December 23, 2014, at his house, about 15 meters away from where I lived. Like Pak Kayim, Sardi appeared embarrassed and reticent to talk despite the location of our meeting. I gained the impression that he felt uncomfortable and out of his depth because he was aware my presence in the village was related to internet technology, a topic he knew little about and was alien to him. He said little in response to questions about ICT. His replies were curt and he did not ask anything of me. Responding to the question about what kind of development was needed in the village, he listed basic infrastructure issues that needed immediate attention, such 28

Article 57, Paragraph (d) of the 2014 Village Law stipulated that a BPD member must be at least a graduate of junior high school (nine years of basic school-based education).

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Figure 6.12 Sardi returning from a bamboo field. The bamboo would be used to build a kiosk in front of his home

as the construction of clean waterways for irrigation, as well as the construction of pathways; many of which were not paved up to that point (interview, par. 62–79). Sardi’s interview lasted about 30 minutes. This was mainly because I realized I could not get more from his taciturn personality and the discussion would not develop further.

6.3.13 Syarifudin Naturally, youth and the younger generation are the social group associated with new media and new ICTs. This was confirmed by my observation of Melung hotspot centers. Young people were usually those who gathered at the Village Hall or at the mosque. To access the internet, they usually used their smartphones. To further investigate the activities of young people in Melung in interacting with the internet, I interviewed Syarifudin, the chairman of the local chapter of the youth

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organization IPNU. It is the student association under the auspices of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia which was founded by Hasyim Asy’ari in 1926. The grandson of Asy’ari, Abdurrahman Wahid, became the fourth president of the nation. Syarifudin was recommended to me by Karang Taruna (village youth organization) activists in Melung when I visited them one morning during a break in work at a plantation (Figure 6.13; see Research Diary, p. 21).

Figure 6.13 Approaching a Karang Taruna activist at the plantation for an impromptu interview

After several failed attempts to meet Syarifudin at his home (see Research Diary, pp. 34–35, 103–104), I received a reply to my SMS in the middle of my interview with Suparyo on December 28, 2014. He apologized for the lack of response to my messages and said that he was at home that day. We set a meeting time of 7:30 p.m. Almost all members of his family were at home when I arrived. I talked with Syarifudin about his daily activities in his campus and in IPNU. Besides being

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active in IPNU, he was an active participant in his campus scouting organization. Syarifudin was majoring in Tarbiyah (Islamic pedagogy) at State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Purwokerto. His two-year term as the chairman of IPNU would end that year. IPNU members, who numbered around 40–50 people (there were no official figures), were mostly junior/senior high school students. Before asking about matters related to my research, I asked extensively about the organization he was leading, to make him feel comfortable about my presence and our interview process. The topic of the internet was actually broached by him without me asking specific questions. He said the village authorities invited him several times to attend the computer and internet training at the CAP room (interview, par. 52). According to him, several Melung youths participated in the organizing committee of the 2013 ICT Village Festival in Melung (interview, par. 56). However, IPNU was not involved as an organization. Syarifuddin said the existence of CAP and its computer equipment or village-organized activities related to digital technology failed to attract young people. They were more interested in doing their own activities (interview, par. 64), despite the village chief’s personal request for them to become trainers or facilitators for villagers (interview, par. 69–72). IPNU did not utilize the internet strategically for coordinating or communication within the organization. Syarifudin admitted that the IPNU Facebook group was inactive because it was set up by the previous IPNU’s administration. Curiously, Syarifudin himself, as the chairman, was not listed in the Facebook group, and they did not use messaging applications such as Whatsapp or Blackberry Messenger. They coordinated among themselves using SMS or offline communication channels. Due to the short distance between their houses, they did not need complicated communication technology to spread messages about organizational issues. Prescheduled regular meetings, held every two weeks on Fridays, were usually sufficient for coordination without having to be constantly connected online. However, they continued to monitor their personal Facebook accounts because of the occasional notification from the village or an invitation to take part in village activities delivered by, for example, the village chief’s wife, through her personal account. Syarifudin’s rejection of the use of new media for organizational matters might be influenced by his educational background. He spent his teenage years at a Salaf Islamic boarding school, which had strict rules about the use of ICTs. The school prohibited students from using cellphones or any other communication devices (interview, par. 143). Toward the end of the interview, several of his friends arrived. One of them was Sardi’s son, who claimed he often hung out near the mosque to use the

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WiFi signal from Khoerudin’s house for his smartphone. The last minutes of the interview were spent in discussion with the young men about their daily activities in interacting with new technology and internet networks within the village. The blurred line of the conversation between research topics and daily issues in this fluid and informal interview setting helped me approach the resource persons while building a comfortable interview atmosphere. This rapport was important to ensure they did not feel they were only “used” for research purposes.

6.3.14 Sukirno As the chair of the Pager Gunung Organization—Melung’s farmer organization concerned with equitable and sustainable environmental and natural resource management—Sukirno was formally required to be interviewed. However, the necessity to interview him was unrelated to his status in Pager Gunung but because the CAP award was not presented to the Melung village government, but officially to Pager Gunung, which was listed as a “community”. Pager Gunung stands for Paguyuban Gerakan Rakyat Gunung or the Association for Mountain People’s Movement. It was established on February 3, 2005, in response to the vast destruction of forest ecosystems around Melung Village. Due to Melung’s location on the slopes of Mount Slamet, the Melung residents had the mission to conserve nature. The association was previously named Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan (LMDH) or the Institution for the Community of Forest Village, with Sukirno also its chairman. When the village government in Satrio’s era needed an official institution to secure funds from donors, LMDH was transformed into Pager Gunung. Since then, a number of project proposals had been submitted to secure funding for Melung’s development, especially those related to nature conservation, many of which used Pager Gunung as the flag bearer. During Satrio’s leadership, this institution was legalized and received a notarial deed of its status. Sukirno said Pager Gunung functioned as a “box”, specifically a “fund box”, where funds from various donor sources were collected long before the Village Law came into effect. This financed many development activities and programs of rural empowerment (interview, par. 8–15). Pages Gunung was thus a “vehicle” used by Satrio’s administration to access external development fund sources. Nevertheless, Sukirno’s own role in the processes was passive. All matters concerning the establishment, development and running of this institution were decided by Satrio as the village head at that time. Satrio was the center, the main man and the brains of this organization. Sukirno claimed to “not know anything”

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about the particular process of proposing funds for any activity in the name of Pager Gunung. He vouched that all he did was sign off on the proposal made by Satrio, including signing the financial statements/reports. Sukirno acknowledged that when Satrio was still serving as the village chief, he was seen by others as a “smart person”, because many Pager Gunung activities he led were successful. His statement indicates that Satrio had controlled and decided virtually everything related to this organization (interview, par. 54–57). The situation changed when Khoerudin took the helm of village leadership. Sukirno, whose opinion was backed by his wife Nani, who was present during the interview, said Pager Gunung was not as active as before. It suffered from miss-management and mal-administration, which resulted in financial problems and led to its crumbling. In relation to the activities in the CAP room, Sukirno said he had limited involvement in the computer or internet training programs. However, Nani was an active participant of the computer training program along with other members of Melung’s women organization (PKK). I did indeed meet Nani at the Village Hall and in the CAP room on many occasions. After Satrio left the office, Pager Gunung seemed to become dormant, even though Sukirno was still officially appointed as its chairman. At the time, the institution was focused on organic agriculture, one of Melung’s leading sectors. This situation showed the central figure of the village chief (Satrio/Khoerudin) as a patron in the village community. The village chief’s active or passive role within the communitiy would influence other components of the village. The patronage culture, which is deeply rooted in Javanese society, was undeniably a factor that formed a distinct social system, within which the Melung community was managed and operated. The interview with Sukirno was held on Saturday, December 20, 2014. On the way to Sukirno’s residence, I met Nani by chance. When we arrived at their house, Sukirno was fixing a leak in the roof. Even though I had not made an appointment with him for an interview, he kindly agreed to speak. During most of the interview, Nani sat next to her husband. I could not discern if Nani’s presence affected Sukirno’s answers, but I gleaned that her role as a PKK cadre who was active in supporting the computer training program made her more knowledgeable about CAP activities than her husband.

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Empirical Findings and Analysis Results

As mentioned before, the presentation of the research results centers on two core categories, namely communication development and communication empowerment that provide answers to the research question. To describe what is meant by those two emerging terminologies and what differs them with development communication as we know it thus far, Glaser’s (1978) coding family of the six Cs and the process family will be used deductively as well as the inductive data analytical process, which explains the properties and dimensions of both communication development and communication empowerment (Corbin & Strauss, 2015).

7.1

Toward a Theory of Communication Development

To this point, it has been assessed that the mechanism of communication in rural development communication mainly remains one-way, despite the use of a participatory approach (Melkote, 2003). The value of communication in development projects is also considered marginal. In development communication, communication itself is intended for “communicating development”. Communication becomes the means for the success of development, whatever the measurement and indicators of development are. Communication development, on the other hand, would reverse the positions of subject/object in communication and in development.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_7

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Communication development is broadly defined as follows: A convergent communication process between center and periphery in both offline and online public spheres, where ideas, opinions and knowledge are exchanged relative equally and without any structural or cultural restraints. Communication development is not seen as pursuing something static. Instead, seen from the periphery’s perspective, it is a dynamic and continuing communication process of liberating oneself from the stranglehold and hegemony of its center through communicative action. On the other hand, from the center’s perspective, communication development urges the liberation from the thinking that center must dominate periphery. Inherent within communication development is the intention for both sides to be liberated from any kind of communication oppression. Communication development is about coordinated human action in the periphery to be able to articulate their interest and opinion independently and deliberately without the need of the center’s consent. In this research, center and periphery can be translated into various forms. (1) From the state’s viewpoint, center can mean the government and periphery means the general citizen. (2) Seen from the hierarchical structure of the state’s bureaucracy, center refers to the central government, while the regional/local governments belong to the periphery, which consists of their own centers and peripheries. For example, the village administration is the periphery of the local government (Pp). (3) From the geographical perspective, center equals to urban area and on the contrary, the rural area resides in the periphery. (4) Politically and economically, centers are those who possess or are close to political power and/or economic resources, while peripheries do not have, or only have limited access, to these resources. (5) Culturally, center can be interpreted as those who master certain knowledge, which is not shared to others, i.e., the peripheries. However, people do not rate every knowledge of equal value, so in practice, often the ownership of certain knowledge or a combination of the above center categories (decision-making nucleus) can be used as tools to dominate the periphery. From this point of view, if communication development is to be understood as “a convergent communication process”, then it will always carry a vertical character, which is the communication between center and periphery, with all its forms. New ICTs, including the internet, can play a significant role in creating alternative forms of public sphere, in which the people who have been marginalized and positioned in the periphery, whether economically, culturally, politically or even geographically can express their opinions, ideas and interests, free from coercion and pressure of the centers (Cc or Cp). More importantly, the freedom of these new public spheres is salient because those marginalized people

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can now own and control their “invented” media (Kersting, 2014). These alternative publics can be online or offline (learning circles, discussion forums, etc.) and can also have a countering or autonomous character to/from the dominant public controlled by the center. Therefore, the communication development that is referred to in this study is depicted with a nuance of a bottom-up approach based on active participation and initiative of the community at the grassroots level. Therefore, center-periphery relations become one of the important properties in communication development. The theoretization of communication development is based on the interview analysis with Khoerudin and Tisam. They were confronted with the questions about rural IT development and the initiative in applicating desa.id as an official domain of village’s website (bottom-up) instead of using the go.id, which was an official domain instructed by the central and regency governments for the digitalization of village governance (top-down). Khoerudin described the history of Melung’s IT initiative: At that time, Pak Budi Satrio communicated directly with the Ministry of Communication, as (we) had proposed it to the regency government but it seems that (there was no response) after a long time. So, he went back (to our village) from the ministry, but not (communicating it) via the regency, but directly to the village. (Interview, par. 21)

At this point, there was a sign of avoidance from the regency in communicating with the Melung representative about the matter. Instead of directly saying “no”, the passive-aggressive attitude of the regency toward Melung was a typical Javanese way of resisting doing something. The failure to respond from the side of the regency carries its own message of refusal. Satrio as the representative felt he had no choice but to leapfrog the bureaucratical obstacle by opening direct communication with the ministry. Tisam, asked about the response of the regency to the initiative, said: The regional (regency) government is in the position of controlling everything. We want to (control things), but it really isn’t (the case in reality). Those who raised the desa.id (initiative) were them [laughing wryly], Pak Budi (Satrio) and his friends … Don’t get into the realm of administration. Because if they do, I am personally afraid that what they (GDM) are working on is useless. So, suppose they create an application, if there is no integration (with ours), it’s useless. The concept is the same though, initially when we communicated to each other, the concept was the same, but then there was not enough communication. The GDM, (our) volunteer friends, from the beginning had limited communication (with us). This means, we can’t talk to them if we want to. (Interview, par. 40).

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Satrio’s action means the attainment of a goal is more important than the formality of that action, even if it entails butting heads with organizational norms. Tisam’s answer indicates his intention to retain control over the village and to restrict the bottom-up initiative. Both actions and reactions signify the poor state of communication between the regency and the Melung Village as well as with GDM. The analysis of the above interview passages provided insight into the urgent need for communication development between center and periphery, which subsequently has snowballed into the formulation of a single theory. It underscores the communication jam or conflict of communication between the top and the bottom, center versus the periphery, regency (Cp) versus rural communities (Melung and GDM/Pp). Both communication patterns were vertical; from top to bottom and vice versa, with no discernible convergence of these two communication flows. Each had its own communication channel (desa.id and go.id) and used it to communicate vertically, but without any connection between the two. Hence, they did not respond to each other’s stimulus positively in order to develop a more reciprocal communication. Ironically, this occurred when both used the so-called 2.0 internet technologybased medium, which was celebrated because of its prominent interactive characteristics. However, in terms of center-periphery communications, its interactiveness was not visible. In a nutshell, the data showed that there was no attempt of communication development from both sides so that it did not contribute to the making of common understanding between center and periphery in the context of rural ICT development. Insights about the seemingly unavailability of communication convergence between center and periphery was then elaborated during a conversation with Lindawati. Concerning the problematization of communication development, considered different theoretically from development communication, Lindawati said: Clearly, if it’s called communication development (then) communication becomes central, not just a tool. If we talk about the term development communication, the impression is that communication is a tool to convey development messages. In communication development, communication becomes the substance, the essence. (Interview, par. 107)

Lindawati’s affirmation is in line with the theoretical objective of this study, which is to bring communication to the center of development discourse. It is precisely because of the “substantiality” and “essentiality” of communication in

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communication development that the difference with development communication is becoming visible. To further explain how communication development was formed (and not formed) from the ground, the following sections will go into details about the process and the components of communication development with the help of two Glaser’s coding families: “The Six C’s” and “the Process Family” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 74–75).

7.1.1

The Six Cs

The process of communication development as will be described in 7.1.2. did not just happen in a vacuum. It was context-specific and conditioned by certain factors, which stimulated the emergence of bottom-up initiatives and ultimately resulted in further consequences (7.1.2.2.(4)), whether anticipated or not; intentional or not. This section will review the “context”, conditions”, “causes”, “covariances”, “contingencies “and “consequences “of communication development.

7.1.1.1 Context Context or “ambiance” (Glaser, 1978, p. 74) covers the actions of a person or group of people (cf. Böhm, 2009). It influences and gives meaning to the process under study and to the other 5Cs. It is so meaningful that a phenomenon cannot be explained without exposing its context. Communication development, as the phenomenon to be explained here, was encompassed within the atmosphere of decentralization, which was being promoted in Indonesia in the Reformasi period and beyond. The centrifugal policy of decentralization has strengthened regional autonomy, which allowed cities and regencies to have their own local development priority plans, as long as they conform to medium- and long-term national development plans. When the new Village Law No. 6/2014 was enforced in 2015, it cancelled the rising power or the autonomy of the cities and, in particular, of the regencies (the law does not apply to urban villages/Kelurahan). Rural communities have acquired greater legitimacy to manage their own budget with funds disbursed from the center. The change in the constellation of power in regional politics led to friction in interest between the regency government and the village authorities. The case of the Village Information System (VIS) in Banyumas was a clear example of this jockeying for position. At that time, both the regency government and several GDM villages in Banyumas (including Melung, Karangnangka, Dermaji,

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Kalibagor) were developing their own VIS (go.id vs. desa.id). The disagreement between these two (and even more) levels of government often spiraled into more miscommunication and a tug of war of interests. Satrio explained the problem of regional autonomy on the effectiveness of the top-down instructional approach of the government. It has led to asymmetry of development policy between centers and peripheries regarding the implementation of VIS. The problem in the (implementation of) the technology system is … the policy makers (in the provincial and regency governments) just don’t understand. That’s the problem. If there’s one province which understands about technology, perhaps the people there will actuate the regencies (under its authority). The regency will in turn actuate the villages. But because of the incapability of the provinces, automatically there will be no policy (for an integrated VIS). The central government has issued a regulation, but the provinces are incapable (of translating it into a set of technical instructions). Further, now is regional autonomy in place, sometimes the provinces themselves are confused (how to deal with that matter) … technology-wise actually all applications (either designed from the top or bottom) can be merged. (But) why does every government unit have their own (system)? Again, this is a matter of projects. It’s difficult when we talk about projects. The last time we pushed – I just came from Jakarta – for discussion (to settle) who are the ones that have the authority. It must be the Communication Ministry. So (in my opinion) the ministry must build the application framework, which will be shared with the villages, the regencies, or well the regencies’ needs are different but the framework must be built by the central government so that the path will be the same. (Satrio, interview, par. 335–343)

Satrio could still adhere to the top-down approach if there were symmetrical and clear instructions for all to follow. However, decentralization means that every government unit in practically each level of government could develop their own applications, which Satrio accused were motivated by the projects’ potential from which people could gain advantage. Development communication models adopted by center and periphery, particularly the regency and the village governments, were different. While the regency still wanted to implement a top-down development model, albeit wrapped in an old-style bottom-up development communication model (Melkote, 2003, p. 138; see 3.1.2.3.1.), rural communities wanted an organic and transformative bottomup development model, especially by utilizing new ICTs. It relied on initiatives from below and addressed its communications directly to the center by avoiding the bureaucratic formalities at the regency level. Communication development took place within the increasing policies of decentralization or regional autonomy. It was also within this mindset that the Indonesian people, especially those dealing

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with rural issues, welcomed the implementation of the new Village Law in early 2015. Another context of communication development was the government’s IT infrastructure development program that referred to the commitment of the WSIS agreement, in which all villages nationwide were expected to be connected in the long run and have access to communication through telephone and internet networks in 2025. This commitment has affected the preparation of shortterm government development programs (five-yearly), which was conditioned in accordance with the ratified agreements at the international level (see below: Condition). Theoretically, communication development emerged within the context of revitalizing development communication theories in Indonesia, which began to be abandoned during the reform era. Development communication, which was identical to Suharto’s power structure, had a top-down and centralized communication bias (centered on the figure of Suharto). When his dictatorial government fell, so did nearly all postulates of development communication built around his development ideals, along with their practical tools, which were institutionalized in the form of bureaucratic apparatuses in all lines, from top to bottom. Lindawati also felt the need to revitalize the study of development communication. At UGM itself, development communication has been abandoned because it is the New Order’s product: how they disseminated development ideas and programs, then from there the public would become more accepting and participate in development, which was defined by the government. … Development communication (needs to be) revitalized. I don’t have colleagues to discuss [it with]. I’m always told that developing development communication is old school, but I feel that this topic is very strategic. (Interview, par. 19 & 267)

This theoretical context indicates the need to redefine development communication and the use of technology in development works in the post-reform era based on the interactive and two-way communication perspective and within the assumption that the civil society was getting stronger and more empowered as an autonomous public as again emphasized by Lindawati: But as I see it, can’t we open the concept (of development communication) to become more macro? For example, more broadly, that communication in the context of development is still important, but with different models. When we talk about empowerment, it’s two-ways interactive communication: how communication has a role to help people define their own development. Including the use of technology. (Interview, par. 19)

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This research problematizes the issue of inequality in development communication, which is seen from its urban bias assumptions (interview with Lindawati, par. 145–152; cf. Lindawati, n.d). This bias seems to be the cause of “asymmetric communication” between center and periphery, in which “center-centric communication” (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(d), (e), (g), (h)) was practiced by both sides. Consequently, asymmetry in communication would affect the imbalanced process of knowledge exchange and the unequal definition of empowerment (see below: Cause).

7.1.1.2 Condition Condition refers to individual actions that led to the formation of communication development theory. While context covers human action, condition is based on human action (cf. Böhm, 2009). First, communication development took place because there were conditions where President Jokowi, who was elected in 2014, launched a development vision called “building from the periphery”, which prioritized the development in the so-called 3T areas (the frontier, the outermost, and the underdeveloped areas), rural areas and eastern Indonesia. This development vision, termed “asymmetric decentralization”, is stated publicly in Jokowi’s Nawacita (Nine Priority Programs), particularly the 3rd point (see 2.2.2.). This conditioned the process of communication development at the time of data collection for this study between November 2014 and February 2015, which was when Jokowi began to implement his development vision. Second, communication development was conditioned by the conflict of interest between several institutions at various levels of government. Some of these conflicts were: (1) horizontally, between the Ministry of Home Affairs, which dealt with government and bureaucratic affairs from the central to the local level, down to the village level, with the Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Areas and Transmigration, a newly formed institution as mandated by the Village Law and worked on development issues and empowerment of rural communities; and (2) vertically, between the rural communities who—at least seen from GDM’s perspective—wanted to be detached from the bureaucratical restraints of the center, empower themselves and be independent and sovereign, with the so-called “supra-village” or the formal-bureaucratic institutions superior to them, i.e., the central government and especially the local regency government. The conflicts could be observed from their dispute over the website domain and the applications that should be used by the villages as described above, whether it was the go.id, which implied that the villages were part of the national government’s hierarchy and thus under the control of the central/local government, or the desa.id, which emphasized the identity and autonomy of the rural community.

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The desire of the regency to maintain power over the villages was shown in the intention to become the gatekeeper of information that entered and came out to and from the village via its website. The regency’s exercise of power was also seen from its treatment of incoming proposals made by the villagers. The strategy of “rejection”, “non-responsive” or “delaying” of the proposals has triggered the rural community to form a movement (see 7.1.2.2.(2)). This condition forced the villagers to create their own initiative without waiting for instructions from above. It eventually encouraged them to carry out bottom-up communication development, which was directed to the central government, often by superseding their local (regency/provincial) government’s formalities. This was possible because Satrio as the then village chief of Melung had an extensive network to the center, paving the way for the rural communities, which were registered in GDM, to bypass the formal-bureaucratical communication path between them and the regency. In other words, the structural constraint that existed between Melung Village and Banyumas Regency was not considered a barrier to communication development, rather it stimulated, motivated, conditioned and underlay its implementation. Third, communication development took place because of the agents who started the initiative. Theoretically, technology alone does not bring change to society if there is no actor behind it who activates the functions of technology. Communication development required people’s “active mentality” in interacting with technology. Consequently, the type of communication in communication development was “active communication”. Satrio said that it was time for the rural community not only to seek information, but also to provide or deliver information via the internet; not to be consumers who were always “colonized” and “trampled” by the technology but to transform themselves to become producers of information to catch up with the urban society (interview with Satrio, par. 723–729). The GDM initiative was started by village chiefs who were considered as the main actors of the movement. After its successful formation, the dissemination of ideas about GDM was carried out further by village activists who actively communicated the initiative in their respective local regions. Many village chiefs who were interested with this ICT-based development idea then voluntarily built internet networks in their villages. The sustainability or failure of this initiative normally could be predicted from the development vision and plans of those chiefs. If they actively supported the movement, then the village’s development vision and plans would be adjusted to the values developed by GDM, i.e., the bottom-up development paradigm that saw the village as the subject or active development actors by optimizing digital technology as a tool to accelerate the

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achievement of development goals, especially in the field of communication, as confirmed by Khoerudin below: … yes, the vision and mission of the village head also have an impact, and (the attitude of) the government apparatus also affects their participation (in GDM) ... For example, we are (in total) 14 villages in the district, but not all are concerned (about technology), only 4 villages are concerned. The rest might consider it not important yet ... At the very least, the village chief’s willingness to first learn (about ICT is important) ... because not all of the village chiefs can operate a computer. There are also those who are capable, but maybe not willing to do that yet. (Interview, par. 49 & 51)

Suparyo called these actors “socialization machines” (interview, par. 393), with the task to multiply and amplify GDM’s ideas. The existence of these communication development agents, who could exist in various development milieus (government bodies, NGOs, media institutions, universities, organized as well as unorganized grassroots movement), became the determiner of conditions, whose role was immense in communication development.

7.1.1.3 Cause In Glaser’s causal-consequence model (Glaser, 1978, p. 74), “cause” is an independent variable that can consist of source, reason, explanation or anticipated consequences. One source of communication development could have been the push toward innovation in digital technology, which put pressure on people to utilize the new technology out of fear of being left behind or separated from the current “millennial civilization”. This technological pressure, which could not be dammed, had forced virtually all members of society to adopt and integrate digital technology into their everyday life, which in the long run would make digital technology a necessity. Human living conditions had to be continuously updated in line with the introduction of new technological innovations. Satrio assumed that “people read it because (it is) the time, right, because of the era …” (interview, par. 72). As observed in Melung and its surroundings, rural communities could not escape the determinism of technology. It was becoming the Zeitgeist, the marker of today’s human era. Those who did not want to adapt and keep up with the novelty of technology risked being excluded from the general society, famously known as the FOMO (fear of missing out) mentality. This was acknowledged by Satrio (interview, par. 53 & 55) when describing the insistence of the regency to force all villages to use the go.id domain despite villagers’ rejection. In turn, this pressure stimulated rural communities to establish their own internet-based communication development initiative.

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In the interview session, Suparyo explained about the mission toward “infrastructure fairness”, which motivated the GDM activists to establish “IT literate village” through the use of USO funds: Infrastructure fairness means this: if you talk to a government official it is impossible to talk about the basic rights of the citizens. But there are the funds from the USO, Universal Service Obligation, which you must use to facilitate internet access for the village. (I talk to them,) “Sir, the people are experiencing infrastructure gaps” … (I believe) we can use it (the USO funds). (Interview, par. 629)

Suparyo lobbied government officials in the center to utilize any resources available for the benefit of the villages because he considered the infrastructure gap to be the cause of the digital underdevelopment of rural communities. Communication bias is another independent factor identified as a contributor to communication development. It is heavily influenced by social media, meaning it is inclined toward the communication activities occurring on social media platforms. These communication practices were immensely powerful in colonizing public communication routines in all kinds of communication milieus. Satrio mentioned the power of the “market” of social media that has driven rural communities to seek a presence in the virtual world (interview, par. 74), characterized as “social mediatization” of this movement (cf. Hepp, 2014; Krotz, 2007; Lunt & Livingstone, 2015). The social media bias also affected the decision taken by GDM in optimizing the use of social media as a strategy to create counterpublic spheres in order to facilitate the process of bottom-up communication development. Counterpublicity was formed as a symbol of resistance to the dominant public sphere located in and organized as well as controlled by the mainstream media, to which rural communities and marginalized people had very little access. It was within this self-invented counterpublic sphere that the strategy of “mainstreaming rural issues” (see 7.1.2.2.(1)(c) and 7.1.2.2.(4)(d)) was implemented. GDM revealed in its profile that the reason behind the forming of the movement was because of its vision to put the village community in the position of the subject of development, to develop itself to become self-reliant and empowered. They rejected the notion that village development must be driven by “outsiders” (the government, donor agencies or NGOs). The initiative was based on the desire to reclaim village sovereignty after so many years confined by the feudal system under the New Order regime. GDM’s vision of development was bottom-up, which promoted good governance (see 6.2.). The decision was taken in order to accelerate development proceedings in rural areas by making use of existing

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resources in the village. The prominence of the characteristics and potential of every village in the development program (for instance, organic farming and ICT development in the case of Melung) was intended so that a unique village identity emerged and strengthened. The use of diverse ICTs focused on creating a village identity that could be articulated into the public sphere, discursively processed by the public and eventually would become part of public awareness. A cause of communication development could be also explained by the development policy pursued in the aftermath of the New Order’s downfall, which highlighted equitable development. In this era, Village Law was implemented to restore village sovereignty. This marked a new phase of Indonesian development in accordance with Jokowi’s “build from the periphery” development policy. However, as the lowest government unit, the village was hierarchically under the direction of the local government. In order to run its administration, the village was still subject to the central government’s policies. For this reason, “bridging” (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(a)) was necessary in communication development, so that a meeting point between the central government’s development plan (from top) and the village’s initiatives (from bottom) would occur.

7.1.1.4 Consequence Glaser (1978, p. 74) suggests that “consequence” generates a set of sub-family: outcomes, efforts, functions, predictions and anticipated or unanticipated consequences. This research has detected that at least eight social changes have emerged as the “outcomes” or (anticipated/unanticipated or intended/unintended) consequences of communication development. These eight changes, which will be explained in more detail in 7.1.2.2.(4), are: (1) changes in center-periphery relations (the shift of power structure and the question of empowerment); (2) changes in village self-concept (the question of village identity); (3) changes in working method of grassroots movement (the nature of the movement); (4) changes in the operation of the public sphere (the role of the marginalized public); (5) changes in the practice of democracy at the national and local level (the question of political transformation); (6) reflective consequences on the development project (the question of project sustainability); (7) changes in the perception of knowledge (asymmetrical value of knowledge); and (8) changes in the meaning of connectivity (the role of network).

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As dependent variables, the “efforts” made to achieve these changes were obviously determined by the previous three Cs (context, condition and cause). Due to conditions (see 7.1.1.2.) where rural communities were placed in the marginal position within vertical center-periphery relations, then the efforts taken by Melung together with GDM were meant to diminish the negative impacts of this situation by deliberately carrying out communicative actions, which would liberate themselves from this unfavorable relation. GDM activists were striving for more equal and symmetrical communication relations, as illustrated by Suparyo below when he complained about the then “caricative”1 or superficial bottom-up planning: It used to be bottom-up planning but it was all caricative. We’re told to plan the program, but the funds were determined (by the supra-village) [sarcastically laughing]. Well, I’ve turned it around. It was a very tiring struggle because it involved many politicians, it concerned the asymmetrical relationships between the supra-village government and the village. So, the relationship between the regency and the village is actually like (between) boss-subordinate. (Interview, par. 218)

In the interest of positive communication development consequences, it was necessary that both center and periphery approached each other in a constructive manner. People in rural areas were expected to understand the interests of the national and local governments that they were charged by development goals and targets, which needed to be achieved. On the other hand, the central and local authorities had to go down to the people, to pick up the “ball” directly from them, respect their opinions, and speak equally with them as part of the “bridging” process (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(a)). However, this did not mean nullifying the bureaucratic system at all. To support good governance, it was expected that the local inhabitants had the will and patience in following the administrative and formal communication paths, so that their movement would have a strong legitimacy. According to the observable changes, communication development had a variety of “functions”, among them were synergizing communication among members of the movement’s network and between them and the supra-village (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(a)), communication empowerment (see 7.2.), collaboration, participation and integration of elements of civil society (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(c)(d)(e)), and recognition of knowledge plurality (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(g)). Meanwhile, this study

1

Suparyo used the word “karikatif”, which is not in the standard Indonesian dictionary, but it in common usage to mean caricature-like, caricaturish, superficial and lacking significance.

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“predicts” that participatory communication practice will be increasingly important in development discourse and even become a prerequisite for a successful communication development campaign (see 7.1.2.2.(4)(d)).

7.1.1.5 Covariance Covariance “includes connected variables without forcing the idea of cause” (Glaser, 1978, p. 74). When the data was collected for this study, there were several occasions that formed the momentum, in which the aggregate of the whole events has supported the conceptual building of communication development. Firstly, 2015 was the first year of the implementation of the Village Law, which increasingly pushed the decentralization bandwagon to the village level. Secondly, toward the end of 2014 a new president was elected. Jokowi’s Nawacita laid out a development foundation to build from the periphery. Thirdly, pressure on public information disclosure (as a consequence of the implementation of the 2008 Public Information Disclosure Act), which has forced both the state and the civil society to be more open. Margino acknowledged that the difference between the villages which have joined GDM and those which have not hinged on their readiness to accept openness. Those who have entered GDM are different in their mindset. The difference is related to technology. They will be more welcomed when there is Public Information Disclosure, they will not have any doubts about providing that information (to the public). (Interview, par. 71)

Fourthly, another variable that has also influenced the formation of communication development was the positive contribution of all actors in the center-periphery communication lines. In Melung, especially the former village chief Satrio and his staff and Melung residents generally, were equipped with an open mindset (Research Diary, p. 14). They were open to ideas that came from outside their community and this mentality was compatible with the philosophy of the internet, which promotes openness. Further, ICT has been used “as an entryway, as a tool so that the villages have the courage in terms of information disclosure” (Satrio, interview, par. 162). Additionally, the Ministry of Communication and Information adhered to a policy which supported the vast spread of internet connectivity throughout the Indonesian villages. This policy had brought quality as well as quantity to the acceleration of the openness philosophy. Kurniawan, a ministry employee, confirmed this.

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Why do we need the internet? Yes, this is part of the information disclosure process. If the information is open, however big the given funds are, Insha Allah, the possibility of manipulation will be reduced. The community can monitor from the beginning where the funds are available. Now we have the Public Information Disclosure Act, right? The public has the right to ask what the money is for, what it is planned for, how much remains. The community can also propose the type of program they want. (Interview, par. 126)

Even obstacles from the local government, which tried to maintain the control over the villages (see 7.1.2.2.(2)(b)) were not able to block the bottom-up communication development. The combination of these variables has opened up what Sudjatmiko called the “pores” or “ventilation” of the community to the outside world, as exemplified by him in the case of the Zapatista movement in Mexico (interview with Sudjatmiko, par. 19). On the one hand, the open ventilation made the villagers vulnerable from outside influence, yet on the other hand, it has formed an active openness mentality that became the fertile ground for communication development to flourish.

