International Society: The English School 3030560546, 9783030560546

Citation preview

TRENDS IN EUROPEAN IR THEORY SERIES EDITORS: KNUD ERIK JØRGENSEN · AUDREY ALEJANDRO ALEXANDER REICHWEIN · FELIX RÖSCH · HELEN TURTON

International Society The English School Edited by Cornelia Navari

Trends in European IR Theory

Series Editors Knud Erik Jørgensen Aarhus University Aarhus, Denmark Audrey Alejandro London School of Economics and Political Science London, UK Alexander Reichwein Justus-Liebig-University Giessen Giessen, Germany Felix Rösch Coventry University Coventry, UK Helen Turton University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK

A series of 9 select Palgrave Pivots that together will provide concise accounts of IR theoretical traditions in Europe and the historical and theoretical roots that European IR currently is missing. The series will provide a theoretical backbone for the IR discipline and define and strengthen the identity of European IR theory. Each Pivot in the series will constitute and reconstruct IR theoretical traditions in Europe (Liberalism, Realism, English School, International Political Economy, International Political Theory, Feminism, and the post-positivist tradition including constructivism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and critical theory), and a concluding volume will look back and summarise the advances (and missed opportunities) of the discipline in the 20th century, all following an initial framework volume setting the scene and providing the rationale. As a theoretical tradition is nothing without theorists to produce, reproduce and transform it, the individual volumes will necessarily focus on the contributions of individual theorists, a feature that will provide the series with a unique edge, and covering the main characteristics of each tradition that is sorely missing. But more than just providing roots, the series will have a critical integrative function. In order to achieve this aim, the projects will take a transnational perspective, going beyond the sociology of knowledge studies that so far has been predominantly national in its orientation. Each Pivot will be kept as close as possible to a common length and shared structure;the volumes will be developed individually yet with a very clear common thread and thus appear as an exclusive collection. Individual volumes will have a largely identical structure which the editorial committee will define and enforce. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15636

Cornelia Navari Editor

International Society The English School

Editor Cornelia Navari University of Buckingham Buckingham, UK

Trends in European IR Theory ISBN 978-3-030-56054-6    ISBN 978-3-030-56055-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

 The Development of English School Theory: An Introduction  1 Cornelia Navari  Sovereignty, Law, and International Society: The Contribution of C. A. W. Manning 15 Peter Wilson  Hedley Bull and the Idea of Order in International Society 31 Andrew Hurrell  The Expansion of International Society 45 Daniel M. Green  Becoming a School: The Institutional Debate of the 1980s 61 Tonny Brems Knudsen  ‘Reconvening’ the English School 79 Laust Schouenborg Pluralism and Solidarism 95 William Bain

v

vi 

CONTENTS

Regionalism109 Yannis A. Stivachtis Institutions and Organizations129 Cornelia Navari  Using the English School to Understand Current Issues in World Politics145 Charlotta Friedner Parrat and Kilian Spandler Bibliography161 Index185

Notes on Contributors

William Bain  is Associate Professor of International Relations, National University of Singapore. His research and teaching interests focus on international relations theory, international political theory, and history of international thought. He is the author of Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power (2003) and editor of and contributor to Medieval Foundations of International Relations (2017). His most recent publication is Political Theology of International Order (2020). Daniel M. Green  is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. Trained as an Africanist, his research interests for some time now have been international relations history and IR theory. His most recent edited volume is The Two Worlds of Nineteenth Century International Relations (2018). He is completing Order Projects and Resistance in the Global Political System: A Framework for International Relations History. Andrew  Hurrell is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at University of Oxford and a Fellow of Balliol College, member of the British Academy and the Johns Hopkins Society of Scholars. His research interests cover theories of international relations, the history of thought on international relations, and the international relations of the Americas. He is also an Einstein Visiting Fellow, working in collaboration with the Berlin-based research programme on Contestations of the Liberal Script. vii

viii 

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Tonny Brems Knudsen  is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. His publications include International Relations in Europe: Traditions, perspectives and destinations (2006) edited with Knud Erik Jørgensen; Kosovo Between War and Peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship (2006) edited with Carsten Bagge Laustsen; International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order (2019) edited with Cornelia Navari. Cornelia  Navari  is visiting professor at the University of Buckingham. She has written Internationalism and the State in the 20th Century (2000), Public Intellectuals and International Affairs (2013); edited Theorising International Society (2009) and Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs (2013); and with Dan Green edited Guide to the English School in International Studies (2014). Her latest book is International Organization in the Anarchical Society (2019) edited with Tonny Brems Knudsen. Charlotta  Friedner  Parrat is an assistant professor at the Swedish Defence University. She holds a PhD from Uppsala University (2017) and is the author of “International Organization in International Society: UN Reform from an English School Perspective” (Journal of International Organization Studies, 2014), “On the Evolution of Primary Institutions of International Society” (International Studies Quarterly, 2017), and “Change in International Society” (International Studies Review, 2019). Laust  Schouenborg is Lecturer in International Relations at City, University of London. He is the author of, among others, International Institutions in World History: Divorcing International Relations Theory from the State and Stage Models (2017) and, with Barry Buzan, Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis (2018). Kilian Spandler  is a researcher at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. His work explores the intersection of global and regional governance, as well as the relation between sovereignty narratives and transboundary cooperation. He is the author of Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing (2018).

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

ix

Yannis A. Stivachtis  is Associate Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair at Virginia Tech (USA). Recent publications include Regional Security in the Middle East (2019, co-editor); World Society in English School Theory (2018, editor); Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle East (2018, editor); The State/Society Relationship in Security Analysis (2015); and Revisiting the Idea of the European Union as Empire (2015, co-editor). Peter  Wilson is Associate Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has published widely on inter-war international thought and English school theory, most recently “The International Consequences of Brexit: An English School Analysis” (Journal of European Integration, 2019, with Tim Oliver). His most recent book is Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation (2013), co-edited with Henrik Bliddal and Casper Sylvest.

The Development of English School Theory: An Introduction Cornelia Navari

English School (ES) theory is associated with two institutions of learning that between them can claim much of the credit for what became Europe’s second riposte to ‘American IR’.1 In 1949, the London School of Economics (LSE) created what was in effect the first bachelor’s degree in international relations, and Charles Manning began his lecture series on ‘The Structure of International Society’, a subject completely of his own invention, and hired Martin Wight and Hedley Bull to teach it.2 Peterhouse at Cambridge, the home of technical history, gave the English School Herbert Butterfield, first chairman of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, who steered the Committee towards theory and provided the key to the Committee’s most complete  The first was Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, 1948, which introduced aspects of European Realpolitik into American IR. 2  Wight taught ‘International Institutions’ in the first Structure syllabus; Bull took firstand second-year classes, taught “Foreign Policy in the Commonwealth Countries”, and shared a seminar with Wight on international thinkers (Ayson 2012, 32). 1

C. Navari (*) University of Buckingham, Buckingham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_1

1

2 

C. NAVARI

achievement—not The Anarchical Society, which was Bull’s alone, but the monumental Expansion of International Society. It developed through critical partnerships and organised cohorts. The first cohort was, obviously, the British Committee (BC) on the Theory of International Politics, and especially the triad of Butterfield, Bull and Wight. The committee met regularly from 1959 until 1985 and produced the two classics associated with the English School—Diplomatic Investigations in 1966 and The Expansion of International Society in 1984, as well as a number of important papers (some of which only came to light in 2005 with the English translation of Brunello Vigezzi’s study of the British Committee). Gerrit Gong, who wrote the influential Standard of ‘Civilization’ (1984), was part of that cohort, as was Adam Watson who wrote The Evolution of International Society (1992) and who served as the BC chair between the tenures of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. The second was the International Political Theory (IPT) group at the London School of Economics, meeting from 1974, which gave it Mayall, Suganami and Navari. Hidemi Suganami suggested the title ‘British Institutionalism’ for the approach, and James Mayall’s Community of States (1982a, b) pinned down some of the institutions of the actually existing international society as against Bull’s general categories.3 (Mayall was also the first to propose that fundamental institutions could be politically contested.) The third consists of Barry Buzan’s interlocutors, including Diez, Dunne, Wheeler, Stivachtis, Zhang, Knudsen and Navari, who have engendered the most recent round of theoretical developments. To them are due regionalism, pluralism and solidarism, and the link between ES’ fundamental institutions and international organisations. The critical partnerships are Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, Robert Jackson and Will Bain, and Richard Little and Barry Buzan. Dunne and Wheeler developed Bull’s ideas of pluralism and solidarism, identifying them as institutional and organisational principles and demonstrating that they could coexist. Jackson (2000) and Bain (2003) identified the fundamental norms of international society in terms of “standards of conduct” elucidated through practice, and demonstrated how norms, principles and 3  Bull used some contemporary illustrations in The Anarchical Society to develop an essentially formal argument whereas Mayall 1982 focused on contemporary functioning: see Navari’s ‘Diplomatic Structure and Idiom’; Brewin’s ‘Sovereignty; Porter’s ‘Nationalism’; Suganami’s ‘International Law’; Paskins ‘Community of Terror; Mayall’s ‘The Liberal Economy’; and Kavan’s ‘Human Rights and International Community’—all in Mayall 1982a, b.

  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 

3

practices could be the subjects of empirical inquiry. Buzan and Little (2000) recovered the insights of Adam Watson on the comparative history of state-systems and prepared the first study of historically existing state systems, from ancient times to the present global order. It was his partnership with Little that spurred Buzan on to ‘reconvene’ the English School and to push its theoretical development towards the idea of ‘nested’ institutions and regional differentiation. The developmental path was marked by pauses, disagreements, diversions and some false starts. The British Committee had determined on a comparative history of state-systems as early as 1968, but nothing appeared until Watson’s Evolution of International Society in 1992, largely because Martin Wight, who was to play the key role in the enterprise, embarked instead on a series of essays exploring his ‘culture-alone’ thesis. In undertaking the study, Wight did not establish a comparative standard, as might be expected, but focused rather on the “norms and values that animate [each] system, and the institutions in which they are expressed” (Bull 1977). The result was four essays on Hellas, Persia and the modern statesystem, demonstrating a somewhat bewildering variety of beliefs, social forms and ‘animating’ tendencies, with little in the way of generalisations and some doubts about “the validity of the concept itself of a states-system” (Wight 1977, 105). Aside from a substantial piece by G. F. Hudson on China, other studies were nugatory, and no second volume, intended to follow Diplomatic Investigations appeared. (Bull edited Wight’s studies putting them together with other material in a stand-alone volume after Wight’s death to illustrate Wight’s thesis that a common culture underlay any state system: Wight 1977.) Following that abortive effort, the Committee turned in another direction, but one that produced even less. For the next five years, under Watson’s chairmanship, it focused on questions of justice and ethics, where discussions, though lively enough, failed to find a single point d’appui, and whose liveliness concealed an overall standstill; Vigezzi (2005) would characterise this period in the Committee’s history as a “dispersal of effort”. In 1978, returning from Australia to take up his Oxford chair, as well as the chair of the BC, Bull wrote to Watson that there had been enough “Ethics and Morality” for the time being, and initiated the discussions that led to Expansion.4 4  Vigezzi 2005, 257 records the correspondence; Bull, however, would return to the theme, outlining a concept of justice in international relations in the Hagey Lectures (Bull 1984).

4 

C. NAVARI

The disagreements included the role of history, the status of the fundamental institutions, culture versus politics, the nature of explanation, naturalism versus historicism—all the vexing questions of a social science in its early stages. But the most fundamental divide, colouring all others, was the Bull—Wight—Butterfield divide over the ontos or nature of the being of international society—of what it was. The divide was not one of sides but of triangles, between history and human nature on one axis (Butterfield and Wight); history and ‘science’ on another (Butterfield and Bull), and ‘science’ and human nature on the third (Bull and Wight). For Butterfield, international society was a historical creation; it arose at a particular time, under particular and possibly unrepeatable circumstances. It was not designed; it was the unintended consequence of a politico-religious standoff between Protestant princes and Catholic emperors. It had an empirical reality in the form of principles and practices that, because they were historical, were also changeable. This was in sharp contrast to Wight, who regarded ‘international society’ as an idea and one that was near to being trans-historical, since it had its germination in the early Christian idea of the ‘two kingdoms’. International society was part of humanity’s fall—an earthly reflection of the Heavenly City perhaps but distinct (and distant) from it (as Ian Hall 2006 cogently observes, Wight was a theological realist). The reflection emitted a varying light, depending on the degree of human apostasy. Wight was not inclined to see international society as a prize hard won out of an earthly political struggle, or its alterations in terms of a Whig ‘cooperation with history’. In contrast to both, Bull was a logical positivist: the fundamental subject was not an earthly society in either sense but an analytical category, which was Order. ‘International Society’ was the product of a series of logical postulates concerning the requisites of order. He based his defence of order on neither history nor a fundament of human nature, but on logic. These fundamental differences were never fully acknowledged in the British Committee, partly because of the “discrete diplomacy” exercised by Butterfield (Vigezzi 2014), but also because at critical points in the early days of the Committee they could coexist. One of the, less important, reasons that the concept of International Society was welcomed so unreservedly by the British Committee, even before it had been much explored, was that it resonated alike with the historians, with philosophical idealists and with the logician of order. Some of the tensions were even creative. Butterfield’s exasperation with Wight’s culture-alone thesis was the spur that led to his formulating the only ‘contingent generalisation’

  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 

5

that the British Committee produced—that “a states-system can only be achieved by a tremendous conscious effort of reassembly after a political hegemony has broken down”.5 But Butterfield’s low-key approach left a legacy of confusion, as later efforts to interpret the theory drew variously on the different sources. These same tensions would appear in the IPT group, where they were more openly acknowledged. Michael Donelan, who initiated the group, was a self-declared natural law theorist; James Mayall a professed traditional British empirical historian; Hidemi Suganami, who had imbibed the precursors to Hollis and Smith,6 was rapidly becoming an interpretivist dedicated to ‘understanding’; Navari roamed about.7 There was no such thing as ‘the English School’ in the early years of the group and no impetus to establish a unified theory. Whereas the British Committee had been charged with producing a theory, the IPT group was pledged to theorising. Of the 36 essays that the group produced in its three-volume oeuvre (Donelan 1978, Mayall 1982a, b, Navari 1990), less than half could be assigned to anything resembling the English School. Theory-building was also affected by the accidents of the human condition. Bull died in 1985, shortly after The Expansion of International Society appeared, drawing attention away from the monumental nature of the accomplishment and depriving the ‘school’ of a guide, as the protean community of scholars struggled to find a common focus. John Vincent, the most promising of the subsequent generation, followed five years later, at the early age of 47. At the same time, it lost its other institutional home, at the London School of Economics. Susan Strange, the distinguished political economist appointed to the chair in 1978, was determined to build a department of international political economy. When the companion professorship came up for refilling in 1985, she pushed for an outsider (in the event the journalist and Middle East expert, Fred Halliday).8 5  Unpublished paper, reported by Vigezzi (2005, 187); it was this thesis that would guide Watson towards his Evolution of International Society. 6   Among others, Daniel M.  Taylor, Explanation and Meaning: An Introduction to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); private communication with the author. 7  Her first contribution to the three volumes of the IPT group was rooted in French structuralism; her second followed Mayall; the third was based on rational choice theory. 8  Historian Brian Porter, who was taught by Martin Wight and contributed to the departmental history, is less forgiving, writing that Strange “was well aware of the heritage she was entering, and had scant respect for it. Not only did she have something like contempt for

6 

C. NAVARI

Within a few years, James Mayall would depart for Cambridge, and Michael Donelan, who had initiated the IPT group, turned to completing his magnum opus on Honor in Foreign Policy, a work with a natural law orientation. With the death of John Vincent, less than a year after his appointment as professor at the LSE, the fate of the English School was left in the hands of the just-appointed Peter Wilson, a junior in the department. Despite these obstacles, there was theoretical innovation. Maurice Keens-Soper (1978) put forward a theory of practices in the first IPT volume (Donelan 1978) and declared that the identity of an international society was to be found in its practices, drawing on Michael Oakeshott. The idea would be exploited by both Jackson (2000) and Bain (2003), and practices would appear fully formed as procedures in Kal Holsti’s 2004 Taming the Sovereigns. Terry Nardin (1983), also drawing on Oakeshott, presented the body of international law as the procedural norms of International Society, providing the normative order with an empirical manifestation. James Mayall (1982a, b) expanded the community of states to include the international economy through a functional analysis linking the liberal economy and the ‘liberal peace’, which at the same time explained the fissures in the global economic order, a method he would employ again in Nationalism and International Society (Mayall 1990). Adam Watson (1992) established the illusive comparative category with which to elucidate and compare state-systems; based on the form of rule, it distinguished between independence, hegemony, suzerainty, dominion and empire, establishing a basic taxonomy of state-systems. John Vincent’s critically important 1986 Human Rights and International Relations established the basic method for identifying International Society’s substantive norms and injunctions, in the form of a ‘dialogue’ between theory, international law and state practice. The third volume in the IPT series (Navari 1990) anticipated the “middle ground” ethical reasoning that would become a hallmark of the English School (Cochran 2014, Navari 2013b). The “Expansion” argument put forward in the Bull and Watson volume has suffered a number of corrections (see Green below), but the significant theoretical innovation is that of Edward Keene (2002), who [Charles] Manning’s ingenious word-play and subtle philosophising, but was not much impressed with the subject as it had hitherto been taught in the Department” (Porter 2003, 36).

  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 

7

proffered the theory that, historically, there was more than one international society and that the European international society had colonised and destroyed the others. Alongside the development of the original corpus, there appeared a subsidiary but supportive body of work in the form of history of thought, reflecting on the social product. It originated in doctoral theses exploring the thinking of the pioneers of international society—notably Ian Hall’s on Butterfield and Peter Wilson’s on Leonard Wolf. Hall went on to produce a definitive study of Martin Wight; in the same vein, Suganami (2001) produced the first substantial study of Charles Manning, and Robert Ayson (2012) would explore the relationship between the strategist Hedley Bull and his ideas of international society. Peter Wilson and David Long, another creative partnership, produced the flagship Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis (1995) with its focus on thinkers in the public realm. Following her contribution to it, Navari embarked on the series of studies that would result in Public Intellectuals and International Affairs (2013a); and Cochran and Navari would edit a companion volume to Long and Wilson’s Thinkers, entitled Progressivism and American Foreign Policy between the World Wars (2018), with a focus on the American “idealists”. This literature concentrates on thinkers who contribute to what Robert Jackson (2005), following Watson, called “the dialogue of states”. The nature of the theory also began to be more clearly defined. Suganami in 1983, who understood the ‘British mainstream’ largely in terms of Martin Wight,9 identified it as a form of Verstehen, or ‘understanding’ in the schema of Hollis and Smith. Robert Keohane (1988) in his presidential address to the International Studies Association followed in the same vein and proclaimed the English School (among others) as a form of “reflectivism”, echoing Suganami, and marked it as interpretive and inductive, as opposed to the structural and deductive approach of American institutionalism. Andrew Hurrell in 1993 carried Keohane’s insight forward with a critique of Regime Theory for ignoring the normative and legal elements in regimes (as did Evans’ and Wilson’s 1992 article in a more diffused manner). Tim Dunne, in the midst of his dissertation on the history of the British Committee, came under the influence of the early Wendt, and in 1995 defined the by-now named ‘English School’ formally in methodological terms as a form of social constructivism, one of the interpretive/reflectivist methods. In his history of the British 9

 Private correspondence with the author.

8 

C. NAVARI

Committee (1988), Dunne would also argue a theoretical consistency along constructivist lines among the BC members (mainly by drawing on the deference Bull accorded to Wight). He anticipated the argument by joining Nicholas Wheeler in detecting solidarist tendencies in Bull, minimising the conflict between order and justice that Bull had posed (Dunne and Wheeler 1996). When Hedley Bull initially put forward pluralism and solidarism, it was as alternative and incompatible social forms (Bull 1966). Their clearer designation as conceptual categories rather than social forms came in Wheeler’s 1992 Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Societies, where Wheeler presented pluralism as a value-based image of international society, associated with the rules of coexistence that sovereign states accepted as a means of maintaining order. By contrast, he identified the opening to a more solidarist international order with humanitarian intervention, presenting humanitarian intervention as solidarism’s effective signifier. The idea that solidarism was manifest in the development of an institutionalised humanitarian intervention regime was carried forward by Tonny Brems Knudsen in his 2003 Humanitarian Intervention: Contemporary Manifestations of an Explosive Doctrine. By associating pluralism and solidarism with specific institutional developments, Wheeler (and Knudsen following him) allowed that they could coexist. These ‘internal’ and subjectivist analyses confronted the ‘external’ and objectivist analyses being developed by Barry Buzan. In a keynote article for International Organization in 1993, he detected two different strands in English School thought. The first, which he ascribed to the legacy of Martin Wight, was a historicist, gradually developing communal idea of international society that he related to a Gemeinschaft as understood by the German social thinker Tönnies. The second was a contractual, rationalist and functional, balance of power international society, which he ascribed to the legacy of Hedley Bull and which he identified with Tönnies’ Gesellschaft. The first was more the result of interpretations; the second more determined by the structures of international relations at any one time. He further related the two schemas to the American regime literature and to structural realism, respectively, arguing that, while they could not replace either, they gave a fuller picture of the agents and processes involved in each. He developed the schema in a 1994 article with Richard Little to explain the history of international systems they were preparing. A short but intense Methodenstreit followed as Dunne (2005) sought to

  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 

9

defend his view and the post-positive epistemology that lay behind it, as against Buzan’s “positivist” leanings.10 Neither the defence of his own view nor theoretical development seems to have been Buzan’s intention in ‘reconvening’ the English School, the term applied to the initiatives he undertook from the beginning of 1999. By his own account, they were directed to establishing the English School as a global brand (Buzan 2001). Yongjin Zhang (2014) would characterise it as securing a position for the ES in the “attention space” for IR theorising. The adoption of the soubriquet ‘ES’ instead of the ‘English School’ to give the approach a less parochial image; the call for those interested in the approach to make themselves known; the creation of a master bibliography of English School works, all point in that direction. There were some disciplinary outcomes: Navari undertook Theorising International Society as a part of the reconvening, on the grounds that, if the ES were to be relaunched, it ought to sort out its epistemological position. But the blossoming of theoretical development that followed owed only a little to it, or to the reconvening in general. It was due much more to Buzan’s 2004 From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Structure of Globalization. The argument of From International to World Society is probably best known as elucidating a firmly structuralist view of international society, albeit structures with a difference (see Schouenborg below). But what spurred on theoretical development, at least in the short term, was not primarily Buzan’s structural argument. Rather it was two supportive propositions that were subordinate to his main theme. Buzan posited, first, that world order is not reposed in fundamental institutions alone but rather that international society is a two-level institutional structure subsisting of ‘primary’ institutions and the ‘secondary’ institutions that instantiated them. The second is that as international society developed into a global order, it suffered differentiation; that is, as the norms and practices of international society spread, they were differently received and they took altered institutional forms in different regions. In other words, regionalism was not simply an accident of geography; it was the reception of the norms, institutions and practices of international society into different areas with different historical experiences. The argument derived in important respects from Holsti’s 2004 Taming the Sovereigns, where Holsti had distinguished between  However, Buzan is closer to P. T. Jackson’s analyticism than to positivism.

10

10 

C. NAVARI

constitutive principles and procedural norms; the regional aspects were developed by Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez in the subsequent volume she edited with Buzan (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009) and carried forward by Yannis Stivachtis in a number of papers (see Stivachtis 2013 and below). The idea of regional international societies was received into the scholarship on the European Union, notably by Diez and Whitman (2002) who first formally proposed that the EU could be understood less as a developing federation than as a regional international society of a highly developed form. Kilian Spandler followed Diez in basing his study of ASEAN (2019a) on English School categories. The institutional argument was worked up by a team led by Knudsen and Navari who developed the idea of Buzan’s nested institutions into an argument about the reticular and constitutive relationship between foundation institutions and international organisations, which the editors termed “the institutional structure of world order” (Knudsen and Navari 2019). The team produced an elaborated model of the relationship between the two levels of institutionalisation that demonstrated how the relevant institutions were connected, how sustained and how the messages moved between them (see below). It could be considered to have fulfilled the conceptual promise made by Wight and Bull when they argued that international relationships existed within a dense framework of norms, principles, rules and practices. * * * The chapters below are organised around the central points in this development. Peter Wilson reviews the contributions of Charles Manning and makes sense of them in contemporary terms; Andrew Hurrell clarifies Bull’s concept of Order and the various forms it can take; Daniel Green explains the significance of the Expansion argument and the uses to which it has been put. Tonny Brems Knudsen reviews the critical developments of the 1980s and early 1990s when, it could be argued, the English School gained its identity. Laust Schouenborg discusses the different aspects of the ‘reconvening’ and points to its legacies. These are considered in turn by William Bain with reference to pluralism and solidarism, by Yannis Stivachtis on regionalism and by Cornelia Navari on international organisations and fundamental institutions. It concludes with some suggestions by Charlotta Freidner Parrat and Kilian Spandler on how to analyse in the English School manner.

  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 

11

Bibliography Ayson, Robert. 2012. Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bain, William. 2003. Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bull, Hedley. 1966. Society and Anarchy in International Relations. In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 35–50. London: Allen & Unwin. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. ———., ed. 1984. Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buzan, Barry. 2001. The English School: An Underdeveloped Resource in IR. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 471–488. ———. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds. 2009. International Society in the Middle East? English School Theory at the Regional Level. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. 2000. International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cochran, Molly. 2014. Normative Theory in the English School. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C.  Navari and D.M.  Green, 185–204. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Cochran, Molly, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2018. Progressivism and American Foreign Policy Between the World Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Diez, Thomas, and Richard Whitman. 2002. Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School. Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (1): 43–67. Donelan, Michael. 1978. Reason of States. London: George Allen & Unwin. Dunne, Tim. 2005. System, State and Society: How Does It All Hang Together? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (1): 157–170. Dunne, Tim, and Nicholas Wheeler. 1996. Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will. International Affairs 72 (1): 91–107. Gong, Gerrit. 1984. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hall, Ian. 2006. The International Thought of Martin Wight. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Holsti, K.J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jackson, Robert H. 2000. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2005. Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

12 

C. NAVARI

Keene, Edward. 2002. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keens-Soper, Maurice. 1978. The Practice of a States-System. In The Reason of States, ed. Michael Donelan, 24–44. London: George Allen & Unwin. Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 379–396. Knudsen, Tonny Brems and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2019. International Organization in the Anarchical Society. The Institutional Structure of World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mayall, James. 1982a. The Liberal Economy. In The Community of States, ed. J. Mayall, 96–114. London: George Allen & Unwin. ———., ed. 1982b. The Community of States. London: George Allen & Unwin. ———. 1990. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nardin, Terry. 1983. Law, Morality, and the Relations of States. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Navari, Cornelia, ed. 1990. The Condition of States. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. ———. 2013a. Public Intellectuals and International Affairs. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters. ———. 2013b. Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Porter, Brian. 2003. A Brief History. In International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years, ed. Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, 29–44. London: Millennium Publishing Group. Spandler, Killian. 2019a. Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Stivachtis, Yannis. 2013. The English School and the Study of Sub-Global International Societies. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/08/ the-english-and-the-study-of-sub-global-international-societies Suganami, Hidemi. 2001. C.A.W.  Manning and the Study of International Relations. Review of International Studies 27 (1): 91–107. Vigezzi, Brunello. 2005. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. Milan: Edizioni Unicopli. ———. 2014. The British Committee and International Society: History and Theory. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 37–58. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Watson, Adam. 1992. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge. Wheeler, Nicholas J. 1992. Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention. Millennium 21 (3): 463–487.

  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 

13

Wight, Martin. 1977. Systems of States, edited with an introduction by Hedley Bull. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Wilson, Peter, and David Long, eds. 1995. Thinkers of the Twenty Year’s Crisis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Zhang, Yongjin. 2014. Curious and Exotic Encounters: Europeans as Supplicants in the Chinese Imperium, 1513–1793. In International Orders in the Early Modern World, ed. S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk, 1–11. London: Routledge.

Sovereignty, Law, and International Society: The Contribution of C. A. W. Manning Peter Wilson

Charles Manning (1894–1978) was a meticulous legal scholar who became one of the leading lights in the British study of International Relations (IR) during its formative years as well as its first meta-theorist. In the historiography of the field, however, his ideas and contributions have received little sustained attention, certainly when compared to other major British/ Commonwealth IR scholars, notably E.  H. Carr, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. His contributions to the study of IR, however, are fundamental. First, he developed the idea that sovereignty was the basis of international society. Through his writing and lecturing, he was largely responsible for this idea becoming the orthodox British view. Second, he insisted that the chief empirical expression of international society was international law. He thereby, in contrast to Realism, rendered law central to any genuinely realistic appreciation of the international realm. Third, on his retirement from the Montague Burton Professorship at the London School of Economics (LSE), he published the first detailed exploration of the idea of international society (Manning 1962/1975). This was based on thinking and lecturing he had done at the LSE for more than 30 years.

P. Wilson (*) London School of Economics, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_2

15

16 

P. WILSON

It was this thinking and lecturing, along with the appointments he made as convenor of the IR department that provided the basis for what became the English School (ES). Indeed, one early commentator called the ES “the Manning school” (Frankel 1973, 628; Aalberts 2010, 248). This chapter considers Manning in four parts. The first part deals with Manning’s analysis of sovereignty, the second with his view of international law, and the third with his theory of international society. Manning’s theory of international society is an elusive theory and there have been several attempts to understand it. This section will review those attempts. A final section considers Manning’s legacy.

Manning on Sovereignty In Manning’s view sovereign statehood had two manifestations. Internally it meant “ascendency, supremacy, top-dog-ness” (Manning 1962/1975, 102). Externally it meant eligibility to join the ‘international club’, that is, a group of other entities similarly identified. These two meanings were often confused. Thus, it was common for people to ask: if sovereignty means top-dog-ness, how can all members of the international club be equally sovereign? Manning’s answer was that this was a club for top dogs, top that is in their respective kennels. Membership of this club, Manning stressed, was not a physical condition but a social status. It was a status conferred on those entities, in fact territorial entities that possessed certain attributes. One of those attributes was sovereignty, which he also characterised as constitutional self-containment or insularity. Being top in one’s own kennel meant not being part of a larger kennel—a part that is of some wider constitutional set-up (Manning 1972, 308–9; Manning 1962/1975, 166–7). Alan James later took on the task of empirically validating Manning’s central claim that sovereignty is a “social fact”, best understood as constitutional insularity or self-containment (James 1972, 1986, 1–36). Yet possessing sovereignty, enjoying constitutional self-containment, was not enough. This was because eligibility for club membership included not only sovereign statehood but also sovereign statehood subject to the rules of the club—that is, international law. “The possibility of a recognised sovereign statehood, divorced from subjection to international law, no more arises than does membership of the Stock Exchange divorced from subjection to the rules of the Stock Exchange. It is technically unthinkable” (Manning 1962/1975, 103). In this way Manning tied sovereignty,

  SOVEREIGNTY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CONTRIBUTION… 

17

international law, and international society intimately together. It was not possible to understand any of them apart from the others. Sovereignty became the basis of international society and international law established the rules by which this occurred. The notion that sovereignty, defined in this way, is the basis of international society (for good or ill) has become the standard view not only in Britain but also among leading European theorists (James 1986; Jackson and James 1993, 3–25; Osiander 1994; Sorensen 1999; Jackson 2007). Translated into the idea of an ‘anarchical society’, it underpinned Hedley Bull’s theory that international relationships could be both anarchic and social, and it allowed for Bull’s identification of the ‘institutions of international society’, each of which was a body of rules and practices structured around the empirical-legal fact of sovereignty. Subsequently, it invaded liberal institutionalism to explain how states, living in anarchy, could at the same time build cooperative frameworks (Keohane 1989), and in the form of “anarchy”, it became the theoretical basis of structural realism. It has been accorded the status of the basic structuring fact of international relationships (Lechner 2017). The significance of Manning’s contribution is, however, wider than a largely positive understanding of international relations. Tanya Aalberts (2010) has drawn attention to this wider significance. Within the ES, while the writings on sovereignty and international society of James, Jackson, and especially Bull receive most attention, it was Manning, according to Aalberts, who had a deeper insight. This is because for Manning, anticipating later critical constructivist thinkers, the international game is not played by pre-existing players but is the condition of the players’ existence. It enables the players’ identity, creating the conditions of ‘sovereign being’, as well as the rules by which they play. Manning’s sovereignty is an example of the relationship between action, identity, and rules so central to constructivist thinking. His reading of sovereignty is not only linguistic, concerned as per James (1986) with the multifarious usages of the term, but socio-linguistic, concerned with the constituting and legitimating discourses behind them (Aalberts 2010, 257–60). This makes Manning’s work of tremendous significance not only for ES but also for contemporary constructivist scholarship.

18 

P. WILSON

Manning on International Law One of Manning’s first substantial academic publications, and one of his last, focussed on the meaning and function of law (Manning 1933, 1972). This should come as no surprise given his legal background—a first in Jurisprudence and Civil Law at Brasenose College, Oxford; Barrister-in-­ Law at the Middle Temple; and Fellow in Law in the 1920s at New College, Oxford (James 2004). In Manning’s writings one finds careful examinations of the bindingness of law, the efficacy of law, the question of compliance, the relationship between law and politics, and the degradation of law in the post-war period. International law was at the heart of Manning’s understanding of international relations. International law and international society had developed hand in hand. They were historically and logically inseparable. The game ‘let’s-play-sovereign-states’ required a body of rules to make the playing of it conceivable, and that body of rules was international law. But what made law binding? Was not law as John Austin said, “the command of the sovereign”? Given the absence of a sovereign internationally, did this not make international law not law properly so-called but, in Austin’s words, ‘positive international morality’? Manning spent a lot of time thinking about this question, including producing a careful dissection of Austin’s argument. His essential point, however, was that law was binding not as a matter of fact but as a matter of doctrine and practice. Law consisted of a body of rules, a process for making them, and a language for communicating them. But essentially it was a set of ideas, one that was inconceivable apart from the social milieu in which it had its status qua law. When a society gave a body of rules the status of law, it imputed its binding character ipso facto. This applied to international society as much as any other society (Manning 1962/1975, 104–6; Manning 1972, 303; Wilson 2008b, 3–4). On the question of the efficacy of international law, Manning gave a similarly unconventional answer. One might as well ask ‘how effective is football?’ The game of states was played, it was up and running, a going concern. What made play possible and intelligible was its conduct according to a system of rules. International law, therefore, was effective to the extent that the players engaged in the game were disposed to comply with it. If they were generally ill-disposed, the game would not take place (Manning 1972, 328–9). What made them generally disposed to comply with the law? Manning put forward various factors including reciprocity

  SOVEREIGNTY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CONTRIBUTION… 

19

and self-image. But the factor he most emphasised was the importance attached by others to correct observance. The concern not to court the displeasure of circumstantially important reference groups was, he contended, a “potent sanction for the efficacy of [a] legal rule” (Manning 1972, 326; Wilson 2008b, 4–5). It was a major tenet of diplomatic theory that ‘what is bindingly provided for will duly be performed’. And by and large it was duly performed despite the fact there was no court around the corner before which an offending state could be haled (Manning 1972: 322). To what extent did the disposition to comply with international law depend on enforcement? Again unconventionally, Manning believed that enforcement was a minor factor in accounting for legal compliance. It was true that all states sought to uphold the law against marginally cooperative members, just as an orchestra might scowl at one of its members getting out of time. Importantly, however, what accounted for the music being played was not the scowling, but the general disposition of the members of the orchestra to play, “and if needs be to scowl” (Manning 1962/1975, 111). Manning’s important insight here was that the general legitimacy of international law, and the general disposition of states to comply with it, was part of the very compact of international society. The criterion for membership of international society was sovereign statehood subject to international law. Compliance in general was built into the system (Wilson 2008b, 5–6). Manning’s position on the relationship between law and politics defies easy summation. A flavour of it, however, can be given by comparing Manning’s position on the League of Nations and the international lawlessness of the 1930s and 1940s, with that of E. H. Carr, the prominent Realist of his time. Throughout this period Manning shared Carr’s arguably realist focus on states, diplomacy, power, and the national interest. He also shared his scepticism towards the role of justice, morality, and ‘world public opinion’. Geneva, he believed, was becoming more and more a sideshow, the real politics being done elsewhere. He also opposed those who believed the answer to lawlessness lay in making law more restrictive. In common with Carr he felt the problem lay not with the law but with the underlying politics. It was the lack of agreement that was at fault not the lack, or inadequacy, of law (Long 2012, 79–82). International law was often misconstrued. It was not to be compared with advanced systems of municipal law. It was not a means of social control. It was a law of sovereigns, not a law over them.

20 

P. WILSON

For this reason, he was critical of the progressive effort to revise and reshape the Covenant of the League (Manning 1930, 1936). Committing to the really existing League was preferable to constantly seeking a better League (Long 2012, 83–4). He was particularly critical of those progressives who traced the problems of the League to its failure to transcend national sovereignty. Not only was this view politically damaging, as it undermined popular support for an essentially valid institution (here Manning departed from Carr), but it was also based on a misunderstanding of the nature of international organisation: IOs for Manning were predicated on state sovereignty, not something designed to supplant it (see esp. Long 2012, 81–4). Manning sided with progressives, however, when it came to the failure of the League in Manchuria, Abyssinia, and elsewhere. These were cases not of League failure but the failure of the principal League Powers to comply with their legal obligations. Here Manning again departed from Carr, placing much more weight on Great Power responsibility to defend and uphold the compact of international society (Long 2012, 87–9). In the final decade of his life Manning was dismayed by what he considered to be declining respect for the law in the post-war period, represented by the seizure of the Portuguese colony of Goa by India in 1961. What was so significant about this now long-forgotten incident was not that it involved a flagrant breach of a major rule of international law, but that it provoked so little response from the rest of the international community. No outcry ensued, nor any suggestion that the transgressor, however half-­heartedly, would be punished. Goa made manifest not just the readiness of a particular country to flout the law, “but the un-readiness of the generality of other countries to react with standard pattern disapprobation” (Manning 1962/1975, xxvii; Wilson 2008b, 1–3). This suggested to Manning that the game of ‘let’s-play-sovereign-states’ was being replaced by the game of ‘let’s-merely-play-at-the-game-of-let’splay-sovereign-states’. Propriety and reputation for it was being replaced by cynicism and selfishness. The reserves of reverence for the law were being depleted (Manning 1962/1975, xv–xxx). Manning gave two reasons for a decline in respect of international law. First, the ideological turn in international politics consequent on the Cold War; and second, the rapid expansion of the international club beyond its formerly exclusive European base. The limited international society of old was confined to states of similar outlook. The new international society ‘inclusive of the communist camp and the anti-colonialist have-not class of

  SOVEREIGNTY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CONTRIBUTION… 

21

states’ was not. Its claim on the loyalty of the community was therefore “feeble if not non-existent” (Manning 1972, 314). The present author agrees in part: he has placed Manning’s writing in the context of contemporary sociological approaches and the weight they attach to the lack of international solidarity (Wilson 2009, 167–75). But he also suggests (2008b) that Manning’s views of “decline” also reflect his own resistance to new approaches to the law (e.g. the ‘process’ of approach of LSE colleague Rosalyn Higgins), his ideological construction of the past, his conservative understanding of the function of law, and his general distrust of change.