7.1.1.6 Contingent Contingency is a possibility that an event may or may not happen. This is contingent upon something else. Communication development could occur or not occur because it relies on several factors. In Melung, communication development took place because of the strong initiative of the former village chief Satrio to form a village network of GDM for the acceleration of rural development (interviews with Suparyo, par. 393; Khoerudin, par. 21, 31, 33, & 115). His extensive personal and professional networks in Banyumas and Jakarta, which connected village activists, journalists, blogger communities and ICT volunteers in Banyumas and government officials at the central and local levels, have helped him to direct his and his colleagues’ initiatives in rural development through the utilization of new ICTs. The government’s attitude toward grassroots initiative would also determine the application of communication development, whether it would run seamlessly or face stagnancy (see 7.1.2.2.(2)). Digitalized communication development depended fundamentally on the availability (or unavailability) of communication infrastructure in the region. This dependency would affect the selection of communication media, which in turn would influence how development messages should be conveyed in a proper manner and in accordance with the purpose of communication itself. Suparyo mentioned the important factor of “infrastructure fairness” to bring equality of communication access (interview, par. 629).

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However, the assurance of communication infrastructure alone is not enough. Communication development was also contingent upon the level of education and the level of media/information literacy held by the actors. Lestari regarded good education and information literacy as “the guard in each person to sort out which news (is to believe)” (interview, par. 40). Those who were able to use various media and information strategically and wisely would be able to carry on a proper communication development. The level of education has had an impact on how these actors think critically to read problems—both development problems and communication problems—in their communities or in the institutions in which they worked, and then design their own communication development strategies. This is the reason that media and information literacy took the most part of the empowerment program of GDM, in which the role of facilitators were crucial, as highlighted by Suparyo: Q: So, literacy is also part of empowerment? A: Yes, it’s true. So, the effort, maybe if we make a percentage, maybe only 25% (about technical training), (and) the effort about literacy, that’s 75 (%). So that’s why it’s very difficult for the others who don’t know about this matter to duplicate (the movement’s programs). This is actually an old issue. In Jembrana (Regency, Bali), all villages gained access in 2004, the whole village. (Likewise) Sragen (Regency, Central Java) (with its) one stop service. Its whole village is connected to Wi-Fi. But the monuments that they carry with are infrastructures. They failed to build literacy (to their people). So, the cost of procuring billions of rupiahs of equipment wrapped in e-governance, (and) the benefits of the investment package cannot be calculated. Whereas in our case, it is the literacy that is being built. (Interview, par. 186–187)

The occurrence of communication development, counted on several factors, i.e., the actors (especially the community leaders), the supportive networks (both social and communication networks), the availability of ICT infrastructures, the education level and background of the actors, and the support of the government.

7.1.2

Bottom-up Process of Communication Development

The process of communication development is captured bottom-up-wise because the ethnographic work of this research was conducted within the rural community at arguably the lowest level of Indonesian social hierarchy, from which social communication has been developed with the utilization of various communication methods. A process, as described by Glaser (1978, p. 74) requires at least two stages, which as a Basic Social Process (BSP) “occurs over time and involves

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change over time” (ibid., p. 97). Process and change are the two properties of BSP (ibid., p. 94). Thus, this section will concentrate on the process or stages for developing communication from below and the changes that are brought by that process. However, before going into the details of the “process”, the next section will readdress the legitimation of the bottom-up strategy–having already discussed in 3.1.2.3.2.–as the findings suggest that the conceptual definition of “bottom-up” needs to be questioned. Afterwards, the bottom-up process of communication development will be elaborated by placing the reflected meaning of bottom-up in the background.

7.1.2.1 On the Legitimation of Bottom-up Strategy: Why Bottom-up is Never Started from the Bottom Bottom-up communication development began with the active participation of the local community by initiating a movement characterized by the information disclosure. From the very beginning, development communication required “transparency” and “accountability” from all the actors involved in the process (interview with Suparyo, par. 90, 232–234 & 257). In an interview with Lestari, she revealed that the success of the community-driven development of PNPM was also based on the principles of transparency and accountability (interview, par. 24 & 50). Here, information transparency played an important role so that people at the grassroots could make correct decisions based on sufficient information (“informed decision”) (ibid., par. 50) (Figure 7.1). Satrio realized the importance of adequate information as the “fuel” of quality decisions. The decision for having a landline telephone at his home was based on the need for more extensive information and communication possibilities (interview with Khoerudin, par. 31). He became the first person to have that technology in Melung. The geographical conditions and the limitations of cable networks in that area at that time only allowed landline telephone to be installed in his neighborhood. In addition to Satrio’s progressive vision, the availability of telecommunication infrastructure was one of the important factors for bottom-up initiatives to be kickstarted in the first place. More fundamental than the personal cognitive and the physical infrastructure factors, socio-psychologically the residents of Melung already possessed an open mental attitude. This was proven by recognizing Satrio and Khoerudin, who were from outside the village, to become their village chiefs. Their educational background, as university graduates, was higher than the average village and gave them greater prominence in the community. It was undeniable that people from

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Figure 7.1 An oversize poster of Melung’s 2018 budget allocation outside of the village office as a form of information transparency and accountability to the public

outside the village have been the catalyst for change in and for the Melung community. Appointing educated outsiders to be the community leaders became the “critical juncture”, from which the village was about to experience a leap or an accelerated change toward progress. At this moment, rural communities were said to be at the crossroads where the choice toward “change” was to be determined. The Melung community, through their village chief, has chosen for the openness policy, through which crucial changes in and of the village would occur. Agusta calls this condition “village cosmopolitanism” (Agusta, 2007, p. 143), which is

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indicated by the fact that more than half of spaces in the Indonesian rural areas have been filled by residents from more than one ethnic group. However, the rural internet policy was not shared by villages around Melung. Only a small number of villages have elected to have internet access. In 2014, from the 14 villages in Kedungbanteng District that registered to GDM, only four of them (including Melung) were equipped with fixed (landline or broadbandbased) internet connection, excluding internet access through mobile networks. Even when several villages already had landline telephone connections and had geographic advantages compared to Melung (e.g., located in a lower terrain and nearer to the city center), they “aren’t willing to install (internet connection)” (Khoerudin, interview, par. 45). Clearly there was no consensus from the village communities in the region about the rural internet development agenda. Not all villages had uniformity of decision in looking at what needed to be built in their villages. Within the Melung community itself, the idea of learning computer or digital technology in general was not shared equally among the population. In the initial stage of this bottom-up initiative, only a small proportion of villages had the same vision as their village heads about ICT-based communication development. Even among the village officials themselves, there were still some staff members who lacked knowledge and skills about the technical matter of operating a computer and who were not interested in learning how to master it. However, the current village chief Khoerudin said there was no compulsion to learn the technology (ibid., par. 33). The above facts have brought me to see “rural collectivity” critically. It has encouraged me to question whether the term “bottom-up” can be legitimized, if, even at the village level or in the periphery in periphery, the idea of development did not really come from the “bottom”, i.e., from the common village inhabitants. The case of Melung shows that the idea of rural internet development came from Satrio, the then village chief who was not actually a native. This situation has crystallized into several questions which need to be clarified, i.e., how should “bottom-up” be defined properly? Where did the communication development process start from? How “low” was actually the “bottom”? What was the conceptual limitation of the term “bottom”? Therefore, in order to be able to establish a proper bottom-up communication development (and also top-down communication development in that respect; see turba or going down to the people at the bottom in 2.1.1.), it was necessary to first clarify, whom did the “bottom” represent or what was actually meant by “grassroots”? How “bottom” was bottom-up initiatives? It was clear that in order for a bottom-up project to be legitimate, the local people at the grassroots level have to be engaged in the implementation of that initiative (cf. Fraser et al., 2006; Lund

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& Sutinen, 2010; Mannion, 1996). However, the experience in Melung and the development concept practiced by GDM indicated that no “pure” bottom-up had existed. At least three reasons underlie this assumption. First, the group of people that could be said the active agents of Melung in supporting the internet project were mostly, if not all, village officers. From the point of view of center-periphery relations, they were the local elites, the village elites, the centers in the periphery at the lowest level. Second, the initiator of the “internet village” project was the former headman, a migrant in the village, who came originally from Jakarta, from the center in the center. Thus, seen from his personal background, he was nowhere near the category of “bottom”. Third, the village representative council (Badan Perwakilan Desa), which in theory was responsible for bringing up aspirations from the local inhabitants, i.e., from the very bottom of the village community, failed to take part in this initiative. This raised the question whether a pure bottomup, in the sense that the initiative came originally from ordinary people without the help of external actors, was actually possible. What happened in Melung gave the impression that it was not a “grassroots” movement. Perhaps, due to the fact that it was the rural “community”, which would be normally seen as a cohesive unit to have organized the initiative, it could be viewed as the movement from the “grass” but the initiative surely was not kickstarted by the very “roots” of the society. Taryono (interview, par. 29 & 55), Lestari (interview, par. 26, 28, 58 & 64) and Lindawati (interview, par. 23) all shared the same view regarding the origin of the bottom-up movement. According to them, there was always the danger of “elite capture”, i.e., the center in periphery, in any project involving local people, which in this case was initiated by GDM. Elite capture refers to development practice which is originally meant for the good of the whole community but in practice is only beneficial for and controlled by a group with privileges and greater opportunities to access social, economic, political or cultural resources. It was revealed through this research that they were normally the community leaders or the village authorities. Elite capture existed either because of some cultural or structural factors, such as patrimonialism or state bureaucracy. “In the end, the villagers will still be separated from the village authorities,” Satrio said in response to the question, “where is the bottom of bottom-up?” (Research Diary, p. 112), confirming the critical question about rural collectivity. On the other hand, the village elites could not be excluded from the bottom category just because they were “elites”, as Lindawati stressed. After all, the elites have helped the community members to articulate their interests when they could not do it due to lack of communication skills (interview with Lindawati, par. 23). Suparyo explained that from the

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perspective of social movement, village governance was different in nature with other types of government, such as Kelurahan (urban village), Kecamatan (district), Kabupaten/Kota (regency/city), the provincial or the national government, at which the status of the apparatuses were civil servants (interview, par. 206). On the one side, Suparyo (interview, par. 393) confirmed the assumption that grassroots movement was not equivalent to bottom-up strategy in terms of who was represented by the “bottom”. On the other side, he defended the legitimacy of the village initiative. He said that no matter who has started the initiative, it was still valid as a bottom-up movement. In rural communities, he explained further, village government was regarded more as part of the civil society rather than as part of the government (as bureaucrat). The Village Law No. 6/2014 no longer places the village community/governance directly under the Bupati (the regent) and Camat (district head) as in the Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, but they have become partly autonomous and separated themselves from the direct hierarchy of government structure and become part of the civil society. However, because the village still carried out medebewind (co-administrative) tasks from the government, as a “self-governing community”, it had a dual character, namely semi government and semi civil society. According to Suparyo, this was because village officials were not civil servants, but rather regular villagers who were given authorization by the village residents to manage village administrations (interview, par. 381). On this basis, village government was attached to its citizens as a collective unit. It tried to break away from the authoritative influence of the government structure superior to it (the supra-village) in terms of village development planning. According to Suparyo, “the so-called grassroots are the rural collective community, who are facing the supra-village. Here we define the supra-villages, as the regency, provincial and national (government)” (interview, par. 206). Based on Suparyo’s statement, in rural communities the “grass” (as a reflection of the village elites, i.e., village officials, community leaders or the elders) and the “roots” (the general villagers) could not be separated. Together they were claimed to be a collective unit. For example, Melung village officials were farmers in their daily lives. They were not professional bureaucrats. On the one hand, they belonged to the center circle of the village, but on the other they were villagers who were positioned in the periphery of the periphery (Pp). Therefore, in defining village governance in a bottom-up context, Suparyo “considered village officers as an organized civil community at the lowest level” (interview, par. 381). This organized civil society was then given greater authority through the Village Law to set their own (bottom-up) development plans. Suparyo continued, “what is called bottom-up planning is how the villages are able to plan the development in their

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area by conducting detailed readings on the problems in the village and (transforming it) to become development planning documents in the village” (interview, par. 206). Suparyo believed an initiative such as the “internet village” was indeed an example of a bottom-up initiative although administered by the village officers. However, it did not eliminate the impression that there was a “gap of interest”, if not a conflict of interest, between the village elites and the regular villagers. Many villagers encountered during the research period did not share the idea of new ICT4D in their village (see Research Diary, p. 77). They were either uninformed about it or wanted other concerns, such as the fulfillment of basic needs (e.g., proper sanitation, renovation of walkways, clear water system) to take precedence (see Research Diary, pp. 32 & 45). This reinforced the assumption there are always the centers and the peripheries within a seemingly collective unit. Therefore, in the center-periphery relation, both parties need to engage more actively in the shared problem so that the “harmony of interest” can occur (Galtung, 1971). The “grass” (the elites) and the “roots” (villagers) of the village community have to work in unison in setting the movement in motion, so that a truly “grassroots” movement can be legitimized and the negative consequences of “elite capture” can be minimized. Mannion (1996) underlines that full participation of the local people is particularly important “to avoid institutionalizing a system of ‘devolved patronage’” (ibid., par. 13). Hence, local participation was important, because of the likelihood that over a long period of time, the development project would be carried out only by a few people who hid their personal interests from the public that overrode needs of the rest of the community members. Nonetheless, it’s undeniable that bottom-up planning was determined by the “grass” due to the low level of literacy, the knowledge gap among the village head and other officials, particularly concerning digital technology. Naturally, as cosmopolitan digital elites, these “grasses” enjoyed networking power because through GDM they were part of bigger rural digital networks, consisting of many other digital elites (Castells, 2011). Here, the village apparatuses took on the role of agents of change, whose function as the “creative minority” of the village was to stimulate changes in their respective village at an early development stage (interview with Suparyo, par. 381). Instead of from below, the changes that took place in Melung could also be interpreted as being instilled from the side by these “grasses”, namely by the centers of the periphery; they were Satrio, Suparyo, the village authorities and their GDM networks (interview with Satrio, par. 31). According to Suparyo, GDM as a bottom-up movement was an “antithesis of the previous movements” (interview, par. 381), which were mainly led by

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NGOs. A development or community empowerment program that was carried out by NGOs although it involved local community in the process was an “invited space” (Kersting, 2014, p. 55) because it was considered to be a program that was transplanted into the village for the purpose of completing an organizational task and not out of the basis of the people’s needs (interview with Suparyo, par. 385–387). NGOs, as well as universities, seen by Suparyo as having a knowledge gap with the people in the grassroots because they were part of the elites (interview with Suparyo, par. 397). Therefore, this kind of initiative was considered as “inorganic” because it did not genuinely come from the village community, so it usually would not sustain. This type of development is what was criticized by Suparyo. He complained about the continuity of development programs led by NGO, which were task-oriented and constrained by it. Their development agents usually would not stay with the community beyond the project’s period (interview, par. 381). This was the reason GDM decided to involve village officials and other local villagers in their movement, because they lived within the community and would not leave after one project has been completed, so their presence did not depend on the completion of the program. In fact, the absence of a structured program in GDM had made the involvement of its agents of change not dependent on the program, instead it was decided by their working commitment in and to the network (interview with Suparyo, par. 300). As an “organic” movement, which means that it was started from the village and by the villagers, GDM took the “non-confrontative” principle toward the supra-villages and the village elites because the founders had gone through a process of “deradicalization” (interview with Suparyo, par. 133). This was different from other movements directed primarily by NGOs, which failed to cooperate with the state because they took opposing positions. This kind of movement would be short-lived, because it placed the village chief (or other village elites) as the enemy of the people and pitted villagers against each other (interviews with Suparyo, par. 393; Sudjatmiko, par. 33). As a result, inorganic movements often “failed to be capitalized upon and mobilized to produce decisions that could be accepted by all parties” (Sudjatmiko, interview, par. 33). Suparyo justified his choice to place village officials as the motor of his organic movement, rather than other elements of the village community, for the following reasons: If I educate regular people, say, the youth, (because) I did it before, after one year they’ll be gone. They’ll be seeking jobs (outside the village). No more people left. Second, (if I educate) Indonesian migrant workers, (I did it) a long time ago. (Same thing will happen) no more people left. So this method doesn’t attract me anymore.

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I’m searching for people who are likely to stay permanently in the village and become the agent of change in that village. The creative minority in the village. Well, I find the village authorities (are the right people). They, like Margino, won’t go anywhere. Finally, they will be the agent of change and in turn pass the (knowledge) over to their community. (Interview, par. 381)

All of the above facts revealed that any social movements taking the rural community as their subject and involving the grassroots in the process were distinguished by their types: (1) natural and organic movement, which was initiated and invented from below by fellow villagers and tried to build networks and collaborations with outside parties, and (2) inorganic and unnatural or artificial movement, initiated by parties external to the village, whether they came from the side, such as the NGOs (as fellow element of civil society) or from above, for instance the supravillages, who then tried to invite rural people to participate in the proceedings (cf. Kersting, 2014).

7.1.2.2 The Process The observed bottom-up process of communication development consisted of at least four stages: (1) the initiation stage of bottom-up initiative, (2) the response stage from the center, (3) the center’s reaction to compete with or support the initiative, (4) the consequences stage. The following sections will describe each of these stages. (1) Initiation of bottom-up initiative (a) The process of knowing the collective self The Melung community began to produce many original ideas after undergoing a process of self-education. This brought an awareness of the state of their collective self in order to then learn about their identity and to find out what problems laid ahead of them, to which they collectively looked for the solutions. Surely, we must always keep in mind that the term “collective” here is not to ignore that there could have been discordant voices within the collectivity but in general, village collectivity refers to the feeling that a person is part of a village community. Meanwhile, the GDM’s collectivity is related to a person’s agreement to the movement’s principles as already described in 6.2.1. According to Lindawati (interview, par. 225), the community’s self-educating process was closely related to news-seeking activities within the village, which was undertaken to compose articles for their village website.

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Self-educating ... that is when they write, they structure the logic. And before they write about any rural issue, they have to learn about their village first. So, then the learning (process) happens ... by themselves, because who knows more about their village than themselves? This means that they dig deeper (to find out about themselves). And it enriches their own knowledge as journalists. (Ibid.)

Lindawati did not mean a professional journalist when she referred to journalistic activity in the village, but citizen journalism or village journalism that was practiced by the villagers themselves. It was distinct from the mainstream journalism as village journalism offered alternative perspectives in viewing rural issues, i.e., the rural perspective or the perspective from the periphery, and not the urban perspective, from which the mainstream media operated and which was influenced mainly by economic interest (Lindawati, 2014). Village journalism concentrated on leveraging “village potential” so that it would have a positive impact on the whole community. For example, after the products of some villagers’ micro and small enterprises were reviewed on the village website, there was an increase in visits to those SMEs (ibid.). Here, the village was seen as a community, within which the collective self was shared among its population. The process of “knowing the collective self”, which meant knowing their own village and community better, had preceded the emergence of bottom-up initiative. By knowing themselves, whether through the process of socializing or through the information seeking process a la citizen journalist (by writing news about their village and posting it on the village website), community members started to build their collective identity, which was important to “wear” when dealing with the “outside world”, including with the local and the central government (Cp or Cc). The collective identity seeking phase went hand in hand with the commencement of the village initiative or the GDM. This process took place within the openness vision, where people tried to exploit the Public Information Disclosure Act and pushed for the implementation of transparency and accountability principles in their villages (interview with Satrio, par. 132 & 162). The use of the internet and the approval of desa.id by PANDI as the official domain of village websites helped to strengthen the identity of the village as a sovereign and distinctive entity, which applied its own community rules and this distinguished them from other government units, such as kelurahan or other supra-village entities. However, Suparyo acknowledged that only a few village chiefs, including Melung’s, understood and were able to apply the principles of Public Information Disclosure in their village (interview, par. 290). This confirms once again the division of center and periphery in the periphery and makes “collectivity” actually a vulnerable concept.

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The village website, according to Suparyo, was intended at an early stage for three things: affirmation of village identity, publication of rural issues and sharing information and experiences with fellow rural community members, separated geographically (ibid.). In this phase, inter-village communication was formed; a condition that was impossible to create during the New Order, when for political reasons village communities were conditioned to be isolated communicatively from one another. This prevented them from building inter-village networks. Building a network through information sharing meant also building solidarity between Indonesian villages, particularly among those with similar experiences. Suparyo emphasized that “the (village) identity is ‘trained’ (built) with the solidarity of learning circles, not (made) top-down” (interview, par. 600). From this process, the villagers began to comprehend that they were not alone and that many villages faced similar development problems. Many new ideas started to emerge that fueled the desire of these villages to be more independent, sovereign, and recognized. Naturally, an attitude of resistance to the concepts of top-down development was rising among these people. As their collective identity was growing, they discussed strategies to overcome development problems in their villages. A frequent topic was how rural communities should treat new digital technology, especially the internet, whose penetration into the rural society could not be stopped. Recalling the discussions, Margino said that all this time they used the internet to “see the outside world” (interview, par. 187). This was exactly the attitude that the GDM activists, especially in Melung, wanted to reverse into “the outside world sees us” (ibid.). The change in perspective toward internet-based digital technology had an impact on their mental attitude, from “inward looking” to “outward looking”, in which they were deliberately exposing themselves to the outside world. Furthermore, this change also indicated the make of a strategy to create a new public sphere, where they would have the power over its access as well as its production and distribution systems, in order to accommodate the new publics created by the online world. When the bottom-up development initiative was kickstarted, the collective identity of the villages which were incorporated under GDM was slowly formed. They envisioned the same idea of development, which was based on openness and placed the village as the subject of development. The consequence of this vision was that the village’s agents of change were forced to be active in developing communication with various parties to convey the interests of their village. (b) Pushing initiative to the top and expanding networks In this phase, communication development set about reaching external sources, which were divided into two types: First, GDM tried to push the initiative to the

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top. In doing so, they were developing communication vertically with the supravillages, whose positions in the government’s hierarchy were above the village. This was done in order to seek legal approval and support from the center. Second, the inter-village communication development was carried out at the same time by utilizing new media and reinforced by routine non-formal meetings in certain places (the nodes, see below) spread across Indonesia. This horizontal communication was done to expand and strengthen the network and diffuse the idea, or, as Kurniawan put it in a positive tone, the “virus” of the movement, to other villages around the nodes (interview, par. 150). Speaking in relation to the ICT Village Festival (DesTIKa), he explained in the past, the principle was that with DesTIKa, we hope that there is a village that can spread the ‘virus’ to other villages, so that the whole region will be motivated to emulate it. Melung was like that, it was the pilot (project). (Ibid.)

In other areas, the same method was duplicated like a “packaged intervention” (Toyama, 2015). Kurniawan told the story of a village in South Sumatra, which transferred its experience to neighboring villages. The model is the same. It means that Harapan Jaya as a pilot village invites the surrounding villages. We hope that this ‘virus’ will spread later, and then the development can be more aligned in the whole area. (Ibid., par. 166)

In pushing the idea upwards, GDM was remarkably persistent. They had considerable motivation to break the dominance of Cp (the regency) over Pp (the village). It was clear that there was an aspect of resistance to the pattern of top-down development. Village resistance in communication development in the current era of digital transformation was not demonstrated through physical resistance such as mass mobilization, but by forming various alternative public spheres that were free of center’s domination, both online and offline (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990), which could be easily accessed by anyone. One good example of this is when GDM streamed the national parliament assembling session online from Jakarta so that the villagers across Indonesia could watch the session without having to mobilize themselves to go to the capital. This action showed two things: the pressure from the periphery to the center by keeping track of the legislative works directly by means of online communication technology and the formation of a new alternative public via this online platform (interview with Suparyo, par. 165–171). This phenomenon will be

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discussed further in 7.1.2.2.(4)(c) when we talk about the changes in the working method of grassroots movement. The formation of these kinds of new public spheres were intended as a counteraction for the center-dominated publics, such as those which were formed by the mainstream media or the government-organized development planning meetings (Musrenbang). The formation of new publics was also seen as Pp’s strategy in competing with Cp by getting support from Cc through lobbying process (interview with Taryono, par. 23). In turn, Cc was expected to exert pressure to Cp to approve the initiative of Pp. The so-called counterpublic spheres had to be “owned” by the movement, so that they could control how these various grassroots publics should be developed and what kind of discourses were to be constructed within them (more about counterpublicity in 7.1.2.2.(4)(d)). Ownership and control over the public sphere were crucial for the success of GDM’s missions. As revealed by Kurniawan, this was also the reason why village activists in Banyumas refused to use the go.id because it would mean that they were under the control of the regency and would possess no independence to utilize the technology for their cause (interview, par. 44). On the other hand, when we look at the Village Law No. 6/2014 Article 86, the central and regency governments through the Ministry/Agency of Communication and Information have given the authority to develop Village Information System, including – so was the Cc’s and the Cp’s interpretation to the Article – the village website. That means, the local government had its own interests and agenda in rural digital development which overlapped with that of the village’s. At this point, conflict of interest between Cp and Pp was inevitable, which hindered and at the same time pushed further the realization of communication development. The Banyumas Regency, through Tisam, eventually rejected GDM’s initiative about desa.id because it was against their “Informatics Model for Banyumas Regency”. Instead of acknowledging it as the official domain for village website, the regency released its official version of village website, which was integrated under the regency’s domain of go.id. For instance, instead of , Melung’s website address would have been named in the regency’s version; a complicated website address with the name of the district (Kedungbanteng) and regency (Banyumas) inserted (Figure 7.2). Although the web was active, it was never used by the Melung administration. All these facts led me to conject that there was a problem in implementing the bottom-up development concept in Banyumas. Citizen initiatives were not automatically accepted by the authorities above the village level. Regional autonomy in Indonesia, which had been gradually implemented since the reform began, might

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Figure 7.2 The interface display of Melung’s Village website on the go.id platform2

have solved the problem of concentration of power, but it could also lead to new problems at the local level. As power decentralized, the propensity of abuse of that power increased as more parties in the peripheries gained more power than before. This assumption is best illustrated from the response of Tisam to the question of village websites that were administered by him under go.id. Q: What is the position of the regency when the villages have their own initiative? We know that now they have their own websites, the desa.id and also other initiatives in GDM, meanwhile the government has also its own policy. How does the regency deal with such initiatives? A: We (the regency) should control all of them. We want to. ... Q: Can you, as the administrator of village websites (under go.id), edit all the entries that were going to be published by them? A: It’s a must ... it’s a must! … It means we act as the last filter before it is published. When they upload, the entries cannot be online yet. We must check them first . . . (we give) the approval . . . that’s why we missed (this chance) for Melung . . . They’ve found their own way to develop their own website. (Interview, par. 50) 2

Retrieved on January 18, 2019 from http://melung.kedungbantengkec.banyumaskab.go.id/

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Tisam’s response raised concerns over the contestation of power in the periphery between the village (Pp) and the regency (Cp) authorities. Censorship was necessary and gatekeeping a must, according to Tisam. On the one side, the internet offered the possibility of freedom of information but on the other side, the freedom could be at stake, if one did not own or possess the power to control the medium. Merely having access to the internet was not enough to be able to capitalize the technology for one’s merit. One still needed to negotiate with all the stakeholders involved in a development project and there was the need to determine the mode of partnerships or relations between those parties, especially between center and periphery. Referring to Galtung (1971), it could be confirmed that there was “conflict of interest” or “disharmony of interest” between Banyumas Regency (Cp) and the Melung authority (Pp) regarding ICT development and internet utilization in the area. The regency wanted to maintain its structure of domination. In contrast, the Melung community sought freedom and more autonomy or, in GDM’s words: more “technological sovereignty”. Satrio illustrated this episode as follows: Now, we are encouraging these two ministries (the Communication Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to authorize the use of ‘desa.id’ to become the official domain of the village (website). Well, the problem is that it’s an initiative. The initiative from the (other) villages is slow. Not all villages have their own initiative. All are still waiting for the instruction from above. Well, that’s unfortunate. Actually, building the village doesn’t have to be dependent upon the above. If the villages independently develop a village website, then that’s legitimate. There are no restrictions. (Interview, par. 49)

The will to maintain control over the periphery (villages) – albeit without justification in the new Village Law No. 6/2014 – reflected what Galtung (1971) means by feudal interaction structures, i.e., “the factor that maintains and reinforces … inequality by protecting it” (ibid., p. 89). Thus, in a smaller scale, the control mechanism effort in the Banyumas Regency could be classified as an imperialist act according to Galtung’s definition of it, i.e., “dominance relation between collectivities …” (ibid., p. 81). Nevertheless, the internet gave the opportunity for the rural populace in the periphery, particularly for the Melung community, to cut across this structure of domination. Access to the internet and the ability to harness it opened up the possibility to develop communication with Cc, i.e., the central government in Jakarta. In so doing, they completely evaded the structural obstacle of Cp. The fact that Melung was awarded the CAP in 2013 by the Ministry of Communication and Information

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without the active involvement of the regency officials proved that in some way the bottom-up communication process existed with the help of new ICTs. Tisam discussed the issue: S: Selection (for the award) was done exclusively by the central government? Did it involve the regency (in the selection process)? JT: Absolutely not. (The selection of the award for) CAP was because Satrio used the “toll road”. Satrio and his colleagues took the “toll road” to the central government asking for a budget. ... S: How come they went directly to the central government without the recommendation of the regency? JT: Yeah, it was lobbying efforts. It was Satrio’s lobby because maybe . . . I don’t really remember, but it was because of (the help of) his network. (Interview, par. 72–79)

Satrio confirmed Tisam’s statement. In fact, the approval of desa.id as the official domain of the village website was the result of the lobbying conducted by GDM activists by leapfrogging the bureaucracy of the regency. They met with the officials from PANDI and the Ministry of Communication and Information in Jakarta. They engaged in a series of open public discussions held online as well as offline – as part of the formal approval mechanism – in the capital (interviews with Satrio, par. 43–45; Taryono, par. 23). GDM did not feel the need to deal with Cp as those ones with authority for granting the domain names were those who sit at Cc, GDM did not feel the need to deal with Cp in this matter. This “broken” relationship between the officials in the village and regency was against the principle of bottom-up development approach as suggested by Mannion (1996). He underlines that all parties participating in a development project should be treated as equal partners. Government at all levels should not act as “power-brokers”, but they should share decision making power with the other parties, notably with the local people, whom they served. This applied also for local community leaders, sectoral agencies and business sectors. It needed the “re-learning” of a “new attitude” from all stakeholders in order to bring “new dynamism” to rural development. This re-learning process would empower people, through which they would enhance their knowledge, change their attitude and gain new skills.

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Changing attitudes from the will to maintain the dominant status quo to that of equal partners is no easy task.3 But one thing the participants could do was first develop communication among all the parties, instead of discussing development communication. In other words, establishing communication development. Forging positive and synergistic communication development required good intentions from all the communication partners in order to acknowledge that each had its own interests and goals in communicating. In communication development, it is important not to belittle or dismiss each other’s interests for a consensus which ultimately fails to take into account their interests. These must be recognized. However, the motivation was not to achieve personal interests by suppressing or overriding an opposing viewpoint, but rather to find common ground between these diverse interests (see interview with Lindawati, par. 193). In the example above, namely about the interaction between the Regency and the village community over domain dispute and CAP award, it was clearly seen that the use of new media, which was believed to be interactive, apparently did not necessarily lead its users to interact with each other. New media was not inherently interactive. Conversely, the use of the same medium with different channels only yielded two patterns of one-way communication, which was non-reciprocal and unconnected to each other. Moreover, it was “contra-flow”, flowing in the opposite direction. Figure 7.3 illustrates how the communication took place, which projects two unconnected linear communication flows, i.e., the bottom-up communication of desa.id conducted by the villages under the GDM networks on the one side and the top-down communication of go.id carried out by the regency on the other side.

Bottom-up communication of desa.id

Top-down communication of go.id

Figure 7.3 An illustration of the contra-flow communication pattern

Communication development between center and periphery had to be done, because of the example of the contra-flow communication that occurred in Banyumas. It only produced “forced interactivity”. The regency could no longer impose its 3

Galtung (1971, p. 81) states two major problems that underlie imperialism or the dominance system, i.e., inequality and the resistance to changing it. He terms it “structural violence”.

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will on GDM because of the decentralized character of this movement, which was marked by its fluidity. GDM did not have an official chairman like other movements, instead it was organized by the lots of its nodes, which were spread over its vast networks. The government was unable to force the villages to stop their initiative nor order them to follow the center’s rules of the game because there was no single leader to deal with, as recognized by Taryono: That (GDM) is something that cannot be stopped because it’s a community movement and not a political movement, like (for example) the PPD (Village Apparatus Association) which is officially chaired. It’s deliberately left flowing. People who want to join can recognize themselves that they are part of GDM, so that it is developing and cannot be stopped. (Interview, par. 25)

As an organic movement, GDM was self-processing, meaning it did not overly depend on the center’s resources. Due to its flexibility and open membership mechanism, this kind of movement prospered, so development of its networks was difficult to stop. For its members, their inclusion in the network could only mean empowerment as Castells explains in his “networking power” (Castells, 2009, 2011). In expanding the network, the villages within GDM learned collectively from each other and with one another through what they called “learning circles”, where knowledge and experiences, positive or negative, were shared among its participants. In Banyumas/Purwokerto, this learning circle was often held in Rumah Desa Indonesia (RDI or House of Indonesian Village), where village activists from the surrounding area usually gathered. Collective learning also functioned as a method for synchronizing the cognitive frameworks between the villages about how they should see rural development issues in general. Half of the number of informants of this research alluded to collective learning in their answers during the interview, usually connecting it with the term “learning together” or informal “workshop”. Such learning models eliminated the teacher-student hierarchy in the learning process. Conceptually, all participants were considered equal regardless of their educational or professional background. In the learning circles, there were students, bloggers or even regency government employees who came individually. All shared concerns for rural issues. Collective learning required “reciprocal learning”, i.e., all participants must give and attain additional information and new knowledge to and from other participants in the forum (take and give principle). However, Satrio revealed that the regency refused this kind of learning model. According to him, the regency felt threatened if the villages were “smarter” than them and avoided the prospect of being “taught” by villagers – and losing face – in a forum where all were equals.