The Theory of International Society The best known and in some ways most prescient account of Manning’s basic theory is by Roy Jones (1981), in the highly critical article that gave the ES its name and identified Manning and Wight as its seminal thinkers. Jones correctly sees Manning as the champion of IR as an “autonomous new subject” with a “unique subject-matter” (Jones 1981, 2). This subject-­ matter is variously “meta-diplomacy”, “social cosmology”, the “world-wide play and cross-play and counter-play of social energies” taking place within an “international society of sovereign states” (Jones 1981, 2–4). It was Jones who thus first identified Manning in terms of what we would today call the meta-theory of international relations, concerned with the elemental character of those relations (social, or perhaps more accurately, ‘quasi-social’), and how to analytically access them (in the event, interpretively). Jones, however, was a positivist with little sympathy for social interpretation or patience for Manning’s serial abstractions. Firstly, he argues that Manning makes no attempt to demonstrate the existence of international society empirically. Many of Manning’s points are illustrated not with examples but with metaphors; and he “disarms criticism by removing his concepts to metaphysical heights where than can be no possibility of empirical reference” (Jones 1981, 4). For Jones there is no more sense in talking about a society of states than there would be in talking about a society of firms. How can a society be constituted by entities so widely different: geographically, demographically, economically, politically, ethnically, and culturally (Jones 1981, 5)? As well as being ungrounded empirically, it belied logic. Secondly, in any new or coherent academic subject, one would expect to find employed a distinct or

22 

P. WILSON

disciplined analytical method. No such method could be found in Manning. Indeed, Manning offered not so much a method as a style— poetic, allegorical, elusive, eclectic—and it was difficult to see how a student of international relations could adopt this style “without completely sacrificing his personality to Manning” (Jones 1981, 3, 9). Jones’ was not, however, the first published engagement with Manning’s ideas. It was preceded by a largely overlooked (including by Jones) analysis by one of Manning’s former students, Michael Banks. While noting the obvious idiosyncrasies, Banks contended that Manning’s work, in fact, contained striking parallels with some of the behaviouralist work then underway in the United States, especially systems analysis. Banks was impressed by Manning’s stress on all aspects of the global system, not just the power relations of states (Banks 1973, 193). Also in common with the behaviouralists, Manning focussed on what was normal as well as what was abnormal—on the global social order as a whole, not just the conflictual parts of it. Banks paralleled Manning’s metaphor of the connected lily ponds (with the lilies on the surface representing the states, drawing sustenance from the pond bottoms below), with systems theory in which the social world is conceived as a series of connected systems. The whole point of the metaphor was to emphasise the interconnected nature of the social world and the need for an understanding of the whole to properly understand the behaviour of the parts (Banks 1973, 195–6). His language may have been different, says Banks, but Manning’s general point was precisely the point of systems theory (Banks 1973, 197–8). One implication was that a wide range of social actors needed to be considered above and beyond the nation-state (see e.g. Manning 1962/1975, 202). According to Banks, The Nature of International Society (hereafter TNIS) thus represented a major and progressive departure from the state-bound legal and diplomatic paradigm that had hitherto prevailed. A similarly sympathetic though far from uncritical reading of Manning’s understanding of international society is present in the first broad overview of his work. Hidemi Suganami (2001) appraises the five main areas of Manning’s scholarship: jurisprudence; the League of Nations; South Africa; the subject/discipline of IR; and international society. He finds interconnections between them all, with John Austin’s legal theory (Manning 1933), and his abiding fascination with the concept of sovereignty and the nature of international law (e.g. Manning 1972), being common threads. Manning’s central insight, however, was the “uniqueness of international society as a formally anarchical but substantially

  SOVEREIGNTY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CONTRIBUTION… 

23

orderly environment” (Suganami 2001, 100). He devoted his career to building an academic subject around this insight, arguing essentially on practical grounds the need for a separate discipline of IR in order to do it. The distinction, central to constructivism, between “brute facts” and “social facts” was one of Manning’s most persistent messages and central to his idea of an international society of sovereign states subject to law (Suganami 2001, 92). It is his “smart” treatment of these subjects in which his contemporary relevance chiefly resides (Suganami 2001, 105). Suganami’s article, which contains the most complete bibliography of Manning’s writings to date, provided the stimulus for a trio of more focused studies on Manning’s understanding of international society and, intimately connected to this, his promotion of IR as a stand-alone academic subject. The first of these is a reassessment by Peter Wilson of TNIS, a work Wilson considers “one of the most original contributions to general thinking in the IR field” (Wilson 2004, 756). In this article, Wilson emphasised the parallels between Manning’s stress on collective meanings and constructivism’s stress on inter-subjectivity. Wilson also notes that while TNIS is a highly abstract, philosophical book, it betrays a strong social purpose in being “conceived under the influence of the possibly naïve belief that the world might have a better chance of becoming a better place if the better people in it could come to understand it better” (Manning 1962/1975, xvi; Wilson 2004, 762). TNIS belies the customary association of conservative approaches to IR with state-centrism. The “multi-state system” was for Manning but the top layer of a “many-levelled society” (Manning 1962/1975, 34; Wilson 2004, 763–4). TNIS also affords evidence of a strong normative streak in Manning’s thinking, revolving around conservative (and arguably male, middle-class, and dated) commitments to being “a good club member” and “acting honourably”, which in Wilson’s view (Wilson 2004, 762) explain Manning’s near-obsession with Goa. The second of the more focussed articles concentrates on Manning’s promotion of IR as a stand-alone academic subject. David Long finds that Manning argued against understandings of the subject advanced by major figures such as Herbert Butterfield, Hans Morgenthau, Alfred Zimmern, and Quincy Wright (Long 2005, 84–5). IR was not a branch of international history, or political science, or international law, or the study of current events. IR was a specialism but a special kind of specialism. It focussed not on one dimension of human existence (say the economic, legal or political), but on an area (Long 2005, 86). This area was that of

24 

P. WILSON

international society. But this society was not a real, empirically observable, society but rather a ‘quasi-society’ composed of notional entities commonly conceived as sovereign states. In turn, these sovereign states were commonly conceived as forming a society. IR was thus for Manning an interpretive sociology of what people (especially a class of people called diplomatists) believed about their world and how they came to believe it. Importantly, Manning drew a sharp distinction between international politics and international relations and was scathing of the tendency of political scientists to collapse the two. IR for Manning involved much more than politics. In Long’s view this is a significant strength of Manning’s approach because it enabled him to construct the field as a sociology of a “complex presence”, in contrast to the dominant (especially US) construction of the field as a “political absence”—anarchy, the absence of central government (Long 2005, 90–1). The third in this trio of articles concentrates on the constructivist elements in Manning’s theory. According to Tanya Aalberts (2010), Manning anticipated the direction of the discipline in the 1980s and 1990s towards constructivism without influencing this direction. Manning’s concern with the role of language in the construction of reality and the interplay between myth and reality, most fully stated in TNIS, strongly anticipated the growth of constructivism within IR and the ‘linguistic turn’. TNIS is essentially a work of social ontology, emphasising the multilayered, multi-­faceted nature of social reality. Manning’s deep concern with notionality, reified abstractions, ‘postulated presence’, ‘imputed thing-ness’ anticipates later constructivist concern with social constructs, institutional facts, inter-­subjectivity, and a range of related concepts. The constructivist anticipations present in Manning had been noted before (e.g. Suganami 2001; Wilson 2004). Aalberts, however, makes the additional observation that Manning not only anticipated conventional constructivism but also critical constructivism. According to this view social reality consists of ideas, values, and norms as well as material facts; but what we consider to be material facts (as well as ideas, values, and norms) are contingent on discursive practices. No facts about the world, even the most material/brute/obvious facts, can be known without accounting for subjectivity and “linguistic interference” (Aalberts 2010, 252). This ontological and epistemological outlook is most apparent in Manning’s repeated use of the game metaphor, whether this be cricket, chess, or rugby-football. To understand what is happening in the field or on the board requires an understanding of the rules, the ideas behind

  SOVEREIGNTY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CONTRIBUTION… 

25

them, and their usage in practice. Importantly these rules are both constitutive and regulative. They tell us who can play the game, the objective of the game, and how it is played. No amount of raw data can enlighten us about the spectacle before our eyes in the absence of knowledge of the relevant rules and practices. The same applies to the international game, the game of ‘let’s-play-sovereign-states’. Without knowledge of the relevant assumptions, conventions, rules, and roles, according to Manning, there is no possibility of understanding what is going on (Aalberts 2010, 253–7).

Manning’s Legacy The current generation of IR scholars takes a dim view of Manning (e.g. Anievas et al. 2015). This is largely due to his defence of the right of his native South Africa to pursue its policy of apartheid (e.g. Manning 1964; Manning 1966). (Manning’s position on apartheid is currently being researched by Wilson (e.g. 2008a)). In addition, on the condition and prospects of international society, Manning’s stance was doggedly pluralist (cf. solidarist, see Bull 1966). While he did not rule out the possibility of solidarist development, his implicit defence and refinement of the pluralist position over several decades did much to shape the thinking of the next generation of IR scholars in Britain. But there is another side to Manning. Long (2012) takes the story back to IR in its infancy, examining Manning’s contribution to IR debates in the 1930s and early 1940s. He reveals Manning as an optimistic supporter of the League who became progressively pessimistic. However, the depressing events of the period did not lead Manning to the fatalism, cynicism, and relativism that were soon to be given its classic exposition in Carr (1939). Indeed, while Manning generally admired Carr, he was highly critical of his views about sovereignty and the future of the small state (Manning 1942). Manning’s experience of the period led him to reject both cosmopolitanism and nationalism as approaches to world order in favour of a ‘sane internationalism’ based on sovereignty, law, and great power responsibility. In this, as Long perceptively observes, one can see the beginnings of the English School (Long 2012, 91). It is significant that Manning’s career spanned both the infancy of the discipline and its youth. Whereas other major disciplinary figures had moved on to other things by the end of the Second World War, Manning was still very much in post. In the 1940s and 1950s, he had a big impact

26 

P. WILSON

on the way IR would be taught in the UK through his appointment to academic posts of future luminaries Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, and former students Coral Bell, Alan James, Peter Lion, Jack Spence, and Geoffrey Stern. For this reason, and despite the attempt to exclude him from the ES by one of its most prominent students (Dunne 1998; see also Knudsen 2000; Suganami 2000), Manning needs to be considered alongside Zimmern, Carr, Mitrany, Aron, Bull, and Wight as one of the seminal voices of early European IR. Manning is an important figure for disciplinary historians. But is he important for current theorists? Manning’s influence is palpable in the writings of all those academics that fell under his spell in the 1950s (e.g. Bull 1977; Garnett 1984; Stern 1995). James (1986), as mentioned, has sought to empirically validate Manning’s understanding of sovereignty as “constitutional independence”. Wilson (2012, 577–80) has utilised Manning’s interpretive, “participant standpoint” methodology to understand the failure of ES theorists to arrive at a settled list of primary institutions. But most areas of Manning’s thought remain under-utilised, including his elaborate take on international law, arguably one of the deeper offerings of the classic ES (see e.g. Wilson 2009; Navari 2013). But as this chapter has sought to show there are valuable ideas for current theorising to be found in Manning’s ‘smart treatment’ of an international society of sovereign states subject to law. There are also valuable ideas to be found in other areas of his thought, including peaceful change (e.g. Manning 1937), his notion of “collective selfhoods” (e.g. Manning 1966), and his case for a separate discipline of IR (e.g. Manning 1954). The latter is a particularly valuable resource for those concerned about the ever-­ tightening grip on IR by political science. For Manning if IR was a branch of anything, it was a branch of Sociology. At the same time, there is little intellectual development in Manning’s ideas, even on international law. At a time of great political change, not the least the breaking-up of the old colonial empires and the expansion of international society beyond its European base, it is as if the main job of law is to stand still, protecting the existing distribution of rights and obligations. He had little patience with new approaches to international law (e.g. Manning 1972, 301–2) and was little intrigued that its role and function in a changing world might be changing. There is nothing intrinsically static, however, in Manning’s ontological, epistemological, and methodological standpoint. This is perhaps best revealed in his quirky concept of “diplomatics” (Manning 1962/1975,

  SOVEREIGNTY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CONTRIBUTION… 

27

182–3). By this he meant the conventions, understandings, habits, assumptions, and expectations of diplomatists—meaning not only professional diplomats but also all those who speak and act in the name of states (Wilson 2004, 760). The centrality of diplomatics for Manning’s understanding of international life cannot be overestimated. Indeed, one is tempted to put forward the equation:

Diplomatics : International Society = Politics : Domestic Society

Empirically, diplomatics was the means by which international society was generated and regenerated. Analytically, it was the means by which the meaning of international life as it was lived corporately and collectively could be most effectively determined. The parallels with practice theory (e.g. Neumann 2002; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Navari 2011; Wille 2018) are strong. As well as a constructivist, Manning was a practice theorist avant-la-lettre.

Bibliography Aalberts, Tanja. 2010. Playing the Game of Sovereign States: Charles Manning’s Constructivism avant-la-lettre. European Journal of International Relations 16 (2): 247–268. Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot. 2011. International Practices. International Theory 3 (10): 1–36. Anievas, Alexander, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, eds. 2015. Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line. Abingdon: Routledge. Banks, Michael. 1973. Charles Manning, the Concept of ‘Order’, and Contemporary International Theory. In The Bases of International Order, ed. Alan James, 188–209. London: Oxford University Press. Bull, Hedley. 1966. Society and Anarchy in International Relations. In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 35–50. London: Allen & Unwin. ———. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. Carr, E.H. 1939. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan. Dunne, Tim. 1998. Inventing International Society: A History of the English School. London/Oxford: Macmillan in Association with St. Antony’s. Frankel, J. 1973. Review of The Bases of International Order ed. Alan James. International Affairs 49 (4): 627–629.

28 

P. WILSON

Garnett, John. 1984. Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics. London: Macmillan. Jackson, Robert H. 2007. Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea. Cambridge: Polity. Jackson, Robert, and Alan James, eds. 1993. States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. James, Alan. 1972. The Contemporary Relevance of National Sovereignty. In Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Leifer, 16–34. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1986. Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 2004. Manning, Charles Anthony Woodward: 1894–1978, Scholar of International Relations. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Retrieved 5 August 2019. Jones, Roy E. 1981. The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure. Review of International Studies 7 (1): 1–13. Keohane, Robert. 1989. International Organizations and State Power. Boulder: Westview. Knudsen, Tonny Brems. 2000. Theory of Society or Society of Theorists? With Tim Dunne in the English School. Cooperation and Conflict 35 (2): 193–203. Lechner, S. 2017. Why Anarchy Still Matters for International Relations: On Theories and Things. Journal of International Political Theory 13 (3): 341–359. Long, David. 2005. C.  A. W.  Manning and the Discipline of International Relations. The Round Table 94 (1): 77–96. ———. 2012. C.  A. W.  Manning and the First Great Debate. In International Relations and the First Great Debate, ed. Brian Schmidt, 78–93. Abingdon: Routledge. Manning, C.A.W. 1930. The Proposed Amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations. The British Yearbook of International Law 11: 158–171. ———. 1933. Austin To-Day: Or “The Province of Jurisprudence” Re-Examined. In Modern Theories of Law, ed. W. Ivor Jennings, 180–266. London: Oxford University Press. ———. 1936. Sanctions—1935. Politica 2 (5): 33–55. ———., ed. 1937. Peaceful Change: An International Problem. London: Macmillan. ———. 1942. Review of E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace. International Affairs 19 (8): 443–444. ———. 1954. The University Teaching of Social Sciences: International Relations—A Report Prepared on Behalf of the International Studies Committee. Paris: UNESCO. ———. 1962/1975. The Nature of International Society. London: Bell in Association with the London School of Economics and Political Science; Reissued in 1975: London: Macmillan. ———. 1964. In Defence of Apartheid. Foreign Affairs 4 (1): 135–149.

  SOVEREIGNTY, LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE CONTRIBUTION… 

29

———. 1966. Collective Selfhoods: An Element in the South West Africa Case, Being the Testimony of an Academic South African. London: South Africa Society. ———. 1972. The Legal Framework in a World of Change. In The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919–1969, ed. Brian Porter. London: Oxford University Press. Navari, Cornelia. 2011. The Concept of Practice in the English School. European Journal of International Relations 17 (4): 611–630. ———. 2013. Liberalism, Democracy, and International Law — An English School Approach. In After Liberalism? ed. by R. Friedman, K. Oskanian, R. Pacheco Pardo, 33–50. Neumann, Iver. 2002. Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31 (3): 627–651. Osiander, Andreas. 1994. The States System of Europe, 1640–1994. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sorensen, George. 1999. Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution. Political Studies 47 (3): 590–603. Stern, Geoffrey. 1995. The Structure of International Society. London: Pinter. Suganami, Hidemi. 2000. A New Narrative, A New Subject? Tim Dunne on the ‘English School’. Cooperation and Conflict 35 (2): 217–226. ———. 2001. C.A.W. Manning and the Study of International Relations. Review of International Studies 27 (1): 91–107. Wille, Tobias. 2018. Practice Turn in International Relations. Oxford Bibliographies: International Relations. Retrieved 5 August 2019. Wilson, Peter. 2004. Manning’s Quasi-Masterpiece: The Nature of International Society Revisited. The Round Table 93 (377): 755–769. ———. 2008a. Manning’s Moral Blindspot. Paper Presented to International Studies Association Conference, San Francisco, USA. ———. 2008b. From Austin to Goa: C. A. W. Manning and International Law. Paper Presented to World International Studies Association Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia. ———. 2009. The English School’s Approach to International Law. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. Cornelia Navari, 167–188. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2012. The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions. International Studies Review 14 (4): 567–590.

Hedley Bull and the Idea of Order in International Society Andrew Hurrell

The idea of order is central to the work of the English School, and Hedley Bull provides one especially clear exposition of what this entails. The chapter will, therefore, begin by laying out the principal features of Bull’s approach to order. It will then relate this to other established theoretical traditions concerned with order, institutions, and governance. Finally, it will look briefly at four ways in which Bull’s discussion of order has fed into more recent theory development. The central question that lies at the heart of Bull’s writing concerns the nature and possibility of order in international life. As is well known, the intellectual framework for this enquiry is provided by the concept of international society. A society of states [or international society] exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. (Bull 1977, 13)

A. Hurrell (*) University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_3

31

32 

A. HURRELL

Bull begins the book with an analytical discussion of the meaning of order. On the one hand, social order can be understood in the sense of stable and regular patterns of human behaviour. In this depiction it is contrasted with chaos, instability, or lack of predictability. On the other hand, social order requires the existence of a particular kind of purposive pattern that human beings have infused with meaning, that involves a particular set of goals, objectives, and values, and that leads to a particular outcome. If order is to be understood in terms of some purposive pattern, what sorts of purposes, goals, and objectives might be relevant to international life? Bull defined social order as: “A pattern [in the relations of human individuals or groups] that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values” (Bull 1977, 3–4). His analysis of these “certain goals and values” always tended to point in a constrained and minimalist direction. Bull’s classic study of order in world politics concentrated on the common framework of rules and institutions that had developed within the anarchical society of states. It was anarchical in that there was no common power to enforce law or to underwrite cooperation; but it was a society in so far as states were conscious of common rules and values, cooperated in the working of common institutions, and perceived common interests in observing these rules and working through these institutions. Bull contrasted an international society with an international system. The latter existed when there were contact and interaction such that each actor became a necessary factor in the calculations of the other. A system also displayed some patterned relationships. But, for Bull, the element of society was missing because of the absence of a sense of common interests and values and of being conscious of being bound by shared institutions. (He may have had in mind the nuclear duopoly between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.) This distinction has been much discussed (see chapter by Knudsen), and it has been widely contested. It may be possible to imagine and find historical examples of encounters between communities where little or nothing was shared. However, it is very hard to think of sustained commercial interaction or power-political engagement without some set of shared understandings, for example in relation to contracts, negotiation, and property in the case of trade. Bull’s international society was, at its core, a necessarily thin and fragile society in which the three fundamental goals of international social life were limited to the preservation of the society of states itself, the

  HEDLEY BULL AND THE IDEA OF ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

33

maintenance of the independence of individual states, and the regulation—but not elimination—of war and violence amongst states and societies. (For a more detailed discussion of Bull’s argument, see Alderson and Hurrell 2000.) On this view, inter-state cooperation could never be expected to provide a stable and universal peace but only to mitigate the inevitable conflicts that would arise from the existence of a multiplicity of separate sovereign states. The relevant question was not: how might human beings create forms of international society or schemes of international cooperation that embodied all their aspirations for justice or which universalized some particular conception of the good society? It was rather: how might states and other groups do each other the least possible harm and, in an age of total war and nuclear weapons, survive as a species? So the core goals of international social order were survival and coexistence, and the political framework was made up of the core institutions of a pluralist international society—international law, Great Powers, the balance of power, diplomacy, and war. Particularly for those writing within a broadly Hobbesian tradition (see Bull, 1981 and on Hobbes and international relations more generally Malcolm 2002), order can never be taken for granted: social life is always potentially subject to disruption and conflict and effective coordinated action is a collective achievement. The dangers of disorder are particularly pressing at the international level because of the weakness of international institutions above the state and because of the sheer range and diversity of values that exist across the world. In addition to capturing shared interests and dealing with common problems, states and societies in the global system must find ways of managing unequal power and mediating between conflicting values and cultural understandings. The historical circumstances within which English School developed also clearly contributed to this minimalism and this sense of fragility and inevitable constraints. Western academic international relations, after all, developed in response to the colossal failures of Western liberal modernity, to the enormous destruction of both the world wars themselves and the associated violence in both Europe and the non-European world, and to the deep and dangerous ideological, geopolitical, and military confrontation of the Cold War. In Bull’s case, in particular, there was a close relationship between his work on order and his work as one of the leading strategic thinkers of the Cold War (see Ayson 2012).

34 

A. HURRELL

Given this background, it is important to understand the differences between Bull’s approach and those who belong more closely to the realist tradition. Even a cursory reading of The Anarchical Society suggests Bull’s many affinities with realism, not least his emphasis on the role of power in international relations and the fact that the “institutions” of international society that he analyses in The Anarchical Society include war, the Great Powers, the balance of power, and diplomacy. Indeed, there is a very important sense in which the balance of power remains the most important foundation for Bull’s conception of international society. Without a balance of power and without sustained and stable understandings between the major powers on the conduct of their mutual relations, then the “softer” elements of international order (international law, international organizations, the existence of shared values) will be so many castles in the air. Bull also stressed the critical function of realist analysis—unmasking the pretensions of those who purport to speak on behalf of international or global society and underlining the extent to which, even when shared, universal or solidarist values will tend to further the interests of particular states. Finally, Bull’s idea of international society grew out of his very close critical engagement with classical realists such as Carr and Morgenthau and retained many of their concerns, especially the relationship between power, law, and morality. But most realists are deeply sceptical of the very idea of order, certainly of order as embodying some shared goal or project. Such order as does exists is the unplanned and unconscious result of individual states seeking to promote their own interests. Their power-political competition leads to a recurrent pattern of behaviour, reflected most clearly and regularly in the formation of a balance of power. (For a particularly clear discussion of the realist view of the balance of power, see Jervis 1992.) For realist and neorealist theorists such as Kenneth Waltz, global order is simply an unintended but recurrent pattern that no single state has sought—a view that reflects Bull’s portrayal of a system as opposed to a society. Some states may seek dominance; others may seek merely to survive, but the responses of all states to the uncertainties of international life and the absence or weakness of effective political authority above the state result most frequently in a balance of power. Order is, therefore, the unintended consequence of self-interested behaviour and does not require either awareness that a particular “order” exists or any commitment to a shared project of “global order”. Moreover, self-interested behaviour of this kind is always

  HEDLEY BULL AND THE IDEA OF ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

35

likely to undermine any concerted attempts to create alternative means of promoting their collective security, such as the United Nations. If one power-political pattern derives from the dynamics of balanced power, another stresses unequal power. In this view, order will be the result of hegemonic power—either through direct coercion and subjugation or through the way in which the dominant state is able to stabilize and legitimize its dominance through the provision of certain public goods or the cultivation of shared values. One influential approach to order—hegemonic stability theory—has laid great emphasis on the extent to which effective cooperation depends on the existence of a leader or hegemon, either within a region, or within an alliance system, or globally. The dominance of the United States in the post-Cold War world brought renewed emphasis on the possibilities—and the constraints—of hegemony and empire as roads to a stable and sustainable global order. From Bull’s perspective, both classical realism and even more its neorealist variants play insufficient attention to the framework of rules, norms, and shared understandings on which international society depends. This does not imply that norms somehow control the actions of states, acting upon them from outside. But it does mean that they shape the game of power politics, the nature, and identity of the actors, the purposes for which force can be used, and the ways in which actors justify and legitimize their actions. Thus, on Bull’s account, even conflict and war take place within a highly institutionalized set of normative structures— legal, moral, and political. As he puts it, “war is as a matter of fact an inherently normative phenomenon; it is unimaginable apart from rules by which human beings recognize what behaviour is appropriate to it and define their attitude towards it. War is not simply a clash of forces; it is a clash between the agents of political groupings who are able to recognize one another as such and to direct their force at one another only because of the rules that they understand and apply” (Bull 1979, 596). Equally, challenges to international order do not derive solely from the breaking of rules but from the unwillingness of governments and leaders to justify their behaviour within some shared legal or moral language. From this perspective even the quintessentially realist “institution” of the balance of power appears not as a mechanical arrangement or as a constellation of forces that pushes and shoves states to act in particular ways from outside. It should be understood instead as a conscious and continuing shared practice in which the actors constantly debate and contest the meaning of the balance of power, its ground-rules, and the role that it

36 

A. HURRELL

should play. Equally Great Powers are to be studied not simply in terms of the degree to which they can impose order on weaker states or within their spheres of influence on the back of crude coercion, but rather in terms of the extent to which their role and their managerial functions are perceived as legitimate by other states (See Clark 2011). Power remains central to Bull’s analysis of international relations, but power is a social attribute. To understand power, we must place it side by side with other quintessentially social concepts such as prestige, authority, and legitimacy. International society is therefore centrally concerned with norms and institutions. But this does not necessarily lead to a soft, liberal Grotianism concerned solely with the promotion of law and morality as is so often mistakenly assumed. Academic international relations has tended to consider the question of order in terms of the degree of conflict and cooperation that exists between and among the major states in the international system. The major powers matter most, not because they control everything that happens in international life but because war and conflict between them constitute one of the most obvious examples of “disorder” and of disorder that is potentially highly dangerous and immensely destructive. What constitutes an acceptable level of order is variable and contested. For example, some see no problem of talking about a “Cold War order”—because the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union did reflect patterned behaviour and did involve some shared norms and institutions. We identify both sides of Bull’s depiction of order: patterned behaviour and some degree of shared institutions, for example in relation to arms control. For others, the ever-present dangers of nuclear conflict and the high levels of death and violence resulted from super-power related conflict in the developing world make it nonsensical to talk of any kind of “order”. This underscores the point that the language of “global order” is never politically neutral. Indeed a capacity to produce and project proposals, conceptions, and theories of order is a central part of the practice of power. Bull’s understanding of order is clearly bound up with institutions, and he is routinely cited by almost all theorists who take this approach. International orders are, then, constituted by a structure of rules and norms that are embodied and organized in stable and relatively regular institutions, both formal and informal, and that are underpinned by a particular set of discourses and narratives. These discourses connect institutions with material forces and factors. Indeed the discursive and the material are in practice hard to disentangle despite the widespread tendency to try and separate out the “material” and the “ideational”. And

  HEDLEY BULL AND THE IDEA OF ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

37

they often have a narrative character, expressing not simply some static set of values but a sense of how a particular order has emerged over time and through history, of the purposes that it serves and the meaning that it gives to the actors involved, and, very importantly, of the nature of future possibility. Some theorists, such as John Ikenberry, a leading liberal theorist, focus on the relationship between institutions and particular values, in his case the values of what he sees as the “global liberal order”. (See Ikenberry 2001 and also Schweller 2001  in his critique of Ikenberry and in his emphasis on the importance of seeing order as patterned behaviour rather than values). Others, such as Reus-Smit, have sought to trace the underlying constitutional principles or moral purposes that animate international society and that help explain how it changes over time (Reus-Smit 1997, 1999, 2012). Both Ikenberry and Reus-Smit talk of constitutional orders and Reus-Smit has increasingly come to define order in terms of the distribution of political authority in global politics, a distribution in which the institutions of the inter-state system play a central role but far from the only one. This takes us to the connection between Bull’s work on order and the enormous upsurge in writing on institutionalism and on global governance. For institutionalists, you understand order by looking directly at the underlying mechanisms and logics that permit cooperation to take place and which allow social order to be created and sustained. Norms and institutions are conceived as negotiated and contracted in the process of social interaction, and institutions make it easier for social actors to cooperate out of self-interest. Internationally, a great deal of global order is thus about the ways in which states have responded to the increasingly serious collective action problems generated by growing societal, ecological, and economic interdependence. Such interdependence creates huge potential scope for joint gains—for example in solving climate change or providing a stable financial system. But cooperation under conditions of formal anarchy is problematic because of the difficulty of enforcing agreements and the temptations to cheat and free ride. For rationalist theories of cooperation, states are driven primarily by a calculating logic of consequences. Rationalist institutionalism views norms and institutions as purposively generated solutions to different kinds of collective action problems. It is precisely this kind of reasoning that explains why so much of the recent discussion of international order has been framed around the

38 

A. HURRELL

concepts of governance (as opposed to government) and of global governance. But there are two important differences between this work and those working within an English School tradition. First, for anyone following Bull’s approach, liberal institutionalism gives far too little weight to power and to values. It implies a world in which distributional conflict is secondary to efficiency, in which institutions have internal logics of path-­ dependent development, and in which legitimate power depends on sets of values that have become institutionally securely embedded. Hence power conflicts and distribution are pushed into the background, whilst value conflict is subsumed within the pale language of preferences. The shared recognition of the problem to be solved, the shared sense of potential benefits from cooperation, the legitimacy of the players around the table, and the existence of a shared language for communication and contracting are all simply assumed or glossed over. The second difference concerns the nature and scope of the questions being asked. Bull’s focus is less on the theoretical understanding of particular institutions and more on assessing the overall character of institutionalization in world politics, the normative commitments inherent in different ways of governing the globe, and the adequacy of existing inter-­ state institutions for meeting practical and normative challenges. It is precisely this concern that opens up the discussion of types of international society and especially the distinction between pluralism and solidarism—a subject that is discussed in more detail in other chapters. The core problem of global order is about how these inherited foundations of political order within the society of states can be made effective in the changed material circumstances of the contemporary world and in the face of the enormous expansion in the ambition and normative aspirations of international society (see Hurrell 2007a). The twentieth century witnessed recurrent calls to create a “new world order”—especially after major wars. In terms of scope, a minimally acceptable order came increasingly to involve both limits on the freedom of states to resort to war and the creation of international rules that came more and more to affect the domestic structures and organization of states; that invested individuals and groups within states with rights and duties; and that sought to embody some notion of a general common good. In terms of institutional form, order was deemed to require both explicit and settled arrangements amongst the major powers, a far more elaborate set of formal international

  HEDLEY BULL AND THE IDEA OF ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

39

organizations and institutionalized multilateralism, and a much wider range of informal governance arrangements and networks. Many of these developments have been associated with the challenges of globalization. But for all those writing within an English School framework, one particular challenge of globalization has been widely neglected and this has to do with the globalization of international society itself (see chapter by Green in this volume). Drawing heavily on Wight and Watson, Bull insisted that the transition from a European to a global international society represented one of the most important developments of the twentieth century. This transition involved five sets of struggles—for decolonization and the end of empire, for equal sovereignty, for racial equality, for economic justice, and for cultural liberation. For Bull this transition also opened up a number of deeply problematic questions. To what extent had decolonization and the emergence of the Third World disrupted and challenged the common rules and institutions of international society? What were the long-term implications for international society of its expanded membership? Had international society outgrown the European or Western culture upon which it was once founded, and if so, what cultural foundations, if any, could it be said to have? What kind of theory is involved in Bull’s work? He asks three kinds of questions. There are, first of all, analytical and definitional questions: what do we mean by order and what are the minimum conditions that would have to exist before any society could be meaningfully so described? Then there are historical questions: how far can one isolate an acceptance of these conditions in the historical practices of the society of states that developed first in Europe and then became global in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? And finally there are evaluative and normative questions: how can this idea of international society be evaluated against other models, ideas, and proposals for international or world order and how is it to be judged in moral terms? As the opening chapter to this volume has suggested, it is the first of these sets of questions that does most of the work. Bull was concerned with the logical postulates involved in the notion of order. Guzzini highlights just how much of Bull’s work is a “relentless analysis of ‘What is’” and he labels this ontological or constitutive theory, concerned above all with the concepts and definitions surrounding anarchy, hierarchy, society, community, and so on (Guzzini 2013). Definitions and concepts are central. From Weber onwards the debate on concepts has ranged between those who see concepts as ways of grasping some universal, or at least very

40 

A. HURRELL

general, political phenomenon on the one hand and those who are far more concerned with the social and historical grounding of our ideas and the ways in which all political concepts necessarily travel in complex and uncertain ways through time and place (see Berenskoetter 2017; and for an illustration, see Bartelson on sovereignty, 1995). Bull clearly leans far more heavily in the former direction (on how Weber might shape our understanding of the English School, see Keene in Navari 2009). The above discussion has related Bull’s work to some of the more prominent features of realist and institutionalist theory. How has it played into other areas of theory development? This has happened in four ways, some emerging from strong critiques of Bull’s approach to order and some from those who have sought to build on his work. In the first place, many have questioned the way in which he simply assumed what “society” involved. The core and universal values necessary for “any society as such” to exist are not argued for or demonstrated empirically. Indeed Bull was heavily influenced in this regard by the legal theorist H.L.A. Hart and Hart’s notion of there being a minimal content of natural law. One of the driving motives behind the critiques of the eurocentrism of the English School and of the need to decentre the Western study of international relations has been to ask in far richer historical, cultural, and linguistic details how ideas of the international and of international society have actually varied across time and space. (For one useful introduction to this very large subject, see Seth 1999, as well as other chapters in this volume.) Second, those coming from a more critical perspective have taken issue with the idea that we can study “order” as a problem that occurs between pre-given actors within a clearly understood idea of the “international”. From this viewpoint, the politics of order and ordering is always about the drawing of boundaries: between inside and outside and between what counts as politics and what doesn’t. The analysis of international order is all about the power politics of these constitutive processes (Bially Mattern 2001; Walker 1993). Third, others have questioned where Bull sought to “find” the idea of international society historically. The Anarchical Society talks rather airily of “theorists of the period” and draws on an eclectic range of political and legal theorists, as well as some historians and statesmen. And yet there is no discussion of why these figures have been chosen, or of how, methodologically, these ideas are to be investigated or understood. Yes, there is a proper concern for history but what we find in The Anarchical Society is a

  HEDLEY BULL AND THE IDEA OF ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

41

strangely narrow and old-fashioned history. As Keene puts it: “It was a political, legal and diplomatic history of international society, not a social history of international politics, law and diplomacy” (Keene 2008, 387). Even looking narrowly at the institutions of international society, we do not learn much about the historical or sociological operation of, say, international law or diplomacy. It is here that more recent work has moved in both a textual/contextual direction focusing on the history of ideas, and in a practice direction, seeking both empirical and theoretical understanding of what the practices of order and of ordering are all about. On the one hand, both the narratives of the evolution of international society and of many individual thinkers have been revised in very significant ways through the expansion of work on the history of international political thought (amongst a very large field, see Armitage 2012; Navari 2013; Bell 2001). On the other, there has been a far greater concern with the importance of practice and of practices. Indeed, we have seen a move to focus less on order and more on ordering, to examine the practitioners of order in much greater empirical depth, and to study the communities of practice within which they are embedded. It is evident that Bull was deeply committed to the centrality of norms and institutions in international politics and to the notion that society is constituted through diverse political practices built around shared, inter-subjective understandings— that is, understandings that exist between and amongst actors. (On the relationship to constructivist theory, see Hurrell 2012.) But he said rather little about the practices themselves, historically or theoretically. This is where we can make a useful connection to the so-called practice turn in academic international relations (Adler 2019; Adler and Pouliot 2011). The practice literature proposes as a central feature of social life the practice of “ordering”, but is somewhat obscure on the relationship between practices and order. For Adler order seems to be the product of a literally endless number of different practices whose relationship with each other remains unclear. For recent institutionalists, the functionalist demands of the complex sub-systems of modern global life mean that we have an equally endless multiplicity of regimes and regime complexes. Similar treatments may be observed in the contemporary study of the history of international law. And even Buzan now seems to have more than 13 “primary” institutions in his account of global international society (see Buzan and Schouenborg 2018). Central to the older English School view, and in line with the classical realist heritage with which it was closely connected, was the claim or

42 

A. HURRELL

intuition that some practices matter far more than others: they are foundational or primary, either in the sense of providing the inter-subjective or communicative building blocks for more developed institutions to emerge and function; or because they seek to provide solutions, however fragile, to the hugely destructive impact of conflicts over power and values. Bull was certain that some institutions—the balance of power, diplomacy, and to a lesser extent international law—really are more fundamental than others. In this sense, the modern “Bullians” are K.J. Holsti, with his distinction between constitutive and procedural institutions and Barry Buzan in his distinction between Master and Derivative institutions, and both in the close relationship between institutions and diplomatic practices. Even if we are now far more concerned with the complex institutionalization of global governance, we still need to understand how global governance relates to the power-political ordering or disordering that takes place between states, especially major states. It is certainly the case that, even within its own terms, Bull’s conception of inter-state order was too starkly divorced from the social and economic structures within which states and societies are embedded. It is also the case that his work tended to downplay political economy and his view of the state’s capacity to direct the direction and scope of economic developments was strained, even in the mid-1970s. Moreover, any contemporary analysis of order and governance needs to place order within the state system against the other two arenas within which all social order needs to be understood: civil society on the one hand (including what is now termed transnational civil society), and global economic markets on the other. At a time in which we have seen the return of geopolitics and deep challenges to many of the most important dimensions of global governance, we are, nevertheless, still left with Bull’s concern over the disjuncture between the vaulting normative ambitions of modern international society and its precarious power-political, institutional, and cultural foundations. Although sometimes seen as optimistic, complacent, or even nostalgic, Bull was constantly worried by what he called premature global solidarism—that too many hopes, too many demands, and too many moral claims were being placed on the still thin fabric of inter-state international society. In thinking about the nature and prospects for order, it is a concern from which it is, once more, hard to escape.

  HEDLEY BULL AND THE IDEA OF ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

43

Bibliography Adler, Emanuel. 2019. World Ordering. A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot. 2011. International Practices. International Theory 3 (10): 1–36. Alderson, Kai, and Andrew Hurrell eds. 2000. Hedley Bull on International Society Basingstoke: Macmillan. Armitage, David. 2012. Foundations of Modern International Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ayson, Robert. 2012. Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bartelson, Jens. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bell, Duncan. 2001. International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn? British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3 (1): 115–126. Berenskoetter, Felix. 2017. Approaches to Concept Analysis. Millennium 45 (2): 151–173. Bially Mattern, Janice. 2001. The Power Politics of Identity. European Journal of International Relations 7 (3): 349–393. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. ———. 1979. Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory. World Politics 31 (4): 596–596. ———. 1981. Hobbes and the International Anarchy. Social Research 48 (4): 717–735. Buzan, Barry, and Laust Schouenborg. 2018. Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clark, Ian. 2011. Hegemony in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of Theorizing. European Journal of International Relations 19 (3): 521–541. Hurrell, Andrew. 2007a. On Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007b. One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society. International Affairs 83 (1): 127–146. ———. 2012. Introduction. In The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, ed. Hedley Bull. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012 edition. Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jervis, Robert. 1992. A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and Concert. American Historical Review 97 (3): 716–724.

44 

A. HURRELL

Keene, Edward. 2008. The English School and the British Historians. Millennium 37 (2): 381–393. Malcolm, Noel. 2002. Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations in N. Malcolm. In Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Navari, Cornelia. 2009. What the Classical English School Was Trying to Explain, and Why Its Members Were Not Interested in Causal Explanation. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. C. Navari, 39–57. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2013. Public Intellectuals and International Affairs. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters. Reus-Smit, Chris. 1997. The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. International Organization 51 (4): 555–589. Reus-Smit, Christian. 2012. International relations, irrelevant? don’t blame theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40 (3): 525–540. ———. 1999. The Moral Purpose of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schweller, Randall. 2001. The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay. International Security 26 (1): 161–186. Seth, Sanjay. 1999. Rewriting Histories of Nationalism: The Politics of ‘Moderate Nationalism’ in Colonial India, 1870-1905. American Historical Review 104 (1): 95–116. Walker, R.B.J. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Expansion of International Society Daniel M. Green

The English School (ES) approach—from its beginnings in the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics—placed history at the center of its work, and a great breadth of history, with frequent treatment of ancient history, the Greeks, Persians, and Rome (Vigezzi 2014; Wight 1977), back to the Neolithic (Buzan and Little 2000). It also emphasized historical change and the uniqueness of different periods, over trans-­ historical similarities. A parallel interest lay in the comparative historical analysis of state systems (Epp 2014; Vigezzi 2005, 2014; Wight 1977). Within this highly historical research agenda, the historical expansion of international society was a consistent focus. This chapter reviews the development of ES thought on Expansion since the 1970s. The basic Expansion Narrative first appeared in Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society (TAS), drawing on writings on international relations and international law going back to the nineteenth century. Bull’s emblematic text examined the possibility, and provision, of order in the contemporary world order, but he began the analysis with a re-capitulation of the basic narrative of how a Westphalian international society had developed.

D. M. Green (*) University of Delaware, Delaware, NJ, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_4

45

46 

D. M. GREEN

The sequence was the Catholic-Christian ecumene of “Christian international society” from pre-Reformation Europe, to a “European international society” that developed largely in the two centuries after 1517, to the completed “world international society” (sometimes called “universal” or “global” international society) that spread fully in the nineteenth century (1977, 27–40). In Systems of States, Wight addressed the medieval-to-modern transition in Europe with an extended discussion of the geographical and chronological origins of “our states-system” (1977, 110–152), based mostly on events from 1492 to 1648. The detailed account includes a creative discussion of the different analytical perspectives, depending on whether 1494 or 1648 is chosen as the key founding date for the “Western states-­ system” (pp. 110–114). (The theme of key dates continues to exercise ES theorists (see Buzan and Lawson 2014)). Wight identified four phases in its development, up to 1500, 1500–1763, 1763–1941, and after 1941 (1977, 42–43), analyzing them using the model of core and periphery. In each phase the core grew geographically. By 1941, the core states had expanded to include all the founders of the League of Nations; the periphery became all the ex-colonial states. Wight also acknowledged “the dual nature of international society” (p. 123), rules applicable within Europe were not necessarily followed in Europe’s relations with the rest of the world. A second feature of the early Expansion Narrative was the premise that the European cultural hearth of early “Christian international society”— united in Catholicism and then experiencing the divisive test of the Reformation—was crucial to the functionality of Europe’s system and the reason it would eventually prevail (Wight, 1977, 33–39). As Wight (1977, 46) noted, “A states-system presupposes a common culture.” This also privileged and idealized the European experience in a Eurocentrism that would linger in the Expansion Narrative, but that would also be fruitfully thought-provoking in later ES discussions of twentieth-century international relations. The common culture issue helped establish the ES concern with understanding the present international society in historical perspective, which both Wight and Bull argued had weakened in the twentieth century. Since WWI we may still have a system but not necessarily a society, thanks to earth-shaking events like the Bolshevik revolution (Bull 1977, 257) and a “decline in the consensus about common interests and values within the states system” (p. 257). A third, related element is the “Revolt Against the West,” and Bull’s interest (1977, 257–260,

  THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

47

282–296) in the non-Western and ex-colonial pushback after 1945 which, together with decolonization, have preoccupied British international thought since the 1950s (Hall 2017). What were the prospects for security and economic justice for all after the end of empire? What damage might such divisions in the world yield? The Expansion Narrative also informed accounts of the present, as in Bull’s coining of the term the “new medievalism” to describe the proliferation of international organizations after WWII and the return of overlapping spheres of authority (1977, 264–276). A lengthy, speculative discussion about the decline of the modern states-system, alternatives to it, and its reform (1977, 233–320) communicated how much the character of the international system can change. For the ES theory, variations in levels of social agreement at different points in history are significant. In comparing state-systems across history, Wight went back to Hellas and Greek “world society,” and Adam Watson pursued such themes in The Evolution of International Society (1992), expanding international society beyond Europe to include the Chinese “warring states” system, the Macedonian system, and the India Mauryan system. The comparative states-systems line of inquiry was inspired by a research agenda suggested by A.H.L.  Heeren (1760–1842) (Keene 2002, 23; Dunne and Little 2014, 91–92). Indeed, in crucial ways the ES founders in the 1960s–1970s revived the classical nineteenth-century agenda of Heeren, William Hall, James , and others, vivifying it and crafting a unique research agenda that still guides ES scholars today.

Elaborating the Classical Account: Bull, Watson, Gong Two important books in 1984 fleshed out what Bull, Herbert Butterfield, Watson, Wight, and others had begun, consolidating the ES account of international history without challenging the founding texts: Bull and Watson’s edited volume, The Expansion of International Society, and Gerrit Gong’s The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society. Two themes carried forward are the entry/admission metaphor and the timing and conditions of formal admission of non-Western countries into international society, including the trope of challenges to contemporary international society, thanks to the “Revolt Against the West.” Some weaknesses of analysis and interpretation, such as the decided Eurocentrism of the

48 

D. M. GREEN

earlier works, were already somewhat obvious to the School, and one can see both Gong and the authors in Expansion correcting for them, notably in less whitewashing of European self-interest, more acknowledgment of the injustice of imperialism, and a greater sense of the development of the rules and institutions of international society as an interactive, multicultural practice, producing a more optimistic account of international society that would ensue after the “Revolt.” Expansion has several chapters on the formal admission theme and “entry of non-European states into international society”—the Americas, the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan, and the Mandate countries after WWI.  Efforts to gain admission include the adoption or acceptance of Westernization processes, changes in governments and bureaucracy, new laws to protect Europeans and their property (extraterritoriality agreements), and cultural adaptations to Western dress and manners. Gong introduces a crucial aspect of Expansion, the formal-legal “Standard of Civilization” developed in the later nineteenth century (though with ancient civilization-barbarism homologues) and applied to non-European polities. Indeed “burgeoning relations with non-European countries” (Gong 1984, 243) created a crisis for international law, and raised the specter of civilizational confrontations. Old Enlightenment-era natural law universalism was replaced by positive international law and the Standard’s emphasis on meeting established criteria and formal admission (Keal 2003, 107–112). The Standard’s purpose was to ensure safe, unfettered access into the non-West—for trade and proselytization—and to safeguard European lives and property once in place. Worthy civilized states (Gong 1984, 14–16) were expected to guarantee basic rights, including “freedom of travel, commerce and religion,” especially for European nationals; to have an “organized political bureaucracy” able to administer a territory and “organize for self-defence”; to adhere to international law and maintain a working system of domestic courts guaranteeing justice; to maintain a functional capacity for diplomacy; and to conform to other key “accepted norms and practices” of civilized nations of the time such as eschewing slavery, polygamy, and suttee. It drew attention to polities that avoided colonization by hastily adapting to the Standard. Gong provided the ES with an archaeology of the Standard’s formation, pulled together from international law textbooks, which made heavy use of the “Family of Nations” conceptualization then prevalent and the idea of being “welcomed in” (1984, 24–53). Gong analyzed the writings of

  THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

49

nineteenth-century international lawyers (mainly Hall, Lorimer, Lawrence Oppenheim, and Henry Wheaton) to determine what the Standard of Civilization was and how it shaped the fates of several country cases. Rendering the Standard an international-legal one somewhat masked the bigger social processes at work and their damage to local ways of life. According to Gong’s “archaelogy,” treaty relations began with China in 1842, Japan in 1854, Siam in 1855 and the Ottomans in 1856, even though “it was still several years before the international lawyers consciously articulated the requirements of the standard which were enforced in the treaties entered into” (1984, 32). There are specific dates for incorporation by European powers, 1899 for Japan, 1939 for Siam, 1943 for China. China, for example, was part of the state-system with the First Opium War (1839–41), but not admitted into international society until 1942 (the formal end of extraterritoriality). A crucial sign of full acceptance into the Family of Nations was the ending of extraterritoriality rights, after which Europeans became subject to local laws and courts. Gong’s analysis saddled the early ES to international lawyers, their textbooks, and world views—something of a retrograde borrowing. Critical voices (e.g., Alexandrowicz 1973) had already made the point that the nineteenth-century shift from a natural law basis for international law to a positivist basis involved a shrinking from the global-universal scope of natural law and Enlightenment thought to a narrower positive law controlled by Europe for its own purposes (Gong 1984, 44). This “exclusionary legal shrinkage” in international thought and practice would be remarked upon by many ES scholars thereafter and made the subject of deeper analyses (e.g., Clark 2005; Keal 2003; Keene, 2002). In the discussion of the “Revolt Against the West,” the question of a post-1945 common culture was raised and reaffirmed as central (Bull 1984b). “European or western dominance of the universal international society” peaked around 1900 (1984b, 219), with acknowledgment that the rules were made by the West/Europe and in Europe’s own interests (1984b, 217). While 1950s/1960s metropolitan resentment against the colonial insurrectionists had clearly faded by the time of the book’s writing, there was still concern that decolonization’s implications would be quite negative. The most dire diagnosis was Elie Kedourie’s brief chapter entitled “A New International Disorder,” expressing alarm that “the principle of national self-determination” was being too widely invoked when “nations” were often difficult to identify (1984, 348–349) and where immature “traditional societies” could fall easily into despotism and

50 

D. M. GREEN

corruption (1984, 350–351). Bull and Watson mention the problem of “pseudo-states” and “quasi-states” given independence “by courtesy” and not really able to function internationally or domestically (1984b, 430–432; see also Jackson 1991). Given independence before they were ready, would such states be good, responsible actors in global politics? Useful details were added to the somewhat primitive historical narrative laid out by Bull in TAS. Several regional systems were identified (Bull and Watson 1984a, 1–2), as well as an intriguing notion of a “Eurasian system.” Gillard (1984, 87) identifies four separate state systems in Eurasia— European, Islamic, Indian and Chinese, in the nineteenth century the European system “shattered” the other three. This emphasizes the phenomenon of breaking into insular regional systems, and the significance of creating one fully linked system (an interesting historical watershed and a dating issue that other IR approaches disregard). Second, the anti-­ hegemonial uniqueness of the European regional society is highlighted, as finally in the eighteenth century, Europe widely accepts the idea that “an attempt by any one of them to establish hegemony” would violate a basic rule of European order (1984a, 6; also Wight 1977). A European/ Christian international society changed in the nineteenth century, expanding outside Europe and becoming neither European (after incorporating the Western hemisphere), nor Christian (after incorporating the Ottomans in 1856) (Gong 1984, 4–6). As would be noted later, a more permissive identity-based inclusiveness made the need for an elaborate Standard of Civilization all the more urgent (Clark 2005, 37–39; also Keene 2002). This second generation of writing adds the theme of interactive processes, in the idea that the European system developed at least in part in a back-and-forth of cultural exchanges and experiences. Bull and Watson (1984a, 6–7) note that the “rules and institutions” of Europe developed through the Expansion process, beginning in the late fifteenth century, thus interaction with the rest of the world was part of the process of formulating the basic rules for Europe (see also Clark 2005, 36–37; Dunne and Reus-Smit 2017, referenced them enthusiastically in the “massive revision of international rules and conventions” (pp.  1–2) by African, Asian and Latin American actors after WWII.) But even before, by 1900, the non-West was setting to work to modify international society, with a five-point agenda, Bull (1984b, 220–222) lists a campaign for equal sovereignty, an anti-colonial revolution, plus struggles for racial equality, for international economic justice, and for cultural liberation from the West. Bull’s “Revolt Against the West” acknowledged East-West/North-South

  THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

51

interaction and the multi-sourced evolution of international society over time, once former colonies got their independence and were admitted to international society, they would of course have an impact. On the issue of a common culture, the authors concluded on a more positive note than the earlier generation. For the most part the new countries had accepted a world of juridical independent states (Bull and Watson 1984b, 433–435); indeed the new “Third World” wanted the presently existing order to work better. In this sense, though international society had “outgrown its original cultural base,” it was successfully absorbing new states (see also Buzan 2004, 216–217). The transfer of nationalism was another noteworthy and significant element, reaffirming the European impact—key forms were adopted after all.

Critiques Since the 1980s at least, there has been a fair degree of self-awareness within the English School about some of the weaknesses of the Expansion Narrative; and the new literature features critiques, revisions, and improvements. Yongjin Zhang (1991) made a very important early contribution, on China’s “entry” into international society, pointing out that China gained entry by pushing its way in, joining the Entente Allies in WWI and then the League of Nations, not by conforming and changing to please the European states. Thus, it wasn’t necessarily Chinese adjustments to external standards that were crucial, but changes in those standards themselves, thanks to non-Western pressures. China became a vocal advocate of sovereignty because it did not automatically receive respect from an international society where the norm of sovereign equality was not established. Recent ES works do not speak of “incorporation,” but rather “hybridizing globalization” and “co-production” of international society’s norms. Around 2000, as the ES was making a new claim to prominence and a (largely successful) bid for attention, key criticisms of the Expansion Narrative (re)surfaced, notably that the Expansion story as originally represented was Eurocentric and over-impressed with Western power (Buzan 2004, 214–216; Buzan and Little 2000; Dunne and Little 2014; Keal 2003). It sanitized a process that was often violent, with little regard for the subjects being incorporated (Callahan 2004; Keene 2002; Little 2005), and it described as gradual and benign a “process of social incorporation” that was, in fact, repressive and excluding (Keal 2003; Zhang 1991). The original indigenous peoples around the world, forgotten in

52 

D. M. GREEN

the standard narratives, were brought to attention (Keal 2003). While it required adaptation, those brought in are said to have appreciated the order and rationality they became a part of, “non-European polities are portrayed as embracing the rules and practices of the expanding international society” (Reus-Smit 2013, 31; also Hall 2017, 352), though we know well how vigorously many new elements of the rules and practices were disputed and grudgingly, bitterly accepted. Indeed, such contestations threatened to undermine the legitimacy of international society (see e.g. Keal 2003). But a new ES was also being born at this time. The 1999–2001 re-­ launching of the English School (see Schoenborg, below) elicited a wave of publications arguably more analytic and “scientistic,” with a parsing out of developmental processes, the fashioning of typologies and new descriptors, and breakthroughs in ES thinking about international system/international society development.

The Reboot, with a New Scientizing of the Classical Account? Emblematic of this “social scientific turn,” was Buzan and Little’s book International Systems in World History (2000), which offered improved conceptual and analytic tools for thinking about millennia of history. Their contributions include a taxonomy of types of international system (2000, 94–96), with useful distinctions: one might have a “full international system” or an “economic international system” and even “pre-international systems” (p. 96). Logically, there are four types of interaction—military, political, economic, societal (or socio-cultural)—and some types of interaction occur more easily than others (with cultural-ideational exchange and luxury goods trade being the easiest) (p. 95). These theoretic developments allowed connectedness and technological breakthroughs to be more systematically integrated into ES understandings of global history. The authors also introduced “interaction capacity” in the global system as a variable, providing a way of thinking about the system-society boundary and how structural forces can accelerate interaction, integration, and convergence. This was built from the global history trend blossoming at the time (e.g., Bayly 2004; Bentley 1993). Keene (2002) unpacked findings previous ES work had raised but rushed past. Reaching back into the Grotian and/or natural law era of

  THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

53

international thought (roughly 1500–1800), Keene argued that one Westphalian system was not the historical reality, but instead there have been two very different kinds of international order in place globally since its early days, one in Europe and one elsewhere, with “principles of appropriation” (2002, 111) devised by Europe to incorporate the territories of the rest of the world. Thus a “radical distinction between civilized and uncivilized societies” (p. 111) was maintained by the West for centuries. By the mid-nineteenth century, Europe’s extra-European order had codified into a means of civilizing “decadent, backward” peoples (2002, 7). Indeed, doing so became a part of Europe’s self-identity (Clark 2005, 37). One insightful addition to the Expansion Narrative is the story of how the two worlds merged and became at least “superficially unified” (p.  122) after WWII via the UN system. In 1917–1945 the rift between West and non-West was healed as Communism and Fascism/Nazism emerged and cut the civilizational boundary along different lines (Keene 2002, 121–123). A new divide emerged in the West, as Germany, Japan, and Russia transited into “the uncivilized world” (p.  123; see also Zhang 2014c, 683), anticipating the present divisions between the autocracies and the rest. As to the ES view of the approaching world order, marked by a “Kantian normative convergence,” it generally shares the more optimistic assessments about a global liberal order (e.g., Ikenberry 2001). Buzan’s 2004 book, From International Society to World Society, is an affirmative account of the direction of the present world order, and in some ways represents the last of the affirmative voices of the classical Expansion account. Buzan steps back to describe analytically what in his terms the ES historical narrative has been aiming at all along; the focus is on the present, on the international society/world society boundary, and the main question has been how to identify progress toward the Kantian-solidarist utopic world to come (especially 2004, 27–160). But Buzan makes important observations about the Expansion Narrative as well, including coining a new term for the ES narrative—“vanguardist”—the situation when one regional international society takes the lead in designing an international society for all. While acknowledging violence, coercion, and the role of empire in Expansion, he re-affirms the vanguardist rendering of the Expansion Narrative, From the fifteenth century onwards, the rise of European power first eroded, and then crushed, the longstanding configuration of four substantially

54 

D. M. GREEN

s­elf-­contained civilizational areas in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. By the end of the nineteenth century, virtually the whole of the international system was either created in the image of Europe, as in the Americas and Australia, or directly subordinated to Europe, as in the African and Asian colonies, or hell-bent on catching up with Europe, as in Japan, Russia and, more slowly, China. (Buzan 2004, 222)

Indeed, “So successful was the European state in unleashing human potential that it overwhelmed all other forms of political organization in the system” (2004, 216). The vanguardist term aptly characterizes the general phenomenon and was later used as critique (Dunne and Reus-­ Smit 2017). Buzan later added the term “syncretist” (2010) to describe a development process the opposite of vanguardist, in which no civilization takes the lead. To improve descriptive precision, Buzan also mapped out four types of “interstate social order” (a way of re-describing system/society features) of increasing degrees of mutual understanding and friendliness: “Power political interstate societies,” “Coexistence interstate societies,” “Cooperative interstate societies,” and “Convergence interstate societies” (2004, 190–204). This help develops the vocabulary needed to describe the history of global politics in ES terms. In fact, the accumulation of new concepts in the ES in these years is arguably a major contribution to the discipline of IR as a whole and to international history in particular. Another wave of work in 2013–2017 reflects a surge of historical interest in IR and focuses considerably on the ES historical agenda, landing critical blows on the Expansion Narrative and even threatening the end of “Expansion” as a theme of ES history. Key developments include a major re-examination of the early period in modern international history (roughly 1491–1800), with a substantial de-throning of Eurocentrism in analysis and of European exceptionalism in history. This work both “provincializes” the European experience and begins to correct “the silence and bias” of the ES and other approaches that fail to cover eras and settings in which non-European actors are dominant (Suzuki et  al. 2014, 4–8). It traverses international history outside the lens of the nineteenth-­ century classical thinkers the ES had relied upon, asking about the “non-­ Eurocentric international order” of the past (Vigneswaran 2014, 98). For example, the East Asian order before the mid-nineteenth century was no primitive international order; it displayed ample civilizational coexistence but also featured the relatively unique saikoku-like policies that China

  THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

55

initiated and Japan and Korea followed, with controlled isolation from Western contacts (Zhang 2014b; Suzuki 2014). We are also reminded to avoid privileging state-systems and to notice non-state-systems; early India was not an order of states but of transnational networks of individuals (Vigneswaran 2014). New arguments about the later European Expansion phase, including the Standard of Civilization phenomenon and other process issues, have appeared. The English School’s pioneering interest in Standards suddenly became highly fashionable as part of the recent “hierarchy turn” in IR (e.g., Bially Mattern and Zarakol 2016). We find deeper critiques of the entry/expansion metaphor itself, arguing for an analytic shift “from expansion to stratification” (Keene 2014). This asks us to rethink how the nineteenth-century system itself functioned and ordered things—in strata of civilizational worthiness, not just “incorporation” (2014a, 655). Zhang (2014a) points out that this hierarchical construct has had multiple versions, and recently operated in international society after 1989 as a human rights-focused Standard (see also Stivachtis 2008a). Indeed, Zhang argues that the first Standard contained relatively minimal expectations, merely asking for “an apparent homology of the Westphalian state” (2014a, 682) to allow basic relations between units, whereas the new human rights standard reaches more profoundly into internal affairs. Further unpacking processes, Filippo Costa Buranelli (2014) describes how Russia functioned as an intermediary brokering power in the process of bringing Central Asia into international society; a process breakthrough, foreshadowing coming insights (Dunne and Reus-Smit 2017) but still within the classical account. A contribution with a different purpose is Christian Reus-Smit’s important 2013 book, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System. Expansion remains present, but is reconfigured to emphasize the creation of states and to ground a causal theory for the expansion/generation of international society. Struggles for the recognition and protection of individual rights are “causal” and drive the creation of the states-system, because the desire for individual rights is “institutionally referential” (p.  46). International society is a society of states and new states are admitted when they (1) break away from a larger unit and (2) are recognized by others (pp. 19–20). Historically there have been five great waves of state creation involving the fragmentation of empires into successor sovereign states. (The focus is on the three most important waves: the Westphalian, the Latin American, and the post-1945 wave.) This effort to provide a causal account of one central aspect of the

56 

D. M. GREEN

Expansion Narrative is an important development, as is the move to yoke together human rights and nationalism (a long-standing ES preoccupation), within a single explanatory framework. Finally, a major new statement on the Expansion Narrative is The Globalization of International Society (2017). Edited by Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit, this volume takes on the 1984 Expansion collection at every point. Four theoretical innovations stand out (Reus-Smit and Dunne 2017, 28–39). Perhaps most significantly, the volume rejects the incorporation/expansion model in favor of globalization processes writ large, proposing the “globalization” of international society, not the “expansion” of it. “Expansion” denotes something whose core characteristics don’t change but simply spread, an incorrect characterization of what was happening (2017, 29). Second, the authors embrace the idea that international systems are inherently social and therefore not distinct in that way from international society, backing away from this aspect of the possible ES stadial understanding of international history. In short, there is no notion that an international system stage preceded a societal one (Reus-Smit and Dunne 2017, 33). Third, to discuss the source of change in those globalization dynamics, the authors return to Bull’s (1977, 278) concept of the “world political system”—all actors and forces in the world, not just state actors—as a constant influence on the development of international society (2017, 33–34). International society thus always exists within and develops from this “broader world of political actors and relations” (2017, 34). Fourth, they highlight the effects of power and contestation across history; international society cannot be “a realm of settled norms” (p. 35)—instead, these have always been contested and should be treated as such. The book makes important contributions to the Expansion historical narrative, in the “emergence phase” of roughly 1400–1600, in hitherto unexamined aspects of the “globalization phase” (1700–1950 or so), and the most recent “contestation phase.” Analysis of the Emergence Phase builds on the Suzuki, Zhang, and Quirk (2014) (and the rising influence of post-colonialism in IR) to question the standard view of the significance of the European voyages of discovery, including 1492. Andrew Phillips (2017) introduces such provocative concepts and terms as “Saharasia,” the notion of “the fifteenth century Afro-Eurasian ecumene” (p. 46), the Islamicate, and the Indosphere (p. 57), giving IR an improved vocabulary for this era. We learn that, in the medieval and early modern timeframe, the global configuration of relations was neither Eurocentric nor

  THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

57

unidirectional (p. 61)—we should think in “Afro-Eurasian-centric” terms (p. 61). (A side-benefit is to raise the status of this neglected early period of global history for IR.) “Contestation” in the later Globalization Phase of international society includes the co-constitution of international societal norms since 1900/1945, with a tone avowedly less Eurocentric and Euro-friendly. Ian Hall (2017) discusses the contours of a new Revolt today, noting that three Bull identified in 1984 have been largely resolved, displaced or won, the anti-colonial revolution, the “struggle for equal sovereignty” (leaping ahead in the UN Charter), and the struggle for “formal racial equality,” in which a key watershed was the end of apartheid in South Africa (p. 354). But new disagreements and modified old concerns have taken their place, including a struggle over “the values that should underpin international society and … be promoted or tolerated by that society” and the ongoing fights over global economic governance and justice (Hall 2017, 355). Especially welcome and relevant are discussions of race and gender— not strong suits of the ES previously—as sites of ongoing contestation. The issue of racial inequality lingers as a central problem in international society today—broadly about “racists seeking to manage human mobility”—but in ever-changing forms (Klotz 2017, 379). Audie Klotz outlines a relevant history, “the intensified racism of Victorian high imperialism” which lasted into the 1950s, with the interwar period as the “apogee of racism” (2017, 364). Deployment of concepts such as “racial institutional orders” and “global race politics” captures something very fundamental about international society and race the ES had not really recognized, underpinning familiar colonial and imperial topics (Klotz 2017, 365). Similarly, Ann Towns brings in gender and gender expectations as part of standards of civilization (2017), something completely missing from the English School thus far. She points out that the classic Standard was decidedly misogynist, especially as regards the distribution of political office and economic opportunities, and exported misogyny elsewhere, and argues serious damage in places with formerly better gender dynamics. Such subjects are evidence of the centrality of cultural issues in the ES account of the present, currently a frontier site of rich possibilities. The ES as an IR approach distinguishes itself by caring fundamentally about cultural norms and values. More than others, it should be able to gather in all the world’s civilizations and their contributions to an international culture. Overall, the ES Expansion Narrative was and remains a centerpiece of its scholarly activity and debates. It offers IR a unique account of

58 

D. M. GREEN

international history going back centuries, one that amply demonstrates the added value of the English School’s approach, and one that continues to evolve.

Bibliography Alexandrowicz, C.H. 1973. The European-African Confrontation. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff. Bayly, C.A. 2004. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914. Oxford: Blackwell. Bentley, J. 1993. Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bially Mattern, Janice, and Ayse Zarakol. 2016. Hierarchies in World Politics. International Organization 70 (3): 623–654. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. ———. 1984a. The Emergence of a Universal International Society. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 117–126. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1984b. Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures. Waterloo: University of Waterloo. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. 1984a. Conclusions. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 425–435. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———., eds. 1984b. The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2010. China in International Society: Is Peaceful Rise Possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (1): 5–36. Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. 2014. Capitalism and the Emergent World Order. International Affairs 90 (1): 71–91. Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. 2000. International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Callahan, W.A. 2004. Nationalizing International Theory: Race, Class and the English School. Global Society 18 (4): 305–323. Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Costa Buranelli, Filippo. 2014. Knockin’ On Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of International Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 817–836.

  THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 

59

Dunne, Tim, and Richard Little. 2014. The International System—International Society Distinction. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 91–107. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Dunne, Tim, and Christian Reus-Smit. 2017. The Globalization of International Society. In The Globalization of International Society, ed. T.  Dunne and C. Reus-Smit, 18–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Epp, Richard. 2014. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics and Its Central Figures. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 25–36. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Gillard, D. 1984. British and Russian Relations with Asian Governments in the Nineteenth Century. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 87–98. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gong, Gerrit. 1984. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hall, Ian. 2017. The ‘Revolt Against the West’ Revisited. In The Globalization of International Society, ed. T.  Dunne and C.  Reus-Smit, 345–361. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keal, Paul. 2003. European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kedourie, Elie. 1984. A New International Disorder. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 347–355. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Keene, Edward. 2002. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2014. The Standard of ‘Civilization’, the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-­ Century International Social Space. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 651–673. Klotz, Audie. 2017. Racial Inequality. In The Globalization of International Society, ed. T. Dunne and C. Reus-Smit, 362–379. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Little, Richard. 2005. The English School and World History. In International Society and Its Critics, ed. A.J. Bellamy, 45–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Phillips, Andrew. 2017. International Systems. In The Globalization of International Society, 18–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reus-Smit, Chris. 2013. Individual Rights and the Making of the Modern International System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stivachtis, Yannis A. 2008a. Civilization and International Society: The Case of European Union Expansion. Contemporary Politics 14 (1): 71–90. ———. 2008b. Europe and the ‘Turk’: An English School Approach to the Study of EU-Turkish Relations. In Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas,

60 

D. M. GREEN

Opportunities and Constraints, ed. Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Yannis A. Stivachtis, 17–40. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Suzuki, Shogo. 2014. Europe at the Periphery of the Japanese World Order. In International Orders in the Early Modern World, ed. S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk, 76–93. London: Routledge. Suzuki, Shogo, Yongjin Zhang, and Joel Quirk, eds. 2014. International Orders in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West. London/New York: Routledge. Towns, Ann E. 2017. Gender, Power, and International Society. In The Globalization of International Society edit, ed. T.  Dunne and C.  Reus-Smit, 380–398. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vigezzi, Brunello. 2005. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. Milan: Edizioni Unicopli. ———. 2014. The British Committee and International Society: History and Theory. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 37–58. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Vigneswaran, D. 2014. A Corrupt International Society: How Britain Was Duped Into Its First Indian Conquest. In International Orders in the Early Modern World, ed. S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk, 94–117. London: Routledge. Watson, Adam. 1992. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge. Wight, Martin. 1977. Systems of States, edited with an introduction by Hedley Bull. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Zhang, Yongjin. 1991. China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilization’. Review of International Studies 17 (1): 3–16. ———. 2014a. Curious and Exotic Encounters: Europeans as Supplicants in the Chinese Imperium, 1513–1793. In International Orders in the Early Modern World, ed. S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk, 1–11. London: Routledge. ———. 2014b. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ Redux: Towards the Expansion of International Society 3.0? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 674–696. ———. 2014c. The Global Diffusion of the English School. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C.  Navari and D.M.  Green, 223–240. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

Becoming a School: The Institutional Debate of the 1980s Tonny Brems Knudsen

This chapter covers the consolidation of the ‘English School’ in the 1980s from Roy E. Jones’ critical, but self-defeating, identification of a school he wanted to close in 1981 to Barry Buzan’s indication of the school’s full paradigmatic status in his 1993 IO article “From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English School”. The school consolidated its identity and ambitions partly by revisiting and developing foundational works by Charles Manning, Martin Wight, Adam Watson and Hedley Bull among others, and partly by engaging with other approaches in key debates on International Relations (IR) theory. The chapter explores the consolidation of the English School in the (long) 1980s in terms of the debate about the existence and defining characteristics of the school as well as its contributions to (a) fundamental (historical and sociological) institutionalism, (b) the theory of international society and (c) the distinction between pluralism and solidarism.

T. B. Knudsen (*) Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_5

61

62 

T. B. KNUDSEN

Becoming a School: Jones Versus Suganami and Wilson Ironically, Roy E. Jones’ case for a closure of the ‘English School of International Relations’, as he named it in his polemical essay from 1981, was quite helpful in re-animating it. The international society approach had been at the center of British IR for decades (Manning 1962; Butterfield and Wight 1966; Wight 1977, 1978, 1991; Bull 1977),1 and it had already been the subject of international scholarly interest and debate before Jones challenged it. The members of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1959–84) and their American colleagues were very well aware that they disagreed on key points, such as the historical reality of international society, the sources of international order, the importance of international law and morality, and the proper methodological approach to the subject of international relations (Butterfield and Wight 1966; Bull 1966a; Dunne 1998). Jones’ 1981 critique of the English School raised again the American behaviouralists’ arguments against Bull and the traditionalist camp of 15 years earlier (see, e.g. Kaplan 1969, 43–44, 55–57; Vital 1969, 146–147, 153). Jones charged leading scholars of British IR— including Manning, Wight, Northedge and Bull—along the same lines: a lack of precision, absence of statistical analysis and models, a preference for holistic conceptions of order and the states system and a habit of formulating research questions that could not be answered or falsified with any certainty (Jones 1981, 1, 8). The younger representatives of the English School answered Jones indirectly (Suganami 1983; Wilson 1989) or directly (Grader 1988).2 Sheila Grader (1988) disputed the existence of a unitary English School, but defended the scientific advances made by the key figures identified by Jones. In contrast, Peter Wilson argued (in his reply to Grader) that there was indeed an increasing acceptance of the existence of a distinct school of thought (1989, 49), that the “English School” label was “in common usage” (Wilson 1989, 57), and that it belonged to the wider Grotian 1  As a part of a broader Grotian or rationalist tradition of thought that can arguably be traced back to Grotius and his predecessors. See Wight 1991; Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, eds. 1990; Navari 2017. 2  Grader, Wilson and Suganami pointed to Alan James, John Vincent, Michael Donelan and James Mayall, among others, as exponents of the English School, in addition to Manning, Wight, Northedge and Bull. Wilson also noted the interest in the ES among young poststructuralists like James Der Derian and Richard K.Ashley.

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

63

tradition of thought (p. 53). Furthermore, he defended its theoretical and methodological merits including the holistic conception of international society, the account of international order and the interpretative approach. Wilson also went further than Grader, stressing that “the identity of the English School hinges upon the idea of international society” (pp. 54–56). On these key elements of the school, Wilson echoed Hidemi Suganami, whose article on “The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations” from 1983 can be seen as the true inauguration of the English School as a formally identifiable and recognized school of thought, differing from both Idealism and Realism (Suganami 1983, 2368–2369).3 Suganami had identified a unique ‘British Institutionalism’ already in an earlier version of the paper for the BISA conference in 1980, and with reference to the same circle of academics. Now, however, he identified historical institutions like the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great power management and law as the defining element of the British school of thought, since it was preoccupied with the institutional bases of international order (p.  2365). Together, Suganami and Wilson confirmed the existence of an English School unified by a holistic theory of international society and international order based on common rules and institutions, and devoted to historical interpretation and sociological methods like the construction of ideal types (Suganami 1983, 2365).

The Fundamental Institutionalism of the English School At the beginning of the 1980s, the first and second generations of English School scholars had arrived at a relatively coherent understanding of fundamental institutions as cornerstones in international society and bases of international order. They derived these institutions from international history and the history of ideas as ideal types, which were furthermore shaped by the logic of the international society in which they figured (see especially

3  In Suganami’s account, ‘British Institutionalism’ (meaning the English School) replaced the older Grotian tradition of thought as the ‘via media’ between the Hobbesian and Kantian traditions identified by Wight and Bull. The key remained, however, the identification of a unique form of international society with unique (institutional) bases of international order (Suganami 1983, 2368–2370).

64 

T. B. KNUDSEN

Wight 1977, 1978 and Bull 1977).4 Wight (1977, 29–33, 129–152; 1978, 107–143, 168–185) had—sometimes loosely, sometimes carefully— pointed to mutual recognition of sovereignty, diplomacy, trade, war, the conference systems, international law, great power management, the balance of power, collective security, alliances, guarantees and neutrality as historical and sociological institutions. In his more systematic treatment, Bull (1977, 71–74, 101–229) had pointed to the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great power management as the effective (order-promoting) institutions. Bull (1977, xiv) used the terms “fundamental” and “basic”, and defined the fundamental institutions as “a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals” (1977, 74). Wight (1977, 129–152, 1978, esp. 105–112) had stressed their importance for the unique societal qualities of the modern states system. Inspired by Manning (1962), Alan James (1973, 1978, 1986, 1999) referred to certain “phenomena” (1978, 97) or practices as bases of international order and key elements in the social structure of international society. By contrast, international organizations like the United Nations (UN) were considered in terms of their supportive, organizing and implementing contributions. They were best seen as “pseudo institutions” (Bull 1977, xiv), because of their perceived political weaknesses and temporal character, compared to the historical and durable practices that had materialized in Europe since the Middle Ages. This theorization was intended to escape the traps of earlier idealist organizational studies. Although they were important as supportive arrangements, the reality of international order and international society did not hang on world organization like the League of Nations and the United Nations—or in “the hopes commonly placed in them” (Bull 1977, xiv)—but on durable institutions, which were considered to be less vulnerable to power political change. According to Suganami (1983, 2378), there was “probably not much more to be done by way of identifying the institutional bases of international order”. What was required by the English School at the beginning of the 1980s was “not to look for more institutions but to investigate whether the institutions the school claims to have identified can justifiably be regarded as such in the light of our historical experience” (p. 2379). 4  The interest in the historical and sociological institutions of international society is also evident in Diplomatic Investigations edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (1966) though mostly without an explicit use of the term of institutions.

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

65

Further, he called for investigations into the factors that brought fundamental institutions into existence and that perpetuated them, and indicated that the apparently limited room for international change and human choice should be realized and discussed (pp. 2380–2381). A large body of literature in the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as a response to this call. Bull and Watson (1984) paid attention to the institutional aspects of the expansion of international society in their anthology on this subject, as did Watson (1992) in his monumental comparison of historically known states systems. Alan James went on to theorize sovereignty (1986, 1999), equality (1992) and peacekeeping (1990), while Adam Watson (1982) dealt with diplomacy. James Mayall (1990, 1991, 1992) studied the historical incorporation and management of nationalism and national self-determination into the legal and institutional framework of international society, much like John Vincent (1986) on human rights. Bull (1984) assembled a team of specialists to analyze the principles, practices and problems of intervention in world politics as a complement to the more historical work by his pupil John Vincent on nonintervention in 1974, and others continued the study of humanitarian intervention after the revival of this practice in the early 1990s (Wheeler 1992, 2000; Vincent and Wilson 1993; Roberts 1993, 1999; Jackson 1993, 2000, 249–293; Knudsen 1996, 1997, 1999). Robert Jackson (1990) studied the “quasi-states” that came out of de-colonization from the perspective of sovereignty, and Mervyn Frost (1991) and Robert Jackson (2000) discussed the option of international trusteeship in the light of current state failure and civil war. The treatment of nationalism, national self-determination, human rights, humanitarian intervention and international trusteeship was to a considerable extent inspired by a concern to find out if, and how, such seemingly explosive and controversial principles, practices or changes could be reconciled with the institutional bases of international order. However, there was also unfinished business. First, while institutional continuity was understood in ways that resembled historical and sociological institutionalism in Political Science, it was hardly acknowledged (Wight 1991, 140–141, is an exception). There was also no clear conceptualization or theorization of fundamental institutional change. Second, the ontological status of fundamental institutions was not clearly specified. Third, the relationship with international organizations was not theorized in a deeper sense, and international organizations were not appreciated as much in theory as in empirical studies. (Major parts of the authorships of

66 

T. B. KNUDSEN

Alan James, Adam Roberts, James Mayall, Hidemi Suganami and Lorna Lloyd were preoccupied with aspects of the UN or its predecessor, the League of Nations).

Institutional Encounters with Liberalism and Constructivism Further consolidation, clarification and innovation of the English School’s institutionalist theory came from encounters with other parts of the discipline of International Relations (IR). At the end of the 1980s leading exponents of Liberalism (Keohane 1988; Krasner 1982/1983) had become aware of the English School and its conceptualization of fundamental institutions, as had (by the early 1990s) early exponents of Constructivism, Post-Structuralism and Critical theory (Wendt and Duvall 1989; Wæver 1992; Walker 1993; Neumann and Welsh 1991; Der Derian 1995). These encounters did a lot to clarify and refine the theoretical tools of the English School and situate it as a third approach to IR. Keohane (1988, 381, 386–387) pointed out that the rationalistic approach to international institutions, favored by scholars of Liberalism such as himself, was preoccupied with specific international organizations and regimes, which are deliberately and rationally constructed by states in order to pursue collective gains, and these within the structural constraints of an anarchical system. Keohane contrasted this rationalistic approach with the interpretive and sociological one favored by exponents of the English School—including Bull (1977), Wight (1977) and James (1986)—as well as upcoming constructivist and critical scholars like Hayward Alker, Richard Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, who were preoccupied with more general and historical institutions such as sovereignty, the balance of power, diplomacy, international law, great power management and war. He called this the reflective approach, because it stressed the importance of impersonal social forces, cultural practices, norms and values, which are not derived from calculations of interest (Keohane 1988, 381). Furthermore, these “scholars emphasized the importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately the character of world politics” (p. 382). As opposed to anarchy, in the reflective approach, individuals, organizations and even states develop within the context of more encompassing (Keohane 1988, 382) or more fundamental (p.  390)

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

67

institutions and practices, like sovereignty, which shape their preferences and power. Furthermore, Keohane highlighted the role of practices as social facts (p. 384), and he also pointed out that specific institutions are “embedded” (pp. 386, 390) in fundamental ones (whereas the standard English School formulation had been that international organizations ‘contribute’ to the working of the basic institutions). He concluded that fundamental institutions were difficult to work with, especially in regard to the sort of deductive explanation (pp. 383, 390) favored by American liberal institutionalists, but he called for further academic exchanges between the two approaches, and further exploration of the relationship between fundamental institutional practices and specific organizations (Keohane 1988, 393). Further clarification came from Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall in a brilliant but rather forgotten article, “Institutions and International Order” from 1989. Here, Wendt and Duvall distinguished between the “old institutionalism” of “the principally British School of international relations theory” and the “new institutionalism”, which they associated with neo-realism as well as exponents of neo-liberalism and regime theory including Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner (Wendt and Duvall 1989, 52, 16, 17). Furthermore, they aligned classical English School scholars like Manning, Northedge, James and Bull5 with upcoming post-structural and constructivist scholars like James Der Derian, Richard Ashley, John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil and Wendt and Duvall themselves (pp. 52, 68). Their goal was to develop a social constructive approach to international relations, but seen from the perspective of the present volume, a primary effect was to add more theoretical, methodological and meta-­ theoretical precision to the old sociological and historical institutionalism of the English School. Furthermore, the combination of constructivist and post-structural meta-scientific insights on the one hand, and English School institutionalism on the other allowed them to formulate a strong institutionalist alternative to both neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Three points in the article are worth noting. First, Wendt and Duvall argued that the appropriate starting point for institutional analysis and theorization (including the relationship between international institutions 5  Wendt and Duvall cited Suganami (1983) as a main inspiration regarding the exponents and characteristics of the “British School”; in addition to Manning, Northedge, James and Bull they referred to Merwyn Frost, Terry Nardin and Paul Keal.

68 

T. B. KNUDSEN

and international order) was the realization that “the international political system is not only a system of states but also a society of states” (p. 52). Here, they built directly on the old institutionalism of Hedley Bull (1977) and the English School. The choice-theoretic and ‘economic’ (why do states chose to cooperate and seek gains in an anarchical system) approach had its merits, but it “blinds scholars to some equally important, if not even more fundamental processes of ‘ordering’ in the international system” (Wendt and Duvall 1989, 51–52). Second, Wendt and Duvall explicitly proposed the term ‘fundamental institutions’ for the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and war (among others).6 And drawing on constructivist structuration theory, they specified these institutions as “shared intersubjective understandings” which “constitute states actors as subjects of international life in the sense that they make meaningful interaction by the latter possible” (p. 53). Consequently, they are preconditions of social integration in international society, and integrated, natural and historical aspects of international society. Third, Wendt and Duvall argued that fundamental institutions structure (in the sense of shaping) state action and interaction, because they make certain forms of meaningful interaction possible, while international organizations and regimes tend to specify, regulate, constrain and organize international interaction. Importantly, they concluded with the argument that both types of institutions have both constitutive and organizing effects on international practice (Wendt and Duvall 1989, 54, 60–63). These arguments informed Tim Dunne’s (1995) article on “The Social Construction of International Society” in which he argued that there was already—long before the introduction of these terms into the discipline of IR—a basically constructivist approach to IR represented by Manning, Wight, Bull, Watson and Butterfield among others. Going further than Wendt and Duvall’s (1989) appreciation of the “old institutionalism”, Dunne argued that the historical and sociological approach of the English School was fundamentally about the social construction of international society as a whole. He cited as evidence the preoccupation with 6  As stated earlier in this article, Hedley Bull (1977) also used the term “fundamental” in relation to his historical and sociological institutions, but only occasionally, and so did Keohane (1988, 390) when referring to these institutions and practices. See also Wendt and Duvall’s (1989, 57) reference to an earlier paper by Keohane. Later, Barry Buzan (2004) coined the term “primary” or “master” institutions (while international organizations and regimes were ‘secondary’ institutions). More on the terminology of historical and sociological institutions in Knudsen and Navari 2019.

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

69

intersubjective rules (p. 377), social facts and practices (pp. 376, 383–384), the construction and reproduction of institutions like the balance of power, diplomacy and sovereignty over time (pp.  377–379), and the assumption that international society and its constituent parts were shared (and identity-­forming) ideas in the minds of international decision-makers (pp. 367, 376–377). Paraphrasing Wendt’s signature statement “anarchy is what states make of it”, Dunne (pp. 376, 384) stressed the constructivist nature of classical English School theory with the conclusive argument that international society is what states make of it. Meanwhile, other exponents of the English School made their own comparisons of the old and the new institutionalism. Tony Evans and Peter Wilson (1992, 329–333) compared regime theory with the English School, locating both inside the broad Grotian stream of thought. As to the differences, they pointed to the rational calculation of state interest in Regime Theory versus the assumption of common reason, collective interests and socially generated interests in the English School. Moreover, the English School had a social understanding of power according to which the balance of power and great power management operate as institutions, which provide for international order in the interest of international society as a whole. In contrast, Regime Theory focused on power (hegemonic leadership by the USA) and material interests (in survival and economic gains) as a cause of more narrow issue area cooperation in international regimes and organizations (pp. 335–336). This was echoed by Andrew Hurrell (1993), who argued that the English School represented a distinctively European approach to international relations with important ideas about the role of international law in international society. In contrast, the mainly American rationalist approach of Neo-Liberal institutionalism was missing the “the role played by international law as constitutive of the structure of the state system itself” (p. 59) as well as the potential of international rules in themselves—beyond the rare enforcement possibilities in international society—to define international legitimacy and thus call for a degree of observance.

The Theory of International Society Amplified In an extensive article in the Review of International Studies, Alan James (1993) challenged the basic structure of Hedley Bull’s account of international order, and solidified the theory of international society as an interpretivist theory. He rejected Hedley Bull’s distinction between an

70 

T. B. KNUDSEN

international system and an international society on the ground that there is, logically and historically, no difference between what Bull termed an international system and an international society. More precisely, the defining elements of the term international system—that “states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave … as parts of a whole” (Bull 1977, 9–10)—is virtually impossible unless the ‘system’ is also a society in the sense that Bull defined it. James argued that regular interaction (system), and indeed orderly interaction—is not possible without the existence of some common rules of the game and diplomatic conventions (society) containing shared expectations about how to interact and communicate. Bull’s distinction implied that the societal element of international relations is “an optional extra to the basic systemic interaction” (272)—as if there could be an international system without societal elements. James rejected this on historical as well as logical grounds: “Historically, the development of international law has moved hand in hand with the development of international relations, and continues so to do” (273).7 He added that it could not be otherwise. Citing Adam Watson (1987, 151), James (274) wrote that no international system as defined by Hedley Bull has operated without some regulatory rules … “and it is hard to see how one could”. Furthermore, states are members of international society, rather than an international system, because of their constitutional independence and mutual recognition (here I use Wight’s (1977, 33) term for it), fundamentally a societal characteristic (286–287). Barry Buzan’s “From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English School” (1993) was published the same year as Alan James’ article in the Review of International Studies. In several ways, Buzan was in agreement with James, but his argument pointed toward a synthesis with, rather than a rejection of, the mechanistic understanding of the international system. Like James, Buzan thought that Bull’s understanding of an international system implied a realist and American conception of inescapable and regular interaction under the condition of anarchy (Buzan 1993, 331). However, he wanted to maintain Bull’s distinction between an international system and an international society as a theoretical abstraction, which to him identified 7  Arguably, a number of fundamental institutions evolved simultaneously with states when the medieval order of overlapping authorities gave way to European international society. See Knudsen 2019, 28–29.