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The following conversation illustrates this problem. A: Well, the village is always held back (by the regency). They don’t want to let these people (the villagers) be empowered. Q: On the contrary they’re put on hold? A (Margino): Yes right … Q: So, this is what’s felt by our friends at GDM, which is also discussed there, namely in order for the villages to not attend? A: To not be present, because if we do, we will be better, right? I said that if the village is cleverer, then the regency loses, they don’t want to learn. (In my opinion), learning actually means you don’t have to see who is above or below whom. Q: Hierarchy? A: Yes, learning, wherever it is, is a space for study … If it was understood together, yes, it would be really good. We want to teach and the regency also wants to (learn), that way. The regency wants to teach us, we’ll also accept it. That’s it. That’s why sometimes it hasn’t ... hasn’t worked yet. Well, at the level of village officials, they’re already well accustomed to it, especially those who are elderly villagers. (They said,) ‘if I am not trained by the regency, I don’t want to (learn)’. That’s the problem too. Because it’s indeed the culture, this issue is, yes, mindset colonization, that’s it all. (Interview, par. 223–231)

In effect, the regency steered clear of these learning circles and tried to maintain its position above the village; a higher position that by nature granted officials the authority to “teach” the village about which development was the “right” development (see 2.2.3. & 3.1.2.3.1. on the discussion about “tutelage”). Many learning circles were held at the RDI. For example, members of GDM were discussing the Public Disclosure Act when I visited them. An activist recounted that there was a fear and unwillingness of the local government in disclosing public data. I noted this in the research diary and interpreted it as meaning that the local government did not understand that there were types of data, which needed to be open to the public access at all times, and other data only available upon request, such as financing or budgetary matters (Research Diary, p. 51). Participants in learning circles such as in RDI or in other places usually organized holding workshops in their respective village districts. They would invite the neighboring villages in these new learning sites to learn and share about the latest issues of rural development and eventually to join the movement. According to Taryono, one village could invite three to five new villages in its area, so that the GDM network would expand even further and the number of nodes would add

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(interview, par. 49). The meetings were usually held in an open forum and did not depend on the GDM section in Banyumas, where the movement originated. The group of GDM activists in Banyumas was not an absolute template for all GDM groups nationwide, the all-determining reference for how GDM circles should be organized. The network did not have a fixed center wielding absolute power to make decisions, even though there were several influential actors within the movement. Besides power, knowledge was also decentralized throughout the network. These decentralized centers were manifested in the form of nodes, both in the form of gathering sites for village activists (e.g., RDI) or personified in several (influential) actors (e.g., Suparyo or Satrio) or villages (e.g., Melung or Tanjungsari). Nodes’ function was to bind the network(s), namely as cut-points because that was where knowledge, as the result of the discussions in learning circles, accumulated. However, these nodes were active cut-points, meaning that their removal would not result in the entire network being disconnected, but they would be replaced easily by other figures in the network who had a similar cosmopolitan character and were already well-connected with other parts of the network. For example, the cessation of Satrio from his position as chief of Melung Village did not result in the village being cut off from its relationship with GDM. It remained connected institutionally because Margino (who still held his formal status in the Melung administration) had replaced Satrio’s position in the network node, while Satrio remained an influential figure in the GDM network. This portrait described a rhizome-shaped network (Servaes & Hoyng, 2015), which did not necessarily require a static or absolute center (see 5.2.4.) The use of the internet by many villages made the transmission of new ideas and knowledge about village development easier and faster along the network. Taryono revealed, learning circles also run on online platforms (interview, par. 49). They met on Twitter, Facebook, and also gathered in WhatsApp groups (I was invited to become a member of one, and accepted, during my research stay). Offline, these villages often received visits from members of non-GDM rural communities who wanted to learn about ICT4D from them and share on the topic of best practice. During my research stay, the village received a delegation from Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa (Bapermasdes/Village Community Empowerment Agency) of several villages in Tegal Regency on December 16, 2014 (see Research Diary, p. 79). In addition to receiving visits, Satrio and other village activists were often invited to become speakers or facilitators at discussion forums held by villages interested in GDM activities. Their participation helped stimulate the growth of new nodes in those areas. In the process of such network development, which was built based on online and offline communication, people also developed communication between the village

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communities and various parties outside the village, such as with the ICT Volunteers, PNPM workers, NGOs, bloggers, PANDI, parliamentarians, bureaucrats, schools and also with tech-experts. The variety of member backgrounds of this network opened up more opportunities for this movement to easily enter or make connections with other networks outside the village network and to gain benefit from them. For example, they could call upon Sudjatmiko, a member of parliament, or Taryono and Kurniawan, civil servants and bureaucrats, to influence the decision-making process for a policy or they could benefit from the blogger community who helped them to disseminate the village’s ideas in their blogging networks, etc. Suparyo revealed the behind-the-scenes story of the struggle to pass the bill for the new Village Law together with a special committee in the national parliament, of which Sudjatmiko was one of the members. This is behind the scenes, ok. The reality was, at that time I accompanied Mr. Budiman Sudjatmiko in the final lobbying session. Mr. Budiman was the vice chairman of the Special Committee. Actually, almost all of the three special committee members were close to GDM. Mr. Budiman, Mr. Khatibul Umam (Democrat Party), because their electoral districts are from here. Individually, I know both of them from college. The other one, Mr. (Akhmad) Muqowam (PPP Party), I know him because our bases are the same at NU … These three people are, first, they need me, second, they need GDM to convince the government. And we need them to talk about this (rural issues), because I can’t talk, right? Well, these three people who almost become, in quotes, the “trigger point” of why this movement is becoming big. (They are needed) for speaking to the public. (Interview, par. 224–226)

In another interview with Satrio, it was revealed that GDM’s close relationships with Sudjatmiko helped them to ensure that an article about Village Development Information System and Rural Area Development was inserted in the Village Law’s draft, which was successful and now can be seen in Article No. 86 (interview, par. 523). These are examples of network capital, which Castells (2011) calls “networkmaking power” (further about networking see 7.1.2.2.(4)(h)). The above network organization was in line with the principle of openness, which was internalized by GDM. The establishment of this network was one of the intended consequences of GDM’s actions (see 7.1.1.4. & 7.1.2.2.(4)). The highlight of these meetings was the ICT Village Festival, which was first held in Melung in 2013. Subsequently, the Festival was held annually in villages considered to be the nodes of this network, namely Tanjungsari, West Java (2014), Lenggang, BangkaBelitung (2015), Khalkote, Papua (2016), and Pulosari, Central Java (2017). We saw here that networking was one of the strategies for communication development and for strengthening village networks as a cohesive unit. Networks were used to form

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solidarity, with which people moved together on behalf of the rural communities who wanted to develop themselves independently. (c) Mainstreaming rural issues There are many forms of political participation or civic engagement. Participation in election polls, for instance, is one. Some argue that a conscious abstention or “no-vote” in general elections is participation because it displays one’s political statement. Memberships in associations, networks, learning groups, CSOs or NGOs as well as in political parties are also counted as political participation. Today, as access to various public spheres is no longer monopolized by certain groups of people/institutions (e.g., mass media, government, politicians, lobbying groups), everyone who is capable of utilizing new digital technologies can join public debates and strategically influence the construction of public opinion as well as reshape the structure of the public. As mentioned in many parts of this report, Kersting (2014) has introduced the terms “invited space” and “invented space” to differentiate the provider of “space” of political participation. The former relates to form of participation initiated by the Center through formal political system, while the latter is “unverfasst, punktuell, individuell und unkonvetionell” (p. 55) and refers to new protest forms organized by civil society. Referring to Kersting’s conceptual differentiation of political space, desa.id would be the invented space as it was the genuine space for public political participation, which was unconventional, offered more freedom from the center’s surveillance and initiated from the bottom. Meanwhile, the domain go.id mirrored Kersting’s invited space because it was designed from above, formal and left very little space for the affected community to modify. Melung and GDM did not take the “invitation” from the regency as it would be a sign of acceptance of a top-down “assignment”. Instead, they operated in their own invented space. How did people’s participation in that invented space look like? Within the context of citizen journalism, Lindawati (2014) conducted a content analysis study of village websites in the area of Banyumas Regency within the period of 2012–2013. Among the results, the study revealed that the village websites published more positive news about village prospects and potential rather than negative news of village problems. The reports came from first-hand sources, and field experience of the “journalists” and “eyewitness reports” characterized village citizen journalism practices. It explains why many of the news angles were taken from that of the man and woman on the street. Quantitatively, more space was given for the rural communities, which signaled the growing representation of village voices in the invented public sphere, rather than for the supra-village elements. The news tended to avoid a provocative tone but more informative and less advocative (ibid., pp. 9–10). This

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was confirmed by Suparyo in the interview who said that citizen’s participation in the village websites was still limited to the information function rather than the advocacy function (interview, par. 129). Public participation through citizen journalism is a positive indication of good governance and democracy practices, which promote openness. More varied news from the periphery has added the possibility for the perspectives of the ordinary people to be taken into consideration by the mainstream media, which in turn can challenge the formation of public opinion. GDM called this approach “mainstreaming rural issues”. This in-vivo expression was conveyed by many informants during the interviews as one of the strategies to overcome news inequality in the mainstream media that flooded the dominant public sphere, in which rural issues were marginalized in daily news coverage. As a counter discourse, mainstreaming rural issues was part of online citizen journalism practice on the village website platforms, which GDM strongly advocated. Village websites, as the citizen media, provided alternative perspectives about rural issues, which were reviewed from the subject’s point of view, rather than from the object’s. This transformation of viewpoint has given new types of knowledge to the audience about many (marginalized) issues which so far have been covered or interpreted within the frame of the dominant public. Satrio provided an example related to the protracted civil strife in Aceh province. The dominant narrative from the government termed it an “insurgency”, blaming elements within Acehnese society. The Acehnese village websites, in contrast, give the province’s people a chance to provide their own personal perspective of the conflict (interview, par. 688–698). This gave the general public a new understanding of the conflict. Moreover, mainstreaming rural issues was a strategy to escape social isolation against village issues. This was a form of resistance and the village’s efforts to avoid the threat of the “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), whose mechanism was determined by the dominant public in the mainstream media. Ideally, in being able to produce a broad communication effect, the mainstreaming rural issue strategy would be more influential if the village issues had had enough news value so that it became relevant for the media to cover. Media resonance of the issue would transform the news into public discourse in the dominant and wider public sphere and this was an important step for influencing the construction of public opinion and public decision-making. One of the ways for the citizen’s narrative to receive decent news value was to engage public figures in their story building. In using social media for example, people could tag influential politicians, who had considerable appeal both to the public and to the mass media. Margino described the usual mainstreaming process. In early 2012, he and Satrio wanted to promote the idea of the “internet village” simply because they saw at that

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time no other village possessed that characteristic and it would be an added value for the Melung community. So, it went like this, every time after we wrote a story . . . I tweeted it, then there were some buzzers. At that time Budiman Sudjatmiko already had many followers. We asked him to be our buzzer for almost every activity. That means, every time there was a story from a village . . . he would be tagged and we asked him to retweet it . . . so apparently the media was aware (about the story) from Twitter and then they came here. (Interview, par. 49 & 51)

As more mainstream media came to Melung, it received more media resonance, and the public came to know more about the so-called “internet village”. The Melung community made more contacts with many local and national journalists and maintained good relationships with them. Consequently, the movement’s networks expanded as fresh contacts in a new network (here: the media network) were made. Taryono pointed to another example of the use of social media in accelerating rural development, this time in Cikadu Village, Cianjur Regency, West Java, in August 2014 (interview, par. 55). The connecting road between Cianjur and Bandung Regency was located in a village whose main road functioned as the link for transporting logistic supplies between regions. However, the road had been severely damaged for several years, and there was no effort from the relevant regency to repair it. Cikadu residents made several social media posts, including photos, most notably Twitter, and reported on the situation on the village website (cikadu.desa.id). The news went viral and drew the attention of the mass media. One of the residents, Nuron (@nuronaby), routinely tagged then West Java governor Ahmad Heryawan (@aheryawan) and his deputy, Deddy Mizwar (@deddy_mizwar_), as well as GDM accounts (@desamembangun) in his tweets on the subject. . The deputy governor became aware of the situation and he, along with his staff minus the regency authority, visited the location on August 28, 2014. He ordered subordinates to renovate the road access to the village. The continuous use of new ICTs by the Cikadu community for local development was appreciated by the Ministry of Communication and Information, PANDI and GDM and it led them to recognize Cikadu with an award for “Initiative and Creativity in Utilizing ICTs and Using desa.id Domain” at the 2014 ICT Village Festival. The above examples show that media technology could not stand alone in processing the issues to become mass consumption. Mass media was still required to amplify these issues to the mass communication public sphere, which would deliver

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a greater impact on the formation of public opinion. Here, the power of technological combination was at work. Mass media acted as a mirror in reflecting village interests and opinions that had been articulated by the citizens on the periphery on social media, which then exerted pressure on the government in the center to act on behalf of the people. Lindawati told of another episode of “mirroring” (interview, par. 95–96) in the village of Pancasan, Central Java (no time specification was made). This village was famous for its roof tile production. Ironically, when a project to renovate one of the schools in the area came, the related government agency prohibited the use of Pancasan roof tiles because they were not accorded Indonesian National Standard Certificate (Standar Nasional Indonesia or SNI). In addition to advocacy efforts, local village activists then mainstreamed the issue through their networks with posts on social media. The local mass media joined the amplification of this news, wherein the mirror effect worked, i.e., the issue became the subject of media reports. The government agency was swayed by public opinion and went so far as to assist the villages to process their accreditation so that the roof tiles could be used for the construction projects. It was a win-win-solution for both sides because neither party contravened any rules. By reverting the pressure to the center to make changes through the means of f mass media, the mirroring effect was also observed in Melung. Satrio recounted that the smooth village roads of Melung were the result of the residents’ advocacy through their writings on the village website, which stimulated mass media to make reports on the situation and finally the government responded with the improvement of road condition because they were also crucial for the seamless evacuation routes due to the increased volcanic activity of Mount Slamet (interview, par. 247).4 Here the media still held a greater power as an agenda setter but the public’s power in influencing the media agenda through their online communication activities was increasing too. Interestingly, a number of local media in Banyumas knew little about GDM compared to the awareness of national media. When Lindawati visited Radar Banyumas and Satelit Pos, two local newspapers in the region, and inquired about GDM, they acknowledged having little knowledge about the movement but they did know about the famous internet village of Melung (interview with Lindawati, par. 81). She presumed this was tied to the “beyond-local” character of the internet, so that “it missed its local effect but (the news) has already spread to many places” (ibid.). This characteristic of the internet seemed to influence Melung’s working method, which 4

Mount Slamet had erupted in March and September 2014, several months before my arrival in Melung. A steady stream of smoke from the volcano was still visible in the distance.

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tended to establish direct communication with the central government by leapfrogging the communication barriers at the local government level. In this case, the internet had enabled Melung’s intention to be national and global, rather than to be local. Melung’s strategy has been relatively successful if gauged by the large amount of coverage from national media. We can comprehend the process of mainstreaming rural issues through the functions of the public sphere as described by Gerhards and Neidhardt (1990). Various forms of internet postings from rural “netizens” in the counterpublic spheres were considered as information inputs for mass media (transparency function/input). After being validated by the dominant public sphere through journalistic operations (validation function/throughput), then, if an issue was deemed significant for public consumption, the media would pass it from their gatekeeping mechanism and release the reports on their communications platforms (articulation function/output). However, not every participant in the grassroots was capable of articulating opinions or interests through new media and then turning it as the fuel for the mass media in the form of valuable information. Lindawati acknowledged that in most villages only village officials, the center in periphery, were active in alternative media (elite capture) (interview, par. 23, 25, 27 & 79). The above conditions explain the low level of participation of the “roots” of the village in village journalism. This could result in minimum project monitoring of village development, which was managed by the village authority. Village journalists were mostly village officers themselves who possessed more technological proficiency than the ordinary residents. This happened in Melung, where Margino, as a treasurer of the village, acted as the village website administrator as well as the village journalist. Lindawati surmised that this could be the reason for the village’s positive image on its website. It was a product of public relations and marketing communications (interview, par. 257). Although village officials were not trained in these fields, they were practicing them. Villagers, in contrast, were not empowered enough to criticize the village government through the website. The village apparatus would censor all postings that it determined detrimental to the community through its own gatekeeping mechanism. Ultimately, there was no self-criticism efforts and a center-periphery hierarchy had been established within the village community. Eventually, the regency’s attempt (Cp) to maintain control over the village (Pp) through the application of go.id was replicated by the “grass” of the village (the village authority) who exercised its control over the village’s “roots” (the ordinary village residents). Many informants of this research were aware of this situation. Accordingly, they argued that from the viewpoints of GDM, this was the initial phase of the holistic strategy of what they termed desa bersuara or the “voicing

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village”, in which rural communities wanted to transform the vision of “seeing the world” into the vision of “be seen by the world” through the use of the internet to voice their perspectives, concerns and opinions on rural issues (interview with Margino, par. 187). According to Suparyo, the voicing village was “the ability of the village community to express their problems to the public” (interview, par. 381), especially through online media as exemplified by the Acehnese case above. Satrio observed that the voicing village contributed to the plurality of rural stories in the public sphere. A: We imagine that if 70,000 villages tell their stories, it’ll become a new cultural wealth, shared knowledge of this nation, even of the world. Q: At least the mainstream media has alternative stories from the village? A: Yes, at most, yes that should also be, yes, because the mainstream media is owned by one or two persons and they have interests, right? So, we fight it with the diversity of villages. It’s something unique. This is something, if this is booming in this nation, it’ll become unique, which might not have happened in other countries. … The villages have people telling their stories. Moreover … there’s a lot of history in their village … if (they) can trace more history (of the village) … our culture will be richer and also rather than an outsider who writes (our history), it’s better to be written by the villagers themselves. After all, they’re the actors of their own history. Like Melung, we tell our story too. I can tell a story by asking someone here first, oh this is one story. Ok I’ll write, I’ll trace the history (of it). (Interview, par. 698–702)

Suparyo added that the courage of the villagers to express opinions and interests to the public was not just a matter of technology, but also about “how to build village self-confidence” (interview, par. 381). To be able to voice their interests, the capacity of the village community had to be improved, for example in terms of specific knowledge about village management or mapping of village needs and potential, in short, knowing the collective self better as discussed above (interview with Taryono, par. 53). In the early phases of communication development and within the voicing village strategy, the communication capability of the village community, particularly the articulation proficiency, needed to be enhanced so that the messages conveyed from the bottom could be directed on target and result in the desired effect. Communication training, such as writing and journalistic training, were part of GDM’s routine activities in their learning circles. However, as revealed by Suparyo, the

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training did not correlate significantly with an increase in the village’s journalistic products. From around 1,800 villages, which had requested GDM for its assistance to set up their village websites, only about 10 percent of them had been actively voicing their interests through the internet, whether on their website platforms or through their social media accounts (interview with Suparyo, par. 381). Nonetheless, this 10 percent strove to expose their experience to the outside world beyond their geographical sphere, in line with the new vision of “seen by the world”. Again, they became the centers in the periphery. Correspondingly, upon seeing the positive development of the voicing village, the central government has decided to support the mission. This could be seen from the 2017 ICT Village Festival, which carried the theme ‘Desa Bersuara untuk Indonesia’ or The Voicing Village for Indonesia.5 In this stage, as explained above, the media had an important role in tackling the issues voiced by the villages and reporting on them so they entered the public discourse. Rural communities must be able to connect with and engage in the media environment for their communication development. Rural communication development actors must have the ability to maximize their network potential and enter the media network. Referring to Castells’s (2011) “network-making power”, the network programmers had to construct the articulation of grassroots messages in such a way for them to be rated with good news values, which could be capitalized on by the mainstream media. For the network switchers, their ability to connect nodes of the village networks with those of the media networks was crucial for the movement to gain benefits from their various types of networks. The above illustration is an example of a network capital, which was successfully capitalized upon by GDM. This was an answer to the methodological challenge posed by Castells (2011) in his analysis of network-based power relationships, in which he asked researchers to “find the specific network configuration of actors, interests, and values who engage in their power-making strategies by connecting their networks of power to the mass communication networks – the source of the construction of meaning in the public mind” (Castells, 2011, p. 14). It was on this basis that the bottom-up communication development initiated by GDM in Melung gained considerable media resonance. However, the success of media attention was not without side effects. The media works with its own particular logic. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) define five factors that can influence media content/frame, i.e., the social systems, social institutions, 5

Press release of the Ministry of Communication and Information of Indonesia on the 2017 DesTIKa Festival. Retrived on February 14, 2018 from https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/ 11579/siaran-pers-no-233hmkominfo112017-tentang-festival-destika-2017-meningkatkantata-kelola-pemerintah-desa-berbasis-tik/0/siaran_pers.

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media organizations, routine practices and individuals. The media – here considered as located near the center because of their market-oriented mode of production – have their own agenda, which may not be in accordance with the agenda set by the villages in the periphery. The experience of Melung provided us with an example of how the village agenda articulated in a counterpublic sphere was not always in congruence with the agenda of the mass media, as reflected in and affected by the dominant public sphere. The self-described rural public village, which was constructed from below via its own communication channel, could be twisted when it was reconstructed by the media from above. This would have an impact on the formation of the alternative rural public, which was intended to be different because of its subjective formation. In Habermasian conceptualization, it was a type of the “colonization” of the rural public by the mass mediated dominant public (Habermas, 1991). The formation of rural public rested in an area which was to be negotiated between the interests of the rural community in the periphery and the media corporations in the center. This situation was an unintended consequence that must be dealt with by the village if it consciously wanted to connect with media networks. The non-synchronicity of the rural public between that of subjectively constructed by the village itself on the one hand, and that objectified by the media on the other hand, could be caused by the village’s inconsistency in mainstreaming the typical rural issues. Lindawati’s study on the desa.id village websites revealed the issues of the village’s potential and characteristics only received minimal coverage on the village website. For example, there was scant discourse about forests on the website of Dermaji Village (Banyumas Regency), despite the village’s location and the considerable attention it received as a “forest village” from the National Forestry Council. Of the 127 news items, only two stories raised the forest issues. It was far behind coverage of the village museum, which Dermaji is known for and is a source of pride for locals (interview with Lindawati, par. 245). Another example is Karangnangka Village, also in Banyumas Regency. Its potential was in the fisheries sector. However, only six fishery-related stories were published from 139 news items. Lindawati said Melung village website also presented similar reporting patterns, with a small number of reports on forestry despite its location at the foot of Mount Slamet and status as a forest village. The failure of the villagers to actively compose news which represent their village on its website was responded by the media with their coverages which were compatible with the Zeitgeist or more precisely with the market, i.e., related with digital technology and thus had more appeal to the current media audience who allegedly had similar interest and curiosity. It was the news of the media that actually had a louder voice and a longer media resonance than the village’s own voice in shaping the rural public.

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Furthermore, to support the implementation of the voicing village in mainstreaming the rural issues, GDM, in collaboration with PANDI and the Ministry of Communication and Information, launched the “free 1000 village websites” program using the hashtag #1000webdesagratis with desa.id as the domain. The program, launched in 2013, was part of the wider strategy to expand the networks of GDM and to increase the strength of the movement. A strong, solid movement with members throughout the regions was non-negotiable for the peripheries if they wanted to counter the domination of the center and enhance the initiative. This was also an attempt to get legal recognition from the government. Desa bersuara or the “voicing village” was a practical form of participatory communication in the context of communication development, which was executed within the online environment and articulated in the self-owned rural public spheres. (2) Response from the center After the village initiative was launched and the villages began to voice their interests publicly, the next step was to see the center’s response to the initiatives of the periphery. Three types of center responses were identified: recognition, rejection and disregard. (a) Recognition As expressed by the informants, there were a number of indications of the center’s recognition of periphery’s initiatives. The recognition of the center signified a meeting point between center and periphery, or between top-down and bottom-up approaches. At this meeting point, the synergistic and reciprocal communication between both sides began to flourish. One of the examples of those meeting points was the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM). Through PNPM, the villages’ development program proposals could be funded with the government’s development funds and would be integrated in the government’s development plans. However, Taryono said that in Rural PNPM, the rural communities only looked at the village from an urban perspective (interview, par. 23). At that time, the government was often in possession of rural development funds but was unsure of what to do with it and how to execute it. In the end, the government created an urban biased development program. Here, the development project was not preceded by communication development. After many villages, notably under the organization of GDM, had developed their own initiatives, the perspective of development slowly transformed. On the one hand, development proposals of the villages received more attention from the government and by using PNPM funds, there were indeed development programs,

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which originated from the bottom (interview with Taryono, par. 23 & 83). On the other hand, after the provision of the Village Funds, which gave the villages the authority to manage their own budgets, the villagers must curb the euphoria of village autonomy in order not to overstep the authority of the local government. The warning had to be taken into account by the village authority in order to establish a meeting point between village interests and the regency as the local ruler (Cp), especially because the regency still oversaw the Village Funds Allocation or ADD (interview with Taryono, par. 27). The meeting point between bottom-up and top-down within the network could also be personified in the active presence of government officials from various levels of “centers”, who became the “ambassadors” of GDM in their respective institutions. Many village program proposals were approved by the center with the help of these ambassadors, for example the desa.id domain program, the #1000webdesagratis, the village 2.0 program and many other digital based village development programs, which were seen as continuations of the previous programs to ensure their sustainability. In addition, the bottom-up village programs were linked to the existing ministry programs (top-down), so a synergistic development agenda could be established (Research Diary, pp. 122, 125 & 132; interview with Taryono, par. 51 & 83). Sudjatmiko highlighted the nature of the movement itself, which enabled an exchange between the state and the people. GDM was the antithesis of previous people’s movements (e.g., the agrarian advocacy movement) and even different from PNPM, whose entry point was at the lowest level of the society yet it did not involve the village heads. The nature of those kinds of grassroots movements was anti-system, which, for example, opposed a large plantation company and placed the village heads as the enemy because they were considered part of the bourgeois class who controlled the (failed) capitalist system. Such a pattern of people’s action resulted in a failed movement, which could have been “capitalized upon or mobilized to produce decisions that could be accepted by all parties” (Sudjatmiko, interview, par. 33). Conversely, GDM was a movement that, despite having a similar resistance character to development policies originating from the supra-villages, took a nonconfrontative path vis a vis the government authority. So far, people’s assistance, people’s movements, have come from the people. But then they failed to outwit the state because they were confrontational. The approach taken by our GDM fellows is something that locates in the intersection where the state and the people meet. (Sudjatmiko, interview, par. 33)

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The meeting of interests between the center and periphery encouraged the state to give its appreciation to village initiatives, which included the approval of the village’s “recognition right”, namely the rights to regulate itself. The recognition right was eventually stated in the Village Law No. 6/2014 (interview with Satrio, par. 47). The central government, through the Ministry of Communication and Information, specifically the Directorate General of Information Applications, has acknowledged the central role of the rural community in developing genuine applications to meet their own needs. Kurniawan explained the position of the ministry in dealing with villages’ bottom-up initiatives: The Ministry of Communication and Information (has been acting) as a supporting system, facilitates bottom-up initiatives to be legal and recognized, because they’ve already moved first. (We) intentionally don’t make (village) applications. (We) respect and believe that bottom-up applications are more applicable. (They) know what they need, (then they) make their own (application). In Yogyakarta (organized by) Combine, in Banyumas by GDM. (These initiatives) are the basics to be distributed throughout Indonesia. This was (intended) as a form of appreciation for bottom-up initiatives. (Interview, par. 11–12)

As Kurniawan stated above, need-based application – in accordance with the specific needs of the village – was the advantage of bottom-up developed applications. These could be termed “need-sensitive technology”. This was not designed and dropped from atop, which would end at disposal because it did not answer the people’s need. On the contrary, top-down applications/technologies were usually project-based and often profit-oriented as happened with the (M)PLIK project (see 2.3.). However, there was a contradiction from Kurniawan’s statement, in which he intended that these initiatives were to be multiplied and applied in other regions in Indonesia. This form of “packaged intervention” (Toyama, 2015) has been criticized by many scholars in ICT4D studies because it nullifies the diversity of regional initiatives and homogenizes the forms of technology used, and they are no longer “sensitive” and run counter to the principle of bottom-up initiative. The form of center recognition for the periphery’s initiative could vary. In this case, it was realized in the form of a request from the Ministry of Communication and Information to GDM to provide recommendations of villages deserving of recognition after Melung received a similar award in the 2013 ICT Village Festival. GDM was honored as a credible movement (interview with Satrio, par. 253 & 257). The model of the award also confirmed the idea of bottom-up initiatives; it was not given to the villages that had successfully run government packaged interventions

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but those who had developed their own initiatives from below and successfully implemented them or in other words: a Melung-like initiative (ibid., par. 247 & 249). Other evidence of the Ministry of Communication and Information recognition of the GDM initiative in Melung was its decision to make the ICT Village Festival an annual official festival after its successful launch in 2013 in the village. Furthermore, the festival would then receive full support from both central and the local governments in the form of funds and facilities, because they had learned from the success story of Melung’s ICT Village Festival organization and the many benefits it brought to Indonesian rural communities in general (ibid., par. 454 & 456). In communication development, this “duplication phase”, both the duplication of application developed locally and then applied in other areas (packaged intervention), as well as the duplication of events such as ICT Village Festival, could also mean the “adoption” of the bottom-up initiative by the center. In the adoption phase, people in the center transformed grassroots initiatives to become a national program (e.g., ICT Village Festival, desa.id) and integrated or recognized village-developed applications (e.g., Lumbungku, Mitra Desa) to be used as the official administrative tools in the rural e-Government system. (b) Rejection It was not uncommon for the villages to find their ideas rejected by the centers, both Cc and Cp, because the ideas conflicted with the center’s policies or because the center already had other priorities in their development plan. This meant that not all elements of the center provided recognition for village initiatives. The rejection could be total, but it could also be partial. If there was a rejection from the center, it meant that there was no meeting point between top and bottom and this impeded the successful implementation of communication development. An example of “total” rejection occurred in Banyumas Regency. The local government through its Office for Communication and Information balked at the usage of desa.id completely and forced villages to use the government-designed go.id. Meanwhile, a “partial rejection” came from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which dealt with rural issues alongside the Communication Ministry and the Village Ministry. In terms of the use of new ICTs in and by the rural community, the Ministry of Home Affairs, through the Directorate General of Village Government Development, was interested in integrating village data into an information system designed and implemented by the ministry, which needed to be inputted online by all villages and urban villages nationwide. The Ministry of Home Affairs had developed its own information system for this purpose, namely Prodeskel or (Village and Urban

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Village Profiles)6 (see Research Diary, pp. 132–133; interview with Taryono, par. 27). Rejection indicated no reciprocity between center and periphery. It was part of the center’s strategy to control and maintain the dominance over the periphery. There were at least two types of rejection which have been identified from the field research: structural and cultural constraints. The “structural constraints” occurred when the rejection was caused by the exercise of power of the supra-village over the village because of their position in the formal governance hierarchy, within which the village was forced to obey its superior. The coercion of the regency government to the village authority to apply the go.id domain signified the center’s refusal of the village’s status as an independent entity, which had the right to regulate itself. The rejection of desa.id and the coercion to use go.id domain only recognized the village authority as part of the lowest governance structure and perpetuated the status quo while placing it in the most marginal position in the central-periphery power relations. Another structural constraint was evident from the attempt of the Communication and Information Agency of Banyumas Regency, in collaboration with a research team from Jenderal Soedirman University, Purwokerto, to compile and implement its own version of ICT Model (Banyumas Informatics Model) in 2014, in which the involvement of the rural communities in the process of designing the model was minimal. Villages under GDM’s organization had earlier applied their self-designed ICT development model, which was not recognized by the Regency. Consequently, the Banyumas local authority did not support the idea nor the organization of the 2013 ICT Village Festival, which was initiated and organized by the people it is supposed to be governed. Support did not come until the central government gave its full endorsement of the event. It was fundamentally different from the subsequent ICT Village festivals, which received support from the regencies in their respective regions (interview with Satrio, par. 454). As a local e-Governance model, the Banyumas Informatics Model focused on the development of telecommunications infrastructure in rural areas, which would support the seamless process of communication between bureaucrats at the regency and their inferiors and between the government and the community, in which the “bureaucrat informatics model” was separated from the “public informatics models”. This model did not touch the human aspect of it, which was one of the important aspects in development. As reflected in the research diary, the Model determined 6

As per February 28, 2018, Prodeskel was moved from www.prodeskel.pmd.kemendagri. go.id to http://www.prodeskel.binapemdes.kemendagri.go.id/mpublik/. This was in preparation of the transfer of the Directorate General of Rural Development and Empowerment from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the auspices of the Village Ministry.

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how a village information system should be built (das Sollen) from above. However, the Model ignored the fact that the villages had already run many initiatives from below before and had moved itself without the guidance and direction from the local government, i.e., from the Communication and Information Agency of the Banyumas Regency (das Sein) (Research Diary, p. 80). As observed, despite having been considered as a structural constraint for bottomup initiatives to expand, the local Banyumas government was in possession of the written concepts of rural development and ICT-based community empowerment. However, it only embarked on minimal execution of these concepts. In contrast, the rural community had implemented many bottom-up initiatives in their neighborhoods yet these were not backed up by a detailed concept, especially for the long-term, which would risk the sustainability of these projects (Research Diary, p. 81). They could argue that such grassroots initiatives were marked by their growing and flexible characteristics, which could be formed and reformed in accordance with the dynamics of the movement itself, yet it could not hide the fact that they lacked long-term conceptual basis for many of their projects (interview with Taryono, par. 83). The structural constraint did not only occur in the context of power relations between the villages and supra-villages; it also emerged at the intra-village level. My observation of the role of Margino in Melung and GDM concluded that he was a village official who was notable for giving a critical perspective on the situation in his village compared to his colleagues and even Khoerudin as the village chief who replaced Satrio. In an example below, he criticized the top-down development programs, which he thought were not based on the need of the beneficiaries and the need to focus on human resources development. A: In the past there were many programs. But I think those programs spent way too much money … From the regency (and also) the provincial government, (those programs) were like that. Because they did not see, yes because they did not see the needs (of the people); what is needed in the community. They just give it (the program) like that … (For example) before, it was more about infrastructure, like building roads. Building roads is actually something that I think is very easy when in the context of building it, say, two or three months it will definitely show results. It’s different from building human resources, whose process might take decades. But if it’s limited to only infrastructure building, it’ll be very easy to judge that the development is successful or so … Q: So, the difference is the focus of development. Initially the focus of development is on infrastructure, actually what is needed is the development of its human resources.

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A: (Yes) human resources. Because, with all due respect, when money is poured into the village, no matter how much, … if its human resources don’t have the power (capability to utilize that money), it will also (be futile) … (Interview, par. 103–109)

His balanced viewpoint came from intense interaction with Satrio and with the GDM movement. In fact, he introduced me to Suparyo and other village activists at the House for Indonesian Villages (RDI). However, Margino did not have the formal power to transform his viewpoint into rural public policy in Melung after Satrio left office as village chief. There was a structural constraint in the village government that prevented him from making a breakthrough or to continue Satrio’s initiatives. His position in the village governance hierarchy actually worked against his becoming a decision maker for the village policy (see interview with Lindawati, par. 153). Lindawati shared her concern about the structural problem in the village with the emphasis on actor dependency, in which she questioned the sustainability of the project once Satrio left. When I finished this research, I also thought, if the people have been changed, would the outcome have been the same? It seems that it shouldn’t depend on the hands of certain actors and it hasn’t yet entered the community system. Suppose that [when] Pak Budi [Satrio] ‘disappears’, what will become of Melung? (Interview, par. 154)

Another factor that also inhibited center’s acceptance of grassroots initiatives was the “sectoral ego” between the ministries/agencies that took care of rural issues. Sectoral ego was an acute problem in the whole development discourse and conveyed by more than one informant during the interviews (with Taryono, par. 21, 27, 81; Lestari, par. 54, 56; Suparyo, par. 206, 300, 302, 325–331). Many villages were burdened by a number of projects from the ministries and the regencies, which objectified the village communities. In addition, these projects were not linked to each other and that exacerbated the problem. For example, the Ministry of Communication and Information initiated its own website project in tandem with its e-Government agenda. Likewise, the Ministry of Home Affairs operated the Prodeskel project, which profiled villages and the urban villages (kelurahan). The problem was that each of these projects required the village to input the data about village profiles, population (demography) and other matters through different applications, which were developed by each ministry. As a result, there was significant overlapping. Villagers found themselves required to input the same information repeatedly to different systems under the ministries. Meanwhile, the village information system that had been independently

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developed by the villages themselves, in which the same data had been compiled and completed with other information in an integrated system in accordance with the needs of the village, was not recognized by the government.7 The refusal to recognize the organic village information system led to the non-integration of data into the systems, designated from above (interview with Taryono, par. 21). Sectoral problems showed the ego as the dominator in center-periphery relations, whose domination power was weakened by the enactment of the Village Law. The power of the rural community was then strengthened or amplified by the utilization of new ICTs, which were characteristically open, fast, cheap and capable of crossing the structural boundaries. Taryono said the Banyumas Regency seemed to be “bent out of shape” (“kebakaran jenggot”) when it learned of GDM’s attempt to legalize the desa.id domain had reached PANDI, which is at the national level (Cc). Meanwhile, the village was initially not included in the clause as a government unit, and thereby ineligible to use the go.id domain. The provision only included kelurahan or urban villages as the lowest government entity. It spurred the regency to then integrate the villages into the go.id domain but through forcing them to use it rather than allowing them to develop their own domain or recognizing the existing desa.id (interview with Taryono, par. 23). Satrio believed that the regency did not want to be rivaled by the “progress” made by GDM. He saw a reluctance from the side of the regency to learn with the village communities, let alone from them. The analysis shows that there was structural ego or feeling of prestige because of the regency’s higher position in the government hierarchy, contributing to an unwillingness to accept the reality that people in the villages were “smarter” than those in urban areas and that they would “teach” them something about development (interview with Satrio, par. 227 & 229). It remains to be determined if this condition was partly a legacy of the culture of Indonesian bureaucrats, who inherited the character of Javanese patrimonialism internalized by the public during the more than three decades of New Order rule. Patrimonial culture instilled in people the belief that a person with a higher position in a government 7

Toward the end of the data collection period, I learned that the Sideka or Sistem Informasi Desa dan Kawasan (Village and Regional Information System) was being developed. Sideka was “a synergy between the village-to-develop movement that represents the downstream and the develop-the-village movement that represents the upper stream” (http://bp2dk.id/sis tem-informasi-desa-kawasan/, retrieved on March 2, 2018) and developed jointly between elements of the community and Badan Prakarsa Pemberdayaan Desa dan Kawasan or the Village and Regional Empowerment Initiative Agency (BP2DK) as the representative of the government. Sideka is an example of the output of a successful communication development activity, where there was a meeting point between bottom-up initiative and top-down development planning.

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institution is ascribed the status of a patron to his/her subordinates, or, essentially, a patronizing relationship (see 2.1.2. and 2.2.3.). If this center-periphery imbalanced pattern of relationship was perpetuated, there would be no reciprocal learning for the parties involved in the dispute. At this point, the change of paradigm from development communication to communication development was deemed necessary. The change should apply to both the state authorities and civil society at all levels. Communication in development communication inclined to be treated merely as a tool with which people pursued development goals. Consequently, technology was also used and integrated in development projects as a tool to enhance the effectiveness of strategic communication. In contrast, in communication development it was less about technology, but more about mutual understanding of what must be pursued in between the interinstitutional development targets. The importance of communication development was increasing, particularly in the time of regional autonomy or decentralization policy in Indonesia, with each government unit at every government level appearing to have the willingness to exercise their power, be it over other government bodies or over their citizens. In addition to the structural constraint, the “cultural constraint” was closely related to hierarchical, status-oriented Javanese culture, with deference toward those of higher status and their wants and opinions. They could be the community leaders, village heads, structurally superior bureaucrats or simply the elders of the community (interview with Lindawati, par. 85, 124–125, 208). In Javanese society great emphasis is placed on ewuh pakewuh, which can be interpreted loosely as a manners system of human interaction where guarding harmony in social relationships is important to avoid engendering ill feeling, especially toward those of high status. According to Lindawati, in the context of rural citizen journalism, the ewuh pakewuh culture could become an obstacle when the villagers wanted to criticize the supra-village in their online reports on the village website but were too afraid of the consequences from “above” if the supra-village was offended. It was an uneasy situation that could result in the fiercely avoided disharmony in social relationships (interview with Lindawati, par. 85 & 125). Smooth advocacy efforts of the periphery to the center was one indicator of a successful communication development, especially when new media was utilized in the process, but advocacy efforts through online publications could be unsuccessful, if the center, as the party who was addressed in this process, exerted pressure on the community in the offline realm. This situation did occur in Melung. News items posted on the village website on the actual conditions of development projects became a reference for journalists at

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local media, particularly newspapers. This transfer of discourse from a small rural public to the larger mainstream public sphere did not sit well with the regency. Regency officials upbraided village officials for not informing them of the journalists’ visits. Melung villagers reacted by self-censuring and not posting any news for a period. The supra-village expected the village community to fall in line with its wishes. In fact, the regency has since vetted all news postings on the village website (interview with Satrio, par. 623–698). There was another alleged example of cultural constraints in Dermaji Village, Banyumas Regency. I was informed of it by the village chief, Bayu, at the third GDM anniversary event in Srowot Village, Banyumas, on December 24, 2014. He recounted that young people in the village, who were digitally literate and accustomed to using social media, had engaged in increased conversations about social problems in the area. However, the output of the discussions, which took place in the self-regulated and self-invented public sphere, could not be converted into a single village policy with coercive power to change actual conditions. The situation occurred because there were no representatives of the youths in the rural political system such as the BPD, which possessed the authority to discuss and issue village regulations together with the village chief. Elders who did not access online media – considered alternative media that provided a space for new counterpublics where alternative discourses were displayed and popular opinions were challenged through alternative interpretations – continued to dominate the BPD membership (Research Diary, p. 98). Ultimately, this online counterpublic sphere was not able to become an intermediary organ between civil society and policy makers or the political system, between the bottom and the top, between periphery and center, and even within the village itself because of the cultural constraint that was immune to the technological advances. New ICTs were not always able to become solutions for social problems due to the generation gap and tech savvy. According to Lindawati, “those who access (the internet) can’t enter there (the village political system), (conversely) those who can enter there (the village political system) don’t access (the internet),” (interview, par. 124). It appears there existed a gap between technology, culture and the political system in certain village communities that needed another approach to overcome the gap apart from a technological approach. In summary, villages resorted to two types of reactions when experiencing rejection from supra-villages. They either treated the rejection as motivation to go straight to the top – the national level – through bypassing the regency, or they responded by withdrawing the initiative and acceding to the dictates of their superiors, as was culturally acceptable. The decision to bypass the structural barrier was a sign that they

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were ready to vie with the “superior” authority in terms of determining a program as the best solution to the development problem in their area. (c) Disregard This category of response means there was no official or clear statement from the center whether it supported or rejected the periphery’s initiative. Disregard was not caused by the center’s ignorance because the regency was long aware of Melung’s initiative, according to Khoerudin (interview, par. 91 & 93). In fact, the regency no longer had the power to reject the village initiative because the central government gave the greenlight for the project after several village activists circumvented the regency’s structural barrier. Formally, the villages no longer needed the presence of the regency in this matter. Meanwhile, the regency did not publicly state its support either, because it wanted to pursue its own ICT development agenda and e-Governance model, to be implemented in the very same village locations in the region. An expression of public support of village initiative would have meant the scuttling of their own development plans. At this point, the regency (Cp) was trapped between these two interests, the interests of the village from below (Pp) and the pressure of the central government from atop (Cc). In this situation, the regency chose a “wait and see” approach to the further development of the village’s initiative while showing a neutral response. In doing so, the Cp could select a more suitable response to the initiative. One strategy to get out of this awkward situation was to imitate the idea of the village (for example in the case of village websites) by creating website platforms for them under the go.id domain with similar interface with that of the desa.id. Previously the villages were not allowed to use go.id because they were not considered part of the government structure, but the regency eventually invited the village communities to actively fill in the aforementioned website templates with censor-able contents. The invitation did not receive a warm welcome in the rural communities because it raised fresh problems. As discussed above, the implementation of go.id as the village website’s domain meant ignoring the existence of village-specific domain desa.id and it would still keep rural people in the position of objects in this development cycle (interview with Taryono, par. 25). “Imitation” was part of the center’s adoption phase on periphery’s initiatives. As with rejection, adoption could also be done for the whole “package”, both ideas and products (total adoption), where the regency recognized and then used desa.id as the official village website domain, as happened in Majalengka Regency. Adoption could also be partial, for example the adoption of a village’s idea with a different product output. The regency’s imitation of some features of village websites under

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desa.id, such as its appearance, on go.id domain reflected partial adoption, as Tisam recounted of Banyumas Regency. Indeed, we’ve made our own, the (website) template, so that people can come here (to) the website (showing examples of village websites on his computer) … Indeed, we made this only simple. I can’t make anything good. But my website (model) might have the advantage from the other regencies and cities, for example this (showing an example of a village website on his computer). It looks the same (with desa.id), right? But this, this (village) web portal goes to the Banyumas (Regency) web portal. This (village) website is also linked with the (regency’s) website. (Interview, par. 40)

Disregard could also happen even though the Banyumas Regency officials had verbally backed up village initiatives through supportive statements in the media. This was because in reality, no real action from the regency has been seen to accelerate or guarantee the implementation of village initiatives. Taryono discussed the issue. … it was stated in the media that … the regent supported (the village initiative) … the governor then backs up (too, saying) ‘ok’. But the reality on the ground is that I haven’t seen anything real. Support, yes, (even) every verbal statement in the media (said that it) is a good website to develop but (the instruction) hasn’t reached the bottom. The proof is that the Ministry of Communication and Information made the website it by itself, (which) … was not integrated with the existing functions, so it really became a real burden when it came to the village. If I’m not mistaken, 3 to 4 applications, that must be filled (by the village). (For example) Prodeskel, then (applications) from another Ministries. The mission is a lot of data that might actually be linked but not yet. That might be a website problem. (Interview, par. 27)

(3) Forced reactions from the center to compete with or support village initiative Bottom-up communication development would still progress regardless of the decision of the regency. As Taryono acknowledged, digital grassroots initiatives were difficult to stop by the government because they were part of a fluid movement organized by decentralized nodes (interview, par. 25). The progressiveness and persistence of this movement in developing bottom-up communication were seen as a form of resistance to the center’s development programs that did not involve the periphery. This applied when the type of adoption taken, as outlined in point (2) above, was not total adoption, but was a partial or even total rejection of the initiative of the village. Total adoption indicated a meeting point between the center and the periphery and the establishment of synergistic communication (interview with Taryono, par. 23), while partial adoption could mean a delay in the development of

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synergistic communication and total rejection signified that there was no communication between the conflicting parties. Let us focus on the last two types of adoption in this phase. In the case of partial adoption or total rejection, both the village and the regency stuck to their own ICT program, which included the website domain issue and the applications used in the village information system. It resulted in latent competition between the village and the supra-village to achieve the goals of their respective ICT development agenda, sans interactivity and reciprocity between these two initiatives. The village in the periphery took this strategy to break away from the regency’s domination and control, and to strive for its independence and sovereignty, as mandated by the Village Law. The village created its own publicity through the persistent use of desa.id. This reflected the bottom-up form of participatory communication, where a newly created public sphere was owned by the village community and it held full control over it. Meanwhile, the supra-villages’ strategy was meant to maintain dominance and power over the rural population by persistently forcing go.id onto the village. However, closer inspection reveals an “imbalance of dependency” between the regency and the village community pertaining to their ICT projects. The existence of desa.id was not dependent on the regency’s approval, while the functioning of go.id for the village websites was completely contingent on the willingness of the villages to welcome the regency’s “invitation” to use it as their domain. In this case, the village community had the upper hand. The central government (Cc) also interfered in the Village Information System project. The Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Areas and Transmigration – in cooperation with a third party – established www.indonesiamemban gun.id in December 2014 and invited all villages to use the site as the base to set up their village websites. A template of Melung Village website was also provided under this domain; only missing from it was its contents that needed to be provided by villagers themselves (see Research Diary, pp. 88–94). This development could be construed in two ways: First, it could be taken that the village website project was once again re-centralized and would have been managed by the central government. In the climate of the decentralization policy, which was the context of this research and coupled with the characteristics of new media that should encourage the growth of new communication forces in the peripheries, this action from Cc was counterproductive because it weakened the villages’ effort for self-dependency and retarded their communication development process. Second, there was the use of “Indonesia Membangun” (Indonesia Develops) as the website’s address (Figure 7.4). It was unclear whether the name was meant to rival GDM’s “village development” (literally “Village-to-Develop”) vision but it

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nonetheless showed that the old development paradigm was still top of mind of the authorities, which believed the local regions must be built by the state or by the center; in other words, top-down development model. While GDM advocated a supportive stance toward village self-reliance, in which every village should be able to develop itself from below and placed itself as the subject of the development, Indonesia Membangun displayed the central government’s reluctance toward village autonomy for determining their development. The project was short-lived. It ended after receiving a barrage of criticism, especially after it was revealed that every village was required to pay a fee to set up the website on the page (see Research Diary, p. 88).

Figure 7.4 The interface display of Melung’s Village website under www.indonesiamem bangun.id8

The regency’s actions – considered as a form of one-upmanship toward the progressiveness of village initiatives – were varied. They included the resistance to learning together on an equal basis at the meeting point of Rumah Desa Indonesia (interview with Satrio, par. 136, 223–227), imposing use of go.id while ignoring the desa.id (interview with Margino, par. 55; Taryono, par. 23) and scheduling similar activities (e.g., workshops) at the same time as GDM events (interview with Margino, par. 151). Was it an indication that feudalism still had a significant 8

Retrieved on December 23, 2014; see Research Diary, pp. 91–94.

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influence on the attitudes of the regency, which presumed that the “lower” position of the villages should render them less empowered than the regency? Pertaining to the influence of culture on decision-making of public policy, especially the communication policy, Mowlana and Wilson (1987, p. 143, cited in Servaes, 2000, p. 30) explains that [c]ommunications policies are basically derivatives of the political, cultural and economic conditions and institutions under which they operate. They tend to legitimize the existing power relations in society, and therefore, they cannot be substantially changed unless there are fundamental structural changes in society that can alter these power relationships themselves.

What was done by the GDM activists through their communicative actions, in which new ICT was their weapon, would basically alter the power structure fundamentally between the center and the peripheries. The consequences of this change, which were caused by the practice of communication development, will be explained in the next section. However, several informants acknowledged that the resistant attitude of the regency could be due to the personal demeanor of non-cooperative Tisam who was responsible for the telematics programs in Banyumas rural areas (interview with Kurniawan, par. 24; Satrio, par. 136, 138, 142 & 276). Nonetheless, his top-down views on the development of rural internet, when manifested in the form of formal public policy, became a reflection of the general view of his institution about that matter. This was the reason why the decision of each regency was different from one another in responding to village initiatives. For example, Majalengka Regency was supportive of village initiatives and backed up the implementation of the 2014 ICT Village Festival in its area. Similar examples of support occurred in East Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and West Java as related by Taryono (interview, par. 23). In this situation, the regency (Cp) was squeezed between the power of Cc and Pp. The position of the regency also contributed to the shaping of the “dismissive” attitude of the Cp as described above. Banyumas Regency received pressure not only from the very bottom of the social hierarchy (the villagers) but also from the very top of the government’s hierarchy (the central government) to collaborate with the villages/GDM and eventually accept the village version of rural ICT development. Taryono said the regency was initially “antipathetic” to the idea of GDM as a means to realize social “equality”. However, because some of the village activists circumvented bureaucratic barriers by directly handling the matter with the central government, the regency had no choice but to forcefully adopt a portion of the

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village’s ideas, and finally acknowledged and provided (verbal) support for them (interview, par. 23). Such pressures were sometimes needed to establish communication between the interested parties. This underscored that communication development was not linear. Figure 7.5 shows that from the periphery, communication messages could be addressed directly to the center by leapfrogging the center in the periphery (or sometimes several intermediate centers and peripheries simultaneously) and then bouncing back down again. Or it could be the opposite, from the top downward to the bottom and then back to the top again.

Pressure from top Central government / Center in center (Cc) / The top

Pressure from bottom Regency government / Center in periphery (Cp) / The midlde

Village government/community / Periphery in periphery (Pp) / The bottom

Figure 7.5 Model of communication leap in communication development

What occurred in Melung was an example of authentic participatory communication starting from below. The communicative participation of the village community in communication development targeted directly the power holders above the village, which were considered superior to them and demanded the distribution of powers. To this, Servaes (2000) says that the authentic practice of participation “often decreases the advantage of certain groups” (p. 29) and in this case it would reduce the authority of the regency in controlling the village community. From this point, we will go into detail about the consequences of bottom-up communication development, which on its journey to the top had to face a number of centers/peripheries at several layers of power. (4) Consequences of bottom-up communication development Bottom-up communication development could result in two types of consequences: intended and unintended consequences.9 The separation between intended and unintended consequence could be unclear in some cases and changes could fall into 9

Instead of intended and unintended consequence, Glaser (1978, p. 74), in Theoretical Sensitivity uses the terms anticipated and unanticipated consequence as one of the subfamilies for consequences.

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both categories. As the outcomes, another five consequences have been identified in addition to the three changes in the field of development communication, the public sphere and the center-periphery relations, which were sought through this research, making eight changes in total on various aspects of ICT4D. These changes consist of a). changes in center-periphery relations (the shift of power structure and the question of empowerment) b). changes in village self-concept (the question of village identity) c). changes in the working method of grassroots movement (the nature of the movement) d). changes in the operation of public sphere (the role of the marginalized public in political participation) e). changes in the practice of democracy at the national and local level (the question of political transformation) f). reflective consequences on the development project (the question of project sustainability) g). changes in the perception of knowledge (asymmetrical value of knowledge), and h). changes in the meaning of connectivity (the role of network). Here is a detailed exploration of their consequences: (a) Changes in center-periphery relations or the shift of power structure and the question of empowerment In the context of political decentralization as occurred in Indonesia since Reformasi began, essentially the sources of power should have been plural. Therefore, the enactment of the 2014 Village Law was an attempt to realize the decentralization policy broadly and equitably by giving back to the rural community the rights of the villages to organize themselves after it was co-opted by the state (i.e., central government) during the authoritative New Order regime. Tensions and power struggle between the center and the local regions that have persisted since the establishment of this country have moved dynamically like a pendulum whose movement was determined by the diverse interests of many political actors (see 2.2.). However, even though the Village Law had been enacted (in effect for two months at the time of data collection), which meant that the state re-recognized the village’s rights to self-regulate, there were still efforts to co-opt the villages by other government units (supra-village). Several village activists responded by forming a

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movement in the interests of the village community. The use of new ICTs amplified the movement’s effort to accelerate some types of intended structural changes in the context of power relations between the center and the peripheries. The e consequences of communication development on the changes in centralperiphery relations were intended, and at the same time, anticipated from the very beginning of the movement’s initiation. By the means of new ICTs, changing the old and feudal arrangement of central-periphery relations had been one of the goals of communication development. The “formal-bureaucratical-feudal” relations were transformed into “defeudalized-informal-unbureaucratical” ones, where center and periphery alike had equal opportunity and freedom to express their interests and opinions in various public forums. The ICT Village Festival (DesTIKa) was a perfect example of an ideal forum, Satrio said. The concept, the idea that we offer to the Ministry of Communication and Information about the ‘space’ is actually how to build a common space for hospitality (silaturahmi/get together) between villages. That’s what other ministries have never done. That means in a relaxed atmosphere … (Sulastri added:) Not too formal. There were trainings (from the government), right? But they were in tense atmospheres, in classes, in various villages, right? But such an atmosphere didn’t build an intimate atmosphere. Well, the spirit of DesTIKa is actually to build an atmosphere of intimacy between villages from various regions. (Interview, par. 452–454)

Consequently, along with the changes in central-periphery relations, the pattern of communication between them had also changed into a faster, more interactive and less formal one than before. This new form of communication pattern followed the character of communication technologies used by GDM, namely the internet and social media. From the other perspective, i.e., from the regency’s point of view, which was sandwiched between the interests of the village and the central government, this change of relations was unintended and unanticipated. This was revealed when Tisam was asked about the policy of Banyumas Regency in responding to the emergence of village initiatives; he responded that the regency wanted to “control everything” (interview, par. 40). The village, especially in the case of the village website project, wanted to retain its “power over” the villages by controlling and supervising the contents of the village website (ibid., par. 50). This means, in the eyes of the regency, the formal relation between them (Cp) and the villages (Pp) was not intended to be

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changed. The feudal structure of center-periphery relations (Galtung, 1971, p. 89; see Figure 3.3 in 3.3.1.) was to be maintained. Suparyo (interview, par. 218) mentioned “asymmetrical relations” when illustrating village relationships with the supra-villages, though it was more accurately depicted as a formal link between superiors and subordinates (patron-client) where the former had the final say in deciding the latter’s development policy. The decision came after the villages had submitted their proposals to the regency. This bottom-up planning model was derided as being of a “caricative” character, meaning caricaturish because its procedures were only for formality sake and continued the powerlessness of the villages. Well this Musrenbang (Village Development Planning Meeting) is really very caricative. Very caricative, (as if the government says) ‘please, the village plans its development, from the hamlet level to the village’. Then, we also go (plan further) to the district, right? (asking rhetorically to Margino). But all of our planning, we are reflecting together, less than 5% can be accommodated. It means that 95% (of it) is actually bull**** (cursing). (Suparyo, interview, par. 202)

Suparyo continued, it used to be bottom-up planning but it was all caricative. We’re told to plan the program, but the funds were determined (by the supra-village) [sarcastically laughing]. Well, I’ve turned it around. It was a very tiring struggle because it involved many politicians, it concerned the asymmetrical relationships between the supra-village government and the village. So, the relationship between the regency and the village is actually like (between) boss-subordinate. (Interview, par. 218)

Satrio extrapolated on the impact of the patron-client or asymmetrical relationship between the regency and the village community. He said many village officials, especially among the older generation, were reticent to receive training if the trainer did not come from the regency. He described this situation as a “colonization of mindset” (“penjajahan mindset”) (interview, par. 231), which implied that liberation from such an oppressive mindset through empowerment was necessary. Through “a very tiring struggle” (Suparyo, interview, par. 218), the village community was able to reverse this condition, including by means of the “voicing village”, i.e., mainstreaming rural issues. By doing so, the local community was forced to empower and rely on themselves to express their own direction of development. Indeed, rural empowerment was a further consequence of the transition of power between central and periphery. The voices of the villages, which came out of their

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own efforts, had strengthened the village community themselves communicatively. At the same time, this method was a rejection of the rural empowerment method as a “program”, which saw the village as the object to be empowered by other external actors (the government or NGOs), instead of as a self-empowering subject (more about “village self-empowerment” in 7.2.). The changes into a more fluid center-periphery relationship were also illustrated by Kurniawan (interview, par. 150) in a story of collaborative works between the government and elements of civil society in the planning and implementation of the ICT Village Festivals. For the events, the governments at the national and local levels provided financial support and official endorsement of the activities, while village communities and other elements of civil society contributed with all the resources they had, for example participating actively in organizing the event, designing it and providing ground personnel as well as engaging in executing the agreed concept. This combination of top-down and bottom-up planning and execution of development projects was an indication of symmetrical communication development, which occurred due to the process of “bridging”, i.e., a synergistic and communicative process through which center and periphery interests converged. The PNPM program was one example in which this convergence could be found. As illustrated in Figure 7.6, the bridging process consisted of two vertical communicative approaches: “approaching downward”, when the center dropped down to capture ideas from below and by doing so it appreciated and recognized the grassroots initiative, and “approaching upward”, which occurred when the peripheries, in this case the village community and the citizens in general, opened talks with the (central or local) government officials to seek legality of their initiatives, thereby recognizing their authority within the framework of formal constitutional state system. The role of bridging was critical in a situation where the center already had a concept for developing the peripheral regions but in no possession of adequate execution ability due to limited resources/manpower. Concurrently, the people in the periphery lacked a proper concept for their initiative (limited to ideas and goals without a clear procedure how to reach those goals) but possessed the resources to execute those ideas although rather pragmatically and sporadically (see Research Diary, p. 81). In such a case, bridging was important so that the usage of these two resources could be optimized to form an integrated and more sustainable development program for the benefit of both parties. For the center, bridging functioned to dismiss the superior-subordinate ego and remove the rigidity of bureaucracy when confronted with grassroots initiatives. For the periphery, bridging was important to understand the government’s interests in the national/local development agenda in

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Figure 7.6 Convergent communication pattern or the “bridging” process of communication development between center and periphery

order that the community could be more accepting of it in the future through finding a point of commonality. In bridging, all parties were expected to communicate equally in whatever forum occurred. Bridging required the willingness of the bureaucrats to interact with the people and vice versa; the periphery should not be hostile to formal development programs of the center. Moreover, bridging was not only important for the synergy of vertical center-periphery relations but implied within it was also a dimension of horizontal center-center relations, which, because of the sectoral ego, as exemplified above in the case of the dispute about Village Information System between the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Village and the Ministry of Communication

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and Information, was prone to conflict of interest. The village communities and the people at the grassroots level were generally the victims of such conflicts among the elite. Communication harmony between all stakeholders involved in communication development became both the conditions and outcomes for/of the successful communication development. Citizen participation in communication development showed that in the current digital era, participatory communication policies did not have to be preceded by structural changes, as happened previously in the era of mass communication (Servaes, 2000, p. 29–30). In contrast, in digital communication, in which communication resources were decentralized, participatory communication from bottom could lead to structural changes, in this case, to the changes in structural relations between the center and peripheries. The emphasis of communication development on the “process” rather than on a predetermined “end” of development project was consistent with Servaes’s “another development”, whose communication approach is “more concerned with process and context, that is, on the exchange of ‘meanings,’ and on the importance of this process, namely, the social relational patterns and social institutions that are the result of and are determined by the process” (Servaes, 2010, p. 30). Communication development underlined the role of civil society at the lower level in expressing publicly its genuine ideas and opinions about development, which encouraged the plurality of development perspectives. Its communication approach was conceptually similar to “another communication”, which also “favors multiplicity, smallness of scale, locality, deinstitutionalization, interchange of sender-receiver roles (and) horizontality of communication links at all levels of society” (McQuail, 1983, p. 97 cited in Servaes, 2000, p. 30). Despite the dynamic process of center-periphery communication development, some aspects were left in the status quo. In some cases, the center persisted to be the center and the periphery remained as it was. “Elite capture” has transformed the actors of communication development – usually the village elites (center in village) who strategically utilized the digital – to become the “digital elites” of Pp, while other members of the community who were not familiar with this medium and did not use it as a productive technology to capitalize on their resources remained marginalized within their community (periphery in village). They were excluded from this digital-based development project and became the “digital victims” of Pp because they did not share the ownership of the project, which was developed by the elites in their village. Rural digital development project has constructed a distinct public with its own center and periphery. Another example of this is illustrated in the relation between the rural community and the provincial government, which could be said to have had no significant

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change despite the use of new digital technologies. According to Satrio (interview, par. 335), the Melung authorities did not develop communication with the provincial government because they assumed that the province did not possess any territorial authority over the village. The provincial government was considered to be only an extension of the central government in the local region, whose function was only to coordinate with the regencies under its supervision. Even if a communication relationship with the province did exist, it was limited only to bureaucratical matters. For these reasons, the village authority chose to circumvent the provincial government and directly establish communication with the central government. At the level of substantive theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the changes in centralregional communication constellation have contributed to the actualization of the model of center-periphery relations. In the context of Indonesian political decentralization, the use of the internet has given the people in peripheral areas more opportunity to intensify their power to challenge the power of the center. The pressure for the center transpired in the form of online contribution. Until recently the voice of the rural people was often neglected by the mainstream media, online actions were the way to make their presence counted by the wider public. Here, online participation was seen as a symbol of resistance against the center’s domination of power. Drawing from Suparyo’s statement, the internet has strengthened the effort of the villagers to “voice the voiceless” (interview, par. 62) to the outside world. Before regional autonomy, village communities pointed to one entity they considered to be responsible for their marginalization within the Indonesian political sphere: the central government at the very top of the hierarchy. In the meantime, as decentralization was already in kracht, they had to fight for power with more parties in the peripheries, i.e., the local (provincial/regency) governments in the middle of the hierarchy. As these mid-level governments gained more authority in Indonesian politics, the significant value of village networks increased. The power of the network was obvious because the villages did not have to fight separately against their regency superiors. The interests of the villages had been strongly backed up by the network (GDM) by communicating their demands collectively from bottom to top. By doing so publicly, it helped to counter similar obstacles faced by other village communities in their respective regencies. The case of “Pancasan roof tiles” described in 7.1.2.2.(1)(c) proved the power of the inter-village networks to put pressure on the center in achieving their goals (interview with Lindawati, par. 95–96). Bridging, mainstreaming village issues and conducting dialogues or workshops in learning circles were basically the “communicative actions” (Habermas, 1984), which were exercised by GDM activists on both online and offline platforms across their vast networks. When these actions reached the top and they finally found consensus upon certain issues (e.g., upon desa.id domain), the central government

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together with the people could conclude a deal by forming a coalition against the regency, for instance in the case of rural ICT development as illustrated above in Figure 7.5. The forming of the coalition between Cc and Pp indicated the presence of “harmony of interest” (Galtung, 1971), which would strengthen particularly the Pp. The coalition would put more pressure on the regional power holders (Cp) to let the villages execute their own development initiatives. In this situation, no “bridgehead” (ibid.) was found in Cp that could guarantee the fulfillment of the interest of both centers (Cc and Cp) because there was “disharmony of interests” (ibid.) between Cc and Cp and also between Cp and Pp. Moreover, because each regency reflected an autonomous power, they were not bound to each other nor influenced one another communicatively. This type of communication relationships between the regencies made the competition with the villages more problematic because the people in rural areas had tied themselves in a solid network that contributed to their collective empowerment (see 7.2.2.). To depict this phenomenon, we should refer to Figure 3.3 that illustrates Galtung’s model of feudal center-periphery structure. According to that model, the peripheries are deliberately secluded and cut off from their peers in order to maintain the feudal structure of power. A group of peripheries belongs to a certain center and they are isolated in such a way in order to protect the center from any dissatisfaction, protest or even rebellion of the peripheries. In politics, this strategy is known as divide et impera (Galtung, 1971, p. 90). In contrast, the centers are connected to each other, so they can have interaction and arrange a deal among themselves regarding the “fate” of their peripheries; in Galtung’s words, “if you stay off my satellites, I will stay off yours” (ibid., p. 89). In the meantime, following what had been observed in Melung and within the GDM networks, the use of the internet for communication development by the village activists has transformed the structure of Galtung’s center-periphery model significantly and in most parts communicatively. It has not only changed the vertical relations between center and peripheries, but also the horizontal relations among the centers and among the peripheries. Figure 7.7 pictures a new structure of center-periphery relations, characterized by its network features. This new networked structure of center-periphery relations illustrates how the villages (Pp) have strengthened communicatively (and consequently politically). This new structure emerged after the internet – as a communication medium to voice the concerns of the rural communities and to form/expand the village networks – was used continually, massively and strategically by the Pp. Through online networks they were no longer isolated from their peers, nor confined by the formal-bureaucratic style of communication of their superiors (Cp). They could now interact with each other and join forces to push the Cp

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Figure 7.7 A new networked structure of center-periphery relations