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

71

important drivers of the evolution of societal elements in international systems. Buzan argued that in an imagined system of states in regular contact, inescapable interaction puts a strong pressure on states to recognize each other as sovereign equals, and to develop rules and diplomacy for their coordination. As the commercial, political and military interaction capacity of states grows, “the intensity of their interactions will virtually force the development of a degree of recognition and accommodation among them”. Assuming just a minimal degree of rationality, Buzan argued that a “minimal desire for order begins to emerge when leaders realize the disadvantages of permanent chaos if interstate relations remain wholly unregulated” (p. 334). More importantly, those who are able to cooperate will fare better than those who allow themselves to be engaged in endless and costly war and conflict. Here, Buzan explicitly activated Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) structural realist shoving and shaping forces as drivers of societal rules and practices—those who fail to adopt such means of trade and other peaceful relations will be punished by slow development and permanent insecurity (Buzan 1993, 342). Buzan accepted Watson’s (1987), and thus James’ (1993), claim that historically, there has never been a system of states without societal elements—to have “international relations of a system without any society” would be “analogous to those of a madhouse” (Buzan 1993, 341). But he maintained that systemic interaction would logically pull states toward the construction of rules and institutions for the conduct of orderly and productive relations. In this way, Buzan turned Waltz’s logic of anarchy into an engine of the English School logic of society. Moreover, he argued that the same theoretical logic leads naturally toward the construction of international organizations and regimes as a deliberate attempt by state actors to escape the costs of disorder and conflict, and reap the gains of cooperation.8

8  Buzan linked Bull’s work to Tönnies’ notion of gesellschaft (systemic, functional and rational integration) and the opposed notion of gemeinschaft (social and cultural integration) to Wight’s work. By comparison, Wendt and Duvall (1989, 52–53) aligned Tönnies’ notion of gesellschaft with the Neo-Liberal theorization of international organizations and regimes, and his notion of gemeinschaft with the English School theorization of fundamental institutions.

72 

T. B. KNUDSEN

Pluralist Versus Solidarist Conceptions of International Society In a paper on “The Grotian Conception of International Society”, Hedley Bull (1966b) had re-launched the classical discussion between adherents of the naturalist and the positivist position on the sources of international law, the former deriving it from human nature and common reason, the latter from the actual agreement among states (Bull 1966b; Vincent 1974, 20–44). Under the labels solidarism and pluralism, Bull traced this controversy beyond the disagreement on the sources of international law and into more substantial questions of law and politics, such as the status of the individual in international society, the place of war and the possibility of collective enforcement of common principles (Bull 1966b). Bull had originally argued an anti-solidarist position. According to him, solidarist ideas concerning the promotion of human rights and international organization, restrictions on the private use of force and collective enforcement of international law were principles that, in the absence of sufficient international solidarity, could have the effect of “undermining those structures of the system, which might otherwise be secure” (Bull 1966b, 70). In other words, solidarist ideas and principles were likely to lead to international disagreement and thus an undermining of international order. Similarly, Herbert Butterfield and most of the members of the British Committee (with Martin Wight as a notable exception) were uncomfortable when confronted with overtly solidarist ideas (Dunne 1998, 100–104). There was, at least until the beginning of the 1990s, a tendency among key members of the English School including Hedley Bull (1966b; 1977) to dismiss the possibility of an international society organized more or less systematically along with the principles of solidarism (Dunne 1998, 100–104, 106–107, 144–152; Knudsen 1999, 10–15, 74–82). However, John Vincent’s work on the strengthening of human rights in the 1970s and 1980s indicated a possible opening to solidarism. Vincent had taken an ultimately pluralist position in his first book Nonintervention and International Order from 1974 (see pp. 345, 346, 348), but a more solidarist one in his second major work, Human Rights and international Relations, from 1986. While he defended the pluralist doctrine of non-­ intervention, a key pillar of international order, he was clearly reluctant to surrender human rights to the quest for order. His endorsement of basic human rights was accompanied by pluralist warnings, but the result was

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

73

the cautious conclusion, that “there is now an area of domestic conduct … that is under the scrutiny of international law” (Vincent 1986, 152). The major challenge to a singular pluralist conception of world order came in 1992 with Nick Wheeler’s timely and ground-breaking article in Millennium, ‘Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention’. It was timely in that it addressed the collective international intervention in the Kurdish refugee crisis in northern Iraq in the spring of 1991, and the heated international discussions of a possible humanitarian intervention in the atrocious civil wars in former Yugoslavia (Croatia and in particular Bosnia). It was ground-breaking because it indicated that there were at least two legitimate positions in the English School on humanitarian intervention and the possible organization of international society, namely a pluralist and a solidarist one, each with their theoretical, normative and historical-­ empirical backings. According to Wheeler (1992, 463), the subject of humanitarian intervention poses the “conflict between order and justice in international relations in its starkest form”, implying that the English School, or “the international society approach” as Wheeler (p.  463) preferred to call it, had the tools to deal with it. Wheeler made a first attempt in his juxtaposition of Bull’s and Vincent’s work, which led him to the conclusion that the question of humanitarian intervention, and the deeper relationship between international order and international justice (or pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society), had to be reopened in the light of early post-Cold War engagements in humanitarian crisis situations. Wheeler referred, correctly, to Bull’s skepticism of solidarist ideas like humanitarian intervention on the grounds of international order, which seemed to require an unconditional principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states (p. 471), but he also stressed the tension that came at the end of Bull’s career (p. 477): Bull’s 1983 ‘Hagey Lectures’ in which Bull attempted to reconcile concerns for international order and international justice, including the calls from the Third World for international equality. Wheeler identified the problem—for Bull and the English School—as finding a politically disinterested and culturally neutral platform on which to ground humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 1992, 473–475). On human rights, Vincent seemed to have found it (with inspiration from Henry Shue) in the idea of a narrow set of potentially universal basic rights which all peoples and states would or should be able to agree on, including the right to life. But Wheeler (pp. 479–481) judged

74 

T. B. KNUDSEN

that this was still a far cry from a formula for workable humanitarian intervention which could answer critical questions concerning the legitimate and disinterested authorization and implementation of such a right in international society. In principle, there were theoretical grounds (like the idea of basic rights or negotiated universality) for a collective right of humanitarian intervention. In practice, Wheeler (1992, 487) had his doubts; he thought (like James Mayall 1991) that the basis had to be international agreement (for instance on UN-authorized humanitarian intervention). In the absence of such an agreement, ‘the cure [interventions without authorization] may well be worse than the disease’. Wheeler’s engagement with the work by Bull and Vincent identified key theoretical and political dilemmas of acute relevance to post-Cold War international society. Furthermore, it indicated that a solidarist development on human rights and humanitarian intervention was possible and could be in the process of evolving. The question remained central to the English School up through the 1990s where further humanitarian interventions were launched, more or less successfully, in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo (controversially without UN Security Council authorization) among other places. Wheeler crystallized the issue as between a leaning toward pluralism or solidarism. Roberts (1993, 1999) and Jackson (1999, 2000, 249–293) pursued the pluralist argument, while Wheeler (2000) and Knudsen (1996, 1997, 1999) would develop the solidarist one.

Bibliography Bull, Hedley. 1966a. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. World Politics 18 (3): 361–377. Also in 1969 Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. Klaus Knorr and James N.  Rosenau, 20–38. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1966b. The Grotian Conception of International Society. In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 51–73. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. ———. 1984. Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. 1984. Introduction. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 1–9. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bull, Hedley, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds. 1990. Hugo Grotius and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

75

Butterfield, Herbert, and Martin Wight, eds. 1966. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: Allen & Unwin. Buzan, Barry. 1993. From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. International Organization 47 (3): 327–352. ———. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Der Derian, James, ed. 1995. International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: Macmillan. Dunne, Tim. 1995. The Social Construction of International Society. European Journal of International Relations 1 (3): 367–389. ———. 1998. Inventing International Society: A History of the English School. Houndmills: Macmillan in Association with St. Antony’s. Evans, Tony, and Peter Wilson. 1992. Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21 (3): 329–351. Frost, Mervyn. 1991. What Ought to Be Done About the Condition of States? In The Condition of States, ed. C.  Navari, 183–196. Buckingham: Open University Press. Grader, Sheila. 1988. The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation. Review of International Studies 14 (1): 29–44. Hurrell, Andrew. 1993. International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach. In Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Ritberger, 49–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackson, Robert H. 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1993. Armed Humanitarianism. International Journal XLVIII (4): 579–606. ———. 1999. Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape. Political Studies XLVII (3): 431–456. ———. 2000. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. James, Alan., ed. 1973. The Bases of International Order: Essays in the Honour of C.A.W. Manning. London: Oxford University Press. ———. 1978. International Society. British Journal of International Studies 4 (2): 91–106. ———. 1986. Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1990. Peacekeeping in International Politics. London: St. Martin’s Press. ———. 1992. The Equality of States: Contemporary Manifestations of an Ancient Doctrine. Review of International Studies 18 (4): 377–391. ———. 1993. System or Society? Review of International Studies 19 (3): 269–288.

76 

T. B. KNUDSEN

———. 1999. The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society. Political Studies XLVII (3): 423–430. Jones, Roy E. 1981. The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure. Review of International Studies 7 (1): 1–13. Kaplan, Morton. 1969. The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations. In Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau, 39–61. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 379–396. Knudsen, Tonny Brems. 1996. Humanitarian Intervention Revisited: Post-Cold War Responses to Classical Problems. International Peacekeeping 3 (4): 146–165. ———. 1997. European Approaches to Humanitarian Intervention: From Just War to Assistance—And Back Again? In European Approaches to Crisis Management, ed. Knud Erik Jørgensen, 171–199. The Hague/London/ Boston: Kluwer Law International. ———. 1999. Humanitarian Intervention and International Society: Contemporary Manifestations of an Explosive Doctrine. Aarhus: Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. ———. 2019. Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Solidarist Architecture. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B. Knudsen and C. Navari, 175–202. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Knudsen, Tonny Brems, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2019. International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Krasner, Stephen, ed. 1983. International Regimes. London: Cornell University Press. First Published as a Special Issue of International Organization 36:2, 1982. Manning, C.A.W. 1962/1975. The Nature of International Society. London: Bell in Association with the London School of Economics and Political Science; Reissued in 1975: London: Macmillan. Mayall, James. 1990. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1991. Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the New World Order. International Affairs 67 (3): 421–429. ———. 1992. Nationalism and International Security After the Cold War. Survival 34 (Spring): 19–35. Navari, Cornelia. 2017. The International Society Tradition: A Glossary of Names. Paper for the EISA Conference in Barcelona, 13–16 September.

  BECOMING A SCHOOL: THE INSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE 1980S 

77

Neumann, Iver, and Jennifer M.  Welsh. 1991. The Other in European Self-­ Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society. Review of International Studies 17 (4): 327–348. Roberts, Adam. 1993. Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights. International Affairs 69 (3): 429–449. ———. 1999. NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo. Survival 41 (3): 102–123. Suganami, Hidemi. 1983. The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations. International Relations 7 (5): 2363–2381. Vincent, Raymond John. 1974. Nonintervention and International Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1986. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vincent, Raymond John, and Peter Wilson. 1993. Beyond Non-Intervention. In Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention, ed. I. Forbes and M. Hoffman, 122–130. London: Macmillan. Vital, David. 1969. Back to Machiavelli. In Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. K.  Knorr and J.N.  Rosenau, 144–157. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wæver, Ole. 1992. International Society: Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled. Cooperation and Conflict 27 (1): 97–108. Walker, R.B.J. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Watson, Adam. 1982. Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States. London: Methuen. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass: AddisonWesley Publishing Company. ———. 1987. Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies. Review of International Studies 13 (2): 147–153. ———. 1992. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge. Wendt, Alexander, and Raymond Duvall. 1989. Institutions and Intenational Order. In Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for 1990’s, ed. E.  Czempiel and J.  Rosenau, 51–73. Lexington: Lexington Books. Wheeler, Nicholas J. 1992. Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention. Millennium 21 (3): 463–487. Wheeler, Nicholas. 2000. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wight, Martin. 1977. Systems of States, edited with an introduction by Hedley Bull. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

78 

T. B. KNUDSEN

———. 1978. Power Politics. Leicester: Leicester University Press. ———. 1991. International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Wilson, Peter. 1989. The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader. Review of International Studies 15 (1): 49–58.

‘Reconvening’ the English School Laust Schouenborg

In the past, English School (ES) theory development often went together with a sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, distancing from American mainstream International Relations (IR), as has been discussed in previous chapters. By contrast, Barry Buzan’s interventions in ES debates in the 1990s and 2000s were characterised by attempts to build bridges with the Americans and with carving out a more well-defined space for the ES in the global community of IR scholars, what Guzzini (2001) critically described as a global branding exercise. At first, in his 1993 piece in the leading American journal International Organization, this took the form of an engagement specifically with structural realism (also known as neorealism) and regime theory (associated with neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism). Later, in the early 2000s, he seemed to be gravitating towards social constructivism as the main theoretical interlocutor overseas. One indication of this was the title of Emanuel Adler’s review of Buzan’s agenda-setting book from 2004, ‘Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School’ (2005). Buzan’s intellectual targets, and the influences on him, thus changed over time. What remained constant up through the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s was his commitment to a

L. Schouenborg (*) City, University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_6

79

80 

L. SCHOUENBORG

structural and top-down approach to theorising (a legacy of his long engagement with Waltz) and his ambition to increase conceptual clarity— be that with respect to institutions, the pluralist-solidarist debate or indeed the concept of international society. This chapter will proceed in two steps. First, it will outline the ‘external’ (referring to the American mainstream) and ‘internal’ (referring to traditional ES scholars) resistance that Buzan encountered in the course of launching the reconvening project. As will become clear, much of this resistance revolved around contrasting perspectives on methods and philosophy of science. The second step is to review the actual contents of Buzan’s 2001 call to reconvene the ES. The call took the form of a forum article in the leading British journal Review of International Studies. It was the published version of a paper written for a set of BISA panels in 1999. This second part will contain two sections. The first section covers theoretical innovation and reviews what I term Buzan’s attempt to take ES ‘self-referential’ reflection to a new level and what resulted from it. The second section covers the additional focus areas that Buzan proposed in his 2001 launch article, and discusses the extent to which they have been successfully addressed.

Speaking a Common Theoretical Language? Theory, Philosophy of Science and Methods in the Reconvened English School The attempt to bring the ES into closer dialogue with its American counterparts was probably bound to be considered controversial by many, given the history of the ES and Bull’s (1966) defence of the classical approach. It was hence not surprising that method issues repeatedly came up in relation to the project to reconvene the ES, both before and after the official launch in 2001. Being an eclectic and pragmatic theorist, Buzan did not appear to share these concerns with regard to methods. He never seemed especially bothered by potential foundational epistemological incompatibility and was prone to accept ‘the good argument’ on its immediate merits. His collaborators, Wæver (1992, 1998) and Little (1995, 2000), were more sensitive to method issues. Little, following Linklater (1990, 10), even argued that one method (and philosophy of science?) was appropriate for the study of each of the three central dimensions in the traditional ES triad. According to him, positivism was tailored to the study

  ‘RECONVENING’ THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 

81

of the international system, hermeneutics to international society and critical theory to world society (Little 2000, 2009). This was a basic call for methodological pluralism. Buzan accommodated these views in his official launch article. He explicitly stated that ‘The time is ripe to develop and apply its [the ES] historicist, constructivist, and methodologically pluralist approach to IR’ (Buzan 2001, 472), and went on to argue that this was not about setting up a research programme that could compete with the dominant American theories on positivist terms, but rather an attempt to step outside of this competitive game altogether and to develop a more holistic approach. Finnemore, in an otherwise sympathetic contribution to the launch forum, directly addressed this when she said that many American scholars found it difficult to simply identify what the methods of the ES were. An uncharitable reading of her intervention would be that she implicitly held the ES up to the standards of positivist American IR; she generally faulted ES scholars for not formulating hypotheses, not discussing case selection, not being particularly bothered with causality or with setting out rules of evidence (Finnemore 2001, 509, 510, 512). The more charitable reading would be that she was right in pointing out that ES scholars, broadly speaking, had had very little to say about methods. It was an acceptance of this claim that partly motivated Navari’s (2009) subsequent edited volume on methods and the ES referred to in earlier chapters.1 Finnemore’s reaction to Buzan’s project was probably somewhat indicative of the broader reception by the American mainstream. Constructivists, given their intellectual debts to the ES tradition and their focus on the social dimension of international politics, appeared to be cautiously optimistic (see also Adler 2005). Realists, by contrast, were largely hostile or indifferent (see Little’s discussion of the contributions to a 2003 forum in Review of International Studies). However, the epistemological or methodological demarcation of the ES from the American mainstream was only one fault-line (re)exposed in the course of the launch of Buzan’s project. An arguably more significant fault-line, seen in the context of the professed goal of increasing internal cohesion within the school (Buzan 2001, 479), was the one that opened up between the ‘normative’ and the ‘structural/analytical’ wings of the ES. 1  Although see Wæver for the opposite view, formulated before Finnemore, ‘There is no need to continue “second-debate” attacks on the English School for not being “precise” or “scientific” enough. There are reasons for the deviation from rigorous precision’ (1998, 101).

82 

L. SCHOUENBORG

This fault-line was not prominently on display in the launch forum in 2001, although there were hints of it in especially Hurrell’s (2001, 491) contribution. It only came into full view with Buzan’s 2004 book and Dunne’s reaction to it. In that book, Buzan was perfectly aware of the resistance he would meet in presenting his structural, top-down perspective on international society and tried to meet it head-on, ‘it is absolutely not my intention to question the validity of the normative approach. My aim is to set up the social structural interpretation alongside it as an alternative, parallel, reading of English school theory’ (emphasis in original, Buzan 2004, 15; see also 228–9). Dunne (2005, 166–9), probably echoing the thinking of many traditional ES scholars, questioned whether that move was in fact possible, could an ‘outside’ and abstract analysis of social structures be accomplished without an ‘inside’ and hermeneutic appreciation of the reasoning of the actors engaged in the game of let’s play states? And furthermore, could normative or ethical commitments be detached from this process if one opened up to the insider perspective? Dunne was not confident that this was the case. What Dunne nevertheless stressed throughout his review of Buzan’s book was that Buzan had succeeded in sparking theoretical innovation in the ES and imparted a great of deal of conceptual clarity to different ongoing debates. It is these aspects of the reconvening project I shall address next.

Taking Self-Referential Discussion to a New Level In his launch article, Buzan (2001, 481) accepted that it was fruitful for some ES scholarship to remain self-referential, ‘Raking over the works of old masters in order to find reassessments and reinterpretations’. Yet he suggested at the same time that such discussions could to some extent be fruitfully detached from the old masters (Bull, Wight, etc.), and re-­ launched as independent conceptual inquiries to support general theory development. The main conceptual target that he and his collaborators had returned to again and again since the early 1990s was the question of how to differentiate between international system, international society and world society, and to firmly establish the meaning of the latter concept in particular (Buzan 1993; Wæver 1992, 1998; Little 1995, 1998, 2000). This theoretical problem was later turned into the centrepiece of Buzan’s 2004 book as indicated by the title, From International to World Society? His eventual solution to the differentiation problem was to abandon the international system dimension on the grounds that no historically

  ‘RECONVENING’ THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 

83

existing systems had been completely asocial. That would logically push all of these systems into the ‘social’ international society category (Buzan 2004, 98–101). In arriving at this position, he seemed especially influenced by the writing of his monumental 2000 book with Little, and his engagement with the work of Adam Watson. His parallel solution to differentiating between international society and world society revolved around units. International society, according to him, was characterised by an interstate domain (defined by states), whereas world society was the home of an interhuman domain (defined by individual humans) and a transnational domain (defined by transnational actors). At one point in the book, Buzan (2004, 202) did suggest that world society could be thought of as a future scenario where all three domains were in play together and no one domain would dominate over the other two. However, the main thrust of his argument did associate the non-state dimensions of international relations with the world society category, and that is mostly also the differentiation that has been perpetuated in subsequent ES literature (Clark 2007; Pella Jr. 2013). Recently, Buzan (2018a) returned to the concept of world society in a special issue of International Politics and partly revised his position. Three additional ‘self-referential’ topics were introduced by Buzan in the 2001 launch article: (1) the tension between conservative/pluralist and progressive/solidarist views of international society; (2) the tension between global and subglobal, particularly regional, levels of international society and (3) the classification of types of international society. In the following years, Buzan did himself try to clarify the positions in the pluralist-solidarist debate, and to relate these positions more systematically to other central ES concepts. The 2004 book had one chapter on the debate, and his 2014 book four chapters. A prominent theoretical innovation of the latter book was the distinction between state-centric and cosmopolitan solidarism. The pluralist-solidarist debate did not feature prominently in his recent book with Schouenborg, though, and in the concluding chapter, the two authors profess certain doubts about the feasibility of structurally separating pluralism and solidarism from both concepts’ attendant normative content (Buzan and Schouenborg 2018, 220–3). One could be tempted to read this as a vindication of Dunne’s argument discussed in the previous section. However, a more accurate interpretation would probably be that not all concepts are amenable to structural theorising. The debate on this question is far from over (see also Bain chapter in this volume). It should moreover be noted that Buzan’s

84 

L. SCHOUENBORG

interventions in this debate did influence subsequent work by scholars from the so-called normative wing of the ES.  For example, Williams (2015, Chap. 4) drew extensively on Buzan in his insightful and ambitious defence of a revised pluralism (see also William’s 2011 direct engagement with Buzan’s work). The second topic, the tension between the global and the sub-global/ regional, connected readily to Buzan’s previous work on the historical evolution of international systems (Buzan and Little 2000) and regional security (Buzan and Wæver 2003). It led to two independent edited volumes, investigating respectively the Middle East (Buzan and Gonzalez-­ Pelaez 2009) and East Asia (Buzan and Zhang 2014). If one was to rank the different impacts of Buzan’s project to reconvene the ES, the regional international society agenda is a good candidate for the top spot. It has received a lot of attention. A potential explanation for this is that it was in a way an open invitation to non-English (non-British) scholars to connect with the ES and to elaborate their own regional stories. It also opened up the ES to the fairly large community of EU scholars. This agenda is reviewed at length in a separate chapter in this volume, so there is no need to discuss it extensively here. However, it is worth stressing that Buzan’s own engagements with the regional international society agenda alerted him to the difficulties of separating out the regional social content from the global, and in turn how to think about the composition of the ‘whole’ once one’s analytical gaze returned from regional to global international society. That leads directly to a consideration of the third ‘self-­ referential’ topic. That topic was about how to classify international societies, the development of a taxonomy for capturing different types. Once again Buzan engaged with this problem in his 2004 book. The outcome of his deliberations was a typology of international societies that hinged on their relative degree of cooperation versus non-cooperation. The typology took the form of a spectrum, starting with ‘asocial’ at one end (the purely theoretical option in line with the abandonment of the international system category), ranging over ‘power political’, ‘coexistence’, ‘cooperative’ and ‘convergence’, and finally coming to ‘confederative’ at the other end. (Cf. Watson’s typology of state systems: anarchy, hegemony, suzerainty, domination and finally, empire.) Interestingly, this typology was formulated in a chapter on the pluralist-solidarist debate, and in Buzan’s thinking, each half of the spectrum represented different nuances of, respectively, pluralism (first half) and solidarism (second half) (Buzan 2004, 139–160). This

  ‘RECONVENING’ THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 

85

is another example of the interaction between the structural/analytical and the normative in Buzan’s thought, and the attendant complexities and tensions. The typology was not foreshadowed in the 2001 launch article. However, in that article he did seem to anticipate the core themes of his recent book with Schouenborg. He argued that a potential approach to classifying international societies would be to look at three organising principles, ‘(a) political inequality amongst units (Imperial); (b) political equality amongst units (Westphalian), and (c) functional differentiation of units (Mediaeval or Neo-mediaeval)’ (Buzan 2001, 483). And moreover, that there was a need ‘to be able to differentiate between weak and strong international societies’ (Buzan 2001, 483). Those three organising principles, together with the regional/subglobal dimension, appeared to morph into general models for disaggregating international societies in Buzan and Schouenborg’s joint book Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis (2018). The main ambition of that book was to understand the overall composition of global international society, and the four models elaborated to accomplish this did reveal some influence of those earlier ideas. The four models were (1) the like-units model, (2) the regions/subglobal model, (3) the hierarchy/privilege model and (4) the functional differentiation model. Gone, however, was the exclusive focus on units. Rather, the models were presented as tools with which to tease out the general logics shaping both the units and the overall structure of international society. Furthermore, in the book, Buzan and Schouenborg used the four models to think through an extensive set of principles for judging whether the present global international society, or any international society for that matter, was becoming weaker or stronger. The latter innovation, in particular, has arguably opened up a whole new theoretical research agenda in the ES.

Additional Focus Areas and Paths Not Taken In addition to the various ‘self-referential’ topics discussed above, Buzan suggested a number of potential focus areas for the ES in the 2001 launch article. I do not have the space to cover all of these at length, so the discussion below will necessarily be selective. Buzan, for example, made quite a lot of the need to recover the ‘working method’ of the British Committee. In fact, it was the very first argument he introduced in favour of reconvening the school (Buzan 2001,

86 

L. SCHOUENBORG

479). His reasoning was that ‘The British Committee flourished not just because it had good ideas and good people, but also because it had a good working method. It created both a sense of intellectual community and a set of research priorities’ (Buzan 2001, 479). He further argued that such a forum was now missing, and taking into consideration the increasingly global ‘membership’ of the ES, there was a further risk that this could lead to fragmentation and thus undermine the potential for future ES contributions to IR theory. It is an open question whether this working method has been recovered. In 2003, Paul Sharp, Bruce Cronin and Buzan succeeded in setting up an English School section of the International Studies Association (ISA)—then and presently the most important, and US-based, forum for IR scholars (ENGSS 2018a). Paul Sharp served as its founding chair. Since then, the section has sponsored numerous panels at the annual ISA conventions. It has also maintained a robust membership, although generally being one of the smallest sections of ISA.  In 2007, it had 47 members (ENGSS 2008), and in 2018, it had grown to 196 members (ENGSSS 2018b). Earlier, in 1999, Buzan had approached the UK Economic and Social Research Council about funding for the establishment of a forum close in form to the British Committee. According to his recent recollections, this proposal was turned down because the council thought it was ‘too English’ (Buzan 2018b). It was moreover around this time that a dedicated website was set up, an ES bibliography created and a more coordinated ES presence at European conferences achieved (Buzan 2018b). Despite all this activity, it is not clear whether the working method of the British Committee has been recovered. There is now a fairly large community of scholars who are aware of each other and who regularly interact and exchange ideas at international conferences. Moreover, a set of working groups, presently linked to the ES section of ISA, have produced a provisional division of labour and instilled a sense of direction. This has resulted in important collaborative projects that are discussed in other chapters of this volume (e.g. Sharp and Wiseman 2007; Navari 2009; Suzuki et al. 2014; Suganami et al. 2017; Dunne and Reus-Smit 2017; Knudsen and Navari 2019). Yet the kind of intimate, intense and sustained mulling over ideas in a relatively small circle, which characterised the original British Committee, has arguably not been achieved in any of these fora. Perhaps this is an idea whose time has passed, and I shall refrain from engaging in counterfactual speculation about what we might have

  ‘RECONVENING’ THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 

87

missed due to its non-implementation. Nevertheless, it remains a central proposal in Buzan’s launch article that has not been brought to fruition. The same applies to Buzan’s (2001, 483–4) proposal to promote a stronger link with the American mainstream, and constructivism in particular. It seems that less progress has been achieved than he initially hoped for. Without doubt, there is presently more awareness of the ES in America. For example, the ES is even included as a general approach in a textbook dealing with a specialist topic such as international organizations (Karns et al. 2015). However, it is hard to point to big and concrete impacts on theoretical debates or sustained dialogue with specific paradigms or theories. Constructivism has not picked up the world society concept as Buzan suggested that it should, and the general dialogue between the ES and constructivism still appears to be sporadic and unfocused. The exception to this assessment would be the collaborations between particularly Reus-­ Smit and different ES scholars (e.g. Bukovansky et al. 2012; Dunne and Reus-Smit 2017). But it has to be said that Reus-Smit is probably the constructivist with the strongest early leaning towards the ES (see Reus-­ Smit 1999), and he has actually spent much of his career outside the US academy. The idea of methodological pluralism has arguably not made a big impact in the US either. Jackson’s The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (2011) took a step towards clarifying philosophy of science positions, so that (mainly US) scholars would no longer talk past each other. But it seems as if the kind of methodological integration suggested by Buzan and other ES scholars has not been seriously considered. International political economy (IPE) represents a third path not fully travelled. Logically, as Buzan (2001, 481, 483, see also Buzan 2005) intimated, the economic dimension or sector should take up a larger share of the general international society story. But ES scholars have tended to shy away from it, perhaps because they feared that they did not possess the requisite skills to deal with it. Of past ES scholars, Mayall (1990) was the one who came closest to an explicit treatment of the subject, although mainly coming at it from the perspective of nationalism in international society. In his 2005 piece, Buzan went more into depth with the negative consequences of this neglect. In particular, he discussed how the pluralist-­ solidarist debate was seriously distorted in pluralism’s favour by not giving due attention to the issue of economic cooperation. And moreover that those interested in the regional aspects of international society also stood to make important gains from an explicit engagement with IPE since

88 

L. SCHOUENBORG

economic organisation and integration varied significantly across international society (Buzan 2005, 119–131). Little (2003, 454–456) touched upon similar themes. However, with a few exceptions, this line of inquiry has not been picked up. Holsti’s (2004, Chap. 7) historical study of international trade as an institution of international society is a key exception (see also Schouenborg’s 2017 exploration of trade as a functional category in world history and Eero Palmujoki’s 2019 study of changing trade norms in the WTO). Bowden and Seabrooke’s (2006) edited volume Global Standards of Market Civilization offered a potential opening to IPE. They activated themes and concepts long associated with the ES (Gong 1984) but did not engage directly with the broader tradition. The most recent attempt to connect IPE and the ES is of Buzan’s own making, which is perhaps indicative of the failure to generate outside interest in the dialogue. This was his analysis of capitalism and world order together with Lawson (Buzan and Lawson 2014a see also Buzan’s discussion of ‘the market’ in his 2014 book). In his contribution to the 2001 launch forum, Guzzini was already critical of the bridge-building with IPE proposed by Buzan. He was not against it in principle, but suggested that the link was not as easy to make or as obvious as Buzan made it out to be. While some of Guzzini’s more detailed objections can be debated, his overall hunch appears to have been right, neither IPE nor ES scholars have been especially interested in crossing this particular bridge. Lest this section turn into a catalogue of unrealised ambitions, it is fitting to close with what are arguably some of the major, and in some cases unanticipated, impacts of the reconvening project. One future focus area that Buzan (2001, 484–486) also identified was the history of international society. Buzan, of course, had already made a significant contribution to this agenda with his 2000 book with Little, but in the following years we witnessed a veritable flood of research on different historical aspects of international society, not least its expansion (e.g. Keene 2002; Keal 2003; Clark 2005, 2007; Suzuki 2009; Fabry 2010; Pejcinovic 2013; Suzuki et al. 2014; Pella Jr 2015; Brenner 2016; Dunne and Reus-Smit 2017; Ejdus 2017; Linklater 2017; Schouenborg 2017). Far from all of this research took its cue from Buzan, but it certainly fitted his overall agenda. It is moreover in an engagement with world history that some of the abstract ‘self-referential’ theoretical questions discussed above can be worked out. Buzan and Schouenborg’s recent book is a good demonstration of this latter point (2018).

  ‘RECONVENING’ THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 

89

Another major legacy of the reconvening project has been the research on institutions. It was in a sense unanticipated, because institutions were not addressed in detail in the 2001 launch article nor in Buzan’s previous work. However, institutions received a lot of attention in Buzan’s 2004 book in which he proposed the now widely used distinction between primary and secondary institutions. According to him, primary institutions were the evolved and durable sociological entities that Bull and other ES scholars had given pride of place in their accounts of international society, whereas secondary institutions referred to the designed and ‘physical’ international organisations that were mainly the subject of neoliberal institutionalist theory. In the course of setting out this distinction, Buzan (2004, 161–204) engaged in a discussion of how to theoretically capture different kinds of primary institutions. He introduced a nesting framework to allow for the possibility that institutions could be organised hierarchically, meaning that some were derived from others. He also discussed the option of functionally differentiating between institutions. In the same year, Holsti (2004) published a detailed empirical study of (primary) institutions and institutional change in international society. Buzan appeared to have been greatly influenced by reading an early version of this at an ISA conference in 2003. Together, these interventions produced a number of reactions. Schouenborg (2011) argued for a ‘new institutionalism’ in ES theory and systematically pursued Buzan’s idea of functional differentiation in a large historical study (Schouenborg 2017). Wilson (2012), by contrast, argued against Buzan, Holsti and Schouenborg’s attempts at structural theorising and instead pleaded for a more traditional, grounded and hermeneutic approach to investigating institutions in the ES. It is easy to see the parallels between his critique and Dunne’s earlier critique of structural theorising, again suggesting that this is a core tension in the reconvened ES. Other scholars were more interested in the theoretical relationship between primary and secondary institutions. Spandler (2015) produced an important article on this topic, and Knudsen and Navari (2019) have recently continued his efforts with a large edited volume that included valuable case studies (see Navari chapter below). Last but not least, Buzan, together with Falkner, has returned to primary institutions and tried to formulate more specific criteria for inclusion in this category, drawing on the case of environmental stewardship (Falkner and Buzan 2019). It seems safe to predict that institutions will remain high on the ES agenda in the future. The concept of primary institutions is central to the very idea of international

90 

L. SCHOUENBORG

society, and it is moreover a concept that clearly distinguishes the ES from the other mainstream approaches to IR. In particular, the concept offers a more fine-grained view of international social structure compared to Wendt’s (1999) three rather abstract cultures of anarchy.

Bibliography Adler, Emanuel. 2005. Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School: ‘Not All the Way Down’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (1): 171–182. Bowden, Brett, and Leonard Seabrooke, eds. 2006. Global Standards of Market Civilization. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Brenner, William J. 2016. Confounding Powers: Anarchy and International Society from the Assassins to Al Qaeda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bukovansky, Mlada, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard MacKay Price, Christian Reus-Smit, and Nicholas J.  Wheeler. 2012. Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bull, Hedley. 1966. Society and Anarchy in International Relations. In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 35–50. London: Allen & Unwin. Buzan, Barry. 1993. From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. International Organization 47 (3): 327–352. ———. 2001. The English School: An Underdeveloped Resource in IR. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 471–488. ———. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2005. The Challenge of International Political Economy and Globalization. In International Society and Its Critics, ed. Alex J. Bellamy, 115–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2014. The International Society Approach and Asia. In The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, ed. Saaadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, 100–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2018a. Revisiting World Society. International Politics 55 (1): 125–140. ———. 2018b. Background to the Reconvening of the English School. Unpublished Document, London. Buzan, Barry, and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds. 2009. International Society in the Middle East? English School Theory at the Regional Level. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. 2014a. Capitalism and the Emergent World Order. International Affairs 90 (1): 71–91.

  ‘RECONVENING’ THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 

91

———. 2014b. Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 20 (2): 437–462. Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. 2000. International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Laust Schouenborg. 2018. Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. Regions and Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Yongjin Zhang, eds. 2014. Contesting International Society in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007. International Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dunne, Tim. 2005. System, State and Society: How Does It All Hang Together? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (1): 157–170. Dunne, Tim, and Christian Reus-Smit. 2017. The Globalization of International Society. In The Globalization of International Society, ed. T.  Dunne and C. Reus-Smit, 18–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ejdus, Filip, ed. 2017. Memories of Empire and Entry into International Society: Views from the European Periphery. New York: Routledge. ENGSS. 2008. Memorandum to Re-Charter a Section. https://www.isanet.org/ ISA/Sections/ENGSS/Reports. Accessed 17 Dec 2018. ———. 2018a. About ENGSS. https://www.isanet.org/ISA/Sections/ENGSS/ About-ENGSS. Accessed 17 Dec 2018. ———. 2018b. Draft ENGSS Annual Report. Author’s Communication with ENGSS Chair Jamie Gaskarth, 5 December 2018. Fabry, Mikulas. 2010. Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Falkner, Robert, and Barry Buzan. 2019. The Emergence of Environmental Stewardship as a Primary Institution of Global International Society. European Journal of International Relations 25 (1): 131–155. Finnemore, Martha. 2001. Exporting the English School? Review of International Studies 27 (3): 509–513. Gong, Gerrit. 1984. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Guzzini, Stefano. 2001. Calling for a Less ‘Brandish’ and Less ‘Grand’ Reconvention. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 495–501. Holsti, K.J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hurrell, Andrew. 2001. Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within the English School. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 489–494.

92 

L. SCHOUENBORG

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics. New York: Routledge. Karns, Margaret P., Karen A. Mingst, and Kendall W. Stiles. 2015. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. 3rd ed. Boulder/ London: Lynne Rienner. Keal, Paul. 2003. European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keene, Edward. 2002. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knudsen, Tonny Brems, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2019. International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Linklater, Andrew. 1990. Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2017. Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Little, Richard. 1995. Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment. European Journal of International Relations 1 (1): 9–34. ———. 1998. International System, International Society and World Society: A Re-Evaluation of the English School. In International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B.A.  Roberson, 59–79. London: Pinter. ———. 2000. The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 6 (3): 395–422. ———. 2003. The English School vs. American Realism: A Meeting of Minds or Divided by a Common Language? Review of International Studies 29 (3): 443–460. ———. 2009. History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism in the English School. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. C. Navari, 78–103. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mayall, James. 1990. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Navari, Cornelia. 2009. What the Classical English School Was Trying to Explain, and Why Its Members Were Not Interested in Causal Explanation. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. C. Navari, 39–57. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Palmujoki, Eero. 2019. Competing Norms and Norm Change: Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health in the World Trade Organization. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure

  ‘RECONVENING’ THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 

93

of World Order, ed. T.B.  Knudsen and C.  Navari, 203–230. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pejcinovic, Lacy. 2013. War in International Society. New York: Routledge. Pella, John Anthony. 2013. Thinking Outside International Society: A Discussion of the Possibilities for English School Conceptions of World Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (1): 65–77. Pella, John Anthony. 2015. Africa and the Expansion of International Society: Surrendering the Savannah. London and New York: Routledge. Reus-Smit, Chris. 1999. The Moral Purpose of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schouenborg, Laust. 2011. A New Institutionalism? The English School as International Sociological Theory. International Relations 25 (1): 26–44. ———. 2017. International Institutions in World History: Divorcing International Relations Theory from the State and Stage Models. Abingdon: Routledge. Sharp, Paul, and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds. 2007. The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Spandler, Kilian. 2015. The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions. Review of International Studies 41 (3): 601–622. Suganami, Hidemi, Madeline Carr, and Adam Humphreys, eds. 2017. The Anarchical Society at 40: Contemporary Challenges and Prospects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Suzuki, Shogo. 2009. Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society. London/New York: Routledge. Suzuki, Shogo, Yongjin Zhang, and Joel Quirk, eds. 2014. International Orders in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West. London/New York: Routledge. Wæver, Ole. 1992. International Society: Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled. Cooperation and Conflict 27 (1): 97–108. ———. 1998. Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans-Atlantic Dialogue. In International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B.A. Roberson, 80–144. London: Pinter. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, John. 2011. Structure, Norms and Normative Theory in a Re-Defined English School: Accepting Buzan’s Challenge. Review of International Studies 37 (3): 1235–1253. ———. 2015. Ethics, Diversity, and World Politics: Saving Pluralism from Itself? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Peter. 2012. The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions. International Studies Review 14 (4): 567–590.

Pluralism and Solidarism William Bain

A key debate within the English School centres on the concepts of pluralism and solidarism. Pluralism describes international societies with a relatively low degree of shared norms, rules, and institutions. Solidarism describes international societies with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules, and institutions. In other words, pluralism presupposes coexistence in recognition of the value of diversity; solidarism presupposes the pursuit of one or more substantive goals that are true for all states and peoples. The debate to which these concepts lend their name is about how international society relates to world society, which is wider and more fundamental than an association of states (Bull 1977: 22). It is about reducing the tension between the needs and imperatives of states and the needs and imperatives of humankind. This tension is often framed by the ostensible conflict between order and justice. Most English School scholars operate within the parameters of this debate. The civil war in Syria illustrates the basic claims of debate. According to a pluralist interpretation, Syria is a sovereign state, responsible for its territory and population, and this status should be respected so long as the war does not threaten international peace and security. A solidarist position stresses the overriding obligation to protect human life and justifies

W. Bain (*) National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_7

95

96 

W. BAIN

external intervention because mass atrocity crimes constitute, ipso facto, such a threat. Each of these interpretations suggests a distinct understanding of international society. Pluralism and solidarism are, in this context, framing principles for a debate about the limits of reform and the possibilities for progress in international society. And, viewed from this vantage point, the English School contributes to IR theory insofar as it tries to balance power, interests, and standards of justice and responsibility in international society.