(the regency) to give more freedom to Pp regarding their bottom-up development initiatives. Meanwhile, the communication relations among the regencies (illustrated by dashed lines) were a loose interaction as it was limited to a bureaucratic style of communication, which was influenced by their regional autonomy philosophy. Additionally, Pp could use their network to communicate directly with Cc (the central government) without the need to be intermediated by Cp regardless of their geographical situation. Immediately after the ties with Cc have been built, this, in turn, could command Cp using its instructional communication and legitimate authority to take actions in favor of Pp (for example recognizing desa.id as the official village website’s domain). (b) Changes in village self-concept or the question of village identity Identity is a topic that was not a part of the design of this research initially. However, identity as a buzzword was often expressed by the informants in the interview sessions, especially about the domain desa.id and the “internet village”, indicating

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it is an important topic both for GDM and the Melung community. It became one of the cornerstones of the village struggle in the virtual realm (interview with Suparyo, par. 277). Therefore, this study cannot rule out the topic of identity as one of the changes which was caused by the interaction of Melung and GDM with digital technology. Suparyo explained that there were three reasons why GDM proposed the desa.id domain to PANDI, with identity as the first. Firstly, our proposal is from identity (reason). This (desa.id) we need as this (identity). Secondly … to disseminate information about the village. Thirdly, it is the way to communicate between villages, which is geographically dispersed. The disclosure of public information is theoretically possible, but I don’t think it has been logically made available to the village government in general. Yes, some village chiefs are okay (able to do it). But (it was) for these three reasons: identity, publication, information and experience sharing. (Interview, par. 290)

Suparyo also used identity when he rejected the versions of village websites, which were proposed by the regency (go.id) and by the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Areas and Transmigration (indonesiamembangun.id). the identity of the village is not there … Melung was able to become melung.desa.id was a struggle and they (the Melung community) participated in the struggle. For example, (if) we change to melung.kedungbantengkab.banyumas.go.id, they didn’t wish it, right? … It is not in their heart; the village’s heart is not there. They already have their own identity, which they’ve fought for from the bottom. Yes, maybe for them it is the history of their struggle … And now, the villages that used ‘.com’ have changed to become ‘desa.id’. Because … it has this identity … when they go for ‘desa.id’, (it’s like they say) “this is our identity” … And this identity is trained with the solidarity of learning circles, not top-down. So, … to get ‘desa.id’, (the villages) had to fight. (Interview, par. 600)

Satrio underlined that the construction of village identity in the virtual world through desa.id was not forced on all villages of GDM. Instead GDM was trying to raise awareness that desa.id bore a deep meaning as a sign of existence of Indonesian villages in cyberspace. We never insisted, no. Please (each village) feel free to take the initiative. We just (want) to foster initiative. We also cannot force it like the government, because we’re indeed a social movement, a village awareness movement. Now (the question is) does the village want to have its own identity? The village has its own identity, now. Like that. There’s clearly a village domain. That’s all. We never insisted, even though they

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want to use blogspot (or) there are those who use subdomains … they’re legitimate, well, the media information on how they promote the village depends on their own understanding. … In the internet world someone will be clearer identified, you know. So that for example (melung.desa.id), Melung is a village in ‘id’, so it’s clearer, right, (a village) in Indonesia? … Now, carrying the Indonesian name will be far more … more respectable in the world of information technology. (Satrio, interview, par. 57–59)

Khoerudin confirmed that the label Melung as an “internet village” has indeed become a kind of identity, although he confessed that they felt “normal” about it (interview, par. 65). A Google search for “Desa Melung” (per September 3, 2015) yielded links to Melung’s official website, Wikipedia page and social media accounts (Twitter and Facebook). Other than links to those sites, there were links to articles from many media outlets that positioned Melung as an internet village, such as a YouTube video showing a news coverage from Metro TV (‘Melung Desa Internet/‘Melung Internet Village’),10 an article from VIVA News (‘Melung, Kisah Sebuah DesaInternet’/‘Melung, a Story of an Internet Village’),11 and from KataData (‘Melung, Desa Internet di Lereng Gunung Slamet’/‘Melung, an Internet Village at the Valley of Mount Slamet’; Figure 7.8).12 According to Khoerudin, the label “internet village” attached to Melung came from external parties (mass media, social media and non-Melung residents) after they learned about Melung’s internet development project (interview with Khoerudin, par. 63–73). If we gather in the regency, they who know Melung (will greet us) “oh, you come from Melung, right?” . . . Sometimes the media, like the other day from SCTV13 come to Melung . . . the people know (about Melung) from watching television . . . as an internet village. As a village that has an internet network . . . they know Melung because of its internet, even in the regency forum, our head of district says that “if (we talk about) internet village, it is Melung” . . . I’ve met several times with my fellow colleagues 10

Retrieved on September 3, 2015 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVcgD7QyXSg Retrieved on September 3, 2015 from http://sorot.news.viva.co.id/news/read/428514-mel ung-kisah-sebuah-desa-internet 12 Retrieved on September 3, 2015 from http://katadata.co.id/foto/2014/08/02/melung-desainternet-di-lereng-gunung-slamet 13 Surya Citra Televisi. A private national television network based in Jakarta (www.sctv. co.id). 11

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Figure 7.8 Screenshot of an online article about Melung Village in KataData

from other villages, they know Melung as an internet village . . . (So, the status of the internet village) is actually from other people. We never thought of naming ourselves ‘tech-village’. We’re just Melung. (Khoerudin, interview, par. 63–73)

Syarifudin, the chairman of a youth organization IPNU in Melung, confirmed these details. People outside Melung, especially in the city of Purwokerto where he studied, attributed the title of internet village or IT village status to Melung. Although many villages were located below Melung (geographically Melung was located on a higher plane than most villages around Mount Slamet) already equipped with internet networks, people knew it as the pioneer of internet villages in the region (interview, par. 116–124). The story of Melung as the internet village reverberated among the village communities/GDM and it eventually reached the ears of government officials and the media as well. Slowly but surely, it began to influence Melung’s identity construction.

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The fact that the Melung community by means of the internet intended to change its perspective from “seeing the world” to becoming “seen by the world” showed that they tried to turn their self-concept into a community that was in the center of people’s attention. They were trying to come out of their mental shell that had isolated the village. It displayed their conscious intended and anticipated purpose. However, in the process of reaching this goal, there were mass media with their intervening forces that came into the play, which have resulted in the “tug of intentions” between the village and the media. Ironically, the media were engaged deliberately in the communication development process as a strategy for mainstreaming rural issues. As an unintended consequence of the media’s involvement in communication development, a conflict of identity occurred between Melung’s “objectified identity” as an internet village and its “subjective identity” as an agro- and eco-village. Most of the labelling of Melung either as an internet village/ IT-village came from the media. The coverage brought Melung and its IT initiative to the attention of the central government through its Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. It led to the awarding of the designation as a Community Access Point (CAP). The media and the government might have their own agenda in ascribing Melung with labels such as internet village, IT literate village or tech-village and it could well be influenced by the media logic and the government’s development goals that were proclaimed in many schemes such as the WSIS, MGDs and SDGs. However, receiving the title of internet village was not what the local inhabitants wanted (see Khoerudin’s statement above). Based on ethnographic observations and daily conversations with many Melung residents, the identity of their village as an internet village was not really shared among the population. It was never a collective identity construction from the beginning. I met villagers not far from the village hall, where CAP was located, who were unaware about the village internet and internet training programs for the residents held by the village authorities (see Research Diary, pp. 6, 10, 25, 68 & 83). Those were the people on the margin of the village, on Melung’s discourse about rural internet development; the periphery in the periphery. On the contrary, there were many signs indicating that Melung initially wanted to be known as an agro- and eco-village, such as the banner at the gate of the village that read “Welcome to Melung Village: Agro- and Ecotourism – Pager Gunung Organic” (Figure 7.9). Moreover, on the homepage of Melung’s website, a digital banner of farmers organization Pager Gunung was shown, which promoted organic farming and signified Melung’s self-concept as an agro- and eco-village. However, there were no such greetings and aspirational titles at the southern area of Melung bordering Kutaliman Village.

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Figure 7.9 Welcome banner at the northeast gate of Melung village, on its border with neighboring Ketenger village

The question is: which is Melung’s “true” and intended identity? Was it the one that was constructed by the media or the government (“other-appointed identity”), who put Melung as an object (i.e., internet village) or the one that subjectively intended by the community (“self-appointed identity”) and they could identify themselves with (i.e., agro- and eco-village)? This conflict of identity indicated that the construction of identity could not be determined only from within the community. It shows how Melung’s self-concept was always negotiated between “internal intention” and “external pressure”. Melung’s identity as an internet village was not something that suddenly emerged from the bottom, in contrast, Melung as an agroand eco-village was actually the bottom-up constructed identity. Unfortunately, this subjective identity failed to reach the top and the mainstream public did not help either.

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Mead (1934) explains people’s self-concept is always the result of interaction between themselves and their social environment. He differentiates the “I-self” from the “me-self”, in which the former is the self as a subject, and the latter is the self as an object. The decision which self should come into the foreground is influenced by the social situation in which the person is situated. Melung could not avoid the fact that its identity was always negotiated in the interaction with whomever it encountered and wherever the interaction took place, be it in cyberspace, which would generate a “virtual identity” (interview with Suparyo, par. 277), or in the physical world. The embedding of identity by the media seemed to influence Melung’s selfconcept. The new objectified status as an internet village appeared to have been echoed within the Melung community that was “forced” to reformulate their identity just because the media (which interpreted the will of the market) considered it “important” or, more to the point, “marketable”’. A YouTube search of “Melung” yielded a list of videos displaying profiles of the village as one that was cyber savvy despite its remote location, especially regarding new ICTs for village development. An example is a profile video titled ‘Melung, Kisah Sebuah Desa Internet’ (‘Melung, the Story of an Internet Village’), which was created by the Melung residents in collaboration with village activists. The video showed how the internet village, which was actually a product of Melung’s objectification by the market-oriented mainstream media (considered to be closer to the center than the periphery), was reformulated by Melung and became an artistic creation for the subjectification of the periphery, i.e., Melung as a progressive village, which refused to give in to the demands of the times but instead chose to adapt to it. Melung’s decision to internalize its new identity was also motivated by its belief that a village was not a backward community in the face of technological sophistication. On the contrary, it wanted to show that the village community actually possessed the power and capability to stand on its own feet (see interview with Khoerudin, par. 95). The resurgence of the village community in its competition with the center has ushered in a conflict of identity within Melung itself, namely as an ecotourism village, which had been proclaimed from the start, and as an internet village, which was later added to its self-concept. The question was, which identity would be displayed to the public? As a consequence of this conflict, Melung was forced to synchronize the virtual reality or media reality (created from the top) with their social reality in the lifeworld (constructed from the bottom). This “synchronization of reality” was reinforced by their ambassadors every time they dealt with interested guests who came to Melung because of its “progress” in developing digital technology in the village (see Research Diary, p. 79). The fact that many researchers (including me)

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were drawn to Melung because of its identity as an internet village (and not as an ecotourism village) was an example of identity being more prominent in the public sphere. From the above discussion, we can draw a brief summary that the identification of Melung as an internet village or tech-village resulted from the dynamic interaction between “internal motivation” and “external responses”, i.e., the responses of Melung’s social environment, whereupon the mass media had a significant role in this identity construction process. Whether the local people in the end agreed with their new identity was another issue. When the problem of Melung’s conflict of identity was broached to Satrio, he confirmed that it existed. He contended that locals were “oppressed” by the information from the media (interview, par. 86). According to him, the internet was only a “tool” for development and that the initial identity of Melung was the agro- and eco-village with its organic farming (interview, par. 68 & 72; see Research Diary, p. 46).14 Satrio pointed to two reasons why Melung conformed to its new identity. First, Melung could not be separated from the Zeitgeist, in which it was said that everything should be digital (Internet of Everything). To be able to survive, Melung had to go with this flow. The rejection of the regency in supporting the village’s selfdependence through desa.id was the sign of their failure to read the development of this era (interview, par. 53 & 55). Second, the deflection of Melung’s identity vision from a village characterized by organic agriculture into an IT-based village was influenced by the market. Satrio did not deny that the world market today was exceptionally technological. He said the role of social media was strong in the community and this caused Melung to get in step with the trend, for instance, by attracting the attention of mass media. The media did eventually capture this strategy setting and he garnered the desired media resonance (interview, par. 74). Therefore, Melung’s decision to involve the internet and digital technology in its communication development process was a strategic decision in order to seize the “market of opinion”, namely to take lots in the public sphere, in which they had been marginalized for so long. These findings served as a case example of the concept of “hybridity” in development as expressed by Assche and Hornidge (2015, p. 109) and Agusta (2007, pp. 149–150) in reference to Homi Bhabha (1994). Humans are always influenced 14

I wrote an article entitled Konflik Identitas Desa Melung: Sebuah Refleksi (Conflict of Identity of Melung Village: A Reflection) about this issue that was published on Melung’s official website on November 5, 2014. Available online at http://melung.desa.id/2014/11/06/ konflik-identitas-desa-melung-sebuah-refleksi/ (last accessed April 9, 2015).

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by internal and external conditions in interpreting development and thus it becomes the driving factor behind the emergence of “plurality of meanings” (Agusta, 2007, p. 150) of development. The people “reflect new things according to their own consciousness” (ibid.). This is part of the process of self-transformation and the transformation of the community in which humans develop. This transformation was possible because of the new “construction [of reality] by the oppressed parties” (ibid.), in this case they were the rural communities in the periphery. Agusta continues, this hybridity stimulates what he calls “globalization from below or from marginalized groups” (ibid.), which can “obscure identity” (ibid., p. 149), because it is a mixture of input (polyglot) from the involved parties. Hybridity means rejecting cultural essentialism, which states that every community has its cultural core (ibid., pp. 145–150). Through the use of the internet, Melung underwent a process of transformation by revealing itself to the outside world. The decision of Melung and GDM to choose an open source operating system (Linux) rather than the paid operating systems (Windows or iOS) in their campaigns also showed their support for the openness and independence of knowledge (interviews with Taryono, par. 21; Kurniawan, par. 196–200; Research Diary, p. 8). If the identity of Melung was renegotiated and reformulated, hybridity argued that it was a natural consequence of this transformation process. Agusta (2007) formulates this polyglot-characterized hybridity as follows: This feature [polyglot] also allows hybridity to occur between parties who agree on the same discourse or habitus. The concept of hybridity thus allows solidarity between actors even though it is across classes, social hierarchies, or other social categories–as long as they agree in discourse. (p. 149)

Relevant to this, communication development hybridity was an important factor in bridging, namely in reaching the converge point between center and periphery. Other changes in village self-concept were related to the status of village as part of the government structure, which carried the co-administration task (medebewind). Ironically, despite its status in the government hierarchy, the right of the village to be recognized in the virtual world through representation on the go.id domain was not provided by the regency. The factors that drove the village communities to opt for desa.id actually confirmed the unique identity of village and at the same time detached them from the label “government”, which was anathema to the people (concerning the changes in village authority, see Research Diary, p. 81). Furthermore, the decision to retain the Indonesian terminology of desa in desa.id

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instead of its English translation (vil.id, derived from village) was also an assertive statement of identity of Indonesian villages under the organization of GDM in cyberspace (interview with Suparyo, par. 277, 290 & 600). Sudjatmiko said that the village’s decision to leapfrog the phase of industrialization/modernization in order to enter the information era, which relied on knowledge by utilizing new digital technology, was based on fears of loss of the village identity. The fear appeared if the villages forced themselves to follow a linear development pattern and, as the consequence, were undermined by the harsh competition in the capitalist system which underlies modernization. To retain the village’s unique identity, Sudjatmiko suggested the leapfrogging only to return to the industrial phase at the latter stage, by utilizing information as the base of the capital (interview, par. 57). This was a recipe for survival in the competition toward “progress” and for the rural communities to be able to catch up with their urban counterparts without having to renounce their originals as villagers. Leapfrogging was the village’s strategy to build from the periphery and escape the marginalization of the urban-rural and central-periphery dichotomy without actually having to move physically toward the center, which also meant it suppressed the level of urbanization. Melung’s labeling as an internet village and its willingness to internalize this identity and reproduce it with similar nicknames also reflected its attempt for bridging, namely by using the same terminologies in the public discourse. However, it is questionable whether the labeling had anything to do with the culturalization of the concept of information society in the current digital era. If so, have the rural communities and GDM been entangled in this culturalization, as though information society was the only norm in today’s “developed” world? Such problems will be addressed in section (f) of this chapter, which discusses the reflective consequence of communication development on the development project itself. (c) Changes in the working method of grassroots movement or the nature of the movement Suparyo began to abandon the classical working mechanisms of the NGO, which he thought were too rigidly programmed. The rigidity of these programs had made development projects resistant to the dynamics of development on the ground, which differed from one village to another. In his view, it ultimately impeded authentic innovation from the grassroots and slowed down the effort to achieve the program’s goals. In addition, the program whose ideas came from NGOs was considered by the village community as dubious or inauthentic because it did not come from below so that the locals usually were not passionate enough to engage in succeeding the program. As a consequence, the NGO worked without optimum participation of the local population for the sake of pursuing the program targets (interview with

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Suparyo, par. 385–387). Suparyo criticized this way of working and this was the reason why he called what he did in GDM as an “antithesis of previous social movements”, referring to those driven by NGOs (interview, par. 381). GDM’s type of online participation was markedly different from other online activisms. First, online social movement, whose goal was any kind of change (political, social, economic) would normally end up mobilizing people and value physical presence of the protesters more than virtual presence. The more this physical presence was closer to the center, the more impact it would have for social change to occur. This study has shown, while physical presence was still needed, it was certainly not the most significant aspect for change to happen. Additionally, through avoiding massive physical presence, a movement shows its deradicalized characteristic. The online streaming of the national parliament’s assembly session by GDM is a perfect example (interview with Suparyo, par. 165–171; see below). Second, GDM’s online activism was characterized by its network power. Online petition or online campaign through hashtags or social media did collect and multiply voices on a certain campaign theme. They do not require the “activists” to physically mobilize themselves either. However, the voices expressed still represent individual action and only have a loose connection to each other. Meanwhile, GDM’s campaign was an act of networked action, which was based on shared problems and experiences, i.e., the problems and experiences of neglected and voiceless yet well-networked villagers who wanted to free themselves from the communication constraints of the center and to speak out their ideas from bottom to challenge the dominant power at the top. Sudjatmiko gave examples of the importance of networking for the grassroots movement. Now, I see that the communication instrument is an instrument that I think is needed by the community whether it is called modern or traditional, which then, these traditional knowledges, these collective knowledges of these scattered communities, can also take advantage of. The problem is how this becomes effective. Becoming effective for me is networking. … Website is one form (of networking). Yes, one of them is ICT ... With a website for example, networking between, then experiences of certain communities for example, in managing their natural resources, managing their environment, architecture, how they’re sharing (for example), “eh, the Naga tribe people (in Tasikmalaya, West Java) have the knowledge on how to build earthquake resistant buildings, which is not taught in the (university)…” When the earthquake happened in Tasikmalaya, why were the houses of the Naga tribe sturdier for example? Well, I imagine, this instrument (ICT) can be used by the Naga tribe community to then share their knowledge. Who knows, it’s useful too either (from) their understanding of the forests, their understanding of the stones. Another example of leapfrogging might be if we remember at that time, the year of 1994 when the Mexican Indians refused NAFTA

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… and then they made a move called Zapatista. How did they then campaign for the issue of Indian tribes, who rejected NAFTA? Through technological instruments, even though at that time through war too, huh. Zapatista, at that time, they could share everything (through ICT). (Interview, par. 19)

Lindawati also shared her observation of the GDM working mechanism, characterized by the inter-village network, needs-based problem-solving method, capacity building and the use of appropriate technology. The networking between villages turns out to be interesting. How the villages are tied to one another; it’s like having a study room. And I like to see their approach; it’s not like telecenters or rural ICT, which only provide infrastructure, without capacity building and so on. But in GDM, they introduce their needs first. They try to identify problems in the village first. For example, when the files are unorganized, a mess, they’re not archived. Then (another problem), “how come we (the village) aren’t noticed by the government?” The village is considered to be a marginal community, without power. They dig into the problems smartly (assisted by fellow facilitators). Then (after that) they enter (involve) the technology. Let’s say, you have this particular problem, we have (appropriate) technology that can help. That is their approach that I follow: The technological approach, introduction and use. (Interview, par. 9)

The combination of the geographically dispersed and separated Indonesian villages and the strategic use of internet-based digital technology has brought changes to the working method of the grassroots movement. However, over-glorifying the technology’s determination capability presented a danger of failing to look at the real problem. Toyama (2015) warns, “this is a classic statement of technological utopianism” (p. 32). He does not believe that technology alone can have a significant impact in bringing social change. His “Law of Amplification” stresses the significance of human capability, which determines the success of technological use (see 3.1.3.3.). If we ascribe to Toyama’s ideas, access to information, such as internet access, is not always important for inciting social change; it is a statement that is only half-true for GDM. Suparyo, the spokesperson of GDM, held that “it is not only about technology. It is also about how we build self-confidence of the village” (interview, par. 381). He continued that the mastery of digital technologies facilitated the building process of the village’s self-confidence. (Our) work method is pretty unique. Perhaps in other village groups (or) associations, (they would say), “let’s go to Jakarta to hold a demonstration” . . . (But) in our

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movement, it’s “let’s make the parliament session accessible for all” … I was attending the (parliament) hearing, and I streamed it online, so my friends (in the villages) could watch . . . We’ve developed our own system. From their experience watching the sessions, they were like, they had thought before that parliament’s assemblies were outstanding, but after watching online, they thought, “oh, there’s nothing special in the parliament”. Eventually, they become (more) confident. At that time the government tended to not believe that the villages can manage (their own) development . . . we supported Melung to conduct a good development activity . . . and then we used social media to tell that what they (the politicians) in the parliament thought (about the village’s lack of self-managing ability) was wrong. This (Melung’s success story) was the proof. Finally, the parliament felt terrorized and the streaming was (forcibly) stopped. We could only stream four times . . . no more permission granted because they were not ready of being watched. Although, in actual fact, there weren’t that many people who watched. But the fact that it was recorded and (could) be watched offline, they were (scared) . . . (Suparyo, interview, par. 165–171)

What Suparyo revealed above shows the importance of information disclosure, which was supported by the use of technology and activated by people who organized to build a strong community network for their struggle against the domination of the center. Up to this point, there were at least five important consequences of communication development on grassroots movement: 1. The villages surrounding the city: To succeed, online protests did not have to end up in the streets. The type of social movement that was practiced by GDM contains no or little radical element (deradicalization). Although they were protesting against the policy issued by the center, they did not mobilize people from periphery to go to the center. Information that was relayed through online streaming, has empowered the people in peripheral areas so that they could be more self-reliant and stand up for the interests of their community. By staying in the periphery, they did not legitimize the power of the center; instead, it strengthened the periphery. This model was the manifestation of the “villages surround city” strategy developed by Mao Zedong during the people’s struggle in China. Melung, consciously or not, adapted this model of struggle by building inter-village networks through desa.id and GDM with other villages across Indonesia in order to build a coalition and solidarity vis a vis the city/the center (Research Diary, p. 69). This change of pattern of struggle defeudalized the system of relations of center and periphery and it loosened the grip of the center on the periphery. Although geographically cities were always surrounded by villages, feudalism made the villages politically and culturally under pressure from the cities. GDM reversed this because now

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the inter-village network was able to suppress the city from their rural locations (see Figure 7.7). 2. Self-confidence due to the disclosure of public information: It was the disclosure of public information (e.g., parliament sessions/hearings) that raised the selfconfidence of the marginalized people in the peripheral villages. The boost in self-confidence led to the empowerment of those people because they gained new knowledge as a result of the interaction with new information. Due to the Indonesian geographical condition, where the distance from periphery to the center is huge, ICT played a significant role in disseminating public information, once considered difficult to be accessed.. By virtue of digital technology, the happenings in the center, particularly Jakarta, were no longer beyond the scope of imagination for distant rural communities. This development corresponds to what Virmani (2002) says about “breaking the information isolation in rural areas” (p. 229). 3. Demystifying technology: Nevertheless, it is important to not become distracted by the seemingly potent effect of technology and overlook the fact that changes could only have happened because there was access to information that was exploited by rural agents; in other words, the activation of passive access. There was human action that preceded the disclosure of information behind the change itself through this activation of the passive information access (the “act” of livestreaming the parliament session by Suparyo). I agree with Toyama (2015) in his criticism of the premise of “technological utopist”. It has been said that the development of new ICTs should never neglect the development of human capability, especially the capability to master technology, which would enter their daily life. Human-centered development should be prioritized because it is people who harness technology, not the other way around. 4. Type of grassroots movement: As a result of a flexible and leaderless movement, there were changes from the type of social movements than we usually encounter. GDM transformed the previous “formal-organizational” type of movement into a more “semiformal-networked” movement. A rhizomatic movement such as GDM worked like “sugar for the other village’s ants” (Taryono, interview, par. 49). Melung was the draw for other villages who wanted to taste its success in managing IT-based development. Taryono (ibid.) revealed that many delegations from other villages visited Melung to study its best practices in development and also many village activists from Melung/GDM were invited to other villages to share their success story in rural good governance. Successively, these newly learned villages would then share their experiences within their communities, for new learning circles and consequently new nodes to be formed, which would expand the reach of the rhizome. This was the learning system of GDM that has

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been working in almost all the 18 provinces where GDM activists have a presence (ibid.). The learning circles took place both on offline (in the form of workshops) and online platforms (open-ended learning through group chatting (WhatsApp), social media (Twitter & Facebook) and website posts/commentaries). These learning circles, which were designed to be held informally (such as group conversations), addressed one problem in human development, which Timbul, one of the village officials in Melung, termed a matter of “dragging dead cows” (see Research Diary, p. 100). The “dead cows” – or dead wood to use an equivalent English idiom – represented the ordinary villagers lacking good digital literacy skills nor the desire to improve their abilities. They were the periphery in the rural periphery. It would be a burden for the village chief and his staff, as well as for the village activists who had learned the knowledge and skills in digital technology to lead their village out of backwardness if they had to carry their village “alone” to an advanced state, without the support nor active participation of its citizens. Learning circles were intended to overcome the deficit in their digital knowledge and skills, for the village as a formal institution and its citizens as a community to progress together. The learning circle was one step toward “deliberative democracy” (interview with Sudjatmiko, par. 29 & 35; see 7.1.2.2.(4)(e)). 5. Decentralization of knowledge: With the establishment of these learning circles, knowledge was shared and passed in a chain-like distribution system within the network. The nodes were practically the chains that linked one point to another. If knowledge was power, then with decentralization of knowledge, power was also decentralized to the members of the network. Learning circles were “contagious”; they “infected” the learners with new knowledge (interview with Taryono, par. 49; Kurniawan, par. 166; Khoerudin, par. 63; Lindawati, par. 279). Referring to Castells’s network-making power (2009, 2011), with this decentralized knowledge, the “programmers” (Castells, 2011), namely network members who have gained new knowledge, would have the power to change the old working system in their villages and reprogram it in accordance with the new working system as envisioned by GDM, without having to depend on the program of the center (the regency). Meanwhile, due to the movement’s semi-formal character, the “switchers” (Castells, 2011) would easily enter and connect themselves with other networks (such as the network of bloggers, the PNPM networks, the parliamentary networks, the media networks, etc.) without having to be contained by the network of formal-bureaucratical center (the regency). From a network perspective, which was embraced in communication development, the possession of these capabilities, i.e., to (re)program and switch networks, was to be

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understood as empowerment, because to be empowered was to be able to break away from the dominant influence and be able to change things independently. The learning circles were not dependent on the GDM’s “central”, which was a circle of rural activists located in Banyumas and Melung. This acknowledges that even within GDM, a center existed. RDI, as a gathering place for rural activists around Banyumas functioned as a “help desk”, which was a crossing of nodes and villages and was one of the locations where learning circles were carried out and knowledge was circulated. However, RDI never took the role as the main reference of the movement’s programmatic approach (interview with Taryono, par. 49). Indeed, certain people in the network, such as Suparyo, Satrio, and several other figures who founded GDM, served as “consultants” according to their technical expertise, for example IT, law or financial experts. Several network members worked as lecturers or practitioners and their knowledge added weight to the network’s power. The power of the network relied on the various knowledge skills of the members who each contributed to strengthen the whole network and also absorb information from it (see Research Diary, p. 55). It was the reason why the inter-village network existed in the first place. (d) Changes in the operation of the public sphere or the role of the marginalized public in political participation In a conversation with Suparyo (interview, par. 147–156), with Margino also present and involved in the conversation, they brought up the subject of a land dispute between Melung and the Indonesian State-Owned Forestry Company (Perhutani) in an outlying part of Melung Village, which was partly controlled by the company. Residents wish to preserve a natural spring and water catchment in the location, and took the initiative to plant different types of shrubs that would prevent a water crisis, the possibility of landslides from denuding the area and maintain the water supply for their daily needs. Perhutani was displeased with the villagers’ actions and destroyed the plants. Suparyo said the village did not have the authority pertaining to the management and processing of the land because it was not included in the area administered by the village, although geographically it was part of Melung. This protracted conflict became a latent conflict; according to local opinion, Perhutani ultimately benefited from the situation because it was portrayed as the “victim” in the dispute. In contrast, Melung residents were saddled with a negative image as perpetrators of land grabbing. Suparyo attributed the contrasting image building to Perhutani having “a good

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image-building machinery” and being able to “buy space in the (national) newspaper” to build a positive image of themselves when dealing with citizens (interview, par. 161). In line with Suparyo, Khoerudin (interview, par. 31) also complained about the media representation of rural issues, claiming they were mostly negative in tone. and failed to highlight positive developments. The task of the village communities was to counter these negative representations without resorting to potentially controversial actions, in contrast to the “controversial presentation” suggested by Habermas (1996, p. 381; see 3.2.). Meanwhile, residents of Melung who were far from the center did not have adequate access to the system of production of the mainstream media, especially on a national scale, and their opportunity to voice their concerns and to fill the public sphere with important issues for rural communities was virtually non-existent. To counter the image-making patterns of the supra-villages (Perhutani/the government), GDM advocated that the village communities should be encouraged to speak out in the public sphere they invented themselves: cyberspace. However, these countering voices from villages were not by means of “I’ll go on the attack” (Suparyo, interview, par. 163), and did not pit the village and supra-village in a frontally conflicting binary position. GDM did not suggest such resistance patterns. Instead, they would fight by “telling that there was a gap between our lives in the village and theirs (the supra-villages). And if this gap was not discussed, the village community may experience a very heartbreaking situation” (Suparyo, interview, par. 163). With this countering strategy, GDM sought to link village affairs in the periphery with supra-village affairs in the center and to build a narrative of interconnectivity between the related parties. Centers and peripheries were not narrated as two opposing parties, but as parts of a large social system (see Figure 7.10). To attract the attention of the greater public, namely the public sphere managed by mass media, counterpublics built by GDM did not adopt a “loud” or clamorous tone, but they criticized the government subtly to be able to change some public policies for the good of the rural communities (interview with Satrio, par. 547). The “controversial presentation” strategy as stated by Habermas (1996, p. 381), designed to attract greater public attention and to convert the agenda of the small rural public (or mini-public) into the public agenda, did not apply to GDM. The “voicing village” was GDM’s refined online communication strategy to accelerate the development process by exercising the articulation function of the internet so that the voices of the rural community could reach and enter the larger political system in order to influence the construction of public opinion and constitution of political agenda of the center (interview with Kurniawan, par. 114). This was acknowledged by Suparyo when he stated that GDM did not take the old way

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by mobilizing tens of thousands of people to gain public attention. Instead, GDM did it by the “voicing village”, which aimed to “influence the public on rural issues” (interview, par. 232). He argued that this strategy succeeded because “journalists have started writing about our movement. And the image of our movement in the eyes of the journalists carries rather high news value. So, they can write one page, half a page, (and even) up to two pages ... because of the news value that there is a new way of managing the village, which has been done by the villages (in the GDM network)” (ibid.). Suparyo added, “the voicing village is the ability of the villages to be able to express their problems to the public” (interview, par. 381). Margino described, in the past, it was impossible to successfully invite journalists to Melung. They didn’t want to come here, because we were considered that we don’t have (news value). Now if I post or I tell a story on Facebook, they could make it into the news. And it appears not only in the local newspaper, but in (national newspaper) Kompas, Media Indonesia . . . Now we have many contacts from, we can call it, senior journalists . . . such as members of AJI15 in Purwokerto, we know almost all of them. . . It is now easy if we want to (be covered by the media. We call them), “brother, please help us to bring this (story) up”. We just have to write a press release and send them pictures. (Interview, par. 121)

With the opening of access to the public, the voicing village did not only function to articulate village’s opinions and interests, but also their collective knowledge or “collective genius”, as stated by Sudjatmiko (interview, par. 19), thereby communicating their collective value and local wisdom to the wider public via self-controlled online communication system. Although we can be critical with the notion “collective” because there has always been disagreement within a collectivity, the fact that many informants said that it mattered to them means that rural/the movement’s collectivity has to be taken into account. Satrio emphasized the importance of differentiating rural discourse, which was constructed on the village website as an online counterpublic from the discourses in the mainstream media as the dominant public sphere. He said the village website was intended to accommodate rural discourses including rural politics without having to bother with issues that were on the agenda of the mainstream media. Even

15

Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (The Alliance of Independent Journalists) is an Indonesian journalist organization which promotes press freedom and was founded in 1994 in Bogor as an alternative to PWI, which is an already established journalist organization, at that time under the control of the Suharto regime. See AJI’s website http://aji.or.id/

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for urban readers, the village’s online public sphere was a unique source of information because its contents were produced directly by the villagers (interview, par. 164–171). Khoerudin termed this “building an understanding of the village itself” (interview, par. 31). Lestari reminded though that the mediated public was not only to be found online. Community radio could be one of the arenas to broach problematic matters concerning the rural public. Locally, community radio could function as a means of solving local problems, and functions distinctly as a local broadcasted public sphere (interview, par. 34). As an attempt at counterdiscourse, the operation of counterpublicity may override the principle of neutrality by taking the side of interests of the village to fight against unjust domination and marginalization. Rural counterpublic spheres may also take subjective views to criticize the supra-villages in their own territory (interview with Lindawati, par. 83). Lindawati analyzed counterdiscourses in the village websites were mainly influenced by the uneasy situation caused by the Jakarta-centric (centercentric) news coverage (interview, par. 208). However, the criticism in this kind of counterpublic sphere needed to pay attention to cultural constraints, such as deferential ewuh pakewuh culture, which could cause negative social impact if the criticism offended certain parties who culturally had higher social status in the community (ibid., par. 83; see 7.1.2.2.(2)(b)). Counterpublics also represented new knowledge, which previously was not publicized by the mainstream media due to political-reasoned censorship, as in the case of Aceh (see 7.1.2.2.(1)(c)). When produced continuously and consistently, the new knowledge resulted from such counterdiscourse would become shared public knowledge and even generate new cultural wealth when all villages in Indonesia (and also other marginalized social groups) voiced their narratives so that the diversity of villages’ voices occupied the public spheres. Essentially, this pictured the ideal mainstreaming rural issues strategy (interview with Satrio, par. 688–700). Agusta (2007) mentions this kind of development concept, which is in favor of the marginalized groups, as “familiarization from below”, which means “the efforts to take sides in a process of social change ... to strengthen the position and narrative of the lower layers in a society. Emancipation of the lower layer is possible when the voices or narratives of these layers also appear in the process of composing social structures“ (Agusta, 2007, p. 152). Voicing villages contributed to the emergence of marginalized narratives in the public sphere. In familiarization from below, the development process even begins from the lowest level of social structure, namely the family, in which “the family and kinship discourses that emphasize marginal groups, families and family ties need to be developed to become mutual solidarity”(ibid.). The occupancy of marginalized voices in public spheres could be the resumption of the recognition of plurality of knowledge in Indonesia before knowledge began

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to be uniformed and manufactured from top to bottom by large political forces, which were imperialistic, repressive, authoritative and manipulative. In other words, the counterpublic sphere could function as “Schutzmittel” (Lueke, 2017, p. 15) or “protective means” for marginalized people from the domination and penetration of mass mediated public sphere. As a means of articulating village interests, the voicing village, which, if viewed from the perspective of participatory communication, was the capability to deliberately articulate own interests and opinions and engage in self-owned and self-controlled public sphere, was considered as one indicator of communication empowerment and hence of communication development. Changes in communication practices meant that communication development could not not require collaborative participatory communication from all stakeholders, especially those who were traditionally communicatively marginalized. Communication development has made the participatory approach more crucial than the past when public participation was seen merely as a means to achieve non-communication development goals. Participatory communication took place both online and offline in a variety of public spheres. Lindawati recounted how four GDM members, including one from Melung, were invited to Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta to give lectures in front of students about the use of new media in rural development, which she called “village lecture in class” (interview, par. 249–253). Such practices were attempts to strengthen communication competency in the process of communication development, which had an impact on the changes in the shape and operation of the public sphere. On the other hand, the success of participatory communication in the public sphere required other parties who were willing to recognize the knowledge possessed by the rural or marginalized people and confer them the authority to spread their knowledge while being willing to listen to the conveyed knowledge. The recognition of authority without this willingness to listen, or vice versa, would only hinder the bridging process and each party would only care about its communication process in its own medium without openness to develop communication understanding (see the model of contra-flow and two unconnected linear communication in Figure 7.3). For example, as an interviewer, I recognized Pak Kayim’s (6.3.11.) knowledge who, as part of the village apparatus was not digital literate. When he detailed Melung’s history, local wisdom and his religious knowledge, the subjects he knew the most, I respected his knowledge of the subjects he knew well. My “permission” to him to decide which subject he wished to share with me indicated the recognition of authority of specific knowledge. This act of recognition apparently empowered him communicatively, compared to if I had forced him to tell about his activities in the village in terms of his interaction with new media or the use of digital technology in

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the village (interview, par. 234–238). Interactivity, which was built on participatory and dialogue-oriented communication between parties involved in communication development, was the norm in communication empowerment (discussed in detail in 7.2.). (e) Changes in the practice of democracy at the national and local level or the question of political transformation Bottom-up communication development that took place in the context of rural development was strongly influenced by the vision of fanning the sense of village sovereignty which was marked by the passing of the Village Law No. 6/2014. This law came against the backdrop of expanding regional autonomy to the lowest level of state administration, namely the village. The implementation of this law incited the tug of power in the local region, especially between the regency and the village communities. Here a village could not be seen as a separate entity apart from its peers but as the lowest collective entity at the grassroots level, where they formed a large rhizome-like network both between village officials and village inhabitants – considering that most village officials were farmers just like the ordinary villagers – and with other villages within the GDM association. GDM, as a grassroots movement at the Pp, was considered as the engine of empowerment, which led the entire rhizome to counter the domination of Cp by making alliance with Cc and establishing various counterpublics on different platforms (online and offline), which they owned and had control over. Melung was the benchmark of such counterpublicity from which the “engine” was designed and constructed. GDM was designed as a “non-exclusive movement” (Sudjatmiko, interview, par. 29) because it opened its doors to collaborate with other village assistance practices/development programs (e.g., PNPM and KPA/Consortium for Agrarian Reform), which also adhered to the participatory techniques but not so much used digital technologies as the main tools of their movements. In the framework of digital democracy, GDM brought together digital and non-digital practices in an integrated and comprehensive movement, which bridged the initiatives of the community and the development programs of the government. However, GDM realized that digital democracy alone was not sufficient to build an equal democratic balance between center and periphery. To stop at digital democracy and refuse to carry on working on a more substantial matter was a mistake. Sudjatmiko described it as a reflection of “the urban middle-class flirtatiousness, who were satisfied with digital democracy” (ibid). Therefore, digital democracy must contain “deliberative democracy”, which was practiced through discussions among the parties participating in the movement and

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led to an agreement to conceptualize and pass the Village Law, which was designed to bring many benefits to the village as a self-governing community. From this background, the Village Law was the legitimacy of the digital and non-digital deliberative processes, namely a dynamic between the intra-village, inter-village and between village and supra-village movements. This was an embodiment of “substantial democracy”, which, according to Sudjatmiko (ibid.) was the next level of “procedural democracy”, which Indonesia has been practicing since the Reformasi began albeit with some setbacks and deficiencies. Below is the long quote of Sudjatmiko explaining his thoughts about rural digital and deliberative democracy. Of course, ICT is not the only solution. Certainly. It’s necessary but not sufficient. That’s for sure. ICT is still just a technological instrument that provides opportunities for democracy. We can overcome asymmetric information, information inequality. Well, ICT can enable the distribution of information. That’s one. But information for what? There must be a deliberative process within ICT. This means that a website, for example, can a website or whatever it is called, then it becomes a place of discussion, a place for exchanging information not only inter-villages but intra-villages themselves? Within the village itself, for example. Yes, it must be followed. Well, what the GDM does, that now the emphasis is on ICT, but then the involvement of GDM in the advocacy of the Village Law (is) because they realize, the Village Law is not the ICT Law on villages. But they see that (from) their experience, (they) contributed to the idea of the need for SID (Village Information System). That’s the idea of GDM. Then finally we put it in Article Nr. 86. That is, putting the SID in a big(ger) context. The context of participatory democracy. Because look, right now, (people) actually worship digital democracy. Digital democracy, right? What do they lack? That digital democracy is only one way. Does it guarantee substantial democracy? Not yet. Hence, digital democracy must be followed by deliberative democracy. There is a process of deliberation. Digital (and) deliberation, both of these are participatory. Now we’ve passed through the procedural democracy (after the reform). Beyond that, (we) should enter the territory of substantivity. Because (it is) substantive, we make it participatory. Digital democracy is only one way to make it participatory. But deeper participation is if there’s a deliberative democracy process. The process of deliberation, the process of exchanging thoughts, the process of finding common sense. Common good, yes, for the village. Well, digital democracy without being followed by deliberative democracy, as you said earlier, “dragging dead cows”. Isn’t it? … Because of that, our friends in GDM are also aware that ICT itself is not enough. That’s why it requires a law; an umbrella. Why didn’t they include the SID in the framework of the law on public information? Why didn’t they include it in the framework of the Law on Public Information Disclosure? Because this is not just information, it’s about the village as a self-governing community … So, digital democracy must be there followed by deliberative (processes). That’s where participatory happens. When participatory happens, the end is substantive democracy toward prosperity. Toward a more independent society, confidence and everything. So, digital is only one aspect. Well, the villagers,

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who were popularized by GDM, yes, that they did not want to get caught up in the urban middle-class flirtatiousness, who were satisfied with digital democracy. The Village Law ensures that deliberative processes take place. (Interview, par. 29)

The deficiencies of Indonesian procedural democracy were revealed by Suparyo at length when he recounted Indonesia’s political reality concerning bottom-up planning, which he believed to be very “caricative” (interview, par. 202–218; see 7.1.2.2.(4)(a)). Suparyo used this term to illustrate the Musrenbangdes (Village Development Planning Meeting) prior to the Village Law as an implementation of the bottom-up planning procedure, which in reality was not conducted as it had been designed on paper and was not even in accordance with the bottom-up planning principle itself. In the design of the Musrenbangdes, each village was asked to make a development plan, which was then proposed to the regency for evaluation. At the village level, this planning process was carried out through intra-village discussion involving all smaller community units such as hamlets, neighborhoods, and other village elements consisting of various stakeholders from three elements: the village authority, the private sector and the general public by paying attention to the principle of representation (age, gender, region, group social and all interest sectors). It seemed that up until this stage, democracy was in a process quite deliberately at the grassroots level, at least theoretically. The next stage was submission of the planning documents, which was done by the Village Delegation Team, to the development planning forum at the district level. Here all the villages at the regional gathered to agree on the village development planning proposals as the material for the local government development program at the regency level for the following year. In the final stage, the regency would decide which village development program should be approved and funded. The budgetary authority was also in the hands of the regency. The participation of the rural community in this matter only happened practically at the planning stage without any authority to determine the fate of the plan itself. They also did not have the certainty of funds they would receive from the regency for the implementation of these plans. The tiered procedure of Musrenbangdes was carried out annually and it became the basis for the preparation of the village’s annual work plan for the next fiscal year. Suparyo criticized sharply the long process of bottom-up planning; it was “nonsense” in practice (interview, par. 202 & 204).16 Lindawati called it “formality” (interview, par. 115) because she supposed that the list of development programs

16

In his original quote, he used the expletive for excrement.

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for approval was actually already provided by the regency even before the Musrenbangdes started (interview with Lindawati, par. 117). In effect, rural development programs had been designed from above because the regency had its own development policy that was much influenced by political considerations (interview with Suparyo, par. 204 & 206). Suparyo estimated that no more than 5 percent of real village planning originated from below, i.e., from the village community, was accommodated by the regency. The remaining 95 percent was what he accused of being “nonsense” (ibid., par. 202). This poor and so-called caricative bottom-up development planning practices resulted in “apatisme desa” or “village apathy” (ibid., par. 206), which was susceptible to be exploited by the center to further strengthen its dominance over the periphery. Another problem revealed by Suparyo regarding the Musrenbangdes process was the different type of development planning produced at the village and regency levels. The regencies, as with the central government, adhered to the principle of sectoral planning, where development programs were divided based on their sectors (health, education, infrastructure, socio-culture, etc.), which were supervised by the relevant ministry or agency. At the village level, the type of planning was “spatial” and “integrative”. The planning was oriented on each village location with its entire planning process and implementation was under the authorization and supervision of the village, because a village did not have sectoral organs to sort out the programs contained in the planning documents. Consequently, when a development program assigned by the government (central or local) was to be implemented in/by the village, many programs overlapped due to the sectoral ego or minimal coordination between the government’s ministries/agencies (interview with Suparyo, par. 206). The acute sectoral ego was the cause of non-integrative and non-synergistic development programs and it put the rural community in an unfavorable situation as the victim of top-down development politics. Examples of sectoral ego were overlapping of various applications from different ministries that had to be used by the village for managing the same data set or the case of domain dispute. This would not have happened if the village was given the authority to design and implement its own development policy by still taking into account the direction of the national development. GDM was erected as a response to this situation. It was also formed as a political statement that the village was an empowered social entity, not an object that had to be empowered by external parties. In a non-digital environment of democracy, the above problems were illustrations of the classic practice of bottom-up development planning, which could be said to be a pseudo-bottom-up because of its “caricative” character, i.e., it showed a more top-down character rather than bottom-up when implemented on the ground. In a pseudo-bottom-up, there was a wide gap between the planning and implementation

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of the development design. Public political participation had been seen formally but not substantially and this participation did not yet deliver significant impact on the preparation of development policy that favored the rural community in the periphery. Community participation was absent at the decision-making phase, which took place at the “invited” forum created by the center. The old bottom-up planning was center biased, or “center-centric”. This is what Sudjatmiko meant by procedural democracy, or we can call it now as “caricative democracy”, where formality took precedence over substance. In an effort to attain deliberative democracy, utilization of new ICTs by rural communities could be one answer to overcome this center-centric problem. Political participation of rural inhabitants by voicing their concerns and opinions in the “invented” public sphere through the voicing village strategy led to the practice of democracy beyond its caricature-like character or its “caricative-ness”. Communication development through the voices of these peripheral villages had been able to put pressure to center to produce development policies that benefited the villages which in the end crystallized in the ratification of the Village Law. The law has safeguarded direct participation of the citizens in development planning, including obtaining the certainty of funding through Village Funds and the authority to manage those funds. According to a report from the Ministry of Village and Bappenas (The National Development Planning Agency), the distribution and use of the Village Funds – absorbed by 97 percent of all villages in 2016 – had been able to reduce economic inequality between high- and low-income citizens and reduce poverty. The Gini ratio had decreased from 0.410 (2015) to 0.393 (March 2017).17 The practice of representative yet so-called caricative democracy in the Musrenbangdes pre-GDM and pre-Village Law was replaced by internet-based direct and participative democracy (Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2015, p. 5). The participation of citizens in political deliberations made them politically active than before and practically turned them into “activists” (ibid.). Formal and bureaucratical democracy in the context of development planning, which was tiered from all levels of government and always center-oriented (from the village to the district to the regency level) was substituted by fluid and flexible network-based democracy. It resulted from villages being given the authority to make decisions for themselves through intra-village decision-making mechanisms, which took place at the “invented” deliberative forums. Center-centric development was reduced, if not diminished, because currently the development process did not start from the top,

17

The report was published on the front-page of Media Indonesia, titled “Dana Desa Tekan Ketimpangan” (Village Funds Pressing Inequality) on August 7, 2017.

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but from the bottom and was oriented to meet the needs and demands of the respective village. These changes reflected political transformation within Indonesian democracy. In a country with a unitary system, where, for the purpose of “integration”, the peripheral regions were bound together by the so-called “national interests”, which were centered on and determined by the national government, the village community was always placed in the weakest political position in the power hierarchy. When the political system did not allow the villages to take free upwards direct communication to the Cc because of bureaucratic obstacles in the middle of the communication line (at the Cp), villages at the Pp had to establish their own communication lines. It was exactly what GDM was practicing by developing bottom-up communication enhanced by new digital ICTs that ignored these systemic-political barriers. The range of changes in the practice of Indonesian democracy as described above was an important development to restore Indonesia’s democratic life into the hands of its people, which was the genuine definition of democracy, after being oppressed for so long by various authoritarian/feudal powers. In such a way, communication development, which has grown in the climate of information disclosure of Indonesian post-Reformasi, has contributed to the political transformation of the nation. From GDM’s bottom-up perspective, the transformation was clearly intended and anticipated because from the very beginning, the movement has fought for social justice and political equality, so that a more democratic life and substantially integrative Indonesian civil society could be realized. (f) Reflective consequences on the development project or the question of project sustainability When the village development project was launched in December 2011, IT utilization was only one of the working methods to achieve development goals of each village. However, as we learned in the previous chapters, the influence of technology has developed quite strongly for users, which has affected the construction of the village and movement’s identity. The consequence for identity, which was shaped by the dynamic interaction between internal motivation and external responses, turned out to lead to another substantial consequence in the process of ICT-based communication development, namely the reflective consequence on the project itself or the question of sustainability of the project. The media’s “anointing” of Melung as the “internet village” is one reason it kept appropriating the internet and maintained a steady stream of reports on village activities on its website. There was mutual benefit for both sides from this internet village narrative. Nonetheless, though such media representation was desired, there was some unease about how Melung was portrayed (interview with Margino,

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par. 47 & 53). Margino felt that media coverage that contained inaccuracies and exaggeration became a “moral burden” for the community (ibid., par. 89, 127 & 129). Q: In general, which aspect (of Melung) was covered by the media? Technology or agro-tourism? A: Technology and then local wisdom. Q: … Do you agree with the representation? A: Yes, there was news coverage that we liked, but occasionally there were some that could be a burden. For instance, when the mainstream media reported that 75 percent of Melung’s population had mastered technology, it was actually only for the sake of (newspaper) circulation. The report wasn’t based on data . . . that’s why sometimes I don’t agree when many stories are dramatized. Because to be honest, it’s for us a moral burden if people come to visit and then their actual experience isn’t the same as what they’ve read or watched in the media. So, yes, there’s disappointment (too). (Ibid., par. 124–129)

Among the “disappointing” reports referring was from KataData News and Research (August 2, 2014), which depicted Melung in the glowing terms as an example of internet-savvy citizens: Now everyone can have access to the internet in every corner of the village. Even the farmers can surf the internet while they are waiting for their harvest or while they chop. The internet hotspots already cover all parts of the village. No wonder, there are so many village members who already make the most of it. Melung has now become an inspiration and a “school” for other villages, inside and outside Banyumas Regency.18

The paradoxical situation resulted from a combination of “lack of verification” from journalists accompanied by a “lack of clarification” on the part of Melung about the real situation on the ground. On the one hand, as acknowledged by Margino above, such an exaggerated depiction enhanced Melung’s chance to be known by the larger public as a village that creatively added to its value by providing free internet access to its residents and drawing benefit from it. On the other hand, though, the combination of this creativity and media over-representation of it created a complex situation for Melung. 18

“Melung, Desa Internet di Lereng Gunung Slamet” (Melung, Internet Village in the Valley of Mount Slamet; emphasis added). Retrieved on September 3, 2015 from http://katadata.co. id/foto/2014/08/02/melung-desa-internet-di-lereng-gunung-slamet

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Margino, and several other residents of Melung whom I encountered during field research, admitted they were embarrassed to acknowledge where they came from when they met other people in the city of Purwokerto. They were not proud of their own village because of its image as an underdeveloped spot that was part of the government’s IDT (less-developed village) program (interview with Margino, par. 95–99; Research Diary, p. 21). However, the presence of internet technology within the village and the mastery of it by the Melung community increased collective self-esteem and changed people’s perceptions of the village. The village’s internet not only had a further impact on the community’s identity but also on the evolution of Melung’s development plan, which would be pursued in the following years. Margino, as a village official who also served as the administrator of Melung’s website, found it hard to maintain the status of internet village bestowed by the media. There was pressure to harmonize the media reality with the “real” social reality. The pressure was to realize a truly internet-based Melung Village, whose elites and citizens were digital literate (interview with Margino, par. 89, 91, 187, 189 & 197) whereas the initial intention of Melung’s presence in cyberspace was not because of the internet per se, but rather to voice their potential to the outside world, especially in relation to their organic agriculture industry. The task became more difficult because the “internet” identity was not shared with the whole village community as described in the previous sections. However, because of media exploitation of Melung’s identity as an internet village, it was this image that stuck in people’s mind, which as an effect shaped the self-concept of the community. They know Melung because of its internet, even in the regency forum, our head of district says that “if (we talk about) internet village, it is Melung” . . . I’ve met several times with my fellow colleagues from other villages, they know Melung as an internet village . . . (Khoerudin, interview, par. 63)

Maintaining the status of an internet village was not an easy task. The idea that was first raised by Satrio in 2011 had been rarely the main development goal of Melung since he resigned as its chief in 2012. There was a huge gap in the village development approach between him and his successor Khoerudin as Margino explained: Yes, there are differences. It (the idea of Melung’s internet) is strongly influenced by leadership factors . . . Pardon me, the current chief doesn’t know that much about technology, if we want to compare him to Pak Budi (Satrio) . . . Now it’s been almost 1,5 years (of Khoerudin’s administration) and he’s almost never talked about it (ICT issue). Not at all! Even he, as the chief, rarely visits our website. (Interview, par. 195 & 197)

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Margino’s view indicated that the idea of establishing the internet village was not entirely shared among all the Melung’s officers; another periphery (or as a consequence, center) was formed within a social group in periphery. Once the initiator left, the sustainability of the project was not guaranteed. Moreover, the sustainability of the vision of development was in jeopardy. The success of an idea’s penetration was still determined by individuals, rather than by the system. The system that applied in the village was an inherent attribute of the individual as the initiator of the project. When the initiator left his working environment, he took with him the system he favored. The village government, as the environment in which Satrio was no longer officially part of, was left with the digital and internet-supported infrastructures without appropriate systems to support the functions of those technological artefacts. A new system had to be implanted, which could be incompatible with the initial purpose of those technological imports into the village in the first place. Margino stated: Q: So, now it (ICT-based development program) runs automatically? A: Yes. Well actually . . . that (program) about IT-Village or internet village was like a heritage (from Satrio the former village chief). Whether we’ll continue it or not, I’ve nothing against it. We – as officers in the village – will always support every decision (made by the new chief). (Interview, par. 207)

He expressed disappointment at the failure to realize Melung as a “real” internet village. I often made (sarcastic) jokes in the office, but I’m also disappointed. When, for example, a printer was broken, the others (colleagues) actually could browse (to find information about printer service) . . . they didn’t have to wait for me. That’s why I’m disappointed. There was no use, the internet village. Just break it down! The IT-Village shouldn’t have existed. I’m ashamed! . . . Sometimes I complained to Pak Budi (Satrio) as the initiator. I forced him to take responsibility. (Interview, par. 213)

This frustration and the fact that the Melung community felt saddled with a burden of living up to the internet village hype instead of concentrating on the realization of the initial vision of Melung’s development, which was the realization of rural agroand ecotourism and the marketing of other village potentials, show the IT-based communication development has reshaped the purpose of Melung’s development. The focus of development has been changed along with the use of new ICTs for

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development. Naturally, those consequences were unintended and unanticipated by the Melung community in the first place. Melung needed to ask itself reflectively whether technology was the determinant factor, which drove the community to adjust themselves to the “interests” of digital technologies used in the village (technological affordances), or it was technology that must be adjusted to the interests of its users (technological appropriation). Several questions need to be answered in the future out of these problems, such as should developmental achievements be evaluated from the extent to which a community is identified through their “proximity” to digital technology? Does the possession of information in communication development, which is then processed as a commodity, have a higher preference than agricultural commodities which actually counted as the local products/resources? Furthermore, is information society as a form of society order which is said to be the representation of a futuristic society a necessity, or a norm, from which we in this “digital era” cannot be separated? Or are development projects, to take a radical view, controlled by the realization of information society? Is information society a kind of new cultural order that determinantly undergoes the process of culturalization? If we look closely at the case of Melung as described above, there were indications that the answer could be “yes”. The adjustment of development goals and socio-cultural changes were consequences that were ongoing and could not be avoided when contact with digital technology took place. Melung seemed unsteady in maintaining its cultural order and its existing development ideals after being exposed to internet technology. Melung was also unable to resist media discourse about internet village narrative (interview with Margino, par. 175–183). When Margino was asked about the issue, he acknowledged the need for an evaluation of the impact of free internet access in the village and the utilization of internet for the village development in general. This was still not done when fieldwork was completed. The basis of the need for evaluation, Margino continued, was the shift of community values and social habits in Melung after the internet entered the village. He remained unsure if use of the internet was solely for pleasure or was there an indication of changes/improvement in the level of general/specific knowledge of the people. He was also concerned that excessive internet usage could lead users to neglect family or their immediate environment (ibid., par. 177). He told of a girl of middle school age who was a diligent student of the Quran, but her attitude changed after she became a user of modern technology. She ran away with a male acquaintance who, Margino suspected, she met through social media (ibid., par. 179). Even though there was no proof this was the case, the impact of new media and “outside influences” on impressionable people was a common concern.

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Syarifudin, the head of the youth organization in Melung, was similarly concerned. He contended that “before the internet entered the village, there should’ve been guidance to the community. Sometimes, a small child is already using a laptop. There are sites about politics, too, but occasionally (windows with inappropriate contents) pop up … The internet now contains a lot of illegal sites” (interview, par. 135). According to him, the internet Wi-Fis scattered around the village were not useful for the village community in general except to village officials (ibid., par. 130–133); again, exposing the gap within the community. It was therefore not surprising, if “digital irrelevance” arising from such cases made the people question reflectively, “is it wrong that we installed (the internet)?” (Margino, interview, par. 177), which showed skepticism about the vaunted positive correlation between the application of internet technology and the advance development of the community. (g) Changes in the perception of knowledge or asymmetrical value of knowledge The emphasis on the aspect of communication in bottom-up communication development means that communication skills are valued over other proficiencies. The high or low level of communication competency determines whether a person could optimally make use of information he/she has at hand and benefit from communicating that information to other people. In the habitat of information society, knowledge and the mastery of information have more value than the mastery of other kinds of knowledge. Here, the comprehension of new digital ICT plays an important role in helping users to accumulate the amount of information they have gathered. Subsequently, proficiency in ICT also becomes more important than mastering other technologies that do not add value to information. The ability of people to commodify information is more valuable than the ability of people to commodify other objects (e.g., agricultural products, organic vegetables). When information, IT mastery and communication competency are contextualized, and users can make sense of all of them based on certain experiences and goals, these things can turn into powerful knowledge. When knowledge is incorporated in human action, then in the context of knowledge society and/or knowledge economy, it will become a force (cf. Unwin, 2009, pp. 21–23, 60). However, Unwin (2009) warns that knowledge has been commodified in contemporary society. No longer a kind of universal public good, whose rights over it are owned by everyone, instead, it has become a commodity that is traded and used to achieve certain goals. Consequently, because ICT has the ability to accumulate the power of information and knowledge, the commodification of knowledge/information will increase along with people’s mastery of ICT. ICT, like other technologies, has an inherent knowledge bias, which has an effect on the increasing/decreasing of an individual’s “power over” others based on his/her technology mastery.

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The above premise is relevant to the research findings. When Pak Kayim was interviewed about his role and function as a village official, he responded, “I feel like, indeed I’m stupid” (interview, par. 82) and “Pak Budi (Satrio) knows that I’m a bit slow” (interview, par. 87). At the time of the interview, Pak Kayim had learned that my presence in Melung was related to the issue of rural internet in the community. Digital technology was the context of my presence at that time. Therefore, even though at that point I did not ask a precise question about technology, instead about the election of village chief (par. 80) and about his involvement with the village chief in various village programs (par. 86), Pak Kayim felt the need to allude to the deficiency of his own capability/knowledge when I posed questions about his role in the village. He seemed to want to self-deprecatingly refer to his ignorance about all the things related to the internet and digital technology. This was the reason behind his confession of his “stupidity” (Research Diary, p. 105). In Five Things We Need to Know About Technological Change, Neil Postman says that “advantages and disadvantages of new technologies are never distributed evenly among the population” (Postman, 1998, p. 3). He also argues that the arrival of new technologies is followed by the formation of new groups of “winners” and “losers” or even groups of people who are not affected by the new technology at all. Pak Kayim, seen from the media ecology viewpoint, could have been the “loser” in his battle versus new digital technology in his village. Nonetheless, in my observation he was not “stupid” in absolute terms. The fact that he owned and led a Quran recitation school for children at his home, was trusted to become an imam in the village’s mosque and assigned to be a village apparatus showed that he actually had knowledge and capability in certain areas, which were not possessed by others, i.e., his knowledge of Islamic religion. However, because he was confronted with the situation in his village, which at that time viewed new ICTs, the Internet and digital technology as an advanced modern knowledge and a sign of developmental progress, he subconsciously devalued his own knowledge about religion, which was actually his strength. His strength had turned to become his weakness when faced with technology, which inherently had knowledge bias as explained before. He was unable to transform his knowledge about religion into a commodity of information that could be exchanged through ICT. Internet technology was not properly utilized for supporting his activities in the recitation school (interview with Pak Kayim, par. 105). The scope of Pak Kayim’s religious knowledge was local and limited by the locality of Melung Village. The capital value of his religious knowledge was also local. Meanwhile, the vision of communication development, to which Satrio and GDM referred, was global (“how the world saw them”). There was “asymmetrical value of knowledge” between one set of knowledge and another. There was no

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knowledge of the same value and there was incompatibility between Pak Kayim’s local knowledge and the global nature of the internet. This situation meant Pak Kayim was left out and marginalized from communication development activities in Melung. He admitted that even though he had tried to practice in terms of improving his digital capabilities, he still considered it lacking (interview, par. 91). Khoerudin said Pak Kayim was the most computer illiterate of all the village officials (interview, par. 33). He did not have an online presence, meaning he missed the opportunity to express his opinion publicly through social media or the village website. Hence, he was absent from the self-created public sphere/discourse. Offline, he was pushed to the periphery; online, he was isolated in silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Pak Kayim’s experience showed that the vision of being a subject in development, as proclaimed by GDM, was difficult to achieve if people did not master the supporting technological system. Here, technology brought social divisions into society. Rather than providing the catapult to leapfrog the lag in modernization, technology divided people even more into social groups based on their technological capability. The celebrated success stories of Melung and other villages under GDM in utilizing ICTs should rightfully refer to e village officials and activists. Lestari confirmed that it did not represent the whole village community. Even school teachers were not literate enough regarding digital technology (interview with Lestari, par. 40). Take the story behind the conferring of the CAP Award. The chair of Pager Gunung, Sukirno, admitted that he did not know anything about the future agenda of the organization he led in relation to the development of CAP. This was ironic considering that the CAP should be for the management of Pager Gunung because the Ministry of Communication and Information awarded it to them, so the CAP technically did not belong to the village administration. He also confessed that that all matters pertaining to the CAP, from drawing up and submitting the proposal to receiving the award, was arranged by Satrio and his colleagues. He only had to sign off on the files presented to him. He had neither an understanding about new ICTs nor the village’s vision of ICT-based development, even though the CAP was under the authority of his organization (interview, par. 54–57). Once again, it showed the village’s vision about internet development was not shared evenly among village members. Many Melung inhabitants still lacked information about the existence of the village’s internet network and its functions for the development of their village (Research Diary pp. 25, 68, 77 & 83). This proved the term “collective knowledge” was somewhat quixotic. Even if there was a kind of collective knowledge in the village as claimed by Sudjatmiko, the collectivity was fragile, because a marginal public always existed even within a periphery, i.e., periphery in a periphery (interview, par. 19; see below).

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Technology is not value-free. It has biases. It promotes certain values and undermines others. Pak Kayim’s considerable knowledge of religion was undervalued. On the other hand, knowledge of digital technology was valued highly and could be transformed as a commodity. Even the most mundane knowledge in other communities, such as creating a Facebook account, had commodity value at that time in the context of the village. Lestari recounted that in Padang, West Sumatra, residents provided services to create email addresses and Facebook accounts. The main commodity there was actually Facebook, but since an email address was required to be able to register, they sold both services. “People rarely opened their email, but they always opened Facebook” (interview, par. 52). Facebook was also the social media of choice in Melung. Internet surfing was mostly devoted to “playing” Facebook. Even the how-to to create a Facebook account was taught in one of the training sessions in CAP, but it was not commodified. From my observations and interactions with the locals, I gleaned that their presence on Facebook carried importance for them in asserting their existence in the virtual world, hence adapting to the “requirements” of the modern day. Facebook was used for many purposes in daily activities, such as sharing and seeking information, organizing activities or doing business (e.g., buying and selling mobile phones; see Research Diary, pp. 10, 11, 15, 32, 62, 75, 84, 85, 96, 101 & 108). As an unintended and unanticipated consequence, there was a change in perception about knowledge. As explained, digitalization forced people to assess knowledge and skills in digital technologies more valuable than other knowledge and skills. In a world where people were encouraged to take a digital leap toward the information/knowledge society, such action has led to “asymmetrical knowledge exchange” (see below) between those who mastered digital technology and those who did not. Melung and other villages under the auspices of GDM were ready to make this leap by the means of application of new ICTs (interview with Taryono, par. 55). Suparyo, commenting on Sudjatmiko’s idea of the so-called “IT-Literate Village”, emphasized that reduction of urban-rural inequality meant that, “we need an abnormal strategy … (which) allows the villages to make intelligent leaps” (interview, par. 370). Lindawati, in contrast, mentioned that this leaping process could result in a “culture shock” when traditional rural communities were confronted with digital technology, which was urban biased (interview, par. 102). The above facts illustrate that a knowledge gap not only existed among village officials, but also between them and the rest of the village population. The gap even existed between the village community and the supra-village, between the villages that were affiliated with GDM and the villages that did not, between GDM and other elements of civil society such as NGOs and universities, which according to

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Suparyo have been part of the elite (interview, par. 397). Nevertheless, within a big circle of periphery, it can be said that arguably the GDM villages were located in the inner-periphery due to their tech-savvy status, whereas the non-GDM villages were in the outer-periphery (Habermas, 1996). In sum, what I was witnessing was a hierarchy or “stratification of knowledge”. Even within Pak Kayim himself, as well as in other people who were in the peripheral of digital knowledge, there was a gap between the possessed competency and the requested capability for the realization of the village’s vision or the “current” development ideals. A knowledge gap or stratification of knowledge formed a distinctive social structure in Melung, which was determined by the mastery of information or the lack thereof and knowledge about new digital technologies. Following Evers and Gerke (2005), a knowledge gap would always exist between related parties, and even became a prerequisite for the emergence of communication development. If the gap between the parties involved in communicative action was not present, as a logical consequence, there would be no new knowledge to be exchanged. If this occurred, no communication development would have existed. The sharing process between the movement’s members was not intended to completely eliminate the gap of knowledge between them for all things to become equal. Instead, increasing the level of knowledge among themselves was the purpose of information sharing. GDM operated according to need-based working principle with the presumption that every village had its own problems, hence had different needs that must be addressed (interview with Lindawati, par. 9, 91–93, & 172– 174). Thus, new knowledge that was gained as a result of discussion in the so-called learning circles would and should always be contextualized according to the needs in their respective villages. By doing so, a new knowledge gap would be created, which would stimulate another debate and keep the dialogue machinery of the movement alive. However, the process of exchanging new knowledge between center and periphery was not balanced. “Asymmetrical knowledge exchange” has caused those in the periphery to receive more information from the center than vice versa (interview with Lindawati, par. 145–148). Once again, this indicated the “center-centric” development practices. The gap became an important element in GDM’s communication network because it was precisely the precondition for forging communication development between those who possessed different knowledge. Communication development required reciprocal information/knowledge giving and taking among the network’s members. Within the understanding of communication development, communication processes that were built and communication patterns that were formed were always vertical, i.e., between those who possessed specific/specialized knowledge

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(center) and those who did not (periphery). However, communication development allowed that to some degree and in specific knowledge schemata every person could take the position of center and at the same time periphery in someone else’s knowledge schemata (Figure 7.10). The structure of communication was dynamic and open-ended. Psychologically, humans categorize and structure new information that they have perceived according to their mental schemata, which decides whether that information is within their knowledge range or not; this influences how the information will be understood (cf. DiMaggio, 1997). The positioning of a person into the category of center or periphery, in this sense, was dynamic and tended to fluctuate according to his/her possession of knowledge (i.e., power) and ability to comprehend new information.