The Classical Account: States Versus Humans The classical account of pluralism and solidarism is found in an essay, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” which Hedley Bull (1966) published as part of the influential collection of papers, Diplomatic Investigations. He begins with solidarism, the central assumption of which is “the solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement of the law.” Opposed to this “Grotian doctrine” is the underlying assumption of pluralism, namely “states do not exhibit solidarity of this kind, but are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforcement of the law” (Bull 1966: 52). Both positions accept the existence of international society and they are united in rejecting both the “tradition” of realpolitik—that is, an international state of nature in which genuine obligation is absent—and “doctrines” of universal empire and cosmopolitan society that subvert international society. But divergence rears its head when Bull (1966: 52–3) considers the extent of agreement disclosed by pluralist and solidarist international societies, specifically as it pertains to the institution of war, sources of international law, and the status of individuals as against the claims of states. Bull’s (1966) discussion of war is set within a just war framework. Solidarists accept that both the right of war (jus ad bellum) and the right conduct of war (jus in bello) fall within the purview of international law. Thus, war is conceived as a kind of police action; in other words, it is an act of law enforcement, the legitimacy of which is determined by benefits enjoyed by the society of states as a whole and, more importantly, the individuals residing in these states. In contrast, pluralists accept limitations on the right conduct of war while pulling up short with regard to the right of war, at least so far as international law is concerned. Pluralists see the

  PLURALISM AND SOLIDARISM 

97

right of war as a political rather than a legal matter, which is to say it is a prerogative of states on which the law is silent (Bull 1966: 54–7). An associated question is whether international law includes natural law or is strictly limited to positive rules and custom. Natural law is a repository of rights or values that are luminous to human reason, irrespective of parochial attributes of culture. That is to say, natural law is independent of convention—it is discovered rather than made—and provides a universal basis for all human conduct (Bain 2014). In contrast, positive law is a product of human volition, for example, agreement or legislation, or the regular and accepted practice of persons and states. The difference between natural law and positive law is intelligible in the pluralist claim that state sovereignty is limited only by self-imposed obligations and the solidarist claim that individuals enjoy certain rights independently of what states agree and do. Bull’s major worry was that the solidarist conception of international society was premature, that it set aspiration before fact in burdening international law with a weight greater than it could reasonably bear (1966: 72). In expressing this worry he did not deny movement towards the solidarist position during the latter part of the twentieth century; it stemmed from his belief that the solidarist fixation with law enforcement as the appropriate response to international delinquency might actually weaken limitations on the use of force. Indeed, attempts to legalize what are in essence political questions—for example, the maintenance of the balance of power—threatened to fray the fabric of a minimal but nonetheless valuable international order. The better approach, Bull argued, is to proceed on the basis of the “area of actual agreement between states” than to adopt one which “sets up the law over and against the facts” (Bull 1966: 71–3). Bull’s pluralist orientation depended, however, on responsible Great Powers limiting their competition for the sake of world order. The superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union instilled in Bull a sense of disillusionment as he came to doubt their ability to moderate parochial interests for the sake of the common good. Indeed, both had shown themselves as having little claim to the title “great responsibles,” much less that of “nuclear trustees for mankind” (Bull 1979: 447). Moreover, Third World demands for political, economic, racial, and cultural liberation—the so-called revolt against the West—heralded the end of Western dominance. Of course, Bull lamented the “bitter ironies” of decolonization, among them the fact that many newly independent states

98 

W. BAIN

had become islands of tyranny; still, he insisted that Western countries had an “overriding interest […] to seek to accommodate the demands of the Third World countries for change” (1984a: 32–4, b). Bull (1984c) explores the tension between pluralism and solidarism, and states and individuals, in the Hagey Lectures, where he observed the rights and duties of individuals have taken a place alongside those of states. This development provided tangible evidence of a significant change in international society. Here again he warns of danger. Bull did not oppose the rights of individuals; in fact, he acknowledged a “responsibility” to promote them. But promoting human rights in an uncompromising way, in the absence of agreement as to their meaning and content, would, he feared, subvert the coexistence of states (1984c: 12–13). The problem, then, lay in a determination of priorities, albeit a determination that did not set either a pluralist preference for order or a solidarist preference for justice above the other. In the end, Bull settled on a middle way, characteristic of English School thought, which charted a course between the “conservative” prioritization of order and the “revolutionary” prioritization of justice. This course rejected a necessary antagonism between order and justice, and instead sought refuge in the belief that “order in international relations is best preserved by meeting demands for justice, and that justice is best realised in a context of order” (1984c: 18). But, even then, he found it difficult to shed a deeply entrenched scepticism, as he went on to concede, in what might have been a moment of resignation, that sometimes a reconciliation of order and justice may be impossible, at which point “terrible choices have sometimes to be made.” Bull’s formulation of pluralism and solidarism proved to be enormously influential in subsequent English School scholarship, though not all of it tracks Bull’s conclusions. John Vincent’s book (1986) on human rights is the important marker in this regard. The language of “pluralism” and “solidarism” figures sparingly in Human Rights and International Relations, but they lurk in the background, providing an unarticulated backdrop to the argument that human rights augur, not the subversion of international society, but its consolidation and legitimacy. Here again, disagreement over the status of individuals in international society shows its face. But in this instance, Vincent looks away from a pluralist arrangement of coexistence to embrace a theory that starts with a solidarist commitment to human rights. This shift radically qualifies the conditions of membership in international society, so that “[t]he failure of a government of a

  PLURALISM AND SOLIDARISM 

99

state to provide for its citizens’ basic rights might now be taken as a reason for considering it illegitimate” (Vincent 1986: 123–8). It is precisely this manner of thinking that gained traction in the twilight years of the Cold War as superpower rivalry gave way to a “new world order,” an order in which sunny optimism soon collided with the reality that norms of coexistence sustained unviable or collapsed states and paralysed collective responses to end mass starvation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (see esp. Jackson 1990). In other words, the Rwandan genocide posed a searching question, a question fed by waxing doubt that the pluralist conception of international society could sustain an order worth having at all. The language of “pluralism” and “solidarism” mediated answers to this question, specifically in the context of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.

To Intervene or Not to Intervene The standard-bearer of the solidarist argument in favour of humanitarian intervention is Nicholas Wheeler, who picked up on the “profound tension” in the Hagey Lectures (1984c) and the implications of Vincent’s (1986) position on state legitimacy to argue: “states that massively violate human rights should forfeit their right to be treated as legitimate sovereigns, thereby morally entitling other states to use force to stop the oppression” (Wheeler 2000: 12–13; 1992: 447; emphasis in original). Wheeler grounds his argument in a moral transformation—the growth of a human rights culture that provides evidence of expanding ties of a common humanity, which gives a positive effect to the Grotian principle that it is right to defend the innocent because the society of humankind is not severed by the institution of political community. Thus, for Wheeler, humanitarian intervention is justified when it is undertaken to uphold minimum standards of humanity, in instances of “supreme humanitarian emergency,” and when it satisfies certain principles: just cause, last resort, proportionality, and reasonable chance at success (2000: 33–1). Fundamental to this argument is the distinctively solidarist claim that the rights of individuals come before those of states. Sovereignty is conditional, which is to say, as Grotius contemplated, that “[a] Prince who attacks the Life of an innocent Person, is ipso facto no more a Prince” (2005: II, ix.2; emphasis in original). Wheeler (2000: 11–13, 27–8, 295) relates the categories of pluralism and solidarism to the “question of order versus justice,” as Bull (1977) described it, with pluralism responding “irreconcilable conflict” and

100 

W. BAIN

solidarism responding “mutual interdependence.” In effect, Wheeler describes pluralism as standing for an order that is home to several different conceptions of justice, the implication being that the meaning and content of justice is solely a domestic rather than an international concern. In contrast, the nascent solidarism he wants to champion involves “deepening” international society’s commitment to justice; that is, a particular justice that transcends particular states and regions, and which mediates whatever value rules of sovereignty and non-intervention impart. But what Wheeler (2000) sees as a contrast between “irreconcilable conflict” and “mutual interdependence” is perhaps better understood as the difference between two different conceptions of order and justice, a difference that is drawn out in consideration of pluralist analyses of humanitarian intervention. The tenor of the pluralist approach is captured in the subtitle of James Mayall’s book (2000) World Politics: Progress and its Limits. Mayall accepts the distinction between a minimalist pluralist order and a progressive solidarist order; that is, an order predicated on coexistence among states, each being home to a particular conception of the good life, and an order premised on shared interests and values, immanent in humanity, which are self-consciously pursued and realized in common. In this respect, pluralism stands for a procedural arrangement where states pursue self-chosen and often disparate destinations; and solidarism stands for a common destination that is the proper meeting place of all states and their populations. But, when pushed to choose, Mayall (2000: 14, 112) is clear: “the pluralists still hold the ascendancy.” In making this choice, Mayall does not deny the authenticity of solidarist claims, either in terms of sincerity or in actual fact of existence; nor does he rule out the possibility of change such that at some point in the future international society might disclose a substantive unity that it lacks at present. Instead, it is underwritten by an outlook that stresses the importance of continuity over change; that progressive aspirations are inevitably tempered by a sense of tragedy inherent in the human condition; and that a thoroughgoing circumspection should moderate projects of radical transformation. In laying out this position, Mayall steers away from the shoals of cynical pessimism while avoiding the uncharted waters of unbridled enthusiasm: “we have no realistic alternative than to approach the future with caution, but also with hope” (2000: 149–57). This same air of caution runs through Robert Jackson’s (2000: 379–80) treatment of humanitarian intervention, which takes as its point of departure the question: “what shall take precedence when pluralist norms of

  PLURALISM AND SOLIDARISM 

101

state sovereignty come into conflict with solidarist norms of human rights?” His answer is framed by the value of procedural association, which he adapts from Michael Oakeshott’s (1996) notion of practical association. Instead of those who see international society as a “second best” arrangement that falls somewhat short of being genuinely desirable (Brown 1995: 186–90), Jackson defends a “global covenant” that is conducted in terms of two distinct but interrelated vocabularies, one centred on procedural ethics of principle and the other on prudential ethics of virtue. Whereas the former establishes the constitutive rules of a game that Charles Manning (1975: 132) once described as “[l]et’s play sovereign states,” the latter establishes purposive maxims according to which the game is played. Thus, Jackson (2000) conceives states as being associated in respect of procedural norms—equal sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity—the justice of which is determined solely in terms of their authenticity. These norms, being non-instrumental or moral in character, are distinct from prudential norms, that is, rules of skill which guide the pursuit of substantive wants, desires, and ends. Jackson comes out against humanitarian intervention but his rejection of humanitarian intervention escapes the formulation put forward by Wheeler, according to which order and justice are torn asunder in a pluralist “irreconcilable conflict” or, alternatively, reconciled in solidarist “mutual interdependence.” Jackson’s position becomes intelligible when we consider the way in which the justice of law is determined in international life. In a procedural association, the justice of law is unrelated to the achievement of substantive ends of all in common. Here, the merits of different interests, the distribution of goods, or claims of exclusive privilege are of little consequence. Nor is the justice of law determined by consulting a higher law, a lex naturalis, or by its correspondence with a supreme norm embodied, for example, by a set of inviolable human rights or a list of human capabilities. Law is indifferent to all these considerations (Oakeshott 1999: 152–6). Justice in a procedural association is a formal affair that asks no more, and demands no less, than persons (natural and legal) observe the authority of rules of law in pursuit of their self-chosen interests and wants. As Oakeshott explains, “the only ‘justice’ the rule of law can accommodate is faithfulness to the formal principles inherent in the character of lex: non-instrumentality, indifference to persons and interests, the exclusion of privilege and outlawry, and so on” (1999: 173). It is in this context that Jackson (2000) adopts an anti-paternal ethics, the heart of which is the norm of non-interference. Therefore, armed

102 

W. BAIN

intervention is a prima facie wrong, barring some justification granting special dispensation that does not yet exist. His subordination of solidarist norms to pluralist norms is unequivocally clear: “the stability of international society, especially the unity of the great powers, is more important, indeed far more important, than minority rights and humanitarian protections in Yugoslavia or any other country – if we have to choose between those two sets of values” (2000: 251–2, 291). Jackson’s position does not reduce to a choice between order and justice, with the former getting the nod before the latter. His point is that human rights and other solidarist values can and must be pursued within a pluralist framework. Intervention is morally wrong in Jackson’s view because it violates (international) principles of justice that demand respect for procedural rules of mutual accommodation; and it is prudentially ill-advised because it threatens to undermine international order, imperfect though it might be, because war is often “the greatest threat to human rights” (2000: 291–3). Pluralism, as Jackson conceives it, is a conception of order and justice that demands respect for diversity and difference as people go about pursuing their self-­ chosen ends, while counselling a policy of moderation and restraint in the event that injury is received. Acharya and Buzan’s (2019: 266) recent idea of “embedded pluralism” is a similar conception.

Pluralism and Solidarism in World Society A third locus of debate relates to notions of world society and global order, as well as ways in which pluralism and solidarism might be related to each another in an ordered and coherent manner. There are three noteworthy contributions in this respect. One of the most influential is Barry Buzan’s (2004) social structural reworking of English School theory, which critiques pluralism and solidarism as theoretical constructs as a prelude to articulating a theory of world society. Buzan sees considerable confusion in contending accounts of solidarism because it is unclear whether solidarism refers to normative agreement among states or refers to a community of rights-bearing individuals that is independent of the society of states. Vincent (1986: 151) accepts the first position: human rights do not challenge international society as much as enhance its legitimacy. Bull, by contrast, adheres to the second; solidarist universalism seeks to destroy arrangements of coexistence and substitute in their place the “true faith” of a cosmopolitan morality (1977: 25–6). Buzan is scarcely more satisfied with the conceptualization of pluralism, although he

  PLURALISM AND SOLIDARISM 

103

concedes that it discloses greater coherence on account of its statist orientation. Buzan’s critique of traditional approaches to theorizing pluralism and solidarism is motivated by his dissatisfaction with the “normative strand” of English School theory, which he alleges “often flounders in conceptual confusion” (2004: 229). He also worries (2004: 50) that sharply differentiating pluralism and solidarism, as English School theorists often do, simply reproduces the all-too-familiar contest between realist statism and liberal individualism. Buzan’s preferred approach is to conceive pluralism and solidarism as two ends of a spectrum that describes international societies in terms of the “thinness” and “thickness” of shared norms, rules, and institutions. The chief advantage of this approach is found in the space it creates for considering shared values that do not fit well into the liberal frame that he claims dominates most international society thinking. Moving beyond this frame, Buzan argues, enables us to imagine different international societies or regional groupings of states as solidarist communities constituted, for example, by “communist ‘peoples republics’, or Islamic states, or monarchies, or any other form of ideological standardisation”—that is, solidarist international societies that might even be illiberal in character (2004: 139–47). Crucially, Buzan severs what is often taken for granted as a close, if not necessary, link between solidarism and cosmopolitan values. Solidarism no longer reduces to human rights as Vincent and advocates of humanitarian intervention, such as Wheeler, seem to imply. Thus, a spectrum defined by pluralism and solidarism provides a way of describing different types of international society; it describes the types of values they share as well as the depth with which they are shared; and, consequently, it highlights the way in which coercion, calculation, and belief sustain these values. A key aspect of Buzan’s argument is that solidarism builds on pluralism, so that a move from pluralism towards solidarism involves adding to characteristically pluralist values of survival and coexistence (2004: 152–60). It is then possible to describe differences that distinguish international societies as well as to make sense of the change that takes place within them. An example is Ian Manners’ (2002) account of “normative power Europe,” in which Europe is conceived, not as an aspiring federation, but as an international society of a particular kind, which is open to critique. Two self-conscious responses, both identified with the English School’s putative normative wing, challenge Buzan’s charge of confusion. In the first, Bettina Ahrens alleges that Buzan’s self-consciously anti-normative

104 

W. BAIN

stand has itself sowed confusion. Ahrens points to Buzan’s (2004: 147) anti-foundational understanding of solidarism, which seeks to detach solidarism from an explicitly liberal-democratic interpretation. Thus, for Buzan, any and all values can underpin a solidarist international society so long as they lead to greater convergence and unity among its members. While this might make sense theoretically, it confounds the analysis of increasing solidarism. Certain non-state actors can ultimately undermine progressive realization of a solidarist international society, understood in the liberal sense of the term, if their objectives do not aim at the well-­ being and the dignity of the individual human being. Likewise, the liberal-­ democratic “dimension” of solidarism excludes other forms of solidarism, raising the question of which solidarism should “win” (Ahrens 2017: 6). Ahrens’ point is that Buzan’s attempt to turn solidarism into a value-free category elides other important insights. The second response is Linklater and Suganami’s (2006) account of “civility,” which relates to a kind of social learning that reveals “progressive possibilities” in world politics. Unlike some English School theorists, they do not subsume pluralism to an anti-progressive narrative of coexistence. A pluralist international society admits a “qualified progressive interpretation,” discerned in mutually recognized limits on the use of force, which is an advance over what is associated in a bare system of states (2006: 120–31). But this progressive interpretation is limited by what Linklater and Suganami call “moral deficits”: lack of respect for the rights of small powers and indigenous peoples, and inadequate means of protecting people from human rights abuses. It is in light of these deficits that they explore new forms of political organization and action, namely those which “reduce or overcome tensions between civility and uncivility” (2006: 131–5). So, whereas a pluralist international society stands for a limited degree of civility between independent political communities, a solidarist international society reflects the growth in civility between these communities as well as between ordinary men and woman. It is against this backdrop that Linklater and Suganami (2006) attempt to bridge ideas of international order and world order with so-called cosmopolitan harm conventions, which shifts the emphasis of protection from states to non-sovereign communities and individuals. These harm conventions are tangible evidence of social learning, an idea, they hasten to point out, which has been largely neglected by English School theorists. Their preoccupation with harm stems not from a desire to align the world as it presently exists with some abstract conception with which it ought to

  PLURALISM AND SOLIDARISM 

105

conform, but from recognition that limiting injurious action is an enduring feature of international life (2006: 176–88). Thus, the road leading away from a pluralist world and its moral deficits is travelled by the “good international citizen,” and it is signposted by four (main) principles: (1) exercising restraint when pursuing national objectives, (2) adhering to the principle of reciprocity, (3) recognizing that unintended consequences often accompany the security dilemma, and (4) striking an equitable balance between national security and the insecurity experienced by others. The notion of good international citizenship, informed by cosmopolitan harm conventions, is guided by a duty of care. It involves avoiding mental and bodily harm, and it inveighs against indifference to the suffering of others (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 237–8). The originality of this approach is that Linklater and Suganami escape the destructive antinomies that arise when a premature cosmopolitan order is set against an already existing, albeit imperfect, international order. Significantly, they do not stipulate this argument from outside international society; theirs is an argument about immanent potential, whereby the “emphasis […] is on duties to avoid harm which are already recognizable features of international society and of the overwhelming majority of its constituent parts” (2006: 256). An alternative to the conventionalist argument advanced by Linklater and Suganami is one that combines naturalist and conventionalist elements that are implicit in the English School narrative about the expansion of international society. For William Bain (2007), pluralism and solidarism are joined in an ordered relationship, whereby the one cannot be separated from the other. Pluralism and solidarism are not opposites, as two ends of Buzan’s spectrum, but are distinct ideas that are nevertheless complementary, interconnected, and interdependent. Bain (2007) understands pluralism and solidarism as two distinct modes of association—one expressed by a (solidarist) law of reason and the other by a (pluralist) law of will—that reconciles the coexistence of pluralism and the unity of solidarism in a single, intellectually coherent argument. It is then possible to make sense of international society, that is, the society of states, as well as a community of all humankind without having to confront that familiar confrontation of a human community threatening the minimalist and imperfect order achieved in an association of states. An argument of this sort relieves the pressure of having to choose between solidarist and pluralist values as do the likes of Wheeler (2000) and Jackson (2000) on humanitarian intervention, who both end up

106 

W. BAIN

making a choice, subordinating the one to the other and distorting the full moral claim of both. Indeed, international society has never been tolerant in the way that pluralists suggest, and it cannot be unified in the way that solidarists want. Rather each seeks to discipline the other and this disciplining is evident throughout the history of international society, in spite of the popular (though incorrect) view that solidarist discourses of individual rights and human sympathy were fleeting prior to the emergence of a human rights culture in the twentieth century (Bain 2003, 2007: 573). As per example, Andrew Hurrell (2007a, b) describes a growing global moral consciousness that informs a qualitatively different kind of international society. He does make a self-conscious choice in favour of solidarism because he sees no plausible case for a simple pluralist coexistence. In short, increasing human interconnectedness as well as the ties of transnational or global civil society has undermined the case for pluralism, just as ecological crisis and changing security threats have highlighted the inability of pluralist arrangements of coexistence to cope with truly global problems. This, in addition to egregious human rights abuses and glaring global inequality, leaves “no acceptable or viable way of reasserting a pluralist view of international society (2007a, b: 57, 292–296).” There is, then, little alternative to striving for ever more extensive forms of collaboration and cooperation. It is in this context that the United Nations and the International Criminal Court can be seen as reflecting a renewed solidarist consciousness. Tonny Brems Knudsen (2019) argues that these institutions can shape and even change older institutions—balance of power, war, diplomacy, international law, and great powers—in a way that consolidates the solidarist architecture of a truly global order.

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan. 2019. The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ahrens, Bettina. 2017. The Solidarisation of International Society: The EU in the Global Climate Change Regime. GLOBUS Research Paper 5/2017. http:// www.globus.uio.no/publications/globus-research-papers/ Bain, William. 2003. Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007. One Order, Two Laws: Recovering the ‘Normative’ in English School Theory. Review of International Studies 33: 557–575.

  PLURALISM AND SOLIDARISM 

107

———. 2014. Rival Traditions of Natural Law: Martin Wight and the Theory of International Society. International History Review 36 (5): 943–960. Brown, Chris. 1995. International Theory and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way. Review of International Studies 21: 183–196. Bull, Hedley. 1966. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. World Politics 18 (3): 361–377. Also in 1969 Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. Klaus Knorr and James N.  Rosenau, 20–38. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. ———. 1979. Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory. World Politics 31 (4): 596–596. ———., ed. 1984a. Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1984b. The Emergence of a Universal International Society. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 117–126. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1984c. Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures. Waterloo: University of Waterloo. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grotius, Hugo. 2005. The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, ed. Richard Tuck. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Hurrell, Andrew. 2007a. On Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007b. One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society. International Affairs 83 (1): 127–146. Jackson, Robert H. 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2000. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Knudsen, Tonny Brems. 2019. Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, 23–50. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Linklater, Andrew, and Hidemi Suganami. 2006. The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 235–258. Manning, C.A.W. 1975. The Nature of International Society. London: Macmillan. Mayall, James. 2000. World Politics: Progress and Its Limits. Cambridge: Polity Press.

108 

W. BAIN

Oakeshott, Michael. 1996. On Human Conduct. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1999. The Rule of Law. In On History and Other Essays. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Vincent, Raymond John. 1986. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wheeler, Nicholas J. 1992. Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention. Millennium 21 (3): 463–487. Wheeler, Nicholas. 2000. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Regionalism Yannis A. Stivachtis

The classical English School (ES) asserted that global international society was the framework within which to discuss international order. Its disregard for societal developments at the regional level is reflected in Hedley Bull’s view that ‘purely regional’ integration is largely irrelevant and indeed inimical to ‘global social integration’ (Bull 1977, 281). This approach has been reinforced, first, by the post-Cold War international relations focus on globalization (Bellamy 2005; Buzan 2004; Dunne 1998a, b; Linklater and Suganami 2006); and second, by the need to examine how order and justice are maintained within the global international society (Buzan 2004; Clark 2007, 2011, 2013; Hurrell 2007a, b). This ‘fixation on the global scale’ has meant that sub-global developments suffered analytically from both conceptual underdevelopment and intellectual skepticism (Buzan 2009, 28). Despite its globalist perspective, however, the classical ES literature did focus on the study of historical regional international societies and investigated both their interaction and expansion tendencies (Butterfield and Wight 1966; Wight 1977; Bull and Watson 1984; Watson 1992). But

Y. A. Stivachtis (*) Virginia Technical University, Blacksburg, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_8

109

110 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

while the ES’ globalist perspective has its origins in the study of the establishment and expansion of the European society of states, the study of the latter was not an object of attention in its own right but rather it was deemed to be important because the global international society was seen as a consequence of the expansion of the European international society. Since the reconvening of the English School, however, scholars working within ES tradition have realized both that emphasis on global international society is insufficient and that there are significant interactions between the global international system and its various regional sub-­ systems. As a result, the reconvened ES has reconfigured its research agenda and has focused more on the study of various world regions. In these studies, concepts derived from a global perspective have had significant purchase at the regional level (Stivachtis and Webber 2014, 10). At the same time, opening the regional level of analysis using the global concepts has had serious implications for understanding how institutions and norms of international society like sovereignty, international law, balance of power and others are performed at both the global and regional levels. Barry Buzan is the first ES scholar who attempted to define the concept of ‘region’ and address the question of regionalism. According to Buzan (1991, 186), because of the increasing autonomy of regional relations in the post-Cold War era, regional systems could be themselves objects of analysis. A ‘region’ is defined as ‘a distinct and significant sub-system of security relations that exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other’ (Buzan 1983b, 105; Buzan 1991, 190; Buzan and Waever 2003, 47). Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) has provided a theoretical justification for constructing world regions based on the degree of enmity and amity existing among states. The theory was applied to South Asia and the Middle East (Buzan 1983b), then elaborated and applied in depth to the case of Southeast Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986) and Africa (Ayoob 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995). Moreover, RSCT was used extensively in the study of the post-cold War transformation in Europe (Buzan et al. 1990, 1998; Buzan and Waever 1992; Waever et al. 1993). Once patterns of amity and enmity define regional systems, the type of primary institutions in operation determines whether these regions constitute ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ regional international societies.

 REGIONALISM 

111

Distinguishing Global from Regional: Same Institutions, Different Interpretations There is general agreement among ES scholars that the global international society is pluralist and heterogeneous. Within the bounds of that ‘thin’ international society, there are several ‘more thickly developed’ ‘regional clusters’ in which the solidarist elements of international society are developed to a greater degree (Stivachtis 2010b, 2013). According to Buzan (1993, 333), because the logic of anarchy works more powerfully over shorter rather than longer distances and because states living in close proximity with one another may also share elements of common culture, gemeinschaft, ‘thick’ types of international societies may exist within the confines of a global international society. Moreover, Buzan argues that the uneven development of international society means that some parts of the contemporary global system have more developed regional international societies than others (Buzan 1993, 344–345). The question about the role of regions and the effects they have on global international society has become even more pertinent with the emergence (or re-emergence) of several regional powers (Buzan and Waever 2003). It is now legitimate to speak of several regional international societies with their own structural and normative frameworks divergent from the global level. However, for regional international societies to exist in their own right, they should have institutions that differ from those of the global international society. Recent ES literature has shown that although the same institutions may operate both at the global and sub-global levels, they may be given different interpretations or be the subject of a different understanding at the regional level. For example, Jorge Lasmar and his colleagues (2015) have mapped the reach of key universal norms and rules of Human Rights Law in international society while also mapping, at the same time, specific regional interpretations and practices of such norms and rules. This mapping exercise helps to understand how regional norms and practices constitute, interact and redefine the global international society. In a similar fashion, Filippo Costa-Buranelli (2013, 2015) argues that while regional international societies can adopt institutions that operate at the global level, they may take those institutions to mean something different at the regional level. He suggests that the development of regional international societies is favoring the ‘polysemy of institutions’, a situation where different international societies adopt the same institutions while at

112 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

the same time attaching different meanings and specific normative contents to them. His conclusion seems to strengthen Ada Bozeman’s earlier observation that although non-European political communities had to formally adopt European norms and institutions during the expansion of European society of states, in practice they still assigned different meanings to these norms and institutions (Bozeman 1960, 5–6, 1971, ix). Yongjin Zhang (2015) has also looked at how East Asian states have creatively accepted, interpreted, engaged in and practiced certain primary institutions of Western-global international society, such as sovereignty and the market. Variations in interpretation and practice of these two primary institutions, he argues, amount to East Asian regional contestations to Western-global international society, as well as point to the existence of an East Asian international society.

The Local and the Global But if institutions exist at the global level and if they are framed, interpreted and adopted differently in several regional international societies, then what are the prospects for the existence of a global international society? While earlier reassessments contending with the effects of globalization focused on differences with regard to institutions and major actors of international society (Little and Williams 2006; Stivachtis 2007) more recently, Yannis Stivachtis and his colleagues (2015a, b) and others have sought to explore whether the development of international society at the regional level strengthens or undermines the global international society. The studies undertaken so far indicate that different regional societies provide different answers. The European International Society Within the ES literature, ‘Europe’ occupies a central place of regional studies, not only because the region conforms to the basic defining condition of a regional inter-state society, but also because the European experience offers the possibility (although it will be unevenly realized) for a broadly integrative and solidarist movement toward extensive cooperation and convergence (Ayoob 1999). The concept of international society has been used, first, to understand the EU outside of the federalist or functionalist model. Roger Morgan (1999) has argued that the concept of international society illuminates the

 REGIONALISM 

113

current functioning of the European Union (EU) as a body of states subject to a wide range of rules, both formal and informal. Hartmut Behr (2007, 2011) also suggests that the idea and study of international society can be applied empirically to the EU as well as to Europe as a whole. Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman (2002) have employed the ES concepts of ‘international society’, ‘world society’ and ‘empire’ to reconfigure the debate about the nature of EU governance and to compare the EU to other regional international systems. Second, there is the institutionalization of the practices of global international society at the regional level. Starting from Buzan’s premise that regional international organizations may reflect the existence of regional international societies, Yannis Stivachtis, Mark Webber and their colleagues (2014) have sought to demonstrate how European organizations, such as NATO the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have provided the basis for the institutionalization of global norms at the European/sub-­ global level. But it is equally the case that regional organizations may contribute to the change or solidification of global norms and practices. Examining the EU, Thomas Diez, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (2014) have conducted a comparison between the EU as a regional international society and the global international society as analyzed by Bull. They argue that the five core institutions of international order identified by Bull (balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great powers) have been modified or replaced by the new institutions of the European order such as the pooling of sovereignty, the acquis communautaire, multilevel multilateralism, pacific democracy, member state coalitions and multiperspectivity. Moreover, Bettina Ahrens and Thomas Diez (2015) argue that the EU forms a regional international society that has transcended the rules of Westphalian state-centered pluralism. However, they point out that the analysis of the consequences of this transcendence for global international society has, so far, been limited. By focusing on the issues of human rights and regionalization, they suggest that the EU contributes to a solidarization of international society. In this sense, the European regional international society (ERIS) does not undermine but instead promotes a global international society based on European norms and values. The region of Europe also constitutes a set of overlapping regional international societies with different degrees of thinness/thickness (Stivachtis 2010c). Consequently, another strand within the

114 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

Europe-related ES literature focuses on the development of sub-European international societies. For example, Laust Schouenborg (2012) analyzes the formation of a Scandinavian international society over a 200-year period and develops the concepts of ‘primary institution’ and ‘binding forces’ as an analytical framework. Focusing on NATO, Webber (2014) contends that during the Cold War, the transatlantic alliance was part of the ‘thick’ or solidarist European international society characterized by a convergence of values, and a sense of cooperative endeavor and common community. This core of ‘liberal solidarism’ stood alongside a ‘thinner’ pan-European international society, characterized by pluralist features of state co-existence, limited cooperation and the dominance of procedural mechanisms, such as the balance of power, diplomacy and international law, for managing international politics. According to Webber, NATO’s post-Cold War development, and particularly its experience of enlargement, has modified this picture in some respects. Enlargement has provided the basis for an extension of the ‘thick’ core of European international society as new members have become enmeshed in the institutional, political and social practices associated with the Alliance. But he concludes that in seeking to consolidate both the thicker (solidarist) and thinner (pluralist) ends of European international society spectrum, NATO has managed to succeed fully in neither enterprise. Examining the OSCE, Georgeta Pourchot (2014) partially agrees: she argues that the pan-European organization has developed most of the elements necessary for a sub-global international society; that the OSCE, like NATO, displays elements of both ‘solidarism’ and ‘pluralism’ but that it contributes to a thin-thick continuum of international society in a manner that is functionally and structurally relevant. (Similar conclusions have been reached by Stivachtis and Habegger (2011) in their own study of the organization.) Pourchot (2011) also suggests that some of the institutions of international society identified by Bull, such as the balance of power, international law and diplomacy are also at work within the OSCE framework. Other studies seek to demonstrate how various organizations contribute to the regional and/or global identity of Europe. Yannis Stivachtis and Mike Habegger (2014) suggest that the Council of Europe was and remains an essential component of ERIS and that the evolving structures and functions of the organization demonstrate an ongoing commitment to a homogeneous European regional international society.

 REGIONALISM 

115

One of the main research themes developed by the classical ES was the study of relations between the historical European international society and the states located on its periphery, such as Russia and Turkey (Naff 1984; Neumann 1996, 1998, 2011; Neumann and Welsh 1991; Watson 1984). Similarly, recent ES literature has sought to investigate the type of relations existing currently between the core of ERIS, on the one hand, and Russia and Turkey, on the other. According to Richard Sakwa (2014), although Russia has formally adopted Western democratic norms, their implementation is impeded by both practical and political forms of resistance to the universalism proclaimed by the West. He argues that Russia does not reject the norms advanced by the European international society, but it objects to what it sees as their instrumental application. Sawka asserts that as a neo-­revisionist power, Russia insists on respect for territorial and governmental sovereignty. He concludes by suggesting that Russia does not repudiate engagement with international society, but at present is ready only for a relatively ‘thin’ version. Pami Aalto (2007) argues that the EU offers Russia access to a regional international society with a ‘thicker’ set of institutions than those available in its relations with the rest of the world. The fact that Russia identifies itself with Europe has driven it to experiment with some of the solidarist institutions typifying EU-centered societies, most notably, the market. Aalto suggests that the ambivalence in the current relations between the core of ERIS and Russia is not very different from the ambivalence of the historical relations between the European society of states and Russia. Finally, Iver Neumann (2008) argues that Russia’s rationality of government deviates from present-day hegemonic neo-liberal models by favoring direct state rule rather than indirect governance. Therefore, he expected that the West would not recognize Russia as a fully-fledged great power. Western reaction to Russia’s treatment of Ukraine has strengthened Neumann’s claim. While Turkey is regarded as an integral part of ERIS, yet it is not included in its core organization, namely the European Union. Bahar Rumelili (2014) suggests that the EU relations with Turkey continue to be situated at the intersection of Europe’s particularist impulses and universalist ambitions and the construction of European and Turkish identities vis-à-vis each other is likely to remain an important arena of contestation. Stivachtis (2008b) has provided a comparison between the treatment of Turkey by the EU and the treatment that the Ottoman Empire received by the members of the historical European international society and identifies many similarities between the two processes.

116 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

International Society in the Middle East Applying the concepts of international and world society to the Middle East, Barry Buzan, Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez and their colleagues (2009) provide a comprehensive overview of the history of the region and argue that the Middle East forms a sub-global international society that can be distinguished from the broader international system. However, this society has not reached a maturity comparable to that of Europe. Moreover, their work reveals the powerful and ongoing tensions among the Western-­ defined political order, the post-colonial state system and the strong transnational cultural elements in the region. At the same time, it shows both the problems and the opportunities of thinking about international and world society in a regional context, and uses the insights from that to cast new light on what it means to talk about international society at the global level. Ayla Göl’s recent work also explores the contested nature of a regional interstate society in the Middle East and examines why and how global and regional international societies mutually evolve (Göl 2015). In so doing, she focuses on the dynamics of the complex interplay between global and regional international societies in the context of the expansion of international society and the ‘revolt against the West’. Focusing on the social structure of the Middle Eastern international society, Göl concludes that both global and regional international societies may mutually evolve despite civilizational differences. International Society in Asia In recent years, the importance of Asia in international relations has grown exponentially. ES theory has been one among several theoretical frameworks that have been utilized by Asian scholars for explaining Asia’s evolving position in international relations both within Asia and with the rest of the world (Buzan 2014; Narine 2008). Wang Qiubin (2007) focuses on the Northeastern Asia and argues that this regional international society did not come into being until the end of the Cold War, when regional states recognized each other’s sovereign equality. Qiubin argues that compared to the EU, regional international society is not mature in Northeast Asia and that the core principles of the global Westphalian system, such as territoriality and sovereignty still dominate the region. A similar conclusion has been reached by Barry Buzan,

 REGIONALISM 

117

Yongjin Zhang and their colleagues (2014) who have sought to investigate whether or not significant and distinct international social structures exist in East Asia and what this can tell us about international society both regionally and globally. They argue that the regional dispute over how regional states and peoples should relate to the Western-dominated global international society makes the existence of East Asian international society essentially contested. While this regional-global social dynamic is present in many world regions, it is particularly strong in East Asia. In response to the excessive universalism in the ES theorization, Zhang (2015) has conducted a critical investigation of the development of international society in East Asia. He focuses particularly on great power management as a primary institution and the way in which it operates and is practiced in East Asia and reflects on how in terms of both power politics and political economy the regional and the global are mutually constitutive. In so doing, he offers a social structural view of contested existence of regional international society in East Asia, with an emphasis on understanding the contingent nature of the emergence of regional international society, its fluid existence and the problematic nature of its social boundaries. Employing the ES approach to study international relations in the increasingly important region of Southeast Asia, Linda Quayle (2013) offers a comprehensive assessment of this region-theory linkage. In a more recent article, she utilizes the ES’ pluralist/solidarist spectrum to map and compare responses to the issue of migrant workers (Quayle 2015). According to Quayle, this case suggests: first, the complexity of the relationship between global and regional societies and how that relationship is exacerbated by the starkly diverging pluralist and solidarist streams within the former; second, that the informal, consensus-oriented methods of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), though often criticized, have proved useful at the global level in moving dialogue forward in this contentious area; and third, that regional international societies provide highly salient arenas for dealing with this issue, but still struggle with inter-regional difference and trans-regional challenges. International Society in Africa and Latin America Unlike Europe and Asia, Africa and Latin America do not feature prominently in ES literature. Building upon theoretical contributions from the ES, John Anthony Pella Jr. (2014) analyzes how West-Central Africa and

118 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

West-Central Africans were integral to the ways in which Europe and Africa came together from the fifteenth century through to the twentieth. His analysis demonstrates that the expansion of international society was driven by individual interaction and was shaped by both Africans and Europeans. Mohammed Ayoob’s work explores key variables in the construction of regional order in Africa and argues that institutional developments in the region have contributed to development of a regional international society (Ayoob 1999). Elaine Tan (2015) addresses the development of international society in Africa by analyzing the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). She views APRM as a platform through which an African international society and global international society have interacted. She begins her analysis by pointing out that the presence of regional international societies implies the presence of differentiation in global international society, the possibility of a breakdown in global consensus and the subsequent fragmentation of global international society. However, she argues that while divergences between African and global international societies on democracy and political governance result in tensions, the APRM can be seen as a way to mediate and reconcile these divergent positions. This has to be seen in the context of an unequal global international society, dominated by a number of core states with an increasingly solidarist governance agenda, as well as the attempts of a largely pluralist African international society to manages its demands. While the APRM might represent an uneasy and unstable compromise, this suggests that the relationship between regional and global international societies is significantly shaped by the ability and willingness of states to create possibilities for such compromises. With reference to Latin America, Federico Merke (2014) provides a historical account of the development of international relations in the region and argues that the presence of a number of shared values and institutions among regional states offers the foundations for a distinct regional international society. Merke (2015) also examines the strategic positioning of Brazil in South America and how South America relates to Brazil’s rising status both globally and regionally. He argues that Brazil shares a number of values and institutions with its neighbors that contribute to the existence and function of a distinct regional international society in South America. A similar conclusion is reached by Lasmar and his

 REGIONALISM 

119

colleagues (2015) who have argued that key universal norms and rules of Human Rights Law have been interpreted and practiced differently by Latin American states. International Society in the Post-Soviet Space There has been an increasing interest in the study of international society in the post-Soviet space and particularly on the role and status of Russia as a great power. Yannis Stivachtis (2015b) explores the entry of Russia into what Boris Yeltsin called ‘community of civilized states’. To this end, he examines the changes that President Yeltsin had to introduce in order to achieve the country’s admission into post-Cold War international society. These changes included the democratization of the Russian political system, the transformation of the Russian economic system into a free market economy and the de-ideologization of Russian foreign policy. Katarzyna Kaczmarska’s work focuses on Russia and its ‘near abroad’. She argues that following the end of the Cold War, Russia was seeking to re-join the global international society (Kaczmarska 2015). Among other things, this meant that Russia was expected to adjust and accept norms and rules established and propagated by mostly Western liberal states but hailed as common for the global family of states. However, with Vladimir Putin’s ascendance to power and the country’s economic recovery followed by Moscow’s more assertive stance on global affairs, Russia has increasingly been the supporter of a pluralist vision of international society characterized by limited co-operation, respect for sovereignty and non-­ intervention. Yet, Kaczmarska points to the fundamental differences in Russia’s approach toward relations between states in the regional and global perspective. While on the global scale Russia cherishes norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, the regional realm has been subject to a variety of moves compromising the sovereignty of post-Soviet states. By analyzing historical and contemporary discourses about Russia’s civilizational status, Costa Buranelli (2014) explores an alternative way for the diffusion of norms and institutions of international society. This involves moving away from the idea of a European ‘expansion’ or ‘inclusion’ and toward what he calls ‘mediated expansion’. In so doing, he views Russia as ‘a periphery in the center’ and as a ‘less civilized civilizer’ in European international society. He discusses the penetration of the Russian Empire in Central Asia in a socio-historical perspective and argues that in

120 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

the process of the expansion, Russia’s Asiatic past weakened its status as a European power, as well as the value of its colonial enterprise as a civilizing influence. Costa Buranelli has also argued that Central Asian states form a distinctive Central Asian international society because they have adopted institutions and norms at the regional level by attaching to them different interpretations and meanings from those that the institutions and norms have at the global level (Costa-Buranelli 2013, 2015). After examining the degree of integration among Central Asian countries, Georgeta Pourchot and Yannis Stivachtis (2014) have also concluded that Central Asia constitutes a ‘thick’ regional international society. Given both, a strong case can be made for a hierarchically structured Eurasian regional international society with Russia at its core. Finally, Thomas Linsenmaier (2015) has put forward a conceptualization of various types of relationships that unfold between regional international societies. In this context, the traditional notion of ‘expansion’ is complemented by forms of co-existence and confrontation. Understood as ideal types, the three concepts (expansion, co-existence and clash) serve as analytical tools for making sense of the varied nature of inter-regional encounters. In Linsenmaier’s work, this is illustrated with regard to the relationship between the European international society and its Eastern neighbors in the aftermath of the 2004 EU enlargement. According to Linsenmaier, a more nuanced reading of the ‘inter-regional’ highlights a constellation quite different from ‘expansion’ where the European society does not push into empty space, but reaches out into an alternative order, opening the possibility of a clash between the European and a consolidating post-Soviet regional international society.

The Expansion of Regional International Societies The fact that gemeinschaft types of regional international societies may exist within the confines of a global gessellschaft type of international society raises the possibility that some of them may face the challenge of expanding into other regions with their own distinctive cultures. For example, it has been shown that the EU constitutes a regional homogeneous international society embedded in a heterogeneous European international system (Diez and Whitman 2002). Through the process of enlargement, however, the regional homogeneous European international society (EU) expands outward, gradually transforming the heterogeneous

 REGIONALISM 

121

European international system, in which it is embedded, into a more homogeneous regional European international society (Stivachtis 2002; Riemer and Stivachtis 2002). But how do expanding gemeinschaft societies incorporate members that do not share their culture? As the standard of ‘civilization’ has fallen into disrepute, other standards have risen to take its place. Of particular importance is the standard of ‘democracy’, which encompasses several other associated concepts such as respect for human rights, the rule of law and liberal economic development. This, along with its portrayal as a timeless universal concept, provides democracy with an advantage in the expansion of regional international societies. As such, democratization has become a stand-in for the civilizing project (Clark 2009). In this context, democracy promotion has become a central dynamic of enlargement not only for the EU but also for other European international organizations (Stivachtis 2016; Stivachtis and Webber 2014). Drawing on the example of the EU, Stivachtis (2008a, 2010a) has argued that ‘membership conditionality’ serves a role similar to that of the historical standard of ‘civilization’. Hartmut Behr (2007) and Yannis Stivachtis (2015a, b; Stivachtis and Kliewer 2007) have demonstrated the similarity between the contents of the Copenhagen criteria, whose purpose is to regulate the EU enlargement (expansion) process, and the contents of the historical standard of ‘civilization’, whose purpose was to regulate the relations of the European powers with the rest of the world. European regional international society has consequently become heavily reliant on forms of conditionality and monitoring. In addition, Stivachtis (2018, 2019) has shown how the EU has employed the policy of conditionality through its Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to create a political order of its preference on its periphery.

As an Epilogue: New Items on the Research Agenda Given recent international developments, three new items can be added to the ES research agenda: first, whether the increasing heterogeneity of global international society will further strengthen regionalism; second, how regional international societies may interact with one another; and third, whether international societies will develop in polar regions. Indeed, post-Cold War conditions in conjunction with climate change have transformed the Arctic and Antarctic into important world regions in the sense that some states began to assert or re-assert their claims of national

122 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

sovereignty over areas previously considered inaccessible. Claims of national sovereignty are of great significance particularly for the Arctic regional order (Ohnishi 2014; Murray and Nuttall 2014; Young 1996, 1998). It remains to be seen if increasing state interaction would lead to the establishment of ‘thick’ polar international societies or whether ‘thinner’, more pluralistic international societies would emerge.

Bibliography Aalto, Pami. 2007. Russia’s Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level International Societies. International Relations 21 (4): 459–478. Ahrens, Bettina, and Thomas Diez. 2015. Solidarisation and Its Limits: The EU and the Transformation of International Society. Global Discourse 5 (3): 341–355. Ayoob, Mohammed. 1983/4. Security in the Third World. International Affairs 60 (1): 41–51. Ayoob, Mohammed., ed. 1986. Regional Security in the Third World. London: Groom Helm. ———. 1989. The Third World in the System of States. International Studies Quarterly 33 (1): 67–79. ———. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. ———. 1999. From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order. Australian Journal of International Affairs 53 (3): 247–260. Behr, Hartmut. 2007. The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? European Journal of International Relations 13 (2): 239–262. ———. 2011. Europe—History, Violence and “Peripheries”. Review of European Studies 4 (3): 7–17. Bellamy, Alex, ed. 2005. International Society and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bozeman, Ada. 1960. Politics and Culture in International History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1971. The Future of Law in a Multicultural World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. 1984. Introduction. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 1–9. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buranelli, Filippo Costa. 2013. Regional International Societies, the Polysemy of Institutions and Global International Society. E-International Relations, August 1, https://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/01/from-e-pluribus-una-to-ex-una-pluresregiona

 REGIONALISM 

123

Butterfield, Herbert, and Martin Wight, eds. 1966. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: Allen & Unwin. Buzan, Barry. 1983a. Regional Security as a Policy Objective. In The Great Game: The Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, ed. A.Z. Rubinstein, 261–278. New York: Praeger. ———. (1983b)1991. People, States and Fear. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. ———. 1993. From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. International Organization 47 (3): 327–352. ———. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2009. International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level. London: Palgrave. ———. 2014. The International Society Approach and Asia. In The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, ed. Saaadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, 100–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Gowher Rizvi. 1986. South Asian Security and the Great Powers. London: Macmillan. Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear. 2nd edition. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 1992. Framing Nordic Security. In Nordic Security in the 1990s, ed. Jan Oberg, 85–104. London: Pinter. ———. 2003. Regions and Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, M.  Kelstrup, P.  Lemaitre, E.  Tromer, and O.  Waever. 1990. The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era. London: Pinter. Buzan, Barry, O. Waever, and J. de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Clark, Ian. 2007. International Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. Democracy in International Society: Promotion or Exclusion? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37 (3): 563–581. ———. 2011. Hegemony in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2013. The Vulnerable in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Costa Buranelli, Filippo. 2014. Knockin’ On Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of International Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 817–836. ———. 2015. ‘Do You Know What I Mean?’ ‘Not Exactly’: English School, Global International Society and the Polysemy of Institutions. Global Discourse 5 (3): 499–514. Diez, Thomas, and Richard Whitman. 2002. Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School. Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (1): 43–67.

124 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

Diez, Thomas, Ian Manners, and Richard Whitman. 2014. The Changing Nature of International Institutions in Europe: The Challenge of the European Union. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 17–38. London: Routledge. Dunne, Tim. 1998a. Inventing International Society: A History of the English School. London: Macmillan. ———. 1998b. Inventing International Society: A History of the English School. London/Oxford: Macmillan in Association with St. Antony’s. Göl, Ayla. 2015. Imagining the Middle East: The State, Nationalism and Regional International Society. Global Discourse 5 (3): 379–394. Hurrell, Andrew. 2007a. On Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007b. One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society. International Affairs 83 (1): 127–146. Kaczmarska, Katarzyna. 2015. Russia’s droit de regard: Pluralist Norms and the Sphere of Influence. Global Discourse 5 (3): 434–448. Lasmar, Jorge, Danny Zahreddine, and Delber Andrade Gribel Lage. 2015. Understanding Regional and Global Diffusion in International Law: The Case for a Non-Monolithic Approach to Institutions. Global Discourse 5 (3): 470–496. Linklater, Andrew, and Hidemi Suganami. 2006. The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linsenmaier, Thomas. 2015. The Interplay Between Regional International Societies. Global Discourse 5 (3): 452–467. Little, Richard, and John Williams, eds. 2006. The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Merke, Federico. 2014. Unpacking South American International Society: A Historical Sketch. In Regions in International Society: The English School at the Sub-Global Level, ed. Ales Karmazin, 68–87. Brno: Masaryk University. ———. 2015. Neither Balance Nor Bandwagon: South American International Society Meets Brazil’s Rising Power. International Politics 52 (2): 146–162. Morgan, Roger. 1999. A European ‘Society of States’—But Only States of Mind? International Affairs 76 (3): 559–574. Murray, Robert W., and Anita Dey Nuttall, eds. 2014. International Relations and the Arctic. Amherst: Cambria Press. Naff, Thomas. 1984. The Ottoman Empire and the European States System. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 143–170. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Narine, Shaun. 2008. The English School and ASEAN. In Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations, ed. A. Acharya and R. Stubbs, 71–90. London: Routledge. Neumann, Iver. 1996. Russia and the Idea of Europe. London: Routledge. ———. 1998. The Uses of the ‘Other’: The ‘East’ in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

 REGIONALISM 

125

———. 2008. Russia as a Great Power, 1815–2007. Journal of International Relations and Development 11: 128–151. ———. 2011. Entry into International Society Reconceptualized: The Case of Russia. Review of International Studies 37 (2): 463–484. Neumann, Iver, and Jennifer M.  Welsh. 1991. The Other in European Self-­ Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society. Review of International Studies 17 (4): 327–348. Ohnishi, Fugio. 2014. The Struggle for Arctic Regional Order. Eurasia Border Review 5 (2): 81–97. Pella, John Anthony. 2014. Africa and the Expansion of International Society. London: Routledge. Pourchot, Georgeta. 2011. The OSCE. A Pan-European Internaitonal Society in the Making? Journal of European Integration 33: 179–196. ———. 2014. The OSCE: A Pan-European Society in the Making? In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y.A.  Stivachtis and M.  Webber, 79–96. London: Routledge. Pourchot, Georgeta, and Yannis A.  Stivachtis. 2014. International Society and Regional Integration in Central Asia. Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (1): 68–76. Qiubin, W. 2007. On the Northeastern Asia Regional International Society. The Institute of International Studies. China: Jilin Changchun. Quayle, Linda. 2013. Southeast Asia and the English School of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2015. Leading or Following? International Societies, Southeast Asia, and the Issue of Migrant Workers. Global Discourse 5 (3): 415–430. Riemer, Andrea, and Yannis A. Stivachtis. 2002. European Union’s Enlargement, the English School and the Expansion of Regional International Societies. In Understanding European Union’s Mediterranean Enlargement: The English School and the Expansion of Regional International Society, ed. A. Riemer and Y. Stivachtis, 15–40. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Rumelili, Bahar. 2014. Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in a Post-Enlargement Europe. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 35–49. London: Routledge. Sakwa, Richard. 2014. Russia and Europe: Whose Society? In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 97–114. London: Routledge. Schouenborg, Laust. 2012. The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–2010. London: Routledge. Stivachtis, Yannis A. 2002. Understanding the European Union’s Enlargement: The International Society Approach of the English School. In The United States and Europe: Policy Imperatives in a Globalizing World, ed. Howard Hensel, 55–77. Aldershot: Ashgate. ———., ed. 2007. International Order in a Globalizing World. Aldershot: Ashgate.

126 

Y. A. STIVACHTIS

———. 2008a. Civilization and International Society: The Case of European Union Expansion. Contemporary Politics 14 (1): 71–90. ———. 2008b. Europe and the ‘Turk’: An English School Approach to the Study of EU-Turkish Relations. In Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities and Constraints, ed. Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Yannis A. Stivachtis, 17–40. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 2010a. ‘Civilizing’ the Post- Soviet/Socialist Space: An English School Approach to State Socialization in Europe—The Cases of NATO and the Council of Europe. Perspectives: Central European Review of International Relations 18 (2): 5–32. ———. 2010b. International Society: Global/Regional Dimensions and Geographic Expansion. In The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark and V.I.I. Volume, 4543–4561. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2010c. The Overlapping of Regional International Societies: The Case of the Transatlantic Community and the European Union. In Global Politics in the Dawn of the 21st Century, ed. Akis Kalaitzidis, 389–409. Athens: ATINER. Stivachtis, Yannis. 2013. The English School and the Study of Sub-Global International Societies. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/08/the-english-andthe-study-of-sub-global-international-societies Stivachtis, Yannis A. 2015a. Enlargement, Conditionality and Empire. In Revisiting the Idea of the European Union as Empire, ed. H.  Behr and Y.A.  Stivachtis, 74–95. London: Routledge. ———. 2015b. Liberal Democracy, Market Economy, and International Conduct as Standards of ‘Civilization’ in Contemporary International Society: The Case of Russia’s Entry into the ‘Community of Civilized States’. Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2): 130–142. ———. 2015c. Interrogating Regional International Societies, Questioning the Global International Society. Special Issue Global Discourse 5 (3). ———. 2016. Democracy Promotion as a Security Strategy. In Democracy and Civil Society in a Global Era, ed. M. Marlin and S. Romaniuk, 14–30. London: Routledge. ———. 2018. The ‘Civilizing’ Empire: The European Union and the MENA Neighborhood. Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies 4 (2): 91–106. ———. 2019. Creating Order in the MENA Neighborhood: The Enlargement of the EU International Society and Its Contestation. In Europe, the Middle East and North Africa: Contestation beyond Borders, ed. R.A.  Del Sarto and S. Tholens. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Mike Habegger. 2011. The OSCE as a Regional International Society. In International Relations, Culture, and Global Finance, ed. A. Kalaitzidis, 35–60. Athens: ATINER.

 REGIONALISM 

127

———. 2014. The Council of Europe: The Institutional Limits of Contemporary European International Society? In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 59–78. London: Routledge. Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Brandon Kliewer. 2007. Democratizing and Socializing Candidate States: The Case of the EU Conditionality. In The State of European Integration, ed. Y. Stivachtis, 143–160. Aldershot: Ashgate. Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Mark Webber. 2014. Regional International Society in Post-Enlargement Europe. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 101–116. London: Routledge. Tan, Elaine S.Y. 2015. Interactions Between African and Global International Societies: The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Global Discourse 5 (3): 398–411. Waever, Ole, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaitre. 1993. Identity, Migration and the New Security Order in Europe. London: Pinter. Watson, Adam. 1984. Russia and the European States System. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 61–74. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1992. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge. Webber, Mark. 2014. NATO: Within and Between European International Society. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 39–58. London: Routledge. Wight, Martin. 1977. Systems of States, edited with an introduction by Hedley Bull. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Young, Oran. 1996. Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives. Global Governance 2 (1): 1–23. ———. 1998. Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zhang, Yongjin. 2015. Regional International Society in East Asia? A Critical Investigation. Global Discourse 5 (3): 360–373.

Institutions and Organizations Cornelia Navari

In the beginning, the founders of the English School displayed little regard for international organization as an organizing principle of international relations. Having taught the subject for eight years, Martin Wight signed off his lecture series on IOs with the observation that the real institutions of international society were not its organizations, but its conventional practices, which he named as “alliances, diplomacy and war” (Bull 1977b, 6); and his views of the United Nations as a non-institution of international society are well recorded in his Power Politics (1978, 216–38). At the very first meeting of the British Committee, he denied the relevance of ‘world government’; and Butterfield, summarizing the subsequent discussion, reported a greater faith in a liberal or ‘whig’ diplomacy (Vigezzi 2005, 383). There does not appear to have been a single paper in the long history of the British Committee on either the United Nations or organization in general. When, moreover, the discussion came to the matter of ‘institutions’— leitmotif of the English School—the term ‘institution’ was counterpoised to ‘organization’ and defined against it. In the preface to The Anarchical Society setting out his schema of the six basic institutions, Bull acknowledged the existence of international organizations but denied their

C. Navari (*) University of Buckingham, Buckingham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_9

129

130 

C. NAVARI

relevance to order, insisting that “to find the basic cause of such order as exists in world politics, one must look not to the League of Nations, the United Nations and such bodies, but to institutions of international society that arose before these international organisations were established, and that would operate…even if these organizations did not exist” (p. xiv). The international institutions that interested Wight and Bull were like ‘property’ or ‘marriage’ in Wight’s oft-quoted characterization (Wight 1991, 141), and international organizations were “best understood…in terms of the contribution they make to the working of more basic institutions” (Bull 1977a, xiv). But when it came to the actual working of the famous ‘institutions’, international organization did not lag far behind. Peacekeeping, a practice in the institution of war and an institutional development of the post-war period, was placed by Alan James (a student of Charles Manning and author of the first major study of peacekeeping) firmly within the United Nations—its development linked to Secretary-general initiatives, General Assembly resolutions, and the redoubtable Brian Urquhart, the UN Undersecretary for Political Affairs who organized the first UN peacekeeping mission (James 1990). Sanctions in their contemporary manifestation (another part of the war regime) were developed within the legal framework of the Charter’s Section VII and were institutionalized via Article 41. Its first political analyst Margaret Doxey (who had made it the subject of her PhD) cited sanctions within the enforcement powers of the Security Council and as part of a legal system, dependent on authority and norms (Doxey 1972). Even Hedley Bull could not ignore the relevance of international organization to his institutions. In The Anarchical Society, the United Nations appears routinely as a setting for contemporary developments in each institution.1 The first hint in theoretical terms that there might be a connection between institution and organization came in Robert Keohane’s presidential address to the International Studies Association in 1988, entitled ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’. There, he contrasted “the assumption of substantive rationality” that had hitherto dominated the study of international organization with a challenging sociological and “reflective” approach that “stresses the impact of human subjectivity” (p. 381). Referencing Kratochwil and Ruggie as writers that “emphasise 1  In regard to the use of force, p.  154; balance of power, p.  110; international law, pp. 145–49; diplomacy, p. 174; war, pp. 188–9.

  INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 

131

that…even states develop within the context of more encompassing institutions”, he distinguished between institutions in the sense of a general pattern or categorization of activity and institutions in the sense of particular human-constructed arrangements. In the former, he included Bull’s institutions of international society, citing sovereignty, diplomacy and statehood, which he characterized as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”. Examples of the second class, that is “particular institutions”, were the international proliferation regime and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, which were “specific institutions with life-histories…which depend on the decisions of particular individuals” (p. 383). Keohane drew on an over-arching “practice of sovereignty” to suggest a close relationship between the two, noting, almost in passing, that “the specific institutions of world politics, with their challengeable rules [are, ed. CBN] embedded within more fundamental practices”. He elaborated this theoretical ‘stub’ by reference to the philosopher John Rawl’s distinction between rules as summations of previous rules (i.e., rules simple and changeable) and “the practice conception of rules”. He related the “practice conception of rules” to systems of intelligibility, or games of understanding in the sociological sense, which require conformity to rules to achieve the objective of the ‘game’ (e.g., those aspiring after sovereignty must cast their efforts in terms of the fundamental rules defining sovereignty if they hope to gain sovereignty) (Keohane 1988, 384). Such an ordering suggested that fundamental institutions may be prior to organizations, as sorts of foundational understandings, without which agents could not start to build organizations, rendering Bull’s institutions the foundations of organizational developments. But Keohane did not go so far, and apparently did not want to go so far. The essay ended with a defence of the rationalistic approach and with a challenge to “reflectivists” to get their research programme in order; that is, with two sets of institutions as parts of two different research programmes and in an indeterminate relation to one another. The theorists who first related the two within a unified theory were Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall in 1989, collaborating to clarify some initial constructivist ideas that might be applied to international relations. They seized upon Keohane’s distinctions to illustrate a proto IR theory of social construction. Using the example of the English School, they identified some international institutions as “fundamental” in that

132 

C. NAVARI

they “represent the shared intersubjective understandings about the…precondition for meaningful state action” (p. 53). These were “constitutive” in that they, among other things, defined and empowered the agents of international society. They distinguished these from the “actual practices that are institutionally organised and selected”. Institutionally organized practices, they suggested, “constitute the medium through which the social or constitutive side of international institutions is reproduced and/ or transformed”, and they added, “thereby completing the circle of structuration” (p. 62). In this ordering, we are invited to consider Keohane’s ‘rational organizations’ as the sites for the selection, definition and institutionalisation of specific practices, completing a “circle of structuration”. But this sociological and practice conception of fundamental institutions (and their instantiation in organizations) did not immediately gain much purchase, at least not within the British English School.2 Following Keohane, Andrew Hurrell (1993) authored an English School contribution on international law for the Rittberger volume on regimes that sourced law in common culture and common interests, with only a brief reference to practice. He also distinguished between “the procedural rules of state behaviour and the structural principles which define the character of the system and the identity of the players” (Hurrell 1993, 59), but did not elaborate on the distinction or explain in any detail how it might apply to international law.3 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson (1992) referred to the “interpretive elements” in English School thought but presented no theory of interpretation, and seemed to imply that law tout court was the basis of order. Chris Reus-Smits’s ‘The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions’ (1997) endorsed the constructivist understanding of fundamental institutions with regard to the foundational principle of sovereignty,4 but moved immediately to “larger complexes of meta-values” in order to explain different standards of rightful state action, by-passing other institutions such as diplomacy and ignoring organizations entirely. Tim Dunne’s 1995 ‘The Social Construction of International Society’ did not mention international organizations or outline any processes that related the two. The major exception was Robert Jackson’s 2000 The Global Covenant. In it, international society was defined as a “procedural association” in the  As opposed to the developing Continental ES; Knudsen’s PhD of 1999 quoted it extensively. 3  The article concluded with a reference to international law as a “bridge” between the two. 4  Sovereignty “defines the social identity of the state and, in turn constitutes the basic institutional practices of international society”. 2

  INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 

133

political philosopher Michael Oakeshott’s terms. (Oakeshott had defined procedures as ‘adverbial qualifiers of action’, a meaning consistent with the idea of institutions in the reflectivist/constructivist sense.) Jackson’s study placed these as fundamental to and indeed constitutive of international society. He further identified international organizations as the “auxiliaries of international society”, suggesting a necessary relationship. Another was Alan James’s presentation of IOs as “enabling international society” (James 1993). But while providing a solid body of empirical material on contemporary practices, much of which occurred within the offices of international organizations (and which demonstrably depended on the existence of such organizations), neither drew further theoretical conclusions. In short, there was little further development of these ideas as they related to the English School until 2004, when the arguments of Buzan and Holsti entered the scene, and a direct, functional relationship was drawn between bedrock or fundamental institutions and international organizations and regimes.

Holsti, Buzan and Primary and Secondary Institutions K.J. Holsti’s contribution was to provide a comprehensible analytical map of what he termed “foundational institutions”. In his work, Taming the Sovereigns (2004), he established, first, the primacy of fundamental institutions in the international interactions of public authorities, endorsing the constructivist ‘turn’. (He sourced Wendt and Duval, Michael Barnet and Reus-Smit.) Second, he established a set of criteria for identifying his ‘foundational’ institutions, rendering them capable of empirical investigation. These criteria were, “[first,] practices that are routinized, typical and recurrent…[secondly] based, usually, on coherent sets of ideas…[that] reflect norms and…[third] include rules and etiquette”—rules and etiquette being necessary to Holsti’s schema. In other words, Holsti identified a set of empirically determinable practices, identifiable in terms of rules and ‘etiquettes’. Third, he made a critical distinction among practices, distinguishing between constitutive institutions which “define and give privileged status to certain actors”, and procedural institutions which “regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors”

134 

C. NAVARI

(p. 24–5),5 providing a basis for identifying as well as locating the sources of change. The subsequent analysis made it clear that constitutive institutions are ideas and ordering concepts that have a normative status—that is, they are shared concepts that are prescriptive, while procedural institutions are the rules, etiquettes and legal creations that arise on the basis of the prescriptions, and that enact them. On the basis of this analysis, Holsti identified eight foundational institutions of the international order; that is, institutions that form the basic constitutional order of international society.6 Each was buttressed and given definition by a phalanx of procedural institutions, such as the institution of the sovereign embassy with regard to diplomacy and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions with regard to modern warfare. There were also practices that could be characterized as ‘repertoires’, which are etiquettes, rules and standards that are not institutionalized, appearing and disappearing as circumstances provide. He classed power balancing and Great Power management as un-institutionalized sets of practices, which had ordering effects while in place but which were not permanently enshrined.7 But on organizations, Holsti was less determinate. His account makes clear that historical processes produce both institutions and organizations; it also makes references to the role that norms play in the creation of organizations. His account suggests, further, that some of the rules and etiquettes, particularly their more recent manifestations, are located in international organizations: viz., the section on trade rules and the WTO. But there is no suggestion that international organizations, in general, perform a necessary (as opposed to contingent) role in securing the basic norms of international society. In fact, most of the institutional developments in his account are sourced in the diplomatic actions of public authorities in unmediated contexts. It is in this sense that Buzan’s 2004 work, although less theoretically informed, made the major break-through. Buzan leapt almost directly from institutions to organizations, suggesting that foundational institutions as they actually existed were primarily located within international organizations and proposing that much diplomacy was actually mediated through organizations. He also posited that organizations largely reflected 5  This is identical in substance to John Duffield’s “new definition” of 2007, 7–8: “relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system” but is superior in specifying the parts. 6  Statehood, territoriality, sovereignty, international law, diplomacy, international trade, colonialism, war. 7  GPM has, of course, been enshrined in the Security Council, but only in regard to threats to the peace.

  INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 

135

the more basic institutions, in effect, making organizations the site of institutions, and in a sense their visible manifestation. Much as he drew on Holsti for inspiration, he turned the analysis around—his approach suggested that, for purposes of analysis, organizations should be examined as the site of institutions (e.g., Buzan derived his ‘master institutions‘ from the practice of ‘derivative institutions’, and some derivative institutions from their practice in ‘secondary institutions’8). It is noteworthy that Buzan did not draw on the IR constructivist literature to formulate these propositions but on the sociology of institutions, notably the Stanford School, on the one hand, and the sociology of knowledge, notably Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality on the other. From the first, he drew the proposition that institutions were “cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular entities and activities, integrating them into larger schemes” (Buzan 2004, 165, referencing Meyer et al. 1987, 13). From the second, he drew the postulate that “institutional facts are a subset of social facts, which arise out of collective intentionality” (p. 166). The latter led him to two conclusions: (1) that ‘social facts’ are kept in place by collective agreement; and (2) that ‘social facts’ in general and institutional facts especially are hierarchically structured’ (p.  167, referencing Searle 1995, 35). This led him to the “reasonable”, as he put it, postulate that “what the English school wants to get at” could be designated as “primary” institutions, and that Krasner’s regimes and Keohane’s organizations could be classed as “secondary” institutions. The 2004 work has a chart that explicitly links them. Their relation, moreover, was as social fact to institutional fact: the primary institutions served as the social facts, while the regimes and organizations were the institutional facts arising from them. Buzan’s analysis gave regimes and organization the ontological status of non-contingent products of fundamental processes of social construction and, in social science terms, as the empirical manifestation of Holsti’s (and Bull’s) foundational institutions. It was in this spirit that Buzan’s formulation was seized upon by the Working Group on International Institutions of the English School section of the International Studies Association, formed in 2012 to sort out the ontological and epistemological status of the English School’s international institutions. Buzan’s schema formed the basis of a project that formulated a thesis on the role of international organizations in contributing to change in foundations institutions, that formalized a model of the relationship between Buzan’s primary and secondary institutions, and that initiated a set of diplomatic case studies to illustrate the thesis.  For example, multilateralism, guarantees, human rights, market.

8

136 

C. NAVARI

Devising a Model The Chair of English School Section of the ISA had stressed from the beginning of her tenure the importance of identifying processes in the construction of international society, as opposed to mere stipulations that norms and rules mattered. Both Holsti and Buzan’s formulations suggested that processes were at play in the constituting of international society, first in the movement from Holsti’s constitutive to procedural institutions, and more particularly in the relations of Buzan’s primary and secondary institutions. One possibility was that IOs were depositories for the more fundamental institutions; that is, they acted as constraints on decision-makers, or alternatively as guides in organizational construction, limiting but also informing the relevant negotiations. This appeared to be the view held by both Holsti and Buzan—both presented international organizations as deposits of more fundamental institutions. But at the very first meeting of the small working group to present some initial ideas on the relationship, Tonny Brems Knudsen went further. He drew on the constructivism of Wendt and Duvall to put forward the proposition that “Even though international organizations are secondary to the primary institutions, they are important to their working, reproduction, and transformation” (Navari 2013). This idea suggested that IOs had a more dynamic relationship to foundation institutions than hitherto suggested, and even a transformative effect on them; that is, organizations could change or elaborate fundamental institutions. The Chair seized upon this insight to establish the initial thesis of the project: that there was a reticular relationship between fundamental institutions and international organization, such that each in some way affected and had consequences for the other. The question was how did this occur? Holsti had suggested one route— via diplomatic interaction. In his account, fundamental institutions are legislated into an organizational form through the deliberated actions of public officials. Taming the Sovereigns is, in fact, an extensive account of the varied and changing forms of institutionalization enjoyed by the fundamental institutions of international society, carried out through the separate and joint actions of kings, ministers, presidents and other plenipotentiaries, since the Peace of Westphalia. It seemed that the answer was, partly at least, in the negotiating practices of the international order, exercised by empowered agents, who transformed nugatory practices into laws, rules and procedures. With regard to how the fundamental institutions came into being in the first place, however, and how they were maintained outside of formal

  INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 

137

institutionalization, Holsti had said little. Each of Holsti’s eight foundational institutions is treated primarily through the changes it has suffered, as if it had no existence other than that exhibited in its changes. Bull had said even less (he did not even raise the question) about their ontological status. In their initial discussions on the ontology of fundamental institutions, Navari and Knudsen had agreed to treat them as forms of practical reasoning, rational postulates refined through experience, in the manner of Hume’s treatment of the Balance of Power in the well-known essay (Knudsen and Navari 2019, 6–7). But neither does Hume’s essay say much about the constitutional act or how, in general, fundamental institutions are created. For this answer, the study relied on Searle’s idea of iteration, again from the philosophy of knowledge stable, supplemented by traditional contractarianism. Iteration is the repetition of a process or utterance. Searle (1995) had argued that social institutions (he used the example of marriage, but we can substitute diplomacy) were reproduced by the continuous iteration of a dense complex of institutional facts (e.g., with regard to diplomacy, the institutional facts of sovereignty, territoriality, extra-territoriality and authorization). He also argued that institutional facts should be understood as the products of intentionality—that humans jointly created social institutions, and maintained them by the continuous practice of them. (The inference of such a postulate is also that, if humans create them, then humans can also bring them down, a postulate with which Searle agrees. He insists that human institutions live only so long as humans support and use them). The idea of iteration was brought into the study by Kilian Spandler who had used the idea of repetitive practice to explain a central process in his model of collective decision-making in ASEAN. The Spandler model (Spandler 2015) showed both instituting and constituting occurring through the medium of practice. Agents not only instituted; they also constituted. They initiated the directive precepts, which in turn gave the specific agents of international society roles in institutional orders through which they iterated practices, such as sovereignty or peacekeeping, in the course of which new directive principles emerged, creating new empowerments, engendering a new ‘circle of structuration’, in Searle’s terms.

The Institutional Structure of World Order The hypothetical model that the study produced mirrored the proposition with which the working group began: even though international organizations are secondary to the primary institutions, they are important to

138 

C. NAVARI

their working, reproduction and transformation. This implied a two-­ level structure to the institutions of world order: foundation institutions and international organizations and regimes. They are linked by continuous processes of, in effect, decision-making by authorized agents who are empowered by the constitutive principles. Processes of empowerment occur both at the level of the primary institutions and also at the level of secondary organizations. The constitutive principles authorize a variety of agents, including not only states but also international civil servants, business organizations and civil society groups as they perform roles in legislating and managing the international order. THE COMPOSITE MODEL: THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF WORLD ORDER

Primary institutions (shared principles and norms)

Primary constitution (c1): definition of actors and legitimate behaviour

Distribution of power

Primary institutionalization [Ins 1]: knowledge production [discourses and meanings]. internalization through iteration

Interested agents in interaction

Secondary institutionalization [Ins 2]: institution building [role differentiation. formalization]

Secondary constitution [c2]: role ascription, resource distribution, altering of preference structures, sanctions

Secondary institutions (organizations and regimes)

Source: Knudsen and Navari 2019, 71

Balance of interests

  INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 

139

The model is heavily institutional, and arguably structural, at two levels, both at a conceptual level of agreed norms embodied in practices and at an evidential organizational level. But the dynamic elements in the theory are the practitioners, the “interested agents in interaction”. It is their iterations that stabilize the institutional order and that indeed ‘institutionalize’ it. They institutionalize at both levels, stabilizing new norms and principles at the fundamental or primary level of institutions and new rules and procedures at the organizational level. At the same time, it is not the sort of agentic theory which presents the agents as determining their choices on the basis of an unlocated ‘freedom’ or on the basis of ‘rational choices’ in an unlocated setting. The agents are situated in the sense Mark Bevir (2017) suggests—while always enmeshed in specific historical contexts, they have reflexivity and creativity. But their situatedness and their creativities are also intimately related to and informed by their institutional identities in non-fortuitous and effectual ways. (Hence, the theory can be classed as a mild form of sociological institutionalism.) In Spandler’s constructivist version of the model (Spandler 2015), the ‘practioners’ are heavily involved in ‘interpretation’ and it is interpretation that sets the cycle moving. This, however, would consign the English School theory to a form of philosophical idealism, which is not consistent with the empirical work most closely identified with the school, such as Gerrit Gong’s Standard of “Civilization”, or James Mayall’s Nationalism in the International System, both of which are essentially interest-based analyses, nor indeed with the idea of structuration, where institutional identities are an important prism for defining interests. In the Knudsen and Navari model, it is the constant mediation of interests, understood as advantage or benefit, on the part of and by empowered agents that sets the cycle moving. The model gives rise to a number of hypothetical postulates concerning the formation of fundamental institutions and organizations. Chief among them is that in the creation of organizations, interest mediation bounded by existing institutional arrangements is the critical factor. It does not speculate on the detail of mediation processes, which are ‘black boxed’, but these can be bolted onto the theory and would be welcomed as explanatory adjuncts. (Kopra (2019), e.g., tells us that China learned to exercise great power responsibility in the environmental regime by watching the United States.) At the level of primary institutions, it hypothesizes a central role for organizations in constituting new norms, empowering actors and institutionalizing change. The model also allows for the

140 

C. NAVARI

development of postulates concerning the aspirations of international organizations (whether, e.g., they all have the same aspirations—Christian Brütsch 2014 suggests that they have not), as well as illuminating central processes in the social formation of international society itself.

Working, Reproduction and Transformation In liberal institutional theory, phenomena such as sovereignty, balance of power, inclination to war and great power management are generally considered to be constraints on the working of IOs. In the ES understanding of institutions, they are not constraints but constitutional foundations that inform the inner mechanisms of the organization. Ahrens argues that the solidarist aspects of the EU came about, not despite, but by way of pluralist impulses and via the foundational principle of national sovereignty. She further observes that solidarist impulses are absorbed into the EU constitutional order in “alleviated versions”, which reproduce pluralist forms in solidarist shapes (Ahrens 2019, 275–77). She illustrates the process in regard to R2P, referencing the EU’s support for ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (p. 287). Michael Smith (Smith 2004) outlines the novel process for producing an EU ‘foreign policy’ (he calls it “multi-level governance”)— a ‘High Representative’ moving between Brussels and national capitols pulling together policies from often differently conceived national stances to form temporary alignments. He mentions almost in passing that the aim is to respect both Great Power autonomy and continued sovereignty over foreign policy. Dennis Schmidt’s 2019 study of the emergence of a jus cogens in international law reveals not only its obligations to Great Power Management, institutionalized in the Security Council, but also Security Council management of such emergent international law as might impinge on its prerogatives. The result in all cases brings us arguably closer to the reality of international politics and to its political processes than Keohane’s ‘rationalistic’ account. The model also theorizes the reproductive function in international society, without which it could scarcely qualify as a society. It postulates that organizations and regimes are central mechanism for the reproduction of fundamental norms and practices, and accordingly to the reproduction of international society itself. Article 2.1 of the UN Charter, for example, institutionalizes sovereign equality of all its members, and rule 137 ensures it by placing admittance of new members in the hands of the Security Council, reproducing the fundamental norm of sovereign equality. Article

  INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 

141

3.3 of the 1963 Organization of African Unity Charter established territorial integrity (and actually no change of borders) as a basic principle of membership and introduced the territorial norm into a socio/political terrain large parts of which were unused to, and even hostile to, the concept of fixed borders. In the same manner, Razlan Ibraham records how the founding of the Arab League played an important role in “selecting, introducing, expressing, specifying and legitimizing principles and practices of Westphalian sovereignty” in Arab inter-state relations. Buzan and Sunay’s database of primary institutions maps (see Buranelli 2019) the reception of Buzan’s master and derivative primary institutions into regional organizations, noting variances. Buranelli’s 2019 analysis of their findings pays particular attention to the variances as part of an evolving theory of regionalism based on the differential reception of basic norms. But perhaps the most important aspect of the larger project is the illumination it sheds on the role of organizations and regimes in the transformation of foundational institutions. Organizations in the international order perform the same political functions as in the domestic order: they provide a locus for aggregation and voice. But in the legally de-centralized international order where norm-setting and legalization of goals and processes are dispersed, they go further and also legislate them. It was the emergence of a humanitarian law through, originally, congresses and conventions that changed the regulation of war as an institution. It is through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that the idea of environmental stewardship has been formalized and made a responsibility of states, which in turn has raised the idea of Great Power management as encompassing environmental stewardship (an idea which the United States is presently firmly refusing and China eagerly adopting: Kopra 2019, 164–65). International organizational processes have even changed the foundational idea of sovereignty itself, raising the norm of ‘responsibility to protect’ to a constitutional obligation (GAR 60/1, 2005), providing that ‘legitimately elected democratic governments’ be protected from ‘an overthrow or attempted overthrow’,9 and legalizing “collective enforcement, in principle and in practice, of international law and international humanitarian law” (Knudsen 2019, 196). In his essay on Western Values, Martin Wight defined international society in terms of, among other things “the regular operations of 9  ECOWAS protocol 1999; Community of Democracies, Warsaw Declaration 2000, UNSCR 940 to Restore Democracy in Haiti.

142 

C. NAVARI

international law” and “economic, social and technical interdependence and the functional international institutions established latterly to regulate it” (Wight 1966, 97). Knudsen and Navari’s account in International Organization in the Anarchical Society presents the most fully worked out theory to date of how this occurs, and their model is to be recommended on that account. But it is the case studies that put the meat on the bones.

Bibliography Ahrens, Bettina. 2019. The European Union Between Solidarist Change and Pluralist Re-Enactment. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, 265–292. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bevir, Mark. 2017. Situated agency: A postfoundational alternative to autonomy. In M. Bevir. Finite But Unbounded: New Approaches in Philosphical Anthropology, 47–66. Berlin: De Gruyter. Brütsch, Christian. 2014. Technocratic Manager, Imperial Agent, or Diplomatic Champion? The IMF in the Anarchical Society. Review of International Studies 40 (2): 207–226. Bull, Hedley. 1977a. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. ———. 1977b. The Anarchical Society: A Study or Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Buranelli, Filippo Costa. 2019. Global International Society, Regional International Societies and Regional International Organizations: A Dataset of Primary Institutions. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T. Knudsen and C. Navari, 233–263. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doxey, Margaret. 1972. International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis. International Organization 26 (3): 527–550. Dunne, Tim. 1995. The Social Construction of International Society. European Journal of International Relations 1 (3): 367–389. Evans, Tony, and Peter Wilson. 1992. Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21 (3): 329–351. Holsti, K.J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 

143

Hurrell, Andrew. 1993. International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach. In Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Ritberger, 49–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackson, Robert H. 2000. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. James, Alan. 1990. Peacekeeping in International Politics. London: St. Martin’s Press. ———. 1993. System or Society? Review of International Studies 19 (3): 269–288. Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 379–396. Knudsen, Tonny Brems. 2019. Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, 23–50. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Knudsen, Tonny Brems, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2019. International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kopra, Sanna. 2019. China, Great Power Management, and Climate Change: Negotiating Great Power Climate Responsibility. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B. Knudsen and C. Navari, 149–174. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Meyer, J.W., J. Boli, and G. Thomas. 1987. Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account. In Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual, ed. G. Thomas et al., 12–37. New York: Sage. Navari, Cornelia. 2013. International Organisations in the Anarchical Society: Interim Report of an English School Research Project. Paper presented at the 8th Pan-European International Studies Conference, Warsaw, September 18–21. Reus-Smit, Chris. 1997. The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. International Organization 51 (4): 555–589. Schmidt, Dennis. 2019. Institutionalising Morality: The UN Security Council and the Fundamental Norms of the International Legal Order. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: the Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B. Knudsen and C. Navari, 99–126. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Searle, John. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin Books. Smith, Michael. 2004. Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-­ Level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 740–758.

144 

C. NAVARI

Spandler, Kilian. 2015. The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions. Review of International Studies 41 (3): 601–622. Vigezzi, Brunello. 2005. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. Milan: Edizioni Unicopli. Wight, Martin. 1966. Western Values in International Relations. In Diplomatic Investigations. ed. by H. Butterfield and M. Wight, 89–131. London: George Allen & Unwn. Wight, Martin. 1978. Power Politics. Leicester: Leicester University Press. ———. 1991. International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Using the English School to Understand Current Issues in World Politics Charlotta Friedner Parrat and Kilian Spandler

Reading the preceding chapters as well as some of the classics of the English School, it is understandable if one gets the impression that the School has primarily been oriented toward history and continuity. Much of its work up until around a decade ago has gone into developing a terminology and methodological approach for studying general characteristics of international society. It does not surprise, therefore, that it rarely features in research addressing contemporary issues in world politics, which are arguably characterized more by transformation and upheaval than stability. However, this lack of visibility does not mean that the School has nothing to say on these topics. In fact, the most recent wave of English School scholarship carries a very active research agenda concerned with present issues and contemporary problems. This agenda draws on the very important groundwork laid in previous generations of English School

C. F. Parrat (*) Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] K. Spandler University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3_10

145

146 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

research in employing their central concepts and historical ideal-types to analyze current developments and ongoing transformations. This chapter thus asks in what way the English School is a helpful framework for addressing questions that are likely to concern International Relations (IR) researchers in the years to come. We argue that its value for tackling these issues is currently underestimated. The chapter will draw on recent scholarship to demonstrate the utility and fruitfulness of the English School in making sense of current issues. To make our case, we will revisit research on, first, the role of the emerging powers and the future of world order; second, globalization and regionalization; and third, European security and Brexit. As we conclude in the final section, the unique theoretical, conceptual and methodological approach of the English School makes it an essential resource for understanding and critically investigating current world politics.