Figure 7.10 The dynamic and fluctuating knowledge-based model of center-periphery

The dynamic of information exchange in communication development has led to multiple outcomes. This is in accordance with Servaes’s “another development” or

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“multiplicity” (1999; Servaes & Malikhao, 2002), Assche and Hornidge’s “hybridity” (2015), and Kleine (2013), who views development as a never-ending process because we are in constant flux. According to this point of view, all countries are developing countries, which should follow their own development path according to their “schemata”. However, in a world that is more connected than before, each country or community should not work in isolation in executing their development agenda, rather; they should cooperate by forming networks (Assche & Hornidge, 2015; Kleine, 2013; Servaes, 1999; Servaes & Malikhao, 2002). GDM was trying to accommodate the building of such a network for the Indonesian rural communities. In fact, GDM was one of those networks. While knowledge in digital technology has been seen as a source of power that could be commoditized, nonetheless, in the communication development practiced by GDM, it was used as a tool to bring people in the periphery to advance by freeing themselves from the backwardness brought by the domination of those who feudally control the information or the source of knowledge (interview with Suparyo, par. 433). One of the objectives of communication development was to guarantee free access to information and knowledge. GDM’s open-source rhetoric in almost all of their communication campaigns was to this point (e.g., they preferred Ubuntu rather than Windows as their O.S.) (ibid.). The goal was to share and exchange knowledge with anyone and at the same time to free the flow of communication, both offline and online. It was in line with the Access to Knowledge (A2K) movement, introduced by Kapczynski (2010 in Servaes & Hoyng, 2015, p. 4) as opposed to the Access to Information (A2I) movement. Rather than information as an external object that can be possessed and transmitted to others, what matters in terms of agency and empowerment is knowledge as the capacity or skill to process information and produce new statements and practical know-how to be mobilized in concrete situations. To push for access to knowledge means to push for the development of capabilities in diverse local contexts … (Servaes & Hoyng, 2015, p. 4–5; emphasis in original)

Unwin (2009, p. 60) also discusses the growing tendency to use the term “knowledge” more rather than “information’” This development led to the transformation of ICT4D into KCT4D (knowledge and communication technologies for development), even though this concept remains less popular than the former. In summary, this research has found that power was seized through the never-ending process of production and reproduction of new knowledge, however asymmetrical it might seem. Seen from the bottom-up perspective, rural citizen

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journalism functioned as a mechanism to produce and reproduce local and indigenous knowledge. Rural citizen journalism could be the method in which people reconstructed their local knowledge subjectively and then voiced it to the public. During the process of news production, rural citizen journalists were “forced” to re-learn about their village, its strengths and weaknesses, its uniqueness and potential. Through the process of writing, they produced information, which were shared online and throughout the time, this re-learning process would reshape their selfconcept (interview with Lindawati, par. 45). Apart from online citizen journalistic practices, the process of sharing local knowledge was done offline in learning circles. By learning together in circles, they processed information from each village member into a kind of shared knowledge, which was the collection of local knowledge (interviews with Lindawati, par. 47 & 49; Sudjatmiko, par. 13 & 15). Speaking in relation to a larger context, Sudjatmiko disagreed with the notion of “local knowledge” as opposed to “global knowledge”. He critically raised an argument as follows: I still don’t like to call local knowledge (or) local wisdom, because being local (or) being global is … where is (actually) the center? It doesn’t exist, right? Actually … in the universe there is no such thing as the center. It’s just because it (a knowledge) is not supported by an instrumentation (or) tool, which of course bring their own problems later, but that they (a certain group of people) then have tools that accelerate the spread of their ideas, so they quickly become global. Now, I see that the communication instrument is an instrument that I think is needed by the community whether it is called modern or traditional, which then, these traditional knowledges, these collective knowledges of these scattered communities, can also take advantage of. The problem is how this becomes effective. Becoming effective for me is networking … Websites are one form (of networking). Yes, one of them is ICT. (Interview, par. 19)

However, Sudjatmiko’s opinion on absence of the center does not annul the explanation about communication development above, which states that everyone or every community can be in the position of center and periphery at the same time. Instead, it confirms the argument that center and periphery are dynamic concepts and that there is no absolute status of center or periphery. To make it global, like Sudjatmiko suggested above, people in the periphery should make their knowledge accessible to the larger public on any communication platforms available to them and preferably through their self-controlled public spheres (websites, social media, learning circles). This action would contribute to the plurality of perspectives about rural development or rural communities in general. In doing so, GDM and the rural communities were trying to resolve the problem

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of inequality of knowledge, especially caused by the limited access to the mainstream public sphere. We will revisit the problem of inequality of knowledge in the communication empowerment section (7.2.). (h) Changes in the meaning of connectivity or the role of network A significant consequence of internet-based communication development was the increasingly relevant role of networks in achieving communication objectives of the rural communities, especially those under the banner of GDM. Sudjatmiko mentioned above that network was one of the most effective communication instruments in disseminating ideas from the grassroots, so it could increase its significance in the more expanded public sphere in this so-called era of “globalization” (interview with Sudjatmiko, par. 19). A strong movement has a strong network. The mastery of ICT would amplify the network’s power so that it accelerated and broadened the effects of the movement. In communication development, networking was seen as a strategy of the rural communities to establish connectivity with various parties, thereby building coalition strength when confronting themselves with the authoritative forces of the supra-villages. Castells (2009, 2011, 2015) explains this kind of strategy by calling it “network-making power”. The capability to build such a network meant the empowerment of the village, whose power in the past was certainly limited due to the bureaucratic feudal system of relations between the center (the supra-village) and the periphery (the rural community). In building a network-based power, it was important for the network members to coordinate with those who possessed the flexibility to switch networks. These “switchers” had a hand in two or more networks, so the village movement had agents spread across various systems of networks. This principle was applied by GDM, with members from a variety of occupational backgrounds who helped the successful execution of GDM’s mission by activating the authority and roles they possessed in their home network. Kurniawan gave an example of GDM activities in Majalengka Regency, especially during the preparation and implementation of the 2014 ICT Village Festival. The festival ran smoothly and received the full support it needed from the regency because “the volunteer rural activists were close to bureaucracy” (interview, par. 42). Direct observation in Majalengka revealed that the rural activists of this regency were not only close to the bureaucrats but were active bureaucrats themselves. Many of them worked in the regency or district government. At the same time, they were active members of GDM and shared the same vision about rural development. Even the head of the ICT Volunteer of Majalengka Regency was the chairperson of Majalengka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who could easily switch networks to a more central ring of network in Majalengka region (Research Diary, pp. 125–128).

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Majalengka activists admitted during a learning circle that ICT volunteers found it easy to open new networks and seek support from them, because they exploited the maximum potential of the networks in which they joined. While doing so, they recognized themselves as part of GDM network even though the ICT volunteers were formed by the center, i.e., by the Ministry of Communication and Information (Research Diary, p. 127). Indeed, GDM did not set specific requirements and procedures for those who wanted to join the movement. What was needed was a common vision and ideology about rural development and not formal membership measurements which was normally applied in modern organizations. GDM followed an open membership principle. One could easily identify his/herself as part of GDM if he/she had this qualification and was committed to attend the learning circles. GDM was essentially a collection and connection of networks of individuals and communities who shared the same perspective about rural development and village governance. They collaborated and coordinated, for example, with the public school in Melung to build the Wi-Fi network. They worked hand in hand with individuals from PNPM, NGOs, bloggers, PANDI, Indonesian Community Radio Networks (JRKI), national legislators and IT experts (interviews with Satrio, par. 21–23, 31, 454, 477; Sudjatmiko, par. 29; Suparyo, par. 224–226, 550, 576–578; Margino, par. 31, 113; Khoerudin, par. 31–33, 140). These elements of government and civil society automatically became part of the GDM networks, boosting the network’s membership and strength thanks to the presence and active role of these switchers who easily changed networks according to the needs of the movement. However, individuals from various occupational backgrounds (or networks) did not represent their respective institutions/organizations while “working” for/with GDM. In GDM, they stood as free individuals with a concern for rural issues. The switchers, who acted as GDM agents, could “switch hats” freely without being limited by strict organizational rules because no legal status was violated when they dabbled in two different milieus. GDM also never issued an official membership identification, such as cards. This was the reason the personal network was crucial in accelerating the expansion of village networks (interviews with Kurniawan, par. 42; Suparyo, par. 323). The existence of these agents in various networks was pivotal because they could create a new program into these networks in accordance with the interests of the movement. For example, as programmers (Castells, 2009, 2011, 2015), when the parliamentarians were fighting for the passing of the Village Law, activities included journalists who provided more extensive and more balanced coverage for rural communities; bloggers and IT experts offering training and mentoring to help villagers become digital and internet literate; village facilitators from PNPM helping village officials in setting up their working agendas and annual budgets as

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well as connected them with funding sources; village agents in PANDI providing discussion forums for the desa.id domain to be approved as the official village domain and colleagues from NGOs who helped seek independent funding sources for GDM campaign activities to be carried out without relying on government funds. In the absence of a network’s formal leader who would have been its central figure, the strength and power of the movement lay in the network itself. The decision-making mechanism was left to the network to handle almost collectively (interview with Suparyo, par. 441). How the next moves of the movement should be planned and executed were mostly decided in deliberative mechanisms of intervillage networks where they discussed the matter both on online (in the WA group, which I joined) and offline (in non-centralized learning circles) platforms (interview with Lindawati, par. 9). The role of networks in communication development is seen here. The rural community has entered a new era of connectivity that crossed geographical, structural and political boundaries, to be decided by the interests of the villages. Networks played an important role in connecting the once scattered peripheral power dots and turning them into a big connective power of rural communities. The network power was especially valuable in dealing with external forces (e.g., the supra-village), which had dominated the village community politically. Changes to this map of network have also stirred changes in villagevillage and village-supra-village relations, where the villages have increased their bargaining power to negotiate or establish communication with the (central or local) government. The above analysis means that the changes have not only happened in the significance of connectivity, but also in the meaning of connectivity itself. Connectivity was not only limited to cooperation with stakeholders. Instead, it has become active connections with the movement’s agents who were placed as switchers and programmers on different networks. This was partly the intended consequence of GDM’s communication development activities in forming active networks amongst the rural communities, between the villages with supra-villages and between the villages with other elements of civil society.

7.2

Communication Empowerment as the Foundation of Communication Development

“Communication empowerment” was born as an impact of asymmetrical communication between center and periphery, where rural communities suffered from exceptionally limited space and opportunities to publicly communicate their own

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development ideas, which in turn ostracized them even further in their relationships with the center. Their position as development objects ascribed to them the role of receivers in the linear process of development communication, in which the governments, both central and local, were the senders. Communication development emerged because of this “communication inequality”, communication empowerment functioned as the fuel of this process. In this research, communication empowerment can be described with the following narrative. First and foremost, it begins with the recognition that everyone, regardless of their social status, has a distinctive knowledge or skills as resources, which can be utilized for their own capital. However, communication empowerment also realizes that not everyone has the capability to express their knowledge and skills to the public at large. By virtue of this, communication empowerment is seen as a communication strategy for marginalized people to battle inequality of “access to appropriate and sustainable opportunities to improve their lives and lives of others in their communities” (Melkote, 2003, p. 137). This is done by strengthening their “communication capability” and utilizing all existing channels, which they have control over, to actively and freely articulate their interests before the public. Their activeness in voicing their interests and opinions means placing people’s participation as a norm in communication empowerment. Communication empowerment cannot be done without active participation of the citizens. It is the same principle found in communication development. The emphasis on participation, equality, and freedom in development for social change is also promoted by Rogers (1976) when he redefines development that only emphasizes economic advancement (see 3.1.2.3.). The struggle to reach communication equality also means the struggle to seize power over access to communication resources from the parties that have dominated the marginalized communities so far, particularly the rural communities, such as large media corporations with their market-oriented media system, politicians, government and those who are close to the center. This struggle can take place on several levels, i.e., at the level of individuals, groups or organizations (cf. Melkote & Steeves, 2015, p. 34). At the group and organizational level, communication empowerment wields a social organizing function, which elevates the degree of its collectivity. To achieve this goal, networking plays a crucial role and regarded as the source of empowerment (cf. Nugroho, 2010). Thus, communication empowerment is defined as a process to break down the “feudal interaction structure” (Galtung, 1971), which maintains the state of inequality between center and periphery. By once again using Glaser’s (1978) coding families, four problematizations of communication empowerment in Melung and in the networks of GDM were

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identified, namely “the problem of inequality in empowerment”, “the question of collectivity”, “the means and goals of communication empowerment” and “the need for literacy in communication empowerment”. Each will be elaborated in the following chapters.

7.2.1

The Problem of Inherent Inequality in Empowerment: Is Empowerment the Appropriate Term?

Viewed from the standpoint of communication, Virmani’s (2002) argument can be taken into consideration when explaining about the relationship between information access and empowerment. He believes that “access to information is an important element of empowerment” (p. 229). He stresses that “[t]he internet and internet telephony can play a role in breaking the informational isolation in rural areas” (ibid., see 3.1.2.3.1). This definition assumes that the more information you have, the more you will be empowered than before. “Empowered people” means, people are able to maximize the use of information for their benefit, to lift their living conditions, and/or to free themselves from any kinds of oppression. In the context of center-periphery and village and supra-village relations, “empowered” would mean having full control of the information production and consumption and apart from the domination of the supra-village during the process. Communication empowerment sees that the general concept of “empowerment” is struggling with the issue of inherent inequality. The empowerment approach encourages local people to be the central point of development, to be the subject of development. But in order to be that central point, the possession of power and control is essential. During the field research it was observed that the marginalized people in rural areas needed to be transformed from the state of powerlessness to being able to take command and control over themselves and their community to enable them to voice their concerns. Accordingly, a person or a community who was subject to empowerment practices must have a “mental condition of acceptance’, which was self-assuring that they possessed lesser power than the person who would empower them. This contradicted the concept of alternative development, which suggests that all parties involved in a development project should be treated equally. It seems the concept of empowerment an sich is flawed because this indicates that “inequality” is a prerequisite for empowerment to happen. If the empowerment approach criticizes the linearity of categorization of countries within the modernization approach (i.e., developed country, middle-income country, less-developed country or under-developed country), the same can be said

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for the empowerment approach for its categorization of people: the “empowered” versus “powerless”. The term empowerment itself is in some way problematic and contains urban bias, which demeans the rural population (interview with Lindawati, par. 145– 152; cf. Lindawati, n.d.). Semantically, the term empowerment, if not juxtaposed with other terms, indicates the asymmetrical position between the empowered and the powerless; between center and periphery. Pragmatically, this point of view becomes the legitimacy for the already-empowered people to empower the less-empowered ones. It means, inequality is an attribute, condition and requirement, which has to be present in empowerment concepts and practices and for empowerment to happen. During the interview with Lindawati, she expressed her doubts whether empowerment really promoted equality and illustrated it from the position of subject/object in an active and passive sentence within the structure of Indonesian language. “This means that there are those who ‘me-’ (take action/active sentence) and ‘di-’ (affected by someone’s action/passive sentence)” (interview, par. 63). Lindawati also addressed the problem of asymmetrical empowerment concept. That’s why I bring up the concept of . . . “self-dependence” . . . There’s discomfort (in the concept of empowerment), although perhaps not so precise like what you think about empowerment. This concept (of empowerment) had shortcomings, which made the facilitators a level or a caste higher than the ones who were being empowered. It meant there were people who were going to empower and were to be empowered. It’s an unequal dichotomy. And then the concept of keswadayaan, that’s the Indonesian term, that’s self-dependence, or actually self-reliance. Keswadayaan wanted to bring back the role of the local actors onto the surface to be able to define their own development without relying on external agents or facilitators from agencies or (other) intermediary agencies who came from the side. That wouldn’t be bottom-up, but probably side-up . . . (Interview, par. 59)

In Indonesian language, the basic word for keswadayaan is swadaya. Swadaya is formed from two words: swa and daya. Swa (from Sanskrit) means “self”. According to the leading Indonesian-English dictionary, swa is “a prefix in formal neologism” (Echols & Shadily, 1992, p. 537). Meanwhile, daya (also absorbed from Sanskrit) means power, energy or capacity (ibid., p. 133). The same dictionary translates swadaya into “innate strength or effort, self-supporting” (ibid., p. 537) or the ability to do something. Accordingly, as quoted above, Lindawati used “self-dependence” to emphasize the strength of the self, and not of

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the other. Synonymously, keswadayaan can also be translated into “self-reliance”, i.e., according to Lindawati above, “without relying on external agents”. In contrast, if we refer to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, empowerment means “the act or action of empowering someone or something: the granting of the power, right, or authority to perform various acts or duties”19 . To empower means “to give somebody the power or authority to do something” (Hornby, 2000, p. 411) or “to give somebody more control over their own life or the situation they are in” (ibid.). The equivalent translation of empowerment into bahasa Indonesia is pemberdayaan. In Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (The Big Dictionary of Indonesian Language) published by the Indonesian Department of National Education, pemberdayaan refers to the “process, method, the act of empowering” (Pusat Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2008, p. 300; author’s translation).20 In sum, the meaning of self-dependence, self-reliance or keswadayaan is different from empowerment or pemberdayaan. While empowerment spotlights weaknesses on the side of the to-be-empowered people, on the contrary, keswadayaan reinforces the strengths of the self, or of the local people. Curiously, in the Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Areas and Transmigration (Kemendes PDTT), the official name of the directorate entasked with the goal to increase the capability of rural communities was the Directorate General of Village Development and Empowerment (Direktorat Jenderal Pembangunan dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa). Likewise, the ministry that handled the problems of women and children is the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection (Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak). The naming of these government institutions showed a condescending viewpoint of the state of Indonesia to those people it considered weak and needed to be under its control to be empowered. However, it’s not the same for bureaucrats or civil servants. For example, the ministry that administered civil servants is the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi). Here, the word daya in pendayagunaan (utilization) did not mean power, which implied empowerment, but it pointed to “making efficient use of something” (Echols & Shadily, 1992, p. 133) or someone’s capabilities. Instead of using the word ‘pemberdayaan’ aparatur negara (state apparatuses empowerment), the government chose ‘pendayagunaan’ aparatur negara (state apparatuses utilization). 19

The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ empowerment. Retrieved on May 25, 2018. 20 Original quote in Bahasa Indonesia: “proses, cara, perbuatan memberdayakan”.

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The way the state saw the state apparatuses (part of center) was different with the way it saw its citizens (part of the periphery). It implied the notion that the government in the center was superior to its citizens in the periphery and it laid the foundation of a linear empowerment and development approach, in which the government was entitled or given the legitimation to empower or develop the people in the periphery. It was precisely the development concept that was strongly rejected and countered by GDM, which persistently envisioned that the villages would develop and empower themselves and consequently, by doing so, develop the state. Nonetheless, in the process of strengthening themselves to become self-reliant or self-dependent, the rural communities under GDM did not completely ignore the role of intermediary agents. Lindawati explained this process as follows: Why did I use (the word) self-dependence at that time? It’s because I saw here in the context of GDM, there’s collaboration between an intermediary agent and the local people. Although you said, “they are local elites, (or) not local people” . . . actually there’s an opportunity for the local people to collaborate and (in turn) they would become the facilitators in their home area. And as a matter of fact, local people understood the problems in their village better than facilitators from (external) agencies. (Interview, par. 63)

The above characteristics of GDM differentiated them with other initiatives, partly because GDM was not an organization. When it identified itself as the antithesis of NGO, it referred to the “network of inter-village”, which consisted of various people from different backgrounds (interview with Suparyo, par. 381; see 6.2.1). GDM as a network could not be categorized as an external entity to rural communities such as NGOs, government agencies or academicians, rather it was part of the rural community. When members of GDM “empowered” the villagers, they were principally empowering themselves, because they were part of the same group of people. It is “self-empowerment” that characterized GDM, rather than solely “empowerment”, which highlighted the reliance on external sources to empower them. By not relying on other external parties, particularly the center, it was necessary for GDM members to educate themselves to be more empowered. As discussed in previous chapters, rural citizen journalism—through the process of news gathering and producing—was one of the activities, which has helped them in terms of self-education to increase their knowledge of all matters relating to rural issues, and specifically about their own villages (interview with Lindawati, par. 225).

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303

The Question of Collectivity: From Empowerment to Self-empowerment to Collective and Connective Empowerment

It has been shown in many parts of this report that collectivity must be evaluated critically because of its potential to summarily disregard dissenting opinions. Yet, despite this “fragile collectivity”, a number of informants mentioned the importance of collectivity in rural activism and development. Consistent with the epistemological choice that has been taken for this research, which intends to bring the voices from below onto the surface and with the methodological choice, which is inductive toward data grounded in the field, their voices must be respected without losing critical and analytical stances. Rural collectivity reflected in GDM’s typical working cycle can be illustrated as follows: A successful village—in terms of achieving its development goals— shared its best practices and success stories with other villages in the GDM networks through online and offline learning circles and in doing so motivated those villages to better themselves and be self-reliant. In turn, these villages did the same in their local environment, i.e., becoming the facilitator in their local network to inspire and motivate other villages in their area. A successful village became the reference or the “honey” for other villages as it attracted others to emulate them in terms of development ideology (interview with Taryono, par. 49). Via simultaneous learning circles, the method of sharing of experience multiplied itself as the network grew. In the end, it was done collectively as many village communities organized learning circles in their own regions to strengthen and empower themselves. Self-empowerment became “collective empowerment” based on the network’s self-dependence and self-reliance principles. Nugroho (2010), who studies rural NGOs in Indonesia, describes such a working method as “the networking of movement for rural empowerment” (p. 93–94), which brings the question whether it is better to name it as “connective empowerment”. Nevertheless, as described in the previous chapter, this study criticizes the use of empowerment as a single term because of its hierarchical nature, its tendency to dominate, its inherent inequality and its non-reciprocal communication character. Rather, this study promotes self-empowerment as an effort to recognize that each “self” has its own unique strengths and therefore has the potential to share those strengths with the other “selves”. When this sharing pattern is carried out together by many “selves”, collective empowerment occurs. Thus, collective empowerment also implies collective action.

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The collective empowerment of GDM relied on the strength of the network. The actions required that each member of the network brought something (knowledge or skill) that they considered their strength into the network to be shared and exchanged in learning circles with the other members. Eventually, these activities would strengthen both the network and all the members themselves with new information and knowledge instilled into the network. The strength of the network was reflected in its pluralism and collectivism of knowledge of its members, meaning that all of the knowledge shared in the network belonged to the whole group. The network empowered itself by connecting the scattered knowledge of its members, hence connective empowerment. The lifeline of the network was funded by the collective knowledge of its members (interview with Sudjatmiko, par. 13). GDM as a collective movement emphasized the equality between the villages and the supra-villages and strived for new perspectives in rural reform and rural empowerment (interview with Taryono, par. 23). Here, rural empowerment could only be achieved through the joint endeavor of the movement’s members, which highlighted the importance of collectivity. Satrio underlined the meaning of collectivity for GDM by saying, “if we build collectively, there are far more (benefits). Going forward together, too, we’re much happier. It’s right … more useful right? Like if we all bring food, it’ll be bigger (for all), right? Together we’ll be stronger” (Satrio, interview, par. 479). On the other hand, he subconsciously overlooked that the rural digital development he strived for might be irrelevant for some members of the village, such as Sardi (interview, par. 118–130), Sukirno (interview, par. 55–57), Pak Kayim (interview, par. 89–93), and Syarifudin (interview, par. 90–106), which left a question mark over the wholeness of the collectivity. However, Suparyo reiterated that GDM was built on the basis of “collective conclusion”, which resulted from the dialectical process of its participants in learning circles who met to share the development problems in their respective villages and collectively seek solutions to these problems (interview with Suparyo, par. 200–202). ICT was then utilized to publicize this collective knowledge or, as Sudjatmiko called it, “collective genius”, which consisted of “collective values” (interview, par. 19) to the wider public in order to gain a bigger public resonance. Collective development was possible for GDM because they did consider the village as a collective community at the grassroots level, which must “face the supra-villages. We define the supra-villages here as the regency, the province and the national (government)” (Suparyo, interview, par. 206). When asked whether GDM would become bigger than the villages themselves because of this collectivity, Suparyo disagreed:

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GDM is not an organization … GDM is passion … spirit, it means passion. And in fact, the person who called GDM is not me. All will become GDM (eventually). Maybe in Banyumas, I will be part of that symbol. But in Riau, maybe our friends there (will become the symbol). Or in Aceh, where else we don’t know. So, this is mutual passion. And the organizations (which are connected to GDM) are varied actually. (Interview, par. 439)

It was this mutual and shared passion that drove the movement forward together; the absence of formal membership ties was seen as an advantage rather than disadvantage because it enabled the network to move flexibly. Many of its members were part of formal organizations outside GDM and that was precisely what made the network even stronger, because they would easily become the network’s switchers who enriched the network with their professionalism. The switchers linked one network to another to create inter-network knowledge. They were an important part of connective empowerment. In conclusion, the collectivity of GDM was marked by its shared vision of rural development and the mechanism of simultaneous learning circles between and within the member villages, which were their methods for collectively self-empowering themselves.

7.2.3

The Means and Goals of Communication Empowerment

The goals of communication empowerment For the success of sustainable communication development, good communication capability was necessary. The actors of communication development must be encouraged to have more communicative power. From the perspective of communication empowerment, communication capability was nurtured by the efforts of self-empowerment carried out together, which meant collective empowerment. From this point of view, communication empowerment also consisted of “communication encouragement”, in which people recognized their abilities and were encouraged to express their strengths openly in the public sphere. On the basis of this articulative impulse, communication capability was crucial to break the center’s domination of communication, which was manifested in the form of village website domain policy, the provision of using certain applications for village data management and the domination of certain actors in mass communication public sphere, as well as the domination of narratives about rural issues that has marginalized the rural communities. Negt and Kluge (1972) describe the bourgeois public sphere as “Blockierungszusammenhang” or “the blocking of social experience” (ibid.,

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1993), “der das ‘Proletariat’ an der Wahrnehmung und Artikulation eigener Bedürfnisse hinder” (Wimmer, 2007, p. 176). In the case of rural development, the rural populace lacked a good bargaining position when faced with the hegemonial power of the center, which has dominated the mainstream public sphere and the bureaucratic communication environment around the village. An important aim of communication empowerment was to break the feudal communication structure of the Indonesian bureaucracy culture, which was hierarchical and top-down by building new alternative public spheres controlled by the village community as the subordinated group (interview with Satrio, par. 547 & 688–700). It was part of rural communication empowerment to regain power from the center, namely the power and acknowledgment of village sovereignty that the center wrested from them when the New Order rose to power in the 1960 s (see 2.2.3.). By reclaiming their power, the village communities could again rely on themselves, on the solidarity of inter-village network, which was manifested in many local initiatives, and they could eventually break away, although not completely, from the existing oppressive power structures of the supra-village. From this point of view, communication empowerment is defined as communication capability to freely articulate the needs and interests of oneself before the public and, reciprocally, to receive information from it in order to enhance one’s own knowledge (interviews with Kurniawan, par. 114; Sudjatmiko, par. 19; Suparyo, par. 381). For it to happen, communication empowerment requires citizens to actively engage in an open and egalitarian public dialogue. New media was used as a tool to fulfil the needs of the people at the grassroots level of the communication process and information flow, which they could control. Lindawati stated that “they (GDM members) were using the technology of new media because there’s a full awareness that this was indeed the right technology for that (fulfilling their communication needs)” (interview, par. 174). The independence of the villages in utilizing and managing Village Information System (VIS) that they had developed themselves (i.e., Mitra Desa; literally means the village’s partner) showed that the village was capable for empowerment and to progress by relying on itself. In VIS, technology was used to enhance better public services. Taryono described the usefulness of technology for this matter: ... in terms of information needs that were so extensive, yes, whether it’s the internet, cell phones or anything, (it’s necessary) because the farmers could use cellphones already. The internet entering the village and everything else, this was the demand, the demand was high (from) the community. The demand for the fulfillment of excellent and fast public services was high. That’s what I found. It means, when the village government could provide fast public services in the form of the Village Information System, which, for example, previously took a long time to type one sheet of paper

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with a typewriter, then with Mitra Desa there were a lot of functions, from extension of ID card, ownership test and so on, and even the ID Number could be printed, the villagers were happy. They knew, “Oh now the Melung village government can provide excellent public services. Within five minutes everything was done. If it took more than the promised time, (we) can complain,” for example. The village knew that although there were only a few: Melung, Dermaji, Karangnangka the Village Information System (was useful). It means, the integration (of ICT into rural life) was for its utility. The community could feel that the public service was faster and they felt happy when their demands were fulfilled. (Interview, par. 31)

Communication empowerment was also fundamental for the functioning of desa bersuara, the “voicing village”. When the village inhabitants were empowered communicatively, they would be able to mainstream the rural issues with the help of new digital ICTs, in order to, in the long term, counter the dominance of the center in influencing the construction of public opinion (interview with Lindawati, par. 83 & 208; Suparyo, par. 163 & 232; Satrio, par. 164–170). By consistently speaking out to the public regarding their concerns, interests and opinions, rural communities became slowly empowered. As public relations efforts, such activities had an impact on the positive image building of rural communities (interviews with Suparyo, par. 161; Khoerudin, par. 31). By becoming active communication actors, rural communities were changing to become the protagonists in development programs. Finally, the action and participation of the periphery in countering the domination of communication of the center was one indicator with which communication empowerment could be measured. The means and strategy of communication empowerment It must be emphasized that in communication empowerment, the village chiefs held a central role. Although it could be said they belonged to the village’s elite, they were first and foremost villagers because they did not hold the status of a civil servant (see 7.1.2.1.). Suparyo stressed that GDM deliberately involved the village chiefs and village officials because in the end they were the ones who remained in the village. Those were the category of people who would become the facilitators and in turn share their experiences with the residents of their villages, so that the collective empowerment process became more sustainable. Village officials were the village’s creative minority and agents of change. Suparyo added, based on past experience, the village empowerment program would not sustain if it was targeted to young people and this was contrary to the popular view. The reason behind this strategy was because of the high tendency of young village residents who usually left the community in early adulthood to work in the cities

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as laborers or abroad as migrant workers (interview with Suparyo, par. 381). In the context of rural Indonesia, the important position of the village heads in village development has been recorded at least as early as the 16th century. The formation and continuation of a village depend on the independence of the village head in managing his citizens (Agusta, 2007). It is not surprising that culturally this pattern of rural development, which is influenced by old patrimonialism, is still valid in Indonesian villages, especially in Java. In general, the practice of Indonesian politics is still driven by its culture of patrimonialism (see 2.1.2; 2.2.3.; 2.2.4.). The function of the village chief is as the catalyst for change for and within the community, who links his village with the networks outside the village community. Village linkage with networks outside the village community, which eventually formed GDM, was a strategy for a village to expand its cosmopolitanism and gain benefit from it (see 7.1.2.1). “The instrumentalization of community networks” (Agusta, 2007, p. 141) was an effort of the village community to escape from center’s dependency and thus they chose to join inter-village networks, which interdependently fought together for the interest of the community. Generally speaking, the strength of the network was virtually the means of communication empowerment. Castells (2011) explains that there are four forms of network power in a networked society, where technology plays an important role in shaping both the power and the network. They are networking power, network power, networked power and network-making power (see 3.3.2.). Power in “networking power” works with the principle of inclusion/exclusion. Those who were incorporated in GDM’s inter-village network had the opportunity to gain and share knowledge and experience from and with other network members. With this method they learned and grew together (interviews with Lindawati, par. 9; Sudjatmiko, par. 19; Khoerudin, par. 59 & 75). Problems that affected one of its members could and would be resolved jointly by mobilizing and activating the networks (interview with Lindawati, par. 95). This was an example of the “instrumentalization of community networks” (Agusta, 2007, p. 141), which was resulted from the networking power. “Network power” is about the imposition of the standard or protocol of communication to actors within a network. This strategy, if done properly with all coordinated actors, should be the solution for nearly all problems that are experienced by the participants of the network. It would—pending negotiation from the actors and depending on the openness of the network—ignore other possible solutions to the same problem (Castells, 2011, pp. 774–775). Network power forces each component of the network to adjust to the rules programmed by the

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network. Those who are able to exploit their communication potentials according to the rules imposed to them by the network might have a better chance to exercise power over those who do not. The network power of GDM could be detected from how the GDM’s standard of value was imposed on the village community and its actors. Value standards, such as good governance, transparency, accountability and the utilization of open and appropriate digital technology, as well as the emphasis on sustainable development were strengths which, if exploited accordingly, would give the periphery a high bargaining power when dealing with the dominant power of the center (see 6.2.). The legitimation for GDM network and Melung as the recipient of the CAP award and the organizers of the 2013 ICT Village Festival, which was handed by the central and local governments, was sign that GDM’s programs and standards (or protocol of communication) were finally accepted by the public and the state. With this legitimacy, GDM could actively and openly expand its network more freely and play a more fundamental role in rural development programs (interviews with Satrio, par. 452; Khoerudin, par. 65). The entitlement from the legitimacy obtained by GDM was not shared by other rural development movements. This distinguished the network power of GDM from the network power of other movements, for example that of GERDEMA in Malinau Regency, North Kalimantan, which was initiated by its head of regency instead of by the village residents themselves (see 6.2.3.). GERDEMA’s network power was only effective locally because the movement did not come from the grassroots’ initiative, but from local government bureaucrats (Cp). This was clearly different from the nationalist nature of GDM because it was formed from the bottom as a rhizomatic communication forum for the villages throughout Indonesia. However, even though GDM had network advantages, its strength was not absolute. The policies taken in and by GDM were not entirely independent. In a network society, they were still influenced by the power of other networks. Regardless of how independent GDM was, it still had to be the subject to national and local legislation in Indonesia where each village was located. This was “networked power”, i.e., the power that was interdependent with each other. In a networked power, one power or the policy-making in one’s network is continuously affected by the power of other networks. Thus, the question will be who influences whom? The answer is that there is no absolute power in a network society, which is an interdependent global world. Therefore, it was noteworthy for GDM to place its agents on as many networks as possible or rather, it was important for GDM that its participants consisted of those who also joined in as many different networks as possible. In doing so, GDM could penetrate more

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easily into many networks and influence their policy-making process for its benefit. This is what Castells (2011) calls “network-making power” (see 7.1.2.2.(1)(c) & (4)(h)). Referring to network-making power, communication empowerment relied on the programmers and switchers who determined how the inter-village movement was run “connectively” (interview with Suparyo, par. 165). The programmers and switchers also determined which networks GDM had to cooperate while expanding its networks (interviews with Satrio, par. 439 & 454; Margino, par. 237 & 239). The programmers of GDM were the rural activists who initially pioneered the formation of the movement and instilled the values of the movement or constituted the network’s programmatic core, which were unavoidably influenced by their educational, occupational, and personal backgrounds (see 6.2.). Suparyo, for example, as one of the key figures in GDM, had a degree in mechanical engineering and another in informatics. His educational background was the reason behind GDM’s IT-based movement. During his time as a student, he was an activist in an Islamic youth movement who also enjoyed reading books about social sciences, thus influencing the working patterns of GDM, which focused on social engineering. Before establishing GDM, he worked in an NGO, which made him aware of the ins and outs of working within the logic of NGO, hence declaring GDM as the antithesis of NGO. His life background from poor families formed a social activist mentality who fought for social justice in rural communities (interview with Suparyo, par. 481–500; see 6.3.5.). GDM’s encounters with other key figures during the movement’s journey could as well affect the programming of the network or even strengthen the initial program. Their acquaintanceship with Sudjatmiko, for instance, a member of national parliament and former anti-Suharto activist who was concerned with development issues of people at the grassroots and persistently promoted the use of digital technology for development, reinforced GDM’s focus on utilizing ICT as a communication system that must be built in the village for the advancement of rural communities (interview with Sudjatmiko, par. 25 & 29). Meanwhile, the switchers enabled GDM to dabble in other networks without having to make formal inter-organizational contacts. These switcher agents worked for the good of the village on their home networks by influencing the decision-making process, as told by Suparyo and Satrio when Sudjatmiko helped GDM to pass the new Village Law Bill (interview with Suparyo, par. 224–226; Satrio, par. 523; see 7.1.2.2.(1)(b)). Therefore, it was not a coincidence that GDM had agents spread in many networks, among others as ICT Volunteers, PNPM facilitators, NGO workers, journalists in the mainstream media, bloggers, PANDI staffs parliament members, state civil apparatus from various levels (national,

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provincial, regency/city), member of chamber of commerce and industry, entrepreneurs, lecturers, and tech-experts. The more people from other networks joined the movement, the easier the process of network switching. In principle, the power of network was used by GDM as a means to counterpower the center, especially against the Cp, which was hegemonic but lessnetworked, because the inter-Cp-relations, namely between the regencies, were only built on formal-bureaucratical foundations. Conditioned by regional autonomy, there was no unified and coordinated action among them in relation to the villages in each region. The power of the Cp, which was characterized by the feudalistic style of governance in the past, was then countered by the linkages of villages through GDM (see Figure 7.7). According to Castells (2011, p. 773), [c]ounterpower is exercised in the network society by fighting to change the programs of specific networks and by the effort to disrupt the switches that reflect dominant interests and replace them with alternative switches between networks … In the network society, power and counterpower aim fundamentally at influencing the neural networks in the human mind by using mass communication networks and mass self-communication networks.

This was precisely what GDM did. Through communication empowerment, the village community sought to change the protocol of communication between center and periphery. Also, through communication empowerment, which was manifested in the form of learning circles and the voicing village, the villages used their agents in mass media and utilized social media or mass self-communication to achieve their goals.

7.2.4

The Need for Literacy in Communication Empowerment

The guarantee of access to ICT alone was not enough in both communication development and empowerment. It also needed the ability to utilize ICT, which required the mastery of knowledge and skills on information and media itself. It means the capability for information literacy and (digital) media of the users needed to be improved. Besides information literacy, a number of informants mentioned other types of literacy that were strived through their movement, including law literacy, village literacy and public literacy. To increase the level of digital literacy of the villagers, the Melung village officials adopted the method by conducting computer and internet training every weekend (Saturdays and Sundays) for the children and mothers by collaborating with a number of volunteer groups, for instance university students. Sometimes

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they taught the villagers by themselves as the tutors (Research Diary, pp. 5, 26– 28). However, after close observation in the training site by spending some time in the CAP room, this pattern of training activities was not optimally executed or not fully in accordance with what was often told by the informants in the interview sessions (Research Diary, pp. 22, 29, 39, 43–44, 61–62). In the first weeks of data collection, the training was held regularly at the end of the week. However, it was postponed or cancelled completely due to various reasons (absence of tutor, heavy raining, other activities, etc.). Until the end of the data collection phase, the computer/internet training was almost never held again. During my time there, the CAP room was predominantly empty rather than used for training (ibid.). School-age children could indeed borrow the keys of the CAP room from the village head and use the computers inside the room and access the internet from there, however, this activity was often without the assistance of adults and without the presence of any tutor (Research Diary, p. 6).21 The community members, especially children, normally accessed social networking sites such as Facebook and YouTube. Facebook was by far the most popular social media platform among the villagers. Based on my daily conversations with them, especially with young children, the Facebook application was almost always installed on their smartphones. Interestingly, Facebook “usage” was included in the internet training “module” organized by the Melung authorities. Some people I met said they rarely used the internet but admitted having at least one Facebook account (Research Diary, pp. 6, 10–11). It appeared that Facebook was considered by villagers almost synonymous with digital progress, meaning that having a Facebook account or being able to “play” Facebook indicated one step further in digital ability (interviews with Kurniawan, par. 131–132; Lestari, par. 52). An inspection of the history of active computers in the CAP room also revealed the frequent accessing of adult sites (Research Diary, p. 61). Unfortunately, the actual condition of the rural internet/computer training program in CAP that is illustrated above failed to be comprehensively evaluated by the Ministry of Communication and Information as the institution that presented the CAP award to Melung. When a three-strong team from the Ministry of Communication and Information arrived to conduct monitoring and evaluation on November 5, 2014, they were only able to meet with two housewives in the CAP Room. They asked the women, who had been chosen by the village administration, to show them the computer skills they had learned. Assisted by two 21

On December 6, 2014, I even became a tutor for mothers who wanted to practice using Microsoft Word on computers in the CAP room because of the absence of the previously appointed tutor (Research Diary, p. 61).

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village officials (Sulastri, Khoerudin), the women executed basic computer skills, for example how to turn on the computer, open files in Explorer and open some Google and Facebook. When asked if they knew how to print those files, the two mothers replied: “not yet”. The monitoring and evaluation team then posed a number of questions from the questionnaire they brought as a gauge to measure the success of the CAP program. The team also interviewed Khoerudin as the village head about the uses and utilities of CAP. After approximately 2.5 hours in Melung, with all the time spent in the CAP room, the team returned to Purwokerto, where they spent the night, and planned to return to Jakarta the next day (Research Diary, pp. 14–15). It was clear that such a brief monitoring and evaluation visit was insufficient to collect data about the success or failure of a program. Representatives of the villagers, who were presented to the team from the ministry, were selectively chosen by the village officials. The data on the level of success of the use of CAP was obtained from oral statements, and most of these were from village officials who had a biased interest in the program itself. The team did not succeed in capturing how the training processes took place. The questionnaires that the team brought from Jakarta were only successfully filled by several people and read out to the two housewives presented by the village officials. In my opinion, the data could not be used as a general description of the success or failure of the CAP program. It could not be generalized, and the monitoring and evaluation visit was cursory and flawed in only gaining a superficial view of the situation (ibid.). The situation described above reinforces why digital literacy for citizens is very important, particularly because the internet network in Melung and the CAP room provided more benefits to the village authority rather than the general inhabitants. It has strengthened the center in the village and did not empower the periphery of the village community. It had not provided added value to the village residents at large. Even Pak Kayim and Sardi, who were part of the village elites (Pak Kayim as a village official and Sardi as the Chair of BPD), claimed they could not give a firm answer about the use of the internet in their village (interview with Pak Kayim, par 101–103; see Research Diary, p. 96). This condition mirrored one of Postman’s (1998) thesis about technological change, which says that “the advantages and disadvantages of new technologies are never distributed evenly among the population. This means that every new technology benefits some and harms others” (p. 2). From my observations on the ground, there was no grand design or clear long-term concept about the future of CAP and what people should do with it. The CAP, which was a pilot project, was more regarded as an appreciation from the Ministry of Communication and Information regarding Melung’s past achievements in the field of IT (the “because” motive), rather than on the basis

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of “in-order-to” motive (Schütz, 1932), which orientates more toward the future action. Lestari criticized the rural website creation, in the rhetorical question, “after knowing that you can create a website, and then what?” (interview, par. 38). When confronted with this situation in the interview session, Kurniawan acknowledged that he encountered a similar condition on the ground, which depicted the low level of information and digital literacy of the village community. Therefore, he replied, overcoming this problem was a priority of the Ministry of Communication and Information to be addressed in the coming years (interview, par. 132). Despite this, digitally literate citizens were able to see these problems as a business opportunity. They monetized their digital knowledge and made it a commodity to be exchanged, for example offering services to create e-mail and Facebook accounts, in addition to selling/buying mobile phones and topping-up mobile phones credit (interview with Lestari, par. 52). People also needed to be literate in the field of law. For example, Suparyo referred to the lack of comprehension of government officials regarding website domain regulations for government institutions that should be using the go.id domain. Suparyo laughingly recounted that even some regencies were still using the.com or.net domains for their official websites. “Their literacy of internet domain policies was poor” (Suparyo, interview, par. 304). In another case, he referred to the lack of understanding of the Communication and Information Agency of Banyumas toward village website regulations, which said that the desa.id domain only applied to GDM and was not part of government’s e-Gov policy to be applied to all villages. This resulted in the assumption that the status of desa.id was “unofficial” for village websites (ibid., par. 302; see also par. 312). Suparyo cited another example of the public’s scant understanding of legal products concerning the procedure for the establishment of village-owned enterprises (BUMDes), which actually should pass deliberation mechanisms in the form of village meetings (musyawarah). There were opinions circulating in the community that people could set up BUMDes without the need for public involvement during the process. This was not true as BUMDes had to be built collectively in order to provide benefits to the village community instead of certain groups in the village or only to the BUMDes itself (interview, par. 600). Because of the crucial role of literacy in communication empowerment, Suparyo admitted that the agenda for literacy within the empowerment program was 75 percent of the existing budget allocated for development in the digital technology sector, while the rest was planned for infrastructure development. This decision was taken to avoid the erected digital infrastructure becoming a “white elephant” because of the failure to boost public literacy (ibid., par. 187).

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Suparyo exemplified a case in Jembrana Regency (Bali) and Sragen Regency (Central Java), where internet-based one-stop public service and internet access to all villages through Wi-Fi were built under the sponsorship of e-Gov programs. However, the projects folded because of a lack of attention to enhance public literacy (ibid.; see 7.1.1.6.). At this point, the role of the facilitator as a creative minority carried out by village officials was prominent in the empowerment program. They were tasked with designing literacy programs and becoming the facilitators themselves in the long-term stage of project implementation. Due to it being a long process, and because of limited resources in the village to conduct such massive projects, Suparyo acknowledged that GDM was yet to fully achieve the goals of this program (interview, par. 192). The citizens also needed to learn the significant differences between the Regional Government Law and the Village Law. This was the next case in the public literacy issue as narrated by Suparyo. The citizens, and especially the local regional government, required an understanding that the reference for village governments in managing village administration was the Village Law, while it was the Regional Government Law for Kelurahan (the urban villages) even though hierarchically Kelurahan positioned at the same level as the village in the national government structure. The Village Law did not apply to Kelurahan, which had different status and origin than the village. Therefore, policy makers, particularly those at the regencies, could not treat the villages like Kelurahan by making them submit completely to the Regional Government Law, because the villages were in possession of their own autonomous territories, which were the subjects to be managed. In the interview, Suparyo expressed his complaints over the regency’s inability to apply proper laws regarding village administration. The application of the correct law was pivotal for the village’s effort to escape the feudal control of the regency so that they had the freedom to carry out their own initiatives (interview, par. 393). Communication capability requires a strong literacy foundation. A communicatively empowered public is a literate public. The ability to express own interests and opinions before the public demands critical attitude, awareness, and good reasoning capability in analyzing the situation in which they are present. Communication empowerment targets weaknesses in these kinds of literacy. Thus, communication development cannot be realized without good public literacy.

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Conclusion

We often hear about the world’s digitalization or the current era of communication revolution that have transformed the industry and the society into information society and cyber-based industries under the banner of industry 4.0 or society 5.0; in short, the Internet of Things (IoT). All of this shows the general perception that the rapid innovations of digital- and internet-based ICTs have stimulated and even accelerated societal change. Within the context of this study, social change refers to changes in relationships and interactions between subsystems (individuals, communities, organizations, institutions, etc.) in a social system, which stimulate the structure of society to change. Many factors are considered to be the sources of social change, including contact with other people from outside the community and technological change. This research shows that a mix of internet-based digital technology and public participation has played a crucial role in stimulating change in Indonesian rural communities. Public participation in open public communication at all levels is one of the goals of development. However, the characteristically open internet technology does not necessarily guarantee the increase of people’s participation in public discourses, which is held in various public spheres. Access to ICT alone is not enough. Technology does not stir changes by itself. It is programmed and activated by concerned people who have designed or used the technology. Hence, the practical use of ICT is shaped by the users and their social environment. Human factors become significant here because it is the man behind the machine who activates the otherwise idle technology so that it becomes useful and efficient. As the backdrop of this research, first, it was carried out with the premise of “digitalization” and even “internetization”, which was said to be the cause of rapid social changes both in urban and rural communities. Second, this research was conducted within the context of the Indonesian decentralization policy, which has made significant expansions, especially since the implementation of the new © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3_8

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Village Law No. 6/2014 in early 2015. Generally, the law stipulates that villages in Indonesia are entitled to greater autonomy to manage their own resources and budgets as well as to determine their own development policies. Hence, the rising power of the Indonesian rural communities, i.e., the periphery, becomes the focus of this research, and the reason for its bottom-up viewpoint (periphery research). This expansion of decentralization up to the village level in peripheral Indonesia politically threatened the hegemony of government institutions, which were structurally positioned above the village and in this study represented the “center” (the regency, provincial and the national governments). Moreover, with the presence of internet technology and other new ICTs in the villages, the village inhabitants (the periphery in periphery) could bypass the formal-bureaucratic communication barriers of the regency (the center in periphery) to directly establish contact and communication with the central government (the center in center). Because of the open and globalized character of the internet, communication could be carried out by rural communities for achieving development goals, which had more global outreach, thereby freeing them from the confines of their locality. Carried out within the context of “development”, this research has several objectives, both theoretical and practical. First, this study aims to place “communication” in the central position of development studies and practices, because in development communication, communication tends to be used mostly as a tool to achieve non-communicative development goals (e.g., economic progress, poverty reduction, etc.). Communication is marginalized and its role reduced into its pragmatic function. Therefore, this study considered that development communication needs to be revisited and reconceptualized by also involving current innovations in ICT as an added variable. Second, by criticizing the theory and practice of development communication in Indonesia, which has been characterized by its top-down and unilinear communication pattern, this research raises the perspective of the grassroots people, namely those in rural areas or in the periphery, in conceptualizing ICT-based development. In other words, this study highlights local participation in development in laying out their genuine bottom-up development concept. Third, this research is interested in examining the extent to which the structure of power relations between center and periphery has been altered since the presence and consistent use of internet-based digital technology in rural areas, which promotes connective communication practices and encourages the formation of networked rural communities. Finally, one of the purposes of this study is to examine how the use of new ICTs by rural communities in the periphery has contributed to the creation of new public spheres in the cyberspace as an

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alternative to the dominant public sphere, which is controlled and managed by the mass media or by formal-bureaucratic institutions, i.e., the center. Furthermore, this research wants to picture the mechanism of these new online publics in countering the hegemony of the dominant public. By using Grounded Theory for its data collection and analysis method, the results of this study are grouped into two major thematic categories: “communication development”, instead of development communication, and “communication empowerment”. Within the perspective of communication development, communication was central to development actions. It became the substance of development itself. Simply by looking from its linguistic arrangement, communication development implies that communication is the central topic here. What is then bottom-up communication development? Communication development itself is broadly defined as follows: A convergent communication process between center and periphery in both offline and online public spheres, where ideas, opinions and knowledge are exchanged relative equally and without any structural or cultural restraints. Communication development is an effort, which, in order to conduct efficient development projects and to successfully achieve development goals, people need to establish mutual understanding between the stakeholders involved in the project. Bottom-up communication development, which is captured in this research, is the process of developing communication from below, from the initiatives of the people in the periphery to reach understanding with the center at the top. This study portrays the practice of bottom-up communication development that was kickstarted in Melung Village (Central Java) in 2011. It was a joint initiative that was set up by Indonesian rural communities under the auspices of Village Development Movement (GDM) by using the internet and other new ICTs as the platforms and tools to reach: (1) the policy makers in the center of Indonesian politics (i.e., the central government and the national parliament), (2) the wider public, from which they were previously excluded because of the dominant control of the mainstream public sphere by big media corporations and the political as well as the business elites, and (3) other rural communities throughout Indonesia in order to strengthen the inter-village networks by using GDM as the point of reference. Communication development is seen more as a “process” of communication characterized by its bottom-up pattern because the database for this study was gained from the people at the bottom of society. This is contrary to the classical viewpoint of development communication, which usually targets the achievement of certain objective measures that are predetermined from above as the “end” of a development process. Meanwhile, communication empowerment emphasizes

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the enhancement of communication capability so that rural communities in the periphery are able to actively and independently voice their interests and opinions before the public for the benefit of their communities, thereby increasing their strength in facing the powers of the center. With the help of Glaser’s coding families (1978), this research uses the 6 C’s and process families to explain the phenomenon of bottom-up communication development. The 6 C’s describe the “context” and “conditions” in which communication development grew. They serve as the foundations that give meaning to the theory building of communication development in this research. “Cause”, as an independent variable, is a direct cause of communication development, while ‘consequences’, which are revisited and explained in more detail in the process family, are dependent variables and become the output of this process. “Covariance” and “contingent” provide a more comprehensive picture of the factors that might have influenced the course of communication development. The presence or absence of these factors will determine how communication development is carried out. Using the process family, this research has discovered at least four major stages of bottom-up communication development, namely (1) the initiation of bottom-up initiative, (2) the response from the center, (3) forced reactions from the center to compete with or support village initiative, and (4) the consequences of bottom-up communication development. The initiation stage involved the search for the collective identity of the village community, one of which was carried out through rural citizen journalism that was important as a rural self-educating mechanism. This stage also included the effort to push the initiative upward while at the same time expanding the village’s network. The initial stage of communication development ended with the “voicing village” (desa bersuara), which was a strategy for mainstreaming rural issues through various communication channels owned and controlled by the village community. These channels usually referred to online communication channels (village websites on desa.id, social networking sites, etc.), although mass media still played a major role in terms of amplifying the messages articulated online from below, so that the strength of communication effects could be increased. The response phase of the center was divided into three types of responses, i.e., recognition, rejection and disregard. If “recognition” showed a positive response from the central/regional (local) government toward village initiatives, then “rejection” was the opposite, namely a negative response that indicated disagreement with the bottom-up initiative. Meanwhile, “disregard” displayed more of a “wait

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and see” attitude from the center while observing the development of the initiative so that it could provide a more appropriate response to the initiative of the village. In contrast to “response”, village initiative could force the center to react, either by competing through the formation of counter-counterinitiatives with similar projects (such as creating the government’s version of village portals) or by supporting village initiatives because of the pressure from the central government. The latter could happen because village communities by means of new digital technologies had built direct communication channels to the center to seek support for their initiatives after previously leapfrogging the formal communication line of the regency (Figure 7.5). The final stage of communication development was the consequences. Initially, this research aims to explore three changes as the consequences of bottom-up communication development, i.e., the changes in development communication theories and practices, in construction of public sphere, and in the constellation of center-periphery relations. However, this research has found a total of eight changes due to the practice of bottom-up communication development. Those were changes in center-periphery relations, in village self-concept, in the working method of grassroots movement, in the operation of the public sphere, in the practice of democracy, in the development project itself, in the perception of knowledge, and in the meaning of connectivity. First, center-periphery relations have changed from what was originally based on feudal power structure (Galtung, 1971; Figure 3.3) to become the relations based on network arrangements or rhizome, in which the internet was effective to build solidarity and inter-village networks throughout Indonesia (Figure 7.7). In communication development, center and periphery were converged in the “bridging” process consisting of approaching upward and downward communication, so that convergent communication pattern was formed (Figure 7.6). In bridging, the center approached the periphery by removing bureaucratic obstacles, while the periphery approached the center actively through authentic initiatives, innovations and ideas and by being transparent and accountable to the public as well as by following the rules of the game agreed upon with the center. Bridging was necessary in order to realize development goals because each party lacked something or possessed something that the other party did not. Through the bridging process each party could collaboratively fill the shortcomings of the other party. Second, changes in the village’s self-concept were revealed when this research detected conflict of identity, which occurred between Melung’s “objectified identity” as the “internet village” and Melung’s “subjective identity” as the “agro- and

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eco-village” as a result of the media’s involvement in communication development. At the end, Melung’s self-concept was always negotiated and resulted from the dynamic interaction between “internal intention/motivation” and “external pressure/responses”. Third, GDM identified itself as an organic movement originating from the rural community, which was the antithesis of the inorganic NGO-led rural movement. It has transformed grassroots movement through deradicalization and opted to not physically mobilize people in order to show its disagreement with the center. Instead, through networking and online information sharing, GDM has built village self-confidence by disclosing public information about rural issues and at the same time put the center under pressure by forcing them to stay transparent and accountable to the periphery. By “breaking the information isolation in rural areas” (Virmani, 2002, p. 229) and building a solid inter-village network, rural communities practiced the so-called virtual “village surrounding the city” strategy. It was successfully done because there was an activation of passive information access by concerned rural actors, which actually demystified the determinant aspect of technology. The type of grassroots movement had also shifted to a more semiformal-networked movement with a rhizomatic character. This rhizome-like network resulted in the decentralization of knowledge because a rhizome does not consist of a “real’ center”, instead it is built by many nodal points, which connects parts of the network. In GDM, the nodes held the function to share information and knowledge among its members. As knowledge was shared and decentralized, so too was power. Fourth, the presence of internet technology in rural areas has enabled rural communities to invent their own publics as a counter to the dominant public generated by the media. Marginalized people in the periphery were encouraged to express their own opinions and interests in these counterpublic spheres. By voicing their concerns publicly, they contributed to the “mainstreaming rural issues” strategy, i.e., fulfilling the public sphere with all matters relating to the village. This act was a form of rural political participation, which was conducted in a self-owned, self-managed and self-controlled public sphere. Fifth, rural counterpublic has shown village sovereignty in the digital world that also signified the act of resistance to the so-called “center-centric” democratic practice. Within the framework of digital democracy, GDM tried to bring together the digital and non-digital democratic practices in order to realize a type of “deliberative or substantial democracy” as opposed to “caricative democracy”, which was embodied in the old Musrenbangdes (Village Development Planning Meeting) mechanism. Such a “caricative” mechanism was accused of showing a pseudo-bottom-up development planning. Genuine democracy practice

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in rural communities after the implementation of the Village Law promoted spatial and integrative development planning in contrast to the sectoral and fragmented planning as applied by the center. Sixth, rural internet- and ICT-based development projects were susceptible of being unsustain, especially when the project initiators– usually the village heads– no longer possessed the authority to control the project. Moreover, when the idea of digital development projects was not shared equally among the village population, the continuity of such projects could become a burden for the next generation of village administrators. This research revealed, the stagnation of rural digital projects pointed to the “digital irrelevance” for some of the rural communities. It signified the mismatch of the digital development project with the real development needs of the village. Seventh, rural development projects that promoted extensive use of new digital technologies could also lead to the degradation of a particular knowledge to an even lower standard. This study found the “asymmetrical value of knowledge” when, for example, local wisdom is faced with new and modern knowledge about digital technologies. The undervaluing of traditional knowledge could cause local people to lose their self-esteem because they felt they did not have the appropriate knowledge to survive in today’s digital age. This situation led to “asymmetrical knowledge exchange” between those who possessed traditional knowledge (periphery) and those who mastered the knowledge of new digital technologies (center). However, if people are able to maximize their knowledge specialty, whether it is traditional or modern, it is possible that the position of center/periphery switches, which results in creation of the dynamic and fluctuating model of center-periphery (Figure 7.10). Finally, communication development has enhanced the meaning of “network” for a movement. A strong movement has a strong network and vice versa. Referring to Castells (2009, 2011, 2015), GDM has succeeded in optimizing the “network-making power” by placing their programmers and switchers in strategic positions. The open membership principle of GDM allowed it to recruit members from diverse backgrounds, and not just villagers, so that they could place their agents in many networks which in turn would influence the decisionmaking process within those networks to create programs that benefited the rural communities. The capability to build such a network means much for rural empowerment, which brings us to the second topic in communication development: communication empowerment. Once again, the perspective of communication has been the central point of the discussion in communication empowerment, which resulted in the reshaping of the empowerment’s meaning. Communication empowerment was born as an

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impact of asymmetrical communication or communication inequality between center and periphery where thus far rural communities had suffered from the structural limitation of space and opportunities to publicly communicate their own development ideas. This, in turn, ostracized them even further in their relationships with the center. There were four issues highlighted in the discussion about communication empowerment. Firstly, communication empowerment raised critical questions about the problem of inequality inherent within the term “empowerment”, which implies the condition that one party ought to empower another party. This would mean that the rural community is the one to be empowered by other external parties (the government, NGOs, the media, the business sector, the academic community, etc.). In sum, the center empowers the periphery. The above concept of empowerment was precisely what was being criticized by GDM as they believed that they could rely on themselves for the improvement of their living conditions and were capable of empowering themselves. By doing so, they resisted being driven by the center. Communication empowerment wanted to address these problems by emphasizing another empowerment model, which was focusing on the strengths (power) rather than on the weaknesses (impotence/inability) of the self. Therefore, secondly, after criticizing the inherently unequal treatment of people within the term empowerment, communication empowerment promoted “selfempowerment”, which stressed the strong points and specialty of every individual and encouraged them to express these qualities in various public spheres. Furthermore, communication empowerment also relied on the principle of “collective empowerment”, which maximized the strength of the rhizomatic network. Collective empowerment was manifested in the form of learning circles where the movement’s participants shared their problems and experiences in dealing with rural issues as well as exchanged knowledge. The movement empowered itself by connecting scattered knowledge of its members through the networks of rural learning circles. At this point, collective empowerment became connective empowerment. Thirdly, communication empowerment aimed to improve communication capability of the marginalized people in the periphery by encouraging them to actively voice their genuine opinions, interests, and concerns through various communication channels available to them. It means, people were encouraged to express their thoughts without fear of being oppressed by the center and that also means that they were on the course of reclaiming power from the center. New media played an important role in this process because it promoted decentralization of media content production so that those who did not have access to the mainstream media,

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which mostly controlled the dominant public sphere, could continue to carry out their articulation mission in diverse alternative public spheres. In this case, desa bersuara or the “voicing village” was considered as a means and strategy to reach the goal of communication empowerment, which was the articulation of rural messages itself that was done collectively through “the instrumentalization of community networks” (Agusta, 2007, p. 141). This strategy has escaped the rural communities from the isolation of one another and prevented them from the exclusiveness of certain villages because they increasingly became more cosmopolitan in outlook by communicatively interacting with the “outside world” by the means of digital technologies and internet networks. The optimization of new ICTs as one of the strategies of communication empowerment was an attempt of the rural communities, which had been politically, economically, culturally, socially and communicatively marginalized, to break away from their dependency on the center. This was the reason why network power was crucial in communication empowerment for building counterpowers against the center, which had dominated the periphery through their government institutions and formal-bureaucratic communication channels. Fourthly, communication empowerment could not have successfully executed without adding a literacy program in the implementation. This means all kinds of public literacy, such as information, media and digital literacy, as well as law literacy, village literacy and public literacy. Digital and information literacy, as well as media literacy, was required so that individuals did not become passive objects of and obsessive to technology, but instead were able to control the force of technology and the excessive flow of information according to their needs and interests. Communication empowerment sought to minimize the negative consequence of technological determinism by promoting technological constructivism. Technology literacy was therefore important as the basis for technological appropriation. It was not meant just to adapt to the Zeitgeist (“because” motive), but deliberately required also in order to reach the community’s development goals (“in-order-to” motive). Knowledge about legal matters, especially concerning equal citizenship as stated in the civil rights (law literacy), was necessary as well, to ensure rural communities were not deceived by the co-opting bureaucratic system. This puts the structure of the society as a pyramid-shaped hierarchical arrangement, in which the rural communities were placed at its bottom. Last but not least, village literacy was crucial in order for the community to be able to look inside themselves, know themselves, explore their own potential, and ultimately capitalize on their own resources by any means necessary. Communication capability requires a strong literacy foundation. A communicatively empowered public is a literate public.

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There are several recommendations for future research that can enrich the study of communication development and strengthen its generalization power. At the time of data collection of this research, the Village Law was just beginning to be implemented in its first year. Follow-up research that studies the impact of the law on the relations of center-periphery, after the villages are assumed to have been empowered by the Village Law, are desired, especially those which relate to the practical use of Internet and new ICTs in rural development. It will be of academic advantage if future studies are to be conducted in other rural communities (inside or outside GDM’s networks). Different communities have diverse cultures, customs, and social structures/systems and they will offer different data sets, which will picture the multiplicity of development initiatives. However, a revisit to Melung and GDM can also be noteworthy if it means employing different research methodology or looking for completely different informants to the ones this study has already picked. Especially, more resource persons from the side of the regency will be crucial to portray a more representative voice of the local government. Looking at the variety of potential outcomes of different types of communication development, some follow-up studies within the positivistic paradigm, involving large research samples, are needed. This is a necessary step to enhance the generalization power of the theory of communication development, i.e., by designing a quantitative research, which will map the general pattern of communication development practices and the impact of the internet in the context of rural development across the Indonesian archipelago.

Appendices

1. LIST OF INITIAL QUESTIONS a. Interview guidelines – Adaptation required depends on field situation – Develop follow-up questions on the field; adjust to informant’s answers b. General questions – Can you tell me how Melung came up with the internet village idea? – Can you identify the differences before and after the village uses computer/internet? c. On bottom-up approach – Participation: o Who had the initiative? How did it work? o How’s the response from the villagers? Do they participate in the initiative? o Is there any other party being involved in the initiative? What is/are their role? – Partnership: o How’s your and your village’s relationship with the government (at every level)? How’s their response to the initiative? o How come the Ministry gave an award (CAP) to Melung back in 2013? Can you tell me the story behind it? o How’s the relationship between your village and other parties? o Do you receive support from the legislative? How far and in what form? o How come the mainstream media came to report? What is their (media) role in your viewpoint in regard to the village’s development?

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 S. Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3

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– Empowerment: o How do you see the village’s position in the government’s development agenda? o Do you feel that villages are neglected? How is your response? o How can internet/technology empower the villagers? d. On the issue of identity – Boundaries: What differentiates Melung and other villages? Is it its technology use? Internet use? – Consciousness: o Can you tell me from the very beginning, how did you get involved with this idea/initiative/movement? How did/do you see that idea? o How’s the response from the villagers? o What does it mean for an agrarian village like Melung? What does it mean for agro- and eco-tourism Melung? – Negotiation of identity through interaction: o How do other villages view Melung? o How’s the government’s response to the initiative? o How does the media frame Melung? How is your/Melung’s reaction? o Where does the naming of Melung as an internet village come from? Do you agree with that? What does it mean for your or Melung’s identity? e. On the cognitive framework – Internet, computer, what for? Why the internet/computer and not any other technology? What is the goal? How important is it for the village development? Can you give me an example? – Why open source? – How is the use of other media in this village? TV, radio, smartphone? f. On the network of active relationship – Can you tell me about GDM? What is their role in ICT4D in this village? How do they work? g. On the emotional relationship – Where does Melung position itself in the ICT4D movement (GDM)? – How far do you engage yourself with the movement? What was/is your role? 2. INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTIONS (in Bahasa Indonesia) AND CODINGS (in English; both available in Electronic Supplementary Material/ESM) 3. RESEARCH DIARY (in Bahasa Indonesia; available in Electronic Supplementary Material/ESM)

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