The Role of Emerging Powers and the Future of World Order One of the central IR debates on current world politics assumes that a fundamental shift is under way in global order. This transformation concerns both its actors and its structure. Regarding the former, the hegemonic status of the US is challenged by states that are quickly catching up in terms of military and economic strength. Regarding the latter, these emerging powers are increasingly projecting their own ideas about international relations on the global level, thus confronting the institutional framework—most prominently: the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations (UN) and the G7—that dominated global governance ever since the end of the Second World War. At the same time, these foundations are also attacked from their very core, as the US under Trump has shifted toward a more unilateral and erratic foreign policy. These developments have sparked a debate over the future of what is usually referred to as the ‘liberal world order’. Still somewhat US-centric, this debate is currently caught up between different versions of realism (Kirshner 2012; Kupchan 2012; Mearsheimer 2014) and a broadly liberal camp (Ikenberry 2008, 2011; Slaughter 2017), although there are also some interventions introducing non-Western, post-colonial and poststructuralist points of view (Acharya 2014; Stuenkel 2016; Wojczewski 2018). The main point of contention between these authors is whether

  USING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT ISSUES… 

147

the liberal order can survive—either by salvaging US hegemony or by integrating emerging powers—or the world will plunge into instability and conflict. Many contributions painstakingly discuss the extent and implications of the ‘rise of China’ as well as possible strategies—containment, engagement or a mix of both—for policy-makers in the West. For the English School, seeing disorder as the only possible alternative to Western hegemony is a category mistake. After all, the possibility of order despite anarchy is its core concern (Bull 1977). It also takes issue with the analytical focus of the debate. First, existing takes rely on an actor-centered understanding of power and conceptualize it as an independent variable influencing the stability and effectiveness of international institutions and regimes (Hopewell 2017). However, since institutions in the English School sense have constitutive effects, they also restrain and shape power. As institutions change, what ‘counts’ as power in world politics can also change. For example, if we move from a (liberal) solidarist international society, the importance of democratic legitimacy as a source of soft power relative to crude material resources may very well decline. At the same time, the US will continue to benefit from the liberal institutions it spearheaded after the Second World War even if it loses its hegemonic position in material and ideational terms (Duncombe and Dunne 2018, 33). Second, when liberals and realists (and in fact most non-mainstream scholars as well) talk about institutions, they look to international organizations and governance mechanisms. Such an approach runs the risk of either over- or underestimating the potential for conflict and transformation. Scuffles over secondary institutions such as forum-shopping and building competing organizations might tell us something about changes to the international pecking order (Hopewell 2017), but they are unlikely to fundamentally affect the underlying rules of the game of world politics (Buzan and Schouenborg 2018). If, on the other hand, authors suggest seemingly easy fixes to accommodate emerging powers, such as reshuffling votes in international fora, then we might overlook much deeper divides over the fundamental normative framework of international society. By contrast, English School scholarship on the institutional dimension of world order puts arguments about primary institutions such as the norms and principles of international law, and how they empower and restrain states’ ability to act in international organizations, front and center (Knudsen and Navari 2019). Arguably, thus, the English School is uniquely well placed to deliver more fine-grained analyses of world order

148 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

dynamics (Duncombe and Dunne 2018). Clark has made a convincing argument that discussing world order requires an integrated framework of material and social factors (Clark 2014, 323f). He is one of several English School authors who have explored whether China is actually rising in any IR-relevant and theoretically interesting way. Instead of focusing on material aspects or strategic doctrine, they ask whether China acts as a norm-­ taker accepting the current international framework and the responsibilities that go along with its rising status, as a norm-maker challenging that framework or as a free-rider foregoing its responsibilities (Clark 2014, 337–340; Kopra 2019, forthc.; Zhang 2016, 803f). A dominant way of the School is to use the institutions of international society as a measuring rod for changing world order—an approach pioneered already by Bull (1977; see also Buzan 2004; Buzan and Schouenborg 2018). In the case of China’s rise, that means looking at how China interprets, and attempts to change, the institutions of international society (Buzan 2018a, b, c; Gaskarth 2015). Instead of fixating on a binary choice between integrating China into the Western-led order and facing anarchy, an English School framework thus allows focusing on ‘the politics of hierarchy [such as] how rising Chinese power wrestles with liberal hierarchies of global international society with a new unfolding raison de système’ (Zhang 2016, 798). Evidently, the English School’s methodological orientation toward the practices of international actors as well as the subjective ‘thought’ or intersubjective principles that guide them means that it is well disposed for such an agenda (Knudsen, this volume; Navari 2009). Building on such analysis, English School scholars would gauge the potential for conflict between the West and emerging powers not simply by analyzing the relative capabilities of major powers and their attitudes to and behavior in international organizations. What matters most is their ability to arrive at a great power bargain, an implicit or explicit agreement that mutual restraint and acknowledgment of interests based on fundamental principles will best serve their interest. Often overlooked by realist scholarship, the hegemonic influence of great powers will have to be crafted in a way that is acceptable to minor and medium states, especially those in the immediate regional neighborhood of the respective power (Buzan 2010; Costa Buranelli 2018). Secondary institutions will not simply reflect the new international pecking order once the dust has settled. They are the main sites where primary institutions of the liberal order will be defended, challenged and redefined (Friedner Parrat 2014; Knudsen 2019). Recent

  USING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT ISSUES… 

149

advances in the theorization of institutional change, including the relation between primary and secondary institutions (Friedner Parrat 2017; Knudsen and Navari 2019; Spandler 2015), are an important asset for the English School in this regard.

Globalization and Regionalization The emergence of regional powers also reinforces another mega-trend in world politics, namely regionalization. Despite setbacks, regional integration processes in Europe and beyond are persisting. Regional organizations have also grown more assertive as global actors, and some have shown a preference for regional solutions for regional security issues. However, the role of regions in global governance remains unsettled. Are regions building blocks for global governance, or will they undermine global efforts by global institutions? The sub-fields of comparative regionalism and International Political Economy have especially labored over this question (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Söderbaum 2016; Telò 2014), but they play into many other fields of IR. For example, both security and area studies scholars are debating how the peacekeeping efforts of the African Union and sub-regional African organizations play into the UN’s self-understanding as a universal body for peace and security matters, while development researchers wonder what role regional organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can or should play in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. The IR literature surrounding these questions is mainly cast in terms of regional governance. It aims to explain differences in organizational design by referring to regional supply and demand factors, and it investigates the potential for cooperation and conflict under conditions of regime complexity (Börzel and Risse 2016). Consequently, scholars focus on the politics in and between regional secondary institutions while mostly ignoring the ‘deep-structural’ dimensions of international society that underlie the proliferation of these governance arrangements. Whether and how regional governance ‘fits’ into the broader fabric of global governance is not just a matter of inter-operability—for example, between the UN and regional security actors. It is conditioned by historically grown ideas about regional and global order, and specifically the tension between pluralist and solidarist, or communitarian and cosmopolitan, principles in political thought and practice (Hurrell 2007a, b). The governance paradigm also has its shortcomings when it comes to explaining differences across

150 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

regions. Despite the proliferation and pluralization of institutional forms, we still lack an understanding of the mechanisms that lead to the development of these diverse manifestations of regionalism. A particular blind spot is the question of how historical processes and narratives have shaped specific regionalisms (Fawcett 2015). Addressing these questions, an English School perspective highlights that regionalization reflects two dialectically interwoven developments: the construction of distinct ideas about order and common purpose in different world regions (i.e. regional international societies), and the contested notion of regionalism as an ordering principle on the global level of international society. Shaped by these parallel dynamics, the role of regions is constantly evolving, which is why sweeping, abstract claims about how they fit into the global order will inevitably overlook the specific politics in different world regions and sectoral dimensions of the regional-global relation. Chapter 8 by Stivachtis in this volume provides a comprehensive review of regional approaches in the English School, and it is not our goal to replicate it here. Instead, we would like to highlight ways in which the focus on regional agency in recent English School scholarship can contribute to current research agendas. A first such area is comparison, a venture with a long pedigree in the English School (Watson 1992; Wight 1977). Recent English School work has identified various mechanisms of region-­ building, such as normative arguing (Spandler 2019a), in- and exclusion or boundary-drawing (Linsenmaier 2015, 2018), and interpretive practices through which globally shared primary institutions gain regionally specific meanings (Buzan and Zhang 2014; Costa Buranelli 2015, 2019). These perspectives provide an opportunity for cross-regional comparisons that go beyond the functional institutionalist focus that pervades Comparative Regionalism, seeing individual forms of regionalism instead as shaped by the promotion and contestation of different notions of regional order and common purpose. Developing a better understanding of agency is crucial for the future development of the regional-global nexus. Buzan’s (2004) structural typology of potential constellations—regionalism undermining globalism, second-order pluralism and regionalism as a vanguard for globalism—provides a helpful analytical point of reference. But how do agents of international society steer the relationship in one direction or the other (Stivachtis 2015a, b)? Again, the conceptual apparatus of the English School points to the creation and transformation of international institutions as a main

  USING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT ISSUES… 

151

focal point of inquiry. It allows us to ask whether regionalism, or regional representation, is a primary institution of global international society, how its principles and norms have been interpreted over time, and how this has affected regional projects around the world (Friedner Parrat 2014; Tan 2016). Depending on such interpretative practices (e.g. relating to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), certain types of regional organizations might become more empowered than others. Reversing the ‘causal arrow’, English School researchers are also exploring how regional organizations develop normative actorness that allows them to shape global international society. For example, although the European Union (EU) is constrained by lingering state-centrism in the institutions at the global level, it is actively promoting solidarization beyond its borders (Ahrens 2019; Ahrens and Diez 2015). Finally, the English School can analyze spaces where tensions between global and regional understandings of international society emerge, and how such frictions can be mediated (Tan 2015). In this, it can go beyond those approaches that reduce conflicts at the intersection of global and regional governance to issues of inter-­operability and dialogue. Such managerial approaches will inevitably fail if the underlying frictions over authority and legitimacy remain unaddressed (Spandler 2019b).

European Security and Brexit One final topic that occupies IR scholars of various stripes is that of European security and the future of the European Union after Brexit. Generally, the most important point of contention has been European external security, as intra-European security still seems to be all but taken for granted. Focusing on the EU as a ‘security community-building’ organization (Bremberg 2015), authors have asked what the EU can achieve outside of its own borders, or what sort of foreign policy actor the EU is (Manners 2002, 2006). Obviously, the picture further complicates when adding the internal strains of the Union and the prospect of the UK leaving the EU (Rosamond 2016). How will Brexit affect EU-NATO cooperation, or the division of labor between those two entities (Græger 2017)? Will Brexit lead to non-members participating in the Common Security and Defence Policy (Whitman 2016), or to a stronger bilateral bond between the UK and France (Martill and Sus 2018)? What happens to the transatlantic link (Biscop 2016) and to European security and geopolitics more widely (Oliver and Williams 2016)?

152 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

Since the Cold War, English School authors have contributed to debates on European security from their particular theoretical vantage point and often with a decidedly normative stance. Consistent with the School’s general perspective on historical evolution, their interests have varied over time. The balance of power being for a long time a vital European concern, NATO and the Warszawa pact naturally constituted foci of attention (Bull 1983; Howard 1982). To Bull (1982, see also 1983), it seemed that (Western) Europe had a responsibility for its own military security which it ought to shoulder in a more decisive and cooperative fashion to decrease pressure on the American presence in Europe. In the changing security environment after the end of the Cold War, issues of human security became more pronounced (Bellamy and McDonald 2004; Makinda 2005). This shift, of course, aligned with the increasing focus in the English School on the pluralist-solidarist debate at that time (Buzan 2004; Weinert 2011; Wheeler 2000; see already Bull 1966), which over time came to be defined along the fault-lines of national versus human security. Regarding ‘what’ the EU is, scholars have drawn on a variety of English School tools that make it possible to go beyond the mainstream focus of analyzing policy coherence and effectiveness (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Peters 2015). At the federalist end of the scale, three conceptualizations have been particularly influential: first, the EU has been understood as a ‘Watsonian’ empire. The center of this empire is not strong enough to exercise coercion on the other parts, but it provides coordination and cooperation for the benefit of the whole because, as Wæver (1996, 228–233, 250) put it, ‘there needs to be a centre somewhere’. In this interpretation, the EU-as-empire has three primary functions: ensuring the coherence of its own core (notably in the shape of Franco-German peace), exercising a stabilizing influence on its immediate neighborhood (mainly with carrots and the occasional stick) and by direct action in the event of foreign policy crises at the outskirts of Europe (including armed interventions). Second, following Bull (1977), the EU has been characterized as a neo-medieval nested system (Rennger 2000). The underlying idea here is that of multiple loyalties replacing citizens’ presumed nationalist loyalty to their own state (Linklater 1982, 1998). Third, emphasizing the normative element of the Union, it has been analyzed using the concept of world society (Diez and Whitman 2002; Linsenmaier 2018; Stivachtis 2014a, b). World society implies that there are values and interests that unite individuals in Europe regardless of nationality, and that shared norms among its people(s) may trump national considerations.

  USING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT ISSUES… 

153

At the intergovernmental end of the scale, the EU may also be considered a regional international society, overlapping with other regional societies under the larger umbrella of global international society (Ahrens and Diez 2015; Linsenmaier 2015; Stivachtis and Webber 2011). In this conceptualization, emphasis is on the functional cooperation within the union, and the effects it may have both on surrounding areas and on global international society. Similarly, the EU might be seen as a secondary institution (Ahrens 2019; for this terminology, see also Buzan 2004; Makinda 2002). This perspective links to the central English School idea that the fundamental (or primary) institutions which maintain regional international societies can be institutionalized through international organizations (Knudsen and Navari 2019). Therefore, the English School does not take the standard approach of measuring the EU’s significance for international security in direct outcomes such as effective peace operations or mediation successes, but asks to what extent it can change the broader institutional fabric according to its normative proclivities. So far, however, the EU’s record in trying to ‘solidarize’ international society beyond its borders has been mixed (Ahrens 2019; Ahrens and Diez 2015). For obvious reasons, not so much has yet been written about Brexit from an English School perspective, but one early attempt uses the English School concept of primary institutions to estimate the effects of the British popular vote to leave the union (Wilson and Oliver 2018). The results suggest that Brexit is not likely to provoke very severe consequences on the systemic level, but that a likely effect might be the weakening of Britain’s claim to great power status—which might in extension lead to a weakening of Europe vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Similarly, early studies of how Brexit will influence the UK and its great power status at the global scene suggest that Brexit leads to a substantial erosion of Britain’s ‘diplomatic capital’ at the UN level, thereby affecting its capabilities to act as a global player (Gifkins et al. 2019; Ralph et al. 2019). Beyond these studies, Brexit raises questions that will make it necessary to critically revisit older English School contributions on what the EU is and can be. Can we still speak of a European empire if its ‘center’ fails in its core function of counteracting centrifugal forces such as the British ‘leave’ campaign? Have hopes of an emerging world society on a European scale underestimated the inertia of nationalism as a primary institution in Europe, as the populist backlash against the EU in the United Kingdom and elsewhere suggests? And does Brexit undermine or strengthen the EU’s solidarization efforts beyond its borders? Questions like these are likely to shape the English School research agenda on European security for the foreseeable future.

154 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

Conclusion In this chapter, we have highlighted just three areas where a new wave of English School research is already making valuable, though rarely acknowledged, contributions to the exploration of topical issues in IR: the role of emerging powers and the future of world order; globalization and regionalization; and European security and Brexit. Not all of the authors use the School in a dogmatic fashion, and innovative perspectives have often emerged through engagements with other theories and approaches— regime theory, social constructivism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism and so on. However, there are several ways in which the unique via media tradition of the English School positions it particularly well for the study of current transitions in world politics. Theoretically, its main ontological assumptions (world politics are always situated between anarchy and organization) and its historical macro-view (attention to major shifts in the way international society is understood) make it sensitive to the subtleties and apparent contradictions of the current transitions. This gives it an edge over many mainstream approaches that tend to over-generalize or overestimate some of the trends regarding, for example, the future of world order. The English School acknowledges the current push for disruption and transformation but contextualizes it in longer trajectories of international society, which allows it to see the big picture and build on historical experience rather than assuming complete novelty in any situation. At the same time, the English School’s methodological stance makes for a fine sensorium for change. Its interpretivist practice-orientation allows it to uncover slow but tectonic shifts in world politics that might be overlooked by more formal and deductive approaches (e.g. on regime complexity), but in a way that still lends itself to abstraction, theory-­ building (e.g. through historical or cross-regional comparison), in short: sense-making (Navari 2009). In this, the English School’s benefits from its epistemologically balanced willingness to problematize categories of thought without denying their analytical value altogether because they might be mere tools of discursive power or epistemological violence. This is a particularly instructive vantage point for studying a world that is (a) caught up between stability and change, and (b) characterized by an increasing differentiation of perspectives (see the buzzwords of a post-­ hegemonic, polycentric, multiplex world) that contest meanings of established institutions and norms. For example, while critical observers might

  USING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT ISSUES… 

155

argue—certainly with some reason!—that the notion of a primary institution of great power management may contribute to the perpetuation of hegemonic practices, it still remains a useful concept precisely because it is now filled with new practices and interpreted differently by various actors that challenge Western hegemony. As a final benefit—one beyond the scope of this chapter to demonstrate in detail but that is important nevertheless—the English School rejects the neat separation of empirical and political views of the world, and instead sees its analysis of world politics as inescapably linked to normative reflection (Cochran 2014; Jackson 2000; Linklater 2011; Wheeler 2000; Williams 2015). In this, it can build on a rich tradition of normative debate. While the pluralism-solidarism distinction is likely to remain a crucial axis of discussion, we are optimistic that new English School voices from the Global South can enrich normative theorizing by drawing on non-Western schools of thought. The potential for cross-fertilization between Chinese political philosophy and the English School (and IR theory more broadly), for example, has already been noted by Wang and Buzan (2014), and it would be interesting to explore to what extent Confucian concepts like tianxia (‘all-under-heaven’, see Wang 2013, 47–49) relate to English School concepts like solidarism, world society and imperialism. This ability to merge analytical and critical observations of different backgrounds will be an indispensable asset for IR theory in making sense of current world politics.

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. 2014. The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. Ahrens, Bettina. 2019. The European Union Between Solidarist Change and Pluralist Re-Enactment. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen & Cornelia Navari, 265–292. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ahrens, Bettina, and Thomas Diez. 2015. Solidarisation and Its Limits: The EU and the Transformation of International Society. Global Discourse 5 (3): 341–355. Bellamy, Alex J., and Matt McDonald. 2004. Securing International Society: Towards an English school Discourse of Security. Australian Journal of Political Science 39 (2): 307–330. Biscop, Sven. 2016. All or Nothing? The EU Global Strategy and Defence Policy After the Brexit. Contemporary Security Policy 37 (3): 431–445.

156 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

Börzel, T.A., and Thomas Risse, eds. 2016. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bremberg, Niklas. 2015. The European Union as Security Community-Building Institution: Venues, Networks and Co-Operative Security Practices. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 53 (3): 674–692. Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler. 2006. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Bull, Hedley. 1966. Society and Anarchy in International Relations. In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 35–50. London: Allen & Unwin. ———. 1977. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. ———. 1982. Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (2): 149–170. ———. 1983. European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO. Foreign Affairs 61 (4): 874–892. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2010. China in International Society: Is Peaceful Rise Possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (1): 5–36. ———. 2018a. Revisiting World Society. International Politics 55 (1): 125–140. ———. 2018b. Background to the Reconvening of the English School. Unpublished Document, London. ———. 2018c. China’s Rise in English School Perspective. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18 (3): 449–476. Buzan, Barry, and Laust Schouenborg. 2018. Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Yongjin Zhang, eds. 2014. Contesting International Society in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clark, Ian. 2014. International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Power. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (3): 315–340. Cochran, Molly. 2014. Normative Theory in the English School. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. Cornelia Navari & Daniel Green, 185–204. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Costa Buranelli, Filippo. 2015. ‘Do You Know What I Mean?’ ‘Not Exactly’: English School, Global International Society and the Polysemy of Institutions. Global Discourse 5 (3): 499–514. ———. 2018. Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony—The Case of Central Asia. Geopolitics 23 (2): 378–403. ———. 2019. Global International Society, Regional International Societies and Regional International Organizations: A Data Set of Primary Institutions. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, 233–64. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

  USING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT ISSUES… 

157

Diez, Thomas, and Richard Whitman. 2002. Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School. Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (1): 43–67. Duncombe, Constance, and Tim Dunne. 2018. After Liberal World Order. International Affairs 94 (1): 25–42. Fawcett, Louise. 2015. Drivers of Regional Integration: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. In Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia: Comparative Perspectives, ed. L. Brennan and P. Murray, 34–51. London/New York: Routledge. Fawcett, Louse, and Andrew Hurrell, eds. 1995. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Friedner Parrat, Charlotta. 2014. International Organization in International Society: UN Reform from an English School Perspective. Journal of International Organizations Studies 5 (2): 7–21. ———. 2017. On the Evolution of Primary Institutions of International Society. International Studies Quarterly 61 (3): 623–630. Gaskarth, Jamie, ed. 2015. China, India and the Future of International Society. London: Rowman and Littlefield. Gifkins, Jess, Samuel Jarvis, and Jason Ralph. 2019. Brexit and the UN Security Council: declining British influence?. International Affairs. 95.6: 1349–1368 Græger, Nina. 2017. Grasping the Everyday and Extraordinary in EU–NATO Relations: The Added Value of Practice Approaches. European Security 26 (3): 340–358. Hopewell, Kristen. 2017. The BRICS—Merely a Fable? Emerging Power Alliances in Global Trade Governance. International Affairs 93 (6): 1377–1396. Howard, Michael. 1982. Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s. Foreign Affairs 61 (2): 309–324. Hurrell, Andrew. 2007a. On Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007b. One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society. International Affairs 83 (1): 127–146. Ikenberry, G. John. 2008. The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87 (1): 23–37. ———. 2011. The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America. Foreign Affairs 90 (3): 56–62. Jackson, Robert H. 2000. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kirshner, Jonathan. 2012. The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China. European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 53–75. Knudsen, Tonny Brems. 2019. Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Solidarist Architecture. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society. The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen & Cornelia Navari, 175–202. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

158 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

Knudsen, Tonny Brems, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2019. International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kopra, Sanna. 2019. China, Great Power Management, and Climate Change: Negotiating Great Power Climate Responsibility. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B. Knudsen and C. Navari, 149–174. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kupchan, C. 2012. No One’s World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linklater, Andrew. 1982. Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. London/Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press. ———. 1998. The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. ———. 2011. The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linsenmaier, Thomas. 2015. The Interplay Between Regional International Societies. Global Discourse 5 (3): 452–467. ———. 2018. World Society as Collective Identity: World Society, International Society, and Inclusion/Exclusion from Europe. International Politics 55 (1): 91–107. Makinda, Samuel M. 2002. Hedley Bull and Global Governance: A Note on IR Theory. Australian Journal of International Affairs 56 (3): 361–371. ———. 2005. Security in International Society: A Comment on Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald. Australian Journal of Political Science 40 (2): 275–287. Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 235–258. ———. 2006. Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2): 182–199. Martill, Benjamin, and Monika Sus. 2018. Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or ‘French Connection’? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20 (4): 846–863. Mearsheimer, J. 2014. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated edition. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. Navari, Cornelia. 2009. What the Classical English School Was Trying to Explain, and Why Its Members Were Not Interested in Causal Explanation. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. C. Navari, 39–57. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Oliver, Tim, and Michael John Williams. 2016. Special Relationships in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US–EU and US–UK Relationships. International Affairs 92 (3): 547–567.

  USING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL TO UNDERSTAND CURRENT ISSUES… 

159

Peters, Ingo, ed. 2015. The European Union’s Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Beyond the “Actorness and Power” Debate. London/New York: Routledge. Ralph, Jason, Jess Gifkins, and Samuel Jarvis 2020. The United Kingdom’s special responsibilities at the United Nations: Diplomatic practice in normative context. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22 (2): 164–181. Rennger, Nicholas J. 2000. European Communities in a Neo-Medieval Global Polity: The Dilemmas of Fairyland? In International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community, ed. M. Kelstrup and M.C. Williams, 57–71. London/New York: Routledge. Rosamond, Ben. 2016. Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration. Journal of Contemporary European Research 12 (4): 864–871. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2017. The return of anarchy?. Journal of International Affairs 11–16. Söderbaum, F. 2016. Rethinking Regionalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Spandler, Kilian. 2015. The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions. Review of International Studies 41 (3): 601–622. Spandler, Killian. 2019a. Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Spandler, Kilian. 2019b. Legitimating Global-Regional Peacekeeping Cooperation: UNAMID and the Hybridity Paradox. Unpublished Manuscript Presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Toronto, 27–30 March. Stivachtis, Yannis A. 2014a. European Union and World Order: An English School Approach. Estudos Internacionais: Revista de Relações Internacionais Da PUC Minas 2 (2): 321–341. ———. 2014b. The Regional Dimension of International Society. In Guide to the English school in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D. Green, 109–126. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2015a. Enlargement, Conditionality and Empire. In Revisiting the Idea of the European Union as Empire, ed. H. Behr and Y.A. Stivachtis, 74–95. London: Routledge. ———. 2015b. Liberal Democracy, Market Economy, and International Conduct as Standards of ‘Civilization’ in Contemporary International Society: The Case of Russia’s Entry into the ‘Community of Civilized States’. Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2): 130–142. Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Mark Webber. 2011. Regional International Society in a Post-Enlargement Europe. European Integration 33 (2): 101–116. Stuenkel, Oliver. 2016. Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. Tan, Elaine S.Y. 2015. Interactions Between African and Global International Societies: The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Global Discourse 5 (3): 398–411.

160 

C. F. PARRAT AND K. SPANDLER

———. 2016. A World of Regions and States: Reconciling the Regional and the Global. Unpublished Manuscript Presented at the 3rd European Workshops in International Studies, Tübingen, 6–8 April. Teló, Mario, ed. 2014. European Union and New Regionalism. 3rd ed. London/ New York: Routledge. Wæver, Ole. 1996. Europe’s Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-­ Wall European Security. In International Society After the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, ed. R. Fawn and J. Larkins, 220–260. Basingstoke/ London: Macmillan. Wang, Hung Jen. 2013. The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship. Plymouth: Lexington Books. Wang, Jiangli, and Barry Buzan. 2014. The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations: Comparisons and Lessons. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (1): 1–46. Watson, Adam. 1992. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge. Weinert, Matthew S. 2011. Reframing the Pluralist–Solidarist Debate. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40 (1): 21–41. Wheeler, Nicholas. 2000. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whitman, Richard G. 2016. The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached? National Institute Economic Review 238 (1): R43–R50. Wight, Martin. 1977. Systems of States, edited with an introduction by Hedley Bull. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Williams, John. 2015. Ethics, Diversity, and World Politics: Saving Pluralism from Itself? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Peter, and Tim Oliver. 2018. The International Consequences of Brexit: An English School Analysis. Journal of European Integration 41 (8): 1009–1025. Wojczewski, Thorsten. 2018. Global Power Shifts and World Order: The Contestation of ‘Western’ Discursive Hegemony. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 31 (1): 33–52. Zhang, Yongjin. 2016. China and Liberal Hierarchies in Global International Society: Power and Negotiation for Normative Change. International Affairs 92 (4): 795–816.

Bibliography

Aalberts, Tanja. 2010. Playing the Game of Sovereign States: Charles Manning’s Constructivism avant-la-lettre. European Journal of International Relations 16 (2): 247–268. Aalto, Pami. 2007. Russia’s Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level International Societies. International Relations 21 (4): 459–478. Acharya, Amitav. 2014. The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. Adler, Emanuel. 2005. Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School: ‘Not All the Way Down’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (1): 171–182. ———. 2019. World Ordering. A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot. 2011. International Practices. International Theory 3 (10): 1–36. Ahrens, Bettina. 2017. The Solidarisation of International Society: The EU in the Global Climate Change Regime. GLOBUS Research Paper 5/2017. http:// www.globus.uio.no/publications/globus-research-papers/ ———. 2019. The European Union Between Solidarist Change and Pluralist Re-Enactment. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, 265–292. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ahrens, Bettina, and Thomas Diez. 2015. Solidarisation and Its Limits: The EU and the Transformation of International Society. Global Discourse 5 (3): 341–355.

© The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3

161

162 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alderson, Kai, and Andrew Hurrell, eds. 2001. Hedley Bull on International Society. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Alexandrowicz, C.H. 1973. The European-African Confrontation. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff. Anievas, Alexander, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, eds. 2015. Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line. Abingdon: Routledge. Armitage, David. 2012. Foundations of Modern International Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ayoob, Mohammed. 1983/4. Security in the Third World. International Affairs 60 (1): 41–51. ———, ed. 1986. Regional Security in the Third World. London: Groom Helm. ———. 1989. The Third World in the System of States. International Studies Quarterly 33 (1): 67–79. ———. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. ———. 1999. From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order. Australian Journal of International Affairs 53 (3): 247–260. Ayson, Robert. 2012. Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bain, William. 2003. Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007. One Order, Two Laws: Recovering the ‘Normative’ in English School Theory. Review of International Studies 33: 557–575. ———. 2014. Rival Traditions of Natural Law: Martin Wight and the Theory of International Society. International History Review 36 (5): 943–960. Banks, Michael. 1973. Charles Manning, the Concept of ‘Order’, and Contemporary International Theory. In The Bases of International Order, ed. Alan James, 188–209. London: Oxford University Press. Bartelson, Jens. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bayly, C.A. 2004. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914. Oxford: Blackwell. Behr, Hartmut. 2007. The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? European Journal of International Relations 13 (2): 239–262. ———. 2011. Europe—History, Violence and “Peripheries”. Review of European Studies 4 (3): 7–17. Bell, Duncan. 2001. International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn? British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3 (1): 115–126. Bellamy, Alex, ed. 2005. International Society and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

163

Bellamy, Alex J., and Matt McDonald. 2004. Securing International Society: Towards an English school Discourse of Security. Australian Journal of Political Science 39 (2): 307–330. Bentley, J. 1993. Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Berenskoetter, Felix. 2017. Approaches to Concept Analysis. Millennium 45 (2): 151–173. Bevir, Mark, and Ryan Phillips. 2017. Genealogies of European Governance. Comparative European Politics 15: 685–704. Bially Mattern, Janice. 2001. The Power Politics of Identity. European Journal of International Relations 7 (3): 349–393. Bially Mattern, Janice, and Ayse Zarakol. 2016. Hierarchies in World Politics. International Organization 70 (3): 623–654. Biscop, Sven. 2016. All or Nothing? The EU Global Strategy and Defence Policy After the Brexit. Contemporary Security Policy 37 (3): 431–445. Blanchard, Eric M. 2011. Why Is There No Gender in the English School? Review of International Studies 37 (2): 855–879. Börzel, T.A., and Thomas Risse, eds. 2016. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bowden, Brett, and Leonard Seabrooke, eds. 2006. Global Standards of Market Civilization. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Bozeman, Ada. 1960. Politics and Culture in International History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1971. The Future of Law in a Multicultural World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bremberg, Niklas. 2015. The European Union as Security Community-Building Institution: Venues, Networks and Co-Operative Security Practices. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 53 (3): 674–692. Brenner, William J. 2016. Confounding Powers: Anarchy and International Society from the Assassins to Al Qaeda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler. 2006. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Brown, Chris. 1995. International Theory and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way. Review of International Studies 21: 183–196. Brütsch, Christian. 2014. Technocratic Manager, Imperial Agent, or Diplomatic Champion? The IMF in the Anarchical Society. Review of International Studies 40 (2): 207–226. Bukovansky, Mlada, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard MacKay Price, Christian Reus-Smit, and Nicholas J.  Wheeler. 2012. Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

164 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bull, Hedley. 1966a. Society and Anarchy in International Relations. In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 35–50. London: Allen & Unwin. ———. 1966b. The Grotian Conception of International Society. In Diplomatic Investigations, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 51–73. London: George Allen & Unwin. ———. 1966c. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. World Politics 18 (3): 361–377. Also in 1969 Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, 20–38. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1977a. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan. ———. 1977b. The Anarchical Society: A Study or Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. ———. 1979. Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory. World Politics 31 (4): 596–596. ———. 1981. Hobbes and the International Anarchy. Social Research 48 (4): 717–735. ———. 1982. Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (2): 149–170. ———. 1983. European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO. Foreign Affairs 61 (4): 874–892. ———, ed. 1984a. Intervention in World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 1984b. The Emergence of a Universal International Society. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 117–126. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1984c. The Revolt Against the West. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 217–228. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1984d. Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures. Waterloo: University of Waterloo. ———. 2012. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th ed., with Foreword by Andrew Hurrell and Stanley Hoffman. New York: Columbia University Press. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. 1984a. Introduction. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 1–9. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1984b. Conclusions. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 425–435. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———, eds. 1984c. The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bull, Hedley, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds. 1990. Hugo Grotius and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buranelli, Filippo Costa. 2013. Regional International Societies, the Polysemy of Institutions and Global International Society. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/01/from-e-pluribus-una-to-ex-una-pluresregional

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

165

———. 2014. Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of International Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42: 817–836. ———. 2015. ‘Do You Know What I Mean?’ ‘Not Exactly’: English School, Global International Society and the Polysemy of Institutions. Global Discourse 5 (3): 499–514. Butterfield, Herbert, and Martin Wight, eds. 1966. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: Allen & Unwin. Buzan, Barry. 1983a. Regional Security as a Policy Objective. In The Great Game: The Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, ed. A.Z. Rubinstein, 261–278. New York: Praeger. ———. (1983b)1991. People, States and Fear. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. ———. 1993. From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. International Organization 47 (3): 327–352. ———. 2001. The English School: An Underdeveloped Resource in IR. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 471–488. ———. 2004. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2005. The Challenge of International Political Economy and Globalization. In International Society and Its Critics, ed. Alex J. Bellamy, 115–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. The Middle East Through English School Theory. In International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level, ed. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, 24–44. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2010. China in International Society: Is Peaceful Rise Possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (1): 5–36. ———. 2014a. The International Society Approach and Asia. In The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, ed. Saaadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, 100–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2014b. An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach. Cambridge: Polity. ———. 2016. People, States and Fear. Revised ed. London: ECPR Press. ———. 2018a. Revisiting World Society. International Politics 55 (1): 125–140. ———. 2018b. Background to the Reconvening of the English School. Unpublished Document, London. ———. 2018c. China’s Rise in English School Perspective. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18 (3): 449–476. Buzan, Barry, and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds. 2009. International Society in the Middle East? English School Theory at the Regional Level. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

166 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. 2014a. Capitalism and the Emergent World Order. International Affairs 90 (1): 71–91. ———. 2014b. Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 20 (2): 437–462. ———. 2015. The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. 1994. The Idea of “International System”: Theory Meets History. International Political Science Review 15 (3): 231–255. ———. 2000. International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2014. The Historical Expansion of International Society. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 59–75. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Buzan, Barry, and Gowher Rizvi. 1986. South Asian Security and the Great Powers. London: Macmillan. Buzan, Barry, and Laust Schouenborg. 2018. Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 1992. Framing Nordic Security. In Nordic Security in the 1990s, ed. Jan Oberg, 85–104. London: Pinter. ———. 2003. Regions and Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, and Yongjin Zhang, eds. 2014. Contesting International Society in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry, M.  Kelstrup, P.  Lemaitre, E.  Tromer, and O.  Waever. 1990. The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era. London: Pinter. Buzan, Barry, O. Waever, and J. de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Callahan, W.A. 2004. Nationalizing International Theory: Race, Class and the English School. Global Society 18 (4): 305–323. Carr, E.H. 1939. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan. Clark, Ian. 2005. Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007. International Legitimacy and World Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. Democracy in International Society: Promotion or Exclusion? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37 (3): 563–581. ———. 2011. Hegemony in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2013. The Vulnerable in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2014. International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Power. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (3): 315–340.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

167

Cochran, Molly. 2014. Normative Theory in the English School. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C.  Navari and D.M.  Green, 185–204. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Cochran, Molly, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2018. Progressivism and American Foreign Policy Between the World Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Costa Buranelli, Filippo. 2019. Global International Society, Regional International Societies and Regional International Organizations: A Dataset of Primary Institutions. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: the Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B.  Knudsen and C.  Navari, 233–264. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2014. Knockin’ On Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of International Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 817–836. ———. 2015. ‘Do You Know What I Mean?’ ‘Not Exactly’: English School, Global International Society and the Polysemy of Institutions. Global Discourse 5 (3): 499–514. ———. 2018. Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony—The Case of Central Asia. Geopolitics 23 (2): 378–403. Der Derian, James, ed. 1995. International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: Macmillan. Diez, Thomas, and Richard Whitman. 2002. Analysing European Integration: Reflecting on the English School. Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (1): 43–67. Diez, Thomas, Ian Manners, and Richard Whitman. 2014. The Changing Nature of International Institutions in Europe: The Challenge of the European Union. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 17–38. London: Routledge. Donelan, Michael. 1978. Reason of States. London: George Allen & Unwin. Doxey, Margaret. 1972. International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis. International Organization 26 (3): 527–550. Duncombe, Constance, and Tim Dunne. 2018. After Liberal World Order. International Affairs 94 (1): 25–42. Dunne, Tim. 1995. The Social Construction of International Society. European Journal of International Relations 1 (3): 367–389. ———. 1998a. Inventing International Society: A History of the English School. London: Macmillan. ———. 1998b. Inventing International Society: A History of the English School. London/Oxford: Macmillan in Association with St. Antony’s. ———. 2005. System, State and Society: How Does It All Hang Together? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (1): 157–170.

168 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dunne, Tim, and Richard Little. 2014. The International System—International Society Distinction. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 91–107. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Dunne, Tim, and Christian Reus-Smit. 2017. The Globalization of International Society. In The Globalization of International Society, ed. T.  Dunne and C. Reus-Smit, 18–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dunne, Tim, and Nicholas Wheeler. 1996. Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will. International Affairs 72 (1): 91–107. Ejdus, Filip, ed. 2017. Memories of Empire and Entry into International Society: Views from the European Periphery. New York: Routledge. ENGSS. 2008. Memorandum to Re-Charter a Section. https://www.isanet.org/ ISA/Sections/ENGSS/Reports. Accessed 17 Dec 2018. ———. 2018a. About ENGSS. https://www.isanet.org/ISA/Sections/ENGSS/ About-ENGSS. Accessed 17 Dec 2018. ———. 2018b. Draft ENGSS Annual Report. Author’s Communication with ENGSS Chair Jamie Gaskarth, 5 December 2018. Epp, Richard. 2014. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics and Its Central Figures. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 25–36. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Evans, Tony, and Peter Wilson. 1992. Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21 (3): 329–351. Fabry, Mikulas. 2010. Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Falkner, Robert, and Barry Buzan. 2019. The Emergence of Environmental Stewardship as a Primary Institution of Global International Society. European Journal of International Relations 25 (1): 131–155. Fawcett, Louise. 2015. Drivers of Regional Integration: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. In Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia: Comparative Perspectives, ed. L. Brennan and P. Murray, 34–51. London/New York: Routledge. Fawcett, Louse, and Andrew Hurrell, eds. 1995. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Finnemore, Martha. 2001. Exporting the English School? Review of International Studies 27 (3): 509–513. Frankel, J. 1973. Review of The Bases of International Order ed. Alan James. International Affairs 49 (4): 627–629. Friedner Parrat, Charlotta. 2014. International Organization in International Society: UN Reform from an English School Perspective. Journal of International Organizations Studies 5 (2): 7–21. ———. 2017. On the Evolution of Primary Institutions of International Society. International Studies Quarterly 61 (3): 623–630.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

169

Frost, Mervyn. 1991. What Ought to Be Done About the Condition of States? In The Condition of States, ed. C.  Navari, 183–196. Buckingham: Open University Press. Garnett, John. 1984. Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics. London: Macmillan. Gaskarth, Jamie, ed. 2015. China, India and the Future of International Society. London: Rowman and Littlefield. Gifkins, Jess, Jason Ralph, and Samuel Jarvis. 2019. Brexit and Lost Influence? Assessing the Impacts of the Decision to Leave the EU on the UK’s Reputation Within the UN Security Council. Unpublished Manuscript Presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Toronto, 27–30 March; Accepted for the British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Gillard, D. 1984. British and Russian Relations with Asian Governments in the Nineteenth Century. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 87–98. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Göl, Ayla. 2015. Imagining the Middle East: The State, Nationalism and Regional International Society. Global Discourse 5 (3): 379–394. Gong, Gerrit. 1984. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grader, Sheila. 1988. The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation. Review of International Studies 14 (1): 29–44. Græger, Nina. 2017. Grasping the Everyday and Extraordinary in EU–NATO Relations: The Added Value of Practice Approaches. European Security 26 (3): 340–358. Grotius, Hugo. 2005. The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, ed. Richard Tuck. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Guzzini, Stefano. 2001. Calling for a Less ‘Brandish’ and Less ‘Grand’ Reconvention. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 495–501. ———. 2013. The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of Theorizing. European Journal of International Relations 19 (3): 521–541. Hall, Ian. 2006. The International Thought of Martin Wight. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2017. The ‘Revolt Against the West’ Revisited. In The Globalization of International Society, ed. T.  Dunne and C.  Reus-Smit, 345–361. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. 1991. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Holsti, K.J. 2004. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopewell, Kristen. 2017. The BRICS—Merely a Fable? Emerging Power Alliances in Global Trade Governance. International Affairs 93 (6): 1377–1396.

170 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Howard, Michael. 1982. Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s. Foreign Affairs 61 (2): 309–324. Hurrell, Andrew. 1993. International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach. In Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Ritberger, 49–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2001. Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within the English School. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 489–494. ———. 2007a. On Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007b. One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society. International Affairs 83 (1): 127–146. ———. 2012. Introduction. In The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, ed. Hedley Bull. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012 edition. Ibraham, Raslam. 2019. Primary and Secondary Institutions in Regional International Society: Sovereignty and the League of Arab States. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B.  Knudsen and C.  Navari, 293–320. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2008. The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs 87 (1): 23–37. ———. 2011. The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America. Foreign Affairs 90 (3): 56–62. Jackson, Robert H. 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1993. Armed Humanitarianism. International Journal XLVIII (4): 579–606. ———. 1999. Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape. Political Studies XLVII (3): 431–456. ———. 2000. The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2005. Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2007. Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea. Cambridge: Polity. Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics. New York: Routledge. Jackson, Robert, and Alan James, eds. 1993. States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. James, Alan. 1972. The Contemporary Relevance of National Sovereignty. In Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Leifer, 16–34. London: Allen and Unwin.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

171

———, ed. 1973. The Bases of International Order: Essays in the Honour of C.A.W. Manning. London: Oxford University Press. ———. 1978. International Society. British Journal of International Studies 4 (2): 91–106. ———. 1986. Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society. London: Allen and Unwin. ———. 1990. Peacekeeping in International Politics. London: St. Martin’s Press. ———. 1992. The Equality of States: Contemporary Manifestations of an Ancient Doctrine. Review of International Studies 18 (4): 377–391. ———. 1993. System or Society? Review of International Studies 19 (3): 269–288. ———. 1999. The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society. Political Studies XLVII (3): 423–430. ———. 2004. Manning, Charles Anthony Woodward: 1894–1978, Scholar of International Relations. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Retrieved 5 August 2019. Jervis, Robert. 1992. A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and Concert. American Historical Review 97 (3): 716–724. Jones, Roy E. 1981. The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure. Review of International Studies 7 (1): 1–13. Kaczmarska, Katarzyna. 2015. Russia’s droit de regard: Pluralist Norms and the Sphere of Influence. Global Discourse 5 (3): 434–448. Kaplan, Morton. 1969. The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations. In Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau, 39–61. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Karns, Margaret P., Karen A. Mingst, and Kendall W. Stiles. 2015. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. 3rd ed. Boulder/ London: Lynne Rienner. Keal, Paul. 2003. European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kedourie, Elie. 1984. A New International Disorder. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 347–355. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Keene, Edward. 2002. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2008. The English School and the British Historians. Millennium 37 (2): 381–393. ———. 2009. International Society as an Ideal Type. In Theorizing International Society: English School Methods, ed. C. Navari, 104–124. Basingstoke: P ­ algrave/ Macmillan.

172 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. 2014. The Standard of ‘Civilization’, the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-­ Century International Social Space. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 651–673. Keens-Soper, Maurice. 1978. The Practice of a States-System. In The Reason of States, ed. Michael Donelan, 24–44. London: George Allen & Unwin. Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 379–396. Keohane, Robert. 1989. International Organizations and State Power. Boulder: Westview. Kirshner, Jonathan. 2012. The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China. European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 53–75. Klotz, Audie. 2017. Racial Inequality. In The Globalization of International Society, ed. T. Dunne and C. Reus-Smit, 362–379. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Knudsen, Tonny Brems. 1996. Humanitarian Intervention Revisited: Post-Cold War Responses to Classical Problems. International Peacekeeping 3 (4): 146–165. ———. 1997. European Approaches to Humanitarian Intervention: From Just War to Assistance—And Back Again? In European Approaches to Crisis Management, ed. Knud Erik Jørgensen, 171–199. The Hague/London/ Boston: Kluwer Law International. ———. 1999. Humanitarian Intervention and International Society: Contemporary Manifestations of an Explosive Doctrine. Aarhus: Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. ———. 2000. Theory of Society or Society of Theorists? With Tim Dunne in the English School. Cooperation and Conflict 35 (2): 193–203. ———. 2019a. Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Theorizing Continuity and Change. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. Tonny Brems Knudsen and Cornelia Navari, 23–50. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019b. Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations: Solidarist Architecture. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B. Knudsen and C. Navari, 175–202. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Knudsen, Tonny Brems, and Cornelia Navari, eds. 2019. International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kopra, Sanna. 2019a. China, Great Power Management, and Climate Change: Negotiating Great Power Climate Responsibility. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B. Knudsen and C. Navari, 149–174. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

173

———. 2019b. China and Great Power Responsibility for Climate Change. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Krasner, Stephen, ed. 1983. International Regimes. London: Cornell University Press. First Published as a Special Issue of International Organization 36:2, 1982. Kupchan, Charles. 2012. No One’s World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lasmar, Jorge, Danny Zahreddine, and Delber Andrade Gribel Lage. 2015. Understanding Regional and Global Diffusion in International Law: The Case for a Non-Monolithic Approach to Institutions. Global Discourse 5 (3): 470–496. Lechner, S. 2017. Why Anarchy Still Matters for International Relations: On Theories and Things. Journal of International Political Theory 13 (3): 341–359. Linklater, Andrew. 1982. Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. London/Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press. ———. 1990. Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 1998. The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. ———. 2011. The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2017. Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linklater, Andrew, and Hidemi Suganami. 2006. The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linsenmaier, Thomas. 2015. The Interplay Between Regional International Societies. Global Discourse 5 (3): 452–467. ———. 2018. World Society as Collective Identity: World Society, International Society, and Inclusion/Exclusion from Europe. International Politics 55 (1): 91–107. Little, Richard. 1995. Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment. European Journal of International Relations 1 (1): 9–34. ———. 1998. International System, International Society and World Society: A Re-Evaluation of the English School. In International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B.A.  Roberson, 59–79. London: Pinter. ———. 2000. The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 6 (3): 395–422. ———. 2003. The English School vs. American Realism: A Meeting of Minds or Divided by a Common Language? Review of International Studies 29 (3): 443–460.

174 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. 2005. The English School and World History. In International Society and Its Critics, ed. A.J. Bellamy, 45–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism in the English School. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. C. Navari, 78–103. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Little, Richard, and John Williams, eds. 2006. The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Long, David. 2005. C.  A. W.  Manning and the Discipline of International Relations. The Round Table 94 (1): 77–96. ———. 2012. C.  A. W.  Manning and the First Great Debate. In International Relations and the First Great Debate, ed. Brian Schmidt, 78–93. Abingdon: Routledge. ———. 2017. Of Mustard Seeds and Shopping Lists: C.  A. W.  Manning and International Relations at the LSE. International Politics 54 (1): 118–123. Makinda, Samuel M. 2002. Hedley Bull and Global Governance: A Note on IR Theory. Australian Journal of International Affairs 56 (3): 361–371. ———. 2005. Security in International Society: A Comment on Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald. Australian Journal of Political Science 40 (2): 275–287. Malcolm, Noel. 2002. Hobbes’s Theory of International Relations in N. Malcolm. In Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 235–258. ———. 2006. Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2): 182–199. Manning, C.A.W. 1930. The Proposed Amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations. The British Yearbook of International Law 11: 158–171. ———. 1933. Austin To-Day: Or “The Province of Jurisprudence” Re-Examined. In Modern Theories of Law, ed. W. Ivor Jennings, 180–266. London: Oxford University Press. ———. 1936. Sanctions—1935. Politica 2 (5): 33–55. ———., ed. 1937. Peaceful Change: An International Problem. London: Macmillan. ———. 1942. Review of E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace. International Affairs 19 (8): 443–444. ———. 1954. The University Teaching of Social Sciences: International Relations—A Report Prepared on Behalf of the International Studies Committee. Paris: UNESCO. ———. 1962/1975. The Nature of International Society. London: Bell in Association with the London School of Economics and Political Science; Reissued in 1975: London: Macmillan. ———. 1964. In Defence of Apartheid. Foreign Affairs 4 (1): 135–149.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

175

———. 1966. Collective Selfhoods: An Element in the South West Africa Case, Being the Testimony of an Academic South African. London: South Africa Society. ———. 1970 [1942]. The ‘Failure’ of the League of Nations. In The New International Actors: The UN and the EEC, ed. C.A.  Cosgrove and K.J. Twitchett, 105–23. London: Macmillan. ———. 1972. The Legal Framework in a World of Change. In The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919–1969, ed. Brian Porter. London: Oxford University Press. Martill, Benjamin, and Monika Sus. 2018. Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or ‘French Connection’? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20 (4): 846–863. Mayall, James. 1982a. The Liberal Economy. In The Community of States, ed. J. Mayall, 96–114. London: George Allen & Unwin. ———, ed. 1982b. The Community of States. London: George Allen & Unwin. ———. 1990. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1991. Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the New World Order. International Affairs 67 (3): 421–429. ———. 1992. Nationalism and International Security After the Cold War. Survival 34 (Spring): 19–35. ———. 2000. World Politics: Progress and Its Limits. Cambridge: Polity Press. Mearsheimer, John. 2014. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Merke, Federico. 2014. Unpacking South American International Society: A Historical Sketch. In Regions in International Society: The English School at the Sub-Global Level, ed. Ales Karmazin, 68–87. Brno: Masaryk University. ———. 2015. Neither Balance Nor Bandwagon: South American International Society Meets Brazil’s Rising Power. International Politics 52 (2): 146–162. Meyer, J.W., J. Boli, and G. Thomas. 1987. Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account. In Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual, ed. G. Thomas et al., 12–37. New York: Sage. Morgan, Roger. 1999. A European ‘Society of States’—But Only States of Mind? International Affairs 76 (3): 559–574. Murray, Robert W., and Anita Dey Nuttall, eds. 2014. International Relations and the Arctic. Amherst: Cambria Press. Naff, Thomas. 1984. The Ottoman Empire and the European States System. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson, 143–170. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nardin, Terry. 1983. Law, Morality, and the Relations of States. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Narine, Shaun. 2008. The English School and ASEAN. In Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations, ed. A. Acharya and R. Stubbs, 71–90. London: Routledge.

176 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Navari, Cornelia, ed. 1990. The Condition of States. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. ———. 2009a. What the Classical English School Was Trying to Explain, and Why Its Members Were Not Interested in Causal Explanation. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. C. Navari, 39–57. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———, ed. 2009b. Theorising International Society: English School Methods. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2011. The Concept of Practice in the English School. European Journal of International Relations 17 (4): 611–630. ———. 2013a. Public Intellectuals and International Affairs. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters. ———. 2013b. Liberalism, Democracy and International Law: An English School Approach. In After Liberalism, ed. R. Friedman, K. Oskanian, and R. Pacheco Pardo, 33–50. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2013c. International Organisations in the Anarchical Society: Interim Report of an English School Research Project. Presented at the 8th Pan European International Studies Conference, Warsaw, 17–21 September. ———. 2013d. Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2017. The International Society Tradition: A Glossary of Names. Paper for the EISA Conference in Barcelona, 13–16 September. ———. 2019. Modelling the Relations of Fundamental Institutions and International Organizations. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B.  Knudsen and C. Navari, 51–76. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Navari, Cornelia, and Daniel M. Green, eds. 2014. Guide to the English School in International Studies. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Neumann, Iver. 1996. Russia and the Idea of Europe. London: Routledge. ———. 1998. The Uses of the ‘Other’: The ‘East’ in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press. ———. 2002. Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31 (3): 627–651. ———. 2008. Russia as a Great Power, 1815–2007. Journal of International Relations and Development 11: 128–151. ———. 2011. Entry into International Society Reconceptualized: The Case of Russia. Review of International Studies 37 (2): 463–484. Neumann, Iver, and Jennifer M.  Welsh. 1991. The Other in European Self-­ Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society. Review of International Studies 17 (4): 327–348. Oakeshott, Michael. 1996. On Human Conduct. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1999. The Rule of Law. In On History and Other Essays. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

177

Ohnishi, Fugio. 2014. The Struggle for Arctic Regional Order. Eurasia Border Review 5 (2): 81–97. Oliver, Tim, and Michael John Williams. 2016. Special Relationships in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US–EU and US–UK Relationships. International Affairs 92 (3): 547–567. Oliver, Tim, and Peter Wilson. 2018. The International Consequences of Brexit: An English School Analysis. Unpublished Manuscript Presented at the 12th Pan-­ European Conference on International Relations, Prague, 12–15 September. Osiander, Andreas. 1994. The States System of Europe, 1640–1994. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Palmujoki, Eero. 2019. Competing Norms and Norm Change: Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health in the World Trade Organization. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: The Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B.  Knudsen and C.  Navari, 203–230. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pejcinovic, Lacy. 2013. War in International Society. New York: Routledge. Pella, John Anthony. 2013. Thinking Outside International Society: A Discussion of the Possibilities for English School Conceptions of World Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (1): 65–77. ———. 2014. Africa and the Expansion of International Society. London: Routledge. Peters, Ingo, ed. 2015. The European Union’s Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Beyond the “Actorness and Power” Debate. London/New York: Routledge. Phillips, Andrew. 2017. International Systems. In The Globalization of International Society, 18–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Porter, Brian. 2003. A Brief History. In International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years, ed. Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, 29–44. London: Millennium Publishing Group. Pourchot, Georgeta. 2014. The OSCE: A Pan-European Society in the Making? In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y.A.  Stivachtis and M.  Webber, 79–96. London: Routledge. Pourchot, Georgeta, and Yannis A.  Stivachtis. 2014. International Society and Regional Integration in Central Asia. Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (1): 68–76. Qiubin, W. 2007. On the Northeastern Asia Regional International Society. Changchun, China: Institute of International Studies, Jilin University. Quayle, Linda. 2013. Southeast Asia and the English School of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2015. Leading or Following? International Societies, Southeast Asia, and the Issue of Migrant Workers. Global Discourse 5 (3): 415–430.

178 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ralph, Jason, Jess Gifkins, and Samuel Jarvis. 2019. The UK’s Special Responsibilities at the United Nations: Diplomacy after Brexit. Unpublished Manuscript Presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Toronto, 27–30 March. Rennger, Nicholas J. 2000. European Communities in a Neo-Medieval Global Polity: The Dilemmas of Fairyland? In International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community, ed. M. Kelstrup and M.C. Williams, 57–71. London/New York: Routledge. Reus-Smit, Chris. 1997. The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. International Organization 51 (4): 555–589. ———. 1999. The Moral Purpose of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2013. Individual Rights and the Making of the Modern International System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Riemer, Andrea, and Yannis A. Stivachtis. 2002. European Union’s Enlargement, the English School and the Expansion of Regional International Societies. In Understanding European Union’s Mediterranean Enlargement: The English School and the Expansion of Regional International Society, ed. A. Riemer and Y. Stivachtis, 15–40. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Roberts, Adam. 1993. Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights. International Affairs 69 (3): 429–449. ———. 1999. NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo. Survival 41 (3): 102–123. Rosamond, Ben. 2016. Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration. Journal of Contemporary European Research 12 (4): 864–871. Rumelili, Bahar. 2014. Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in a Post-Enlargement Europe. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 35–49. London: Routledge. Sakwa, Richard. 2014. Russia and Europe: Whose Society? In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 97–114. London: Routledge. Schmidt, Dennis. 2019. Institutionalising Morality: The UN Security Council and the Fundamental Norms of the International Legal Order. In International Organization in the Anarchical Society: the Institutional Structure of World Order, ed. T.B.  Knudsen and C.  Navari, 99–126. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Schouenborg, Laust. 2011. A New Institutionalism? The English School as International Sociological Theory. International Relations 25 (1): 26–44. ———. 2012. The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815–2010. London: Routledge. ———. 2017. International Institutions in World History: Divorcing International Relations Theory from the State and Stage Models. Abingdon: Routledge. Searle, John. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin Books.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

179

Seth, Sanjay. 2009. Historical Sociology and Postcolonial Theory: Two Strategies for Challenging Eurocentrism. International Political Sociology 3 (3): 334–338. Sharp, Paul, and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds. 2007. The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2017. The Return of Anarchy? Journal of International Affairs, 15 March. jia.sipa.columbia.edu/return-anarchy. Accessed 25 Apr 2019. Smith, Michael. 2004. Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-­ Level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 740–758. Söderbaum, F. 2016. Rethinking Regionalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sorensen, George. 1999. Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution. Political Studies 47 (3): 590–603. Spandler, Kilian. 2015. The Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions. Review of International Studies 41 (3): 601–622. Spandler, Killian. 2019a. Regional Organizations in International Society: ASEAN, the EU and the Politics of Normative Arguing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Spandler, Kilian. 2019b. Legitimating Global-Regional Peacekeeping Cooperation: UNAMID and the Hybridity Paradox. Unpublished Manuscript Presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Toronto, 27–30 March. Stern, Geoffrey. 1995. The Structure of International Society. London: Pinter. Stivachtis, Yannis A. 2002. Understanding the European Union’s Enlargement: The International Society Approach of the English School. In The United States and Europe: Policy Imperatives in a Globalizing World, ed. Howard Hensel, 55–77. Aldershot: Ashgate. ———., ed. 2007. International Order in a Globalizing World. Aldershot: Ashgate. ———. 2008a. Civilization and International Society: The Case of European Union Expansion. Contemporary Politics 14 (1): 71–90. ———. 2008b. Europe and the ‘Turk’: An English School Approach to the Study of EU-Turkish Relations. In Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities and Constraints, ed. Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Yannis A. Stivachtis, 17–40. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. ———. 2010a. ‘Civilizing’ the Post- Soviet/Socialist Space: An English School Approach to State Socialization in Europe—The Cases of NATO and the Council of Europe. Perspectives: Central European Review of International Relations 18 (2): 5–32. ———. 2010b. International Society: Global/Regional Dimensions and Geographic Expansion. In The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark and V.I.I. Volume, 4543–4561. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

180 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. 2010c. The Overlapping of Regional International Societies: The Case of the Transatlantic Community and the European Union. In Global Politics in the Dawn of the 21st Century, ed. Akis Kalaitzidis, 389–409. Athens: ATINER. ———. ed. 2012. Europe and the World. www.ccsenet.org/res. Review of European Studies 4 (July): 3. Stivachtis, Yannis. 2013. The English School and the Study of Sub-Global International Societies. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/08/ the-english-and-the-study-of-sub-global-international-societies Stivachtis, Yannis A. 2014a. European Union and World Order: An English School Approach. Estudos Internacionais: Revista de Relações Internacionais Da PUC Minas 2 (2): 321–341. ———. 2014b. The Regional Dimension of International Society. In Guide to the English school in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D. Green, 109–126. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2015a. Enlargement, Conditionality and Empire. In Revisiting the Idea of the European Union as Empire, ed. H. Behr and Y.A. Stivachtis, 74–95. London: Routledge. ———. 2015b. Liberal Democracy, Market Economy, and International Conduct as Standards of ‘Civilization’ in Contemporary International Society: The Case of Russia’s Entry into the ‘Community of Civilized States’. Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2): 130–142. ———. 2016. Democracy Promotion as a Security Strategy. In Democracy and Civil Society in a Global Era, ed. M. Marlin and S. Romaniuk, 14–30. London: Routledge. ———. 2018. The ‘Civilizing’ Empire: The European Union and the MENA Neighborhood. Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies 4 (2): 91–106. ———. 2019. Creating Order in the MENA Neighborhood: The Enlargement of the EU International Society and Its Contestation. In Europe, the Middle East and North Africa: Contestation beyond Borders, ed. R.A.  Del Sarto and S. Tholens. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Mike Habegger. 2011. The OSCE as a Regional International Society. In International Relations, Culture, and Global Finance, ed. A. Kalaitzidis, 35–60. Athens: ATINER. ———. 2014. The Council of Europe: The Institutional Limits of Contemporary European International Society? In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 59–78. London: Routledge. Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Brandon Kliewer. 2007. Democratizing and Socializing Candidate States: The Case of the EU Conditionality. In The State of European Integration, ed. Y. Stivachtis, 143–160. Aldershot: Ashgate. Stivachtis, Yannis A., and Mark Webber. 2011. Regional International Society in a Post-Enlargement Europe. European Integration 33 (2): 101–116.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

181

———. 2014. Regional International Society in Post-Enlargement Europe. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 101–116. London: Routledge. Stivachtis, Yannis A. ed. 2015. Interrogating Regional International Societies, Questioning the Global International Society. Global Discourse Special Issue 5 (3): 327–340. Stuenkel, Oliver. 2016. Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. Suganami, Hidemi. 1983. The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations. International Relations 7 (5): 2363–2381. ———. 2000. A New Narrative, A New Subject? Tim Dunne on the ‘English School’. Cooperation and Conflict 35 (2): 217–226. ———. 2001. C.A.W. Manning and the Study of International Relations. Review of International Studies 27 (1): 91–107. Suganami, Hidemi, Madeline Carr, and Adam Humphreys, eds. 2017. The Anarchical Society at 40: Contemporary Challenges and Prospects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Suzuki, Shogo. 2009. Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society. London/New York: Routledge. ———. 2014. Europe at the Periphery of the Japanese World Order. In International Orders in the Early Modern World, ed. S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk, 76–93. London: Routledge. Suzuki, Shogo, Yongjin Zhang, and Joel Quirk, eds. 2014. International Orders in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West. London/New York: Routledge. Tan, Elaine S.Y. 2015. Interactions Between African and Global International Societies: The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Global Discourse 5 (3): 398–411. ———. 2016. A World of Regions and States: Reconciling the Regional and the Global. Unpublished Manuscript Presented at the 3rd European Workshops in International Studies, Tübingen, 6–8 April. Teló, Mario, ed. 2014. European Union and New Regionalism. 3rd ed. London/ New York: Routledge. Towns, Ann E. 2017. Gender, Power, and International Society. In The Globalization of International Society edit, ed. T.  Dunne and C.  Reus-Smit, 380–398. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vigezzi, Brunello. 2005. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. Milan: Edizioni Unicopli. ———. 2014. The British Committee and International Society: History and Theory. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C. Navari and D.M. Green, 37–58. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

182 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vigneswaran, D. 2014. A Corrupt International Society: How Britain Was Duped Into Its First Indian Conquest. In International Orders in the Early Modern World, ed. S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk, 94–117. London: Routledge. Vincent, Raymond John. 1974. Nonintervention and International Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1986. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vincent, Raymond John, and Peter Wilson. 1993. Beyond Non-Intervention. In Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention, ed. I. Forbes and M. Hoffman, 122–130. London: Macmillan. Vital, David. 1969. Back to Machiavelli. In Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. K.  Knorr and J.N.  Rosenau, 144–157. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wæver, Ole. 1992. International Society: Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled. Cooperation and Conflict 27 (1): 97–108. ———. 1996. Europe’s Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security. In International Society After the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered, ed. R.  Fawn and J.  Larkins, 220–260. Basingstoke/ London: Macmillan. ———. 1998. Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans-Atlantic Dialogue. In International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B.A. Roberson, 80–144. London: Pinter. Waever, Ole, P.  Lemaitre, and E.  Tromer, eds. 1989. European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation. London: Macmillan. Waever, Ole, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaitre. 1993. Identity, Migration and the New Security Order in Europe. London: Pinter. Walker, R.B.J. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wang, Hung Jen. 2013. The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship. Plymouth: Lexington Books. Wang, Jiangli, and Barry Buzan. 2014. The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations: Comparisons and Lessons. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (1): 1–46. Watson, Adam. 1982. Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States. London: Methuen. ———. 1984. Russia and the European States System. In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H.  Bull and A.  Watson, 61–74. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1987. Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies. Review of International Studies 13 (2): 147–153. ———. 1992. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. London: Routledge.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

183

Webber, Mark. 2014. NATO: Within and Between European International Society. In Europe After Enlargement, ed. Y. Stivachtis and M. Webber, 39–58. London: Routledge. Weinert, Matthew S. 2011. Reframing the Pluralist–Solidarist Debate. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40 (1): 21–41. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wendt, Alexander, and Raymond Duvall. 1989. Institutions and Intenational Order. In Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for 1990’s, ed. E.  Czempiel and J.  Rosenau, 51–73. Lexington: Lexington Books. Wheeler, Nicholas J. 1992. Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention. Millennium 21 (3): 463–487. Wheeler, Nicholas. 2000. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whitman, Richard G. 2016. The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy After Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached? National Institute Economic Review 238 (1): R43–R50. Wight, Martin. 1977. Systems of States, edited with an introduction by Hedley Bull. Leicester: Leicester University Press. ———. 1978. Power Politics. Leicester: Leicester University Press. ———. 1991. International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Wille, Tobias. 2018. Practice Turn in International Relations. Oxford Bibliographies: International Relations. Retrieved 5 August 2019. Williams, John. 2011. Structure, Norms and Normative Theory in a Re-Defined English School: Accepting Buzan’s Challenge. Review of International Studies 37 (3): 1235–1253. ———. 2015. Ethics, Diversity, and World Politics: Saving Pluralism from Itself? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Peter. 1989. The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader. Review of International Studies 15 (1): 49–58. ———. 2004. Manning’s Quasi-Masterpiece: The Nature of International Society Revisited. The Round Table 93 (377): 755–769. ———. 2008a. Manning’s Moral Blindspot. Paper Presented to International Studies Association Conference, San Francisco, USA. ———. 2008b. From Austin to Goa: C. A. W. Manning and International Law. Paper Presented to World International Studies Association Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

184 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

———. 2009. The English School’s Approach to International Law. In Theorising International Society: English School Methods, ed. Cornelia Navari, 167–188. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2012. The English School Meets the Chicago School: The Case for a Grounded Theory of International Institutions. International Studies Review 14 (4): 567–590. Wilson, Peter, and David Long, eds. 1995. Thinkers of the Twenty Year’s Crisis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wojczewski, Thorsten. 2018. Global Power Shifts and World Order: The Contestation of ‘Western’ Discursive Hegemony. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 31 (1): 33–52. Young, Oran. 1996. Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives. Global Governance 2 (1): 1–23. ———. 1998. Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zhang, Yongjin. 1991. China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilization’. Review of International Studies 17 (1): 3–16. ———. 2014a. Curious and Exotic Encounters: Europeans as Supplicants in the Chinese Imperium, 1513–1793. In International Orders in the Early Modern World, ed. S. Suzuki, Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk, 1–11. London: Routledge. ———. 2014b. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ Redux: Towards the Expansion of International Society 3.0? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 674–696. ———. 2014c. The Global Diffusion of the English School. In Guide to the English School in International Studies, ed. C.  Navari and D.M.  Green, 223–240. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. ———. 2015. Regional International Society in East Asia? A Critical Investigation. Global Discourse 5 (3): 360–373. ———. 2016. China and Liberal Hierarchies in Global International Society: Power and Negotiation for Normative Change. International Affairs 92 (4): 795–816.

Index1

A Aalberts, Tanya, 17, 24 Acquis communautaire, 113 Adler, Emanuel, 41, 79 Africa, 110, 118 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 118 Agentic theory, 139 Ahrens, Bettina, 140, 151, 153 Alexandrowicz, 49 Alker, Hayward, 66 Alliances, 64 American behaviouralists, 62 American institutionalism, 7 American liberal institutionalists, 67 The Anarchical Society, 2, 45, 129, 130 Anarchy, 17, 24 cultures of, 90 Ancient history, 45 Apartheid, 25, 57 Arab League, 141 Arctic and Antarctic, 121

Arctic regional order, 122 Ashley, Richard K., 62n2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 10, 117, 137 Austin, John, 18, 22 Ayoob, Mohammed, 110, 112, 118 B Bain, Will, 2 Bain, William, 105 Balance of power, 34, 35, 63, 137 Banks, Michael, 22 Barnet, Michael, 133 Basic rights, 73 Bell, Coral, 26 Bellamy, Alex, 152 Bettina Ahrens, 103 Bevir, Mark, 139 Bozeman, Ada, 112 Brazil, 118 Brian Urquhart, 130

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2021 C. Navari (ed.), International Society, Trends in European IR Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56055-3

185

186 

INDEX

British Committee, 4, 72, 86 British Committee (BC) on the Theory of International Relations, 2 British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1959–84), 45, 62 British Institutionalism, 63 Brütsch, Christian, 140 Bull, Hedley, 2, 8, 15, 17, 26, 45, 61, 80, 89, 96–98, 109, 129, 148, 152 Buranelli, Filippo Costa, 111, 148, 150 Butterfield, Herbert, 1, 4, 23, 47, 62, 68 Buzan, Barry, 2, 8, 61, 68n6, 70, 79–89, 102, 104, 110, 111, 116, 134, 147, 148, 150, 153 primary and secondary institutions, 136 C Capitalism and world order, 88 Carr, E. H., 15, 19, 25, 26, 34 Central Asia, 55, 120 Central Asian international society, 120 China, 3, 48, 49, 51, 139, 148 Chinese “warring states” system, 47 Circle of structuration, 137 Civility, 104 Civilized states, 48 Clark, Ian, 121, 148 Classical realism, 35 Cochran, Molly, 7 Cold War, 33, 36 Collective security, 64 Collective selfhoods, 26 Common culture, 46, 49, 51 Communism, 53

Communities of practice, 41 Community of civilized states, 119 Community of States, 2 Compact of international society, 19 Comparing state-systems, 47 Conditionality, 121 Conference systems, 64 The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions, 132 Constitutive institutions, 132–134 Constitutive processes, 40 The Construction of Social Reality, 135 Constructivism, 23, 24, 66–69, 87 Constructivist, 17, 24, 27, 66, 81, 87, 133 Copenhagen criteria, 121 Cosmopolitan, 83 Cosmopolitan harm conventions, 104 Cosmopolitanism, 25 Cosmopolitan order, 105 Costa Buranelli, Filippo, 119, 141 Council of Europe (CoE), 113 Covenant, 20 Critical constructivist thinkers, 17 Critical theory, 66, 81 D Database of primary institutions, 141 Decolonization, 49 Derian, James Der, 62n2 Derivative institutions, 135 Diez, Thomas, 10, 113, 151–153 Differentiation, 9 Diplomacy, 63, 134 Diplomatic Investigations, 2, 3 Diplomatics, 26, 27 Disorder, 33 Donelan, Michael, 5, 6, 62n2 Doxey, Margaret, 130

 INDEX 

Duncombe, Constance, 147, 148 Dunne, Tim, 2, 56, 68, 82, 83, 89, 132, 147, 148 Duvall, Raymond, 67, 131 E East Asia, 84, 117 East Asian international society, 112, 117 East Asian order, 54 East Asian states, 112 Economic international system, 52 Efficacy of international law, 18 Emerging powers, 146, 147 Enforcement, 19 English School (ES), 5, 16, 25 as a global brand, 9 International Studies Association (ISA), 86 methodological stance, 154 Entry of non-European states into international society, 48 Environmental regime, 139 Environmental stewardship, 89 Equality, 65 ES, 26 Ethics, 3 EU foreign policy, 140 Eurasian regional international society, 120 Eurocentric, 51, 57 Eurocentrism, 46 Europe, 113 European international society, 7, 119, 120 European international system, 121 European regional international society (ERIS), 113, 121 European regional society, 50 European Union (EU), 84, 113, 115, 120, 151–153

187

Evans, Tony, 69 Evolution of International Society, 3 Expansion Narrative, 45, 51, 53–55 Expansion of international society, 2, 45, 47 Expansion of the European society of states, 110 Expansion process, 50 F Family of Nations, 49 Fascism/Nazism, 53 Finnemore, Martha, 81, 81n1 Foundational institutions, 10, 134, 137 transformation of, 141 Friedner Parrat, Charlotta, 151 From International Society to World Society, 53, 82 English School Theory and the Structure of Globalization, 9 From international system to international society, 70 Frost, Mervyn, 65 Functional differentiation, 89 Functional international institutions, 142 Fundamental goals of international social life, 32 Fundamental (historical and sociological) institutionalism, 61 Fundamental institutional change, 65 Fundamental Institutionalism, 63–66 Fundamental institutions, 4, 63, 131 G Gaskarth, Jamie, 148 Gemeinschaft, 8, 71n8, 111, 120 Gender, 57

188 

INDEX

General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 131 Germany, 53 Gesellschaft, 8, 71n8 The Global Covenant, 132 Global governance, 38 Global history, 52 Global international society, 84, 85, 109, 110, 112, 113, 121 Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan and Schouenborg), 85 Global international system, 110 Globalization, 56 Globalization of international society, 39, 56 Global order, 34, 36, 38 Global social integration, 109 Goa, 20 Goals of international social order, 33 Göl, Ayla, 116 Gong, Gerrit, 2, 47, 48, 139 Gonzalez-Peleaez, Ana, 10 Governance, 38 Grader, Sheila, 62 Great power, 36, 97, 102, 148, 153 autonomy, 140 management, 63, 117, 134 responsibility, 20, 25 Grotianism, 36 Grotian or rationalist tradition of thought, 62–63, 62n1 Grotius, Hugo, 62n1, 99 Guarantees, 64 Guzzini, Stephan, 39, 88 H Hall, Ian, 7 Hall, William, 47 Halliday, Fred, 5

Hart, H.L.A., 40 Heeren, A.H.L., 47 Hegemonic power, 35 Hegemonic stability theory, 35 Hermeneutics, 81, 82, 89 Higgins, Rosalyn, 21 Historical change, 45 Historical European international society, 115 Historical evolution of international systems, 84 Historical institutions, 63 Historical regional international societies, 109 Historicism, 4 History of international society, 88 History of thought, 7 Hobbes, Thomas, 33 Hobbesian, 63n3 Holistic conception of international society, 63 Holsti, K.J., 6, 88, 89, 133 Honor in Foreign Policy, 6 Howard, Michael, 152 Hudson, G. F., 3 Humanitarian intervention, 8, 65, 73, 74, 99–101, 103 Humanitarian law, 141 Human rights, 55, 65, 98, 101, 102, 104 Human Rights and International Relations, 6, 98 Human Rights Law, 111, 119 Hurrell, Andrew, 7, 69, 82, 106, 132, 149 Hybridizing globalization, 51 I Ibraham, Razlan, 141 Idealism, 63

 INDEX 

Ideal types, 63 Ikenberry, G John, 37 Imperialism, 57 Individual rights, 55 Individual Rights and the Making of the International System, 55 Injustice of imperialism, 48 Institution, 129 Institutional bases of international order, 63 Institutional continuity, 65 Institutional facts, 135 Institutionalism, 17, 37 Institutionalization, 136 Institutional Structure of World Order, 10, 133–135 Institutions, 36, 63, 89, 147, 148 Institutions of international society, 17, 130, 131 Interaction capacity, 52, 71 Interdependence, 37, 142 Interested agents in interaction, 139 Interhuman domain, 83 International economy, 6 International Institutions: Two Approaches, 130 International law, 15–22, 63, 132 International lawyers, 49 International morality, 18 International order, 136 and international justice, 73 International organisations, 10, 20, 47, 64, 129, 147, 148, 153 International Organization in the Anarchical Society, 142 International political economy (IPE), 87, 88 International Political Theory (IPT), 2, 5 International society, 4, 15, 17, 18, 31, 56, 62, 83, 89, 147–150, 153

189

in East Asia, 117 with an international system, 32 International Studies Association, 130 International system, 52, 56, 82 international society and world society, 82 International Systems in World History, 52 International trade as an institution of international society, 88 International trusteeship, 65 Interpretation, 139 Interpretative approach, 63 Interpretive, 26 Interstate domain, 83 Interstate social order, 54 Intersubjective understandings, 68 Intervention, 65 Iteration, 137 J Jackson, Robert, 2, 50, 65, 100–102, 132 James, Alan, 16, 17, 26, 62n2, 130, 133 Japan, 48, 49, 53 Jones, Roy E., 21, 22, 61 Jus cogens, 140 Justice, 3 K Kantian, 63n3 Kantian normative convergence, 53 Kantian-solidarist, 53 Keal, Paul, 67n5 Kedourie, Elie, 49 Keene, Edward, 6, 41, 52 Keens-Soper, Maurice, 6 Keohane, Robert, 7, 66, 130, 131

190 

INDEX

Knudsen, Tonny Brems, 8, 74, 89, 106, 136, 147, 148, 153 Kopra, Sanna, 141, 148 Krasner, Stephen, 67 Kratochwil, Friedrich, 66, 130 L Lasmar, Jorge, 111 Latin America, 117 Lawrence, T. J., 49 League, 25 League of Nations, 19, 22, 46, 64, 130 Let’s-play-sovereign-states, 20, 25 Liberal institutional theory, 140 Liberalism, 66–69 Liberal solidarism, 114 Liberal world order, 146 Linguistic turn, 24 Linklater, Andrew, 80, 104, 152 Linsenmaier, Thomas, 120, 150 Lion, Peter, 26 Little, Richard, 2, 8, 80, 81, 83, 88 Lloyd, Lorna, 66 Logic of society, 71 London School of Economics (LSE), 1, 15 Long, David, 7, 23–25 Lorimer, James, 47 M Makinda, Samuel, 152, 153 Mandate countries, 48 Manners, Ian, 103, 113 Manning, Charles, 1, 16, 23–25, 61, 101, 130 analysis of sovereignty, 16 school, 16 Master institutions, 68n6, 135

Mayall, James, 2, 5, 6, 62n2, 87, 100, 139 McDonald, Matt, 152 Medieval-to-modern transition, 46 Member state coalitions, 113 Merke, Federico, 118 Meta-theory of international relations, 21 Methodenstreit, 8 Methodological pluralism, 81 Middle East, 84, 116 Middle Eastern international society, 116 Mitrany, David, 26 Morgenthau, Hans, 23, 34 Multilevel multilateralism, 113 Multiperspectivity, 113 Mutual recognition of sovereignty, 64, 70 N Nardin, Terry, 6, 67n5 Nationalism, 25, 51, 65 National self-determination, 65 Nationalism and International Society, 6 Nationalism in the International System, 139 NATO, 113, 114, 152 Natural law, 97 Naturalist, 72 Natural law universalism, 48 The Nature of International Society, 22 Navari, Cornelia, 9, 81, 89, 139, 147, 148, 153 Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 121 Neoliberal institutionalism, 79 Neoliberal institutionalist, 89 Neoliberalism, 67, 79 Neorealism, 79

 INDEX 

Neorealist theorists, 34 Neumann, Iver, 115 Neutrality, 64 New institutionalism, 67 New medievalism, 47 New world order, 38 Non-interference, 101 Nonintervention, 65 Normative, 81, 85 Normative structures, 35 Norms, 10, 35 Northeastern Asia, 116 Northedge, F.S., 62 North-South interaction, 50–51 O Oakeshott, Michael, 101, 133 Old institutionalism, 67 Oliver, Tim, 153 Order/Ordering, 41, 130, 149, 150 and justice, 8, 95, 99, 102 Organization, 129 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 113, 114 Organization of African Unity, 141 Ottoman Empire, 48–50 P Pacific democracy, 113 Parrat, Charlotta Friedner, 149 Participant standpoint, 26 Peaceful change, 26 Peacekeeping, 65, 130 Peace of Westphalia, 136 Pella, John Anthony Jr., 117 Pluralism, 8, 61, 83, 84, 87, 95, 96, 98–100, 102–106, 114 and solidarism, 98, 103 Pluralist, 25, 72, 83, 149, 152

191

Pluralist international society, 8, 33 Pluralist-solidarist debate, 83, 84, 87 Polar regions, 121 Polysemy of institutions, 111 Positive international law, 48 Positive law, 97 Positivism, 80 Positivist, 72 Post-colonialism, 56 Post-Structuralism, 66 Power balancing, 134 Power-political, 34 Power Politics, 129 Practical reasoning, 137 Practice conception of rules, 131 Practices, 42, 64, 148, 150 Practice theorist, 27 Practice theory, 27 Practitioners, 139 Premature global solidarism, 42 Primary institutions, 9, 26, 68n6, 89, 135, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153 Procedural association, 132 Procedural institutions, 133, 134 Procedural norms, 101 Progressivism and American Foreign Policy between the World Wars, 7 Pseudo institutions, 64 Pseudo-states, 50 Public Intellectuals, 7 Putin, Vladimir, 119 Q Quasi-states, 50, 65 R Race, 57 Racial equality, 57 Rationalistic approach, 66 Rawl, John, 131

192 

INDEX

Raymond, Aron, 26 Realism, 15, 34, 63 Realist, 19, 34, 70, 81 Reflective approach, 66 Reflexivity, 139 Regime theory, 66, 67, 69, 79, 132 Regional aspects of international society, 87 Regional integration, 109 Regional international societies, 84, 121, 150, 153 Regionalism, 2, 9, 150, 151 Regionalization, 149, 150 Regional organizations, 149, 151 Regional powers, 149 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), 110 Regional/subglobal, 85 Regional systems, 50 Re-launching, 52 Rengger, Nicholas, 152 Reproductive function, 140 Reticular relationship, 136 Reus-Smit, Christian, 37, 55, 56, 87, 132 Revolt Against the West, 46, 47, 49, 50, 97, 116 Right conduct of war, 96 Right of war, 96 Roberts, Adam, 66 R2P, 140 Ruggie, John, 66, 130 Rules and etiquette, 63, 133 Russia, 53, 55, 115, 119 S Sakwa, Richard, 115 Sanctions, 130 Sane internationalism, 25

Scandinavian international society, 114 Schmidt, Dennis, 140 Schouenborg, Laust, 83, 85, 88, 89, 114, 147, 148 Searle, John, 135, 137 Secondary institutions, 9, 68n6, 89, 133–135, 147–149, 153 Security, 149, 151–153 Security Council, 130 Self-interested behaviour, 34 Sharp, Paul, 86 Shue, Henry, 73 Siam, 49 Smith, Michael, 140 Social construction, 68, 131 Social Construction of International Society, 132 Social constructivism, 7, 79 Social facts, 67, 135 Social institutions, 137 Social integration, 68 Social order, 32 Social status, 16 Social structure, 64 Solidarism, 8, 61, 83, 84, 95, 98–100, 102, 104, 105, 114 Solidarist, 8, 25, 72, 83, 147, 149, 152 Solidarist architecture, 106 Solidarist Conceptions of International Societies, 8 Solidarist European international society, 114 Solidarist impulses, 140 Solidarization, 153 Sources of change, 134 South Africa, 22, 25 South America, 118 South Asia and the Middle East, 110 Southeast Asia, 110, 117 Sovereign equality, 140

 INDEX 

Sovereign statehood, 16 Sovereignty, 15, 16, 20, 22, 65, 131 Spandler, Kilian, 10, 89, 137, 149–151 constructivist version, 139 Spence, Jack, 26 Standard of Civilization, 2, 48–50, 55, 121, 139 The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society, 47 Standard of democracy, 121 State-centric, 83 State-systems, 3 Stern, Geoffrey, 26 Stivachtis, Yannis, 150 Strange, Susan, 5 Stratification, 55 Structural/analytical, 81, 85 Structuralist view of international society, 9 Structural realism, 17, 79 Structuration theory, 68, 132 The Structure of International Society, 1 Structures, 9 Sub-European international societies, 114 Sub-global/regional, 84 Subjectivity, 130 Suganami, Hidemi, 2, 5, 7, 22, 23, 62–63, 104 Syncretist, 54 Syria, 95 Systemic interaction, 71 Systems of States, 46 Systems theory, 22 T Taming the Sovereigns, 9, 133 Tan, Elaine, 118, 151

193

Territorial integrity, 141 Theorising International Society, 9 Theory of International Society, 61, 69–71 Theory of practices, 6 Thick types of international societies, 111 ‘Thin’ or ‘thick’ regional international societies, 110 Third World, 51 Tönnies, Ferdinand, 71n8 Trade, 64 Traditional societies, 49 Transnational domain, 83 Turkey, 115 Typology of international societies, 84 U UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 141 United Nations (UN), 64, 129 US, 146, 147 V Vanguardist, 53 Vigezzi, Brunello, 2 Vincent, John, 5, 62n2, 98, 99, 103 W Wæver, Ole, 80, 81n1, 111, 152 Waltz, Kenneth, 34, 80 logic of anarchy, 71 Watson, Adam, 2, 3, 6, 61, 83, 150 Webber, Mark, 114, 153 Wendt, Alexander, 7, 67, 90, 131 West-Central Africa, 117 Western dominance, 49

194 

INDEX

Western states-system, 46 Westphalian international society, 45 Westphalian system, 53 Wheaton, Henry, 49 Wheeler, Nicholas, 2, 8, 99, 100, 103, 105 Wheeler, Nick, 73 Whig, 4 Whitman, Richard, 113, 152 Wight, Martin, 2, 3, 7, 8, 15, 21, 26, 46, 61, 129, 130, 141, 150 Williams, John, 84 Wilson, Peter, 6, 7, 23, 25, 26, 62–63, 69, 89, 153 Wolf, Leonard, 7 Working Group on International Institutions of the English School section of the International Studies Association, 135

‘Working method’ of the British Committee, 85 World international society, 46 World order, 147, 148 World political system, 56 World public opinion, 19 World society, 83, 87, 152, 153 Wright, Quincy, 23 WTO, 134 Y Yeltsin, Boris, 119 Z Zhang, Yongjin, 9, 51, 112, 117, 148, 150 Zimmern, Alfred, 23, 26